The Gender Gap in Pensions and Wages

Author(s): William E. Even and David A. Macpherson

Source: The Review of Economics and Statistics , May, 1990, Vol. 72, No. 2 (May, 1990),
pp. 259-265
Published by: The MIT Press

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.com/stable/2109715

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms

The MIT Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The
Review of Economics and Statistics

This content downloaded from

179.6.208.243 on Thu, 27 Aug 2020 23:02:33 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 THE GENDER GAP IN PENSIONS AND WAGES
William E. Even and David A. Macpherson*
Abstract-This study provides rationale for the underrepre-
sentation of women in the pension sector, and examines the
consequences for the gender wage gap. For a given set of
observed characteristics, a woman is 11%-19% less likely
than a man to have a pension. Of the unexplained portion of
the gender wage gap, 10%-38% is due to unexplained differ-
ences in pension coverage. Finally, consistent with a screening
effect of pensions, women are paid more equally in the
pension sector.
I. Introduction
IN 1983, 53% of employed men over age 18 had
private pensions. Only 36% of their female
counterparts received coverage.1 In section II,
possible causes of this gap in coverage and the
consequences for the gender wage gap are out-
lined. The empirical model and relevant statistics
for the data analysis are presented in section III.
Three results from the empirical work in section
IV are: (i) for a given set of observed characteris-
tics, a woman is 11%-19% less likely to have a
pension; (ii) if women are represented in the
pension sector according to the male model, be-
tween 10% and 38% of the unexplained gap in
wages is eliminated; and (iii) controlling for ob-
served characteristics, men and women are paid
more equally in the pension sector.
II. The Conceptual Framework
Controlling for differences in labor market
characteristics, there are at least three reasons to
expect that a woman is less likely to have a
pension. The first arises from the fact that the tax
advantages of pensions rise with income and-that,
as shown in numerous studies (e.g., Corcoran and
Duncan, 1979), women receive a lower return to
observed labor market characteristics. Conse-
quently, since women have lower wage returns to
characteristics they are less likely to have a pen-
sion.
Received for publication January 17, 1989. Revision ac-
cepted for publication October 10, 1989.
* Miami University.
We thank Richard Ippolito, Daniel Seiver, members of the
Miami University Micro workshop, and two anonymous refer-
ees for comments. Partial funding for Professor Even's work
was provided by a Miami University summer research grant.
1 Based on a sample of privately employed workers over age
18 from the May 1983 Current Population Survey.
Copyright C)
This content downloaded from
179.6.208.243 on Thu, 27 Aug 2020 23:02:33 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
A second explanation is that pensions screen
out quitters and women have above average quit
rates. The implicit contract theory of pensions
(see Ippolito (1987)) implies that, at any point
prior to normal retirement age, the present value
of the pension a worker receives (the "quit"
pension) is less than the present value of the
worker's previous contributions. This quit penalty
screens out women with an above average proba-
bility of quitting.2
A third possible explanation is that pension
sector employers are less willing to hire workers
with a high quit propensity. Mobility reduction
devices (such as pensions) are most desirable in
the presence of high turnover costs. The differ-
ence between the quit pension and the value of
previous contributions serves as a bond that the
employee forfeits if s/he quits prematurely. Given
some probability that the firm will fail, or cheat
on the contract by firing the employee, the opti-
mal size of the bond may result in less than
complete insurance for the firm. In this case,
pension sector firms may be faced with relatively
high uninsured quit costs, causing avoidance of
workers with high quit rates.3
These three reasons provide a rationale for
women being underrepresented in the pension
sector, even after controlling for observed charac-
teristics. Henceforth, this is referred to as the
"unexplained" component of the gender gap in
pension coverage. The remainder of the gap is
"explained" by differences in observed character-
istics.
This study's first goal is to determine how much
of the gap in pension coverage is explained versus
unexplained. The hypothesis is that, for a given
2 Under a "legal" theory of pensions, pensions impose no
quit penalty. However, most of the empirical evidence sup-
ports the implicit contract theory. See, for example, Ippolito
(1985), Kotlikoff and Wise (1985), Mitchell (1982), and Schiller
and Weiss (1980).
3Pension firms have an additional incentive to discriminate
if employers complement pensions with efficiency wage premi-
