963

A Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone

at the New Stage of the Development
in Global Nuclear Disarmament
and Non-proliferation

Hiromichi Umebayashi*
Tatsujiro Suzuki**

Given the increased tension in the Northeast Asia region, depen-

dence on nuclear deterrence is becoming stronger among countries
in the region. There is now a new urgency to look at North Korean
nuclear weapon program with serious attention. The DPRK has
signaled it may be ready to resume negotiation. It is clear that
engagement of the DPRK is essential to resolve this stalemate and
such engagement cannot be limited to just nuclear and missile
issues but should extend to a more comprehensive agenda. This
paper proposes a comprehensive approach towards establishing
Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, in which three coun-
tries (the DPRK, the ROK and Japan) declare non-nuclear weapon
status and the other three nuclear weapon states (the United States,
Russia and China) provide negative security assurances under the

* Hiromichi Umebayashi is Visiting Professor and former Director of the Research

Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA). He is
also Special Advisor, former President and Founder of Peace Depot Inc., Japan.
Email: cxj15621@nifty.ne.jp.
** Tatsujiro Suzuki is Director and Professor at the Research Center for Nuclear
Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA). Before joining RECNA, he
was Vice Chairman of Japan Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) of the Cabinet
office from January 2010 to March 2014. Email: suzukitatsu@nagasaki-u.ac.jp.

KOREA OBSERVER, Vol. 47, No. 4, Winter 2016, pp. 963-976.

© 2016 by INSTITUTE OF KOREAN STUDIES.
964 Hiromichi Umebayashi and Tatsujiro Suzuki

legally binding treaty. The comprehensive approach also includes

agreement on; 1) termination of Korean War, 2) equal access to all
forms of energy 3) establishment of a permanent Northeast Asia
Security Council. It is essential for non-governmental actors to
initiate regional confidence-building process on Track 2 level. The
authors hope such process, called the “Nagasaki Process” will
become a new platform for security dialogue among interested
parties in the region, eventually leading to peace and security of
Northeast Asia, contributing to global efforts to achieve a world
without nuclear weapons.

Key Words: North Korea, nuclear weapon, Northeast Asia, nuclear

weapon free zone, confidence building, Nagasaki
Process

I. Introduction

T he 71st session of the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) marked

historic progress in the global multilateral nuclear disarmament and
non-proliferation efforts. A UNGA resolution entitled “Taking for-
ward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations,” which was
adopted at the First Committee of the UNGA (which “deals with dis-
armament, global challenges and threats to peace that affect the inter-
national community and seeks out solutions to the challenges in the
international security regime”) in October 2016 and is due to be
adopted at the plenary session in December 2016, decides that the
U.N. shall convene in 2017 a “conference to negotiate a legally binding
instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total
elimination.”
The conference will be the first in history that will negotiate a
treaty to explicitly outlaw such weapons. When this takes place, global
nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation will enter a new stage. All
the nuclear weapon states but China, which abstained, voted against
the resolution at the First Committee. As for nuclear weapons holders
A Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone at the New Stage of the Development in Global Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation 965

outside the NPT, Israel voted against, India and Pakistan abstained,
and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North
Korea) voted in favor. Most of the NATO member states and U.S.
Asia Pacific allies including Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea),
Japan and Australia voted against the resolution under intense pres-
sure applied by the United States. The negative vote by the govern-
ment of Japan caused fierce resentment among the public in Japan,
including hibakusha, survivors in Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic
bombings in 1945.
The political dynamics that this new development will set in
motion remain to be seen. However, it will be unavoidable that poli-
cies of the non-nuclear weapon states under “extended nuclear deter-
rence” or “nuclear umbrella” will be placed under stricter scrutiny
now that the illegality of nuclear weapons will be highlighted in the
course of negotiations for the legal prohibition of such weapons. In
this respect the policy alternatives to “nuclear umbrella,” such as the
establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ), will draw
more attention from practical point of view. It will be especially true in
the region like Northeast Asia, where substantial non-governmental
works have already been accumulated in order to realize a Northeast
Asian NWFZ (NEA-NWFZ).
In contrast to this progress in the field of global nuclear disarma-
ment and non-proliferation, attempts by the international community
to restrain and reverse the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program have
been stalemated since the end of 2008, when the last meeting of the
Six Party Talks was held, involving the DPRK, the ROK, Japan, China,
the United States, and Russia. Also, no official bilateral talks between
the United States and the DPRK have taken place since the failed 2012
Leap Day agreement despite the latter calling for talks on several
occasions. To make matters worse, we have witnessed an accelerated
deterioration of the situation in Northeast Asia caused by events such
as the fourth and the fifth underground nuclear tests by the DPRK,
which happened in 2016 after three years without any nuclear tests.
Now is the time to refocus and revitalize a process in which
peace and security flowing from a NEA-NWFZ will be realized and
966 Hiromichi Umebayashi and Tatsujiro Suzuki

