Lawyers League for a Better Philippines vs.

Aquino, 22 May 1986

FACTS:

Proclamation No. 1 on February 25, 1986 was issued by President Corazon Aquino announcing that she
and Vice President Laurel were taking power. Petitioners alleged that the Aquino government is illegal
because it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Aquino Government is legitimate?

RULING:

Yes. The Court held that:

 The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire
country;
 It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and
 The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.

Hence, the legitimacy of the Aquino Government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of
politics where only the people are the judge.
Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez, 17 September 1945
G.R. No. L-5a

FACTS:

The Imperial Japanese Forces occupied the City of Manila on January 2, 1942. The next day their
Commander in Chief proclaimed "the Military Administration under law over the districts occupied by the
Army." In said proclamation, it was also provided that "so far as the Military Administration permits, all the
laws now in force in the Commonwealth, as well as executive and judicial institutions, shall continue to be
effective for the time being as in the past," and "all public officials shall remain in their present posts and
carry on faithfully their duties as before."

A civil government or central administration organization under the name of "Philippine Executive
Commission was organized by Order No. 1 issued on January 23, 1942, by the Commander in Chief of
the Japanese Forces in the Philippines, and Jorge B. Vargas, who was appointed Chairman thereof, was
instructed to proceed to the immediate coordination of the existing central administrative organs and
judicial courts, based upon what had existed therefore, with approval of the said Commander in Chief,
who was to exercise jurisdiction over judicial courts.

The so-called Republic of the Philippines was inaugurated, but no substantial change was effected
thereby in the organization and jurisdiction of the different courts that functioned during the Philippine
Executive Commission, and in the laws they administered and enforced.

A few days after the historic landing in Leyte, General Douglas MacArthur issued a proclamation to the
People of the Philippines which declared:

1. That the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines is, subject to the supreme
authority of the Government of the United States, the sole and only government having legal and
valid jurisdiction over the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control;

2. That the laws now existing on the statute books of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and
the regulations promulgated pursuant thereto are in full force and effect and legally binding upon
the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control; and

3. That all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of
the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free
of enemy occupation and control.

The City of Manila was partially liberated and on February 27, 1945, General MacArthur, on behalf of the
Government of the United States, solemnly declared "the full powers and responsibilities under the
Constitution restored to the Commonwealth whose seat is here established as provided by law."

ISSUE:

Whether or not under the rules of international law, even after the liberation or reoccupation of the
Philippines by the United States and Filipino forces, the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts
established in the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the
Philippines remained good and valid?

RULING:

Yes, they remained good and valid even after the liberation by the United States and Filipino Forces.
By virtue of the principle postliminy (postliminium), the fact that a territory which has been occupied by an
enemy comes again into the power of its legitimate government of sovereignty, “does not, except in a very
few cases, wipe out the effects of acts done by an invader, which for one reason or another it is within his
competence to do. Thus, judicial acts done under his control, when they are not of a political complexion,
administrative acts so done, to the extent that they take effect during the continuance of his control, and
the various acts done during the same time by private persons under the sanction of municipal law,
remain good.
 Province of North Cotabato vs. GRP Peace Panel, 14 October 2008
GR No. 183591 Oct. 14, 2008

FACTS:

On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the
Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of
Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of
2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

The Province of North Cotabato and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piñol filed a petition, for Mandamus and
Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order. Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel
respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its
attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of
the MOA-AD and the holding of a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the
MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional.

Petitions were filed before the Court, among other reliefs, praying for declaring such MOA-AD
unconstitutional and preventing its execution.
1. GR No. 183591 filed by the Province of North Cotabato and VG E. Pinol;
2. GR No. 183572 filed by the City of Zamboanga, et al;
3. GR No. 183893 filed by the City of Iligan et al;
4. GR No. 183951 filed by the Province of Zamboanga de Norte and;
5. GR No. 183962 filed by Sen. E. Maceda, et al.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the MOA-AD has a status of a treaty which is binding?

RULING:

No.

Even if the UN DRIP were considered as part of the law of the land pursuant to Article II, Section 2 of the
Constitution, it would not suffice to uphold the validity of the MOA-AD so as to render its compliance with
other laws unnecessary.

It is, therefore, clear that the MOA-AD contains numerous provisions that cannot be reconciled with the
Constitution and the laws as presently worded. Respondents proffer, however, that the signing of the
MOA-AD alone would not have entailed any violation of law or grave abuse of discretion on their part,
precisely because it stipulates that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the laws shall not take effect
until these laws are amended.

It created neither rights nor obligations capable of being regulated by international law. An agreement
which brings to an end an internal armed conflict no doubt creates a factual situation of restoration of
peace that the international community acting through the Security Council may take note of. That,
however, will not convert it to an international agreement which creates an obligation enforceable in
international, as distinguished from municipal law.

An international agreement in the nature of a treaty must create rights and obligations regulated by
international law, so that a breach of its terms will be a breach determined under international law which
will also provide principle means of enforcement.
An international agreement in the nature of a treaty must create rights and obligations regulated by
international law, so that a breach of its terms will be a breach determined under international law which
will also provide principle means of enforcement.
Holy See vs. Rosario, 01 December 1994
G.R. No. 101949 December 1, 1994

FACTS:

Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is
represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio.

Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged in the real
estate business.

