Frederick P. Van de Pitte (Auth.) - Kant As Philosophical Anthropologist-Springer Netherlands (1971)

KANT AS PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGIST
KANT AS PHILOSOPHICAL
ANTHROPOLOG 1ST
by
FREDERICK P. VAN DE PITTE

University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta
MARTINUS NIJHOFF / THE HAGUE / 1971

© 1971 by Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
All rights reserved, including the right to translate or to
reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form
ISBN-13: 978-90-247-5120-4 e-ISBN-13: 978-94-011-7532-6
001: 10.1007/978-94-011-7532-6
To Margaret
CONTENTS
Preface . IX
Introduction. 1
Chapter I: The Genesis of the Anthropology. 7
Chapter II: Kant's Explicitly Formulated Anthropology 17
Chapter III: Anthropology and the First Critique . 32
Chapter IV: Rousseau and Kant's Moral Philosophy. 49
Chapter V: Anthropological Implications of the Third Critique. 70
Chapter VI: Kant's Rational Religion. 82
Chapter VII: The Role of Teleology in the Work of Kant. 94
Conclusion . 108
PREFACE
This work is the product of several years of intense study of the various
aspects of Kant's work, and the attempt to provide insights for students both
with respect to the details of the Kantian system, and into the development
and implications of the system as a whole. During that time many individuals
have contributed to its ultimate formulation, and I would like to express my
appreciation at least to the more generous contributors. For a careful reading
of the manuscript in its earlier forms, and suggestions which helped in many
ways to improve the work and to crystalize its thesis, I would like to thank
Professors Wilbur Long, A. C. Ewing, and Richard Bosley. For their interest
and encouragement in the later stages of the project, I must thank Professor
Lewis White Beck, and the many students who have taken my Kant seminar
at the University of Alberta, especially Mr. Dieter Hartmetz. And finally, 1
acknowledge with pleasure my longstanding debt to Professor William H.
Werkmeister for his years of critical advice and encouragement. Perhaps only
Kant and my wife have contributed more to my philosophic development.
Acknowledgment must also be made of the permission kindly granted
by various publishers for the use of material from the following works
under their copyright. Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, translated by
Lewis White Beck (copyright 1956, by The Liberal Arts Press, Inc.), ex-
cerpts reprinted by permission of The Liberal Arts Press Division of the
Bobbs Merrill Company, Inc. The Development of Kantian Thought, by
Herman-J. de Vleeschauwer, translated by A. R. C. Duncan (copyright
1962, by Thomas Nelson & Sons, Ltd). Kant's Religion Within the Limits
of Reason Alone, translated with an introduction and notes by Theodore
M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (copyright 1934, by The Open Court
Publishing Co., La Salle, Illinois). Rousseau, Kant, Goethe, by Ernst
Cassirer, translated by James Gutman, Paul Oskar Kristeller, and John
Herman Randall, Jr. (copyright 1945, by Princeton University Press). A
Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, by Lewis White Beck
x PREFACE
(copyright 1960, by The University of Chicago Press). Kant: Philosophical

Correspondence 1759-99, edited and translated by Arnulf Zweig (copyright
1967, by The University of Chicago Press). Finally, I am grateful to Walter
de Gruyter & Co. for permission to quote from the excellent Academy
Edition of Kant's work, and to the KoIner Universitiits-Verlag for per-
mission to quote from Forrest Williams' article "Philosophical Anthro-
pology and the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment," which appeared in Kant-
Studien, Vol. XLVI (1954-55).
INTRODUCTION
The writings of Immanuel Kant are one of the most fertile grounds available
to the student of the history of philosophy. They contain profound insights
in every major field of philosophy, and provide revolutionary concepts in
metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. Moreover, the influence of Kant's
thought on succeeding generations of philosophers makes a thorough under-
standing of his work essential to the mastery even of the most recent writers.
In fact, it may be said that few men have enriched the western tradition, or
influenced its direction so greatly, as has Kant. Consequently, an enormous
body of literature has been developed, which centers around Kant - either
analyzing and interpreting his own works, or tracing the lines of his influence
into the works of others.
In view of these facts, it is surprising to note the neglect which certain
aspects of Kant's work have suffered since his own period. As one might
expect, there are minor topical essays which are of no great interest today,
and to which little attention is likely to be paid. But there are more significant
works, as well- notably those which, taken together, constitute Kant's contri-
bution to anthropology. For example, there is, at present, no complete
English translation of the Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, and no
comprehensive study of this work has yet appeared. A partial translation,
covering Part I, Book I, of the Anthropologie appeared in the Journal of
Speculative Philosophy, beginning in 1875; and there are a number of works
in epistemology and aesthetics which draw upon the Anthropologie for in-
cidental material. But these exceptions only emphasize the general neglect
of this important work. And the shorter anthropological works have suffered
a similar fate.
From the standpoint of science. this neglect may be justifiable, since the
period of Kant produced much more significant contributions in both
physical and cultural anthropology than Kant was able to make.! The work
1 This is not meant to imply that Kant produced nothing of importance. Benno
2 INTRODUCTION
of Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1752-1840),2 who is recognized as the

father of physical anthropology,S and the multitude of travel literature, such
as the Voyages (1773) of Captain James Cook, will suffice to remind one of
the wealth of material produced at that time.
But from the philosophic standpoint, such neglect seems unwarranted. It
is true, of course, that even the student of Kant's work may be inclined to
neglect the anthropological works, since Kant gives anthropology a relatively
minor role in the general scheme of science. In his explicit references to
anthropology, Kant customarily mentions it as an empirical science which,
with physics, makes up empirical philosophy. The latter, in turn, is dis-
tinguished from pure philosophy, which is comprised of logic and meta-
physics. 4 And while Kant is not unconcerned with empirical philosophy, it
is well known that the most important aspects of his work lie in the realm of
pure philosophy.
Nonetheless, the technical position which Kant gives to anthropology as
an empirical science should not mislead one to conclude that anthropology
plays no other role in his work. We find, for example, that the concern of
contemporary philosophy with philosophical anthropology 5 derives directly
from the Kantian tradition. It may be said, in fact, that it was Kant's famous
formulation of basic questions which gave philosophical anthropology its
distinctively modern character.
These questions were first raised in his lectures on Logic, wherein he was
attempting to provide an integrated view of the entire field of philosophy in
a modern context.
The field of philosophy, in this sense, may be reduced to the following questions:
1. What can I know?
2. What ought I to do?
3. What may I hope?
4. What is man?
The first question is answered by Metaphysics, the second by Morals, the
third by Religion, and the fourth by Anthropology. In reality, however, all these
Erdmann maintains that the work Bestimmung des Begriffs der Menschenrasse assures
for Kant an honorable name in the history of modem anthropology. Reflexionen
Kants zur kritischen Philosophie (2 vols.; Leipzig: Fues's Verlag, 1882-84), J, p. 55.
Cited hereafter as Reflexionen.
2 Most important was his De Generis Humani Varietate Nativa, Gottingen, 1775.
3 Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1961 ed., Vol. II.
4 This division, which seems to express Kant's mature view, is mentioned, for ex-
ample, in the preface to the Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals.
5 For those unaware of the traditional position of philosophical anthropology in
Continental thought, and the prominence of this discipline in recent years (especially
following the work of Scheler), it may clarify matters to emphasize that this is not at all
an empirical science, but rather a purely philosophical attempt to establish the essen-
INTRODUCTION 3
might be reckoned under anthropology, since the first three questions refer to
the last,6
Here we have the first clear formulation of the problem of anthropology in
a philosophic context, with an explicit statement of its relation to other areas
of philosophy.
It is not our intention, of course, to maintain that all aspects of philosophi-
cal anthropology find their origin in Kant; such a position would ignore a
great deal of evidence to the contrary. We cannot even credit Kant with
originating the term "philosophical anthropology," for in Baumgarten's
Metaphysica (third edition, 1749), which Kant used as the basis for his
lectures on metaphysics, we find mention of a study of man which he called
anthropoiogia philosophica et mathematica sive anthropometria. 7
But Kant was the first to introduce anthropology as a branch of study in
German universities,8 and he took pride in the fact that these lectures were
read at no other institution. 9 That the course was more than an analysis of
scientific data is indicated in a description of it given by one of Kant's stu-
dents:
Anthropology signifies in general the experimental doctrine of the nature of
man; and is divided, by Kant, into
1) theoretical or empirical doctrine of mind, which is a branch of Natural
Philosophy;
2) practical, applied and empirical Philosophy of Morals; Ethics - the con-
sideration of the moral law in relation to the human will, its inclinations, motives,
and to the obstacles in practising that law. 1o
Clearly Kant was attempting to communicate a conception of man that was

not merely empirical and descriptive, but essential and normative. Here,
then, we have a complete anthropology: one that is pursued in depth, and
tial nature of man. For a brief general treatment of the topic, see the contribution of
H. O. Pappi:, "Philosophical Anthropology," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed.
Paul Edwards (New York: The Macmillan Co. & The Free Press, 1967), pp. 159-166.
6 Kant's Introduction to Logic, trans. Thomas Kingsmill Abbott (London: Long-
mans, Green, and Co., 1885), p. 15.
7 See the discussion of this point by Friedrich Delekat, Immanuel Kant; Historisch-
Kritische Interpretation der Hauptschriften (Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer, 1963), p. 171.
The present reference is to section 747 of the Metaphysica. Erdmann claims that Kant
took the name for his lectures from Platner's "scholastischen" Anthropologie (Re-
f/exionen, I, p. 48), but in view of the fact mentioned above, this seems unlikely.
8 Erdmann, Reflexionen, I, p. 48.
9 Fr. Ch. Starke [Johann Adam Bergk], I. Kants Menschenkunde oder philoso-
phische Anthropologie (Leipzig: Die Expedition des europliischen Aufsehers, 1831),
p.5.
10 A. F. M. Willich, Elements of the Critical Philosophy (London: N. T. Longman,
1798), p. 140. Willich attended Kant's lectures between the years 1778-1781, and again
in 1792 (p. iii).
4 INTRODUCTION
from every aspect open to the scholar of the period. Both as an empirical
science, and as a philosophic discipline, the investigation of the nature of
man took on new life and vigor in the work of Kant.
From what has been said, it should be clear that there are two distinct
conceptions of anthropology to be found in Kant's work. As an empirical
science, anthropology is relegated to a minor position in the system, though
it played an important part in Kant's teaching career. It is primarily the
empirical aspect of anthropology which is presented in the Anthropologie
itself. The second conception of anthropology is that which we find in Kant's
four questions: a discipline which can encompass the other aspects of phi-
losophy - a general philosophical conception of the nature and destiny of
man. Both the empirical and the philosophical treatments of anthropology in
Kant's work are worthy of further study, we feel, and one of the purposes of
the present work is to understand them more fully.
Unfortunately, however, while many contemporary figures refer to Kant's
four questions, and recognize him as having provided some kind of foundation
and/or directive for the development of the new discipline - Philosophical
Anthropology - there is almost no recognition of Kant's own contributions
to this field. There seems, in fact, to be a double confusion. First the (perhaps
understandable) error is made of assigning empirical anthropology to a
minor position in Kant's work, as a rather small group of lectures and essays
which play no obvious part in the development of the system as a whole. l l
Then the term "anthropology" is reduced to a univocal status in which it
always refers to an empirical discipline, despite Kant's explicit statements to
the contrary.
Like most misconceptions, of course, these errors are built upon half-
truths. It is quite true, for example, that Kant originally took up anthropolo-
gy as an interesting study of empirical data found in the travelogues and
scientific treatises of his day. But he soon recognized that no significant con-
clusions concerning the nature of man could be derived from such a study.
It would be necessary, rather, to undertake a theoretical, purely philosophi-
cal anthropology which would deal with the entire question of human nature
and human destiny. Such a discipline would be approached through all the
avenues open to the well-rounded philosopher, and would involve a pure,
theoretical groundwork encompassing all the elements of human experience
(speculative, practical, aesthetic), and the application of the principles thus
derived to the various aspects of man's individual and social condition. But
11 It should be a simple matter as we progress to demonstrate that this is in fact an

error, and one which is primarily due to a lack of real acquaintance with Kant's
writings.
INTRODUCTION 5
if this is indeed how Kant conceived anthropology in its full sense, and if he
truly considered his work to be the fulfillment of this conception, then surely
no aspect of his anthropological work can be neglected as insignificant, and
the full influence of anthropology on his system of philosophy can hardly be
overemphasized. It is precisely the establishment of these hypotheses which
we shall undertake in the following pages.
In one sense the perspective sketched here is not novel. It is well known
that Kant included anthropological data in his lectures on other topics,
especially ethics and metaphysics. 12 In addition, the temporal priority of the
anthropology lectures (in relation to the Critical Philosophy) leads one to
suspect that there may be causal priority as well; and one occasionally en-
counters an explicit statement that the anthropological perspective is essential
to the later development of Kant's thought.1 3 But no one has taken the trouble
to elaborate upon this notion, or to document it. It is far more common, as
we have already noted, to encounter comments which disparage Kant's
anthropological work as merely a series of popular lectures and essays, or,
even worse, to find it completely ignored. For those already familiar with the
work of Kant, it may avoid misconceptions if we point out at the beginning
that it would be folly at this late date to pretend to have discovered a totally
new conception of Kant's work, or totally new data on which such a con-
ception might be based. Actually most of the material which we shall discuss
is well-known to scholars in the field (some, indeed, so often cited as to be-
come tedious), but the full implications of this material seem never to be
brought out, and the proper interpretation (when made) seems never to be
justified and developed. It will be our task to systematically eliminate these
deficiencies.
From what has been said, it should be clear that it is not our intention
merely to remedy the neglect of a certain aspect of Kant's work, or to pro-
mote scholarly concern that all areas of Kant's work be given a fair hearing.
Nor is it simply a matter of demonstrating the relation between the Anthro-
pologie and the Critical Philosophy, or even of showing the influence of
Kant's anthropological interests in the broad sense on his Critical thought.
Rather, it is the task of displaying clearly that Kant's Critical Philosophy is
the pure philosophical core of his fully developed conception of man, and
12 Such material is clearly discernible as early as 1765-66. See Kant's announcement

of lectures, Kants gesammelte Sch riften , ed. Koniglich Preussische Akademie der
Wissenschaften (23 vols; I-VIII, XIV-XVI Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1905-14; IX-XIII,
XVII-XXIII Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1922-55), II, p. 311. Cited hereafter as
Schriften. Cf. also Erdmann, Reflexionen, I, Intro.
13 See, for example, Friedrich Paulsen, Immanuel Kant: His Life and Doctrine,
trans. J. E. Creighton and A. Lefevre (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1902), p. 39.
6 INTRODUCTION
man's place in reality. In other words, that Kant's system is precisely what
we would currently call a philosophical anthropology, and that the three
Critiques constitute the a priori framework which serves as its basis and its
guaranty of adequacy.
The complete task will require an examination of Kant's system as it
gradually developed. In the process it will be useful to consider the relation
of anthropological and critical works through textual analysis and cor-
relation. This will best provide evidence of direct lines of influence between
the two areas. But this technique will almost necessarily provide a rather
disorganized view of Kant's work as a whole. And it must be remembered
that our primary project is to display the synthetic unity of Kant's system in
its entirety when it is viewed from the standpoint of the nature and destiny
of man. 14 It will be necessary, therefore, to conclude with an analysis of basic
themes which flow through all the works, and bind them together in an
anthropological framework.
14 Perhaps the work which best emphasizes the synthetic unity of Kant's work, and
at the same time comes closest to a proper demonstration of the importance of human
nature in its development, is Paul Menzer's work Kants Lehre von der Entwicklung
in Natur und Geschichte (Berlin: Georg Reimer Verlag, 1911). But, to the best of our
knowledge, the precise perspective and emphasis of the present work is as yet unrepre-
sented.
CHAPTER I
THE GENESIS OF THE ANTHROPOLOGY
It is always dangerous in a philosophic context to relate the work of an

individual to the events and details of his biography. Too often this kind of
liaison results in a genetic account involving pure conjecture, or a form of
reductionism which loses the significance of the work in question. It is
precisely this sort of analysis which has reduced Aristotle to a "treason com-
plex," Descartes to a moral coward, and Martin Heidegger to a Nazi sym-
pathizer. Obviously, such thinking is far more likely to distort, than to clarify,
the content of a man's work.
At the same time, however, it is impossible to ignore completely the
circumstances and events which seem genuinely to contribute to the develop-
ment of a body of thought. In attempting to build a background against
which Kant's anthropology developed, therefore, we shall try to give only
what seems clearly pertinent and necessary for the presentation ahead.
Probably the single most important factor in the early formation of Kant's
character and personality is the pietistic orientation of his parents. Actually,
this influence must first be attributed to his mother, who was a member of the
Pietist group within the Lutheran Church. His father, while less religiously
inclined, laid a strong emphasis on morality, and took particular pains to
impress upon his children a love for the truth. 1
The impression which Kant's homelife made upon him was both profound
and lasting. Later, in contemplating the work which he had done as a tutor
in the home of a count not far from Konigsberg, he said that "he had often
thought, with deep emotion, of the incomparably more excellent training
which he had received in his home, where, as he gratefully boasted, he had
never seen or heard anything that was immoral." 2 Even in later years, when
1 J. H. W. Stuckenberg, The Life of Immanuel Kant (London: Macmillan and Co.,

1882), p. 6.
2 Ibid., p. 9.
8 THE GENESIS OF THE ANTHROPOLOGY
he had no sympathy for Pietism. Kant felt it necessary to distinguish between

its good and bad forms. He maintained that those who sincerely adopted
pietistic principles were often extraordinary people. They displayed a kind
of rest. cheerfulness. and inner peace which no passion could disturb. "No
need and no persecution disheartened them. no contention could excite them
to anger and enmity. In a word. even the mere observer was involuntarily
inspired to respect." 3 That this characterization was applied to his parents is
also quite clear. Kant tells of remembering how a quarrel about their re-
spective rights broke out between the guilds of the harness-makers and of the
saddlers. from which his father - a saddler - suffered a great deal. In spite
of personal suffering. however. a proper spirit of charity was always main-
tained. Even in the conversation of the family home. Kant reports. "this
quarrel was mentioned with such forbearance and love toward the op-
ponents. and with such firm confidence in Providence. that the thought of it.
though I was only a boy then. will never leave me." 4 The purity of this in-
fluence is staggering when we find that Kant. the strict - even severe -
moralist. could say: "Never. not even a single time was I permitted to hear
anything improper from my parents; never did I see in them anything that
was wrong." 5 Such an influence was clearly an important force in molding
Kant's character.
But Pietism was not merely a part of Kant's homelife. In the spring of
1732, Kant entered the Collegium Fridericianum. The rector of this school.
Dr. F. A. Schulz, was also the pastor of the family church. and he was un-
doubtedly responsible for this educational opportunity. Stuckenberg tells us
that the rector was much occupied with other matters. and left the business
affairs of the gymnasium to a man named Schiffert - also a zealous Pietist
and a good scholar. But Schulz remained the ruling spirit in the school, and
his power was especially felt in its religious atmosphere. "The spiritual
element was the most prominent in the institution, and everything had a
Pietistic hue." 6 Each day much time was devoted to devotional exercises.
and these were chiefly emotional. or intended to arouse religious emotion;
their purpose was to promote a conviction of sin. and to effect conversion.
Unfortunately. Kant had no taste at all for such forms of piety, and no sym-
pathy for emotional religion. 7
It is important to realize that Kant spent eight and one half years at the
3 Ibid., pp. 9-10.

4 Ibid., p. 10.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid., p. 22.
7 Ibid., pp. 22.23.
THE GENESIS OF THE ANTHROPOLOGY 9
gymnasium. s Even if, as a consequence, he later rejected the external trap-

pings of religious observance, he could hardly have failed during this time
to cultivate a deep and lasting awareness of the moral dimension of human
experience. As Stuckenberg expresses it: "Pietism did not win his heart, but
it moulded his conscience." 9
The importance of this period becomes especially clear when we recall
that the young Kant was very sensitive, and had early been encouraged to
perceive the world through reverent eyes. In speaking of his mother in later
years, he clearly recalled her efforts in that direction. He told how she had
often taken him outside the city, directed his attention to the works of God,
spoke with pious rapture of His omnipotence, wisdom, and goodness, and
impressed on his heart a deep reverence for the Creator of all things. Kant
felt that his mother had planted and nourished in him the first good seed,
and opened his heart to the impressions of nature. She aroused and enlarged
his thoughts, and her instruction had an abiding and blessed influence on his
life. 10 We must add to this intellectual stimulus, also, the fact that Kant was
never of a very strong physical constitution. This is not, of course, to say
that he was predetermined to a life of speculative philosophy; but it is im-
portant to realize that he did not have the option of a life of robust physical
activity.
While at the gymnasium, Kant studied Latin, Greek, Hebrew, French,
history, logic, mathematics, and geography. German was studied at that time
in connection with rhetoric and poetry, but not as a separate discipline. No
natural history or physics was taught.1 1 Apparently only one instructor
sparked the interest of Kant at that time, a Latin scholar named Heyden-
reich. But through this man Kant acquired a good Latin style, and a broad
foundation in the classics. As Stuckenberg points out, the diligent study of
the classics was of great and permanent value to Kant. It enabled him to use
the Latin language easily and gracefully, as we see in his later dissertations in
that language; "but it also laid the basis for that broad humanistic culture
which was so noticeable in his conversation and lectures." 12 It is perhaps
here that we catch the first glimpse of Kant's later interests.
At the University of Konigsberg, which he entered in 1740, Kant again
attached himself to the courses of a particular instructor. In Martin Knutzen,
he found a replacement for Heydenreich, and his interests changed to the
subjects Knutzen was teaching. These included the whole field of philosophy,
8 Ibid., p. 20.
9 Ibid., p. 24.
10 Ibid., pp. 7-8.
11 I bid., p. 26.
12 Ibid., p. 28.
as well as mathematics and natural science. 13 After finishing his coursework,

Kant's specialties were mathematics, physics, metaphysics, and morals,
though metaphysics was almost certainly the least important of his current
interests. 14
But Knutzen was important in Kant's development for another reason.
Apparently Kant entered into closer personal relations with Knutzen than
with his other teachers. In addition to hearing his lectures and taking part in
his reviews and discussions, he also consulted him about his studies, and
conversed with him on learned subjects. Knutzen was pleased with Kant's
abilities and thirst for knowledge, and placed his library at Kant's disposal.
He also gave him direction in his reading, "and it was in this way that the
eager student became acquainted with the works of eminent scholars, in-
cluding those of Newton." 15 This was the first time that Kant was able to
satisfy his intense desire to read extensively, and he took full advantage of it.
It was during these university years, also, that Kant brought into focus the
intellectual tendencies which were apparent in his earlier years. Stuckenberg
tells us that, in Kant, intellectuality almost amounted to a passion. 16 His
mind was in complete command of his being, and he was able to subject his
physical states to this mental power. It was in this way that he overcame the
disadvantage of his frail physical condition. In a letter to Dr. Hufeland, he
tells how his flat and narrow chest had always restricted his internal organs
to the point of causing a deep feeling of oppression at times. But realizing
that this oppressive feeling was probably only mechanical, and could not be
removed, he soon brought it to pass that he paid no attention to it. There-
after, while he felt oppressed in his chest, his head was clear, and he pos-
sessed a cheerfulness which he could voluntarily communicate in society.
"The oppression in my chest remained, for its cause lies in the structure of
my body," Kant informed the doctor. But he added, "I have become master
of its influence on my thoughts and actions, by turning my attention away
from this feeling altogether, just as if it did not at all concern me." 17 It is,
of course, this great intellectual power which dominates the structure of his
later work. While there is always a practical aspect to the work of Kant, there
is also a paradoxical inability to work at the practical level. His intellect is
faced with the difficulty of compensating for this deficiency in the context
of each new problem.
13 Paulsen, Immanuel Kant: His Life and Doctrine, p. 32.

14 Stuckenberg, op. cit., pp. 44 and 46.
15 Ibid., pp. 44-45.
1e Ibid., p. 106.
17 Quoted by Stuckenberg, op. cit., 102-103.
Now it takes a purely speculative turn, then it deals with physics or with mathe-
matics; now it contemplates theology, then morality; but whatever the subject
may be, he lifts it into the region of the intellect, and there disposes of it. In the
ordinary sense, he was certainly not a practical man; but it may be said that he
was speculatively practical, or if it did not seem too paradoxical, that he was
theoretically practica1. 18
This is an interesting aspect of Kant's character and thought, and one to
which we shall have occasion to return.
Manifestations to Anthropological Interests

The first nine years after his university training Kant spent as a tutor in
various homes. Little is known about this period, but from the early works
which he produced, it seems clear that he continued to pursue the areas of
study on which he had already concentrated. 19 The three dissertations which
he presented and defended when he began lecturing at the University of
Konigsberg in 1755-56, were in the fields of physics, metaphysics, and mathe-
matics, and each demonstrated real competence in its area.
But his avid curiosity and continuous desire for more information had
taken him in other directions as well. In 1757, Kant began lecturing on phy-
sical geography. The series proved to be popular, in both senses, and in these
lectures Kant displayed the broad knowledge that he had already accu-
mulated in this area. 20 But along with the geographical information in the
strict sense, he included details concerning "the inclinations of men which
flow from the climate in which they live, the variety of their prejudices and
manners of thinking," and "a brief conception of their arts and sciences."21
His anthropological interests, then, can definitely be traced back to the early
years of lecturing at Konigsberg. Paul Schilpp, dealing with this same period,
suggests that the early lectures in ethics were instrumental in promoting
anthropological interests. "Beginning his third semester in the university in
1756, Kant found himself called upon to offer a course of lectures on ethics."
This fact, Schilpp feels, "had much to do with Kant's rapidly growing interest
18 Ibid., 107-108.
19 Vleeschauwer's investigation of this period results in the conclusion that, while
Kant was certainly interested in philosophy at this time, "there is no doubt that Knut-
zen had oriented his pupil toward the exact sciences, and this orientation was to con-
tinue for quite some time." Herman-I. de Vleeschauwer, The Development oj Kantian
Thought, trans. A. R. C. Duncan (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd, 1962),
p.17.
20 Stuckenberg, op. cit., 70-71.
21 Schrijten, II, 9. This announcement of lectures, distributed in 1757, clearly indi-
cates the breadth of Kant's perspective at that time.
in man and in human relationships and activities."22 But in what sense

Kant, as a Privat-Docent, was "called upon to offer" such a course is not
at all clear. It could well be that these lectures were a product of such in-
terests, rather than instrumental in furthering them. Such a view would more
readily fit in with Erdmann's findings. He shows that Kant's anthropological
interests played a significant role in furthering the geographical studies, and
that the conception of the lectures on geography, and the collection of basic
materials for them, goes back to the years when he was still tutoring. 23
It is after 1760, however, that we notice a real burgeoning of Kant's con-
cern with anthropology. As Paulsen expresses it: "In the sixties a transfor-
mation begins to be apparent in Kant's thought, which we may call the
Socratic tendency." Through this change, "the inner world, the realm of man
and his moral nature, gains an importance at the cost of the mathematico-
scientific, and even of the scholastico-metaphysical." 24 Paulsen sees this
development in Kant as connected with a general trend of the period, and
to some extent that is undoubtedly true. Because he was reading current
works as fast as they became available, there is every reason to see Kant's
intellectual development in this period as stimulated by the scientific, politi-
cal, and cultural ferment of the times.
The validity of this position is borne out by Herder, who was a student of
Kant from 1762-1764. In later years, he left us a description of the philoso-
pher as lecturer. The character of Kant is clearly indicated by the description:
"He had at his service jest, witticism, and humorous fancy, and his lectures
were at once instructive and most entertaining." But it is the content of
Kant's lectures which most interests us.
With the same spirit in which he criticized Leibniz, Wolff, Baumgarten, Crusius,
and Hume, and pursued the natural laws of Kepler, Newton and the physicists,
he also took up the currently appearing works of Rousseau, his Emile, and his
HelOise, as well as any new discovery with which he was acquainted in the
natural sciences, and estimated their value, always returning to speak of the
unbiased knowledge of nature, and the moral worth of man.25
Both the extent of Kant's knowledge and its emphasis are worth noting, but
it is especially important to understand his interest in Rousseau at this time.
As Herder mentions, some of Rousseau's most significant works were
22 Kant's Pre-Critical Ethics (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University, 1938),

20-21.
23 Erdmann, Ref/exionen, I, pp. 40-41.
lI4Paulsen, op. cit., p. 38.
25 Herders Sammtliche Werke, ed. Bernard Suphan (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buch-
handiung, 1881), XVII, p. 404.
published during this period.lulie ou la nouvelle Heloise appeared in 1761,26

the Contrat social ou Principes du droit politique in 1762, followed in the
same year by Emile ou de l' Education. With his earlier essay on the arts and
sciences, Si Ie retablissement des sciences et des arts a contribue a epurer les
moeurs (1750), these provided his full conception of human nature, and it is
certain that these views profoundly impressed Kant. We are told that Emile
so engrossed his attention that the rigid schedule which he kept was inter-
rupted for several days.27 But Kant's own words from this period are our
best certification here. He tells us that he was always an investigator by
inclination. He had a keen thirst for knowledge, a deep unrest to advance
further in it, and a great sense of satisfaction with each bit of progress. In
fact, Kant felt in his early years as a lecturer that knowledge was the most
important thing in the world. Regarding his own pursuit of knowledge, he
says:
There was a time when I believed that all this constituted the real worth of
mankind, and I despised the rabble who know nothing. Rousseau set me right.
This dazzling advantage vanishes; I am learning to honor men, and I would
regard myself as of much less use than the common laborer if I did not believe
that this speculation can give a value to everything else to restore the rights of
mankind. 28
It was precisely during this period, then, with the reading of Rousseau, that
Kant attained his most important personal revelation. For hereafter science
and speculative knowledge could not be valued for their own sakes, but must
be used as a means to a higher end - they must serve the moral destiny of
man.
The most immediate result of this influence is seen in Kant's short works
"An Inquiry into the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and
Morals" (written 1763), and Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Illustrated by Dreams
of Metaphysics (1766). In both of these works Kant has obviously changed
from his previous scientific orientation; now man and morality assume
central importance. The influence of Rousseau is seen in both essays, but
neither mentions him explicitly.
Another result of Kant's contact with Rousseau is seen in Kant's lectures
on ethics in the years 1765-66. In the announcement of these lectures, he
says that he will set forth the method by which man must be studied, not
only in the varying forms in which man's accidental circumstances have
26 It was first published under the title Lettres de deux amants, habitants d'une
petite ville au pied des Alpes (1761).
27 Stuckenberg, op. cit., p. 147.
28 Schriften, XX, p. 44.
molded him, or in the distorted form in which even philosophers have almost
always misconstrued him, but what is enduring in human nature, and the
proper place of man in creation.29 While Rousseau is not explicitly mention-
ed here, Kant speaks of this new method of investigation as a "brilliant
discovery of our time, which, when considered in its full scheme, was com-
pletely unknown to the ancients." 30
It would be difficult to overestimate the impact of the work of Rousseau
on Kant. Passages from La nouvelle HelOise, for example, are extremely
suggestive. We find Rousseau's characters saying:
Since the character and the love of the beautiful are imprinted by nature in the
depths of my soul, I shall have my rule as long as they are not disfigured. But
how can I be sure that I shall always preserve in its purity that inner image which
finds among sensible things no model with which it may be compared? Do we
not know that the disordered affections corrupt the judgment as they corrupt
the will? ... For the heart deceives us in a thousand ways and acts only by a
principle always suspect, but reason has no other end than what is good, its rules
are certain, clear and easy in conduct, and it never goes astray save in the use-
less speCUlations that are not made for it. 31
Whether Rousseau intended this to be taken seriously, we may doubt; but
apparently Kant took it very seriously, for much of this thought is structured
into his later works.
We shall examine the influence of Rousseau in greater detail later. For
the present, it is sufficient to emphasize that at a particular time, about 1762,
Kant's whole life took on a different meaning. "The moral and anthropologi-
cal interest, rather than cosmological and metaphysical speculation, assumes
the central position. On the basis of this anthropocentric direction of thought,
the critical philosophy grew up." 32 If we can demonstrate the truth of this
assertion by Paulsen, it will provide a significant step in establishing the
validity of our argument.
Kant's Actual Work in Anthropology

If a drastic reformation of Kant's orientation can be found in the period
mentioned above, the actual formulation of his anthropology did not occur
29 " ••• So werde ich die Methode deutlich machen, nach welcher man den Menschen
studiren muss, nicht allein denjenigen, der durch die veranderliche Gestalt, welche ihm
sein zufalliger Zustand eindriickt, entstellt und als ein solcher selbst von Philosophen
fast jederzeit verkannt worden; sondem die Natur des Menschen, die immer bleibt,
und deren eigenthtirnliche Stelle in der Schopfung .... " Schriften, II, p. 311.
30 Ibid., p. 312.
31 Part III, letters 18 and 20.
1I2 Paulsen, op cit., p. 39.
until somewhat later. As we have already pointed out, his lectures on physi-
cal geography contained some anthropological material, but the actual
lectures on anthropology did not begin until the winter of 1772-73. 33 By
that time, we may assume, the material had been sufficiently structured to
provide a unified pattern of instruction. But there is good reason to believe
that this organization had taken place somewhat earlier.
Apparently Kant had planned to publish a manual on anthropology, and
had already begun to segregate the material from that of his other lectures.
The lectures on metaphysics, which he began with a discussion of empirical
psychology,34 and those on physical geography were sifted for materials
which were more appropriate to anthropology. The process seems to have
been completed by the summer of 1772, since Erdmann tells us that notes
from Kant's lectures on physical geography in that year show as little
anthropological content as the manual later edited by Rink. 35 This is clearly
in contrast with the earlier lectures mentioned above.
Unfortunately, however, Kant was unable to complete the organization
of the material for publication, and it was not until 1798 that the actual
publication took place. This was unfortunate for two reasons. First, Kant
was past the peak of his intellectual powers by the time the material was
finally edited. As Erdmann expresses it, more candidly, the work was "com-
pleted in the toilsome compilation of the seventy-four year old man, as he
stood on the threshhcld of decrepitude." 36 The richness and vitality which
the younger man had given to the material in his lectures is no longer dis-
cernible in the publication. 37
The second reason for regretting the late publication of the Anthropologie,
however, is more important for our discussion. For if Kant had published a
complete presentation of his anthropological thoughts in 1773, or shortly
thereafter, there would probably be no need for this discussion. Certainly
the textual relationship with later works would be unnecessary to establish,
since Kant himself would have referred his reader to the Anthropologie
whenever he found himself dealing with related material. And if an anthro-
pological framework had been thus established in this early period, it is
more than likely that Kant would have continued to relate his thought ex-
plicitly to it. But because the Anthropologie was published so much later
33 Schriften, VII, pp. 354-56.