maintained. Such process will respond not only to the urgent, even
critical situation in Northeast Asia but also to the emerging new stage
of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.
The Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki
University (RECNA), was founded in 2012 in a university suffered
from the 1945 atomic bombing. RECNA has commenced a project to
materialize the concept of a NEA-NWFZ, based on past accomplish-
ments by academics and civil society. Since mid-1990s, there were
various proposals on potential configurations of a NEA-NWFZ,
including a scheme called “three-plus-three,” where three non-
nuclear-weapon states, DPRK, ROK and Japan would constitute
the zone and would be provided security assurances by three sur-
rounding nuclear-weapon states, the United States, China and Russia
(Umebayashi, 2005). In 2011, a conceptual breakthrough occurred
when Morton H. Halperin, a renowned international political scientist
and former special advisor to the US President, was commissioned by
Nautilus Institute to provide a framework whereby states could estab-
lish the geo-strategic conditions that would realistically achieve a
NEA-NWFZ. Halperin proposed establishing a NEA-NWFZ as an
element of a “comprehensive agreement on Peace and Security in
NEA” (Halperin, 2011). This concept was quickly adopted as a basis
for implementing a NEA-NWFZ strategy by various groups of differ-
ent countries including Japan. RECNA convened a series of interna-
tional research workshops in 2012 to 2014, and published an outcome
document in 2015 (Umebayashi 2015), in which the authors proposed
a “Comprehensive Framework Agreement for the Denuclearization of
Northeast Asia.”
This essay expands upon that publication. In sum, we find that
Northeast Asia faces increased tension and that dependence on
nuclear deterrence is becoming stronger among countries in the
region. It is urgent to address North Korea’s nuclear weapon pro-
gram. The DPRK has sent signals about starting possible negotiations
with the United States and other parties. It is clear that engagement of
the DPRK is essential to resolve the stalemate over its nuclear weapons.
Moreover, such engagement cannot be limited to just nuclear and
A Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone at the New Stage of the Development in Global Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation 967

missile issues but should extend to a more comprehensive security

agenda. To this end, we propose a comprehensive approach towards
establishing Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, in which
three countries (the DPRK, the ROK and Japan) declare non-nuclear
weapon status and the other three nuclear weapon states (the United
States, Russia and China) provide negative security assurances under
the legally binding treaty. The comprehensive approach must also
include agreement on; 1) termination of Korean War, 2) equal access
to all forms of energy 3) establishment of a permanent Northeast Asia
Security Council. It is essential for non-governmental actors to initiate
regional confidence-building process on a Track 2 level. The authors
hope such process, called the “Nagasaki Process” will become a new
platform for security dialogue among interested parties in the region,
eventually leading to peace and security of Northeast Asia, contribut-
ing to global efforts to achieve a world without nuclear weapons.

II. Increasing Nuclear Dependence and Stalemate

in Northeast Asia: No way out?

The Northeast Asian region’s nuclear confrontation is severely

aggravated in large part because the DPRK’s nuclear weapons devel-
opment program has increased Japan and ROK’s dependence on U.S.
extended nuclear deterrence. The result is a heightened risk of nuclear
weapon use, whether intentional or not, and diminishing international
efforts towards achieving a nuclear weapon free world. This trend is
directly contrary to the historical work underway at the global level
outlined above. There are many intertwining elements creating the
current situation. These elements include the DPRK’s perception that
U.S. nuclear weapons are a threat to its regime, a risk that there will
be a growing base of Japanese and ROK proponents for developing
their own nuclear weapons should their trust in depending on U.S.
extended nuclear deterrence be rattled, and the fact that strengthening
of the missile defense system in the region as a means of extended
deterrence could be seen as a threat to China. In order to resolve
968 Hiromichi Umebayashi and Tatsujiro Suzuki

recent nuclear tensions in the Northeast Asian region, it is necessary

to consider resolving all these issues.
Given the increasing tensions in Northeast Asia, especially with
regard to the nuclear threats posed by the DPRK, Japan’s security
alliance with the United States has become stronger. Japan’s position,
while facing the dilemma of nuclear abolition and nuclear deterrence,
is even clearer now, as shown by its statement from April 14, 2016, at
the meeting of the United Nations Open Ended Working Group:

