Pols7506-Essay 2: The NPT: Can its discriminatory nature be sustained and do some states have a right to certain weapons?

What did the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty set out to do? Can its discriminatory nature be sustained and do some states have a right to certain weapons?

Introduction

Over the past four decades, global security has evolved, either for better or worse, in conformity with the ups and downs of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT that has become an integral part of contemporary political life is considered to be the cornerstone of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. It is hard to imagine how the world would be like if this regime ceases working, although it is sometimes under great stress, and almost in a fragile state that requires intensive care.

This essay argues that the NPT is designed to perform its ultimate objective of relieving this breakable world from the risk of being shattered into pieces by the power of massive destruction of nuclear weapons. The NPT mirrors a great and honored jointeffort by international community for a better common house free of the bomb. It is very this honorable end (for a world without nuclear weapons), I shall argue, that helps the NPT to transcend its discriminatory nature. The essay starts with an overview of the NPT, providing an account of the three main pillars of the treaty: non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear energy. First, non-proliferation has been long viewed as an important international norm that is vividly illustrated by its achievements in many ways. The indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 marks a significant milestone in this 40-year-old history of this treaty, strongly affirming global determination to abstain from acquiring this kind of devastating weapon. The NPT has nearly reached universality when rallying behind it some 190 signatories, thus limiting real proliferation to minimum level. The fact that some countries successfully rolled back their nuclear programmes and joined the treaty affirms the NPTs appealing quality despite some inherent flaws and empirical setbacks. Second, the peaceful use of nuclear energy is guaranteed and encouraged, leading to the surge in interest in nuclear power as an alternative to traditional source of fossil fuels. The peaceful use of nuclear power, though faced up to some risks of military-purpose potentials resulted in by the access to full fuel cycle activities, makes remarkable contribution to worlds electricity production. Third, gains in disarmament

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Pols7506-Essay 2: The NPT: Can its discriminatory nature be sustained and do some states have a right to certain weapons?

are hard to be reduced to lip-services by nuclear weapons states (NWS), although disarmament is often referred to as the least successful pillar of the NPT. US President Obamas pledging his support to the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons gives new life to the hope of success of the disarmament roadmap produced in 1995 and 2000 RevCon and recently reaffirmed in 2010 RevCon. Nevertheless, complete disarmament remains a long-term goal, if not impossible one.

This essay also examines some ways of making sense of the NPT in the perspective of various theoretical traditions. Views of the NPT as a bargain, coercion or a norm in the eyes of, respectively, neoliberal instituionalists, realists and constructivists all fail to bring about satisfactory elucidation of the NPT per se and its sustainability. As a bargain, the NPT can hardly survive due to clashing interests between NWS and nonnuclear weapon states (NNWS); as coercion, the treaty never gained the collective approval of its indefinite extension; and as a norm, this NPT norm is in odds with more fundamental norm of equality among sovereign states.

The failure in explanation of the treaty by way of theoretical traditions leads the essay to the investigation of the discriminatory nature of the NPT in an effort to justify the survival of the treaty. It is argued that this discrimination is moderated by NWS disarmament obligations on the one hand, and compensated for by NNWSs inalienable right to peaceful use of nuclear energy on the other. The discriminatory nature is also sustained by political expediency in which the NPT is either viewed as a conditional norm (Herrera & Hymans 2011) or logic of inequality (Nye 1985); both arguing that it is proper to apply different rules to different states in certain historical contexts. In this case, discriminatory nature of the NPT can avoid a nuclear war. However, what finally is the underlying reason that sustains the NPT with its discriminatory nature is the interplay of end and means. It is my last argument in this essay that goes less will be better and zero is best (i.e., in terms of nuclear proliferation). Non-proliferation is the key to the less will be better approach, while disarmament to the zero is best.

The NPT: an overview

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Pols7506-Essay 2: The NPT: Can its discriminatory nature be sustained and do some states have a right to certain weapons?