34 Ibid., II, p. 309.
35 Reflexionen, I, p. 48. Rink employed lecture notes to compile this volume in 1802.
M Ibid., p. 37.
37 In an able discussion of this point, L. A. F. von Baczko speaks of the volume as
"wohl nur eigentlich das Skelett von Kants Vorlesungen," "Probe eines Commentars zu
Kants Anthropologie," Vesta (1807), p. 179.
(it was the last work of any length edited by Kant himself), the whole matter
remains controversial. It would seem possible to maintain, for example, that
anthropological works were a byproduct of Kant's critical period, rather
than its ratio seminalis. In what follows, we shall attempt to eliminate such
misconceptions.
With these remarks our preparatory considerations are complete. For
purposes of our investigation, the points of emphasis are four. First, we find
that Kant was subjected to a rigorous moral training until he was sixteen
years old (1740). Secondly, even as a youth Kant was intellectually inclined,
and this tendency developed almost into a passion in later years. Thirdly,
while Kant's university training prepared him primarily for work in mathe-
matics, science, and philosophy, he demonstrated an explicit interest in
anthropology soon after he began lecturing at the University in 1755, and
experienced a real conversion to such interests when he encountered the
thought of Rousseau about 1762. Finally, his anthropology was well-formu-
lated by the winter of 1772-73, and it is perfectly reasonable, therefore, to
search for ways in which it may have influenced the later work. With these
points in mind, we shall now tum to a more detailed examination of the
anthropological works themselves.
CHAPTER II
KANT'S EXPLICITLY FORMULATED ANTHROPOLOGiY
The only extensive work on anthropology actually published by Kant is the

volume already mentioned, a summary of his lectures on the topic which
was printed in 1798: Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht. Since he was
no longer giving the lectures (1796-97 was the last year they were offered),
there was a great demand that he provide a work on the topic that would be
available to the general public. In September 1797, one correspondent wrote:
"The reading world will receive your anthropology with the greatest joy;
it is excellent that you are delivering it to the printing office this year." 1
And in November, Tieftrunk wrote: "The public hopes for an Anthropology
from you, will it appear soon?" 2 There can be little doubt, then, that the
anthropology lectures had been well received and appreciated, even in Kant's
later years.
The content of the Anthropologie, even though it is merely a summary
of the lectures, provides a clear indication of the reasons for this popularity.
Far from being the intense analysis of difficult material which one might
expect in some other lectures, the Anthropologie presents a light and
varied fare, which would be enjoyable, even entertaining, for a person of
normal intelligence. 3 We find a discussion of various peoples, their customs
and contributions to world culture; a consideration of such things as dreams
and prophecy; maxims for clear thinking; and suggestive aphorisms, such
as: "The most important revolution in the inner heart of man is his exit
from self-incurred minority." 4 On closer examination, however, the more
rigid, underlying structure of these lectures gives us an indication of their
importance to Kant, and their potential value to a worthy recipient. It is this
core of material with which we shall be concerned in the Anthropologie.
1 Oswald Kiilpe's Introduction to the Anthrop%gie, Schriften, VII, p. 354.
2 Ibid.
3 Kant himself refers to the volume as a popular anthropology because of its con-
stant reference to examples. Schriften, VII, p. 121.
4 Ibid., p.229.
18 KANT'S EXPLICITLY FORMULATED ANTHROPOLOGY
The title, Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, clearly indicates the

intended scope of the work, since Kant tells us in the preface that anthropolo-
gy can be done either in a physiological or a pragmatic manner. "Physi-
ological knowledge of man lends itself to the investigation of what nature
makes of man, the pragmatic to what he makes of himself, or can and should
make, as a freely acting agent." 5 Here the influence of Rousseau discussed
in the last chapter is clearly seen. Man is treated as a moral, rather than as a
merely physical entity. Not that Kant will concern himself with the spiritual
aspects of man, for he explicitly states that anthropology prescinds from the
question of whether man has a soul, as a separate, immaterial substance. 6
But he will present man as a being caught up in activities which demand
moral consideration.
In his investigation, as one might expect, Kant follows a pattern of rational
inquiry.7 But he also adopts man's rational capacity as the object of his
inquiry. The opening passage of the Anthropologie begins: "That man is
able to have among his conceptions the notion 'I,' lifts him infinitely over
all other beings on earth." 8 It is this power to objectify the self which
constitutes him as a person, and provides the unity of consciousness so
necessary in a moral agent. At a certain stage in the development of a child,
perhaps a year after he begins to speak, this objectification manifests itself
in speech, and from that point on, man is pre-eminently concerned with the
self, "der Egoism schreitet unaufhaltsam fort." 9
It is in terms of this "egoism" that Kant establishes the format for the
first part of his Anthropologie. Since, as he points out, this self-interest has
three different aspects, "that of the understanding, that of taste, and that of
practical interest," 10 the study of man may be followed at each of these
levels, as a logical, an aesthetic, or a practical investigation. In order to be
Ibid., p. 119.
5
Ibid., p. 161.
I
7 Cassirer points out in this regard: "For [Kant], reason is of and through its own
powers certain of its own inherent logic. In this logic reason possesses once and for all
its surest guiding star, which it can trust at every step in the realm of experience, in
the general philosophy of nature and in the special doctrine of man, philosophical
anthropology." Ernst Cassirer, Rousseau-Kant-Goethe, trans. James Gutmann, Paul
Oskar Kristeller, and John Herman Randall, Jr. (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1945), p. 5.
8 Schriften, VII, p. 127.
9 Ibid., p. 128. It should be noted that the term "egoism" is not employed by Kant
in the popular sense carried by the term today. It means, rather, the awareness and
concern of the individual for himself as the center of his own world of experience -
that objective self-awareness which is specifically characteristic of human knowledge.
10 "Der Egoism kann dreierlei Anmassungen enthalten: die des Verstandes, des
Geschmacks, und des praktischen Interesses, d.i. er kann logisch oder listhetisch oder
praktisch sein." Schriften, VII, p. 128.
KANT'S EXPLICITLY FORMULATED ANTHROPOLOGY 19
complete, the Anthropologie must concern itself with all three forms, and we
find, therefore, that Kant has divided Part I into three books dealing with
these respective topics. Part II is developed from a different perspective, and
is devoted to a summary of the anthropological characteristics of the person,
the race, the species, etc.
In the first part, Book I deals with the intellect, and man's powers of
perception in general. Here Kant discusses the various aspects of the intel-
lect, the five senses, and imagination. Each of these is considered at some
length, and from various perspectives, but it is the intellect proper, composed
of understanding, judgment, and reason, which receives the greatest attention.
In Book II, Kant turns to the aesthetic aspect of man. The discussion is
brief, and rather sketchy, with sensuous pleasure, taste, and the sublime
receiving primary attention. The section includes "anthropological remarks
on taste," in which Kant considers taste in fashions, taste in art, and the
excesses in good living, or luxuries.
The third book is on the appetitive faculties. The affections, such as
timidity and bravery, are discussed briefly, but passion is given a more
thorough analysis. Under this heading Kant considers the inclination toward
freedom, the desire for vengeance, and the desire for influence over other
men. This last passion is divided into the search for honor, the desire for
power, and the problem of avarice. The most significant social aspects of
Kant's thought stem from this portion of the work.
Part Two of the Anthropologie is important because it treats specifically
the notions of the person and of the species. But the discussion is cluttered
with unnecessary complexities. The portion entitled "The Character of the
Person" for example includes sections on the sanguine, the melancholic,
the choleric, and the phlegmatic temperaments, together with an introduction
to the science of Physiognomy.ll It is clear, however, that Kant intends the
person to be understood as a moral agent, rather than simply as a con-
glomeration of physical and mental characteristics. 12 In a similar fashion,
the notion of the species is developed in its social and cultural aspects, in
addition to the implications of the specific properties of its members. It is
with the consideration of the consequences of this characteristic that the
Anthropologie ends.
With this brief outline of the work in mind, we may now proceed to ex-
amine the specific details of Kant's conception of man. As might be expected,
each section of the Anthropologie makes an essential contribution to the
11 It must be understood, of course, that in Kant's period all of these were generally
accepted as "scientifically" established aspects of anthropological knowledge.
20 KANT'S EXPLICITLY FORMULA TED ANTHROPOLOGY
final view. The first book 13 provides the basic notion of man as a rational
animal. 14 After his preliminary remarks on egoism and the nature of ex-
perience in general, Kant examines in detail the sensory powers of man. He
begins by pointing out the passive role of sensation in cognition as opposed
to the active role of the understanding, and asserting that both of these
aspects must be present before knowledge can occur. He distinguishes clearly
between the roles of these two complementary functions by noting certain
misconceptions concerning the dependability of sensation, and defending the
senses against three specific charges: that they confuse; that they govern the
understanding; and that they deceive.1 5 It is precisely the passive nature of
sensation, he maintains, which permits these erroneous charges the sem-
blance of validity. But, on the other hand, a reconsideration of this same
aspect of sensation provides its best defense.
With respect to the first charge, it is surely mistaken to speak of the great
number and variety of sense perceptions as constituting a state of confusion
before any principle of organization has yet been applied to this "manifold
of intuition." It is the task of the understanding, Kant points out, to connect
these perceptions under a rule of thought, bringing order into the manifold
and first constituting of these perceptions what we call empirical knowledge
or experience.
Hence it is the fault of the understanding, neglecting its duty if it judges rashly,
without having previously organized the sense perceptions according to concepts,
and then complains about the confusedness of those perceptions as due to the
sensory structure of human nature. 16
Understanding, therefore, rather than sensation, must assume responsibility
for confusion.
Secondly, it is incorrect to maintain that the senses govern the under-
standing. While there are judgments which are not formally taken before the
tribunal of the understanding in order to be passed upon, these only seem
to be dictated by the senses. These judgments are of the kind that we call
13 Since Kant is often studied primarily as an epistemologist, it is perhaps worth

mentioning again that this section of the Anthropologie is available in English (Journal
of Speculative Philosophy, IX-XVI (1875-82». Kroeger's terminology is not always
felicitous (e.g., "contemplation" for "Anschauung"), but in general the translation is
accurate. The more informal treatment offered here of the relation between man's
various cognitive powers provides an interesting perspective from which to reconsider
the tight, overly-neat presentation of the Critique of Pure Reason.
14 Man, in this section, is classed as animal rationabile, or a mit Vern unftfiih igkeit
begabtes Thier, not yet as animal rationale, or a verniinftiges Thier. See Schriften, VII,
p. 321.
16 Ibid., p. 144.
KANT'S EXPLICITLY FORMULA TED ANTHROPOLOGY 21
epigrams or oracular sayings - for example, the kind that Socrates attributed
to his demon. "For in those instances it is always presupposed that the first
judgment, concerning what is right or wise to be done in a certain case, is
also the true and correct one, as a rule; and that it can only be artificialized
by pondering over it." 17 Actually, however, those judgments do not come
from the senses, but from very real, though half-unconscious, consideration
of the understanding. "The senses prefer no claim upon them, but resemble
the common people, who, if they are not a mob (ignobile vulgus), submit
readily to their superior, the understanding, though they certainly also want
to be heard in the matter." 18
Finally, it is obvious that the senses do not deceive - not because they
always judge correctly, but because they do not judge at all. It does often
occur that the understanding has, if not a justification, at least an excuse in
sensuous appearances for its errors. For one is often led to mistake the sub-
jective aspect of his perception for the objective, and hence appearance for
experience. A distant square tower, for example, may appear round, if one
is not able to see the corners.19 But such errors are nonetheless properly at-
tributed to the understanding rather than the senses.
With the distinction between the roles of the senses and the understanding
neatly established, Kant turns to a more thorough consideration of the in-
dividual senses, and finally to the imaginative powers of man. Imagination,
or the facultas imaginandi, is defined primarily as the "faculty of intuiting
an object without its presence." 20 In this capacity, its function is either
productive (i.e., a power of the original representation of the object which,
therefore, precedes any experience), or reproductive (which brings back into
the mind a previous empirical intuition). "Pure intuition of time and space
[which provide the spatio-temporal framework for all objects of intuition]
belong to the former class; all others presuppose empirical intuition, which,
when connected with the conception of the object and thus constituting
empirical cognition, is called experience." 21 Curiously enough, the entire
discussion of imagination seems to fall within the confines of man's sensory
powers.22 But the role of the imagination is a significant one in spite of its
17 Ibid., p. 145.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid., p. 146.
20 Ibid., p. 167. The frequent use of Latin terms throughout Kant's work reminds us
that very few philosophic works had as yet been written in the vernacular. The new
terminology was by no means clearly defined or generally agreed upon.
22 Even more curious is the fact that the precise synthetic function of imagination
in sensation to which Kant calls attention in the Critique of Pure Reason is not pointed
connection with the "lower" faculties of cognition, since Kant understands

it to be in some sense a creative power, and the seat of originality or "genius"
in man. 23
The sections which follow deal with the sensuous power of productive
imagination in its different applications. "These are the constructive power
of intuition in space, the associative power of intuition in time, and the
relating power, which deals with the common derivation of our represen-
tations from each other." 24 Throughout these operations the imagination
functions in accordance with the rules of the understanding, but not as direct-
ed by the understanding. It follows instead the laws of sensuousness, which
furnish its material. 25 Finally, after considering such things as the use and
abuse of the imagination through various stimuli; the powers of memory,
prevision, and prophecy; and the significance of dreams, Kant begins a
consideration of the higher faculty of cognition.
This facuity, when considered in general, is called the Understanding. But
in virtue of its particular functions in regard to the cognition of things, it is
more precisely viewed as three distinct faculties: Understanding, Judgment,
and Reason - to which Kant refers as die drei oberen Erkenntnissver-
mogen. 26 As a unitary faculty, considered simply as the power to think,
understanding is distinguished from sensation in terms of its object. Sen-
sation, or the faculty of intuition, deals with the particular aspect of the
object. The understanding, on the other hand, is the faculty of concepts, and
deals with the universal aspect of representations under which the manifold
of sensuous intuitions must be subsumed in order to produce unity in the
cognition of any object. 27 But the precise operation of the understanding is
made more clear when it is considered in its tripartite cooperation. From
this perspective, the more specific function of understanding is that of es-
tablishing rules. Judgment is then the faculty for discovering whether a given
case comes under a particular rule; and reason is the faculty to deduce the
particular from the general, and thus to represent the latter according to
principles, and as being necessary.28
In the discussion which follows Kant provides many examples of how
these faculties interact, and considers the various aberrations of reason in its
out in this context. Cf. Schriften, IV, p. 89. Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason,
trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan Co., 1958), p. 144n.
23 Schriften, VII, pp. 172 and 224.
24 Ibid., p. 174.
25 Ibid., p. 177.
2G Ibid., p. 197.
27 Ibid., p. 196.
28 Ibid., p. 199.
common use. Toward the end, however, he brings the matter into focus again
with a brief summary:
The understanding is positive, and scatters the darkness of ignorance; the power
of judgment is more negative, for the avoidance of errors which arise from the
dim light in which objects appear. Reason stops the source of errors (prejudices),
and thus makes understanding secure, through the universality of principles.29
Together these powers constitute the complete capacity for thought. "A
correct understanding, a practical power of judgment, and a thorough power
of reason constitute the whole extent of the intellectual power of cog-
nition." 30 Kant constantly reminds us, however, that this intellectual power
cannot act alone. He insists on the necessary cooperation of the higher and
lower cognitive powers. He points out that the inner perfection of man con-
sists in having all his faculties under his control, in order that he be able to
submit them to his own arbitrary direction. But to achieve this end, under-
standing would have to govern sensibility without weakening it. For, while
sensibility has an aspect of unruliness about it, since it does not reflect, none-
theless, without sensibility there would be no material to which the under-
standing could apply its legislative power. 31 Cooperation of both levels of his
cognitive powers is thus necessary if man is to achieve his inner perfection.
In the second book of Part I, Kant adds an additional dimension to the
animal rationabile presented thus far. Here aesthetic elements are provided
through a discussion of delight and aversion, which are considered both at
the sensible and at the intellectual levels. The main division of the section,
however, lies in the distinction between the purely sensible enjoyment of the
agreeable, and the appreciation of beauty which is more subtle and involves
both sensible and intellectual aspects.
"Pleasure," Kant tells us, "is the feeling of furthering, pain that of hinder-
ing, life." 32 And life at the animal level is a continuous play of antagonism
between the two - an interplay which provides for the constant promotion
of life forces. But for man there is a higher criterion for the acceptance or
rejection of pain, and that is morality. This criterion, of course, involves the
intellectual capacity of man, and Kant sees the faculty of taste, in which the
sensible and intellectual are conjoined, as a ground for the furtherance of
29 Ibid., p. 228.
30 Ibid., p. 198.
31 "Die innere Vollkommenheit des Menschen besteht darin: dass er den Gebrauch
aIler seiner Vermogen in seiner Gewalt habe, urn ihn seiner /reien Willkur zu unter-
werfen. Dazu aber wird erfordert, dass der Verstand herrsche, ohne doch die Sinnlich-
keit (die an sich Pobel, weil sie nicht denkt) zu schwachen; weil ohne sie es keinen
Stoff geben wlirde, der zurn Gebrauch des gesetzgebenden Verstandes verarbeitet
werden konnte." Ibid., p. 144.
32 I bid., p. 231.
morality. For taste, he says, is "the power of aesthetic judgment to choose

with universal validity." 33 And this power clearly involves two aspects: The
first is the ability to consider a reflected intuition (by means of the repro-
ductive imagination) with pleasure or displeasure. The second is the ability
to consider this judgment in relation to our fellow man. Thus, taste is a
power of social judgment. In the exercise of taste, "the mind feels its freedom
in the play of imagery (therefore of sensibility); for sociality with other men
presupposes freedom - and this feeling is delight." But the universal validity
of this delight for everyone carries with it the conception of law as an inherent
part of itself; for only in this way can the validity of the pleasure be universal
for the one judging.34 But similarly, because the pleasure which is felt in the
harmony (between the delight of the subject and the feeling of every other
individual) carries with it the aspect of universality, it must flow from the
general legislative power of the feeling individual as such, i.e., it must flow
from reason itself. Thus, in its formal aspect, the choice for this pleasure
stands under the principle of duty, and in its ideal form, taste, which guides
this choice, would have a tendency to promote at least the outward appear-
ance of morality.35
It is important to note the role played here by reason - the legislative
faculty, the faculty for the representation of the universal. 36 For this is pre-
cisely the role which it was assigned in Book I, but it has now acquired a
more significant context. We begin at this point to see the relation between
the various powers of man which Kant is displaying for our view. Reason, as
presented in the first book, is connected through taste with the social
dimension of man treated in Book III. The social aspect of man presented
in this last book completes the discussion of man as an individual, and we
shall expand our consideration of its material directly into that of Part II.
It is in this third book, undoubtedly that we obtain the best understanding
33 Ibid., p. 241. Kant distinguishes here between the objects of aesthetic pleasure:
When pleasure is taken in the apprehension of the beautiful, it is as the object of the
faculty of taste. When the sublime is involved, however, pleasure is experienced
through the emotions rather than through taste (p. 243).
34 "Er ist also ein Vermogen der gesellschaftlichen Beurtheilung ausserer Gegen-
stiinde in der Einbildungskraft. - Hier fuhlt das Gemuth seine Freiheit im Spiele der
Einbildungen (also der Sinnlichkeit); denn die Socialitat mit andern Menschen setzt
Freiheit voraus, - und dieses GefUhl ist Lust. Aber die Allgemeingiiltigkeit dieser Lust
fUr Jedermann, durch welche die Wahl mit Geschmack (des Schonen) sich von der
Wahl durch blosse Sinnenempfindung (des bloss subjectiv Gefallenden), d.i., des An-
genehmen, unterschiedet, fuhrt den Begriff eines Gesetzes bei sich; denn nur nach
diesem kann die GUltigkeit des Wohlgefallens fUr den Beurtheilenden allgemein sein."
Ibid., p. 241.
35 Ibid .• p. 244.
38 Ibid., p. 241.
of man according to Kant. For while man has a rational capacity, Kant tells
us, we cannot at all credit him with full rationality. In order to develop all
his natural powers to the point of perfection, i.e., in order to become animal
rationale, he must overcome emotion and passion which obstruct reason.
When considered from the standpoint of perfection, the emotions are re-
garded as comparable to drunkenness, and the passions to chronic illness. 37
But nature has provided a method by which men may overcome these dif-
ficulties. For each man has three great passions which urge him on to self-
fulfillment. These are desire for gain, desire for power, and desire for glory
- passions which are appropriate to man only as animal sociale. 38
Because of these inner promptings, man desires not merely to exist, but to
live with others in order to enjoy the gratification of attaining superiority
over them. The will to live, proper to the individual, becomes in this new
context a desire for influence over others, and this is the basic tendency of
man as a social being. He is driven on to perfect his powers of mind and
body in order to establish and improve his position in society. As a necessary
consequence of this tendency, man is led to establish a political and judicial
system which will limit the activity of others, and ward off the destruction
which their attacks would bring about. It is antagonism in society, therefore,
which brings man unwittingly nearer to perfection. 39 An artificial condition
of peace and security is attained through the creation of a state. Antagonism
and competition are not thereby destroyed, but they are limited, and pre-
vented from degenerating into violence and deception. 40
Kant points out, however, that the process which provides stability for
society cannot at the same time provide for the happiness of the individual.
Rather, the passions proper to the individual as such - die Freiheits- und
Geschlechtsneigung 41 - are curtailed in the process of satisfying the passions
of the social order. But the forces of nature, or Providence, are justified by
the course of history, and it is in the species, rather than in the individual,
that fulfillment is to be achieved by man. Kant completes his analysis of the
species with a consideration of this fulfillment, and man's development to-
ward it.
Three aspects of that development are pointed out: the technical (mit
Bewusstsein verbunden mechanische), the pragmatic (andere Menschen zu
seinen Absichten geschickt zu brauchen), and the moral (nach dem Freiheits-
37 Ibid., p. 252.
38 Ibid., p. 268.
39 Just as it is pain at the purely animal level which prompts him, unreflectively, to
preserve and enhance his vital powers.

40 Ibid., p. 252.
41 Ibid., pp. 267-68.
princip unter Gesetzen gegen sich und andere zu handeln).42 With respect to
the first of these Kant says: "The characterization of man as a rational
animal is immediately to be found in the form and organization of his hand,
his finger and fingertips, part of which is for construction, part for delicate
feeling." It can readily be seen, therefore, that nature has not made man
merely for one manner of handling objects, but in a more clever fashion has
made him indeterminately competent to handle all objects, and, consequent-
ly, fit for the use of reason. Thus Kant finds that the technical organization
or aptitude of the species has designated man as a rational animal.4:.I
Concerning the pragmatic aspect of man's development Kant points out
that among all other animals, each individual of the species achieves his full
determination. With respect to man, however, perhaps only in the species
will full determination be achieved. "Thus the human race is able to work
itself up to its determination only through progress in a line of incalculably
many generations." Actually, however, Kant sees this as an endless process,
since he says that the goal remains always in prospect, though the tendency
to this ultimate object, while very often checked, can never be completely
retrograde. 44
Finally, with respect to man's moral aspect, Kant raises the question as to
whether man is by nature good, bad, or equally susceptible to both. In the
last instance, he feels, the species itself would be without character, for it
would be morally neither good nor bad. But such a condition is not possible
for man, Kant maintains, for man is
a being equipped with the power of practical reason and consciousness of the
freedom of his absolute will (a person), [and] sees himself in this consciousness,
even in the most obscure presentation, under a law of duty, and with the feeling
(which is called moral) that to him, or to another through him, right or wrong
occurs.45
42 Ibid., p. 322.
403 "Die Characterisirung des Menschen, als eines verniinftigen Thieres, liegt schon
in der Gestalt und Organisation seiner Hand, seiner Finger und Fingerspitzen, deren
theils Bau, theils zartem Gefiihl, dadurch die Natur ihn nicht fur Eine Art der Hand-
habung der Sachen, sondem unbestimmt fUr aile, mithin fur den Gebrauch der Ver-
nunft geschickt gemacht und dadurch die technische oder Geschicklichkeitsanlage
seiner Gattung als eines vernunftigen Thieres bezeichnet hat." Ibid., p. 323.
44 "Zuvorderst muss man anmerken, dass bei allen iibrigen, sich se1bst iiberlassenen
Thieren jedes Individuum seine ganze Bestimmung erreicht, bei den Menschen aber
ailenfalls nur die Gattung; so dass sich das menschliche Geschlecht nur durch Fort-
schreiten, in einer Reihe unabsehlich vieler Generationen, zu seiner Bestimmung
emporarbeiten kann; wo das Ziel ihm doch immer noch im Prospekte bleibt, gleich-
wohl aber die Tendenz zu diesem Endzwecke, zwar wohl ofters gehemmt, aber nie
ganz riicklaufig werden kann." Ibid., p. 324.
45 Ibid.
This consciousness of duty is an aspect for the intelligible character of man-

kind in general, and to this extent man may be said to be good according
to his innate design, or by nature. 46
We should not conclude from this statement, however, that Kant con-
siders man to be naturally good. There is another aspect of man which must
be taken into consideration. Kant reminds us that experience also shows that
there is in man an inclination toward the active desire of the illicit, which he
plainly knows to be illicit, i.e., toward evil. And this aspect of man must be
considered a part of his very nature, for "this inclination stirs so inevitably,
and so early, while man is only beginning to make use of his freedom," that
we must certainly consider it innate. Judged according to his sensible nature,
then, man may be said to be naturally evi1. 47
One might feel that Kant has involved himself in a contradiction, since he
finds both good and evil as naturally present in man. But he points out that
these two aspects of human nature are not attributed to man in the same way.
It is as an individual that man is seen as naturally evil; it is as a race that he
is considered naturally good. 48 Kant goes on to show that in spite of the in-
adequacies of the individual, man is unwittingly involved in a process of
development which promises eventual fulfillment. Man is seen as good, not
in terms of his essential nature, but in the perspective of his destiny. In this
sense, then, history can be seen as the education of the human race, an edu-
cation that is "wholesome, but harsh and severe." 49 Gradually, through this
process, the moral nature of man will become free from the natural impulses
- and morality, as the free determination of the will through the moral law,
will become possible. Only in this way can human nature be fulfilled and
perfected.50
These are the important aspects of Kant's anthropology as it appeared in
published form. But as we have already seen, the Anthropologie is little
~a Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid., pp. 324f.
49 Ibid., p. 328.
50 Ibid., pp. 328ff. In considering the conclusions presented by Kant, T. Mengti-
soglu maintains that Kant's philosophical anthropology is by no means inferior to
those advanced today. He points out that the conception of man which is distinctively
Kant's is centered around two essential points: the first is the important realization that
man shares in both the sensible and the intelligible worlds; the second, that as deter-
mined by nature man is precisely undetermined. He must employ his rational capacity,
his freedom as a member of the rational order, to grasp clearly his position in reality,
formulate a conception of his possibilities and potential goals, and then provide a
program of training and education which will promote the realization of these ends.
"Der Begriff des Menschen bei Kant," Kritik und Metaphysik, ed. F. Kaulbach and
J. Ritter (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1966).
more than an outline of his actual lectures on the topic. It seems appropriate,
therefore, that, while we are not concerned to provide a detailed analysis of
the anthropology lectures, we should at least indicate the amount of material
available in this area, and its potential value for further investigation.
Anthropology Lectures and Notes

There are several manuscripts which provide knowledge of the lectures from
the student's point of view. Fortunately, they are from different periods. The
most recent of them to be discovered is a notebook containing a record of
several of Kant's courses which were attended by Graf Heinrich zu Dohna-
Wundlacken. 51 Of these courses, two at least are of interest to us: the Anthro-
pology, and the Metaphysics. The notes on anthropology were taken in the
course which Kant delivered in the winter of 1791. This is rather late, of
course, but still seven years before the Anthropologie appeared. The notes
on metaphysics are useful because, as was mentioned earlier, Kant habitually
began this course with a discussion of empirical psychology. Unfortunately,
however, the notes were taken even later, during the winter of 1792-93, and
reveal little for the analysis of Kant's development.
Another, and earlier, set of lecture notes was published under the pseu-
donym Fr. Ch. Starke some years after Kant's death. 52 The source of these
notes is not entirely clear, but Erdmann refers to them as "on the whole,
including Kant's own edition, the most valuable and most detailed presen-
tation which we possess of his anthropology." 53 An analysis of the content
of these notes has established their period as sometime between 1779, when
Lessing's work Nathan der Weise first appeared, and 1788, when the French
naturalist, Georges Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon, died. The most proba-
ble date has been established as 1784 by Paul Menzer. 54 This would make
the work of greater interest than the manuscript from 1791, providing an
51 Die Philosophischen Hauptvorlesungen Immanuel Kants; Nach den neu aufge-

fundenen Kollegheften des Grafen Heinrich zu Dohna-Wundlacken, ed. Arnold
Kowalewski (Miinchen: Resl & Cie., 1924).
52 [Johann Adam Bergk], 1. Kants Menschenkunde oder philosophische Anthro-
pologie, 183l.
Ii3 Erdmann, Reflexionen, I, p. 58. At the time Erdmann published this evaluation,
he was under the impression (based on internal evidence) that the notes were from
Kant's first lectures on anthropology in 1772-73. While this opinion later proved in-
correct, his statement concerning the value of the lectures, as a detailed account of
Kant's thought, does not seem to depend upon the date involved.
54 "Der Entwicklungsgang der Kantischen Ethik in den Jahren 1760-1785," Kant-
studien, III (1899), pp. 67-68.
additional seven-year step back into the development of Kant's thought. But
it would not yet take us back to the pre-Critical period.
There is one final manuscript, however, which does take us back at least
to the period before the Critique of Pure Reason was published in 1781. This
is Kants Vorlesungen aber die Metaphysik, which was published anony-
mously in 1821. The material was edited by K. H. L. Politz, who had not
been a student of Kant, but had come into possession of two sets of notes.
Erdmann at first felt that these notes were from the eighties: one from 1788-
90, the other "from the same decade." 55 Later, however, he decided that
only one of the manuscripts was from this period; the other, he felt, was from
the early seventies, approximately 1774.56 This would make the notes of un-
paralleled significance in the investigation of the evolution of Kant's thought.
Finally, however, it was determined by Max Heinze that the earlier manu-
script would have to be from the period between the winter of 1775-76, and
the winter of 1779-80. 57 This reduces its value somewhat, but the material
is still sufficiently early to prove interesting.
The work of Erdmann to which we have already referred, Reflexionen
Kants zur kritischen Philosophie, is also useful, since it contains the notes
which Kant wrote in the margins and on blank pages interleaved in his copy
of Baumgarten's Metaphysica. But these notes were jotted in during the
course of many years, and it is not always clear to what period a particular
reflection should be assigned.
The uncertainties mentioned in connection with all of these works make a
critical examination of such sources essential to a precise analysis of Kant's
development - and fortunately we have been provided one. The Royal
Prussian Academy edition of Kant's works, noted above, devotes eight
volumes (XN-XI) to the presentation and critical analysis of Kant's notes,
reflections, and fragments, as they are found in various materials gathered
after his death. Volume XV is devoted entirely to notes on anthropology.
The editors have indicated clearly where there is reason for doubt, but in all
cases they have attempted to determine the exact date of each entry. Cer-
tainly this effort should prove invaluable for establishing the temporal
relationships between various elements in Kant's thought.

