Professional Documents
Culture Documents
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12. LUCRETIUS
EPICTETUS
Introductory Volumes:
MARCUS AURELIUS
1. The Great Conversation
13. VIRGIL
2. The Great Ideas I
14. PLUTARCH
3. The Great Ideas II
15. TACITUS
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16. PTOLEMY
4. HOMER COPERNICUS
KEPLER
5. AESCHYLUS
SOPHOCLES 17. PLOTINUS
EURIPIDES
18. AUGUSTINE
ARISTOPHANES
19. THOMAS AQUINAS I
6. HERODOTUS
THUCYDIDES 20. THOMAS AQUINAS II
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GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD ^
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GREAT BOOKS
OF THE WESTERN WORLD
ROBERT MAYNARD RVTCHINS, EDITOR IN CHIEF
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Mortimer J. Adler, Associate Editor
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Members of the Advisory Board: Stringfellow Barr, Scott Buchanan, John Erskine,
Clarence H. Faust, Alexander Meiklejohn, Joseph J. Schwab, Mark Van Doren.
Editorial Consultants: A. F. B. Clark, F. L. Lucas, Walter Murdoch.
Wallace Brockway, Executive Editor
THE GREAT IDEAS
A Syntopicon of
Great Books of the Western World
Mortimer J.
Adler, Editor in Chief
VOLUME I
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1952 ./
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BY Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc.
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Mortimer J. Adler, Editor in Chief
Associate Editors
Editorial Staff
VOLUME
.........
I
Preface
Chapters 1-50:
....
Explanation of Reference Style
Angel to Love .... .1-1082.
xi
xxxiii
VOLUME II
.1-1140
.
ix
1143
Appendix II.
Syntopical Construction
Inventory of Terms
.....
The Principles and Methods of
....... 1x19
1303
.
2TMHTMO:) JA^a'/t30
C|;.i:r-3.
V '
CONTENTS
Preface xi Chapter 24. Evolution 451
IX
or
PREFACE
The great books are pre-eminently those which have given the western
tradition its life and light.The unity of this set of books does not consist
merely in the fact that each member of it is a great book worth reading.
A deeper unity exists in the relation of all the books to one tradition, a
unity shown by the continuity of the discussion of common themes and
problems. It is claimed for this set of great books that all the works in it
are significantly related to one another and that, taken together, they ade-
quately present the ideas and issues, the terms and topics, that have made
the western tradition what it is. More than a collection of books, then, this
set is a certain kind of whole that can and should be read as such.
The Great Ideas results from and records such a reading of the great
books. The aim of this "syntopical reading" was to discover the unity and
continuity of western thought in the discussion of common themes and
problems from one end of the tradition to the other. The Syntopicon does
not reproduce or present the results of this reading in a digest to save
others the trouble of reading the great books for themselves. On the con-
trary, it only lays down the lines along which a syntopical reading of the
great books can be done, and shows why and how it should be done. The
xi
— a
The lines along v/hich a syntopical reading of the great books can and
should be done are the main lines of the continuous discussion that runs
through the thirty centuries of western civihzation. This great conversa-
tion across the ages is a Tiving organism whose structure the Syntopicon
tries to articulate. It tries to show the many strands of this conversation be-
tween the greatest minds of v^estern civilization on the themes which have
concerned men in every epoch, and which cover the whole range of man's
speculative inquiries and practical interests. To the extent that it succeeds,
it reveals the unity and continuity of the western tradition.
It was with these considerations in mind that the editors called The
Great Ideas a syntopicon of the great books — literally, a collection of the
topics which are the main themes of the conversation to be found in the
books. A topic is a subject of discussion. It is a place at which minds meet
—to agree or disagree, but at least to communicate with one another
about some common concern. Just as a number of minds, or what they
have to say, can be related by their relevance to a common theme, so a
number of topics can be related by their relevance to a common term—
ing of the ideas that are the important common terms of discussion; and,
then, by an enumeration of the topics that are the various particular points
about which the discussion of each of these ideas revolves.
The full title of thiswork The Great Ideas, a Syntopicon of Great
Boo\s of —
the Western World thus indicates not only that its structure
consists of terms and topics, but also that it functions as a guide to the
great books from which its terms and topics are drawn. But the title may
fail to indicate another equally important function which the Syntopicon
performs when it is taken together with the great books. By serving as a
guide to the syntopical reading of the great books, it does more than trans-
form them from a mere collection of books into a unified whole; it trans-
quite distinct from, the dictionary and the encyclopaedia. The dictionary
is a basic reference work in the sphere of language. The general encyclo-
paedia is a basic reference work in the sphere of fact, concerned with all
the set — is a basic reference work in the sphere of ideas, comprehending the
wisdom and understanding accumulated thus far in all major fields of
inquiry. As its utility is realized, it will, the editors hope, take its place
beside the dictionary and the encyclopaedia in a triad of fundamental ref-
erence works.
topics and, through them, to the content of the references. For certain of
the most important topics, it frequently provides, in the words of the au-
thors themselves, a foretaste of the great conversation contained in the
passages referred to. The Introduction usually expands on the necessarily
brief statement of the themes or issues in the Outline of Topics, and fur-
nishes some comment on the structure of the Outline as a whole, and on
the relation of particular topics to one another.
The Introduction serves one other purpose. It indicates some of the con-
nections between the idea it discusses and other great ideas, thus function-
ternal structure of the idea by presenting its topics in relation to one an-
other. There are about 3000 topics in the Syntopicon as a whole, an average
of 30 to a chapter, though the actual number varies from as few as six top-
The 3000 topics provide a statement of the scope and variety of subjects
wath which the great books deal in a substantial and significant fashion.
Since the topics are divided among 102 chapters, according to the great
ideas under which they fall, the user of the Syntopicon can find a particu-
lar topic by turning to the chapter on the idea which is a central term ex-
pressed in the statement of that topic or, if not actually present in the
phrasing of the topic, is implied by it.
Almost all the topics involve one or more terms other than the name of
the great idea under which they fall. Hence, by consulting the Inventory
of Term^s, the user of the Syntopicon can ascertain whether the particular
subject in which he is interested is represented by one or more of the 3000
PREFACE XV
However, with the help of the Inventory of Terms, he can always use a
term to find the topics which either state or approximately represent the
subject of his interest.
For the convenience of the reader, the Outline of Topics in each chap-
ter is keyed to the pages of the Reference section which immediately fol-
lows. In the Outline, the number to the right of a particular topic indicates
Under each topic, the references are arranged in the order in which the
authors and their works appear in Great Boo^s of the Western World,
References to the Bible, when present, are always placed first. The order
of references enables the user of the Syntopicon either to follow the dis-
cussion of some theme through the great books in the historical sequence,
such a reading should proceed, in the first instance at least, in the order in
which the references are presented. Reading the materials in chronological
order enables the reader to follow the actual development of thought on
a topic. In many passages, later authors explicitly refer to earlier ones; and
even more frequently, the expression of later views presupposes an under-
standing of earlier ones, on which they are based or with which they take
issue. ml t)i.*i ?.dk|o3 siom to ;
But the individual reader may deviate from this ideal procedure in a
number of ways, according to his particular interests. He may wish only to
The reader may know sufficiently well the position of certain authors on
the topic in question, and so may turn his attention to other authors whose
works are cited there ; or he may wish to examine thoroughly the thought
of certain authors, while merely forming a general impression of what
others have to say. The Reference section is so constructed that it permits
the reader, almost at a glance, to follow any one of a wide variety of pro-
cedures.
A brief explanatory note, repeated at the beginning of every Reference
section, gives the minimum necessary directions for going from the refer-
ences to the passages to which they refer. For the sake of brevity, it oilers
only such information as is uniform for all of the works cited. If the
section and gives examples of the usual typographical form of the refer-
ences.
Only one further point requires comment here. In some chapters, a few
topics contain no references. These topics serve in the Outline as headings
for other topics grouped analytically under them. The user of the Syn-
topicon who wants to know what the great books have to say on a partic-
ular subject, and finds that subject represented by a topic without reference
PREFACE xvii
content, will find in its subordinate topics references to the great books
on various aspects of the general subject he has in mind.
The user of the Syntopicon will find that topics in different chapters
often resemble one another, both in their phrasing and in the references
set forth under them. In a few cases they are identical or almost identical.
But similar topics will usually differ in their reference content because the
and by the surrounding topics which form its context. Hence, in most
cases, the reader who turns to similar topics in other chapters will find
some proportion of different references.
always indicated by the use of English titles; these are usually accom-
panied by the title in the original language.
The 102 lists of Additional Readings, each constructed for the idea and
topics of a particular chapter, contain in all 2603 titles by 1181 authors. For
the convenience of the reader, the authors and titles in the 102 separate
lists of Additional Readings are compiled into a single Ust in the Bibliog-
raphy of Additional Readings, which is Appendix I (see Volume II, pg.
I 143).
order to learn what the great books have to say on a particular subject,
must be able to find that subject among the 3000 topics. The primary func-
tion of the Inventory of Terms is to enable him to find the topic or topics
inquiry. It does so by citing, for each term listed, the topics in which that
PREFACE xix
term is a principal element. It cites these by giving the name of the chapter
in which the topic appears, and the number of the topic in that chapter.
The reader can find the topic in which he is interested by looking in the
hiventory for the term or terms that would appear in a statement of the
subject.
The user of the Syntopicon may have a broader interest than can be ex-
pressed in a particular topic. He may wish to examine the whole range of
discussion of a basic concept, whether that be one of the great ideas or
some other term. This may involve, not one or two topics, but a large
number, as is certainly the case for the great ideas, and for many other
important concepts as well. Since the Inventory of Terms cites all the top-
cates only the whole chapter which deals with that great idea; whereas
the Inventory of Terms usually cites topics in many other chapters, in ad-
dition to the chapter on that idea itself. For the reader who wishes to ex-
plore the discussion of a great idea as thoroughly as possible, the Inven-
tory of Terms supplements the topics to be found in the chapter on that
idea, and even those mentioned in the Cross-References of that chapter.
The 1800 terms in the Inventory are Hsted alphabetically, and for each
term the relevant topics are cited in the alphabetical order of the chapters
in which the topics occur. Sometimes the topics are divided into two
groups, of primary and secondary importance. Within each group, the
chapters are alphabetically arranged.
The Inventory is likely to present only one difficulty to the person who
consults it in order to find a particular topic. The first step in the location
ment of the subject; or (2) he can use the names of the chapters in which
the topics occur as a clue to finding the topic which states the subject of
XX THE GREAT IDEAS
his inquiry. Since the content of particular topics is largely determined by
the idea under which they fall,.tlie.cbapter nanies will quite frequently
prove a reliable guide. ' -Wrrj-f, ,,; -jir-r] --rf-t ly^jj ,.n-, r
construction and furnishes directions for its use. Nothing more need be
said here of its structure, or of its utility in making the Syntopicon a ref-
erence book. But a word should be added about, the significance of the In-
ventory in relation to the great ideas, r^'j^
in^':--"- ^^
o^The division of the Syntopicon into 102 chapters may give rise to the
action that its editors think there are only 102 ideas worth discussing. The
number of really great, that is, primary or pivotal ideas may be smaller or
larger than 102. That number represents an editorial judgment which was
made in the course of constructing the Syntopicon. How it was reached is
have much less comprehensive or critical meaning than the 102 major
terms of the Syntopicon, they all have general currency or importance
in some special field of inquiry. They also represent notions or topics
the principles adopted. While freeing the Preface from the burden of
fuller explanations, they nevertheless hoped to provide systematic an-
swers to questions which might arise in the reader's mind as a result of
i' The foregoing discussion of the nature and structure of die Syntopicon
has expressed the purpose for which it was designed, but it does not fully
state all its possible uses. There are four basic types of usefulness which the
editors hope the Syntopicon will have. Two of these have already been
mentioned. It has been pointed out that the Syntopicon is both a reference
book and a book to be read. But the Syntopicon is also intended to serve
tain kind of study and teaching of the great books. It is not inconsistent
with its primary function as a reference book that it should, in addition,
prove to be an instrument of research and discovery. i
further questions in his mind and excite him to further inquiries, which,
in turn, they are able to satisfy, they are more than answer-books. They are
pedagogues, leading the mind from question to question in the pursuit of
learning. Reference books at their best perform an educational function,
not simply by answering questions, but by arousing and sustaining inquiry.
Nevertheless, the field of any reference book is defined, in the first in-
inquiry which the Syntopicon is able to satisfy, and which gives it its spe-
books are assembled and ; it is through reading the works or passages rec-
ommended by these references that the person who consults the Syntopi-
con finds the answer to his question, What do the great books have to say
on this subject ?
of the topics and guided by the references assembled under them. This
fact distinguishes the Syntopicon from all other familiar reference books,
which contain within themselves xht answers to the questions on which
they are consulted. The Syntopicon does not contain the answers, but only
a guide to where the answers can be found in the pages of the great books.
The references which constitute this guide do not tell the reader what the
great books have to say on a particular subject. They only tell him where
to read in the great books in order to discover for himself the thought
and opinion, the imagination and emotion, in which the authors of these
books have expressed their minds on this or that particular subject. For
this reason it was said earlier in this Preface that only when it is taken to-
gether with the great books themselves, does the Syntopicon create a ref-
The question, What themes have been discussed in the tradition of west-
ern thought under this idea? is answered in the first instance by the Out-
Hne of Topics in the chapter on each of the great ideas. If the reader be-
comes interested in the actual content of the discussion under one or more
of these topics, he will then be asking the primary sort of question, to
which the references, assembled under these topics, provide the beginning
of an answer, and the great books the fullness of it.
The question, To which of the other great ideas is this idea related and
how is it related? is answered by the Cross-References in the chapter on
each of the great ideas. The Cross-References enumerate the topics in
other chapters which are related to the topics covered by the idea in ques-
tion. The introductory essay on the idea also usually contains references
to other Introductions in which related ideas are considered. By reading
the Introduction and examining the Cross-References, a person can use the
Syntopicon to discover, at least initially, the connections between one great
idea and others.
The question. What hoo\s other than those published in this set contain
important discussions of this idea? is answered, to some extent, by the
Additional Readings listed in the chapter on each of the great ideas.
The question. What is the history of the idea, its various meanings, and
the problems or controversies it has raised? is answered, at least initially,
by the Introduction to the chapter on each of the great ideas. Here as be-
fore, if the reader's interest is aroused to further inquiry, the topics, the
references under them, the passages in the great books referred to, and the
books listed in the Additional Readings, provide the means for a fuller ex-
ploration of the idea, in varying degrees of thoroughness and ramification.
With respect to its 102 essays on the great ideas, the Syntopicon is first
of all a book to be read. These essays are arranged in the alphabetical or-
der of the ideas, but they need not be read in that order. Each is intended
to be intelligible in itself, independently of the others.
The reader can therefore begin according to his interests with any one of
the Introductions to the great ideas. No matter where he begins, he will
find that the reading of no other Introduction is presupposed. But he will
also find that each Introduction traces some of the connections between
the particular idea which it treats and other great ideas.
—
attention, tOy and may arouse his interest in^ still others. Since each of the
the Outlines of Topics in these same chapters and, through them and the
;
tegral parts of the Syntopicon, the Introductions to the great ideas are not
intended to satisfy the reader's interest, but rather to arouse it, and then
direct it to the great books. The name "Introduction" specifies the func-
tion these essays were designed to perform. When they function effective-
ly as introductions to the Outlines of Topics and the References, they im-
plement the use of the Syntopicon, not simply as a reference book, but as
an instrument of liberal education.
facilitates the reading of the great books and, beyond that, the study and
teaching of them. To make the nature of this educational contribution
clear, it is necessary to distinguish between the integral and the syntopical
reading of great books.
Integral reading consists simply in reading a whole book through. But
syntopical reading does not consist simply in reading parts of a book
rather than the whole. It involves the reading of one book in relation to
In some cases, as the References show, whole works are cited along with
the juxtaposition of many authors under the same topic and, in conse-
quence, the reading together of their works, in whole or part.
—
PREFACE XXV
Neither of these two types of reading can ever be a substitute for the
other, nor can either be taken as sufficient in itself. On the contrary, each
is incomplete v^ithour the other. Those who begin by reading in the great
books and reading them syntopically must eventually read at least some
of them integrally. Those who have already read some of the great books
through must read them syntopically to discover what an integral reading
of the great books seldom reveals, except, perhaps, to the most mature
student or conscientious scholar. For each of these two sorts of persons
the beginning reader and the more advanced student or scholar —the Syn-
topicon functions differently and the syntopical reading of the great books
serves a different purpose.
For the beginning reader —in the extreme case, a person who has read
none of the great books —a syntopical reading, done in accordance with
the references under even a few topics, works in three ways: initiatively,
where to begin and in what order to proceed. There are many solutions to
in other topics related to those which initiated his reading in the great
topic niay also impel the reader to look beyond the passages cited. Except
rAm tjiqijiui .^oiqoJ ln:>i3Bib -^i ni \bn.^v:ii\ih inriwamoe
xxvl THE GREAT IDEAS
when they cite whole works, the references cite passages which neces-
sarily exist in a context, ultimately the context of the whole book. Few of
these passages are absolutely self-contained. For few of them can it be said
that it will be finally satisfactory to read them without looking further
into the author's thought. Hence, proceeding along the natural lines of
his own interests, the reader may be led from reading small parts of cer-
tain books to reading larger parts and, eventually, to reading whole books.
process is repeated, each syntopical reading may occasion and stimu-
If this
centuated when they are read against one another. And sometimes the
passages from one author, by amplifying or commenting on the passages
cited from another, materially help the reader's understanding of the sec-
ond author.
Third, if the individual does a syntopical reading of the great books
under a number of distinct topics, the fact that the same passage will often
be found cited under two or more topics will have its instructive effect.
pretation not only is a basic exercise in the art of reading, but also tends
to make the mind habitually alert to the many strains of meaning which
any rich or complex passage can contain.
In this description of the ways in which a syntopical reading instructs in
the art of reading the great books, we have emphasized only the influence
of the topic under which the reading is done and the effect of reading one
passage in relation to another or in relation to several distinct topics. But
to assure or reinforce its instructive effect, two other factors may operate
in the background of a syntopical reading. One is the whole Outline of
Topics, which places a particular topic in the context of other topics under
the same idea. The other is the Introduction to that idea, which may help
the reader to interpret the particular topic, thereby increasing the effective-
ness of that topic as a guide to the interpretation of the works or passages
referred to under it.
If we turn now from the beginning reader to the more mature student
or scholar —in the extreme a person who has read through many,
case, if
not all, of the great books — we shall see that a syntopical reading works
in a different way. It no longer need function initiatively or suggestively;
nor, for the competent reader, need it serve instructively, to develop skill
in the art of reading. But it does provide the occasion and the materials
for a more intensive and critical reading of passages already read; and it
Short of that, reading a great book through one or more times will in-
evitably leave unnoticed or only partly recognized many passages of criti-
cal significance to a particular theme or problem. Only when the book is
read with that particular subject in mind will these passages, hitherto
unobserved, be found.
xxviii THE GREAT IDEAS
The truth of this can be verified by accomplished readers of the great
books if they will examine, under particular topics, passages from books
they have already read or even studied to some extent. Unless their previ-
ous reading of the books w^as done in the light of the particular intellec-
tual interest represented by this topic, they are likely to find some passages
that they never saw before, or at least never fully recognized as having
the significance they take on when read syntopically —in the light of this
topic and in relation to other works and passages relevant to the same
theme.
The Syntopicon can thus serve those who have already done, to a greater
or less extent, an integral reading of the great books. The method of syn-
topical reading not only provides a different and rewarding way of read-
ing them, but also carries the study of them to deeper and deeper levels of
makes possible the close study of each work in relation to all the problems
The particular problem may involve many topics in one or more chap-
ters. It may involve a number of great ideas and many subordinate terms.
The organization of the Syntopicon enables the student of such a problem
to discover the range of the terms and topics traditionally involved in its
other books which bear upon the problem more or less directly.
'It does not seem an exaggeration to say that a person who has done all
the syntopical reading suggested by the References and the Additional
Readings on a particular problem^ will have a fairly adequate knowledge
What has just been said about the studious or scholarly use of the Syn-
topicon suggests how it may serve as an instrument in teaching the great
books, or in using them as teaching materials. For the most part, the great
than as wholes, they are, for the most part, used as materials in a general
course of study rather than as appUcable to the study of particular subject
matters.
Without detracting from or competing with the unquestionable value
of such procedures, the Syntopicon offers another pedagogical use of the
great books. The method of syntopical reading makes them available in
textbooks.
For a particular problem or subject matter, whose name is either one of
the great ideas or a major term in the Inventory of Terms, the Syntopicon
suggests some, if not all, of the topics which deserve to be studied, and
some, if not all, of the works which deserve to be read in whole or part.
What has already been said about the use of the Syntopicon by the seri-
tion ; he would examine the materials referred to under every idea or topic
which appeared to have been considered by the minds of that period.
In these three types of historical inquiry, the Syntopicon is at best an
auxiliary instrument in the service of scholarship. If it proves to be more
than that for the ordinary student, it will probably be less than that for
field are more extensive than those from which the Syntopicon is con-
structed. This is especially true of those problems in the history of ideas
which have been investigated by prolonged research. But some problems
have not been so investigated, and the Syntopicon may have something to
contribute to the study of these. It is even possible that the Syntopicon may
uncover or call attention to new problems, or may cause the re-formulation
of old problems in a new way.
above the examples call attention to the five elements commonly present
in the construction of the references.
cluded in Volume 43. Authors' names are usually given in shortened form.
xxxiii
xxxiv THE GREAT IDEAS
sions" does not necessarily mean divisions made by the author; they
may have been made by an editor of his work.
Author's divisions are given only for some works, according as, in the
judgment of the editors, their inclusion would prove meaningful or help-
ful to the reader. References to Locke, for instance, as in the example,
example, do not.
For some works, author's divisions are completely given, as for Locke.
For other works, only the most important or largest divisions are given.
Thus for Rabelais only the book but not the chapter is given.
Line numbers, in brackets, are given for all works of poetry, including
those published in prose translations. For Goethe's Faust, the line num-
bers cited refer to the lines of the EngUsh translation as well as to the lines
works of Homer, the Greek dramatists, Lucretius, Virgil, and Dante — the
line numbers cited refer to the lines of the works in their original lan-
guages; for these works, the line numbers printed on the pages of this
edition furnish only an approximate indication of the location of the
equivalent lines in the English translation. For all poetical works written
in English, the line numbers are the numbers of the EngHsh Unes. In the
In references to the works of Aristotle (in Volumes 8 and 9), the figures
and letters enclosed in the brackets signify the page, column, and approxi-
mate line in the Berlin edition of the Greek text edited by Immanuel
Bekker. In references to the American State Papers (in Volume 43),
:
the bracketed line numbers refer to the hnes on the pages of this
edition only.
Summa Theologica of Thomas Aquinas (in Vol-
In references to the
umes 19 and 20), the author's division "Part I-II" stands for Part I of the
Second Part, and "Part II-II" stands for Part II of the Second Part. In the
case of the Summa Theologica, the author's divisions cited may include
not only questions and articles, but the subdivisions of articles. In such
cases the page sections correspond in extent to that of a w^hole article, to
hand column, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the
right-hand column. These half and quarter page sections are based on
divisions of a full text page.
Page sections give the page numbers and locate the sections of the page
in which the passage referred to begins and ends. For example, in the
reference:
53 James Psychology,
: 1 1 6a- 1 1 9b
the passage cited begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the
lower half of page 119. In the reference:
the passage cited begins in the lower half of the left-hand column of page
163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand column of page 164.
upper half of the page, or in the b and d sections of the lower half of the
page. This occurs when a work or an author's division begins in the lower,
or ends in the upper, half of the two-column page. Where continuous read-
ing matter thus appears in discontinuous. page sectipns, it is indicated by
a,c or b,d. For example: r 'nlj .^Mv-o^o-iiXT v.t^m^^?. Dfb 1-:^ 'v-:.',
means that the work cited begins in the lower half of page 64 and ends in
the upper half of page 77.
-:fii Footnotes or notes are sometimes specifically cited by themselves in the
references, in which case the page sections given correspond to their loca-
tion on the pages referred to. When a footnote or a note is not specifically
cited, the page sections given mark the beginning and the end of the text
referred to. The reader is expected to consult the footnotes or notes indi-
cated in the body of that text.
Chaucer's works (in Volume 22) are printed in two columns; tlie inside
column of each page contains the Middle EngUsh text, the outside column
a Modern English version. Since both columns contain equivalent pas-
sages, the references to this volume employ page sections, (a and b) which
divide each page only in to. an upper and a lower half. , r j
^^''
II. STYLE OF BIBLE REFERENCES ^^ bniirl-iHlrH:
King
All Bible references are to book, chapter, and verse in both the
James and Douay versions of the Bible. When the King James and Douay
versions differ in the title of books or in the numbering of chapters or
verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by
a (D), follows. For example:
the passages from Plutarch are only a part of LycurguSy and the passage
from Swift is only a few pages from Part II of Gulliver s Travels.
When the title of a work, or an author's division of a work, is not
separated by a comma from the page sections which follow, the reference
is to the whole work or to the whole of the indicated author's division.
(2) Symbols
esp: The abbreviation "esp" precedes one or more especially relevant
passages w^hich are contained within the page boundaries of a larger pas-
sage or a whole work that has just been cited.
Whenever passages contained within a single reference are especially
referred to, a comma after the page sections separates these passages. For
example
42 Kant: Science of Right, 435a-441d esp 435c-436b, 437c-d, 438d-441d
(3) Abbreviations
of the Western World, Volumes 4-54. The authors are enumerated in the
order in which they appear in the successive volumes of the set ; and under
each author's name the titles of his works are listed in the order of their
appearance.
In the references, the name of the author is frequently given in short-
ened form. In this table, their full names are given, followed by their life
dates when these are ascertainable. Because some volumes contain the
works of two or more authors who may be separated by centuries, the
order in which the authors are cited in the references sometimes departs
from the strict chronological order. The life dates help the reader to place
the authors and their works in the right chronological order.
In the references, the title of a work is frequently given in an abbrevi-
ated or shortened form. In this table, the titles are first given exactly as
they appear in the references. Whenever this is an abbreviated or short-
ened title, the full title follows.
The table also includes a notation of the author's divisions that are used
in references to particular works.
A dash in the column headed "Author's Divisions Cited" means that references
to the work or works in question cite page sections only. Where the author's divisions
cited are the same for several titles, they are named only once, either opposite the set
of titles as a whole, or opposite the last title in the group.
which appear on the title page of the work,
Titles in brackets are collective titles
but do not appear in the references. The names of the authors of The Federalist (in
Volume 43) are bracketed because they do not appear in the references.
4 Homer
The Iliad The Odyssey BOOK, Line
r ^ r.
Oedipus at Colonus Trachiniae
Antigone Philoctetes Line
'
Ajax
rlJ io i\
J
?^ytt><\ griEwoHol 3flT
<"¥ »i:yX«lbiO
5 Euripides {c. 480-406 B.C.)
^ ;^^>^-a.
Wiesus Electrd
Medea The Bacchantes '^^ 3 fh ->;-/a fin
Hippolytus Hecuba
Alcestis Heracles Mad
;3fi5iJpu
Heracleidae The Phoenician Maidens I
'^-'^^
The Suppliants Orestes '''
Charmides Phaedo
Lysis Gorgias
Laches The Republic
_. ill i,:liLj..' .
.\.-'^^
Protagoras Ttmaeus
Euthydemus Critias
..':,: T
\i-3\i'
Cratylus Parmenides
Phaedrus Theaetetus
Ion Sophist
Symposium Statesman
Meno Philebus
Euthyphro Laws
Apology The Seffenth Letter except Republic
Crito •."\i '.';>,•*•(".,• I
•/ v:'.v >'.r.a-^i. and LawSy book
'ttn«oa ..
,
Categories I _ .
.
^ r
•
f CHAPTER, Line
Interpretation On Interpretation )
Prior Analytics )
Posterior Analytics /•
book, chapter. Line
Topics )
9 Aristotle
History of Animals \
T. r A r^ .1
1 n r A ' 1 f BOOK, CHAPTER, Line
Parts of Animals On the Parts of Animals
.
^ } .
10 Hippocrates (continued)
Aphorisms section, paragraph
The Law
Ulcers On Ulcers
paragraph
Fistulae On Fistulae
Hemorrhoids On Hemorrhoids
Sacred Disease On the Sacred Disease
Sphere and Cylinder On the Sphere and Cylinder, BOOK, DEFINITION, ASSUMPTION,
Books I-II PROPOSITION, COROLLARY, LEMMA
Measurement of a Circle PROPOSITION
Conoids and Spheroids On Conoids and Spheroids DEFINITION, LEMMA, PROPOSITION
Spirals On Spirals PROPOSITION, DEFINITION
Equilibrium of Planes On the Equilibrium ofPlaneSy
Poplicola Eumenes
Poplicola- Solon Poplicola and Eumenes-Sertorius Eumenes and
Solon Compared Sertorius Compared
Themistocles Agesilaus
Camillus Pompey
Pericles Agesilaus-Pompey Agesilaus and
Fabius Pompey Compared
Fabius-Pericles Fabius and Alexander
Pericles Compared Caesar
Alcibiades Phocion
Coriolanus Cato the Younger
Alcibiades- Corio lanus A Icibiades Agis
and Coriolanus Compared Cleomenes
Timoleon Tiberius Gracchus
Aemilius Paulus Caius Gracchus
Aemilius Paulus-Timoleon Caius and Tiberius Gracchus- Agis
Aemilius Paulus and Timoleon and Cleomenes Caius and
Compared Tiberius Gracchus and Agis and
Pelopidas Cleomenes Compared
Marcellus Demosthenes
Marcellus-Pelopidas Marcellus Cicero
and Pelopidas Compared Demosthenes- Cicero Demosthenes
Aristides and Cicero Compared
Marcus Cato Demetrius
Aristides- Marcus Cato Aristides Antony
and Marcus Cato Compared Antony -Demetrius Antony and
Philopoemen Demetrius Compared
Flamininus Dion
Flamininus-Philopoemen Marcus Brutus
Flamininus and Philopoemen Brutus-Dion Brutus and
Compared Dion Compared
Pyrrhus Aratus
Caius Marius Artaxerxes
Lysander Galba
Sulla Otho
Lysander-Sulla Lysander and
Sulla Compared
xiiv THE GREAT IDEAS
17 Plotinus (205-270)
First- Sixth Ennead- The Six Enneads tractate, chapter
27 Shakespeare, William
Twelfth Night Tu^elfth Night; Antony and Cleopatra
or, What You Will Coriolanus
Hamlet Hamlet, Prince of DenmarJ^ Timon of Athens
The Merry Wives of Windsor Pericles Pericles, Prince of Tyre
Troilus and Cressida Cymbeline
All's Well That Ends Well The Winter's Tale
Measure for Measure The Tempest
Othello Othello, the Moor of Venice Henry VIII The Famous History
King Lear of the Life of King Henry
Macbeth the Eighth prologue, act, scene, epilogue, Line
II Penseroso Younger
Arcades Mr. Cyriacl{ Skjnner To Mr. Cyriacl^
Triangle
Correspondence tvith Fermat Correspondence tvith
41 Gibbon, Edward
Decline and Fall The Decline and Fall of the
Roman Empire (continued), Chapters 41-71
REFERENCE STYLE xlix
Representative Government
Utilitarianism
t
THE GREAT IDEAS
I
\ -.IKRCW i:Ki>lT> Ait I
V;.Vv :\"^
Chapteri: ANGEL
INTRODUCTION
INFLUENCED by a long tradition of reli- of its existence; and, so considered, it functions
gious symbolism in painting and poetry, our as an hypothesis in and economic
political
imagination responds to the word "angel" by thought. What sort of being an angel would be
picturing a winged figure robed in dazzling if one existed can likewise serve as an hypothe-
white and having the bodily aspect of a human sis in the examination of a wide variety of
are persons; that they are most essentially char- characteristics of corporeal existence. Pascal's
acterized by their intelligence. The wings sug- remark— that "man is neither angel nor brute,
gest the function of angels — their service as and the unfortunate thing is that he who would
messengers from God to man. The aura of light act the angel acts the brute"— points to the
which surrounds them signifies, according to different conceptions of man which result from
established conventions of symbolism, the spir- supposing him to be either angel or brute rather
ituality of angels. It suggests that to imagine than neither. Such views of human nature, con-
angels with bodies is to use a pictorial metaphor. sidered in the chapters on Animal and Man,
Another interpretation might be put upon cannot be fully explored without reference to
this aura of light if one considers the role which theories of the human mind or soul in its rela-
the notion of angel has played in the history of tion to matter and to body. As the chapters on
thought. Wherever that notion has entered in- Mind and Soul indicate, theories carrying the
to discussions of God and man, of niatter, names of Plato and Descartes, which attribute
mind, and soul, of knowledge and love, and to the human mind or soul the being and pow-
even of time, space, and motion, it has cast ers of a purely spiritual substance or entity,
light upon these other topics. The illumination seem to place man in the company of the angels.
which has been and can be derived from the In this tradition Locke applies the word "spir-
idea of angels as a special kind of being or nature its" equally to human minds and to supra-
is in no way affected by doubts or denials of human intelligences.
their existence.
Whether such beings exist or not, the fact It would be misleading to suppose that the
that they are conceivable has significance for idea of angels is primarily a construction of the
theory and analysis. Those who do not believe philosophers — a fiction invented for their ana-
in the existence — or even the possible exist- lytical purposes; or that it is simply their con-
ence — of Utopias nevertheless regard them as ception of a supra-mundane reaUty, concerning
fictions useful analytically in appraising ac- the existence and nature of which they dispute.
cepted realities. What an ideal society would be In the literature of western civilization, angels
like can be considered apart from the question first appear by name or reference in the Old
—
one of the seven, who stand before the Lord. permanent being, then they must be corporeal.
And when they had heard these things they were As "in the resurrection men shall be permanent
troubled; and being seized with fear they fell upon and not incorporeal," Hobbes writes, "so there-
the ground on their face.
fore also are the angels ... To men that under-
And the angel said to them: Peace be to you.
Fear not. stand the signification of these words, substance
For when I was with you, I was there by the will —
and incorporeal and mean by "incorporeal"
of God: bless ye him and sing praises to him. having no body at all, not just a subtle body
I seemed to eat and to drink with you; but I use
the words taken together "imply a contradic-
an invisible meat and drink, which cannot be seen
tion. Hence Hobbes argues that to say "an
by men.
It is time therefore that I return to him that sent angel, or spirit, is (in that sense) an incorporeal
me. . . . substance, is to say in effect that there is no
And when he had he was taken
said these things, angel or spirit at all. Considering therefore the
from their sight; and they could see him no more. signification of the word angel in the Old Testa-
As A RESULT of scriptural exegesis and commen- ment, and the nature of dreams and visions that
tary, the angels become a fundamental topic for happen to men by the ordinary way of nature,"
Jewish theologians from Philo to Maimonides, Hobbes concludes that the angels are "nothing
and for such Christian theologians as Augustine, but supernatural apparitions of the fancy, raised
Scotus Erigena, Gregory the Great, Aquinas, by the special and extraordinary operation of
Luther, Calvin, Pascal, and Schleiermacher. God, thereby to make his presence and com-
They figure in the great poetry of the Judaeo- mandments known to mankind, and chiefly to
Christian tradition — in the Divine Comedy of his own people."
Dante, in Paradise Lost of Milton, and in Locke seems to take the exactly opposite po-
Chaucer's Canterbury Tales and Goethe's Faust. sition. Asserting that we have "no clear or
The philosophers, especially in the 17th and distinct idea of substance in general," he does
1 8th centuries, are motivated by Scripture or not think spirits any less intelligible than bodies.
provoked by theology to consider the existence, "The idea oi corporeal substance,'' he writes, "is
the nature, and the activity of angels. Hobbes, as remote from our conceptions and apprehen-
for example, attacks the supposition that angels sions, as that of spiritual substance or spirit; and
are immaterial on the ground that the notion therefore, from our not having any notion of
of incorporeal substance is self-contradictory, the substance of spirit, we can no more con-
and undertakes to re-interpret all the scriptural clude its non-existence, than we can, for the
passages in which angels are described as spirits. same reason, deny the existence of body." Just
After examining a great many, he says that "to as we form the complex idea of bodies by sup-
mention all the places of the Old Testament posing their qualities, such as figure and motion,
where the name of Angel is found, would be or color and weight, to co-exist in some sub-
too long. Therefore to comprehend them all at stratum; so by supposing the activities we find
once, I say, there is no text in that part of the in ourselves — such as "thinking, understanding.
—
Chapter 1 : ANGEL
willing, knowing, and the power of beginning (the bcstowcr and creator of forms), and per-
motion, etc." — to co-exist in some substance, haps for angels or intelligences at once to recog-
*'we are able to frame the complex idea of an nize forms affirmatively at the first glance of
immaterial spirit.'' contemplation."
Not only does Locke think that "we have as
clear a perception and notion of immaterial sub- Unlike most of the great ideas with which
stances as we have of material," but he also we are concerned, the idea of angel seems to be
finds the traditional doctrine of a hierarchy of limited in its historical scope. It is not merely
angels quite acceptable to reason. "It is not im- that since the i8th century the discussion has
possible to conceive, nor repugnant to reason, dwindled, but also that the idea makes no ap-
that there may be many species of spirits, as pearance in the great books of pagan antiquity
much separated and diversified one from an- —certainly not in the strict sense of the term,
other by distinct properties whereof we have whereby "angel" of God,
signifies a creature
no ideas, as the species of sensible things are dis- spiritual in substance and nature, and playing
tinguished one from another by qualities which a role in the divine government of the universe.
we know and observe in them." There are, nevertheless, analogous concep-
Locke goes even further — beyond the mere tions in the religion and philosophy of the an-
possibility of angels to the likelihood of their cients; and in philosophy at least, the points of
real existence. His reasoning resembles the tra- resemblance between the analogous concepts
ditional argument of the theologians on this dif- are sufficiently strong to establish a continuity
ficult point. "When we consider the infinite of discussion. Furthermore, elements in the
power and wisdom of the Maker," he writes, thought of Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus exer-
"we have reason to think that it is suitable to cise a critical influence on Judaeo-Christian
the magnificent harmony of the Universe, and angelology.
the great design and infinite goodness of the Gibbon relates how the early Christians made
Architect, that the species of creatures should the connection between the gods of polytheism
also, by gentle degrees, ascend upward from us and their doctrine about angels. "It was the
toward his infinite perfection, as we see they universal sentiment both of the church and of
gradually descend from us downwards." heretics," he writes, "that the daemons were
Such speculations concerning the existence the authors, the patrons, and the objects of
and the order of angels are usually thought to idolatry. Those rebellious spirits who had been
be the province of the theologian rather than degraded from the rank of angels, and cast
the philosopher. But Bacon, like Locke, does down into the infernal pit, were still permitted
not think it unfitting for the philosopher to in- to roam upon the earth, to torment the bodies
quire into such matters. In natural theology and to seduce the minds of sinful men. The
for him a part of philosophy — Bacon thinks it is daemons soon discovered and abused the nat-
improper "from the contemplation of nature, ural propensity of the human heart towards
and the principles of human reason, to dispute devotion, and, artfully withdrawing the adora-
or urge anything with vehemence as to the tion of mankind from their Creator, they
mysteries of faith." But "it is otherwise," he usurped the place and honors of the Supreme
declares, "as to the nature of spirits and angels; Deity."
this being neither unsearchable nor forbid, but In the polytheistic religions of antiquity, the
in a great part level to the human mind on demi-gods or inferior deities are beings supe-
account of their affinity." rior in nature and power to man. "The poly-
He does not further instruct us concerning theistand the philosopher, the Greek and the
angels in the Advancement of Learning, but in barbarian," writes Gibbon, "were alike accus-
the Novum Organum he throws light on their tomed to conceive a long succession, an infinite
nature as well as ours by touching on one char- chain of angels, or daemons, or deities, or aeons,
acteristic difference between the human and or emanations, issuing from the throne of light."
the angelic mind. Discussing there the theory of In Plato's Symposium, for example, Diotima
induction, he holds that "it is only for God tells Socrates that Love "is intermediate be-
THE) GREAT IDEAS
twcen the divine and the mortd j .and inter- . are they an order of knowcrs as well as a realm
prets between gods and men; conveying and of knowables ? Can they be regarded, as sub-
taking across to the gods the prayers and sacri- stances ? And if so, do they havea mode of ac-
fices of men, and to men the commands and re- tion appropriate to their mode of being — action
pHes of the gods; he is the mediator who spans which is other than knowing, action which in
the chasm which divides them." Love, Diotima some way impinges on the course of events or
explains, is only one of "these spirits and inter- the motions of the physical world? yjm.]?
mediate powers" which "are many and diverse." Plotinus answers affirmatively that the pure-
Such demi-gods are intermediate by their pure intelligences,
ly intelligible beings are also
very nature. Although superhuman in knowl- but he does not conceive them as having any
edge and action, they still are not completely power or action except that of knowledge. An-
divine. Occupying a place between men and other answer to these questions given in antiq-
gods, they are, according to Plato, "by nature uity and the Middle Ages is that the inteUi-
neither mortal nor immortal." Their existence gences are the celestial motors, the movers of
is necessary to fill out the hierarchy of natures. the heavenly bodies. "Since we see," Aristotle
They are links in what has come to be called writes, "that besides the simple spatial move-
"the great chain of being." ment of the universe, which we say that the
The analogy with the angels arises primarily first and unmovable substance produces, there
from this fact of hierarchy. Both pagan and are other spatial movements — those of the
Christian religions believe in an order of super- planets — which are eternal (for a body which
natural or at least superhuman beings graded in moves in a circle moves eternally), each oi these
perfection and power. In both, these beings movements also must be caused by a substance,
serve as messengers from the gods to men; they both unmovable in itself and eternal." These
act sometimes as guardians or protectors, some- secondary movers, Aristotle thinks, are "of the
times as traducers, deceivers, and enemies of same number as the movements ot the stars,"
man. But the analogy cannot be carried much and not only must they be eternal and unmov-
further than this. The angels, according to able, as is the prime mover, but also "without
Christian teaching, are not inferior gods, or magnitude" or immaterial.
even demi-gods. As compared with the "inter- Plato offers an alternative hypothesis that —
mediate spirits" of pagan religion, they are less the celestial bodies are alive and have souls.
human in character, as well as less divine. This hypothesis, like Aristotle's, tends in the
Nevertheless, the reader of the great poems of Middle Ages to be restated in terms of the
antiquity will find a striking parallelism be- theory of angels. Aquinas reports Augustine as
tween the heavenly insurrection which under- thinking that "if the heavenly bodies are really
liesthe action of Prometheus Bound and the living beings, their souls must be akin to the
angelic warfare in Paradise Lost. angelic nature." He himself holds that "spirit-
ual substances are united to them as movers to
In the writings of Plato, Aristotle, and Pioti- things moved," the proof of which, he says,
nus, philosophical inquiry turns from the sensi- "lies in the fact that whereas nature moves to
ble world of material things to consider the ex- one fixed end, in which having attained it, it
istence and nature of an order of purely intelli- rests; this does not appear in the movement of
gible beings. As there is an inherent connection the heavenly bodies. Hence it follows that they
between being perceptible to the senses and be- are moved by some intellectual substances."
ing material, so that which is purely intelligible The question whether intelligences govern
must be completely immaterial. If ideas exist the planets also occupies the attention of an
—
independently in their own right and apart astronomer like Kepler. Although he denies
from knowing or thinking minds then they — any need for such intelligences — among other
constitute such an order of purely intelligible reasons because planetary motion is not circular
entities. but elliptical— he argues that the celestial
At this point a number of difficult questions movements are the work either "of the natural
arise. Are the intelligiblcs also intelligences, /.<?., power of the bodies, or else a work of the soul
—
Chapter 1 : ANGEL
acting uniformly in accordance with those bod- sweetness of that most happy contemplation of
ily powers." But whether or not they are to be Thyself. . . cleaving close unto Thee, placed be-
regarded as movers^ as well as ^powers and knoiu- yond all the rolling vicissitudes of times." It is
ables, the intelligences represent for ancient and for this reason that the angels are spoken of as
mediaeval thought a mode of being exempt "aeviternal."
from the vicissitudes of physical change even as The familiar question concerning the num-
it is separate from matter. ber of angels able to stand on a needle's point
if it was ever asked by mediaeval theologians
When modern philosophers consider spirits or merely poses the problem of how an incorpo-
spiritual being, they seldom deal with the an- real substance occupies space. which The way in
cient speculations about pure intelligibles or Aquinas discusses "angels in relation to place"
separate intelligences without being influenced discloses how the question serves to raise gen-
by the theological doctrine of angels which de- erally significant issues concerning the nature of
veloped in mediaeval thought. space and quantity, and their relation to causal-
The extent of this doctrine may be judged ity. He points out that a body occupies place in
from the fact that the Sutnma Theologica of a circumscribed fashion, i.e., its dimensive
Aquinas contains a whole treatise on the angels, quantity is contained within the space; whereas
as well as additional questions on the speech of "an angel is said to be in a corporeal place by
and orders, the division
angels, their hierarchies application of the angelic power in any manner
between the good and the bad angels, and whatever to the place. . . . An incorporeal sub-
their action on men —
the guardianship of the stance virtually contains the thing with which it
good angels and the assaults of the demons. comes into contact, and is not contained by it."
That these additional questions are contained To an objector who thinks that since, unlike
in the treatise on divine government throws bodies, angels do not fill a place, several can be
some light on their theological significance. in the same place at the same time, Aquinas re-
The primary fact about the angelic nature is plies that two angels cannot be in the same
immateriahty. An angel is immaterial both in place because "it is impossible for two complete
its substantial being and in its characteristic ac- causes to be immediately the cause of one and
tivity which, says Aquinas, is "an altogether the same thing." Since an angel is where he
immaterial mode of operation." Being imma- acts, and since by the power of his action he
terial, they are also incorruptible. "Nothing is contains the place at which he acts, "there can-
corrupted except by its form being separated not be but one angel at one place."
from the matter .Consequently," Aquinas
. . Angels are also said to go from one place to
writes, "a subject composed of matter and form another without traversing the intervening
ceases to be actually when the form is separated space and without the lapse of time. Consider-
from the matter. But if the form subsists in its ing their immateriality, such action is less re-
own being, as happens in the angels, it cannot markable for angels to perform than is the ac-
lose its being." To signify that they are intelli- tion of electrons, which, according to modern
gences existing apart from matter, the angels quantum mechanics, jump from outer to inner
are sometimes called "subsisting forms" and orbits of the atom without taking time or pas-
sometimes "separate substances." sing through inter-orbital space.
Although they are imperishable in being and The immateriality of angels has other conse-
have immortal life, the angels are not, like God, quences which throw comparative light on the
truly eternal. "That heaven of heavens which conditions of corporeal existence. In the world
Thou createdst in the beginningis some intellec- of physical things we ordinarily think of a
tual creature," Augustine writes, but it is in species as including a number of individuals.
"no ways coeternal unto Thee." As created, the While all men have the same specific nature,
angels have a beginning. Yet, while not eternal, they differ numerically or individually. But be-
neither are they temporal creatures in contin- cause angels are immaterial substances, it is
ual flux, but, according to Augustine, they held that each angel is a distinct species.
"partake of Thy eternity . . . through the "Things which agree in species but differ in
THE GREAT IDEAS
number," Aquinas explains, "agree in form but as they are exalted to see. Those other loves,
are distinguished materially. If, therefore, the which go around them, are called Thrones of
angels are not composed of matter and form . . . the divine aspect, because they terminated the
it follows that it is impossible for two angels to first triad. . . . The next triad, that in like man-
be of one species." ner bourgeons in this sempiternal spring which
Furthermore, as Aquinas states in another the nightly Aries despoils not, perpetually sing
place,among "incorporeal substances there can- Hosannah with three melodies, which sound in
not be diversity of number without diversity the three orders of joy ... Dominations, first
of species and inequality of nature." Each and then Virtues; the third order is of Powers.
species is necessarily higher or lower than an- Then in the two penultimate dances, the Prin-
other, so that the society of angels is a perfect cipalities and Archangels circle; the last is
hierarchy in which each member occupies a dis- wholly of Angelic sports. These orders all gaze
tinct rank. No
two angels are equal as, on the upward, and downward so prevail, that towards
supposition that they share in the same specific God all are drawn, and all draw."
humanity, all men are. Yet such names as "sera-
phim" and "cherubim" and the distinction be- The theory of angels raises many questions
tween archangels and angels indicate an organi- regarding the similarity and difference between
zation of spiritual substances into various them and disembodied souls. But for compari-
groups — according to the tradition, into nine son with men, perhaps the most striking conse-
orders or subordinate hierarchies. quences of the theory of angels as bodiless in-
The nine orders or ranks of angelic being are telligences concern themanner of their knowl-
described by Dante in the Paradiso as dis- edge and government. The comparison can be
tinct circles of love and light. Using these meta- made on quite different views of the nature of
phors he thus reports his vision of the heavenly man and the soul. In fact, diverse conceptions
hierarchy. "I saw a Point which was raying out of man or the soul can themselves be compared
keen that the sight on which it blazes
light so by reference to the angelic properties which
must needs close because of its intense bright- one conception attributes to human nature and
ness. . . . Perhaps as near as a halo seems to another denies.
girdle the lightwhich paints it, when the vapor Lacking bodies, the angels are without sense-
that bears it is most dense, at such distance perception and imagination. Not being im-
around the Point a circle of fire was whirling so mersed in time and motion, they do not reason
rapidly that it would have surpassed that mo- or think discursively as men do by reasoning
tion which most swiftly girds the world; and from premises to conclusion. Whereas "human
this was girt around by another, and that by intellects," according to Aquinas, "obtain their
the third, and the third then by the fourth, by perfection in the knowledge of truth by a kind
the fifth the fourth, and then by the sixth the of movement and discursive intellectual opera-
fifth. Thereon the seventh followed, so wide- tion ... as they advance from one known thing
spread now in compass that the messenger of to another," the angels, "from the knowledge
Juno entire would be narrow to contain it. So of a known principle straightway perceive
. . .
the eighth and ninth." as known all its consequent conclusions with . . .
Beatrice explains to him how the relation of no discursive process at all." Their knowledge
the circles to one another and to the Point is intuitive and immediate, not by means of
which is God depends upon their measure of concepts abstracted from experience or other-
love and truth, whereby there is "in each wise formed, but through the archetypal ideas
heaven a marvellous agreement with its Intelli- infused in them at their creation by God. That
gence, of greater to more and of smaller to less." is why, Aquinas goes on to say, angels "are
She then amplifies her meaning: "The first cir- called intellectual beings" as contrasted with
cles have shown to thee the Seraphim and the such rational natures as "human souls which ac-
Cherubim. Thus swiftly they follow their own quire knowledge of truth discursively." If men
bonds, in order to liken themselves to the Point "possessed the fulness of intellectual light, like
as most they can, and they can in proportion the angels, then in the first grasping of princi-
Chapter 1 : ANGEL
pics they would at once comprehend their the writers of The Federalist remark that "if
whole range, by perceiving whatever could be men were angels, no government would be
reasoned out from them." necessary." If they had considered that the an-
It would appear from this that conceptions of gelic society is governed by love alone and
the human intellect which minimize its depend- without force, they might have said, "if men
ence on sense and imagination, and which em- were angels, no coercion would be necessary in
phasize the intuitive rather than the discursive their government."
character ofhuman thought, attribute angehc
power to man. The same may be said of theories One of the great theological dogmas asserts
of human knowledge which account for its ori- that,from the beginning, the angels are divided
gin in terms of innate ideas or implanted prin- into two hosts —
the good and evil spirits. The
ciples. Still another example of the attribution sin of Lucifer, or Satan, and his followers is that
of angelic properties to man is to be found in of disobedience, or rebeUion against God, moti-
the supposition that human beings can commu- vated by a pride which refuses to be satisfied
nicate with one another by telepathy. The an- with being less than God. As Satan himself says,
gels are telepathic; one angel, it is said, can in Paradise Lost,
make its ideas known by an
to another simply
pride and worse Ambition threw me down
. . .
act of will and without any exterior means of Warring in Heav'n against Heav'ns matchless King.
communication. ... Ail his good prov'd ill in me,
Lacking bodies, the angels are without bodily And wrought but malice; lifted up so high
I 'sdeind subjection, and thought one step higher
emotions, free from the human conflict be-
Would set me highest, and in a moment quit
tween reason and passion, and completely di-
The debt immense of endless gratitude .
God is not equal. In heaven "the Primal Light And even supposing it were possible, it would
that irradiates it all is received in it by as many be against natural desire, because there exists in
modes as are the splendors with which the everything the natural desire to preserve its
Light pairs Itself. Wherefore, since the affection own nature which would not be preserved were
follows upon the act that conceives, in this na- it to be changed into another nature. Conse-
ture the sweetness of love diversely glows and quently, no creature of a lower nature can ever
warms." covet the grade of a higher nature, just as an ass
Such a society, governed by knowledge and does not desire to be a horse."
love, has no need for the application of coercive It must be in the other way, then, Aquinas
force, for angels are ordered to one another in thinks, that Satan sinned by wishing to be like
such a way that no misunderstandings or dis- God. But this requires further explanation. "To
agreements can occur among them. The philo- desire to be as God according to likeness can
sophical anarchist who proposes the ideal of a happen two ways. In one way, as to that
in
human society without restraint or coercion likenesswhereby everything is likened unto
seems, therefore, to be angelicizing men, or at God. And so, if anyone desire in this way to be
least to be wishing for heaven on earth. Con- Godlike, he commits no sin; provided that he
ceiving government on earth in other terms, desires such likeness in proper order, that is to
B THE GREAT IDEAS
say, that may obtain It from God. But he
he commanded to." If it were otherwise, the war-
would were he to desire to be like God even
sin farebetween the powers of light and darkness
in the right way, but of his own power, and not would have to be construed as a battle between
of God's. In another way, he may desire to be equals, which, according to Christian ortho-
like God in some respect which is not natural doxy, is the Manichean heresy that regards the
to one; one were to desire to create
e.g., if world as the battle ground of the forces of good
heaven and earth, which is proper to God, in and evil. -a^i;-? t>vij!ujtii 3fU'ei!?r •
which desire there would be sin." The word "angelic" usually has the connota-
In this last way, Aquinas asserts, "the devil tion of perfect moral goodness, but that must
desired to be as God, Not that he desired to not lead us to forget that the demons are an^
resemble God by being subject to no one else gehc in their nature although of a diabohcal or
absolutely, for thus he would be desiring his evil will. Nor should the fact of Satan's subser-
own non-being, since no creature can exist ex- vience to God cause us to forget that Christian
cept by participating under God." But he "de- theology tries not to underestimate the power
sired as the last end of his beatitude something of the devil in his goings and comings on earth.
which he could attain by virtue of his own na- Satan tried to tempt even Christ, and through-
ture, turning his appetite away from the super- out the New Testament the destruction of the
natural beatitude which is attained by God's diabolical influence over men occupies a promi-
grace." nent place. The intervention of the devil in
In the original sin of Lucifer and the other man's life provides, if not the theme, the back-
fallen angels, as well as in all subsequent inter- ground of Goethe's Faust.
vention by Satan or his demons in the affairs As the theory of demonic influences and dia-
of men, lie the theological mysteries of the ori- bolical possession is an integral part of the tra-
gin of evil in a world created by God's love and ditional doctrine of angels, so, in modern times,
goodness, and of the liberty of those creatures demonology has been a major focus of attack
who, while free, can only do God's will. As in- upon theological teaching concerning spirits.
dicated in the chapter on Sin, the fall of Adam Moralists have thought it possible to explain
from grace and innocence involves the same human depravity without recourse to the se-
mysteries. Man's destiny is connected with the ductions of the devil, and psychiatrists have
career of Lucifer in traditional Christian teach- thought it possible for men to go mad or to
ing, not only on the side of sin, but also with behave as if bewitched without the help of evil
regard to man's redemption — salvation replac- spirits. The idea of the devil, according to
ing the fallen angels by the souls of the elect in Freud, is a religious fiction
— "the best way out
the heavenly choir. in acquittal of God" for those who try "to rec-
Among the most extraordinary moments in oncile the undeniable existence ... of evil with
our literature are those in which Lucifer talks His omnipotence and supreme goodness."
with God about mankind, as in Paradise Lost', The characteristic skepticism of our age has
or about a particular man, as in the Book of been directed against the belief in angels gener-
Job or in the Prologue in Heaven in Faust. ally. It casts doubt by satire or denies by argu-
Their pagan parallel is the speech of Prome- ment the existence of spirits both good and evil.
theus to a silent Zeus, but Prometheus, un- Yet, all arguments considered, it may be won-
like Satan, man's benefactor and he can defy
is dered whether the existence of angels— or, in
Zeus because the Fates, whose secret he philosophical terms, the existence of pure intelli-
knows, rule over the gods. Lucifer, on the gences — is or is not still a genuine issue. Or are
contrarv', seems always to be in the service of there two issues here, one philosophical and the
God. When he appears to Ivan in the Brothers other theological, one to be resolved or left un-
Karamazov, he protests, "I love men genuinely resolved on the level of argument, the other to
. and against the grain I serve to produce
. . be answered dogmatically by the declarations
events and do what is irrational because I am of a religious faith ?
(%-r
1
Chapter 1 : ANGEL (H
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. Inferior deities or dcmi-gods in polytheistic religion lo
2a, The celestial motors or secondary prime movers: the intelligences attached to
the celestial bodies
3f. The angelic hierarchy: the inequality, order, and number of the angels and their
relation to one another
4. Comparison of angels with men and with disembodied souls: their relation to the
blessed in the heavenly choir 14
5. The distinction and comparison of the good and the bad angels
5 J. The origin of the division between angels and demons: the sin of Lucifer or
Satan ^5
53. The society of the demons: the rule of Satan over the powers of darkness
6b. The intervention of the demons in the affairs of men: temptation, possession 16
ya. Warfare between the powers of light and darkness: their struggle for dominion
over man
8. Criticism and satire with respect to the belief in angels and demons
10 THE GREAT IDEAS
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Homer: Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53] ames: Psychology, 116a- 119b, the passage
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 1 19. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 Plato: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
Author's Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as part, bk, ch,
sect) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d.