The Treaty on Nuclear Non-Proliferation, according to its literature, reflects an international joint-effort, almost universal, in building a safer common house, a world in the absence of nuclear weapons. It has been since its entry into force in March 1970 deemed as the cornerstone of the international regime that paves the way for the world to move toward the global zero for the bomb. In order to facilitate the feasibility of this ultimate goal, the NPT is designed to promote and achieve three following fundamental objectives (pillars): non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear energy.

As the name of the treaty suggests, nuclear non-proliferation in sense of no more spread of nuclear weapons among states emerges as the central and foremost objective, and is perceived as a common norm. This norm of non-proliferation is not merely introduced in the NPTs preamble as aspiration or desirability of signatories to the treaty, but officially enshrined in the first articles of the treaty. In accordance with Article I, NWS (i.e., China, France, the Soviet Union (Russia), the United Kingdom, and the United States are Treaty-recognized nuclear weapons states as these five states manufactured or exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device before 1 January 1967) are legally obliged not to transfer "nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices" and "not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce" a non-nuclear weapons state to acquire nuclear weapons (NPT, Article I). The non-proliferation norm is once again protected by Article II which legally requires NNWS parties to the NPT not to receive, manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or to "seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons" (NPT, Article II). To ensure that no nuclear weapons in practice could be proliferated, civilian nuclear programs of NNWS parties are subject to the safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which functions to verify that peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall not be translated into nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (NPT, Article III). In a similar way, the pillar of disarmament is mentioned in the NPTs preamble whose language affirms a strong desire of the parties to work toward a prospect where NWS would cease their production of nuclear weapons, liquidate their nuclear stockpiles and completely eliminate their nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles from national arsenals. This strong desire is codified in Article VI that imposes legal obligations on all NPT parties to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a
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treaty on general and complete disarmament (NPT, Article VI). Notwithstanding varied interpretations due to the wording of this article, nuclear disarmament is by no means rejected as an obligation/provision by which every signatory to the NPT is legally bound. This obligation, specified in Article VI, was much clearer interpreted by the International Court of Justice as an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control" (World Court Project 1996).

The NPT also allows and promotes peaceful use of nuclear energy. Regarding this third pillar, NPTs Article IV confirms the inalienable right of all parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. This right also allows NPTs parties to take part in the fullest possible exchange of nuclear technology and materials with other NPT signatory countries for the development of civilian nuclear energy programs so long as these activities are not in violation of NPTs Articles I and II. That is, the right is restricted to nonproliferation obligations by which NPTs parties are bound, i.e., these nuclear programs are not diverted for the development of nuclear weapons. And to deter this diversion, as earlier mentioned, these civilian nuclear programs are, required by the treaty, under strict supervision of the nuclear watchdog established by the treaty: the IAEA.

Nonproliferation

With respect to non-proliferation, achievements have been gained in several aspects. The first and foremost success that merits special attention is the indefinite extension approved by all signatories to the treaty in May 1995. This demonstrates strong commitments of international community to resisting the temptation of possessing and wielding nuclear weapons which, otherwise, may run the risk of driving the world into a nuclear chaos. More importantly, the indefinite extension of the NPT creates precondition for, and paves the way for, the dream of a world free of the bomb to come true. This is the fundamental and underlying reason for the NPT to survive.

