Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz

Institut für Politikwissenschaft Seminar: Sem (MA/MEd) EU-US Relations: Policies and Politics
Leitung: Dr. Arne Niemann
Seminar besucht im Wintersemester 2021/22
Modulprüfung WS 2021/2022 im Modul Fachwissenschaftliche Vertiefung M.Ed.

Biden’s America, the EU, and Climate Action – futile

or fruitful?

Simon El Rayah
Raimundistraße 25
55118 Mainz
E-Mail: selrayah@students.uni-mainz.de

Matrikelnummer: 2727805
Studiengang: M.Ed.
Sozialkunde 1. FS
Englisch 1. FS
Spanisch Erweiterungsprüfung 3. FS
Table of Content
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1
2. Influences on climate and climate action ........................................................................... 2
3. EU Climate Policy and Climate Reality ............................................................................. 3
4. US Climate Policy and Climate Reality ............................................................................. 6
5. Differences and Consensus ............................................................................................... 10
6. Conclusion and Outlook ................................................................................................... 13
Sources ..................................................................................................................................... 16
 1. Introduction
According to the European Commission in a 2021 survey, 93% of Europeans in the EU believe
climate change to be a serious problem. 92% of Europeans think that policymakers of their
respective country should set ambitious goals to increase the amount of renewable energy that
is used in everyday life (European Commission 2021b). In a large-scale survey by the Yale
program on climate change communication from the year 2021, 65% of Americans state that
they are worried about climate change and 72% agree with the statement that global warming
is happening. Furthermore, 52% of Americans state that climate change is an issue that should
be addressed by the current Biden administration and 55% state that the next administration
should tackle the issue (Marlon et al. 2022). While the items in these surveys differ, the general
assertion of the situation by the broad public as well as recognizing the need for climate action
seems to differ strongly when comparing the US and the EU. Shifting the view from the
perception of the public to actual policies we can see that the need for action is acknowledged.
The UN Climate Change Summit 2021 in Glasgow resulted in concrete goals for years to come.
Despite the ambitious goals set at the summit, the reality of climate change would require more
ambitious goals and even the most optimistic scenario would not keep global warming in the
required 1.5 degrees centigrade (compared to pre-industrial levels) limit required to prevent the
initiation of irreversible environmental damage (Stockwell et al. 2021:1-2; Tachiiri et al. 2019).
Contributing to the rise in temperature are greenhouse gasses (henceforth abbreviated as GHG).
According to OECD-Data1, the US is the country with the second largest annual GHG emission
of around 6.5 million metric tons; closely followed by EU with around 4 million metric tons,
which makes both key players in the combat against climate change. The dependency on other
players distinguishes the issue of climate change from other policy areas and requires more
international cooperation than other issues. The Trump administration has challenged the trust
governments all over the world have in the US government and especially in policymaking
directed towards environmental issues and therefore has made cooperation on these issues more
difficult. During that time the view of the US in general stayed mostly favorable (Wike et al.
2020) which implies that cooperation issues arose from the Trump administration rather than
the US’ environmental record and the Biden administration could reestablish policy ties that
have been cut. Considering the reality of the US economy and infrastructure and its dependency
on fossil fuels this work will investigate how the Biden administrations ambitious
environmental policy plans might not lead to an increased cooperation between the US and the

1
Greenhouse gas emissions (oecd.org)
EU. Furthermore, it will look at the feasibility of the Biden administration’s plans and their
compatibility with EU environmental policies. Since the Biden administration is only the
representation and reflection of the greater US society, social and through that, socio-political
aspects will be taken into consideration to analyze the state of current climate action and the
prognosis of its future.

