Democracy

West Asia is drifting to a stark future.

Maha Yahya, March 22, 2022, “West Asia Is on the Brink Again,” Foreign Affairs,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2022-03-22/middle-east-brink-again // NR
in [West Asia] West Asia and plunged others
A little more than a decade after the Arab Spring swept away many autocratic regimes
into chaos, a new authoritarian order is settling over the region. Egypt and Tunisia, the first two countries to rid
themselves of longtime dictators in 2011, have weathered coups that pulled them back toward authoritarianism. Sudan, which had to wait until
2018 for its revolution to succeed, has also seen its once-promising transition to democracy derailed by a coup. Meanwhile, Iran has expanded its
sphere of influence across West Asia, especially in Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen, while China, Russia, Turkiye, and the Gulf states have increased
their sway over many of the region’s weakest states. Thanks in part to these trends, President Bashar al-Assad’s brutal regime in Syria is being
quietly eased back into the Arab fold. This is partly a story of authoritarian backlash. Alarmed by unprecedented scenes of citizens
taking to the streets to demand their rights, the autocratic regimes that survived the first wave of the Arab Spring cracked down
on those who joined pro-democracy protests and offered handouts to win over those who were considering doing so. Bahrain’s
promises of jobs and pay raises in early 2011 and subsequent assault on demonstrators in Manama—aided by troops from Saudi Arabia—was the
first example of this approach. It was followed by far more brutal crackdowns that ended in civil conflicts in Libya, Syria, and Yemen, and a mix
of repression and co-optation in other countries that saw minor protest movements, such as Jordan and Morocco. Later, authoritarian leaders
would claw back power in Egypt, Sudan, and Tunisia. Beyond a revenge of the old order, the autocratic resurgence playing out
across West Asia is a story of U.S. disengage[s]ment from the region and the geopolitic[s]al shifts that this has caused.
The last three U.S. administrations, but especially the last two, have sought to pare back U.S. military commitments in West Asia while
maintaining Washington’s long-standing focus on combating terrorism.
Over the last
This trend toward authoritarianism has been reinforced by the United States’ gradual disengagement from West Asia.
decade, Washington has let its expansive goals of democratization and regional
transformation fall by the wayside, replacing them with a more modest set of priorities—namely, ensuring
regional stability, keeping Iran from gaining a nuclear weapon, and combating terrorism that threatens the U.S. homeland. The United States’
diminished presence in the region has given regional powers more space to pursue their authoritarian interests, and unsurprisingly,
they have prioritized their own survival over the well-being of their people. As Washington has pulled back, Russia and China have
also moved to fill some of the void, threatening to turn West Asia into an arena of great-power competition. Moscow has become
deeply enmeshed in the Syrian conflict in particular, achieving significant diplomatic and military results at a relatively
low cost. It has also increased its sway over other parts of the Arab world, especially North Africa, where it has used arms deals and mercenaries
to advance its interests.
The new autocratic order settling over West Asia [West Asia] is destined to be unstable. Far
from the “durable authoritarianism” that many scholars once saw in the region prior to the 2011 uprisings, the blend of domestic repression,
produce greater
deteriorating socioeconomic conditions, and international meddling that has taken hold in Arab capitals is likely to
instability, more violence, and a resurgence of extremism. Hollowed out by corruption and mismanagement and
buffeted by adverse economic conditions, authoritarian governments in West Asia are struggling to deliver the socioeconomic benefits that once
pacified their publics. Armed actors, whether national security services or private militias, are playing an ever more important role in many
countries—both economically and politically.

More US diplomacy is key in increasingly unstable internal conflicts.

Simon Handler, June 15, 2021, “The 5×5—The state of cybersecurity in West Asia,” Atlantic Council,
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/the-5x5-the-state-of-cybersecurity-in-the-middle-east/ // NR
Hassib: “Russia’s support to the Assad regime probably involves increasing the regime’s surveillance and cyber
defense capabilities. The investments of Chinese companies in artificial intelligence (AI) surveillance in the Gulf and their sales of
armed drones are significant for the Gulf states in countering extremism and securing urban spaces, as well as in their conflict
with the Iran-backed Houthis. However, given the wider Russian and Chinese approaches to authoritarian cybersecurity, their growing
technology and cyber interest in West Asia would reinforce authoritarian cybersecurity in the region.” Sheniak: “There is hardly any common
knowledge of Chinese cyber operations conducted against West Asiaern countries, and China is not an active cyber player in West Asia public
sphere. However, the growing international technological competition and friction between China and the United States
(especially throughout the Trump administration) has the potential to spill over and affect [into] cyber conflicts in
West Asia. This is due to China’s role in building advanced information technology infrastructure such as 5G telecommunications, and the
 China’s recent
resulting US efforts to choose non-Chinese vendors (i.e., the “Clean Network Initiative”). Additionally,
cyber-cooperation agreements with Iran might push[es] other regional powers, such as the Gulf states, to
further advance their cooperation with the United States.” Shires: “Russia is shaping cyber conflict predominantly
through its actions in Syria and through private military companies in Libya. The Syrian conflict is highly mediatized, so Russian troops have
become part of this terrible online archive, and Russia is likely providing technical assistance on surveillance and cyber operations to the Assad
regime.

These interests are mutual and explicit.

Gerald M. Feierstein et al. April 5, 2022, “US-Gulf Relations at the Crossroads: Time for a Recalibration,”
MEI, https://www.mei.edu/publications/us-gulf-relations-crossroads-time-recalibration // NR
China has already emerged as the primary economic trading partner with regional actors. Its growing military presence in the Red Sea and the
Gulf, especially in Djibouti, has been a source of concern for the security of U.S. military operations in the region. Beijing’s
willingness to sell critical military technologies to regional customers, notably drone and ballistic missile systems, reinforces
destabilizing military competitions and introduces systems that threaten[s] the security of regional partners as well as U.S. personnel,
facilities, and weapons systems. Overall, China’s rising regional profile has complicated U.S. ability to achieve key foreign policy and national
GCC partners have been explicit in warning U.S. interlocutors that they will avoid being
security objectives in the region.
reiterating their preference for
drawn into a U.S.-China competition for influence in the region, at the same time
maintaining close ties to the U.S. Although Russia’s efforts to regain influence in the Gulf region have generally been seen as
less concerning than the rise of Chinese power, the current conflict with Ukraine may have encouraged an emboldened Vladimir Putin to pursue
aggressive new projects there.

Talei, Rafiah, May 27, 2021, “The Dilemma of U.S. Democracy and Human Rights Promotion in West Asia,”
https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/84632 //vy
Although 79
percent of Arab public opinion considers a democratic system to be the most
appropriate for their countries , the ruling elite in many Arab countries still oppress, imprison, and exile those who demand it.
Autocratic regimes continue to justify their repressive practices; however, with the idea that Arab people are not yet ready to practice democracy,
pointing to the negative repercussions of the Arab Spring in Libya, Syria, and Yemen. In assessing citizens’ views on the 2011 Arab uprising,
however, 58 percent consider the uprisings to have been positive. This percentage from the 2019-2020 poll is the highest ever since the question
was first included in the 2012-2013 survey. Furthermore, 51 percent of Arab citizens stated that they would accept an electoral victory that
resulted in a rise to power of a political party with which they disagreed, while 43 percent stated that they would not.
encourage and support
These statistics clearly show that the majority of Arab people support democracy and that they might even
an American plan to promote democracy as a solid political base for their governments.