Secondly, the gradually growing number of its signatory states articulates great progress of the non-proliferation regime despites some inherent flaws including its discriminatory nature (to be further analysed in detail in this essay). Initially, with 40
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members when the treaty began to go effective in March 1970, the number has currently reached as many as 190 (UNODA 2010), leaving only three states outside the treaty: India, Pakistan and Israel. For over 40 years of operation, the NPT has just experienced the only seceder, North Korea, which withdrew from the treaty in 2003 (Hanson 2005: 302-303). An extremely high proportion of international community having joined the treaty as its parties makes the NPT the regime to have been ratified by more countries than any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement (UNODA 2010). This near universality of the NPT, a testament to the treatys significance, reveals the necessity and appealing quality of this non-proliferation regime. This also epitomizes a big success of NPT. The last but not least evidence of NPTs success in terms of non-proliferation lies in the fact that real proliferation had in fact been very limited so far, with several countries programmes successfully rolled back over the years (Ditchley 2010). Apart from five treaty-recognized nuclear weapons states (i.e., the United States, Russia, France, Britain, and China), only four states more are believed to have developed nuclear weapons. India, Israel, and Pakistan remain the holdouts who have never signed the treaty, while North Korea is the seceder who withdrew from the NPT in 2003. The total number of nine nuclear weapon states up to date has rendered the nonproliferation regime greatly successful, particularly compared to U.S. President John F. Kennedys forecast of 15 or 20 or 25 nations with the bomb in 1970s (Allison 2010 , Nye 1985) and expectations of those who had negotiated it in 1968 (Ditchley 2010). The list of states with nuclear weapons could reach twenty or more, should the non-proliferation regime cease working or collapse (Hanson 2005: 302). The NPT has provided real security for NNWS by creating a norm that their neighbours should not build nuclear weapons (Ditchley 2010). Positive signs have been recorded over the past years. Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa rolled back their nuclear weapons programs and entered the NPT in the 1990s; Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan gave up nuclear weapons left by the Soviet Union on their territories and became NPT non-nuclearweapons parties in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union; Iraq and Libya are now in full compliance with the NPT after their respective nuclear weapons programs were dismantled (Kerr, Paul K. et al. 2010). These developments have not just signaled but indeed underscored the appeal of the nonproliferation regime, contributing to writing into the NPTs success story.
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Pols7506-Essay 2: The NPT: Can its discriminatory nature be sustained and do some states have a right to certain weapons?

From pessimistic perspective, however, one may not view the non-proliferation regime that successful as far as the real spread of the bomb is concerned. Apart from the open declaration of possessing nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan, Israel has employed a long standing policy of deliberate nuclear ambiguity, although this country is believed to have around 100 nuclear weapons (Hanson 2005: 306). North Koreas defying misdeeds of October 2006 and May 2009 nuclear tests amount to challenges that seriously threaten the sustainability of the NPT. The nonproliferation regime is now also faced up to high risks of Iran following suit when this country was found in noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards obligations in 2005 (Kerr et al. 2010). The future risks emanate not only from the rogue state of North Korea and probably nuclear-desirous Iran, but also from Syria that was reported to have not fully cooperated with an investigation into its nuclear activities in February 2010 (Kerr et al. 2010). Similar challenges to the nonproliferation regime may undoubtedly continue to emerge on the way ahead.

Disarmament

Disarmament is often referred to as the least successful pillar of the NPT. Little progress has been made from NPTs inception, even since NWS reiterated their commitments to subsequently moving toward complete disarmament in exchange for NNWSs approval of the indefinite extension in 1995. The ambiguity and vagueness of NPTs Article VI is to blame for this poor achievement as it fails to set out a specific and feasible timetable for all NPT signatories to fulfil their obligations necessary to move in the general direction of nuclear and total disarmament (Hanson 2007: 164; Harvey 2010: 20). More importantly, NWS do not strive for complete disarmament, though over four decades have passed since the NPT took effect (Lamin 2010). This NPTs pillar was seriously deteriorated in the 2005 RevCon by the USs history airbrushing when it insisted on rejecting what it had committed in the previous conferences in 1995 and 2000 (Hanson 2005: 310). This renege of the US not merely rendered the 2005 RevCon concluded in impasse but also pushed the NPT per se to the verge of collapse. The failure of the NPT-recognized nuclear weapons states to disarm themselves of nuclear weapons may, to some extent, bear the responsibility for some

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clandestine misdeeds to develop their own nuclear arsenals of non-nuclear-weapon signatories such as Iran, Syria, and even for the seceder of North Korea.