2. Influences on climate and climate action

Influences on climate and climate action can be latent and manifest. Manifest influences are
factors that influence the climate directly, like GHG emissions or pollution of ecosystems.
Latent influences are factors like environmental policies or opinions and perception of issues
concerning climate. In the following, aspects will be described, in order to provide comparative
groundwork for the analysis of EU – US cooperation. It is crucial for the comparison to know
how the two might differ in certain aspects and how small or extensive the discrepancy between
the EU and the US is, in order to comprehend clearly whether cooperation is realistic or not.

a) Emissions and pollution

GHG emissions and pollution of waters and ecosystems are the most manifest and direct
negative influences on the environment and climate change. From a quantitative perspective
they can be compared directly and progress or a decline in climate action can be measured by
these factors.

b) Policy making, legislative process and governance structure

Depending on how the policy making and legislative process work, climate action can be
tackled differently and implemented with varying time discrepancies. The time it takes for
ideas to turn into policies depends on the legislative process and the composition of law- and
policymakers in the respective governance structures that are responsible for changing climate
reality in the country. Another factor is the organization of environmental politics and how new
rules, and regulation can be implemented, since most environmental problems require a
geographically wide approach and remain ineffective without transborder cooperation.

c) Civil society and public opinion

A driving force in promoting climate action are civil society organizations (CSO), non-
governmental and non-business organizations. They take it upon them to frame the issue for
the public and bring climate change to awareness. This factor is a latent factor for climate action
but most crucial. This aspect is closely tied to b), due to the democratic nature of the EU and
US political system and therefore relatively close ties of lawmakers to their constituents.
Another defining aspect of this is the publics perception of climate change as an issue and its
dependency on sustainable or unsustainable infrastructure.

d) Fiscal means and infrastructure

Climate change requires economies to change, adapt and invest in more sustainable
infrastructure. The challenge for most countries lies in the heavy investment required to
become more environmentally sustainable while still ensuring economic growth. The two most
popular economic models for that are 1. Growth: maintaining economic growth while trying to
lower GHG emissions, which is the current dominant strategy and does not yield promising
results and 2. De-Growth: The reduction of global consumption as well as production in order
to lower GHG emissions and pollution. De-Growth is not only an economic model but a social,
political and ecological model as well (Priewe 2021). It is furthermore important to be familiar
with the economy’s reliance and dependance on fossil fuels and how quickly or if the
dependency on fossil fuels, as required by respective industries, can be replaced at all.

3. EU Climate Policy and Climate Reality

Climate Action Tracker2 (CAT) is a collaboration of independent scientific institutes who
specialize in analyzing and tracking climate action of governments and other international and
supranational institutions and regimes. It evaluates the EU’s overall performance in combatting
climate change as insufficient. The EU’s current policies and domestic targets would keep the
temperature increase below 2 degrees centigrade (compared to preindustrial levels). CAT
considers historical responsibility, size of the country and economy as well as fiscal capabilities
of respective players in the international field to evaluate a fair share a country or supranational
institution like the EU should contribute. With respect to these factors, the EU’s plans and
ambitions are clearly insufficient and will push the rise in temperature to well above 2 degrees
Celsius. It needs to be acknowledged that the EU’s emissions have decreased steadily since
20173 which could result in a more than 30% decrease by 2030, if the trend is kept up. Since
the European Green Deal, the EU has further launched the fit for 554 package in 2021, which
specifies and expands some goals of the Green Deal, by tackling and incentivizing change in

2
The Climate Action Tracker | Climate Action Tracker
3
Greenhouse gas emissions (oecd.org)
4
Fit for 55 | Legislative train schedule | European Parliament (europa.eu)
specific industries like the energy or transportation industry as well as making these industries
more resilient to adaptations towards sustainability.

