DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE v. EDWIN L. RANA, B M No.

1036, 2003-06-10
403 SCRA 342
Facts:

Respondent Edwin L. Rana ("respondent") was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.
Donna Marie Aguirre ("complainant") filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to
the Bar. The complainant charged... respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct,
violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar
However, the Court ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution
of the... charge against him. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared
as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election
Canvassers ("MBEC") of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with
the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing
of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor... represented himself as "counsel for and in
behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan," and signed the pleading as counsel for George
Bunan ("Bunan").
complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government employee, being a secretary of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, the respondent is not allowed by law to act as
counsel for a client in any court or administrative... body. respondent admits that Bunan sought his
"specific assistance" to represent him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that "he decided to assist
and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law."
Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001... pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain votes
in the canvassing. He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented
himself as an "attorney" in the pleading.
Respondent further claims that the complaint is politically motivated considering that the complainant
is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent
prays that the complaint be dismissed for lack... of merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll of
Attorneys.
When the respondent appeared as counsel before the MBEC, the complainant questioned his
appearance on two grounds: (1) the respondent had not taken his oath as a... lawyer; and (2) he was
an employee of the government. The Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant ("OBC")
for evaluation, report, and recommendation.

Issues:

Charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation,... respondent... admission to the Philippine Bar.

Ruling:

The OBC also believes that the respondent's unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny... his
admission to the practice of law.

We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that the respondent engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.
Respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the lawyer's
oath.

In the pleading... respondent signed as" counsel for George Bunan."

In the first paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated that he was the undersigned Counsel
for, and in behalf of Vice

Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN."

Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had "authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his
counsel to represent him" before the MBEC and similar bodies.

Emily Estipona-Hao also "retained"... that "Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by REFORMA LM-
PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of... the said party."

Clearly, the respondent engaged in the practice of law without being a member of the Philippine Bar.

respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC
and filed various pleadings, without a license to do so.

The practice of law is a privilege that can be... withheld even from one who has passed the bar
examinations if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a license.

True, the respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer's oath. However,
it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer.

Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed,
namely: his lawyer's oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of

Attorneys.

WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.

Principles:

The OBC believes that respondent's misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a
member of the Bar.

Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,[1] the Court elucidated that:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,... where the
work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263).

Cayetano v. Monsod... the Court held that "practice of law" means any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons
of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified.
 PAFLU v. Binalbagan – Isabelo Sugar Co. 42 SCRA 302
GR No. L-23959 November 29, 1971

FACTS:
In Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo titled, "PAFLU, et al, vs. Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Co., et al.,” the Court of
Industrial Relations rendered a decision ordering the reinstatement with back wages of complainants
Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenazas. Said decision became final and executory. Cipriano Cid &
Associates, the counsel of record for the winning complainants, filed a notice of attorney's hen
equivalent to 30% of the total back wages. Atty. Atanacio Pacis also filed a similar notice for a
reasonable amount. Complainants Entila and Tenazas filed a manifestation indicating their
nonobjection. Then, Quintin Muning filed a "Petition for Award of Services Rendered" equivalent to
20% of the backwages. Muning's petition was opposed by Cipriano Cid & Associates on the ground
that he is not a lawyer.
The records of case show that the charge was filed by Cipriano Cid & Associates through Atty. Atanacio
Pacis. All the hearings were held in Bacolod City and appearances made on behalf of the complainants
were at first by Atty. Pacis and subsequently by Muning.The Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25%
of the backwaters as compensation where10% of such was awarded to Muning who is not a lawyer.
In this petition, the 10% award given to Muning was sought to be voided.

ISSUE: W/N a non-lawyer may recover an attorney’s fee for legal services rendered.

HELD:
No. In Amalgamated Laborers' Association, et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., it was stated
that an agreement providing for the division of attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president
is allowed to share in said fees with lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is immoral
and cannot be justified. An award by a court of attorney's fees is no less immoral in the absence of a
contract, as in the present case. The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear
or defend in the said court on behalf of a party-litigant does not by itself entitle the representative to
compensation for such representation. As Section 24, Rule 138, Rules of Court imports the existence
of an attorney-client relationship as a condition for the recovery of attorney’s fee. Such a relationship
cannot exist unless the representative is a lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not one, he cannot
establish an attorney-client relationship with Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU, and
he cannot, therefore, recover attorney's fees
 Halili v CIR (136 SCRA 112)

Facts:
The cases involve disputes regarding claims for overtime of more than five hundred bus drivers and
conductors of Halili Transit. Litigation initially commenced with the filing of a complaint for overtime
with the CIR. The disputes were eventually settled when the contending parties reached an Agreement
where the Administratrix would transfer to the employees the title to a tract of land in Caloocan, Rizal.
The parcel of land was eventually registered in the name of the Union.