However, in imperfect practice, progresses made in disarmament could hardly be confined and reduced to merely lip-service by NWS. The worlds nuclear arsenals, though no verification measures applied, must have tremendously reduced over the past years due to disarmament efforts by NWS, especially the US and the Soviet Union (Russia), either bilaterally or unilaterally, such as START I (1991), START II (1993). The US and Russia recently replaced this 1991 START, which expired by the end of 2009, with a new treaty signed on 8 April 2010 (Kerr et al 2010). The landmark success recorded in the area of nuclear disarmament is the package of decisions produced by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference figuring out the three-milestone roadmap for nuclear disarmament: the negotiation and entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the negotiation of a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT), and the determined pursuit of the ultimate goals of general and complete disarmament by all states (Harvey 2010). The roadmap was then strengthened by the 13 practical steps toward nuclear disarmament that were unanimously passed in the 2000 RevCon. Perilous setbacks and mounted tensions that arose in 2005 RevCon were then mitigated, if not neutralized, by US President Obamas Prague speech in 2009 pledging his support to the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons (Obama 2009). Obamas pledges were then reconfirmed by NPT members in 2010 RevCon: all committed to pursue policies that are fully compatible with the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons, including the reaffirming of the 13 Practical Steps (Center for Nonproliferation Studies 2011).

Nevertheless, whether nuclear disarmament can be completely realized or not is an open question. The issue still, definitely, looms large on international security agenda. At present, it is still hard to imagine if any current nuclear weapons state is confident enough to seriously consider eliminating its last nuclear weapons without fear that other countries might acquire them.

Peaceful use of nuclear energy

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Pols7506-Essay 2: The NPT: Can its discriminatory nature be sustained and do some states have a right to certain weapons?

The peaceful use of nuclear energy is guaranteed to the NPT signatories in accordance with Article IV on condition that these activities are subject to IAEA safeguards to ensure no nuclear weapons could be acquired. The pursuit of nuclear power for civil purposes has also been respected and encouraged by the US, although with caution over the proliferation risks of some aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle (Kerr et al 2010). This encouragement plus scarcity and depletion of traditional fuel sources (i.e., fossil fuels) have led to surge in interest in nuclear energy as an alternative in many countries in recent years. It is estimated that, as of December 2009, some 436 reactors were operating in 31 countries, accounting for approximately 14% of the global electricity production (Findlay 2010). According to IAEA, 55 civilian reactors more are under construction across the globe as of February 2010 (Findlay 2010). Nuclear power makes a remarkable contribution to worlds energy and may grow into larger part in the future.

However, the peaceful use of nuclear energy faces challenges: (1) certain controversy in interpretation of NPTs Article IV, and (2) the issue of access to the full range of fuel cycle activities that risk proliferation. As regards Article IV, interpretation of this article raises the question whether the access to the inalienable right to peaceful use of nuclear energy for NNWS is guaranteed even if the state fails to meet its safeguards obligations under Article III? The issue was redressed by the 2000 RevCon (in its Final Document) and UN Security Council (in its Resolution 1887) in such a way that this inalienable right can be assured only by full compliance with the safeguards obligations specified in Article III (Kerr et al 2010). However, some NNWS interpret the issue in a direction that the right to the peaceful applications of nuclear energy should not affected by unresolved safeguards issues because the NPT does not stipulates this, thus supporting some technical cooperation programs with Iran despite this countrys some noncompliance being found by the IAEA (Kerr et al 2010). In the meantime, the access to the full range of fuel cycle activities gives rise to the issue of common concern. The problem lies in the fact that the full fuel cycle may run the risk of proliferation, because uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing to extract plutonium can be used to produce both nuclear fuel and fissile material usable in a nuclear weapon (Harvey 2010). Some NNWS, such as Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, and South Africa, do not want to accept either even voluntary limitations on this access, or strengthened safeguards under the Additional Protocol because,
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Pols7506-Essay 2: The NPT: Can its discriminatory nature be sustained and do some states have a right to certain weapons?

technically, the NPT does not forbid access to enrichment or reprocessing technologies (Kerr et al 2010). The US also seeks to limit the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology, while the discouragement of the spread of these technologies requires various options from states and the IAEA to create additional nuclear fuel supply assurances (Kerr et al 2010). While access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes has long been viewed as an incentive for NNWS to comply with their NPT obligations, the issue of full range of fuel cycle has weakened this incentive.