CAT also provides data for emission records from a) industry, b) transportation, c) buildings,
d) agriculture, e) forestry, and f) waste management. According to this data, emissions from a)
industry in 2019 added up to 9,4% of all EU emissions, with plans on remodeling towards a
more hydrogen reliant industrial sector (European Commission 2020a). b) Transportation in
2019 added up to 23%, which is a 9% increase, compared to 1990. In 2021 15% of vehicles
were electrically chargeable with a bigger share of electric vehicles in the Scandinavian
countries and Finland, which has also to do with the required infrastructure for electric charging.
The emissions from privately and commercially used c) buildings in the EU in 2021 added up
to 36% of overall emissions (as well as 40% of overall consumed energy), which is the largest
emission factor and lead to the planning of requiring new buildings to be zero-emission, starting
2027. Furthermore, renovations are to tackle energy-efficiency and lower emissions (European
Commission 2021a). Emissions from d) agriculture in 2019 were less than 11%, which, through
the incentivization of carbon farming, shall be reduced further by 2030. e) Forestry is foremost
a factor of equalizing emissions through natural reduction of atmospheric CO2 by trees. The
EU aspires to balance out 310 metric tons of GHG annually by 2030. Emissions of waste
management in the EU total to 3.2% in 2021 and has registered a significant decrease in recent
years. The emissions from waste management are to be tackled mostly through the reduction
of overall waste and more efficient and sustainability-oriented recycling process (European
Commission 2020b).

The European Green Deal has been approved in 2020 by the European Commission
with the plan to make Europe the first carbon neutral continent in the world by 2050 and to
reduce GHG emissions by at least 50% by 2030 compared to 1990 levels (European
Commission 2019). The prospected budged for the next 10 years are 1 trillion Euros, which
earmarks deliberate investments into European industries to renew, or build from scratch,
methods, and ways to decarbonize, become more energy efficient and less dependent on fossil
fuels by switching to renewable energies. Another rational behind industrial investments is to
incentivize and initiate a spillover effect into industries of other countries and create more
sustainable supply chains (Bechberger, Thiele, and Neumann 2020:77). The EU vows to spend
at least 25% of all expenditure on climate-related projects between 2021-20275. As of 2020 the

5
Supporting climate action through the EU budget (europa.eu)
average EU member state spent 2% of its annual GDP on environmental protection which adds
up to around 300 billion6. It is also to be noted that the recent aggression of Russian forces on
Ukraine has shown that European energy supply is not only a question of environmental policy
but security policy.

The most important legislative body, concerning climate action in the EU is the
European Commission. It is comprised of commissioners from each of the EU member states
and is through this mechanism practically non-partisan. In terms of implementation and data
however, the Commission is dependent on the reliability of the data and action provided by the
respective member state (Egenhofer et al. 2011:4; Skjærseth, Bang, and Schreurs 2013:66).
The commission can propose legislation to the European Council and collaborates closely with
respective member states, NGOs, industries, interest and expert groups (Skjærseth, Bang, and
Schreurs 2013:67). The EU decision making process focusses primarily on finding consensus
through unanimity rather than mere majorities and abiding by decisions requiring power
struggles (Tsebelis 2013:7). The European Commission is only very distantly tied to
constituents of the respective member state representative and can therefore act upon and set
long term goals that are decided mostly unanimously, which simplifies the implementation
(Skjærseth, Bang, and Schreurs 2013:70).

The EU is trying to be a strong foreign policy influence, by being vocal about climate
action ambitions and plans on a multilateral level, by setting a precedent on climate action
policies, and by establishing bilateral partnerships with developing countries on specifically
climate related issues. Schunz defines the EU as of 2014, as a “multilateral, diplomany-focused
and policy-oriented foreign policy actor” and has attributed medium international and
multilateral influence to it (Schunz 2014:302). The European Green Deal and Fit for 55
promise to establish an increased influence of the EU by leading the way towards a more
sustainable global economy, albeit the current European conflict, caused by Russian aggression
has proven that the EU is far from being autarkic when it comes to energy, thus far from being
a global role model of a low-fossil – low-emission – economy.

6
Environmental protection expenditure accounts - Statistics Explained (europa.eu)
 4. US Climate Policy and Climate Reality
Before US climate reality and policies are presented and evaluated it should be note that the
US does not have coherent and comprehensive nationwide environmental legislation and to
evaluate the state of climate action in the US one needs to regard climate action in the respective
states and investigate the legislative process and current law on climate action as well as the
factors influencing this process and the people involved in it. Specific state policies will not be
investigated thoroughly since they do not have a strong and direct influence on EU-US
cooperation. The social and economic environment as well as governance procedures through
which the federal government operates are more interesting and instrumental to the explanation
of why cooperation might or might work.

