Khwaja Fareed University of Engineering &

Information Technology

Assignment

Submitted by: Muhammad Ahmad

IAEA &NPT
The International Atomic Energy Agency
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) serves as the world’s foremost intergovernmental
forum for scientific and technical cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Established in 1957
as an autonomous international organization within the United Nations system, the IAEA carries out
programs to maximize the contribution of nuclear technology to society while verifying its peaceful use.

The IAEA works with its 164 Member States and multiple partners worldwide to promote the safe,
secure, and peaceful use of nuclear energy. Through technical cooperation programs, the IAEA assists its
Member States and promotes the exchange of scientific and technical information between them. The
IAEA’s work also includes setting the framework for cooperative efforts to build and strengthen an
international nuclear safety and security regime and verifying States’ fulfillment of their non-proliferation
undertakings under the NPT.

The IAEA focuses on three main areas of work such as Safety and Security, Science and Technology, and
Safeguards and Verification. These three pillars provide the basis for the Agency’s work to develop the
use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and to prevent the use of nuclear energy for military
purposes. Thus, under the first pillar, the Agency enters into agreements with Member States to ensure
that states comply with their NPT obligations and inspects national facilities to monitor that nuclear
material is not being used for military purposes.

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT):

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is an
international treaty developed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons technology. Between 1965 and
1968, the treaty was negotiated by the United Nation's Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament. The
treaty was first opened for signatures in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. US Ambassador Llewellyn
E. Thompson signs the NPT as Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko watches in Moscow, Russia,
on July 1, 1968.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty is of vital importance for international endeavors in nuclear disarmament.
The Treaty was negotiated and adopted in a political climate characterized by the Cold War’s arms race,
fear of proliferation, and increased risk of use, and, thus, made the world a less safe place. The Treaty
recognizes the US, Russia, the UK, France, and China as five Nuclear Weapons States. The states that
have acquired nuclear weapons after 1968 are, hence, not recognized by the NPT as Nuclear Weapons
States. In 1995, the NPT Review Conference, arranged every fifth year, extended the due date of the
Treaty's objectives to indefinite – unlike the 25 years set in 1968.

Pillars of NPT:

The Non-Proliferation Treaty contains three pillars. Such as:

1. Non-proliferation
2. Disarmament
3. Right to peaceful use of nuclear energy

Non-proliferation means that Nuclear Weapons States cannot transfer nuclear weapons, and explosives or
assist other states to acquire such weapons. Non-nuclear weapons States cannot acquire or control nuclear
weapons or explosives or receive assistance to develop. In addition, the NPT refers to safeguards by the
International Atomic Energy Agency to secure compliance. Thus, the Treaty is dual: States cannot give or
receive nuclear weapons or knowledge of how to develop them.

Provisions

Nuclear & Non-Nuclear Weapon States

(Article IX): The Treaty defines nuclear weapon states (NWS) as those that had manufactured and
detonated a nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967. All the other states are therefore considered
non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). The five nuclear weapon states are China, France, Russia, the
United Kingdom, and the United States.

Nonproliferation
(Articles I, II, III): Nuclear weapon states are not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons
and not to assist, encourage, or induce any NNWS to manufacture or otherwise acquire them. Non-
nuclear weapon states are not to receive nuclear weapons from any transferor and are not to manufacture
or acquire them. NNWS must accept the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on all
nuclear materials on their territories or under their control.

Disarmament

(Article VI): All Parties must pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the
cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Peaceful Use

(Article IV): The Treaty does not affect the right of state parties to develop, produce, and use nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes, provided such activities are in conformity with Articles I and II. All state
parties undertake to facilitate, and have a right to participate, in the exchange of equipment, materials, and
scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The IAEA and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

The IAEA is not a party to the NPT but is entrusted with a key verification role under it. Under the NPT,
the IAEA has a specific role as the international safeguards inspectorate. The IAEA serves also as a
multilateral channel for transferring peaceful applications of nuclear technology:

NPT Article III: The IAEA administers international safeguards to verify that non-nuclear-weapon
States party to the NPT fulfill the non-proliferation commitment they have made, “with a view to
preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive
devices.” NPT Article IV: The IAEA facilitates and provides a channel for endeavors aimed at “the
further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the
territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the
developing areas of the world.”

IAEA Safeguards

Under Article III of the NPT, each non-nuclear-weapon State party undertakes the obligation to conclude
a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Under such an agreement, the IAEA has the right
and obligation to ensure that safeguards are applied on all nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear
activities within the territory of the State, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere,
for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices.

As of the end of 2014, safeguards were applied for 180 states with safeguards agreements in force with
the IAEA. These states include the five Nuclear-Weapon-States party to the NPT with voluntary offer
agreements in force for which safeguards are applied to declared nuclear material in selected facilities or
parts thereof. Twelve non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT had not yet brought comprehensive
safeguards agreements into force as required by Article III of the NPT.