Nuclear disarmament must be promoted based on two basic under-

standings, the first being a clear understanding of the humanitarian
impacts of the use of nuclear weapons and the second being the objec-
tive assessment of the reality of the security environment. . . . At the same
time, severe security environment, especially that of Northeast Asia as it
faces the clear and present security challenges such as the recent nuclear
testing and ballistic missile launches by the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea, must always be taken into consideration in promoting nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation. (United Nations 2016)

Even though Japan has non-nuclear weapon policies in place, the

fear of Japan gaining its own nuclear arsenal does not go away. The
demeanor of a small fraction of politicians and certain government
bureaucracy’s attitudes towards nuclear weapon dependence cause
these anxieties. One reason for suspicions over Japan’s intent towards
nuclear armament is that Japan is incapable of producing a logical
explanation for its plutonium policies. Concerns over reprocessing
programs are spreading across Northeast Asia. The government of
the ROK, during bilateral negotiations with the United States, strong-
ly insisted on its sovereign right to conduct reprocessing, like Japan.
While criticizing Japan for holding large plutonium stockpiles, China
is planning to build a commercial reprocessing plant imported from
France. Reprocessing plutonium has thus become an issue of regional
security and needs to be given serious attention (Sakolsky 2016).
After it was revealed that North Korea was developing nuclear
weapons, South Korea worked closely with the United States to carry
out diplomatic efforts aimed at reversing this program. South Korea
A Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone at the New Stage of the Development in Global Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation 969

simultaneously strengthened its dependence on U.S. extended nuclear

deterrence. In 2016, after the two nuclear tests by North Koreas and
more than twenty tests related to ballistic missiles that can be used as
delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons, there were more reinforced
US-ROK joint military exercises, flight operations by the U.S. strategic
bombers from the U.S. continent and Guam, and DPRK’s Korean Peo-
ple’s Army launched landing and anti-landing drills (North Korea
Leadership Watch, 2016). The agreement between the United States
and the ROK to deploy THAAD systems in South Korea has raised
tension in the area beyond the Korean Peninsula. In October 2016, the
Presidential Advisory Council on Democratic and Peaceful Unifica-
tion of Korea suggested to the President that U.S. tactical nuclear
weapons should be returned to the ROK. In addition, there are
increasing voices within South Korea to have an independent nuclear
weapon capability. On September 12, 2016, 31 representatives of the
Saenuri governing Party signed a statement that the Parliament
should discuss launching an independent South Korean nuclear pro-
gram (Asmolov 2016).

III. North Korea’s Nuclear Policy and Weapon Program:

Possibility of Negotiation

Given the fact that North Korea conducted five nuclear tests, plus
numerous missile tests, there is now a new urgency to look at North
Korean nuclear weapon program with serious attention. In the past,
many experts believed that North Korea’s nuclear weapon programs
were not meant for immediate military purposes, but rather to use
nuclear weapon as to extract concessions from foreign governments,
that is, as tools for coercive diplomacy to obtain various benefits for
the DPRK. But a growing number of experts suggest that North Korea
is seeking a real, functioning nuclear weapon program for genuine mili-
tary purposes. Jeffrey Lewis recently concluded that “North Korean’s
nuclear weapons are not a mere totem or a symbol. They are a real
military capability that North Korean believes will deter as US inva-
970 Hiromichi Umebayashi and Tatsujiro Suzuki

sion of North Korea.” (Lewis 2016)

On the other hand, it should be noted that the DPRK repeatedly
sent signals calling for a negotiation. In January 2015, the DPRK
proposed that, in exchange of the U.S. temporary suspension of joint
military exercises in the ROK, the DPRK would be ready to take
responsive measures such as suspending nuclear tests. Moreover, on
July 6, 2016, the DPRK presented five concrete points of conditions for
possible negotiation with the US (Carlin 2016, July). The five points
are; 1) all nuclear weapons of the US in South Korea must be publicly
disclosed; 2) all nuclear weapons in the South Korea should be dis-
mantled and verified; 3) Washington must guarantee that it will not
deploy offensive nuclear weapons in South Korea and its vicinity; 4)
the US must commit not to use nuclear weapons against North Korea;
and 5) Washington must declare its willingness to withdraw from
South Korea all troops holding the authority to use nuclear weapons.
Such conditions are worth considering for all interested parties, in
particular, for the U.S. government. It is now a good time for new U.S.
president-elect Donald Trump to take new initiatives to bring a possi-
ble breakthrough, abandoning its past “strategic patience” policy
which has not been working at all to prevent North Korean nuclear
weapon programs and substituting a policy of “strategic impatience”
aimed at all parties, not just the DPRK.