CAT 7 evaluates the US’s overall climate action rating as insufficient, with their
financial share in relation to their historical and current share in GHG emission being critically
insufficient. In an executive order from January 2021, the Biden administration has rejoined
the Paris Agreement and declared plans to tackle the policy changes made by the Trump
administration that did not go in accordance with general scientific consensus. Washington has
agreed to decarbonize the power sector by 2035, which is consistent with the Paris Agreement.
Furthermore, the Biden administration declared their goal of becoming carbon neutral by 2050
(Climate Action Tracker 2021). Before talking about specific policies, the US’s environmental
policy system needs to be clarified in order to give an understanding of the reasons for action
and inaction, respectively, concerning climate change. The overarching federalism of US
politics does not halt at climate change. A result of this system is that there is no coherent
national policy combatting climate change, which in turn results in scattered and localized
policies (Selin and Vandeveer 2012:2). The localized approach offers opportunity, like a more
diverse trial and error approach to certain issues, by which effective measures can be isolated
and replicated, albeit many processes that would require nation-wide implementation are
impeded by this stern environmental federalism. This further leads to policy-making and -
implementation that is tied more closely to public, private and civil society actors across
various governance levels (Selin and Vandeveer 2012:8). The division between the states on
the matter of climate action makes it more difficult to find federal consensus. The silver lining
in the matter is that states can enact their own policies and through a quasi-trial-and-error,
effective policies can be distilled and be used as a precedent for effective climate action.
Homogenous nationwide climate action would admittedly be difficult to implement in the US

7
USA | Climate Action Tracker
due to its size and differing climatic conditions, ranging from subarctic to hot-humid8. For the
US, these climatic differences offer challenges, like rising sea-levels and droughts as well as
chances like solar and wind power.

There have been great disparities between US-congresses as to their agreement with
policies that tackle or at least control GHG emission, but even the more promising
administrations have not lived up to their potential or at least expectation. A shift from an
isolationist environmental policy of a Bush administration to a more multilaterally oriented set
of environmental policies during the Obama administration was not adequately made, due to
political structures and the composition of the US-congress and its institutionalized conflict
with the office of president, to which Congress has yielded power (Desombre 2012:5;
Martinelli 2007:98). During the Reagan administration, many regulatory mechanisms in
private enterprise were dropped, which lead to a highly profit oriented economy that had no
fiscal nor legal incentive to self-regulate towards sustainability or pro-environment – decisions
that have only been revoked in isolated incidents (Selin and Vandeveer 2012:4-5). Even though
Congress has lost power to the President, its role in policymaking is still vital and its influence
on climate action immediate, as will be explained in the following.

Congress is the institution primarily responsible for climate-oriented legislation but its
reluctance to act – apart from apparent financial risks and expenditure a switch to a carbonless
economy might bear – stems from the fact that, according to business insider9, 100 members
of the 2019 congress – of whom all but one are of the republican party – deny or at least doubt
man made climate change. With 535 members of congress in total, 100 representatives who
will vote against climate action policies, regardless of the quality and extend of the bill, already
paints a relatively gruesome picture of future policy plans. Among those lawmakers, who do
believe in climate change, especially in the Republican party, are many who will refer to
science only as a means of innovation, not as a source for knowledge and policy guidance. This
way they can publicly proclaim to be pro-science and pro-climate action while ultimately
positioning themselves on a conservative anti-climate action, anti-regulation, and pro-fossil
fuels stance on the issue (Mccright and Dunlap 2010). It appeals to constituents who are very
dependent on their cars and maybe themselves doubt climate change. This circumstance will
thus keep anti-climate action lawmakers in office and those who are pro-climate action out of
office, since constituents might not see the need for a changing vote if their representative

8
Climate Zones | Department of Energy
9
Members of Congress Who Have Denied or Doubted Climate Change (businessinsider.com)
superficially supports climate action, or at least does not want to implement any policies that
would regulate towards fewer emissions.