Bible References: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., Old Testa-
ment: Nehemiah, 7:45— (D) // Esdras, 7:46.
Symbols: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
14 Plutarch: Numa
Pompilius, 50d-51c; 57b- 273b; q 65, a 4, ans 342b-343c; o 79, a 4
58a / Coriolanus, 189a-c / Aemilius Puulus, 417a-418c; a 10, ans 423d 424d; q 84, a 4,
220d-221b / Pelopidas, 238a-b; 239d-240c / ans and rep 1,3 444d-446b; q 87, a i, ans
Aristides,268a-d / Dion, 781d-782a and rep 3 465a-466c; q 88, a i, ans 469a-
15 Tacitus: Annals, bk ii, 35d-36a; bk hi, 471c; Q no, a i, rep 3 564c-565d; q 115, a i,
59d-60c / Histories, bk ii, 214d-215a; bk iv, ans 585d-587c
293b-294a; bk v, 294d-296a 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part hi suppl,
17 Plotinus Second Ermead, tr ix, ch 9 70d-72a
: Q 92, A I, ans and rep 9-10 1025c-1032b
passim / Third Ennead, tr v 100c -106b / Fourth 21 Dante: Divine Cojnedy, paradise, ii [112-
Ennead, tr hi, ch 14 149d-150a / Fifth 123] 109a; xxviii [1-78] 148d-149c; xxix [13-
Ennead, tr vih, ch 3, 241a; ch 10 244c-245a 45] 150b-c
18 Augustine: City of God, bk i-x 129a-322a,c 23 HoBBEs: Leviathan, part hi, 174b-176d; part
passim; bk xviii, ch 8-19 475d-482c; ch 21 IV, 258b-260c
482d-483b; ch 24 485a-b; bk xix, ch 9 516a-c 24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, bk hi,
/ Christian Doctrine, bk ii, ch 17 645d-646a 172d-173c
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 22, 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 41d-42a /
A 3, ANS 130d-131c; q 67,, a 7, ans 331c-332b Novum Organum, bk 11, aph 15 149a
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, hell, xxxi 46a-47c; 31 Descartes: Objections and Replies, 225d 226a
paradise, VIII [1-15] 116d 32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk ii [142-154] 114b;
22 Chaucer: Knight's Tale [1902-2482] 191a- BK HI [694-735] 150b-151b; bk v [388-450]
200b 183b-185a; [469-505] 185b-186a; bk vi [316-
23 Hob BBS Leviathan, part i, 79d-82c
:
353] 203a-204a
24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, bk hi, 35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk ii, ch xv,
132b-c sect II 165a-b; ch xxi, sect 2 178c; ch xxih,
25 Montaigne: Essays, 246d-248c; 256d-257d; sect 5 205a-b; sect 15-37 208c-214b passim;
269a-b BK HI, ch VI, sect 11-12 271b-272b; bk iv,
26 Shakespeare: As You Like It, act v, sc iv ch hi, sect 6, 315a-b; sect 27 321d-322a;
[i 14-152] 625a-b ch XVI, sect 12 370b-371a; ch xvh, sect 14
27 Shakespeare: Tempest, act iv, sc i 541c- 378c-d
544d 35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, sect 25-27
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 20b-c 417d-418b; sect 135-145 440a-442a
32 Milton: Christs Nativity la-7b / AllegroU 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 136b; 136d
17b-21a / // Penseroso 21a-25a / Arcades 25a- 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 237c-d / Fund. Prin.
27b / Lycidas 27b-32a / Comus 33a-56b / Par- Metaphysic of Morals, 253d-254a; 259c-d;
adise Lost, bk I [331-621] 100b-107a / Samson 263a; 263d-264d; 266a-c; 271a-277b; 278a;
Agofiistes [896-902] 359a 280b-281a; 282c; 286a-287h / Practical Reason,
35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk i, ch hi, 296a-c; 300a-c; 303b-304a; 305c-d; 308c-
sect 15 116c-d 309b; 321b-c; 325d-327a; 328b; 340c-d; 347d-
37 Fielding: To7n Jones, 152b-c 348h / JudgefJient, 508b; 572d-574b
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 12b-d; 184c-185d; 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, part i, 238d-
345b-347d esp 346c-347a; 461b-c; 583d-584a 239a
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 135b; 226a-227c
46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, intro, 196d- 2a. The celestial motors or secondary prime
brews, 12:22-23 / Jude, 9 / Revelation, 5:11 — A 6 lla-12a; q 51, a i, ans and rep 2 12b-13c;
(D) Apocalypse, 5:11 part ii-ii, q 5, a 2 411b-412a; part hi, q 6,
18 Augustine: Confessions, bk xii, par 12, 102a; A 3, REP 2 742a-743a; q 8, a 4 759b-d; part
par 31, 106C'd / City of God, bk viii, ch 24, III suppL, q 69, A 3, REP 5 887d-889c; q
70,
283b; BK XXII, ch 30, 617c A 3, CONTRARY 897d-900d; q 89, a 3 1007d-
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 47, lObsb; A 8 1011b-1012a; q 95, a 4 1046d-
A 2, ANS 257b-258c; q 50, aa 3-4 272a-274b; 1047d; Q 96, A 9 1062d-1063b; q 99, a 3
Q 63, A 7 331c-332b; a 9, rep 3 333b-d; qq 1081d-1083a
106-109 545c-564b; part i-ii, q 4, a 5, rep 6 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, paradise, iv [28-48]
632c-634b Ilia; VII [121-148] 116b-c; viii [22-39] 116d-
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part hi, q 8, 117a; XIX [40-66] 135c-d; xxi [73-102] 139a-b;
A 4 759b-d XXIX [13-36] 150b-c; xxxi 153b-154c; xxxii
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, paradise, ii [112- [85-114] 155c-d
138] 109a; XXVIII 148d-150b; xxix [127-145] 27 Shakespeare: Hamlet, act ii, sc ii [314-322]
151c-d 43 d
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 17d 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 80d-81a /
32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk v [600-904] 188b- Novum Organum, bk ii, aph 15 149a
195a esp [769-799] 192a-b, [809-845] 193a-b 32 Milton: At a Solemn Music\ 13a-b / Para-
35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk iv, ch hi, dise Lost, BK II [345-353] 118b-119a; bk hi
sect 27 321d-322a; ch xvi, sect 12, 370c- [654-735] 149b-151b esp [681-693] ISOa-b; bk
371a IV [358-365] 160a-b; bk v [388-450] 183b-
35 Berkei^ey Human Knowledge, sect 81 428c-d
: 185a; [469-505] 185b-186a; bk vi [316-353]
47 Goethe: Faust, prologue [243-270] 7a-b; 203a-204a; bk viii [66-178] 233b-236a; bk x
PART II [11,844-12,111] 288a-294b [888-908] 293b-294a
33 Pascal: Pensees, 140 199a-b; 418 243a; 793,
4. Comparison of angels with men and with 326b
disembodied souls: their relation to the 35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk ii, ch x,
blessed in the heavenly choir SECT 9 143a-c; ch xxiii, sect 13 207d-208b;
Old Testament: /o^, 4:18-19 / Psalms, 8:4-5— BK IV, CH hi, sect 17 317c; CH xvii, SECT 14
(D) Psalms, 8:5-6 378c-d
New Testament: Matthew, 22:23-33 / Marl{, 36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 318b-319a; 394a
12:18-27 / Lu}^, 20:27-38 / / Corinthians, 43 Federalist: number 51, 163b-c
6:2-3 / Hebrews, 1:13-14; 2:7; 12:22-23 / Rev- 44 B0SWEI.1.: Johnson, 363a-b
elation, 22:8-9— (Z)) Apocalypse, 22:8-9 47 Goethe: Faust, part ii [11,894-12,111] 289b-
18 Augustine: Confessions, bk xii, par 23 104b-c 294b
/ City of God, bk vii, ch 30, 261d; bk viii, 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk vii, 295b-c
CH 14-18 273d-277a; ch 25 283b-c; bk ix, ch 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, bk 11, 22c-
5-13 288b-292d; ch 22 296d-297a; bk xi, ch 29 23a
339a-b; bk xiii, ch i 360a-b; bk xvi, ch 6
426c-427a; bk xxi, ch 10 569d-570b; bk xxii, 5. The distinction and comparison of the good
CH 614b-d / Christian Doctrine, bk i, ch 23
29,
and the bad angels
630a-c; ch 30 632c-633b; ch 33 633d-634b Old Testament: Job, 4:18
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 7, New Testament: II Peter, 2:4 / Jude, 6
A 2, REP 2 31d-32c; q 23, a i, rep 3 132c-133b; 18 Augustine: Confessions, bk x, par 67 88b-c /
Q 47, a 2, ANS 257b-258c; q 51, a i, ans and City of God, bk ix 285b,d-298a,c passim; bk
rep 2-3 275b-276b; qq 54-60 284d-314c pas- XI 322b,d-342a,c passim, esp ch 11-13 328d-
sim; Q 62 317c-325b passim; q 66, a 3, ans 330b, CH 19-20 332b-333a; bk xii, ch 1-9
and rep 3 347b-348d; q 75, a 7 384d-385c; 342b,d-348b; bk xxii, ch 586b,d-587b /
i
•
19 Aquinas: Summa Theohgica, part i, q 63 [1335-1378] 33a-34a; part ii [11,612-843]
325b'333d esp a 3 327b-328b 282b-288a
20 Aquinas: Summa Theological part i-ii, q 80, 48 Melville: Moby DicJ{Csp 4b 5a, 117a-122b,
A I, RF.p 2-3 159d-160c 131a-138a, 144a-b, 370b 372a, 418a-419b
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, hell, xxxiv 51b-52d 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, bk mi, 50c-
22 Chaucer: Friar's Tale 278a-284a 54b esp 54a-b; bk iv, 86b-c; bk v, 130b-136b;
23 HoBBEs: Leviathan, part hi, 195a BK VI, 151b-d; 169c-170b; bk vii, 175b-176c;
32 Milton: Paradise Lost 93a-333a esp bk i-ii 185a-c; bk xi, 342d-343b
93a-134a, bk hi [56-134] 136b-138a, bk iv
[1006-1015] 174b, BK V [224-245] 180a-b, bk
7b. Lucifer in the service of God
V [563]-BK VI [892] 187b-215b, bk x [1-62] Old Testament: /o^, 1-2 / Psalms, 78:49— (D)
274b-275b, [460-584] 284b-287a Psalms, 77:49
33 Pascal: Pensees, 784 325b; 820 331b; 826 Apocrypha: Ecclesiasticus, 39:28 — (D) OT, Ec-
332b-333a; 846 339a-b clesiasticus,
39:33-34
52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, bk xi, 18 Augustine: City of God, bk viii, ch 24, 283a-
337a-346a b; BK x, CH 21 311c-312a; bk xii, ch 27 359c
360a,c; bk xxii, ch i 586b,d-587b
la. Warfare between the powers of light and 19 Aquinas: Smmna Theologica, part i, q 64,
darkness: their struggle for dominion a 4, ans 337d-338d; q 114, a i 581d-582c
over man 20 Aquinas: Sum,ma Theologica, part hi suppl,
Old Testament: / Samuel, 16:14-23 — (D) q 89, a 4 1008b-1009b . .
/ Kings, 16:14-23 / Job, 1-2 / Zechariah, 3:1- 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, hell, xviii [19-39]
7— (D) Zacharias, y.i-y 25c-d; xxi-xxiii 30a-34c; xxvii [55]-xxviii
Apocrypha: Tobit, 8:3— (Z>) OT, Tobias, 8:3 [42] 40a-41c; xxxiv 51b-52d
New Testament: Matthetv, 4:1-11; 12:22-30; 22 Chaucer: Friar's Tale [7055-7085] 281a-b
13:19,24-30,36-43; 25:41 / Mar\, 1:13; 5:1-20 32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk i [157-168] 97a;
/ Lu}{e, 4:1-13; 8:26-36; 10:17-20; 11:14-23; [209-220] 98a; bk x [616-640] 288a-b
22:31-34 I John, 12:31-32 / Acts, 8:5-8; 19:11- 47 Goethe: Faust, prologue [271-353] 7b-9b;
20; 26:9-29 / Romans, 16:17-20 / / Corin- PART II [7127-7137] 174b-175a
thians, 10:20-21 / // Corinthians, 2:10-11; 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, bk vi,
I 4-3-4; 10:2-5; 11*13-15 / Ephesians, 4:27; 6:10- 151b-d; BK XI, 341a-344d
18/// Thessalonians, 2:8-9// Timothy, 4:1-5 / 54 Freud: Civilization and Its Disconte?its, 790d
// Timothy, 2:24-26 / Hebretvs, 2:13-15 /
James, 4:7 / / Peter, 5:8-9 / I John, 3:8-12 / 8. Criticism and satire with respect to the belief
Jude, 9 / Revelation, 2:9-13; 3:9-13; 12-14;
in angels and demons
16:13-14; 20:1-10— (D) Apocalypse, 2:9-13; 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part i, 51d-52b; 69c-71a;
3:9-13; 12-14; 16:13-14; 20:1-10 PART 174b-176d; 195a; part iv, 258b-
III,
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Other discussions relevant to the theory of angels, see Eternity 4a; Idea le; Knowledge
7b; Mind ioc; SouL4d('2); and for the metaphysical consideration of immaterial substances,
see Being ybfa).
The theological doctrine of the fallen angels, see Sin 3, 3b; and for the related doctrines of
Heaven and Hell, see Eternity 4d; Good and Evil id, 2b; Immortality 5e-5f; Punish-
ment 5e(i).
The theory of the celestial motors, see Astronomy 8b; Change 14.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Boo\s of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the BibUography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
Maimonides. The Guide for the Perplexed, part i, Wendell. "Were the Witches of Salem Guiltless.?'*
CH 49; PART II, CH 2-7 in Stelligeri
BoNAVENTURA. BrcvUoquium, part ii (6-8) Lea. Materials Toward a History of Witchcraft
R. Bacon. Opus Majus, part vii France. The Revolt of the Angels
Albo. The BooJ^of Principles {Sefer ha-If^arim) bk , Earn ell.Greeks Hero Cults and Ideas of Immortality
II, CH 12 Williams. The Place of the Lion
Calvin. Institutes of the Christian Religion, bk i, Glover. "The Daemon Environment," in Gree\
CH 14 (3) Byways
Luther. Table Tall^ Zilboorg. The Medical Man and the Witch During
Donne. Aire and Angells the Renaissance
SuAREZ. Disputationes Metaphysicae, xii (14), VoNiER. The Angels
XXXIV (3, 5), XXXV, xli (2), li (3-4) C. S. Lewis. Out of the Silent Planet
Marlowe. The Tragical History of Doctor Faustus The Screwtape Letters
.
Chapter i: ANIMAL
INTRODUCTION
ALPHABETICAL ordering places Animal his own traits, his intelligence and freedom,
/x after Angel in this list of ideas. There even his moral qualities and political propensi-
is a third term which belongs with these two ties. Nevertheless, he has seldom ceased to re-
and, but for the alphabet, might have come be- gard himself as the paragon of animals, possess-
tween them. That term is Man. ing in a higher degree than other animals the
—
These three terms and a fourth, God, characteristic properties of all.
which rounds out the comparison— are con- There are exceptions to this, however. Ani-
joined in Shakespeare's statement of what is mals have been glorified by man for skeptical
perhaps the most universal reflection of man or satiric purposes.
upon himself. "What a piece of work is man!" Montaigne, for example, doubts that man
says Hamlet, "How noble in reason! how infi- can lay claim to any special attributes or excel-
nite in faculty! in form and moving, how ex- lences, and further suggests that, in some par-
press and admirable! in action, how like an an- ticulars at least, men are less able and less noble
gel! in apprehension, how like a god the beauty ! than the beasts. Relying on legends found in
of the world! the paragon of animals!" Animal, Pliny and Plutarch which describe the marvel-
angel, god —
in each of these man has seen his ous exploits of animals, he argues that "it is not
image. And at different moments in the history upon any true ground of reason, but by a fool-
of thought, he has tended to identify himself ish pride and vain opinion, that we prefer our-
with one to the exclusion of the others. selves before other animals, and separate our-
Yet predominantly man has regarded him- selves from their conditions and society."
self as an animal, even when he has understood Why, Montaigne asks, "should wc attribute
himself to be created in God's image, and to to I know not what natural and servile inclina-
share with the angels, through the possession of tion the works that surpass all we can do by na-
intellect, the dignity of being a person. As his ture and art" ? We have no grounds for believ-
understanding of himself has varied, so has he ing that "beasts, by natural and compulsory
altered his conception of what it is to be an tendency, do the same things that we do by our
animal. choice and industry." Rather "we ought," he
In terms of a conception of personality which continues, "from like effects, to conclude like
involves the attributes of reason and free will, faculties, and consequently confess that the
man has legally, as well as morally and meta- same reason, the same method, by which we op-
physically, drawn a sharp line between persons erate, are common with them, or that they have
and things, and placed brute animals in the others that are better."
class of things. According to the principle of Nor can we excuse our presumption of su-
this distinction, being alive or even being sen- periority by the fact that we are compelled to
sitive does not give animals, any more than look at animals from our human point of view.
plants and stones, the dignity or status of per- "When I play with my cat," Montaigne writes,
sons. "who knows whether I do not make her more
When man's animality — either in terms of sport than she makes me ? We mutually divert
his biological affinities or his evolutionary ori- one another with our monkey tricks; if I have
gins — has seemed an adequate definition of his my hour to begin or to refuse, she also has hers."
nature, man has attributed to animals many of Suppose animals were to tell us what they
19
20 THE GREAT IDEAS
thought of us. "The defect that hinders com- animals, never to plants. On either approach
munication betwixt them and us, why may it the issue remains whether plants and animals
not be on our part as well as theirs ? 'Tis yet to are different in kind, not merely in degree.
determine," Montaigne thinks, "where the fault' On the one hand, it may be argued that sensi-
lies that we understand not one another; for we tivity, desire,and locomotion (even perhaps
understand them no more than they do us; by sleeping and waking) are, in some form or de-
the same reason they may think us to be beasts gree, to be found in all living things. On the
as we think them." other hand, it may be argued that such func-
If Montaigne's view were to prevail, no spe- tions as nutrition, growth, and reproduction,
cial significance could be given to "brute" as though obviously common to plants and ani-
opposed to "rational" animal. For that matter, mals, are performed by animals in a distinctive
the same holds true whenever man is conceived manner. If plants manifest all the vital powers
asjtist an animal, paragon or not. Animals are or activities present in animals; or if in func-
brute only when man is not — only when to be tions common to both, animals differ only in
human is to be somehow more than an animal, degree, then the scale of life would seem to be a
different in kind, not merely in degree. continuous gradation rather than a hierarchy.
Satirists like Swift idealize an animal nature The opposite position, which affirms a differ-
to berate the folly and depravity of man. In his ence in kind and consequently a hierarchy, is
last voyage, Gulliver finds in the land of the taken by Aristotle. In his biological writings, as
Houyhnhnms a race of human-looking crea- well as in his treatise On the Soul, he draws a
tures, the Yahoos, who by contrast with their sharp line between plant and animal lifeby ref-
noble masters, the horses, are a miserable and erence to faculties or functions absent in the one
sorry lot. Here it is the Yahoos who are brutes, and found in the other. Aristotle first points out
bereft as they are of the intelligence and virtue that "living may mean thinking or perception
which grace the splendid Houyhnhnms. or local movement and rest, or movement in the
sense of nutrition, decay, and growth. Hence,"
The comparison of men and animals takes still he goes on, "we think of plants also as living,
another direction in the allegories of fable and for they are observed to possess in themselves
poetry. From Aesop to the mediaeval Bestiaries, an originative power through which they in-
there is the tradition of stories in which animals crease or decrease in all spatial directions; they
are personified in order to teach a moral lesson. grow up and down, and everything that grows
In the Divine Comedy Dante uses specific ani- increases its bulk alike in both directions or in-
mals to symbolize the epitome of certain pas- deed in all, and continues to live so long as it
sions, vices, and virtues. The intent of his alle- can absorb nutriment."
gory is, however, never derogatory to man as This leads him to assign to plants what he
man. But when Machiavelli allegorizes the qual- calls a nutritive or vegetative soul, whereby
ities required for political power, he advises the they have the three basic faculties common to
prince "knowingly to adopt the beast" and "to all living things — nutrition, growth, and repro-
choose the fox and the lion." This tends to re- duction. But Aristotle does not find in plants
duce human society to the ungle where strength
j any evidence of the functions performed by
and guile compete for supremacy. animals, such as sensation, appetite, and local
The comparison of men and animals fails to motion. These are the characteristic powers of
touch the distinction, or lack of distinction, be- the animal soul, called by him the "sensitive
tween animals and plants. This is basic to the soul" because sensation is the source both of
definition or conception of animal nature.As in animal desire and animal movement.
the case of men and animals, this problem can Galen follows Aristotle in this distinction. In
be approached in two ways: either from the side his Natural Faculties he limits his investigations
of plant life, and with respect to those functions to the functions common to all living things.
which seem to be common to all living things; He uses the word "natural" for those effects,
or from the side of animal life, and with respect such as "growth and nutrition . . . common to
to those functions which seem to belong only to plants as well as animals," which, in his view,
Chapter 2: ANIMAL ;»
opposed to such activities as "feeling and The fact that organisms exist which do not
iarc
i
^voluntary motion peculiar to animals," that
. . . readily fall into cither classification may signify
jie calls "effects of the soul," or "psychic." It continuity rather thanseparation between plants
may seem surprising at first that Galen's study and animals; but it may also be taken to mean
of nutrition, growth, and reproduction— not that more acute observations are required to
only of the functions themselves but of the classify these so-called "intermediate forms."
bodily organs and processes involved in these Plant tropisms may or may not require us to
functions — should be restricted to their mani- deny that sensitivity belongs to animals alone.
festation in animals, and not in plants as well. The apparent local motion of plants may be a
The reason may be that for the naturalists of mode of growth or a random movement rather
antiquity, the biological functions of vegetable than a directed change from place to place; and
matter did not yield their secrets readily enough the attachment to place of apparently station-
to observation. A treatise on plants, not written ary animals, such as barnacles and mussels, may
by Aristotle but attributed to his school, be- be different from the immobility of rooted
gins with the remark that "life is found in ani- plants.
mals and plants; but whereas in animals it is
clearly manifest, in plants it is hidden and less Against the background of these major issues
evident." concerning plants, animals, and men as con-
This view of the world of living things as di- tinuous or radically distinct forms of life, the
vided into the two great kingdoms of plant and study of animal organisms — their anatomy and
animal hfe prevailed through centuries of spec- physiology — acquires much of its critical sig-
ancient and modern biology. In some respects, crucial; or, to take another example, our
Aristotle's researches on the reproductive or- knowledge of the functioning of the respira-
gans and their functions are more general than tory and the nervous system has been greatly
Harvey's. They represent for him only part of enlarged by the researches of Haldane, Sher-
the large field of comparative anatomy, and rington, and Pavlov. Yet even in these areas,
have significance for the study of mating habits the background of recent scientific contribu-
in different classes of animals. Yet on the prob- tions is to be found in the great books in the —
lem of the act of generation causes and
itself, its writings, for example, of Harvey, Darwin, and
consequences, especially the phenomena of em- William James.
bryonic development, Harvey's treatise reads
partly as a conversation with Aristotle, and Another interest which runs through the
partly as the record of original observations un- whole tradition of man's study of animals lies
dertaken experimentally. in the problem of their classification both —
"Respect for our predecessors and for antiq- with respect to the principles of taxonomy it-
uity at large," he writes, "inclines us to defend self, and also in the systematic effort to con-
their conclusions to the extent that love of struct schemes whereby the extraordinary va-
truth will allow. Nor do I think it becoming in riety of animal types can be reduced to order.
us to neglect and make little of their labors and In this field Aristotle and Darwin are the two
conclusions, who bore the torch that has lighted great masters. If the names of Buifon and Lin-
us to the shrine of philosophy." The ancients, naeus also deserve to be mentioned, it must be
in his opinion, "by their unwearied labor and with the double qualification that they are fol-
variety of experiments, searching into the na- lowers of Aristotle on the one hand, and pre-
ture of things, have left us no doubtful light cursors of Darwin on the other.
to guide us in our studies." Yet, Harvey adds, The Aristotelian classification is most fully
"no one of a surety will allow that all truth was set forth in the History of Animals. There one
engrossed by the ancients, unless he be utterly kind of animal is distinguished from another by
ignorant ... of the many remarkable discoveries many "properties": by locale or habitat; by
that have lately been made in anatomy." Re- shape and color and size; by manner of locomo-
ferring to his ov/nmethod of investigation, he tion, nutrition, association, sensation; by or-
proposes as a "safer way to the attainment of ganic parts and members; by temperament, in-
knowledge" that "in studying nature," we stinct, or characteristic habits of action. With
"question things themselves rather than by respect to some of these properties, Aristotle
turning over books." treats one kind of animal as differing from an-
It is particularly with respect to animal gen- other by a degree — by more or less — of the same
eration that the great books exhibit continuity trait. With respect to other properties, he finds
in the statement of basic problems in biology, the difference to consist in the possession by one
as well as indicate the logical conditions of their species of a trait totally lacking in another. He
solution. The issue of spontaneous generation speaks of the lion as being more "ferocious"
as opposed to procreation runs through Aris- than the wolf, the crow as more "cunning"
totle,Lucretius, Aquinas, Harvey, and Dar- than the raven; but he also observes that the
win. The problem of sexual and asexual repro- cow has an "organ of digestion" which the spi-
Chapter 2: ANIMAL 23
der lacks, the lizard an "organ of locomotion" wide opposition in value between analogical or
which the oyster lacks. The sponge lives in one adaptive characters, and characters of true af-
manner so far as "locale" is concerned, and the finity."Furthermore, "the importance of em-
viper in another; reptiles have one manner of bryological characters and of rudimentary or-
locomotion, birds another. So ample were Aris- gans in classification" becomes "intelligible on
totle's data and so expert were his classifica- the view that a natural arrangement must be
tions, that the major divisions and sub-divisions genealogical." By reference to "this element of
of his scheme remain intact in the taxonomy descent," not only shall we be able to "under-
constructed by Linnaeus. stand what meant by the Natural System,"
is
The radical character of Darwin's departure but also, Darwin adds, "our classifications will
from the Linnaean classification stems from a come to be, as far as they can be so made, gene-
difference in principle rather than a correction alogies; and will then truly give what may be
of observational errors or inadequacies. Where called the plan of creation."
Aristotle and all taxonomists before Darwin Whereas the Aristotelian classification is static
classify animals by reference to their similarities in principle, having no reference to temporal
and differences, Darwin makes inferred geneal- connections or the succession of generations,
ogy or descent the primary criterion in terms the Darwinian is dynamic — almost a moving
of which he groups animals into varieties, spe- picture of the ever-shifting arrangement of ani-
cies, genera, and larger phyla. mals according to their affinities through com-
Naturalists, according to Darwin, "try to ar- mon ancestry or their diversities through ge-
range the species, genera, and famiHes in each netic variation. Connected with this opposition
class, on what is called the Natural System. But between static and dynamic principles of clas-
what is meant by this system.? Some authors sification is a deeper conflict between two ways
look at it scheme for arranging to-
merely as a of understanding the nature of scientific classi-
gether those living objects which are most alike, fication itself.
and for separating those which are most unlike. The point at issue is whether the classes which
. The ingenuity and utility of this system are
. . the taxonomist constructs represent distinct
indisputable," but Darwin thinks that its rules natural forms. Do they exist independently as
cannot be explained or its difficulties overcome objects demanding scientific definition or are
except "on the view that the Natural System is the scientist's groupings somewhat arbitrary
founded on descent with modification that — and artificial.? Do they divide and separate
the characters which naturalists consider as what in nature is more like a continuous distri-
into a few grand classes"; and understand "the in the chapters on Life and Man.
24 THE GREAT IDEAS
On the theme of comparisons between ani- many strings; and the
nerves, but so joints, but
mals and men, two further points should be so many wheels, giving motion to the whole
noted. body.?" The animal is thus pictured as an elab-
The first concerns the soul of animals. When orate system of moving parts, inflexibly de-
soul is conceived as the principle or source of termined to behave in certain ways under the
life whatever is alive, plants and animals can
in impact of stimulation by external forces.
be said to have souls. Like Aristotle, Augustine The doctrine of the animal automaton is
machine or automaton follows as a further cor- calls behavior "voluntary" if it involves some
ollary. "If there had been such machines, pos- knowledge or consciousness of the objects to
sessing the organs and outward form of a mon- which it is directed.
key or some other animal without reason," Instinctive behavior, such as an animal's
Descartes claims that "we should not have had flight from danger or its pursuit of food or a
any means of ascertaining that they were not mate, involves sense-perception of the objects
of the same nature as those animals." Hobbes of these actions, as well as feelings or emotions
hkewise would account for all the actions of about them. But though it is "voluntary" in
animal life on mechanical principles. "For what the sense in which Aquinas uses that word, in-
is the heart, but a spring," he asks, "and the stinctive behavior is, according to him, the
—
Chapter 2: ANIMAL 25
exact opposite of action based upon free will. with foresight of its 'end' just so far as ihal end
It is completely determined by the inborn pat- may have fallen under the animal's cognizance."
tern of the instinct. It may vary in operation If instinct, in animals or men, were sufficient
with the circumstances of the occasion, but it for solving the problems of survival, there
does not leave the animal the freedom to act would be no need for what James calls "sagac-
or not to act, or to act this way rather than ity" on the part of animals, or of learning from
that. Such freedom of choice, Aquinas holds, experience. Like Montaigne, James assembles
depends on reason's ability to contemplate al- anecdotes to show that animals exercise their
ternatives, to none of which is the human will wits and learn from experience. "No matter
bound by natural necessity. how endowed an animal may originally be
well
Aquinas does not limit human reason and in the way of instincts," James declares, "his
will to a role analogous to the one he ascribes resultant actions will be much modified if the
to instinct and emotion in animal life. Their instincts combine with experience, if in addi-
power enables man to engage in speculative tion to impulses he have memories, associations,
thought and to seek remote ends. Never- inferences, and expectations, on any consider-
theless, on the level of his biological needs, man able scale."
must resort to the use of his reason and will where In his consideration of "the intellectual con-
other animals are guided by instinct. "Man trast between brute and man," James places
has by nature," Aquinas writes, "his reason and "the most elementary single difierence between
his hands,which are the organs of organs, since the human mind and that of brutes" in the
by means man can make for himself in-
their "deficiency on the brute's part to associate
struments of an infinite variety, and for any ideas by similarity," so that "characters, the
number of purposes." Just as the products of abstraction of which depends on this sort of
reason take the place of hair, hoofs, claws, association, must in the brute always remain
teeth, and horns
— "fixed means of defense or drowned." Darwin similarly makes the differ-
of clothing, as is the case with other animals" ence in degree between human and animal in-
so reason serves man's needs, in the viev/ of telligence a matter of greater or less power to
Aquinas, as instinct serves other animals. associate ideas. In consequence, human in-
Others, like Darwin, James, and Freud, seem stincts are much more modifi.ed by learning
to take a different view. They attribute in- and experience than the instincts of other ani-
stinct to men as well as to animals. In their mals, as in turn the higher animals show much
opinion instinctively determined behavior is greater variability in their instinctive behavior
influenced by intelligence, and affected by than do lower organisms.
memory and imagination, in animals as well as It is not necessary to deny that men alone
in men. They recognize, however, that instinct have reason in order to affirm that, in addition
predominates in some of the lower forms of to instinct, animals have intelligence in some
animal life, and acknowledge that the contribu- proportion to the development of their sensi-
tion of intelligence is great only among the tive powers, especially their memory and im-
more highly developed organisms. agination. The position of Aristotle and Aqui-
"Man has a far greater variety of impulses nas seems to involve both points. But if we at-
than any lower animal," writes James; "and any tribute the extraordinary performances of ani-
one of these impulses taken in itself, is as 'blind' mals to their intelligence alone, rather than
as the lowest instinct can be; but, owing to primarily to instinct, then we are led to con-
man's memory, power of and power
reflection, clude wath Montaigne that they possess not
of inference, they come each one to be felt by merely a sensitive intelligence, but a reasoning
him, after he has once yielded to them and ex- intellect.
perienced their results in connection with a "Why does the spider make her web tighter
foresight o{ xhost results." On the same grounds, in one place and slacker in another?" Mon-
James argues that ''every instinctive act, in an ani- taigne asks. "Why now one sort of knot and
mal with memory, must cease to be 'blincT after then another, if she has not deliberation,
being once repeated, and must be accompanied thought, and conclusion.'^" And in another
1
26 THE GREAT IDEAS
place he asks, "What is there in our intelH- The use, or even the exploitation, of animals
gence that we do not see in the operations of by man seems to be justified by the inferiority
animals? Is there a polity better ordered, the of the brute to the rational nature. As plants
offices better distributed, and more inviolably exist for the sake of animals, so animals, accord-
observed and maintained than that of bees? ing to Aristotle, "exist for the sake of man, the
Can we imagine that such and so regular a dis- tame for use and food, the wild, if not all, at
tribution ofemployments can be carried on least the greater part of them, for food, and for
without reason and prudence?" the provision of clothing and various instru-
ments." Aristotle's conception of the natural
Gregariousness in animals and the nature of slave, discussed in the chapter on Slavery,
animal communities are considered in the chap- uses the domesticated animal as a kind of
ter on State, in connection with the formation model for the treatment of human beings as
of human society. But so far as human society tools or instruments.
itself is concerned, the domestication of ani- Though he does not share Aristotle's view
mals signifies an advance from primitive to that some men are by nature slaves, Spinoza
civilized life and an increase in the wealth and takes a comparable position with regard to
power of the tribe or city. man's domination and use of animals. "The
Aeschylus includes the taming of animals law against killing animals," he writes, "is
among the gifts of Prometheus, who "first based upon an empty superstition and woman-
brought under the yoke beasts of burden, who ish tenderness, rather than upon sound reason.
by and carrying relieved men of their
draft A proper regard, indeed, to one's own profit
hardest labors yoked the proud horse to
. . . teaches us to unite in friendship with men, and
the chariot, teaching him obedience to the not with brutes, nor with things whose nature
reins, to be the adornment of wealth and lux- is different from human nature ... I by no
ury." The Iliad pays eloquent testimony to the means deny," he continues "that brutes feel,
»
change in the quality of human life which ac- but I do deny that on this account it is unlaw-
companied the training of animals to respond ful for us to consult our own profit by using
to human command. Homer's reference to them for our pleasure and treating them as is
Castor as "breaker of horses" indicates the most convenient to us, inasmuch as they do not
sense of conquest or mastery which men felt agree in nature with us."
when they subdued wild beasts; and the oft- But other moralists declare that men can be-
repeated Homeric epithet "horse- taming," friend animals, and not
insist that charity, if
which is intended as a term of praise for both justice, should control man's treatment of
the Argives and the Trojans, implies the rise of beasts. Nor is such contrary teaching confined
a people from barbarous or primitive condi- to Christianity, or to the maxims of St. Francis,
tions — their emancipation from the discom- who would persuade men to love not only their
forts and limitations of animal life. neighbors as themselves, but all of God's crea-
Aristotle points out that one mark of wealthy tures. Plutarch, for instance, argues that al-
men is "the number of horses which they keep, though "law and justice we cannot, in the na-
for they cannot afford to keep them unless they ture of things, employ on others than men,"
are rich." For the same reason, he explains, nevertheless, "we may extend our goodness and
"in old times the cities whose strength lay in charity even to irrational creatures." In kind-
their cavalry were oligarchies." ness to dumb animals he finds the mark of the
Legend and history are full of stories of the "gentle nature" — the sign of a man's humane-
loyalty and devotion of animals to their human ness. "Towards human beings as they have
masters, and of the reciprocal care and affection reason, behave in a social spirit," says Marcus
which men have given them. But, motivated as Aurelius; but he also writes: "As to animals
it is by their utihty for economic or military which have no reason, and generally all things
purposes, the breaking of animals to human will and objects, do thou, since thou hast reason and
also frequently involves a violent or wanton they have none, make use of them with a gen-
misuse. erous and liberal spirit."
Chapter 2: ANIMAL 27
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. General theories about the animal nature
lb. The distinction between plants and animals in faculty and function : cases difficult
to classify
id. The habits or instincts of animals: types of animal habit or instinct; the habits
or instincts of different classes of animals
2c. Continuity and discontinuity in the scale of animal life: gradation from lower
to higher forms 36
4. Animal movement
5^. The ducts, channels, and conduits involved in interior bodily motions
^b. The circulatory system: the motions of the heart, blood, and lymph 39
5^. The glandular system: the glands of internal and external secretion
5^. The alimentary system: the motions of the digestive organs in the nutritive process
28 THE GREAT IDEAS
PAGE
f^f. The excretory system: the motions of elimination 39
5^. The brain and nervous system: the excitation and conduction of nervous impulses 40
6. Animal nutrition
6a. The nature of the nutriment
(3) The reproductive cells and secretions: semen and catamenia, sperm and tgg
43
(4) The mating of animals: pairing and copulation
^f.
The care and feeding of infant offspring: lactation
10. Heredity and environment: the genetic determination of individual differences and
similarities
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Homer: Iliad, bk ii [265-28:5] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 James Psychology, 1 16a-l 19b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand sideof the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 Plato: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
Author's Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as part, bk, ch,
sect) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d.
Bible References: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., Old Testa-
ment: Nehemiah, 7:45— (D) II Esdras, 7:46.
Symbols: The abbreviation *'esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
1. General theories about the animal nature 18 Augustine: Confessions, bk x, par 11 74a-b /
City of God, bk vii, ch 23, 256b-c
la. Characteristics of animal life: the animal 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 18,
soul A I 104c-105c; Q 72, a i, rep i 368b-369d
7 Plato: Cratylus, 93c-d / Phaedo, 233b-c / Q 75, A 3 380c-381b; a 6, rep i 383c-384c
Republic, bk x, 440b-c / Timaeus, 476d-477a,c Q 78, A I 407b-409a; q 118, a i 600a-601c
8 Aristotle: Metaphysics, bk v, ch 8 [1017^10- PART I-II, Q 17, A 2, REP 2 687d-688b
17] 538b / Soul 631a-668d esp ek ii, ch 2 20 Aquinas Summa Theologica, part hi suppl^
:
35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk ii, ch ix, 8 Aristotle: Soul, bk iii, ch 9-11 664d-667a
sect 11-15 140b-141a 9 Aristotle: History of Animals, bk vi, ch 18
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk xiv, 103a-c 97b-99c; bk viii, ch i [588^24-589*10] 115b;
1^(4) to \b Chapter 2: ANIMAL 31
BK IX, 4 [611*9-14] 136d; ch
CH 37 [621^28- 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk v {837-859]
622*10] 147c / Farts of Animals^ bk 11, ch 4 72a-b
[650^20-651*15]175c-176a; bk hi, ch 4 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 18,
[667*10-22] 195b; BK IV, CH 5 [679*5-32) A I, ans 104c-105c; a 2, rep i 105c-106b; a 3,
209a-c; ch ii [692*22-27] 224b-c / Motion of ans 106b-107c; q 78, a r, ans and rep 4 407b-
Animals, ch 6-1 i 235d-239d / Ethics, bk hi, 409a
ch 8 [1116^23-1117*9] 363a-c; ch 10 [1118*17- 24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, bk hi,
^8] 364d-365a; bk vii, ch 6 [1149^30-36] 400c; 192d
ch 12 [1153^27-35] 404c-d 31 Descartes: Rules, xii, 19d-20a
10 Galen: Natural Faculties, bk hi, ch 6 202d- 35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk ii, ch ix,
203a; ch 8, 206b-c sect ii 140b-c; sect 13 140d
12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk hi [1:56-160] 49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 279a-280c; 371d-
31d-32a; [288-322] 33d-34b; [741-753] 39c-d 372c
13 Virgil: Aeneid, bk xi [745-760] 348b; bk xii 53 James: Psychology, 10a-12b esp 12a-b; 699a
[5-1 1 ] 354a
17 Plotinus: Fourth Ennead, tr hi, ch 23, 154b
\a{5) Sleeping and waking in animals
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 6, a i, 8 Aristotle: Sleep 696a-701d
REP 2 28b-d; qq 80-81 427a-431d; part i-ii, 9 Aristotle: History of Animals, bk hi, ch 19
Q 6, A 2 646a-c; q 11, a 2 667b-d; q 12, a 5 [521*15-17] 46a; bk iv, ch 10 63c-64b; bk vi,
672a-c; q 13, a 2 673c-674c; q 15, a 2 682a-c; ch 12 [566''i3-i5] 92d; bk vih, ch 14 [599*20]-
Q 16, A 2 684d-685b; q 17, a 2 687d-688b; CH 17 [600^15] 125b-126d / Parts of Animals,
Q 40, A 3 794c-795a; q 46, a 4, ans and rep 2 BK II, CH 7 [653*10-20] 178b-c / Motion of
815b-d Animals, ch ii [703^8-15] 239b / Generation
22 Chaucer: Manciple's T^^/d- [17,104-135] 490a-b of Animals, bk v, ch i [778^20-779*28] 321a-c
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part i, 61a-d; 64a-c 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk iv [907-961]
25 Montaigne: Essays, 224c-225b 56a-d
27 Shakespeare: King Lear, act iv, sc vi [109- 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part hi suppl,
125] 274c Q 81, A 4, ANS 966d-967d; q 82, a 3, ans 971a-
28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 346a-347d; 972d
349a-350a; 391a-c; 402a-d; 405c-406a; 476c- 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 337c
477a
31 Spinoza: Ethics, partiii, prop 57,scHOL415b \h. The distinction between plants and animals
Rousseau: Inequality, 343d-345a in faculty and function: cases difficult to
38
BoswEhL: Johnson, 215d-216a classify
44
48 Melville: Moby Dic{, 289b-291a 7 Plato: Timaeus, 469d-470a
49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 289a-291a; 303c; 8 Aristotle: Topics, bk vi, ch 10 [148*23-38]
305c-309d; 371c-372c; 447b-c; 480a-481b; 202b-c / Physics, bk ii, ch 8 [199*20-^13]
543d-545d 276c-d / Heavens, bk ii, ch 12 [292^1-11] 384a
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk xiii, 575b; bk / Soul, BK I, CH 5 [410*^16-411*2] 640d-641a;
XIV, 605d-606a bk II, CH 2 [4i3*2o-*'io] 643b-c; ch 3 644c-
53 James: Psychology, 14a-b; 49b-51a; 700b-711a 645b; BK III, CH 12 [434*22-*'9] 667a-c / Sleep,
passim, esp 702a-703a; 717b; 723b-725a; 729b CH I 696a-697c
54 Freud: General Introduction, 607d'609b esp 9 Aristotle: History of Animals, bk iv, ch 6
609b / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, [531*^8-9] 58b; BK V, ch i [539^15-25] 65b-d;
721a; 737c-d bk VIII, CH I [588V589^2] 114d-115b / Parts
of Animals, bk ii, ch 3 [650*1-37] 174c-175a;
l</(4) Locomotion: degrees of animal motility CH 10 [655*^27-656*8] 181d-182a; bk iv, ch 4
8 Aristotle: Soul, bk hi, ch 9-11 664d-667a; [677*^36-678*15] 207d-208a; ch 5 [681*10-^9]
ch 12 [434*30-^9] 667b-c 211c-212b; ch 6 [682*^26-28] 213d; ch 10
9 Aristotle: History of Animals, bk i, ch i [686*^23-687*1] 218b-c / Gait of Animals, ch 4
[487^5-34] 8b-d; BK II, CH I [497*^18-498^10] [705*26-*'9] 244a-b / Generation of Animals,
20a-d; bk iv, ch i [523^20-524*24] 48d-49d; BK I, CH I ch 23
[715*^18-716*1] 255d-256a;
CH 4 [528*30-^11] 55b; BK VIII, ch i [588^11- 271b-d; bk ii, ch i [732*12-14] 272c; [735*16-
24] 115a; BK IX, ch 37 [621^2-13] 147a-b; ch 19] 275d; ch 3 [736*25-**i4] 276d-277b; ch 4
48 [631*20-30] 156c-d / Parts of Animals, bk [740*'25]-cH 5 [741*30] 281d-282b; bk hi, ch 7
IV,CH 6-9 213b-217b passim; ch 10 [686*25- [757*^15-30] 298c-d; ch ii 302b-304d; bk v,
^35] 217d'218c; ch 12 [693*25]-ch 13 [696*34] CH I [778*'30-779*4] 321a-b
225b-228a / Motion of Animals, ch 1-2 233a- 10 Galen: Natural Faculties, bk i, ch i 167a-b
234a; ch 8 [702*22]-ch 10 [703^1] 237c-239a / 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk ii [700-710]
Gait of Animals 243a-252a,c / Generation of 23d-24a
Animals, bk ii, ch i [732*12-24] 272c 12 AuRELius: Meditations, bk viii, sect 7 286a;
10 Galen: Natural Faculties, bk ii, ch 8, 193 b-c bk IX, sect 9, 292c
32 THE GREAT IDEAS
12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk 1, ch 3 108b-c;
(1 . General theories about the animal nature. 1 h. ch lilac; ch
6, 114c-115a; ch 16 121d-
9,
The distinction bettveen plants and animals 122d; ch 28, 134a-b; bk ii, ch 8, 146a-c;
ht faculty and function: cases difficult to BK III, CH 183d; BK IV, CH 228c-d; ch
7, 5, 7,
classify.^
233a-b; ch ii, 240d-241a
18 Augustine: City of God, bk vii, CH23, 256b-c 12 Aurelius: Meditations, bk hi, sect 16 262d-
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 18, 263a,c; bk v, sect 16 271c-d; bk vi, sect 23
A I, REP 2 104c-105c; A 2, REP I 105c-106b; 276b; BK IX, sect 9 292b-d
A 3, ANS 106b-107c; q 69, a 2, rep i 361c-362c; 18 Augustine: Confessions, bk x, par 11 74a-b;
Q 72, A I, REP I 368b-369d; q 78, a i, ans BK XIII, par 35-37 120b-121a esp par 37, 121a
407b-409a / City of God, bk vii, ch 23, 256b-c; bk xi,
28 Harvey: Motion of the Heart, 278b / Circula- CH 27-28 337b-338d; bk xxix, ch 24, 610c-d
tion of the Blood, 327d-328a / On Anifval / Christian Doctrine, bk i, ch 8 626c-627a;
Generation, 368a-b; 369d-370b; 372b; 397c- CH 22, 629b-c
398c; 457c-d; 461b-d 19 Aquinas: Swnma Theologica, part i, q 3, a i,
30 Bacon: Novum Organum, bk ii, aph 30 rep 2 14b-15b; a 4, rep i 16d-17c; q 18, a 2,
159c-d rep I 105c-106b; a 3, ans 106b-107c; q 19,
35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk ii, ch ix, A 10, ANS 117d-118b; q 30, a 2, rep 3 168a-
SECT 11-15 140b-141a; bk hi, ch vi, sect 12 169b; Q 59, A 3, ANS 308b-309a; q 72, a i,
271d-272b rep 1,3 368b-369d; q 75, aa 2-3 379c-381b;
43 Federalist: number 37, 119c A 6, rep I 383c-384c; q 76, a 5, rep 4 394c-
49 Darwin: Origin of Species, 241 b-c / Descent of 396a; q 78, a i, ans 407b-409a; a 4, ans
Man, 372b-c 411d-413d; q 79, a 8, rep 3 421c-422b; q 81,
53 James: Psychology, 8a a 3, ans and rep 2 430c-431d; q 83, a i, ans
54 Freud: Unconscious, 429c-d 436d-438a; q 91, a 3, rep 1-3 486b-487d;
q 92, A I, ans 488d-489d; q 96, a i 510b-511b;
Ic. The distinction between animal and human q 115, A 4, ANS 589d-590c; q 118, a a 1-2
nature 600a-603b; part i-ii, q i, a i, ans 609b-610b;
Old Testament: Genesis, 1:20-30 / Psalms, 8 esp A 2, ANS and REP 1,3 610b-611b; q 2, a 5,
8:4-8— (D) Psalms, 8 esp 8:5-9 / Ecclesiastes, contrary 618d-619c; q 6, a 2 646a-c; q 10,
.
3:18-22 A 3, ANS 664d-665c; q 11, a 2 667b-d; q 12,
'"'^'Aeschylus: Prometheus Bound [436-505] 44c- A 5 672a-c; q 13, a 2 673c-674c; q 15, a 2
'45a 682a-c; q 16, a 2 684d-685b; q 17, a 2 687d-
5 Euripides: Trojan Women [669-672] 275d 688b
7 Plato: Laches, 35b-d / Protagoras, 44a-45a / 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 50,
1;;;. Cratylus, 93a-b / Timaeus, 452d-453a / Laws, A 3, REP 2 8b-9a; q no, a 4, rep 3 350d-35id;
bk ii, 653b-c; bk vii, 723c-d part hi, q 2, a 2, REP 2 711d-712d; q 7, a 9,
8 Aristotle: Topics, bk v, ch 3 [132^17-22] ANS 751d-752c; part hi suppl, q 79, a i,
183a / Heavens, bk ii, ch 12 [292*^1-11] 384a / ANS 951b-953b
Metaphysics, bk i, ch i [980*28-^27] 499a-b / 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, hell, xxvi [i 12-120]
Soul, bk II, CH 3 [414^17-20] 644d; [415*7-12] 39b; purgatory, xxv [34-78] 91d-92a; para-
645b; BK III, CH 3 [427^7-14] 659d-660a; dise, V [19-24] 112b; VII [121-148] 116b-c
[428*20-24] 660c; CH 10 [433^8-13] 665d / 22 Chaucer: Knight's Tale [1303-1333] 181b-
Memory and Reminiscence, ch 2 [453*5-14] 182a
.695b 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part i, 52b; 53a-b; 54a;
:<>?) Aristotle: History of Animals, bk i, ch i 59b-c; 63a; 79b-c; part ii, lOOa-c
[488^20-27] 9d; BK IV, CK 9 [536*34-*'8] 63a-b; 25 Montaigne: Essays, 207a-c; 215a-232c
BK VIII, CH I [588*18-^4] 114b,d / Parts of 27 Shakespeare: Hamlet, act iv, sc iv [32-39]
Animals, bk i, ch i [641^5-10] 164b-c; bk ii, 59a
CH 10 [656*4-14] 182a-b; bk hi, ch 10 [673*4- 31 Descartes: Rules, xii, 19d-20a / Discourse,
,'1'. 10] 201d-202a; bk iv, ch 10 [686*25-687^5] PART I, 41d; part V, 56a-b; 59a-60b / Objec-
;- '-: 217d-219a / Generation of Animals, bk v, ch 7 tions and Replies, 156a-d; 226a-d; 276c
(786^15-22] 328c-d / Ethics, bk i, ch 7 31 Spinoza: Ethics, part hi, prop 57, schol
[1097^33-1098*4] 343b; bk hi, ch 2 [1111^6-9] 415b; PART IV, prop 37, schol i, 435a-b
357b; BK VI, ch 2 [1139*17-20] 387d; ch 13 32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk vii [449-549] 227a-
[1144^1-10] 394b; BK VII, ch i [1145*15-26] 229a; bk vhi [369-451] 240a-242a; bk ix
395a; ch 5 399a-d; ch 6 [1149^24-1150*8] [549-566] 259b
400b-c; BK X, CH 8 [1178^23-32] 433c / Poli- 33 Pascal: Pensees, 140 199a-b; 339-344 233a-b;
tics, BK I, CH 2 [1253*7-18] 446b-c; bk hi, ch 9 418 243a / Vacuum, 357a-358a
[1280*31-34] 477d-478a; bk vii, ch 13 35 Locke: Human Understanding, intro, sect i
{1332*39-^5} 537a-b / Rhetoric, bk i, ch i 93a-b; bk ii, ch xi, sect 4-1 i 144d-146a pas-
[1355^1-3] 594d / Poetics, ch 4 [1448^4-8] 682c sim, esp sect io-ii 145d-146a; ch xxvii, sect
b
510b-511b; part i-ii, q 12, a 5 672a-c; q 17, 122d / Parts of Animals, bk ii, ch 4 [650^19-
A 2 687d-688b 651*5] 175c-d; bk iv, ch 5 [679*5-32] 209a-c /
20 Aquinas Summa Theologica, part hi suppl,
: Generation of Animals, bk hi, ch 2 [753^8-17]
Q 79, A I, ANS 951b-953b 294a-b / Politics, bk i, ch 5 [1254*^23-24] 448b;
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part i, 52b; 53a-b; 53d- CH 8 [1256*18-30] 450a; bk vii, ch 13 [1332^3-
54a; 59b-c; 63a; 64b-c; 79b-c; part ii,100a-c; 4] 537b
PART IV, 267b 10 Galen: Natural Faculties, bk i, ch 12,
25 Montaigne: Essays, 215a-224a; 231d-232c 173a-c
28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 428a-b; 454a 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk ii [333-370]
30 Bacon: Novum Organum, bk i, aph 73 117d- 19b-d; [661-668] 23b-c
118a; BK II, APH 35, 163d-164a 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 19,
31 Descartes: Rules, xii, 19d-20a / Discourse, A 10, ANS 117d-118b; q 59, a 3, ans 308b-309a;
PART v, 59d-60b / Objections and Replies, Q 78, A 4, ANS 411d-413d; q 81, a 3, ans and
156a-d; 226a-d REP 2 430c-431d; q 83, a i, ans 436d-438a;
32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk viii [369-451] 240a- Q 96, A I, ANS and REP 2,4 510b-511b; q 115,
242a; bk ix [549-566] 259b A 4, ANS 589d-590c; part i-ii, q 12, a 5, ans
33 Pascal: Pensees, 339-344 233a-b / Vacuum, and REP 3 672a-c; q 13, a 2 esp rep 3 673c-
357a-358a 674c; Q 15, A 2, ans 682a-c; q 16, a 2, rep 2
35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk ii, ch ix, 684d-685b; q 17, a 2, rep 3 687d-688b; q 40,
sect 12-15 140c-141a; ch x, sect 10 143c-d; A 3 794c-795a; q 41, a i, rep 3 798b-d; q 46,
CH XI, SECT 4-1 1 144d-146a passim; ch xxvii, A 4, REP 2 815b-d
SECT 8 221a-222a; sect 12 223a-b; bk hi, 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 50,
CH VI, sect 12 271d-272b; bk iv, ch xvi, A 3, REP 2 8b-9a
sect 12, 370c-371a; ch xvii, sect i 371c-d 22 Chaucer: Nun's Priest's Tale [15,282-287]
35 Berkeley: Human Knotvledge, intro, sect 457b / Manciple's Tale [17,104-144] 490a-b
II 407b-408a 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part ii, lOOa-c
35 Hume: Human Understanding, sect ix 487b- 24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, bk iv,
488c; sect xii, div 118, 504c 247d-248b
36 Swift: Gulliver, part iv 135a-184a esp 151b- 25 Montaigne: Essays, 184a-b; 216b-219a
152a, 159b-160a 26 Shakespeare: Henry V, act i, sc ii [187-204]
38 Rousseau: Inequality, 337d-338a; 341d-342a 535d-536a
/ Social Contract, bk i, 393 b-c 27 Shakespeare: Timon of Athens, act iv, sc
39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, bk i, 6d-8b III [320-348] 414b-c
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 199c-200c; 235c-d / Prtf 28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 339a-b;
Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 372a-b / 346a-347d; 349a-350a; 361c-362a; 402a-d;
Judgement, 479a-c; 584d-585c; 602b,d [fn i] 405c-406a; 428a-c; 476b-477b
le to lb Chapter 2: ANIMAL 35
30 Bacon: Advancement of learning, 72c / A^o- 2. The classification of animals
vum Organum, bk i, ai>h 73 117d-118a
2a. General schemes of classification: their
31 Descartes: Discourse, part v, 60b / Objec-
principles and major divisions
tions and Replies, 156a-d
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part hi, prop 57, schol Old Testament: Genesis, 1:20-31; 2:19-20 /
415b Leviticus, 11
33 Pascal: PensSes, 342-344 233b 8 Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, bk ii, ch 13
35 Hume: Human Understanding, sect v, div 38, [96^25-97'»6] 132a-b; ch 14 133c-134a / Top-
466b; div 45 469c; sect ix, div 85 488c; ics, BK VI, CH 6 [144*27-145*2) 197d-198c
SECT XII, DIV 118, 504c passim / Metaphysics, bk v, ch 28 546b-c;
36 Swift: Gulliver, part iv, 162a-b BK VII, CH 12 [io37''28-io38*35l 561c-562a /
38 Rousseau: Inequality, 334d-335a; 337d-338a; Soul, BK II, CH 3 644c-645b
343d-344a 9 Aristotle: History of Animals^ bk i, ch i
42 Kant: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, [486*i5]-CH 6 [491*5] 7b-12c esp ch i [486^*15-
256d-257a / Practical Reason, 316c-317a 487*1] 7b-d; bk ii, ch i [497*^4-18] 19b,d-20a;
43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 469c-d CH 15 [505^25-32] 28b-c; bk iv, ch i [523*30-