Making sense of the NPT The NPT is often viewed by scholars as a bargain between the NWS and NNWS (Hanson 2007: 163; Herrera & Hymans 2011; Kerr et al. 2010) according to which the latter pledges not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons in exchange for the formers commitments to ceasing their nuclear arms race and moving toward complete elimination of their nuclear arsenals. NWS also promise to assist and guarantee NNWS with the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy (NPT, Article IV). This explanation of NPT as a bargain is deemed by Herrera & Hymans (2011) to be premised on neoliberal institutionalism. In this perspective, the emphasis of either side would, little doubt, differently focus on the bargains components. For NWS, what preoccupies their security agenda as primary concern is definitely nonproliferation. They concurrently try to distance from their obligations of disarmament, and are less eager to draw attention to the failure of disarmament on their part (Hanson 2005: 303). On the contrary, NNWS, in addition to their deep concern of proliferation, view NWSs disarmament as important encouragement to push for nonproliferation. They press NWS to fulfill their pledges of disarmament on the ground that the continued possession of nuclear weapons by any state provides good incentives for other states to acquire the bomb (Hanson 2005: 304). This character of clashing interests between NWS and NNWS renders the bargain inherently volatile and fragile.

In light of hard-line and self-interested realism, the NPT is explained as coercion the great powers (NWS) impose on the lesser powers (NNWS) through a mix of offers of nuclear guarantees and threats to remove those guarantees (Herrera & Hymans 2011). The underlying bedrock that buttresses this coercion lies in Thucydides, the great
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founder of realism, well-known philosophical saying: The strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept1. This great powers coercive diplomacy, if it is, rests more on stick than carrot. NWS, especially the US, tend to make use of the NPT as a retribution-threatening tool for noncompliance with the nonproliferation regime rather than as promotion of peaceful use of nuclear energy, much less commitment to complete disarmament. This was characterized by the US behavior it showed up in the periodical 2005 RevCon. The US, not just distancing from its undertakings, refused to accept any mention of previous commitments, especially any reference to the promise of elimination of its nuclear arsenal, or of the CTBT made in 2000 (Hanson 2005: 305). Although might is right, it is hard to believe several great powers could successfully coerced almost the rest of the world into joining the treaty, not least when it was indefinitely extended in 1995 (Herrera & Hymans 2011). Coercion is by no means stable and sustainable as it is unfair per se.

In contrast to the aforementioned realist explanation, the NPT is perceived by constructivists as an international, if not universal, norm to be respected, valued and shared by international community. This elucidation of the NPT seems to go on the right tract of contemporary international order that is best captured by an image of international society in which states conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions (Bull 1977:13). However, Herrera & Hymans (2011) reject the explanation of the NPT as an international norm because, they claim, the NPT norm is quite unlike the norms constructivists usually study. While most international norms reinforce the bedrock constitutive norm of the international society of states: sovereign state equality, the NPT norm violates this fundamental norm (Herrera & Hymans 2011). The argument of Herrera & Hymans proves flawless and amply persuasive because the first common value or norm states become conscious of and share in any interaction with one another in international society must be the principle of equality. This principle requires fair and equal treatment among sovereign states without any discrimination. In the meantime, by categorizing states into two classes: the nuclear haves and the nuclear have-nots, the NPT is inherently discriminatory in nature. NPTs discriminatory nature and the right to certain weapons of certain countries

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The NPT holds its explicitly discriminatory nature by creating a presumably unequal non-proliferation regime by whose restrictions parties are not equally bound. It enshrines the right of the five officially-recognized nuclear weapons states to possess the bomb, while categorically ruling out the right to their possession by all others (Herrera & Hymans 2011). In this sense, the NPT recognizes a double standard that favors NWS just because they were faster on the one hand, and simultaneously deprives NNWS of the same right as they are slower on the other.

