Paper: hoe valt vriendschap in te bedden in egoisme

Annas, mitsis : epicures accepteert wel valuation condition maar kan daardoor vriendschap niet in
bedden in hedonistich egoisme

Epicures verwerpt valuation condition: dan is vriendschap wel in te bedden in (hedonisme) egoïsme

Beginnen met: Torquates in Definibus

While the two sides agree that the sage will in fact behave so as to promote his friend’s good as
much as his own, they disagree about the kind of practical reasoning that moves the sage to act in
this way

Ons eigen genot is onmogelijk zonder vriendschappen?

274

Torquatus, in his exposition of the first theory, argues as follows: (i) our friends' pleasures are not
desired by us to the same degree as our own, but (ii) friendship is necessary for us to attain the
greatest pleasure for ourselves, and (iii) friendship requires us to love our friends as much as
ourselves, so that (iv) we do love our friends as much as ourselves, on egoistic grounds. Torquatus
elaborates on (iv), saying that the wise man will feel exactly the same toward his friend as toward
hims

At least initially, this position suffers from obvious problems. The first, and most serious, is that there
appears to be an immediate internal contradiction: we care only for our own pleasure for its own
sake,45 and yet we also care for our friends and our friends' pleasures equally as we do for ourselves
and our own pleasures. Also, the process that Torquatus describes, in which you come to love your
friend as much as yourself, suffers from psychological implausibility: is it possible to decide, on
egoistic grounds, to cultivate a disinterested love of others?

p, Cicero says that he recognizes 'a saying of Epicurus himself—that friendship cannot be divorced
from pleasure, and that it deserves to be cultivated for the reason that without it we cannot live
secure and free from alarm, and therefore cannot live agreeably' (DF 2 82)

We come now to the crux: how can we reconcile the Epicurean insistence that the Wise Man loves
his friend as much as himself with the equally strong insistence that friendship is only valued and
valuable because of 48 Although this itself would be problematic for the Epicurean ethical theory
(see section 2b) and would not save the passage from contradicting itself (see section 4b). Is
Epicurean Friendship Altruistic? 293 the pleasure that it affords oneself? The first seems to demand
that the Epicurean be other-regarding, while the second demands that the Epicurean be only self-
regarding. In other words, how is it possible to love others as much as oneself on egoistic grounds?

My proposal is that we should interpret the talk about 'loving one's friend as much as oneself in
behavioral terms. 'Love your friend as much as yourself prescribes a policy of action, instead of
describing what one ultimately values. As Torquatus puts it: we desire pleasure for ourselves, and we
see that friendship is one of the best means of attaining that end. If we are wise, however, we will
also realize that we must treat our friends as well as we treat ourselves in order for there to be a
stable friendship. Thus, on egoistic grounds, we do treat our friends as well as we treat ourselves.49
To 'love' our friends as much as ourselves is a matter of not favoring our interests over theirs when
deciding how to act. If we are good friends, we cannot allow our friends to suffer some great pain for
the sake of ourselves avoiding some smaller pain. At a common-sense level, we can't harm our
friends for the sake of some advantage to ourselves. Even more strongly, we must weigh their
interests equally with our own when deciding how to act. Doing so is needed in order to maintain a
true friendship, and true friendships are one of the best means for us to attain ataraxia

(1)‘Wecannotmaintainastableandlastingenjoymentoflife

withoutfriendship.’

(2)‘Norcanwemaintainfriendshipitselfunlessweloveour

friendsnolessthanwedoourselves.’

(3)‘Thusitiswithinfriendshipthatthisattitudeiscreat

ed...

Wedelightinourfriends’happiness,andsufferattheirsorrow,

asmuchaswedoourown.’

(4)‘Hencethewisewillfeelthesamewayabouttheirfriends

astheydoaboutthemselves.Theywouldundertakethesame

efforttosecuretheirfriends’pleasureastosecuretheirown.’

 Dus torquates zegt we hebben vriendschap nodig, hoe passen we dat dan toch toe in
erpicures filosofie? Behavioral approach: its not abt what u value maar abt what youre
disposed to do???? They can be seen as claims as to how friends are motivated to treat
eachother

If Epicurus is an indirect egoist, then he recommends that we not aim at the good in our actions,
since aiming at the good will in fact do us less good than aiming at something else. This is an
intuitively jarring but well-motivated view, and it is not obviously incoherent.20 It is particularly
useful as a supplement to hedonism, since single-minded pleasure-seeking is generally self-
defeating.21 Only by adopting practical principles aiming at something other than pleasure can the
hedonist be successful in action. If O’Keefe is right, then Epicurus arrives at a similar insight by
grappling with the problem of friendship: in order to make and keep friends—and so lead the most
pleasant life—one needs to aim in action at something in addition to one’s own pleasure, namely (at
the very least) one’s friend’s pleasure. According to O’Keefe, this is the line of thought at work in the
argument reported by Cicero. But I doubt that O’Keefe is right about this. For there is good
independent evidence that Epicurus rules out indirect theories of any kind. Consider KD 25: If you do
not on every occasion refer each of your actions to the natural goal (efi mØ parå pãnta kairÚn
§pano¤seiw ßkaston t«n prattom°nvn §p‹ tÚ t°low t∞w fÊsevw) but turn prematurely to something
else in avoiding or pursuing things, your actions will not accord with your reasoning (oÈk ¶sonta¤ soi
to›w lÒgoiw afl prãjeiw ékÒlouyoi). This passage strongly suggests that Epicurus does not subscribe
to any indirect theory.22 For if he did, he presumably would not urge us in such unambiguous terms
to refer all of our actions at every time to the ‘natural goal’ of one’s own pleasure. By condemning
any failure to bring the principles of egoist hedonism to
Blz 24