ums (as suggested in Akerlof and Katz (1988)). According to
Bulow and Summers (1986), firms that pay efficiency wages
hire proportionately fewer workers with high quit rates to
equalize the expected value of the shirk penalty across worker
types.
1990 [ 259 1
260 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
set of observed characteristics, women have a
lower probability of being in the pension sector
because of screening effects, lower wages, and
pension firms avoiding workers with high quit
rates.
The second goal is to determine how much of
the gender wage gap is due to unexplained dif-
ferences in pension coverage. Numerous studies
use the Oaxaca (1973) technique to decompose
the wage gap into explained (nondiscriminatory)
and unexplained (discriminatory) components.
The unexplained component results from males
and females receiving different estimated returns
to a vector of productive characteristics (denoted
by X). Moore (1987) argues that, within the pen-
sion sector, women pay a greater compensating
wage differential for a defined benefit pension
plan since they have greater life expectancies,
and hence greater expected benefits. This re-
duces women's wage returns to characteristics
relative to men's, and increases the traditionally
measured unexplained gap in wages.
This study takes a more general view of how
pensions affect the returns to characteristics by
recognizing that pensions influence the observed
relationship between productive characteristics
(X) and wages in numerous ways. It is unclear,
a priori, what the net effect is. On the one hand,
the theory of compensating differences suggests
that workers will have to sacrifice wages in order
to offset the cost of the pension. Thus, pensions
reduce wages. Working in the opposite direction
are three phenomena. First, following Salop and
Salop (1976), if pensions screen out quitters and
if a low quit propensity is a scarce resource, total
compensation in the pension sector will be
greater. Second, as Akerlof and Katz (1988) note,
when turnover costs are high, firms will comple-
ment pensions with tilted wage profiles (as in
Lazear (1979)), and efficiency wage premiums to
impede quits.4 Third, tax advantages induce
workers with unobservables that increase wages
to negotiate pensions. In contrast to the theory of
compensating differences, these effects increase
wages for a given X.
For the sake of illustration, assume that pen-
sions increase the wage return to X. In this case,
underrepresentation of women in the pension
4 Gustman and Steinmeier (1987) find empirical evidence of
efficiency wage premiums for pension workers.
This content downloaded from
179.6.208.243 on Thu, 27 Aug 2020 23:02:33 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
sector decreases the estimated return to X in a
pooled sample of pension and nonpension work-
ers. Elimination of unexplained differences in
pension coverage (thus increasing female repre-
sentation in the pension sector) reduces unex-
plained gender wage differences. The reverse is
true if pensions decrease the wage return to X.
The effect of pooling pension and nonpension
workers on the unexplained portion of the gender
wage gap is demonstrated by calculating the
change in wages that occurs if unexplained dif-
ferences in pension coverage are eliminated.
Three sources of the unexplained gap in pen-
sion coverage are screening, women receiving
lower wage returns to characteristics, and pen-
sion employers avoiding workers with high quit
rates. While it is impossible to sort out the rela-
tive importance of each factor, whether screening
plays a role can be ascertained. If women receive
lower wage returns to X because of higher quit
rates, and if pensions screen out quitters, the
gender difference in the return to X should be
reduced by pensions. Working in the opposite
direction is the greater life expectancy of women
which increases the difference in the wage re-
turns to X.
In sum, the study investigates three major
questions. First, for a given X, are women less
likely to have a pension? Second, if the unex-
plained difference in pension coverage is elimi-
nated, how much would the wage gap change?
Finally, does pension screening result in women's
wage returns being more equal to men's?
III. The Model
The econometric analysis relies upon an en-
dogenous switching regression model (Maddala
and Nelson, 1975). It consists of a wage equation
for the pension and nonpension sector, and an
equation that determines sector membership. De-
fine Wi as the observed wage; W1i and W21 as the
pension and nonpension wage of the ith worker,
respectively; Pi* as a latent variable that deter-
mines sector membership; Pi as an indicator vari-
able that equals one if worker i is in the pension
sector and equals zero otherwise; X, as a vector
of observed characteristics that determine wages;
and Zi as a vector of characteristics that deter-
mine pension membership.5 The switching re-
5X, and Z, may have variables in common.
 THE GENDER GAP IN PENSIONS AND WAGES 261

