Nuclear Age: Nuclear

Proliferation and Security, WMD,

Nuclear Programmes and
Doctrines of Pakistan and India
Section-IV ( Pakistan Affairs )
Section-III ,Part-08 and 09 ( Current Affairs )
Section-VII( IR Paper-II)
Essay Paper

Aftab Ullah
 Introduction
• The quest for security is a universal fact.
• The extent and quality of security vary among nations.
• The onset of globalization have given new dimensions to it.
• Absence of collective security on global level.
• Alternatives for security.
• Conventional security is not enough in some contexts.
• Weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).
• Start of nuclear weapons era.
 What are WMDs?
• Weapons having the capability to inflict a massive damage to both the living and
non-living environment in a short duration of time without discrimination.
• The technology vary but element of lethality is common to all.
• Atomic and Hydrogen bombs ( Hiroshima and Nagasaki catastrophe )
• Biological weapons and Chemical weapons/unconventional WMDs ( viral, bacterial,
‘poor’s man A-bomb, mustard gas, chlorine gas, phosphorus, sarin, nerve gas etc)
• International law prohibits the use of chemical and biological weapons ( 1925
Geneva Protocol, Chemical Weapons Convention, Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention 1972 ).
• Still cases of biological and chemical weapons use surfaces ( Iran-Iraq war 1979-89,
Israel’s use of chlorine gas in recent intifada, Sarin gas use by Assad regime in Syria
etc ).
 Timeline of Nuclear Age
The development of nuclear weapons is categorized into the following four ‘4’ eras:
A. First Nuclear Age: This was an age marked by the race towards an all-powerful
weapon among nations having technological sophistication to make an A-bomb to
have military supremacy and decimation of enemies. ( Manhattan Project, US as
winner, ended up with pulverizing Hiroshima and Nagasaki )
B. Second Nuclear Age: Multiple nuclear weapon states surfaced with others following
the suit or searching for a ‘nuclear umbrella’ and the two giants amassing greater
number of nuclear weapons with mutually assured destruction ‘MAD’ as a central
theme for ‘deterrence’ ( Cold war era, Indian nuclear programme, Pak Nuclear
programme etc )
 Timeline of Nuclear Age
C. Third Nuclear Age: Power vacuum and insecurity led the more states to consider
nuclear weapons or at least develop full nuclear fuel cycle that will enable them to
devise a weapon if their security is threatened. Threat of asymmetrical atomic warfare
with terrorists or ‘rogue’ states having the acquisition of the A-bomb. ( Post-cold war,
North Korean regime )
D. Fourth Nuclear Age: The fourth nuclear age will start in the foreseeable future since
we are at a critical juncture’ we either resolve the tensions or the alternative will be
beyond control ( Resolution of nuclear tensions, IAEA role, Collective security )
 Nuclear ‘Haves’ and ‘Haves not’
The states having nuclear weapons or no nuclear weapons can be categorized into the
following four ‘4’ categories:
A. Recognized Nuclear-weapons States ( P5, NPT 1967 )
B. De-facto Nuclear-weapons States ( India, Israel, Pakistan, North Korea )
C. States under nuclear umbrella of nuclear-weapons states ( NATO members )
D. Non-nuclear Weapons States ( Members of NPT except P5; full nuclear fuel cycle
developed by few )
 Nuclear Politics
• The set of interactions and decision making in the international arena based on using
the nuclear energy or nuclear weapons or both of them at time same time as bargaining
tools for mainly the following five ‘5’ purposes:
A. For forcing a state to accept a decision which it would not otherwise under an
offensive threat ( Compellence; nuclear brinkmanship; massive retaliation- US strategic
doctrine )
B. To dissuade a state from undertaking any action which it would if not under a
defensive threat ( Deterrence based on three elements- a) Capabilities b) Credibility
c) Communication; Second-strike capability; MAD/mutual deterrence )
 Nuclear Politics
C. For getting discounts in foreign policies against a state which would not happen otherwise
or will have much complexities ( recent example of US and Belarus; Pressler and
Symington Amendments and the case of Pakistan’s cooperation with the US ; JCPOA;
North Korea etc )
D. To stop further states or actors from acquiring nuclear weapons ( nuclear non-proliferation
regimes; Iraq war; Libya’s case; South Africa dismantling; Iran’s case presently; assurance
of US security to Saudian bloc ).