The IAEA has the authority to ensure that countries are using nuclear materials for peaceful purposes
under comprehensive safeguards agreements, but detecting undeclared nuclear activities is a significant
challenge. Additional protocols, based on the 1997 Model Additional Protocol, provide the IAEA with
more tools to access information and locations, improving its ability to verify the peaceful use of nuclear
materials in countries with such agreements. By the end of 2014, 124 states had implemented these
additional protocols. The IAEA was overseeing safeguards in about 1,300 facilities, managing nuclear
materials equivalent to 190,000 significant quantities, involving both fieldwork and evaluations at its
headquarters in Vienna, which included scrutinizing nuclear material accounting reports and other
required information.

Successes of the NPT

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) successfully deterred nuclear proliferation among countries
capable of developing nuclear weapons when the treaty was established. Early adherents like Canada and
Sweden, along with later signatories such as Japan and South Korea, refrained from pursuing nuclear
arms. The United States played a crucial role in dissuading these nations, often offering security
assurances and nuclear umbrellas. Diplomatic pressure and leverage from the U.S. were instrumental in
preventing potential proliferators from acquiring nuclear weapons.

As the Cold War ended in 1989, the NPT gained widespread support from countries like Australia,
Canada, West Germany, Japan, Sweden, and Switzerland, who became active nonproliferation supporters.
These states endorsed nonproliferation efforts, export control regimes, and IAEA safeguards. The NPT
transformed into a near-international norm, creating a global consensus against nuclear proliferation. This
norm facilitated UN Security Council resolutions against Iraq, India, Pakistan, and North Korea's nuclear
programs.

The NPT also allowed for the establishment of regional nuclear-weapon-free zones, which were not
originally mandated but anticipated by Article VII of the treaty. These regional zones, including those in
Southeast Asia, the Pacific, Africa, Central Asia, and Mongolia, complemented the NPT by reinforcing
nonproliferation obligations and providing negative security assurances against nuclear attacks within
those regions.

Challenges of Nonproliferation

The most serious challenge facing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the broader nuclear
nonproliferation regime today is noncompliance with the Treaty's core of nonproliferation obligations by
countries seeking to develop nuclear weapons. Iran, for example, has engaged in a clandestine nuclear
weapons program for many years, in violation of its obligations as a State Party. North Korea also
violated its NPT obligations for many years while a Party to the Treaty.

Noncompliance with the NPT has four significant consequences:

Undermining Core Purpose: Noncompliance erodes the NPT's central purpose of preventing nuclear
proliferation, thereby endangering global peace, security, and the potential for nuclear arms races and
warfare.

Eroding Trust and Cooperation: It weakens the trust and safety essential for international nuclear
cooperation, making nuclear technology transfers for peaceful purposes more difficult, and putting the
benefits at risk.

Hindering Universality: Noncompliance impedes efforts to achieve universal adherence to the NPT, as
failure to respond to violations discourages non-parties from joining and subjecting themselves to its
obligations.

Obstructing Disarmament: It undermines the international community's aspirations for nuclear

disarmament by potentially triggering new arms races and making the elimination of nuclear weapons
more challenging, thereby increasing the risk of nuclear conflict. Nonproliferation compliance is vital for
future disarmament progress.

Nonproliferation Obligations

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) establishes essential nonproliferation obligations for both
nuclear-weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). NWS is forbidden from
transferring nuclear weapons or aiding NNWS in acquiring them, necessitating strong export controls and
risk assessments for technology transfers. NNWS are barred from receiving or developing nuclear
weapons and must establish laws and regulations to enforce these restrictions. Additionally, all NNWS
must enter safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to prevent the
diversion of nuclear material for weapons, and noncompliance with these agreements may also indicate
noncompliance with the NPT. Compliance with these obligations is crucial for the NPT's overarching
goal of preventing nuclear proliferation and maintaining global security.

Compliance Challenges in North Korea

North Korea's history of noncompliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is evident
through its secret nuclear weapons development efforts, which continued despite its treaty membership.
In 2003, North Korea declared its withdrawal from the NPT, and subsequent actions, including a nuclear
detonation in 2006, have resulted in international condemnation. Diplomatic efforts, particularly the Six-
Party Talks involving major regional powers, aim to peacefully resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis. A
February 2007 agreement outlines steps for North Korea's denuclearization and return to the NPT and
IAEA safeguards. While challenges remain, this process offers hope for resolving North Korea's
noncompliance with nuclear nonproliferation norms and underscores the importance of collective efforts
in achieving compliance. States Party to the NPT should support this process to maximize its success.

Compliance Challenges in Iran

Iran's noncompliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is marked by violations of
Articles II and III. The country's clandestine nuclear program, ongoing for two decades, included unsafe-
guarded enrichment activities, plutonium separation, and the procurement of undeclared nuclear
materials. Iran consistently obstructed International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors and
refused to provide vital information. This led to Iran's being found in safeguards noncompliance by the
IAEA Board of Governors in 2003 and 2005, with the matter reported to the UN Security Council in
2006. Iran's continued pursuit of nuclear weapons capabilities was a grave concern, with evidence
suggesting a breach of Article II. In 2006, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1696, demanding
Iran's suspension of enrichment activities. Subsequent resolutions followed: Resolution 1737 in
December 2006, and Resolution 1747 in March 2007, imposing sanctions as Iran defied international
efforts to resolve the issue.