Steady diplomacy is the remedy.

Brian Katulis, December 16, 2021, “Strategic Reengagement in West Asia,” American Progress
https://www.americanprogress.org/article/strategic-reengagement-in-the-middle-east/ // NR
In January, President Joe Biden entered office with a daunting list of priorities at home and abroad, ranging from the ongoing COVID-19
pandemic to Russian-origin cyberattacks—with West Asia decidedly low on the list of broader priorities.1 In his first 10 months in office,
President Biden and his foreign policy team adopted an approach of pragmatic engagement in [West Asia]
West Asia, trying to avoid overpromising results and setting a new practical plan for U.S.
engagement in the region. In its opening months, the administration emphasized diplomacy: It appointed a
special envoy for [in] Yemen, worked unsuccessfully to revive the Iran nuclear deal, and began rationalizing America’s military presence
in the Persian Gulf. At the same time, it dealt with crises in the region, including an outbreak of Israeli-Palestinian violence and
Iranian-sponsored attacks on U.S. troops deployed in Iraq and Syria. As the Biden administration’s first 10 months in
office demonstrate, West Asia needs steady engagement rather than disengagement or a vague, ill-defined notion of “restraint.” The region
presents the United States with too many challenges, crises, and opportunities to simply be downgraded or ignored.
[...]
Values: More than 10 years after the start of the popular uprisings across the region, West Asia [West Asia] remains on the
front lines of the worldwide struggle for human dignity and universal rights, values that the United States supports—including
religious freedom, women’s rights, and freedom of expression. The region’s lack of freedoms prevents its people from achieving their
aspirations of dignity and prosperity while undermining its stability in the long term. In a global context where Chinese and Russian
technological authoritarianism and state-dominated capitalism presents itself as an alternative
model of governance, West Asia is a contested space in this global values competition. At the same time, West Asia
presents three main, interrelated opportunities for American policy: generational transitions across the region bring new
perspectives to the public debate in key countries in West Asia. New, younger, and more digitally attuned generations unburdened by the politics
of the past are coming to power across West Asia, creat[e]ing new openings for both positive and negative change in the region and
within its individual countries—change with the potential to help create new opportunities to advance liberal values and economic
progress. However, there are obstacles to promoting progress on this front, including the complicated diplomatic challenge of showing regional
leaders a pathway toward more open and accountable societies—one that draws countries away from the dictatorship and authoritarianism that
has crushed human potential in the region for decades.

The US has a history of democratic promotion tied with diplomacy.

Thomas, Carothers, April 2006, “The Backlash against Democracy Promotion,” Carnegie.
https://carnegieendowment.org/files/DemocracyDevm-Carothers-sec.pdf //vy
We began to see greatly increased activities in the diplomatic realm as well. Foreign ministries added
offices of democracy and governance and began to put forward strategies on democracy promotion.
Many small- and medium-sized diplomatic interventions were initiated, supporting elections,
pushing for political openness and supporting pro-democratic, post-conflict reconstruction and so
forth.
Taken together, the changes in democracy aid and democratic diplomacy resulted in substantial
pro-democratic engagement by the United States and Europe, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, Southern Africa,
Central America and Southeastern Europe, somewhat in the former Soviet Union and in a few other parts of the world. It came to a point
by the end of the 1990s that if you travelled to a country attempting a democratic transition, every single
sector in that country’s political or public life was in some way touched by democracy assistance. You
could not visit the judiciary, the legislature, the local governments, the civil society organisations,
media and so forth, without tripping over people from the other countries, trying to promote democracy.

This approach is working now in other regions.

Ryan, Missy, September 19, 2022, “U.S. presses Tunisia, once a bright spot of Arab Spring, on democracy,” WashPost.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/09/19/united-states-tunisia-democracy/ //vy + NR
The Biden administration is pressing Tunisia’s leaders to reverse steps weakening the
country’s democracy, exposing friction with a nation once seen as the most promising of those who experienced Arab Spring
revolutions.
The U.S. moves include talks between Saied and Barbara Leaf, the State Department’s top
official for [West Asia] West Asia. During a visit to Tunis last month, Leaf conveyed worries
about a new constitutional framework “that weakens Tunisia’s democracy and how crucial
going forward an inclusive and transparent reform process is to restore confidence of the Tunisian people,”
the official said, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive diplomatic discussions.
U.S. officials have sought to forcefully nudge Tunisia while avoiding a total rupture with a
nation whose cooperation on counterterrorism is seen as a crucial element of U.S. strategy for North Africa. Tunisia, with a population of
nearly 12 million, for its part values U.S. military support and needs America’s backing as it seeks a deal with the International Monetary Fund.
Sarah Yerke, a former State Department official who is now a scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said the
series of
U.S. visits to Tunisia and public statements about its political process had been “effective in
that they let Saied know someone is watching.”
The Biden administration has adopted a more critical stance than its European allies, many
of whom are focused on deterring migration via North Africa. Citing Democratic reversals, the Biden administration
has proposed a large cut to U.S. military and economic aid to Tunisia.
U.S. officials believe their pressure may be having the effect of heading off even more
problematic steps, like a more dramatic crackdown on the media and civil society groups.
On Friday, Tunisia published a new electoral law that reduced the size of the country’s
parliament and lessens the role of political parties. But it did not, as some U.S. officials had feared it might,
take more worrisome steps like prohibiting candidates affiliated with parties from participating in upcoming
legislative elections. Some opposition groups plan to boycott the vote. The senior official said the Biden administration
welcomed the law as a step toward enabling broad participation in the elections.
“An inclusive and transparent reform process is so crucial going forward,” the official said.

Democracy is an extinction-level threat & impact filter.

Kasparov, Garry, February 16, 2017, “Democracy and Human Rights: The Case for U.S.Leadership,”
https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/021617_Kasparov_%20Testimony.pdf // recut NR & vy
The Soviet Union was an existential threat, and this focused the attention of the world, and the American people. There existential
threat today is not found on a map, but it is very real. The forces of the past are making steady progress against the modern world
order. Terrorist movements in West Asia , [West Asian] extremist parties across Europe, a paranoid tyrant
in North Korea threatening nuclear blackmail, and, at the center of the web, an aggressive
KGB dictator in Russia. They all want to turn the world back to a dark past because their
survival is threatened by the values of the free world, epitomized by the United States. And they are thriving as the
U.S. has retreated. The global freedom index has declined for ten consecutive years. No one like to talk about the United States as a global
policeman, but this is what happens when there is no cop on the beat. American leadership begins at home, right here. America cannot lead the
world on democracy and human rights if there is no unity on the meaning and importance of these things. Leadership is required to make that case
clearly and powerfully. Right now, Americans are engaged in politics at a level not seen in decades. It is an opportunity for them to rediscover
that making America great begins with believing America can be great. The Cold War was won on American values that were shared by both
parties and nearly every American. Institutions that were created by a Democrat, Truman, were triumphant forty years later thanks to the courage
of a Republican, Reagan. This bipartisan consistency created the decades of strategic stability that is the great strength of democracies. Strong
institutions that outlast politicians allow for long-range planning. In contrast, dictators
can operate only tactically, not
strategically, because they are not constrained by the balance of powers, but cannot afford to
think beyond their own survival. This is why a dictator like Putin has an advantage in chaos, the ability to move quickly. This
can only be met by strategy, by long-term goals that are based on shared values, not on polls and cable news. The fear of making things worse has
The spread
paralyzed the United States from trying to make things better. There will always be setbacks, but the United States cannot quit.
of democracy is the only proven remedy for nearly every crisis that plagues the world
today. War, famine, poverty, terrorism–all are generated and exacerbated by authoritarian
regimes. A policy of America First inevitably puts American security last.