56 "Eine unbeachtet gebliebene QueUe zur Entwicklungsgeschichte Kants," Philo-
sophische Monatshefte, XIX (1883), pp. 13Of.
57 "Vorlesungen Kants tiber Metaphysik aus drei Semestem," Abhandlungen der
koniglich- sachsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaft, Philosophisch-historische Kiasse,
XIV (1894), pp. 481-728. Note especially p. 516. There is one serious objector to this
dating. E. Amoldt, in his Kritische Exkurse im Gebiet der Kantforschung (1894), would
place the date in the period 1778-84.
Other Sources
Besides the works directly connected with Kant's lectures on anthropology,
there are a variety of others which provide an insight into his thoughts on
anthropological topics - some explicitly so, others less directly. Among the
former are Definition of the Concept of a Race of Men (1785), and Con-
cerning the Radical Evil in Human Nature (1792); among the latter, Ideas
toward a Universal History of Mankind (1784), Conjectural Beginning of
Human History (1786), and The End of All Things (1794). But again Kant's
early writings have a special interest, since they give an indication of the in-
fluence of various elements on his thought during its formative period. For
that reason, it is particularly useful to consider such writings as the General
Natural History and Theory of the Heavens (1755), Observations on the
Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime (1764), the Inaugural Dissertation of
1770 (Disputatio de mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis),
and On the Different Races of Men (1775). Material from all of these works
is important in any attempt to clarify the formation of Kant's thought as it
evolved into the Critical Period.
The consideration of the many sources with which a fuII investigation
would have to contend should, by now, have made it evident that there is
some ambiguity in speaking of Kant's anthropology. In part, his thought is
clearly defined, namely, that doctrine which centers around the Anthro-
pologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, and the anthropology lectures. Other
aspects of his thought, however, are widely scattered, and yet are essential
to the fuII understanding of his teaching. More important for our purposes,
Kant's position is ambiguous in the sense that one is never entirely sure of
the scope of his concept of anthropology. For there are works which are
clearly empirical in nature, but there are others (such as the Anthropologie)
which are obviously directed toward the derivation of a normative concept of
man - necessarily transcending their apparent empirical framework. We may
conclude, therefore, that even Kant's "empirical" anthropology cannot be
reduced entirely to the minor role which he ascribes to this discipline in his
classification of the sciences. And it should not surprise us to find that this
ambiguous conception gradually broadened to encompass a fuII, philo-
sophical and empirical doctrine of man.
Perhaps it is permissible to emphasize once more at this point that we are
not merely interested in showing the influence of particular anthropological
works on other aspects of Kant's thought; rather, we shall attempt to de-
monstrate that the entire framework around which the later philosophy is
structured is essentially anthropological in nature, i.e., concerned with the
nature and destiny of man. Naturally this position can only be validated
through a careful consideration of the Critical Philosophy itself, and this will
be our next task.
CHAPTER III
ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE FIRST CRITIQUE
Those who criticize the Anthropologie as the least philosophic of Kant's

works, and as merely a series of popular lectures,l seem consistently to
ignore the very special organization given to the popular content. It is no
accident, for example, that the three aspects of self-interest discussed in its
opening pages - that of understanding, of taste, and of practical interests -
correspond exactly to the studies involved in the three Critiques. And one
immediately recognizes in the first Critique a complete analysis of man as
animal rationabile, the first division of the formal anthropology.
It has often been held that the first Critique does not lend itself readily to
a demonstration of Kant's anthropological tendencies. As Forrest Williams
points out,
the principles of Kant's philosophy in the first Critique, although resting on a
certain analysis of subjective functions, take no concrete human nature for their
foundation in any philosophically significant sense, but only the abstract struc-
ture of a transcendental reason and a formal sensibility.2
But while Kant's analysis of cognition provides little occasion for the intro-
duction of anthropological elements, it would be incorrect to maintain the
same position with respect to the Critique as a whole. Erdmann mentions,
for example, that there are occasional observations in the first Critique which
are psychological in nature, and seem to be a lapse of formality into the more
casual style of the anthropology lectures. 3 But these minor references hardly
1 A good example of this attitude is to be found in J. H. von Kirchman's foreword
to his edition of the Anthropologie (Berlin: L. Heimann, 1869), p. vii.
2 "Philosophical Anthropology and the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment," Kant-
Studien, XLVI (1954-55), p. 173. This is by no means a new complaint, of course.
Dilthey made essentially the same comment in his Einleitung in die Geisteswissen.
schaften in 1883: "In den Adern des erkennenden Subjects, das Locke, Hume und
Kant konstruierten, rinnt nicht wirkliches Blut, sondem der verdunnte Saft von Ver.
nunft als blosser Denktiitigkeit." Gesammelte Schriften (Stuttgart: B. C. Teubner,
1922), I, p. xviii.
3 Erdmann, Reflexionen, I, p. 55. He mentions especially the note on page 172 of
ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE FIRST CRITIQUE 33
merit our notice when we recall the statements made by Kant in later portions
of the Critique. The "Canon of Pure Reason" gives a clear presentation of
the role of happiness as an integral aspect of man's highest good - and this
highest good is said to be a determining ground of the ultimate end of pure
reason.4 In the closing pages of the "Architectonic of Pure Reason" we find
emphasized again that the "supreme end" of science is "the happiness of all
mankind." 5 Kant is dealing here not with an abstract subject of possible
experience, but with concrete man and his goals.
The whole orientation of this final portion of the first Critique is clearly
practical. Kant discusses the practical application of pure reason,6 the re-
lation between the kingdom of nature and the kingdom of grace,7 and the
question of belief (especially pragmatic belief) 8 - all of which are unmistaka-
bly concerned with man as an active participant in the world of his experi-
ence. It is not difficult, therefore, to demonstrate that there is an anthro-
pological content to the first Critique. But we are interested in establishing
more than the presence of anthropological material; we are concerned to
demonstrate that it was Kant's anthropological interest which originally
necessitated the writing of the Critique. That will be quite a different task.
Perhaps it would be well to begin with the fact that the first Critique and
the Anthropologie occupied a contemporaneous position in Kant's develop-
ment. The fact is well established that the problems dealt with in the Critique
of Pure Reason had occupied Kant for many years before its publication.
Certainly the Inaugural Dissertation of 1770 contains the germs of the
Critical Philosophy, and it might be said that this work actually marks the
beginning of the Critical period. 9 But it is in the following years that we see
the specific problems begin to take shape in Kant's thought, and the solutions
begin to reorganize his conception of philosophy. In a letter to J. H. Lambert
(renowned mathematician, physicist and philosopher - 1728-1777), in Sep-
tember 1770, Kant mentioned his new epistemological and practical system. 10
the second edition. In the following pages we shall employ the usual procedure of
using "A" to refer to the first edition, "B" to the second edition, of the Critique.
4 A 806ff, B 834ff. Norman Kemp Smith trans., pp. 636ff. Cited hereafter as NKS.
5 A 851, B 879. NKS, p. 665.
6 A 804ff, B 832ff. NKS, pp. 635ff.
7 A 812, B 840. NKS, p. 640.
8 A 842, B 852. N KS, p. 648.
9 The position represented by the dissertation is commonly referred to as a "semi-
critical" position. See, e.g., Norman Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant's "Critique
of Pure Reason" (London: Macmillan and Co., 1918), p. xx. Cited hereafter as Kemp
Smith, Commentary.
10 Schriften, X, p. 93. Kant: Philosophical Correspondence 1759-99, ed. and trans.
Arnulf Zweig (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 58. Cited hereafter
as Zweig, Correspondence.
34 ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE FIRST CRITIQUE
In 1771 he wrote to Marcus Herz (physician, friend, and former student of

Kant) that he was working on a volume which would appear under the title
The Boundaries of Sensibility and of Reason. It would involve a discussion
of the nature of taste, of metaphysics, and of morality.ll The first mention of
a "critique of pure reason" occurred in a letter to Herz, February 21,1772.
Kant spoke of having laid out a plan for the new work which was still un-
finished.
Without explaining at length here the whole range of the investigation, which
was continued to the very end, I can say that I have succeeded in my essential
intent, and am now ready to supply a critique of pure reason, containing the
nature of theoretical as well as practical knowledge, insofar as it is purely
intellectual. Of these I shall first work out the first part, concerning the sources
of metaphysics, its methods and limits, and thereafter the pure principles of
morality. That concerning the first part will be published in about three
months. 12
But, of course, it was many years before this work was put into final form,
and a great many changes occurred in Kant's thought during that interval.
Kant's project demanded a good deal of his time and energy, leaving him
little opportunity for involvement in other matters. In 1776 he mentioned in
a letter to Herz that he was receiving objections from all sides about his
apparent inactivity. Yet he had never been more systematically and perse-
veringly busy than during the years since they had last seen each other. None-
theless, his work was far from finished. Rather, the work seemed to grow
under his hands - a thing which often happens, as he points out, "when one
gains possession of some fruitful principles." 13
Kant looked forward to the completion of this project which had caused
him so much labor: "After finishing this work, which I am only now really
beginning, after having overcome the last hindrances just this last summer,
I shall have a free field, the cultivation of which will be just pleasure." 14
But he realized that much work was yet to be done: "I do not expect to be
finished with this work before Easter, but to dedicate a portion of next sum-
mer to it, as much as my continually interrupted health will permit me to
11 Schriften, X, p. 117.
12 Schriften, X, pp. 126-27. Zweig, Correspondence, p. 73.
13 "Ieh empfange von allen Seiten Vorwtirfe wegen der Unthatigkeit, darin ieh seit
langer Zeit zu sein scheine, und bin doch wirklich niemals systematiseher und an·
haltender beschaftigt gewesen, als seit den Jahren, da Sie mich gesehen haben. Die
Materien, durch deren Ausfertigung ich wohl hoffen konnte, einen vOriibergehenden
Beifall zu erlangen, haufen sieh unter meinen Handen, wie es zu geschehen pflegt,
wenn man einiger fruehtbaren Principien habhaft geworden." Schriften, X, p. 185.
14 Ibid.
work. ... " 15 And then, the following August, he reported to Herz that he
hoped to have the work fully completed that winter.16 Finally, the work was
completed in 1780, when Kant spent four or five months correlating the
materials and getting them ready for pUblication.17
We may safely say, therefore, that Kant's thought concerning the problems
of the first Critique was in continual ferment between 1771 and 1780. In fact,
Kant himself speaks of a twelve year period of incubation, which would take
his original consideration of these problems back to 1769. 18 If, then, we are
to demonstrate causal connection with the anthropological interests which
also were developing at this time, it will have to be in terms of material dating
from prior to 1769. As we have already seen, the earliest manuscripts which
give us a detailed presentation of Kant's anthropology are those of POlitz
and Starke, and neither of these will provide an insight into the period which
now concerns us. Obviously, therefore, a different approach will be necessary
in order to establish our point.
One of Kant's letters is interesting in this regard, since it mentions both of
the projects with which we are concerned. Again it is a letter to Herz, this
time late in the year 1773. The main body of this letter is a discussion of the
progress of his critical analysis of pure reason, and comments on the
enormous amount of time the work is consuming. Then Kant turns to a
discussion of Platner's Anthropologie which had just been published, and
expresses his own interest in the subject. "I am teaching for the second time
this winter a private course in anthropology, which I now intend to make a
regular academic discipline." 19 Because of the pressure of his critical work,
Kant could hardly spare time for a proper treatment of this second discipline.
Yet he says:
I am working in between times on this project, which, in my opinion, is a very
agreeable study of observations, a preliminary exercise of skill, of cleverness,
and even of wisdom, for academic youth to perform, which, with the physical
geography is distinguished from all other instruction and can be called know-
ledge of the world. 20
This second work was the Anthropologie, of course, but as we saw in Chap-
ter I, the proposed volume was not completed until much later. We can be
sure from Kant's statements, however, that his work in anthropology was
very significant to him at that time, and some commentators have maintained
15 Ibid., p. 186.
16 Ibid., p. 198. Zweig, Correspondence, p. 89.
17 Kemp Smith, Commentary, pp. xix-xx.
18 Ibid.
19 Schriften, X, p. 138. Zweig, Correspondence, p. 78.
20 Schriften, X, pp. 138-39. Zweig, Correspondence, pp. 78-79.
that only the tremendous task of completing the first Critique prevented him
from bringing the Anthropologie to publication.
There is every reason to believe, therefore, that these two projects, while
apparently directed toward different goals, were both important factors in
Kant's life during this period. And it is significant for our purposes to note
that they were both in progress at the same time. For obviously, then, it will
be much more fruitful if we avoid any attempt to draw direct causal relations,
and instead consider the context in which the two works occurred, and the
purposes they were intended to serve. In this way perhaps we can determine
precisely what relation does obtain between them, and, more important, what
role they play in Kant's development.
The Purpose of the First Critique

There has been a great deal of disagreement among scholars as to what Kant
meant to be the purpose of the first Critique. Paulsen, for example, spends
several pages discussing Schopenhauer's interpretation, the difference be-
tween his own and Erdmann's conception, and defending his own position
against the objections of Volkelt and Vaihinger. 21 The analyses consequent
upon such polemics are, unfortunately, often more confusing than enlighten-
ing. In order to avoid such confusion, we shall attempt to view Kant's in-
tentions through his own statements on the subject, rather than accept the
opinions, however documented, of later commentators. There are occasional
remarks in works which he intended for publication, but the most important
source of information on the subject is again the letters which he wrote to
various friends.
There can be no question concerning the fact that Kant viewed the Critique
of Pure Reason as a part of a complete system, rather than as an isolated
tour de force, or an entire system in itself. There could be a misunderstanding
of this point in one connection, however. In a letter to Christian Garve, on
August 7, 1783, Kant agreed that the first Critique was not well formulated
for general consumption, and explained that it was hurriedly brought to-
gether because he was beginning to fear that further delay would find him
incapacitated while he still had "the entire system" in his head. 22 This could
21 Paulsen, Immanuel Kant: His Life and Doctrine, pp. 118ff. For a more contem-
porary discussion of the problem, see the first chapter of D. P. Dryer's impressive
work, Kant's Solution for Verification in Metaphysics (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1966).
22 Schriften, X, p. 316. Zweig, Correspondence, p. 101. Actually there are many
passages which permit this misinterpretation. Another commonly cited is Kant's Open
Letter on Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre (Schriften, XII, pp. 370-71; Zweig, Correspon-
be taken as a reference to the first Critique as a complete system in itself;

but a more careful consideration of Kant's letters quickly obviates such an
error.
There is another letter, for example, written to Marcus Herz on August 20,
1777. Kant writes:
Since the time that we were separated from each other, my investigations, which
were formerly related to all sorts of objects of philosophy, have achieved
systematic form, gradually leading me to the idea of the whole system. Not
until I have that will it be possible to judge the value and interrelationships of
the parts. All executions of these works, meanwhile, depend upon that which
I call the critique of pure reason, like a stone in the path, with whose removal
alone I am currently occupied, and with which I hope to be completely finished
this winter.23
From this statement it is clear that the Critique is a preliminary study which
must be completed before other elements of the system can be brought to
completion. The position of the Critique as a means to this end is clear even
four years earlier. In a letter to Herz, Kant says that he will be glad when he
has completed his transcendental philosophy, which is really a critique of
pure reason. "Then I will go on to metaphysics, which has only two parts:
the metaphysics of nature, and the metaphysics of morals, of which I will
publish the last part first, and I rejoice over it in anticipation."24 There can
be no doubt, then, that the transcendental philosophy is intended to clear
the way for the other works to follow, and in Kant's thought the most im-
portant of these must deal with morals.
Kant's emphasis on morality is clear in the first Critique itself. There he
points out that "essential ends are not as such the highest ends; in view of
the demand of reason for complete systematic unity, only one of them can
be so described." Therefore, we may distinguish two kinds of essential ends:
the ultimate end itself, and subordinate ends which are necessarily connected
with the ultimate end as means. The ultimate end, Kant tells us, "is no other
than the whole vocation of man, and the philosophy which deals with it is
entitled moral philosophy." 25 It is easy to see in this context, also, that the
first Critique is a subordinate end - necessarily connected with moral phi-
losophy as means.
We can see a double meaning, then, in Kant's term "transcendental phi-
dence, pp. 253·54). Almost invariably the error arises from the neglect of the fact
that Kant's critique of pure reason involves more than the Critique of Pure Reason.
24 The letter is undated, but the Academy edition lists it as "gegen Ende 1773."
Schriften, X, pp. 136-38. Zweig, Correspondence, p. 78.
25 A 840, B 868. NKS, p. 658.
losophy." While it is usually used to mean an analysis of the conditions

necessary for the possibility of human knowledge as such, we can also see
that, insofar as it is embodied in the Critique of Pure Reason, it clearly
constitutes the necessary condition for the possibility of true philosophy.
In this negative sense, the first Critique is a destruction of the illusions which
previous metaphysics had fostered, in order to make way for the proper
employment of reason in a true metaphysics. But Kant clearly maintains that
the Critique has a positive function as well,26 and it is in this positive aspect
that we find the most important relation between Kant's anthropological
interests and the first Critique.
The passages cited make it clear that the philosophy which deals with the
whole vocation of man is moral philosophy, and the first Critique is the
necessary step which makes possible this philosophy of the highest end. Or,
to express the thought in another manner, Kant's conception of man as es-
sentially a moral agent required him to place moral philosophy at the peak
of his philosophic hierarchy, and his desire that it be established securely
required him to undertake the first Critique as a ground-clearing operation
which would at the same time provide a solid foundation upon which to
build this moral structure. "Required" is, of course, a strong word, but it
seems justified here. Kant was equally competent as a logical, mathematical,
speculative technician, and as a practical moralist concerned with the "whole
vocation of man." Therefore, his conception of man, drawn, as we have seen,
in large part from Rousseau, imposed upon him the task of objectively
formulating a system in which a true morality was possible. And this morality
had to be rationally founded and acceptable to men of intellect who had
rejected traditional morality. In the letter to Herz last cited, Kant wrote that
he hoped to establish philosophy on a new and more durable foundation,
one which would be more advantageous for religion and morality, and "at
the same time to give to it a form which is able to tempt the disdainful mathe-
matician to consider it fit for and worthy of his treatment. "27
Our point, then, is simply that, for Kant, it was not sufficient merely to
publish the conception of man, reality, and, consequently, philosophy which
he had gained through the insights of Rousseau. Rather, as a sound specu-
lative and moral philosopher, he found himself faced with the task of justi-
fying it and, if possible, even of demonstrating it as necessary. This is the
positive purpose of the first Critique, and indeed of the whole Critical
Philosophy.
But to understand this fully, it will be necessary to examine more closely
26 B xxv. NKS, p. 26.
certain stages of Kant's philosophic development. For while the arguments

presented are surely persuasive, what is really needed at this point is a more
conclusive demonstration of the causal role of anthropological considerations
in bringing about the Critical Philosophy - and this can only be done by
examining the change which Kant's thought gradually underwent during the
years preceding 1770.28
Our opening line of thought is one with which we are already familiar,
since we saw in Chapter I that Kant was very much interested in science
during his years as a student. And, of course, there is a good deal of evidence
that he pursued these interests with great dedication during the period imme-
diately after he had left the University. Vleeschauwer assures us that Knutzen
had succeeded in orienting Kant toward the physical sciences, and that the
influence lasted for some time. 29 But the influence of Knutzen was not that
of the pure scientist (if such could be distinguished in this period), but that
of the philosopher concerned with the ontological bases and with the
methods of science. And it is a concern with such issues as these that we find
evident in Kant's work when he returned to the University as Privatdozent
in 1755, and in the years immediately following. In fact, it would be extra-
ordinary if Kant had not manifested a great deal of interest in these matters,
since they were (and had for some time been) of vital concern to the entire
community of European scholars.
But the precise development of Kant within this context can be more
clearly determined. The general conflict of the period centered in the violent
antagonism between the metaphysical commitments of the Leibniz-Wolffian
philosophy on the one hand, and the rising flood-tide of Newtonian scientific
thought on the other.
Conflict between induction and deduction, or, in other words, between the
analytic and synthetic methods; conflict between mathematics and philosophy;
conflict between the principle of sufficient reason and that of causality; conflict
between the logical and the real; conflict between monadology and geometry;
conflict between the absolute and relative conceptions of space; conflict be-
tween the pre-established harmony and physical influxion; all these conflicts
arose from the clash between Newton's Principia Mathematica and the Leibnizo-
Wolffian metaphysics. 3o
28 Vleeschauwer's excellent work La Deduction transcendentale dans l'Oeuvre de

Kant, and his shorter summary L'Evolution de la pensee Kantienne provide an ex-
cellent insight into this period, and while the following disagrees with certain aspects
of Vleeschauwer's thought, the essential presentation is very much indebted to his
work. The English translation of the shorter work, The Development of Kantian
Thought, has already been cited above in Chapter I.
29 The Development of Kantian Thought, p. 17.
30 Ibid., p. 14.
It is in considering several of these conflicts that we may expect to find the

threads of thought which gradually drew Kant into a position which indi-
cated, and even necessitated, the critical solution.
To begin with, it seems clear that while Kant's philosophic development
was within the framework of the Wolffian school of thought, there is little
likelihood that he could have attained a naIve dedication to its principles.
The men who most directly influenced his education (Schultze and Knutzen)
were serious critics of the prevailing doctrine,3t and Kant's early writings
show an obvious debt to their work - particularly that of Knutzen. 32 It will be
remembered, as well, that it was Knutzen who introduced Kant to the work
of Newton, and the growing influence of the latter on Kant's thought is
repeatedly acknowledged. Vleeschauwer maintains, in fact, that the entire
period from 1755 to 1764 displays a general tendency on the part of Kant
to align himself with Newton in regard to matters of method. 33 And this
brings up to the essential element in what must be seen as a crucial period
in Kant's development.
As he gradually sorted out the various threads which were tangled to-
gether in the several conflicts which claimed his attention, Kant was con-
stantly confronted with the problems of methodology. In each of his early
writings there is a genuine concern not only with the problem at hand, but
with determining the particular method which is best suited to handling the
problem. In his dissertation of 1746 (written under the influence of Knutzen,
and ultimately published in 1749), entitled On the Estimation of Living
Forces, he was concerned not only with the mathematical estimation of
forces, but also with the manner in which we come to know this estimation.
His General Natural History and Theory of the Heavens attempts to recon-
cile the mechanical and teleological explanations of the universe. And the
Monadologica physica (1756) is sub-titled "The Use of Metaphysics in con-
junction with Geometry in Natural Science." But this concern with method
became more specialized as time passed, and finally the many lines of
thought which he had been following led to one central concern: the method
of metaphysics. 34
The steps by which Kant arrived at this point are not very difficult to
determine. The entire climate of thought in the period prevents us from
concluding (as some commentators have suggested) that the scientific inter-
31 T. D. Weldon, Introduction to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (Oxford: The
Clarendon Press, 1945), p. 55.
32 Vleeschauwer, The Development of Kantian Thought, pp. 14, 17.
33 Ibid., p. 29.
M Vleeschauwer feels justified in calling this concern "the great, and I should even
say the sole, Kantian problem." Ibid., p. 19.
ests of Kant during these years were pursued without concern for meta-
physical issues. 35 His work on the foundations of metaphysical knowledge
(Principiorum Primorum Cognition is Metaphysicae Nova Dilucidatio, 1755)
surely indicates otherwise. And, in addition, the concern with ethics and
natural theology which his work displays in the early seventies makes it clear
that metaphysical issues continued to be very much on his mind. But it must
be remembered that, while Kant was not entirely convinced by the con-
clusions of Leibniz and Wolff, he had not as yet come to understand the real
source of problems within a rationalist metaphysics. He was still perfectly
willing to accept the basic presupposition that reality, as the product of an
intelligent creator, was itself essentially rational, and fully open to rational
investigation. It was only gradually during the late fifties and sixties that he
became aware of the inherent difficulties of this position.
Perhaps Vleeschauwer is correct in maintaining that Kant was led early to
his concern with metaphysics through an attempt to generalize the views on
method which he set forth in his dissertation of 1746. 36 Certainly he is
justified in asserting that Kant was necessarily concerned about the infringe-
ments on scientific territory made by metaphysics in its attempt to be an
all-encompassing wisdom of the world. And there is no reason to doubt that
"an attempt to examine current methods and to put a brake on the tendency
of metaphysics to extend its boundaries at the expense of thoroughness" is
to be seen as the underlying factor in Kant's own demand for thoroughness
in handling metaphysical issues. 37
But within this context there are several precise issues which forced Kant
to place the methods of metaphysics at the center of his investigations.
Among these were the problems of causality,38 existence, and space. The first
two elements were intricately involved in his growing awareness that philo-
sophy could not follow the mathematical method which had captured the
rationalist imagination since the work of Descartes in the preceding century.
It is unnecessary for our purposes to follow the various stages in Kant's
development on this point,39 It is sufficient to note the conclusions which
35 Again it is worth noting that Kant read avidly, and never lost contact with
scholarly circles at Konigsberg. Cf. for example, Vleeschauwer, The Development 0/
Kantian Thought, p. 16.
36 Ibid., p. 20.
37 Ibid.
38 The problem of causality is intimately connected with the concept of sufficient
reason in the rationalist tradition. For a more thorough discussion of the matter, cf.
Weldon, op. cit., pp. 57-59; and Vleeschauwer, Development, pp. 23-24 and 32-33.
39 Vleeschauwer points out that in any event Crusius and Lambert had "anticipated
Kant in marking off the boundaries between mathematics and philosophy, and the
boundaries which they assigned to these subjects do not differ essentially from those
he presents in his essay The Only Possible Argument for the Existence of
God (1763), and the prize essay of 1764 (Investigation into the Distinctness
of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morals). In the first he determines
that neither real existence nor causality can be demonstrated by means of
judgment, by conceptual analysis, or by pure thought. It is experience which
assures us of both existence and causality. On the basis of these thoughts,
Kant goes on in the second work to draw a clear distinction between the
method of mathematics and that of metaphysics. On the one hand, mathe-
matics is the science of pure thought; its objects are ideal entities and its
leading principle is that of ground and consequence. Metaphysics, on the
other hand, is the science of the real; its objects are real absolute existences
and its principle is that of causality.40 Thus, while the method of mathe-
matics is synthetic, proceeding from definitions by purely rational arguments
to certain conclusions, metaphysics must proceed analytically, in the manner
of the natural sciences, in an attempt to clarify what is given indistinctly in
experience. 41 It is at this point that Kant rejected the dogmatic conclusions
of the Wolffian school which were based on the mathematical method of
Leibniz. In contrast, he espoused the analytic method which was essentially
that proposed by Newton for the science of physics. "The true method of
metaphysics is basically the same as that introduced by Newton into natural
science and which had such useful consequences in that field." 42 But if this
conclusion is accepted, its implications are rather extensive. For while the
solution removed the methodological problems which had been troubling
Kant, it also removed most of the traditional content of metaphysics from
its new purview. Thus, the new method in metaphysics would involve a great
established by Kant" (Development, p. 12). It is also worth noting that, in the same
work, Vleeschauwer defends the position that "what in fact led Kant to the exami-
nation of causality was a moral discussion about liberty, and a metaphysical discus-
sion about the existence of God" (p. 23). And he does an excellent job of tracing
influences which would account for Kant's development without the customary role
given to Hume in awakening him from his "dogmatic slumber." [Cf. Kant's remarks
in the Introduction to Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, Schriften, IV, p. 260;
Lewis White Beck translation (Library of Liberal Arts, 1960), p. 8.] In certain respects
Vleeschauwer assigns this role to Crusius and Newton (pp. 28-31), in others to Rous-
seau (p. 41).
40 For a discussion of the relation between these investigations and the two works
in which they occur, cf. Vleeschauwer, Development, p. 33.
41 Apparently Kant felt at this time that the synthetic method might be useful to
metaphysics in the future: "It is far from being the time for proceeding synthetically
in metaphysics. Only when analysis has helped us toward clearly and fully understood
concepts will it be possible for synthesis to subordinate compound knowledge to the
simplest knowledge, as in mathematics." Schriften, n, p. 290. Kant: Selected Pre-
Critical Writings and Correspondence with Beck, trans. and intro. by G. B. Kerferd
and D. E. Walford (Manchester: The University Press, 1968), pp. 22-23.
deal more than a mere change in perspective, or a new kind of argumentation.

A genuine revolution was in the making.
It is not surprising that some commentators have felt that Kant entered
a period of genuine scepticism at this time in his development - scepticism
concerning the possibility of metaphysics, of establishing the existence of
God, the immortality of the soul, the ultimate validity of morality, and so
forth. And surely a casual reading of Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Illustrated by
Dreams of Metaphysics (1766) would tend to support this conclusion. The
style of the short work is light and bantering, and a great deal of its levity is
clearly aimed at the abortive efforts of metaphysicians. But a superficial
examination of this work is quite easily shown to be misleading when the
content is more closely explored, and, in particular, when the context in
which it was written is properly understood.
In discussing the influence of Newton on Kant's development with respect
to methodology, we have neglected to bring into account that of Rousseau
during the same period. From 1762 on, this influence played a very great role
in determining Kant's perspectives. And Kant's solution to the crisis which
had arisen in regard to the transcendent objects of traditional metaphysics
(God, freedom and morality, and the immortality of the soul) cannot be
understood with<1Ut reference to Rousseau. Fortunately, it is the same source
that most clearly acknowledges the influence of Rousseau that also gives us
the best insight into the shift in Kant's perspective during this period.
Kant's own copy of the short work Observations on the Feeling of the
Beautiful and the Sublime (1764) contains a large number of handwritten
entries which express his thoughts during the years 1764-65. 43 There are
entries which indicate his dissatisfaction with the answers thus far attained,
and his quest for a more solid position:
Everything passes in a flow before us, and the variations in taste, and the dif-
ferent aspects of man make the whole play uncertain and delusive. Where shall
I find fixed points of nature which man can never shift and which can give him
indications as to the shore on which he must bring himself to rest. 44
Others make it clear that his conception of metaphysics has already under-
gone a significant change: "One may say that metaphysics is a science of
delimiting human reason." 45 And again: "Metaphysics can be useful in that
42 Schriften, II, p. 286. Selected Pre-Critical Writings, p. 17.

43 These notes constitute the important Fragmente of the eighth volume of the
Hartenstein edition of Kant's work, reprinted in Volume XX of the Prussian Academy
edition. They are given an approximate date of 1764-65.
45 "Man konnte sagen die Metaphysik sey eine Wissenschaft von den Schranken der
Menschlichen Vernunft," Schriften, XX, p. 181.
it abolishes illusion which can be dangerous." 46 Finally, there are several

entries which indicate that the traditional tasks of metaphysics can be ac-
complished without the aid of metaphysics as it had been traditionally
defined:
The knowledge of God is either speculative, and this is uncertain and subject to
dangerous errors, or moral through faith, in which case no other properties are
thought in God than those directed toward morality.47
In another place:
When men subordinate morality to religion (which is only possible and neces-
sary in the case of a suppressed rabble) they become hostile, hypocritical,
slanderous; when they subordinate religion to morality, however, they are kind,
benevolent and just.48
In the printed text of this volume we find the observation that true virtue
must be based upon principles which are not speculative rules, but the con-
sciousness of a feeling which lives in every man's breast. "I hope that I ex-
press this completely when I say that it is the feeling of the beauty and worth
of human nature." 49 Thus natural theology and religion are to be based upon
morality, and morality in turn is to be based upon the feeling which every
man has of the beauty and worth of human nature. This is clearly an ex-
tension, or amplification of the insight which Kant had achieved under the
influence of Rousseau, and its importance would be difficult to ignore. 50
But there will be further discussion of this influence in the next chapter.
For the moment, it is more important to take note of the relationship be-
tween the two influences we have been discussing. To put the matter simply,51
the influence of Newton with respect to methodology (in conjunction with
that of Crusius, Lambert, Leibniz and others, of course) ultimately brought
Kant to the position that traditional metaphysics was wrong in its method,
and that its arguments were untenable. And the influence of Rousseau, which
46 "Die Metaphysik ist darin ntitzlich dass sie den Schein aufhebt der schadlich seyn
kann," (ibid.). From this time on, Kant moves gradually toward his mature view of
metaphysics as serving a dual function: First in establishing the limits of reason, and
thereby eliminating the misconceptions of previous rationalist systems; and secondly,
in laying the foundations of pure philosophy - of physics with respect to the material
order, and of morality with respect to the intelligible order.
48 Ibid., p. 153.
49 Ibid., pp. 46-47.
50 Some authors do in fact ignore this influence, and it materially simplifies their
presentation of Kant's pre-critical development. Cf., e.g., Weldon, op. cit., pp. 55-56.
In spite of apologies for oversimplification (p. 56), this procedure is surely unfortunate.
51 Too simply, one may be inclined to feel; but the works of such men as
Vleeschauwer and Paul Menzer (Kant's Entwicklung in Natur und Geschichte, cited
in Introduction above) certainly seem to justify the conclusions offered here.
brought Kant to a realization that the dignity and worth of man is a sufficient
basis for moral and theological convictions, made these traditional argu-
ments superfluous. From this standpoint, it is perfectly understandable that
Kant would take the opportunity provided by Dreams of a Spirit-Seer to
discredit the flights of speculative fancy which rationalist philosophers had
unfortunately encouraged. It is clearly maintained in this work that the con-
clusions of speculative reason cannot be held as certain so long as they tran-
scend the experiential framework which alone can give assurance in the order
of existence. But Kant has no intention (in this work, or in any other) of dis-
crediting metaphysics as such. That is, any scepticism which he manifests in
this work is calculated, and carefully directed against the errors of previous
systems - not at all an indication of scepticism on his own part with respect
to the justifiability of metaphysics as a legitimate discipline.
This is perfectly clear in the reply (April 8, 1766) which Kant sent to Moses
Mendelssohn when the latter chided him for the bantering tone of Dreams.
Kant admits that the opinion which he expressed concerning the value of
metaphysics in general may not have been sufficiently careful and qualified;
and he willingly acknowledges that the "insights" being passed off upon the
public during the period are extremely repugnant to him. He continues:
... for I am fully convinced that the path that has been selected is completely
wrong, that the methods now in vogue must infinitely increase the amount of
folly and error in the world, and that even the total extermination of all these
chimerical insights would be less harmful than the dream science itself, with its
confounded contagion. 52
But, in clear contrast:
I am far from regarding metaphysics itself, objectively considered, to be trivial
or dispensible; in fact I have been convinced for some time now that I under-
stand its nature and its proper place in human knowledge and that the true and
lasting welfare of the human race depends on it - an appraisal that would seem
fantastic and audacious to anyone but yoU. 53
Thus it is clear that in the period under consideration Kant is more than ever
concerned with metaphysics, and certain that he knows how it must be
pursued. The critical attitude is already forming.
But in order to understand the role of the Critical Philosophy itself, there
is one additional point that must be emphasized as vital to this period in
Kant's development. And once again we must mention Rousseau. For we
find that, while the influence of Rousseau is necessarily recognized as oc-
curring at this time, the extent and duration of this influence is usually over-
53 Ibid.
looked. Even Vleeschauwer, for example, seems to feel that this influence
provided merely a temporary diversion in Kant's thought. He speaks of
Kant's enthusiasm for Rousseau as a "new infatuation," the consequences
of which "are discernible in all Kant's work up to 1766." 54 The period is
mentioned as involving "the blending of Newtonianism and the sentimental-
ism of Rousseau," 55 and the latter is apparently seen as a threat to Kant's
stability. "When Kant, after 1770, recovered his spiritual equilibrium, he
was to criticise the sentimentalism and the method of Rousseau. By that
time the crisis was over. But at its height, as in the Dreams, it is acute." 56
Surely this is misleading. There is no reason whatever to believe that Kant
ever seriously considered adopting the "sentimentalism and method" of
Rousseau. In his annotated copy of Observations we find the comment: "1
must read Rousseau until the beauty of expression no longer distracts me,
and only then will I be able to survey him with reason."57 Surely senti-
mentalism, like literary style, would be subjected to rational evaluation. And
Kant explicitly contrasts his own method with that employed by Rousseau. 58
Thus, it was not after 1770, but at the very time when Rousseau's influence
is clearly discernible that Kant subjected him to a careful criticism. And the
result was not a temporary enthusiasm, but a very radical and lasting change
in Kant's thought.
What Kant gained from Rousseau was the awareness that the attainment
of knowledge is not an end in itself; that all aspects of philosophy must be
directed toward the comprehension and fulfillment of the moral nature of
man; and thus that, in general, moral or practical philosophy takes pre-
cedence over speculative. Quite obviously Kant had not as yet attained his
mature view in such matters, but the basic insight gained in these years did
not undergo serious change in later years. What did change was his con-
ception of the proper correlation and organization of the materials of phi-
losophy on the one hand, and the proper manner of presentation in order
to justify his convictions on the other. Undoubtedly commentators are cor-
rect in seeing the problems of Newtonian absolute space as precipitating
Kant's adoption of the critical perspective.59 In any event, Kant himself tells
us that it was essentially a methodological matter, an attempt to resolve the
antinomies of pure reason (rather than an attempt to establish the existence
54 Vleeschauwer, Development, p. 39.