This discriminatory character has been a great challenge to the legitimacy of, and even the survival of, the NPT as an international norm of nuclear nonproliferation. There is little doubt that it makes the NPT inherently weak and volatile to certain degree, because a norm/regime which seems inequitable to many risks irrelevance. Some scholars and experts even unequivocally forecast an imminent collapse soon after the treaty began to take effect (Herrera & Hymans 2011). In fact, the NPT was strongly criticized by major holdouts of Argentina, Brazil and India, when it was posited for debate in the UN General Assembly in 1968. The NPT, for its discriminatory nature, was even accused by Argentina of legitimizing the disarmament of the unarmed (Carranza 2006). It was for this reason of discriminatory nature of the treaty that China and France, the two treaty-recognized nuclear weapons states, did not join the NPT until 1992. This discrimination is also viewed as the underlying reason why the NPT has not succeeded in gaining its universality (i.e., to be ratified by all states) though over 40 years have elapsed since its inception in 1970 (Lamin 2010). This nonuniversality of the Treaty can undermine the foundation of the non-proliferation regime (Lamin 2010) as it accepts the existence of unofficial nuclear states which in turn incentivize, or at least tempt, others to taste the forbidden fruit. Until recently, this discriminatory nature continued to be seen by many participants of 2010 RevCon as an issue that kept the NPT, though survived, still in intensive care (Ditchley 2010). The perception of double standards by parties to the NPT perpetuates threats looming over the inherently fragile non-proliferation regime. The double standards that provide different states with different rights could put the world under risk of being split into good/responsible countries and bad/irresponsible countries, which is unacceptable (Ditchley 2010). In fact, there are good reasons for NNWS to persist raising voice against this discriminatory nature of the NPT. There are

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no undertakings by NWS not to use their nuclear weapons against a NNWS party that have been formally incorporated into the treaty. Empirical experiences demonstrate that NWS has no less than once explicitly not excluded the possibility of the use of their nuclear weapons in response to attacks either by rogue state or state-sponsored terrorists.2 In worst possible scenarios, discriminatory character of the NPT is by little means exempted from being assumed in sense of allowing some states a right to possess (possibly use) certain weapons (nuclear weapons included). The implicative assumption this way may lead to the fact that some states may wield this monster to advance their own interests in global politics, manipulating some states and intimidating others to seek advantage. For example, the US used to rest on its strategic nuclear superiority over China and the Soviet Union to impose its coercive diplomacy in dealing with, respectively, the Taiwan Strait Crises in the 1950s, 1996, and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 (George 1991). This may give rise to two possibilities (1) some states succumb to temptation of possessing nuclear weapons to seek hegemony like the US, and (2) others pursue this kind of weapons at any cost in order to have it as an important deterrent to any intimidation or attacks from outside, probably North Korea. Either may result in bankruptcy of the NPT. Ditchley (2010) even arrives at a warning conclusion that the norm against proliferation could not be sustained unless there was also a norm against possession too.

However, the NPT has survived as the cornerstone of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime (without any institutional change) despite its discriminatory nature. Unless it is overblown, this discriminatory character is sustained in sense that some states are more equal than others due to an array of following factors. First of all, according to the literature of the NPT, this discriminatory nature is moderated by NWS commitments and obligations to moving toward complete nuclear disarmament (NPT, Article VI). This immediately reduces discontent of NNWS as this discrimination is generally perceived as temporary result of historical context, and inequality is just momentary. Article VI clearly breeds and feeds the hope among NNWS that there soon comes a world free of nuclear weapons, which means that discriminatory nature no longer exists. Moreover, disadvantages NNWS incur (or perceive) as a result of the discriminatory character of the NPT is somewhat

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compensated for by Article IV according to which NNWS should be assisted with the transfer and use of nuclear materials and technology for peaceful purposes.

Secondly, the discriminatory character of the NPT is not actually taken as severely as expected due to, or/and for the sake of, the political expediency in international arena. It is clear that global politics has never exited the international system whose ordering principle is anarchy, the absence of overriding authority to regulate. In theory, all sovereign states are of formal equality, but in fact somewhat of informal inequality. Kang (2003: 166) goes much further to explicitly recognize that nation-states are not equal when acting on the world stage. States, therefore, have to learn to accept differences as legitimate; and the NPT is a quintessence. Differences inherent in the NPT, according to Herrera & Hymans (2011), however, are not just the result of great power sticks and carrots, either the weapons of the weak, but regarded as a conditional norm. The historical context or political expediency of international security and stability convince states into believing that it is proper to apply different rules to different statesindeed, that it is more proper than applying the same rules to all states (Herrera & Hymans 2011). Acceptance of these differences in the NPT is, to greater extent, synonymous with avoidance of mounted tensions and disastrous dangers possibly resulted in by unnecessary nuclear arms race that may spiral out of control. The discriminatory NPT defined as a conditional norm is accepted by states as appropriate and legitimate in this similar sense. They support the norm (nonproliferation) not because of the lack of their knowledge about what really behind the depository parties rhetoric of common security of their NPT design, but because they really perceive it is better for common security of which their own security is composed. In a much similar way, the discriminatory nature of the NPT is justified by the logic of inequality (Nye 1985). This logic lies in the fact that nuclear equality at the moment the NPT was opened for ratification might significantly increase the risk of nuclear war (Nye 1985: 124). This nuclear equality, he explains, means either all or none are allowed to possess nuclear weapons, and he unhesitatingly confirms, under the condition of the heyday of the nuclear deterrence theory, that either is dangerous (Nye 1985: 124). Most of the states, therefore, accepted nuclear inequality as a better