44 BoswEi.1.: Johnson, 221b-d *'2o] 48b,d; bk v, ch i [539*4-15] 65b; bk
48 Melville: Moby Dic{, 144a-b; 146b-147a; VIII, CH I [588^4]-CH 2 [590*18] 114d-116c /
283b-284a; 289b-292a Parts of Animals, bk i, ch 2-4 165d-168c; ch 5
49 Darwin: Origin of Species, 66a-69c passim; [645^20-28] 169c-d; BK III, CH 6 [669^7-14!
82d-85c; lOSd-lllb; 119a-135a,c esp 119a- 198a / Generation of Animals, bk i, ch i
122d, 134d-135a,c / Descent of Man, 287d- [715*18-^25] 255b-d; bk ii, ch i [732*13-
289a; 304b-310d esp 308a-310a; 312c-d; 733^17] 272c-274a; bk hi, ch ir [761^9-24]
369b-371b; 456b-457c; 463a-464b; 470d-475c 302c-ci / Politics, bk iv, ch 4 [1290^25-36]
passim, esp 475c; 504d-507a passim, esp 506c; 489d-490a
583a 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 3,
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk xi, 499c-500c A 4, rep 1 16d-17c; q 50, a 4, rep i 273b-274b;
53 James: Psychology, 49b-50a; 68a-73b; 700a- QQ 71-72 367a-369d
711a; 724a-b; 730a-b; 890b-891b [fn 3] 28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 468b-
54 Freud: Narcissism, 401a-c / Insti?2Cts, 412b- 469b
415d / General Introduction, 615b-616c / Be- 30 Bacon: Novum Organum, bk ii, aph 27,
yond the Pleasure Principle, 650c-662b esp 65 Id- 158b-c; APH 30 159c-d
654a / Group Psychology, 684d-686c esp 684d- 35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk hi, ch vi
685b / Ego and Id, 711c-712a / New Introduc- 268b-283a passim, esp sect 7 270b, sect 36-
tory Lectures, 846a-851d esp 846b-d, 849c- 37 279a-b; ch xi, sect 19-20 304b-d
850a, 851a 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 193a-200c / Judgement,
579b-c
\e. The conception of the animal as a machine 48 Melville: Moby Dic{, 95b-105b
or automaton 49 Darwin: Origin of Species, 24a-b; 25d-29a
9 Aristotle: Parts of Animals, bk i, ch i esp 28c-29a; 30d-31d; 63d-64d; 207a-212c;
[640^5-18] 163a-b / Motion of Animals, ch 7 215b-217b; 224d-225b; 228c-229a,c; 238b-
[701^1-13] 236d-237a / Generation of Animals, 239a; 241d-242a / Descent of Man, 331a-341d
BK II, CH I [734^3- 20] 275a-b; ch 5 [741^5-10] esp 331b-333a, 337a-338c; 342a-350b passim,
282c esp342a-b
10 Galen: Natural Faculties, bk ii, ch 3,
185a-b 2b. Analogies of structure and function among
23 HoBBEs: Leviathan, intro, 47a diflferent classes of animals
SECT 5 179c-d; sect 7-1 i 180a-d; ch xxxiii, [474^2-9] 720d; CH 17 [476*26-^8] 722b-c;
sect 6 249a-b; bk iv, ch x, sect 19 354a-c CH 22 724b-d passim
35 Hume: Human Understanding, sect vii, div 9 Aristotle: History of Animals, bk i, ch 2
51-52 472b-473c [488^29]-CH 3 [489*14] 9d-10b; ch 4 [489*20-
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 164b-c / Intro. Metaphysic 23] lOb-c; ch 12 15a; ch 16 [495*i8]-ch 17
of Morals, 386b-d [497*29] 17b-19d; bk ii, ch 15-BK iii, ch 4
49 Darwin: Origin of Species, 115b 28b-39c; bk hi, ch 20 [521^4-8] 46c; bk v,
53 James: Psychology, 3b; 5a; 8a-15a esp 12a-b, CH 5 [540^29-541*12] 67b-c; BK VI, ch ii
15a; 71b [fn i]; 694a-702a; 705a-706b; 761a- [566*2-14] 92a-b; bk vii, ch 8 [586*^12-24]
765b; 767b-768a; 827a-835a 112d-113a / Parts of Animals, bk ii, ch 9
54 Freud: Interpretation of Dreams, 351d-352a; [654*31-^12] 180a-b; bk hi, ch 3 191d-193a;
363b-d / Instincts, 412b-414b passim CH 4 [665bio]-CH 5 [668^31] 193b-197b; ch 7
[670*7-18] 198c-d; CH 8 [67ob34]-cH 9 [671^28]
4c. The organs, mechanisms, and characteris- 199c-200c; ch 14 203b-205c; bk iv, ch 2
tics of locomotion [676^16-677*24] 206b-207a; ch 4 [677^36-
7 Plato: Timaeus, 454b 678*20] 207d-208a / Generation of Animals,
8 Aristotle: Soul, bk hi, ch 10 [433^^13-27] bk I, ch 2 [7i6*33]-cH 16 [721*26] 256b-261a
666b-c passim; bk ii, ch 4 [738*9-739*2] 278d-279d;
9 Aristotle: History of Animals, bk i, ch i [740*21-35] 281a-b; ch 6 [743*1-11] 284b; ch 7
[487^14-34] 8c-d; ch 4 [489^27-29] 10c; ch 5 [745^22-746*19] 287a-c; bk iv, ch 4 [773*13-
[489^20-490^6] lla-12a; ch 15 [493^26-494^18] 29] 315a-b
16a-b; bk ii, ch i [497^18-498^10] 20a-d; 10 Hippocrates: Ancient Medicine, par 22 8a-d/
CH 12 26b-27a passim; bk hi, ch 5 39c-40a; Sacred Disease, 156a-b
bk iv, ch [523^21-524*32] 48d-50a; ch 2
I 10 Galen: Natural Faculties, bk i, ch 10 171b-
[525»'i5-526^i8] 51d-53b; ch 4 [528*29-^11] 172b; ch 13 173d-177a; bk i, ch 15-BK 11, ch
55b; ch 7 [532*19-29] 59a-b / Parts ofAnimals, 3, 179d-185b; bk n, ch 5-6 188b-191a; ch 9
BK II, CH 9 [654*31-^35] 180a-d; bk iv, ch 6-9 195c-199a,c; bk iii 199a-215d passim
213b-217b passim; ch 10 [690*4-^11] 221d- 28 Harvey Mo//o;2 ofthe Heart, 268d-304a,c esp
:
r
9eio 10 Chapter 2: ANIMAL 45
.•
10 Hippocrates: Aphorisms, sect v, par 38 139a BK hi,ch 20 [52i*'2i] CH 21 [525*1:5] 46d 48c;
: 28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 363a; 382d- bk V, CH 18 [550*32 '"6] 77b-c; ch 22 [55:5''24-
384a; 481a; 482b; 482d-483a; 484b; 488a; 554''61 80c 81b; ch 26 27 82a-c; en 33
488c [558*4] CH 34 [558^'4| 84d-85a,c; bk vi, ch 4
88d 89b; ch 69 89c-90d; en 12 [566^^16-
9e. The period of gestation: parturition, de-
567*7] 92d-93a; ch 14 [568^13-569*4] 94c-
livery, birth 95a; cii 20 [574^7-13] 100b; ch 21 [575*^9 12]
Old Testament: Genesis, 25:24-26; 38:27-30 / 101b; CH 22 [576''ii 12] 102a-b; ch 26-27
Job, 39:1-4 103d; CH 33 [580*2-5] 105c-d; bk vii, ch 3
Apocrypha: Wisdom of Solomon, 7:2 — (Z)) OT, [583*26-33] 108d-109a; cn 5 [585*29-33] 111b;
Boof^of Wisdom, 7 -.2 CH II 114a, c; bk viii, ch i [588^31-589*3]
6 Herodotus: History, bk hi, 112d-113b; bk 115b; bk IX, CH 4 [6ri*9]-cH 5 [611*21] 136d;
VI, 197b-c; 198b-d CH 7 [6i2''26-6i3*i6] 138c-d; ch 8 [613^7-33]
9 Aristotle: History of Animals, bk v, ch ii 139a-c; ch ii [614^31-34] 140c; ch 29 143c-d;
[543^14-17] 70b; cH 12 [544*1-3] 70c; ch 14 CH 32-34 144b-145c passim; ch 37 [621*21-^1]
[545^6-9] 72b; [546^1-14] 73a-b; ch 17 [549* 146d-147a; ch 49 [63i*>i3-i7] 156d-157a /
14-20] 76a; [549^1-13] 76b-c; ch 18 [55o''26- Parts of Animals, bk iv, ch 10 [688*19 ''34]
29] 77b; [550^6-14] 77c; ch 20 [553*2-11] 79d; 219d-220d / Generation of Animals, bk hi, gh
BK VI, CH 2 [559^11-16] 86b; [560^17-24] 87a- 2 [752^17-753*17] 293d-294b; ch 10 [759*36-
b; CH 4 [562^15-31] 89a; ch 10 [565*22-31] ^8] 300c; BK IV, CH 8 318b-319c / Politics,
91c; [565^24-32] 92a; ch ii [566*15-16] 92b; BK I, CH 8 [1256*^7-15] 450b-c; bk vii, ch 17
CH 12 [566^19-20] 92d; CH 13 [567*28-''27] [1336*3-22] 541a-b
93c-d; CH 17 96b-97b; ch 18 [572^31-573*32] 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk v [806-815]
98d-99a; ch 19 [573^21] 99c; ch 20 [574*20-^7] 71c
lOOa-b; ch 21 [575*25-29] 101a; ch 22 [575^ 28 Harvey: Motion of the Heart, 288d / On
26-27] lOlc; [576*21-25] 101d-102a; ch 23 Animal Generation, 350c-d; 361b-362c; 381b-
[577*24-^10] 102d-103a; ch 26 [578*io]-ch 29 382d; 402a-b; 439a-d; 461b; 464c-d; 487c-
[578^18] 103d-104b; ch 30 [579*i9]-ch 31 488a
[579^5] 104d-105a; ch 33 [579b3i]-CH 35 33 Pascal: Weight of Air, 415a
[580*19] 105c-106a; bk vii, ch i [582*16-21] 35 Locke: Civil Government, ch vii, sect 78-80
107d; ch 3 [583*^1 i]-ch 4 [584^25] 109b-110c; 42b-43a
CH 9 [586^26]-cH 10 [587^5] 113a-d; bk viii, 36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 316b
CH 21 [603^34-604*3] 129d; CH 24 [604^29- 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 336a-b; 337b; 340c
605*1] 130c / Generation of Animals, bk i, ch 44 BoswEi.1.: Johnson, 510b-c
II [719*2-30] 259a-b; bk ii, ch 8 [748*27-31] 48 Melville: Moby Dic{, 286b-287b
289c; BK III, CH 2 [752*10-^17] 293a-d; bk iv, 49 Darwin: Origin of Species, llOc-lllb / De-
ch 4 [772^5-11] 314b-c; ch 6 [775*28-^2] scent of Man, 289d-290a; 339d-340c; 441 c-d;
317b-c; CH 8 [777*22]-ch 10 [778*12] 319b- 443b-444a
320a,c / Politics, bk vii, ch 16 [1335*11-22] 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, epilogue i, 661d;
540a; [1335^12-19] 540c 662c-d
10 Hippocrates : Airs, Waters, Places, par 4-5 53 James: Psychology, 709a-710a
lOa-d; par 7, lla-c / Aphoristns, sect v, par 54 Freud: Netv Introductory Lectures, 854c
29-62 138d-139d
10 Galen: Natural Faculties, bk hi, ch 3 200a- 9g. Characteristics of the offspring at birth
201a; ch 12, 208c-d 9 Aristotle: History of Animals, bk vi, ch 20
24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, bk i, [574*20-29] 100a; ch 30 [579*2 i]-ch 31 [579^9]
5c-6b; 8c-9c 104d-105b; ch 33 [58o*4]-ch 35 [580*29]
28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 343d; 353a- 105d-106a / Generation of Animals, bk iv, ch 6
b; 381b-382d; 406a-b; 458c-459d; 476c [774^5-775*6] 316c-317a; bk v 320a-331a,c
36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 268a-b; 270a-274a passim
48 Melville: Moby Dicl^, 254a-255a; 287a-b 49 Darwin: Origin of Species, 222b-223b
49 Darwin Origin of Species, 94a / Desce?it of
: 53 James: Psychology, 49b-50a; 691a-b; 710a
Man, 341b.d [fn 32]; 384b-c
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk iv, 180d-183b 10. Heredity and environment: the genetic
54 Freud: Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety determination of individual differences
737c-738a passim and similarities
7 Plato: Republic, bk hi, 340b-341a
9/. The care and feeding of infant offspring: 9 Aristotle: History of Animals, bk vi, ch 19
lactation
[573^32-574*9] 99d; ch 29 [578^26-30] 104c;
7 Plato: Republic, bk v, 362b-c BK vii, ch 6 [585^29-586*14] llld-112b / Parts
9 Aristotle: History of Animals, bk h, ch r of Animals, bk i, ch i [640*14-28] 162c-d;
[500*13-33] 22b-c; ch 13 [504^22-27] 27a-b; [641^27-39] 164d-165a; ch 17 [72ibi4]-cH 18
46 THE GREAT IDEAS 11 to \2a
[724*13] 261c-264b; bk iv, ch i [766^7-12] 11^. The relation between animals and their
307d; CH 3-4 308d'315b / Politics, bk ii, ch environments
3
[1262*14-24] 457a; bk vii, ch 16 [1335^17-19] 6 Herodotus: History, bk iv, 129a-b
540c 8 Aristotle: Physics, bk ii, ch 8 [198^16-33]
10 Hippocrates: Airs, Waters, Places, par 14 275d-276a / Longevity 710a-713a,c passim
15a-b / Sacred Disease, 155d-156a 9 Aristotle: History of Animals, bk i, ch i
12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk hi [741-753] [487*14-^33] 8a-d; bk hi, ch 12 [519*3-19]
39c-d; BK IV [1209-1232] 60a-b 43d-44a; ch 21 [522^12-523*1] 47d-48a; bk
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 119, IV, CH 5 [530^19-24] 57c; bk v, ch ii [543^19-
AREP 2 607b-608d
2, 31] 70b-c; CH 22 [553^20-24] 80c; bk viii, ch
28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 363a-c; 2-29 115c-132d; bk ix, ch i [608^18-610*34]
386d-387b; 391c-393b; 395a-396a; 425b-d; 134a-136a; ch 37 [622*8-15] 147c / Parts of
446b-c; 455d'456a Animals, bk ii, ch 16 [658^30-659*36] 185d-
35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk hi, ch vi, 186b; BK IV, ch 5 [680*28-^^3] 210d; ch 8
SECT 23 274b-c [684*1-14] 215b; CH 12 [693*10-24] 225a/ Gait
36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 191b-192b of Animals, ch 15 [7i3*4]-ch 18 [714^8] 250d-
38 Rousseau: Inequality, 335a- b; 337a; 347a'b 252a / Generation of Animals, bk ii, ch 4
39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, bk i, 7d-8a [738*9-27] 278d-279a; bk iv, ch 2 308b-d;
42 Y^a^t: Judgement, 580a; 581d-582a BK v, CH 3 [782^23-783^22] 324d-325d
49 Darwin: Origin of Species, 9b-12a esp 9b-10d; 10 HippocR.\TEs: Airs, Waters, Places, par 12
53b-55b; 62a-63a; 65a-71a; 98c; 132a-134c 14b-d; par 19 16c-17a
esp 134a-c; 144a; 149b-150c; 182d-183a; 220b- 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk v [845-854]
228a esp 222a-224b / Descent of Man, 268b- 72a-b
269a; 375a-382d esp 381c-382a; 413d [fn 61]; 24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, bk iv,
429d-430c; 500a-525a passim, esp 500a-502a, 242a-b
511a-b, 524d-525a; 529d-531a,c 25 Montaigne: Essays, 223c
53 ]am-es: Psychology, 853a-858a esp 857b; 890b- 28 Galileo: Two New Sciences, first day, 160c-
897b esp 896a-897a d; second day, 187b-188c
54 Freud: General Introduction, 594d-595a 30 Bacon: Novum Organum, bk ii, aph 13, 146c
33 Pascal: Equilibrium of Liquids, 401a-403a
11. The habitat of animals 36 Swift: Gulliver, part ii, 79a-b
36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 224b; 295b-296b
1 \a. The geographical distribution of animals: 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk xiv,
their natural habitats 102b,d-104a
Old Testament: Genesis, 1:20-21,24-26 42 Ka^t: Judgement, 553c-554b; 585b
6 Herodotus: History, bk hi, 113a-b; bk v, 43 Feder.\list: number ii, 56a
161b-c; BK VII, 236d 45 Lavoisier: Elements of Cliemisiry, part ii,
9 Aristotle: History of Animals, bk i, ch i 57b-c
[487*14-^5] 8a-b; bk iv, ch i [525*12-25] 51a- 45 Fourier: Theory of Heat, 209b
c; bk v, ch 15 [547*4-12] 73d; ch 15 [547^11]- 45 Faraday: Researches in Electricity, 534c-535b
ch 16 [548*28] 74b-75a; ch 16 [548^18-30] 49 Darwin: Origin of Species, 9a-10d; 32a-39a,c
75c-d; CH 17 [549^14-22] 76c; ch 22 [554^8- passim, esp 34c-36a, 39a,c; 40d-42c; 53d-55b;
18] 81b-c; CH 28 [556*4-6] 82d; ch 30 [556*21- 65a-69c esp 65b-66a; 106b-107a; 144a-145c;
24] 83a; ch 31 [557^4-32] 83d-84a; bk vi, ch 5 182d-183a; 230d-231b / Descent of Man,
[563*5-12] 89b; BK VIII, CH 2-20 115c-129b esp 268b-269a; 320a-c; 341b,d [fn 32]; 354c-355a;
ch 2 [589*10-590*19] 115c-116c, CH 12-17 430d-432c; 442a-443b; 468d-469a; 525b-
122d-127b; ch 28-29 131c-132d; bk ix, ch 527c;554d-555b
11-27 140c-143c passim; ch 32 [618^18-619*8] 53 James: Psychology, 857b
144b-c / Generation of Animals, bk hi, ch ii 54 Freud: Civilization and Its Discontents, 791d-
[761^9-24] 302c-d 792a
12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk ii [532-540]
21d 12. The treatment of animals by men
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, qq 71-
72 367a-369d
12a. The taming of animals
32 Mii^tok: Paradise Lost, bk vii [387-498] 225b- 4 Homer: Odyssey, bk iv [625-637] 205c
228a 5 Aeschylus: Prometheus Bound [459-468] 44d
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 630b-c [n 43] 5 Sophocles: y^w/Z^^ow^ [332-352] 134a
48 Melville: Moby Dic{, 146b-148a 7 Plato: Phaedrus, 128a-d
12-^/0 12r Chapter 2: ANIMAL 47
9 Aristotle: History of Animals, bk i, ch i 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 72,
[488*26-31] 9b; BK VI, CH 21 [575^1-3] 101a; A I, rep 6 368b 369d; q 96, a 510b 511b
i
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: The general discussion of the grades of life and the kinds of soul, see Life and Death 3, 3b;
Soul 20-20(3).
Other considerations of the issue concerning continuity or discontinuity in the relation of
plants, animals, and men, as well as between living and non-living things, see Evolution
3e, 7a-7b; Life and Death 2, 3a; Man la-ic; Nature 3b; Sense 2a.
The comparison of men and animals, or of different species of animals, with respect to
sensitivity, memory, imagination, and intelligence, see Memory and Imagination i;
Mind 3a-3b; Reasoning la; Sense 2b-2c.
The general theory of instinct, see Habit 3-3e; and for the emotional aspect of instincts, see
Emotion ic.
I V.
Chapter 2: ANIMAL 49
ADDITIONAL, READINGS
J J
Listed below are works not included in Great Bool(s of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works arc divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
INTRODUCTION
THE forms of government have been vari-
ously enumerated, differently classified,
speak of "the efite" and "the four hundred";
or we follow Marx and Engels in thinking of the
and given quite contrary evaluations in the "feudal aristocracy" as the class "that was
great books of political theory. In the actual ruined by the bourgeoisie." The Communist
history of political institutions, as well as in the Manifesto wastes little sympathy on the aristo-
tradition of political thought, the major prac- crats who, while seeking an ally in the prole-
tical issues with respect to the forms of govern- tariat, forgot that "they [too] exploited under
ment — the choices open, the ideals to be circumstances and conditions that were quite
sought, or the evils to be remedied — have shifted different." For Marx and Engels, the aristoc-
with the times. racy and the bourgeoisie alike represent the
In an earlier day — not merely in ancient propertied classes, but they differ in the man-
times, but as late as the i8th century — the ner in which they came by their property and
form of government called "aristocracy" pre- power. The landed gentry and the feudal no-
sented a genuine alternative to monarchy, and bility got by inheritance, the
theirs largely
set a standard by which the defects and infir- bourgeoisie by industry and trade.
mities of democracy were usually measured. If Today, for the most part, we call a man an
aristocracy was not always regarded as the ideal "aristocrat" if, justly or unjustly, he claims a
form of government, the principle of aristoc- right to certain social distinctions or privileges.
racy always entered into the definition of the We seldom use that word today to indicate a
political ideal. man who deserves special political status or pre-
Today, both in theory and practice, aristoc- eminence, though we do sometimes use it to
racy is end of the scale. For a
at the other name the proponent of any form of government
large part of mankind, and for the political which rests upon the political inequaUty of
philosopher as well as in prevailing popular men.
sentiment, aristocracy (together with mon- Since the discussion of aristocracy in the
archy) has become a subject of historical inter- great books is largely political, we shall here be
est. form of government with a past
It is a primarily concerned with aristocracy as a form
rather than a future. It no longer measures, but of government. The general consideration of
is measured by, democracy. If the aristocratic the forms of government will be found in the
principle still signifies a factor of excellence in chapter on Government. Here and in the
government or the state, it does so with a mean- other chapters which are devoted to particular
ing now brought into harmony with demo- forms of government, we shall consider each of
cratic standards. the several forms, both in itself and in relation
This change accounts for one ambiguity to the others.
which the word "aristocracy" may have for
contemporary readers. Formerly its primary, There is one element in the conception of
if not only, significance was to designate a form aristocracy which does not change with chang-
of government. It is currently used to name a ing evaluations of aristocratic government. All
special social class, separated from the masses of the writers of the great political books agree
by distinctions of birth, talent, property, power, with Plato that aristocracy is a "government
or leisure. We speak of "the aristocracy" as we of the few," according as the few rather than
50
^
Chapter 3: ARISTOCRACY 51
the one or the many exercise political power the Eleatic Stranger declares in the Statesman^
and dominate the state. By this criterion of "a far greater and more ruinous error than any
number, aristocracy is ahvays differentiated adherence to written law."
from monarchy and democracy. Taking the division of governments accord-
Though he uses the word "oHgarchy" to ing to number, "the principle of law and the
name what others call "aristocracy," Locke absence of law will bisect them all." Monarchy
defines the three forms of government by refer- divides into "royalty and tyranny" depending
ence to numbers. When the majority them- on whether "an individual rules according to
selves exercise the whole power of the commu- law ... or governs neither by law nor by cus-
nity, Locke says, "then the form of the govern- tom, but pretends that he can only act for
. . .
ment is a perfect democracy." When they put the best by violating the laws, while in reality
"the power of making laws into the hands of a appetite and ignorance are the motives." By
few select men . . . then it is an oligarchy; or the same criterion, the rule of the few divides
else into the hands of one man, and then it is "into aristocracy, which has an auspicious
a monarchy." Kant proceeds similarly, though name, and oligarchy." While democracy is sub-
again in somewhat different language. "The re- ject to the same division, Plato makes the same
lation of the supreme power to the people," he name apply to both its good and bad forms.
says, "is conceivable in three different forms: The second way in which aristocracy differs
either one in the state rules over all; or somcy from oligarchy is also brought out in the States-
united in relation of equality with each other, man. Since "the science of government," ac-
rule over all the others; or all together rule cording to Plato, is "among the greatest of all
over each individually, including themselves. sciences and most difficult to acquire any . . .
The form of the state is therefore either auto- true form of government can only be supposed
cratic, or aristocratic, or democratic to be the government of one, two, or, at any
Hegel claims, however, that "purely quanti- rate, of a few really found to possess sci-
. . .
tative distinctions like these are only super- ence." Because of this demand for "science,"
ficialand do not afford the concept of the which presupposes virtue and competence in
thing." The criterion of number does not seem ruling, monarchy and aristocracy came to be
to suffice when other forms of government defined as government by the single best man
are considered. It fails to distinguish monarchy or by the few best men in the community.
from tyranny or despotism, which may consist A high degree of competence or virtue is,
of rule by one man, as has usually been the case however, not the only mark by which the few
historically. Number alone likewise fails to dis- may be distinguished from the many. The
tinguish aristocracy from oligarchy. In the de- possession of wealth or property in any size-
liberations of the Medean conspirators, which able amount also seems to divide a small class
Herodotus reports or invents, the rule of "a in the community from the rest, and Plato at
certain number of the worthiest" is set against times refers to aristocracy simply as the govern-
both democracy and monarchy and identified ment of the rich. Yet if wealth is the criterion
as "oligarchy." How, then, shall aristocracy be by which the few are chosen to govern, then
distinguished from oligarchy.'' oligarchy results, at least in contrast to that
There seem to be two answers to this ques- sense of aristocracy in which the criterion is
tion. In the Statesman, Plato adds to the char- excellence of mind and character. Aristocracy
acteristic of number the "criterion of law and is called aristocracy, writes Aristotle, "either
the absence of law." The holders of political because the rulers are the best men, or because
power, whatever their number, may govern they have at heart the best interests of the state
either according to the established laws, orby and of the citizens."
arbitrary caprice in violation of them. "To go By these additional criteria — never by num-
against the laws, which are based upon long ex- bers alone — the ancients conceive aristocracy.
perience, and the wisdom of counsellors who When it is so defined, it always appears to
have graciously recormnended them and per- be a good form of government, but never the
suaded the multitude to pass them, would be," only good form, or even the best. The same
—
due primarily to age and is found among simple fied with this admission. They deny that aris-
peoples, where "the young bowed without tocracy has ever existed in purity of principle
question to the authority of experience." Elec- they deny that the governing few have ever
tive aristocracy arose "in proportion as artificial been chosen solely for their virtue. Machiavelli
inequality produced by became
institutions assumes it to be a generally accepted fact that
predominant over natural inequality, and rich- "the nobles wish to rule and oppress the people
es or power were put before age." This form, in . . . and give vent to their ambitions." Mon-
Rousseau's opinion, is "the best, and is aris- tesquieu, although more optimistic about the
tocracy properly so called." The third, which possibility of a truly virtuous aristocracy, rec-
is characterized as "the worst of all govern- ognizes its tendency to profit at the expense of
ments," came about when "the transmission of the people. To overcome this he would have
the father's power along with his goods to his the laws make it "an essential point . . . that
children, by creating patrician families, made the nobles themselves should not levy the taxes
government hereditary." ... and should likewise forbid the nobles all
This emphasis upon inequality radically sep- kinds of commerce and abolish the right of
. . .
arates aristocracy from democracy. From Aris- primogeniture among the nobles, to the end
totle down to Montesquieu, Rousseau, and our that by a continual division of the inheritances
own day, equality has been recognized as the their fortunes may be always upon a level."
distinctive element of democracy. Disregarding But perhaps the strongest attack upon aris-
slaves who, for the ancients, were political tocracy in all of the great political books is
Chapter 3: ARISTOCRACY 53
made by Mill in his Representative Government. Then said all the trees unto the bramble, Come
thou, and reign over us.
He admits that "the governments which have
And tlic hramhle said unto the trees, If in truth ye
been remarkable in history for sustained mental anoint me
king over you, then come and put your
abihty and vigour in the conduct of affairs have trust in my
shndow: and if not, let fire come out of
generally been aristocracies." But he claims the bramble, and devour the cedars of Lebanon.
aristocratic class "assumes to themselves an punishment is that he who refuses to rule is lia-
endless variety of unjust privileges, sometimes ble to be ruled by one who is worse than him-
benefiting their pockets at the expense of the self. And the fear of this, as I conceive, induces
people, sometimes merely tending to exalt the good to take office . . . not under the idea
them above others, or, what is the same thing that they are going to have any benefit or en-
in different words, to degrade others below joyment themselves, but as a necessity,and
themselves." because they are not able to commit the task
Yet except by those political thinkers who of ruling to anyone who is better than them'
deny the distinction between good and bad selves, or indeed as good."
government, and hence the relevance of virtue
to institutions which are solely expressions of The political issues, in which monarchy,
power, the aristocratic principle is seldom, en- aristocracy, oligarchy, and democracy represent
tirely rejected. Even when the notion of a pure the major alternatives, cannot be clarified with-
aristocracy is dismissed as an ideal w^hich can out recourse to the distinction between govern-
never be fully realized, the aristocratic princi- ment by laws and government by men.
ple reappears as a counsel of perfection in the It has already been noted that in the States-
improvement of other forms of government. man Plato makes respect for the
law^s and vio-
Even so, one difficulty remains, which tends lation of the laws themarks of good and bad
to prevent aristocracy from being realized in government respectively. But he also proposes
practice, quite apart from any question of its that "the best thing of all is not that the law
soundness in principle. It lies in the reluctance should rule, but that a man should rule, sup-
of the best men to assume the burdens of public posing him to have wisdom and royal power."
office. The parable told in the Book of Judges The imperfections of law could then be avoided,
applies to aristocracy as much as to monarchy. because one or a few men of almost superhuman
wisdom would govern their inferiors even as
The went forth on a time to anoint a king
trees
the gods could direct the affairs of men without
over them; and they said unto the oHve tree, Reign
the aid of estabhshed laws. But if no man is a
thou over us.
But the unto them, Should I leave
olive tree said god in relation to other men, then, in Plato's
my wherewith by me they honor God and
fatness, opinion, it is better for laws or customs to be
man, and go to be promoted over the trees? supreme, and for men to rule in accordance
And the trees said to the fig tree, Come thou, and with them.
reign over us.
But the fig tree said unto them. Should I forsake The
larger issue conceiTiing rule by law and
my sweetness, and my good fruit, and go to be rule by men is discussed in the chapters on
promoted over the trees? Constitution and Monarchy. But here we
Then said the trees unto the vine. Come thou,
must observe how the difference between these
and reign over us.
two types of rule affects the understanding of
And the. vine said unto them, Should I leave my
wine, which cheereth God and man, and go to be all other forms of government. This can be seen
promoted over the trees? in terms of Aristotle's distinction between royal
54 THE GREAT IDEAS
and political government, which closely resem- ment. Montesquieu, for example, divides gov-
bles the modern conception of the difference ernments into "repubhcan, monarchical, and
between absolute or despotic government on despotic," and under "republican" places those
the one hand, and limited, constitutional, or "in which the body, or only a part, of the peo-
republican government on the other. ple is possessed of the supreme power," thus
There are passages in which Aristotle regards including both democracy and aristocracy. In
absolute rule by one or a few superior men as both, laws, not men, are supreme, but the spirit
the divine or godlike form of government. of the laws is different. In democracy, the
When one man or a few excel "all the others to- "spring," or principle, "by which it is made to
gether in virtue, and both rulers and subjects act," is virtue resting on equality; in aristoc-
are fitted, the one to rule, the others to be racy, "moderation
is the very soul ... a mod-
ruled," it is right, in Aristotle's opinion, for the eration founded on virtue, not that which
. . .
government to be royal or absolute rather than proceeds from indolence and pusillanimity."
political or constitutional — whether one man Hegel's comment on this theory deserves men-
rules or a few. "Royal rule is of the nature of an tion. "The fact that 'moderation' is cited as the
aristocracy," he says. "It is based upon merit, principle of aristocracy," he writes, "implies
whether of the individual or of his family." the beginning at this point of a divorce between
But in other passages Aristotle seems to re- public authority and private interest."
gard absolute government as a despotic regime, For Aristotle, in contrast to Montesquieu,
appropriate to the family and the primitive the two major types of constitution are the
tribe, but not to the state, in which it is better democratic and the oligarchical, according as
for equals to rule and be ruled in turn. In either free-birth or wealth is made the chief quaUfica-
case, it makes a difference to the meaning of tion for citizenship and public office. Aristoc-
aristocracy, as also to monarchy, whether it be racy enters the discussion of constitutional
conceived as absolute or constitutional govern- governments mainly in connection with the
ment. construction of the polity or mixed constitu-
When it is conceived as absolute government, tion. Although in most states "the fusion goes
from monarchy only on the
aristocracy differs no further than the attempt to unite the free-
point of numbers — the
few as opposed to the dom of the poor and the wealth of the rich,"
one. Otherwise, aristocracy and monarchy are he points out that "there are three grounds on
defended in the same way. The defense usually which men claim an equal share in the govern-
takes one of two directions. One line of argu- ment, freedom, wealth, and virtue."
ment which stems from Plato and Aristotle When the fusion goes no further than the
claims that inequality in wisdom or virtue be- attempt to unite the freedom of the poor and
tween ruler and ruled justifies absolute rule by the wealth of the rich, "the admixture of the
the superior.The other line is followed by those two elements," Aristotle says, is "to be called a
who, Hobbes, maintain that since sover-
like polity." But sometimes the mixture of democ-
eignty is absolute, unlimited, and indivisible, racy with oligarchy may include an ingredient
the difference between kinds of government of aristocracy, as in "the distribution of offices
"consisteth not in the difference of Power, but according to merit." The union of these three
in the difference of Convenience, or Aptitude elements "is to be called aristocracy or the
to produce the Peace, and Security of the peo- government of the best," and "more than any
ple." When they are conceived as forms of ab- other form of government, except the true and
solute government, aristocracy and monarchy the ideal," it has, in Aristotle's judgment, "a
are attacked for the same reason; to those who right to this name." Polity and aristocracy, as
regard absolutism or despotism in government mixed constitutions, are fusions of some of the
as unjust because it violates the basic equality same elements; hence, he says, it is "obvious
of men, an absolute monarchy and a despotic that they are not very unlike."
aristocracy are both unjust.
Aristocracy, however, can also be conceived Beginning in the i8th century, and with the
as a form or aspect of constitutional govern- rise of representative government, the discus-
Chapter 3: ARISTOCRACY 55
ment is largely superceded by the consideration Jay to be a necessary safeguard for popular gov-
of the role which the aristocratic principle plays ernment. The senate, for instance, is not only
in the development of republican institutions. to provide elder statesmen, but is also to serve
The writers of The Federalist, for example, as "a salutary check on the government . . .
respond in several places to the charge that the [which] doubles the security to the people, by
constitution which they are defending shows requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies
tendencies toward aristocracy or oligarchy. Yet in schemes of usurpation or perfidy, where the
and defense of the new
in their consideration ambition or corruption of one would otherwise
instrument of government as essentially repub- be sufficient." The electoral college aims di-
lican, they frequently appeal to principles that rectly at placing theimmediate election of the
arc aristocratic in nature. president in the hands of "men most capable
In giving their own meanings to the terms of analyzing the qualities adapted to the sta-
"republic" and "pure democracy" — that is, tion under circumstances favorable to de-
. . .
—
whole people on the other the Federalists also corruption," which are the "most deadly ad-
give an aristocratic bent to the very notion of versaries of republican government."
representation. They seem to share the opinion In all these respects, as well as in the restric-
of Montesquieu that "as most citizens have tions on suffrage which it permitted the states
sufficient ability to choose, though unqualified to impose, the unamended American constitu-
to be chosen, so the people, though capable of tion appears to have adopted an aristocratic
calling others to account for their administra- principle in government. Whether the motiva-
tion, are incapable of conducting administra- tion of its proponents was in fact simply aris-
tions themselves." tocratic, or whether it was partly or even
Thus Madison praises "the delegation of the largely oligarchical — leadership being the right
government ... to a small number of citizens of men of "good" family and substantial prop-
elected by the rest" as tending "to refine and erty — will always be a question to be decided
*
enlarge the public views, by passing them in the light of the documents and the relevant
through the medium of a chosen body of citi- historic evidence.
zens, whose wisdom may best discern the true
interest of their country." He further points More democratic than the American consti-
out that "it may well happen that the public tutionalists of the 1 8th century, certainly so
pronounced by the representatives of
voice, with regard to the extension of suffrage, John
the people, will be more consonant to the pub- Stuart Mill appears to be no less concerned
[lic good than if pronounced by the people than they are to introduce aristocratic elements
i
themselves, convened for the purpose." into the structure of representative govern-
On such a view, the people's representatives ment.
in the legislature, or other branches of govern- According to Mill, two grave dangers con-
ment, are supposed to be not their minions, front a democracy: "Danger of a low grade of
but their betters. For the American constitu- intelligence in the representative body, and
, tionalists, as for Edmund Burke, the represent- in the popular opinion which controls it; and
I ative serves his constituents by making inde- danger of class legislation on the part of the
pendent decisions for the common good, not by numerical majority." Claiming that much of
doing their bidding. This theory of representa- the blame for both dangers lies in the rule of
tion, to which Mill and other democratic think- the majority. Mill looks for means to overcome
ers agree in part, supposes that the representa- the situation in which "the numerical majority
tive knows better than his constituents what is . alone possess practically any voice in the
. .
perior political intelligence exert an effect upon the fundamental fact and the only fact hav-
government, Mill also proposes a plurality of ing a bearing on the just distribution of suffrage.
votes for the educated and the establishment of That certain individuals have superior aptitude
an upper legislative chamber based on a spe- for the exercise of political authority docs not
cially membership. Such proposals
qualified automatically confer that authority upon them.
seem to indicate Mill's leanings toward aris- The inequality of m.en in merit or talent does
tocracy, not only because they aim at procur- not establish a political right, as does their
ing a "government of the best," but also be- equality in human nature. The selection of the
cause they are designed to prevent a govern- best men for public office is, on this theory, not
ment based on a majority of "manual labour- a matter of justice, but of expediency or pru-
ers" with the consequent danger of "too low a dence.
standard of poUtical intelligence." Another issue concerns the weight to be given
the opinion of the majority as against the
The issues raised by the theory of aristocracy, opinion of the wise or the expert when, as
or by the aristocratic principle in government, frequently happens, these opinions diverge or
seem to be basically the same in all centuries, conflict. As the chapter on Opinion indicates,
however different the terms or the context in the experts themselves disagree about the
which they are expressed. Even when, as today, soundness of the popular judgment.
a purely aristocratic form of government does Where Thucydides believes that "ordinary
not present a genuine political alternative to men usually manage public affairs better than
peoples who have espoused democracy, there their more gifted fellows," because "the latter
remains the sense that pure or unqualified de- are always wanting to appear wiser than the
mocracy is an equally undesirable extreme. The laws," Herodotus observes that "it seems easier
qualifications proposed usually add an aristo- to deceive the multitude than one man."
cratic leaven. Where Hegel holds it to be "a dangerous and a
One issue concerns the equality and in- false prejudice, that the People alone have rea-
equality of men. The affirmation that all men son and insight, and know what justice is,"
are created equal does not exclude a recognition John Jay declares that "the people of any coun-
of their individual inequalities the wide di- — try (if, like the Americans, intelligent and well-
versity of human and the uneven dis-
talents informed) seldom adopt and steadily persevere
tribution of intelligence and other abilities. for many years in an erroneous opinion respect-
Nor does it mean that all m^en use their native ing their interests," and Hamilton adds that
endowments good purpose or in the same
to "the people commonly intend the public good."
degree to acquire skill or knowledge or virtue. Sometimes the same author seems to take
To grasp the double truth that no man is — both sides of the issue, as Aristotle does when,
essentially more human than another, though though he says that "a multitude is a better
one may have more of certain human abilities judge ofmany things than any individual," he
Chapter 3: ARISTOCRACY 57
yet prefers government by the one or few who present ambiguity. We
have already noted it in
are eminent in wisdom or virtue. Each side, considering the reality of the line between aris-
perhaps, contributes only part of the truth. tocracy and oligarchy. The agreement or dis-
Certainly those who acknowledge a political agreement of Mill and Aristotle, of Burke and
wisdom in the preponderant voice of the many, Plato, of Hamilton and Paine, of Veblcn and
but who also recognize another wisdom in the Pareto, or John Dewey and Matthew Arnold
skilled judgment of the few, cannot wish to ex- cannot be judged without determining whether
clude either from exerting its due influence the distinction between the many and the few
upon the course of government. derives from nature or convention.
Still another issue has to do with education. It is this distinction which Jefferson had in
Shall educational opportunity be as universal mind when, writing to Adams in 1813, he said,
as the franchise? Shall those whose native en- "There is a natural aristocracy among men.
dowments fit them for political leadership be The grounds of this are virtue and talents . . .
trained differently or more extensively than There is also an artificial aristocracy founded on
their fellow citizens? Shall vocational educa- wealth and birth, without either virtue or tal-
tion be given to the many, and liberal educa- ents; for with these it would belong to the first
tion be reserved for the few? class. The natural aristocracy I consider as the
These questions provide some measure of the most precious gift of nature, for the instruc-
extent to which anyone's thinking is aristo- tion, the trusts, the government of society . . .
cratic or democratic —
or involves some admix- The artificial aristocracy is a mischievous in-
ture of both strains. In the great discussion of gredient in government, and provision should
these questions and issues, there is one ever- be made to prevent its ascendancy."
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. The general theory and evaluation of aristocracy 58
6. The selection of the best men for public office: the aristocratic theory of representation
in modern constitutional government
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Homer: Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. Forexample, in 53 James :Pi>'(r/!6>/o^^,116a-119b, the passage
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 Plato: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
Author's Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as part, bk, ch,
sect) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d.
Bible References: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g.. Old Testa-
ment: Nehemiah, 7:45— (Z)) // Esdras, 7:46.
Symbols: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
1. The general theory and evaluation of aristoc- la. Aristocracy as a good form of government
racy Old Testament: Exodus, 18:13-26 / Deuteron-
6 Herodotus: History, bk hi, 107c-108c omy, 1:9-17 / Proverbs, 29:2
7 Plato: Republic, bk ii-vii, 316a-401d / Apocrypha: Ecclesiasticus, 10:1-2 {D) OT,
Statesman, 598b-604b / Laws, bk hi, 665c- Ecclesiasticus, 10:1-2
666c; 669d-672a 6 Herodotus: History, bk hi, 107d-108a
9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk viii, ch 10 [1160^32- 6 Thv CYDiDES Peloponnesian War, bk iv, 478d-
:
\b to lb Chapter 3: ARISTOCRACY 59
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 273,
\h. Criticisms of aristocracy as unrealizable or 90d-91c; par 279, 94b
unjust
6 Herodotus: History, bk hi, 108b-c 2a. Aristocracy and monarchy
6 Thucydides: Peloponnesiatj War, bk vi, 6 Herodotus: History, bk hi, 107c-108c
520a-c 7 Plato: Republic, bk iv, 355d-356a / States-
7 Plato: Republic, bk v, 368c-369c; bk vi, man, 598b-604b
380b-383a; bk vii, 401c-d; bk ix, 426d-427b 9 Aristotle: Politics, bk ch 7 476c-477a;
hi,
9 Aristotle: Politics, bk hi, ch 10-13 478d- ch ch 15 [1286*23-^8]
13 [1284*3-35] 482a-c;
483a; bk iv, ch 8 [i293''2i-28] 493c 484c-d esp [1286^4-8] 484d; ch 16 [1287^8-35]
15 Tacitus: Histories, bk i, 193c-194a 486a-c; ch 17 [1288*5-25] 486c-487a; ch 18
23 HoBBEs: Leviathan, part ii, 105a; part iv, 487a,c; bk iv, ch 2 [1289*26-35] 488b; bk v,
273a-b CH 10 [i3io*39-*'i4] 512d-513a; [i3io*'3i-
35 Locke: Civil Government, ch xi, sect 138 1311*8] 513b / Rhetoric, bk i, ch 8 608a-c
57b-c 15 Tacitus: Annals, bk vi, 97b
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk ii, 7c 18 Augustine: City of God, bk v, ch 12, 218d-
38 Rousseau: Social Contract, bk hi, 411 d 219b
42 Kan't: Science of Right, 442c-d; 445a-c 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 95,
43 Mill: Representative Government, 366a-367b A 4, ANS 229b- 230c; q 105, a i, ans and rep
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 297 1-2 307d-309d
99b / Philosophy of History, part iv, 356c- 23 Machiavelli: Prince, ch iv 7a-8a; ch ix
357a; 365a 14c-16a passim; ch xix, 27a-b
50 Marx-Engels: Communist Manifesto, 420c 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part ii, 104d-109a pas-
sim; part hi, 201a
2. The relation of aristocracy to other forms of 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk ii, 6b-8c;
government bk hi, lOc-lld; bk v, 23a-25d; 32b-c; bk viii,
6 Herodotus: History, bk hi, 107c-108c 53d-54a; bk xi, 75b-d; 77b-c; bk xii, 90c;
6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, bk viii, bk xx, 147a-d
579c-590c passim 38 Rousseau: Social Contract, bk hi, 418c
7 Plato: Republic, bk i, 301c-d; bk viii-ix, 39 S:vhth: Wealth of Nations, bk v, 308b-c
401d-421a esp bk viii, 401d-402d / Statesman, 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 81c-d
598b-604b / Laws, bk hi, 669d-672a 43 Federalist: number 17, 70a-d
9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk v, ch 3 [1131^24-29] 43 Mill: Representative Government, 351d-352b;
378d; bk viii, ch io-ii 412c-413d / Politics^ 366a-c
bk hi, ch 5 [1278^15-34] 475b-c; ch 7 476c- 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 273,
477a; ch 13 [1284*3-^34] 482a-483a; ch 15 90c-91d; par 279, 94b / Philosophy of History
[1286^8-22] 484d-485a; ch 17 [i287^37]-ch 18 part iv, 356d-357a
[1288*37] 486c-487a,c; bk iv, ch 2 [1289*26-^4] 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk vi, 241c-242b;
488b-c; ch 3 [1290*13-29] 489b; ch 14 [1298* bk IX, 384c-388a,c; epilogue i, 668a-669c
34-^10] 498d-499a; ch 15 [1299^20-1300*8]
500b-d; ch 16 [1301*10-16] 502c/ Rhetoric, bk 2b, Aristocracy and constitutional government:
I, CH 8 608a-c
the polity or mixed constitution
14 Plutarch: Lycurgus, 34d-35d 6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, bk viii,
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, Q95, 579d'580d; 581b-c; 582a; 587a-b; 588a-589a;
A 4, ANS 229b-230c; q 105, a i, ans 307d- 590a-b
309d 9 Aristotle: Politics, bk hi, ch 7 476c-477a;
23Hobbes: Leviathan, part i, 73b; part ii, BK IV, CH 8 493c-494a; ch ii [1295*31-34]
104d-108b passim; 154b-c 495b-c; ch 14 [1298^5-10] 499a; bk v, ch 7
33 Pascal: Pensees, 304 227b-228a [1307*5-27] 509a-b / Rhetoric, bk i, ch 8
35 Locke: Civil Government, ch x, sect 132 [1365^22-1366*2] 608a-b
55a-b; ch xi, sect 138 57b-c 14 Plutarch Lycurgus, 34d / Dion, 800c
:
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, hell, xvi [64-78] 94b'c; PART II, 112d; 154a; 158c-d; 164a,c
23a-b; paradise, xv-xvi 128b-132a 24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, bk i,
23 Machiavelli: Prince, ch iv 7a-8a; en ix 18b-19d; 24a-30c; bk ii, 75a-77a; 78b-33b
14c-16a 25 Montaigne: Essays, 60a-62a; 63d-64a; 71d-
36 Swift: Gulliver, part iv, 158a-b 72b
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk ii, 6c-7b; 26 Shakespeare: Taming of the Shrew, act i,
BK III, BK V, 23a'25a; bk vii, 45b;
lOc-lla; sc I [1-45] 202c-203a / Ist Henry IV, act i, sc
viii, 52c-53a; bk x, 64a-d; bk xii, 91c-
BK II [218-240] 437c-d / Henry V, act i, sc i [22-
92b; bk xiii, 96d-97a; bk xx, 151c-152a 66] 533b-c / As You Like It, act i, sc i [1-28]
38 Rousseau: Social Contract, bk hi, 411c-d; 597a-b
418c-419b 29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, part ii, 332c-
39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, bk v, 420b-c 336a; 362a-c
42 Kant: Science of Right, 451a 36 Swift: Gulliver, part i, 29b-31a; part iv,
43 Federalist: number 17, 70a-d 158a-b; 166b-167a
43 Mill: Representative Government, 366a-367b 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk v, 18d
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 273, 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, bk v, 347c-d
91c / Philosophy of History, part iv, 355d- 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 86c
357a esp 356c-357a; 364a-b 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 508d-509d
50 Marx-Engels: Communist Manifesto, 423d- 43 Mill: Liberty, 298b-299a / Representative
424b; 429c-430b Government, 384a-387d; 415a-417c
51 Tolstoy: War ajid Peace, epilogue i, 666c- 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, additions, 169
669d 145d / Philosophy of History, part hi, 310a-c;
part IV, 368a-b
4. Aristocracy and the issue of rule by men as 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk vi, 244d-245c
opposed to rule by law
7 Plato: Republic, bk vi, 380b-c / Statesman, 6. The selection of the best men for public
598b-604b / Seventh Letter, 806d-807b office:the aristocratic theory of repre-
9 Aristotle :Po//V/W, bk hi, ch 10 [1281*29-38] sentation in modern constitutional gov-
479a; ch 13 [1284*3-18] 482a-b;cH 15 [1286*7- ernment
^8] 484b-d; ch 17 486c-487a esp [1288*5-14] Old Testament: Genesis, 41:33-40 / Exodus,
486c-d 18:13-26 / Deuteronomy, 1:9-18 / Judges esp
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part iv, 273a-c 9:8-15 / / Samuel, 1:1-25:1 —
(D) / Kings,
35 Locke: Civil Government, ch xviii, sect 199- 1:1-25:1 / / Kings, 3:5-15— (D) /// Kings,
202 71a-72a 3:5-15 / II Chronicles, 1:7-12— (D) // Para-
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk ii, 4a; bk lipomenon, 1:7-12 / Proverbs, 29:2 / Daniel,
viii, 52c; bk xi, 69a-c 6:1-4
42 Kant: Science of Right, 450d-451d Apocrypha: Wisdom of Solomon, 6; 9— (D) OT,
Boo\of Wisdom, 6; 9 / Ecclesiasticus, 10:1-3 —
5. The training of those fitted for rule: aristo- (D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 10:1-3
cratic theories of education 5 Euripides: Electra [367-400] 330c-d
Old Testament: Exodus, 18:13-26 / Deuteron- 6 Herodotus: History, bk hi, 93c; 107d-108a
omy, 1:9-17 6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, bk ii, 396c-
Apocrypha: Ecclesiasticus, 38:24-34— (D) OT, d; BK III, 425b-c; bk iv, 478d; bk vi, 520b-c
Ecclesiasticus, 38:25-39 7 Plato: Protagoras, 44d-45b / Republic, bk ii,
7 Plato: Republic, bk ii-iii, 320c-339a; bk vi- 319a-320c; bk hi, 339b-341a; bk v, 369c-
vii, 383b-401d esp bk vii, 389d-401d / 370a; bk vi, 373c-375b; 383b-d; bk vii.
62 THE GREAT IDEAS 6/0 7
103a; additions, 169 145d; 182 148c-d /
(6. The selection of the best men for public office:
Philosophy of History, part ii, 277c-d; part
the aristocratic theory of representation in
IV, 368b-d
modem constitutional government^ 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk vi, 241c-242b
390b-391b / Statesman, 598b-604b; 608c-d /
Laws, BK VI, 697a-705c passim; bk xii, 786b- 7. Historic and poetic exemplifications of
787b; 794b-799a,c esp 796d-798b / Sevanh aristocracy
Letter, 807a-b 6 Herodotus: History, bk hi, 107c-108d; bk v,
9 Aristotle: Politics, bk ii, ch 9 [1270^7- 160d-161a
1271^17] 466d-467b; ch ii [1272^33-1273*2] 6 Thucydides Peloponnesian War, bk 1, 355a-
:
469b-c; [1273*22-^7] 469d-470a; bk hi, ch 4 356a; bk ii, 409a; bk hi, 434c-438b passim;
[1277*13-23] 474a'b; ch 5 [1278*40-^5] 475d; bk iv, 458d-459c; 463a-b; 465c; 478d-479b;
CH 7 [1279*24-^4] 476c-d; ch 10-13 478d- bk V, 482d-483a; bk vi, 533a-c; bk viii, 568d-
483a; ch 15 [1286*22-^14] 484c-485a; ch 16 569a;579c-590c
[1287^12-14] 486a; ch 18 487a,c; bk iv, ch 7 9 Aristotle: Politics, bk ii, ch 9 [1270^7-34]
[1293^2-21] 493a-b; ch 8 [1294*9-24] 493d- 466d-467a; bk v, ch 7 [1307*27-^24] 509b-d /
494a; ch 14 [1298^5-10] 499a; ch 15 [1300*9- Athenian Constitution, ch 1-4 i 553a-572a
^4] 500d-501b; bk v, ch 8 [1308^31-1309*10] passim, esp ch 23-26 563c-565a
511a-b; ch 9 [1309*33-^13] 511c-d; bk vi, ch 4 14 Plutarch: Theseus, 9a-d / Romulus, 20c-21a
[1318^21-1319*4] 522b-c; bk vii, ch 9 [1328^ / Lycurgus 32a-48d / Pericles 121a-141a,c esp
33-1329*17] 533b-c / Rhetoric, bk i, ch 8 126d-127a / Coriolanus, 174b,d-184a / Aris-
[1365^32-39] 608a-b tides, 263c-266a
14 Plutarch: Lycurgus, 45c-d / Lysander, 365a- 15 Tacitus: Annals, bk i, lb-2a; 3a-b; bk ii,
366a / Lysandcr-Sulla, 387d-388a 32b-d; 34a-c; bk iv, 65a-c; 72a-b; bk vi, 97b;
15 Tacitus: Annals, bk xi, 105d-107b BK XI, 105d-107b / Histories, bk i, 193c-194a;
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 92, 212a-b
A I, rep 3 213c-214c; q 105, a i, ans and rep 18 Augustine: City of God, bk v, ch 12, 218d-
1-2 307d-309d 219b
23 HoBBEs: Leviathan, part ii, 136b 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, purgatory, viii
25 Montaigne: Essays, 364b-365a; 411a-d; [i 12-139] 65c-d
46b; CH viii, sect 105-112 48c-51b passim sc III [33-54] 108c / AWs
Well That Ends Well,
36 Swift: Gulliver, part i, 28b-29a; part ii, ACT II, SC III [i 15-15 1 152c-153a / Coriolanus
]
BK in, lOc-lla; bk v, 21d-22c; bk xi, 71a-72b 36 Swift: Gulliver, part ii, 73a-76b; part iv,
38 Rousseau: Social Contract, bk hi, 412b-c; 157a-158b
BK IV, 427a-d 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk ii, 6b-7c;
39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, bk iv, 269d-271d; bk V, 23a-25a; bk vii, 45b-c; bk xi, 76c-84c
BK V, 309c-311c 38 Rousseau: Political Economy, 369c-d / Social
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 61d-62a Contract, bk hi, 418c-d [fn 2]
43 Constitution of the U.S. article i, sect 2
: 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, bk hi, 165b-181a,c
[11-16] lib; sect 3 [67-72] 12a; article ii, passim
sect I 14b-15a; sect 2 [424-439] 15b; 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 61d-62a
amendments, XII 18a-c 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 71d-73c passim;
43 Federalist: number 33d-34a; number
3, 217d-219a; 387d-390b passim; 427d-428a;
10, 51d-53a; number 28, 98a; number 35, 452d-456a,c esp 452d-453a,c, 453a-b; 570d;
113a-114b; number 52-63 165a-195b passim, 574b-582c; 588a-589a
esp number 57, 176d-177a; number 68 205b- 43 Federalist: number 17, 70a-d
207a; number 76-77, 225a-229b 43 Mill: Representative Government, 363d-364d
43 Mill: Liberty, 290d-291a; 320c-322a / Repre- 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, part ii, 277c-d;
sentative Government, 336b-337a; 338a-b; PART III, 285b-d; 310a-c; part iv, 368b-d
341d-424c passim, esp 363b-366a, 384a-387d; 50 Marx: Capital, 355d-364a esp 356a-357a,
439d-442a 359a-c
44 B0SWEI.1.: Johnson, 125c-d; 141a; 178b-c; 191c 50 Makk-^.nge'ls: Communist Manifesto,^\9h,6.;
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 279, 420b-c; 423d-424b; 429c-430b
94b-c; par 291-295 97d-99a; par 308 102c- 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk ix, 384c-388a,c
Chapter 3: ARISTOCRACY 63
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: The general theory of the forms of government, see Government 2-2e.
Other chapters on particular forms of government, i^^ Constitution; Democracy; Mon-
archy; Oligarchy; Tyranny; and for the conception of the ideal state, see State 6-6b.
The comparison of aristocratic with democratic theories of education, see Education 8d.
