DELTAVENTURES RESOURCES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. FERNANDO P.

CABATO, PresidingJudge Regional Trial Court, La

Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 62; HON. GELACIO L. RIVERA,JR., Executive Labor Arbiter, NLRC-CAR, Baguio City, ADAM P.
VENTURA, Deputy-Sheriff,NLRC-CAR, Baguio City; ALEJANDRO BERNARDINO, AUGUSTO GRANADOS, PILANDOTANGAY,
NESTOR RABANG, RAY DAYAP, MYRA BAYAONA, VIOLY LIBAO, AIDA LIBAO, JESUSGATCHO and GREGORIO
DULAY,respondents.Oreta Suarez & Narvasa for petitioner.The Solicitor General for public respondents.E.L. Gayo &
Associates for private respondent.

SYNOPSISO

July 15, 1992, a decision was rendered by the National Labor Relations Commission in the NLRC case entitled Alejandro, et
al. vs. Green Mountain Farm, Roberto Ongpin and Almus Alabe. On May 19, 1994, privaterespondents filed before the
Commission a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution as respondent's appeal tothe Commission and the Supreme
Court were respectively denied. On June 16, 1994, the Executive Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution and the sheriff
proceeded to enforce the writ by garnishing certain personal properties to satisfy the monetary award, but proceeded to
levy upon a real property registered in the name of Roberto Ongpin due to inadequacy of the personal property. On July 27,
1994, a month before the scheduled auction sale petitioner filed before the Commission a third-party claim asserting
ownership levied upon by the sheriff's notice of sale . Due to this claim, the Executive Labor Arbiter issued an order
suspending the auction sale until the merits of petitioner's claim had been resolved. Inspite of the filing of the third party
complaint, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet a complaint for injunction and damages with
prayer for the issuance of a TRO. Private respondents-laborers moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of
the court's lack of jurisdiction over the case. On November 7, 1994, after both parties had submitted their respective briefs,
respondent court rendered a decision dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the same was denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Issue:W h e t h e r o r n o t t h e t r i a l c o u r t m a y t a k e c o g n i z a n c e o f t h e c o m p l a i n t f i l e d b y petitioner

and consequently provide the injunction relief sought? –NO.

The Supreme Court found the petition devoid of merit. The Court ruled that the complaint filed before the trial court was for
recovery of possession and injunction, but in essence it was an action challenging the legality orpropriety of the levy vis--
visthe alias writ of execution, including the acts performed by the Labor Arbiter and theDeputy Sheriff implementing the
writ. The complaint was in effect a motion to quash the writ of execution of adecision rendered on a case properly within
the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter, to wit, illegal dismissal and unfairlabor practice. Considering the factual setting, it is
then logical to conclude that the subject matter of the thirdparty claim is but an incident of the labor case, a matter beyond
the jurisdiction of the regional trial courts. Thus,the Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
Judge in denying petitioner's motion for theissuance of an injunction against the execution of the decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission.Accordingly, the petition was denied and the assailed orders of respondent judge were
affirmed.

LORENZO C. DY, ZOSIMO DY, SR., WILLIAM IBERO, RICARDO GARCIA ANDRURAL BANK OF AYUNGON, INC.,
petitioners,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND EXECUTIVE LABOR ARBITERALBERTO L. DALMACION, AND
CARLITO H. VAILOCES, respondents.

Facts:

Private respondent, Carlito H. Vailoces, was the manager of the Rural Bank of Ayungon(Negros Oriental), a banking
institution duly organized under Philippine laws. He wasalso a director and stockholder of the bank.

A special stockholders' meeting was called for the purpose of electing the members ofthe bank's Board of Directors.
Immediately after the election the new Board proceededto elect the bank's executive officers.

Petitioners Lorenzo Dy, William Ibero and Ricardo Garcia were elected president, vice-president and corporate secretary,
respectively. Vailoces was not re-elected as bankmanager, 3 Because of this development, the Board passed Resolution No.
5, series of1983, relieving him as bank manager.

Vailoces filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages with the Ministry of Laborand Employment against Lorenzo Dy
and Zosimo Dy, Sr. The complaint was amendedto include additional respondents-William Ibero, Ricardo Garcia and the
Rural Bank ofAyungon, and additional causes of action for underpayment of salary and non-paymentof living allowance.
Vailoces asserted that Lorenzo Dy, after obtaining control of the majority stock of thebank by buying the shares of Marcelino
Maximo, called an illegal stockholders' meetingand elected a Board of Directors controlled by him; that after its illegal
constitution, saidBoard convened and passed a resolution dismissing him as manager, without givinghim the opportunity to
be heard first; that his dismissal was motivated by Lorenzo Dy'sdesire to take over the management and control of the
bank, not to mention the fact thathe (Dy) harbored ill feelings against Vailoces.

Lorenzo Dy, et al. denied the charge of illegal dismissal. They pointed out that Vailoces'position was an elective one, and he
was not re-elected as bank manager because ofthe Board's loss of confidence in him brought about by his absenteeism and
negligencein the performance of his duties; and that the Board's action was taken to protect the interest of the bank and
was "designed as an internal control measure to secure thecheck and balance of authority within the organization." 5

The Executive Labor Arbiter found that Vailoces was Illegally dismissed because of theresentment of petitioners against
Vailoces which arose from the latter's filing of thecases for recognition as natural child against Zosimo Dy, Sr. and for
violation of thecorporation code against Lorenzo Dy;

and second, because he was not afforded the due process of law when he wasdismissed during the Board meeting the
validity of which is seriously doubted;

Lorenzo Dy, et al. appealed to the NLRC, assigning error to the decision of the LaborArbiter on the ground that Vailoces was
not entitled to notice of the Board meetingwhich decreed his relief because he was no longer a member of the Board on
said date;that he nonetheless had the opportunity to refute the charges against him and seek aformal investigation because
he received a copy of the minutes of said meeting while hewas still the bank manager, instead of which he simply
abandoned the work he wassupposed to perform up to the effective date of his relief; and that the matter of his reliefwas
within the adjudicatory powers of the Securities and Exchange Commission. 7

The NLRC, however bypassed the issues raised and simply dismissed the appeal forhaving been filed late.

In this Court, petitioners assail said ruling as an arbitrary deprivation of their right toappeal through unreasonable
adherence to procedural technicality.

Issue:

W/N the election of directors and the election of officers which resulted in Vailocesfailure to be re-elected, were validly held.

Ruling: Yes.

This is not a case of dismissal. The situation is that of a corporate office having beendeclared vacant, and of Vailoces not
having been elected thereafter. The matter ofwhom to elect is a prerogative that belongs to the Board, and involves the
exercise ofdeliberate choice and the faculty of discriminative selection. Generally speaking, therelationship of a person to
corporation, whether as officer or as agent or employee, isnot determined by the nature of the services performed, but by
the incidents of therelationship as they actually exist. The questioned decision of the Labor Arbiter and the Resolution of the
NLRC dismissingpetitioners' appeal from said decision are hereby set aside because rendered withoutjurisdiction.

CASE DIGEST: RAUL C. COSARE, Petitioner, v. BROADCOM ASIA, INC. and DANTE AREVALO, Respondents.

FACTS: In 1993, Cosare was employed as a salesman by Arevalo, who was then in the business of selling broadcast
equipment needed by television networks and production houses. In December 2000, Arevalo set up the company
Broadcom, still to continue the business of trading communication and broadcast equipment. Cosare was named an
incorporator of Broadcom, having been assigned 100 shares of stock with par value of P1.00 per share. In October 2001,
Cosare was promoted to the position of Assistant Vice President for Sales (AVP for Sales) and Head of the Technical
Coordination.

Sometime in 2003, Alex F. Abiog (Abiog) was appointed as Broadcoms Vice President for Sales and thus, became Cosares
immediate superior. Cosare sent a confidential memo to Arevalo to inform him of the anomalies which were allegedly being
committed by Abiog against the company. Cosare ended his memo by clarifying that he was not interested in Abiogs
position, but only wanted Arevalo to know of the irregularities for the corporations sake.

Apparently, Arevalo failed to act on Cosares accusations. Cosare claimed that he was instead called for a meeting by Arevalo
on March 25, 2009, wherein he was asked to tender his resignation in exchange for "financial assistance" in the amount
ofP300,000.00.Cosare refused to comply with the directive, as signified in a letter which he sent to Arevalo.

Cosare received from Roselyn Villareal (Villareal), Broadcoms Manager for Finance and Administration, a memosigned by
Arevalo, charging him of serious misconduct and willful breach of trust. He was given forty-eight (48) hours from the date
of the memo within which to present his explanation on the charges. He was also "suspended from having access to any
and all company files/records and use of company assets effective immediately."Thus, Cosare claimed that he was
precluded from reporting for work and was instead instructed to wait at the offices receiving section. Upon the specific
instructions of Arevalo, he was also prevented by Villareal from retrieving even his personal belongings from the office until
he was totally barred from entering the company premises.

Cosare filed a labor complaint, claiming that he was constructively dismissed from employment by the respondents. He
further argued that he was illegally suspended, as he placed no serious and imminent threat to the life or property of his
employer and co-employees.

In refuting Cosares complaint, the respondents argued that Cosare was neither illegally suspended nor dismissed from
employment. They also contended that Cosare committed the following acts inimical to the interests of
Broadcom.Furthermore, they contended that Cosare abandoned his job by continually failing to report for work beginning
April 1, 2009, prompting them to issue on April 14, 2009 a memorandumaccusing Cosare of absence without leave
beginning April 1, 2009.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint on the ground of Cosares failure to establish that he was constructively
dismissed.

Cosare appealed the LA decision to the NLRC. It reversed the LA decision.

The respondents motion for reconsideration was denied.Dissatisfied, they filed a petition for certiorari with the CA on the
issues of constructive dismissal and intra-corporate controversy which was within the jurisdiction of the RTC, instead of the
LA. They argued that the case involved a complaint against a corporation filed by a stockholder, who, at the same time, was
a corporate officer.

The CAgranted the respondents petition. It agreed with the respondents contention that the case involved an intra-
corporate controversy which, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 902-A, as amended, was within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the RTC. Hence, this petition filed by Cosare.

ISSUES:

Was the case instituted by Cosare an intra-corporate dispute that was within the original jurisdiction of the
RTC, and not of the LAs?
Was Cosare constructively and illegally dismissed from employment by the respondents?
HELD: An intra-corporate controversy, which falls within the jurisdiction of regular courts, has been regarded in its broad
sense to pertain to disputes that involve any of the following relationships: (1) between the corporation, partnership or
association and the public; (2) between the corporation, partnership or association and the state in so far as its franchise,
permit or license to operate is concerned; (3) between the corporation, partnership or association and its stockholders,
partners, members or officers; and (4) among the stockholders, partners or associates, themselves.Settled jurisprudence,
however, qualifies that when the dispute involves a charge of illegal dismissal, the action may fall under the jurisdiction of
the LAs upon whose jurisdiction, as a rule, falls termination disputes and claims for damages arising from employer-
employee relations as provided in Article 217 of the Labor Code. Consistent with this jurisprudence, the mere fact that
Cosare was a stockholder and an officer of Broadcom at the time the subject controversy developed failed to necessarily
make the case an intra-corporate dispute.

In Matling Industrial and Commercial Corporation v. Coros,the Court distinguished between a "regular employee" and a
"corporate officer" for purposes of establishing the true nature of a dispute or complaint for illegal dismissal and determining
which body has jurisdiction over it. Succinctly, it was explained that "[t]he determination of whether the dismissed officer
was a regular employee or corporate officer unravels the conundrum" of whether a complaint for illegal dismissal is
cognizable by the LA or by the RTC. "In case of the regular employee, the LA has jurisdiction; otherwise, the RTC exercises
the legal authority to adjudicate.

Applying the foregoing to the present case, the LA had the original jurisdiction over the complaint for illegal dismissal
because Cosare, although an officer of Broadcom for being its AVP for Sales, was not a "corporate officer" as the term is
defined by law.

***
There are three specific officers whom a corporation must have under Section 25 of the Corporation Code. These are the
president, secretary and the treasurer. The number of officers is not limited to these three. A corporation may have such
other officers as may be provided for by its by-laws like, but not limited to, the vice-president, cashier, auditor or general
manager. The number of corporate officers is thus limited by law and by the corporations by-laws.

In Tabang v. NLRC, the Court also made the following pronouncement on the nature of corporate offices: there are two
circumstances which must concur in order for an individual to be considered a corporate officer, as against an ordinary
employee or officer, namely: (1) the creation of the position is under the corporations charter or by-laws; and (2) the
election of the officer is by the directors or stockholders. It is only when the officer claiming to have been illegally dismissed
is classified as such corporate officer that the issue is deemed an intra-corporate dispute which falls within the jurisdiction of
the trial courts.

The Court disagrees with the respondents and the CA. The only officers who are specifically listed, and thus with offices that
are created under Broadcoms by-laws are the following: the President, Vice-President, Treasurer and Secretary. Although a
blanket authority provides for the Boards appointment of such other officers as it may deem necessary and proper, the
respondents failed to sufficiently establish that the position of AVP for Sales was created by virtue of an act of Broadcoms
board, and that Cosare was specifically elected or appointed to such position by the directors. No board resolutions to
establish such facts form part of the case records.

The CAs heavy reliance on the contents of the General Information Sheets, which were submitted by the respondents
during the appeal proceedings and which plainly provided that Cosare was an "officer" of Broadcom, was clearly misplaced.
The said documents could neither govern nor establish the nature of the office held by Cosare and his appointment thereto.

Finally, the mere fact that Cosare was a stockholder of Broadcom at the time of the cases filing did not necessarily make the
action an intra-corporate controversy. Not all conflicts between the stockholders and the corporation are classified as intra-
corporate. There are other facts to consider in determining whether the dispute involves corporate matters as to consider
them as intra-corporate controversies.

***

Constructive dismissal occurs when there is cessation of work because continued employment is rendered impossible,
unreasonable, or unlikely as when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay or when a clear discrimination,
insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee leaving the latter with no other option but to
quit.

The Court emphasized in King of Kings Transport, Inc. v. Mamac 553 Phil. 108 the standards to be observed by employers
in complying with the service of notices prior to termination:

The first written notice to be served on the employees should contain the specific causes or grounds for termination against
them, and a directive that the employees are given the opportunity to submit their written explanation within a reasonable
period. "Reasonable opportunity" under the Omnibus Rules means every kind of assistance that management must accord
to the employees to enable them to prepare adequately for their defense. This should be construed as a period of at least
five (5) calendar days from receipt of the notice to give the employees an opportunity to study the accusation against them,
consult a union official or lawyer, gather data and evidence, and decide on the defenses they will raise against the
complaint. Moreover, in order to enable the employees to intelligently prepare their explanation and defenses, the notice
should contain a detailed narration of the facts and circumstances that will serve as basis for the charge against the
employees. A general description of the charge will not suffice. Lastly, the notice should specifically mention which company
rules, if any, are violated and/or which among the grounds under Art. 282 is being charged against the employees.

In sum, the respondents were already resolute on a severance of their working relationship with Cosare, notwithstanding
the facts which could have been established by his explanations and the respondents full investigation on the matter. In
addition to this, the fact that no further investigation and final disposition appeared to have been made by the respondents
on Cosares case only negated the claim that they actually intended to first look into the matter before making a final
determination as to the guilt or innocence of their employee. This also manifested from the fact that even before Cosare
was required to present his side on the charges of serious misconduct and willful breach of trust, he was summoned to
Arevalos office and was asked to tender his immediate resignation in exchange for financial assistance.

The charge of abandonment was inconsistent with this imposed suspension. "Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified
refusal of an employee to resume his employment. To constitute abandonment of work, two elements must concur: (1) the
employee must have failed to report for work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) there
must have been a clear intention on the part of the employee to sever the employer-employee relationship manifested by
some overt act."Cosares failure to report to work beginning April 1, 2009 was neither voluntary nor indicative of an intention
to sever his employment with Broadcom. It was illogical to be requiring him to report for work, and imputing fault when he
failed to do so after he was specifically denied access to all of the company's assets. Hence, the Court held Petitioner was
constructively dismissed by respondent.

***

Court reiterated that an illegally or constructively dismissed employee is entitled to: (1) either reinstatement, if viable, or
separation pay, if reinstatement is no longer viable; and (2) backwages.The award of exemplary damages was also justified
given the NLRC's finding that the respondents acted in bad faith and in a wanton, oppressive and malevolent manner when
they dismissed Cosare. It is also by reason of such bad faith that Arevalo was correctly declared solidarily liable for the
monetary awards.

L-50459 August 25, 1989LEONARDO D. SUARIO, petitioner,vs.BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Davao Branch or The
Manager/Cashier andNATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.FACTS:

Petitioner Leonardo D. Suario was the head of the loan section of respondent BPI in1976. During his employment he
pursued his studies of law with the consent of the BPI.

Sometime in March 1976, Suario verbally requested the then VP and Branch Manager,Mr. Armando N. Guilatico, for a 6-
month leave of absence without pay in order for him totake the pre-bar review in Manila. Mr. Guilatico informed Suario that
there would be noproblem as to the requested leave of absence (LoA).

Sometime in May 1976, Suario received a verbal notice from the new Branch Manager,Mr. Vicente Casino, that he was
approved only a 30 day LOA. However, Mr Guilatico, thenassigned in Head Office as VP advised Mr. Casino to inform Suario
to avail the 30-day LOAand proceed to Manila since the request would be ultimately granted. Suario availed the 30day LOA
and proceeded to Manila.

During the 1st week of August, he received a letter ordering him to report back for worksince his request was disapproved.
He decided not to report back because of theconsiderable expenses already incurred in Manila. Hence, he received an
application for aclearance to terminate on the ground of resignation/or abandonment. Suario failed to file hisopposition
because he was busy taking up the review.

During the 1st week of December 1976, Suario went to respondent BPI but was verballyinformed that he was already
dismissed. He wrote a letter to the respondent bankrequesting for a written and formal advise as to his real status. The
lawyers of BPI repliedthat his service is terminated. Therefore, Suario filed a complaint praying for separation pay,damages
and attorneys fees against the BPI on the ground that he was illegally dismissed.

The Labor Arbiter ordered BPI to pay Suarios claim for separation pay. His claim fordamages and attorneys fee were
dismissed for lack of merit.

On appeal, NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter

Issue

1: Whether NLRC has the authority to entertain claims for moral and other forms of damages.

HELD: YESP.D. 1691, a decree which substantially reenacted Article 217 of the Labor Code in its originalform, nullified P.D.
1367 and restored to the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC their jurisdiction toaward all kinds of damages in cases arising from
ER-EE relationship.

Issue2: Whether petitioner Suario is entitled to his claim for moral damages

HELD: NO Although it is already settled that Labor Arbiters are allowed to award moral and other forms ofdamages arising
from ER-EE relations, it is consistently ruled that in the absence of a wrongfulact or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral
damages cannot be awarded.The SC did not find any bad faith or fraud on the part of the bank officials who denied
thepetitioners request for 6 months leave of absence without pay. He was merely given personalassurances which could be
reconsidered in later developments. There is no evidence that theymeant to deceive the petitioner.

Therefore, the fact that petitioners request was denied, does not entitle him to damages.WHEREFORE, PETITION DENIED.

JGB vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 109390, March 7, 1996
FACTS:
Respondent was given notice that his employment was terminated before the expiration of his
contract of employment because his performance in productivity and efficiency was below
average. The termination of his employment took effect on the same day. He was immediately
scheduled to depart Saudi Arabia.
JGB vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 109390, March 7, 1996
FACTS:
Respondent was given notice that his employment was terminated before the expiration of his
contract of employment because his performance in productivity and efficiency was below
average. The termination of his employment took effect on the same day. He was immediately
scheduled to depart Saudi Arabia.
Respondent filed with the POEA a complaint against JGB and Associates, Inc., Tariq Hajj
Architects and Country Bankers Insurance Corporation, alleging illegal dismissal and seeking
payment of salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of his employment contract, salary
differential, refund of S.R. 1,000 which was withheld from him for telephone bills, moral
damages and attorney’s fees.
Petitioner averred that private respondent was dismissed for neglect of duties and performance
below par. Petitioner also alleged that although no prior notice of dismissal was given to private
respondent, he was given in lieu thereof a “notice pay” equivalent to one month salary.
POEA dismissed respondent’s complaint and ordered the respondents to pay complainant
jointly and severally the refund of the telephone bills deducted from the latter. Respondent
then appealed to the NLRC, which found respondent's dismissal illegal. Respondent then
appealed to the NLRC, which found respondent's dismissal illegal and ordered to pay the
complainant the amount representing unexpired portion of the contract, salary differential for
9months and refund for telephone bills.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was dismissed by the NLRC for lack of
merit. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in reversing the decision of the POEA and ruling
that private respondent was illegally dismissed.
RULING:

The NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that private respondent was
illegally dismissed. In termination cases, the burden of proving just cause for dismissal is on the
employer. In this case, the grounds for the dismissal of private respondent were stated in two
documents presented by petitioner before the POEA: (1) the notice of termination given to
private respondent on February 20, 1990; and (2) the letter of the principal, Tariq Hajj on August
1, 1990. In the termination letter, the foreign employer stated that private respondents
performance was below average. We find that petitioner failed to prove that the NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that private respondent was illegally dismissed.
The contract of employment between the parties an Employer may terminate the contract of
employment for any of the following causes:
a. Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties
b. Fraud or willful neglect by the employee of his duties
- Gross negligence connotes want of care in the performance of one’s duties.[2] Habitual
neglect implies repeated failure to perform one’s duties for a period of time, depending
upon the circumstances. On the other hand, fraud and willful neglect of duties imply bad
faith on the part of the employee in failing to perform his job to the detriment of the
employer and the latter’s business.
- None of these causes is stated in the two letters of the employer as reasons for dismissing
private respondent. None of the reasons there stated even approximates any of the causes
provided in the contract of employment for the termination of employment by the
employer.
- Indeed, the grounds given for private respondent’s dismissal are nothing but general, vague
and amorphous allegations. As the NLRC noted, the letters do not state particular acts which
show that private respondent was indeed negligent and that his performance was below
par. Nor did petitioner show the tangible financial loss which it claimed it suffered as a result
of private respondent’s alleged neglect of duty.

DAYAG V. CANIZARES
FACTS
The seven petitioners, William Dayag, et.al, filed a complaint illegal dismissal, non-payment of wages,
overtime pay, premium pay, holiday pay, service incentive leave, 13 t' pay, and actual, NLRC. The case
was subsequently assigned to Labor Arbiter Canizares. According to the petitioners, they were hired by
Young to work as tower crane operators at the latter's construction site in San Juan, Metro Manila then
they were transferred to Cebu City to work at the construction of his Shoemart Cebu project.
The petitioners left Cebu for Manila purportedly due to harassment by Young. Instead of attending the
initial hearings set by the labor arbiter, Young filed a motion to transfer the case to the Regional
Arbitration Branch, Region Vll of the NLRC. He claimed that the workplace where petitioners were
regularly assigned was in Cebu City and that, in consonance with Section I(a) of Rule IV of the New Rules
of Procedure of the NLRC, the case should have been filed in Cebu City. The labor arbiter, agreeing that
petitioners' workplace when the cause of action accrued was Cebu City, granted Young's motion and
ordered the transmittal of the case to the regional arbitration branch of Region Vll.
The petitioners promptly appealed said order to the NLRC, which, however, dismissed the same for lack
of merit. Hence, the recourse to this Court by petitioners. Stating the Rules of Court, specifically Sections
4 and 5 of Rule 15, 4 in relation to Section 3 of Rule I of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, in
support of their contention
ISSUE
Whether or not the proper venue is at Cebu City, being the workplace of the complainants
HELD
NO. Court has consistently ruled that the application of technical rules of procedure in labor cases may
be relaxed to serve the demands of substantial justice. As provided by Article 227 of the Labor Code
"rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and
intention of this Code that the Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiters shall use every and
all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to
technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process. Furthermore, while it is true that any
motion that does not comply with the requirements of Rule 15 should not be accepted for filing and, if
filed, is not entitled to judicial cognizance, this Court has likewise held that where a rigid application of
the rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, technicalities may be disregarded in
order to resolve the case. Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on
technicalities.

Issue:Whether or not the proper venue is at Cebu City, being the workplace of the complainants

Ruling:

No.In the recent case of Sulpicio Lines, Inc. vs. NLRC this Court held that the question of venue essentially pertains to the
trial and relates more to the convenience of the parties rather than upon the substance and merits of the case. It
underscored the fact that the permissive rules underlying provisionson venue are intended to assure convenience for the
plaintiff and his witnesses and to promote the endsof justice. With more reason does the principle find applicability in cases
involving labor andmanagement because of the doctrine well-entrenched in our jurisdiction that the State shall afford
fullprotection to labor.The rationale for the rule is obvious. The worker, being the economically-disadvantaged partywhether
as complainant/petitioner or as respondent, as the case may be, the nearest governmentalmachinery to settle the dispute
must be placed at his immediate disposal, and the other party is not to begiven the choice of another competent agency
sitting in another place as this will unduly burden theformer. In fact, even in cases where venue has been stipulated by the
parties, this Court has nothesitated to set aside the same if it would lead to a situation so grossly inconvenient to one party
as tovirtually negate his claim.In the case at hand, the ruling specifying the National Capital Region Arbitration Branch as
the venueof the present action cannot be considered oppressive to Young. His residence in Corinthian Gardensalso serves
as his correspondent office. Certainly, the filing of the suit in the National Capital Region Arbitration Branch in Manila will not
cause him as much inconvenience as it would the petitioners, who are now residents of Metro Manila, if the same was heard
in Cebu. Hearing the case in Manila would clearly expedite proceedings and bring about the speedy resolution of instant
case.

PHIL TRANCO SERVICES v.

NLRCG.R. No. 124100, April 1, 1998

Facts: Nieva was employed as a driver by petitioner assigned to the Legaspi City-Pasay City route.Nieva sideswiped an
owner-type jeep and a criminal complaint was filed against him. Philtrancoposted a bail bond for Nieva. After having been
suspended for thirty days, he tried to report towork but was told to wait until his case was settled. The case was finally
settled, he again reportedto work but was requested to file a new application as he was no longer considered an
employeeof Philtranco, allegedly for being absent without leave from October 19 to November 20, 1989.

Nieva filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and demanded for Thirteenth-Month Pay with theNLRC’s National Capital Region
Arbitration Branch in Manila. Philtranco filed a motion to dismisson the ground of improper venue, stating that the complaint
should have been lodged with theNLRC’s Regional Arbitration Branch in Legaspi City, not only because Nieva was a resident
thereof,but also because the latter was hired, assigned, and based in Legaspi City.

Issue: Whether or not NLRC’s NCR Arbitration Branch in Manila was the proper venue for thefiling of Nieva’s complaint for
illegal dismissal?

Ruling: Yes, the NLRC’s NCR Arbitration Branch was the proper venue for the filing of thecomplaint. The question of venue
essentially pertains to the trial and relates more to theconvenience of the parties rather than upon the substance and merits
of the case. Provisions onvenue are intended to assure convenience for the plaintiff and his witnesses and to promote
theends of justice. In fact, Section 1 (a), Rule IV of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, cited byPhiltranco in support
of its contention that venue of the illegal dismissal case filed by Nieva isimproperly laid, speaks of the
complainant/petitioner's workplace, evidently showing that therule is intended for the exclusive benefit of the worker. This
being the case, the worker may waivesaid benefit. Furthermore, the aforesaid Section has been declared by this Court to be
merelypermissive. Moreover, Nieva, as a driver of Philtranco, was assigned to the Legazpi City-PasayCity route. Sulpicio
Lines, Inc. vs. NLRC is exactly in point. In said case, we held that: "Section 1,Rule IV of the 1990 NLRC Rules additionally
provides that, for purposes of venue, workplace shallbe understood as the place or locality where the employer is regularly
assigned when the causeof action arose." From the foregoing, it is obvious that the filing of the complaint with theNational
Capital Region Arbitration Branch was proper, Manila being considered as part ofNieva's workplace by reason of his plying
the Legazpi City-Pasay City route.