Defectors, Ordinary Leave-Takers, and Apostates

Defectors, Ordinary Leave-takers, and Apostates: A Quantitative Study of Former Members
of New Acropolis in France

Author(s): Massimo Introvigne
Source: Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions, Vol. 3, No. 1
(October 1999), pp. 83-99
Published by: University of California Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/nr.1999.3.1.83 .
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Introvigne: New Acropolis in France
Defectors, Ordinary Leave-takers,

and Apostates: A Quantitative
Study of Former Members of
New Acropolis in France
_________________________________________________
Massimo Introvigne
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF EXIT NARRATIVES
A
considerable amount of sociological literature exists on exit
processes from social organizations in general.1 A good number
of these studies deal specifically with religious organizations2
and, more particularly, with new religious movements.3 An important
part of this research is concerned with how exit roles are socially
constructed. Starting from earlier methodology developed by David
Bromley—and leaving aside less frequently occurring roles, such as
whistle-blowers4—I shall use three ideal types of exit roles: defectors,
ordinary leave-takers, and apostates.5 My assumption is that different
exit roles may co-exist among former members of the same organization
(a possibility Bromley also mentions). These types identify the
experience of an ex-member at a given moment in his or her personal
history (an ordinary leave-taker may eventually become an apostate,
and vice versa) and correspond to socially constructed roles. An exit
narrative results from the dynamic interaction between the psychological
and social experience of the person who leaves an organization and
the environment. The latter is the social context in which the former
member is situated and by which he or she is requested (with greater
or lesser pressure) to give an account of his or her former affiliation.
Although social-psychological explanations of exit role constructions
have been attempted in the past,6 there is no such a thing as a “pure,”
“photographic” narrative of an exit process. All such narratives are
socially constructed, culturally conditioned, and politically negotiated.
Type I narratives characterize the exit process as defection.
According to Bromley, “the defector role may be defined as one in
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which an organizational participant negotiates exit primarily with

organizational authorities, who grant permission for role
relinquishment, control the exit process, and facilitate role transition.
The jointly constructed narrative assigns primary moral responsibility
for role performance problems to the departing member and interprets
organizational permission as commitment to extraordinary moral
standards and preservation of public trust.”7 The ultimate responsibility
for leaving the organization is attributed solely to the exiting member.
The latter accepts that he or she was simply not able to conform to the
standards required by the organization. The exiting member had tried
to merge into the organization but failed because of personal difficulties.
The organization and the former member negotiate an exiting process
aimed at minimizing the damage for both parties. It is expected that
the former member expresses a certain amount of regret for not having
been able to remain in an organization he or she still regards as
benevolent and highly moral.
Type II narratives—ordinary leave-taking—are both the most
common and the least often discussed. In fact, participants exit a wide
variety of organizations every day, and little is heard about the actual
exit processes unless they are contested in some way. Noncontested
exit processes involve a minimal degree of negotiation between the
exiting member, the organization he or she intends to leave, and the
environment or society at large. In fact, contemporary society offers a
readily available narrative of how a person, in what has become the
normal process of moving from one social “home” to another in
different fields, simply loses interest, loyalty, and commitment to an
old experience and proceeds to a new one. In this sense, the usual
narrative implies that the ordinary leave-taker holds no strong feelings
concerning the past experience. Since loyalty towards it has diminished,
and the organization was ultimately exited, the leave-taker’s narrative
will normally include some comments on the organization’s more
negative features or shortcomings. The ordinary leave-taker, however,
may also recognize that there was something positive in the experience.
In fact, ordinary leave-taking is not normally seen as requiring any
particular justification, and there will be no deep probing into the causes
and responsibilities behind the exit process.
Type III narratives define the role of the apostate. In this case, the
ex-member dramatically reverses his or her loyalties and becomes a
professional enemy of the organization he or she has left. “The
narrative,” in Bromley’s terms, “is one which documents the
quintessentially evil essence of the apostate’s former organization
chronicled through the apostate’s personal experience of capture and
ultimate escape/rescue.”8 The former organization could easily label
the apostate a traitor. However, the apostate—particularly after having
joined an oppositional coalition fighting the organization—often claims
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that he or she was a “victim” or a “prisoner” who did not join voluntarily.
This, of course, implies that the organization itself was the embodiment
of an extraordinary evil. Having been socialized into an oppositional
coalition, the apostate finds a number of theoretical tools (including
powerful brainwashing metaphors) ready for use which help to explain
precisely why the organization is evil and able to deprive its members of
their free will.
It is normally assumed that the more controversial a religious
organization is, the higher the number of apostates there will be.
Conversely, highly respected organizations will produce more defectors
and fewer apostates. Comparisons should preferably be made between
voluntary associations a person freely joins rather than between
denominations or churches within which he or she was born. There are,
however, several voluntary associations within the mainline churches,
such as religious orders, lay movements, and even the Roman Catholic
priesthood in general. Although extremely vocal apostates exist among
former Catholic priests and nuns, many of those leaving the priesthood
or religious orders would rather blame themselves for their failure to
meet the Church’s standards. Accordingly, they will often reconstruct
their experiences through Type I (defector) narratives. This happens,
we are told by Ebaugh and others, because the Roman Catholic Church
is a powerful (although, of course, not unchallenged) organization.9 It
is thus able, more often than not, to negotiate damage-controlling
narratives with exiting members. By contrast, organizations perceived
as subversive—including most new religious movements—are typically
less able to negotiate damage-controlling narratives with exiting
members, thus generating more apostates and fewer defectors. This
theoretical expectation seems eminently reasonable on the surface, but
is not entirely confirmed by empirical research. New religious
movements are normally perceived as subversive, and they tend to
generate extremely vocal apostates. Current research, however, seems
to suggest that apostates may represent but a minority segment of former
members of even the most controversial new religious movements.10 A
large majority of former members can be classified as ordinary leave-
takers, and some of them even as defectors.11
A distinction may be established here between visible and invisible
former members. Most former members are invisible insofar as they do
not care to discuss their former affiliation. In fact, their very existence
can often only be discovered through quantitative research that is able
to access a group’s membership records. They are even less likely to be
available for qualitative sociological work, although this should not be
ruled out entirely. Visible former members are primarily apostates, and
the oppositional coalitions they have since joined make every effort to
assure their visibility. In a much smaller proportion, defectors may also
become visible and can occasionally be mobilized by those organizations
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attacked by the apostates. They may also spontaneously come out of