To

call a relationship which is such that there is ‘nothing in it’ for the Epicurean agent a friendship,

and then to suggest that breaking off that relationship violates the norms of friendship, implies an

expectation of the Epicurean agent to sustain the other-concern that has been present up to this

point in the relationship irrespective of the costs to the agent. And it is this feature of the

relationship that presumably renders friendship incompatible with Epicureanism’s egoistic

demands. But the unconditionality criterion is problematic.

The first problem with the unconditionality criterion is that it suffers from the same

defect it means to avoid: merely instrumental concern is problematic for friendship because it

‘does violence to the intuition that in [genuine] friendship the object of [other-concern] is the

unique, irreplaceable individual.’

Since genuine

friendship involves other-concern for our friends qua the unique and irreplaceable individuals

they are to us, that is, requires us to value our friends for their own sakes,

Since genuine 404-5

friendship involves other-concern for our friends qua the unique and irreplaceable individuals

they are to us, that is, requires us to value our friends for their own sakes, we delight not merely

in the rote performance of behaviors characteristic of friends, but rather we delight in our

friends, because of who they are to us, and often irrespective of the contingent and possibly

negative circumstances our friendships encounter—yet, these negative circumstances

notwithstanding, we delight nevertheless. But we do this for reasons associated with our

conception of the good, and not just because some condition on friendship mandates it. There is,

then, no reason to think that pledging ourselves to the kinds of long-term situations that seem to

result in significant losses to us (presumably via stress and anxiety regarding the well-being of

our friend) could not be outweighed by a deep and fulfilling form of pleasure consistent with

Epicureanism: being there in a time of need for our best friends is itself a genuine pleasure—and

a powerful one.

Conclusive (zie evans 423)

And just as hatred, jealousy and contempt are the enemies of pleasure, so too is friendship
not only it most faithful sponsor, but also the author of pleasures as much for our friends as
for ourselves. Friends not only enjoy the pleasures of the moment, but are cheered with
hope for the near and distant future. We cannot maintain a stable and lasting enjoyment of
life without friendship; nor can we maintain friendship itself unless we love our friends no
less than we do ourselves. Thus it is within friendship that this attitude is created, while at
the same time friendship is connected to pleasure. We delight in our friends’ happiness, and
suffer at their sorrow, as much as we do our own.

We cannot maintain a stable and lasting enjoyment of life without friendship; nor can we
maintain friendship itself unless we love our friends no less than we do ourselves. Thus it is
within friendship that this attitude is created, while at the same time friendship is connected
to pleasure. We delight in our friends’ happiness, and suffer at their sorrow, as much as we
do our own. Hence the wise will feel the same way about their friends as they do about
themselves. They would undertake the same effort to secure their friends’ pleasure as to
secure their own.

Voor epicuristen is persoonlijk geluk het hoogste goed. De ultieme motivatie voor
vriendschap is dan ook het eigen genot.

De beloning is nu en niet in de toekomst drm direct

Asadirectegoist,Epicuruscannotclaimthatthe
sage’sbehaviorresultsfromadecisionprocedurethatputshisfriend’sgoodona
parwithhisown;nor,obviously,canheclaimthatthesageismotivatedby
authenticself-sacrificeandintrinsicother-concern.Hisonlyoptionistoinsist,
againstthegrainofcommonsense,thatthosewhopursueonlytheirownplea-
sureastheirfinalendcanandshouldtreateachotherashethinksfriendsdo

Other-concern: er is ook, miss zelfs evenveel, ruimte voor de ander: 140 omwille vd ander zelf?

142 ish

We hebben vriendschap nodig voor eigen genot maar om vriendschap te behouden is t noodzakelijk
om hen net zoveel te waarderen als onzelf. Ons egoisme dwingt ons vriendschappen aan te knopen
waarbij we net zo veel om de ander geven als om onszelf

Je kan niet zeggen we waarderen vriend niet omwille v zichzelf, toch wel, maar wel we nemen gedrag
aan waarbij we tav vriend evenveel ons best doen als tav onszelf. Zo kan epicurist geen reserves
hebben tav vriend ookal is motivatie egoïstisch. 145 ish
Kritiek evans op indirect op blz 414, rond 154. Je moet geen omwegen maken, elke actie moet je zelf
direct onderwerp maken van een afweging in het licht van het einddoel, het einddoel being: je eigen
persoonlijke genot.

Hoe kan direct genot? Evans wijst erop dat hebben v vrienden geeft ons nu gemoedrust want we
hebben vangmet dat in de toekomst miss nodig zal zijn maar daar ontlenen we op dit moment genot
aan dus een handeling die vrienden behoud brengt ook onmiddellijk genot. Dit is geloof ik ook in
epicures fil te herkennen ofzo volgens evans?

De beloning is nu en niet in de toekomst drm direct