Discussions of the role of virtue in political theory, in relation to citizenship and public
office, see Citizen 5; Virtue and Vice y-yd.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Boo^s of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
INTRODUCTION
THE word
which may
"art" has a range of meanings
be obscured by the current
The ancient and traditional meanings are
present in our daily vocabulary. In our thought
all
disposition to use the word in an extremely the first connotation of "art" is fine art; in the
restricted sense. Incontemporary thought, art thought of all previous eras the useful arts
is most readily associated with beauty; yet its came first. As late as the end of the i8th cen-
historic connections with utility and knowledge tury, Adam Smith follows the traditional usage
are probably more intimate and pervasive. which begins with Plato when, in referring to
The prevalent popular association reflects a the production of a woolen coat, he says: "The
tendency in the 19th century to annex the shepherd, the sorter of the wool, the wool-
theory' of art to aesthetics. This naturally led comber or carder, the dyer, the scribbler, the
to the identification of art with one kind of art spinner, the weaver, the fuller, the dresser,
—the so-called "fine arts," "beaux arts" or with many others, must all join their different
"Schone Klinste" (arts of the beautiful). The arts in order to complete even this hom.ely
contraction of meaning has gone so far that the production."
word "art" sometimes signifies one group of In the first great conversation on art— that
—
the fine arts painting and sculpture as in — presented in the Platonic dialogues — we find
the common phrase "literature, music, and useful techniques and everyday skills typify-
the fine arts." This restricted usage has be- ing art, by reference to which all other skills
come customary that we ordinarily refer to
so are analyzed. Even when Socrates analyzes the
a museum of art or to an art exhibit in a art of the rhetorician, as in the Gorgias, he con-
manner which seems to assume that the word stantly turns to the productions of the cobbler
"art" is exclusively the name for something and the weaver and to the procedures of the
which can be hung on a wall or placed on a husbandman and the physician. If the liberal
pedestal. arts are praised as highest, because the logician
A moment's thought will, of course, correct or rhetorician works in the medium of the soul
the assumption. We are not unfamiliar with the rather than in matter, they are called arts "only
conception of medicine and teaching as arts. in a manner of speaking" and by comparison
We are acquainted with such phrases as "the with the fundamental arts which handle phys-
industrial arts" and "arts and crafts" in which ical material.
the reference is to the production of useful The Promethean gift of fire to men, which
things. Our discussions of liberal education raisedthem from a brutish existence, carried
should require us to consider the liberal arts with it various techniques for mastering matter
which, however defined or enumerated, are — the basic useful arts. Lucretius, writing in
supposed to constitute skills of mind. We rec- a line that goes from Homer through Thucy-
ognize that "art" is the root of "artisan" as dides and Plato to Bacon, Adam Smith, and
well as "artist." We thus discern the presence Rousseau, attributes the progress of civilization
of skill in even the lowest forms of productive and the difference between civilized and primi-
labor. Seeing it also as the root of "artifice" tive society to the development of the arts and
and "artificial," we realize that art is dis- sciences. "Ships and tillage, walls, laws, arms,
tinguished from and sometimes even opposed roads, dress, and all such like things, all the
to nature. prizes, all the elegancies too of life without
64
J
Chapter 4: ART ^
exception, poems, pictures, and the chiselling to produce that result. Hence even in the case
of fine-wrought statues, all these things prac- of the shoe or the statue, art seems to be
ticed together with the acquired knowledge of primarily in the mind and work of the cobbler
the untiring mind taught men by slow degrees or sculptor and only derivatively in the objects
as they advanced on the way step by step." produced.
At the beginning of this progress Lucretius Aristotle, in defining art as a "capacity to
places man's discovery of the arts of metal- make, involving a true course of reasoning,"
working, domesticating animals, and cultivat- identifies it with making as distinct from doing
ing the soil. "Metallurgy and agriculture," says and knowing. Though art, like science and
Rousseau, "were the two arts which produced moral action, belongs to the mind and involves
this great revolution" — the advance from prim- experience and learning, imagination and
itive to civilized life. The fine arts and the thought, it is distinct from both in aiming at
speculative sciences come last, not first, in the production, in being knowledge oi how to make
progress of civilization. something or to obtain a desired effect. Science,
The fine arts and the speculative sciences on the other hand, is knowledge that something
complete human life. They are not necessary is the case, or that a thing has a certain nature.
—except perhaps for the good life. They are Knowledge is sometimes identified with science,
the dedication of human leisure and its best to the exclusion of art or skill; but we depart
fruit.The leisure without which they neither from this narrow notion whenever we recognize
could come into being nor prosper is found that skill consists in l^owing how to make some-
for man and fostered by the work of the use- thing.
ful arts. Aristotle tells us that is "why the "Even in speculative matters," writes Aqui-
mathematical arts were founded in Egypt; for nas, "there is something by way of work; e.g.,
there the priestly caste was allowed to be at the making of a syllogism, or a fitting speech,
leisure." or the work of counting or measuring. Hence
whatever habits are ordained to suchlike works
There another ambiguity in the reference
is of the speculative reason, are, by a kind of com-
of the word "art." Sometimes we use it to name parison, called arts indeed, but liberal arts, in
the effects produced by human workmanship. order to distinguish them from those arts which
We elliptically refer to wor\s ofart2iS art. Some- are ordained to works done by the body, which
timeswe use it to signify the cause of the things arts are, in a fashion, servile, inasmuch as the
produced by human work — that skill of mind body is in servile subjection to the soul, and
which directs the hand in its manipulation of man as regards his soul is free. On the other
matter. Art is both in the artist and in the work hand, those sciences which are not ordained to
—
of art in the one as cause, in the other as the any suchlike work, are called sciences simply,
be that of art as cause rather than as effect. and a science. In his treatise on Ancient Medicine^
There are many spheres of art in which no he says, "It appears to me necessary to every
tangible product results, as in navigation or physician to be skilled in nature, and strive to
military strategy. We might, of course, call a know — if he would wish to perform his duties
landfall or a victory a work of art, but we — what man is in relation to the articles of food
tend rather to speak of the art of the navi- and drink, and to his other occupations, and
gator or the general. So, too, in medicine and what are the effects of each of them on every
teaching, we look upon
the health or knowledge one. And it is not enough to know simply that
which from healing or teaching as natural.
results cheese is a bad article of food, as disagreeing
We do not find art in them, but rather in the with whoever eats of it to satiety, but what
skill of the healer or teacher who has helped sort of disturbance it creates, and wherefore,
— .
with which the art deals. This does not mean combining many techniques and using many
that an individual cannot acquire the habit of products of art: the water-clock, the inclined
an art without being taught the relevant scien- plane,and the pendulum of Galileo; the prisms,
tific knowledge. An art can be learned by prac- mirrors, and lenses of Newton.
tice; skill can be formed by repeated acts. But —
The second question whether all sciences
the teacher of an art cannot direct the learning have related arts and through them productive
without setting rules for his pupils to follow; —
power raises one of the great issues about the
and if the truth or intelligibility of the rules nature of scientific knowledge, discussed in the
is questioned, the answers will come from the chapters on Philosophy and Science,
science underlying the art. For Francis Bacon, and to some extent Des-
According to Kant, "every art presupposes cartes, art is the necessary consequence of sci-
rules which are laid down as the foundation ence.At the beginning of the Novum Organum,
which first enables a product if it is to be called Bacon declares that "knowledge and human
one of art, to be represented as possible." In power are synonymous since the ignorance of
the case of "fine art," which he distinguishes the cause frustrates the effect; for nature is only
from other kinds of art as being the product of subdued by submission, and that which in con-
"genius," Kant claims that it arises only from templative philosophy corresponds with the
"a talent for producing that for which no definite cause, in practical sciencebecomes the rule.'*
rule can be given." Yet he maintains that a The Bacon makes here between the
distinction
"rule" is still at its basis and may be "gathered speculative and practical parts of knowledge
from the performance, from the product,
i.e., corresponds to the distinction between science
Chapter 4: ART 67
and art, or as we sometimes say, "pure and directed to the necessities of life, others to
applied science." He opposes their divorce from recreation, the inventors of the latter were nat-
one another. If science is the indispensable foun- urally always regarded as wiser than the in-
dation of art and consists in a knowledge of ventors of the former, because their branches
causes, art in Bacon's view isthe whole fruit did not aim at utility. Hence, when all such in-
of science, for it applies that knowledge to the ventions were already established, the sciences
production of effects. which do not aim at giving pleasure or at the
His theory of science and his new method for necessities of life were discovered, and first in
its development are directed to the establish- the places where men first began to have lei-
ment of man's "empire over creation" which sure. ... So that the man of experience is
"is founded on the arts and sciences alone." thought to be wiser than the possessors of any
Just as the present state of the arts accounts sense-perception whatever, the artist wiser than
for "the immense difference between men's the man of experience, the master-worker than
lives in the most polished countries of Europe, the mechanic, and the theoretical kinds of
and in any wild and barbarous region of the knowledge more of the nature of Wisdom
to be
new Indies," so further advances in science than the productive." That the theoretic sci-
promise the untold power of new inventions ences are useless, in the sense of not providing
and techniques. men with the necessities or pleasures of life, is a
On Bacon's view, not only the value, but mark of their superiority. They give what is
even the vaHdity, of scientific knowledge is to better than such utility— the insight and un-
be measured by its productivity. A useless nat- derstanding which constitute wisdom.
ural science —
a science of nature which cannot The Baconian reply condemns the concep-
be used to control nature — is unthinkable. With tion that there can be knowledge which is
the exception of mathematics, every science merely contemplation of the truth. It an-
has its appropriate magic or special productive nounces the revolution which, for John Dewey,
power. Even metaphysics, in Bacon's concep- ushered in the modern world. The pragmatic
tion of it, has its "true natural magic, which theory of knowledge had its origin in a concep-
is that great liberty and latitude of opera- tion of science at every point fused with art.
tion which dependeth upon the knowledge of
forms." The ancients, trying to understand the nat-
The opposite answer to the question about ural phenomena of change and generation,
science and art is given by Plato, Aristotle, and found that the processes of artistic production
others who distinguish between speculative and provided them with an analytic model. Through
productive sciences. They differ from Bacon on understanding how he himself worked in mak-
the verbal level by using the word "practical" ing things, man might come to know how na-
for those sciences which concern moral and ture worked.
political action rather than the production of When a man makes a house or a statue, he
effects. The sciences Bacon calls "practical" transforms matter. Changes in shape and posi-
they call "productive," but under either name tion occur. The plan or idea in the artist's mind
these are the sciences of making rather than comes, through his manipulation of matter, to
doing — sciences which belong in the sphere of be embodied and realized objectively. To the
art rather than prudence. But the significant ancients a number of different causes or factors
difference lies in the evaluation of the purely seemed to be involved in every artistic produc-
speculative sciences which consist in knowledge tion — material to be worked on; the activity
for its own sake, divorced from and morals,
art of the work; the form in his mind
artist at
or from the utilities of production and the which he sought to impose on the matter, thus
necessities of action. transforming it; and the purpose which moti-
In tracing the history of the sciences, Aris- vated his effort.
totle notes that those men who first found the the medical tradition from Aristotle
In
useful arts were thought wise and superior. through Galen to Harvey, there is constant
'*But as more arts were invented, and some were emphasis upon the artistic activity of nature.
158 THE GREAT IDEAS
Galen continually argues against those who do artist works on is entirely passive with respect
not conceive Nature as an artist. Harvey con- to the change he wishes to produce. The artistic
sciously compares the activity of nature in result is in this sense entirely of his making.
biological generation to that of an artist. "Like The realm of art, or of the artificial, is then
a potter she first divides her material, and then opposed to the natural and differentiated from
indicates the head and trunk and extremities; it. Kant, for whom art is distinguished from
like a painter, she first sketches the parts in nature "as making is from acting or operating
outline, and then fills them in with colours; in general," claims that "by right, it is only
or like the ship-builder, who first lays down his production through freedom, i.e., through an
keel by way of foundation, and upon this raises act of will that places reason at the basis of its
the ribs and roof or deck: even as he builds his action, that should be termed art." Conse-
vessel does nature fashion the trunk of the body quently, art is that which would not have come
and add the extremities." into being without human intervention. The
Of all natural changes, the one most closely man-made produced by man, not in
object is
resembling artistic production appears to be any way, but specifically by his intelligence,
generation, especially the production of living by the reason which makes him free.
things by living things. In both cases, a new Animals other than man are apparently pro-
individual seems to come into being. But upon ductive, but the question is whether they can
further examination, artistic production and be called "artists." "A spider conducts opera-
natural generation reveal significant differences tions that resemble those of a weaver, and a
— differences which divide nature from art. bee puts to shame many an architect in the
Aquinas considers both and distinguishes construction of her cells. But," according to
them in his analysis of divine causation. In Marx, "what distinguishes the worst architect
things not generated by chance, he points out from the best of bees is this, that the architect
that there are two different ways in which the raises his structure in imagination before he
form that is in the agent is passed on to another erects it in reality. At the end of every labour-
being. "In some agents the form of the thing to process, we get a result that already existed
be made pre-exists according to its natural in the imagination of the labourer at its
com-
being, as in those that act by their nature; as mencement. He not only effects a change of
a man generates a man, or fire generates fire. form in the material on which he works, but
Whereas in other agents the form of the thing he also realizes a purpose of his own that gives
to be made pre-exists according to intelligible the law to his modus operandi, and to which he
being, as in those that act by the intellect; must subordinate his will."
and thus the likeness of a house pre-exists in As indicated in the chapter on Animal, some
the mind of the builder. And this may be called writers, like Montaigne, attribute the produc-
the idea of the house, since the builder intends tivity of animals to reason rather than to
to build his house like to the form conceived instinct. Art then ceases to be one of man's dis-
changes into, as for example the acorn naturally This in turn leads to the question whether
tends to become an oak, whereas the oaken nature itself is a work of art. "Let me suppose,"
wood does not have in itself any tendency to the Eleatic Stranger says in the Sophist, "that
become a chair or a bed. The material the things which are said to be made by nature
Chapter 4: ART 69
are the work of divine art, and that things vine workmanship, the Hne we draw
arc able to
which arc made by man out of these are the between the realms of art and nature becomes
work ol human art. And so there are two kinds shadowy or sharp.
of making and production, the one human and
the other divine." Thf. discussions of art in the great books af-
Ifwe suppose that the things of nature are ford materials from which a systematic classi-
originally made by a divine mind, how does fication of the arts might be constructed, but
their production differ from the work of hu- only fragments of such a classification are ever
man artists, or from biological generation? explicitly presented.
One answer, given in Plato's Timaeus, con- For example, the seven liberal arts are enu-
ceives the original production of things as a merated by various authors, but their distinc-
fashioning of primordial matter in the patterns tion from other arts, and their ordered relation
set by the eternal archetypes or ideas. In conse- to one another, do not receive full explication.
y quence, the divine work would be more like There is no treatment of grammar, rhetoric,
;
human artistry than either would be like nat- and logic (or dialectic) to parallel Plato's con-
ural reproduction. The emanation of the world sideration of arithmetic, geometry, music, and
i
from the One, according to Plotinus, and the astronomy in the Republic, nor is there any
production of things out of the substance of analysis of the relation of the first three arts
God in Spinoza's theory, appear, on the other to the other four — traditionally organized as
, hand, to be more closely analogous to natural the trivium and the quadrivium.
generation than to art. However, in Augustine's work On Christian
Both analogies — of creation with art and Doctrine we have a discussion of these arts as
with generation — are as false by
dismissed they are ordered to the study of theology.
Christian theologians. God's making is abso- That orientation of the liberal arts is also the
lutely creative. It presupposes no matter to theme of Bonaventura's Reduction of the Arts
be formed; nor do things issue forth from to Theology. Quite apart from the problem of
God's own substance, but out of nothing. hov>- they are ordered to one another, particular
Thus Augustine asks: "How didst Thou liberal arts receive so rich and varied a dis-
mal^ the heaven and the earth V And he answers: cussion in the tradition of the great books that
**It was not as a human artificer, forming one the consideration of them must be distributed
body from another, according to the discretion among number of chapters, such as Logic,
a
of his mind, which can in some way invest with Rhetoric, Language (for the discussion of
such a form, as it seeth in itself b)' its inward grammar), and Mathematics.
eye . . . Verily, neither in the heaven, nor in The principles of classification of the fine
the earth, didst Thou ma^e heaven and earth\ arts are laid down by Kant from "the analogy
! nor in the air, or waters, seeing these also be- which art bears to the mode of expression of
'
long to the heaven and the earth; nor in the which men avail themselves in speech, with a
whole world didst Thou make the whole world; view to communicating themselves to one
because there was no place where to make it, another as completely as possible." Since such
before it was made, that For
it might be . , . expression "consists in word, gesture, and
what is, but because Thou art } Therefore Thou tone," he finds three corresponding fine arts:
spa\esty and they were made, and in Thy Word "the art of speech, formative art, and the art
,
Thou madest them.'" According to this view, of the play of sensations." In these terms he
I human art cannot be called creative, and God analyzes rhetoric and poetry, sculpture, archi-
cannot be called an artist, except metaphor- tecture, painting and landscape gardening, and
ically. music.
The issue concerning various theories of cre- A different principle of division is indicated
ation, or of the origin of the universe, is dis- in the opening chapters of Aristotle's Poetics.
cussed in the chapter onWorld. But here we The principle that all art imitates nature sug-
must observe that, according to the view we gests the possibility of distinguishing and re-
take of the simihtude between human and di- lating the various arts according to their char-
—
or enjoyed. To describe them in terms of imi- they worked productively in symbolic medi-
tation, the products of the useful arts must be ums. But by other principles of classification,
said to imitate a natural function (the shoe, for poetry and sculpture are separated from logic
example, the protective function of calloused and carpentry, as fine from useful art. Logic,
skin). The imitation merely indicates the use, along with grammar, rhetoric, and the mathe-
and it is the use which counts. But in the pro- matical arts, is separated from poetry and
ducts of the fine arts, the imitation of the form, sculpture, as liberal from fine art. When the
quality, or other aspect of a natural object is word "Hberal" is used to state this last distinc-
considered to be the source of pleasure. tion, its meaning narrows. It signifies only the
The least familiar distinction among the arts speculative arts, or arts concerned with pro-
is implied in any thorough discussion, yet its cesses of thinking and knowing.
divisions are seldom, if ever, named. Within The adequacy of any classification, and the
the sphere of useful art, some arts work toward intelligibility of its principles, must stand the
a result which can hardly be regarded as an test of questions about particular arts. The
Chapter 4: ART 71
great books frequently discuss the arts of ani- The other major controversy concerns the
mal husbandry and navigation, the arts of regulation of the arts by the state for human
cooking and hunting, the arts of war and gov- welfare and the public good.
ernment. Each raises a question about the na- Here, as before, the fine arts (chiefly poetry
ture of art in general, and challenges any anal- and music) have been the focus of the debate.
ysis of the arts to classify them and explain It is worth noting, however, that a parallel
There are two other major issues which have of state control over the production and dis-
been debated mainly with respect to the fine tribution of wealth, Smith and Marx represent
arts. extreme opposites, as Milton and Plato are poles
One, already mentioned, concerns the imi- apart on the question of the state's right to
tative character of art. The opponents of imi- censor the artist's work. In this debate, Aris-
tation do not deny that there may be some totle stands on Plato's side in many particulars,
perceptible resemblance between a work of art and Mill with Milton.
and a natural object. A drama may remind us of The problem of censorship or political regu-
human actions we have experienced; music may lation of the fine arts presupposes some prior
simulate the tonal qualities and rhythms of the questions. Plato argues in the Republic that all
human voice registering the course of the emo- poetry but "hymns to the gods and praises of
tions. Nevertheless, the motivation of artistic famous men" must be banned from the State;
creation lies deeper, it is said, than a desire to "for if you go beyond this and allow the
imitate nature, or to find some pleasure in such honeyed muse to enter, either in epic or lyric
resemblances. verse, not law and the reason of mankind,
According to Tolstoy, the arts serve pri- which by common consent have ever been
marily as a medium of spiritual communica- deemed the best, but pleasure and pain will be
tion, helping to create the ties of human the rulers in our State." Such a view pre-
brotherhood. According to Freud, it is emotion supposes a certain theory of the fine arts and
or subconscious expression, rather than imita- of their influence on the citizens and the whole
tion or communication, which is the deepest character of the community. Yet because both
spring of art; the poet or artist "forces us to Plato and Aristotle judge that influence to be
become aware of our inner selves in which the far from negligible, they do not see any reason
same impulses are still extant even though they in individual liberty for the state to refrain
are suppressed." Freud's theory of sublimation from interfering with the rights of the artist
of emotion or desire through art seems to con- for the greater good of the community.
nect with Aristotle's theory of emotional ca- To Milton and Mill, the measure of the
tharsis or purgation. But Freud is attempting artist's influence does not affect the question
to account for the origin of art, and Aristotle of the freedom of the arts from political or ec-
is trying to describe an effect proper to its en- clesiastical interference. While admitting the
joyment. need for protecting the interests of peace and
The theories of communication, expression, public safety, Milton demands: "Give me the
or imitation, attempt to explain art, or at least liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely
its motivation. But there is also a conception according to conscience, above all liberties."
of art which, foregoing explanation, leaves it a The issue for them is entirely one of liberty.
mystery — the spontaneous product of inspi- They espouse the cause of freedom — for the
; ration, of a divine madness, the work of un- artist to express or communicate his work and
fathomable genius. We encounter this notion for the community to receive from him what-
first, but not last, in Plato's Ion. ever he has to offer.
72 THE GREAT IDEAS
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. The generic notion of art: skill of mind in making
y^
2a. Causation in art and nature : artistic production compared with natural generation
2b. The role of matter and form in artistic and natural production 74
2c. The natural and the artificial as respectively the work of God and man
3. Art as imitation yc
4. Diverse classifications of the arts: useful and fine, liberal and servile
6b. The liberal arts as productive of science: means and methods of achieving knowl-
edge 77
6c. Art as the application of science: the productive powers of knowledge
lob. The political regulation of the arts for the common good: the problem of censor-
ship
12. The history of the arts: progress in art as measuring stages of civilization
Chapter 4: ART 73
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the vohimc and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Homkr: Iliad, bk ii [265 283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 James Psychology, 1 16a- 1 19b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page ri6 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand sideof the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 Plato: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164
Author's Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as part, bk, ch,
sect) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d.
Bible References: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., Old Testa-
ment: Nchemiah, 7:45 — (D) // Esdras, 7:46.
Symbols: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference St vie: for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
244a; q 104, a i, ans 534c-536c; q 105, a 5, 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 17b-d; 43c-
ans 542a-543b; q 117, a i, ans and rep 1-2 45a
595d-597c 32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk v [468-505]
20 Aquinas Summa Theologica, part hi suppl,
: 185b-186a
Q 80, AA 1-2 956c-958b 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part i, par 56-57
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, hell, xi [91-111] 26b-27a; additions, 32 121d-122a / Philos-
16a-b; paradise, i [94-142] 107b-d; 11 [112- ophy of History, intro, 165a- 166b; 185c- d;
138] 109a; vni [91-111] 117d-118a; xiii [52- PART II, 266a-267b
84] 126a-b 50 Marx: Capital, 17a; 85b-c; 86d-87c
22 Chaucer: Physician's Tale [11,941-972] 366b-
367a 2c. The natural and the artificial as respeaively
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, intro, 47a-b the work of God and man
25 Montaigne: Essays, 93b-d Old Testament: Genesis, 1-2 / Leviticus, 2.6:1 /
28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 385a-c;400d- Numbers, 33:52 / Deuteronomy, 5:7-10; 16:21-
401a;407c;412b-415b;427d-428c;442d-443b; 22 / Job, 37:1-40:5— (D) Job, 37-39 / Isaiah,
443d-444c; 447d-448a; 450c; 492a-b 40:18-26— (D) Isaias, 40:18-26
29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, part ii, 251d-252a 7 Plato: Republic, bk x, 427c-428d / Timaeus,
30 Bacon: Novum Organum, bk i, aph 4 107b 447a-449c / Sophist, 577d-578d / Laws, bk x,
33 Pascal: Geometrical Demonstration, 437a 760a-761d
35 Lockb: Human Understanding, bk ii, ch xxvi, 12 Aurelius: Meditations, bk vi, sect 40 277d
sect 2 217b-d 16 Kepler: Harmonies of the World, 1048a
3/0 4 Chapter 4: ART 75
17 Plotinus: Fourth Ennead, tr iv, ch ^i, 174d- 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q i, a 9,
175a / Fifth Ennead, tr 242a
viii, cii 5, rep i 8d-9c; q 93, a 2, rep 4 493a-d; g 117,
18 Augustine: Confessions, bk xi, par 7 90d-91a A I, ANS 595d-597c
/ City of God, bk xxii, ch 24, 610a-d / Chris- 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, hell, xi [91 in]
tian Doctrine, bk ii, ch 30 651c-d 16a-b; purgatory, x [22-99] 67c-68b; xii
19 Aquinas: Sumtna Theologica, part i, q 2, a 3, [10-72] 70b-71a
ANS and rep 2 12c-14a; q 14, a 8 82c-83b; a 22 Chaucer: Trotlus and Cressida, bk ii, stanza
II, ANS 84c-85c; q 15 91b-94a; q 16, a i 149 41a / Physician's Tale [11,941-972] 366b-
94b-95c; q 17, a i lOOd-lOld; q 22, a 2, ans 367a
and REP 3 128d-130d; q 41, a 3, ans 219d- 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, intro, 47a-b; part iv,
221c; QQ 44-46 238a-255d passim; qq 65-66 262c
339a-349d passim; q 74, a 3, rep i 375a- 27 Shakespeare: Hamlet, act ii, sc ii [576-592]
377a,c; q 91, a 3, ans 486b-487d; q 93, a 2, 46b; ACT III, sc 11 [1-39] 49a-b / Timon of
rep 4 493a-d; q 103, a i, rep 1,3 528b-529a; Athens, act i, sc i [28-38] 393d-394a; [156-
Q 104, a i 534c-536c; part i-ii, q i, a 2 160] 395b-c / Winter's Tale, act iv, sc iv
610b-611b; q 13, a 2, rep 3 673c-674c [77-108] 508c-509a / Sonnets, lxvii-lxviii
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part hi, q 3, 596c-d
A 8, ans 729b-730b; part hi suppl, q 75, 28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 332c-333c;
a 3, REP 4 938a-939d 438c; 444b-c; 492b
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, hell, xi [91-111] 29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, part i, 82c-d;
16a-b; paradise, viii [91-111] 117d-118a; ix 184a-185b; part ii, 237b-c; 251d-252a
[103-108] 119d; X [7-21] 120b-c; xiii [52-84] 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 33c-d /
126a-b; xviii [70-117] 134b-d esp [109-111] Novum Organum, bk ii, aph 29 159b-c
134d 31 Descartes: Meditations, i, 76a-b
22 Chaucer: Physician's Tale [11,941-972] 366b- 32 Milton: Samson Agonistes, 337a-338a
367a 33 Pascal: Pensees, 29 176a; 32-33 176a-b; 120
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, intro, 47a-b 195a; 134 196a
28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 427d-428c; 35 Hume: Human Understanding, sect i, div 5,
442d-443b; 492a-b 452d-453a
32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk hi [694-735] 37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 121b,d-123a; 243a-d
150b-151b 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 158d
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 663d-664a 42 Kant: Judgement, 521b-524b; 525a-528c esp
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 188c-189a / Judgement^ 527b-528c; 557a-558b
521b-523d 44 BoswEi.!.: Johnson, 196d-197a
t
49 Darwin: Origin of Species, 87a-b 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part i, par 68
29d-30a / Philosophy of History, part i, 219b-c
5. Art as imitation 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karatnazov, bk x,
4 Homer: Iliad, bk xviii [478-608] 135a-136c 284b-d
7 Plato: Cratylus,104c-106c; 108c-110d / 53 James: Psychology, 186b; 686b-688a
Republic, bk 320c-334b; bk vi, 382a-c;
ii-ih, 54 Freud: Interpretation of Dreams, 265c / Civil-
bk X, 427c-434c / Timaeus, 443b-d; 455b-c / ization and Its Discontents, 779c-d
j
Critias, 478c-d / Sophist, 552c-d; 560b-561d;
577c-579d / Statesman, 596c-d / Lati's, bk ii, 4. Diverse classifications of the arts: useful and
I
I
12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk v [1379- 8 Aristotle: Physics, bk ii, ch 2 [194*33-^9]
1383] 79a 270d-271a / Metaphysics, bk i, ch i [981^13-
12 AuRELius: Meditations, bk hi, sect 2 259d- 24] 500a
260a; bk xi, sect 10 303b-c 9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk i, ch i 339a-b; ch 7
16 Kepler: Harmonies of the World, 1048a [1097^15-23] 342c / Politics, bk i, ch ii
17 Plotinus First Ennead, tr vi, ch 2-3 21d-23a
: [1258^9-39] 452d-453b; bk viii, ch 2 [1337^3-
/ Fourth Ennead, tr hi, ch 10 147c-148b / 23] 542c-d / Rhetoric, bk i, ch 2 [1355^26-36]
Fifth Ennead, tr viii, ch 1-2 239b-240c; tr 595b / Poetics, ch 1-3 681a-682c
IX, CH 2, 247a; ch ii 250c-251a / Sixth 17 Plotinus: Fourth Ennead, tr iv, ch 31, 175a
Ennead, tr ii, ch ii, 275c / Fifth Ennead, tr ix, ch ii 250c-251a
18 Augustine: Christian Doctrine, bk ii, ch 25 18 Augustine: Christian Doctrine, bk ii, ch 30
649b-d 651c-d
l(i THE GREAT IDEAS 5 to 6a
27 Shakespeare: Sonnets, xxxii 591a-b;
(4. Diverse classifications of the arts: useful and Lxxviii-Lxxxv 598b-599b; c-cvi 601c-602c
and servile?)
fine, liberal 28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 332c-333c
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q i8, 29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, part ii, 251 d-
A ANS 106b-107c; q 103, a 2, rep 2 529a-
3, 252a; 340b
530a; part i-ii, q 8, a 2, rep 3 656a-d; q 9, 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 32d; 38c-
A I, ANS 657d-658d 39b
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 57, 31 Descartes: Discourse, part i, 43b / Medi-
A 3, REP 3 37b-38a tations, I, 76a-b
24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, bk ii, 32 Milton: On Sha\espear. 1630 1^3. / Paradise
82c-d; BK III, 190d-191a Lost, BK I [1-26] 93b-94a; bk in [1-55] 135b-
25 Montaigne: Essays, 69d-70d 136b; bk VII [1-39] 217a-218a; bk ix [1-47]
29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, part ii, 251b-c 247a-248a
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 38c-39d; 36 Swift: Gulliver, part hi, 97a-98a
56a-b / Novum Organum, bk i, aph 85, 121d- 36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 198a-b; 302a-b
122b 37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 152a-155b; 190b-191c;
42 Kant: Judgement, 524a-b; 526a-527b; 532a- 273a-274c; 280a; 296b,d-298a
535d 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 185b; 627b-d
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 528c
5. The sources of art in experience, imagina- 42 Kant: Judgement, 463a-464c; 473a-c; 482b-
tion, and inspiration 483d; 523d-524b; 525c-532a esp 526a-d,
Old Testament: Exodus, 31:1-11; 35:30-36:8 528c-530c; 542b-543c
4 Homer: Iliad, bk i [1-7] 3a; bk ii [484-493] 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, intro, 153a-c;
14d-15a / Odyssey, bk i [i-io] 183a 176a-c; part ii, 263d-268b
7 Plato: Phaedrus, 124a / Ion 142a-148a,c / 47 Goethe: Faust, dedication la-b; part ii
Symposium, 160c-d / Apology, 202b-d / [9945-9960] 242a
Gorgias, 253a; 260a-262a / Sophist, 561b-d; 49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 288d-289a; 292a-b
577d-579d / Laws, bk iv, 684b-c 50 Marx Capital, 85b-c
:
8 Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, bk ii, ch 19 53 James: Psychology, 165b [fn i]; 686b-688a
[100*3-9] 13^^ / Metaphysics, bk i, ch i 54 Freud: Interpretation of Dreams, 181a-b: 239c-
[980^25-982*1] 499b-500b 240a; 246c-248c; 383d / General Introduction,
9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk ii, ch i [1103*26-^13] 483c; 600d-601b / Group Psychology, 670a-b;
348d-349a; bk x, ch 9 [1180^29-1181^23] 692c-693a
435d-436a,c / Rhetoric, bk i, ch i [1354*1-12]
593a; bk hi, ch i [1404*13-19] 654b; ch 2 6. Art and science
[1405*3-9] 655b; ch 10 [1410*^5-8] 662c /
Poetics, CH 17 [1455*22-36] 690c
6a. The comparison and distinction of art and
10 Hippocrates: Ancient Medicine la-9a,c esp
science
par 1-8 la-3b / Articulations, par 10, 94d 7 Plato: Republic, bk vi, 386d-388a; bk vii,
13 Virgil: Eclogues, iv [1-3] 14a; vi [1-12] 19a 391b-398c; bk x, 427c-434c / Laws, bk iv,
/ Aeneid, bk i [i-ii] 103a; bk vii [37-44] 684b-685a
237a 8 Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, bkii, ch 19
982^1] 499b-500b; bk ch 7
[1032*25-
vii, 45 Fourier: Theory of Heat, 170a; 184a; 213a-b
1033*4] 555b-556a; ch 9 [1034*21-32] 557c; 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, part i, 218d-
BK IX, CH 2 571c-572a; ch 5 573a-c; ch 7 219a; 251a-b; part iv, 347b-348a
[1049*5-12] 574c-d; bk xi, ch 7 [1064*10-14] 50 Marx: Capital, 170b-c; 177a; 183b-189a;
592b-c 239c-241a; 299b-d
9 Aristotle: 'Ethics^ bk i, ch i 339a-b; ch 7 54 Freud: Psycho- Analytic Therapy, 123a-125a /
[1098*28-32] 343d; BK II, CH 4 [1105*17-^4] General Introduction, 484a / Civilization and
350d-351a; bk vi, ch 4 388d-389a Its Discontents, 777a-c; 778b-779a esp 778d
10 Hippocrates Ancient Medicine la-9a,c esp
:
par 1-4 la-2c, par 14 5a-c, par 20-22 7b-8d / 7. The enjoyment of the fine arts
Epidemics, bk hi, sect hi, par 16 59b-c /
Surgery, par i 70b / Articulations, par 58, la. Art as a source of pleasure or delight
112d / The Law 144a-d 7 Plato: Gorgias, 260a-262a / Republic, bk x,
10 Galen Natural Faculties, bk ii, ch 9, 195c-
: 433a-434c / Timaeus, 455b-c / Statesman,
197b 596c-d / Philebus, 628d-630c / Laws, bk ii,
11 Nicomachus: Arithmetic, bk i, 812d-813a 654b-d; 658d-660d
12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk ii, ch 17, 158d- 8 Aristotle: Metaphysics^ bk i, ch i [981^13-
159b 19] 500a
13 Virgil: Gd'org'/Vj' 37a-99a passim, esp 11 [475- 9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk vii, ch it [1152^18-19]
5i5]65a-66a 403d; CH 12 [1153*24-27] 404c; bk ix, ch 7
14 Plutarch: Marcellus, 252a-255a [1167^34-1168*18] 421b-c / Politics, bk vni,
16 Copernicus: Revolutions of the Heavenly CH 3 [1337^27-1338*29] 543a-c; ch 5 544c-
bk i, 510b
Spheres, 546a / Rhetoric, bk i, ch ii [1371^4-11] 615a;
186a 238b
47 Goethe: Faust, prelude 2a-6a esp [89-132] 37 FiELDiNc;: Fom Jones, la-2a; 19a-20a; 35a-d;
3a-4a; part ii [9863-9869] 239b 49b-50c; 73b-d; 121b,d-123a; 152a-155b;
49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 569a-c 189a 191c; 204b,d-205c; 223a-225a; 246a-
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk i, 37a-d; hk ii, 247a; 273a-274c; 296b,d 298a; 357a-d
64d-65d; bk iv, 190d-192b; bk vi, 257c- 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 300a-b; 573a-
259a; 268b; bk vii, 288c-290b; 295c-296a; 574a
BK VIII, 318a-321d; 324b-325a; bk xiv, 601c- 42 Ka\t :Judge?nent, 461a-495a,c esp 492b-493b;
602d 513b-518d; 527b-528c
52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, bk x, 43 Federalist: number 47, 154a
284b-d 43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 446d-447a
53 James: Psychology, 157a; 727b; 755a-758a 44 Boswell: Johnson, 115c; 196d-197a; 202b;
54 Freud: General Introduction, 601a-b / Beyond 284a-b; 373b-c; 546d-547a
the Pleasure Principle, 643c / War and Death, 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, intro, 185c-d;
756b-c / Civilization and Its Discontents, llZd- parti, 219b-c
774c; 775b 47 Goethe: Faust, prelude [95-103] 3b
48 Melville: Moby Dic/{, 277a-b; 335b
lb. The judgment of excellence in art 49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 302a
5 Aristophanes: Clouds [518-562] 494d-495c / 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk i, 37a-d; bk iv,
Peace [732-774] 534c-535a / Frogs [758-1533] 186c-188a; 191d-192a; bk vi, 257c-259a; bk
573a-582a,c VII, 288c-290b; 295c-296a; bk viii, 318a-
7 Plato: Phaedrus, 130c-141a,c / Ion 142a- 321d; 324b-325a; bk x, 444a-445d esp 445a-c
148a,c / Republic, bk 320c-334b / Crit-
ii-iii, 53 James: Psychology, 157a; 288a; 689b-690a;
ias, 478c-d / Theaetetus, 513c-d; 531c-532a / 755a-758a; 886b
Statesman, 594a-595a / Laws, bk ii, 653c-656b
esp 656a-b; 660a-662a; bk hi, 675c-676b 8. Art and emotion: expression, purgation,
9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk i, ch 7 [1097^23- sublimation
1098*18] 343a-c; bk ii, ch 6 [1106*26-^15] Old Testament :/«^^<fi-, 11 :34 / I Samuel, 16:15-
351d-352a; bk vi, ch 5 [1140^20-25] 389c; ch 23 ; 1 :6-7— (D) / Kings, 16:1 5-23 1 8 :6-7
8 ;
/
7 [1141*9-12] 390a; bk x, ch 9 [ii8i*i3-'^i3] // Samuel, 6:14-15— (D) // Kings, 6:14-15 /
436a,c / Politics, bk i, ch 9 [1257^25-1258*18] Psalms, 150:4 / Ecclesiastes, 3:4 / Jeremiah,
451d-452b; bk hi, ch ii [1281^39-1282*23] 31:13— (D) Jeremias, 31:13
479d-480a; ch 12 [1282^32-1283^13] 480d- 4 Homer: Odyssey, bk i [325-359] 186b-c; bk
27 Shakespeare: Hamlet, act ii, sc ii [454-471] [440-493] 115a-116b; bk viii [608-731] 275a-
45a 278b
29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, part i, 184a-187c; 16 Copernicus: Revolutions of the Heavenly
189d-193a; part h, 212a-215b bk i, 510a-b
Spheres,
31 Descartes Discourse, part ii, 44c-d
: 18 Augustine: Confessions, bk i, par 20-22 6a-c;
32 Mii.TO^'. Paradise Lost, bk ix [1-47] 247a-248a par 25-27 7a-d; bk hi, par 2-4 13c-14b; bk x,
/ Samson Agonistes, 337a-338a par 49-50 83c-84b
b d j
157c; 240b-255d passim; 284a-c; 288b-289a; V [41-6^] 350a-b / Merchant of Venice, act v,
338d-344a,c csp 338d-339a, 343a-c; 577a 578c sc i [66-88] 431b-c
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 102c-103a; 176c- 27 Shakespeare: Measure for Measure, act iv,
177c; 504c-505c sc I [1-15] 192c
43 Federalist: number 35, 113b-c; number 37, 29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, part i, la 3b;
119c-120a; number 62, 190b-d 12b-16c; 184a-187c; 189d-193c; part ii, 427c-
43 Mill: Liberty, 322a-b / Representative Govern- 429d
;w^«/, 327b,d-328d;331b-c; 338d-339a; 356b- 30 Bacon: Advancetnent of Learning, 4c-6c; 38c-
362c passim; 411d-412a; 442a-d / Utilitarian- 39a; 78a-d; 79c-80a
ism, 445c-d 31 Descartes: Discourse, part i, 43a-b
46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, part ii, 275d- 32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk ix [1-47] 247a-248a
276a; part iv, 360b-c; 361d-362a / Areopagitica, 385a-386b
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk vi, 238c-243d; 33 Pascal: Pensees, 11 173b- 174a
260a-262a; bk ix, 350d-354a 35 Hume: Human Understanding, sect i, div i
53 James Psychology, 201a
: 451a-b
36 Swift: Gulliver, xviib-xviiia
10. The moral and political significance of the 36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 250b-251a
aFts 37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 253d-254d
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk iv, 17b-
10^. The influence of the arts on character and 18d
citizenship: the role of the arts in the 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 365c-366b
training of youth 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, bk v, 337d-343d;
5 Aristophanes: Acharnians [626-658] 462b-d 347c-d
/ Wasps [1009-1070] 519d-520c / Frogs [1008- 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 3a-b; 79a-b; 94a-b;
1098] 576b-577c; [1482-1533] 581d-582a,c 629a-b
7 Plato: Protagoras, 46b-c / Phaedrus, 140a-d / 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 40d-41a; 225a-226a
Symposium, 156b-c / Gorgias, 280d-282b / esp 225c; 300a-b; 573a-574b
Republic, bk ii-iii, 320c-339a; bk iv, 344b-d; 42 Kant: Judgement, 521b-523c; 586d-587a
BK vii 388a-401d esp 389d-398c; bk x, 427c- 44 BoswEhi.: Johnson, 158a-b; 259b-c; 308b-d
434c / Timaeus, 455a-c / Laws, bk ii 653a- 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, part ii, 259b-c;
663d; bk hi, 675c-676b; bk v, 696b-d; bk 263d-265c; 267b-268b; 276a-d; part iv,
vii, 717b-728b 347b-d
9 Aristotle: Politics, bk vii, ch 17 [1336^30- 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk i, 47b-48d; bk
^24] 541b-d; bk viii 542a-548a,c II, 64d-65d; bk iv, 172d-173d; bk viii, 316b-
76a / Pericles, 121a-122b / Timoleon, 195a-b / common good: the problem of censor-
Demetrius, 726a-d ship
15 Tacitus: Annals, bk xiv, 146b-d 5 Aristophanes: Acharfiians [366-382] 459c-d;
16 Copernicus :Revolutions of the Heavenly [480-508] 460d-461a
bk i, 510a-b
Spheres, 7 Plato: Republic, bk ii-iii, 320c-339a; bk iv,
17 Plotinus: First Ennead, tr hi, ch 1-2 lOa-d 344b-d; bk x, 427c-434c esp 432d-434c /
18 Augustine: Confessions, bk i, par 20-22 6a-c; Statesman, 601c-602c / Laws, bk ii 653a-663d;
par 25-27 7a-d; bk hi, par 2-4 13c-14b; bk x, bk hi, 675c-676b; bk vii, 717b-730c; bk viii,
par 49-53 83c-85a / City of God, bk i, ch 31- 731d-732c; bk xi, 782d-783b
33 147d-149a; bk ii, ch 8-14 153d-157c; bk 9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk i, ch 1-2 339a-d / Poli-
IV, CH 26-27 202a-203c / Christian Doctrine, tics, bk vii, ch 17 [1336^12-23] 541c-d
(10. The moral and political sign^cance of the 12. The history of the arts: progress in art as
arts. 1 Ob. The political regulation of the measuring stages of civilization
arts for the common good: the problem of 4 Homer: bk iv [104-111] 25a; bk ix
Iliad,
censorship.^ [185-189] 59a; bk xi [15-46] 72b-c; bk xviii
29 Cervantes: Don Quixote^ part i, 13b-16c; [368-617] 133d-136d/ Odyssey, bk ix [105-115]
117d-119d; 184a-187c 230b
30 ^\coyi: New Atlantis, 214a-b 6 Herodotus: History, bk i, 5b; 5d-6a; bk ii,
32 Milton: Areopagitica 381a-412b esp 384b- 49d-50a; 75b-76a; bk hi, 102c; bk vii, 220d-
389a, 398a-b 221b
37 Fielding: To?n Jones, 253d-254d 6 Thucydides Peloponnesian War, bk i,350b-d
:
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk iv, 17b- 7 Plato: Critias, 479d / Statesman, 602b-c /
18d; BK XII, 90b-c Laws, bk ii, 654c-655b; bk hi, 675c-676b
39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, bk v, 347c-d 8 Aristotle: Sophistical Refutations, ch 34
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 148a [i83''i6-i84b8] 253a-d / Metaphysics, bk i,
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 220b-221b; 223a-c / ch I [981^13-24] 500a; bk xii, ch 8 [1074^11]
Science of Right, 425c-426a 605a
43 Constitution of the U.S. article i, sect 8
: 9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk i, ch 7 [1098^21-25]
[214-217] 13b; amendments, i 17a 343c-d / Politics, bk ii, ch 8 [1268^23-1269^29]
43 Federalist: number 43, 139d-140a 464d-465b / Rhetoric, bk hi, ch i [1403^15-
43 Mill: Representative Government, 368d-369b 1404^39] 653b,d-654c / Poetics, ch 4-5 682c-
44 Boswell: Johnson, 259b-c; 300c-301a esp 684a
301a-d [fn i] 10 Hippocrates: Ancient Medicine, par 1-4 la-
2c; par 12 4b-c
11. Myths and theories concerning the origin 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk v [324-337]
of the arts 65b-c; [925-1160] 73b-76b; [1241-1457] 77b-
Old Testament: Genesis, 4:20-22; 10:8-9 / 80a,c
/ Chronicles, 4:14 — (D) 1 Paralipomenon, 4:14 13 Virgil: Georgics, i [121-146] 40b-41a
5 Aeschylus: Prometheus Bound 40a-51d 14 Plutarch: 127a-129b / MarcelluSy
Pericles,
esp [109-113] 41b, [248-256] 42d, [459-461] 252a-255a / Aratus, 830b-c
44d 15 Tacitus: Annals, bk xv, 167c-168a
7 Plato: Protagoras, 44a-45a / Phaedrus, 138c- 18 Augustine: City of God, bk xii, c'h 10,
139a / Symposium, 160c-d / Republic, bk ii, 348b-c; bk xviii, ch 13-14 478d-479d; bk
316c-319c / Statesman, 589a-c / Philebus, XXII, CH 24, 610a-c
610d-613a esp 611d-613a / Laws^ bk ii, 653a- 19 Aquinas : Summa Theologica, part i, q 46,
c; 662c-663b A 2, REP 4 253a-255a
9 Aristotle: Politics, bk viii, ch 6 [1341^2-8] 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, purgatory, xi [79-
547a / RJietoric, bk hi, ch i [i403''i5-i404^39] xxiv [49-63] 90a-b
120] 69c-70a;
653b,d-654c / Poetics, ch 3 [i448*25]-ch 5 23HoBBEs: Leviathan, part i, 85c; part iv,
[1449^19] 682b-684a 267c-269b passim
10 Hippocrates: Ancient Medicine, par 3 ld-2b; 24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, bk ii,
par 7 3a; par 12 4b-c; par 14, 5a 81d-82c
12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk v [1028- 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning la-lOld esp
1104] 74c-75c; [1241-1457] 77b-80a,c la-15a, 18b, 20b-25c, 29a-32c, 33d-34a, 35b-
13 Virgil: Georgics, i [121-146] 40b-41a 36c, 38d-39a, 51d-54b / Novum Organum,
24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, bk iv, bk I, aph 85 121d-122d; aph 129 134d-135d
299a-300b 31 Descartes: Discourse, part vi, 61a-c
30 Bacon: Advancemefit of Learning, 38d-39a / 36 Swift: Gulliver, part hi, 103b-115b esp
Novum Organum, bk i, aph 109 128d-129c 106a-107a
38 Rousseau: Inequality, 352a-d 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 338d-340a; 346d-347a;
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 655d-656a 352a-d; 365b-366b
46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, part i, 239a-b; 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, bk i, 6a-d; bk hi,
252a-c; part ii, 261b 173d-175b; bk iv, 191a; bk v, 308c-309a,c;
49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 278a-279c; 298a- 337d-338c
301c; 329c; 348d-349d; 567c-571a esp 569d- 40 Gibbon: Decline a?id Fall, 18b-24a,c; 88d-
570a, 570d 89d; 157d-159a; 171c; 237c-239a; 502d-503a;
52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, bk x, 633b-634a,c; 641b-642b; 655d-658b; 661c-
284b-d 664d
53 James: Psychology, 727b-728a 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 195d-197a; 225a-c;
54 Freud: General Introduction, 512d-513a / 291d-292c; 298a-300b; 327a-328a,c; 355a-d;
Group Psychology, 670a-b; 692a-693a / 451c-452d; 509d-510a,c; 522b-528a,c esp
Civilization and Its Discontents, 778b,d [fn 2] 528a,c; 573a-574a; 590a-598a passim, esp
/ New Introductory Lectures, 862 d 596d-598a
12 Chapter 4: ART 85
42 Ka^-t: Judgement, 586a-587a III, 312c-d PART IV, 323c-d; 335a-d; 346c-
43 Constitution of the U.S. article i, sect 8
: 348a
[214-217] 13b 49 Darwin: Origin of Species, 13c; 19c-d / De-
43 Federalist: number 43, 139d-140a scent of Man, 278a-279a; 320a-321a; 329a-
43 Mill: Representative Government, 367b-c 330a,c; 349b-d; 569d
44 Boswell: Johnson, 70d-71b; 307c-d; 380d- 50 Marx: Capital, 86b-c esp 86d [fn 4]; 181 d
381a; 406c; 408d-409a; 446d [fn 3]
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part i, par 69, 50 Marx-Encels: Communist Manifesto, 420d-
30b; part hi, par 356 113a-b / Philosophy of 421a; 421d
History, intro, 153a-b; 182b-c; 185a-186a; 53 James: Psychology, 727b
PART I, 219b-c; 229b-d; 243d-244c; 247c- 54 Freud: Civilization and Its Discontents, 776c-
248d; 251a-b; 253b-c; part it, 259a-282d esp 780b esp 779a-b / New Introductory lectures,
261b, 267b-268b, 276a-d, 277d-278a; part 882d-883b
CVkOSS-ILEFEKENCES
For: The conception of art as a habit of mind or an intellectual virtue, see Habit 5a, 5cl; Virtue
AND Vice 2a(2).
The applications of science in the useful arts, ^d"^ Knowledge 8a; Physics 5; Science ib(i),
3b; and for the dependence of science on art, see Physics 4a; Science 5b, 6a.
The distinction between art and prudence and the spheres of making and doing, see
Prudence 2b.
Other discussions of art and nature, see Nature 2a; and for the comparison of artistic pro-
duction, natural generation, and divine creation, see Form id(i)-id(2); World 4e(i).
Experience as a source of art, see Experience 3; for the distinction between artist and
empiric, /^d- Experience 3a; and for the opposition between art and chance, Chance 5. .?(?<?
The enjoyment of beauty in nature and in art, see Beauty 2; Pleasure and Pain 40(1) and ;
for discussions of the aesthetic judgment or the judgmicnt of taste, see Beauty 5.
Other considerations of the educational influence of the arts, see Education 4d; Poetry 9a;
Virtue and Vice 4d(4); and for the problem of political regulation or censorship of art,
see Emotion 5e; Poetry 9b.
More extended treatments of the liberal arts, see Language 4-8; Logic; Mathematics;
Rhetoric; and for an analysis of one of the fine arts, see Poetry.
Discussions of the useful and industrial arts, see Education 5a-5b; Labor 2b; Medicine;
Progress 3c, 4a, 6a; State 8d-8d(3); War and Peace lo-iof; Wealth 3c-3d.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Books of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
Hume. Ofthe Rise and Progress ofthe Arts and Sciences Goethe. Poetry and Truth
Rousseau. Discourse on the Arts and Sciences . Travels in Italy
A. Smith. "Of the Affinity Between Music, Danc- .
Conversations with Eckermann
ing and Poetry," in Essays Philosophical and . Maxims and Reflections
Literary J. S. Mill. A System of Logic, bk vi, ch ii
S6 THE GREAT IDEAS
Tolstoy. What Is Art? LoTZE. Microcosmos, bk viii, ch 3
Freud. Leonardo da Vinci Burckhardt. The Civilization of the Renaissance in
The Theme of the Three Cas\ets
. Italy
The Moses of Michelangelo
. RusKiN. Modern Painters
. AChildhood Memory from ''Dichtung und .The Stones of Venice
Wahrheit" .Sesame and Lilies
Taine. The Philosophy of Art
II.
E. Hartman. Philosophy of the Unconscious, (b) v
Epicurus. Letter to Herodotus Arnold. Essays in Criticism
Horace. The Art of Poetry Van Gogh. Letters
ViTRUvius. On Architecture Morris, Hopes and Fears for Art
QuiNTiLiAN. Institutio Orator ia (Institutes ofOratory), Art and Socialis?n
.
INTRODUCTION
ASTRONOMY could take its place in this immense persistence. They calculated and pre-
jlV catalog of ideas on the ground that several dicted. They turned their predictions to use
of the great books are monuments of astronom- through the priestly office of prophecy to fore-
ical science, exemplifying the imaginative and tell eclipses, tides, and
and they em- floods,
analytical powers which have made it one of the ployed their calculations in the mundane arts of
most remarkable triumphs of the human mind. navigation and surveying to guide travel and
Its claim might further be supported by the fixboundaries. But they did not, like the Greeks,
fact that other great books —
of mathematics, develop elaborate theories which sought to or-
physics, theology, and poetry —
have a context ganize all the observed facts systematically.
of astronomical imagery and theory. But the in- With the Greeks, the down-to-earth, every-
clusion of astronomy can be justified by what is day utility of astronomy seems to count for
perhaps an even more significant fact, namely, less than its speculative grandeur. The dignity
that astronomical speculation raises problems which they confer upon astronomy among the
and suggests conclusions which have critical rel- disciplines reflects the scope and majesty of its
evance for the whole range of the great ideas. subject matter. The Greek astronomer, con-
Man has used astronomy to measure, not only cerned as he is with figuring motions that range
the passage of time or the course of a voyage, through the whole of space and are as old as
)
but also his position in the world, his power of time or as interminable, takes for his object the
knowing, God. When man first
his relation to structure of the cosmos.
turns from himself and his immediate earthly Aristotle and Plato pay eloquent tribute to
surroundings to the larger universe of which he the special worth of astronomy. In the opening
is a part, the object which presses on his vision chapters of his Metaphysics, Aristotle associates
is the overhanging firmament with its luminous astronomical inquiry with the birth of philos-
bodies, moving with great basic regularity and, ophy. "Apart from usefulness," he says, "men
upon closer observation, with certain perplex- delight ... in the sense of sight" and, he adds,
ing irregularities. Always abiding and always "it is owing to their wonder that men both now
changing, the firmament, which provides man begin and at first began to philosophise." They
with the visible boundary of his universe, also wondered first about "the obvious difficulties,"
becomes for him a basic, in fact an inescapable, but by little they advanced to "greater
little
Careful and precise astronomical observa- phenomena of the moon and sun and stars, and
tions antedate the birth of astronomy as a about the genesis of the universe." In his own
science. The early interest in the heavenly bod- philosophical thought, Aristotle's treatise On
ies and their motions is often attributed to the the Heavens is not only one of the basic natural
which can be made
usefulness of the predictions sciences, but certain of its principles have gen-
from a knowledge of celestial phenomena. eral significance for all the other parts of his
Whether their motive was entirely utilitar- physical science.
ian, or partly religious and speculative, the A wider view of the importance of astronomy
Egyptians and Babylonians, we learn from is taken by Plato. In the Timaeus, he dwells on
Herodotus, undertook patient study of the "the higher use and purpose for which God has
heavens. They observed and recorded with given eyes to us. . . . Had we never seen the
87
88 THE GREAT IDEAS
stars, and the sun, and the heaven," Timaeus Copernicus, and Kepler, for all their differences
says, "none of the words which we have spoken on points of scientific theory, seem to concur in
about the universe would ever have been ut- reaffirming Plato's conception of the bearing of
tered. . God invented and gave us sight," he
. . their science on religion and morals. Lucretius
continues, "to the end that we might behold and Augustine, on the other hand, while not
the courses of intelligence in the heaven, and agreeing with each other, seem to disagree with
apply them to the courses of our own intelli- Plato. In the tradition of western thought, they
gence which are akin to them, the unperturbed represent different types of opposition to the
to the perturbed; and that we, learning them Platonic view.
and partaking of the natural truth of reason, Where Plato and his followers, including re-
might imitate the absolutely unerring courses ligious Christians like Copernicus and Kep-
of God and regulate our own vagaries." ler, hold that true piety profits from astronom-
For Plato, then, man's intellectual relation to ical study, Lucretius hopes that astronomy may
the heavens does more than initiate philosophy. help to free men from religious superstitions. If
Man's self-rule, his purity and peace of soul, is when they '
'gaze on the heavenly quarters of the
at stake in that relation. That is one reason why, great upper world" and direct their thoughts
in both the Republic and the Laws, Plato makes "to the courses of the sun and moon," they do
astronomy a required part of the curriculum so with "a mind at peace" because they see only
for the education of rulers. "He who has not the workings of natural law and no evidences of
contemplated the mind of nature which is said a controlling power in the will of the gods, then
to exist in the stars and seen the connection
. . . men achieve the natural piety of the scientist
of music with these things, and harmonized — different in the opinion of Lucretius from the
them all with laws and institutions, is not able," false worship which is based on fear.
the Athenian Stranger says in the Laws, "to From his own experiences in dealing with the
give a reason for such things as have a reason." astronomy of the Manichean sect in relation to
Plato considers the opposition to astronomy their religious doctrine, Augustine insists that
on religious grounds by those who think that the teachings of religion in no way depend upon
men who approach celestial phenomena by the astronomy. He denies that such knowledge is in
methods of astronomy "may become godless any way essential to true piety. Though a man
because they see .things happening by ne-
. . does not know "even the circles of the Great
cessity, and not by an intelligent will accom- Bear, yet is it folly to doubt," he writes, "that
plishing good." His answer points out that one he is in a better state than one who can measure
of the "two things which lead men to believe in the heavens and number the stars, and poise the
the gods ... is the argument from the order of elements, yet neglecteth Thee 'Who hast made
"
the motion of the stars and of all things under all things in number, weight, and measure.'
the dominion of the mind which ordered the When Faustus, the leader of the Manicheans,
universe." It was a false understanding of these "was found out to have taught falsely of the
matters which "gave rise to much atheism and heaven and stars, and of the motions of the sun
perplexity." and moon (although these things pertain not to
the doctrine of religion)," his religious teach-
The issues raised by Plato concerning the im- ings, according to Augustine, inevitably suffered
portance of astronomy for purification and pi- ridicule because of his pretension that they de-
ety, for education and politics, run through the rived support from a science of the heavenly
tradition of western thought. Though they are bodies. Augustine would disengage theology
somewhat transformed in the context of Jewish from astronomy. His position anticipates that
and Christian beliefs, and altered by later de- later taken by Cardinal Barberini who, during
velopments in the science of astronomy itself, the controversy over the Copernican hypothe-
they remain as matters on which an author's sis, is reported to have told Galileo that as-
strong assent or dissent forcefully reflects his tronomy and have quite separate tasks,
religion
whole intellectual position. the one teaching how the heavens go, the other
On the one hand, astronomers like Ptolemy, how to go to heaven.