their social closet to defend their former organization as being unfairly
criticized or misrepresented. This means that, although apostates (and
defectors) may constitute only a minority of former members of several
organizations, no matter how controversial, they may well constitute
the majority of visible ex-members. This is a risk run also by mainline
and relatively noncontroversial organizations. Vocal apostate ex-priests
are much more visible than the quiet majority of former priests who
prefer not to go public with their defector-type narratives. The almost
exclusive visibility of apostates may also become the rule for controversial
organizations such as some new religious movements.
FORMER MEMBERS OF NEW ACROPOLIS IN FRANCE
New Acropolis
New Acropolis is commonly labeled as a “cult” by the anti-cult

movement and was listed as such in a 1996 French parliamentary report.
It emphatically denies being in any way a religious movement, however,
and prefers to be regarded as a school of philosophy. While it is outside
of the purposes of this paper to reconstruct the history and the ideas of
New Acropolis, some general information is offered to provide a useful
context for what follows.12
Founded in Argentina in 1957 by Jorge A. Livraga Rizzi (1930–1991),
New Acropolis is a post-theosophical movement, combining ideas of
the Theosophical Society with other sources. In the 1970s, it expanded
into Europe and in 1974 was established in France by Fernand Schwarz,
an archaeologist. In 1997, the movement claimed some 20,000 members
worldwide. It is currently headquartered in Brussels, and its
international president is Delia Steinberg Guzman. In accordance with
the larger theosophical tradition, New Acropolis accepts the idea of a
universal “philosophy” or “Tradition,” the existence of which is
presupposed behind the world’s different religious and esoteric
traditions. However, compared with the Theosophical Society, New
Acropolis emphasizes Western rather than Eastern esotericism
(although Eastern references are occasionally included) and focuses
particularly on Greek philosophy in the tradition of Pythagoras and
Plato.
The stated aim of New Acropolis is to help each member reach his
or her Higher Self and to reclaim a higher consciousness that, while
normally dormant, is preserved in the esoteric schools and accessible
through symbols, the active use of imagination, the study of one’s own
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dreams, and other techniques. The Higher Self, in turn, is a gateway to

the Cosmic or Universal Self, described as a collective archetypal reality.
When an adequate number of human beings achieve that Higher Self,
the Universal Self may emerge as a collective consciousness and may
have important social and political implications. Although the society
inspired by the collective consciousness of the archetypal Universal Self
has been described in different ways throughout the history of the
movement, it is certainly different from modern democracy. Indeed,
the founder’s criticism of contemporary democracy (quoting Plato and
other authors) is often offered by critics of New Acropolis as evidence
of the movement’s “reactionary” or “fascist” political attitude, although
other texts by Livraga and his successors unequivocally condemn
Nazism, Fascism, and, more recently, the National Front in France.13
The use by New Acropolis of allegedly paramilitary language, symbols,
and forms of organization has also been criticized in much the same
vein. More recently, brainwashing charges have been added, particularly
within the framework of the new European cult scares following the
suicides and homicides of a number of members of the Order of the
Solar Temple in 1994, 1995, and 1997. New Acropolis has thus become
particularly controversial in some European countries, including France,
a country in which widespread fear of “cults” (sectes, in French) and
right-wing extremism are often part of the same rhetoric. These
controversies—and the role of apostates in them—made New Acropolis
in France a promising subject for a quantitative case study of former
members.
The Research
Another reason why the French branch of New Acropolis seemed a