C2 Turkiye
Erdogan is escalating tensions in Syria
Jeffrey from December 9th (James Jeffrey, 12-9-2022, "How the U.S. Can Compromise With Turkiye to Avert a Syria
Incursion," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/12/09/us-Turkiye-incursion-syria-kurds-sdf-ypg-erdogan/?tpcc=recirc_latest062921
FREE LINL: https://archive.ph/yzFRr#selection-1081.0-1093.1021 , DOA: 12-9-2022 ) ET
The latest crisis in the Turkiye-U.S. relationship—Turkish threats to launch ground operations into
Syria against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s (PKK) Syrian Kurdish offshoot, the People’s Defense
Units (YPG)—has again raised tensions in a bilateral relationship that is as critical as it is
tumultuous. Although no final decision has yet been taken by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, it is certainly likely
he will launch some form of ground operation, which, depending on where and how, will more or
less tank bilateral relations.
Jeffrey elaborates (James Jeffrey, 12-9-2022, "How the U.S. Can Compromise With Turkiye to Avert a Syria Incursion," Foreign
Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/12/09/us-Turkiye-incursion-syria-kurds-sdf-ypg-erdogan/?tpcc=recirc_lat est062921 FREE LINL:
https://archive.ph/yzFRr#selection-1081.0-1093.1021, DOA: 12-9-2022)ET
Erdogan is still concerned
That agreement has held—apart from minor, usually artillery and air, action—for over three years. But
with the SDF being so close to Turkiye on either side of that block in the northeast as well as in two
enclaves in the northwest, Tal Rifaat near Aleppo and Manbij just west of the Euphrates River. He negotiated an agreement with
Russian President Vladimir Putin later in October 2019 for Russian forces, who had moved into Manbij and northeastern areas when U.S. troops
pulled back, to force the SDF back 30 kilometers from the Turkish border in those northeast areas not covered by the Pence-Erdogan agreement.
But unlike the agreement Pence made with Erdogan, the SDF was never consulted, and it has not pulled back. The
proximate cause of
the current crisis was two November attacks against Turkish civilian targets in Istanbul and
Gaziantep province that together killed nine people, which Ankara attributes to the PKK operating
out of Syria. (The PKK has denied involvement.) And though Erdogan has previously threatened to launch
ground operations against the SDF only to be dissuaded by Washington and Moscow, this time he
appears more serious. Some observers attribute this to Turkiye’s upcoming national elections in
mid-2023, where polling shows Erdogan’s party well short of a majority, and allege he is seeking to
boost support by taking a “wag the dog” action against PKK elements. Perhaps, but Erdogan might
instead be seeking to intimidate the PKK from launching attacks right before the elections, whose
“Benghazi” effect could torpedo Erdogan’s candidacy. Turkiye-U.S. coordination on Syria is also
not as high-level as in the past and given Washington’s emphasis on pivoting away from West Asia,
Turks want to know what will happen to the PKK statelet on their border. Washington fears that a
new Turkish incursion into Syria—especially one in the northeast, near where U.S. forces and the
SDF are operating against the Islamic State—could undercut the fight against that terrorist group
and, in particular, the critical role the SDF plays in guarding thousands of Islamic State prisoners
and family members and thus is urging Turkiye in ever stronger terms not to launch an operation. The Turks do not appear to be heeding
Washington’s call, in part because they heard the same tune before their 2018 incursion against the SDF in Afrin, Syria, and didn’t suffer any
long-term consequences for ignoring it that time. More generally, Ankara appears frustrated that, after eight years, it still does not know
Washington’s long-term intentions in the northeast (in part because Washington, beyond supporting U.N. Resolution 2254, has not announced any
comprehensive strategy).

However, the US can use 3-way mediation to calm tensions – has worked in the past
Jeffrey from December 9th (James Jeffrey, 12-9-2022, "How the U.S. Can Compromise With Turkiye to Avert a Syria
Incursion," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/12/09/us-Turkiye-incursion-syria-kurds-sdf-ypg-erdogan/?tpcc=recirc_lat est062921
FREE LINL: https://archive.ph/yzFRr#selection-1081.0-1093.1021 , DOA: 12-9-2022)ET
U.S. officials could build on past
But Washington’s protestations alone will not compel Ankara to stand down. Rather,
three-way Turkiye-U.S.-SDF arrangements to put a real offer on the table. Turkiye’s immediate demands are
for SDF forces to pull away from Turkish territory and from Syrian areas that Turkiye controls. It also wants commitments against PKK attacks
out of Syria against Turkish territory. There are precedents for this. In 2016, the United States—including
then-Vice President Joe Biden himself—committed to Turkiye to ensure an SDF withdrawal across the
Euphrates River after the group had seized Manbij; then, after the Obama administration failed to follow through,the Trump
administration negotiated a new SDF withdrawal from Manbij in 2018, only partially successful due
to SDF intransigence and internal U.S. sparring. In 2019, Ankara, Washington, and the SDF formally
agreed to a withdrawal of SDF forces in the northeast to between four and 14 kilometers from the
Turkish border, with joint U.S.-Turkish military patrols to verify. (That agreement was de facto obviated by the
October 2019 Turkish incursion and the Pence-Erdogan agreement.) Moreover, Washington obtained repeated commitments
from the SDF not to attack Turkiye from northeast Syria. (The recent attacks in Turkiye have been traced to the SDF in
northwest, not northeast, Syria.) Given the importance for both the United States and the SDF of forestalling a
destabilizing Turkish incursion, Washington should revitalize these commitments in some form.
The SDF could withdraw from Manbij and Kobani, as it had previously agreed to do in various
forms, and extend its pledge not to attack Turkiye from northeast Syria to not attacking from
anywhere in Syria, in return for a Turkish promise not to move against Manbij or the northeast.
Turkiye could still attack Tal Rifaat, but the PKK elements there have had nothing to do with the United States, and thus an attack there would be
far less destabilizing for the U.S.-Turkiye relationship than elsewhere.

Two impacts, first is Iran-

Iran has plans to respond militarily to Turkish incursion in Syria, could spiral
Azizi 2022(Hamidreza Azizi, Hamidreza Azizi, Ph.D., is a CATS fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs
(SWP) in Berlin. He was an assistant professor of regional studies at Shahid Beheshti University (2016-20) and a guest lecturer at the department
of regional studies at the University of Tehran (2016-18), 7-1-2022, "How Iran sees Turkiye’s plan for a new military operation in Syria," West
Asia Institute, https://www.mei.edu/publications/how-iran-sees-Turkiyes-plan-new-military-operation-syria , DOA: 12-10-2022 )ET
Butshould all these moves fail to deter Turkiye, Iran has also worked on military plans to confront
Turkish forces or at least limit the scope of their operation. These plans include promoting and
facilitating cooperation between Iran-backed militias in Syria and Kurdish militants, as well as
sending reinforcements to these groups. Since early June, the Iranians have reportedly dispatched militia forces to Nubl and
al-Zahra. The forces have been deployed to frontlines with Turkish forces and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army in northern Aleppo and
areas around Afrin. At the same time, there have been reports that Iran has established a joint operations
room north of Aleppo consisting of its Syrian and non-Syrian proxies, YPG forces, and Lebanese
Hezbollah. If true, this would be the most comprehensive military coordination between
Iran-backed forces and Kurdish militias since the start of the Syrian conflict. As such, if Turkiye
decides to carry out its plan to attack northern Syria, and if the operation extends to Tel Rifaat and northern Aleppo,
Iran will most probably resort to an indirect military response via proxy forces. Although this would be a
less risky option compared to the scenario of a direct Iranian-Turkish confrontation,there would still be a high likelihood that
the situation could spiral out of control and lead to a broader and longer-term conflict between the
two neighbors.