Another aspect that plays an important role in US politics and therefore Congress is the
immediate impact public opinion has on state policymaking. Most issues that are brought up
through public opinion are derived from palpable issues in society, like inflation or lack of
infrastructure – issues that have an immediate effect on those concerned, whose failure to
resolve can be interpreted just as immediately. Climate change differs in this regard, since its
effects come slowly and oftentimes feel like isolated events instead of an interrelated and
interdependent set of events within a system. The concept of shifting baselines – in which slow
but steady change over time is hardly noticed until all is changed – applies in this context as
well, since many effects of climate change only show over time and the results of irreversible
damage might only show years later. This concept also applies to citizens of the EU, but the
public opinion as of now is less relevant since the EU already has a comprehensive plan in
action to combat climate change while the US does not.

In the fiscal year 2021, the EPA (environmental protection agency) spend around 9
billion dollars10, which is an all time high and only the peak of an upward trend. If we consider
inflation the expenditure is however only marginally higher than the years before. This amount
is the largest amount spent on any environmental agency of the country, yet considerably lower
than the amount of money spent in the EU on environmental protection, compared by GDP.
While the average EU expenditure in 2020 amounted to 2% of GDP, US expenditure on the
EPA was at 0,045%. This number is only comparable to some extent, since many
environmental policies are enacted through state policy and therefore do not fully fall under
the federal expenditure umbrella. It still gives an outlook on the humble fiscal means of the
biggest federal agency fighting climate change. In executive order 13990 on January 20th, 2021,
the Biden administration revoked a plethora of the formers president’s changes in climate
action and ordered several other changes to existing law with the intention of saving energy,
diminishing emissions and protecting natural resources and nature, as well as rejoining the
Paris Climate agreement11. The executive order is an effective tool of the president instigate
quick change, yet what is perceived as a positive from the view of climate action can be
reversed just as quickly in case of a new administration in the upcoming election. Furthermore,

10
EPA's Budget and Spending | US EPA
11
Executive Order on Protecting Public Health and the Environment and Restoring Science to Tackle the Climate
Crisis | The White House
executive orders can be contested by the supreme court (Rudalevige 2021:3). The Biden
administration proposed the “build back better”-bill12 with expenditures of around 2 trillion
dollars towards a socially, and environmentally more sustainable economy. The bill would
have to pass the Senate, then the House of Representatives and then be affirmed by the
president to become law. Due to lack of Democratic support by West Virginia Senator Joe
Manchin, the bill is still put on ice in the Senate and is not likely to move forward to the House
of Representatives without changes.

A driving force in framing climate change and promoting or defaming climate action
are civil society organizations (CSOs) and interest groups. They take it upon them to frame the
issue for the public and bring issues surrounding climate change and climate change legislation
to public awareness. Since all lawmakers in Congress can potentially introduce climate bills,
CSOs and interest groups can either frame the issue to the lawmakers’ constituents or to the
lawmakers themselves. These bills can then be sponsored, therefore supported, by other
senators or as very common, be opposed in other bills, challenging the original with an
alternative proposal. Just like CSOs and other interest groups that work towards climate action,
private-enterprise interest groups can try to influence lawmakers and decrease the amount of
restrictive policies that could damage the profits or heighten expenditure in certain industries.
As described earlier, this development towards private-sector solution of environmental issues
has begun during the Reagan administration and has continued until today. The supreme court
case decision Citizens United vs. FED (Federal Election Committee) 13 in 2010 resulted in
exacerbating the issue by deciding that monetary donations from private-enterprise interest
groups or corporations to election campaigns fall under the protection of the first amendment
of the constitution – free speech. This continues to increase the influence of interest groups on
policymakers and their campaigns. Even though climate-oriented interest groups could also
increase their influence, business interest groups have far greater economic means and thus
exercise greater control over policymakers’ campaigns. Additionally, a general aversion of the
US-public towards government involvement (Martinelli 2007:135) decrease the chances for
regulatory practices as a form of climate action.

US infrastructure is highly dependent on cars as the 2019 Census Bureau’s survey

attests. 150 million Americans were surveyed, of which 119 million commuted to work by car
alone and 13 million carpooled, which makes 84.8% of Americans who get to work by car,

12
The Build Back Better Framework | The White House
13
Citizens United v. FEC
85% if we include taxicabs (Burrows, Burd, and Mckenzie 2019:2). This is partly due to the
sheer size of the US and the scarcely populated areas in the Midwest in which a public
transportation infrastructure would be almost futile, thus economically superfluous. The case
for a railway system in these areas is therefore weak, since additionally the infrastructure of
most US towns is designed for motorized transportation and a railway system would only be
sensical in densely populated areas. Busses and car coaches would be the most logical choice
for short and especially long-distance travel, yet to be emission free would require the
expansion of an electric mobility network that allows quick charging. Due to a lack of
alternative, the rural population thus has no option but to sympathize with conservative
policymakers who will continue to curtail legislation that would expand public transport but
rather policies that strengthen the car industry and would therefore benefit the part of the
population that’s highly reliant on cars.

5. Differences and Consensus

While the US and EU are historically allies and together make up more than 40% of global
GDP and trade, differences do come up, especially on the matter of environmental policies,
which impedes cooperation on the issue. The current reality of climate and environmental
issues has already been depicted in parts 3 and 4 and will help to discuss why EU-US
cooperation on the issue of climate change might not be successful under the Biden
administration, provided that a common perspective and common goals will lead to and
simplify cooperation.

Initially one topic that needs to be addressed when talking about the EU and the US is
that the economic strength of both is directly linked to the use of fossil fuels (Hogan 2018) and
developing countries are not blind to the injustice that they suffer from climate change despite
having contributed relatively little to global pollution. Many developing countries accept that
they too must contribute to the saving of the planet but expect a certain proportionality from
larger economies in combating climate change (Gardner 2020:381). This means that a
cooperation of the EU and the US on strong and effective climate action is not only directly
necessary for themselves but necessary to be able to reason credibly with developing countries
like India or Brazil, maybe even China. In order to exert influence over other players mere hard
power is not enough, which could lead to an effective power dynamic between the US’ hard
power and the EU’s soft power approach. “Americans are idealists, but they have no experience
of promoting ideals successfully without power” (Kagan 2002:18) – a quote that encapsulates
the reciprocal dependency of the EU and the US on one another if they want to create
meaningful environmental change. The US has enough financial and military capabilities to
stay on top of transatlantic relations without fearing that the EU outstrip them of their leading
position. However, recent years have shown that the EU has displayed more leadership
qualities policy-wise than the US at important climate summits like Copenhagen and Paris.
Perception of US-leadership in climate summits has correlated and still strongly correlates with
the trust in US-leadership in general (Parker and Karlsson 2018:10-12), which has been low
for the Trump administration and only slightly higher for the Biden administration14. If the
possibility of another Trump presidency is ignored, cooperation and agreement of the US and
the EU on some core issues would be possible, since EU-US allyship on climate change is one
of the crucial points the Biden administration was running on and continues to highlight in
multilateral contexts (Sloan 2021:25;27). Nonetheless effective cooperation for comprehensive
climate action in accordance with scientifically backed data is still unlikely due to far greater
discrepancies in other areas, as will be explained more detailed in the following.

One of the most important factors for the past lack of cooperation and probable
continuation of it, is the disagreement on regulatory practices concerning emissions. This
disagreement stems from differing opinions on the certainty of scientific evidence and the
resulting legislative consequences. While in the EU emission-regulating legislature would be
passed on the basis of ample scientific evidence, US legislation is based in the contrastive
understanding that something should be allowed as long as there is no definite proof that it is
harmful (Gardner 2020:384). The EU relies more on the so-called precautionary-principle,
while the US resorts to the described “sound-science” argument (Carlarne 2010:225-326). As
suggested earlier, the monetary support by interest groups exacerbated this problem is recent
years and in connection with the winner-take-all system of American elections, it has become
easier for said interest groups to single out a candidate to whom funding shall be given. The
trend that political campaigns in 2007 cost more than three times as much as they did 50 years
before that (Martinelli 2007:140) and probably even more nowadays adds to the problem that
policymakers are either dependent on financial support by interest groups or are already very
affluent themselves. This dismissiveness towards regulatory legislation on a national level is
reflected in the reluctance towards multilateral agreements on regulations like the refusal to
ratify the Kyoto Protocol for such a long time (Carlarne 2010:312) and stands in direct contrast
with the emission regulation approach the EU is following.

14
The crisis of American power: How Europeans see Biden’s America – European Council on Foreign Relations
(ecfr.eu)
 Another important factor that separates the EU and the US is the importance of civil
discourse and how this discourse is constituted. Firstly, the fear of individuals to lose their
financial status stands in direct connection to the public’s perception of climate related policies,
because fighting climate change has been framed as opposing financial gains and economic
growth (Carlarne 2010:336). Secondly, historically the US public deems national issues more
important than international ones, even if the US is involved in these conflicts which has
arguably been the case several times in the past decades (Nye 2002:234). However, Nye only
describes a symptom of a larger issue, concerning US public opinion, which has direct
influence on civil discourse, hence policymaking – American exceptionalism. American
exceptionalism is a crucial part of the American identity, performed by blue collar workers and
presidents alike. It describes the notion that the American self-image or in other words,
nationalist ideology, is rooted in the conviction that America is best or at least one of the best
in most disciplines and that American values are the ideal everybody else should strive for
(O’Connor 2019). This in turn results in a loop in which other solutions to problems are
dismissed as unamerican and therefore worse than the American solution. Accepting that the
EU is a global leader in climate action and by that accepting that the US should consider policy
changes that resemble EU policies would therefore be an attack on the US’ self-image and
national identity – an attack that, through the lens of American exceptionalism, would be more
harmful to the nation than climate change. The declining power of the US as a global hegemon,
in comparison to other international players like the EU or most prominently China, acts as a
polarizing factor on civil discourse and solidifies the opinion of those who already feel left
behind, regardless of the conclusiveness of their argument. The prospect of a changing US
national identity is therefore closely linked to changing climate policies. This can be observed
in past climate negotiations like 2009 in Copenhagen, where the EU presented ambitious goals
but the US, under the wings of the new Obama administration, reacted with conservative
positions and the EU was not able to live up to their potential leadership position in the matter
of positive climate action (Groen and Niemann 2013:317). Just as in 2009, today the US wants
to lead the discourse and form multilateral treaties and policies around their ideals. This has
been the case in transatlantic relations for the past decades and is oftentimes accepted as a given
(Knudsen 2020). Concerning climate action and even other policy areas, it might be necessary
to rethink transatlantic relations in order to be able to show credible willingness to cooperate
on climate action.
 The EU’s climate legislation has been continuingly mandatory and incrementally
requires its member states to wane voluntary action, with the reciprocal arrangement of
monetary and epistemic support. The US approach relies on voluntary solutions through the
private sector and offers incentives rather than regulations and mandatory legislation (Carlarne
2010: 246-247).

6. Conclusion and Outlook

The US’ dismissiveness of emission-regulating legislation is a key factor speaking against
successful cooperation between the EU and the US. As long as regulatory practices and
investment into adequate alternatives in industry, infrastructure and transportation are not made,
effective cooperation will not be achievable. If the legislative groundwork that could see the
needed change towards a more sustainable economy is stuck in Capitol Hill, due to political
gridlock and cannot be implemented on a federal level, effective cooperation is unlikely.
Another point contributing to the political divide and therefore impeding cooperation is the
lawmakers’ direct and strong dependance on their partially ill-informed constituents, which
adds to the issue and will continue to cause lawmakers to vote against regulatory legislation.
This dependence is directly linked to the issue of civil discourse that fuels the ill-informed. As
a matter of prudence, Robert Kagan stated that Americans come from Mars and Europeans
from Venus (Kagan 2002:3), but probably not even he could have predicted a Trump
presidency. Trump as a symptom of a spoiled civil discourse in the US that does not allow for
the superiority of ideas not American-born. This issue seeps through American society, which
makes it at crucial factor determining the bleak prospect of collaboration. A gleam of hope on
this issue is that both the US and the EU have their respective competences and could profit
off of one another by supporting the other in their respective field of expertise. The US could
use their international influence and hard power to promote climate action globally and the EU
could serve as a precedent to others, who are in doubt about the successful implementation of
climate action into a growing economy. A certain extend of climate action would need to be
legislated on a federal level in the US to provide credibility towards other countries that effort
is put in by the countries who are historically most responsible for climate change (Hogan
2018). Problematic is that small changes to the US infrastructure and economic system would
not be sufficient, since the country is designed for motorizes transportation and the size of the
country would require substantial rebuilding and a large amount of investment into renewable
energy and sustainable infrastructure.
 The system of governance and the legislative process in the United States does not
promise to change in the near future and it is unlikely that the divide between the Democratic
and the Republican party is going to narrow on most issues and especially not on climate
change. The institutionalization through partisanship with the democratic party of many social
and political groups, but most important for the trajectory of the argument environmental
groups (Grossmann and Hopkins 2016:100), has led to an increased divide between Democrats
and Republicans as well as a divide between those affiliated with the respective party or those
who identify themselves as either Democrat or Republican. Thus, climate action becomes a
matter of partisanship and party affiliation and not a matter of factual issue that concerns all
US-citizens equally. An appeasement of this partisan conflict in the near future is as unlikely
as a reform of the two-party system that’s partly responsible for the political gridlock the US
finds itself in. As long as this political gridlock persists, effective and serious cooperation
between the EU and the US is not only improbable but impossible and as Stanley R. Sloan put
it: “without a strong domestic foundation, it would be difficult to pursue the core Biden
international objectives (27)”. Other literature supports this claim by stating that the key driver
from foreign US policy is domestic US politics and in the matter of climate action the domestic
skepticism towards both climate change and international law (Carlarne 2010:315)

EU climate action would benefit strongly from a more clearly defined authority on
climate and environmental policies – a person or small group of people, whose only
responsibility is to communicate the EU climate and environmental agenda and act as an EU-
foreign policy advocator (Oberthür and Dupont 2021:1107-1109). The EU climate strategy is
already progressive and ambitious but is futile without the effort of others – especially the
larger nations, who have a more significant impact on climate change as well as more affluent
nations who could help to fund poorer countries infrastructural change. Since environmental
change needs to be as ecologically sustainable as it needs to be economically sustainable,
financial incentives by the EU or affiliated actors could help convince less wealthy nations to
adapt environmental policies. These nations need not be forgotten, since supply chains of
poorer countries have to be reforged at the same time, if the meaningful change in our own
economic system is to be sincere and equitable.

The US has deep internal conflict on a societal and political level, which would need to
be addressed before meaningful change through legislation could be achieved. Despite – and
the cynic would say because of – the Biden administrations goals to build a more sustainable
and climate-oriented economy, there is no foreseeable end to this conflict, which suggests that
meaningful EU-US cooperation on climate change that will effectively reduce GHG emissions
and will work towards sustainable growth, is unlikely. The EU is an ambitious actor, who has
shown internally that sustainable growth is possible even though their achievements are not
ample enough to enforce real leadership. The EU’s lack of both enough hard and soft power to
act as a sole leader in multilateral climate action result in zealous efforts that lead to
disproportionate outcome. If the US can accept the EU’s partial leadership on climate action
and the US could overcome or at least alleviate their inner conflicts to use their international
power and influence to support the EU, cooperation is possible. EU-US cooperation would
therefore not stand at the end of effective climate action but at the beginning.

Regardless of the will or capability of the US to cooperate, the EU should continue

advocating for climate action and continue to expand their cooperation with other important
players like China or Africa (European Commission 2022).
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