promising movement for a quantitative investigation of former members
is that, as mentioned earlier, it does not claim to be a religious
organization as such. It neither requests nor receives any tax benefit
associated with the status of religious congregation. Under French law,
it is obliged to keep complete and accurate records of the annual fees
paid by its members. In the wake of recent public controversies, it
became the subject of an in-depth tax investigation concluded in 1989
which ultimately judged in its favor. In 1997, the French leadership of
New Acropolis accepted a proposal by CESNUR (the Center for Studies
on New Religions, whose managing director is the undersigned) to
conduct a quantitative survey of members who had left the association
in France between January 1986 and April 1997.14 Under the agreement
reached between CESNUR and the French branch of New Acropolis,
we were given access to membership records for the previous ten years
which indicated how many members had stopped paying their yearly
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fees after the year 1986. A CESNUR team verified all New Acropolis
records. We found no evidence that records had been tampered with,
and any such tampering would indeed have been extremely dangerous
for New Acropolis given the not exactly benevolent attention paid by
French tax officers to groups listed in the 1996 parliamentary report as
“cults.”15 We recognized the names of a couple of its more prominent
apostates who had gone public with their criticism of New Acropolis,
but most names meant nothing to us. Labels were affixed to the
envelopes enclosing the questionnaire, and no copies of them were
kept by CESNUR. We had to dispatch a second limited number of
questionnaires, which had come back with no clear indication that the
address was hopelessly wrong, but under the agreement we had with
New Acropolis all the envelopes including names of the senders were
destroyed. We had, at any rate, recommended that answers be sent
anonymously, and most were.
A discussion of what a “member” of New Acropolis in France exactly
is seems, at this stage, in order. The by-laws distinguish between six
different membership categories. Categories I, II, and III include,
respectively, the two founders in France (Mr. Schwarz and Ms. Winckler),
honorary members, and supporters who are not part of the association
but contribute to it financially or otherwise. Category V includes the
core members of the association who have followed at least a first degree
course, have requested recognition as full members, and participate in
the activities of the New Acropolis’ Center for Philosophical Formation.
Category IV includes members of Category V occupying national
leadership positions. Category VI includes members of what is called
the Cultural Center of New Acropolis. They pay a small yearly fee and
receive various publications as well as reduced rates for attendance at
conferences organized by the association. These people are not
members of the Center for Philosophical Formation (the real core of
the association) but only of the Cultural Center. They have limited
contacts with the association and can not be regarded as members of
the corresponding social movement in any usual sociological sense.
The members of the Cultural Center numbered around 2,000 in
1991, and the figure was roughly the same in 1997. The members of
the Center for Philosophical Formation (we refer to them as members
of New Acropolis in France belonging to Categories IV and V) numbered
701 in 1986, 710 in 1991, and 260 as of 30 April 1997. It appears,
therefore, that New Acropolis lost almost two thirds of its membership
in France between the years 1991 and 1997. In view of the fact that new
members have joined in the meantime, the number of leave-takers is
higher than 450. Our examination of the records showed 530 leave-
takers (i.e. former members who had ceased their annual fee payment)
between January 1986 and April 1997. Questionnaires were sent to all
these 530 leave-takers, although an obvious problem was that the
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association did not keep track of their changes of address once they
had left. In fact, of the 530 questionnaires sent, 236 were later returned
with “transferred” or similar indications on them (in some cases, Post
Office comments were ambiguous, and we tried a second mailing with
prepaid notices of receipt). Of the 294 addressees who presumably
received the questionnaires, 120 replied (although two replies were
very incomplete). This means that 40.8% of the questionnaires received
were completed and returned, yielding a 22.6% response rate out of
the total population of former members, a respectable result in terms
of quantitative research.
An important question is whether or not those who did not respond
might systematically differ in attitude from those who did. Similar
problems obviously affect any research conducted by means of a mailed
questionnaire, rendering their results always to some extent tentative.
In this case, however, one may specifically ask whether, in the heated
climate of the current French cult wars, apostates may have been less
likely than other ex-members to return a questionnaire to CESNUR. It
is true that CESNUR has been criticized by anti-cultists in France as an
association of “cult apologists” and that the anti-cult milieu is extremely
suspicious of scholars in general. On the other hand, it is also true that
apostates are more eager than other ex-members to make their voices
heard and to engage in fierce debates with scholars.16 The latter
circumstance may possibly balance the former.
The Questionnaire
Questionnaires are, in turn, socially constructed tools culturally