55 Ibid., p. 43.
56 Ibid., p. 40.
58 Ibid., p. 14.
59 Cf. Weldon, op. cit., pp. 60-62; Vleeschauwer, Development, pp. 47-56.
of God or the immortality of the soul) which necessitated his critical task. 60
He found it necessary "to resolve the scandal of the ostensible contradiction
of reason with itself." 61 It was thus the first task of metaphysics, the purely
speculative attempt to delimit speculative reason itself, which produced the
first aspects of the Critical Philosophy. But the Critical Philosophy grew out
of this negative function into a fully developed positive system. What is
constantly ignored in Kant's works is the fact that the critique of pure reason
which he provides is not limited to a critique of pure speculative reason. It is
developed into a critique of the essential (a priori) structure of all human
experience, i.e., a critique of the human experiencer as such - or, more
simply, of the a priori principles of human nature.
Once this is realized, several interesting perspectives develop. Perhaps the
first point that comes to mind is that there is a much more significant reason
than that normally cited for Kant's failure to produce the proposed hand-
book on anthropology. Even Erdmann seems to have failed to grasp the
essential issue when he mentions that this failure may be ascribed to the fact
that Kant was then at the peak of his intellectual life and in the midst of
working out the Critical Philosophy which took up all his time. 62 Rather, if
our interpretation is accepted, it becomes obvious that Kant intentionally
withheld his study on anthropology because a definitive work on the topic
would be impossible until after the a priori principles had been laid down in
the proposed critique. 63
Professor Beck makes essentially the same point with reference to the work
on ethics which Kant proposed during this period. For there is every reason
to believe that Kant would have produced an ethics based on the "hidden
nature of man" which he mentioned occasionally. Or he might have pro-
duced a metaphysic in the traditional sense as a basis for ethics. But Hume
and/or the antinomies intervened, and it was necessary for Kant to validate
the capacity of reason to deal with these matters. This attempt at validation
produced the Critique of Pure Reason. 64
But there are more interesting consequences to the proposed anthropolo-
gical interpretation of Kant's work. For example, it becomes clear that what
is usually called Kant's "Copernican Revolution" is not merely an epistemo-
60 Schriften, XII, p. 58. Zweig, Correspondence, p. 252.
61 Ibid.
62 Erdmann, Reflexionen, I, pp. 53-54.
@ Curiously enough, in another place Erdmann mentions that Kant may indeed
have planned to withhold the practical anthropology until after he had published the
Metaphysic of Morals, but he does not seem to have seen the full implications of this
suggestion. Cf. Reflexionen, I, p. 51.
64 Lewis White Beck, Studies in the Philosophy of Kant (Indianapolis: Bobbs-
Merrill Co., Inc., 1965), pp. 10-11.

logical shift in perspective, nor, in itself, the pivot upon which the entire
system revolves, but rather a symptom of a much broader and deeper revo-
lution. The full significance of the Kantian Revolution is that it provides a
complete rebirth of all aspects of science and philosophy in a totally new
dimension. It involves a transvaluation of values which in many respects
foreshadows that of Nietzsche. The essential difference, of course, is that
Kant preserves all the significant aspects of the traditional conception of
reality, while providing a totally new basis for their understanding and
justification. 66 Still, the very terms and elements of the new anthropological
system have a radically different meaning. Reality is now man's reality, and
the Enlightenment is fulfilled. Man is freed from his self-imposed minority
- he has the courage to use his own intelligence, and to assume his rightful
position. 66
Kant was totally convinced of the importance of his contribution to
humanity. As early as 1765 we find him saying: "If there is any science which
man really needs, it is the one I teach, of how to fulfill properly that position
in creation which is assigned to man, and from which he is able to learn what
one must be in order to be a man." 67 The remark is, of course, appropriate
to the period shortly after his most fruitful encounter with the work in Rous-
seau, but it expresses, as well, the essential orientation of Kant throughout
his career. It is appropriate, then, that in moving to a consideration of Kant's
practical philosophy we examine more closely the details of his relation to
Rousseau, whose influence so forcefully directed it. With this as point of
departure, we should find easy access to the thought of the second Critique.
85 That Kant did not intend to destroy metaphysics, and that he did hope to provide
a new justification for the traditional conception of reality is borne out by his letter
to Kastner in 1790, in which he mentions that the Critical Philosophy is not intended
to attack the long-neglected Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy, but to reach the same
objective by a different path - "an intention that will become clearer when, if I live
long enough, the coherent system of metaphysics that I propose is completed."
(Schriften, XIII, p. 278; Zweig, Correspondence, p. 179, n. 1).
83 These comments reflect Kant's opening statement in the essay What is Enlighten-
ment?, and a similar passage in the Anthropologie cited above, Chapter I.
CHAPTER IV
ROUSSEAU AND KANT'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY
The study of the Anthropologie is fascinating to one interested in Kant's

thought, because it provides an opportunity to encounter, at least in a frag-
mentary form, the personality of Kant as it was manifest in the lecture hall.
The breadth and depth of his insights, and his ability to draw constantly upon
a great variety of illustrative material to establish the validity of each po-
sition, made him an extraordinary teacher in addition to his undoubted com-
petence as a technical philosopher. That the richness of his thought was
fostered by voracious reading we have already seen, and his curiosity and
scholarly bent found him equally at home in both the light novels and the
scientific speculations of the period. He had a deep love for the classics, yet
kept abreast of the most advanced thought of his day. It was this constant
search for greater knowledge that brought Kant into contact with one of the
most powerful and permanent sources of inspiration that he would ever
encounter - the work of Jean Jacques Rousseau.
The depth of the impression made on Kant can be realized fully only
when we keep in mind what we have already noted - that his early work was
concentrated primarily in the neat, orderly world of scientific and mathe-
matical thought. That he was also interested in man and in questions of
morality we may be quite certain, but, as these latter areas were understood
by Kant at the time, they could in no sense satisfy his craving for precision
and order in intellectual matters. His encounter with the thought of Rous-
seau, however, provided the basis for just such a systematization.
The great respect which Kant acquired for the scientific insights of New-
ton during his years as a student under Knutzen has already been pointed
out. In his own words: "Newton was the first to discern order and regularity
in combination with great simplicity, where before him men had encountered
disorder and unrelated diversity. Since Newton, the comets follow geometric
orbits." 1 In similar fashion, Rousseau provided the key which would permit
50 ROUSSEAU AND KANT'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY
a neat and orderly philosophy of man. "Rousseau was the very first to dis-
cover beneath the varying forms which human nature assumes the deeply
concealed nature of man and the hidden law in accordance with which
Providence is justified by his observations." 2
Naturally, since Rousseau and Kant were so extremely different, both in
their lives and in their works, the precise manner in which the former might
influence the thought of the latter is not immediately apparent. But a second
consideration quickly brings the essential factor to light. In the work of
Rousseau, there is a primary distinction between primitive man, and the
conventional man of civilization - l' homme de la nature and l' homme de
l' homme - and Kant saw in this distinction a contribution to ethical and
social criticism, a distinction of true and false values. As Cassirer rightly
observes: "What Kant prized in Rousseau was the fact that he had dis-
tinguished more clearly than others between the mask that man wears and
his actual visage." 3 Civilization has added many dimensions to human ex-
perience which are apparently good, but which actually add nothing to man's
moral worth, and, at times, even detract from it. "There is a great deal that
man has absorbed in the course of time and learned from his cultural heri-
tage, which is really in conflict with his 'true' character and his proper and
original vocation." 4 Realizing this, Kant took up the idea of l' homme
naturel, but in an ethical and teleological sense, rather than as a scientific
or historical concept.
It is not, therefore, in a descriptive sense that Kant accepted Rousseau's
theory, but in a normative sense. He saw this conception of man "not as a
retrospective elegy, but as a prospective prophecy." I)
What is truly permanent in human nature is not any condition in which it once
existed and from which it has fallen; rather it is the goal for which and toward
which it moves. Kant looks for constancy not in what man is but in what he
should be. And Kant credits Rousseau the ethical philosopher with having dis-
cerned the "real man" beneath all the distortions and concealments, beneath all
the masks that man has created for himself and worn in the course of his history.
That is, Kant esteems Rousseau for having recognized and honored man's dis-
tinctive and unchanging end. 6
For Kant, then, the work of empirical philosophers - those who base their
2 Ibid. Lewis White Beck sees the impact of Rousseau at this time as sufficiently
decisive to warrant reference to the subsequent shift in Kant's moral thought as a
"Rousseauistic Revolution." Studies in the Philosophy of Kant, p. 223.
3 Cassirer, Rousseau-Kant-Goethe, p. 20.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., p. 10.
6 Ibid., p. 20.
ROUSSEAU AND KANT'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY 51
doctrine on experience, and derive their knowledge of human nature from

the history of man's previous development - must necessarily prove in-
adequate. Such work would deal only with the accidental and changing
aspects of man, rather than with the essential and permanent. But through
the work of Rousseau, Kant did grasp the essential element in man: his
ethical and not his physical or speculative-intellectual nature. It was for this
reason that Kant hailed Rousseau's position as marking a new age in man's
intellectual development, a great discovery totally unknown to the ancients. 7
But while Kant accepted the insights of Rousseau, he found it necessary
to reject his method. For Rousseau did not follow a strict form of rational
inquiry, the essential mode of investigation for the rigorous mind of Kant.
In fact, as we have seen, even the excellence of Rousseau's literary style
troubled Kant, and he felt that he must struggle to ignore it. He wanted to
examine Rousseau's work not merely for the aesthetic pleasure it might
afford, but in particular for the validity of his thought as an expression of
rational insights. He would read Rousseau until the beauty of expression no
longer bothered him, and then he would be able to survey the work with
reason. 8 Such an attempt at rational purity is difficult to comprehend, but it
clearly indicates the significance which Kant attributed to the works of Rous-
seau, and the frame of mind in which he approached them.
Because of this distrust of the method employed, it is clear that Kant
accepted only the core of Rousseau's thought, rather than the details of its
presentation. He felt, also, that Rousseau was incorrect in starting with an
assumed natural man, and proceeding synthetically. Kant felt it necessary to
begin with man as we know him, civilized man, and to proceed analytically.9
It is appropriate in studying animals to begin with their wild state, but in
studying man it is necessary to observe him in his creative endeavors, i.e.,
in civilization.lO "This beginning is indicated because, in the concept of man,
civilization constitutes no secondary or accidental characteristic, but marks
man's essential nature, his specific character." 11 This becomes perfectly clear
when we realize that civilization constitutes the social and ethical context
which alone reveals the essential and permanent aspects of man.
In working out his thought, Kant employs at the moral level a principle
which, for Rousseau, was a principle of the social order. In the Contrat
social, Rousseau discusses the superiority of man's position in the ideal
civil state, pointing out that, in addition to all other advantages, in this con-
7 Schriften, II, p. 312.
9 Ibid., p. 14.
11 Cassirer, op. cit., p. 22.
text man achieves "moral liberty, which alone makes him truly master of
himself; for the mere impulse of appetite is slavery, while obedience to a law
which we prescribe to ourselves is freedom." 12 Kant singles out this unique
quality of man, that of self-legislation, as the key to the full understanding
of the moral order - and upon this point his whole practical philosophy rests.
In the Critique of Practical Reason (1788), Kant provides the basis for his
moral philosophy.13 In setting about this task, he follows a procedure very
similar to that employed in the first Critique,14 and at the same time makes
clear the relation between "pure" and "practical" reason. In the Critique
of Pure Reason, the distinction had been clearly drawn between sensible and
intelligible worlds: between the world of phenomena reported by the senses,
and the noumenal world which the intellect is forced to posit, but can say
virtually nothing about. In the first Critique, also, it was established that,
while a strict order of causality reigns in sensible reality, it is at least not
contradictory to conceive of the possibility of freedom from this order in the
intelligible world. But again nothing positive can be said of freedom except
that it is possible.1 5 In the realm of speculative reason, then, there is an area
of human interest which cannot be satisfied, a "vacant place" 16 which
crowns our pursuit of knowledge.
The second Critique, however, can shed more light on these matters. For
in this new context Kant is dealing with morality rather than nature. Here,
he points out, reason imposes a fundamental law of conduct upon man. "The
consciousness of this fundamental law may be called a fact of reason, since
one cannot ferret it out from antecedent data of reason, such as the con-
sciousness of freedom (for this is not antecedently give)." 17 This law, which
man experiences as universal, is therefore "an imperative commanding
12 Book I, Chapter VIII.

13 While the Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals (Grundlegung
zur Metaphysik der Sitten) had already been published in 1785, Kant felt that it did not
properly clear the way for the metaphysic of morals which he still proposed to write.
For a discussion of Kant's reasons, see Lewis White Beck, A Commentary on Kant's
Critique of Practical Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 15f.
14 The structural relation between the first and second Critiques has been the subject
of much controversy. Paulsen, for example, considers Kant to be "enslaved" by his
format (Immanuel Kant: His Life and Doctrine, pp. 300f), while Beck feels that it is
essential to Kant's purposes (Commentary, p. 55).
15 Kant does mention in the first Critique that practical freedom can be proved
through experience, but the question of transcendental freedom remains unanswered.
A 80lff, B 829ff. NKS, pp. 633f.
16 Schriften, V, p. 49. Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings in Moral
Philosophy, trans. Lewis White Beck (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949),
p. 159. Cited hereafter as Beck trans.
17 Schriften, V, pp. 30f. Beck trans., p. 142.
categorically because it is unconditioned." 18 It is this categorical imperative

which is called the moral law, and the relation of man's will to this law is one
of dependence under the name of obligation. "This term implies a constraint
to an action, though this constraint is only that of reason and its objective
law." 19 The will, therefore, is constrained, but not compelled, and man is
ultimately free to accept or reject the moral law.
It is here that we encounter Rousseau's principle of self-legislation or, as
Kant calls it, Autonomie. "The autonomy of the will is the sole principle of
all moral laws and of the duties conforming to them .... The moral law ex-
presses nothing else than the autonomy of the pure practical reason, i.e., free-
dom." 20 Thus, while it is impossible to formulate a theoretical proof that
rational beings are free, the moral law compels us to assume freedom, and
therefore authorizes us to assume it. We are compelled to assume it because
the concept of freedom and that of the supreme principle of morality "are so
inextricably bound together that practical freedom could be defined through
the will's independence of everything except the moral law." 21 In consider-
ation of this in severable connection, the moral law is said to postulate free-
dom. 22
Thus we find that, as in the first Critique the pure intuitions of space and
time make possible our knowledge of sensible reality, so in the Critique of
Practical Reason the moral law makes possible our knowledge of the intel-
ligible world. "This law gives to the sensible world, as sensuous nature (as
this concerns rational beings), the form of an intelligible world, i.e., the form
of supersensuous nature, without interfering with the mechanism of the
former."23 If, then, we accept Kant's definition of "nature," in the broadest
sense, as "the existence of things under laws," 24 it becomes clear that man
shares in two different worlds, and that there are two distinct aspects to his
nature.
The sensuous nature of rational beings in general is their existence under em-
pirically conditioned laws, and therefore it is, from the point of view of reason,
heteronomy. The supersensuous nature of the same beings, on the other hand,
18 Schrijten, V, p. 32. Beck trans., p. 143.

19 Schrijten, V, pp. 30f. Beck trans., pp. 143-44.
20 Schrijten, V, p. 33. Beck trans., p. 144.
21 Schrijten, V, pp. 93-94. Beck trans., p. 200.
22 It is in this sense - the necessary assumption of freedom in the practical order -
that Kant speaks of freedom as ·'proved." He is careful to distinguish this from
speculative knowledge, but affirms that "with the pure practical faculty of reason,
the reality of transcendental freedom is also confirmed." Schrijten, V, p. 3. Beck
trans., p. 118.
23 Schrijten, V, p. 43. Beck trans., pp. 153-54.
24 Ibid.
is their existence according to laws which are independent of all empirical condi-
tions and which therefore belong to the autonomy of pure reason. 25
The moral law is the law of this autonomy, and it constitutes "the funda-
mental law of supersensuous nature, and of a pure world of the understand-
ing, whose counterpart must exist in the world of sense without interfering
with the laws of the latter." 26 While, therefore, man is constrained in the
order of the sensible world, he is free in the intelligible world, in the world of
morality. It is for this reason that Kant tells us that the moral order alone
shows man in his proper perspective.
What was for Rousseau a principle of the political order is thus developed
by Kant into a moral and metaphysical doctrine which is essential to his
Critical Philosophy. For self-legislation, or autonomy, is freedom, and "the
concept of freedom, in so far as its reality is proved by an apodictic law of
practical reason, is the keystone of the whole architecture of the system of
pure reason and even of speculative reason." 27
It is interesting to note, also, that the system of moral philosophy which
Kant built upon this foundation was necessarily marked by other character-
istics of Rousseau's thought.28 It had been common, for example, for phi-
losophers of the Enlightenment to assume that a sound ethics must depend
upon rational knowledge, and that moral progress could only be expected
when progress in knowledge had been achieved. In fact, the latter was seen
as almost the guarantor of the former. The Gnostic implications of such a
system are obvious. However, even philosophers of this school recognized
that until a true morality could be achieved, a temporary system of philo-
sophically untenable, popular morality, based on religion, would have to be
adopted as a necessary evil, and be at least tolerated. But, for Kant, popular
morality had a much different significance.
Kant, more than any other philosopher of his age, respected the "ordinary moral
consciousness" of the ordinary man; under the influence of his early pietism
and of Rousseau, he came to regard the unshakable moral convictions of the
simple and humble as the proper starting point for philosophical analysis; and
philosophy, so far from being the moral teacher of mankind, is given the task
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Schriften. V, pp. 3-4. Beck trans., p. 118.
28 In a work which deals primarily with Rousseau, Hoffding maintains that Rous-
seau actually affected Kant twice: the first time through Emile in 1762, and "the
second about 1783, when not only the 'Confession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar,'
but especially Rousseau's conception of society, and the distinction between 'bonte'
and 'vertu' made an impression on him." Harald Hoffding, Jean Jacques Rousseau
and His Philosophy. trans. William Richards and Leo E. Saidla (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1930), p. 119n.
of defending it from its outward enemies - the philosophers of heteronomous
ethics - and its internal dangers - moral fanaticism and mysticism. 29
Just as the natural freedom of man serves as the basis of Rousseau's political
order, the object of that freedom, the moral law, forms the basis of Kant's
practical philosophy.
We even find that the fundamental law of pure practical reason, the cate-
gorical imperative, strongly reflects the thought of Rousseau. Cassirer points
out that the formulation which Kant gives to this law in the Critique of
Practical Reason - "so act that the maxim of your will could always hold at
the same time as a principle establishing universal law" - coincides with what
Rousseau regards as the really fundamental principle of every legitimate
social order. "And we may surmise that Rousseau not only influenced the
content and systematic development of Kant's foundation of ethics, but that
he also formed its language and style." 30
If we consider another formulation of this law, which Kant suggests in the
Grundlegung, the influence of Rousseau is even more apparent. After point-
ing out the special nature of the person, and the fact that rational nature
exists as an end in itself, Kant gives the practical imperative in this form:
"So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any
other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only." 31 As usual, Kant
has given his own particular form to the thought, but surely we cannot fail
to see reflected here the thoughts of Mme de Wolmar in sections of La
Nouvelle HelOise: "It is never right to harm a human soul for the advantage
of others." 32 And later: "Man is too noble a being to serve simply as the
instrument for others, and he must not be used for what suits them without
consulting also what suits himself .... " 33 In the work of Kant, the principle
that each person constitutes an end in itself is seen as the basis for devel-
oping a perfect society in which each man would act, and be treated, as an
end. This "kingdom of ends" bears a striking resemblance to the social
structure envisioned by Rousseau as the voluntary cooperation of free men
in the ideal state. Once again, therefore, we find that Rousseau has provided
29 Beck, Commentary, p. 235. One may argue, as well, that it was not merely the
moral consciousness of man that Kant held worthy of respect. At one point he wrote:
"One must learn the virtue of honoring the common understanding on moral, as well
as logical, grounds." Schriften, XX, p. 44.
30 Cassirer, op. cit., p. 32.
31 Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. Thomas Kingsmill
Abbott (Chicago: Great Books Foundation, 1949), p. 53.
32 Part IV, letter 22.
aa Part V, letter 2.
the elements which Kant intensified, restructured, and proclaimed as the

necessary path which man must follow if he would better himself. 34
In all fairness to Rousseau, it should be mentioned that scholars who are
primarily concerned with Rousseau find it very difficult to accept the idea
that Kant gave structure and intensity to the insights which he had borrowed.
They naturally resent the implication that Rousseau's thought lacks structure
and intensity, and that Kant found it necessary to correct and improve upon
Rousseau's rudimentary findings. 35 But such delicate sensibilities are surely
inappropriate here. Kant's respect, even reverence, for Rousseau is un-
doubted,36 and the Kant-scholar would surely be unfaithful to the master if
he neglected to show due respect in tum. But it is equally clear to anyone
who reads the work of Kant that his thought is vitally different from that of
Rousseau in any number of ways. There are a great many discussions of the
precise similarities and differences between the two on particular points,37
and it is unnecessary for us to go into such detail here. But what can be said,
and emphasized, is that the thought of Rousseau, as originally presented, was
inadequate to the task for which Kant required it. Thus the thought had to
be transformed - not because of any inherent deficiency, but because of the
precise use to which Kant was to put it. Surely polemics are unnecessary
here, and scholars in both camps would do well to avoid them.
Quite apart from such questions of loyalty, however, it is possible to doubt
that the influence of Rousseau upon Kant was quite so direct as the passages
cited would imply. After all, Kant had read the works of Rousseau about
1762, and the second Critique was not written until twenty-five years later.
34 Accused of merely giving a new formulation, rather than a new principle of

morality, Kant replied in the Critique of Practical Reason: "Who would want to
introduce a new principle of morality and, as it were, be its inventor, as if the world
had hitherto been ignorant of what duty is or had been thoroughly wrong about it?
Those who know what a formula means to a mathematician, in determining what is
to be done in solving a problem without letting him go astray, will not regard a
formula which will do this for all duties as something insignificant and unnecessary"
(Schriften, Y, p. 8n; Beck trans., p. 123n). The statement indicates how precise and
complete Kant thought his moral formula to be.
35 Cf., for example, Mark J. Temmer, Time in Rousseau and Kant: An Essay on
French Pre-Romanticism (Paris: Librairie Minard, 1958), especially pp. 9-10 and
70-71.
38 We are constantly reminded by biographers that an image of Rousseau was the
only ornament in Kant's study.
37 For a variety of comparative material cf.: Temmer, Time in Rousseau and Kant
(cited above); Martin Rang: Rousseaus Lehre vom Menschen (Gottingen: Vanden-
hoeck & Ruprecht, 1959); Georg Gurvitch, "Kant und Fichte als Rousseau Inter-
preten," Kantstudien, XXVII (1922). In addition, there are several works by Victor
De1bos on Kant's moral philosophy which deal extensively with Rousseau, and that
of Cassirer already mentioned is invaluable.
But such hesitance is unwarranted. The moral nature of man is the central
factor of the entire system of Kant's thought, and it would be impossible for
him to forget passages such as these which express essential aspects of his
conception of morality.3S It is safe to say that Kant did not exaggerate when
he expressed his indebtedness to Rousseau - we may even feel that there was
more influence involved than even Kant was aware of.
The Distinctive Morality of Kant

While we have considered the general structure of Kant's morality as it
flowed from his contact with Rousseau, we have not as yet viewed it in
relation to the moral agent himself. Precisely to what kind of being is this
morality appropriate, and to what end will it direct him? Paulsen gives an
excellent capsule view of Kant's thought on the first point. The charac-
teristic position of man in reality is that of a being in whom sensibility and
reason are united. With respect to knowledge, at least, this is certainly clear
in Kant's work: human knowledge requires both perception and under-
standing. "Understanding without sensibility is a description of the divine
intelligence, while sensibility without understanding is the condition of the
brutes." 39 Man, of course, is directly between these extremes. "In like man-
ner, the human will is characterized by the fact that reason and sensibility
are always united in action, the former determining the form of the will, and
the latter furnishing the object of desire." 40 We can conceive of reason
without sensibility, but this could only characterize the divine will, "whose
nature is expressed in the moral law, which alone determines its activity." 41
On the other hand, "sensible impulses without reason result in the animal
will, made up of lawless and accidental desires, subject to the natural course
of events." 42
The very nature of morality rests upon the distinctive character of man in
which reason and sensibility are joined. For with respect to the divine will
as one extreme, and animal sensibility as the other, there can be no obligation
and, consequently, no morality. Because the divine will corresponds exactly
to the divine reason, it is not moral, but holy. Because the will of the lower
38 Stuckenberg reminds us that "even in old age, when his memory for recent im-
pressions had become very weak, he was still able to quote easily and correctly
numerous passages from Latin writers." Stuckenberg, op. cit., p. 28. Note also his dis-
cussion of Kant's ability to retain detail, pp. 109-10.
39 Paulsen, op. cit., p. 303.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
animals is made up of passive excitation of impulse, it does not act but

remains passive as a part of nature, and therefore is entirely outside morality.
"In the case of man, morality rests upon the control of the sense impulses by
the reason. Through the fact that man as a rational being prescribes a law to
himself as a sensible being, obligation first arises." 43
In man, according to Kant, inclinations are all drawn ultimately from sense
impulses, while the concept of duty proceeds from reason - the only source
of universal principles. It is the opposition between these two aspects of man
which sets up a conflict within him and requires him to struggle for moral
rectitude. But Kant makes it clear that true morality must be carefully dis-
tinguished from mere legality. To act in accordance with the law is not
enough. The concept of duty demands of action that it objectively agree
with the law, but it also demands of the maxim of the action subjective
respect for the law as the sole mode of determining the will through itself.44
And thereon rests the distinction between consciousness of having acted ac-
cording to duty and tram duty, i.e., from respect for law. The former, legality,
is possible even if inclinations alone are the determining grounds of the will,
but the latter, morality or moral worth, can be conceded only where action
occurs from duty, i.e., merely for the sake of law.45
For Kant, then, morality requires the complete dominance of sense and in-
clination by reason, not only in order to bring action into accord with the
law, but also to determine its motivation - pure, selfless reverence for the
law itself. Only in this way can self-interest and self-love be avoided as under-
mining forces of morality.46
Although Kant explicitly repudiates the moral principles of the Stoics,47
it is not extraordinary that his conception of human perfection has been com-
pared to the rational ideal which they sought. In discussing this ideal of a
totally rational man, Paulsen maintains that "it was the Stoic type of human
perfection that Kant had before his mind. The complete sovereignty of
reason, and complete freedom from the passions, constitute the status per-
fectionis." 48 Emotions could have no power over the perfect man, for he
would act according to principles rather than feelings. "Emotions are only
provisional springs of action with which the wisdom of nature endowed man,
43 Ibid., p. 304.
44 Schriften, V, p. 81. Beck trans., p. 188.
45 Ibid.
48 This topic is thoroughly discussed in Part I, Chapter ill, of the Critique of
Practical Reason, "The Incentives of Pure Practical Reason." Schriften. V, pp. 7Iff.
Beck trans., pp. I80ff.
47 Schriften, V, pp. 4Of. Beck trans., pp. I5lf.
48 Paulsen, op. cit., p. 289.
as it endowed animals, until reason is sufficiently developed to assume the

guidance of life." 49 But Paulsen carries his argument too far.
In criticizing Kant's moral thought, he feels constrained to call it "nega-
tivism," centered in the notion that "to act morally is to do what one does
not want to do." 50 He maintains that, according to Kant,
even the virtuous man might really always prefer to follow his sensuous incli-
nations to luxury, ease, etc. But the "idea of the law," with its "thou shalt not,"
or "thou shalt" interposes. And so, practicing the hard virtue of repression, he
does what he does not want to do. 51
This is what is referred to by some writers as the "sour duty" conception of
Kant's thought, and Beck vigorously defends Kant against such an inter-
pretation. He points out, to begin with, that Kant considers it a duty to
establish and cultivate a moral feeling, a sense of satisfaction in the con-
sciousness of virtue. 52 That alone would make it difficult for the virtuous
man "really always [to] prefer to follow his sensuous inclinations."
In another context, however, Kant tells us that we have at least an indirect
duty to provide for our own happiness, though this is for the purpose of
ensuring the fulfillment of duty.53 But a further statement clearly undermines
the "sour duty" interpretation. Kant tells us that
man is a being of needs, so far as he belongs to the world of sense, and to this
extent his reason certainly has an inescapable responsibility from the side of his
sensuous nature to attend to its interest and to form practical maxims with a
view to the happiness of this and, where possible, of a future life.54
Kant is only concerned that man should not make his intellect subservient
to his senses, for that would make man simply another form of animal rather
than a higher form of life.
We can see, therefore, that while the notion of "sour duty" is too strong
an accusation to level against Kant's moral thought, Kant is nonetheless sus-
picious of the sensible aspect of man, and is careful to guard against its
blandishments. It would seem, then, that Kant's moral doctrine has been
strongly influenced by his rather unflattering conception of the nature of
man. Because Kant understood the rational powers of man to constitute
man's distinctive characteristic, he would necessarily propound an ethic in
49 Ibid. In another place, Paulsen mentions of Kant himself: "Stoic apathy, in-
dependence of things and mastery over them is his personal ideal. It is obvious how
strong an influence this exercises upon his moral theory." Ibid., p. 335.
50 Ibid., p. 332.
51 Ibid., pp. 332-33.
M Schriften, V, p. 61. Beck trans., p. 170.
which the rational capacity is supreme. But the extreme effort to purify
motivation of all taint of sense and inclination cannot help but remind us of
the passages in the Anthropologie where he likens the emotions to drunken-
ness, and the passions to chronic illness. 55 Such an emphasis reflects not only
the logical relationship between reason and sense in a rational animal; it
implies, as well, the clear understanding of man in his concrete particularity,
as seen through the empirical data of the anthropological investigations. The
connection between Kant's ethical position and his broader conception of
man is important for us to consider.
Morality and Anthropology

There are various ways in which we might consider the relation between
Kant's anthropology and the moral doctrine which he advanced, but perhaps,
again, it would be best at least to begin with his own statements on the matter.
In the introductory remarks to his lectures on ethics,56 Kant takes up the
point in order to make clear the role of ethics in philosophy. He gives a brief
analysis of a rational agent, showing the relation between the understanding
and the will, and pointing out that if the will is free, then it is necessary to
have principles or rules for the use of that freedom. To provide these rules
is the task of general practical philosophy, and the rules which it provides
must be objective. But there are also SUbjective practical rules, and these are
the concern of anthropology. "An objective rule lays down what ought to
occur, even though it never actually occurs. But the subjective rule deals with
actual happenings." 57 The distinction is necessary, since, as Kant points out,
even the wicked have rules of conduct; but they usually have little to do with
what ought to be. The role of anthropology in this scheme, then, is to observe
the actual behavior of human beings, and to formulate the practical and
subjective rules which that behavior obeys. But moral philosophy "seeks to
formulate rules of right conduct, that is, of what ought to happen, just as
logic comprises the rules for the right use of the mind." 58 But, while moral

56 We employ here the notes of Kant's students, compiled and edited by Paul
Menzer from three notebooks dated variously 1780-1782. This work was first published
in 1924. The material from this source is excellent for our purposes, since it provides
a clear view of Kant's thought on the subject just a few years before the writing of the
second Critique. There is no reason to believe that his conception of this relation
changed.
57 Lectures in Ethics, ed. Paul Menzer, trans. Louis Infield (London: The Century
Co., no date), p. 2.
58 Ibid. From Kant's statement, it seems likely that the distinction which he intends
philosophy and anthropology are distinct, they are not entirely independent.
Not only are they closely connected, but we may even say that moral phi-
losophy "cannot subsist without" anthropology; "for we cannot tell whether
the subject to which our consideration applies is capable of what is demanded
of him unless we have knowledge of that subject." 59 It would be possible,
of course, to pursue the study of practical philosophy without knowledge of
the subject gained through anthropology, but then we would be engaged in a
merely speculative endeavor. "We therefore have to make at least some study
of man." 60
Apparently then, in Kant's scheme, anthropology provides the framework
for the practical philosophy, and the testing ground for "objective rules"
derived from reason. But this statement provides only the logical relation-
ship between the two disciplines as separate elements of a system of phi-
losophy. We are interested, as well, in the relation between them as they were
actually formulated by Kant.
With respect to the Critique of Practical Reason, we have already sug-
gested one connection: the mistrust of sensibility discussed in such detail in
the Anthrop%gie. But Erdmann maintains a much more explicit relation
between the two works. Everything in the second Critique that belongs to
empirical psychology, he feels, is directly drawn from the anthropology
lectures - for they had become the repository for such material after it had
been separated from the lectures on physical geography.61 Erdmann par-
ticularly emphasizes the material employed in the discussion of the appetitive
faculty.
There is, then, a definite relation between the anthropology and the second
Critique, and it can be seen at two distinct levels. Formally, the science of
anthropology is seen as a prerequisite to the formation and validation of the
practical philosophy. Then, as this formal relation would lead us to expect,
we find that some portion of the content of the practical philosophy was
literally drawn from the lectures Kant had been delivering on anthropology.
We do not mean to imply that the relation between these two aspects of
Kant's thought came into existence at the time of the second Critique; for
we have already seen that he had included anthropological material in his
lectures on ethics as early as 1765. But our examination of the later work
permits us to conclude anew, and with greater assurance, that there is a
between these two sciences is precisely that established in current philosophic thought
between the descriptive and the normative levels of discourse.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid., p. 3.
ft! Erdmann, Reflexionen, I, p. 55.
strong and direct influence exerted on Kant's moral thought by his anthro-
pology.
There is one additional point, however, which should be discussed in
relation to Kant's practical philosophy: the question of the ultimate source
of his doctrine. Many works dealing with Kant assume an obvious, and rather
facile, answer to this question, and the matter is worthy of comment. It is
not uncommon, for example, to encounter suggestions that Kant's moral
theory is a direct product of his pietistic background. Stuckenberg quotes
favorably the comment that "Pietism forged that brass logical chain whose
last link is the Categorical Imperative." 62 Beck, in the introductory note to
his translation of the second Critique tells us that "Pietism's deeply ethical
orientation and singular lack of emphasis on theological dogmatism became
a part of Kant's nature and a determining factor in his philosophy." 63 And
Schilpp, after discussing the strictness and rigor of Kant's early childhood,
and the enforced routine and self-discipline of his later life, concludes:
"These facts combined give a natural setting for what has since come to be
universally spoken of as the 'rigor' of Kant's philosophic theories." 64 He
goes on to raise an objection to the interpretation of Kant's work as rigorous,
but not because it is an incorrect evaluation of the sources of Kant's thought.
Rather, Schilpp is concerned because the interpretation gives an unjust im-
pression of Kant himself: "These influences, none the less, have been over-
estimated by Kant scholars. The Pietistic up-bringing of Kant offers a com-
paratively easy explanation for certain rigoristic features of his philosophy,
but hardly justifies a caricature of Kant's personality that falsifies his real
character." 65 To balance this error, Schilpp proceeds to establish that Kant
was actually a man of deep feeling, and even of profound emotion. He con-
cludes that the rigor of Kant's ethics may have been due in part to what we
would today call a "defense mechanism." "Having once seen the need for an
universally valid foundation for morality, Kant may have been afraid that
his own emotional nature might obstruct the discovery and formulation of
such a law. It is conceivable that he came to distrust his own emotions." 66
Schilpp concedes that Kant may not have been aware of this process. "This
fear probably was more subconscious than conscious, but if it was a defense-
reaction, as we may assume, it is a vital factor in accounting for the vigorous
onslaught which Kant directs against any merely emotional determinant of