The Union, through Atty. Benjamin C. Pineda, filed an urgent motion with the Ministry of Labor and
Employment (MOLE) requesting for authority to sell and dispose of the property. Union President
Amado Lopez, in a letter, informed J.C. Espinas and Associates that the general membership of the
said Union had authorized a 20% contingent fee for the law firm based on whatever amount would be
awarded the Union.
Atty. Jose C. Espinas, (the original counsel) established the award of 897 workers' claim. When Atty.
Pineda appeared for the Union in these cases, still an associate of the law firm, his appearance carried
the firm name B.C. Pineda and Associates," giving the impression that he was the principal lawyer in
these cases.

Atty. Pineda joined the law firm of Atty. Espinas in 1965 when these cases were pending resolution.
He always held office in the firm's place at Puyat Building, except in 1966 to 1967 when he transferred
to the Lakas ng Manggagawa Offices. During this one-year stint at the latter office, Atty. Pineda
continued handling the case with the arrangement that he would report the developments to the
Espinas firm. When he rejoined the law firm in 1968, he continued working on these cases and using
the Puyat Building office as his address in the pleadings.

When Atty. Pineda rejoined the Espinas firm in 1968, he did not reveal to his partners (he was made
the most senior partner) that he had a retainer's contract. He stayed with the law firm until 1974 and
still did not divulge the 1967 retainer's contract. Only the officers of the Union knew of the contract.

The alleged retainer's contract between Atty. Pineda and the Union appears anomalous and even
illegal as well as unethical considering that-
1. The contract was executed only between Atty. Pineda and the officers of the Union chosen by about
125 members only. It was not a contract with the general membership.
2. The contingent fee of 30% for those who were still working with Halili Transit and the 45% fee for
those who were no longer working worked to the prejudice of the latter group who should and were
entitled to more benefits. Thus, too, when the alleged retainer's contract was executed in 1967, the
Halili Transit had already stopped operations in Metro Manila. By then, Atty. Pineda knew that all the
workers would be out of work which would mean that the 45% contingent fee would apply to all.
3. The contract which retroactively took effect on January 1, 1966, was executed when Atty. Espinas
was still handling the appeal of Halili Transit in the main case before the Supreme Court.
4. When Atty. Pineda filed his motion for approval of his attorney's lien with Arbiter Valenzuela on
February 8, 1983, he did not attach the retainer's contract.
5. The retainer's contract was not even notarized.

A prospective buyer, the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. objected in view of PD 1529 which
requires no less than an order from a court of competent jurisdiction as authority to sell property in
trust.
Atty. Pineda, without authority from the Supreme Court but relying on the earlier authority given him
by the Ministry of Labor, filed another urgent motion, praying that the Union be authorized to sell the
lot. The sale was finally consummated, resulting in the execution of an escrow agreement.

When Atty. Jose C. Espinas (herein movant and alleged original counsel for the Union) learned of the
sale and apportionment of the proceeds from past Union president Amado Lopez, he requested Labor
Arbiter Raymundo Valenzuela to allow him to look into the records of the case. The latter, however,
told him that the records of the case were missing. Thereupon, Atty. Espinas requested Director
Pascual Reyes of the NLRC to locate the records.

Issue:
a.Whether or not Atty. Pineda and Arbiter Valenzuela should be held in contempt.

b. Whether or not Atty. Pineda should be disbarred.

Held:
a. YES. Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct
as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or
prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during litigation.

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of order
in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and
consequently, to the due administration of justice.

In the Slade Perkins case, "the exercise of the power to punish contempt has a twofold aspect, namely
(1) the proper punishment of the guilty party for his disrespect to the court or its order; and (2) to
compel his performance of some act or duty required of him by the court which he refuses to perform.
Due to this twofold aspect of the exercise of the power to punish them, contempts are classified as
civil or criminal.
A civil contempt is the failure to do something ordered to be done by a court or a judge for the benefit
of the opposing party therein.

A criminal contempt, is conduct directed against the authority and dignity of a court or of a judge, as
in unlawfully assailing or discrediting the authority or dignity of the court or judge, or in doing a duly
forbidden act.

b. YES. Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds.—A member of the bar
may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required
to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corrupt or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to
do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer for any conduct on his part showing his unfitness for the
confidence and trust which characterize the attorney and client relations, and the practice of law
before the courts, or showing such a lack of personal honesty or of good moral character as to render
him unworthy of public confidence.
In the case, the expeditious manner by which Arbiter Valenzuela granted Atty. Pineda's motion for
such authority to sell the property make the entire transaction dubious and irregular.

Significantly Atty. Pineda's act of filing a motion praying for authority to sell was by itself an admission
on his part that he did not possess the authority to sell the property. He could not and did not even
wait for valid authority but instead previously obtained the same from the labor arbiter whom he
knew was not empowered to so authorize.

The 45% attorney's lien on the award of those union members who were no longer working and the
30% lien on the benefits of those who were still working as provided for in the alleged retainer's
contract are also very exorbitant and unconscionable.

*Atty. Pineda is found guilty of indirect contempt of court for which he is sentenced to imprisonment
and directed to show cause why he should not be disbarred.