conditioned by the status of the research and by the different biases of
the scholars involved. 17 They are aimed at proposing falsifiable
conjectures, “models,” or “figures,” which presuppose the relationship
with empirical reality to be one of analogy, rather than one of
transparent “truth.”
I present in this paragraph some relevant answers from the
questionnaire.18 Questions 13 to 17 requested demographic and general
information (sex, age, religion, profession, and marital status). The
first and second questions asked how long each respondent had been a
member of New Acropolis and when he or she had left. Questions 3 to
12 requested an evaluation of life within New Acropolis, the reasons
for leaving it, and an opinion on the most common criticism (including
political) of the group.
The sample appears to be equally divided among male and female
respondents. The age group most represented (42.5%) is 30 to 40 years,
followed by 40 to 50 years (28.3%). Younger former members appear
to be comparatively rare (nobody under 18 years and only 2.5% in the
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18-25 years group). 57.1% of the respondents indicated their religion

as “Catholic” (the questionnaire did not ask whether they were active
Catholics), and 25.2% declared themselves to be “nonreligious.” A
variety of professions, mostly middle-class, is represented in the sample.
Lawyers, doctors, and business consultants prevail (14.3%), followed
by professors and schoolteachers (9.2%). A significant minority is
unemployed (8.4%). A majority of the respondents (57.1%) is
unmarried.
Most respondents remained in New Acropolis for more than three
years (31. 7%), with only 2.5% leaving within less than six months of
their joining it. In terms of their leaving New Acropolis, the largest
group had left more than three years previously (48.7%). Bearing in
mind that several members who left three or more years ago probably
have not been reached since their address has changed, this percentage
could be even more significant.
Respondents were evenly distributed between those who regarded
their former engagement in New Acropolis as “very important” (24.2%),
“important” (39.2%), and “not particularly important” (35%). 74.8%
have internalized—and still maintain—the self-definition of New
Acropolis as “a philosophy”; 19.3% regard it as a “cultural association”;
only 3.4% define it as “a religion”; and even fewer (2.5%) view it as “a
political organization.” In terms of the “main” reason for quitting, a
large majority (65%) indicated (selecting among a range of eight
possible replies, plus “other”) that the experience, “while interesting,
had lasted long enough.” The second largest group (10.2%) mentioned
negative changes in the internal climate of the association, and 8.5%
simply stated that they had moved (presumably to a city where there
was no New Acropolis center). “Ideological” reasons for quitting were
mentioned by smaller percentages: 7.6% indicated that they have
changed to “another movement, or group, or church” or that they “no
longer believed in the doctrines.” Another 6.8% had been influenced
by media hostility, and 1.7% by the negative judgments of relatives and
friends.
An important question is whether or not anti-cult movements had
played a role in the decision to leave New Acropolis. In this context,
7.5% mentioned ADFI (Association for the Defense of the Families and
the Individual, the largest French anti-cult movement). No one in our
sample mentioned CCMM (Center Against Mental Manipulations, the
second largest French anti-cult movement), whilst 0.8% referred to
other unspecified anti-cult organizations.
Another important item was the present opinion of respondents
about New Acropolis. Respondents were offered a choice between five
possible answers: “It is a dangerous cult”; “It is probably my way, I regret
having left it”; “It is an interesting way, but it is not my way”; “It is not
very interesting”; “It is an association spreading false ideas.” The answer
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“It is probably my way, I regret having left it” identifies the classical
defector, and a total of 18% of the respondents gave this answer. A
large proportion, however, answered that “it is an interesting way, but it
is not my way” (67.4%), and 2.6% regarded New Acropolis as “not very
interesting.” The apostate-type answers (an association “spreading false
ideas” [1.7%] and “a dangerous cult” [10.3%]) reflect a sizable minority
of the respondents. Another question asked whether New Acropolis
exerted “excessive pressure” on them, with four options offered. 68.3%
replied that they felt “they have always been free” (option 1), and
another 21.7% also answered in the negative, conceding nonetheless
that the association was “strict” (option 2). A further 6.7% accused New
Acropolis of “brainwashing” practices (option 3) and 2.5% of “fraud”
(option 4). A parallel question concerned money (three options). 85.8%
did not regret money spent during their time with New Acropolis
(option 1). 6.7% regretted having spent money in the interests of the
association (option 2), and 5% felt the money had been “stolen by
fraudulent means” (option 3).
We also included two questions about politics. One asked the reaction
of each respondent when he or she had heard New Acropolis accused
of being a “nazi,” “fascist,” or “extremist right-wing” movement (three
options were offered). 77.1% of the respondents regarded these
accusations as “false and a libel” (option 1), and 5.1% as “true” (option
2). A total of 14.4% selected option 3, i.e. that New Acropolis is a “right-
wing movement, but neither nazi nor fascist.” Answers to the second
political question (with only “yes” or “no” offered as options) indicated
that 7. 6% also felt that New Acropolis was guilty of propagating a “racist”
ideology.
We compared the responses of those who attributed a role to the
anti-cult movements in their decision to leave New Acropolis to the
general sample. The majority of those influenced by anti-cult movements
in general (the “anti-cult” sample) regarded their former engagement
in New Acropolis as important (60%). Some of them are now persuaded
that New Acropolis (according to the usual anti-cult version) is in fact a
religion (20%, compared to 3.4% in the general sample), whilst half of
them still regard it as a “philosophy.” Those who have been in touch
with the anti-cult movements are also more likely (30%) to have been
influenced by the hostile media. They generally regard New Acropolis
as “a dangerous cult” (90%) and attribute their own persistence within
it to the use of “brainwashing” techniques (80%). They are also more
likely to regard its leaders as “intolerant” (70%) and to claim that their
money was stolen from them fraudulently (50%). No less than 30% of
those who had had significant contacts with an anti-cult movement
regarded the “extremist right-wing,” “nazi,” or “fascist” labels attached
to New Acropolis as “true” (although 50% of them still preferred to
regard the movement as “right-wing but neither nazi nor fascist”). A
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total of 70% of the “anti-cult” subgroup also regarded New Acropolis’

ideology as “racist.” The principal difference in demographic terms is that
70% of the anti-cult sample respondents (compared to 35.3% of the general
sample) were married. Table 1 compares a number of answers given to
different questions by the total sample (T; n=120) and by those respondents
(8.3% of T) who had stated that an anti-cult movement had played a key
role in their decision to leave New Acropolis (AC).
TABLE 1
Total and “Anti-Cult” Samples Compared
T AC
New Acropolis as
3.4 20
religion
Influence by hostile
6.8 30
media
NA regarded as
10.3 90
"dangerous cult"
Brainwashing used by
6.7 80
NA
Leaders of NA as
7.6 70
intolerant
Money stolen by fraud 5 50
NA as extremist, nazi, or
5.1 30
fascist
NA as racist 7.6 70
Respondent married 35.3 70
Note: Each row refers to a different possible answer to a different

question. For example, the first row identifies what percentage of the
total sample gave “a religion” in answer to the question about the nature
of New Acropolis (96.6 % gave answers different from “a religion,” or
no answer, to that question), as opposed to what percentage of the anti-
cult sample indicated “a religion” in reply to the same question (80%
in the anti-cult sample gave answers other than “a religion,” or no answer,
to that question). For this reason percentages do not add up.
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Table 1 shows the relationship between the former members’

perception of New Acropolis and their socialization process into an
anti-cult movement. Theories of brainwashing often rely on the
“consistency” of apostate accounts, and they regard as highly significant
that “a great many individuals independently report similar accounts
of disenchantment.”19 The research suggests that, in some cases at least,
the situation may actually be more ambiguous. Similar accounts may
simply be the effect of a comparable exposure to a pre-existing anti-
cult milieu. On the other hand, ex-members with a particularly negative
view of their former movement may be more likely to associate with an
anti-cult movement.
We cross-tabulated some answers according to a preliminary
classification of the respondents on the basis of the three identities
presupposed by our study, i.e. the ordinary leave-taker, the defector,
and the apostate. Once again, this classification represents a definition
rather than a “discovery” of some unquestionable “truth.” Such
definitions may be useful, however, in generating additional falsifiable
conjectures. We have considered as defectors those who replied to
question 7 that New Acropolis “is probably my way, I regret having left
it” and who, at the same time, do not feel that New Acropolis exerted
“excessive pressure” on them. We have classified as apostates (1) those
who regard New Acropolis as “a dangerous cult” or “an association
spreading false ideas”; and/or (2) those who accuse New Acropolis of
“brainwashing” or of fraud. Respondents who do not qualify as defectors
or apostates have been classified as ordinary leave-takers. Results are
presented in Table 2.
TABLE 2
Defectors, Ordinary Leave-takers, and Apostates
(numbers) (percentages)
Ordinary leave-takers 86 71.6
Defectors 20 16.7
Apostates 14 11.7
Cross-tabulations reveal no highly significant results in terms of time

spent in New Acropolis, when the movement was left, and demographics.
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On the other hand, apostates are less frequent (6.9%) and defectors
more frequent (31%) among those who regarded their former engage-
ment in New Acropolis as “very important.” Apostates represent 75%
of the total number of respondents who categorize New Acropolis as “a
religion.” However, 42.9% of the apostates still look on New Acropolis
as a philosophy. Not surprisingly, 88.9% of those attributing a role to
ADFI in their decision to leave New Acropolis have become apostates.
The great majority of apostates, however, are still reluctant to identify
New Acropolis as “fascist” or “nazi.” A large proportion of them (46.1%)
prefers to view it as a right-wing movement, but neither nazi nor fascist.
It is only apostates who accuse New Acropolis of spreading racism.
TABLE 3
New Acropolis’ Political Perception among Former Members

(percentage)
Total Ordinary
Defectors Apostates
Sample Leave-takers
Accusations
generally 77.1 82.1 100 15.4
unfair
Right-wing,
but neither
14.4 13.1 0 46.1
nazi nor
fascist
Accusations
True: NA as
extremist, 5.1 1.2 0 38.5
nazi, or
fascist
No Answer 3.4 3.6 0 0
Note: Rows indicate answers to a single question (multiple responses

were not permitted). The “no answer” subgroup has been included
so that columns add up to 100.
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CONCLUSIONS
Although, in order to be complete, a study of former members of

New Acropolis in France should also include a significant amount of
qualitative research in the form of case histories of individual ex-
members, the importance of quantitative research in this field should
not be underestimated. In fact, when it comes to new religious
movements in general, some anti-cult authors oppose the approach of
social scientists and the experiential truth of ex-members, the latter
being allegedly closed to social analysis. This is, obviously, a
misunderstanding, because the positions and experiences of ex-
members are open to both qualitative and quantitative social analysis.
Quantitative analysis would seem to be particularly appropriate in
assessing whether the individual experience of a given ex-member is
representative of a larger group. In this respect, the results of this study,
although by no means definitive, may nonetheless be useful in raising
further questions and promoting further research.
1. The present study suggests that Type II (Ordinary Leave-taker)
narratives may prevail among exiting members of even a controversial
social organization such as New Acropolis. The common presupposition
that apostates are likely to be more prevalent in highly controversial
organizations may not, in itself, be untrue; it does not necessarily mean,
however, that apostates constitute the greater number of members
exiting from such groups. There is little doubt that New Acropolis in
France is an extremely controversial organization. Irrespective of
whether or not the accusations are true, for a sizable number of French
media New Acropolis embodies two of the most widespread current
subversion fears: the fear of the sectes (cults) and the fear of right-wing
extremism. Controversies notwithstanding, our research suggests that
the majority of members exiting from New Acropolis are ordinary leave-
takers who, whilst they have mixed feelings about New Acropolis, still
regard their past experience as not entirely negative. These ex-members
remain largely invisible and do not usually talk to the media. The fact
that ordinary leave-takers and uncontested exit processes prevail even
within such a highly controversial organization as New Acropolis is not
really so surprising. After all, those repelled by the very ideas of groups
such as New Acropolis would not join them in the first place.
2. It is possible that defectors—i.e., former members who actually
regret having left the organization—are less evident among members
exiting a minority controversial group such as New Acropolis than
among those leaving a voluntary association within a more mainline
organization such as a Catholic religious order. However, even in a group
like New Acropolis, the percentage of defectors (16.7%) is not
insignificant and there are, in fact, more defectors than apostates.
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Nova Religio
3. The percentage of apostates among former members of New

Acropolis (11.7%) should also not be overlooked. Again, further
research on this point is needed. It is, however, not improbable that
apostasy is more prevalent among former members of New Acropolis
than among ex-members of less controversial social and religious
organizations. Examples of the latter may include the Roman Catholic
priesthood and perhaps even some of the new religious movements
subjected to less extreme forms of criticism. The hypothesis that
apostates may, however, constitute a minority among ex-members of
even very controversial movements—a possibility emerging from
previous research on a variety of groups—appears to be supported by
this study.
4. A quantitative study may not adequately answer the question of
why some exiting members become apostates rather than ordinary leave-
takers or defectors. One point, however, emerges unambiguously from
our results and confirms other similar studies (such as those by Lewis
and Solomon). An overwhelming majority of the apostates have
apparently had contact with an oppositional coalition of some kind, in
this case an anti-cult movement (in France, mostly ADFI). Large
numbers (88%) of those who have left New Acropolis after contact with
an anti-cult movement have since become apostates. Conversely, all
apostates have had some contact at some time with one of the anti-cult
movements. Most (88. 9%) of those who regard New Acropolis as a
“dangerous cult” have also had contact with an anti-cult movement,
and 80% of the respondents who had been in touch with such a
movement explained their sustained allegiance to New Acropolis on
the basis of its use of brainwashing techniques. Words like “dangerous
cult” and “brainwashing” were selected almost exclusively in the
questionnaire by respondents who had been in contact with an anti-
cult movement. As mentioned earlier, it may also be true that ex-
members whose assessments of New Acropolis were negative were more
likely to seek contact with an anti-cult movement. On the other hand,
once socialized into the anti-cult subculture, former members not only
became apostates but also found a number of interpretive tools
(primarily the brainwashing model) that would ultimately shape the
narrative of their experience within the movement. Conversely, those
who had not been exposed to the anti-cult model rarely, if ever, used the
“cult” narrative. Most apostates may thus be described as exiting
members who apparently sought or had contact with anti-cult
movements and were socialized into their peculiar subculture.
5. In general, former members—be they ordinary leave-takers,
defectors, or apostates—strongly resisted the idea that New Acropolis
is a “nazi,” “fascist,” or “racist” movement. In contemporary French
society, these labels are so unacceptable that not even in the interests
of constructing a credible apostate narrative is it easy to admit having
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supported such subversive ideas. On the other hand, apostates and those
who have been socialized into the anti-cult subculture are clearly much
more likely to view New Acropolis as a “fascist,” “nazi,” or “racist”
organization, although it should also be said that a significant number
of them disapprove of these labels.
6. It is interesting to note that 75% of those who regarded New
Acropolis as a “religion” were apostates. This is consistent with the anti-
cult narrative, which describes New Acropolis as a religious (or pseudo-
religious) cult. Defectors, ordinary leave-takers, and even some apostates
still believe that the movement is what it claims to be, i.e. a school of
philosophy, or a cultural association.
7. As we mentioned earlier, New Acropolis lost almost two thirds of
its core members (or members of the Center for Philosophical
Formation) between the years of 1991 and 1997. Its leadership has
occasionally blamed the campaigns of the anti-cult movement that, as
far as New Acropolis is concerned, became particularly vociferous from
March 1991 onwards. However, as previous research on new religious
movements indicates, similar claims, by both the anti-cultists and the
“cults” themselves, may be exaggerated. The activities of the anti-cult
movement and the reports in the media influenced by it are but two of
several factors which determine why and how many members decide to
leave a controversial movement. In fact, less than 8% of our sample
were of the opinion that either hostile media reports or the anti-cult
movements were important factors in their resolve to leave New
Acropolis. Internal factors seem to have played a much more important
role in this disaffiliation process. On the other hand, external factors
and the anti-cult movements themselves may be more relevant in
explaining why fewer new members have been attracted to groups such
as New Acropolis in the last few years.20 Media and anti-cult criticism,
thus, appear to have influenced the membership decline by making
the movement less attractive to would-be followers, rather than by
directly provoking a significant number of disaffiliations.
ENDNOTES
1
See, for example, Albert Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms,
Organizations, and States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970); Frances DellaCava,
“The Process of Leaving a High Commitment Status,” Sociological Enquiry 45 (1975): 41-
50; J. Keith Murnigan, “Defectors, Vulnerability, and Relative Power: Some Causes and
Effects of Leaving a Stable Coalition,” Human Relations 34 (1981): 589-609; Helen Rose
Ebaugh, Becoming an Ex: The Process of Role Exit (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1988).
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Nova Religio
2
See, among others, Roger Jehenson, “The Dynamics of Role Leaving: A Role Theoretical