E. To share the benefits of nuclear energy and other uses of fissile material in the civilian
sector in a safe and secure way ( Eisenhower’s ‘Atoms for Peace’ concept; nuclear
diplomacy; IAEA; NSG; bilateral Civil-nuclear agreements etc )
 Nuclear Proliferation
The spread of technologies, material or information in the nuclear realm to states or
organizations that are not recognized ‘ Nuclear-weapons states ‘ under NPT and which can
enable those actors to make an A-bomb or a similar version of it ‘poor man’s atomic
bomb/dirty bomb’.
There are mainly two ‘2’ ways in which nuclear proliferation occurs:
A. Horizontal Proliferation ( new states etc acquiring weapons; more disturbing )
B. Vertical Proliferation ( existing nuclear states’ qualitative development; higher risks )
 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime
These are the rules to contain arms races so that weapons or materials ( nuclear
weapons and fissile materials ) do not spread to the states that don’t have them. They
are as follows:
A. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 1957.
B. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 1967.
C. Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) 1974.
 IAEA 1957
The IAEA was created in 1957, headquartered in Vienna (Austria), in response to the
deep fears and expectations generated by the discoveries and diverse uses of nuclear
technology. The Agency’s genesis was U.S. President Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace”.
It is world’s ‘Atoms for Peace’ organization under UN. Its main functions falls in three
‘3’ categories:
• Nuclear technology and applications ( energy, health, industry, nuclear science etc ).
• Nuclear safety and security ( radioactive material safety, installations, human
resource management etc ).
• Safeguards and Verification ( watchdog and a vanguard etc )
 Challenges to IAEA
• Subscription is voluntary ( states can step-back on their commitments; North Korea;
Additional Protocol ).
• Self-interests of states/Compromises in negotiations ( ‘six party talks’ in case of North
Korea ).
• No enforcement powers ( only a technical agency, UNSC dependent ).
• Limited powers of inspection and getting information ( only declared sites can be
inspected; Additional protocol is not signed by all; not a spy agency ).
• Gray areas in appointment of its head ( Kay’s appointment and the alleged role of CIA ).
• Discrimination between states ( Iraq, Iran vs North Korea, Libya vs South Africa ).
• Accounting and control systems of states vary and abstruse.
 Pakistan’s Position on IAEA
• Pakistan extends its full support to the mandate of IAEA ( it was the 6th country to ratify
the statute of IAEA ).
• Signing of a Safeguards Agreement with Pakistan to have assurance that the nuclear
assets are in safe hands. ( concluded between 1962-2017 )
• Collaboration with IAEA for strengthening its nuclear power programme ( four ‘4’
national technical cooperation projects of IAEA amalgamated into one as of Feb 2020 ).
 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 1967
It is one thing to deny additional countries nuclear weapons; but denying them the use
of nuclear science for peaceful ends has no justification, and it would have meant no
NPT at all .It is an international treaty aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear
weapons and unregulated flow of nuclear technologies to the states made in 1967 and
have almost universal membership ( except non-recognized or de facto Nuclear-
weapons states are not members of NPT ). It has the following three ‘3’ main
objectives:
A. Prevention of nuclear proliferation ( stopping further states from acquiring nuclear
weapons ).
 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 1967
B. Promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy and technological cooperation for
shared benefits. (supply of nuclear technologies to NPT members for peaceful
purposes in exchange for their pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons ).
C. Complete nuclear disarmament ( doing away with all the existing nuclear weapons
by the nuclear states ).
 Challenges to NPT
• Hidden agendas of the states. ( North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Libya etc )
• Existence of nuclear blackmarkets ( surfacing of A.Q Khan Network; myriad players ).
• Sense of insecurity by the states and the alternative offered by A-bomb ( Cases of
Iraq, Libya and Iran vs North Korea ).
• Monopoly of the P5 states ( No nuclear disarmament on the ground, no timeframe ).