gression model is written as computations for the male sample are made by
interchanging the f and m subscripts in equa-
Wli = X43l + uli (1.1)
tions (4) and (5).
W2i = Xi432 + U2i (1.2) To determine how differential pension mem-
Pi*=Zi + Ei (1.3) bership contributes to the gender wage gap, the
Pi = 1 iff Pi* > Ofollowing question is posed: If a worker with the
= O iff Pi* < 0. average characteristics switched from the non-
pension to the pension sector, how much would
The distributional assumption is that (u
her wage change? To determine this, equations
are N(O, E).
(2) and (3) are differenced:
The expected value of worker i's wage condi-
tioned on observed characteristics and pension E(WJjIX, Pi = 1) - E(WIlXi, Pi = 0)
status is
X -i( 31_2) + o1A,li + 2A2i (6)
E(WjIlXi, Pi = 1) = Xi431 + a)1Ali (2) where Xi is the sample mean, and the computa-
E(W2jIXj, Pi = 0) = XiB32-to2A2i (3) tion is made separately for each sex.
The wage effect of underrepresentation of fe-
where A1li f(Zi5)/F(Zi8), A2i f(Zia)/(l -
males in the pension sector is determined by the
F(ZiS)), f(-) and F(A) are, respectively, the stan-
following approach. First, a predicted wage for
dard normal density and distribution functions,
each woman is generated with the estimates of
and oj is the covariance between Ei and uji(=
the switching regression model as follows:
1,2).
A A A A)
The model is estimated using Heckman's (1979)
Wi( f, t3f, (f0
two stage procedure. The first stage estimates a
probit model of pension membership to obtain 5.
- Pr(Pi = 1Zi) [ E(WA
The second stage estimates wage equations with + Pr(Pi = OIZ1)[E(W
selectivity corrections. - F(Zi?3)[Xif31f + (
The first issue is whether women are less likely
to have a pension than men, cetens paribus. The + [i - F(Zif)J [ Xif3
following approach is taken. First, the probit (7)
model of pension membership defined in (1.3) is where Aki(&f) (k = 1, 2) are the selectivity correc-
estimated separately for males and females. Us- tions computed with the coefficients from the
ing m and f subscripts to denote whether an female pension probit, and (f = ( 2f) rep-
estimated parameter is from the male or female resents the estimated selectivity coefficients from
sample, the predicted fraction of women (hf) the female wage equations.
with pensions is The predicted mean wage iS7
Nf
Nf

,LLf(8f) = (1i=A /Nt) E F(Zi8f) (4) W f,O f) _(f/N) E H f(f,Of f

where Nf is the number of females in the sample.6
If female pension membership is determined
by the male model, the predicted fraction of
women with pensions is
Nf
aLf(8m) = (1/Nf) E F(Zim) (5)
it=1
The difference [A/ifSA) -,uf(8m)] is the "unex-
plained" difference in pension coverage. Similar
6The expected fraction of women with pensions is not, in
general, equal to F(ZfSf) due to the nonlinearity of the 7 Due to the nonlinearity of the model, the predicted sample
probit model.
(8)
The consequence of the unexplained gender
gap in pension coverage for female wages is de-
termined by computing the expected wage when
female pension membership is determined by the
male model. The computation is the same as that
in (7)-(8) except that 8m replaces 8f everywhere.
The effect of sex differences in wage structure,
holding pension determination constant, is com-
puted by replacing (13f, (Of) with (Pm m) in
mean will not necessarily equal the true sample mean.

This content downloaded from

179.6.208.243 on Thu, 27 Aug 2020 23:02:33 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
262 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS

(7)-(8). The combined effect of differences in to differences in observed characteristics is artifi-