Approach to the Leaving of Religious Organizations,” Journal of Applied Behavioural Science
5 (1969): 287-308; David G. Bromley, ed., Falling from the Faith (Newbury Park: Sage
Publications, 1988); David G. Bromley, ed., The Politics of Religious Apostasy: The Role of
Apostates in the Transformation of Religious Movements (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers,
1998).
3
See Janet Jacobs, Divine Disenchantment: Deconverting from New Religions (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1989); Trudy Solomon, “Integrating the Moonie Experience:
A Survey of Ex-Members of the Unification Church,” in In Gods We Trust: New Patterns of
Religious Pluralism in America, eds. Thomas Robbins and Dick Anthony (Princeton: Rutgers
University Press, 1981), 275-94; James R. Lewis, “Reconstructing the ‘Cult’ Experience,”
Sociological Analysis 47, no. 2 (1986): 151-59; James R. Lewis, “Apostates and the
Legitimation of Repression: Some Historical and Empirical Perspectives on the Cult
Controversy,” Sociological Analysis 49, no. 4 (1989): 386-96; Dick Anthony and Thomas
Robbins, “Law, Social Science, and the ‘Brainwashing’ Exception to the First
Amendment,” Behavioral Sciences and the Law 10 (1992): 5-30.
4
A whistle-blower is commonly defined as a member of an organization who advises an
external regulatory agency (e.g. the police) of real or alleged wrongdoings taking place
in his or her organization.
5
This is a modified typology with respect to David G. Bromley, “The Social Construction
of Contested Exit Roles: Defectors, Whistle-blowers, and Apostates,” in Bromley, The
Politics of Religious Apostasy, 19-48. While largely relying on Bromley’s seminal study, I
would like to focus more on the role of ordinary leave-takers. I am also largely indebted
to Bromley’s chapter for a number of invaluable bibliographical leads.
6
See Lewis Coser, “The Age of the Informer,” Dissent 1 (1954): 249-54.
7
Bromley, “The Social Construction of Contested Exit Roles,” 28.
8
Ibid., 36.
9
Ebaugh, Becoming an Ex.
10
See Solomon, “Integrating the Moonie Experience”; Lewis, “Reconstructing the ‘Cult’
Experience”; Lewis, “Apostates and the Legitimation of Repression.”
11
In addition to Solomon and Lewis see Stuart Wright, “Post-Involvement Attitudes of
Voluntary Defectors from Controversial New Religious Movements,” Journal for the Scientific
Study of Religion 23 (1984): 172-82; Jacobs, Divine Disenchantment; Bromley, Falling from
the Faith.
12
For a scholarly assessment see Antoine Faivre, “Nouvelle Acropole en France,” in Pour
en finir avec les sectes. Le débat sur le rapport de la commission parlementaire, 3rd ed., eds.
Massimo Introvigne and J. Gordon Melton (Paris: Dervy, 1996), 236-46.
13
See Faivre, “Nouvelle Acropole en France,” 245, for the references. See also Horacio
Labat and Isabelle Ohmann, Le Défi de la démocratie. Vivre ensemble libres (Paris: Editions
Nouvelle Acropole, 1997) for New Acropolis’ present assessment of democracy.
14
CESNUR is an association of scholars of new religious movements established in 1988
and independent of any church, denomination, or religious movement. Religious
affiliations of its directors vary, while CESNUR per se is in no way sponsored or financed
by any religious organization. Its only institutional funding comes from the Region of
Piedmont, Italy. The research discussed in this paper was part of CESNUR’s regular
activities and was not financed by New Acropolis or by any other group or association.
15
Of course, some conspiracy theorists may still argue that parallel bogus records were
produced solely for our perusal. We doubt, however, that the benefits for New Acropolis
of this research, if any, would have balanced the efforts required. Besides, the records
we used obviously included militant apostates, as the results of the survey show.
16
As even a cursory search among the usenet groups would reveal, apostates and anti-
cultists in general immediately react to the posting on the internet of scholarly papers
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about the group to which they were affiliated and express their disagreement accordingly.
CESNUR receives a large amount of unsolicited correspondence of this kind.
17
On common scholarly biases in this field and their influence, see David G. Bromley
and Anson Shupe, “Organized Opposition to New Religious Movements,” Religion and
the Social Order 3 (1993): 177-98.
18
In the text of the article, statistical results have been rounded to the closest decimal.
Questions were not open, i.e. only one answer was allowed. It was, on the other hand,
possible to leave one or more question unanswered, and this explains why the total (in
percentage) of the answers to each question is occasionally lower than 100 percent.
19
Benjamin D. Zablocki, “Exit Cost Analysis: A New Approach to the Scientific Study of
Brainwashing,” Nova Religio 1, no. 2 (April 1998): 231.
20
Laurence Bernard-Mirtil, Sûkyô Mahikari: Une nouvelle religion venue du Japon (Trignac,
France: Bell Vision, 1998), 129, suggests the same conclusion for the Japanese new
religious movement Sûkyô Mahikari currently operating in France. The anti-cult
campaigns and the inclusion of the group in the list of “dangerous cults” in the 1996
report of the French parliamentary commission, according to Bernard-Mirtil, made no
decisive contribution to the number of defections, but they were partially responsible
for the lower number of new members. Interestingly, Sûkyô Mahikari has also been
accused in France of being both a cult and a right-wing political organization.
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Defectors, Ordinary Leave-takers, and Apostates: A Quantitative Study of Former Members

of New Acropolis in France

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