63 Lewis White Beck, "Sketch of Kant's Life and Work," op. cit., p. xxi.
114 Schilpp, op. cit., p. 3.
65 Ibid.
86 Ibid., p. 7.
morality." 67 Surely this passage is too strongly argued; and it illustrates the
point that one must be careful to make clear precisely what the nature of this
pietistic influence might be. For there is influence, and it may be seen as a
determining factor in some sense, but it is surely not one which can be
reduced to a "logical chain" or a psychological conditioning.
The inadequacy of such hypotheses comes to light when we realize the
incongruity which they impose upon the various aspects of Kant's work. On
the one hand, we are presented a man of incredible speculative powers,
working out with great precision the details of the Critique of Pure Reason.
Then we are asked to believe that the same man was the blind pawn of social
and religious conditioning, or psychological forces, in working out his moral
doctrine. If the case is somewhat overdrawn, the point is clear enough. Kant
explicitly acknowledges the pietistic influence of his early life, but this should
not lead us to conclude that this influence dictated the development of his
moral thought. Is there not some more reasonable interpretation of the
relation between Kant's background and character, and the practical phi-
losophy which he formulated? One significant possibility suggests itself.
There is no point in attempting to maintain that there is no connection
whatever between Kant's background and the formulation of his later
thought. Such a position would be impossible to prove, even if it were true.
The question we are concerned with is, rather, in precisely what manner
might the various forces present in Kant's life have conjoined to influence his
moral thought, without having determined it completely? Because of our
context, the answer is perhaps obvious.
Kant himself tells us that in his home the dignity of man was a living fact,
and even a vigorous dispute could not rob an opponent of this proper regard.
We have seen, also, that in his home the moral character of man was both
emphasized and exemplified. Is it not reasonable to suggest that so thought-
ful a child as Kant would have formed a very strong and vivid conception
of what it means to be a man? To be sure, as he tells us, his own enthusiastic
excursion into the world of the intellect misled him for a while. But when
Rousseau set him right - i.e., reoriented Kant's thinking in man as opposed
to science - was it not merely a re-affirmation and clarification of the con-
ception of man he had long-since possessed? The suggestion is simple
enough, but, if accepted, its consequences are significantly different from
those of the positions previously mentioned. 68
67 Ibid. First italics added.
68 It was only after this work had been completed that we encountered the passage
in Schilpp's work (p. 49) which agrees with the interpretation offered here. The con-
trast between this passage and the one referred to earlier is somewhat difficult to
resolve.
It seems clear that, for Kant, a moral code could only be the criterion
according to which man uses properly the powers which he has been given,
and thereby achieves the end for which he was ordained. The statements of
Kant concerning practical philosophy certainly support this view. It would
then be reasonable to assert that, given a certain conception of the nature of
man, and a particular notion of the destiny for which he was created, the
precise, speculative mind of Kant could hardly have avoided the rigorous
ethical system which finally resulted from his long and arduous deliberations.
It is easy enough to establish that Kant's thought worked itself out slowly
with respect to the content of the Critique of Practical Reason, just as it did
in the case of the first Critique. The principle of autonomy was not fully
realized as the key to morality until about 1785. 69 The pieces fell into place
slowly, and with deliberate precision. Thus, the gradual nature of its devel-
opment makes it extremely unlikely that Kant's moral doctrine was a direct
result of his early moral conditioning, or that its form was the product of
some personal, psychological defense-mechanism. Rather, we can see that
his early formation need only have provided him with a profound awareness
of the nature and destiny of man. His encounter with Rousseau would then
be seen as a re-affirmation and purification of his convictions. And the
consequent determination and specification of the details of his system of
morality would follow as a natural result of critical analysis.
This interpretation is, of course, only an hypothesis, but it seems a much
more natural and adequate explanation of Kant's development than is
normally given. And while the interpretation adds weight to our general
thesis, it should not be felt that we suggest it on that account. For there is no
need of such emphasis in establishing our point. By Kant's own admission,
the anthropology is an essential condition for the elaboration of a truly
practical philosophy, and we find that the influence of Rousseau, who most
forcefully aroused him from his neglect of man, permeates the Critique of
Practical Reason. There can be no doubt concerning the influence of the
anthropology on this aspect of Kant's thought. In fact, we may be tempted
to generalize and assert that every aspect of Kant's moral doctrine centered
around his conception of human nature, and his vision of human destiny.
But a consideration of Kant's other ethical works should provide a sounder
basis for that conclusion.
Additional Works on Morality

Only a brief acquaintance with the work of Kant is necessary to realize that
e9 Beck, Commentary, p. 14.
his thought on morality is not to be found in one neatly organized body.
We have already seen that the Critique of Practical Reason was preceded
by the Foundation of the Metaphysic of Morals (1785), which only tempo-
rarily satisfied Kant. Later, in 1797, he published the Metaphysical Prin-
ciples of Law, and the Metaphysical Principles of Virtue. In the following
year, these two works were published together as the Metaphysic of Morals.
But even if the second Critique, the Foundation, and the Metaphysic are
grouped together, they still constitute only a portion of Kant's thought on
morality. For there are numerous observations on the topic scattered
throughout his work, and an especially significant portion is to be found in
his works on religion. In order to establish, therefore, that our findings in
connection with the Critique of Practical Reason are true also of Kant's
general moral doctrine, we shall examine briefly some of these other sources.
The lectures on ethics have already contributed to our awareness of the
relation between Kant's anthropological and ethical thought, and we need
say little more about them. Also, since the material contained in the Foun-
dation was, for the most part, revised and presented again in later works, we
may be permitted to neglect it here. Both the lectures, and the Foundation,
of course, are from a period with which we are already familiar. It will be
more to our purpose, then, to extend our consideration to the earlier and
later works, which might present different aspects of Kant's developing
thought.
The essay, "An Inquiry into the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural
Theology and Morals" (written 1763, published 1764), gives a clear indi-
cation of Kant's concern with morality at that time, and his mention of the
concept of "moral feeling," which he had encountered in the work of "Hut-
cheson and others," 70 gives evidence of wide reading in moral philosophy.
But perhaps the best example of Kant's ethical position in the pre-critical
period is his essay, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the
Sublime (1764).71 The work may be called primarily anthropological, since it
deals with this particular feeling as it is related to men generally, as it differs
in the two sexes, and as it may concern national characteristics. But Kant
takes up questions of morality as well. Schilpp points out that, in its handling
of moral problems, this work "shows the greatest influence of the British
moralists and especially Rousseau." 72 He also calls attention to the fact,
70 Schriften, n, p. 300. Beck trans., p. 285.
71 In the introduction to his translation of Observations, Goldthwait expresses the
opinion that this work is "the epitome of Kant's pre-Critical thought." Observations
on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, trans. John T. Goldthwait (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1960), p. 1.
noted earlier, that in Observations Kant grounds morality, on its material

side, upon the feeling for the beauty and the dignity of human nature. 73
Actually, the blank pages which were bound in Kant's personal copy of this
essay are filled with a great many notes of both moral and anthropological
interest. But we have already been led to expect that these two disciplines
were strongly related in Kant's early thought.
With respect to his later thought, we certainly cannot ignore the Meta-
physic of Morals, for this work fulfills the promise of Kant to his corre-
spondents some twenty-five years before. It is the second portion of his
proposed metaphysic, which entailed a metaphysic of nature and a meta-
physic of morals. 74 The work is obviously a product of Kant's old age,75
and we might wish that it had been possible to complete the project earlier.
But, for our purposes, the work is ideal.
There are several sections of the Metaphysic of Morals, which bear an
explicit resemblance to the Anthropologie. We find that Section Ten of the
"Metaphysical Principles of Virtue," which discusses avarice ("Vom
Geize"), has much the same content as Section 8Sc of the Anthropologie
("Habsucht"). Section Thirty-six of the former deals with the vices springing
from hatred of our fellowman, and which are opposed to the duties of phi-
lanthropy. Here we see a reflection of Section Eighty-three of the Anthro-
pologie ("Von der Rachbegierde als Leidenschaft"). Section Forty-two,
dealing with pride ("Der Hochmuth"), is clearly related to Anthropologie
8Sa ("Ehrsucht"). And finally, Section 23, on the duties of charity ("Von
der Liebespflicht gegen andere Menschen") reminds us of those portions of
Section Eighty-five in which the Anthropologie deals with das gute Gemilt
in its analysis of the person. We find that where these sections are not simply
repetitions of the same material, they provide complementary aspects of the
same topic.
Perhaps even more significant than these specific points of similarity is
the general pattern of the work referred to by Erdmann. He mentions that a
considerable amount of material concerning the psychology of the will and
of feeling is to be found in the Metaphysic of Morals, but that, above all,
its manner of execution betrays its anthropological origins. 76 Again, there-
73 Ibid., p. 59.
74 The Metaphysical Elements af Natural Science had been published in 1786, as
the first part of Kant's metaphysic of nature. The second part, which Kant considered
the culmination of his system, was apparently never completed. See Stuckenberg's
discussion of the problem, ap. cit., pp. 304-305.
75 The first indication of Kant's dissolution is in the Preface, which degenerates into
a polemical and self-satisfied diatribe.
78 Reflexianen, I, p. 56.
fore, we find that the moral philosophy of Kant was closely related with,
and strongly influenced by, his work in anthropology.
Since we are completing our consideration of Kant's moral thought, it
seems appropriate to discuss briefly its essential character as seen in relation
to human nature. Perhaps the most criticized aspect of Kant's moral position
is its concentration on duty, and reverence for the moral law, as the only
acceptable motive for virtuous action. Moral feeling, or sentiment, is reject-
ed, and emotion is deliberately avoided - as we saw in the second Critique.
Other men have felt that emotion is essential to ethical theory,77 but Kant
maintains that this facet of human nature can stand neither as a basis for
ethics nor as a determining factor in ethical decisions. Respect for moral
law alone can stand as the necessary and sufficient criterion for all human
acts. It is this "rigorous" formula which has caused many writers to search
deeply into Kant's past for hidden sources of pessimism or scrupulosity.
A proper understanding of the work of Kant demands that such genetic
accounts of his ethics either be ignored or explained away. Better still, a more
thoughtful evaluation of the way in which Kant's position developed would
obviate such considerations altogether. The following thoughts may serve
that purpose.
There can be no doubt about the accomplishments of the first of Kant's
great works, the Critique of Pure Reason. In laying the foundation for the
metaphysical works to follow, it clearly established the limits of reason,
demonstrating that much which had formerly passed for knowledge really
had no objective claim to be called such. 78 Human understanding was re-
stricted to knowledge of possible objects of experience; but the moral order
could not be contained within this limit. It was the role of the second Critique
to demonstrate that pure practical reason, through the recognition of the
moral law as a fact of experience, could establish the basis for an ethical
system. But in the given context, precisely what structure could the ethics
have, and how much certainty could it be accorded?
If the first Critique had sorely limited the powers of reason, the second
had similarly restricted the possibility for kinds of ethical system - for the
only fact of pure practical reason is the moral law itself.79 If, therefore, Kant
77 Both the well known emotive theory of ethics, and the ethical theory of Edmund
Husserl demand a consideration of the emotional aspect of man. A discussion of
Husserl's critique of Kant, involving this point, is presented in Alois Roth's Edmund
Husserls ethische Untersuchungen (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), pp. 37-5l.
18 We are concerned here not with what Kant actually achieved, but rather with
what he believed to be the accomplishment of the work, and thus its role within his
system.
19 "In order to regard this law without any misinterpretation as given, one must note
desired an ethical system in which one could have complete assurance, he

could not use any other foundation than the moral law itself. The addition
of any empirical (e.g., psychological) element would immediately deprive the
system of total validity.
There can be no doubt that Kant desired such absolute certainty. Could
his labor over the Critique of Pure Reason possibly be regarded as anything
other than the demand of an intellect for complete precision and unity in its
investigation on the one hand, and apodictic certainty with respect to its
conclusion on the other? And his intent to produce a system of morality
which would tempt even the mathematician surely implies that he would
accept nothing less than absolute validity. If the moral law is the sole fact
of pure reason, as we have just seen, then it must also be the sole basis for
Kant's ethical system.
But then we come to the question of motivation. Christian moralists have
often accused Kant of lacking a true sense of morality because he did not
recognize love as a sufficient ethical motive. And there does seem to be some
truth in the notion that he regarded respect or esteem more highly than love.
In Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, Kant states
that beauty stimulates love, while the sublime engenders esteem (Hoch-
achtung). Then he goes on: "People in whom especially the feeling for the
beautiful rises seek their sincere, steadfast, and earnest friends only in need,
but choose jesting, agreeable, and courteous companions for company." 80
He points out that there are many people whom we esteem too highly to be
able to love. For they inspire admiration, but are too far above us for us to
dare approach them with the familiarity of love. And finally, "friendship
has mainly the character of the sublime, but love between the sexes, that of
the beautiful." 81 While nothing derogatory is said regarding love, it seems
clear that in the mind of Kant it was always second best, and we can im-
mediately realize why.
If what we have already said concerning the moral law in Kant's thought
is true, then it is just as impossible for Kant to accept love as a moral motive
as it was for him to base his ethics on something other than the moral law.
For all forms of love are grounded in sensibility, and sensibility cannot
provide an absolute morality. All sensibility involves self-interest and, there-
fore, distracts the will from the strict moral law.
It will be recalled from the Anthropologie that man's primary character-
that it is not an empirical fact but the sole fact of pure reason, which by it proclaims
itself as originating law (sic vola, sic iubeo)." Schriften, Y, p. 31. Beck trans., p. 143.
80 Schriften, II, p. 211. Goldthwait trans., p. 51.
8t Ibid.
istics, from childhood on, lie in some form of concern with the self. It is
precisely this self-interest which the moral law must overcome. In the Cri-
tique of Practical Reason, Kant discusses the problem at length, and con-
cludes that the moral law deprives self-love of its influence and self-conceit
of its delusions. By that means, "it increases the weight of the moral law by
removing, in the judgment of reason, the counterweight to the moral law
which bears on a will affected by the sensibility." 82 For this reason, Kant
is able to conclude that "respect for the law is not the incentive to morality;
it is morality itself, regarded subjectively as an incentive, inasmuch as pure
practical reason, by rejecting all the rival claims of self-love, gives authority
and absolute sovereignty to the law." 83
What Kant is saying in his system, then, is that, given the restrictions of the
first Critique, and the realization that the moral law is the sole fact of pure
reason, if man wishes to be absolutely certain that he is acting from pure mo-
tives, then the moral law must be the basis, the incentive, and the guarantee of
his morality. It seems clear that such a guarantee is what Kant sought all
along - and within his system he could have come to no other conclusion. The
real source of Kant's rigor, then, lies not in some obscure psychological influ-
ence, but in the fact that he accepted human reason as the sufficient and, in
fact, the only satisfactory source of moral doctrine. For reason alone provided
the source and guide of his developing system, and it alone was judged com-
petent to establish the destiny of man. Thus, man is seen as essentially ratio-
nal, in the strongest sense, and as we shall see later, this conception of man
dictated Kant's thought even with respect to supernatural aspects of reality.
But first we must complete our consideration of the three Critiques.
82 Schriften, V, pp. 75-76. Beck trans., p. 183.

S3 Ibid. Since these observations are in terms of self-love, it is well to note that
Kant gave considerable thought to the notion of a general love of mankind. In one
place he says: "The general love of man has something high and noble about it in the
eyes of man; but it is chimerical" (Schriften, XX, p. 25). And in another: "It is very
ridiculous to say you should love other men, but one must perhaps say you have good
grounds to love your neighbor" (Schriften, XX, p. 45). Kant's position seems to be
that love cannot serve as a ground for ethics, since it requires a ground itself.
CHAPTER V
ANTHROPOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS
OF THE THIRD CRITIQUE
As the structure of the Critical Philosophy took on a more mature form,

Kant became concerned with a problem which had not been fully realized at
the time of the first Critique - the necessity of a critical examination of the
faculty of judgment,! It seems likely, in fact, that the full measure of this flaw
in the proposed system did not become clear in Kant's mind until he began to
work out the details of his practical philosophy. For then Kant saw that there
was a gap between the speculative philosophy of natural necessity and the
practical philosophy of human freedom. He therefore proposed a third
critique, one which would serve "as a means of combining the two parts of
philosophy into a whole." 2 That Kant should identify a gap in the system
with his own failure to consider sufficiently the specific nature of the powers
of the mind, and that the problem should be solved by a third critical ex-
amination, the Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790), is again an as-
surance that Kant understood the mental powers of man to constitute the
most essential element of human nature, and that he trusted completely the
power of reason to analyze human experience - even those aspects which
consist in its own activities and limitations.
Actually, it is rather obvious that Kant would have realized the need for
such a critique in an earlier period. For, as he now makes clear, the faculty
of judgment has to do with the feeling of pleasure and pain, and the third
Critique carries him into an analysis of the beautiful and the sublime as they
are related to cognition. 3 It seems, then, that at a certain point in his analysis
1 Kant spoke earlier (1771) of his intention to include in his work an investigation
of "die Natur der Geschmackslehre," but he could not then have realized the full
significance of the task. See Schriften, X, p. 117.
2 Critique of Judgment, Schriften, V, p. 176. Translation by I. H. Bernard (London:
Macmillan and Co., 1914), p. 14.
3 While it is not essential to our development at this point, it is important to realize
that Kant was not alone in assigning to the power of judgment, and in particular the
power of taste, a synthetic function in bringing together the other faculties (speculative
and practical) to form a unified whole. The work of Baumgarten and others in
IMPLICA TIONS OF THE THIRD CRITIQUE 71
of cognition, Kant became fully aware of the intimate connection between

his current interests and the anthropological investigations of an earlier
period, such as Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime.
We can be certain that much of the material contained in the third Critique
was not new to Kant. Besides the Observations itself, we find that many
particulars in the discussion of feeling, as well as all the remarks on taste as
it is related to genius, art, the agreeable and the beautiful, etc., are taken
directly from the lectures on anthropology.4 Obviously, then, the new critique
implies that Kant achieved new insights into the role of feeling and taste in
human experience.
Various discussions of the Critique of Judgment (as it is more commonly
called) have attempted to determine the precise implications of this work for
Kant's Critical Philosophy and, in particular, its significance with respect to
his conception of man. A consideration of the findings of some of these com-
mentators on the third Critique should help us to establish its exact relation
to Kant's anthropology.
As we mentioned in Chapter III, Forrest Williams has done a study which
attempts to show an undercurrent in Kant's work which implies a growing
awareness on the part of Kant of the role of anthropology in the Critical
Philosophy. Williams' discussion centers on the third Critique, and particu-
larly on the "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment." Several interesting points are
raised in his study.
To begin with, Williams distinguishes between the "classical" interpre-
tation of the role of the Critique of Judgment in Kant's thought and a second
view, which he calls the "anthropological" interpretation. With reference to
the former, he says: "The Critique of Judgment, on this view, is a link be-
tween the too-hastily severed phenomenal and noumenal of the first Critique,
between the determinism of categorised nature and the freedom of rational
activity of the second Critique." But in connecting these two realms it does
not "effect any radical transformation of the initial Kantian philosophy." 5
The anthropological view, on the other hand, would maintain that the third
Critique does constitute a radical change in the Critical Philosophy, because
aesthetics had laid a sound foundation for precisely this conclusion. Cf. Cassirer, The
Philosophy of the Enlightenment, trans. F. C. A. Koelln and J. P. Pettegrove (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1955), Chapter VII, Section VI, esp. pp. 351-53. It is particularly inter-
esting for the present study that Cassirer feels justified in concluding: "The problem
of the beautiful thus leads not only to the foundation of systematic aesthetics, but to
the foundation of a new 'philosophical anthropology,' and an idea which is character-
istic of the entire culture of the eighteenth century gains credence and confirmation"
(op. cit., p. 353).
5 Williams, op. cit., p. 177.
72 IMPLICA TIONS OF THE THIRD CRITIQUE
of the introduction of the notion of reflective judgment. Williams maintains

that "the emergence of reflective judgment in the philosophy of Kant is not
now the addition of a new mediating faculty, but the transformation of a
whole philosophy." 6
Williams, of course, supports the anthropological view, as the title of his
article would lead us to expect ("Philosophical Anthropology and the Cri-
tique of Aesthetic Judgment"). But when we recall what Kant said con-
cerning the function of the Critique of Judgment, and realize that in his
thought it provided not a radical transformation but, rather, a necessary link,
we are forced to conclude that Kant must be placed among the "classicists."
We cannot be certain that Kant saw fully the importance of reflective judg-
m~nt for his system, but neither can we dismiss his opinion lightly. We must
d~111and that Williams provide strong support for his position.
As we have seen, Williams' chief concern is with the reflective judgment,
and in the system of Kant this is a very special concept. "Judgment in
general," Kant says, "is the faculty of thinking the particular as contained
under the universal." That judgment which subsumes the particular under
a universal (rule, principle, or law) which is already given is determinant.
If, on the other hand, only the particular is given for which the universal has
to be found, the judgment is reflective. 7
The reflective judgment, which is obliged to ascend from the particular in nature
to the universal, requires on that account a principle which it cannot borrow
from experience, because its function is to establish the unity of all empirical
principles under higher ones, and hence to establish the possibility of their
systematic subordination. Such a transcendental principle, then, the reflective
judgment can only give as a law from and to itself.8
Thus, the reflective judgment plays a unique role in the Kantian scheme.
It employs, for the purpose of comprehending and unifying experience, an
interpretive principle (purposiveness) which supplements the constitutive
role of the categories in organizing the world of nature.
In a detailed scholarly analysis of the role of reflective judgment in the
Critical Philosophy, Michel Souriau traces the development of Kant's
thought in regard to this special kind of judgment. Souriau points out that
the Analogies of Experience in the Critique of Pure Reason contain the first
indication of the significance of a discovering judgment. For in the Analogies,
judgment brings what are otherwise merely temporal modes - those of
permanence, succession, and coexistence - into categorial form - inherence,
6 Ibid., p. 180.
7 Critique of Judgment, Schriften, V, p. 179. Bernard trans., pp. 17-18.
8 Ibid., p. 17.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE THIRD CRITIQUE 73
causality, and community - by means of schemata. 9 These principles are

regulative rather than constitutive, and Souriau feels that this constitutes an
implicit appeal to the facuIty of judgment in preference to the understanding.
He suggests, therefore, that this development is a foreshadowing of the re-
flective judgment.1° In the same way, Souriau points to the regulative char-
acter of the Modal principles in contrast to the principles of Quantity and
Quality.
After thus showing certain implications for his analysis in the relation
of elements in the first Critique, Souriau goes on to show the gradual devel-
opment of the function of judgment as the Critical Philosophy progresses.
Judgment is found to take upon itself functions which had at first been con-
nected with reason's service to the understanding, while reason becomes
progressively purified of dialectical activities for the sake of effective moral
activities. The faculty of judgment is gradually enhanced and, finally, in the
third Critique, reflective judgment turns out to be precisely the acquisition
by judgment of the hypothetical, regulative, and teleological functions which,
in the first Critique, reason had exercized with respect to the principles of the
understanding. 11
Our brief summary of Souriau's thought in no sense does justice to his
work - it especially loses the impact of his argument through neglect of its
carefully detailed presentation. But even so inadequate a summary reveals
the significance of Williams' claim that the anthropological implications of
Kant's thought, which center in the Critique of Judgment, can be seen as an
undercurrent which moves through the development of the entire Critical
Philosophy.
Williams centers his attention almost entirely on the "Critique of Aesthe-
tic Judgment," and we shall follow him through his analysis. Consequent
upon the two interpretations of the third Critique - the classical and the
anthropological- Williams finds that there are "two senses in which it con-
tains or implies a philosophical anthropology." 12 The classicist, he feels,
would be forced to admit that there is a sense in which the Critique of Judg-
ment brings into focus the nature of the Kantian Subject. "This is clear
merely from the general context in which a reflective judgment is even con-
ceivable." 13 For the transcendental subject of the first Critique "neither
needs, nor is capable of, judgmental reflection, since it merely determines the
9 Le Jugement Reflechissant dans la Philosophie Critique de Kant (Paris: Alean,
1926), pp. 15-16.
10 Ibid., pp. 25-26.
11 For the full presentation of this argument, see pp. 15-34 of Souriau's work.
13 Ibid., p. 184.
74 IMPLICATIONS OF THE THIRD CRITIQUE
form and type of experience. Its only reflexivity lies in empty analytic pro-
cedures." In turning to the third Critique, however, the classicist must find
that "Kant has now turned his gaze away from forms and categories exhibited
in actual knowledge, and towards the character of the knowing subject." 14
Williams' basis for this statement is presented very briefly, but it has
merit. "The context of reflective judgment in the third Critique," he finds,
"is that of bringing the particular intuitive manifold into specific conceptual
unity." Therefore, the notion of reflective judgment expresses, in the third
Critique, precisely the a priori possibility of knowledge which the determi-
nant judgment expressed in the first Critique. But now judgment functions
in an anticipatory context, rather than in the retrospective context of the
earlier work. However, given this new context of reflective judgment, what
are the implications for its subject-matter?
Certainly we are not now talking about the phenomenally conceived em-
pirical ego of the first Critique, for such a conception is by definition in-
capable of validating an a priori faculty. Nor can our subject be the tran-
scendental ego of the first Critique, for a bare unity of apperception cannot
explain the concrete process in which it is achieved. "We conclude that we
are talking about the Kantian Subject in the third Critique in a sense which
combines both the concreteness of the empirical ego and the transcendental
nature of reason." 15 Therefore, Williams concludes, because of its signifi-
cance for every human being, "this new context of reflective judgment seems
to demand the title: universal human nature." 16
Even the classicist must follow him this far, Williams feels, but contempo-
rary views of philosophical anthropology demand a great deal more. "The
'philosophical anthropology' which emerges from the classicist interpre-
tation, in short, is an insight into the pattern of the 'normal thinker' whose
judgmental capacity is identical with the perfect functioning of his sensibility
and understanding." In other words, the human subject of the third Critique
reveals our essential humanity when everything is going well, "when we are
successfully occupied in acquiring knowledge and practising morality with
the aid of reason." 17 More than that the classicist view cannot support.
A true philosophical anthropology, on the other hand, "would afford
a concrete insight into human nature which is normative rather than psy-
chological without being limited to the mere acknowledgement of a certain
minimum interrelationship of a priori capacities." 18 And this concrete,
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
11 Ibid., p. 185.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
IMPLI CATIONS OF THE THIRD CRITIQUE 75
normative concept of human nature, Williams maintains, is rather obvious
in the third Critique, if one considers the proper sections. The classicist must
shift his view from the "Analytic of the Beautiful" to the "Critique of
Aesthetic Judgment." For in the former, reflective judgment is merely regu-
lative - is nothing more than an enlargement of the determinant judgment:
"Instead of subsuming this or that intuition of sense under a concept of the
understanding, reflective judgment places the entire faculty of sensibility in
the service of the entire facuIty of understanding." 19 However, the Critique
of Aesthetic Judgment provides a much richer context for reflective judg-
ment, and a more satisfactory conception of human nature. "Reflective judg-
ment, by its association with the sublime, with art, and finally with the
aesthetic ideas of the genius, brings a transforming vitality into the com-
paratively abstract, mechanical Subject of the earlier philosophy." 20
The beginning of the development of Kant's radically new position, Wil-
liams points out, is evident in the dissatisfaction which Kant manifests to-
ward the "Deduction of the Beautiful" and the "Exposition of the Sublime"
as final answers to the problem of the valid ground of aesthetic predication.
As evidence of this dissatisfaction, Souriau notes that the third Critique is
structurally different from the other two. In the first and second Critiques,
Kant provides an Exposition to present the facts, then a Deduction to
establish the facts and the limits of their intelligibility, and finally a Dialectic
in which antinomies are resolved by means of the distinctions now available.
In the Critique of Judgment, however, Kant returns after the Exposition and
Deduction to a new set of facts - those of art - which finally refer the proper
solution to the Dialectic, after the development of the essential notions of
"genius," and "aesthetic idea." 21
Williams sees this change in structure as indicative of a significant shift in
Kant's whole position.
Kant adopted the course of viewing reflective judgment concretely and non-
theoretically, that is, as constitutive of feeling, rather than merely regulative for
knowledge. This is tantamount to introducing an anthropological postulate, for
constitutive for feeling which is universal implies a depth-structure of humanity
which is, let us not forget, an individual possession or potentially and not merely
an abstract presupposition of science. 22
Williams feels that Kant begins to reveal the elements of this universal
structure of the human subject in his discussion of taste as a kind of sensus
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., p. 181.
21 Souriau, op. cit., pp. 94-95.
communis. There he tells us that we must include under sensus communis