This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters (Lot 5-A,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 390440) located in the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila and
registered in the name of petitioner. Said Lot 5-A is contiguous to Lots 5-B and 5-D which are covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 271108 and 265388 respectively and registered in the name of the
Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A.
Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private
respondent.

In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a dispute arose as to
who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the
relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and Development
Corporation (Tropicana).

Private respondent thus prayed for: (1) the annulment of the Deeds of Sale between petitioner and the
PRC on the one hand, and Tropicana on the other; (2) the reconveyance of the lots in question; (3)
specific performance of the agreement to sell between it and the owners of the lots; and (4) damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Holy See can be sued?

RULING:

No. The Holy See has immunity from suits.

Under the Vienna Convention, a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from the civil and administrative
jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable property situated in the
territory of the receiving state which the envoy holds, on behalf of the sending state for the purposes of
the mission. If this immunity is provided for a diplomatic envoy, with all the more reason should immunity
be recognized as regards the sovereign itself, which in this case is the Holy See.

The issue of petitioner's non-suability can be determined by the trial court without going to trial in the light
of the pleadings, particularly the admission of private respondent. Besides, the privilege of sovereign
immunity in this case was sufficiently established by the Memorandum and Certification of the
Department of Foreign Affairs.
Western Sahara Case, Advisory Opinion of 16 October 1975, ICJ Reports 1975, p. 12

FACTS:

The Western Sahara, or former Spanish Sahara, is an expanse of desert measuring over 260,000 square
kilometers, bordered by Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania. The territory, which traditionally had a tribal,
nomadic population, was under Spanish occupation from 1904 until 1975. Following the second world
war, the rise of nationalist sentiment had a destabilizing effect on the European colonial powers. The
United Nations eventually responded to the growing demands for self-determination by adopting a
resolution on decolonization in 1960.

In the meantime, Morocco had put forth its own claims to sovereignty over the Western Sahara. On
December 13, 1974, the United Nations General Assembly asked the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
to provide an advisory opinion on whether the Western Sahara was, at the time of colonization by Spain,
a terra nullius (no man’s land) and, if not, what the legal ties were between this territory and the Kingdom
of Morocco and Mauritania.

ISSUE:

Is the Moroccan territorial claims to Western Sahara valid?

RULING:

No. The court’s opinion, issued on October 16, 1975, found that there was no evidence “of any tie of
territorial sovereignty” between the Western Sahara and either Morocco or Mauritania, but that there were
“indications of a legal tie of allegiance between the [Moroccan] sultan and some, although only some, of
the tribes in the territory.” In addition, the court found “the existence of rights, including some rights
relating to the land, which constituted legal ties between the Mauritanian entity and the territory of the
Western Sahara.” However, the court concluded that it “has not found legal ties of such a nature as might
affect the application of [General Assembly] resolution 1514 (XV) in the decolonization of the Western
Sahara and, in particular, of the principle of self-determination.”
 FISHERIES CASE (UK v NORWAY)

FACTS:

On 28 September 1949, the Government of the United Kingdom filed with the Registry of International
Court of Justice an application instituting proceedings against the Kingdom of Norway. The subject of the
proceedings was the validity or otherwise, under international law, of the lines of delimitation of the
Norwegian fisheries zone as laid down in a Decree of 12 July 1935.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the validity of the lines of delimitation was in accordance with international law?

RULING:

Yes, the Court ruled that neither the methods nor the baseline stipulations in the decree were contrary to
international law.

The ICJ found that the lines drawn were in accordance with the traditional Norwegian system and,
moreover, pointed out that they were a result of a careful study initiated by the Norwegian authorities as
far back as 1911. The Court pointed out that the Norwegian Government has relied upon historic title
since the end of the Seventeenth Century”. In addition, the Court considered that "traditional rights
reserved to the inhabitants of the Kingdom over fishing grounds … founded on the vital needs of the
population and attested by very ancient and peaceful usage, may legitimately be taken into account in
drawing a line, which, moreover, appears to the Court to have been kept within the bounds of what is
moderate and reasonable".

The ruling ended a long controversy between UK and Norway which had aroused considerable interest in
other maritime states.
CLIPPERTON ISLAND ARBITRATION
FRANCE v MEXICO Jan. 8, 1931

FACTS:

Both France and Mexico were claiming ownership over Clipperton Island, an uninhabited corral atoll in the
eastern Pacific Ocean, southwest of Mexico. Mexico was claiming it by virtue of the activities it had
undertaken therein from as early as 1848 to 1849. As for France, they discovered Clipperton Island and
drew a map and Emperor Napoleon III annexed the same as a French colony, together with Haiti. In
1725, an expedition took place and they lived in the island for several months. Mexico and France
submitted the dispute to a binding arbitration by King Emmanuel Victor of Italy.

ISSUE:

Who between France and Mexico has sovereignty over the island?

RULING:

The taking of possession consists in the act or series of acts by which the occupying state reduces to its
possession the territory in question and takes steps to exercise exclusive authority there.

Thus, if a territory is completely uninhabited, from the first moment an occupying state makes its
appearance there, at the absolute and undisputed disposition of that state, from that moment, the taking
of possession must be considered as accomplished, and the occupation is thereby completed.

Here, France occupied and possessed the Clipperton Island first.