Avery 20 terminalizes
(theoretical chemist at the University of Copenhagen. Since 1990 he has been the Chairman of the Danish National Group of Pugwash
Conferences on Science and World Affairs. Between 2004 and 2015 he also served as Chairman of the Danish Peace Academy. He founded the
Journal of Bioenergetics and Biomembranes, and was for many years its Managing Editor. He also served as Technical Advisor to the World
Health Organization, Regional Office for Europe . (John Scales, 1-4-2020, "Attacks On Iran, Past And Present", Countercurrents,
https://countercurrents.org/2020/01/attacks-on-iran-past-and-present/)
World War I, and we should remember that this
An attack on Iran could escalate We recently passed the 100th anniversary
colossal disaster escalated uncontrollably from what was intended to be a minor conflict. There is a
danger that an attack on Iran would escalate into a large-scale war in West Asia, entirely destabilizing a region
that is already deep in problems. The unstable government of Pakistan might be overthrown, and the revolutionary Pakistani
government might enter the war on the side of Iran, thus introducing nuclear weapons into the conflict. Russia and
China, firm allies of Iran, might also be drawn into a general war in West Asia. In the dangerous situation that could potentially result from an
attack on Iran, there is a risk that nuclear weapons would be used, either intentionally, or by
accident or miscalculation. Recent
research has shown that besides making large areas of the world uninhabitable through long-lasting radioactive contamination, a
nuclear war would damage global agriculture to such a extent that a global famine of previously unknown proportions would result. Thus, nuclear
war is the ultimate ecological catastrophe. It could destroy human civilization and much of the biosphere. To risk such a war would be an
unforgivable offense against the lives and future of all the peoples of the world, US citizens included. Recent research has shown thatthick clouds
of smoke from firestorms in burning cities would rise to the stratosphere, where they would spread globally and remain for a decade, blocking the
hydrological cycle, and destroying the ozone layer. A decade of greatly lowered temperatures would also follow. Global agriculture would be
destroyed. Human, plant and animal populations would perish. We must also consider the very long-lasting effects of radioactive contamination.
One can gain a small idea of what it would be like by thinking of the radioactive contamation that has made large areas near to Chernobyl and
Fukushima permanently uninhabitable, or the testing of hydrogen bombs in the Pacific in the 1950’s, which continues to cause leukemia and birth
defects in the Marshall Islands more than half a century later. In the event of a thermonuclear war, the contamination would be enormously
greater. We have to remember that the total explosive power of the nuclear weapons in the world today is 500,000 times as great as the power of
the bombs that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. What is threatened today is the complete breakdown of human civilization and the destruction
of much of the biosphere.

Next is ISIS
Turkish invasion of Syria would lead to massive resurgence in ISIS activity
Mandel 2022(Eric R. Mandel, Dr. Eric R. Mandel is the director of MEPIN, West Asia Political Information Network. He regularly
briefs members of Congress and their foreign policy aides. He is the senior security editor for the Jerusalem Report., 11-29-2022, "Remember
ISIS? It’s why Biden must stop a Turkish invasion of Kurdish Syria," Hill,
https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3753563-remember-isis-its-why-biden-must-stopa-turkish-invasion-of-kurdish-syria/, DOA:
12-10-2022)ET
Fast forward to 2022 and another Turkish invasion is on the horizon that could overwhelm Kurdish
forces, who now incarcerate more than 10,000 ISIS prisoners. The ISIS terrorists are just waiting
for an opportunity to escape and restart their jihad. In January, there was a significant prison break at the Ghwayran
prison in Hassakeh. Preventing the resurgence of ISIS is still an American priority and a prime reason we have 900 U.S. troops aiding the Kurdish
forces. Our small footprint has given us disproportionate security influence, which could disappear in the blink of an eye with a full-scale Turkish
invasion. Unfortunately, our NATO ally Turkiye’s priority appears to be not ISIS but eliminating the Kurds. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF),
whose primary contingency is the Kurdish YPG, has said that to defend the Kurdish region from a massive ground attack, they will focus their
forces against the invasion. That means soldiers guarding the ISIS prisoners could leave overnight. SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi told The
Associated Press, “If Turkiye attacks … the war will spread to all regions. … We can say that our work against IS with the international coalition
has stopped because we are preoccupied with the Turkish attacks.” According to Fox News’s Jennifer Griffith, “There is significant concern that
Turkiye’s planned ground invasion into Syria … could open the floodgates for the release of thousands of imprisoned Islamic State terrorists …
from more than 50 countries.” Turkiye is preparing for its fifth and possibly ultimate ground war in northern and eastern Syria. Turkiye considers
the Syria Kurdish forces to be an arm of the Turkish Kurdish PKK, a U.S.-listed terrorist group. The United States disagrees. Turkiye’s goal is to
create a permanent 20-mile-deep security zone in Syria along the Turkish border. The territory, once emptied of Kurds, would be used to resettle
Syrian refugees living in Turkiye who were displaced during the Syrian civil war. However, Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits
the deportation of a civilian population. With Russia’s war in Ukraine and protests in Iran ongoing, President Biden may believe that the U.S. is
too overextended to deal with an invasion by Turkiye. That would be a mistake, as a resurgent ISIS would call the U.S. back to a far more chaotic
West Asia.