IV. A Comprehensive Approach is Needed:

Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Northeast Asia
(NEA-NWFZ)

Now it is clear that engagement of the DPRK cannot be limited to

just nuclear and missile issues, but should extend to a more compre-
hensive agenda including a peace treaty to end the Korean War and
establishment of a NEA-NWFZ which will provide security assur-
ances to a denuclearized DPRK, and to non-nuclear ROK and Japan.
Considering the history of past, failed joint statements among North
Korea, the United States and other countries, Halperin proposes a
A Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone at the New Stage of the Development in Global Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation 971

methodology where a legally binding outline of the final agreement

should be made first and then followed by negotiations for details
(Halperin 2011). In principle, our proposal agrees with Halperin’s
methodology. When political leadership is weak, however, it can be
difficult and take too much time to go through parliamentary processes
necessary to ratify legal instruments.
Based upon such considerations, the “Comprehensive Frame-
work Agreement for the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia” (CFA) is
proposed in our Proposal as an instrument to be concluded and effec-
tuated by signatures of state heads of the Six-Party Talks. It would
also be possible, in this case, to include specific provisions within the
CFA to be ratified and become strictly legally binding. Appointing an
independent non-governmental, authoritative expert group for support
and verification of CFA processes could alleviate concerns regarding
the CFA being overruled by changing administrations. The expert
group will be deeply involved in the process leading up to manifesting
the CFA, and work for support and verification to ensure continuity
of negotiations after an initial agreement is reached.
Specific Chapters of a CFA are divided into “Declaratory” or
“Actionable” categories and are composed of the following four key
items:
(1) Declare to terminate the Korean War and provide for mutual
nonaggression, friendship, and equal sovereignty among CFA state
parties. States lacking diplomatic relations will endeavor to succeed in
normalizing its diplomatic relations. Encourage negotiations among
states party to the Korean conflict to draft a Korean War Peace Treaty.
(Declaratory)
(2) Assure equal rights to access all forms of energy, including
nuclear energy. Establish a Northeast Asia Energy Cooperation Com-
mittee that is dedicated to contributing to the stability of Northeast
Asia and the peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula. The invi-
tation for committee members extends beyond the six parties and is
open to any state or state groups supporting the cause. Participation
of Mongolia and Canada would be welcome. (Declaratory. Actionable
details will be decided by the Committee.)
972 Hiromichi Umebayashi and Tatsujiro Suzuki

(3) Agree on a treaty to establish a Northeast Asia Nuclear

Weapon-Free Zone. It will include requirements to join the NPT and
other details mandated to achieve a NWFZ, such as those discussed
below. Signatory states are obligated to join the Chemical Weapons
Convention. The agreement will protect the rights of signatory states
for peaceful space exploration in accordance with the 1967 Outer
Space Treaty. An article will be provided to place collective sanctions
on states in violation of the treaty, while restricting any unilateral
sanction imposed by an individual state party on account of treaty
matters. (Actionable)
(4) Establish a permanent Northeast Asia Security Council. The
primary objective of this council will be to ensure the implementation
of the CFA. The secondary objective will be, when appropriate, to
serve as a platform for discussions involving various Northeast Asian
security issues. In the future, the council is expected to deal with more
comprehensive security issues. The council could host the verification
mechanisms of the NEA-NWFZ. The Six-Parties will form the initial
members of the Council, while member states of the Energy Coopera-
tion Committee and any other states offering cooperation in Northeast
Asian security are welcome to be general members (Actionable).

V. Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Northeast Asia

(NEA-NWFZ)

The proposed “Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone

Treaty” includes characteristics unique to the region, as shown below:
(1) State Parties: A six party treaty in a “Three-plus-Three
Arrangement” (ROK, DPRK, and Japan are “Intra-zonal States” and
the United States, China, and Russia are“Neighboring Nuclear
Weapon States”) would be the most likely to succeed in the current
state of affairs. It would be even more desirable for Mongolia, a country
with recognized nuclear weapon-free status, to join the NEA-NWFZ
as a diplomatic strategy following up its 20th anniversary of its
nuclear weapon free declaration in 2012.
A Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone at the New Stage of the Development in Global Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation 973