"a faculty of judgment which, in its reflection, takes account (a priori) of the
mode of representation of all other men in its thought." By this means, the
faculty is able "to compare its judgment with the collective Reason of hu-
manity," and thus avoid subjective illusion.23 Developing out of this sensus
communis, Williams sees a chain which leads to the concrete Kantian subject.
Kant's reason for introducing fine arts into his investigation, Williams
maintains, is perfectly clear if we accept the theory that his thought is now
oriented toward the human subject. For "if satisfaction of taste is considered
in the context of the arts, which are human creations, its origin cannot be
regarded as merely gratuitous or as a matter of 'natural teleology.' " Rather,
we see that satisfaction of taste in this context "must indicate a normative
ground in humanity of a sort no less intricate and subtle than art itself." 24
In other words, we are referred by art to a "fundamentum of nature," but
not to the nature of Newton. Rather, we are referred to "a human nature
with its own ways of functioning which attains universal significance apart
from conceptual understanding. This new philosophical acquisition is sum-
med up under the title of genius." 25
Next, Williams points out that the aesthetic ideas of genius preserve the
hybrid character - of concrete plenitude and universal significance - which
the Kantian subject assumes as genius, or as human nature functioning as
artistic creator. Because its universality consists "precisely in the distinctions
which it spontaneously makes between valid and invalid determination of
materials," the faculty of aesthetic ideas cannot be merely "a spacio-tempo-
ral sensibility receiving the impress of transcendental categories." 26 Thus
aesthetic ideas provide an extraordinary combination of concrete particulari-
ty with respect to material, and universality with respect to form. It is on
the basis of the faculty of aesthetic ideas that the final links are formed in
Williams' chain of thought. For it is within that framework that Kant pre-
sents his antinomy of taste, and resolves it on the basis of "the supersensible
substrate of humanity." 27 This substrate, which serves as the determining
ground of aesthetic judgment, is the concept toward which Williams had
been working, and it provides an impressive culmination to his argument.
On the basis of his findings, Williams feels justified in concluding that
Kant would have to look to various forms of art for the data required to fill
out this incomplete conception of the concrete subject. Not that philosophy
23 Schriften, V, p. 293. Bernard trans., p. 170.
25 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
27 Schriften, V, p. 340. Bernard trans., p. 233.
would take on an artistic form, but it would gather from art the basic
material indicative of "expressive normative structures," by which a truly
philosophic anthropology could be enriched.
The argument which Williams presents is actually insufficiently developed.
One feels that he has done little more than outline the form which the argu-
ment would have to take in pursuing the subtle thread of thought through the
works of Kant. However, if, with Williams, we prescind from the question
of whether Kant was aware of the new direction which his thought had taken,
and the implications which the change might involve,28 we must certainly
agree that his point is worth serious consideration. If Kant, in his later work,
was actually moving away from the abstract subject of the first Critique,
which was hardly more than the bare unity of apperception, and toward a
more concrete conception of man as necessarily involving a rich, aesthetic
dimension, there would certainly be implications for our investigation of the
influence of anthropology on his work. And it seems clear, even from Wil-
liams' abbreviated presentation, that Kant's concept of man was enriched
in the Critique of Judgment. Our problem, then, will be to relate the work
of Williams to our own investigation.
It will prove useful to our argument to set aside briefly the line of thought
which Williams has provided, and to consider the three major works of the
Critical Philosophy in their mutual interrelations as parts of an entire system.
We have already seen that the Critique of Pure Reason, while of monumental
significance in its own right, is nonetheless a propaedeutic to other aspects
of the system, and, as such, could not be expected to transgress the bounda-
ries of its own purpose. If, then, we find that the first Critique provides
"only" an abstract transcendental subject, we can hardly raise an objection,
since that is precisely what the context demands.
In moving to the Critique of Practical Reason, we find that the subject
has been expanded to include a moral dimension. The moral subject of the
second Critique is, of course, still an abstraction - but again we find that the
limits of the work could permit no other. While the second Critique examines
reason in its entire practical faculty, its primary purpose is to establish that
there is a pure practical reason, and only a limited presentation of the em-
pirical aspects of the subject would be appropriate to this task. 29 None-
theless, the entire presentation of this work makes it clear that, for Kant,
the moral dimension increases tremendously the value of the subject which
is gradually emerging from the critical maze. In fact, the moral law alone
28 Williams explicitly avoids involvement in the controversy which such consider-

ations would necessitate. Op. cit., p. 174.
29 Schriften, V, p. 3. Beck trans., p. 118. As was mentioned in Chapter N, Kant
can provide the context within which man stands as an end in himself.
Without morality, man would have to be seen as an insignificant aspect of
the phenomenal world, or an abortive and self-contradictory postulate of
the noumenal order. The essential contribution of the second Critique to the
Kantian subject is, therefore, incontestable.
The Critique of Judgment, in tum, provides an element which was ap-
propriate to neither of the first two Critiques. Here we find the presentation
of the intellectual framework within which man can function as an aesthetic
entity. We have not entirely lost our abstract subject, because Kant is still
dealing with the critical analysis of pure cognitive faculties, and the third
Critique must be recognized as an examination of the pure power of judg-
ment, i.e., that aspect of judgment which is legislative a priori. 30 Again, how-
ever, it is necessary to realize that the technical analysis which Kant pursues
is only for the purpose of establishing the rational foundation which will
permit the presentation of man as an aesthetic subject. The dimension opens
up to the subject - previously restricted to factual knowledge and a moral
imperative - the entire world of value experience which makes human ex-
istence rich and meaningful. 31
What we have said in this brief consideration of the three Critiques un-
doubtedly accords roughly with what Williams has called the anthropology
of the classicist interpretation of Kant's work. Therefore, his objection at
this point would have to be identical to that which he raised concerning the
classical view. He felt that the Kantian subject as it could be formulated
under such an interpretation would only be an ideal subject, neatly struc-
tured, but lacking real content - in short, insufficiently concrete.
The first response which must be made to Williams' objection should
now be quite obvious. As a result of the three Critiques, each of which deals
with an aspect of the pure cognitive faculties, no conception of a concrete
subject could possibly be formulated. Empirical content of any sort would
have to be restricted to an inessential role in this three-fold investigation of
does include material drawn from his empirical psychology lectures, but its use is only
incidental, playing a supportive role to the main purp06e of the Critique: a consider-
ation of the logical factors which relate the essential elements of man's cognitive and
volitional powers. Kant also discusses the role of happiness in the highest end of man,
but it should be noted that even in this context he is careful to restrict himself to the
abstract consideration of man in general.
30 Schriften, Y, p. 170. Bernard trans., p. 17.
31 It is obvious, of course, that moral value had already entered Kant's scheme in
the Critique of Practical Reason, but the analogy which he draws between the judg-
ment of taste and the moral judgment (Critique of Judgment, Schriften, Y, p. 301;
Bernard trans., pp. 179-80) leads us to believe that he saw the third Critique as con-
firming the second, just as he saw the second Critique as confirming the first (Critique
of Practical Reason, Schriften, Y, p. 6; Beck trans., p. 121).
IMPLICA TIONS OF THE THIRD CRITIQUE 79
pure reason. While the subject was gradually given new dimensions as the
Critical Philosophy progressed, these were the dimensions of a critically
founded rational subject - fit for the reception of concrete determinations,
but not as yet so specified. Our first response to Williams' objection, then,
is that to look for a concrete subject emerging from the third Critique is to
seek in it what Kant, by definition, has specifically excluded from its purview.
But we cannot be content with so negative a rejoinder, for Williams' work
involves an intricate pattern of thought which is extremely suggestive. It
deserves a more positive consideration. In fact, whatever shortcomings we
find in the work may be seen to stem from one essential difficulty: the
perspective from which Kant's anthropology is viewed. From the analysis
which we have provided of Williams' article, it should be clear that nothing
of Kant's work has been considered by him except the three Critiques. What
Williams has done, therefore, it to write an article on Kant's conception of
human nature without considering any of the anthropological works in which
Kant explicitly deals with the topic. Consequently, his accusation that Kant
failed to achieve a conception of a concrete human nature is based on a
neglect of those works in which Kant presented the empirical details of
human existence. It would be extremely interesting to see what additional
conclusions might have been forthcoming if Williams had broadened his
perspective, and considered Kant's work as a whole. 32
It might be suggested, for example, that Kant did provide the appropriate
development of his conception of human nature after the three Critiques
had established the theoretical basis for such a presentation. The Anthro-
pologie would, of course, constitute the primary contribution toward that
end. But we have already noted the inadequacy of the Anthropologie, even
as a representation of Kant's earlier lectures. It would not be unreasonable,
then, to assume that whatever significance the work should have embodied
for the Kantian system was lost through the incapacity of the aging phi-
losopher.
If we are correct in seeing a gradual development of Kant's conception of
man as a well-defined entity in the Critical Philosophy as it unfolded, it
would then be extraordinary if Kant did not complete the project by adding
empirical aspects, such as a political or social view of man - areas with
which Kant was very much concerned. Several of his later works must
certainly have been intended to serve that purpose. On the other hand, since
Kant does not take up the line of thought which Williams sees implied in the
32 It is perhaps unnecessary to point out that the problem encountered here is a

traditional one in Kant-scholarship - the failure to recognize that all of Kant's works
fit together as a system, and that the system extends beyond the three Critiques.
Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, we can only conclude that Kant failed to

grasp the implications of his work, or that he explicitly repudiated them.
In either case, it would be legitimate to assume that if Kant was interested
in anthropology - and we have seen that he certainly was - then he must
have had a different conception of anthropology than that proposed by
Williams, and must have followed a procedure in working it out which
Williams does not recognize. The distinction between the views of Kant and
those of Williams is worth noting.
It must be clearly seen that there is an important difference between the
purpose and implications of Williams' work, and that in which we are cur-
rently engaged. For the major thesis of Williams' work seems to be that
there is a certain view of man implied by the material of the third Critique,
and that this conception of the human subject is the product of a growing
awareness on the part of Kant of the role of anthropology in his work. On
this view, anthropology is a subtle force which moves as an undercurrent
through the work of Kant, and finally emerges as a conscious concern only
very late in the development of the Critical Philosophy.
The present study, on the other hand, presumes - on the basis of sound
evidence - that Kant was explicitly concerned with anthropology through-
out the period in which the Critical Philosophy took form. In fact, we feel
that anthropology should be seen as the motivational element behind the
critical works, and the stabilizing force which guided their development.
Certainly we have seen that each of the three Critiques was strongly in-
fluenced by Kant's anthropological work. But we must leave the elaboration
of this theme to its proper place in our conclusion. Our concern here is with
the difference between Williams' conception of anthropology, and that of
Kant.
Because Williams views Kant's anthropology as an emerging awareness,
it is easy for him to identify Kant's thought - or at least its implications -
with contemporary analyses of human SUbjectivity. He sees the Kantian
subject as taking on depth and character, and beginning to resemble the
complex, creative subject of existentialist anthropology. In his article, Wil-
liams maintains that an investigation of creativity holds the key to the
awareness of man's ultimate structure which the philosophical anthropologist
is seeking.
There is good reason to believe that Kant would have found such an in-
quiry interesting and he would undoubtedly have recognized it as useful in
its own way. As a philosophical anthropology, however, it could only prove
grossly inadequate. We may be sure that Kant felt his critical work to con-
stitute the foundation for an analysis of human subjectivity - he was not
humble in his conception of his own accomplishments. And any additional

elaboration of the basic subject would have to be an elaboration of the three
Critiques. To that extent he would commend Williams' efforts. But he would
find it incomprehensible to confine one's investigation of man to sub-
jectivity,33 when the over-arching perspective of man's position in reality is
at least of equal importance. Kant's view of reality is essentially hierarchical,
and his understanding of man is vitally connected with the position man
holds in this hierarchy. A complete awareness of man, Kant would main-
tain, must involve the objective, as well as the subjective, side of his nature.
A truly normative anthropology must consider not merely what capacities
man displays, but rather the role which he has been given in reality, and the
consequent capacities which he must exercise to fill that role.
Whether he was right or wrong in his view, this is certainly the conception
of anthropology to which Kant subscribed. We need only recall the passage
quoted above (Chapter III): "If there is any science which man really needs,
it is the one I teach, of how to fulfill properly that position in creation which
is assigned to man, and from which he is able to learn what one must be in
order to be a man. 34 Emphasizing his point, Kant continues:
Granted that he may have become acquainted with deceptive allurements above
him or below him, which have unconsciously enticed him away from his distinct
station, then this teaching will lead him back again to the human level, and
however small or deficient he may regard himself, he will suit his assigned
station, because he will be just what he should be. 35
From this statement, we may conclude two things concerning Kant's anthro-
pology. There can be no doubt, first of all, that Kant felt himself to have
developed a complete view of man, one which would serve to orient man
properly in relation to all aspects of his experience. But, secondly, it is clear
also that Kant's anthropology involves more than a subjective analysis of
man's various faculties. It includes, as well, a complete, hierarchical view
of reality, in which man's place is clearly defined. But for a proper per-
spective on this complete conception of man we must include Kant's religious
thought, and that shall be our next consideration.
33 It may be well to emphasize that "subjectivity," as it applies to the three Critiques,

is always a logical and ethical, never a psychological, subjectivity. Cf. Richard Kroner's
comments on this point, Kant's Weltanschauung, trans. John E. Smith (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 69.
34 In the Introduction to the Anthropologie Kant mentions that in order for a
discipline to be a science it must be organized philosophically. Thus, the description
which he provides here is precisely that of a philosophically ordered study of man
and his place in reality, or a philosophical anthropology.
35 Schriften, XX, pp. 45-46.
CHAPTER VI
KANT'S RATIONAL RELIGION
The extent to which Kant's awareness of the powers and limitations of man
moulded his thought is strikingly brought to light in his works on religion.
As we have already seen, religion does not provide Kant with the foundation
of his moral theory. In typical unorthodox fashion, Kant has reversed the
ordinary relation of these disciplines, and has based his entire religious
position on his moral doctrine and, in particular, on the moral nature of man.
In several of his works, and especially in the Critique of Pure Reason.
Kant had occasion to discuss possible proofs for the existence of God. In
every case, he found it necessary to reject any proof from the natural order 1
and, in spite of his personal religious convictions, such rejections troubled
him not at all. In fact, as he points out in one place, such a proof would be
of little value. For even if the concept of an original Being could be establish-
ed by a purely theoretical path, i.e., the concept of such a Being as mere cause
of nature,
it would afterwards be very difficult - perhaps impossible without arbitrary
interpolation - to ascribe to this Being by well-grounded proofs a causality in
accordance with moral laws; and yet without this that quasi-theological concept
could furnish no foundation for religion. 2
Kant, therefore, approaches the matter from the aspect of morality.
Our earlier investigation of Kant's ethics leaves no room for doubt that
consciousness of moral law is a most vital element in his thought - it is an
absolute fact of pure practical reason upon which we can base the entire
system of morality.s And it is on this same base that Kant builds the frame-
1 With respect to the teleological proof, of course, he says: "This proof always
deserves to be mentioned with respect. It is the oldest, the clearest, and the most ac-
cordant with the common reason of mankind." Critique of Pure Reason, A 623, B 651.
N KS, p. 520. But we will discuss this matter further in Chapter VII.
2 Critique of Judgment, Schriften, V, p. 481. Bernard trans., p. 423. Kant defines
religion here as "the recognition of our duties as divine commands."
3 Because of the central position of morality in Kant's thought, one might say with
KANT'S RATIONAL RELIGION 83
work of his religious thought. The cornerstone of this additional structure is

the concept of the highest good: the morally rational ideal of the complete
and perfect goal of human life.
In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant points out that man as an
individual is unable to attain perfection in this world; for the supreme con-
dition of the highest good is the complete fitness of intentions to the moral
law, and this involves a degree of perfection which is impossible for a rational
being in the world of sense. But if this condition cannot be satisfied, then the
highest good cannot be attained, and that would be absurd; for the moral law
commands us to promote the highest good. It must therefore be possible to
meet this condition. But we can conceive it as possible "only in an endless
progress to that complete fitness; on principles of pure practical reason, it is
necessary to assume such a practical progress as the real object of our will." 4
But such a progress is possible only if we presuppose the infinitely enduring
existence and personality of the same rational being - what is normally re-
ferred to as the immortality of the soul. "Thus the highest good is practically
possible only on the supposition of the immortality of the soul, and the
latter, as inseparably bound to the moral law, is a postulate of pure practical
reason." 5 Kant finds it possible, then, through the concept of immortality,
for man to achieve virtue - but that would still not be the full realization of
the highest good.
In order to achieve that ultimate state (the sharing in the summum bonum
in the intelligible world), both virtue and happiness are required: the former
is moral worth attained through obedience to the moral law; the latter, "the
condition of a rational being in the world in whose whole existence every-
thing goes according to wish and will." 6 Virtue, of course, is the more im-
portant of the two. Kant still maintains that man must do his duty out of
pure respect for the moral law rather than from any inclination toward satis-
fying the self or attaining happiness. But, while virtue is the supreme good,
it is not the complete and perfect good. For man's conception of the highest
human good requires happiness as well as virtue. Such happiness would, in a
rational moral world, correspond to the degree of virtue - always being
subordinate to virtue - and at the same time would constitute a perfect whole
with it.7
equal validity that it is on the consciousness of the moral law that Kant builds his
whole philosophy.
4 Schriften, V, p. 122. Beck trans., pp. 225-26.
5 Ibid.
e Schriften, V, p. 124. Beck trans., p. 227.
7 "Inasmuch as virtue and happiness together constitute the possession of the highest
good for one person, and happiness in exact proportion to morality (as the worth of a
84 KANT'S RATIONAL RELIGION
Man requires this conception of the highest good in order that he be as-
sured of the systematic order of the universe in accordance with moral
purposes. As T. M. Greene expresses it:
Unless man can be assured by faith in the Summum Bonum that he is living
under a just moral order and can thus be saved from inhibiting fear that virtue
itself may in the end be of no avail, he has not the heart to exert himself to the
performance of dUty.s
But how is this combination of virtue and happiness to be attained? Virtue
is attained by acts of the will, but happiness depends upon the order of things
in the world of nature as well. And the causality of nature is of a different
order. "Hence there is not the slightest ground in the moral law for a neces-
sary connection between the morality and proportionate happiness of a
being which belongs to the world as one of its parts and as thus dependent on
it." 9 But in the practical order of things, in which man is commanded to
strive for the highest good, such a condition is a necessary postulate: we
should seek to further the highest good, therefore it must at least be possible.
"Therefore also the existence is postulated of a cause of the whole of nature,
itself distinct from nature, which contains the ground of the exact coincidence
of happiness with morality." 10
In Kant's view, then, the highest good is possible only on the supposition
that there is a supreme cause of nature in which there is causality corre-
sponding to the moral intention. But that would imply two things: A being
which is able to act in accordance with the idea of laws is an intelligence,
or a rational being; and secondly, in such a being, the causality according to
laws is his will. "Therefore, the supreme cause of nature, in so far as it must
be presupposed for the highest good, is a being which is a cause (and conse-
quently the author) of nature through understanding and will, i.e., God." 11
Thus, if we accept the dictates of the moral law, and the possibility of their
fulfillment, we must accept the existence of God. Kant completes his argu-
ment: "As a consequence, the postulate of the possibility of a highest derived
person and his worthiness to be happy) constitutes that of a possible world, the highest
good means the whole, the perfect good, wherein virtue is always the supreme good,
being the condition having no condition superior to it, while happiness, though some-
thing always pleasant to him who possesses it, is not itself absolutely good in every
respect, but always presupposes conduct in accordance with the moral law as its con-
dition." Schriften, Y, pp. 110-11. Beck trans., p. 215.
8 See Greene's introduction to Kant's Religion Within the Limits of Reason A/one,
trans. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (Chicago: Open Court Publishing
Co., 1934), p. lvii.
9 Schriften, Y, p. 124. Beck trans., p. 228.
10 Schriften, Y, p. 125. Beck trans. p. 228.

11 Ibid.
good (the best world) is at the same time the postulate of the reality of a
highest original good, namely, the existence of God." 12
For Kant, then, the concepts of immortality and of God are necessary in
order to guarantee, respectively, virtue and happiness, the two ingredients
of the highest good. 13 Kant is careful to point out here that, on the basis of
this argument, it is morally necessary to assume the existence of God, and
thus it is a subjective need rather than an objective duty.14 But moral neces-
sity is quite sufficient for Kant's purpose - establishing the reality of God
and of the immortality of the soul for the moral order.
Kant affirms strongly that this moral proof for the existence of God is
superior to any other possible form. And he gives good reasons to support
his contention. He points out, for instance, that if a theoretical argument
were to be used to establish the existence of God, it would then be necessary
to adjust morals in accordance with theology. We can readily see that such
a state of affairs would be impossible for Kant to accept, since it would
violate his entire conception of reason. For such a morality would undermine
the internal, necessary legislation of reason, and would do so invalidly, since
the theology on which it was based would be in violation of the limits placed
upon speculative reason. But the reason which Kant gives for rejecting such
a procedure is that it would ultimately undermine religion itself. He points
out that, in such a system, "whatever is defective in our insight into the
nature of this Being must extend to ethical precepts, and thus make religion
immoral and perverted." 15
Since Kant's efforts in the first Critique were explicitly directed toward
convincing us that man's knowledge is restricted to the realm of possible
sense experience, it is not surprising that he expresses very little opinion
concerning the nature of God, or of the future state of man. Regarding the
latter, he said at one time: "We know nothing of the future, and we ought
not to seek to know more than what is rationally bound up with the incentives
of morality and their end." 16 In his lectures on the philosophy of religion,
however, Kant indicated that he did not think that man should expect a
radical change in the next life. "Rather, experience of his state on earth and
the ordering of nature in general gives him clear proofs that his moral
12 Ibid.
13 Regarding Kant's doctrine of salvation, Karl Barth says that it "is intended to be
anthropology and nothing but anthropology, even if it does have as its background a
metaphysics with an ethical foundation." Protestant Thought from Rousseau to
Ritschl, trans. Brian Cozens (New York: Harper and Row, 1959), p. 187.
15 Critique of Judgment, Schriften, V, p. 460. Bernard trans., p. 394.
16 Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, Schriften, VI, p. 161n. Greene-
Hudson trans., p. 149n.
deterioration. " as well as his moral improvement ... will continue end-
lessly, i.e. eternally." 17 But Kant makes no attempt to extend this obser-
vation.
Because of the manner in which he arrives at the postulate of the exist-
ence of God, however, Kant is now able to say slightly more about the nature
of God. In order to fulfill the role of guarantor of the highest good, He must
be moral, so as to make the coordination of virtue and happiness possible;
He must be intelligent, or capable of conceiving laws, both natural and
moral; He must be endowed with a will capable of acting according to an
ideal, both for the creation of the world, and for the achievement of the
highest good. On the basis of these properties, necessary to the concept of
God as postulated, other properties can be determined as logically implied
correlates. For in considering the concept of God in relation to the object of
practical reason, we find that the moral principle admits of an author of the
world having the highest perfection.
This Being must be omniscient, in order to be able to know my conduct even to
the most intimate parts of my intention in all possible cases and in the entire
future. In order to allot fitting consequences to it, He must be omnipotent, and
similarly omnipresent, eternal, etc. Thus the moral law, by the concept of the
highest good as the object of a pure practical reason, defines the concept of the
First Being as that of a Supreme Being. 1s
And this awareness of a supreme being, Kant emphasizes again, cannot be
achieved through a consideration of physical causality, or any of the specu-
lative procedures of reason.
Kant sees great value in the fact that reason cannot attain to ideas of the
supersensible except through its practical, moral application. For this limi-
tation prevents man from carrying theology into theosophy - "transcendent
concepts which confound reason" - or from falling into demonology - "an
anthropologic way of representing the highest being." At the same time, it
prevents religion from becoming theurgy - "a fanciful belief that we can
have a feeling of other supersensible beings and can reciprocally influence
them" - or degenerating into idolatry - "a superstitious belief that we can
please the Supreme Being by other means than by a moral sentiment." 19
But while practical reason guards us against such distortions, man is ever
subject to the tendency to give content to his conception of God, and this
tendency, if not carefully guarded, can also undermine morality. Therefore,
Kant carefully defines the few properties which must be posited of God in
17 Vorlesungen tiber philosophische Religionslehre, [eel. K. H. L. Politz] (Leipzig:

Carl Friedrich Frans, 1817), p. 150.
18 Critique of Practical Reason, Schriften, Y, p. 140. Beck trans., p. 242.
19 Critique of Judgment, Schriften, Y, p. 459. Bernard trans., p. 393.
His relation to man. Naturally, Kant's choice is of strictly moral properties.

God, he tells us,
... is the only holy, the only blessed, and the only wise being, because these
concepts of themselves imply unlimitedness. By the arrangement of these He is
thus the holy lawgiver (the creator), the beneficent ruler (and sustainer), and the
just judge. 2o
These attributes, Kant assures us, contain everything in virtue of which God
is the object of religion. Naturally, he feels that man should not concern
himself with attributes of God which are not appropriate to God as the object
of religion; for such properties can have no practical significance for man,
and speculation concerning them is useless.
The strictness of Kant's position is moderated somewhat in his lectures
on religion. We find him saying that while we should "in theory" carefully
purify our conception of God of all anthropomorphic encrustations, "one
may, from a practical consideration, think to oneself and represent to others
such predicates (as God's immortality, i.e., His eternity) in human fashion, if
the idea of God thereby attains to a greater power and strength for our
morality." 21 Human motivation thus takes on more significance when
Kant's statements are directed to an actual audience. We even find him
saying to his students that the postulate of God is essential to morality, "for
otherwise all the subjectively necessary duties which I am under obligation
as a rational being to perform lose their objective reality." Here, morality
for its own sake is temporarily forgotten. "Why should I make myself worthy
of happiness by means of moral conduct if there exists no Being who can
secure me this happiness?" 22 And, at another time, "if morality can offer
me no prospect that my need to be happy will be satisfied, neither can it
command me." 23 These remarks are very much unlike the more cautious
formulation of the written works. Yet, on the basis of these explicit state-
ments in his lectures, Kant has been accused of hedonism for placing virtue
in a merely instrumental relation to happiness. 24 Such a conclusion does not
seem warranted.
If, however, we are interested in mentioning exceptions to Kant's custom-
ary pattern of thought, we certainly must consider the Opus Postumum. For
in his closing years, Kant went precisely to the opposite extreme. He then
decided that his ethical proof for the existence of God was unsatisfactory,
and took up the difficult task of redefining his faith in God, and of attempt-
20 Critique of Practical Reason, Schriften, V, p. l31n. Beck trans., p. 233n.
21 Vorlesungen iiber die philosophische Religionslehre, p. 156.
22 Ibid., p. 129.
23 Ibid., p. 199.
24 See T. M. Green's accusations, op. cit., p. !xiii.
ing to establish it on a firmer foundation. 25 Adickes maintains that Kant's

primary reason for making this radical change was the desire to eliminate
from his ethical system whatever elements of heteronomy and hedonism had
come into it through his doctrine of the highest good. 26 To achieve that end,
Kant returned to a strict interpretation of man's relation to the moral law,
emphasizing that man must act solely out of regard for the categorical com-
mand of practical reason, and for no external end whatever. Man may, how-
ever, as a religious person, recognize "that the ideals and ends which he has
himself imposed, are also God's ideals, ends, and laws, and through this recog-
nition his motives to do good are appreciably strengthened." 27 Any mention
of happiness, however, would be out of place in Kant's later work. Thus, we
see him reacting in the Opus Postumum to errors which may have arisen
from the rather lenient formulation of his position in a few exceptional
statements in the lectures. But neither of these two extremes represent the
more widely recognized moral teaching of Kant.
It is safe to say that Kant's general conception of the relation between God
and man is essentially expressed in the passage from the Critique of Practi-
cal Reason cited above: God is the holy lawgiver, the beneficent ruler, and
the just judge. Here the relationship is perfectly expressed in neat, legalistic
language which, better than anything else, aptly characterizes Kant's religious
thought. For in this relationship man can only be the receiver of laws, the
ruled, and the judged. Because God is for Kant solely a postulate of practical
reason, there is no basis for adopting toward Him an attitude of worship or
love, as between persons. 28 Religion, therefore is almost reduced to morality.
The word "almost" is important here, for many authors blatantly accuse
Kant of completely identifying religion and morality. Rosenkranz, for ex-
ample, says that "Kant fell into the one-sidedness of absorbing religion in
morality." 29 And somewhat later: "Now if religion is entirely absorbed by
morality, then the relation of man to God as a personal Being ceases. He
may believe in God; morality does not forbid this. But it is superfluous. It is
not necessary." According to Rosenkranz, then, Kant has deprived man of
God in the traditional sense. "Conscience is his God. The most essential
25 See Appendix C, Kemp Smiths Commentary (2nd ed., 1923), for a summary of
Kant's various attempts in the Opus Postumum to relate God to the moral law. This
appendix is not in the first edition.
26 See Adickes' discussion of Kant's changed position, Kant's Opus Postumum, ed.
Erich Adickes, Kantstudien, L (1920), pp. 846·49.
27 Ibid., p. 847.
28 The term "awe" which Kant employs in this context is undoubtedly the best to
express his attitude of religion.
29 Immanuel Kant's Siimmtliche Werke, ed. Karl Rosenkranz and Friedrich Wilhelm
Schubert (12 vols; Leipzig: Leopold Voss, 1838·42), XII, p. 202.
KANT'S RA TIONAL RELIGION 89
thing is the conception of the highest good, of the categorical imperative, of
the maxim." 30 But this kind of statement only emphasizes the degree to
which Kant's thought can be misinterpreted; for while part of what is said
here is true, more is either misleading, or explicitly false.
Kant leaves himself open to such criticism when he speaks of religion as
"morals in reference to God as legislator." 31 If the statement is taken liter-
ally, it would reduce religion to a subcategory of morality - an appropriate
arrangement for a system in which the very existence of God is a postulate
based on the fact of morality. At the very least, it is clear in Kant's discussion
of ethics that morality depends solely upon man's consciousness of the moral
law, never in any sense upon religion. 32 But the emphatic statements of
Rosenkranz fail to take into consideration many other aspects of Kant's
thought.
The error in Rosenkranz' position is made obvious by an examination of
any of Kant's major works. The concluding chapters of each of the three
Critiques deal explicitly with man's religious aspirations, and it is clear from
Kant's discussion in each work that he is vitally concerned to establish
religious values on a firm foundation. Nor can it be consistently maintained
that these religious values are reducible to pure morality.
In many places it is clearly expressed that religion is something added to
morality - something which adds greatly to the significance of morality. In
the second Critique, Kant says that morality is not really the doctrine of how
to make ourselves happy, "but of how we are to be worthy of happiness.
Only if religion is added to it can the hope arise of someday participating in
happiness in proportion as we endeavored not to be unworthy of it." 33 In
the Lectures on Ethics, he says: "Morality as such is ideal, but religion im-
bues it with vigour, beauty, and reality." 34 Kant makes it clear, moreover,
that the relation between morality and religion is not merely one of con-
venience to make the former palatable. Wherever he discusses the two dis-
ciplines, he emphasizes that morality leads necessarily to religion. 35
Kant's conception of religion, then, is vital to his thought - but it is never
permitted to assume importance apart from morality. It seems obvious to
Kant that nothing glorifies God more than that which is most treasured in
30 Ibid., p. 253.
31 Critique of Judgment, Schriften, V, p. 460. Bernard trans., p. 394.
32 For an essentially clear and uncompromising statement of this position, see
Lectures on Ethics, p. 81.
34 Kant, lac. cit., p. 81.
35 Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, Schriften, VI, p. 6. Greene-Hudson
trans., p. 5.
the world: "respect for His command, the observance of sacred duty which
His law imposes on us, when there is added to this His glorious plan of
crowning such an excellent order with corresponding happiness." 36 The
rigor of Kant's personal ethic is clear as he concludes: "If the latter, to speak
in human terms, makes Him worthy of love, by the former he is object of
adoration." 37 Love, therefore, has its place in Kant's thought, but adoration,
based on respect for God's law, must retain its primacy.
The religious position of Kant becomes more understandable when we
realize what it was he was attempting to combat. The kind of religion which
he repudiated was entirely deserving of his criticism. Two aspects of religion
are mentioned in the lectures on ethics: piety and bigotry. Obviously, these
two categories contrast Kant's own conception of religion with what he
sometimes observed in others. "Piety, which is practical, consists of obeying
the divine laws for the reason that God wills it; bigotry is zeal in the worship
of God which uses words and expressions of devotion and submission in
order to win God's favor." 38 Certainly the latter cannot be construed as
worship of God, for it implies that morality is unnecessary and that we can
win God over to our side by flattery. "We imagine God to be like an earthly
lord and we treat him as such; we seek to please Him with flattery, praise,
and obsequious servility." 39
But by this attack Kant does not mean to undermine the devoutness of a
truly religious man. "Devoutness," he says, "is an indirect relation to the
heart of God, which seeks to express itself in action to make the knowledge
of God work effectively upon the will." 40 Thus, it is not action in itself, but
rather a method of securing readiness for action. And the action for which it
prepares us, "the putting into practice of the moral law, the doing of what
God wills us to do," is what constitutes true religion. 41 Devoutness, therefore,
is seen as providing the drill through which we acquire the skill necessary
for such action. "By means of it we seek to have the knowledge of God so
impressed upon us that it acts as an incentive to us to give effect to and prac-
tice the moral law." 42
To clarify his position, Kant employs the example of a person interrupted
in prayer by someone in need of assistance. Since devotional exercises are
intended for the acquisition of good habits, i.e., performing proper deeds,
36 Critique of Practical Reason, Schriften, V, p. 131. Beck trans., p. 234.

37 Lectures on Ethics, p. 89.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
e Ibid.
this opportunity would provide an occasion for fulfilling the purpose of
devotion. It would be foolish, therefore, to refuse to aid the supplicant be-
cause one should not be disturbed while at prayer. "Devotion as a separate
pursuit, as an occupation in itself, has no point." 43
The point is well taken, and the serious student of religion finds little to
quarrel with in this version of Kant's morality. True, he completes the dis-
cussion by stating that, because devotion is geared to action, we no longer
need it when we have established the habit of doing good. But this obser-
vation is merely the logical implication of the thoughts already expressed,
and not at all a suggestion that devotion is unnecessary in achieving virtue.
It seems legitimate to conclude, therefore, that those, like Rosenkranz, who
claim that religion holds no real significance for Kant are engaged in special
pleading or, at the very least, they are grossly over-simplifying Kant's
religious position.
There is no need for us to consider in detail Kant's thoughts on revealed
religion, or to examine his attitude toward specific churches. It will suffice
to mention that, in general, he favored the Christian religion. 44 He was
thoroughly familiar with the Bible and employed its basic concepts in both
his written works and his lectures. Nonetheless, shortly before his death he
said: "Were the Bible not already written, it would probably not be written
anymore." 45 With respect to churches, he applied one rule. Insofar as they
advance morality, they are good; to the extent that they substitute mechanical
observance for morality, they are evi1. 46
Kant's lack of interest in revealed religion is explained by some writers
as a result of his ignorance of theology. While he had been familiar with the
Bible and the catechism from the time of his early youth, he did not continue
his studies in later years. Stuckenberg mentions that "although he subjected
theology to severe criticism, he did not make it a subject of careful study." 47
Kant's biographer, Borowski, also remarks on this deficiency in Kant's
background, contrasting it with the otherwise universal character of his
learning. "Theological investigations only, of whatever kind they might be,
especially exegetics and dogmatics, he never touched." 48 The point is well
emphasized by his remark that Kant, before writing Religion Within the
43 Ibid.
44 In Religion Kant mentions that "of all the public religions which have ever
existed, the Christian alone is moral." Schriften, VI, pp. 51-52. Greene-Hudson trans.,
p.47.
45 Stuckenberg, op. cit., p. 340, n.139.
46 Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, Schriften, VI, pp. 167ff. Greene and
Hudson trans., pp. 156ff.