pension and wage determination is obtained by
Means of selected variables are provided in
replacing (1f, af, (Of) with (fm' Nm' m). Differ-
ences in observed characteristics explain the por-
tion of the wage gap not attributable to pension
and wage structure. By reversing the roles of
males and females in the above computations, a
symmetric analysis is possible with male wages as
the reference point.
IV. The Data and Empirical Results
The May 1983 Current Population Survey (CPS)
is chosen as the data source because of its pen-
sion information. Our subsample includes those
who are white, married, work 35 or more hours
per week, 25 to 64 years old, not enrolled in
school, and not a self-employed, agricultural, or
government worker.
The data have some shortcomings. For exam-
ple, whether a pension is defined benefit or de-
fined contribution plan is unknown. Defined
contribution plans are essentially tax-free savings
accounts that do not penalize quitters. For most
workers, the pension is expected to be a defined
benefit plan. Luzadis and Mitchell (1986) report
that 85% of pensions are defined benefit plans.
However, since some pensions do not penalize
quitters, the total effect of pension screening in
defined benefit plans will be underestimated.
A second potential problem is that compar-
isons of the pension effect across the sexes is
biased if gender affects the probability of having a
defined benefit versus defined contribution plan.
If, for example, all women have defined contribu-
tion plans and all men have defined benefit plans,
the screening effect would be larger for males.
Such a problem is unlikely, however. Two studies
(Luzadis and Mitchell, 1986, and Gustman and
Steinmeier, 1988) report that the gender differ- since the reverse argument may be true (i.e.,
women may have lower pension coverage because
ence in the probability of a defined benefit versus
defined contribution plan is only 1%-2%. they are not at large, unionized firms), results are
Another shortcoming of the data is that the presented with and without the job-specific con-
worker's true amount of "other experience" is
unknown, though the actual number of years with
the current employer is available. As a proxy for
other experience, (Age - Education - Tenure
- 6) is used. Since this is likely to overestimate
the true value for females, a smaller return on
their "other experience" is expected, implying
that the male-female wage difference attributed
cially low.
table 1. There are four notable differences across
groups: First, pension wages are 40% higher than
nonpension wages for men, and 32% higher for
women. Second, pension women earn 66% of
pension men's wages; nonpension women earn
71% of nonpension men's wages. Third, for each
sex, average tenure is higher for pension workers;
and for a given pension status, average tenure is
higher for men than women. Fourth, the percent-
age of workers with pensions is 51% for women
and 66% for men.
To determine whether, for a given set of ob-
served characteristics, women are less likely than
men to have a pension, a probit model of pension
coverage is estimated for each sex. There are
"worker-specific" and "job-specific" control vari-
ables. The worker-specific controls are: years of
education and its square; 10 occupation dum-
mies; 4 region dummies; age; the income of the
spouse; and the number of children in three
different age groups. These variables are included
because of their influence on the worker's pen-
sion demand. Education, occupation, and age all
influence wages, and hence the worker's demand
for pensions. The incom'e of the spouse will in-
crease pension demand by increasing the family's
marginal tax rate. The number and ages of chil-
dren will affect pension demand by altering the
family's saving behavior.
The job-specific controls are union member-
ship, the employer's firm size, and industry. Since
the job-specific variables are endogenous to the
pension choice, their inclusion may bias the re-
sults. That is, if women have lower pension de-
mand, they will avoid the large, unionized firms
that are more likely to offer pensions. However,
trols included.
For each sex, the control variables provide
significant explanatory power, but do not explain
much of the gender gap in coverage.8 The simu-
8A likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis that all coefficients
except the constant term are equal to zero is rejected at the
.01 level. Estimates of the probit model are available upon
request.

This content downloaded from

179.6.208.243 on Thu, 27 Aug 2020 23:02:33 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 THE GENDER GAP IN PENSIONS AND WAGES 263

TABLE l.-MEANS OF VARIABLES

Male Female
No Pension Pension No Pension Pension

Hourly Wage 8.92 12.19 6.12 7.99

Tenure 6.9 13.8 5.8 10.4
Union Membership 9.3% 35.4% 6.1% 22.1%
Firm Size
1-24 47.4% 8.4% 42.1% 8.5%
25-99 19.8% 9.8% 20.1% 10.1%
100-499 13.5% 13.5% 14.9% 17.2%
500-999 3.7% 5.5% 5.1% 9.2%
> 1000 15.6% 62.7% 17.9% 54.9%
Sample Size 1477 2916 941 983