—
Chapter 5: ASTRONOMY 89
Still another point of view on the importance courses of our own intelligence." But in one
of astronomy is represented in the skeptical and passage of Freud we find an almost complete re-
l^umanist attitude of Montaigne. "I am very turn to the Platonic insight. "Order has been
r^ivell pleased with the Milesian girl," he remarks, imitated from nature," he writes; "man's ob-
"who . advised the philosopher Thales rather
. . servations of the great astronomical periodici-
to look to himself than to gaze at heaven." In ties not only furnished him with a model, but
saying this, or in quoting with approval the formed the ground plan of his first attempts to
question asked of Pythagoras by Anaximenes introduce order into his own life."
gards astronomical inquiry as a prime example indispensable cause — occasions the inference by
of man's "natural and original disease pre- — Aquinas that it may also operate as a cause in
writes, have shown us "the abyss of our igno- by the meaning of the word "lunacy";
signified
rance in relation to the universe." But Kant an — and sometimes omens and auguries are read in
astronomer himself as well as a moralist does — the aspect of the heavens.
not, therefore, advise us to forsake the study of The chapters on Prophecy and Sign and
the heavens. On the contrary, he recommends Symbol deal with the issues raised by astrol-
it not only for its scientific value, but for its ogy. Problems more closely associated with
moral significance. astronomical science and speculation are treat-
"Two things," Kant declares in a passage ed in other chapters. The cosmological prob-
which has become famous, "fill the mind with lem of the origin of the material universe
ever new and increasing admiration and awe, is discussed in the chapters on Eternity,
the oftener and more steadily we reflect on Time, and World; the question of its size in the
them: the starry heavens above and the moral chapter on Space; the question of whether the
law within." The two fit together to produce a celestial spheres are themselves alive or are
single effect. Astronomy with its view "of a moved by intelligences or spirits in the chapters
countless multitude of worlds annihilates, as it on Angel and Soul; and the question of the
were, my importance as an animal creature." nature of the heavenly bodies in the chapter on
Morality "elevates my worth as an intelligence Matter.
by my personality, in which the moral law re- This last problem is of crucial significance in
veals to me a fife independent of animahty and the history of astronomy itself. Opposed the-
even of the whole sensible world." ories of the motions of the heavenly bodies be-
Kant's association of the starry heavens with come correlated with opposed theories con-
the moral life is not so much an echo of, as a cerning their matter — whether that is different
variant upon, Plato's precept that we apply in kind from terrestrial matter or the same. It
"the courses of intelligence in heaven ... to the is with reference to these related issues that what
f
90 THE GREAT IDEAS
has come to be called "the Copernican revo- which humanity "had to endure from the
lution" represents one of the great crises, cer- hands of science."
tainly one of the most dramatic turning points, It has been questioned whether this interpre-
in the development of astronomy, and of phys- tation of the Copernican revolution fits all the
ics and natural science generally. documents in the case. Freud may be accurately
The Copernican revolution did not take place reporting a popular feeling which, since the 1 8th
by the improvement and enlargement of astro- century, has become a widespread consequence
nomical observations alone, nor even by the ef- of Copernican and post-Copernican astronomy.
fect of these on alternative mathematical for- But in earlier centuries when the Ptolemaic
mulations. If it had not been accompanied by system prevailed, or even after Copernicus, the
the radical shift from ancient to modern physics appraisal of man's rank seems to depend more
— especially with regard to the diversity or uni- upon the position he occupies in the hierarchy
formity of the world's matter — the Copernican of God's creatures — below the angels and above
hypothesis concerning the celestial motions the brutes — than upon the place or motion of
would have been no more than a mathematical the earth, or the size of the world.
alternative to the Ptolemaic hypothesis. Coper- Boethius, for example, finds the Ptolemaic
nicus seems to advance it only as such, but in the universe large enough to remind man of the
hands of Kepler, Galileo, and Newton it be- infinitesimal space he occupies. Dante, too,
comes much more than that. They, rather than comments on the smallness of the earth in the
Copernicus, seem to accomplish the revolution scheme of things. When in his visionary travel
connected with his name. Dante reaches the Empyrean, he looks down
When their contribution is neglected or in- upon the earth and "with my sight," he tells us,
adequately grasped, the Copernican revolution "I returned through all and each of the seven
appears to be, as is often popularly supposed, spheres, and saw this globe, such that I smiled at
merely a shift in astronomical theory. The prob- its mean semblance; and that counsel I approve
lem being to organize mathematically the ap- as best which holds it of least account."
parent motions of the heavens, Copernicus of- Kepler, a passionate Copernican deeply con-
fers an alternative solution to that of Ptolemy. cerned with the human significance of astron-
Instead of treating the earth as stationary and omy, can be found arguing that the new hy-
central in the cosmic system, Copernicus at- pothesis involves something more fitting for
tributes three motions to the earth by treating man than the old. In his last argument in de-
it as a planet which revolves around the sun, fense of the Copernican view against that of
spins on its axis, and varies the inclination of its Tycho Brahe as well as that of Ptolemy, he de-
axis with reference to the sun. clares, "it was not fitting that man, who was
What is usually supposed to be revolutionary going to be the dweller in this world and its
about this hypothesis is its effect on man's esti- contemplator, should reside in one place as in a
mate of himself and his place or rank in the closed cubicle. ... It was his office to move
universe. On either of the rival hypotheses, the around in this very spacious edifice by means of
apparent motions of the heavens remain unal- the transportation of the Earth his home." In
tered, but not man's conception of himself, of order properly to view and measure the parts
his earth, or of the universe in which the earth's of his world, the astronomer "needed to have
orbit cuts so small a figure. As Kant suggests, the Earth a ship and its annual voyage around
man's stature seems to shrink. He becomes "a the sun."
mere speck in the universe" which has been en- Yet the very fact that Kepler argues in this
larged to infinity, or at least to an unimaginable manner may be interpreted as indicating his
immensity. He is displaced from its center to sense of the drastic implications for man of the
become a wanderer with his planet. Humanity's altered structure of the universe. Kepler may
self-esteem, according to Freud, was thus for even be thought to announce the problem of the
the first time deeply wounded; he refers to the so-called "Copernican revolution" when, in de-
theory that "is associated in our minds with the nying that the earth can any longer "be reck-
name of Copernicus" as the "first great outrage" oned among the primary parts of the great
.
Chapter 5: ASTRONOMY 91
world," since it is only a part of a part, i.e., the gnawing loneliness, born of the doubt that so
planetary region, he deliberately adds the quali- vast a cosmos— if cosmos it is rather than chaos
fication: "But I am speaking now of the Earth — can have been beneficently designed as man's
in so far as it is a part of the edifice of the world, habitation.
and not of the dignity of the governing crea-
tures which inhabit it." W^HATEVER THE TRUTH about the effect of the
Whether or not it was the traumatic blow to Copernican theory in the order of opinion, im-
the human ego which Freud conjectures, there agination, and feeling, it did produce a direct
can be little doubt that the from Ptolemy
shift result on the intellectual plane. It, more than
to Copernicus involved a real shock to the imag- any other overthrow of
single factor, led to the
ination. The Ptolemaic system conforms to the certain crucial doctrines which had been linked
look of the world, which is indeed the reason together in the physics and astronomy of Aris-
why it is still the one used in practical courses in totle; it thus radically changed the fundamen-
navigation. Here again Kepler defends Coperni- tal principles in terms of which man had under-
cus by explaining why "our uncultivated eye- stood the order and unity of nature. That scien-
sight" cannot be other than deceived and why tific event deserves not only the name but the
four arguments in especial: (i) From the na- Ignoring the supposition that simplicity must
ture of moveable bodies. (2) From the nature be judged differently in different spheres, Co-
of the motor virtue. (3) From the nature of the pernicus challenges Ptolemy on his own grounds
place in which the movement occurs. (4) From when he proposes "simpler hypotheses" to fit
the perfection of the circle." He then states each "the movements of the heavens." But in doing
of these arguments, and answers each in turn. so,he seems to adopt the traditional view of the
mathematical character of astronomical hy-
What is extraordinary about Kepler's attack potheses. Yet, as will appear, he does not adopt
upon the Ptolemaic astronomy cannot be un- this view in the unqualified form in which
derstood without examining Ptolemy's defense Osiander states it in his Preface to the Revolu-
of his theory, a defense which Copernicus meets tions of the Heavenly Spheres.
in Ptolemy's own terms rather than, as Kepler "It is the job of the astronomer," Osiander
does, by going outside them. writes, "to use painstaking and skilled observa-
Though his expressed intention was to con- tion in gathering together the history of the
struct a mathematical theory of the celestial movements, and then since he cannot
celestial —
motions which would also conform to Aris- by any Ime of reasoning reach the true causes
totle's physics, Ptolemy, when he finished, of these movements — to think or construct
recognized that the complications he had been whatever causes or hypotheses he pleases, such
compelled to add in order "to save the appear- that, by the assumption of these causes, these
ances" left him with a theory that did not con- same movements can be calculated from the
form to Aristotle's doctrine of the perfect cir- principles of geometry, for the past and for the
cular motion of the heavenly spheres. Instead future too.
of abandoning Aristotle's physics, he defended "It is not necessary," he adds, "that these
his theory on the ground that astronomy, being hypotheses should be true, or even probable;
mathematical rather than physical, could ad- it is enough if they provide a calculus which
mit such "unrealistic" complications if they fits When for one and the
the observations.
served the purposes of calculation and of "sav- same movement varying hypotheses are pro-
I ing the appearances." posed, as eccentricity or epicycle for the move-
In the thirteenth and last book of the Alma- ment of the sun, the astronomer much prefers
gest, when he faces the fact that his mathemat- to take the one which is easiest to grasp."
ical become exceedingly difficult
devices have What distinguishes Kepler from both Ptol-
—and from the point of view of the
strained emy and Osiander is the way in which he is
Aristotelian reality —
Ptolemy writes: "Let no concerned with the truth of alternative hypoth-
one, seeing the difficulty of our devices, find eses in astronomy. He looks upon the truth of
troublesome such hypotheses. ... It is proper an hypothesis something to be judged not
as
to try and fit as far as possible the simpler merely in mathematical terms according to the
hypotheses to the movements of the heavens; adequacy and simplicity of a calculating de-
and if this does not succeed, then any hypoth- vice, but to be measured by its conformity to
eses possible. Once all the appearances are all the physical realities. At the very beginning
saved by the consequences of the hypotheses, of his Epitome of Copernican Astronomy, he
why should it seem strange that such compli- flatly declares that "astronomy is part of phys-
cations can come about in the movements of ics." And in the opening pages of the fourth
heavenly things?" We
ought not to judge the book, he astronomy has not one,
insists that
simplicity of heavenly things by comparison but "two ends: to save the appearances and to
with what seems to be simple in the explanation contemplate the true form of the edifice of the
of earthly phenomena. "We should instead W^orld." He follows this immediately by ob-
judge their simplicity from the unchangeable- serving that, if astronomy had only the first
ness of the natures in the heavens and their end, Tycho Brahe's theory would be as satis-
movements. For thus they would all appear factory as that of Copernicus.
simple, more than those things which seem so Early in his scientific career, before writing
here with us." the Epitome^ Kepler asserts that "one cannot
m THE GREAT IDEAS
leave to the astronomer absolute license to feign on the earth — or of the earth, such as Gilbert's
no matter what hypotheses." He complains that theory of the magnetic fields generated by the
astronomers **too often . . . constrain their earth's axial rotation— could be equally true of
thought from exceeding the limitsof geometry." all the other planets.
It is necessary to go beyond geometry into "Read
the philosophy of magnetism of the
physics to test the consequences of competing Englishman William Gilbert," writes Kepler;
hypotheses which are equally good mathemat- "for in that book, although the author did not
ically. ''You must seek the foundations of your believe that the Earth moved . . . nevertheless
astronomy," he tells his fellow scientists, "in he attributes a magnetic nature to it by very
a more elevated science, I mean in physics or many arguments. Therefore, it is by no means
metaphysics." absurd or incredible that any one of the pri-
Because Kepler thus conceives the task and mary planets should be, what one of the pri-
truth of astronomy, Duhem in his great history mary planets, namely, the Earth, is." Such a
of astronomy calls him a "realistic Copernican." statement plainly shows that when the earth
Galileo also, Duhem thinks, was a realistic becomes a planet, as it does in Copernican
Copernican. "To confirm by physics the Co- theory, no obstacle remains to the assertion of
pernican hypotheses," he writes, "is the center a homogeneity between the earth and the other
towards which converge Galileo's observations planets both in matter and motion. The old
as an astronomer and his terrestrial mechanics." physical dualism of a supralunar and a sublunar
Newton was the third member of this trium- world is abandoned.
virate. For him there remained the solution of "Not the movement of the earth," White-
tiie problem of deducing Kepler's formulation head remarks, "but the glory of the heavens
of the planetary orbits in a manner consistent was the point at issue," for to assert the heavens
with Gahleo's laws of motion in the dynamics to be of the same stuff and subject to the same
of bodies falling on the earth's surface. But the laws as the rest of nature brings them down to
very posing of this depended on
problem itself the plane of earthly physics. That is precisely
the insight that terrestrial and celestial me- what Newton finally does when, in the enun-
chanics can proceed according to the same prin- ciation of his Third Rule of reasoning in natural
ciples and laws. That insight entailed the com- philosophy, he dryly but explicitly completes
plete overthrow of the ancient physics, with its the Copernican Revolution. Those "qualities
division of the universe into two distinct parts, of bodies . . . which are found to belong to all
having different kinds of matter and different bodies within the reach of our experiments,
laws of motion. are," Newton maintains, "to be esteemed the
universal qualities of all bodies whatsoever."
Copernicus, who, despite Osiander's apolo- In the bifurcated world of ancient theory,
getics, believed his theory to be true, did not astronomy had a very special place among the
himself face the great point at issue in the natural sciences, proportionate to the "glory
Copernican revolution — the material uniform- of the heavens." But with Newton it could be
ity of the physical universe. We shall subse- completely merged into a general mechanics
quently consider the question of the truth of whose laws of motion have universal applica-
astronomical hypotheses, but whether or not tion. That merger, begun by Newton, has been
Copernicus and the Copernicans had in their perfected since his day. The last obstacle to the
own day a right to believe their theory true, generalization lay in the apparent discrepancies
it was the acceptance of the Copernican hy- between electrical phenomena on the subatomic
pothesis as true which led Kepler and Galileo scaleand gravitational phenomena on the astro-
to deny the truth of Aristotelian physics. nomic scale. But in our own time the unified field
If the earth is not at the center and station- equations of Einstein's theory of relativity em-
ary, then the basic doctrine of a natural direc- brace the very large and the very small motions
tion in motion and a natural place of rest for of matter within a single conceptual scheme,
the various elements is completely upset. If the with radical consequences for the revision of
earth is one of the planets, then anything true the Newtonian or classical mechanics.
—
Chapter 5 ASTRONOMY 95
But the unification of nature whicli Kepler Darwin argues, if it has the power to explain
( began andNewton completed, when set against several large classes of facts, which "it can
f may be even more radical.
Aristotle's physics, hardly be supposed that a false theory would
•
Newton's theory, because of the amazing way explain" in so satisfactory a manner. Darwin
1 in which it covered the widest variety of phe- defends the theory of natural selection as having
.
nomena by the most universal for-
simplest, such power. To those who object that "this is
It brought within the range of observation coveries in/7«r^ mathematics by suggesting good
certain celestial phenomena, hitherto imper- problems and by requiring formulations which
ceptible to the naked eye, such as the phases of transcend an interest in the truth about the
Venus, the satellites of Jupiter, and the con- heavens.
stitution of the Milky Way. This twofold relation between mathematical
Concerning the last of these, Pascal later re- discovery and empirical observation is pres-
marks that the ancients can be excused for the ent in the development of astronomy itself, and
idea they had of the cause of its color. "The of all branches of mathematical physics. But
weakness of their eyes not yet having been there is another aspect of the relationship which
artificially helped, they attributed this color to must be taken into account if we are to consider
the great solidity of this part of the sky"; but it the problem of truth in such sciences. The way
would be inexcusable for us, he adds, "to retain in which mathematical formulations fit the
the same thought now that, aided by the ad- phenomena measures the truth of rival hypoth-
vantages of the telescope, we have discovered eses with respect to the same reality.
Chapter 5: ASTRONOMY ^1
The Iof;ic of such verification has already esis was devised. The word "consilience" has
been suggested in the discussion of the geo- been used to name the property of an hypoth-
centric and hehocentric hypotheses. It is fur- esis which, in addition to saving a limited field
ther considered in the chapter on Hypothesis. of appearances, succeeds in fitting many other
To be satisfactory, an hypothesis must — in the phenomena which seem to have become related
language used ever since Simplicius
— "save the — to \\^vt jumped together under its covering ex-
appearances," that is, account for the relevant planation. The heliocentric hypothesis, as de-
phenomena. But two hypotheses (as for exam- veloped by Newton's laws of motion and theory
ple the geocentric and heliocentric) may, at a of gravitation, certainly has this property of
certain time, do an equally good job of saving consilience to a high degree, for it covers both
the appearances. Then the choice between them celestial and terrestrial phenomena, and a wide
becomes a matter of the greater mathematical variety of the latter.
elegance of one than the other. Is the heliocentric hypothesis true then? If
That, however, does not give the mathe- the truth of an hypothesis depends on the range
matically superior theory a greater claim to of the phenomena it fits or saves, it might seem
truth. So far as reality is concerned, it is only, to be so, for by its consilience it accounts for
in Plato's words, "a likely story"; or as Aquinas phenomena that the Ptolemaic theory cannot
points out with reference to the geocentric But though this may cause us to reject
handle.
hypothesis, "the theor)' of eccentrics and epi- the unsuccessful hypothesis, does it establish
cycles is considered as established because there- beyond doubt the truth of the successful one ?
by the sensible appearances of the heavenly Or, to put the question another way, is not our
movements can be explained; not however, as judgment here a comparative one rather than
if this reason were sufficient, since some other absolute.? Are we saying more than that one
theory might explain them." hypothesis is more successful than another in
Two hypotheses may be equally satisfactory doing what an hypothesis should do? Are we
for the range of phenomena they were both de- logically entitled to regard that success as the
vised to fit. But only one of them may have the sign of its must we restrict
exclusive truth, or
quite amazing virtue of fitting other sets of ourselves to the more modest statement that,
observations not originally thought to be re- as the better hypothesis, it simply tells a more
lated to the phenomena for which the hypoth- likely story about reality?
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. The end, dignity, and utility of astronomy 99
2b. The use of hypotheses: the heliocentric and geocentric theories 100
3^. Formal archetypal causes: the number and the music of the spheres
4. The relation of astronomy to the other liberal arts and sciences: the place of astronomy
in the educational curriculum
5. Astronomy and cosmology: the theory of the world or universe as reflecting astronomi-
cal conceptions
98 THE GREAT IDEAS
PAGE
6. Astronomy and theology: astronomy as affecting views of God, creation, the divine
plan, and the moral hierarchy 102
7. Astronomy and the measurement of time: calendars and clocks; days and seasons
gf.
The comets and meteors
11. The influence of the stars and planets upon the character and actions of men
12. The worship of the earth, sun, moon, and stars 109
REFERENCES
To numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
find the passages cited, use the
numbers For example, in 4 Homkr: Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d, the
ot the passages rctcrred to.
number 4 is the number of the vokmne in the set; the number 12d mdicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 James Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 Plato: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
Author's Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as part, bk, ch,
sect) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d.
Bible References: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., Old Testa-
ment: Nehemiah, 7:45 — (D) // Esdras, 7:46.
Symbols: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
. 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 37b; 46b c 32 Milton: Paradise Lost, rk hi [573-587] 148a;
31 Descartes: Meditations, i, 76c bk vih [122-158] 234b-235b
34 Newton: Principles, la-2a; bk hi 269a-372a 34 Newton: Principles, bk hi, prop 1-9 276a-
36 Swift: Gulliver, part hi, 94b-103a passim 284a esp PROP 7 281b-282b; prop 35, schol
42 Kant: Practical Reason, 361c / judgement, 320b-324a; general schol, 371b-372a /
551a-552a Optics, BK HI, 531b; 540a-541b
35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, sect 102-108
3. Causes in astronomy 432d-434a passim
35 Hume: Human Understanding, sect i, niv 9,
3</. Formal archetypal causes: the number and 454c-d
the music of the spheres 36 Swift: Gulliver, part hi, 94b-103a; 118b-
7 Plato: Phaedo, 241b-242b / Republic, bk vii, 119a
395d-396b; bk x, 438c-439a / Timaeus, 447a- 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 8d [fn 2]
452b 45 Faraday: Researches in Electricity, 670a-673d;
8 Aristotle: Heavens, bk i, ch 2-5 359d-364a; 817a-b; 824a-b; 832b [fn i]
BK II, CH 1-12 375b,d-384c / Metaphysics, bk 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, epilogue ii, 694c-
I, CH 5 [985^22-986*21] 503d-504b; ch 8 695c
[989^29-990^12] 508a-b; bk xii, ch 8 603b-
605a 4. The relation of astronomy to the other liberal
arts and sciences: the place of astronomy
11 NicoMACHUs: Arithmetic, bk i, 811a-814b
16 Ptolemy: Almagest, bk i, 8a; bk ix, 270b in the educational curriculum
16 Copernicus: Revolutions of the Heavenly 7 Plato: Gorgias, 254b-c / Republic, bk vii,
Spheres, bk i, 511b 391b-398c esp 394d-396b / Lau/s, bk vii,
16 Kepler: Epitome, bk iv, 846a-847b; 857b- 728b-730d; bk xii, 797b-798b
860b; 863b-887a passim; 913a-b; 915b-916a; 8 Aristotle: Physics, bk ii, ch 2 [193^25-
925b-928a; 932a-933a / Harmonies of the 194*11] 270a-c / Metaphysics, bk xi, ch 6
World, 1016b-1018a; 1023b-1085b esp 1049b- [1063*10-17] 591b; BK xir, ch 8 [1073^1-7]
1050b 603d
18 Augustine: Confessions, bk v, par 3-6 27c-28c 11 Nicomachus: A^rithmetic, bk i, 812b-813d
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, paradise, i [76-126] 13 Virgil: Aeneid, bk vi [847-853] 233b-234a
107a-c; xxviii [1-78] 148d-149c 16 Ptolemy: Almagest, bk i, 5a-6a
30 Bacon: Novum Organum, bk ii, aph 48, 16 Copernicus: Revolutions of the Heavenly
185c-d bk i, 510a-b
Spheres,
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part i, appendix, 371d-372a 18 Augustine: Christian Doctrine, bk ii, ch 29,
32 Milton: Christs Nativity [i 17-140] 4b-5a / At 651b-c
a Solemn Musicl{ 13a-b / Arcades [54-83] 26b- 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part ii-ii, q 9,
27a / Comus [238-243] 38b / Paradise Lost, A 2, REP 3 424b-425a
bk IV [660-688] 166b-167b; bk v [153-184] 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part i, 72a-d
178b-179a; [616-627] 188b-189a; bk vni [15- 24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, bk i,
168] 232b-235b 29c; bk ii, 82c-d
34 Newton: Principles, bk hi, general schol, 25 Montaigne: Essays, 69d-70c; 257d-259d
369b-370a 30 Bacon: Novum Organum, bk i, aph 80 120a-b
"35 Hume: Human Understanding, sect i, div 9, 31 Descartes: Meditations, i, 76c
454c-d
36 Swift: Gulliver, part hi, 96b-97a 5. Astronomy and cosmology: the theory of the
47 Goethe: Faust, prologue [243-246] 7a world or universe as reflecting astro-
nomical conceptions
3^. Physical ef&cient causes: gravitation and 7 Plato: Timaeus, 447a-452b; 455a-b
action-at-a-distance 8 Aristotle: Physics, bk iv, ch 5 [212^7-21]
8 Aristotle: Heavens, bk it, ch 8 381a-382a; 291d-292a / Heavens 359a-405a,c / Meteor-
ch 12 [292^26-293*12] 384b-c / Meteorology, bk I, CH 1-3 445a-447d / Metaphysics,
ology,
'
36 Swift: Gulliver, part iv, 169a 7 Plato: Phaedrus, 12^c-d/ Apology, 204d-205a
36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 229a / Timaeus, 449b-450c; 451d-452b / Philebus,
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 376a-b 618b-619c / Laws, bk x, 762b-765c esp 764a-
46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, part i, 219a-b; 765c; bk xii, 797c-798b
251a-b 8 Aristotle: Heavens, bk ii, ch 1-2 375b,d-
377c; CH 12 383b-384c / Metaphysics, bk xii,
8. The heavenly bodies in general CH 603b-605a bk ch
8 / Soul, i,
3 [406*^26-
407^13] 636b-637b
8a. The special character of matter the 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk v [76-90]
supra-lunar spheres 62a-b; [i 10-145] 62c-63a
New Testament: / Coriitthians, 15:40-41 13 Virgil: Aeneid, bk vi [724-738] 230b
7 Plato: Phaedo, 247b-248c / Timaeus, 448a- 16 Kepler: Epitome, bk iv, 854b-856a; 890a-
449c; 451d-452a / Laws, bk xii, 797d-798a 895b; 896a-897a; 914a-b; 930b; 932a-933a;
8 Aristotle: Heavens, bk i, ch 3 [270*12-^26] 959a-960a / Harmonies of the World, 1080b-
361b-362a; bk i, ch 9 [279*i2]-bk ii, ch i 1085b esp 1083b-1085b
[284^6] 370b-376a; bk ii, ch 7 380c-d / Meta- 17 Plotinus: Second Ennead, tr ii-ih 40a-50a /
physics, bk viii, ch 4 [1044*^2-8] 569a-b; bk ix, Third Ennead, tr ii, ch 3, 84b; tr iv, ch 6,
ch 8 [1050^6-27] 576b-d; BK xi,ch 6 [1063*10- 99d: TR V, CH 6 103b-104a / Fourth Ennead,
17] 591b; BK XII, ch 2 [1069^24-27] 598d-599a tr IV, CH 6-8 161b-162d; ch 22-27 168d-172a;
104 THE GREAT IDEAS 8^ to 8<r(2)
•c\ 345d-347b; q 70, a 3 365b-367a; q iio, a i, 8c(l) The eternity of celestial motion V,
rep 2-3 564c-565d; a 3, ans 566d-567b; q 7 Plato: Timaeus, 447 b-c; 450b-451a; 460c-d
115, A 4, REP I 589d-590c; q 117, a 4, rep i 8 Aristotle Physics, bk viii, ch 1-2 334a-337b;
:
8c. Celestial motion: periodicity and the great 68b; CH 7-8 69c-70d / Third Ennead, tr vii,
year CH 7-8 122d-124c; ch 11-13 126a-129a /
7 Plato: Republic, bk x, 438c-439a / Timaeus, Fourth Ennead, tr iv, ch 7-8 161d-162d
451a-452b / Statesman, 586c-587b / Laws, bk 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 10,
vii, 730a-c A 2, rep 2 41d-42c; a 4, ans 43b-44b; a 5,
8 Aristotle: Heavens, bk i-ii 359a-389d / ANS 44b-45c
Metaphysics, bk xii, ch 8 603b-605a 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part hi suppl,
9 Aristotle: Motion of Animals, ch 3 [699^11]- Q 77, A 2, ans 945a-946b; q 91, a 2 1017c-1020c
CH 4 [700^5] 234a-235a 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, paradise, i [73-81]
12 Lucretius Nature of Things, bk v [509-533]
: 107a
67d-68a; [614-649] 69a-c 30 Bacon: Novum Organum, bk ii, APH 35,
12 AuRELius: Meditations, bk vi, sect 13 271b; 163a-b
bk XI, SECT 27 306b 34 Newton: Principles, bk hi, prop 10 284a-
16 Ptolemy: Almagest, bk i, 7a-8b; 12b-14a; bk 285a / Optics, bk hi, 540a-541b
IV, 109a-112b 36 Swift-: Gulliver, part hi, 98a-b
16 Copernicus: Revolutions of the Heavenly
Spheres, bk i, 513b-514b 8c(2) The form of celestial motion: circles, the
/ Christian Doctrine, bk ii, ch 29, 651b-c 8 Aristotle: Physics, bk viii, ch 8-9 348b-353b
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 32, / Heavens, bk i, ch 2-5 359d-364a; bk ii, ch 4
A I, rep 2 175d-178a; q 115, a 3, ans 588c- [287^2-31] 378c-379a; ch 5 379b-c; ch 8 381a-
589c 382a; ch 12 [293^4-14] 384c / Metaphysics, bk
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part ii-ii, q 2, XII, ch 6 [io7i^32]-ch 7 [1072*22] 601d-602b;
A 3, ANS 392d-393c CH 8 [1073^17-1074*14] 604a-c
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, paradise, ii [112- 16 Ptolemy: Almagest, bk i, 7a-8b; bk hi, 83a;
148] 109a-b; xxvii [97-120] 148b-c; xxviii 86b; bk V, 148b-157a; bk ix, 270b; 291a-296a
[1-78] 148d-149c 16 Copernicus: Revolutions of the Heavenly
28 Gilbert: Loadstone, bk vi, llOb-c Spheres, 507a-508a; bk i, 513b-514b; bk hi,
28 Galileo: Two New Sciences, fourth day, 628b-629a; bk iv, 675b-678a esp 677b-678a;
245b-d BK V, 740a-b; 784b-785b
j
\Sc{3)to9a Chapter 5: ASTRONOMY 105
16 Kepler: Epitome, bk iv, 888b 893b; 929a- cii 19-21 332b-333d; en 23 334c-335c; bk
933a; bk v, 968a-979b esp 975a-977b; 984b- XII, CH 15 351b 352d
985 b / Harmonies of the World, lOlSa-b 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 46,
17 Plotinus: Second Ennead, tr i, ch 8 39c-d A I, rep 2-3,5 250a-252d; a 3, ans and rkp i
19 Aquinas: Siwima Theologica, part i, q 66, 255a-d; q 66, a i, ans and rep to contrary
A 2, ANS 345d-347b 343d-345c; a 3 347b 348d; a 4, ans and rep 5
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part hi suppl, 348d-349d; q 67, a 4 352a-354a; q 68, a i
Q 77, A 2, ANS 945a-946b 354a-355c; q 70, aa 1-2 362c-365a
28 Gilbert: Loadstone, bk vi, llOb-d 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, hell, vii [73-81] 10b;
28 Galileo: Two Netv Sciences, fourth day, PARADISE, vii [121-148] 116b-c; X [1-6] 120b;
245b-d XXIX [13-45] 150b-c
30 Bacon: Novum Organum, bk ii, apii 48, 28 Galileo: Two New Sciences, third day, 214d
186b-d 30 Bacon: Adva?icement of Learning, 17b-d
32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk v [616-627] 188b- 31 Descartes: Discourse, part v, 54b-56a
189a 32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk iii [708-7:55] 150b-
33 Pascal: Pensees, 72, 181a 151b; BK VII [192-386] 221b-225b; bk viii
34 Newton: Principles^ bk i, prop ii 42b-43b; [15-178] 232b-236a
prop 17 48b-50a 34 Newton: Optics, bk hi, 542a-543a
8c(3) The laws of celestial motion: celestial 9. The particular heavenly bodies
mechanics
16 Kepler: Epitome, bk iv, 888a-895b passim; 9a. The sun: its position, distance, size, and mass
897a-907a passim, esp 897a, 904b-905a; 933a- Old Testament: Joshua, 10:12-14— (D) Josue,
952a passim bk v, 975a-979b / Harmonies of
; 10:12-14 / Psalms, 136:7-8— (D) Psalms,
the World, 1018a-b; 1019b-1020b 135:7-8 / Isaiah, 13:9-11; 30:26; 60:19-20—
34 Newton: Principles, bk i, prop 1-3 and schol (D) Isaias, 13:9-11; 30:26; 60:19-20 / Joel,
32b-35b; prop 4, corol vi 36a; prop 11-13 2:10,31; 3:15 / A?nos, 8:9
42b-46a esp prop ii 42b-43b; prop 15 46b- Apocrypha: Ecclesiasticus^ 43:1-5 — (D) OT,
47a; prop 17 48b-50a; bk ii, prop 51-53 and Ecclesiasticus, 43:1-5
SCHOL 259a-267a; bk hi 269a-372a passim, esp New Testament: Matt/iew, 24:29-30 / MarJ^,
RULE i-iii 270a-271a, phenomenon i-prop 7 13:24-25 / L^^d", 23:44-45
272a-282b, prop 13 286a-b, prop 35, schol 6 Herodotus: History, bk ii, 53d-54b; 79c;
320b-324a, prop 40 337b-338a, general BK IV, 130d-131a
SCHOL, 369a, 371b-372a 6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, bk ii, 394c
•
35 Hume: Human Understanding, sect i, div 9, 7 Plato: Cratylus, 98a / Apology, 204d-205a /
454c-d Republic, bk vi, 385c-386c / Timaeus, 451b-d
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 8d [fn 2] 8 Aristotle: Heavens, bk ii, ch 7 [289*26-35]
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk xiii, 563b; 380d; CH 12 [291^29-292^27] 383c-384b; ch 13
EPILOGUE II, 694d-695c [293^34-294*12] 385c / Meteorology, bk i, ch 8
[345^1-9] 451c-d
Sd.The creation of the heavens 11 Archimedes: Sand'Rec\oner, 520a-b
Old Testament: Genesis, 1:1-8,14-19; 2:1-4 / 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk v [564-574]
Nehemiah, 9:6— (D) // Esdras, 9:6 /Job, 26:7; 68b-c; [592-704] 68d-70b; [751-771] 70d-71a
37:18; 38 / Psalms, 8:3-4; 19-15 89:11; 102:25; 14 Plutarch: Pericles, 138d
136:5-9; 148:1-6— (D) Psalms, 8:4-5; 18:2; 16 Ptolemy: Almagest, bk hi 77a-107a; bk v,
88:12; 101:26; 135:5-9; 148 1-6 /Pror<?r^^, 3:1 9;
: 171b-182b; bk vi, 215a-222b
8:27 / Jeremiah, 31:35; 51:15— (Z)) Jeremias, 16 Copernicus: Revolutions of the Heavenly
31:35; 51:15 / Amos, 5:8 Spheres, bk i, 520b-529a; bk iii, 646a-674b;
New Testament: Acts, 14:15; 17:24— (D) Acts, BK IV, 710b-714a; 716a-731a
14:14; 17:24 / Hebrews, 1:10 / II Peter, 3:5 / 16 Kepler: Epitome, bk iv, 854b-856a; 857b-
Revelation, 14:7— (D) Apocalypse, 14:7 860b; 873a-876a; 882a-883b; 885b-886b;
7 Plato: Timaeus, 450c-452b 895b-905a; 907b-916a passim / Harmonies of
8 Aristotle: Physics, bk viii, ch i [251^13-19] the World, 1014b-1016a; 1080b-1085b
335b / Heavens, bk i, ch 10-12 370d-375d 18 Augustine: City of God, bk hi, ch 15, 176d-
9 Aristotle: Parts of Anitnals^ bk i, ch i 177a
[641^13-29] 164c-d 19 Aquinas Summa Theologica, part i, q 70, a i,
:
Arcades [61-73] 26b / Comus [93-144] 35b-36b 193b; [8034-8043] 195b; [8078-8081] 196b;
/ Paradise Lost, bk i [594-599] 106b; bk viii [8285-8302] 202a
[511-514] 243b; BK X [657-661] 288b
33 Pascal: Pensees, iji, 203b-204a 13. The history of astronomy
36 Swift: Gulliver, part hi, 98a-b 5 Aeschylus: Prometheus Bound [442-461]
36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 194b-195a; 332a- 44c-d
334b;407b-408b 6 Herodotus: History, bk ii, 49d-50a; 65b; 79c
47 Goethe: Faust, part ii [4947-4976] 122b- 7 P1.AT0: Phaedrus, 138c-d / Apology, 204d'205a
123a; [6667-6670] 163b I Statesman, 586c-589c / Laivs, bk vii, 728b-
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk viii, 340d- 730d; bk xii, 797b-798b
341a,c 8 Aristotle: Heavens, bk i, ch 3 [270^12-26]
361d-362a; ch 10 370d-371d; bk ii, ch 1-2
12. The worship of the earth, sun, moon, and 375b,d-377c; ch 12 [292^6-9] 383c; ch 13
stars 384d-387d / Meteorology, bk i, ch 6 449b-
Old Testament: Genesis, 37:9-10 / Deuteron- 450b; CH 8 451b-452d; bk ii, ch i [354*^27-32]
omy, 4:19; 17:3 / // Kings, 23:4-5,11 (D) — 460b / Metaphysics, bk i, ch 2 [982^11-17]
IV Kings, 23:4-5,11 /Jeremiah, 8:1-2; 10:2— 500d; BK XII, ch 8 603b-605a
(£>) Jeremias, 8:1-2; 10:2 / Eze\iel, S:i6—(D) 11 Archimedes: Sand-Reckpner 520a-b ,
Ezechiel, 8:16 / Zephaniah, 1:4-5 — (D) Soph- 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk v [720-730]
onias, 1:4-5 70c
Apocrypha: Wisdom of Solomon, 13:1-9— (D) 14 Plutarch: Romulus, 20b-c / Numa Pompi-
OT, Boo}{ of Wisdom, 13:1-9 / Baruch, 6:60- lius, 55a-b / Solon, 74a / Pericles, 138d
69— (D) OT, Baruch, 6:60-68 / Aemilius Paulus, 220d-221b / Lysander,
5 Sophocles: Antigone [332-340] 134a 358d-359c / Nicias, 435b-d
5 Euripides: Orestes [1625-1693] 410b-d 16 Ptolemy: Almagest, bk hi, 77a-83a; bk iv,
5 Aristophanes: Clouds [563-626] 495c-496b 109a-110b; bk vii, 223a-232b passim; bk ix,
/ Peace [406-416] 530d 272a-b
6 Herodotus: History, bk i, 31a-b; 48c; bk 16 Copernicus: Revolutions of the Heavenly
VII, 226c Spheres, 508a
7 Plato: Apology, 204d-205a / Latvs, bk vii, 16 Kepler: Epitome, bk iv, 861b-863a; 888b-
728b-730d; bk xh, 797b-798b 891b; 907b-910a; 929a-933a passim; 955a
8 Aristotle: Metaphysics, bk xii, ch 8 [i074^r- 18 Augustine: Confessions, bk v, par 3-6 27c-
14] 604d-605a 28c
9 Aristotle: Generation of Animals, bk i, ch 2 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 32,
[716^15-20] 256b a i, rep 2 175d-178a
12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk ii [581-660] 22 Chaucer: Miller's Tale [3187-3212] 212b 213a
22b-23b; bk v [396-411] 66b; [821-836] 71d- 24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, bk ii,
72a 69d-70a
I
110 THE GREAT IDEAS . 13
/,^ T*/ y. ^ X
35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge^ sect ^8
(13. The history of astronomy.)
424a.b; sect 104 433a.b
25 Montaigne: E/^^?^^, 257d-258b 35 Hume: Human Understanding, sect i, div 9,
28 Gilbert: Loadstone, bk vi, 107c-d; 117c-d; 454c-d
118d-119c 36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 227a
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 24d / No- 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 68c-69a; 226b;
vum Organum, bk i, aph So 120a-b; aph 89 299b-c; 664d [n 55-56]
124a-d; bk ii, aph 36, 165c-167b 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 8d [fn 2]; 175b Ifn i] /
32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk i [284-291] 99b; Practical Reason, 36lh-c
BK V [261-263] 181a; bk viii [66-168] 233b- 46 Hegel: PMo^o^^jy o///iV/ory, part i, 219a-b;
235b / Areopagitica, 400a 251a-b
33 Pascal: Provincial Letters, 165a / Vacuum, 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk viii, 340d-
358a; 368b-369a 341a,c; bk xiii, 563b; epilogue ii, 694d-696d
CWSS-KEFEKENCES
For: The discussion of related disciplines, see Mathematics; Mechanics; Physics.
The consideration of mathematical physics, see Mathematics 5b; Mechanics 3; Physics
lb, 3; Science 5c.
Other treatments of observation and measurement in natural science, see Experience 5-5C;
Mechanics 2a; Physics 3, 4a, 4d; Quantity 6-6c\ Science 5a-5b; Sense 5.
The logic of hypotheses and their verification in scientific method, see Hypothesis 4b-4d;
Physics 4b; Principle 30(2) Science 5e.
;
The general consideration of scientific method, see Logic 4b; Reasoning 6c; Science
5-5^;
The distinction between formal and efficient causes, see Cause la; and for the role of causes
and causal explanation in natural science, see Cause 5b; Nature 3c; Physics 2b;
Science 4c.
The consideration of certain mathematical forms used in astronomy, see Quantity 3b(i)-
3b(2), 3e(2).
Other discussions of celestial and terrestrial mechanics, see Mechanics 4a, 5f-5f(2), 6c.
The theory of gravitation and the problem of action-at-a-distance, see Mechanics 6d(i)-
6d(2); Space 2c.
The issues concerning matter and soul or intellect in relation to the heavenly bodies, see
Angel 2a; Matter ib; Soul la; World 6a.
Other discussions of the measurement of time, see Quantity 5b; Time 4.
The interpretation of celestial phenomena in divination and augury, see Language 10;
Prophecy 3b; Sign and Symbol 5b.
Criticisms of astrology, see Religion 6a.
The cosmological and theological implications of astronomy, see Angel 2a; Change i3~i4;
Eternity 2; Infinity 3d-3e; Space 3a; Time 2b; World 4a, 4e, 5, 7.
Chapter 5: ASTRONOMY 111
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great BooJ{s of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
HoBBES. Concerning Body, part iv, ch 26 Kapteyn. Recent Researches in the Structure of the
Kant. Cosmogony Universe
A. Smith. The History of Astronomy Duhem. Le systeme du monde
Arrhenius. The Destinies of the Stars
II.
T. Chamberlin. The Origin of the Earth
Aristarchus. On the Sizes and Distances of the Sun E. Huntington. Earth and Sun
and Moon Dingle. Modern Astrophysics
Epicurus. Letter to Pythocles Shapley. Starlight
. Letter to Herodotus Eddington. The Internal Constitution of the Stars
Ibn Ezra. The Beginning of Wisdom .Stars and Atoms
Maimonides. The Guide for the Perplexed, part ii, Jeans. Problems of Cosmogony and Stellar Dynamics
CH 8-12, 24 .Astronomy and Cosmogony
R. Bacon. Opus Majus, part iv Tolman. Relativity, Thermodynamics, and Cosmology
Rheticus. Narratio Prima H. N. Russell. The Solar System and Its Origin
Suarez. Disputationes Metaphysicae, xiii (10-13), Abetti. The Sun: Its Phenomena and Physical
XV (3) Features
Fontenelle. Conversations on the Plurality of Worlds Hubble. The Realm of the Nebulae
Voltaire. "Astrology," "Astronomy," in A Philo- Gamow. The Birth and Death of the Sun
sophical Dictionary B. Russell. Human Knowledge, Its Scope and
Lagrange. Mecanique analytique Limits, part i, ch 2
{.[
Chapter 6: BEAUTY
INTRODUCTION
TRUTH, goodness, and beauty form a triad seems good to one man may seem evil to anoth-
of terms which have been discussed to- er. What seems ugly or false may also seem
gether throughout the tradition of western beautiful or true to different men or to the
thought. same man at different times.
They have been called "transcendental" on Yet it is not altogether true that these three
the ground that everything which is is some
in terms have always suffered the same fortunes.
measure or manner subject to denomination For Spinoza goodness and beauty are subjec-
good or evil, beautiful or ugly.
as true or false, tive, but not truth. Because he "has persuaded
But they have also been assigned to special him.self that all things which exist are made for
spheres of being or subject matter — the true him," man, Spinoza says, judges that to be "of
to thought and logic, the good to action and the greatest importance which is most useful to
morals, the beautiful to enjoyment and aes- him, and he must esteem that to be of surpass-
thetics. ing worth by which he is most beneficially
They have been fundamen-
called "the three affected." The notions of good and evil, beauty
tal values" with the implication that the worth and ugliness, do not conform to anything in the
of anything can be exhaustively judged by nature of things. "The ignorant," says Spinoza,
reference to these three standards and no — nevertheless, "call the nature of a thing good,
others. But other terms, such as pleasure or evil, sound, putrid, or corrupt just as they are
utility, have been proposed, either as additional affectedby it. For example, if the motion by
values or as significant variants of the so-called which the nerves are affected by means of ob-
fundamental three; or even sometimes as more jects represented to the eye conduces to well-
fundamental. Pleasure or utility, for example, being, the objects by which it is caused are
has been held by men like Spinoza or Mill to be called beautiful', while those exciting a con-
the ultimate criterion of beauty or goodness. trary motion are called deforfned.''
Truth, goodness, and beauty, singly and to-
gether, have been the focus of the age-old con- Beauty has been most frequently regarded as
troversy concerning the absolute and the rela- subjective, or relative to the individual judg-
tive, the objective and the subjective, the uni- ment. The familiar maxim, de gustibus non dis-
versal and the individual. At certain times it has putandum, has its original application in the
been thought that the distinction of true from sphere of beauty rather than truth and good-
false, good from evil, beautiful from ugly, has ness. "Truth is disputable," Hume writes, "not
its basis and warranty in the very nature of taste . . . No man reasons concerning another's
things, and that a man's judgment of these m.at- beauty; but frequently concerning the justice
ters is measured for its soundness or accuracy by or injustice of his actions."Thus even when it
its conformity to fact. At other times the oppo- was supposed that judgments of the true and
site position has been dominant. One meaning the good could have a certain absoluteness or
of the ancient saying that man is the measure of universality —
or at least be considered as some-
all things applies particularly to the true, good, thing about which men might reach agreement
and beautiful. Man measures truth, goodness, —
through argument opinions about beauty
and beauty by the effect things have upon him, were set apart as useless to dispute. Beauty
according to what they seem to him to be. What being simply a matter of individual taste, it
112
Chapter 6: BEAUTY U3
could afford no basis for argument or reasoning of these related problems. The degree to which
— no objective ground for settling differences the three problems must be considered inter-
of opinion. dependently is determined by the extent to
From the ancient skeptics down to our own which each of the three terms requires the con-
dav, men have noted the great variety of traits, text of the other two for its definition and anal-
often sharply opposed, which have been con- ysis.
"We fancy its forms," Montaigne says of beau- Beauty is, perhaps, not definable in any strict
ty, "according to our appetite and liking . . . sense of definition. But there have been, never-
Indians paint it black and tawny, with great theless, many attempts to state, with the brevi-
swollen lips, big flat noses, and load the carti- ty of definition, what beauty is. Usually notions
lage betwixt the nostrils with great rings of gold of goodness, or correlative notions of desire and
to make it hang down to the mouth ... In love, enter into the statement.
Peru, the greatest ears are the most beautiful, Aquinas, for example, declares that "the
and they stretch them out as far as they can by beautiful is the same as the good, and they
art .There are, elsewhere, nations that take
. . differ in aspect only. . . . The notion of good is
great care to blacken their teeth, and hate to that which calms the desire, while the notion
see them white; elsewhere, people that paint is that which calms the desire,
of the beautiful
them red The Italians fashion beauty gross
. . . by being seen or known." This, according to
and massive; the Spaniards, gaunt and slender; Aquinas, implies that "beauty adds to goodness
among us one makes it white, another brown; a relation to the cognitive faculty; so that ^oo^
one soft and delicate, another strong and vig- means that which simply pleases the appetite,
orous .... Just as the preference in beauty is while the beautiful is something pleasant to
given by Plato to the spherical figure, the apprehend."
Epicureans give it to the pyramidal or the Because of its relation to the cognitive pow-
square, and cannot swallow a god in the form er, Aquinas defines the beautiful as "that which
of a ball." upon being seen" {id quod visum placet).
pleases
Like Montaigne, Darwin gives an extensive Hence, he continues, "beauty consists in due
account of the things men have found beauti- proportion, for the senses delight in things duly
ful, many of them so various and contradictory proportioned . . . because the sense too is a
that would seem there could be no objective
it sort of reason, as is every cognitive power."
basis for judgments of beauty. If any consensus The pleasure or delight involved in the per-
is found am.uig individuals about what is beau- ception of beauty belongs to the order of know-
tiful or ugly, the skeptics or relativists usually ing rather than to desire or action. The know-
explain it by reference to the prevalence of ing, furthermore, seems to be different from
certain prejudices, or customary standards, that which is proper to science, for it is con-
which in turn vary with different tribes and cerned with the individual thing rather than
cultures, and at different timxs and places. with universal natures, and it occurs intuitively
Beginning in the sphere of beauty, subjec- or contemplatively, rather than by judgment
tivism or relativism spreads first to judgments and reasoning. There is a mode of truth pe-
of good and evil, and then to statements about culiar to the beautiful, as well as a special kind
truth, never in the opposite direction. It be- of goodness.
comes complete when, as so frequently happens Fully to understand what Aquinas is saying
in our own time, what is good or true is held about beauty we are required to understand
to be just as much a matter of private taste or his theory of goodness and truth. But enough
customary opinion as what is beautiful. isimmediately clear to give meaning to Eric
The problem of the objectivity or subjec- Gill's advice to thosewho are concerned with
tivity of beauty can, of course, be separated making things beautiful: "Look after goodness
from similar problems with regard to truth and and truth," he says, "and beauty will take care
vidual reactions, objects may differ in the de- apart from all interest^ The pleasure that re-
gree to which they possess such properties sults from its contemplation "may be said to be
traits which are capable of pleasing or displeas- the one and only disinterested ?ind free delight;
ing their beholder. for, with it, no interest, whether of sense or
This does not mean that the individual re- reason, extorts approval."
action is invariably in accordance with the ob- The aesthetic experience is for Kant also
jective characteristics of the thing beheld. Men unique in that its judgment "is represented as
differ in the degree to which they possess good universal, i.e. valid for every man," yet at the
perception — and sound criticaljudgment same time it is "incognizable by means of any
even as objects differ in the degree to which universal concept." In other words, "all judge-
they possess the elements of beauty. Once ments of taste are singular judgements"; they
again in the controversy concerning the objec- are without concept in the sense that they do
tivity or subjectivity of beauty, there seems to not apply to a class of objects. Nevertheless,
be a middle ground between the two extreme they have a certain universality and are not
positions, whichupon a beauty intrinsic
insists merely the formulation of a private judgment.
to the object but does not deny the relevance When "we call the object beautiful," Kant
of differences in individual sensibility. says, "we believe ourselves to be speaking with
William James would seem to be indicating a universal voice, and lay claim to the concur-
such a position when, in his discussion of aes- rence of every one, whereas no private sensa-
thetic principles, he declares: "We are once and tion would be decisive except for the observer
for all so made that when certain impressions alone and his liking."
come before our mind, one of them will seem to In saying that aesthetic judgments have sub-
call for or repel the others as its companions." jective, not objective, universality, and in hold-
As an example, he cites the fact that "a note ing that the beautiful is the object of a neces-
sounds good with its third and fifth," Such an sary satisfaction, Kant
seems to take the
also
aesthetic judgment certainly depends upon in- middle position which recognizes the subjec-
dividual sensibility, and, James adds, "to a cer- tivity of the aesthetic judgment without deny-
tain extent the principle of habit will explain ing that beauty is somehow an intrinsic prop-
[it]." But he also points out that "to explain all erty of objects. With regard to its subjective
aesthetic judgements in this way would be ab- character, Kant cites Hume to the effect that
Chapter 6: BEAUTY 115
**although critics are able to reason more plau- thetic" has progressively narrowed, until now
sibly than cooks, they must still share the same it refers almost exclusively to the appreciation
fete." The universal character of the aesthetic of works of fine art, where before it connoted
judgment, however, keeps it from being com- any experience of the beautiful, in the things
pletely subjective and Kant goes to some length of nature as well as in the works of man.
to refute the notion that in matters of the beau- The question is raised, then, whether natural
tilul one can seek refuge in the adage that beauty, or the perception of beauty in nature,
"every one has his own taste." involves the same elements and causes as beau-
The fact that the aesthetic judgment re- ty in art. Is the beauty of a flower or of a flower-
quires universal assent, even though the uni- ing field determined by the same factors as the
versal rule on which it is based cannot be beauty of a still life or a landscape painting.?
formulated, does not, of course, preclude the The affirmative answer seems to be assumed
failure of the object to win such assent from in a large part of the tradition. In his discus-
be available for measuring the taste of individ- With regard to the beauty of nature and of
uals. If beauty is simply objective something — art,Kant tends to take the opposite position.
immediately apparent to observation as are the He points out that "the mind cannot reflect on
simple sensible qualities — no special training the beauty of nature without at the same time
would seem to be needed for sharpening our finding its interest engaged." Apart from any
perception of it. question of use that might be involved, he
The genuineness of the educational problem concludes that the "interest" aroused by the
in the sphere of beauty seems, therefore, to beautiful in nature is "akin to the moral," par-
depend upon a theory of the beautiful which ticularly from the fact that "nature ... in her
avoids both extremes, and which permits the beautiful products displays herself as art, not as
educator to aim at a development of individual a mere matter of chance, but, as it were, design-
sensibilities in accordance with objective cri- edly, according to a law-directed arrangement."
teria of taste. The fact that natural things and works of art
stand in a different relation to purpose or in-
The foregoing considerations also provide terest is for Kant an immediate indication that
background for the problem of beauty in na- their beauty is different. Their susceptibility
ture and in art. As indicated in the chapter on to disinterested enjoyment is not the same. Yet
Art, the consideration of art in recent times for Kant, as for his predecessors, nature pro-
tends to become restricted to the theory of the vides the model or archetype which art fol-
So too the consideration of beauty has
fine arts. lows, and he even speaks of art as an "imi-
become more and more an analysis of excellence tation" of nature.
in poetry, music, painting, and sculpture. In The Kantian discussion of nature and art
consequence, the meaning of the word "aes- moves into another dimension when it con-
116 THE GREAT IDEAS
siders the distinction between the beautiful ject through both knowledge and love. Here
and the subUme. We must look for the sub- again the context of meaning favors the align-
lime, Kant says, "not ... in works of art . . . ment of beauty with love, at least for theories
nor yet in things of nature, that in their very which make beauty primarily an object of con-
concept import a definite end, e.g. animals of templation. In Plato and Plotinus, and on
a recognized natural order, but in rude nature another level in the theologians, the two con-
merely as involving magnitude." In company siderations— of love and beauty— fuse together
with Lx)nginus and Edmund Burke, Kant char- inseparably.
acterizes the sublime by reference to the limi- It is the "privilege of beauty," Plato thinks,
tations of human powers. Whereas the beauti- man the readiest access to the world of
to offer
ful "consists in limitation," the sublime "im- ideas.According to the myth in the Phaedrus,
mediately involves, or else by its presence pro- the contemplation of beauty enables the soul
vokes, a representation of limitlessness," which to "grow wings." This experience, ultimately
"may appear, indeed, in point of form to con- intellectual in its aim,is described by Plato as
greater than himself. This dual mood signal- a downright madman, he would sacrifice to his
izes man's experience of the sublime. Unlike beloved as to the image of a god." When the
the enjoyment of beauty, it is neither disin- soul bathes herself "in the waters of beauty, her
terested nor devoid of moral tone. constraint is loosened, and she is refreshed, and
has no more pangs and pains." This state of
Truth is usually connected with perception the soul enraptured by beauty, Plato goes on
and thought, the good with desire and action. to say, "is by men called love."
Both have been related to love and, in different Sharply opposed to Plato's intellectualiza-
ways, to pleasure and pain. All these terms nat- tion of beauty is that conception which con-
urally occur in the traditional discussion of nects it with sensual pleasure and sexual attrac-
beauty, partly by way of definition, but also tion. W^hen Darwin, for instance, considers the
partly in the course of considering the faculties sense of beauty, he confines his attention almost
engaged in the experience of beauty. entirely to the colors and sounds used as "at-
Basic here is the question whether beauty is tractions of the opposite sex." Freud, likewise,
an object of love or desire. The meaning of while admitting that "psycho-analysis has less
any answer will, of course, vary with different to say about beauty than about most things,"
conceptions of desire and love. claims that "its derivation from the realms of
Desire is sometimes thought of as funda- sexual sensation . . . seems certain."
mentally acquisitive, directed toward the ap- Such considerations may not remove beauty
propriation of a good; whereas love, on the from the sphere of love, but, as the chapter on
contrary, aims at no personal aggrandizement Love makes clear, love has many meanings,
but rather, with complete generosity, wishes and is of many sorts. The beautiful which is
only the well-being of the beloved. In this sexually attractive is the object of a love which
context, beauty seems to be more closely asso- is almost identical with desire — sometimes with
ciated with a good that is loved than with a lust — and certainly involves animal impulses
good desired. and bodily pleasures. "The taste for the beau-
Love, moreover, is more akin to knowledge tiful," writes Darwin, "at least as far as female
than is desire. The act of contemplation is beauty is concerned, is not of a special nature in
sometimes understood as a union with the ob- the human mind."