Pakistan’s Position on NPT

• Pakistan have never accepted the NPT due to its supreme national interests.
• Pakistan considers it discriminatory (Foreign Secretary Aizaz Ahmad).
 NSG (1974)
The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was created following the so-called peaceful nuclear
explosion (PNE) in 1974 by a non-nuclear-weapon state (India), which demonstrated that
nuclear technology transferred for peaceful purposes could be misused. This is an authorized
market on global level for access to the nuclear technologies and materials for peaceful
purposes. It do the following:
• A market for cooperation ( exports and imports ) of nuclear technologies/fissile material
among NPT members with specific guidelines.
• Two ‘2’ sets of guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear-related exports ( any technology
that contributes indirectly ).
• To check nuclear proliferation by giving a legal and more transparent way of dealing in
nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.
 Membership Condition and Issues
• A state must ratify the NPT before it can be admitted to the NSG.
• The policy of USA to give NSG membership to India (2008) after the India-specific waiver
by USA as consequence of Civil-Nuclear deal (2005) between the two countries is opposed
by Pakistan on the same principle since India is not a member of NPT.
• China contends that Pakistan should be given membership if India is to be admitted.
• The issue still lingers due to differences of the great powers ( USA and China )

Pakistan’s Position on NSG

• Pakistan applied for NSG membership in 2016 ( international opinions about improving
‘non-proliferation’ credentials; international discrimination because of India’s commercial
size ).
• Giving India NSG’s membership will create a strategic imbalance in South Asia.
Managing the Nuclear Weapons and Disarmament
The following three ‘3’ efforts have been made on the international level at different
times to either manage the mushrooming threat of nuclear weapons or to take
measures for an eventual complete nuclear weapons disarmament. They are:
A. Partial or Limited Test Ban Treaty (PTBT/LTBT) 1963
B. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 1996- Proposed
C. Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) 1998- Proposed
Limited or Partial Test Ban Treaty 1963 (LTBT/PTBT)
A. Background: The treaty was the result of nearly a decade’s worth of arms control