TABLE 2.-SIMULATIONS OF PENSION COVERAGE
Predicted Pension Coveragea b
Without Job With Job
Characteristics Coefficients Characteristics Characteristics
Male Male 66.4% 66.4%
Male Female 48.5% 55.1%
Female Female 51.1% 51.1%
Female Male 69.7% 62.0%
d Predicted pension coverage isthe
ture, computed
exercise described (1/Nj)1F(Z,g3k)
and k indicate, respectively, the characteristics and coefficients employed.
bThe pension probit is estimated with and without job characteristics
(union membership, firm size, and industry).
lated pension coverage rates are presented in
table 2, with and without job-specific controls
included. For both specifications, the predicted
fraction of workers with a pension is equal to the
observed fraction. Without the job-specific con-
trols, if women receive pensions according to the
male model, pension coverage increases from
51.1% to 69.7%. With the job-specific controls,
the same simulation increases coverage to 62.0%.
The symmetric exercise for males supports simi-
lar conclusions. Worker characteristics do not
explain much of the gap in pension coverage, but
job-specific characteristics do.
To determine how pensions affect wage struc-
as in
equation (6) is w
performed. The results indicate that if the aver-
age male (female) worker switched from the pen-
sion to the nonpension sector, his (her) wage
would increase 15% (13%).9 Thus, pensions in-
crease returns to observed characteristics.
9 In an OLS regression of log(wage) on observed character-
istics and a dummy variable indicating pension status, the
pension effect is 14% and 12% for males and females, respec-
tively.

TABLE 3.-WAGE SIMULATIONSa

Assumptions Employed Predicted Wageb

Wage Pension Without Job With Job

Characteristics Coefficients Coefficients Characteristics Characteristics

Female Female Female 6.41 6.48

Female Female Male 7.26 6.69
Female Male Female 7.64 8.02
Female Male Male 8.63 8.49
Male Male Male 9.53 9.79
Male Male Female 9.00 9.43
Male Female Male 8.35 7.87
Male Female Female 7.39 7.59

d The wage regressions include the following control variables: occupation (manager, professional, technician,
sales, administrative support, service, precision production, operative, transport operative, equipment operative,
and laborer), industry (mining, construction, durable manufacturing, transportation, communications and utilities,
wholesale trade, retail trade, finance and insurance, business services, personal services, entertainment, or
professional services industry), firm size (0-24, 25 to 99, 100 to 499, 500 to 999, or 2 1000 employees), region
(Northeast, North Central, South, and West), residence in an SMSA, union membership, tenure with current
employer, other experience (age - education - tenure - 6), schooling and its square, and the appropriate selec-
tivity correction.
bThe wage is predicted with and without job characteristics (union membership, firm size, and industry)
included in the pension probit.