ISIS wants a dirty bomb

Dettmer 2016(Jamie Dettmer, 4-19-2016, "IS Seeks Biological, Nuclear Materials, Counterterror Officials Warn," VOA,
https://www.voanews.com/a/islamic-state-seeks-biological-nuclear-materials-/3293382.html, DOA: 12-13-2022)ET
European counterterror chiefs warned at a London conference Tuesday that Islamic State militants are seeking to secure
biological and nuclear materials to build rudimentary weapons of mass destruction. They said IS might be splitting into two for
operational purposes, with one wing focused on defending the terror group’s self-styled caliphate straddling Syria and Iraq, and the other
dedicated to carrying out terror attacks in the West. Speaking at the Security and Counter Terror Expo in London, security officials said IS
militants had shown interest in obtaining nuclear, biological and chemical material for terror attacks in the West. “We know terrorists are trying to
acquire these substances,” said Jamie Shea, deputy assistant secretary general for emerging security threats at NATO. Jorge Berto Silva, deputy
head of counterterrorism for the European Commission, added that there was a “justified concern." Summer attacks The warning came as German
and Italian intelligence officials reported their fears that IS strategists are planning suicide summer attacks on Mediterranean resorts.The German
newspaper Bild said the plans involved the use of automatic weapons on crowded beaches, similar to the shooting last June in the Tunisian beach
resort of Sousse that left 38 vacationers, mostly Britons, dead. Disguised as a tourist, the gunman at Sousse, Seifeddine Rezgui Yacoubi, pulled
out an AK-47 assault rifle concealed in a beach umbrella. An Italian security official told VOA the plans involve attacks on French, Spanish and
Italian beaches. “We think they are planning to pretend they are vendors,” he said. On Tuesday, Spanish police announced they had arrested a
Moroccan on the island resort of Palma de Mallorca on suspicion of recruiting fighters for IS. Many analysts argue the chances that IS will be
able to secure nuclear material for even a rudimentary bomb are small — but not zero. Over the past five years, the FBI has assisted authorities in
Moldova in disrupting four efforts by nuclear smugglers to sell radioactive material to West Asiaern groups, including IS. The Associated Press
reported last year that one IS-involved deal was focused on the attempted sale of a huge cache of deadly cesium. British, Belgian warnings British
Prime Minister David Cameron said this month at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington that the danger of radioactive material ending up
in the hands of militants was “only too real.” Belgian officials warned at the summit in Washington that jihadist suspects had been monitoring the
movements of a nuclear scientist at one of the country’s three nuclear plants. Security officials in Brussels said that the el-Bakraoui brothers —
suicide bombers at the Brussels airport and subway — filmed the scientist going to and from work. And Belgium's interior minister said the
country's nuclear plants were a target for the IS terror group. Last month, Belgian investigators reported that during searches of the Brussels
apartment of Salah Abdeslam, one of the Paris attackers, they found a stash of documents relating to the nuclear research center at
Forschungszentrum Jülich near the Belgian border in northwest Germany.According to nuclear scientists, only 10 grams of radiological material
would be required for
a so-called “dirty bomb" — a weapon that combines radioactive material and
conventional explosives and is meant to contaminate the area around a blast.

A successful attack is devastating

Hayes 18 (Peter Hayes is Director of the Nautilus Institute and Honorary Professor at the Centre for International Security Studies at the
University of Sydney. “NON-STATE TERRORISM AND INADVERTENT NUCLEAR WAR,” Nautilus Institute, 1/18/18,
https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/non-state-terrorism-and-inadvertent-nuclear-war/ ) dwc 18
Conclusion We now move to our conclusion. Nuclear-armed states can place themselves on the edge of nuclear war by a combination of
threatening force deployments and threat rhetoric. Statements by US and North Korea’s leaders and supporting amplification by state and private
media to present just such a lethal combination. Many observers have observed that the risk of war and nuclear war, in Korea and globally, have
increased in the last few years—although no-one can say with authority by how much and exactly for what reasons.//// However, states are
restrained in their actual decisions to escalate to conflict and/or nuclear war by conventional deterrence, vital national interests, and other
institutional and political restraints, both domestic and international. It is not easy, in the real world, or even in fiction, to start nuclear wars.[19]
Rhetorical threats are standard fare in realist and constructivist accounts of inter-state nuclear deterrence, compellence, and reassurance, and are
not cause for alarm per se. States will manage the risk in each of the threat relationships with other nuclear armed states to stay back from the
brink, let alone go over it, as they have in the past. //// This argument was powerful and to many, persuasive during the Cold War although it does
not deny the hair-raising risks taken by nuclear armed states during this period. Today,the multi-polarity of nine nuclear weapons states interacting
in a four-tiered nuclear threat system means that the practice of sustaining nuclear threat and preparing for nuclear war is no longer merely
complicated, but is now enormously complex in ways that may exceed the capacity of some and perhaps all states to manage, even without the
emergence of a fifth tier of non-state actors to add further unpredictability to how this system works in practice. //// The possibility that
non-state actors attack without advance warning as to the time, place, and angle of attack presents another layer of
may

uncertainty to this complexity as to how inter-state nuclear war may break out. That is, non-state actors with nuclear weapons or threat goals and
capacities do not seek the same goals, will not use the same control systems, and will use radically different organizational procedures and
systems to deliver on their threats compared with nuclear armed states. If used tactically for immediate terrorist effect, a non-state nuclear terrorist
could violently attack nuclear facilities, exploiting any number of vulnerabilities in fuel cycle facility security, or use actual nuclear materials and
even warheads against military or civilian targets. If a persistent, strategically oriented nuclear terrorist succeed in gaining credible nuclear threat
capacities, it might take hostage one or more states or cities.//// If such an event coincides with already high levels of tension and even military
collisions between the non-nuclear forces of nuclear armed states, then a non-state nuclear terrorist attack could impel a nuclear armed
state to escalate its threat or even military actions against other states, in the belief that this targeted state may have
sponsored the non-state attack, or was simply the source of the attack, whatever the declared identity of the attacking non-state entity.
Thisoutcome could trigger these states to go onto one or more of the pathways to inadvertent nuclear war, especially if the terrorist
attack was on a high value and high risk nuclear facility or involved the seizure and/or use of fissile material. //// Some experts dismiss this
possibility as so remote as to be not worth worrying about. Yet the history of nuclear terrorism globally and in the Northeast Asian region
suggests otherwise. Using the sand castle metaphor, once built on the high tide line, sand castles may withstand the wind but eventually succumb
to the tide once it reaches the castle—at least once, usually twice a day. Also,theories of organizational and technological failure point to the
coincidence of multiple, relatively insignificant driving events that interact or accumulate in ways that lead the “metasystem” to fail, even if each
individual component of a system works perfectly. Thus, the potential catalytic effect of a nuclear terrorist incident is not that it would of itself
lead to a sudden inter-state nuclear war; but that at a time of crisis when alert levels are already high, when control systems on nuclear forces have
already shifted from primary emphasis on negative to positive control, when decision making is already stressed, when the potential for
miscalculation is already high due to shows of force indicating that first-use is nigh, when rhetorical threats promising annihilation on
the one hand, or collapse of morale and weakness on the other invite counter-vailing threats by nuclear adversaries or their allies to gain the upper
hand in the “contest of resolve,” and when organizational cybernetics may be in play such that purposeful actions are implemented differently
than intended, then a terrorist nuclear attack may shift a coincident combination of some or all of these factors to a threshold level where they
collectively lead to a first-use decision by one or more nuclear-armed states. If the terrorist attack is timed or happens to coincide with high levels
of inter-state tension involving nuclear-armed states, then some or all of these tendencies will likely be in play anyway—precisely the concern of
those who posit pathways to inadvertent nuclear war as outlined in section 2 above. //// The critical question is, just as a catalyst breaks some
bonds and lets other bonds form, reducing the energy cost and time taken to achieve a chemical reaction, how would a nuclear terrorist attack at
time of nuclear charged inter-state tension potentially shift the way that nuclear threat is projected and perceived in a four or five-way
nuclear-prone conflict, and how might it affect the potential pathways to inadvertent nuclear war in such a system?//// Such a pervasive
incremental effect is shown in Figure 6 below. Figure 6: Impact of a Terrorist Nuclear Threat or Attack on Interstate Nuclear Use Control //// Any
one or indeed all of these starting nuclear control profiles may be disputed, as might the control profile at the end of the response arrow. (In
Figure 6, each nuclear state responds to a terrorist nuclear attack by loosening or abandoning negative controls against unauthorized use, and
shifts towards reliance mostly on positive procedural controls biased towards use). But each nuclear armed state will make its moves in response
to the posited terrorist nuclear attack partly in response to its expectations as to how other nuclear armed states will perceive and respond to these
moves, as well as their perception that an enemy state may have sponsored a terrorist nuclear attack—and considered together, it is obvious that
they may not share a common image of the other states’ motivations and actions in this response, leading to cumulative potential for
misinterpretation and rapid subsequent action, reaction, and escalation

C3 Lebanon
Iranian arms smuggling through Hezbollah is threatening to destabilize Lebanon and
West Asia more broadly
Frantzman on December 14 Seth Frantzman 22, 12-14-2022, "Iranian arms smuggling to Lebanon
could potentially create crisis," The Jerusalem Post | JPost,
https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-724842 //DaBest is Back DOA 12/16/2022

Iranian arms smuggling to Hezbollah may be shifting course and could potentially create a crisis in Lebanon. Recent
reports have indicated there is a focus on Iranian arms shipments to Beirut, or potential ones. Iran has trafficked weapons to Hezbollah for decades, improving its
missile and drone programs. This has been a source of tension between Israel and the terrorist group. Jerusalem has acted to prevent Iranian entrenchment in
Syria over the last decade during the Syrian civil war. This is called the “war between the wars campaign.” However, Lebanon
is generally seen as
separate from Iran’s use of Syria as a conduit, meaning that once weapons enter Lebanon, they have sort of
reached a get-out-of-jail-free space. On Saturday December 10, Asharq al-Awsat, a London-based Arab newspaper, said in a report widely
quoted in the region that “Israel raised threats on Saturday of plans to bomb the Beirut airport if the terminal gets used as an Iranian weapons smuggling route,
in a situation similar to what it did in Syria.” The report said that “Israeli political sources in Tel Aviv said that Israel was aware of a report broadcast by the
‘Al-Arabiya Channel’ about Iran's plans to use a new smuggling corridor for its weapons through Beirut after the failure of the Damascus corridor. The sources
said that Israel is investigating Tehran’s attempt to smuggle weapons through civilian flights to Beirut Airport.” Lebanese Hezbollah terror leader Hassan Nasrallah
is focused on shifting the Iranian arms shipments that usually go across Syria, according to the report. Iran uses Iraq and Syria as a corridor for weapons
trafficking and basing of weapons. It has provided drones to militias in these countries and based drones at places like the T-4 base in Syria. It even flew a drone
from T-4 into Israeli airspace in 2018, which Israel shot down. In 2021, Iran launched a drone from Iraq at Israel during the May hostilities between Israel and
Hamas. The Islamic Republic has now begun launching drones directly from Iran to threaten the Jewish state. Tehran also used a drone from Chabahar to strike a
commercial ship in mid-November, which it apparently believed was Israeli-owned. THE OVERALL pattern
is clear. Iran backs Hezbollah,
Hezbollah intervened in the Syrian civil war in 2012 to support the Syrian regime, and Iran backs the
Syrian regime. It also backs militias and key political leaders and parties in Iraq. Tehran moves ballistic
missiles and drones to Iraq and also to Syria and Lebanon. It has also helped Hezbollah with its precision-guided munitions
industry. This is a major threat to Israel because such munitions can target strategic infrastructure in mass attacks. In July, Hezbollah sent drones to target a gas
rig off the coast of Israel. This was a major warning that Hezbollah wanted to strike at economic interests off the coast. In October, on the eve of Israel’s elections,
Jerusalem and Beirut agreed to a maritime demarcation deal that gave in to most of Lebanon’s demands. Hezbollah and Iran have characterized the deal as a win
for the terrorist group, Hezbollah now believes it can dictate to Israel. The deal may also bring in Qatari investment, enabling Qatar to play a role in southern
Lebanon, where Hezbollah is based, and also in Gaza where Doha has sent funds over the last few years. The Alma Research and Education Center Now the issue
of Iranian weapons trafficking to Lebanon is back in the spotlight. The Alma Research and Education Center, founded by Lt. Col. (Res.) Sarit Zehavi and devoted to
examining Israel's security challenges on the northern border, recently put out several tweets about Iranian issues. One issue Alma has examined is the pilots of
Iran’s Mahan Air “who have the potential to be involved in unit 190's weapon components smuggling to Syria/Lebanon in the past year. We have photos and
additional information about them which we will begin to publish soon with the full report.” Unit 190 is a part of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds
Force. THE ALMA center has also asked “how many Shahed 136/Mahajar 6 UAV parts can fit in your 41 planes' luggage compartment and be smuggled to
Damascus/Beirut airport for Hezbollah (assuming a fully booked flight with passengers with carry-ons only?)” This claim appears to indicate that Iran may be
using Mahan Air to move munitions. The Shahed 136 drone is the same type that Iran has supplied to Russia. Another series of tweets by Alma focuses on Beirut
International Airport and how “direct flights from Iran to [the Lebanese capital] have been taking place for years and two Iranian airlines maintain a regular flight
route to this day.” In 2019, the IDF exposed the identities of three senior officers in the IRGC and accused them of being “involved in Hezbollah’s attempt to
develop and acquire precision-guided missiles in Lebanon.” In August of that year, Hezbollah also accused Israel of an attempted drone attack in Beirut. In
September 2020, the military also revealed details of Hezbollah missile sites in the Lebanese capital. The Jerusalem Post reported last week that “the
IRGC-affiliated Meraj Airlines has begun flights to Beirut in recent days, raising concerns that Iran could use the flights to transfer weapons directly to Hezbollah
in Lebanon instead of using Damascus.” Assaf Orion wrote at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy in July that, “in
response to such efforts,
Israel has reportedly struck air defense systems destined for transfer to Hezbollah throughout Syria’s
civil war next door, including Russian-made SA-8 and SA-17 batteries as well as Iranian systems deployed to Syria. After a drone strike hit Hezbollah
targets in Beirut in August 2019, Nasrallah vowed to shoot Israeli UAVs out of Lebanon’s skies.” Nasrallah has boasted that Hezbollah’s air defenses have reduced
Israel’s air activity over Lebanon. Israel-Lebanon maritime deal

Israel has threatened to start war in response

Haaretz wrote on December 10, 12-10-2022, "Israel warns it will bomb Beirut airport if used to
smuggle Iranian arms, report says,"
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2022-12-10/ty-article/.premium/report-israel-threatens-to-bo
mb-beirut-airport-if-used-to-deliver-iranian-weapons/00000184-fcd9-d4c7-a786-fdffe5150000//
DaBest is Back

Israel raised threats to bomb Beirut’s airport if it is used as an Iranian weapons smuggling route,
London-based Asharq Al-Awsat reported on Saturday. According to the report, political sources in Israel said confirmed that they
were aware of Al-Arabiya Channel’s report about Tehran’s plans to use a new smuggling corridor for its weapons
through Beirut after the failure of the Damascus corridor, adding that Israel is investigating an attempt to smuggle weapons through
civilian flights. The sources reportedly confirmed that Israel’s intensified air raids on Syria in recent years helped thwart most of the Iranian
weapons smuggling operations to its armed militias in Syria and to Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Biden administration support of the Lebanese army is keeping Lebanon from becoming
a failed state – but an increase in funding is necessary to maintain the conflict
Brown 22 Cate Brown 22, 7-27-2022, "Why the United States Should Pay the Lebanese Army’s
Salaries—Before It’s Too Late," Century Foundation,
https://tcf.org/content/commentary/why-the-united-states-should-pay-the-lebanese-armys-salaries-b
efore-its-too-late/ // DOA 12/16/2022 DaBest is Back