Chapter 6: BEAUTY 117
On the other hand, Darwin attributes to of ideas; the great poems which crystaUizc
man alone an aesthetic faculty for the appre- beauty in a scene, in a face, in a deed; and,
ciation of beauty apart from love or sex. No above all, the writings of the theologians which
other animal, he thinks, is "capable of atlmiring do not try to do more than suggest the ineffable
such scenes as the heavens at night, a beautiful splendor of God's infinite beauty, a beauty
landscape, or refined music; but such high fused with truth and goodness, all absolute in
tastes are acquired through culture and depend the one absolute perfection of the divine be-
on complex associations; they are not enjoyed ing."The Divine Goodness," observes Dante,
by barbarians or by uneducated persons." For "which from Itself spurns all envy, burning in
Freud, however, the appreciation of such beau- Itself so sparkles that It displays the eternal
that beauty of every kind comes from a "form" simple, and everlasting, which without diminu-
or "reason," traces the "beauty v/hich is in tion and without increase, or any change, is
bodies," as well as that "which is in the soul" imparted to the ever-growing and perishing
to its source in the "eternal intelligence." This beauties of all other things. He who from these,
"intelligible beauty" lies outside the range of ascending under the influence of true love, be-
desire even as it is beyond the reach of sense- gins to perceive that beauty, is not far from
perception. Only the admiration or the adora- the end."
tion of love is proper to it. The order of ascent, according to Diotima,
begins "with the beauties of earth and mounts
These distinctions in types of beauty — nat- upwards for the sake of that other beauty," go-
ural and artificial, sensible and intelligible, ing from one fair form to "all fair forms, and
even, perhaps, material and spiritual — indicate from fair forms to fair practises, and from fair
the scope of the discussion, though not all practises to fair notions, until from fair notions"
writers on beauty deal with all its manifes- we come to "the notion of absolute beauty and
tations. at last know what the essence of beauty is. This,
Primarily concerned with other subjects, my dear Socrates," she concludes, "is the life
many of the great books make only an indirect above all others which man should live, in the
contribution to the theory of beauty: the moral contemplation of beauty absolute."
treatises which consider the spiritual beauty of For Plotinus the degrees of beauty corre-
a noble man or of a virtuous character; the spond to degrees of emancipation from matter.
cosmologies of the philosophers or scientists "The more it goes towards matter the . . .
which find beauty in the structure of the world feebler beauty becomes." A thing is ugly only
—the intelligible, not sensible, order of the because, "not dominated by a form and reason,
universe; the mathematical works which ex- the matter has not been completely informed
hibit, and sometimes enunciate, an awareness by the idea." If a thing could be completely
of formal beauty in the necessary connection "without reason and form," it would be "abso-
—
Even separated from a continuous scale of and on the natural level, every experience of
—
beauty, the extreme terms the beauty of God —
beauty in nature or art, in sensible things or
and the beauty of the least of finite things in ideas —
occasions something li\e an act of
have similitude for a theologian like Aquinas. vision, a moment of contemplation, of enjoy-
The word visum in his definition of the beauti- ment detached from desire or action, and clear
ful (id quod visum placet, "that which pleases without the articulations of analysis or the
upon being seen") is the word used to signify demonstrations of reason.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. The general theory of the beautiful 119
la. The beautiful and the good: beauty as a kind of fitness or order
id. The distinction between the beautiful and the sublime 121
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Homer: Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. Forexample, in53 jAMEs:Pi)'£:Ao/o^^, 116a-119b, the passage
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand sideof thepage, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For exam pie, in 7 Plato: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins m the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
Author's Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as part, bk, ch,
sect) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d.
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., Old Testa-
ment: Nehemiah, 7:45 — (Z)) U Esdras, 7:46.
Symbols: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
Ennead^ tr ii, ch i8, 278a; tr hi, ch ii, 474d-475a / Statesman, 594a-c / Philebus,
287b-c; tr vii, ch 22 332d-333b; ch 31-33 637d-638a / Laws, bk ii, 654a-655b; 660a-
336d-338b 662a
18 Augustine: Confessions, bk ii, par 12 llc-d; 8 Aristotle: Topics, bk hi, ch 3 [118^20-24]
bk IV, par 20 24b-c; par 24-27 25b-26a; 165d / Physics, bk vii, ch 3 [246*10-^19] 329c-
bk X, par 53 84d-85a 330a / Metaphysics, bk i, ch 3 [984^8-22]
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 5, 502d; BK V, CH i [1013*20-24] 533b; bk xii,
A 4, rep I 25d-26c; q 91, a 3, rep 3 486b-487d; CH 7 [1072*23-^4] 602b-c; [1072^30-1073*2]
part i-ii, q 27, A I, rep 3 737b-d 603a; bk xin, ch 3 [1078*31-^6] 609d-610a
120 THE GREAT IDEAS lb to
20 Aquinas : Summa Theologica, part ii-ii, q
(1. The general theory of the beautiful, la. The
180, A 2, REP 3 608c-609c; part hi suppl,
beautiful and the good: beauty as a kind of
Q 94, A I, REP 2 1040d-1041b
fitness or order. ^
27 Shakespeare: Sonnets, xiv 588b; liv 594c
9 Aristotle: Tarts of Animals, bk i, ch 5 29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, part i, 184b-d
[645^4-26] 168d-169a / Ethics, bk iv, ch 2 35 Hume: Human Understandifig, sect i, div 5,
[i 122^34-1 i23''*33l 369a-370b passim / Politics, 452d'453a
BK VII, CH 4 [1326*30-35] 530c / Poetics, ch 7 42 Kant: Judgement, 476a-479d esp 479a- d;
[i45o''23-i45 1^*15] 685b-c 484d-485b; 496d; 501d-502a; 518a-d; 521b-
12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk hi, ch i 175a- 523c;525a-c
177c 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, part ii, 266a-
12 AuRELius: Meditations, bk ii, sect i 256b,d 267a; 278a-c; part iv, 346d-347a
14 Plutarch: Lycurgus, 47a 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, bk vi,
16 Kepler: Epitome, bk iv, 868b 153b-d
17 Plotinus: First Ennead, tr vi 21a-26a/ Eifth 53 James: Psychology, 865b-866a; 886b-888a
Ennead, tr v, ch 12, 234a-c; tr viii 239b-246c 54 Freud New Introductory Lectures, 880b
:
49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 302a-b; 595c- 10-14 88a-89d / Fifth hlnnead, r viii, ch 8-9
1
16:26-27; 43 —
(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 16:26- VI, 383d-388a
CWSS-KEFEKENCES
For: Other discussions of the relation of beauty to goodness and truth, see Good and Evil ic;
Truth ic; and for the relation of grades of beauty to degrees of perfection in being, see
Being 3a.
Unity, order, and proportion as elements of beauty, see Relation 5c.
The consideration of beauty as an object of love or desire, see Desire 2b; Love id.
The theory of the aesthetic judgment or the judgment of taste, see Sense 6; and for the
controversy over the objectivity and universality of such judgments, see Custom 9a;
Relation 6c\ Universal and Particular 7c.
The problem of cultivating good taste and critical judgment in the field of the fine arts, see
Art 7b; Poetry 8a-8b.
The context of the comparison of beauty in nature and in art, see Art 2a-3; Nature 2a, 5d;
Pleasure and Pain 40(1).
Consideration of the kind of knowledge which is involved in the apprehension of beauty, see
Knowledge 63(2), 6c(i).
Another discussion of sensible and intelligible beauty, see Sense 6; and for the intelligible
beauty of God and of the universe, see God 4h; World 6d.
feLV
Chapter 6: BEAUTY 125
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Boo{s of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
^':
Chapter j. BEING
INTRODUCTION
THE words
words
most
the
and "is'* "(is) not" are probably
frequently used by anyone.
philosophy.
it
Though it often leads to subtleties,
also keeps the philosopher in deepest touch
They are unavoidable, by implication at least, with common sense and the speculative wonder
in every statement. They have, in addition, of all men.
a greater range of meaning than any other
words. As A TECHNICAL couccpt in philosophy, being
Their manifold significance seems to be of a has been called both the richest and the empti-
very special kind, for whatever is said not to be est of all terms in the vocabulary of thought.
in one sense of being can always be said to be in Both remarks testify to the same fact, namely,
another of its senses. Children and practiced that it is the highest abstraction, the most uni-
liars know this. Playing on the meanings of be- versal of predicates, and the most pervasive
ing, or with "is" and "not," they move smooth- subject of discussion.
ly from fact to fiction, imagination to reality, William James is in that long line of philoso-
or truth to falsehood. phers which began with the early Greeks when
Despite the obviousness and commonplace- he points out that "in the and ultimate
strict
ness of the questions which arise with any con- sense of the word 'existence,' everything which
sideration of the meanings of "is," the study of can be thought of at all exists as some sort of
being is a highly technical inquiry which only object, whether mythical object, individual
philosophers have pursued at length. Berkeley thinker's object, or object in outer space and
gives one reason why they cannot avoid this for intelligence at large." Even things which do
task. "Nothing seems of more importance," he not really exist have being insofar as they are
says, "towards erecting a firm system of sound objects of thought — things remembered which
and real knowledge . . . than to lay the begin- once existed, things conceivable which have
ning in a distinct explication of what is meant the possibility of being, things imaginary which
by thing, reality^ existence; for in vain shall we have being at least in the mind that thinks
dispute concerning the real existence of things, them. This leads to a paradox which the an-
or pretend to any knowledge thereof, so long cients delighted in pondering, that even noth-
as we have not fixed the meaning of those ing is something, even non- being has being, for
words." before we can say "non-being is not" we must
In the whole field of learning, philosophy is be able to say "non-being is." Nothingis at least
distinguished from other disciplines — from his- an object of thought.
tory, the sciences, and mathematics — by its Any other word than "being" will tend to
concern with the problem of being. It alone classify things. The application of any other
asks about the nature of existence, the modes name will divide the world into things of the
and properties of being, the difference between sort denominated as distinct from everything
being and becoming, appearance and reality, else. "Chair," for example, divides the world
the possible and the actual, being and non- into things which are chairs and all other ob-
being. Not all philosophers ask these questions; jects;but "being" divides something or any-
nor do all who ask such questions approach or thing from nothing and, as we have seen, even
formulate them in the same way. Nevertheless, applies to nothing.
the attempt to answer them is a task peculiar to "All other names," Aquinas writes, "are
126
j
Chapter 7: BEING 127
either less universal, or, if convertible with it, in this sense, 'being' becomes the richest of
, add something above it at least in idea; hence terms— the one which has the greatest ampli-
in a certain way they inform and determine tude of meaning.
it." The concepts which such words express
have, therefore, a restricted universality. They Both ways of thinking about being arc rele-
, apply to all things of a certain l^ind, but not to vant to the problem of the relations among the
all things, things of every kind or type. With various meanings of 'being.' Both are also re-
the exception of a few terms inseparably associ- lated to the problem of whether being is one or
ated with 'being' (or, as Aquinas says, converti- many— the problem first raised by the Eleatics,
ble with it), only being is common to all kinds exhaustively explored in Plato's Parmenides,
of things. When every other trait peculiar to a and recurrent in the thought of Plotinus, Spi-
thing is removed, its being remains — the fact noza, and Hegel.
that it is in some sense. The two problems are connected. If every-
If we start with a particular of any sort, clas- thing that is exists only as a part of being as a
sifying it progressively according to the char- whole, or if the unity of being requires every-
acteristics which it shares with more and more thing to be the same in being, then whatever
things, we come at last to being. According to diversities there are do not multiply the mean-
this method of abstraction, which Hegel fol- ings of being. Although he speaks of substance
lows in his Science of Logic, 'being' is the empti- rather than of being, Spinoza argues that
est of terms precisely because it is the com- "there cannot be any substance excepting God,
monest. It signifies the very least that can be and consequently none other can be con-
thought of anything. On this view, if all we are ceived." From this it follows that "whatever
told of something is that it is — that it has being is, is in God, and nothing can be or be con-
—we learn as little as possible about the thing. ceived without God."
We have to be told that a thing is a material or Since "there cannot be two or more sub-
a spiritual being, a real or an imaginary being, a stances of the same nature or attribute," and
hving or a human being, in order to apprehend since God is defined as a "substance consisting
a determinate nature. Abstracted from every- of infinite attributes, each one of which ex-
thing else, 'being' has only the positive meaning presses eternal and infinite essence," it is ab-
. of excluding 'non-being.' surd, in Spinoza's opinion, to think of any
There is an opposite procedure by which the other substance. "If there were any substance
term being has the maximal rather than the besides God, it would have to be explained,"
minimal significance. Since whatever else a he "by some attribute of God, and thus
says,
thing is, it is a being, its being lies at the very two substances would exist possessing the same
heart of its nature and underlies all its other attribute," which is impossible.
properties. Being is indeterminate only in the Spinoza's definition of substance, attribute,
i
sense that on every sort of determina-
it takes and mode or affection, combined with his axi-
: tion. Wherever being is found by thought, it om that "everything which is, is either in itself
is understood as a determined mode of being. or in another," enables him to embrace what-
To conceive being in this way, we do not re- ever multiplicity or diversity he finds in the
move every difference or determination, but on world as aspects of one being. Everything
the contrary, embrace all, since all are differ- which is not substance, existing in and of itself,
ences or determinations of being. exists in that one substance as an infinite attri-
Aquinas, for example, conceives "being tak- bute or a mode. "The thing extended
finite
en simply as including all perfections of being" {reni extensam) and the thinking thing {rem
and in the Judaeo-Christian tradition, 'being' cogitantem),'' he writes, "are either attributes
without qualification is taken as the most prop- of God or affections of the attributes of God."
^
er name for God. When Moses asked God His If, on the contrary, there is no unitary whole
\
name, he received as answer: "I AM THAT I of being, but only a plurality of beings which
AM . . . Thus shalt thou say unto the children are alike in being and yet are diverse in being
of Israel, I AM hath sent me unto you." Used from one another, then our conception of being
a
we understand to be supremely perfect" — Des- place, he adds that "besides all these there is
cartes defines two kinds of finite substance. that which 'is' potentially or actually."
"That substance in which thought immediately All these senses of being, according to Aris-
resides, I call Mind," he writes; and "that sub- totle, "refer to one starting point," namely,
stance, which is the immediate subject of ex- substance, or that which has being in and of
tension in space, and of the accidents that pre- itself. "That which is primarily, i.e., not in a
suppose extension, e.g., figure, situation, move- qualified sense," he writes, "must be a sub-
ment in space, etc., is called Body." All these stance." But when he also says that "that
substances, and even their accidents, have be- which 'is' primarily is the 'what' which indi-
ing, but not being of the same kind or to the cates the substance of a thing," he seems to be
same degree. "There are," according to Des- using the words "substance" and "essence'*
cartes, "diverse degrees of reality, or (the qual- interchangeably. This, in turn, seems to be re-
ity of being an) entity. For substance has more lated to the fact that, although Aristotle dis-
reality than accident or mode; and infinite sub- tinguishes between actual and potential being,
stance has more than finite substance." Its be- and between necessary or incorruptible and
ing is independent, theirs dependent. contingent or corruptible beings, he, like Plato
The between Spinoza and Descartes
issue — and unlike Aquinas, Descartes, or Spinoza,
single substance or many —
is only one of the does not consider whether the essence and exist-
ways in which the problem of the unity or di- ence of a being are identical or separate.
versity of being presents itself. Both Plato and It may be held that this distinction is im-
Aristotle, for example, affirm a multiplicity of plied, since a contingent being is one which is
separate existences, but though both are, in able not to exist, whereas a necessary being
this sense, pluralists, being seems to have one cannot not exist. A contingent being is, there-
meaning for Plato, many for Aristotle. fore, one whose essence can be divorced from
According to Plato's distinction between be- existence; a necessary being, one which must be
ing and becoming, only the immutable es- precisely because its essence is identical with
sences, the eternal ideas, are beings, and though its existence. But the explicit recognition of a
they are many in number, they all belong to real distinction between essence and existence
one realm and possess the same type of being. seems to be reserved for the later theologians
But for Aristotle, not only do perishable as well and philosophers who conceive of an infinite
and eternal being; but the being which sub- possession of all perfections, but even more
stances possess is not the same as that of acci- fundamentally in its requiring no cause outside
dents; essential is not the same as accidental itself for its own existence. "That thing," says
being; potential being is not the same as being Aquinas, "whose being differs from its essence,
actual; and to be is not the same as to be con- must have its being caused by another. That . . .
ceived, that is, to exist in reality is not the which has being, but is not being, is a being by
same as to exist in mind. participation." Where Aristotle makes sub-
Chapter 7: BEING 29
stance the primary type of being, and the being qua being —
both what it is and the prop-
"starting-point" of all its other meanings, erties which belong to it qua being."
Aquinas makes the infinite being of God, As pointed out in the chapter on Meta-
\ whose very essence it is to be, the source of physics, it is an historical accident that this
'
all finite and participated beings, in which there inquiry concerning being came to be called
is a composition of existence and essence, "metaphysics." That is the name which, ac-
or "of that whereby they are and that which cording to legend, the ancient editors gave to a
they are'' collection of writings in which Aristotle pur-
Since "being itself whereby a thing
is that sued this inquiry. Since they came after the
is," being belongs to God primarily and to all books on physics, they were called "meta-
other things according to modes of derivation physics" on the supposition that .\ristotle in-
or participation. God and his creatures can be tended the discussion of being to follow his
called "beings" but, Aquinas points out, not in treatise on change and motion.
the identically same sense, nor yet with utter If one were to invent a word to describe the
diversity of meaning. A similarity — a sameness- science of being, would be "ontology," not
it
in-diversity or analogy — obtains between the "metaphysics" or even "theology." Yet "meta-
unqualified being of God and the being of all physics" has remained the traditionally accept-
other things, which have being subject to vari- ed name for the inquiry or science which goes
ous qualifications or limitations. beyond physics — or all of natural science — in
All other questions about being are affected that it asks about the very existence of things,
by the solution of these basic problems con- and their modes of being. The traditional con-
cerning the unity of being, the kinds of being, nection of metaphysics with theology, discussed
and the order of the various kinds. If they are in the chapters on Theology and Meta-
—
solved in one way in favor of unity certain — physics, seems to have its origin in the fact
questions are not even raised, for they are gen- that Aristotle's treatiseon being passes from a
uine only on the basis of the other solution consideration of sensible and mutable substan-
which finds being diverse. The discussion, in the ces to the problem of the existence of imma-
I
chapters on Same and Other, and on Sign terial beings, and to the conception of a divine
AND Symbol, of sameness, diversity, and anal- being, purely actual, absolutely immutable.
ogy is, therefore, relevant to the problem of In a science intended to treat "of that which
how things are at once alike and unlike in being. is primarily, and to which all the other cate-
gories of being are referred, namely, substance,"
The Greeks, notably Plato and Aristotle, Aristotle says, "we must first sketch the nature
began the inquiry about being. They realized of substance." Hence he begins with what he
that after all other questions are answered, calls "the generally recognized substances.
there still remains the question, What does it These are the sensible substances." He post-
mean to say of any thing that it is or is not ? After pones until later his critical discussion of "the
we understand what it means for a thing to be Ideas and the objects of mathematics, for some
a man, or to be alive, or to be a body, we must say these are substances in addition to the sen-
still consider what it means for that thing sim- sible substances"; yet he directs his whole in-
ply to be in any way at all; or to be in one sense, quiry to the ultimate question "whether there
and not to be in another. are or are not any besides sensible substances."
The discussion of being, in itself and in rela- His attempt to answer this question in the
tion to unity and truth, rest and motion, runs twelfth book makes it the theological part of
through many dialogues of Plato. It is central his Metaphysics.
in the Sophist and Parmenides. The same terms
and problems appear in Aristotle's scientific Though their order of discussion is different,
treatise which makes being its distinctive sub- the metaphysicians of the 17th century, like
ject matter, and which he sometimes calls "first Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibnitz, deal with
philosophy" and sometimes "theology." It be- many, if not all, major points in the analysis
longs to this science, he declares, "to consider of being which the Greek philosophers initi-
130 THE GREAT IDEAS
ated and the mediaeval theologians developed. Freedom, and Immortality, and it aims at
Later philosophers, whose main concern is with showing that the second conception, conjoined
the origin and validity of human knowledge, with the first, must lead to the third as a neces-
come to the traditional metaphysical questions sary conclusion."
through an analysis, not of substance or essence, Hegel, on the other hand, does not approach
existence or power, but of our /^^^i of substance the problem of being or reality through a cri-
and power. tique of knowledge. For Hegel, as for Plotinus
This transformation of the ancient problem before him, the heart of metaphysics lies in
of being is by Berkeley in almost epi-
stated understanding that "nothing is actual except
grammatic form. Considering "what is meant the Idea" or the Absolute, "and the great thing
by the term exist ^ he argues from the experi- is to apprehend in the show of the temporal
ence of sensible things that "their esseispercipi, and the transient, the substance which is imma-
nor is it any exist-
possible they should have nent, and the eternal which is present." Plo-
ence, out of theminds or thinking things which tinus calls the absolute, not the Idea, but the
perceive them." Locke, too, although he does All-one, yet he tries to show that the One is the
not identify being with perception, makes the principle, the light, and the life of all things,
same shift on the ground that "the first step just as Hegel reduces everything to a manifes-
towards satisfying several inquiries the mind of tation of the underlying reality of the Absolute
man was apt to run into, was to make a survey Idea.
of ourown understandings, examine our own Despite all such changes in terminology, de-
powers, and see to what things they were spite radical differences in philosophical princi-
adapted." ple or conclusion, and regardless of the attitude
Once the problems of being are viewed first taken toward the possibility of metaphysics as a
in terms of the mind, the questions for the science, the central question which is faced by
philosopher become primarily those of the rela- anyone who goes beyond physics, or natural
tion of our definitions to real and nominal es- philosophy, is a question about being or exist-
sences, the conditions of our knowledge of ex- ence. It may or may not be asked explicitly,
istence, and the identification of the real and but it is always present by implication.
ideal with perceptible matters of fact and intel- The question about God, for example, or
ligible relations between ideas. free will or immortality, is first of all a question
For Kant the basic distinction is between about whether such things exist, and how they
the sensible and supra-sensible, or the phenom- exist. Do they have reality or are they only
enal and noumenal, realms of being. From an- fictions of the mind ? Similarly, questions about
other point of view, Kant considers the being the infinite, the absolute, or the unconditioned
of things in themselves apart from human ex- are questions about that primary reality apart
perience and the being of natural things or, from whose existence nothing else could be or
what is the same for him, the things of experi- be conceived, and which therefore has an exist-
ence. The former are unconditioned, the latter ence different from the things dependent on it
conditioned, by the knowing mind which is for their being. Here again the first question is
formative or constitutive of experience. whether such a reality exists.
"The sole aim of pure reason," Kant writes, Enough has been said to indicate why this
"is the absolute totality of the synthesis on the discussion cannot consider all topics which have
side of the conditions ... in order to preposit some connection with the theory of being. To
the whole series of conditions, and thus present try to make this Introduction adequate even
them to the understanding a priori^ Having for the topics outlined here, under which th(
obtained these "conditions," we can ascend references to the great books are assembled,
through them "until we reach the uncondi- would be to make it almost co-extensive in scope
tioned, that is, the principles." It is with these with the sum of many other Introductions all, —
ideas of pure reason that metaphysics, accord- in fact, which open chapters dealing with meta-
ing to Kant, properly deals. Instead oi being, its physical concepts or problems.
object consists in "three grand ideas: God, It is to be expected, of course, that the special
Chapter 7: BEING 131
problems of the existence of God, of an immor- criticisms. Yet his opponents tried to preserve
. tal soul, and of a free will should be treated in the reality of cliange, without having to accord
the chapters on God, Immortality, and Will. it the fullness of being. The Greek atomists, for
I
But it may not be realized that such chapters example, think that change cannot be explained
as Cause, Eternity, Form, Infinity, Idea, except in terms oi permanent beings in fact —
I Matter, One and Many, Same and Other, eternal ones. Lucretius, who expounds their
^ Relation, Universal and Particular— all views, remarks that in any change "something
these and still others cited in the Cross-Refer- unchangeable must remain over, that all things
ences below —
include topics which would have be not utterly reduced to nothing; for when-
to be discussed here if we were to try to cover ever a thing changes and quits its proper limits,
all relevant considerations. at once this change of state is the death of that
Reasons of economy and intelligibility dic- which was before." The "something unchange-
tate the opposite course. Limiting the scope of able" is thought to be the atom, the absolutely
this Introduction to a few principal points in indivisible, and hence imperishable, unit of
the theory of being, we can also exhibit, matter. Change does not touch the being of the
through the relation of this chapter to others, atoms, "but only breaks up the union amongst
the interconnection of the great ideas. The var- them, and then joins anew the different ele-
ious modes of being (such as essence and exist- ments with others; and thus it comes to pass
ence, substance and accident, potentiality and that all things change"— that is, all things com-
actuality, the real and the ideal) and the basic posite, not the simple bodies of solid singleness
correlatives of being (such as unity, goodness,
— "when the clashings, motions, arrangement,
truth) are, therefore, left for fuller treatment position, and shapes of matter change about."
in other contexts. But two topics deserve fur- In a conversation with Cratylus, who favors
ther attention here. One is the distinction be- the Heraclitean theory of a universal flux, Soc-
tween being and becoming, the other the rela- rates asks, "How can that be a real thing which
tion of being to knowledge. is never in the same state?" How "can we
reasonably say, Cratylus," he goes on, "that
The fact of change or motion — of coming to there is any knowledge at all, if everything is in
be and passing away — is so evident to the senses a state of transition and there is nothing
that it has never been denied, at least not as an abiding"?
experienced phenomenon. But it has been re- When he gets Glaucon to admit in the Repub-
garded as irrational and unreal, an illusion per- lic that "being is the sphere or subject matter of
petrated by the senses. Galen, for instance, knowledge, and knowing is to know the nature
charges the Sophists with "allowing that bread of being," Socrates leads him to see the correla-
in turning into blood becomes changed as re- tion of being, not-being, and becoming with
gards sight, taste, and touch," but denying knowledge, ignorance, and opinion. "If opinion
that "this change occurs in reality." They ex- and knowledge are distinct faculties then the
plain it away, he says, as "tricks and illusions of sphere of knowledge and opinion cannot be the
our senses . . . which are affected now in one same ... If being is the subject matter of
way, now in another, whereas the underlying knowledge, something else must be the subject
substance does not admit of any of these matter of opinion," It cannot be not-being, for
changes." "of not-being ignorance was assumed to be the
The familiar paradoxes of Zeno are reductio necessary correlative."
ad absurdum arguments to show that motion is Since "opinion is not concerned either with
unthinkable, full of self-contradiction. The way being or with not-being" because it is obviously
of truth, according to Parmenides, Zeno's mas- intermediate between knowledge and igno-
ter in the Eleatic school, lies in the insight that rance, Socrates concludes that "if anything ap-
whatever is always was and will be, that noth- peared to be of a sort which is and is not at the
ing comes into being out of non-being, or same time, that sort of thing would appear also
passes out of being into nothingness. to lie in the interval between pure being and
The doctrine of Parmenides provoked many absolute not-being," and "the corresponding
132 THE GREAT IDEAS
faculty isneither knowledge nor ignorance, but If to exist is to be completely actual, then
will be found in the interval between them." changing things and change itself do not fully
This "intermediate flux" or sphere of becom- exist. They exist only to the extent that they
ing, this "region of the many and the variable," have actuality. Yet potentiahty, no less than
can yield only opinion. Being, the realm of the actuality, is a mode of being. That potentiality
"absolute and eternal and immutable [Ideas]," —power or capacity— belongs to being seems
is the only object that one "may be said to also to be affirmed by the Eleatic Stranger in
know." Plato's Sophist. "Anything which possesses any
Aristotle would seem to agree with Plato sort of power to affect another, or to be affected
that change "partakes equally of the nature of by another," he says, "if only for a single mo-
being and not-being, and cannot rightly be ment, however trifling the cause and however
termed either, pure and simple." He points slight the effect, has real existence ... I hold,"
out that his predecessors, particularly the Eleat- he adds, "that the definition of being is simply
ics, held change to be impossible, because they power."
believed that "what comes to be must do so The basic issue concerning being and becom-
either from what is or from what is not, both of ing, and the issue concerning eternal as opposed
which are impossible." It is impossible, so they to mutable existence, recur again and again in
argued, since "what is cannot come to be (be- the tradition of western thought. They are in-
cause it is already), and from what is not noth- volved in the distinction between corruptible
ing could have come to be." Aristotle concedes and incorruptible substances (which is in turn
the cogency of this argument on one condition, connected with the division of substances into
namely, that the terms 'being' and 'not-being' corporeal and spiritual), and with the nature of
are taken "without qualification." But his God as the only purely actual, or truly eternal,
whole point is that they need not be taken with- being. They are implicit in Spinoza's distinc-
out qualification and should not be, if we wish tion between natura naturans and natura natw
to explain change rather than make a mystery rata, and in his distinction between God's
is "a sort of actuality, but incomplete . . . hard be no scientific treatment of the accidental . . .
to grasp, but not incapable of existing." for the accidental is practically a mere name.
Chapter 7: BEING 133
'
And," he adds, "Plato was in a sense not wrong ultimate reality we can know. "The secondary
in ranking sophistic as dealing with that which sensible qualities," he writes, "are nothing but
being and pass out of being by a process, but Hobbes exemplifies still another view. "A
things which are accidentally do not." But man can have no thought," he says, "represent-
though he rejects the accidental as an object of ing anything not subject to sense." Hobbes
science, he does not, like Plato or Plotinus, ex- does not object to calling bodies "substances,"
clude the whole realm of sensible, changing but thinks that when we speak of "an incorpo-
things from the sphere of scientific knowledge. real body, or (which is all one) an incorporeal
For him, both metaphysics and physics treat of substance," we talk nonsense; "for none of these
sensible substances, the one with regard to their things ever have, or can be incident to sense;
mutable Beings the other with regard to their but are absurd speeches, taken upon credit
—
being mutable their becoming or changing. (without any signification at all) from deceived
For Plotinus, on the other hand, "the true and deceived, or deceiving,
Philosophers,
sciences have an intelligible object and contain Schoolmen."
no notion of anything sensible." They are di- He enumerates other absurdities, such as "the
rected, not "to variable things, suffering from giving of names of bodies to accidents, or of
all sorts of changes, divided in space, to which accidents to bodies," e.g.^ by those who say
the name of becoming and not being belongs," that "extension is body." Criticism of the fallacy
but to the "eternal being which is not divided, of reification — the fallacy first pointed out by
existing always in the same way, which is not Ockham and criticized so repeatedly in con-
born and does not perish, and has neither space, —
temporary semantics also appears in Hobbes'
place, nor situation but rests immovable in
. . . warning against making substances out of ab-
itself." stractions or universals "by giving the names of
> According to another view, represented by bodies to names or speeches."
Locke, substance is as such unknowable, wheth-
er it be body or spirit. We use the word "sub- Whenever a theory of knowledge is concerned
stance" to name the "support of such qualities, with how we know reality, as opposed to mere
which are capable of producing simple ideas in appearances, it considers the manner in which
us; which qualities are commonly called acci- existing beings can be known — by perception,
dents." The sensible accidents are all that we intuition, or demonstration; and with respect
truly know and "we give the general name sub- to demonstration, it attempts to formulate the
stance" to "the supposed, but unknown, sup- conditions of valid reasoning about matters of
port of those qualities we find existing." Some fact or real existence. But it has seldom been
of these sensible accidents are what Locke calls supposed that reality exhausts the objects of
"primary qualities" — the powers or potentiali- our thought or knowledge. We can conceive
ties by which things affect one another and also possibilities not realized in this world. We can
our senses. imagine things which do not exist in nature.
But to the extent that our senses fail to dis- The meaning of reality — of real as opposed
cover "the bulk, texture, and figure of the mi- to purely conceptual or ideal being — is derived
nute parts of bodies, on which their constitu- from the notion of thinghood, of having being
tions and differences depend, we are fain to outside the mind, not merely in it. In tradition-
1 make use of their secondary qualities, as the al controversies about the existence of ideas
i
characteristical notes and marks whereby to or of universals, the objects of mathematics, or
frame ideas of them in our mind." Neverthe- relations — it is not the being of such things
less, powers — which are qualities or accidents, which is questioned, but their reality, their
not substances — seem to be, for Locke, the existence outside the mind. If, for example,
134 THE GREAT IDEAS
fi
ideas exist apart from minds, the minds of men personal need, and second, to whatever farther
and God, they have real, not ideal, existence. things continuously belong with these."
If the objects of mathematics, such as numbers The self or ego is the ultimate criterion of
and figures, have existence only as figments of being or reality. "The world of living realities
the mind, they are ideal beings. as contrastedwith unrealities," James writes,
The judgment of the reality of a thing, James "is thusanchored in the Ego. That is the
. . .
thinks, involves "a state of consciousness sui hook from which the rest dangles, the absolute
generis'^ about which not much can be said support. And as from a painted hook it has
"in the way of internal analysis." The focus of been said that one can only hang a painted
this problem in modern times is indicated by chain, so conversely from a real hook only a
James' phrasing of the question, "Under what real chain can properly be hung. Whatever things
circumstances do we think things real?" And have intimate and continuous connection with my
James gives a typically modern answer to the life are things of whose reality I cannot doubt.
question. Whatever things fail to establish this connection
He begins by saying that "any object which are thingswhich are practically no better for
remains uncontradicted is ipso facto believed me than if they existed not at all." James
and posited as absolute reality." He admits would be the first to concede toany critic of his
that "for most men the 'things of sense'
. . . . . . position, that its truth and good sense depend
are the absolutely real world's nucleus. Other upon noting that word "practically," for it is
things," James writes, "may be real for this "the world of 'practical realities' " with which
man or that — things of science, abstract moral he professes to be concerned.
relations, things of the Christian theology, or
what not. But even for the special man, We can in conclusion observe one obvious
these things are usually real with a less real measure of the importance of being in philo-
reality than that of the things of sense." But sophical thought. The major isms by which the
his basic conviction is that "our own reality, historians of philosophy have tried to classify
that sense of our own life which we at every its doctrines represent affirmations or denials
moment possess, is the ultimate of ultimates for with respect to being or the modes of being.
our belief. 'As sure as I exist!' — this is our utter- They are such antitheses as realism and ideal-
most warrant for the being of all other things. ism; materialism and spiritualism; monism, du-
As Descartes made the indubitable reality of alism, and pluralism; even atheism and theism.
the cogito go bail for the reality of all that the Undoubtedly, no great philosopher can be so
cogito involved, so all of us, feeling our own simply boxed. Yet the opposing isms do indi-
present reality with absolutely coercive force, cate the great speculative issues which no mind
ascribe an all but equal degree of reality, first to can avoid if it pursues the truth or seeks the
whatever things we lay hold on with a sense of ultimate principles of good and evil.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
1. Diverse conceptions of being and non-being: being as a term or concept; the meanings
of is and is not 136 I
4^. Being as the measure of truth in judgments of the mind: clarity and distinctness
as criteria of the reality of an idea
5. Being and becoming: the reality of change; the nature of mutable being
']a. The distinction between essence and existence: existence as the act of being
(5) Substance as subject to change and to different kinds of change: the role of
accidents or modifications 145
(6) The nature and kinds of accidents or modifications
7c. The distinction between potentiality and actuality: possible and actual being 146
(i) The order of potentiality and actuality
7(^. The distinction between real and ideal being, or between natural being and
being in mind
(i) The being of the possible 148
7^. The distinction between appearance and reality, between the sensible and supra-
sensible, between the phenomenal and noumenal orders
8^. Being and becoming in relation to intellect: abstraction and intuition 151
8c. Essence or substance as the object of definition: real and nominal essences
%d. The role of essence in demonstration: the use of essence, property, and accident
in inference 152
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Homer: Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 James Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 Plato: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
Author's Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as part, bk, ch,
sect) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d.
Bible References The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
:
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., Old Testa-
ment: Nehemiah, 7:45— (D) // Esdras, 7:46.
Symbols: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
232d; CH 25 [180*32-38] 248c / Physics, bk i, 66b-67d, A 10, ANS 72c-73c; q 14, a 9, ans
CH 2 [185*20-^4] 260a-b; ch 3 [186*23-187*10] 83b-d; q 16, a 3, rep 2 96b-d; q 22, a 4, rep 3
261b-262a; ch 5 [188*18-23] 263c; bk hi, ch 6 131c-132b; q 29, a i, rep 4 162a-163b; qq
[206*13-34] 284b-d; bk v, ch i [225*20-29] 44-45 238a-250a; q 48, a 2, rep 2 260c-261b;
305b-c / Generation and Corruption, bk i, ch 3 Q 54, A 2, ANS 285d-286c; q 104 534c-538c;
413c-416c passim / Metaphysics, bk i, ch 3-10 Q 105, A 5, ANS 542a-543b; part i-ii, q 2, a 5
501c-511d passim; bk hi, ch 3 [998^14-28] esp REP 2-3 618d-619c
517b-c; bk iv, ch 2 [1003*33-^10] 522b; ch 5 20 Aquinas Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q
: 61,
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 120c-129c esp 121a-124d, 438d / Meteorology, bk iv, ch 12 [389^23-
12 6a- 128b / Judgement, 566c- 390*17] 493d-494b / Metaphysics, bk i, ch 6
53 James: Psychology, 104a-107b esp 104a-b; 505b-506b; ch 7 [988*34-^5] 506c; ch 8
215b-216a;406b [989^21-990*8] 507d-508a; ch 9 508c-511c;
bk II, CH I [993^19-31] 512a-b; bk iv, ch 4
3. Being and good [1008^32-1009*5] 528b; BK IX, ch 9 [1051*4-
Old Testament: Genesis, 1 22] 577a-b; bk xii, ch 5 [1071*30-36] 601a;
New Testament: / Timothy, 4:4 CH 7 602a-603b; ch 10 605d-606d; bk xiii,
7 Plato: Phaedrus, 124c-125b / Republic, bk ch 2 [1077*14-^14] 608b-609a; bk xiv, ch 4
383d-398c / Timaeus, 447b-448b
vi-vii, [io9i*29]-CH 5 [1092*17] 624a-625a / Soul,
8 Aristotle: Topics, bk vi, ch 5 [143*9-12] BK III, CH 4 [429*29-^4] 661c-d
196c; CH 6
[145*19-27] 198d-199a; ch 8 [146^9- 9 Aristotle :Parts of Animals, bk i, ch 5
147*11] 200c-201a; ch 12 [149^31-39] 204b-c / [644^20-645*5] 168c-d/ Generation ofAnimals,
Generation and Corruption, bk ii, ch id BK CH I [731^^24-33] 272a-b / Ethics, bk i,
II,
';19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q i, a i, sect 24-25 120a-d; Bfe 11, ch viii, sect 1-6
REP 1-2 3b-4a; q 3, a 4, rep i 16d-17c; q 5, 133b-134a; ch xiii, sect ii 150d-151b; sect
A 2 24b-25a; q ii, a 2, rep 4 47d-48d; q 14, 25-26 154a-c; ch xxiii, sect 5 205a-b; sect
A 9, rep I 83b-d; q 16, aa 3-4 96b-97c; q 79, 15 208c-d; SECT 32 212c-d; ch xxxii 243c-
A 7, ANS 420d-421c; a 9, rep 3 422b-423d; 248b passim, esp sect 19 247a-b; bk hi, ch
Q 82, A 4, rep I 434c-435c; q 87, a 3, rep i VI, SECT 46-47 281d-282b; bk iv, ch v, sect
467b-468a; part i-ii, q 3, a 7, ans 628a'd; 7-9 330b-331a; ch x, sect 7 350d-351a; ch
Q 9, A I, ans and rep 3 657d-658d; q 10, a i, x, sect 19-CH XI, sect I 354a-c; ch xi, sect
'^'
REP 3 662d-663d i2 357c-d
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 94, 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 36b-c; 85d-88a; 179c-
A 2, ANS 221d-223a 182b / Pref Metaphysical Elements of Ethics,
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part iv, 269b-270c 367d-368a / Judgement, 603d-604b
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 40a-48d esp 53 James: Psychology, 141a'142a; 636a; 638a-
40a-41b, 43a-c, 43d-45a 641a; 879b-882a esp 881a-b
31 Descartes: Discourse, part iv, 53b-d /
Objections and Replies, 261a , Being and becoming: the reality of change;
the nature of mutable being
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part ii, prop 44, corol 2
and DEMONST 390a 7 Plato: Cratylus, 94c-d; 99b-104b; 113c-114a,c
35 Locke Human Understanding, bk ii, ch vii,
: J Phaedrus, 124c-126c / Symposium, 165c-166b;
SECT 7 132d 167a-d / Phaedo, 231b-232b; 247b-248c /
^42 Kant: Pure Reason, la-4a,c; 119a-c; 120b Republic, bk ii, 322d-323a; bk v, 368c-373c;
[fn i] / Judganent, 551a-552c; 603d-607c esp bk vi-vii, 383d-398c; bk viii, 403a-b / Ti-
606d-607c maeus 442a-477a,c esp 447a-d, 455c-458b /
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, pref, 6a- 7a; Parmenides A^Qa-Slld/ Theaetetus, 517d-534b
part III, par 360 113d'114a,c / Philosophy of / Sophist, 561d-574c / Statesman, 587a-b /
History, intro, 156d-157b; part i, 234b-c; Philebus, 610d-617d; 631d-635a esp 634b-635a
245d-246c / Laws, BK x, 760a-765c
8 Aristotle: Physics, bk i 259a-268d esp ch 8
Ab. Being as the measure of truth in judgments 267a-d; bk ii, ch i 268b,d-270a; bk hi, ch
of the mind: clarity and distinctness as 1-3 278a-280c; ch 6 [206^18-^16] 284c-285a;
criteria of the reality of an idea bk IV, CH II [219^23-31] 299c-d; bk vi, ch 6
*•
7 Plato: EuthydemMS, 71c-74a esp 72b-c / 319c-321a / Heavens, bk i, ch 3 360d-362a;
'^
Cratylus, 85a-89b / Parmenides, 507c-509a esp CH 9 [277^29-278^9] 369a-d; bk iv, ch 3
508d-509a / Sophist, 558c-d; 575a-577b [310^22-311^12] 402b-c; ch 4 [311^29-33] 403c
8 Aristotle: Categories, ch 5 [4^10-^12] 8b-9a; / Generation i, ch 3 413c-
and Corruption, bk
ch 10 [12^6-15] 17d-18a; ch 12 [14^10-21] 20b 416c; bk II, CH 9-M 436d-441a,c / Meta-
15 to 6 Chapter 7: BEING 141
104c-105b; par 28 105c-d; bk xih, par 48 124a 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 2,
/ Christian Doctrine, bk i, ch 9 627a; bk ii, ch A 3, ANS 12c-14a; q 3, a 4, ans 16d-17c; a 5,
38 654b-c REP 2 17c-18b; Q 5, A 2, REP 1-2 24b-25a; q 8,
19 Aquinas Summa Theologica, part i, q 2, a 3,
: A I 34d-35c; a 2, ans 35c-36b; a 3, ans and
ANs 12c-14a; q 4, a i, rep i 20d-21b; q 9, a i, REP I 36b-37c; a 4, ans 37c-38c; q 9, a 2,
ANS 38c-39c; q 10, a 4, rep 3 43b-44b; a 5, ANS 39c-40d; q 14, a 8 82c-83b; qq 44-46
ans 44b-45c; q 26, a i, rep 2 150b-c; q 29, 238a-255d; q 57, a 2, ans and rep 2 295d-
a r, rep 4 162a-163b; q 65, a 4 342b-343c; 297a; q 61, a i 314d-315b; q 65 339a-343c;
Q 86, A 3 463b-d; part i-ii, q 10, a i, rep 2 q 75, A 6, rep 2 383c-384c; q 104 534c-538c;
662d-663d Q 105, A 3, ANS 540c-541b; a 5, ans 542a-
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 543b; part i-ii, q 18, a 4, ans 696b-d
no, A 2, rep 3 349a-d; part hi, q 62, a 4, 28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 443b-c
REP 2 861a-862a; part hi suppl, q 91, a 3, 31 Descartes: Discourse, part v, 55d-56a /
REP 2 1020d-1022c Meditations, iii, 87c-d / Objections and Re-
22 Chaucer: A^m^/i/VT^/e [2987-3040] 209a-210a plies, AXIOM IX 132b; 213b-d
25 Mo^tkig^-e: Essays, 292a-294b 31 Spinoza: Ethics, part i, def i 355a; prop 17,
/31 Descartes: Discourse, part iv, 52d / Objec- scHOL 362c-363c; prop 24-29 365a-366c;
and Replies, 212a
tions PROP 33 367b-369a; part ii, prop 6-7 374d-
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part i, def 2 355a; part ii, 375c; prop 10, schol 376d-377a; prop 45,
PROP 31 385b-c SCHOL 390b
142 THE GREAT IDEAS 7 to7h
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 280
(6. The cause of existence^ 94d-95a / Philosophy of History, intro, 165a-
32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk hi [80-134] 137a- b; 178c-d; part i, 233d-234b
138a; bk viz 217a-231a esp [162-169] 220b, 53 James Psychology, 640b [fn i]; 644b
:
[601-640] 230a-231a
35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk ii, ch xv, lb. The distinction between substance and
SECT 12 165b-c; ch xxvi, sect 1-2, 217a-c attribute, accident
or modification: inde-
35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, sect 2-4 pendent and dependent being
413b-414a; sect 25-33 417d'419a; sect 36 8 Aristotle: Categories, ch 2 [1*20-^9] 5b-c;
419c-d; SECT 45-46 421b-c; sect 48 422a; CH 5 6a-9a; ch 7 [8^12-^24] 13a-d / Topics,
sect 88-91 430a-431a; sect 146-150 442a- bk V, CH 4 [i33'^i5-i34*4] 184d-185b / Sophis-
443b tical Refutations,CH 7 [169*33-36] 233a; ch 22
35 Hume: Human Understanding, sect viii, div [178^37-179*10] 246c / Physics, bk i, ch 2
74, 484a [i85*2o]-CH 3 [187*10] 260a-262a/ Metaphysics,
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 140b,d-145c; 177b-179b BK CH 9 [990^22-991*2] 509a; [992^18-24]
I,
132b-c; 158b-162a passim; 217d-218a a 2, ANS and rep 3 2b-4a; q 50, a 2 7c-8a; q
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part i, def 8 355c; axiom 52, A I, ANS 15d-18a; q 53, a 2, rep 3 21a-d;
7 355d; PROP 7 356c; prop 8, schol 2 356d- Q 66, A 4, ANS 78c-79b; part ii-ii, q 23, a 3,
357d; PROP 11 358b-359b; prop 17, schol, rep 3 485a-d; part hi, q 2, a i, ans 710a-
363 b-c; prop 20 363d-364a; prop 24-25 365a- 711c; PART III SUPPL, Q 70, A I, ANS 893d-
b; PROP 34 369a; part ii, def 2 373b; axiom i 895d; Q 79, A I, REP 4 951b-953b; q 83, a 3,
373c PART III, prop 7 399a; part iv, def 3
; ANS 978c-980d
424a 30 Bacon: Novum Organum, bk i, aph 66, 114d-
35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk hi, ch v, 115a
SECT 1-6 263d-265a; bk iv, ch ix, sect i 349a 31 Descartes: Discourse, part i, 41d; part iv,
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 179c-182b; 191d-192b 52d / Meditations, iii 81d-89a passim, esp
mi) to 7b{2) Chapter 7: BEING 143
87b-88c / Objections afid Replies, def v 130b-c; 287d-290a; bk iv, chvi, sect 4-16 331d-336d
DEF IX 130d: 135b-136b; 136c; 139b-c; 153d; passim, esp sect ii 334b 335b
162d-165d; 170d; 211b-c; 228c-229c 35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, sect 6-7
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part i, def 3-5 355b; axiom 414b-c; sect 26-27 418a-b; sect 73 427b-c;
1-2 355c-d; prop 1-9 355d-357d; prop 10, SECT 88-91 430a-431a; sect 135-136 440a-b;
SCHOL 358a-b; prop 19 363c-d; prop 20, SECT 139 440d
COROL 2 364a; prop 21-23 364a-365a 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 15b-c; 63a; 63d-64a;
35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk i, ch hi, 69c-72c;74b-76c;81b-83b;86c-87b;91d-93b;
SECT 19 117c-d; BK II, CH XII, SECT 3-6 147d- 95a-d; lOOd-lOlb; 121a-128b; 131c-d; 137a-
148c; CH xiii, SECT 17-20 152a-d; ch xxiii 140c; 162b-163a; lS6h'd / Judgement, 565b-d;
204a-214b esp sect 1-15 204a-208d;cH xxxii, 566d-567a
sect 24 247c-d; bk hi, ch ix, sect 12-13 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part in, par 146
287d-288d 55c-d / Philosophy of History, intro, 156d-
35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, sect 1-7 157b; PART I, 211a-c; 227d-228a
413a-414c; sect 25-33 417d-419a passim; 53 James: Psychology, 221b; 223a
sect 49 422b; sect 73-78 427b-428b; sect
88-91 430a-431a; sect ior-102 432c-433a 7^(2) Corporeal and spiritual substances, com-
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 33a-d; 74b- 76c; 130b- posite and simple substances: the kinds
133c esp 131c-d; 140b,d-143a / Practical of substance in relation to matter and
Reason, 310d-311d / Judgement, 529c-530a; form
550a-551a.c; 566b-d; 580c-d 8 Aristotle: Physics, bk i, ch 7 265b-267a;
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, additions, 26 BK II, CH I 268b,d-270a; bk iv, ch 2 288b-
121a-b; 39 122d / Philosophy of History, intro, 289a / Heavens, bk i, ch 9 [277^26-278^9]
160c-161a; part i, 211a-c 369a-d; bk iv, ch 4 [312*12-17] 403d / Gen-
53 ] AMES -.Psychology, 572a-b eration and Corruption, bk i, ch 3 413c-416c /
Meteorology, bk iv, ch 12 493d-494d / Meta-
E7^(l) The conceptions of substance physics, bk III, ch i [995^13-18] 514a; [995^31-
8 Aristotle: Categories, ch 5 6a-9a; ch 7 39] 514b; [996*13-15] 514c; ch 2 [997*34-
[8*12-^24] 13a-d / Metaphysics, bk v, ch 8 998*19] 516a-d; ch 4 [999*24-^23] 518a-c; ch
538b-c; bk vii-viii 550b,d-570d; bk x, ch 2 5 520c-521b; ch 6 [1002^11-32] 521b-d; bk v,
580b-d; bk xii, ch i 598a-c; bk xiii, ch 2 CH 8 538b-c; bk vii-viii 550b,d-570d; bk xi,
[io77'*i4-^ii] 608b-609a CH I [1059*33-^14] 587b-c; ch 2 [1060*3-27]
12 Aurelius: Meditations, bk vii, sect 23 281b 588a-b; [1060^23-29] 588d-589a; bk xii-xiv
17 Plotinus: Sixth Ennead, tr i, ch 2-3 252c- 598a-626d / Soul, bk ii, ch 1-2 642a-644c
253b; ch 10 257b-258b; ch 25 265b-d; tr hi, 12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk iv, ch ii, 240d-
CH 2-10 281c-286d 241a
19 Aquinas Summa Theologica, part i, q 3,
: 12 Aurelius: Meditations, bk iv, sect 21 265b-
A 5, REP 1-2 17c-18b; a 6 18C'19a; q ii, a 3, c; bk vii, sect 23 281b; bk viii, sect ii
ANS 49a-c; q 13, a 9, ans 71b-72c; qq 29-43 286b; BK XII, sect 30 310a-b
161d-237a,c passim, esp q 29, a 2 163b-164b; 17 Plotinus: Second Enneady tr iv, ch 2-4
Q 45, a 4 244d-245c; qq 75-76 378a-399b 50b-51a; ch 6 51d-52a; tr v, ch 2 58b-d /
passim; q 88, a 2, rep 4 471c-472c; part i-ii, Third Ennead, tr vi, ch 7-19 110d-119a /
Q 17, a 4, ans 688d-689c Fourth Ennead, tr viii, ch 6 203d-204b /
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part ii-ii, q 4, Fifth Ennead, tr i, ch 2 208c-209b; tr ix, ch 3
A I, ans and rep i 402a-403d; part hi, qq 1-3 247b-d / Sixth Ennead, tr i, ch 27-28 266c-
701b,d-730b; q 17 806d-809d passim; part hi 267c; tr hi, ch 2-10 281c-286d; tr v, ch 5-8
suppL, Q 83 974d-983b passim 307a-308c
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part hi, 172b 18 Augustine: Confessions, bk vii, par 1-2 43b-
30 Bacon: Nofum Organum, bk ii, aph 37 168d- 44a; par 7 45a-d; par 16 48c-49a; par 20 49d;
169c par 26 51c-d; bk xii, par 5-6 lOOa-c; par 8
31 Descartes: Objections and Replies, def v- lOla-b; par 16 102d-103a; par 18-22 103a-
vinl30b-d;153c-155c 104b; par 24-26 104c-105b; par 28-30 105c-
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part i, def 3,6 355b; prop 106c; par 38-40 108d-110a; bk xiii, par 48
1-9 355d-357d; prop 11-14 358b-360a; prop 124a / City of God, bk xi, ch 10 327d-328d
15, SCHOL 360b-361d; prop 19 363c-d; part 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 3
II, prop 10 376c-377a 14a-20c; q 6, a 3, rep i 29c-30b; q 7, a i, ans
35 Locke: Pluman Understanding, bk i, ch hi, 31a-d; q 8, a i, rep 2 34d-35c; a 2 35c-36b;
SECT 19 117c-d; bk ii, ch xii, sect 6 148b-c; Q 9, A 2, rep 3 39c-40d; q 11, a 4, rep 3 49d'
CH XIII, SECT 17-20 152a-d; ch xxiii 204a- 50b; Q 14, a 2, rep 1,3 76d-77d; q 18, a 4,
214b; CH xxxi, sect 6-13 240d-243b; ch rep 3 107d-108c; q 29, a i, rep 4 162a-163b;
xxxii, SECT 24 247c-d; bk hi, ch vi, sect 21 A 2, REP 3,5 163b-164b; q 40, a i, rep i 213b-
273c-d; sect 42 280b-c; ch ix, sect 11-17 214b; Q 45, A 4 244d-245c; q 50 269a-275a;
144 THE GREAT IDEAS 7b{3>) to 7b{^)
31 Descartes: Discourse, part iv, 51d-52a / A 4, ans 5a-6a; q 85, a 6 182d-184a; part
Meditations, vi 96b-103d / Objections and Re- ii-ii, q 24, A II, ANS 498b-499c; part m
plies, DEF vi-viii 130c-d; 153c-155c SUPPL, q 91, A I 1016b-1017c; aa 4-5 1022d-
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part i, prop 15 360a-361d; 1025b
part ii, prop 1-2 373d-374a; prop 6 374d- 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, paradise, vii [64-84]
375a; prop 7, schol 375b-c 115d-116a;[i2i-i48]116b-c;xni[52-87]126a-b
35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk ii, ch xhi, 31 Descartes: Objections and Replies, 127c-d
SECT i6-i8 151d-152c; ch xv, sect ii 165a-b; 31 Spinoza: Ethics, part i, prop 6-8 356b-357d;
CH XXI, sect 2-4 178c-179c; ch xxiii, sect 5 PROP 12-13 359b-d; prop 15, schol, 361d
205a-b; sect 15-37 208c-214b; ch xxvii,sect 32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk i [i 16-156] 96a-
7^(5) Substance as subject to change and to 7b(6) The nature and kinds of accidents or
diflferent kinds of change: the role of modifications
accidents or modifications 8 Aristotle: Categories, ch 2 [i*20-''9J 5b c;
8 Aristotle: Categories^ ch 8b-9a
5 [4*10-^19] CH 4 5d-6a; ch 5 [2*27-^5} 6b-c; [3*6-21] 7b;
/ Physics, BK I, CH 6-bk ii, ch i 264c-270a; CH 6-9 9a-16d / Prior Analytics, bk i, ch 1:5
BK in, CH 1-3 278a-280c; bk v-viii 304a-355d [32^4-14] 48b-c / Posterior Analytics, bk 1, en 4
/ Generation and Corruption, bk i, ch 1-5 [73''33-^i6] lOOb-d / Topics, bk i, ch 9 147a-b
;. ,409a-420b; bk ii, ch 9-10 436d-439c / Meta- / Physics, BK I, ch 2 [i85'^2o-i86*4] 260a-d; ch
physics, RK I, CH 3 [983''7-984^8] 501d-502c; 4 [188*5-13] 263b; BK II, CH i [192^35 39]
bk III, cH 4 [999*24-^24] 518a-c; BK VII, cH 7-9 269a; bk iv, ch 3 [210^1-8] 289b-c; bk vii, ch
555a-558a; bk viii, ch i [io42*24-*'7] 566b-d; 3 329a-330d / Metaphysics, bk v, ch 6 [1015'*
CH ch 4-5 568d-569d;
3 [1043^15-23] 568a-b; 16-34] 536a-b; ch 7 ['ioi7'*23-3o] 537d-538a;
BK IX,570b,d-571b; ch 3 572a-c; ch 6-7
ch i CH 9 [ioi7*^27-ioi8''3] 538c; ch 30 547a-d;
573c-575a; bk xi, ch 9 593d-594d; ch ii BK vii, CH I [io28''io-i8] 550b; ch 4-6 552b-
596a-d; ch 12 [io68'*7-''26] 596d-597d; bk 555a; bk viii, ch 4 [i044*'8-2o] 569b; bk x,
XII, ch 1-5 598a-601a / Soul, bk ii, ch 4 ch 9 586a-c; bk xii, ch i [1069*18-25] 598a /
[416^8-17] 646d-647a Sense and the Sensible, ch 6 [445*^4-446*20]
10 Galen: Natural Faculties, bk i, ch 2 167b- 683b 684c
168c; ch bk ii, ch 4, 187a-b; bk hi,
5 169b-c; 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk i [449-482]
CH ch 15, 214d-215d
7 203b-205a; 6c-7a
17 Plotinus: Second Ennead, tr i, ch 3-4 36b- 17 Plotinus: Second Ennead, tr vi 60c-62d /
37b; TR IV, ch 6 51d-52a; tr vi, ch 1-2 60c- Sixth Ennead, tr i, ch 4-24 253b-265b; ch 30
62b / Third Ennead, tr vi, ch 7-19 llOd- 268b-c
119a 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 3,
19 Aquinas: Surnma Theologica, part i, q 3, A 6 18c-19a; q 8, a 2, rep 3 35c-36b; q 9, a 2,
A 6, ANs 18c-19a; q 9, a 2 39c-40d; q 41, a 3 ANS 39c-40d; q 28, a 2 158d-160a; q 29, a 2,
219d'221c; a 5 222b-223b; q 44, a 2 239b- ANS and REP 4-5 163b-164b; q 44, a 2,
240a; q 45, aa 1-5 242a-247a passim; a 8 ANS 239b-240a; q 45, a 4, ans 244d-245c;
249b-250a; q 50, a 5 274b-275a; q 53 280d- Q 54, A I 285a-d; a 3 286c-287b; q 66,
284d; Q 65, A 4 342b-343c; q 66, aa 1-2 343d- A I, REP 3 343d-345c; q 67, a 3 351b-352a;
347b; Q 67, A 3, ANs and rep i 351b-352a; Q 76, A 6 396a-d; a 8, ans 397d-399b;
Q 73, A 3 371d-372c; q 75, a 6 383c-384c; Q 77 399b-407a passim; q ioi, a i, rep i 522c-
Q 76, A 4 393a-394c; q 78, a 2, ans and rep 4 523a; q 108, a 5, ans 555d-558b; q 115, a i,
409a-410a; q 90, a 2, ans and rep 2 481d-482c; ans and rep 3,5 585d-587c; a 6, ans 591d-
Q 92, A 3, REP I 490c-491b; q 98, a i 516d- 592d; q 116, a i, ans 592d-593d; part i-ii,
517d; Q 104 534c-538c; q 105, aa 1-2 538d- q 2, A 6, ANS 619d-620d; q 7 651d-655a
540c; A 5, ANS 542a-543b; q 115, aa 1-3 585d- passim; q 17, a 4, ans 688d-689c; q 18, a 3
589c; A 6, ans 591d-592d; q 118, a i 600a- 695d-696b; q 35, a 4, ans and rep 2 774d-
601c; Q 119 604c-608d; part i-ii, q 22, a i 775d
720d-721c 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, qq
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 51, 49-54 la-25d passim, esp q 49, aa 1-2 Ib-
A 2, ANS and REP 1-2 13c-14b; q 52, aa 1-2 4a; Q 56, A I, rep 1,3 30a-c; part ii-ii, q 23,
15d-19a; q 53, a i, rep i 19d-21a; a 2, rep 1-3 A 3, REP 3 485a-d; q 24, a 5, ans and rep i
21a-d; q iio, a 2, rep 3 349a-d; part hi 492b-493d; part ni, q 2, a 6 716b-718b;
suppL, q 75, a 3, ANS 938a-939d; q 80, a 4 part III suppL, q 70, A I, ANS 893d-895d;
959c-963a; q 82, aa 1-2 968a-971a; q 83, a i q 79, A I, REP 4 951b-953b; q 83, a 3 978c-
974d-976b; a 5, ans 981b-982c; q 84 983c- 980d
989b; Q 86, a a 2-3 993c-996a,c 23 HoBBEs: Leviathan, part i, 57a-b; 59c-d
30 Bacon: Novum Organum, bk i, aph 66, 30 Bacon: Novum Organum, bk i, aph 66, 114d-
li5a-b 115a
31 Descartes: Objections and Replies, 162d- 31 Descartes: Discourse, part i, 41d / Objec-
165d tions and Replies, 135b-136b 136c 162d-165d
; ;
{lb. The distinction between substance and attri- 7c(l) The order of potentiality and actuality
bute, accident or modification: independent 8 Aristotle: Interpretation, ch 13 [23*21-26]
and dependent being. lb{6) The nature 35b-c / Physics, bk hi, ch i [201*19-27] 278d /
and kinds of accidents or modifications.) Heavens, bk iv, ch 3 [310^22-311*12] 402b-c /
SECT 2 239b-d; bk hi, ch iv, sect i6 263b-c; Metaphysics, bk hi, ch 6 [1002^32-1003*5]
CH IX, SECT 13 288a-ci 521d; BK V, CH II [1019*1-14] 540a; bk vh, ch
35 Berkeley: Hu?nan Knowledge, sect 1-15 9 [1034^16-19] 558a; bk ix, ch 8-9 575b-577c;
413a-416a; sect 25 417d-418a; sect 49 422b; BK XII, CH 5 [1071*30-36] 601a; ch 6-7 601b-
sect 73 427b-c; sect 78 428a-b; sect 102 603b
432d-433a 17 Plotinus: Second Ennead, tr v 57d-60c /
35 Hume: Human Understanding, sect xii, div Third Ennead, TK vi, ch 7, llla-b; ch i i, 113b-
122 SOSc-d c; ch 14-15 115b-116c; tr ix, ch 3, 137d-138a
53 ] AMES -.Psychology, 503a-b; 572a-b; 650b-651a / Sixth Ennead, tr i, ch 15-22 260c-264c
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 3, a i,
7c. The distinction between potentiality and ANS 14b-15b; a 8, ans 19d-20c; q 4, a i, rep 2
actuality: possibleand actual being 20d-21b; a 2, ans 21b-22b; q 9, a i, ans
8 Aristotle: ch 9 [19^6-^4] 29b-
Interpretation, 38c-39c; q ii, a 2, rep i 47d-48d; q 25, a i,
d; CH 35b-c / Topics, bk v, ch 8
13 [23^18-26] rep 2 143d-144c; g 94, a 3, ans 504a-505a;
[138^27-139*9] 191c-d/ Physics, bk hi, ch 1-3 PART i-ii, q 2, A 7, ANS 620d-621c; q 3, a 2,
278a-280c; bk iv, ch 9 [217^20-^26] 297a-c / ANS 623a-624b; q 9, a i, ans 657d-658d; q 22,
Heavens, bk hi, ch 2 [301^33-302*9] 393b / a 2, REP I 721c-722c
Metaphysics, bk iv, ch 5 [1009*22-39] 528d; 20 Aquinas Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 50,
:
77d-78b; a 4, ans 78b-79a; q 18, a i, ans a 2, ANS 21b-22b; q 5, a i, rep i 23c-24a; q 14,
104c-105c; A 3, REP I 106b-107c; a 4, rep A 2, ans and rep 2-3 76d-77d; q 18, a 3, ans
3 107d-108c; q 25, a i, rep i 143d-144c; and rep i 106b-107c; q 25 143c-150a; q 48,
Q 45, A 5, rep 3 245c-247a; q 46, a i, rep A 4, ANS 262a-263a; q 50, a 2 270a-272a; q 52,
I 250a-252d; q 54, a i, ans 285a-d; a 3, ans AA 1-2 278d-280a; q 58, a i 300c-301a; q 63,
and rep 2 286c-287b; q 75, a i, ans and A I, REP I 325C'326c; q 66, a 2 345d-347b;
rep 2 378b-379c; q 86, a 3 463b-d; q 115, q 75, A 5 382a-383b; a 6, rep 2 383c-384c;
a I, ANS and rep 1,4 585d-587c; part i-ii, q 77, A I 399c-401b; a 3 401d-403a; a 6 404c-
Q 10, A I, REP 2 662d-663d; q 27, a 3 738c- 405c; Q 79, A 2 414d-416a; a 10 423d-424d;
739c q 87, A 2, ANS 466c-467b; q 92, a 4, rep 3
31 Descartes: Meditations, iii, 86d-87a 491b-d; q 104, a 4, rep 2 538a-c; q 105, a 5,
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part iv, def 4 424a ANS 542a-543b; part i-ii, q 3, a 2, ans and
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 90c-91a / Practical Reason, rep i 623a-624b; q 10, a i, rep 2 662d-663d;
291a-292a / Judgement, 570c-571c Q 22, A I 720d-721c
46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, intro, 156d- 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 49,
157b; 160d-161c; 178a-179d A 3 4b-5a; q 50, a 2 7c-8a; a 6 lla-12a; q 51,
7r(3) to Id Chapter 7: BEING \Hh
A 2 13c-14b; Q 55, a 2, ans 27a-d; q 71, a 4,
REP 3 108b-109a ld» The distinction between real and ideal
35 Lockh: Human Understandingy bk ii, ch vii, being, or between natural being and
SKCT 8 132d-133a; ch xxi, sect 1-4 178b- being in mind
179c; SECT 74, 199d-200b; ch xxhi, sect 7 7 Plato: Parmenides, 489a-
205d-206a; sect 28 211b-d 8 \\i\STOTi.v.: Prior Analytics, bk i,ch 36 (4H'*4o-
''966d / Metaphysics, bk v, ch 7 [i or 7^3 1^34)
1
7c(3) Potentiality and actuality in relation to 538a; bk vi, ch 4 550a,c; bk ix, ch 3 [1047'^
matter and form 30-^2] 572c; CH 10 577c-578a,c; bk xii, ch
7
8 Aristotle: Physics, bk i, ch 9 [ic)2'^2^-t,t,] [i072*'i8-24] 602d-603a; cii 9 [io74''35-
268c; BK II, CH I [193*9-^21] 269b-270a; bk 1075*^11] 605c-d / Soul, BK III, CH 4 [429*13-
III, CH 1-3 278a-280c / Heavens, bk iv, ch 3 29] 661b-c; CH 8 [43i''2o-432*9] 664b-c /
[3io''22-3ii''i2] 402b-c / Generation and Cor- Memory and Reminiscence, en i [4
50^' 12-
53 jAMts: Psychology, 233b [fn i]; 301b-302a A 5, REP 2 715a-716b; q 4, a 4, ans and rep 2
733a-734a; part hi suppl, q 92, a i, ans
ld{2) The being of ideas, universals, rights 1025c-1032b
7 Plato: 87d-89a; 113c-114a,c /
Cratylus, 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part i, 55b-c; 59d; part
Phaedo, 224a-225a; 228d-230c; 231b-232b; IV, 262a-b
7d{3) to 7d(^) Chapter 7: BEING 149
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 43d-44c / 589c; BK XII, ch i [io69*:5o-37] 598b; cii 10
Novum Organum, bk i, aph 51 111c; hk ii, aph [1075^25-1076*4] 606c-d; BK XIII, CH i-^607a-
2 137b-c; APH 17 149b-d 610a; CH6-9 611d-618c; bk xiv 619b.d 626d
31 Descartes: Meditations, iii, 84a-85a / Ob- / Soul, BK III, CH 7 [43i''i3-i9| 664b
jections and Replies, 121a-c; def i-iv 130a-b; 9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk i, ch 6 [1096*17-19]
AXIOM VI 132a 341b; bk VI, ch 8 [1142*16-19] 391b
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part ii, prop 37-40 386b- 11 Nicomaciius: Arithmetic, bk i, 811a-812a;
388b 813d-814b
35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk i, ch i, 17 Plotinus: Sixth Ennead, tr vi 310d-321b
SECT 15 98d-99a; bk ii, ch viii 133b-138b 18 Augustine: Confessions, bk x, par 19 76a-b /
passim; ch xi, sect 8-9 145b-c; ch xxii, sect Christian Doctrine, bk ii, ch 38 654b-c
2 201a-b; ch xxx 238a-239b; ch xxxi, sect 2 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 5,
239b-d; ch xxxii, sect 6-8 244b-d; sect A 3, rep 4 25a-d; q 10, a 6, ans 45c-46d; q 11,
14-18 245c-247a; bk hi, ch hi, sect 11-20 A I, REP I 46d-47d; A3, rep2 49a-c; q 30, a i,
257a-260a; ch v-vi 263d-283a passim, esp ch REP 4 167a-168a; q 44, a i, rep 3 238b-239a;
VI, SECT 32-33 277c-278c, sect 36-37 279a- Q 85, A I, REP 2 451c-453c
b; bk IV, ch IV, sect 4-5 324c-d; sect 11-12 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part hi suppl,
326b-d; ch vi, sect 4 331d-332b; ch ix, sect Q 83, A 2, ANS 976c-978c; a 3, rep 2 978c-980d
I 349a; ch xi, sect 4-9 355b-357a 31 Descartes: Rules, xiv, 30b-32a / Discourse,
35 Berkeley: Hiunan Knowledge, intro, sect part IV, 52d-53a / Meditations, i, 76c; v,
i2-i6 408a-409d; sect 2-4 413b-414a; sect 93a-d; v-vi, 96a-b / Objections and Replies,
48-49 422a-b; sect 86-91 429c-431a 169c-170a; 216d-217c; 218c; 228c-229a
35 Hume: Human Understanding, sect xii, div 35 Locke: Human Uttderstanding, bk ii, ch xiii,
122 505c-d sect 5-6 149b-d; bk hi, ch hi, sect 19,
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 93c-99a; 112d-209d esp 259c-d; bk iv, ch iv, sect 5-8 324d-325c
112d-120c, 121a-128b, 129c-145c, 173b-190a; 35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, intro, sect
237b / Fufjd. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 281c- 12-16 408a-409d; sect 12-16 415b-416a; sect
282d / Science of Right, 404d-408b; 416b-417b 118-128 436b-438d passim, esp sect 121-122
/Judgement, 461a-c; 489b-c; 504d-505a; 436d-437c, sect 125-126 438a-c
528d-530c; 542b-544c; 551a-552c; 570b-c 35 Hume: fluman Understanding, sect iv, div 20
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, pref, 6a-7a; 458a-b; sect xii, div 122 505c-d
INTRO, par I 9a; part i, par 66-67 29a-c; 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 16a-b; 17d-18d; 24d-25b;
par 71 31b-c; part hi, par 184 64b; par 280 31b-d; 46a-c; 55c; 62a-d; 68a-69c; 86b-c;
94d-95a; additions, 2 llSd / Philosophy of 87b-c; 91c-d; 94b-95a; 211c-213c; 217c-d /
-I:
History, intro, 156d-190b esp 156d-157b, Practical Reason, 312c / Judgement, 551a-552c
158a-160b, 165a-b; part iv, 364b-c 53 James: Psychology, 874a-878a passim; 880b-
53 James: Psychology, 113a-115a esp 113b-114a; 881a
^r 128a-b; 300a-313a passim, esp 300a-301a,
304b, 307a-b, 309a-311a; 641b-643a passim; ld{4) The being of relations
^
^y 659a-b; 865b; 881b-882a 7 Plato: Phaedo, 242c-245b / Parmenides, 489a-
c / Sophist, 570a-574c
7d{b) The being of mathematical objects 8 Aristotle: Metaphysics, bk i, ch 9 [990^9-17]
7 Plato: Phaedo, 228b-229d / Republic, bk vi, 508d; bk xiv, ch i [1088*15-^4] 620b-d
387b-c; bk vii, 392a-394c; 395c-397a / 9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk i, ch 6 [1096*18-22]
Theaetetus, 535b-c; 541 b-d / Sophist, 562c-d / 341b-c
Philebus, 636b-c / Seventh Letter, 809c-810b 17 Plotinus: Sixth Ennead, tr i, ch 6-9 254d-
8 Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, bk i, ch 13 257a
[79^6-10] 108c; ch 18 [81*40-^5] lllb-c / Top- 19 Aquinas Summa Theologica, part i, q i 3, a 7,
:
ics, bk VI, CH 6 [143^11-33] 197b-c / Physics, ANS and REP 2,4-5 68d-70d; q 28, aa 1-2 157c-
bk II, CH 2 [193^23-194^1 1] 270a-c; bk hi, ch 4 160a; A 4, ANS and rep 1,3-4 160c-161d; q 40,
[203 V9] 280d; ch 5 [204^8-34] 282a-b; bk A2,REP4 214b-215b;Q45, A3,REP 1-3 244a-d
IV, CH I [208^19-24] 287b-c; ch ii [219^5-8] 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part hi, q 2,
299b; ch 14 [223*^21-29] 303a / Metaphysics, A 7, REP 2 718b-d
bk I, CH 5 [985^22-986*21] 503d-504b; ch 6 30 Bacon: Novum Organum, bk i, aph 45 110b
... [987^10-34] 505c-506a; ch 8 [989^^29-990*32] 35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk 11, ch xxv,
^' 508a-c; ch 9 [991^9-992^18] 509d-511a; bk iii, sect I 214d-215b; sect 10 216d-217a; chxxx,
^
ch i [995^13-18] 514a; [996*13-15] 514c; ch 2 SECT 4 238d-239a
^ [997^12-998*19] 516b-d; ch 5 [iooi^26]-ch 6 35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, sect ii, 415a
[1002^25] 520c-521c; bk vii, ch 2 [1028^18-28] 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 24a-33d esp 31d-32c;
551a-b; ch 10 [1035^32-1036*12] 559b-c; ch 61a-64a esp 62d-63c; 72c-85d; 99a-108a,c;
II [1036*^32-1037*4] 560b-c; BK XI, ch 2 119b
[1060*36-^19] 588c-d; ch 3 [1061*29-^4] 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, istro, 156b-c
150 THE GREAT IDEAS 1d{5) to 8«
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: 'Being' as a transcendental term or concept, see Idea 4b(4); Metaphysics 2b; Opposition
meaning of words like "being," and for the theory of 'being' as an
2c; for the analysis of the
analogical term or concept, see Relation id; Same and Other 4c; Sign and Symbol 3d.
The discussion of unity, goodness, and truth as properties of being, or as convertible with
being, see Good and Evil ib; One and Many i; Same and Other la, 2e; Truth ib.
Other treatments of the distinction between being and becoming, and of the problem of the
reality of mutable as compared with immutable being, see Change i, ioc; Eternity 4a-
4b; Matter i; Necessity and Contingency 2c.
Considerations relevant to the distinction between essence and existence, see Form 2a; God
2a-2b, 4a; Necessity and Contingency 2a-2b; Soul 4b; Universal and Particular
2a; for considerations relevant to the distinction between substance and accident, or
between the essential and the accidental, see Form 2c(2); Matter ib; Nature ia(i);
Necessity and Contingency 2d; Quality i; Quantity i; Same and Other 3a;
Soul 2a; and for the problem of the being of qualities, quantities, and relations, see
Quality i; Quantity i; Relation la.
Considerations relevant to the distinction between potentiality and actuality, or matter and
form, see Change 2a; Desire 2a; Form 2c(i); Habit la; Infinity ib, 4c; Matter i-ia,
3b; Mind 2b, 4c; Necessity and Contingency i; for considerations relevant to the dis-
tinction between the real and the ideal, see Idea 3c, 6a-6b; Knowledge 6a(3); and for the
controversy over the real existence of ideas, forms, mathematical objects, universals, see
Form la, 2a; Mathematics 2b; Space 5; Universal and Particular 2a-2c.
Considerations relevant to the distinction between sensible and supra-sensible being, see
Knowledge 6a(i), 6a(4); Mind ia(i).
Elaborations of the theory of substance and treatments of the distinction between material and
immaterial, corruptible and incorruptible substances, see Angel 2; Change loc; Element
5a; Form 2d; Man 3a-3a(i),3b; Matter 2, 2d, 3a; Mind ib, 2a, loc-iod; Soul 3a-3c, 4b.
The relation of being and becoming as objects of knowledge to the faculties of sense and
reason, /^^ Change ii; Knowledge 6a(i); Opinion i; Sense ib.
Essence in relation to the natures of things and to their definitions, see Definition la; Form
3c; Knowledge 6a(2); Nature la, ia(2), 4a.
The relation of the concept 'being' to the principle of contradiction, both as a principle of
being and of thought, see Opposition 2a; Principle ic.
Logical problems concerning judgments of existence and proofs of existence, see God 2c;
Judgment 8c; Knowledge 63(3); Necessity and Contingency 2b; Reasoning 6a.
154 THE GREAT IDEAS
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Boo\s of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibhography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
Bon A VENTURA. Itinerarium Mentis in Deum {The McTaggart. The Nature of Existence, bk i
Itinerary of the Mind to God) Moore. Philosophical Studies, ch 6
Duns Scotus. Tractatus de Primo Principio {A Dewey. Experience and Nature, ch 2, 8, 10
Tract Concerning the First Principle) Heidegger. Sein und Zeit
Crescas. Or Adonai, propositions 18-25 B. Russell. The Analysis of Matter, ch 23
Albo. The Bool^of Principles {Sefer ha-I^j^arim), bk Santayana. The Realm of Essence, ch i-ii
II, CH I Whitehead. Process and Reality
G. Pico della Mirandola. Of Being and Unity Love JOY. The Great Chain of Being
Cajetan. De Conceptu Entis A. E. Taylor. Philosophical Studies, ch hi
SuAREZ. Disputationes Metaphysicae Blondel. Uetre et les etres
John of SaintThomas. Cursus Philosophicus Thomis- Weiss. Reality
ticus, Ars Logica, part ii, qq 2, 13-19 Sartre. Uetre et le neant
Malebranche. Dialogues on Metaphysics and . Existentialism
Religion Maritain. An Introduction to Philosophy, part ii
BK II, ch 23-24 A
Preface to Metaphysics, lect i-iv
.
INTRODUCTION
EXPLANATION is an inveterate human give the genesis of our opinion. Things as differ-
tendency. Even philosophers who think ent as a logical demonstration and a piece of
that we cannot attain to knowledge of causes autobiography seem to be relevant in account-
get involved in explaining why that is so. Nor ing for our convictions; as, in accounting for
will their disputes about the theory of causes our behavior, we may refer to our purposes and
ever remove the word "because" from the vo- to our past.
cabulary of common speech. It is as unavoid-
able as the word "is." "The impulse to seek The Greek word from which our
for cause,
causes," says Tolstoy, "is innate in the soul of English word "aetiology" came into
is derived,
man. the vocabulary of science and philosophy from
The question "Why ?" remains after all other the language of the law courts. In its legal sense
questions are answered. It is sometimes the only itwas used to point out where the responsibility
unanswerable question — unanswerable either in lay. A suit at law is based upon a cause of action;
the very nature of the case or because there are he who demands redress for an injury suffered
secrets men cannot fathom. Sometimes, as Dan- is expected to place the blame. The charge of
te says, man must be "content with the quia,'* responsibility for wrongdoing — the blame or
the knowledge that something is without know- fault which is the cause for legal redress or pun-
ing why. "Why?" is the one question which it ishment — naturally calls for excuses, which may
has been deemed the better part of wisdom not include a man's motives.
to ask; yet it has also been thought the one In the context of these legal considerations^
question which holds the key to wisdom. As two different meanings of cause begin to ap-
Virgil writes, in one of his most famous lines, pear. One man's act is the cause of injury to
Felix, quipotuit rerum cognoscere causas (Happy another, in the sense of being responsible for
the man who has been able to know the causes its occurrence. If the act was intentional, it
can be answered in many ways. Other knowl- These two types of cause appear in the ex-
edge may prove useful in providing the answers. planations of the historians as well as in trials at
A definition, for example, which tells us what a Herodotus and Thucydides, trying to ac-
law.
thing is, may explain why it behaves as it does count for the Persian or the Peloponnesian war,
or why it has certain properties. A narrative, enumerate the incidents which led up to the
which tells us how something happened by de- outbreak of hostilities. They cite certain past
scribing a succession of events, may also be part —
events as the causes of war the factors which
of the total explanation of some event in ques- predisposed the parties toward conflict, and
tion. even precipitated it. The historians do not
In other circumstances, a demonstration or a think they can fully explain why the particular
statement of grounds or reasons may be ex- events become the occasions for war except by
planatory. "How do you know ?" is often a con- considering the hopes and ambitions, or, as
cealed form of the "Why" question. To answer Thucydides suggests, the fears of the contest-
it we may have to give our reasons for thinking ants. For the ancient historians at least, finding
that something or other is the case; or perhaps the causes includes a search for the motives
155
—
156 THE GREAT IDEAS
which underUe other causes and help to explain hausts the number of ways in which the term
how other factors get their causal efficacy. 'cause' is used."
Thucydides explicitly distinguishes these two The production of works of art, to which
kinds of causes in the first chapter of his history. Aristotle himself frequently turns for examples,
After noting tliat the "immediate cause" of the most readily illustrates these four different
war was the breaking of a treaty, he adds that kinds of causes. In making a shoe, the material
the "real cause" was one "which was formally cause is that out of which the shoe is made — the
most kept out of sight," namely, the "growth leather or hide. The efficient cause is the shoe-
of the pow^r of Athens, and the alarm which maker, or more precisely the shoemaker's acts
this inspired in Lacedaemon." which transform the raw material into the
It is sometimes supposed that Thucydides finished product. The formal cause is the pat-
owes his conception of causes to the early medi- tern which directs the work; it is, in a sense,
cal tradition. That might very well be the case, the definition or type of the thing to be
for Hippocrates constantly seeks the "natural made, which, beginning as a plan in the artist's
causes" of disease; and in his analysis of the mind, appears at the end of the work in the
various factors involved in any particular dis- transformed material as its own intrinsic form.
ease, he tries to distinguish between the pre- The protection of the foot is the final cause or
disposing and the exciting causes. —
end that for the sake of which the shoe was
But the classification of causes w^as not com- made.
pleted in the Athenian law courts, in the Greek Two of the four causes seem to be less dis-
interpretation of history, or in the early prac- cernible in nature than in art. The material and
tice of medicine. Causes were also the pre- efficient causes remain evident enough. The
occupation of the pre-Socratic physicists. Their material cause can usually be identified as that
study of nature was largely devoted to an anal- which undergoes the change — the thing which
ysis of the principles, elements, and causes of grows, alters in color, or moves from place to
change. Concerned w4th the problem of change place. The efficient cause is always that by
in general, not merely with human action, or which the change is produced. It is the
particular phenomena such as crime, war, or moving cause working on that which is sus-
disease, Greek scientists or philosophers, from ceptible to change, e.g., the fire heating the
Thales and Anaxagoras to Empedocles, Democ- water, the rolling stone setting another stone
ritus, Plato, and Aristotle, tried to discover the in motion.
causes involved in any change. Aristotle carried But the formal cause is not as apparent in
the analysis furthest and set a pattern for all nature as in art. Whereas in art it can be iden-
prehended under the question 'why.' " This takes on in ripening is the formal cause of its
question can be answered, he thinks, in at least alteration in color. The trouble with the final
four different ways, and these four ways of say- cause is that it so often tends to be inseparable
ing why something is the case constitute his fa- from the formal cause; for unless some extrinsic
mous theory of the four causes. purpose can be found for a natural change
"In one sense," he writes, "that out of which some end beyond itself which the change serves
a thing comes to be and which persists, is called — the final cause, or that for the sake of which
'cause' " — the material cause. "In another sense, the change took place, is no other than the
the form or the archetype" a cause — the for-
is quality or form which the m.atter assumes as a
mal cause. "Again the primary source of the result of its transformation.
change or coming to rest" is a cause the effi- —
cient cause. "Again the end or 'that for the This sunlvIary of Aristotle's doctrine of the
sake of which' a thing is done" is a cause the — four causes enables us to note some of the basic
final cause. "This," he concludes, "perhaps ex- issues and shifts in the theory of causation.
Chapter 8: CAUSE 157
The attack on final causes does not, at the whole of nature exhibits the working out of a
beginning at least, reject them completely. divine plan or design.
Bacon, for example, divides natural philosophy Spinoza answers such questions negatively.
into two parts, of which one part, "physics, "Nature has set no end before herself," he de-
inquireth and handleth the material and effi- clares, and "all final causes are nothing but
cient causes; and the other, which is meta- human fictions." Furthermore, he insists, "this
physics, handleth the formal and final causes." doctrine concerning an end altogether over-
The error of his predecessors, of which he com- turns nature. For that which is in truth the
plains, is their failure to separate these two cause it considers as the effect, and vice versa.'*
types of inquiry. The study of final causes is He deplores those who "will not cease from
inappropriate in physics, he thinks. asking the causes of causes, until at last you fly
"This misplacing," Bacon comments, "hath to the will of God, the refuge of ignorance."
caused a deficiency, or at least a great impro- Spinoza denies that God acts for an end and
ficiency in the sciences themselves. For the that the universe expresses a divine purpose.
handling of final causes, mixed with the rest in He also thinks that final causes are illusory even
physical inquiries, hath intercepted the severe in the sphere of human action. When we say
and diligent inquiry of all real and physical that "having a house to live in was the final
causes, and given men the occasion to stay upon cause of this or that house," v/e do no more than
these satisfactory and specious causes, to the indicate a "particular desire, which is really an
great arrest and prejudice of further discov- efficient cause, and is considered as primary, be-
ery." On this score, he charges Plato, Aristotle, cause men are usually ignorant of the causes of
and Galen with impeding the development of their desires."
science, not because "final causes are not true, Though Descartes replies to Pierre Gassen-
and worthy to be inquired, being kept within di'sarguments "on behalf of final causality," by
their own province; but because their excur- saying that they should "be referred to the
sions into the limits of physical causes hath bred efficient cause," his position more closely re-
a vastness and solitude in that tract." sembles that of Bacon than of Spinoza. When
Such statements as "the hairs of the eyelids we behold "the uses of the various parts in
are for a quickset and fence about the sight," plants and animals," we may be led to admire
or that "the leaves of trees are for protecting of "the God who brings these into existence," but
the fruit, "or that "the clouds are for watering "that does not imply," he adds, "that we can
of the earth," are, in Bacon's opinion, "imper- divine the purpose for which He made each
tinent" in physics. He therefore praises the thing. And although in Ethics, where it is often
mechanical philosophy of Democritus, It seems allowable to employ conjecture, it is at times
to him to inquire into the "particularities of pious to consider the end which we may con-
physical causes" better "than that of Aristotle jecture God set before Himself in rufing the
and Plato, whereof both intermingled final universe, certainly in Physics, where every-
causes, the one as a part of theology, the other thing should rest upon the securest arguments,
as a part of logic." it is futile to do so."
As Bacon's criticisms indicate, the attack on The elimination of final causes from natural
final causes innature raises a whole series of science leads Descartes to formulate Harvey's
questions. Does every natural change serve discoveries concerning themotion of the heart
some purpose, either for the good of the chang- and blood in purely mechanical terms. But
ing thing or for the order of nature itself .f^
Is Harvey himself, as Boyle points out in his Dis-
there a plan, analogous to that of an artist, quisition About the Final Causes of Natural
which orders the parts of nature, and their ac- Thi7igs, interprets organic structures in terms of
tivities, to one another as means to ends? A their functional utility; and Boyle defends the
natural teleology, which attributes final causes soundness of Harvey's method —
employing fi-
to everything, seems to imply that every nat- nal causes — against Descartes.
ural thing is governed by an indwelling form Guided as it is by the principle of utility or
working toward a definite end, and that the function, Harvey's reasoning about the circula-
158 THE GREAT IDEAS
tion of the blood— especially its venal and ar- explanation. Spinoza, in fact, claims that the
terial flow in relation to the action of the lungs reliance upon final causes "would have been
—appeals to final causes. He remarks upon the sufficient to keep the human race in darkness
need of arguing from the final cause in his work to all eternity, if mathematics, which does not
on animal generation. "It appears advisable to deal with ends, but with the essences and prop-
me," he writes, "to look back from the perfect erties of forms, had not placed before us another
animal, and to inquire by what process it has rule of truth."
arisen and grown to maturity, to retrace our Nevertheless, the tendency to restrict causal-
steps, as it were,from the goal to the starting ity to efficiency —
a motion producing a motion
place." —gains headway. By the time Hume questions
Kant generalizes this type of argument in his man's ability to know causes, the term cause
Critique of Teleological Judgement. "No one has signifies only efficiency, understood as the energy
ever questioned," he says, "the correctness of expended in producing an effect. Hume's doubt
the principle that when judging certain things concerning our ability to know causes presup-
in nature, namely organisms and their possi- poses this conception of cause and effect, which
bility, we must look to the conception of final asserts that "there is some connection between
causes. Such a principle is admittedly necessary them, some power in the one by which it in-
even where we require no more than a guiding- fallibly produces the other." The identification
thread for the purpose of becoming acquainted of cause with the efficient type of cause becomes
with the character of these things by means of acommonly accepted notion, even among those
observation." Kant criticizes a mechanism who do not agree with Hume that "we are ig-
which totally excludes the principle of finality norant ... of the manner in which bodies oper-
— whether it is based on the doctrine of "blind ate on each other"; and that "their force and
chance" of Democritus and Epicurus, or the energy is entirely incomprehensible" to us.
"system of fatality" he attributes to Spinoza. The narrowing of causality to efficiency also
Physical science, he thinks, can be extended by appears in the doctrine, more prevalent today
the principle of final causes "without interfer- than ever before, that natural science describes,
ing with the principle of the mechanism of —
but does not explain that it tells us how things
physical causality." happen, but not why. If it does not require the
scientist to avoid all reference to causes, it
The tendency to dispense with final causes does limit him to the one type of causality
seems to prevail, however, in the science of me- which can be expressed in terms of sequences
chanics and especially in the domain of inani- and correlations. The exclusion of all causes ex-
mate nature. Huygens, for example, defines cept the efficient tends furthermore to reduce
motion of some sort of matter."
light as "the the causal order to nothing but the relation of
He explicitly insists that conceiving natural cause and effect.
things in this way is the only way proper to The four causes taken together as the suffi-
what he calls the "true Philosophy, in which cient reason for things or events do not as such
one conceives the causes of all natural effects in stand in relation to an effect, in the sense in
terms of mechanical motions." which an effect is something separable from and
Mechanical explanation is distinguished by externally related to its cause. That way of con-
the fact that it appeals to no principles except ceiving causation — as a relation of cause to
matter and motion. The material and the mov- effect— is appropriate to the efficient cause
ing (or efficient) causes suffice. The philosoph- alone. When the efficient cause is regarded as
ical thought of the 17th century, influenced by the only cause, having a power proportionate to
that century's briUiant accomplishments in me- the reahty of its effect, the very meaning of
chanics, tends to be mechanistic in its theory cause involves relation to an effect.
of causation. Yet, being also influenced by the In the other conception of causation, the
model and method of mathematics, thinkers causal order relates the four causes to one an-
and Spinoza retain the formal
like Descartes other. Of the four causes of any change or act,
cause as a principle of demonstration, if not of the first, says Aquinas, "is the final cause; the
Chapter 8: CAUSE 159
reason of which is that matter does not receive and instrumental causes — become of great sig-
act.But an agent does not move except from or ultimate cause. Aristotle's proof of a prime
the intention of an end." Hence in operation mover, for example, depends upon the proposi-
the order of the four causes is final, efficient, tion that there cannot be an infinite number of
material, and formal; or, as Aquinas states it, causes for a given eff^ect. But since Aristotle
"first comes goodness and the end, moving the also holds that the world is without beginning
agent to act; secondly the action of the agent or end and that time is infinite, it may be won-
moving to the form; thirdly, comes the form." dered why the chain of causes cannot stretch
back to infinity.
As indicated in the chapter on Chanxe, it is in the world has a definite beginning in time."
terms of coincidental causes that Aristotle Though it is a matter of their Jewish and Chris-
speaks of chance as a cause. tian faith that the world had a beginning in
A given eff^ect may be the result of a number time, theologians like Maimonides and Aquinas
of efficient causes. Sometimes these form a se- do not think the world's beginning can be
ries, as when one body in motion sets another in proved by reason. Theydo, however, think that
motion, and that moves a third; or, to take an- the necessity of a first cause can be demon-
other example, a man is the cause of his grand- strated, and both adopt or perhaps adapt the
son only through having begotten a son who argument of Aristotle which relies on the im-
later begets a son. In such a succession of causes, possibility of an infinite regression in causes.
the first cause may be indispensable, but it is The argument is valid, Aquinas makes clear,
not by produce the eff^ect.
itself sufficient to only if we distinguish between essential and
With which it fails to pro-
respect to the effect accidental causes. "It is not impossible," he
duce unless other causes intervene, it is an ac- says, "to proceed to infinity accidentally as re-
cidental cause. In contrast, an essential cause is gards efficient causes. ... It is not impossible
one which, by its operation, immediately brings for man to be generated by man to infinity."
the eff^ect into existence. But, he holds, "there cannot be an infinite num-
Sometimes, however, a number of efficient ber of causes that are per se required for a cer-
causes may be involved simultaneously rather tain eff^ect; for instance, that a stone be moved
than successively in the production of a single by a stick, the stick by the hand, and so on to
eff^ect. They may be related to one another as infinity." In the latter case, it should be ob-
cause and eff^ect rather than by mere coinci- served, the cooperating causes are simultaneous
dence. One cause may be the essential cause of and so if there were an infinity of them, that
another which in turn is the essential cause of would not require an infinite time, llie crux of
the eff^ect. When two causes are thus simulta- the argument, therefore, lies either in the im-
neously related to the same effect, Aquinas calls possibility of an infinite number of simulta-
one the principal, the other the instrumental neous causes, or in the impossibility of an infinite
cause; and he gives as an example the action of number of causes related to one another as in-
a workman sawing wood. The action of the saw strumental to principal cause.
causes a shaping of the wood, but it is instru- Among causes so related, Descartes, like
mental to the operation of the principal cause, Aquinas, argues that there must be one first or
which is the action of the workman using the principal cause. "In the case of causes which are
saw. so connected and subordinated to one another,
These two distinctions between essential — that no action on the part of the lower is possi-
and accidental causes and between principal ble without the activity of the higher; e.g., in
a
professing to conduct us by a new road to the aim." That God governs and cares for all things
desired goal, but bringing us back, after a short may be supposed to reduce nature to a puppet
circuit, to the old path which we had deserted show in which every action takes place in obe-
at its call." Hence the causal proof does not, in dience to the divine will alone. Natural causes
Kant's opinion, succeed in avoiding the fallacies would thus cease to be causes or to have any
which he, along with Maimonides and Aquinas, genuine efficacy in the production of their own
finds in the ontological argument. effects.
the regular processes of nature, still another and until the separation widens between the ex-
kind of divine causation is presupposed by the perimental and the philosophical sciences, the
religious belief in supernatural events, such as possibility of knowing causes is not generally
the elevation of nature by grace and the devia- doubted.
tions from the course of nature which are called Galileo's exposition of the new mechanics
."miracles." All these considerations, and espe- explicitly announces a departure from the tra-
cially the matter of God's miraculous interven- ditional interest of the natural philosopher in
tion in the regular course of nature, have been the discovery of causes. The aim, he says in his
subjects of dispute among theologians and phi- Two New ScienceSy is not "to investigate the
losophers (and sometime physicists and histo- cause of the acceleration of natural motion,
rians). Some of those who do not deny the ex- concerning which various opinions have been
istence of a Creator, or the divine government expressed by various philosophers"; but rather
of the universe through natural law, neverthe- "to investigate and to demonstrate some of the
less question the need for divine cooperation properties of accelerated motion." The "var-
with the action of every natural cause, or God's ious opinions" about causes are referred to as
intervention in the order of nature. "fantasies" which it is "not really worth w hile"
Throughout these controversies, the theory for the scientist to examine.
of causes defines the issues and determines the This attitude toward causes, especially effi-
lines of opposing argument. But since other cient causes, characterizes the aim of mathe-
basic notions are also involved in the debate of matical physics, both in astronomy and me-
these issues, the further consideration of them chanics. For Newton it is enough in fact, he —
is reserved for other chapters, especially God, says, it "would be a very great step in philos-
Nature, and World.
—
ophy" "to derive two or three general prin-
ciples of motion from phenomena though . . .
The discussion of cause takes a new turn in the causes of those principles were not yet dis-
modern times. The new issues arise, not from covered. And, therefore, I scruple not to pro-
different interpretations of the principle of pose the principles of motion . and leave
. .
causality, but from the skeptic's doubts con- their causes to be found out." In other passages,
cerning our ability to know the causes of things, Newton disparages the search for "hidden or
and from the tendency of the physical sciences occult causes" as no part of the business of
to limit or even to abandon the investigation of science.
causes. Hume goes further. He insists that all causes
According to the ancient conception of sci- are hidden. By the very nature of what causes
ence, knowledge, to be scientific, must state the and because of the manner
are supposed to be
causes of things. The essence of scientific meth- which the human mind knows, man can
in
od, according to the Posterior Analytics of Aris- have no knowledge of how causes really pro-
totle, consists in using causes both to define and duce their effects. "We never can, by our ut-
to demonstrate. Sometimes genus and differ- most scrutiny," he says, "discover anything
entia are translated into material and formal but one event following another, without
cause; sometimes a thing is defined genetically being able to comprehend any force or power
by reference to its efficient cause, and sometimes by which the cause operates, or any connexion
teleologically by reference to its final cause. between it and its supposed effect."
The degree to which this conception of sci- All that men can be referring to when they
ence is realized in particular fields may be ques- use the words "cause" and "effect," Hume
tioned. The treatises of the astronomers, for thinks, is the customary sequence of "one ob-
example, do not seem to exemplify it as much ject followedby another, and where all objects
as do Aristotle's own physical treatises or Har- first are followed by objects simi-
similar to the
vey's work on the circulation of the blood. Yet lar to the second." So far as any knowledge
until modern developments in mathematical based upon reason or experience can go, the
physics, the ascertainment of causes seems to be relation of cause and effect is simply one of
the dominant conception of the scientific task; succession, impressed upon the mind "by a
162 THE GREAT IDEAS
customary transition." That one event leads to contingency in the happenings of nature.
another becomes more and more probable but — Against Hume's reduction of statements about
never more than probable— as the sequence causes to probable opinion, Kant insists that,
recurs more and more frequently in experience. in the metaphysics of nature, such judgments
Hume's skepticism about causes, and his re- can be made with absolute certainty. These
interpretation of the meaning of cause, gains related issues are discussed in the chapters on
wide acceptance in subsequent thought, es- Chance, Fate, and Necessity and Contin-
pecially among natural scientists. William gency.
James, for example, considering "the principle In the development of the natural sciences
"
that 'nothing can happen without a cause,' since Hume's day, his translation of cause and
"we have no definite idea of what
declares that effect into observed sequences or correlations
we mean by cause, or of what causality consists reinforces the tendency, which first appears
in. But the principle expresses a demand for with Galileo and Newton, to describe rather
some deeper sort of inward connection between than to explain natural phenomena. Yet to the
phenomena than their merely habitual time- extent that the findings of science bear fruit
sequence seems to be. The word 'cause' is, in in technology, man's control over nature seems
short, an altar to an unknown god; an empty to confirm Bacon's view of science rather than
pedestal marking the place for a hoped-for
still Hume's — at least to the extent that the appli-
statue. Any
really inward belonging- together cation of scientific knowledge to the production
of the sequent terms," he continues, "if dis- of effects implies a knowledge of their causes.
covered, would be accepted as what the word
cause was meant to stand for." The principle of causality that nothing —
Though Hume holds that we cannot pene- happens without a cause or sufficient reason,
trate beyond experience to the operation of or, as Spinoza puts it, "nothing exists from
real causesimbedded in the nature of things, whose nature an effect does not follow" has —
he does not deny the reality of causation as a been made the basis for denials of human free-
principle of nature. On the contrary, he denies dom as well as of chance or contingency in the
that anything happens by chance or that any order of nature. The problem of man's free will
natural occurrence can be uncaused. "It is uni- is discussed in the chapters on Fate, Liberty,
versally allowed," Hume says with approval, and Will, but we can here observe how the
"that nothing exists without a cause of its exist- problem is stated in terms of cause, with re-
ence, and that chance, when strictly examined, spect to both divine providence and natural
is mere negative word, and means not any
a causation.
real power which has anywhere a being in na- If God's will is the cause of everything which
ture." But "though there is no such thing as happens, if nothing can happen contrary to His
chance in the world, our ignorance of the real will or escape the foresight of His providence,
cause of any event has the same influence on thenhow is man free from God's foreordination
the understanding, and begets a like species of when he chooses between good and evil ? If, as
belief or opinion." the theologians say, "the very act of free choice
In other words, Hume's position seems to be is traced to God as to a cause," in what sense
that man's ignorance of real causes, and the can the act be called "free"? Is it not neces-
mere probability of his opinions about custom- sarily determined to conform to God's will and
ary sequences of "cause" and "effect," indicate to His plan } But, on the other hand, if "every-
human limitations, not limits to causal deter- thing happening from the exercise of free
mination in the order of nature itself. Adversar- choice must be subject to divine providence,"
ies of Hume, coming before as well as after must not the evil that men do be attributed to
him in the tradition of the great books, take God as cause }
issue with him on both points. The problem takes another form for the scien-
Against Hume's determinism, which is no tist who thinks only in terms of natural causes,
less complete than Spinoza's, Aristotle, for especially if he affirms a reign of causality in
example, affirms the existence of chance or real nature from which nothing is exempt — just as,
Chapter 8: CAUSE 1<J3[
for the theologian, nothing is exempt from God's give to these questions have profound conse-
vvill. Since the realm of nature includes human qucnces for man's view of himself, the universe,
nature, must not human acts be caused as are and his place in it. As the issue of necessity and
all other natural events? Are some human acts chance is central in physics or the philosophy of
free in the sense of being totally uncaused, or nature, so the issue of determinism and freedom
only in the sense of being caused differently is central in psychology and ethics, in political
from the motions of matter? Are causality and theory and the philosophy of history, and above
freedom opposed principles within the order of all intheology. It makes opponents of James
nature, appropriate to physical and psychologi- and Freud, of Hegel and Marx, of Hume and
cal action; or do they constitute distinct realms Kant, of Spinoza and Descartes, of Lucretius
—as for Kant, the realms of phenomena and and Marcus Aurelius. It raises one of the most
noumena, the sensible and the supra-sensible; perplexing of all Au-
theological questions for
or as for Hegel, the realms of nature and gustine, Aquinas, Pascal, and for the two great
history ? poets of God's will and man's freedom— Dante
The different answers which the great books and Milton.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. The general theory of causation 164
5^. Cause in philosophical and scientific method: the role of causes in definition,
demonstration, experiment, hypothesis 169
ya. Divine causality in the origin and existence of the world: creation and conserva-
tion
yb. Divine causality in the order of nature or change: the first cause in relation to all
other causes
yc. Divine causality in the government of the universe: providence and free will 173
REFERENCES
To numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
find the passages cited, use the
numbers of the passages For example, in 4 Homer: Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d, the
referred to.
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 James Psychology, I16a-119h, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
thepage. For example, in 7 Plato: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
Author's Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as part, bk, ch,
sect) are sometimes included in the reference; hne numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d.
Bible References: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., Old Testa-
ment: Nehemiah, 7:45— (D) // Esdras, 7:46.