negotiations between the United States and Soviet Union. The Cuban Missile Crisis in
October 1962 brought the United States and Soviet Union to the brink of nuclear war. The
incident highlighted the necessity for greater cooperation between the two principal
nuclear powers, and served as an impetus for the LTBT. It was a significant step in the arms
control efforts by US and Soviet Union.
B. Objective: To restrict the testing of nuclear weapons and limit nuclear proliferation.
• Increase security by decreasing the prospects of a disastrous war ( President Kennedy ).
 Limited or Partial Test Ban Treaty (LTBT/PTBT)
C. Declarations: Outlawed all nuclear weapons testing (except those conducted
underground) in the following environments-
• Underwater
• Upper space
• Atmosphere
D. Results:
• Slowing proliferation by making nuclear weapons tests much more expensive.
• Prevention of further radioactive emissions and waste in the different environments.
E. Current Status: More than ‘120’ states are a party to it including Pakistan ( initially it was
signed by three states- US, USSR and UK ).
• It is an example of sanity in nuclear diplomacy and its effectiveness.
 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 1996 (CTBT)
A. Background: It is the result of the efforts being carried out for disarmament. The
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva was the mouthpiece for CTBT. It was a multilateral
treaty adopted by UN General Assembly and was opened to states for signing in 1996. It
strives constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and
ending the development of more advanced nuclear weapons. It establishes an organization
of itself for implementation of this treaty, CTBTO based in Vienna, structurally independent
but working in collaboration with IAEA.
B. Objective: Continued reduction of nuclear arms and gradual elimination of these
weapons.
C. Organizational Structure: 1) Conference of the States Parties- main organ ( consultation )
2) Executive Council ( implementation ) 3) Technical Secretariat ( official working )
 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
D. Declarations:
• Not to conduct any nuclear detonation test for both civil and military purposes in all
environments or allowing it in its jurisdiction.
• To refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any
nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.
E. Point(s) of Contention: Inflexibility by P5. ( all of P5 is not signing it or giving any security
guarantees )
F. Results: No concrete results have achieved so far but it is a positive development that
deters the states to conduct nuclear detonations because of its almost universal subscription.
But, recent reports of nuclear tests in Russia as alleged by USA suggests a challenging future
for CTBT.
 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
G. Current Status: It has not yet entered into ‘force’ since three ‘3’ ( North Korea, India,
Pakistan) of the 44 required states ( mentioned in Annex 2 of the treaty ) have yet to sign it
and five ‘5’ ( US, China, Egypt, Israel, Iran ) yet to ratify it. The conferences are held annually
by those states that have ratified the treaty, to accelerate the process of ratifications by states
required for entry of this treaty into force.
H. Pakistan’s Position on CTBT:
• Voted for CTBT when it was adopted but preferred to assume a unilateral moratorium.
• Not willing to sign it before India.
• Also, it is discriminatory so Pakistan is not going to jeopardize its supreme national
interests.
 Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty 1998 (FMCT)
A. Background: The NPT does not addressed the loopholes related to the use of fissile
material ( HEU and Plutonium ) for peaceful purposes. As the cheaters were found ( North
Korea ), which developed nuclear weapons in the garb of peaceful nuclear programme. A
need was felt to devise an instrument that place a check on the fissile material and thus; the
fissile material cut-off treaty was proposed in Conference on Disarmament (CoD) in 1995.
B. Objective: To curb the proliferation ( mainly vertical ) and eventual disarmament.
C. Declarations: Banning further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices.
 Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)
D. Results: No tangible results have achieved so far but it can prove to be an effective
arrangement given that the points of contention are addressed.
E. Points of Contention:
• Cap on existing stockpiles of fissile material.
• Inspection and Verification of the stockpiles ( US and India wants exclusion of ‘tritium’
inspection etc )
F. Current Status: It is still in limbo due to the differences over the formula for dealing the
existing stockpiles and verification process. In order for negotiations to begin on an FMCT,
Pakistan will have to remove its opposition vote, and a consensus to move forward with
negotiations must be reached.
 Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)
G. Pakistan’s Position:
• For signing the treaty, it must be universal, verifiable and non-discriminatory.
• It will put Pakistan at disadvantage vis-à-vis India.
• Pakistan is enriching uranium in accordance with its nuclear doctrine.
 Challenges to Non-Proliferation/ of Proliferation
• Institutional limitations in IAEA etc. ( already covered earlier )
• Lack of consensus among parties especially P5. ( JCPOA, North Korea, Iraq, CTBT etc )
• Discriminatory and universally non-verifiable Nuclear non-proliferation arrangements.
( points of contention in the different non-proliferation treaties )
• Zero-sum game in nuclear politics. ( recent US vs Russian; Pak-India; Iran-Saudi blocs;
Missile defense systems-BDS,S-400 etc ; Weaponization of space- Space Force )
• Increasing sense of external insecurity. ( increasing polarization; missile defense systems;
Weaponization of space debate; arms race )
• Presence of nuclear blackmarkets. ( a number of cartels highlighted in the book ‘ The Age
of Deception…’ by a high ex-official of IAEA )
 Challenges to Non-Proliferation/ of Proliferation
• Inexorable march of cyber technologies. ( Shamon virus; Kuji and Datastream cowboy;
Stuxnet bot attack on Iran etc )
• International violent non-state actors. ( Obama’s statement; fear of ‘dirty bomb’ etc )
• Lack of comprehensive efforts to treat the disease of insecurity rather than just focusing
on the symptoms because of interconnectedness between social issues and global
security. ( poverty-> injustice and rage-> governance crises-> civil strife-> extremism->
wars ). Since survival is central to every regime, both democratic and authoritarian;
therefore, states resort to maximizing their security by whatever means available.
 Dangers of Nuclear Warheads and Proliferation
• A war to end all wars ( Doomsday clock; nuclear wars; consequences beyond borders;
extermination of life on earth ).
• Irreparable damage to the environment ( nuclear winter; radiations; Chernobyl's example ).
• Accidental uses ( faulty signals of nuclear warheads approaching; technical problem;
cyberattacks etc ).
• Weaker vs stronger states scenario and a nuclear catastrophe ( labeling of nuclear
deterrence as an ultimate security insurance; rethinking of strategic doctrines ).
• Terrorist activities ( world’s fate hanging in the balance ).
 Way Forward
• Plugging the loopholes in the non-proliferation regimes. ( strengthening IAEA etc )
• Cooperative multinational and multidimensional responses ( no single state or organization
can neutralize or manage the threats ).
• Development of collective security system that is not perceived as a zero-sum game based
on inclusive multilateralism and multinational institutions.
( security is indivisible; limited possessors and their nuclear umbrellas is a temporary if not
delusional security strategy ).
• Sharing the economic resources in a manner that don’t jeopardize the global security.
( global insecurities are not disconnected ).
• P5 states in collaboration with other nuclear weapon states should play the leading
inclusive role. ( US and Russia accounting for more than 95% of existing nuclear assets are
vital ).
 International Relations’ Perspectives
A. Realism: ( survival; self-help; balance of power; balance of terror; international anarchy;
arms races; possible options etc )
B. Liberalism: ( diplomacy; multilateralism; institutions; peaceful resolution )
C. Constructivism: ( perceptions regarding nuclear programmes; military vs civil use; ideas
vary from state to state; perceptions about use of these weapons by violent actors or rogue
state; international sentiments )
 Future Trajectories in Nuclear Age
The dawn of nuclear age is ominous given the way states are using it for furthering their
security while putting the stake of entire planet earth on stake. It is difficult to predict the
future of this area with reasonable accuracy due to the complexities involved. However; the
following course of future could possibly take place in the foreseeable future:
A. Complete disarmament as envisaged under different nuclear non-proliferation regimes
and peaceful resolution of the nuclear tension for mutual benefits. ( Least likely )
B. Strengthening of the international institutions with elements of the status quo retained.
( Likely )
C. Horizontal and vertical proliferation with increase in realist nuclear politics. ( Most likely )
 Critical Analysis
• The quest for security is a basic to every society throughout history of human civilization.
• Different means are being employed so far, some of which, ironically, threatens for the
same actors across the board.
• Nuclear age is revolutionary if channeled properly.
• For humanity to avert the doomsday scenario brought out by nuclear weapons, synergistic
approach is needed that hits at the core issues rather than just symptoms.
• When basic human needs are met, the environment will be conducive for these efforts.
• The strategy for dealing with nuclear crises is based on a point of logic: the alternative is
unacceptable.
• The only quest that makes sense, the only quest worth pursuing, is toward ‘collective
security’ because either there is going to be ‘co-existence or no-existence’.
 Suggested Questions
Q#01. Why states pursue the nuclear ambitions despite the fallouts in the aftermath of
international sanctions?
Q#02. The presence of deterrence weapons is an all out solution to the increasing insecurities
in the international arena. Critically analyze.
Q#03. There has been no major war on world’s scale after the onset of nuclear age. What are
the possible explanations for this relative peace especially after WWII?
Q#04. Nuclear non-proliferation regimes have failed the world in getting rid of nuclear WMDs.
Evaluate
Q#05. What is the way forward for the world in the wake of increasing risks of nuclear
weapons use?
 Suggested Essays
1. Nuclear politics is based on retaining the nuclear weapons by the powerful states while
depriving the weak states from the benefits of nuclear energy.
( Persuasive Essay )

2. Can the existing architecture of nuclear diplomacy bring an end to the nuclear tensions?
( Argumentative Essay )

3. Nuclear Age: Benefits, threats, challenges, way forward

( Expository Essay )
 Suggested Readings/Videos
• Ch#07 and 08, ‘World Politics, Trend and Transformation’ 2016-17 edition by Shannon and
Kegley
• Ch#02, 03, 07, 10 and Conclusion of ‘ The Age of Deception ‘ by Mohamed Elbaradei ( only
read the highlighted portions of these chapters of the book in the shared folder of the
‘suggested books’.
• https://www.dawn.com/news/1185843
• https://thediplomat.com/2011/08/nuclear-politics/
• https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IqGmBenz-j8
• https://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/en/about-nsg
• https://thediplomat.com/2016/06/pakistan-india-and-the-nsg-a-curious-case-of-norms-and-d
iscrimination/
• https://www.atomicheritage.org/history/limited-or-partial-test-ban-treaty-ltbtptbt
• https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/fmct
• https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/comprehensive-nuclear-test-ban-treaty-ctbt/
• https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/test-ban-treaty-at-a-glance
• https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/IAEA_SG_INF_4_web.pdf
Nuclear Programme of Pakistan, Issues and
its Nuclear Doctrine
 Introduction
• The blessing of freedom has no parallel.
• Getting independence is one thing, but securing it is a different story.
• Pakistan have suffered the worst tragedies in its history.
• ‘ There is no power on earth that can undo Pakistan ‘. Jinnah
• A nation’s resolve compel it to do what it takes to safeguard its freedom.
• Pakistan search for security is based on the same realities.
• The quest for nuclear weapons and its accomplishment speak volumes.
• The defense of Pakistan is made impregnable with the development of nuclear arms.
• This was not a rosy journey and still there is a long way to go given the geopolitical,
geostrategic realities and internal situation of the country.
• But, this is a milestone in the security history of Pakistan.
 Timeline
The journey of Pakistan in the nuclear realm can be classified mainly into the following three
‘3’ eras, with respect to the motivations and dimensions of the nuclear programme:
A. Acquisition of Nuclear Technology and Development of Nuclear Programme ( mid 1950s-
1971 ): PAEC;PINSTECH; acquisition of reactors from US and Canada for research and other
peaceful purposes; both placed under IAEA safeguards.
B. Development and Testing of Nuclear Weapons ( 1972- 1998 ): Bhutto’s efforts started from
1960s; meeting of nuclear scientists in 1972 for expeditious development of full nuclear
fuel cycle; funds allocated in 1970s; Smiling Buddha 1974 given impetus; Uranium
enrichment plant in Kahuta 1976 under Dr A.Q Khan; ability to enrich weapon grade
uranium achieved and first atomic device by 1983; Chaghi nuclear weapons tests in 1998.
C. Upgrading the Nuclear Posture per the Developments ( 1998-present ): maintenance of
‘minimum credible deterrence’ especially vis-à-vis India.
 Major Driving Factors
The sole motivation for conduction of nuclear weapons test was the security challenges posed
by a belligerent neighbor and an international community that has reneged on its pledges or
hesitated to give any tangible security assurance to Pakistan in the aftermath of the strategic
imbalance in South Asia, made more precarious after the nuclear weapons tests by India in
May 1998.
• No concept of an ‘Islamic Bomb’, only a political slogan. ( strategic compulsion )
• No ambitions of prestige to join the nuclear-weapons states club.
• No hegemonic or aggressive designs against any state but prevention of war. ( never done
aggression but is attacked )
• No bad-blood against the discrimination meted out to Pakistan in NPT etc. ( still cooperate
with the non-proliferation regime in principle )
 Achievement or a Deception?
It is alleged by many that Pakistan's nuclear programme is a classical saga of deception and
theft of critical information and technology. However, this is an ill-informed and malicious
propaganda. This propaganda doesn’t take the entire spectrum of nuclear politics into
account at one hand, while outrightly belittling the technological genius and arduous journey,
fueled with patriotic zeal to safeguard the country from aggression, of Pakistani scientists on
the other hand. Also, the political unity and resolve of Pakistani public is also overwhelming in
the case of nuclear programme. This is evident from the following:
• Indigenous development of centrifuges and the concomitant equipment. ( thesis of Kamil
Saddiqi in the book ‘Is Pakistan a Failed State?’ highlights the engineering genius of
Pakistani scientists in developing the complex systems connected with nuclear weapons
programme; local development of centrifuges technology for fissile material etc ).
 Achievement or a Deception?
• Discrimination, hostility and non-cooperation of the great powers. ( lukewarm response to
India’s intransigence on its pledges of peaceful nuclear programme; NPT, NSG and FMCT
etc; Pressler, Symington and Glenn amendments ;concept of ‘regional influentials’ by US;
different sanctions and refusal by NSG members to export even non-nuclear components
to Pakistan while at the same time giving discounts to India and Israel etc )
• Failure of different countries at different times to develop any such programme despite
they had the complete kits. ( statements on Pakistan’s quest for nuclear weapons by critics;
case of Libya, Argentina, South Africa etc )
• Resilience in the face of extreme adversity and challenges. ( carrot and stick approach by
US; US, India and Israel’s aggressive designs against Kahuta in 1980s; economic pressures;
political pressures; cost of securing the nuclear assets )
 Nuclear Doctrine of Pakistan
Nuclear doctrine consists of a set of principles, rules and instructions for the employment or