48 Ibid.
Limits of Reason Alone, "carefully read one of our oldest catechisms,

namely, the Basis of Christian Doctrine, which appeared in 1732 or 1733." 49
It is difficult to conceive of Kant as being quite so narrow with respect to
a discipline which he considered vital, but the testimony of his friends can-
not be ignored. And, of course, it must be admitted that, if Kant were really
rather badly informed on theological matters, it would go a long way toward
explaining his obstinate stand on some religious issues. But while these con-
siderations are enlightening, they bear no important relation to Kant's
anthropology, and we must return to our central theme.
There is no difficulty in establishing a connection between Kant's thought
on religion and his anthropological work. In the first part of Religion Within
the Limits of Reason Alone,50 for example, we find a discussion of the con-
flict of good and evil in man, which is a clear reflection of conclusions in
Anthropologie, Part II, Section E: "The Character of the Species." In Re-
ligion, also we find constant allusion to the customs and religious practices
of peoples around the world, and a discussion of the merits and shortcomings
of these practices in relation to morality. On the whole, we are inclined to
agree with Erdmann that the entire work has an anthropological form which
is only slightly obscured by the external protestations of its rational religious
purpose.51
But there is a more interesting aspect to Kant's religious thought: it con-
tains the first presentation of man as both a subjective and an objective
phenomenon. The "complete conception of man," which we mentioned at
the end of Chapter V, begins now to take on significant form. In earlier works
we have seen an analysis of man's rational capacity, and - in relation to
morality - the internal struggle of his sentient and rational powers. But only
in Kant's religious doctrine do we find the analysis of man as a rational
subject combined with the explicit analysis of man's objective position in the
order of reality. In this context we see man as related to nature, to his fel-
lowman, and to God. Kant presents man as superior to nature - indeed, as
the purpose of nature - because he shares in a moral realm which transcends
nature. Man stands in a social, and thus a moral, relationship with other
men, directed toward the realization of the kingdom of ends. And finally,
man is seen as related to God in the order of reality, with this Supreme Being
serving as both the object of his respect and adoration, and the hope of his
ultimate attainment of the highest good.
49 Ibid.
50 "Uber das radicale BOse in der m.enschlichen Natur," which had already appeared
separately in the Berlinische Monatsschrift in 1792.
In a sense, then, we might be inclined to feel that Kant's religious thought
is the key to his anthropology, since only in the religious context does man
take on full dimension. But Kant would be extremely dissatisfied with such
an interpretation. For anthropology in its full philosophical sense deals with
the facts of human nature as participating in both the sensible and intelligible
worlds. Religion on the other hand, is a postulate of practical reason, based
on the moral law which is a fact of human experience. Therefore, because
the concepts of religion are derived from human experience, they cannot
serve as the logical basis for the investigation of man. Rather, it is necessary
for Kant to find that religion, through morality, is based upon a conception
of human nature as a part of a logically ordered reality. Religion can crown
human experience, and add significance to it, but it can never serve as a
foundation upon which anthropological conclusions could be based.
It is important to note, finally, that the relation between Kant's anthro-
pology and his religious thought can provide an insight into the perspective
which Kant had in regard to his work as a whole. He was very much con-
cerned to show an integrated pattern of reality, man's position within that
pattern, and the knowledge which man could attain of his relation to other
aspects of the pattern. The last point, man's knowledge of his relation to
reality, is especially important, since only after it is attained can man proper-
ly establish the criteria in terms of which he must seek fulfillment. That
Kant was vitally concerned with man's fulfillment - the attainment of the
summum bonum - and that this concern strongly influenced the structure
of his thought, is the final point which we shall attempt to establish.
CHAPTER VII
THE ROLE OF TELEOLOGY IN THE WORK OF KANT
While the individual writings of Kant each provide some contribution to the
development and continuity of his thought, it is only in viewing his work as
a whole that we begin to notice the particular aspects which so clearly mark
the system as a product of Kant's distinctive character. As we saw in con-
sidering the early progress and development of the young scholar, there was
always a tension between the speculative and the practical in his thought: a
constant concern with practical ends, and a constant employment of specu-
lative means to achieve them. In a sense, this dual characteristic became the
hallmark of Kant's entire system.
There are particular examples which stand out as excellent illustrations of
this interesting dichotomy in Kant's thought. The most obvious, perhaps, is
to be found in the attitude which Kant had with respect to man's historical
development, and the particular conception which he had of history itself.
Our brief analysis of the Anthropologie, in Chapter III, made clear Kant's
notion of man's fulfillment. Unlike other species, man does not achieve his
fuII determination in the individual; rather, he must progress gradually
through many generations to the point where he has attained perfect social,
cultural, and political stability through reason. On this view, the process of
history is seen as the gradual education of man to rational ends, and his
further development in slowly attempting to implement his knOWledge. The
final result would be a community of people living entirely in accordance
with the moral law, and employing in friendly rivalry all the powers of reason
- in short, a state of everlasting peace.
Since the process of history is an essential aspect of Kant's vision of human
perfection, therefore, we would expect him to be very much interested in the
discipline. And, in a sense, he was. But while he read works of an historical
nature, and included the events of history in his lectures, the discipline played
no major role in his thought. In his Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant,
Adamson felt justified in saying that "the historical element in its widest
THE ROLE OF TELEOLOGY IN THE WORK OF KANT 95
sense never received its full due at the hands of Kant, whose deficiency in the
historical interest was remarkable." 1 The point, then, is not that Kant was
ignorant of the facts of history, but that he had a peculiar conception of the
nature of history, and its role in the general scheme of academic disciplines. 2
Kant was not concerned with the details of history, but rather with their
significance. He felt that "critical study of the reason, of history and histori-
cal books, a largeness of mind which goes into human knowledge en gros
and not merely en detail, will constantly make the extent smaller without
diminishing its content." 3 New methods for dealing with such disciplines
would put old knowledge into a more compact form, and enable us to do
without the multitude of books. By means of these new methods, also, we
would be able, without burdening the memory, to find out everything our-
selves as we wish. "Therefore, he displays true genius with respect to history
who groups it under ideas which can endure." 4 Apparently what Kant had in
mind was not history in the proper sense, but the philosophy of history.
Contemporaries noted Kant's tendency to reconstruct history on speculative
lines, and were concerned about it. For example, Herder once wrote to Ha-
mann: "It is strange that metaphysicians, like your Kant, even in history
want no history, and as much as boldly banish it from the world." 5 Such
would be the accusation of the historian, for Kant wanted to eliminate from
history the clutter of details in order that its true significance might be dis-
cerned.
In the same fashion, it is interesting to note, Kant considered the notion of
an a priori history of philosophy. Among his notes we find a discussion of
whether a history of philosophy can be written mathematically, meaning
dogmatically, or from concepts. In other words, whether it would be possible
to show how dogmatism must have arisen, and from it scepticism, and how
this in tum would necessarily lead to criticism. From what has already been
said, we may anticipate the answer: "Yes, if the idea of a metaphysic in-
evitably presses on human reason, and the latter feels a necessity to develop
it; but this science lies entirely in the mind, although only outlined there in
1 Robert Adamson, Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant (Edinburgh: David

Douglas, 1879), p. 25. For a more complete discussion of Kant's view of history, see
Sidney Axinn: A Study of Kant's Philosophy of History, Doctoral Dissertation, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania, 1955 (University Microfilms Publication No. 13,374).
2 Stuckenberg excuses this deficiency in Kant's perspective by pointing out that
"his education belonged to a period when there was but little taste in Germany for
general history and when there were no attractive historical books." Op. cit., pp.
150-51.
3 Kant's Introduction to Logic, p. 34.
4 Ibid.
5 Quoted by Stuckenberg, op. cit., p. 151.
96 THE ROLE OF TELEOLOGY IN THE WORK OF KANT
embryonic form." 6 It would be difficult to ignore the abstract dialectic in

this neat, conceptual ordering of history.
But if Kant's views on history provide an excellent example of his tendency
to conceptualize, or make speculative, things of the practical order, it is by
no means an exceptional case. We need only recall that in matters of religion
Kant concerned himself not with the alleged facts of revealed religion, and
established denominations, but only with the a priori dictates of reason. And
after our consideration of the relation between the first and second Critiques,
it is hardly necessary to point out that the first constitutes the specUlative
base upon which alone the practical philosophy could be established. More-
over, the practical philosophy itself is erected solely on the a priori postulates
of the moral law.
In a sense, the problem which we isolate here is an oversimplification,
since it is merely one phase of a more pervasive tension which permeates
the work of Kant. It may be seen clearly in the contrast between the purely
intellectual aspect of philosophy and the moral aspect; between the mecha-
nistic necessity of nature and the moral freedom of human acts; and, most
important, in the dual nature of man himself as a participant in both the
physical and the intelligible worlds. We believe, however, that the general
problem can best be understood through the perspective of the relation be-
tween the speculative and the practical aspects of Kant's work.
In examining this relation, it is certainly safe to begin with the fact that
Kant was vitally concerned with practical matters. 7 His original predis-
position toward science gives an indication of such interest, and we may
recall that some of his last writings were on political and educational topics.
The Critique of Practical Reason, and his constant reference to questions
of morality merely compound the obvious, and compel us to consider Kant
as primarily a man of practical orientation. But precisely what does it mean
to speak of Kant as practical?
Certainly Kant did not concern himself with the petty details of daily
living. Such matters were strictly ordered, and placed in the hands of the
cook, or the servant, Lampe. The practical matters which concerned Kant
were of another order. In the letter to Herz in which he described the new
course in anthropology, we find the statement: "The intention which I have
is to unfold by means of this course the sources of all the sciences, those of
• Lose Blatter aus Kants Nachlass, ed. Rudolf Reicke (3 vols; Konigsberg, Ferd.
Beyer, 1889), II, pp. 285ff. Cf. also, Schriften, XX, p. 342.
7 The term "practical" has more than one meaning, of course. In the context of
Kant's work it could refer either to the pragmatic order or the moral order. We shall
see, however, that Kant was vitally concerned with both orders, and that ultimately
the two were reduced to one - the moral order.
morals, of skill, of social intercourse, of the methods of forming and ruling

men, and consequently all things practical." 8 In the Critique of Pure Reason,
on the other hand, we find the statement: "By 'the practical' I mean every-
thing that is possible through freedom." 9 It seems clear, therefore, that, for
Kant, the practical order was the order of important purposeful activity,
and particularly the level of human conduct which involves freedom, i.e., the
moral order. But a purely speculative concern for practical affairs would be
fruitless indeed; it was with the achievement of significant ends that Kant
was concerned. The question then arises, how were these ends, or purposes
to be achieved?
There was no possibility of Kant himself becoming involved in practical
affairs - even a political career would undoubtedly have proved too much
for his frail constitution. Nor would Kant have chosen such a career if it
were open to him. He saw his mission as one of a higher nature - that of
clearing the ground, and of laying a proper foundation, so that a correct
ordering of practical affairs might take place in society. The attempt to give
to philosophy a new and more durable foundation was not merely a specu-
lative game, as we have seen. It was to give philosophy the authority needed
to proclaim rules for practical affairs. The application of philosophic prin-
ciples to society came relatively late in Kant's work, but only because the
critical foundation was a necessary step which had to be accomplished before
practical matters could be validly pronounced upon.
In the general development of Kant's system, then, we may look for an
increasing integration of speculative and practical principles. There seems
little need to emphasize again how perfectly this system reflects the dual
nature of man in Kant's thought. We are concerned here rather to point out
the precise element in Kant's work which most perfectly displays his gradual
integration of principles: the notion of teleology. It is important to realize
that, for Kant, teleology provides the rational justification and the systematic
presentation of the interrelation of physical and moral reality - the final
conjunction of the speculative and the practical in Kant's work.
The first important use of teleology by Kant is in the Critique of Pure
Reason, where he deals with it on two levels: in the teleological proof for the
existence of God, and as a regulative principle for the unification of know-
ledge. In the case of the former, we have a clear statement of Kant's own
view of reality. It is mentioned with obvious approval, but must be denied
ultimate validity as a proof of God's existence. The teleological proof, Kant
8 Schriften, X, p. 138.
B A 800, B 828. NKS, p. 632.
tells us, "always deserves to be mentioned with respect." 10 Besides being

"the oldest, the clearest and the most accordant with the common reason of
mankind," it is also extremely useful in the study of nature.
It suggests aims and intentions where our own observation by itself would not
have detected them, and expands our knowledge of nature by means of the
heuristic concept of a special unity, the principle of which lies outside nature.
This knowledge reacts again on its cause, namely on the guiding idea, and thus
intensifies the belief in a supreme author into an irresistible conviction.
Because the tendency to accept the teleological proof is so strongly en-
trenched in man's mind, Kant maintains that it would not only be dis-
comforting, but "utterly vain to attempt to diminish in any way the authority
of this argument." 12 Subtle and abstruse speculation has no power to counter
the ever increasing evidence of the senses, and the wonders of nature silence
all doubts. Kant clearly favors this argument, but finds it technically de-
ficient. While he has "nothing to bring against the rationality and utility" of
the argument, and would rather "commend and further it," he must still
deny it apodictic certainty.13 In the context of the first Critique, even the
teleological argument is insufficient to establish the existence of God.
The second use of teleology - as a regulative principle for the unification
of knowledge - is based upon the first. The highest formal unity which we
can impose upon nature is that of the purposive unity of things, and thus the
speculative interests of reason make it necessary to consider all order in the
world as though it had originated in the purpose of a supreme reason. As
applied to the field of experience, such a principle opens up to our reason
"altogether new views as to how the things of the world may be connected
according to teleological laws, and so enables it to arrive at their greatest
systematic unity." 14 Kant views this teleological principle as extremely
useful, and always beneficial, provided only that it be relegated to a regula-
tive function and never considered to be constitutive of reality. As regulative,
it helps us to find connective elements which assist us in subsuming events
under natural laws. As constitutive, the principle of teleology could only
assume the total connection of all elements of nature - thus presuming the
unifying factors of nature which the scientist is attempting to establish. Only
the regulative use of the principles of teleology is permitted by Kant, there-
10 A 623, B 651. NKS, p. 520.

11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 A 687, B 715. NKS, p. 560.
fore, and we can see that teleology in the first Critique has a very precise, and
very limited use. It is a useful tool, but must be employed with caution.
In the second Critique, however, we see a totally different employment of
teleology. For Kant does not raise the issue of teleology as a tool at all. In
fact, we find that in his works on morality Kant is careful to omit teleology
as a speculative concept which is inappropriate to the context of practical
philosophy. In the Foundation of the Metaphysic of Morals, he explicitly
mentions this distinction: "Teleology views nature as a kingdom of ends;
ethics views a possible kingdom of ends as a kingdom of nature." 15 The
distinction here lies in the different employment of the concept "kingdom
of ends." "In the first case the kingdom of ends is a theoretical idea used to
explain what exists. In the second case it is a practical idea used to bring into
existence what does not exist but can be made actual by our conduct - and
indeed to bring it into existence in conformity with this idea." 16 To employ
teleology in this context, therefore, would be to use it in a constitutive, rather
than in a regulative sense, and Kant has already determined such usage to be
illegitimateP
But if teleology is not permitted as a tool in Kant's ethical works, it would
be incorrect to maintain that it plays no part at all. In fact, when one con-
siders the foundation of Kant's ethical system, it becomes clear that teleology
is the absolutely necessary presupposition in order that the system come to-
gether at all. A brief resume of Kant's thought in this area should serve to
establish the point.
In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant provides a short summary of the
basic elements of his moral system. He points out that a need of pure reason
leads only to hypotheses, but "a need of pure practical reason, on the other
hand, is based on a duty to make something (the highest good) the object of
my will so as to promote it with all my strength." 18 In order to promote the
highest good, I must presuppose its possibility, and also its conditions: God,
freedom, and immortality; for speculative reason can neither prove nor
disprove these conditions. Kant is careful to assure us that the duty to pro-
mote the highest good is based on apodictic law - the moral law - which is
completely independent of such presuppositions, "and thus needs no further
support from theoretical opinions on the inner character of things, on the
secret final end of the world order, or on a ruler presiding over it in order to
15 Schriften, IV, p. 436n. The Moral Law or Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysic
oj Morals, ed. H. J. Paton (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1950), p. 104n.
16 Ibid.
17 Paulsen criticizes Kant strongly for having eliminated teleology from his ethical
system. Paulsen, op. cit., pp. 324ff.
18 Schriften, Y, p. 142. Beck trans., p. 244.
bind us completely to actions unconditionally conformable to the law." 19

But the intention which this law imposes on me as a subjective effect - to
promote the practically possible highest good - must at least presuppose
the latter as possible. "Otherwise it would be practically impossible to strive
for the object of a concept, which, at bottom, would be empty and without
an object." 20
The postulates of God, freedom, and immortality concern only the physi-
cal or metaphysical condition of the possibility of the highest good, and "not
for the sake of some arbitrary speculative design, but only for the sake of a
practically necessary end of the pure rational will, which does not here choose
but rather obeys an inexorable command of reason." 21 This command of
reason, is not, of course, based upon inclination, which would by no means
justify us in assuming the means possible or the object real for its fulfillment.
Rather, "this command of reason has its ground objectively in the character
of things as they must be universally judged by pure reason." 22 The need
created by this command is, therefore, "an absolutely necessary need and
justifies its presupposition not merely as an allowable hypothesis but as a
practical postulate." 23
It is important to realize that, for Kant, while this practical postulate is
denied apodictic certainty, it is nonetheless completely established. Since it is
based upon the apodictic moral law, it is far more certain, for example, than
the laws of science which are merely empirical. It is nothing less than com-
plete assurance which permits Kant to draw the conclusion:
Granted that the pure moral law inexorably binds every man as a command (not
as a rule of prudence), the righteous man may say: I will that there be a God,
that my existence in this world be also an existence in a pure world of the under-
standing outside the system of natural connections, and finally that my duration
be endless. I stand by this and will not give up this belief, for this is the only case
where my interest inevitably determines my judgment because I will not yield
anything of this interest; I do so without any attention to sophistries, however
little I may be able to answer them or oppose them with others more plausible. 24
There can be little doubt that Kant, as a righteous man, does make such a
proclamation.
Now this summary makes clear Kant's effort to avoid teleology, or any
other purely speculative consideration, in formulating his argument. But it
19 I bid.
20 Schrijten, V, p. 143. Beck trans., pp. 244-45.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
would be difficult to ignore the fact that the entire argument is based on a
neat, rationally organized, teleological conception of reality. It is quite true
that God, freedom, and immortality must be postulated if the moral need of
reason is to be fulfilled - but to give to this postulate such complete ac-
ceptance is equivalent to asserting that reason is perfect in its order, and
perfectly reflects reality: there can be no absolute need of reason which is not
proportioned to an aspect of reality which can fulfill it. Kant's position is
clear, and there can be no doubt concerning the interpretation of reality
which would be necessary to support the postulate of practical reason.
Teleology is not permitted within the system, but the system is impossible
without presupposing it.
In the Critique of Judgment, Kant gives us his most thorough explication
of teleology. Encountering purposiveness as an essential quality of aesthetic
judgment, Kant then devotes the final portion of the work to a discussion
of teleology. In the context of nature, he finds, teleology presents a significant
problem: organisms seem to possess an internal purposiveness and principle
of self-development which cannot be reduced by the mind to merely me-
chanical causality. Yet, the rigorous mechanistic chain of the natural order
is an important aspect of Kant's thought. In order to account for this con-
flict, Kant brings into the argument the power of reflective judgment. As he
points out, our judgment that all nature must conform to mechanical causal
principles is a determinant judgment, while that by which we infer purposive
causality is merely reflective. The latter, then, is not a judgment concerning
the structure of nature, but a judgment required by the particular structure
of the human mind. In this way, we recognize teleology not as a rule of
nature, but as a rule of our judgment, by which nature is made intelligible
and assimilable to our cognitive faculties. Our intellect can attempt to ex-
plain nature without the employment of teleological principles, of course,
but not in a manner which would be satisfactory to reason. 25 For reason
wishes to do more than merely explain experience. It attempts also to make
it a unitary system; and the principles of teleology, although not principles
constitutive of experience, are nonetheless principles which regulate system-
atizing reason. 26 With this foundation clearly established, Kant begins to
build the notion of teleology into a more imposing structure.
25 Kant maintains that "absolutely no human reason ... can hope to understand
the production of even a blade of grass by mere mechanical causes." Critique oj
Judgment, Schriften, V, p. 409. Bernard trans., p. 326.
26 Elements of this summary are borrowed from Vleeschauwer's excellent brief
exposition of Kant's analysis of teleology, The Development of Kantian Thought,
pp. 133-35.
In the third Critique Kant is no longer concerned with the need to main-
tain his moral system pure of all involvement with speculative principles.
The entire basis of his system of morality has already been established, and
he is able to consider objectively the relation between the speculative and
practical aspects of his work in terms of the current analysis of judgment.
Thus, we find a reconsideration of the speculative notion of physical teleolo-
gy, and a discussion of it in relation to moral teleology - a conception of the
final purposiveness of the natural order as derived from the implications of
moral law.
We recall from earlier statements that, while physical teleology is not
credited with apodictic certainty, nonetheless, because of the weight it car-
ries for the mind of man, it demands the greatest respect. But now Kant
gives this thought a more favorable formulation: "There is a physical teleolo-
gy which gives a sufficient ground of proof to our theoretical reflective
judgment to assume the being of an intelligent world cause." 27 Together
with this form of teleology, "we find in ourselves, and still more in the con-
cept of a rational being in general endowed with freedom (of his causality),
a moral teleology." 28 But in the case of this moral teleology, the purposive
reference, together with its law, is determined a priori in ourselves, and can
therefore be cognized as necessary. Such internal conformity to law requires
no intelligent cause external to us, any more than we need look to a higher
understanding as the source of the purposiveness that we find in the geo-
metrical properties of figures. However, this moral teleology has to do with
our role as beings in the world, "and therefore as beings bound up with other
things in the world, upon which latter, whether as purposes or as objects in
respect of which we ourselves are final purpose, the same moral laws require
us to pass judgment." 29 Thus, moral teleology has to do with the reference of
our own causality to purpose, and even to a final purpose, which we must aim
at in the world. It concerns as well the reciprocal reference of the world to
that moral purpose, and the external possibility of its accomplishment. This
final concept, Kant assures us, is one "to which no physical teleology can
lead us." 3(1 We find, therefore, that, while no aspect of teleology was per-
27 Schritten, V, p. 447. Bernard trans., p. 377.

28 Ibid. It is unfortunate that in his recent volume, Kant's Concept ot Teleology,
J. D. MacFarland has chosen to exclude Kant's treatment of moral teleology, since
only by including all aspects of teleology in Kant's work can one demonstrate the
integrity which this concept imposes on his system as a whole. In other respects,
MacFarland's work is a careful and detailed presentation of Kant's position.
mitted in the development of the moral argument, in a later context moral

teleology is fully developed and becomes a useful tool.
The usefulness of moral teleology is seen immediately after the presen-
tation just outlined. Kant finds that when both physical and moral teleology
are employed in a continuous argument, the value of this argument for the
existence of God is greatly enhanced. Kant summarizes the argument brief-
ly. From the purposes of nature, physical teleology proves an intelligent
world cause sufficiently for the theoretical reflective judgment. 3l In addition,
moral teleology establishes an intelligent world cause for the practical judg-
ment by the concept of a final purpose it is forced to ascribe to creation from
a practical point of view. And, while the objective reality of the idea of God
as moral author of the world cannot be established by physical purposes
alone, nevertheless, the awareness of these purposes, when combined with
that of the moral purpose, is of great importance for the practical reality of
the idea of God. 32 The maxim of pure reason requires us to seek a unity of
principles as far as possible, and the combination of the concept of physical
purposiveness with that of moral purposiveness adds credence to the idea
of God by bringing in the reality which this idea has for the judgment from
a theoretical point of view. 33 Thus, in the context of the third Critique, a
more thorough analysis of teleology, and the application of the concept at a
new level, adds significantly to Kant's argument for the supersensible goal
of human endeavors.
Three distinct kinds of teleology are explicitly employed by Kant in his
work - organic teleology in nature, the speculative conception of physical
teleology, and moral teleology - and each contributes something to his ulti-
mate portrayal of a well-ordered system of reality. It does not seem too
much to say at this point that the work in which Kant had been engaged from
1770 until 1790 is open to another interpretation than those which are com-
monly provided from a consideration of the apparent evidence. He was, of
course, developing a critical examination of pure speculative reason at three
levels - understanding, judgment, and reason itself. And in formulating this
critical system, Kant was careful to maintain strict logical order, and a
rigorous deduction of principles. The result, then, was a brilliant, well-
integrated system of technical philosophy - the speculative monument for
which Kant is rightly famous.
At the same time, however, Kant was providing a sound basis for moral
philosophy: limiting knowledge in order to make room for faith, as he ex-
31 Schriften, Y, p. 458. Bernard trans., pp. 388-389.

32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
pressed it. This second level of Kant's work has also received much attention,
and it has already been useful in our present investigation. For, following
the ethical aspect of Kant's work, we find that he was so concerned with the
moral dimension of man that his whole system may be seen as directed to
that end. Seen in this perspective, Kant's moral thought is the pivot upon
which the Critical Philosophy turns, with the first Critique as a propaedeutic,
and the third as its confirmation and elaboration. But even this level of inter-
pretation does not exhaust the complexity of Kant's thought.
We have seen that in his work Kant gradually develops a conception of
teleology as the principle through which man can attain an integrated aware-
ness of all the levels of reality open to him. The third Critique employs the
notion of teleology to link together the speculative dimensions of the first
Critique and the practical dimension of the second. A teleological conception
of reality is thus the factor which completes and integrates the total structure
of Kant's system.
Based on these findings, we would suggest still another level of interpreting
Kant's work. The thought suggests itself that the gradual unfolding of the
Critical Philosophy was Kant's slow and labored exposition - or justification
- of a certain conception of reality. According to this interpretation, each
work, as it was produced, was an additional step in drawing the structure of
Kant's technical system more closely into alignment with reality as he con-
ceived it: a well-integrated, teleologically ordered system. The final product,
then was a neat, logically valid philosophic structure, reflecting an ordered,
rational universe. It was as though Kant had joined the physical order of
Newton to the moral order of Rousseau, and expanded the combination into
a full-blown philosophic system encompassing all levels of reality. For the
first time, man had a scientifically sound, completely unified perspective on
reality, incorporating the physical, intellectual, and moral aspects of his ex-
perience. It would require little awareness of Kant's thought to realize that
such a philosophic system is precisely that which he had envisioned in his
letters to various correspondents.
In a sense, of course, such an interpretation of Kant's work is nothing more
than a simple statement of what he was attempting to do in constructing his
system. But there is another sense in which the teleological conception of
Kant's work would take on a more controversial nature, namely, if one were
to maintain that teleology, rather than reason, is the ultimate principle em-
ployed by Kant in developing his system. 34 Certainly this would provide a
34 Here we must distinguish between the elements ingredient in Kant's Critical

Philosophy, and the motives and convictions which prompted him to develop tho
system. In the former case, reason reigns supreme; in the latter we find good reason
novel conception of Kant's philosophy. And yet, we believe that such an

interpretation of Kant's thought would be seen as quite possible, if all the
evidence were closely examined. Because our concern is with other matters,
however, we shall restrict ourselves to a single example of how Kant permits
teleology to assume the superior position. The problem arises in the con-
text of the anthropology - Kant is finally faced with a choice between reason
and teleology.
In the last book of the Anthropologie, Kant considers the goal of the
human species, and the progress which man is making toward that goal.
Throughout the rest of his system Kant has time and again found human
reason competent to settle its own problems. But the attainment of the perfect
state of man upon earth is not to be approached through reason. The process
toward that ideal, ultimate condition is governed not by reason, but by
nature.
Kant speaks of the development of man toward full rationality as the
"education" of mankind - animal rationabile becoming animal rationale.
By education, in this case, he means not an intellectual process so much as
the gradual unfolding of all man's powers in an atmosphere of moral recti-
tude. This state will involve a development of man's rational powers in as-
suming dominance over the passions and emotions; but apparently Kant
does not see this as a rational process in the sense of being directed by reason.
He maintains that achievement of this ideal state will not follow upon man's
intention, but rather in spite of it. Kant tells us that the education of man is
wholesome, but harsh and severe. It requires many efforts and transfor-
mations of nature, which extend almost to the destruction of the whole race,
to produce from the disunited and self-contradictory evil a good that man
did not intend, but which, once present, preserves and maintains itself.35
Because of man's moral weakness, his rational direction is insufficient to
produce real progress. But enlightened self-interest keeps him in the right
path. It is not man's rational intent, therefore, but a kind of natural, anthro-
pological teleology which directs human progress. If, therefore, we are inter-
ested in determining the ultimate principle upon which Kant's conception of
reality depends, it would seem that in the context of his anthropology - a
to consider teleology dominant. It should be noted also that we do not mean to imply
that there is a real incompatibility between reason and teleology in Kant's thought.
As we saw in Chapter V, reason itself is teleologically oriented. But Kant does
seem to make a distinction. The problem is further discussed below.
35 "Diese Erziehung ... ist heilsam, aber rauh und strenge, durch viel Ungemach
und bis nahe an die Zerstorung des ganzen Geschlechts reichende Bearbeitung der
Natur, namlich der Hervorbringung des vom Menschen nicht beabsichtigten, aber
wenn es einmal da ist, sich ferner erhaltenden Guten aus dem innerlich mit sich selbs(
immer sich veruneinigenden Bosen." Schrijten, VII, p. 328.
theme which pervades his entire work - the answer would be not reason, but
teleology.
It seems strange and unnecessary that Kant should choose between reason
and teleology in discussing man's end. Strictly speaking, there is no conflict
between the two principles in his thought as it is presented in the Anthro-
poiogie. Rather, the conflict seems to be in Kant himself. When he is faced
with the decision as to whether man is competent to achieve perfection under
his own power, Kant seems arbitrarily to opt for a teleological explanation
which would hardly do justice to reason - an unexpected compromise which
seems inconsistent with his other work.
One might attempt to explain away the problem by pointing out that, in
a sense, Kant has not abandoned reason as such, but rather has found it
necessary to assert the supremacy of divine reason as expressed in a teleologi-
cal conception of reality. However, it is human reason which Kant seems
constantly to champion, and to submit human reason to divine reason in this
context would be to abandon what apparently is his customary stance.
The only obvious way to eliminate the inconsistency here would be to
assert that teleology is actually the mainspring of Kant's thought all along,
and that it is only in the consideration of man's ultimate end that Kant feels
it necessary openly to declare his position. Such an interpretation might
prove unpopular among Kant scholars, for there is often a tendency to
emphasize the rigorous, logical analysis of reason as the primary concern or
central theme of Kant's work. But opposition to a teleological interpretation
of Kant's system on that basis would involve a critical error. The rigorous
investigation of reason - indeed, the whole critical enterprise - is essential
to Kant's thought, and can in no sense be degraded. But it would be a mis-
conception of Kant's philosophy to consider the critical method as more than
a means. Kant himself makes that clear enough. On the other hand, our
emphasis on teleology has to do not with means, but with the purpose Kant
had in mind for his work, and the relation of his means to that end. s6
It might readily be maintained that it is unnecessary to argue for the ac-
ceptance of a teleological interpretation of Kant's work. For, if we properly
understand the third Critique, it would seem that Kant himself presented the
case. Did he not take great pains to establish that the mind necessarily fol-
lows a teleological interpretation of reality? Certainly the critical philosopher
would not be exempt from this tendency. And does he not use the teleological
principle itself as the linking factor (through reflective judgment) of his whole
36 We may care to draw a distinction between what Kant intended to achieve, and
his actual accomplishments as viewed through the perspective of the history of phi-
losophy. But that is an entirely different level of criticism.
philosophic system? We certainly must find that the Critical Philosophy is

permeated with an atmosphere of teleology, and to interpret Kant's thought
with an emphasis upon this principle seems more than justified.
But the justification of a teleological interpretation of Kant's work is not
really our purpose here. Rather, we are interested in teleology only because
it helps us to understand the full significance of Kant's anthropological com-
mitment, and the systematic development of his work in which this com-
mitment is fulfilled. It is impossible to separate anthropology and teleology in
dealing with Kant, and perhaps a passage in the Critique of Practical Reason
shows most clearly why this is so. Kant points out that it is not the fact that
man has reason which elevates him above the brutes. For if that reason only
enables him to do for himself what instinct does for the animal, then it would
indicate for man no higher aim or destiny than that of the brute, but only a
different way of attaining the same end. 37 Rather, Kant sees man as elevated
above the animal because he has an aim which it cannot have. As Stucken-
berg phrases it, "reason distinguishes between good and bad, and it can make
morality the ruling purpose of life; this is man's prerogative and glory." 38
The point is well worth emphasizing. In Kant's view, theoretical reason is
man's most important tool, we might even say his most essential attribute;
but it is not in itself sufficient to establish man's dignity. We may recall
Kant's remark that it was precisely on this point that Rousseau set him right.
After Rousseau's revelation, Kant always remembered that it is man's moral
destiny that sets him apart, and gives him his true worth.
It is approprate to conclude with the recollection of that revelation, for in
it we find that the three most important motivational aspects of Kant's
thought come together. The moral destiny of man is, of course, a teleological
concept. Thus, we find Kant's moral, teleological, and anthropological inter-
ests inextricably bound together in a central theme. And again we find how
essential his conception of man and human nature is to his philosophy, for it
constitutes the core around which this important theme is developed.

CONCLUSION
The various arguments with which we have been concerned in the preceding
chapters provide, we believe, more than sufficient evidence to establish our
thesis: that Kant's work as a whole is an anthropological system in the broad
sense, i.e., a system which establishes on a priori principles a particular con-
ception of the nature and destiny of man. But, in a sense, the very quantity
of material is a disadvantage in formulating a convincing pattern of thought.
Because the evidence is necessarily presented in many different contexts, the
rigorous connection of detail so important to argumentation may fail to be-
come evident as the conglomeration of material gradually takes form. It is
appropriate, therefore, to provide at this point a summary of the major
elements of our argument in a clear, cogent pattern that should remove all
doubt concerning our thesis.
To begin with, to recall a statement made in the introduction, our presen-
tation involves two distinct elements: the demonstration of anthropological
influence on specific works, and an exposition of the synthetic unity of Kant's
work as a whole, when viewed from the standpoint of anthropology. A brief
resume of evidence in each of these areas will perhaps best set the stage for
our concluding remarks.
The textual relation between the anthropology lectures and Kant's other
works has been mentioned briefly in each chapter. With respect to the
Critique of Pure Reason, we found that a comparison of textual passages
could not serve as a basis for establishing anthropological influence, since
both the Critique and the proposed volume on anthropology were under
preparation at the same time. But precisely because he was working on both
projects at the same time, we may rest assured that Kant was vitally con-
cerned with anthropology as he prepared the first Critique. Therefore, if we
establish an anthropological interpretation of this speculative endeavor on
other grounds, there is no reason to believe that a distortion of Kant's thought
is involved.
CONCLUSION 109
The other works that we have examined require no elaborate justification

of our position. Each of them contains material which is either explicitly
anthropological in nature, or which clearly reflects the findings of Kant in an
earlier anthropological investigation. We find that the Critique of Practical
Reason makes use of various elements of empirical psychology drawn from
the anthropology - particularly with respect to the appetitive faculties. The
Critique of Judgment draws liberally from the anthropology lectures for its
discussion of feeling, of taste, and of genius. Religion Within the Limits of
Reason Alone employs the anthropological analysis of good and evil traits
in human nature, as well as general information concerning the mores and
religious customs of various peoples. The Metaphysic of Morals borrows
anthropological material with respect to the psychology of the will and of
feeling. Indeed, without providing a complete inventory, one feels justified
in asserting that few, if any, of Kant's major works could be found free of
anthropological data.
Emphasis for this assertion is provided by Erdmann. It will be recalled
from our findings in Chapter II that the Anthropologie is recognized as
merely an outline of the lectures which Kant had been delivering for twenty-
five years. It was suggested that Kant elaborated on this outline in the lecture
hall, but that later, when he finally reached the point of editing the material
for publication, he was too old and tired to do more than organize the lecture
notes. Since we have ample evidence from his students concerning the rich-
ness and variety of the anthropological lectures, it would seem reasonable to
assume that Kant's advancing age and weakness - of which he made no
secret - was responsible for the paucity of the Anthropologie as it appeared.
But Erdmann attributes a deeper significance to the same facts. After ex-
amining at length the relation between the Anthropoiogie and several of
Kant's other works, Erdmann concludes that Kant did, indeed, borrow
liberally from the anthropology lectures for the composition of his other
works - so liberally, in fact, that when he came to publish the Anthropologie
itself, there was very little material left to deal with. 1
It is difficult, of course, after nearly two centuries to formulate a conclusive
argument for the support of Erdmann's assertion. But for our purposes, it is
unnecessary to provide conclusive evidence. It is sufficient that Erdmann,
after examining the facts, is able to maintain that the anthropology lectures
were seriously depleted by their contributions to other of Kant's projects.
The evidence which Erdmann marshals in support of his contention, while
not conclusive, is certainly adequate to establish the credibility of the po-
sition. Surely, we need no further discussion at the textual level to support
1 Erdmann, Reflexionen, I, pp. 55-57.
110 CONCLUSION
our claim that Kant's anthropological interests were influential in the for-
mation of his other works.
But our second level of inquiry, that concerning the pattern of Kant's
work as a whole, is much more interesting to deal with. At this level, we may
begin with Kant's early interest in anthropology, and his complete "con-
version" to a concern with mankind when he encountered the work of Rous-
seau in 1762-63. From that time forward, Kant was keenly aware of the
distinction between what man is and what he ought to be - between what
man has made of himself in the course of history, and the perfection which
is his ultimate destiny. According to Kant's own statement quoted above,
Rousseau destroyed Kant's intellectual conceit, and his purely intellectual
evaluation of man. Thereafter, Kant was primarily concerned to place phi-
losophy on a new and firmer foundation which would both justify a correct
view of man's place in reality, and assist man in his progress toward fulfill-
ment.
The first Critique was the foundation for the new structure. In Chapter III
we saw that Kant understood the Critique of Pure Reason as a propaedeutic
to his projected metaphysic of nature and metaphysic of morals. It was
necessary to eliminate man's speculative delusions before providing what
Kant felt to be a true interpretation of reality, based on practical reason. We
understand, therefore, why Kant says in one of his reflections that the first
Critique is "a cure for a disease of the reason which has its roots in our
nature." This disease is the "longing to wander beyond our proper sphere
and establish relations with other worlds." 2 Kant felt that once this longing
was eliminated by the argument of the first Critique, man would be more
receptive to the less speculative, but more accurate and efficacious inter-
pretation of reality supplied by practical reason.
We do not mean to ignore the fact that Kant's speculative bent kept him
working at problems on a rational,logicallevel. But it cannot be emphasized
too strongly that the solutions which his speculation produced were always
consonant with his view of man as essentially a moral being, teleologically
ordered to God and immortality, through his own freedom as a moral agent.
Even after the completion of the Critical Philosophy we find that Kant con-
tinued to affirm the foundational role of the first Critique. In his essay "On
the Progress of Metaphysics Since Leibniz and Wolff" (1791), Kant asserted
that the transcendental philosophy, as embodied in the Critique of Pure
Reason, had for its object the founding of a metaphysic whose purpose, as
the chief end of pure reason, was intended to lead reason beyond the limits
2 Erdmann, Reflexionen, II, 59.