The Biden administration should quickly make good on its plans to pay a portion of the Lebanese
military’s salaries—demonstrating American commitment and propping up the most effective surviving institution in a collapsing state. The
White House made the right decision more than six months ago, when it increased its support for the
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), following a precipitous devaluation of the Lebanese lira that has left soldiers without a living wage and hamstrung
the military’s basic activities. The LAF performs critical functions that go far beyond the role of militaries in

typical countries: It provides vital domestic policing of sectarian feuds; it monitors and deters the active threat posed by the Islamic State and similar
groups; it patrols the country’s porous borders; and in times of crisis—like the present—it is responsible for crowd and riot control. Further, the military is
perhaps the sole institution in Lebanon that welcomes members of all sects and serves the national interest rather than the agenda of a single warlord or sect.
Simply put, if
Lebanon can’t pay its soldiers, those soldiers can’t hold Lebanon together. But right now, the funds that
the White House promised to Lebanon’s military are in jeopardy. Some lawmakers are trying to pressure the Biden administration into changing course,

claiming that any money spent in Lebanon risks going to Hezbollah or other bad actors. But the reverse is true: a
stronger Lebanese army is one of the last safeguards against much broader chaos in Lebanon, which
would only embolden Washington’s adversaries. Supporting Lebanese soldiers’ livelihoods is an
inexpensive yet effective way to advance American priorities—in Lebanon and the region—and help a country
in dire need. President Biden’s recent West Asia trip showcased some of the administration’s worst instincts, embracing authoritarians and getting little in return.
Helping Lebanon would provide a sorely needed model for how the United States can support governance and stability in West Asia’s few fragile democracies.
Brown concludes
Brown 22 Cate Brown 22, 7-27-2022, "Why the United States Should Pay the Lebanese Army’s
Salaries—Before It’s Too Late," Century Foundation,
https://tcf.org/content/commentary/why-the-united-states-should-pay-the-lebanese-armys-salaries-b
efore-its-too-late/ DOA 12/16/2022 DaBest is Back
It is not conceivable to entirely eliminate sympathizers of any Lebanese faction from a Lebanese institution. But it is possible, as the LAF has
done, to guarantee that leadership, policy, and operational security insulate a national institution from manipulation or control by a
subnational force such as Hezbollah. Yet members of the U.S. Congress’s Republican Study Committee have opposed sending military
assistance to Lebanon, arguing that sending funds to the LAF is equivalent to propping up an “Iranian puppet regime”—and counter to U.S.
interests, including keeping Iran from becoming a nuclear power. In fact, the contrary is true—preserving
the LAF, even with its
flaws, is the most effective path in Lebanon toward countering Iran and stabilizing the region. The LAF
has quite literally kept the peace in Lebanon, handling tasks as mundane as gas line maintenance and as critical as securing
borders and deterring the Islamic State throughout Syria’s civil war. Allowing the LAF to collapse would only open up a
governance vacuum for hybrid actors like Hezbollah to exploit.

As goes Lebanon, so goes West Asia. Lebanese collapse guarantees a regional war.
Alexander King, 7/08/2022, Lebanon: Collapse, Uncertainty, Rejuvenation – or the Next Big War,
https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/lebanon-collapse-uncertainty-rejuve
nation-or-next-big-war)// DaBest is Back