non-employment of nuclear weapons and other systems associated with those weapons.
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme, since its inception, is based on ‘minimum credible
deterrence’. Its major components are as follows:
• It is a ‘weapon of defensive last resort’. ( Musharraf’s statement; weapon of political choice )
• Minimum credible deterrence. ( not a static concept; quantity and quality is secondary; high
value targets, surviving preemption and interception; backed by a strong enough
conventional force; tactical nuclear assets; second strike capability/full spectrum
deterrence /nuclear triad; evolving in nature ).
• No policy of ‘no-first use’ against a state. ( USSR proposal; rationale of no-first use by India )
• Unilateral moratorium on further hot testing. ( while keeping the deterrence concept in
 Command and Control
The National Security Council, in February 2000, approved the establishment of the National
Command Authority (NCA) to control policy on nuclear weapons. the National Command
Authority is responsible for policy formulation and will exercise employment and
development control over all strategic nuclear forces and strategic organizations. National. It
has the following three ‘3’ organs:
A. Employment Control Committee ( policy formulation; headed by PM with other members
from government, civil and military establishment, technical advisers )
B. Development Control Committee ( deals with the development of nuclear facilities and
assets; headed by PM with other members from both armed and civil organizations )
C. Strategic Plans Division ( planning, coordination, and establishment of a reliable
command, control, communication, computers and intelligence network; secretariat of
NCA; headed by Army ).
 International Concerns and Opinions
International concerns surfaced mainly as a result of the proliferation under A.Q Khan
network ( Iran; North Korea; Libya ). But, they have been diluted due of a robust command
and control system developed by Pakistan. The international opinion about nuclear
programme of Pakistan is mixed ( neutral vs prejudiced opinions ). Some of the major
concerns are as follows:
• Proliferation to other Muslim countries. ( extended deterrence; North Korea’s case )
• Weak non-proliferation credentials. ( selective vigilance by states; diversion of enriched
Uranium from countries like US and Italy to Israel; supply of ‘heavy water’ by a Norwegian
firm to India, Argentina, South Africa and Israel; nuclear blackmarkets etc )
• Theft of nuclear weapons or terrorists taking over nuclear facilities. ( recent reports on
Pakistan’s nuclear programme by IAEA and US negates it; security system developed in
collaboration with US etc )
Nuclear Programme of India and
its Nuclear Doctrine
 Nuclear Programme of India
• India started its nuclear programme under the facade of peaceful purposes through the
efforts of Homi Bhaba in 1946 and established Atomic Energy Research Committee (AERC).
• Even the early statements of Indian leaders suggested otherwise. ( Nehru’s statements )
• India is getting extensive support from nuclear states for its programme from 1950s till date,
even by giving Indian-centric waivers. ( training facilities in 1955-1974 by US produced 1,104
Indian nuclear scientists; provision of nuclear plants from US and civil-nuclear cooperation
with India; first research reactor in 1955 was commissioned with help from UK; CIRUS,
capable of generating bomb-grade Plutonium was built with assistance from Canada etc )
• India, under Indira Gandhi in 1972, decided to go for a nuclear test. ( ‘Smiling Buddha’ in May
1974; myth of PNE; statement by a senior official )
• Five ‘5’ hot tests conducted on 11th and 13th May, 1998. ( Operation Shakti; Pokhran range )
 Nuclear Doctrine of India
• India devised its nuclear doctrine after deliberating on several drafts and come up with its
policy regarding use of nuclear weapons in 2003 under the mantra of ‘no first use’ with
enormous flexibility to mould in whatever way it wants. The major components of India’s
nuclear doctrine are as follows:
A. Minimum credible deterrence to be maintained. ( Full spectrum deterrence/ Nuclear triad )
B. ‘No first use’ of nuclear weapons against a state but only in retaliation against a nuclear
attack on its territory or on Indian forces anywhere. ( recent signs of a paradigm shift;
‘Choices’ by Shivshankar Menon statement about first use scenarios-preemption; parallel
with US policy of distinction between first strike and first use of nuclear weapons under the
pretext of self-defense; India is exploiting the element of silence or complexity in this regard
and thus carry full options without declaring it overtly )
 Nuclear Doctrine of India
C. Nuclear attack, no matter how small or intense, will be responded with massive retaliation
with intent to inflict unbearable damage. ( tactical weapons attack could be responded with
complete obliteration under full scale attack from India etc )
D. Non-nuclear states will not be attacked, even in case of aggression from their side, by India.
( exception of chemical and biological weapons attack ).
E. Unilateral moratorium on further nuclear testing. ( full flexibility under the pretext of
maintain minimum credible deterrence )
 Impacts on Security
It was believed that the possession of nuclear weapons by both Pakistan and India will compel
both the states to resolve the outstanding issues that eludes peace in the region. But, the
adamant posture of India has jeopardized such hopes and efforts both by the UN (SC Resolution