(2) Flexibility in Effectuating the Treaty: Doubts over achieving a

NEA-NWFZ repeatedly point towards the lack of mutual trust
between the states within the region. As the Treaty of Tlatelolco,
which overcame difficulties between Brazil and Argentina to enter
into force, demonstrates, however, the system in which articles enter
into force can be flexible in order to facilitate achieving a NEA-NWFZ.
For instance, the entry-into-force requirements of the NEA-NWFZ
treaty can be provided for through ratification by the three nuclear
weapon states (the United States, Russia, China) and two non-nuclear
weapon states (Japan and the ROK). It may be plausible to provide an
option for Japan and the ROK to withdraw from the treaty after three
to five years, if the DPRK continues not to join, or joins but does not
comply. By ratifying the treaty under this scheme, Japan and the ROK
will enjoy security assurances sooner against the potential threats
from nuclear weapon states other than the United States. As for the
benefits to the DPRK, an article can be included to provide it with a
certain period of time to dismantle its nuclear weapons and related
facilities, while the United States provides immediate security assur-
ances in exchange for the DPRK’s ratification.
(3) Requirements Prior to Negotiations: Considering that states
with nuclear weapons are involved in negotiating a NEA-NWFZ
Treaty, there is a need to address the issue of guaranteeing that nego-
tiations are held in good faith once the negotiations commence. For
example, North Korea would be requested to commit to a moratorium
of nuclear weapon tests and other nuclear weapon related activities.
The United States, South Korea, and Japan would likely be requested
to commit to a moratorium of joint military exercises around the
Korean Peninsula. Such mutually agreed “prior moratoriums”
should be adopted before negotiations. The “prior moratoriums”
could also explore alleviating current sanctions imposed on North
Korea in a manner calibrated to the pace and depth of its verified
nuclear disarmament.
(4) Eliminating Dependence on Extended Nuclear Deterrence:
When a NWFZ treaty is fully implemented, international law pre-
vents the threat or use of nuclear weapons against the zone. This
974 Hiromichi Umebayashi and Tatsujiro Suzuki

implies that non-nuclear weapon states within the NWFZ do not need
extended nuclear deterrence or a nuclear umbrella. This is why a
NWFZ is a mechanism that builds cooperative security that does not
depend on nuclear weapons. (Because the proposed CFA includes a
non-aggression agreement, non-nuclear weapons states in NEA-
NWFZ are protected from attacks and threats by conventional weapons,
as well as by nuclear weapons. Considering past negotiations for a
nuclear weapon-free Korean Peninsula, the possibility of including
conventional weapons in the security assurances exists in a possible
NEA-NWFZ.)
Nonetheless, there are many concerns and fear over losing the
nuclear umbrella. The argument for the fear is that states will be
defenseless if one state violates the treaty and either attacks or threat-
ens to attack other states. However, once a state violates the treaty, the
treaty becomes null and void; the state of affairs will return to pre-
treaty conditions, thus they will not be defenseless. To further allevi-
ate anxieties, the treaty could provide that states may take sanctions
against the offender in accordance with international law and their
individual national constitution.

VI. Conclusion:
Starting the Track 2 “Nagasaki Process”

Following up on the report, RECNA held a workshop in Novem-

ber 2016 inviting key experts from the region where an independent,
non-governmental “Panel on Peace and Security of Northeast Asia
(PSNA)” was established. Given the difficult security environment, it
is essential for non-governmental actors to initiate regional confi-
dence-building on the Track 2 level. Its primary mission is to facilitate
political processes, through timely policy recommendations and pub-
lic engagement, to create a NEA-NWFZ as part of establishing peace
and security in the region. It also provides venue for frank exchange
of opinions among experts involving policy makers, academics and
civil society. In order to achieve the above mission, the Panel holds a
A Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone at the New Stage of the Development in Global Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation 975

series of workshops, as necessary, which will involve experts as well

as diplomats and officials from the region and relevant countries and
international organizations. It is our intention that this series of work-
shops will become an effective “Track 2” process in the Northeast
Asian region. The Panel will collaborate and coordinate with other
similar activities in the region and the world, such as “Ulaanbaatar
Process” and Pugwash community activities in Northeast Asia, as well
as the U.N. process to negotiate a legally-binding instrument to pro-
hibit nuclear weapons globally. This whole process, aiming at pro-
moting peace and security of Northeast Asia through establishment of
a NEA-NWFZ, is called the “Nagasaki Process.”
We hope the new “Nagasaki Process” will become a new plat-
form for security dialogue among interested parties in the region to
enhance confidence building, and eventually leading to peace and
security of Northeast Asia and denuclearization of the region. The
Process will thus contribute to the global efforts at a new stage to
achieving and maintaining a world free from nuclear weapons.

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