It could get much worse, and more violent, before it gets better. Lebanon
has never been in a worse state outside
wartime. Historically unstable by imperial design, its region is now rocked by the same waves of
strategic competition, destabilisation and malign influence as the rest of the developing world. But
Lebanon stands out. Now in the third year of a crushing economic crisis, with political paralysis, heightened social tensions, and the ongoing
negative effects of the coronavirus pandemic and the 2020 Beirut port explosion, the human impact is sobering. The country’s
catastrophically poor economy severely limits its ability to weather the gathering storm of a global uneven pandemic recovery, supply chain
bottlenecks, energy volatility, crushing inflation – and now a war of aggression affecting food security. For the 11th year in a row – since the
outbreak of the Syrian Civil War – Lebanon’s real GDP per capita has fallen. The dollar-pegged Lebanese lira – providing the liquidity in an
attractive investment bastion for regional wealth – has been destroyed by a combined economic and fiscal crisis. Now, no one knows what
the lira is really worth – the most recent guess is that it has lost more than 90% of its 2019 value. Last year, the World Food Programme
massively ramped up assistance to support a third of the population (2.1 million) through a catastrophic crisis. Entrenched interests hiding
behind a veil of confessionalism – effectively cartels of political and business elites – prevent any significant work to address gaping
infrastructure and economic gaps and to conduct reforms. This has drawn lobbying and now outright begging pleas that the country has lost
time, opportunities and allies and that it can ill afford to adopt basic reforms to its economic and financial systems. Organised crime has
benefited. Lebanon is used to a lack of accountability. The UN's 17-year effort to bring the murderers of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri to
justice is finally at an end, costing a billion dollars and leaving the accused assassins at large. Anecdotally, apathy and disenfranchisement
among the Lebanese population is palpable, fuelling discontent, desperation and migration. Then Came the War With the outbreak of a war
in Ukraine – over 1,000 miles away – the litany of woe gets worse. A June Mercy Corps analysis of impacts of the war on the region suggested
that in Lebanon, food prices had risen 400% even before the war began, fuel prices are now nearly triple what they were last September, and
there is often a choice of one, the other – or neither. Low-income households will go hungry if supply chains of bread and other staples
remain at current levels, as black-market diversion and hoarding capture the majority of basics. Lebanon’s electricity crisis will worsen as fuel
prices rise. Basic critical services such as water and telecoms will also deteriorate over the summer as high temperatures strain demand.
Poverty, tensions and outward migration are all expected to increase. As the most immediate
challenge to stability, food price spikes have demonstrable links to waves of global unrest – most recently in
2007–8 and 2010–11. As Russia’s vicious, grinding fight for Ukrainian territory continues, Lebanon is reliant on Ukraine for 80% of its wheat,
sparking an unusual condemnation of Russia’s actions. There is nonetheless a private perception across West Asia that the Ukraine war is a
European affair, and that the Global South will primarily receive the overspill. Regional populations tend to view the conflict as a
US/NATO–Russia war, fuelled at least in part by NATO actions against Russia, rather than by a blatant – and neo-imperial – war of aggression
against a sovereign country. There are accusations of double standards against the West over its response to the Ukraine war. The significant
and immediate diplomatic efforts over Ukraine, military support to Kyiv, and reception of Ukrainian refugees in Western states are – rightly
or wrongly – viewed as indicative of a Western inclination to care significantly more about conflicts in Europe’s immediate neighbourhood
than about those in West Asia. The Upside? Even with such significant challenges, Lebanon has historical traits that support its ability to
‘muddle through’, most particularly its oft-quoted ‘resilience’. However tired the concept is, it remains the case that Lebanon has some
developed and unifying factors not present in many other countries, which make judgements about its stability complex. These include
cultural resilience (a unifying sense of purpose and belonging) and societal resilience (local informal support structures offering education,
welfare and security provision outside state influence). What OECD states might refer to as non-traditional resilience is difficult to quantify,
but forms a key part of the country’s ability to avoid the worst forms of conflict and state breakdown. While Hizbullah no longer commands
the popularity it once did, it can keep its supporters living in a fantasy world of relentless propaganda for longer than competitors can Recent
elections have provided some minor hope. ‘At a time of existential self-questioning by the Lebanese…Focused on daily survival, and
profoundly disillusioned with the political process after decades of war and subjugation, many would not take part…[but] the outcome was
more hopeful than many had dared hope’, one former Ambassador wrote. Hizbullah The economic crisis and a loss of its electoral majority in
May have not dimmed Hizbullah’s fervour. While the party no longer commands the popularity and groundswell of opinion it once did, it can
keep its supporters living in a fantasy world of relentless propaganda for longer than competitors can. While the Lebanese people attempt to
focus on practical solutions to their fundamental cost-of-living crisis, they are still being lectured regularly by Hizbullah Secretary General
Hassan Nasrallah about the continued necessity of arming ‘the Resistance’ (Hizbullah’s other name), and arguing that given the economic
crisis, the issue should be postponed for two more years, ‘because it is not a pressing issue and you have coexisted with them since 2005’. We
should not be under any illusion. Hizbullah is semi-independently funded, highly strategic in its thinking and makeup, and organised carefully
to deter, operate against, and survive assault by Israel, one of the most formidable military-technical opponents in the world. Hizbullah is
also an organisation of consummate Israel-watchers. As Israel’s head of state changed on Monday, Hizbullah offered Yair Lapid his first
security test, flying three Iranian-made drones towards an Israeli-sponsored gas rig in a disputed area, all of which were promptly shot down.
As Hizbullah-watchers predicted in June, the organisation had not aimed to cause damage, but rather intended to score publicity points by
filming the rig, while demonstrating a capability to threaten. Given Lebanon’s context and the state of regional affairs, it remains highly
unlikely that Hizbullah has any interest in a war with Israel over a maritime dispute. Likewise, it has not responded to (alleged) Israeli
sabotage attacks inside Iran – and telegraphed in April that it would leave Iran to respond for itself. Israel Israel is highly aware of Hizbullah’s
lack of interest in a shooting war, and shares a disinterest in provoking the level of damage that Hizbullah could cause through use of
longer-ranged precision missiles, shutting down major infrastructure and forcing the population into bunkers. It is not waiting around,
however. Last month, the recently departed Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett summarised Israel’s so-called Octopus Doctrine against
Iran: ‘We no longer play with the tentacles, with Iran’s proxies: we’ve created a new equation by going for the head’. A campaign of sabotage,
assassinations, cyber attacks and other covert operations inside Iran proper has targeted critical infrastructure far beyond Iranian nuclear
facilities. Just as Iran has built proxies on its enemies’ borders, Israel is also using clandestine diplomacy to build its network of likeminded
countries – with US help – who are just as concerned about the disruptive power of small, parasitic Iranian proxies building political veto
power inside their hosts, alongside ever-more-accurate ballistic missile arsenals. Step one was US sponsorship of the ‘Abraham Accords’; step
two is a so-called West Asia air defence partnership, which recent announcements suggest has already made significant progress toward a
system to share information and counter Iranian missile and air defence threats to Arab countries and to Israel. The Israeli defence minister
said on Monday that the partnership had already foiled attempted Iranian attacks and could be boosted by President Joe Biden's visit next
week. Given the current level of global political and economic volatility, the ability to plan ahead has
been further reduced, and the risk of shocks heightened New Prime Minister Lapid, on the other hand,
will have to play this extremely carefully. He has already been tested once. He has four months to
prove himself. Conclusions The Near East’s security has always been tenuous, but in a region beset by
fear and constant warnings of the next war, it is sometimes complex to understand the drivers and
tensions that fuel uncontrollable escalations before they happen. Given the current level of global
political and economic volatility, the ability to plan ahead has been further reduced, and the risk of
shocks heightened. The most likely major escalation that could snowball is a conflict between Israel
and Iran, arguably the region’s two most capable covert actors. Iranian enrichment has now reached an extremely advanced stage, as has
Israeli planning to deal with it. The region is now faced with the real prospect of an Iran permanently at the threshold of a nuclear weapon.
Those who oppose the achievement of this will have to think creatively about how to manage this state of affairs if they want to avoid an
Iranian bomb and the negative consequences that would follow. Get ready to hear more about a ‘lack of good options’. Needless to say, any
escalation would have broad implications for the whole region, and potentially the world. There are several linked issues that may provide
indicators of the immediate future direction of the Levant: The outcome of US-mediated negotiations on the maritime border between
Lebanon and Israel continue to evolve. They may yet achieve something – peacefully. Reports of an Arab-Israeli partnership to focus on air
defence should be watched closely. An achievement would be a quiet earthquake for regional security and diplomatic relations, and could
provide avenues to resolve a host of other issues. To date, Russia has been fairly helpful in the region on issues like arms control and, to some
extent, UN-linked humanitarian and political processes. But its willingness to silo these issues could easily diminish, should the direction of
the war in Ukraine change. There are fears that the region could turn into an additional arena for heightened competition with the West.
Russian decision-making over Israeli freedom of action in Syria may be a bellwether. Finally, Lebanon needs a new government and a new
president. The Arab League has made the right noises, though very few have made sensible interventions. The filling of the two vacancies
has, in the past, taken years. It should not this time. A collection of fears of escalation provide, on the one hand, a heating effect. On the
other hand, they provide a window of opportunity.

The terminal impact is nuclear war – Avery 13 writes:

John Avery, 9/06/2013, An Attack On Iran Could Escalate Into Global Nuclear War By John Scales
Avery, Counter Currents, https://www.countercurrents.org/avery061113.htm)// DaBest is Back

Despite the willingness of Iran's new President, Hassan Rouhani to make all reasonable concessions to US demands, Israeli pressure groups in
Washington continue to demand an attack on Iran. But such an attack might escalate into a global nuclear war, with catastrophic
consequences. As we approach the 100th anniversary World War I, we should remember that this colossal disaster escalated uncontrollably
from what was intended to be a minor conflict. There is a danger that an attack on Iran would escalate into a large-scale war in
West Asia, entirely destabilizing a region that is already deep in problems. The unstable government of Pakistan might be overthrown, and
the revolutionary Pakistani government might enter the war on the side of Iran, thus introducing nuclear weapons into the conflict. Russia
and China, firm allies of Iran, might also be drawn into a general war in West Asia. Since much of the world's
oil comes from the region, such a war would certainly cause the price of oil to reach unheard-of heights, with catastrophic effects on the
global economy. In the dangerous situation that could potentially result from an attack on Iran, there is a risk that nuclear weapons
would be used, either intentionally, or by accident or miscalculation. Recent research has shown that besides
making large areas of the world uninhabitable through long-lasting radioactive contamination, a nuclear war would damage global
agriculture to such a extent that a global
famine of previously unknown proportions would result. Thus, nuclear
war is the ultimate ecological catastrophe. It could destroy human civilization and much of the biosphere. To
risk such a war would be an unforgivable offense against the lives and future of all the peoples of the world, US citizens included. To accept
money from agents of a foreign power to perform actions that put one's own country in danger is, by definition, an act of treason. Why are
members of the US?