1172) and Pakistan. As a result, the overall situation of security in South Asia has become more
volatile as evident from the following facts:
• Scale of conflict will result in a ‘nuclear Armageddon’. ( Henry Kissinger narrative in ‘World
Order )
• The element of restraint from Indian side is shaky. ( Indian Army Chief statement in 1999;
Cold Start doctrine; recent strikes on Balakot etc )
• Threat of accidental use or cyberattacks. ( command and control system in case of conflict
etc)
 Nuclear Politics in South Asia
The nuclear politics in South Asia revolve around the single concept of ‘insecurity’. The nuclear
states in South Asia have developed the nuclear weapons out of this compulsion. However; the
role of international players especially US have complicated the equation of nuclear politics in
South Asia by extending support to India for its strategic goals. In response, China is playing its
role to dilute the strategic imbalance in South Asia by either frustrating US efforts or
cooperating with Pakistan. The above conclusion is evident from the following points:
• Development of nuclear weapons by both India and Pakistan. ( narrative of dual threat by
India as evident from the letters by then Indian PM Vajpayee letters to 177 states )
• US nuclear cooperation with India. ( Civil-nuclear deal in 2005; strategic agreements )
• China cooperation with Pakistan in the nuclear realm. ( recent extension of nuclear power
plants; Indian allegations )
• Zero-sum game. ( NPT; NSG; FMCT politics )
 International Relations’ Perspective
A. Realism: ( Balance of terror; zero-sum game; minimum credible deterrence etc )
B. Liberalism: ( CBMs; Nuclear non-proliferation regime; peaceful resolution of disputes etc )
C. Constructivism: ( social construction of adversary’s evil intentions; mirror image; self
fulfilling-prophecy; people of the region are the final arbiters; power of ideas; information
age; sentiments of co-existence; international reappraisal etc )
 Future Trajectories of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia
Predicting the exact future of nuclear weapons in South Asia is tantamount to loosing the
metaphorical Gordian knot. However, we can predict the probable future of nuclear weapons in
South Asia with reasonable accuracy, with respect to its existence, in the foreseeable future:
A. Nuclear arms disarmament in accordance with the non-proliferation regime/ world nuclear
order. ( Least likely )
B. Extended deterrence due to rising tensions in the region especially with respect to Indian
hegemonic ambitions. ( Likely )
C. Nuclear weapons existence in Pakistan and India with strict adherence to their respective
nuclear doctrines. ( Most likely )
 Critical Analysis
• Nuclear weapons are developed and are advancing further due to the chequered relations of
major powers in South Asia, complicated by role of international players.
• It has a restraining effect on the conventional wars between Pakistan and India due to the
cost-benefit equation of such a war with nuclear warheads in the inventory.
• The fallouts of war or accidental use or misinterpretation by command and control systems
in case of even a minor conflict; however, have astronomically increased.
• ‘More is unnecessary if less is enough’ narrative should prevail.
• India have to soften its tone due to the factor of MAD.
• Pakistan should hope for the best but prepare for the worst.
• The world community needs to take the possible exploding situation with its full due
responsibility because ‘ just hope is not an option ‘ without pragmatic steps in this case.
 Suggested Questions
Q#01. What are the major challenges to Pakistan nuclear programme? Give your
recommendations for its solution in the light of nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Q#02. Pakistan’s nuclear arms are weapons of last resort and is a matter of political choice.
Evaluate.
Q#03. Critically analyze the nuclear doctrines of Pakistan and India with respect to each other.
Q#04. What is the way forward for making South Asia a nuclear weapons zone? What are the
major hurdles in this process?
Q#05. What is the possible future of nuclear arms race in South Asia? What are the dangers
connected with it for the region and the world?
 Suggested Essays
1. The security situation has improved with the dawn of nuclear age in South Asia.
( Persuasive Essay )

2. The nuclear weapons programme of Pakistan is based on aggressiveness against India?

( Argumentative Essay )

3. Nuclear politics in South Asia: Implications, challenges and way forward.

( Expository Essay )
 Suggested Readings/Videos
• Ch#12, The Nuclear Programme and Relations with USA; Foreign Policy of Pakistan 1947-
2019 by Abdul Sattar.
• Ch#17, Nuclear Tests; Foreign Policy of Pakistan 1947-2019 by Abdul Sattar.
• Ch#06, 14,19 and 20, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb by Feroz Hassan Khan.
• Ch#05, Choice- Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy by Shivshankar Menon.
• https://tribune.com.pk/story/1603554/pakistans-evolving-nuclear-doctrine
• https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YmqaaxHPKh8 ( India’s Nuclear Doctrine )
• https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ddvgCUvIbGQ ( Possible Change in India’s Posture )
• https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tkkmc7bLnVE ( Dangers of Pak-India Nuclear Conflict )
• https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/cohens20020501.pdf ( Nuclear
Politics in South Asia and Possibilities )