This content downloaded from

179.6.208.243 on Thu, 27 Aug 2020 23:02:33 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
264 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
Given that pensions enhance wages, women's
lower pension probabilities will partially explain
their lower average wage. The empirical results
support this hypothesis. Table 3 presents simu-
lated wages under alternative assumptions along
with a list of the control variables used in the
wage equations.10 According to the specification
without job-characteristics in the pension probit,
the gender gap in simulated wages is $3.12 ($9.53
- $6.41).11 Changing female pension determina-
tion to the male structure increases their average
wage by 13.3% (0.85/6.41). If women receive
pensions and wages according to the male model,
their wages increase 34.6% (2.22/6.41). Thus, of
the $2.22 unexplained gap in wages, 38.4% is due
to differential pension determination.
As expected, the importance of pension deter-
mination is reduced when job-specific variables
are included in the pension probit. According to
this specification, switching female pension deter-
mination to the model increases wages by 3.3%
(0.21/6.48). There is, however, an interaction be-
tween pension and wage structure that increases
the importance of each. Switching only wage
structure to the male model increases wages
23.7% (1.54/6.48), whereas changing both pen-
sion and wage structure increases wages 31.0%
(2.01/6.48). Thus, the sum of the individual ef-
fects (3.3 + 23.7) is less than the combined effect
(31.0).
A final concern is whether pension screening
reduces gender differences in the wage returns to
observed characteristics. To examine this point,
separate wage equations are estimated by pen-
sion status and sex using the same control vari-
ables described in table 3. Using the Oaxaca
(1973) technique, the gender wage gap is decom-
posed into explained and unexplained compo-
nents for pension and nonpension workers. Elim-
ination of unexplained differences increases
women's wages by 26% and 34%, respectively, in
the pension and nonpension sectors. Thus, men
and women receive more equal wage treatment in
the pension sector.
10 Since A changes when job characteristics are included in
the pension probit, separate wage equations are estimated for
each probit specification. Results are available upon request.
11Since ln (W) is the dependent variable, our technique
dence
generates a predicted value for the mean of ln(W), which is
exponentiated in table 3 to convert to standard units.
This content downloaded from
179.6.208.243 on Thu, 27 Aug 2020 23:02an 1976 12:34:56 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
V. Conclusions and Summary
Three important results from our wage simula-
tions are: (i) If the source of gender differences in
pension coverage were eliminated, women's aver-
age wages increase by 3%-13%. (ii) For each sex,
pension coverage is associated with a significant
(13%-15%) increase in the return to observed
characteristics. (iii) The smaller unexplained wage
gap in the pension sector provides suggestive
evidence of a screening effect that tends to equal-
ize the treatment of men and women.
More needs to be done to determine the causes
of female underrepresentation in the pension sec-
tor. In particular, this study provides no conclu-
sive evidence regarding whether women avoid, or
are avoided by, the pension sector. However, it
does show that most of the gender gap in pension
coverage is not explained by differences in worker
characteristics, though job characteristics do ex-
plain a substantial portion of the gap. Possible
explanations for this unexplained gap in coverage
include: screening, unobserved wage differences,
and pension employers avoiding workers with high
quit rates.
REFERENCES
Akerlof, George, and Lawrence Katz, "Workers' Trust Funds
and the Logic of Wage Profiles," National Bureau of
Economic Research Working Paper 2548 (Mar. 1988).
Bulow, Jeremy, and Lawrence Summers, "A Theory of Dual
Labor Markets with Application to Industrial Policy,
Discrimination, and Keynesian Unemployment," Jour-
nal of Labor Economics 4 (Apr. 1986), 376-414.
Corcoran, Mary, and Gregory Duncan, "Work History, Labor
Force Attachment, and Earnings Differences between
the Races and the Sexes," Joumal of Human Resources
14 (Winter 1979) 3-20.
Gustman, Alan, and Thomas Steinmeier, "Pensions, Effi-
ciency Wages, and Job Mobility," National Bureau of
Economic Research Working Paper 2426 (Nov. 1987).
_____, "An Analysis of Pension Benefit Formulas, Pension
Wealth and Incentives from Pensions," National Bu-
reau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 2535
(Mar. 1988).
Heckman, James, "Sample Selection Bias as a Specification
Error," Econometrica 47 (Jan. 1979), 153-161.
Ippolito, Richard, "The Labor Contract and True Economic
Pension Liabilities," American Economic Reuiew 75
(Dec. 1985), 1031-1043.
_____, "The Implicit Pension Contract: Developments and
New Directions," Joumal of Human Resources 22
(Summer 1987), 441-467.
Kotlikoff, Laurence J., and David Wise, "Labor Compensa-
tion and the Structure of Private Pension Plans: Evi-
for Contractual Versus Spot Labor Markets," in
David Wise (ed.), Pensions, Labor and Indiuidual
Choice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985).
 THE GENDER GAP IN PENSIONS AND WAGES 265

Lazear, Edward, "Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?"
Joumal of Political Economy 87 (Dec. 1979), 1261-1284.
Luzadis, Rebecca, and Olivia Mitchell, "Defined Benefit,
Defined Contribution, or No Pension?" mimeo (Aug.
1986).
Maddala, G. S., and Forest Nelson, "Switching Regression
Models with Exogenous and Endogenous Switching,"
Proceedings of the American Statistical Association
(1985), 423-426.
Mitchell, Olivia, "Fringe Benefits and Labor Mobility," Jour-
nal of Human Resources 17 (Spring 1982), 286-298.
Moore, Robert, "Are Male/Female Earnings Differentials
Related to Life-Expectancy-Caused Pension Cost Dif-
ferences?" Economic Inquiry 25 (July 1987), 389-401.
Oaxaca, Ronald, "Male-Female Wage Differentials in Urban
Labor Markets," Intemational Economic Review 14
(Oct. 1973), 693-709.
Salop, Joanne, and Steven Salop, "Self-Selection and Turnover
in the Labor Market," Quarterly Journal of Economics
91 (Feb. 1976), 39-57.
Schiller, Bradley R., and Randall D. Weiss, "The Impact of
Private Pensions on Firm Attachments," this REVIEW
61 (Aug. 1980), 369-380.

This content downloaded from

179.6.208.243 on Thu, 27 Aug 2020 23:02:33 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms