Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

 By the late 1960s, the world realised that nuclear weapons were not
merely massively destructive but, because of the way they would be
employed, could lead to the practical annihilation of life on the
planet.
 As movies such as Dr Strangelove (1964) showed, nuclear weapons
were not ordinary weapons that you could use a few at a time in a
few places.

 Rather, a nuclear strike would be overwhelming with the

attacker going all out at the adversary’s arsenal and population
centres. Fearing this, the adversary would pre-empt such a
devastating attack by launching an all-out attack first.
 So, the world’s governments negotiated a deal. Those who had
already tested nuclear weapons before 1 January 1967 would
disarm over a period of time and the rest would be prohibited from
building any.
  The United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and
Communist China agreed to eventually give up their nuclear
weapons, but argued that they could hardly be expected to do so
while they were in the middle of a Cold War.

Important provisions of NPT

 The NPT is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to

prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons
technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear
disarmament and general and complete disarmament.
 The Treaty represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral
treaty to the goal of disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States.
 Opened for signature in 1968, the Treaty entered into force in 1970.
On 11 May 1995, the Treaty was extended indefinitely.
 A total of 191 States have joined the Treaty, including the five
nuclear-weapon States.
 More countries have ratified the NPT than any other arms limitation
and disarmament agreement, a testament to the Treaty’s significance.
 To further the goal of non-proliferation and as a confidence-building
measure between States parties, the Treaty establishes a safeguards
system under the responsibility of the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA).
 Safeguards are used to verify compliance with the Treaty through
inspections conducted by the IAEA.
 Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to
transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive
devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist,
encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive
devices.
 Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not
to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such
weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance
in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices
 Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable
right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research,
production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes
without discrimination
 Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of
Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to
 review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the
purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being
realised.
 At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the
Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the
Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with
the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

 Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right
to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events,
related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the
supreme interests of its country.

 It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other parties to the

Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in
advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary
events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

 Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a

conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall
continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an
additional fixed period or periods.

 This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty

 On 11 May 1995, in accordance with article X, paragraph 2, the

Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons decided that the Treaty should
continue in force indefinitely .

India’s opposition to the treaty

 The Lok Sabha debated the NPT on 5 April 1968. The then Prime
Minister late Smt. Indira Gandhi assured the house that "we shall be
guided entirely by our self-enlightenment and the
considerations of national security".

 She highlighted the shortcomings of the NPT whilst reemphasising

the country's commitment to nuclear disarmament.

 She warned the house and the country "that not signing the Treaty
may bring the nation many difficulties. It may mean the
stoppage of aid and stoppage of help. Since we are taking this
decision together, we must all be together in facing its
consequences".

What is the current status

 Through the 1980s and 1990s, China helped Pakistan and North
Korea build their arsenals because they could serve as its proxies in
pinning down the United States.
 Observing the relative fortunes of Saddam Hussein (who didn’t
have nuclear weapons), Muammar Gaddafi (who abandoned
Libya’s nuclear project) and Pervez Musharraf (who became the
toast of Washington DC), the Iranian ayatollahs concluded that
possessing nuclear weapons will protect their regime from external
aggression.
 When Tehran came close to a bomb, the Saudis signalled that they
too had access to a bomb — quite possibly built for them by the
Pakistanis.
 For the past few years, South Korea and Japan have
been contemplating whether they must go nuclear given that two of
 their unfriendly neighbours are nuclear-armed, and the reliability of
the US nuclear umbrella is doubtful.
 In other words, whether they signed the NPT or not, countries that
see a need for nuclear weapons have acquired them. This won’t
change in the future.

Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)

 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a multinational body concerned

with reducing nuclear proliferation by controlling the export
and re-transfer of materials that may be applicable to nuclear
weapon development and by improving safeguards and protection
on existing materials.
 It regulates nuclear commerce worldwide.
 NSG has 48 members.
 India is not a part of the group

India and NSG:

 Since 2008, India has sought membership in the NSG.

  The NSG had granted India a clean waiver from its existing rules,
which forbid nuclear trade with a country which has not signed the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT).
 India had also submitted its membership application to the NSG in
May 2016, a month before the Seoul plenary of the Group.

 However at the Seoul plenary group, India’s membership was

blocked by China.

Roadblocks in India’s NSG membership:

 NSG operates by consensus and all its current members are

signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
 China has relied on an obstructionist argument claiming that a
compulsory requirement for NSG membership is that they must
be signatories to the NPT.
  China equates India with Pakistan which has an established history of
nuclear proliferation.

Significance of NSG for India:

 The NSG is the top club of countries which controls access to

technology and guards against proliferation
 Its membership important for India to access cutting-edge high
technology.

 Access to technology and being allowed to produce nuclear

equipment will give a boost to the Make in India program. That will,
in turn, boost the economic growth of our country.
 As per India’s INDC under the Paris Climate agreement, we have
committed to reducing dependence on fossil fuels and ensuring that
40% of its energy is sourced from renewable and clean sources.
 In order to achieve this target, we need to scale up nuclear power
production. This can only happen if India gains access to the NSG.
 It will improve legitimacy of India’s nuclear programme and India
can sign nuclear deal with more countries for civilian use.
 India will become an active member in stopping the proliferation
of nuclear material .
  Will get more information about how much nuclear material is
possessed by which country
 Many countries have refused to signed civil nuclear deal with India
because it is not a signatory of NPT or not a member of NSG. For
India’s energy security Nuclear reactors are necessary.

Why India is a legitimate entrant to NSG?

 India has maintained an exceptional record in nuclear non-

proliferation despite not being any under legal obligation. India had
been an ardent supporter of complete nuclear disarmament
 It has maintained a strong commitment to controlling exports of
nuclear materials, equipment and technologies.
 After 1998 nuclear tests when India became a nuclear weapon
It has been a voluntary adherent to the NSG guidelines for last one
decade.
 The exceptional waiver provided by the NSG in 2008 was an
acknowledgement of India’s non-proliferation record.
 India has declared moratorium on the underground nuclear
weapons testing which is in accordance with the spirit of NPT.
 This shows that India has abided by the non-proliferation rules even
without being a party to NPT.
 India pledged to subject its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards
and currently 14 out of 23 nuclear reactors are already under IAEA
safeguard.
 Autonomous institute like AEC to keep strict vigil on nuclear
facilities; advanced security provisions in nuclear sites; stable
democracy with diffused decision making power
 Also, India’s need for developing nuclear weapons is not driven by
any misguided agenda to pursue regional dominance or to strong
arm neighbouring states, but by pragmatic realisation of threat from
China and Pakistan, both nuclear powered states, one communists
and other failed democratic state in the immediate neighbourhood.
India has also committed to the policy of no-first use.