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alternative to global security and stability, as also too the right of some states (P5) to possessing nuclear weapons.

In the abstract, this argument leads to another more fundamental factor that sustains and perpetuates the oft-cited issue of NPTs discriminatory nature: the interplay between end and means. Take non-proliferation, disarmament and discriminatory character of NPT into consideration vis-a-vis global security. If global security is the foremost and ultimate goal all states aspire to, then, it is clear that both nonproliferation and disarmament are good for security. Abortion of this discriminatory character may risk jeopardizing global security in such a way that it enables all states wield nuclear weapons! On the contrary, even if NWS fail to completely do what they promise, i.e., they refuse to disarm their nuclear arsenals, it is widely believed that the world would be safer with rather without the NPT. This belief relies heavily on a strong argument that says no to the deterrence dogma on the ground that it is better to be safe than worry (Mcc Gwire 1985: 55). The real survival of the NPT for over four decades reaffirms the view of deterrence as the problem rather than the solution (Mcc Gwire 1985), thus making outdated the Cold Wars dominant nuclear deterrence theory. It also rejects Kenneth Waltz (1981) more may be better thesis, getting nearer to the approach less will be better and zero is best. Non-proliferation is the key to the less will be better approach, while disarmament to the zero is best. This is probably the underlying reason for the NPT to be sufficiently able to mitigate, if not neutralize, its discriminatory nature. In this case, it appears that the compromise between NWS and NNWS emerges from an argument in which end is used to justify means. Every states right to acquiring any kind of weapons necessary for its selfdefence, including equality in nuclear weapons, gives way to the safety of all states. As Nye (1985: 127) claims most states are likely to accept some ordered inequality in weaponry because anarchic equality appears more dangerous. Anyhow, the NPT does more good than harm, even if with its discriminatory nature.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, opened for signing in 1968 and entering into force two years later (1970), has been widely viewed extraordinarily successful because it remains the most adhered-to treaty in the world, and has been
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instrumental in limiting the number of nuclear weapon states (Hanson 2005: 302). The NPTs success story, as earlier analysed in the essay, can be read most in the pillar of non-proliferation and less in peaceful use of this special energy, while least in the field of disarmament. This reflects the central goal of the treaty, as its name-the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty- suggests, that is to cease proliferation in the most efficient manner. This goal reflects the aspiration of almost all humankind, thus perpetuating the life of the NPT.

That the sustainability or resilience of the NPT lies beyond traditional explanations of international relations theories (Herrera & Hymans 2011), be they neoliberal institutionalism, realism, or constructivism, rests on more important foundation: the NPT is intended for common good. It is this common good that mitigates, and nullifies, the NPTs explicitly discriminatory character. As a result, despite speculations about an immature demise, the Treaty on Nuclear Non-Proliferation has survived, if not flourished, for over four decades.

Notes 1. The Melian Dialogue from The History of the Peloponnesian War by Thucydides. Translated by Rex Warner. Harmondsword: Penguin Classics 1954. Pp 400-408. 2. See UK 'Prepared to Use Nuclear Weapons', 20 Match 2002. Available at [Link] France 'Would Use Nuclear Arms', 19 January 2006. Available at [Link] Chirac: Nuclear Response to Terrorism Is Possible, 20 January 2006. Available at [Link]

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