CONCLUSION 111
of the sensible to the field of the supersensible. 3 The supersensible, or intelli-
gible, world is, of course, the moral order in which man shares as a free moral
agent.
It is a generally recognized fact, and one which is clearly established
throughout our presentation, that Kant was vitally concerned with working
out a sound practical or moral philosophy. Many writers, in fact, have con-
cluded from similar arguments that Kant was primarily a moralist. But we
must keep in mind the very special kind of moral doctrine which Kant
proposed. His view of human nature and its ultimate perfection form an
essential part of his ethics. Moreover, the whole purpose of his moral phi-
losophy is to explain and justify a particular conception of human destiny,
and to present the means for its attainment.4 We must certainly conclude,
therefore, that anthropological considerations determine Kant's moral doc-
trine. As he explicitly states, morality is the "whole vocation of man."
The later works of Kant again fit neatly into our anthropological inter-
pretation. The Critique of Judgment synthesized and confirmed the findings
of the first two Critiques. This cannot be too strongly emphasized. Without
the addition of "feeling" and the teleological role of reflective judgment in
the third Critique Kant's system would have been extremely inadequate. It
would have contained a two-fold dichotomy: the speculative-moral split in
man's mental powers; and the gulf between the sensible and intelligible
worlds in Kant's conception of reality. It is this double "gap" which Kant
is so vitally concerned with in the early pages of the third Critique. And the
unification of reality, as well as man's intellectual capacity to grasp this
unified reality, could only be brought about by adding a third dimension of
the human subject which had previously been underestimated. s With the
addition of man's aesthetic and teleological aspect, Kant completed his pre-
sentation of a priori aspects of the human subject of experience, or as we
prefer to phrase it, his essential conception of human nature. And at the same
time, he brought into a unified structure the two otherwise distinct divisions
of his philosophic system.
Thus there is a very strong sense in which the Kantian system must be
seen as anthropological. For while the first and second Critiques seem to
3 Schriften, XX, pp. 272-73.
4 This is not to say that Kant was disinterested in combatting the heteronomous
moral theories which dogmatism and empiricism had produced, but this task was
achieved incidental to, and by means of, his fulfillment of the higher purpose.
5 The impact of this new awareness is clear in Kant's letter to K. L. Reinhold in
December, 1787. Besides theoretical and practical philosophy, Kant now recognizes
teleology as a legitimate division of philosophy - and the new perspectives are seen
to provide ample material for investigation for the rest of his life. Schriften, X, pp.
513-15. Zweig, Correspondence, pp. 127-28.
112 CONCLUSION
provide independent treatments of specific epistemological and moral factors

in human experience, the perspectives which they present cannot be com-
pleted independently of the third Critique and the Religion. It is because man
has this particular kind of nature that the three cognitive aspects (and the
corresponding three divisions of Kant's system) fit together in precisely this
manner. Without the teleological (reflective) employment of judgment, the
full system of human knowledge and experience would be impossible. The
moral order, too, depends upon an extension of categorical knowledge
beyond experience, but both the detailed texture of this experience (e.g.,
particular empirical laws), and the necessary extrapolation beyond it, would
be impossible without the reflective employment of judgment again. It is be-
cause man is a unified speculative-moral-aesthetic entity that any single
aspect of Kant's thought becomes fully meaningful.
Only after all of the a priori principles of human nature had been dealt
with did Kant bring his speculative critical work down to the level of com-
mon experience. But many of his later works did provide just such a con-
crete application of his thought. Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone
(1793) brought the Critical Philosophy into direct conflict with established
religious practices - and provoked government censure. "On Everlasting
Peace" (1795) presented some of Kant's conclusions on political matters.
The Metaphysic of Morals provided the basis for a concrete ethical system
by dealing with the two main categories of morality; virtue with respect to
the individual, and jurisprudence with respect to the state. "The Strife of the
Faculties" applied Kant's thought to education, and finally, the Anthropolo-
gie completed his presentation of human affairs.
It was suggested in Chapter III that the order of Kant's works followed
precisely the pattern which he desired - that e.g., the Anthropologie was
intentionally placed last, in spite of the earlier thoughts for its publication in
1773. Would it not seem perfectly appropriate that Kant should withhold the
practical anthropology until after he had established the a priori principles
of human nature by means of the three Critiques, and had provided the
Metaphysic of Morals - just as he had planned to present his empirical
physics only after a metaphysic of nature? Certainly this ordered descent
from the speculative to the practical level fits well with our interpretation of
Kant's work as a gradual revelation of man in relation to reality. The Anthro-
pologie serves its purpose well as the final portrayal of man in the setting of
nature and society, while at the same time reminding him of the destiny which
he must achieve.
It must be admitted that the very simplicity of a teleological and anthro-
pological interpretation of Kant's work seems to argue against its acceptance.
CONCLUSION 113
Kant's thought is notoriously intricate and complex. It may seem an over-

simplification to suggest that his entire system can be reduced to a theoretical
justification of its foundation, and a gradual revelation of man's position, and
destiny, in a teleologically ordered moral universe. However, we must re-
member that Kant himself portrays reason as a cognitive power which at-
tempts to reduce reality to a single unified system. Should we not, then, ex-
pect his own work to display precisely that simplicity of unity and integrity
which his speculative genius would demand?
One might object to an anthropological interpretation of Kant's work on
the basis that it would take little account of Kant's work in mathematics and
science. Such an objection would seem to be legitimate, since we can be
certain that Kant was vitally interested in these disciplines during the first
decade of his teaching career. But, as Schilpp points out, there is actually no
reason to feel that, because a man devotes himself to a study of physical
nature, he must necessarily lack interest in man. 6 With respect to the early
period in question, then, we might very well determine that both scientific
and humanistic interests held Kant's attention.
It should be noted, however, that Kant did little work in science and mathe-
matics once the critical spirit had grasped him - or perhaps we should say,
after Rousseau had enlightened him. The fact is important because the
neglect of these disciplines was not accidental, and it cannot merely be at-
tributed to Kant's activity in other areas. Rather, we find that Kant tended
to reject his earlier scientific works as unworthy to be set beside his later
critical writings. When Tieftrunk discussed with him the possibility of
publishing a collection of shorter works, Kant explicitly requested that all
works published prior to 1770 be omitted from the collection. 7 That would
exclude all of the early scientific and mathematical works, and, therefore,
we need not be concerned if the anthropological interpretation of Kant's
thought were construed as attributing no great significance to these projects.
The fact might even be seen as additional evidence for the validity of the
position. But, as a matter of fact, an anthropological interpretation, when
properly understood, is the essential element in establishing that Kant's
scientific and mathematical writings must be taken seriously as a part of his
fully developed system. It is rather the opposite error, that of maintaining
that these writings constitute, exclusively, the vital aspect of Kant's work,
that we must caution against.
In effect, such a one-sided view is what was sought in the "back to Kant"
movement of earlier years, when various figures (such as Cohen, and Natorp)
7 Schrijten, XII, p. 208. Zweig, Correspondence, p. 239.
114 CONCLUSION
insisted that the scientific and logical aspects of Kant's work had been dis-
torted by those promoting an emphasis on his moral thought. Surely such
controversy is unnecessary. One of the clear implications of an anthropologi-
cal interpretation of Kant's thought is that it would be a complete distortion
of his system to over-emphasize either the sensible or the intelligible world.
For the nature of man is precisely to be a full member of both orders, and
the purpose of philosophy can only be to establish the essential principles of
his relationship with each. Kant did not give up his dream of providing a
metaphysic of physics and a metaphysic of morality. Both are essential to
a philosophy in which the place of man in reality is fully discerned. s Quite
obviously, Kant's reason for de-emphasizing the early writings was simply
that they had preceded the essential critical perspective which alone could
produce a sound scientific position.
There is another objection to our interpretation with which we have been
dealing constantly, and perhaps we are now in a position to properly answer
it. This is the objection of one who has paid some attention to Kant's ex-
plicitly anthropological works, and noted the statements concerning anthro-
pology which occur in his moral works. The Anthropologie is primarily an
empirical work, "an interesting observation study," as Kant remarked in his
letter to Herz. Can we really extend the significance of such a discipline to
the point of seeing in it the roots of speculative and practical philosophy
alike? Would Kant not think it absurd to base so much upon an empirical
discipline?
In his introductory remarks to the Foundation of a Metaphysic of Morals,
Kant mentions that we must have experience with human nature before we
can work out the details of particular human duties. He refers to this ex-
perience as "practical anthropology." 9 But he emphasizes also that such an
empirical study cannot serve as the essential foundation for ethics. Only
a priori principles can provide a base sufficiently solid for the ethical struc-
8 It would be wrong to over-emphasize the point, but Kant does seem to have
conceived the sensible and supersensible orders to stand in direct proportional relation-
ship with each other, at least with respect to corresponding elements. In a letter to
Tieftrunk (Dec. 11, 1797) he mentions that "supersensible objects are not objects of
theoretical knowledge for us. But since it is unavoidable that we regard the idea of
such supersensible objects as at least problematic, an open question (since otherwise
the sensible would lack a non-sensible counterpart, and this would evidence a logical
defect in our classification), the idea belongs to pure practical knowledge, which is
detached from all empirical conditions. The sphere of non-sensible objects is thus
not quite empty, though from the point of view of theoretical knowledge such objects
must be viewed as transcendent." Schriften, XII, p. 224. Zweig, Correspondence, p. 247.
9 Schriften, N, pp. 388ff. A similar line of thought is mentioned in the Critique
CONCLUSION 115
ture. Thus it would seem that anthropology could not serve as the basic
principle of all Kant's work.
To arrive at this conclusion would be perfectly justified - even necessary
- if Kant's conception of anthropology were restricted to that of an em-
pirical science. But as early as our introductory remarks we became aware
that, for Kant, anthropology extended far beyond such limitations. We need
only recall the four questions which he raised to indicate the proper divisions
of philosophy when considered in its full significance:
1. What can I know?
2. What ought I to do?
3. What may I hope?
4. What is man?
The first question is answered by Metaphysics, the second by Morals, the third
by Religion, and the fourth by Anthropologie. In reality, however, all these
might be reckoned under anthropology, since the first three questions refer to
the last.1O
Certainly anthropology here is not merely a descriptive analysis of empirical
data. One might almost imply from Kant's statement that the whole of
philosophy is reducible to anthropology, when the latter is fully comprehend-
ed. Such a conception of anthropology would be perfectly suited to our inter-
pretation of Kant's work as primarily anthropological in character.
But how seriously did Kant take the division of philosophy suggested by
these four questions? Could the questions not be considered as simply a foil
employed by Kant for the purpose of working neatly into the material of his
logic lectures? By no means. Kant was not the type of person to employ
deceptive pedagogical techniques in the lecture hall. And, fortunately, we
have his own statement as evidence that this fourfold division of philosophy
was important to him. In a letter to C. F. Stiiudlin (May 1793), Kant mentions
the same four questions as his own plan of organization according to which
he was working out the field of pure philosophy.11
of Pure Reason, where Kant says that "the metaphysic of morals is really pure moral
philosophy with no underlying basis of anthropology or of other empirical con·
ditions." A 841-42, B 869-70. NKS, p. 659.
10 Kant's Introduction to Logic, p. 15. Schriften, IX, p. 25.
11 "Mein schon seit geraumer Zeit gemachter Plan der mir obliegenden Bearbeitung
des Feldes der reinen Philosophie ging auf die Auflosung der drei Aufgaben: 1) Was
kann ich wissen? (Metaphysik) 2) Was soll ich thun? (Moral) 3) Was darf ich hoffen?
(Religion); welcher zuletzt die vierte folgen soUte: Was ist der Mensch? (Anthro-
pologie; tiber die ich schon mehr als 20 Jahren jahrlich ein Collegium gelesen habe)."
Schriften, XI, p. 429. Zweig, Correspondence, p. 205. This letter seems clearly to
undermine the objections offered by Dryer to an anthropological interpretation of
Kant's work. Cf. Kant's Solution for Verification in Metaphysics, p. 82. His essential
point is that the notes compiled and edited by Jasche as Kant's Lectures on Logic
(1800) serve as inadequate evidence that Kant really assigned this role to anthropology.
116 CONCLUSION
But the letter suggests additional evidence for our cause. Kant speaks of
the plan as having been formulated a long time before. We have reason, then,
to believe that he had been following out a plan for many years which would
ultimately culminate in the Anthropologie. It takes little insight to project
this sketch of philosophy upon the work which Kant had completed by 1793.
The first two questions are perfectly answered by the three Critiques, each
successive volume supporting and confirming the others. And Kant himself
tells us that, with Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, he has com-
pleted his answer to the third question. 12 The Anthropologie at that time was
yet to be published, but the answers to the first three questions, as related to
anthropology, had certainly provided a significant insight into the matter of
human nature and human destiny. We may conclude, therefore, that Kant
had consciously projected a system of philosophy which explored man
through reason, established the principles of the moral and practical con-
cerns of society, and culminated in a complete analysis of man in his world. 13
Anthropological interests took hold of Kant as a young man, and governed
the major aspects of his philosophical development. They determined the
plan for his entire system, and the form which it finally attained.
We emphasize again that it was not sufficient, in Kant's thought, merely
to present to the world the conception of man which Rousseau had revealed
to him. Rather, it was necessary for him, as a moral man and a speculative
philosopher, to devise a complete system which would justify that view of
man, and, if possible, establish it beyond doubt. In a sense, then, our entire
project has been nothing more than an extensive explication and clarification
of the plan which Kant presents to us in his four questions. And our con-
clusion can only be that, in the system of Kant, the first three questions are
indeed related to the fourth.
12 Ibid.
13 If additional evidence were still desired, one should note the letter of Kant to
Beck (Sept. 27, 1791). He had recommended Beck as the man best able to provide an
original summary of his (Kant's) works. Now, in writing to Beck, he points out that
mathematics (Beck's field) is really not adequate to fulfill the soul of a thinking man,
and perhaps the proposed project would be just the thing to stimulate and entertain
him during his leisure hours. "For what can serve better for this and for a lifetime
than investigating something that concerns the whole nature of man, especially if one
has the hope of making some progress from time to time by a systematic effort of
thought." Schriften, XI, p. 289. Zweig, Correspondence, p. 179.
INDEX
Abbott, Thomas Kingsmill, 3n., 55n. Cassirer, Ernst, 18, 50, 51n., 55, 56n., 71n.
Adamson, Robert, 94-95 categorical imperative, 52-53, 55, 62, 89
Adickes, Erich, 88 causality, 41-42
aesthetics, 1, 18, 23-24, 71n., 72-80 Christianity, 91
animal rationabile vs. animal rationale, 20n., Classics, 9, 49, 57
24-26,105 Collegium Fridericianum, 8-9
animal sociale, Cook, Capt. James, 2
passions appropriate to man as, 25 Copernican Revolution, 47
anthropology, Cozens, Brian, 85n.
as an academic discipline, 3, 35 Creighton, J. E., 5n.
as an empirical science, 2-4, 30, 115n. Crus ius, C. A., 12, 41n., 42n., 44
as more, 3-4, 30, 115 Delbos, Victor, 56n.
as prescinding from the question of the Delekat, Friedrich, 3n.
soul, 18 demonology, 86
lectures on, see Kant's Works Descartes, Rene, 7, 41
antinomies, 46-47, 76 Dilthey, Wilhelm, 32n.
a priori principles, 6, 47, 74, 78, 96, 102, Dohna-Wundlacken, Graf Heinrich zu, 28
108, 112, 114 Dryer, D. P., 36, 115n.
Duncan, A. R. C., 11n.
architectonic, 52
duty, 24, 27, 58-59, 67, 83-85, 87, 90
Aristotle, 7
egoism, 18, 20, (see also self-love)
Arnoldt, E., 29
emotions, 24n., 25, 58, 60, 62, 67, 105
autonomy, 52-54, 64
epistemology, 1, 20, 47-48
Axinn, Sidney, 95n.
Erdmann, Benno, 2n., 3n., 5n., 15, 28-29,
Baczko, L. A. F. von, 15n.
32, 36, 47, 51n., 61, 66, 71n., 92, 109,
Barth, Karl, 85n.
l1On.
Baumgarten, A. G., 3, 12, 29, 70n.
Beck, J. S., 42n., 116n. ethics, 3, 5, 11, 13, 28n., 41,50,62,67, 85n.,
Beck, Lewis White, IX, 42n., 47, 50n., 52n., 111
55n., 59, 62n., 64n., (see also references lectures on, see Kant's works
to Beck's trans. of the Critique of Practi- Ewing, A. C., IX
cal Reason) freedom, 24, 26-27, 52-55, 60, 97, 99-102
Bergk, Johann Adam, see Fr. Ch. Starke Garve, Christian, 36
Bernard, J. H., 7On., 72n., 76n., 78n., 82n., genius, 22, 71, 75-76, 109
85n., 86n., 89n., lOIn., 102n., 103n. God, 9, 42n., 43-44, 47, 82, 84-90, 92,
Bible, 91 97-103
Blumenbach, Johann Friedrich, 2 moral proof for the existence of, 84-85
Borowski, L. E., 91 nature of, 85-87
Bosley, Richard N., IX Goldthwait, John T., 65n., 68n.
118 INDEX
Greene, T. M., 84, 85n., 87n., 89n., 91n. praktisehen Vernunft), Chapter IV,
Gurvitch, Georg, 56n. passim, 77-78, 83, 86n., 88-90, 96, 99,
Gutmann, James, 18n. 107, 109, 111-112, 116
Hamann, J. G., 95 Critique of Pure Reason (Kritik der
Hartmetz, Dieter, IX reinen Vernunft), 200., 21n., 29, Chap-
Heidegger, Martin, 7 ter III, passim, 52-53, 63, 67-70, 72-73,
Heinze, Max, 29 77, 82, 85, 96-99, 104, 108, 110--112,
Herder, J. G., 95 116
Herz, Marcus, 34--35, 37-38, 96, 114 Definition of the Concept of a Race of
Heydenreich, 9 Men (Bestimmung des Begriffs der
highest good (summum bonum), 33, 83-86, Mensehenrasse), 2n., 30
88,92-93, 99-100 Disputatio de mundi sensibilis atque intel-
history, 25, 27, 50--51, 94--96 ligibilis forma et principiis, 30, 33
of philosophy, 1, 95, 106n. Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Illustrated by
H6ffding, Harald, 54n. Dreams of Metaphysics (Triiume eines
l'homme de la nature vs. l'homme de Geistersehers, erliiutert dureh Triiume
l'homme, 50--51 der Metaphysik), 13, 43, 45--46
Hudson, Hoyt H., 84n., 85n., 89n., 91n. The End of All Things (Das Ende aller
Hufeland, Dr., 10 Dinge),30
Hume, David, 12, 32, 42n., 47 Everlasting Peace (Zum ewigen Frieden),
Husserl, Edmund, 67n. 112
Hutcheson, Francis, 65 Foundation of the Metaphysic of Morals
idolatry, 86 (Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sit-
imagination, 19, 21-22, 24 ten), 2n., 52n., 55, 65, 99, 114
immortality of the soul, 83, 85, 99-101 General Natural History and Theory of
Infield, Louis, 6On. the Heavens (Allgemeine Naturge-
intellect, 19 (see also reason) sehiehte und Theorie des Himmels),
intelligible world, 27n., 53-54, 93, 111 30,40
intuition, 21-22, 24 Ideas toward a Universal History of
Jiische, 115n. Mankind (Idee zu einer allgemeinen
judgment (Urteilskraft), 22-23, Chapter V, Gesehiehte in weltbiirgerlieher Ab-
passim sieht), 30
determinant, 72 Inaugural Dissertation (1770), see Dis-
reflective, 72-76, 111-112 putatio de mundi sensibilis atque intel-
Kant, works of, ligibilis forma et principiis
announcement of lectures (1765-66), 5n., An Inquiry into the Distinctness of the
13 Principles of Natural Theology and
Anthropologie in pragmatiseher Hinsieht, Morals (Untersuehung iiber die Deut-
1, 4--5, 15-16, Chapter II, passim, 32, liehkeit der Grundsiitze der natiir-
35-36, 48n., 49, 60--61, 66, 68, 79, 81n., liehen Theologie und der Moral), 13,
92, 94, 105-106, 109, 112, 114, 116 42,65
The Boundaries of Sensibility and of Lectures,
Reason, 34 on Anthropology, 5, 15, 17, 28, 30,
Concerning the Radical Evil in Human 61,71
Nature (Ober das radikale Bose in der on Ethics, 11-13, 60--61, 65, 89-90
mensehliehen Natur), 30, 92n. on Logic, 2-3, 95, 115
Conjectural Beginning of Human His- on Metaphysics, 15,28-29
tory (Muthmasslieher Anfang der on Philosophy of Religion, 85-87
Mensehengesehiehte), 30 Metaphysical Elements of Natural
Critique of Judgment (Kritik der Ur- Science (Die metaphysischen Anfangs-
theilskraft), Chapter V, passim, 82, 86, griinde der Naturwissenschaft), 66n.
89,101-104,109,111-112,116 Metaphysic of Morals (Die Metaphysik
Critique of Practical Reason (Kritik der der Sitten), 47n., 65-66, 109, 112
INDEX 119
Monadologica physica (The Use of Kowalewski, Arnold, 28n.
Metaphysics in conjunction with Kristeller, Paul Oskar, 18
Geometry in Natural Science), 40 Kroeger, A. E., 20
Observations on the Feeling of the Kroner, Richard, 81n.
Beautiful and the Sublime (Beobach- Ktilpe, Oswald, 17
tungen uber das Gefuhl des Schonen Lambert, J. H., 33, 41n., 44
und Erhabenen), 30, 43, 46, 65-66, 68, Lampe, 96
71 Leclerc, Georges Louis (Comte de Buffon),
On the Different Races of Men (Von 28
den verschiedenen Rassen der Men- Lefevre, A., 5n.
schen), 30 Leibniz, G. W. von, 12, 39,41-42,44, 48n.,
On the Estimation of Living Forces 110
(Gedanken von der wahren Schatzung Lessing, G. E., 28
der lebendigen Krafte), 40-41 Locke, John, 32n.
On the Progress of Metaphysics Since logic, 2, 3n., 9, 18, 38, 60
Leibniz and Wolff (Welches sind die Long, Wilbur, IX
wirklichen Fortschritte, die die Meta- love, 68-69, 88, 90
physik seit Leibnitzens und Wolf's mathematics, 10-12, 16, 38-39, 41n., 42, 49
Zeiten in Deutschland gemacht hat ?), method of 41-42
110 McFarland, J. D., 102n.
Open Letter on Fichte's Wissenschafts- Mendelssohn, Moses, 45
lehre, 36n. Mengii 90glu, T., 27n.
The Only Possible Argument for the Menzer, Paul, 6n., 28, 44n., 60n.
Existence of God (Der einzig mogliche metaphysic of morals, 37, 52n., 66, 110
Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration metaphysic of nature, 37, 66, 110
des Daseins Goffes), 42 metaphysics, 2, 5, 11-15, 34, 38-45, 47,
Opus postumum, 87-88 48n., 67, 85n., 110, 115
Principiorum primorum cognitionis meta- revised conception of, 42-43, 44n.
physicae nova dilucidatio, 41 lectures on, see Kant's works
Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysic moral destiny of man, 13, 64, 107
(Prolegomena zu einer jeden kunftigen moral law, 52-55, 58, 67-69, 77, 82-84, 86,
Metaphysik die als Wissenschaft wird 88, 90, 96, 99-100
auftreten konnen), 42n. morality, 3, 12-13,23-27,34,37-38,43-44,
Religion Within the Limits of Reason Chapter IV, passim, 90-93, 111
Alone (Die Religion innerhalb der as a basis for religion, 82
Grenzen der blossen Vernunft), 84n., relation between happiness and, 83-84
89n., 91-92, 109, 112, 116 Newton, Sir Isaac, 10, 12, 39, 42-44, 46,
The Strife of the Faculties (Der Streit der 49, 76
Fakultaten), 112 Newtonian science, see science
What is Enlightenment? (Beantwortung Nietzsche, Friedrich, 48
der Frage: Was ist Aufklarung ?), 48n. Pappe, H. 0., 3
Kastner, A. G., 48n. passions, 19,25, 58, 60, 105
Kaulbach, F., 27 Paton, H. J., 99n.
Kemp Smith, Norman, 22n., Chapter III, Paulsen, Friedrich, 5n., IOn., 12, 14, 36,
passim, 88n., 97n., 98n., 115n. 52n., 57-59, 99n.
Kepler, Johannes, 12 Pettegrove, J. P., 71n.
Kerferd, G. B., 42n. philosophical anthropology, 2-4, 6, 18n.,
kingdom of ends, 55, 92, 99 32n., 71n., 72-80, 81n.
kingdom of grace, 33 philosophy of history, 95
kingdom of nature, 33, 99 physical geography, 11, 15,35,61
Kirchman, J. H. von, 32 physico-theological proof, 82n., 97-98
Knutzen, Martin, 9-11, 39-40, 49 physics, 2, 11
Koelln, F. C. A., 71n. Pietism, 7-9, 54, 62-63
120 INDEX
Platner, Ernst, 3, 35 Smith, John E., 81n.

POlitz, K. H. L., 29, 35, 86n. Socrates, 21
providence, 25, 50 Socratic tendency, 12
psychology, empirical, 15, 28, 61, 78n. Souriau, Michel, 72-73, 75
Randall, John Herman, Jr., 18 Starke, Fr. Ch. (pseudonym of Johann
Rang, Martin, 56n. Adam Bergk), 3, 28, 35
Reason, 22-24 state, role of, in human development, 25
relation between sense and, 20, 57, 59~, Staudlin, C. F., 115
69, 92 Stoics, 58, 59n.
relation between taste and, 24 Stuckenberg, J. H. W., 7-13, 57n., 62n.,
Reicke, Rudolph, 96n. 66n., 91, 95n., 107
Reinhold, K. L., I11n. Suphan, Bernard, 12n.
religion, 44, 54, 65, Chapter VI, passim, Taste (Geschmack), 18-19, 23-24, 32, 34,
96, 115 43,700.,71, 75-76, 109
moral,44 teleological proof, see physico-theological
emotional, 8 proof
almost reduced to morality, 88-91 teleology, Chapter VII, passim, 110-111
lectures on philosophy of, see Kant's as a regulative principle, 97-98
works moral, 50, 102-103, 110
Richards, William, 54n. natural, 76, 102-103
Rink, F. T., 15 as essential to the formulation of science,
Ritter, J., 27 98, 112
Rosenkranz, Karl, 88-89, 91 Temmer, Mark J., 56n.
Roth, Alois, 67n. theosophy, 86
Rousseau, J. J., 12-14, 18, 38, 42n., 43-46, theurgy,86
48-57, 63-65, 107, 110, 116 Tieftrunk, J. H., 17, 114n.
Rousseauistic revolution, 50n. understanding (Verstand), 18,20-23,32,60
Saidla, Leo E., 54n. University of Konigsberg, 9-11, 39
Scheler, Max, 2n. Vaihinger, Hans, 36
Schiffert, 8 Vleeschauwer, Herman-J. de, 11, 39-41,
Schilpp, Paul, 11, 62, 63n., 65, 113 42n., 44n., 46, lOIn.
Schopenhauer, Arthur, 36 vocation of man, 37-38, 50
Schubert, F. W., 88n. VolkeIt, Johannes, 36
Schulz (Schultze), F. A., 8, 40 Walford, D. E., 42n.
science, 1-2, 10-13, 16, 33, 39, 41-43, 48- Weldon, T. D., 400., 41n., 44n., 46n.
50, 100 Werkmeister, William H., IX
early interest in, 11, 39, 49, 113 will (Wille, Willkiir), 23, 26-27, 57, 60, 66,
shift from interest in, 12-13 69, 83-84, 90, 99-100, 109
Newtonian, 12, 39, 42, 46 Williams, Forrest, 32, 71-81
self-love, 69 Willich, A. F. M., 3
senses, 19-22 Wolff, Christian, 12, 39, 41-42, 48n., 110
sensation, 22 Zweig, Arnulf, 33n., 34n., 35n., 36n., 37n.,
sensibility, 23, 27, 57, 59 38n., 45n., 47n., 48n., ll1n., 113n., 114n.,
sensible world, 27n., 53-54, 93 115n., 116n.
sensus communis, 75-76

Frederick P. Van de Pitte (Auth.) - Kant As Philosophical Anthropologist-Springer Netherlands (1971)

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Frederick P. Van de Pitte (Auth.) - Kant As Philosophical Anthropologist-Springer Netherlands (1971)

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KANT AS PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGIST

FREDERICK P. VAN DE PITTE

MARTINUS NIJHOFF / THE HAGUE / 1971

(copyright 1960, by The University of Chicago Press). Kant: Philosophical

of Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1752-1840),2 who is recognized as the

Clearly Kant was attempting to communicate a conception of man that was

11 It should be a simple matter as we progress to demonstrate that this is in fact an

12 Such material is clearly discernible as early as 1765-66. See Kant's announcement

THE GENESIS OF THE ANTHROPOLOGY

It is always dangerous in a philosophic context to relate the work of an

1 J. H. W. Stuckenberg, The Life of Immanuel Kant (London: Macmillan and Co.,

he had no sympathy for Pietism. Kant felt it necessary to distinguish between

3 Ibid., pp. 9-10.

gymnasium. s Even if, as a consequence, he later rejected the external trap-

as well as mathematics and natural science. 13 After finishing his coursework,

13 Paulsen, Immanuel Kant: His Life and Doctrine, p. 32.

Manifestations to Anthropological Interests

in man and in human relationships and activities."22 But in what sense

22 Kant's Pre-Critical Ethics (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University, 1938),

published during this period.lulie ou la nouvelle Heloise appeared in 1761,26

Kant's Actual Work in Anthropology

33 Schriften, VII, pp. 354-56.

KANT'S EXPLICITLY FORMULATED ANTHROPOLOGiY

The only extensive work on anthropology actually published by Kant is the

The title, Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, clearly indicates the

13 Since Kant is often studied primarily as an epistemologist, it is perhaps worth

connection with the "lower" faculties of cognition, since Kant understands

morality. For taste, he says, is "the power of aesthetic judgment to choose

preserve and enhance his vital powers.

This consciousness of duty is an aspect for the intelligible character of man-

Anthropology Lectures and Notes

51 Die Philosophischen Hauptvorlesungen Immanuel Kants; Nach den neu aufge-

55 Erdmann, Reflexionen, I, p. 28.

ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE FIRST CRITIQUE

Those who criticize the Anthropologie as the least philosophic of Kant's

In 1771 he wrote to Marcus Herz (physician, friend, and former student of

The Purpose of the First Critique

be taken as a reference to the first Critique as a complete system in itself;

losophy." While it is usually used to mean an analysis of the conditions

certain stages of Kant's philosophic development. For while the arguments

28 Vleeschauwer's excellent work La Deduction transcendentale dans l'Oeuvre de

It is in considering several of these conflicts that we may expect to find the

deal more than a mere change in perspective, or a new kind of argumentation.

42 Schriften, II, p. 286. Selected Pre-Critical Writings, p. 17.

it abolishes illusion which can be dangerous." 46 Finally, there are several

54 Vleeschauwer, Development, p. 39.

Merrill Co., Inc., 1965), pp. 10-11.

ROUSSEAU AND KANT'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY

The study of the Anthropologie is fascinating to one interested in Kant's

doctrine on experience, and derive their knowledge of human nature from

12 Book I, Chapter VIII.

categorically because it is unconditioned." 18 It is this categorical imperative

18 Schrijten, V, p. 32. Beck trans., p. 143.

the elements which Kant intensified, restructured, and proclaimed as the

34 Accused of merely giving a new formulation, rather than a new principle of

The Distinctive Morality of Kant

animals is made up of passive excitation of impulse, it does not act but

as it endowed animals, until reason is sufficiently developed to assume the

Morality and Anthropology

55 Schriften, VII, p. 252.

82 Stuckenberg, op. cit., p. 25.

Additional Works on Morality

noted earlier, that in Observations Kant grounds morality, on its material