Symbols: The abbreviation **esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk vi [703-711] 355b; axiom 3-5 355d; prop 3 356a; prop 8,
89c-d scHOL 2, 357b-d; prop 36 369b; appendix
12 Aurelius: Meditations, bk v, sect 8 269d- 369b-372d; part ii, prop 7, corol and schol
270b 375a-c
17 Plotinus: Third Ennead, tr i, ch i 78a-c; 34 Newton: Principles, bk hi, rule i-ii 270a
ch 4 79d-80a; ch 10 82b / Fourth Ennead, tr 35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk ii, ch xxi,
IV, CH 31 174d-175c / Sixth Ennead, tr vii, sect 1-5 178b-179d; sect 19 182b-c; ch xxii,
ch 2 322b-323a SECT 11 203c-d; ch xxvi, sect 1-2 217a-d
19 Aquinas: Sum7na Theologica, part i, q 2, 35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, sect 25-33
a 3 12c-14a; q 3, a 4, ans 16d-17c; q 33, a i, 417d-419a passim; sect 60-66 424b-426a
REP I 180d-181c; Q 49 264d-268a,c passim; 35 Hume: Human Understanding, sect hi, div
Q 52, A 3, ANS 280a-d; q 65, a i 339b-340b; i8-SECT VIII, DIV 75 457c-485a passim
la io \b Chapter 8: CAUSE 165
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 15a-b; 17c d; 46d-47c; A 858c 859d; a 4 861a 862a; part hi suppl,
I
57c-d; 58d 59b; 63b; 67d-68b [ii\ i]; 76c-83b; Q76, A 1, ANS 939d-941a
95a-d; 133a; 140b,d-143a; 152a-153a; 164a- 22 Chaucer: Tak of Melibeus, par 37 417b
171a; 187c-189a; 214b,d [fn i]; 225c-226b / 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part r, 78c-d
Fund. Prin. Mctaphysic of Morals, 279b,d- 28 Cjilbert: Loadstone, bk ii, 36d
287d csp 285c-286a / Practical Reason, 291a- 28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 335d; 407c;
292a; 294c-295d; 311d-314d; 339a / Judge- 408b; 415b-417a; 425a-429b
ment, 550a-578a csp 550a-551a,c, 555a-558b, 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 43a d; 45a-
564a-c, 566a-b, 568c-570a, 577c-578a; 587a- 46a
591b; 592a-d; 597a-599d; 611d-613a,c 31 Descartes: Meditations, in, 87c-88c; iv,
53 James: Psychology, 885b-886a 90a-b / Objections and Replies, llOc-llld;
axiom viii 132b; 158b-161d passim, esp 158c-
la. The kinds of causes: their distinction and 161b; 212a; 213b-c; 214c; 229c-d
enumeration 31 Spinoza: Ethics, part i, def i 355a; prop ii
7 Plato: Phaedo, 240c-245c / Timaeus, 447b-c; 358b-359b; prop 17, schol-prop 18 362c-
455a-458a; 465d-466a / Sophist, 577d-578b / 363c; prop 28, schol 366a; appendix 369b-
Statesman, 592d-593a; 596a-b/ PAZ/tf^w^, 615c- 372d; PART II, PROP 45, schol 390b; part hi,
619d; 637c-d / Laivs, bk x, 760a-765c esp DEF 1-3 395d-396a; prop 1-3 396a-398c; part
762b-763b IV, pref 422b,d-424a; def 7 424b
8 Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, bk i, ch 2 35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk 11, ch xxvi,
[71^33-72^6] 98b-c; BK II, CH II 128d-129d / sect 2 217b-d
Physics, BK II, CH 3-7 271a-275d esp ch 3 35 Berkeley: Human Knotuledge, sect 51-53
27ia-272c; bk hi, ch 7 [207^35-208*4] 286c; 422d-423a
BK IV, CH I [209^18-23] 288a / Genei'ation and 36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 229b-230a
Corruption, bk ii, ch 9-10 436d-439c / Meta- 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 133a; 164a-171a / Judge-
physics, bk i, ch 3-10 501c-511d; bk ii, ch 2 ment, 550a-551a,c; 553c-555a; 556b-558b;
[994^28-31] 513b; bk III, CH 2 [996*18-^26] 577c-578a; 584c-d; 594b-c
514d-515b; bk v, ch 2 533b-534c; ch 18 543c- 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, intro, 165a-
d; CH 30 547a-d; bk vi, ch 2-3 548c-549d; 166b
bk VII, CH 17 565a-566a,c; bk viii, ch 2 566d-
567d; CH 3 [1043*^5-24] 567d-568b; ch 4 lb. The order of causes: the relation of cause
568d-569b; bk xi, ch 8 [1065*26-^4] 593d; and eflfect
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 2,a3 136a / Physics, bk ii, ch 6 [198*5-13] 275a;
12c-14a; q 3, a 8, rep i 19d-20c; q 4, a 3, CH 8-9 275d-278a,c; bk hi, ch 2 [202*2 ]-ch 3
ANs 22b-23b; q 5, a 2, rep 1-2 24b-25a; a 4 [202*^22] 279c-280c; bk vii, ch 1-2 326a-329a;
25d-26c; q ii, a 3, ans 49a-c; q 13, a 5, ans bk viii 334a-355d / Heavens, bk i, ch 7
and REP I 66b-67d; q 14, a 8, ans and rep i [275*1-^29] 366a-367a / Generation and Cor-
82c-83b; a ii, ans 84c-85c; a 16, rep i 90b- ruption, BK I, CH 7 421d-423b / MetaphysicSy
91b; Q 19, A 6, ans 113c-114d; q 25, a 2, rep BK CH I [993*^23]-cH 2 [994*^30] 512a-513b;
II,
28 Galileo: Ttvo Netv Sciences, first day, 135c- [1040^5-16] 564c; BK IX, CH 2 571c-572a; ch 5
136b 573a-c;ch 7 [1049*12-19] 574d / Soul, bk ii,
28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 390c; 415b- CH 4 [415^8-28] 645d-646a; bk iii, ch 9-13
416c; 426a-429b; 442c-443c; 445c; 447a-b 664d-668d / Sleep, ch 2 [455^13-28] 698b-c
3/0 4 Chapter 8: CAUSE 167
9 Aristotle: Parts of Animals, bk i, ch i 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 71,
[639^12-642*14] 161d-165b / Gait of Animals, A 4, ans and rep 3 108b'109a
CH 2 [704^12-18] 243c / Generation of Animals, 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, purgatory, xvi [52-
BK I, CH I [715*1-7] 255a; bk ii, ch i [734''i7- 84] 77b-d
735*4] 274c-275c 22 Chaucer: 'Troilus and Cressida, bk iv, stanza
10 Galen: Natural Faculties, bk i, ch 12 172d- 138-154 106b-108b / Nun's Priest's Tale
173c; CH 14-17 177a-183d; bk ii, ch 1-7 [15,238-256] 456b-457a
183b,d-191b passim; ch 9, 197b 23 Hobbes: leviathan, part ii, 112d-113c
12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk ii [700-729] 25 Montaigne: Essays, 452a-d
23d-24b 26 Shakespeare: Julius Caesar, act i, sc ii
16 Kepler: EpitomCy bk iv, 930b-931b; 959a- [135-141] 570d
960a 31 Spinoza: Ethics, part i, def 7 355b; prop
19 Aquinas: Summa Theological part i, q 8, 16-17 362a-363c; prop 26-36 365b-369b;
A I, rep 3 34d-35c; q 14, a 8, ans 82c-83b; appendix 369b-372d; part ii, prop 48-49
Q 18, A 3, ANS 106b-107c; q 22, a 2, ans 128d- 391a-394d; part hi, 395a-d; part iv, pref,
130d; Q 70, A 3 365b-367a; q 98, a i, ans 423b-c
516d-517c; part i-ii, q i, a 2 610b-611b 33 Pascal: Provincial Letters, 154b-159a / Pen-
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part hi suppl, sees, 821 331b-332a
12 AuRELius: Meditations, bk v, sect 8 269d- 90b; 291a-295b; 388a; 820b-826a esp 825b-
270b 826b [fn 2]
15 Tacitus: Annals y bk hi, 49c; bk iv, 69a; bk 54 Freud: Origin and Development of Psycho-
VI, 91b-d Analysis, 13c / General Introduction, 454b-c;
17 Plotinus: Third Ennead, tr i 78a-82b esp 486c-487a
ch 4 79d-80a, ch 9-10 82a-b
18 Augustine: City of God, bk v, ch 9-10 213b- 4. The analysis of means and ends in the
216c practical order
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 19, 7 Plato: Lysis, 23a-b / Laches, 29b-c / Gorgias,
AA 3-10 110b-118b passim; q 41, a2 218c-219d; 262a-264b; 280b-d / Republic, bk ii, 310c-d
Q 46, A I, REP 9-10 250a-252d; q 47, a i, rep i 8 Aristotle: Topics, bk hi, ch i [116^22-36]
256a-257b; Q 59, a 3 308b-309a; q 62, a 8, 163b-c / Heavens, bk ii, ch 12 [292*i4-*'26]
REP 2 323c-324a; q 83, a i 436d-438a; q 103, 383d-384b / Metaphysics, bk ii, ch 2 [994^8-
A I, REP 1,3 528b-529a; q 115, a 6, ans 591d- 16] 512d-513a; bk v, ch 2 [1013*32-^3] 533c;
592d; PART I-II, q 10 662d-666a,c; q 13, a 6 [1013^25-28] 533d-534a; bk ix, ch 8 [1050*4-
676c-677b ^i] 575d-576b / Soul, bk hi, ch 10 665d-666d
168 THE GREAT IDEAS 4 to 5a
257c-d; 260a-c; 265c-268b; 271c-279d esp
(4. The analysis of theansand ends in the practical 274d-275b; 282c; 286a-287b / Practical Rea-
order. ^ son, 307a-d; 314d-329a esp 320c-321b, 327d-
9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk i, ch 1-2 339a-d; ch 5 329a; 357c-360d / Pref Metaphysical Elements
340d-341b esp [1096*5-10] 341a-b; ch 6 of Ethics, 367c / Science of Right, 397b-398a /
[1096^8-26] 341d-342a; ch 7 342c-344a pas- Judgement, 477b-c; 478a-b; 557d [fn 2]; 586a-
sim; CH 9 [1099^25-32] 345b; bk hi, ch 3 b; 588b [fn 2]; 594b-595c; 605d-606b [fn 2]
358a-359a; bk vi, ch 2 [1139^17-^5] 387d- 43 Federalist: number 23, 85b; number 31,
388a; ch 5 389a-c passim; ch 9 [1142^17-33] 103c-d
391d-392b / Politics, bk vii, ch 13 [1331^24- 43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 445a-d; 446d-447a;
38] 536b-c / Rhetoric, bk i, ch 6-7 602d-607d; 461c-463c
ch 8 [1366*3-16] 608b-c; ch 10 [1369*5-^27] 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part i, par 45
612b-613a 23c-d; par 61 27b-c; part ii, par 1 19-128 43b-
12 Epictetus Discourses, bk in, ch 2 177c-178d;
: 45d esp par 122 44a; par 140 49b-54a; part hi,
CH 10 185d-187a; ch 14, 189d; bk iv, ch 4 par 182 64a; par 191-193 66b-c; par 328
225a-228a 108b-c; par 340 llOb-c; additions, 38 122c-d;
12 AuRELius: Meditations, bk v, sect 16 271c-d; 76-81 128a-129a/ Philosophy of History, intro,
bk VI, SECT 40-45 277d-278c; bk vii, sect 44 162a-170c; part ii, 267a-b
282b-c; bk viii, sect 19-20 286d-287a 53 James: Psychology, 4a-6b; 203a; 381b-382a;
17 Plotinus: First Ennead, tr iv, ch 6 15a-b 788a-789a
18 Augustine: City of God, bk viii, ch 4 266d-
267c; ch 8 270a-d; bk xix, ch 1-3 507a- 5. Cause in relation to knowledge
511a; CH 13-17 519a-523a; ch 20 523d-524a /
Christian Doctrine, bk i, ch 3-5 625b-626a;
5a. Cause as the object of our inquiries
CH 22 629b-630a; ch 31-33 633b-634b; ch 35 7 Plato: Meno, 188b-189a / Phaedo, 240a-246c
634c-d / Gorgias, 260a-262a / Timaeus, 465d-466a
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 5, a 4 8 Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, bk i, ch 2
25d-26c; a 6, ans 27c-28b; q 18, a 3, ans [71^19-33] 98a-b; ch 13 107c-108c; bk ii, ch
106b-107c; q 19, a 2, rep 2 109c-110b; a 3, 1-2 122b,d-123c / Physics, bk i, ch i [184*10-
ANS llOb-lllc; AA 4-5 lllc-113c; q 23, a 7, 16] 259a; bk ch 3 [194^16-23] 271a-b;
ii,
(5. Cause in relation to knowledge. 5b. Cause in 5d.The limits of our knowledge of causes
philosophical and scientific method: the role Old Testament: Job, 38-39— (D) Job, 38:1-
of causes in definition, demonstration, ex- 39:30
periment, hypothesis.) 7 Plato: Republic, bk vi, 383d-388a / Timaeus,
49 Darwin: Origin of Species, 217d-218a; 239c- 447b-d
240d 8 Aristotle: bk ii, ch 4 [196^5-7] 273a
Physics,
50 Marx: Capital, lOb-llb / bk 1, ch 2 [982^28-983*11]
Metaphysics,
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk xi, 470a-c; bk 501a-b; bk hi, ch 2 [996^18-^26] 514d-515b
XIII, 563b; epilogue ii 675a'696d passim, esp 9 Aristotle: Generation of Animals, bk ii, ch 6
677b-680b, 687b-688a, 694d-695c [742^17-743*1] 283d-284a
53 James: Psychology, 89b-90a; 324b; 668a-671a 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk v [526-533]
esp 670a-b; 745b; 824b-825a; 884b-886a 67d-68a; bk vi [703-711] 89c-d
54 Freud: General Introduction, 454b-c; 483d- 16 Copernicus: Revolutions of the Heavenly
484a Spheres, 505a-506a
17 Plotinus: Sixth Ennead, tr viii, ch ii 348b-c
5c. The nature and sources of our knowledge 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 12,
of causes A 8, ans 57b-58b; q 19, a 5, rep 2 112d-113c;
7 Plato: Meno, 188b-189a / Phaedo, 240c-245c Q 57, A 3, ans 297b-298a
/ Republic, bk vi, 383d-388a / Timaeus, 455a- 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, purgatory, hi [24-
c; 465d-466a 45] 56a-b; xviii [49-60] 80b-c
8 Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, bk i, ch 2 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part i, 54a; 78a-80c
[71^33-72^6] 98b-c; BK II, CH 19 136a-137a,c / 25 Montaigne: Essays, 80b-82b; 271b-273b;
Metaphysics, bk i, ch 1-2 499a-501c; bk ii, ch 497b-502c passim
I [993*^19-31] 512a-b; bk hi, ch 2 [996^i8-'^26] 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 45a-46a /
514d-515b Novum Organum, bk ii, aph 2 137b-c
10 Galen: Natural Faculties, bk i, ch 4 169a 31 Descartes: Meditations, iv, 90a-b / Objec-
18 Augustine: City of God, bk xi, ch 7 326a-c; tions and Replies, llOa-b; 215a-b
ch 29 339a-b 31 Spinoza: Ethics, part i, appendix 369b-372d;
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 13, PART IV, PREF, 422b,d-423c
a 5, ans 66b-67d; q 14, a rep i 82c-83b;
8, 33 Pascal: Pensees, 184-241 205a-217b passim,
Q 19, A 5, ans 112d-113c; q 57, a 2, ans 295d- esp 233-241 213b-217b
297a 34 Newton: Principles, bk hi, general schol,
23 Hobbes Leviathan, part i, 53a-b; 60a-b; 63a;
: 371b-372a
78c-d; 79b-80a 35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk ii, ch xxi,
28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 442c; 443c SECT 4 178d-179c; sect 70 197a-b; ch xxiii,
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learni?ig, 42a-c; sect 28-29 211b-212a; bk iv, ch hi, sect 10-
43a-c; 45a-46a; 46c-47c / Novum Organum, 16 315c-317c; sect 28-29 322a-323a; ch vi,
bk I, APH 48 llOd-llla; aph 99 127b-c; bk ii SECT 5-16 332b-336d passim; ch xvi, sect
137a-195d i2,370b-c
31 Descartes: Discourse, part vi, 62a-b / 35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, sect 102-109
Objections and Replies, llOa-b 432d-434b
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part i, axiom 4 355d; 35 Hume: Human Understanding, sect iv-vii
APPENDIX 369b-372d 458a-478a; sect viii, div 71-72 482c-483c;
33 Pascal: Pen<:ees, 234-235 216b / Great Experi- sect XI 497b-503c passim, esp div 105 498d-
ment, 388b 499a, DIV 115 503b-c; sect xii, div 127 507b-c
34 Newton: Optics, bk hi, 543a-b 38 Rousseau: /«(?^W(2///y, 348a,c
35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk ii, ch xxi, 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, bk v, 335b-336c
sect 1-7 178b-180a; ch xxv, sect ii-ch 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 46d-47c; 140b,d-145c;
XXVI, SECT 2 217a-d 171a-172c; 234c-235a / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic
35 Hume: Human Understanding, sect hi, div of Morals, 267d-268a; 285c-d / Practical
18-SECT VIII, DIV 75 457c-485a passim; sect Reason, 291a-292a; 294c-295d; 313b-314d /
IX 487b-488c passim; sect xi 497b-503c Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 390b / Judgement,
passim, esp div 105 498d-499a, div 115 503b-c 550a'551a,c; 557c-558b; 564a'C; 584c-d;611d-
39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, bk v, 335b-337a 613a,c
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 15a-b; 17c-d; 46d-47c; 45 Fourier: Theory of Heat, 169a
57c-58b; 58d-59b; 66d-67b; 76c-83b; 85a-b; 49 Darwin: Origin of Species, 65a; 92d-94c pas-
86c-d; 95a-d; 110b; 164a-171a; 194d-195a; sim
214b,d 225c-226b / Fund. Prin. Meta-
[fn i]; 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk ix, 342a-344b;
physic of Morals, 285c-286a / Practical Reason, BK X, 405a-b; bk xi, 469a-470c; bk xhi,
294c-295d; 311d-314d / Intro. Metaphysic of 563a-b; epilogue i, 646c-647b; 650b-c;
Morals, 387a-b / Judgement, 562d-563b EPILOGUE II 675a-696d esp 687d-688a, 693c
53 James: Psychology, 88a-90b passim 53 James: Psychology, 90a; 822b; 885b-886a
Chapter 8: CAUSE 171
113:3; 118:73; 120:2; 135:5-9; 145:5-6; 148:1- 137d-138a; 214c; 215a-b; 228a-c; 229c-d
6 / Proverbs, 3:19-20; 8:23-29 / Isaiah, 40:26- 31 Spinoza: Ethics, part i, prop 16-18 362a-
28; 42:5; 44:24; 45:7-12,18; 48:13; 65:17— 363c; prop 25 365b; prop 33, schol 2, 368c-
(JD) Isaias, 40:26-28; 42:5; 44:24; 45:7-12,18; 369a
48:13; 65:17 / Jercfniah, 10:12; 27:5; 31:35; 32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk i [650-659] 107b;
51:15-16— (Z)) Jeremias, 10:12; 27:5; 31:35; BK II [345-353] 118b-119a; bk iii [708-735]
51:15-16 / Amos, 5:8 / Zechariah, 12:1 (D) — 150b-151b; bk iv [720-735] 168a-b; bk v
Zacharias, 12:1 [468-505] 185b-186a; [577-594] 187b-188a;
Apocrypha: Judith, 16:14— (D) OT, Judith, [800-868] 192b-194a; bk vii [59-640] 218b-
16:17 / Rest of Esther, 13:10— (D) OT, Esther, 231a esp [139-161] 220a-b, [216-550] 221b-
13:10 / Wisdom of Solomon, 1:14; ii:ij—{D) 229a
OT, Bool{ of Wisdom, 1:14; 11:18 / Ecclesias- 33 Pascal: Pensees, 482 258a
ticus, 24:8-9; 33:10-13; 39:16-35; 43-(£>) 34 Newton: Optics, bk hi, 542a-543a
OT, Ecclesiasticus, 24:12-14; 33:10-14; 39:21- 35 Locke: Human U?iderstanding, bk ii, ch xv,
41; 43 / Bel and Dragon, 5—
(D) OT, Daniel, sect 12, 165c; bk iv, ch x, sect 15 352d-
14:4 / 11 Maccabees, 7:23,28— (D) OT, // 353a; sect 18-19 353c-354c
Machabees, 7:23,28 35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, sect 25-33
New Testament: Acts, 7:49-50; 14:15; 17:22-28 417d-419a esp sect 29-33 418c-419a; sect
— (D) Acts, 7:49-50; 14:14; 17:22-28 / Colos- 45-46 421b-c; sect 48 422a passim; sect 57
sians, i:i6-iy / Hebretvs, 1:10; 3:4; 11:3 / 423d-424a; sect 146-150 442a-443b
// Peter, 3:5 / Revelation, 4:11; 14:7— (D) 35 Hume: Human Understanding, sect xii, div
Apocalypse, 4 1 1 1 4 :7
: ; 132, 509d [fn i]
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, purgatory, xxv [37- Third Ennead, tr ii-iii 82c-97b passim; tr viii
78] 91d-92a; paradise, vii [121-148] 116b-c; 129a-136a / Fifth Ennead, tr i, ch 2 208c-209b
lb to Ic Chapter 8: CAUSE 173
18 Augustine: Confessions, bk i, par lo 3b c; 35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk ii, cm xxi,
BK VII, par 16-23 48c-50c / City of God, bk vii, SECT 2 178c; ch xxiii,SEct 28 211b d; bk iv,
CH 29-31 261a-262a; bk x, ch 14 307c-308a; ch III, SECT 28-29 322a-323a
BK XI, CH 22 333d-334c; bk xii, ch ? 358b- 35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, sect 25-33
359a; bk xix, ch 12-17 517b-523a; bk xxii, 417d-419a passim, esp sect 29-33 418c-419a;
CH 24 609a-612a SECT 51-53 422d-423a; sect 57 423d-424a;
19 Aquinas: Surnma T/ieoIogica, part i, q 2, SECT 60-66 424b-426a; sect 105-109 433b-
A 3 12c-14a; q 3, a i, ans 14b-15b; a 2, ans 434b passim; sect 146-153 442a-444a passim,
15c-16a; a 4, ans 16d-17c; a 6, ans 18c-19a; esp SECT 150 442d-443b
A 7, ANS and REP I 19a-c; a 8, ans and rep 1-2 35 Hume: Human Understanding, sect vii, div
19d-20c; Q 4 20c-23b; q 12, a i, ans 50c-51c; 54-57 474b-475d
Q 18, A 3, ANS 106b-107c; q 19, a 5 112d-113c; 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 140b,d-145c; 164a-165c;
Q 23, A I, ANS and REP 1-2 132c-133b; q 46, 171a-172c; 177b-179b; 183b [in ij; 184b-c;
A 2, REP 7 253a-255a; q 47, aa 1-2 256a-258c; 187a-189c esp 188c-189a; 190a-b; 191a-d;
Q 49, A2 266a-c; q 51, a i, rep 3 275b-276b; 205a-209a;239a-240b / Practical Reason, ZZ^h-
A 3, REP 3 277a-278c; q 52, a 2 279b-280a; 335c; 345a-c / Judgement, 564a-567b; 572b-
Q 60, A I, REP 2-3 310b-311a; q 75, a i, rep i 578a; 581b-582c; 587a-592d; 597a-599d
378b-379c; q 76, a 5, rep i 394c-396a; q 83, 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, intro, 161d-
A I, REP 3 436d-438a; q 84, a 2, ans 442b- 162a; part i, 245d-246c
443c; A 4, REP I 444d-446b; a 5 446c-447c; 48 Melville: Moby Dic{, 396b-397a
Q 88, A 3, REP 2 472c-473a; q 89, a i, rep 3 49 Darwin: Origin of Species, 243b-d
473b-475a; q 92, a i, rep i 488d-489d; a 2,
rep 2 489d-490c; a 4 491b-d; q 94, a 3, ans 7c. Divine causality in the government of the
504a-505a; qq 104-105 534c-545b; q 116 universe: providence and free will
592d-595c; part i-ii, q 2, a 3, ans 617b-618a; Old Testament: Gejiesis, 1-3; 4:5-7; 6-9 esp
A 5, rep 3 618d-619c; q 6, a i, rep 3 644d- 8:21-22; 12-13 esp 12:1-3, 12:7, 13:14-18; 15
646a; q 9, a 6 662a-d; q 12, a 5, ans 672a-c; esp 15:13-21; 17-18; 21-22 esp 22:1-19; 26:1-
Q 17, A 8, REP 2 692a-c 6,22-25; 28:10-22; 35:9-15; 37-50 esp 45:7-8
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 79, / Exodus, 3; 4:21; 7-14 esp 7:3, 9:12, 10:1,
A 2, ans 157b-158a; q 85, a 6 182d-184a; 10:20, 10:27, 11:10, 12:1-51, 13:21-22, 14:4,
Q 109, A I, ANS 338b-339c; q iio, a i, rep 2 14:8, 14:17; 15:18; 19-20 esp 19:3-9; 23:20-33;
347d-349a; part ii-ii, q 9, a 2, ans 424b- 33:18-19; 40:34-38— (D) Exodus, 3; 4:21;
425a; q 18, a 4, ans 464c-465a; part hi, q 6, 7-14 esp 7:3, 9:12, 10:1, 10:20, 10:27, 11:10,
A I, rep I 740b- 741b; q 13, a 3, contrary 12:1-51, 13:21-22, 14:4, 14:8, 14:17; 15:18;
782b-783b; part hi suppl, q 74, a 2, rep 3 19-20 esp 19:3-9; 23:20-33; 33:18-19; 40:32-
926c-927c 36 / Numbers, 9:15-23; 12; 22-24 / Deuteron-
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, paradise, i [94-142] omy, 4:1-40; 5-11 esp 11:26-28; 29:1-31:8 esp
107b-d; II [112-148] 109a-b; xiii [52-84] 30:1-4, 30:19-20 / Joshua, i-ii; 23-24 esp
126a-b; xxvii [97-120] 148b-c 24:14-28— (D) Josue, i-ii; 23-24 esp 24:14-
22 Chaucer: Knight's Tale [2987-3040] 209a- 28 / Judges, 1-16 / I Samuel, 8-10; 15-16— (D)
210a / Tale of Melibeus, par 37-38 417b- / Kings, 8-10; 15-16 / // Samuel, j—{D)
418a U Kings, 7 / / Kings, 11; 13-22 passim— (D)
23 Ho^B-Es: Leviathan, part 78d-79a; 79d-80a;
i, /// Kings, 11; 13-22 passim / U
Kings passim
PART III, 241c-242a; part iv, 272b-c — (Z>) IV Kings passim / / Chronicles, 17:4-14;
28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 390d-391a; 29:11-12 —(Z)) I Paralipomenon, 17:4-14;
406b-407b; 416b-c; 426a-429b; 443a-c; 490d- 29:11-12 / U
Chronicles, 11-36 passim, esp 36
493a ip) UParalipomenon, 11-36 passim, esp 36 /
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 2c-d; 4b-c / Esther esp 4:12-17— (D) Esther, 1:1-10:3 esp
New Atlantis, 203a-b 4:12-17 / Job esp 1-2, 24, 27, 38-41 / Psalms
31 Descartes: Discourse, part v, 55d-56a / passim, esp 3-4, 9-1 1, 13, 17-18, 20, 23, 65,
Meditations, hi, 87c-88c; iv, 90a-b / Objec- 104— (D) Psalms passim, esp 3-4, 9-10, 12,
tions and Replies, 110a; 123b; axiom ix 132b; 16-17, i9> 22, 64, 103 / Proverbs, 16:33 /
158a-162a; 213b-d; 229c-d Ecclesiastes, 3; 8-9; 11-12 / Isaiah, 36-37; 46;
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part i, prop r6-i8 362a- 51; 52:7— (D) Isaias, 36-37; 46; 51; 52:7 /
363c; PROP 24-29 365a-366c; prop 33 367b- Jeremiah, 17:5-8; 18-19; 3'' 45""(^) J^remias,
369a; appendix 369b-372d; part ii, prop 5-7 17:5-8; 18-19; 31; 45 / Ezekjel, i8-(D)
374c-375c; prop 9-10 376a-377a; prop 45 Ezechiel, 18 / Daniel esp 3, 6— (D) Daniel,
390a-b 1:1-3:23 esp 3:1-23; 3:91-12:13 esp 3:91-97'
32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk v [468-474] 185b 6:1-28 /Jonah, 1-2— (D) Jonas, 1-2
33 Pascal: Pensees, 77 186a; 513, 262a Apocrypha: Tobit—(D)OT, Tobias / Judith tsp
34 Newton: Principles, bk hi, general schol, 5_6, 8-i6-(D) OT, Judith esp 5-6, 8-16 /
369b-371a / Optics, bk hi, 528b-529a Rest of Esther- (D) OT, Esther, 10:4-16:24 /
-tili b;OS
174 THE GREAT IDEAS Ic
261b-d; bk ix, ch 22 296d-297a; bk x, ch
(7. The causality of God or the gods. Ic. Divine 14-15 307c-308b; bk xi, ch 17 331c-d; ch 22
causality in the government of the universe: 333d-334c; bk xii, ch 1-9 342b,d-348b; ch 22
providence and free will.) 357c; CH 25 358b-359a; ch 27 359c-360a,c;
Ecclesiasticus, 15:11-20— (D) OT, Ecclesias- BK XIV, CH 27 396c-397a; bk xix, ch 12-17
ticus, 15:11-22 / Song of Three Children— {D) 517b-523a; bk xxii, ch 1-2 586b,d-588a
OT, Daniel, 3:24-90 / Susanna— {D) OT, 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 2, a 3,
Daniel, 13:1-64 / Bel and Dragon— {D) OT, ANs 12c-14a; q 3, a i, rep i 14b-15b; q 8, a 3,
Daniel, 13:65-14:42 / / Maccabees, 3:13-26— ans and rep 2-3 36b-37c; q 13, a 8, ans and
{D) OT, / Machabees, 3 13-26 / // Maccabees,
: rep I 70d-71b; q 15, a 3, rep 4 93b-94a; q 19,
6:1-16— (D) OT, 11 Machabees, 6:1-16 A 3 llOb-lllc; QQ 22-24 127c-143c; q 63, a 7,
New Testament: Matthew, 6:25-34; 10:29-33; ANS 331c-332b; q 96, a i, ans and rep 2 510b-
23:37/ Luke, 12:4-7,22-34; 21:12-19 esp 21:18 511b; QQ 103-119 528a-608d esp qq 103-105
/John, 6:22-71 esp 6:40, 6:44-45, 6:64-65 — 528a-545b; part i-ii, q 9, a 6 662a-d; q 10,
John, 6:22-72 esp 6:40, 6:44-45, 6:65-66
(£>) A 4 665d-666a,c; q 19, a 4 705b-c; q 21, a 4,
/ Acts, 6:8-7:60 esp 7:51; 13:48— (D) Acts, rep 2 719d-720a,c
6:8-7:59 esp 7:51; ly.^^ / Romans, 8:28-11:36 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 91,
/ Ephesians, 1:4-2:10; 4:1-7 / Philippians, AA 1-2 208b-209d; q 93 215b,d-220d passim;
2:12-13 / // Timothy, 1:9 / Hebrews, 13:5-6 part ii-ii, q I, a 7, ans 385c-387a; q 25, a ii,
/ / Peter, 1:1-5 / Revelation, 11:15-18— (D) rep 3 508d-509c; part hi, q 61, a i, ans
Apocalypse, 11:15-18 855a-d
4 Homer: Iliad, bk viii [130-144] 52c; bk xxiv 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, hell, vii [61-96]
[522-551] 176d-177a lOb-c; purgatory, xvi [52-114] 77b-78a; xxi
5 Euripides Helen [703-733] 304d-305a
: [40-72] 85b-d; paradise, i [94-142] 107b-d;
6 Herodotus: History, bk hi, 112d-113b II [112-148] 109a-b; vni [85-148] 117c-118c;
7 Plato: Republic, bk ii, 321d-322d; bk x,439b XI [28-39] 122b; xn [37-45] 124a; xx [118-138]
/ Critias, 479c 138a
8 Aristotle: Generation and Corruption, bk ii, 22 Chaucer: Troilus and Cressida, bk iv, stanza
CH 10 [336^25-34] 438d / Metaphysics, bk xii, 137-154 106b-108b / Knight's Tale [1251-1267]
CH 10 605d-606d 180b; [1303-1333] 181b-182a; [1663-1672]
9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk x, ch 8 [1179*23-32] 187b; [2987-3046] 209a-210a / Friar's Tale
434a / Politics, bk vii, ch 4 [1326*29-32] [7064-7085] 281a-b / Franklin's Tale [11,177-
530b-c 206] 353b-354a / Monk^s Tale 434a-448b /
12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk ii [167-183] Nun's Priest's Tale [15,236-256] 456b-457a
17a-b; [1090-1104] 29a; bk v [146-234] 63a- 23 Machiavelli: Prince, ch xxv, 35a-b
64a; [1161-1240] 76b-77b; bk vi [43-95] SOd- 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part i, 53d; 96b; part ii,
81c; [379-422] 85b-d 113b-c; 160b-c; 163d-164a; part iv, 254b;
12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk i, ch 6 110c-112b; 271b;272b-c
CH 12 118d-120b; ch 16 121d-122d; bk ii, ch 25 Montaigne: Essays, 98b-99a
14 153d-155b; bk hi, ch 17 191d-192a; ch 22 27 Shakespeare: Hamlet, act v, so ii [7-1 1]
195a-201a; bk iv, ch 3 224b-d; ch 5 228a- 68a; [230-235] 70a
230b; CH 7 232c-235a 28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 491d-492a
12 Aurelius: Meditations, bk ii, sect 3 257a-b; 29 Cervantes Don Quixote, part ii, 408c
:
SECT II 258a-b; bk hi, sect ii 262a-b; bk v, 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 38a; 94b-c
sect 8 269d-270b; bk vi, sect 8 274b; sect / Novum Organum, bk i, aph 93 125d-126a
274c; SECT 40-45 277d-278c; sect 58 279d;
II 31 Descartes: Meditations, iv 89a-93a; vi, 99c
BK VII, sect 8 280b; sect 58 283c-d; sect 68 / Objections and Replies, 229c-d
284c-d; bk viii, sect 17 286d; sect 35 288b; 31 Spinoza: Ethics, part i, def 7 355b; prop 17,
sect 46-47 289b-c; sect 51 289d-290a; bk x, corol 1-2 and schol 362b-363c; appendix
SECT 3 296d; sect 6 297a-b; sect 25 299c; 369b-372d; part ii, prop 3, schol 374b-c
SECT 35 301b; bk xii, sect 3 307b-d; sect 5 32 Milton Sonnets, xvi 66b-67a / Paradise Lost,
:
OT, Daniel, 14:27-42 / // Maccabees, 1:18-22; Q 62 858b-864c; part hi suppl, q 75, a 3 938a-
2:10— (D) OT, II Machabees, 1:18-22; 2:10 939d; Q 83, A 3 978c-980d; q 92, a i 1025c-
New Testament: Matthew, 8-9; 12:22-29; 1032b
14:13-36; 15:22-39; 17:1-8; 20:29-34 / M[^r{, 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, paradise, vii [16-
1:29-34,40-44; 2:3-12; 4:34-41; 5; 6:34-56; 120] 115b-116b; xiii [52-87] 126a-b; xx
7:24-8:26; 9:2-10,17-30; 10:46-52; 13:24-26 [79-138] 137c-138a; xxix [58-66] 150d-151a;
— (D) Mar\, 1:29-34,40-44; 2:3-12; 4:34-40; XXXII [40-87] 155a-c; xxxii [i39]-xxxiii [145]
5; 6:34-56; 7:24-8:26; 9:1-9,16-29; 10:46-52; 156a-157d
b c
46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, part hi, 307a- 262c-263d; 274a-275a; 281d-282d; 283c-
b; part iv, 338b-c; 348d-349a 284a,c; part hi, 300a-301c; part iv, 337d-
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk v, 219b-220a , 342a
52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, bk i, 11a- 49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 323a-b; 327a-328d
b; BK V, 127b-137c passim; bk vii, 171a-177b; 50 Marx: Capital, 7b; 8a-lld passim; 377c-378d
189d 190a 50 Marx-Engels: Communist Manifesto, 416c-
417a,c; 419b,d-425b passim; 428b-d
8. The operation of causes in the process of 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk ix, 342a-344b;
history bk X, 389a-391c; 430b-432c; 447c-448c; bk
6 Herodotus: History, bk i, 21d-22a; bk ix, XI, 469a-472b; bk xiii, 563a-575a; bk xiv,
291b-c 588a-590c; 609a-613d; bk xv, 618b-621b;
6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, bk i, 354d- epilogue I, 645a-650c; epilogue ii 675a-
355a; bk iv, 462a-b 696d
7 Plato: Statesman, 587a-589c / Latvs, bk hi, 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, bk v,
663d-666d; bk iv, 679a-c 127b-137c
9 Aristotle: Politics, bk v 502a-519d passim 54 Freud: War and Death, 761a-c / Civilization
12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk i [449-482] and Its Discontents, 781a-782d; 787a-788d;
6c-7a 791b-d; 799a-802a,c esp 801d-802a,c / New
12 Aurelius: Meditations, bk v, sect 8 269d- Introductory Lectures, 834b-c; 882b-884c
Chapter 8: CAUSE 177
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: The consideration of cause in relation to principle and element, see Element 2; Principle la.
The distinction between necessary and contingent and for the conception of chance
causes,
in relation to cause, see Chance la-ib; Nature 3c-3c(i); Necessity and Contingency
The issue concerning determinism in nature or history, see Fate 5-6; History 4a(i);
Mechanics 4c(i); Nature 2f, 3c(2).
Other discussions of the controversy concerning causality and free will, and of the problem
of man's freedom in relation to God's will, see Fate 2, 4; History 4a(i); Liberty 4a-4b,
5a, 5d; Will 5^(3)-5<^)^ 5^(2), 5c, 7c.
The theory of divine causality in creation, providence, and the performance of miracles, see
Astronomy 8d; God 5a, ya-ye; Matter 3d; Nature 3c(4); World 4b, 4d-4e.
The role of ends or final causes in the order of nature and the structure of the universe, see
Desire i ;God 5b; Nature 3c (3) World ic, 6c; and for the general theory of means and
;
ends, see Good and Evil 4b, 5c; Judgment 3; Prudence 3a, 4b; Will 2c(2)-2c(3).
The discussion of cause as an object of knowledge and methods and aims of
in relation to the
philosophy, science, and history, see Astronomy 3a-3b; Definition 2d; History 3b;
Knowledge 5a(3); Mechanics 2c; Physics 2b; Reasoning 5b(4)-5b(5); Science ib(i),
4c.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great BooJ^s of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date,place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
I. II.
Aquinas. Siimma Contra Gentiles, bk hi, ch 1-16, Sextus ExMpiricus. Outlines of Pyrrhonism, bk hi,
64-83, 88-98 CH 1-20
Descartes. The Principles of Philosophy, part i, 28 .Against the Physicists, bk i (Concerning Cause
HoBBES. Concerning Body, part h, ch 9 and the Passive)
Hume. A Treatise of Human Nature, bk i, part hi, Proclus. The Elements of Theology, (b,g,i)
SECT ii-iv, XV Maimonides. The Guide for the Perplexed, part i,
INTRODUCTION
ONE sense in which we use the word
"chance" does not exclude the operation
The swerve of the atoms, according to Lu-
cretius, accounts for the origin of the world,
of causes. The chance event, in this sense, is the motions of nature, and the free will of man.
not uncaused. But within this meaning of But nothing accounts for the swerve of the
chance, there is the question oihow the chance atoms. It is uncaused, spontaneous, fortuitous.
event is caused. "When the atoms are being carried downwards
On one view, what happens by chance is dis- straight through the void by their own weight,
tinguished from what happens by nature in they push a from their path at times quite
little
179
180 THE GREAT IDEAS
**If each motion is always due to another, and accidents happen. The chance meeting of old
the new always springs from the old in a deter- friends who run across each other in a railroad
mined order, and if the atoms do not by swerv- station after a separation of many years is a
ing break through the decrees of fate, so that coincidence— a coinciding of the two quite
cause does not follow cause through infinite separate and independent lines of action which
time"; whence, asks Lucretius, "is it wrested brought each of them to the same station at
from fate, this will whereby we move fonvard the same time, coming from different places,
where pleasure leads each one of us, and swerve going to different places, and proceeding un-
likewise in our motions, neither at a fixed time der the influence of different causes or pur-
nor at a fixed place, but only when and where poses. That each is there can be explained by
the mind prompted us?" The answer
itself has the operation of causes. That both are there
he gives is that there must be "in the atoms . . . together cannot be explained by the causes
another cause of motion besides blows and determining their independent paths.
weights, whence comes this power born in us, So understood, the chance event exemplifies
since we see that nothing can come to be from what Aquinas calls a "clashing of two causes."
nothing." And what makes it a matter of chance is the
fact that "the clashing of these two causes, in-
Being absolutely fortuitous, the swerve of asmuch as it is accidental, has no cause." Pre-
the atom.s is absolutely unintelligible. There is cisely because it is accidental, "this clashing of
no answer to the question why they chance to causes is not to be reduced to a further pre-ex-
swerve at undetermined times and places. This isting cause from which it follows of necessity."
unintelligibility may not, however, make the The illustration is not affected by considera-
fortuitous either unreal or impossible. It can tions of free will. Whether men have free will
be argued that chance may exist even though, or not, whether free acts are caused or are, as
for our limited understanding, it remains mys- Kant suggests, uncaused and spontaneous, the
terious. event we call a "chance meeting" remains acci-
The same problem of intelligibility arises dental or, more precisely, a coincidence. What-
with respect to that meaning of chance wherein ever the factors are which control the motions
it is identified with coincidence or contingency. of each man, they operate entirely within that
Here, as in the case of the absolutely fortuitous, single man's line of action. Prior to the meeting,
chance belongs to reality or nature. "Some they do not influence the other man's conduct.
things always come to pass in the same way, and If we could state the cause for the coincidence
others for the most part," writes Aristotle as an of the two lines of motion, it would have to be
observer of nature, but there is also "a third some which influenced both lines. Were
factor
class of events besides these two events which — there such a cause and were it known to us, we
all say are 'by chance.' " Things of this last could not say that the meeting happened by
kind, he goes on to say, are those which "come chance. It would still be a coincidence in the
to pass incidentally" — or accidentally. merely physical sense of coming together, but
According to this theory, a real or objective it would not be a coincidence causally.
indeterminism exists. Chance or contingency is That free will is irrelevant to this meaning of
not just an expression of human uncertainty chance can be seen from the fact that the col-
born of insufficient knowledge. Contingency, lision of particles which produces atomic fission
however, differs from the fortuitousness or is regarded as resulting from chance or coinci-
spontaneity of the atom's swerve, in that it is dence in a manner no different from the acci-
a product of causes, not their total absence. dental meeting of friends. Causes control the
Of the contingent event, "there is no definite speeds and directions of the colliding particles,
cause," in Aristotle's opinion, but there is "a but no cause determines their collision; or, in
chance cause, i.e., an indefinite one." other words, there is no cause for the coinci-
In the chance happening, two lines of action dence of two separate lines of causation. Con-
coincide and thereby produce a single result. temporary physics affirms a real or objective
This is our ordinary understanding of the way indeterminism insofar as it does not merely say
Chaptf.r 9: CMANCE 181
that the cause of the coincidence is unknown A world in which chance really exists is re-
to us, but rather holds that no such cause exists markably different from a world in which neces-
to be known. sity prevails, in which everything is determined
by causes and there are no uncaused coinci-
The conckption of the chance event as an dences. William James vividly epitomizes their
uncaused coincidence of causes is an ancient as difference by calling the world of absolute ne-
well as a modern doctrine. In his Physics, Aris- cessity or determinism— the world of Spinoza
totle distinguishes between what happens by or Hegel— a "block universe" in contrast to
nature and what happens by chance in terms of what he describes as a "concatenated universe."
different types of causality. "Chance," he Voltaire before him, in his Philosophical Dic-
writes, is "reckoned among causes; many things tionary, had used the phrase "the concatenation
are said both to be and to come to be as a result of events" to express the meaning of chance.
of chance." But the fact that its effects cannot The phrase evokes the right image, the pic-
be "identified with any of the things that come ture of a world in which many concurrent lines
to pass by necessity and always, or for the most of causality, exercising no influence upon one
part" at once distinguishes the causality of another, may nevertheless concatenate or be
chance from that of nature. joined together to produce a chance result.
"The early physicists," Aristotle observes, The block universe presents the contrasting pic-
"found no place for chance among the causes ture of a world in which each motion or act de-
which they recognized Others there are
. . . termines and is determined by every other in
who, indeed, believe that chance is a cause, but the fixed structure of the whole.
that it is inscrutable to human intelligence, as Spinoza claims, for example, that "in nature
being a divine thing and full of myster^'." But to there is nothing contingent, but all things arc
Aristotle himself "it is clear that chance is an determined from the necessity of the divine
incidental cause" and "that the causes of what nature to exist and act in a certain manner."
comes to pass by chance are infinite." For this Chance, in other words, does not exist in nature.
reason, he explains, "chance is supposed to be- A thing is said to be contingent, Spinoza writes,
long to the class of the indefinite, and to be in- only "with reference to a deficiency in our
scrutable to man." Though he distinguishes be- knowledge. For if we do not know that the es-
tween spontaneity and chance, he says that both sence of a thing involves a contradiction, or if
"are causes of effects which, though they might we actually know that it involves no contra-
result from intelligence or nature, have in fact diction, and nevertheless we can affirm nothing
been caused by something incidentally with certainty about its existence because the
What happens by nature happens regularly, order of causes is concealed from us, that thing
or for the most part, through causal necessity. can never appear to us either as necessary or
This necessity results from the operation of es- impossible, and therefore we call it either con-
sential causes, causes in the very nature of the tingent or possible." Hence, for Spinoza, con-
moving things. When the regularity fails, it is tingency or chance is illusory rather than real
due to the intervention of some accidental — a projection of the mind's ignorance or of its
other causes to operate, the effect— contingent chance with divine from
providence, apart
on their combined activity — is produced by which nothing can happen either necessarily
chance, that is, by the contingency of several or contingently.
incidental causes working coincidentally. For Augustine it would seem that divine
182 THE GREAT IDEAS
providence leaves no room for chance among nature where no natural causes determine the
natural things. After noting that causes are coincidence, while not real — at least not in the
sometimes divided into a "fortuitous cause, a —
same sense for God? Or does the statement
natural cause, and a voluntary cause," he dis- that what "divine providence plans to happen
misses "those causes which are called fortui- contingently, happens contingently" mean that
tous" by saying that they "are not a mere name chance remains a real feature of the universe
for the absence of causes, but are only latent, even for God ?
and we attribute them either to the will of the One thing is clear. In one sense of the word,
true God, or to that of spirits of some kind or the Christian theologians completely deny
other." chance. If "chance" means something which
In certain places Aquinas seems to talk in God does not foresee, something unplanned
much the — as
though chance
same fashion by His providence, then according to their
existed only for our limited intellects and not faith nothing happens by chance. It is in this
for God. "Nothing," he declares, "hinders sense also that what happens by chance is
certain things from happening by luck or opposed to what happens on purpose, or has a
chance, if compared to their proximate causes; final as well as an efficient cause. As the chapter
but not if compared to divine providence, ac- on Cause indicates, those who deny final causes
cording to which 'nothing happens at random in nature sometimes use the word "chance" to
in the world,' as Augustine says." The example signify not lack of cause, nor even contingency,
he uses to illustrate his point is that of two serv- but only the blindness of causality — working
ants who have been sent by their master to the to no end.
same place: "the meeting of the two servants, The controversy discussed in the chapter on
although to them it appears a chance circum- World — between those who see in the struc-
stance, has been fully foreseen by their master, ture of the universe the grand design of a di-
who has purposely sent them to meet at one vine plan and those who attribute whatever
place, in such a way that one has no knowledge order there is in nature to blind chance — further
of the other." In such a way also "all things which theologians like Au-
indicates the sense in
must of necessity come under God's ordering," gustine and Aquinas deny chance. But if
from which it follows that God directly causes "chance" means no more than contingency, then
the action of even accidental causes, and their to affirm chance excludes, not providence, but
coincidence. The chance event would then be fete, at least that sense of "fate" according to
necessitated by God. It would be determined which everything is blindly necessitated. Here
by His will, however indeterminate it might ap- it is Spinoza's statement that "in nature there
pear to us. is nothing contingent, but all things are de-
Yet in other places Aquinas writes that "God termined from the necessity of the divine na-
wills some things to be done necessarily, some ture" which opposes the statement of Aqui-
contingently .... To some effects He has at- nas that "the mode both of necessity and con-
tached unfailing necessary causes, from which tingency falls under the foresight of God."
the effects follow necessarily; but to other
defectible and contingent from which
causes, The theory of chance has obvious bearings on
effects arise contingently." For some minds the theory of knowledge, especially with regard
this may only deepen the mystery rather than to the distinction between knowledge and opin-
solve it. At least it leaves many questions un- ion and between certainty and probability.
answered. On any view of chance — whether it is real or
Does Aquinas mean that a coincidence of illusory — when men call a future event con-
causes is not itself uncaused ? Does he mean that tingent they mean that they cannot predict it
God causes the concatenation of events, and with certitude. So far as human prediction goes,
that a suthcient reason for every contingency itmakes no difference whether the future event
exists in God's will? If so, is chance ^n illusion, isnecessarily determined and we lack adequate
a function of our ignorance of divine provi- knowledge of its causes, or the event has a gen-
dence } May chance be quite real on the level of uine indeterminacy in the way it is caused or
Chapter 9: CHANCE 183
uncaused. Regardless of what the objective comparison. To the question "whether our
situation is, the assurance with which we pre- intellect can know contingent things," he re-
dict anything reflects the state of our knowl- plies that "the contingent, considered as such,
edge about it. is known directly by sense and indirectly by
The ancients who, for the most part, regard the intellect, while the universal and necessary
chance as and objective, treat probability
real principles of contingent things are known by
as subjective.For them, the different degrees of the intellect. Hence," he goes on, "if we con-
probability which men attach to their state- sider knowable things in their universal prin-
ments measure the inadequacy of their knowl- ciples, then all science is of necessary things.
edge and the consequent uncertainty of their But if we consider the things themselves, thus
opinions about matters which cannot be known some sciences are of necessary things, some of
but only guessed. Holding different theories contingent things."
of the distinction between knowledge and Among the sciences of contingent things,
opinion, both Plato and Aristotle exclude the Aquinas includes not only "the sciences of na-
accidental and the contingent, along with the ture" but also "the moral sciences," because the
particular, from the objects of science. Since in latter, dealing with human action, must reach
their view certitude belongs to the essence of down to contingent particulars. In the sphere
science —
or of knowledge as contrasted with of morals as of nature, certainty can be achieved
opinion— science for them deals not only with only on the level of universal principles. De-
the universal but with the necessary. liberation about particular acts to be done
In the Republic Socrates assigns opinion to moves on the level of probable opinion. In con-
the realm of becoming the realm — of changing trast to the moral scientist, the man of action
and contingent particulars. Unlike Plato, Aris- must weigh chances and make decisions with
totle does not restrict knowledge to the realm of regard to future contingencies. It would be as
eternal and immutable being, but he does in- foolish, Aristotle says, to expect the certitude
sist that physics, as a science of changing things, of scientific demonstration from an orator or a
preserve the certitude of science by concerning judge, as "to accept probable reasoning from a
itself only with the essential and the necessary. mathematician."
"That a science of the accidental is not even
possible," he writes, "will be evident if we try It is not surprising that the modern theory of
to see what the accidental really is." It is a mat- probabiUty — or, as it was by Boole,
later called
ter of chance that cold weather occurs during the Venn, and others, the "logic of chance"
dog-days, for "this occurs neither always and should have its origin in the sphere of practical
of necessity, nor for the most part, though it problems. Pascal's correspondence with Fermat
might happen sometimes. The accidental, then, illustrates the early mathematical speculations
iswhat occurs, but not always nor of necessity, concerning formulae for predicting the out-
nor for the most part. Now ... it is obvious come in games of pure chance. For Pascal the
why there is no science of such a thing." logic of chance also has moral implications. If
Though he disagrees with Aristotle and we are willing to risk money at the gaming
Aquinas about the reality of chance or con- table on the basis of calculated probabilities,
tingency, Spinoza agrees with them that knowl- how much more willing should we be to act
edge — at least adequate knowledge — has the decisively in the face of life's uncertainties,
necessary for its object. Of individual things, even to risking life itself on the chance of eternal
he says,"we can have no adequate knowledge salvation.
. . . and this is what is to be understood by us as When we act "on an uncertainty, we act
their contingency." To be true to itself and to reasonably," Pascal writes, "for we ought to
the nature of things, reason must "perceive work for an uncertainty according to the doc-
things truly, that is to say, as they are in them- trine of chance." If the chance of there being
selves, that is to say, not as contingent but as an after-life is equal to the chance of there
necessary." being none — if the equiprobability reflects our
The position of Aquinas is worth stating for equal ignorance of either alternative — then.
184 THE GREAT IDEAS
Pascal argues, we ought to wager in favor of Hume asserts, "is the same with the probability
immortality and act accordingly. "There is of causes, as with that of chance."
here the infinity of an infinitely happy life to Since Hume's day, the theory of probability
gain, a chance to gain against a finite number of has become an essential ingredient of empirical
chances of loss, and what you stake is finite." science. The development of thermodynamics
Like Pascal, Hume thinks that we must be in the 19th century would have been impossible
content with probabihty as a basis for action. without it. This is also true of the quantum
"The great subverter of Pyrrhonism or the ex- mechanics and atomic physics of our own time.
cessive principles of skepticism," he writes, "is But like the doctrine of chance, the theory of
action, and employment, and the occupations probability tends in one of two directions:
of common life." But unlike the ancients, either toward the subjective view that proba-
Hume also thinks we should be content with bility isonly a quality of our judgments, meas-
probabilities in the sphere of the natural sci- uring the degree of our ignorance of the real
ences. Certitude is attainable only by the causes which leave nothing in nature unde-
mathematician who deals with the relations be- termined; or toward the objective view that
tween ideas. Since the natural sciences deal there is genuine indeterminism in nature and
with matters of fact or real existence, and since that mathematical calculations of probability
to know such things we must rely entirely upon estimate the real chance of an event's occurring.
our experience of cause and effect, we cannot
reach better than probable conclusions. The element of chance also has a bearing on
The scientist, according to Hume, "weighs the general theory of art. The hypothesis of the
opposite experiments. He considers which side melody which a kitten might compose by walk-
is supported by the greater number of experi- ing on the keyboard, is obviously intended to
ments; to that side he inclines, with doubt and contrast a product of chance with a work of
hesitation; and when at last he fixes his judg- art. The competent musician knows with
ment, the evidence exceeds not what we prop- certainty that he can do what the meandering
erly call probability. All probability, then, sup- kitten has only one chance in many millions
poses an opposition of experiments and observa- of ever accomplishing.
tions ... A
hundred instances or experiments In proportion as an art is developed, and to
on one and fifty on another, afford a
side, the degree that its mastery of
rules represent a
doubtful expectation of any event; though a the medium which the artist works, chance
in
hundred uniform experiments, with only one is excluded from its productions. This point is
that is contradictory, reasonably beget a pretty strikingly exemplified in the history of medi-
strong degree of assurance." cine. "If therehad been no such thing as medi-
Hume applies the logic of chance to weighing cine," Hippocrates suggests, "and if nothing
the evidence against and the testimony in had been investigated or found out in it," all
favor of miracles, as well as to contrary hy- practitioners "would have been equally un-
potheses in science. As much as Spinoza, he skilled and ignorant of it, and everything con-
denies the existence of chance or contingency cerning the sick would have been directed
in the order of nature. Chance is entirely sub- by chance." On the same principle, Galen dis-
jective. It is identical with the probability of tinguishes the physician from the empiric, who,
our opinions. In the throw of dice, the mind, he "without knowing the cause," pretends that he
says, "considers the turning up of each particu- is "able to rectify the failures of function."
lar side as alike probable; and this is the very The empiric works by trial and error — the very
nature of chance, to render all the particular opposite of art and science, for trial and error
events, comprehended in it, entirely equal." can succeed only by chance. The physician,
But may also be "a probability, which
there learned and skilled in medicine, works from a
from a superiority of chances on any side;
arises knowledge of causes and by rules of art which
and according as this superiority increases, and tend to eliminate chance.
surpasses the opposite chances, the probability Augustine reports a conversation with the
receives a proportionate increase . . . The case," proconsul concerning the relative merits of
Chapter 9: CFIANCE 185
medicine and astrology. When the proconsul that fortune, unhke chance, receives personifi-
tells him that, as compared with medicine, cation in myth and legend. Fortune is a goddess
astrology is a false art, Augustine, at this time or, like the Fates whom she combats, a power
himself "much given to the books of the horo- with which even the gods must reckon.
scope-casters," asks how the fact that "many The doctrine of chance or fortune occupies
things were foretold truly by [astrology]" can be an important place in moral theory. Aristotle's
explained. The proconsul "answered, very rea- classification of goods tends to identify external
sonably, that it was due to the force of chance, gocxls with goods of fortune— the goods which,
which is always to be allowed for in the order of unlike knowledge and virtue, we cannot ob-
things." Thus, Augustine says later, "I saw it tain merely by the exercise of our will and
as obvious that such things as happened to be faculties. Considering the elements of happi-
said truly from the casting of horoscopes were ness,Aquinas groups together wealth, honor,
true not by skill but by chance; and such things fame, and power as goods of the same sort be-
as were false were not due to want of skill in the cause they are "due to external causes and in
art but merely that luck had fallen the other most cases to fortune."
way." The goods of fortune, as well as its ills, con-
Neither art itself, nor skill in its practice, sist in things beyond man's power to command
can ever be perfect enough to remove chance and, in consequence, to deserve. Recognizing
entirely, for the artist deals with particulars. the unpredictable operation of fortune, Epicte-
Yet the measure of an art is the certainty which tus, the Stoic, argues that "we must make the
its rules have as directions for achieving the de- best of those things that are in our power, and
sired result; and the skill of the artist is meas- take the rest as nature gives it." We have "the
ured by the extent to which he succeeds by power to deal rightly with our own impres-
rule and judgment rather than by chance. sions." Hence the Stoics advise us to control our
When Aristotle quotes Agathon's remark that reactions to things even though we cannot con-
"art loves chance and chance loves art," he ex- trol the things themselves. Yet men will always
plains its sense to be that "chance and art are ask, as Hamlet does, "Whether 'tis nobler in
concerned with the same objects" that which — the mind to suffer the slings and arrows of out-
does not come to be by nature nor from neces- rageous fortune, or to take arms against a sea of
sity. Hence art sometimes fails, either from un- troubles, and by opposing end them?"
controllable contingencies or from insufficient The fact that the goods and ills of fortune are
knowledge of causes. "All causes," says Hume, beyond our power to control raises the fur-
"are not conjoined to their usual effects with ther question of man's responsibility regarding
like uniformity. An artificer, who handles only them. We can hardly be held responsible for
dead matter, may be disappointed of his aim, as everything that happens to us, but only for
well as the politician, who directs the conduct those things which are subject to our will.
of sensible and intelligent agents." This traditional moral distinction between the
good or evil which befalls us by fortune and
In the realm of human affairs — in morals, that which we willfully obtain or accomplish,
politics, and history — the factor of chance is parallels the legal distinction between acciden-
usually discussed in terms of good and bad for- tal and intentional wrongdoing.
tune. The word "fortune" — as may be seen in What is true of the individual life seems to
the root which it shares with "fortuitous" apply to history — the fife of states and the de-
has the same connotations as "chance." Aris- velopment of civilization generally. For the
totle treats fortune as the kind of chance that most part, the historians Herodotus and —
operates in the sphere of human action rather Thucydides, Plutarch, Tacitus, and Gibbon
than natural change. Fortune, he thinks, can find fortune a useful principle of interpretation.
be attributed properly only to intelligent be- To Machiavelli history seems to be so full of
ings capable of deliberate choice. The sense of accidents and contingencies
— "great changes in
this distinction between chance and fortune affairs . . . beyond all human conjecture"
seems to be borne out in history by the fact that he tries to advise the prince how to make
186 THE GREAT IDEAS
by
use of fortune in order to avoid being ruined shall not be obliged to have recourse to chance
it.Such advice can be followed because, in his for an explanation of those small events which
opinion, "Fortune is the arbiter of one half of made these people what they were, but it will
our actions, but still leaves us to direct the be clear that all those small events were inevi-
other half, or perhaps a Uttle less." table."
Hegel, on the contrary, does not admit chance As the contingent is opposed to the neces-
or fortune in his view of world history as a sary, as that which happens by chance is op-
"necessary development out of the concept of posed to that which is fully determined by
the mind's freedom alone." For Tolstoy also, causes, so fortune is opposed to fate or destiny,
either necessity or freedom rules the affairs of This opposition is most evident in the great
men. Chance, he writes, does "not denote any poems, especially the tragedies, which depict
really existing thing," but only "a certain stage man's efforts to direct his own destiny, now
of understanding of phenomena." Once we pitting his freedom against both fate and for-
succeed in calculating the composition of forces tune, now courting fortune in his struggle
involved in the mass movements of men, "we against fate.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. The conception of chance 187
3. Chance, necessity, and design or purpose in the origin and structure of the world 189
4. Cause and chance in relation to knowledge and opinion: the theory of probability
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which arc the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Homkr: Iliad, bk ii (265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in53 jAMEs:Pi)'<r/?o/o^^', 116a-119b, the passage
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 Plato: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
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Author's Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as part, bk, ch,
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and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., Old Testa-
—
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relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
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548c-549d; bk xi, ch 8 593a-d; bk xii, ch 3 lb. Chance as the absolutely fortuitous, the
[1070^4-9] 599b / Memory and Reminiscence, spontaneous or uncaused
CH 2 [452^30-^6] 694b 8 Aristotle: Physics, bk ii, ch 4 [196*25-^4]
9 Aristotle: Parts of Animals, bk i, ch i 272d-273a; ch 6 [198^14] 275a
[640^12-33] 162b-d / Rhetoric, bk i, ch 10 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk i [1022-
[1369^31-^5] 612c-d 1029] 13c-d; BK II [184-293] 17b-18d esp [284-
12 Aurelius: Meditations, bk ii, sect 3 257a-b 293] 18c-d; [1048-1066] 28b-c; bk v [181-194]
17 Plotinus: Fourth Ennead, tr hi, ch 16, 150c 63b-c; [416-431] 66c-d
/ Sixth Ennead, tr viii, ch id, 347c-d 17 Plotinus: Third Ennead, tr i, ch 3 79b-c
18 Augustine: Confessions, bk iv, par 4-6 20a-d; 18 Augustine: Citv of God, bk iv, ch 18 197c-
bk VII, par 8-10 45d-47a passim 198a
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 22, 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 16,
A 2, rep I 128d-130d; q 47, a i, ans 256a- A I, REP 2 94b-95c: q 22, a 2, ans 128d-130d;
257b; Q 57, A 3, ANS 297b-298a; q 103, a 5, Q 47, A I, ANS 256a-257b
188 THE GREAT IDEAS 2/0 2^
34 Newton: Optics, bk hi, 542a-b
(1. The conception of chance, lb. Chance as the 35 Hume Human Understafiding, sect vi, div 46,
:
absolutely fortuitous, the spontaneous or 469d; DIV 47, 470b; sect viii 478b-487a pas-
uncaused.^ sim, esp div 67 480c-481a, div 74 484a-c
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 132d-133a; 140b,d-143a 38 Rousseau: Social Contract, bk ii, 397a
/ Practical Reason, 331c-332a / Judgement, 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 72c-85d esp 74b-76c;
566a-b 91d-92c; 132d-133a; 140b,d-143a; 153a; 171a-
54 Freud: General Introduction, 454b-c 172c; 184b-c / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of
Morals, 285c-d / Practical Reason, 331c-333a /
2. The issue concerning the existence of chance Judgement, 558b-c; 564a-c; 566a-b; 587a-c
or fortune 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 342
llOc-d / Philosophy of History, intro, 157b-
2a. The relation of chance to causality: philo- 158a
sophical or scientific determinism 48 Melville: Moby Dic\, 159a
7 Plato: Republic, bk x, 438c-439a / Titnaeus, 49 Darwin: Origin of Species, 37c-d; 65a /
455c-456a; 465d-466a / Statesman, 587a-589c Descent of Man, 593 d
esp 587a-b / Laws, bk x, 759d-765d 50 Marx: Capital, lOb-llb
8 Aristotle: hiterpretation, ch 9 28a-29d / 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk ix, 342a-344b;
Posterior Analytics, bk ii, ch ii [95*3-9] 129d / BK X, 389a-391c; bk xi, 469a-472b; epilogue
Physics, BK II, CH 4-5 272c-274b; ch 8 [199*33- I, 646c-650c esp 646c-647b; epilogue ii 675a-
396d-398b; part iv, pref 422b,d-424a; def 17 Plotinus: Third Ennead, tr ii, ch 1-2 82c-
3-4 424a; appendix, vi 447c-d; part v, prop 83d; TR III, ch 2 93d / Fourth Ennead, tr hi,
6, DEMONST 454a ch 16 150c-d
3/0 5 Chapter 9: CHANCE 11^^
18 Augustine: City of God, bk v, ch i 207d- 31 Spinoza: Ethics, part r, prop 33 367b 369a;
208c; CH 9 213b-215c APPENDIX 369b 372d
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 14, 34 Newton: Principles, bk hi, general schol,
A 86 d 88c; q 15, a i, ans 91b-92a; q 16,
13 369b-370a / Optics, bk hi, 541b-542b
A REP 2 94b-95c; q 19, a 8 116a-d; q 22,
I, 42 Kant: Judgement, 558b-559d; 560d-562a,c;
2, REP I 128d-130d; a 4 131c-132b; q 47,
A 562d-567b; 568c-570b; 575b-588a
AI, ANS 256a-257b; q 57, a 3, ans 297b- 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, intro, 156d-
298a; q 86, a 4, ans 463d-464d; q 103, a 5, 157b; 158c-159b
REP I 531b-532b; a 7, rep 2 533b-d; q 116, 53 James: Psychology, 5a
a I 592d-593d; a 3 594c-595a; part i-ii,
Q 10, a 4 665d-666a,c 4. Cause and chance in relation to knowledge
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, hell, vii [49-99]
and opinion: the theory of probability
lOa-c; paradise, viii [91-148] 117d-118c; xiii 7 Plato: Meno, 189c / Crito, 214a
[52-87] 126a-b 8 Aristotle: Interpretation, ch 9 28a-29d /
22 Chaucer: Troilus and Crcssida, bk hi, stanza Prior Analytics, bkch 13 [32*^4-23] 48b-d /
i,
esp ACT I, sc I [29-159] 149b-150d / Merchant 7 Plato: Republic, bk v, 366a-c / Laws, bk iv,
of Venice, act ii, sc i [23-46] 411d-412a / 679a-c
Henry F, act hi, sc vi [21-40] 547d-548a / 9 Aristotle: Politics, bk ii, ch ii [i273*'i7-24]
Julius Caesar, act i, sc h [135-141] 570d; act 470b; BK VII, CH 13 [1332*28-32] 537a
IV, sc HI [218-224] 590d / As You Like It, act 13 Virgil: Aeneid, bk [441-495] 115a-116b
i
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Other discussions of the issue of determinism and chance, see Fate 3, 5-6; History 43(1);
Nature 30-30(1); Necessity and Contingency 3a-3c; and for the relation of chance to
free will, see Liberty 4a; Will 53(3), 5c.
The general theory of cause and its bearing on the concept of chance, see Cause i-ib, 5d-6;
Nature 30(3).
The theological problems of chance in relation to fate, providence, and predestination, see
Cause yb-yc; Fate 4; God 7b.
Other discussions of the theory of probability, see Judgment 6c; Knowledge 4b, 6d(i)-
6d(3); Necessity and Contingency 4a; Opinion i, 3b; Science 4e; Truth 4d.
Discussions bearing on the relation of art to chance, see Art i, 2a; and for the role of chance
in the sphere of prudence, see Prudence 4a-4b, 5a.
The theory of the goods of fortune, see Good and Evil 4d; Happiness 2b(i); Virtue and
Vice 6c; Wealth loa.
192 THE GREAT IDEAS
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Boo^s of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the pubhcation of the works cited, consult
the Bibhography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
J.S. Mill. A System of Logic, bk hi, ch 17-18 T. Hardy. Life's Little Ironies
Freud. The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, ch 12 Pearson. The Chances of Death
W. James. "The Dilemma of Determinism," in Meyerson. Identity and Reality, ch 9
The Will to Believe PoiNCARE. Science and Hypothesis, part iv, ch ii
Some Problems of Philosophy, ch 9-13
. Science and Method, bk i, ch 4
.
INTRODUCTION
FROM the pre-Socratic physicists and the natura from which "nature" comes. In their
ancient philosophers to Darwin, Marx, and original significance, both words had reference
James — and, in our own day, Dewey and White- to the sensible world of changing things, or to
head— the fact of change has been a major focus its underlying principle — to the ultimate source
of speculative and scientific inquiry. of change. The physics of the philosopher and
Except by Parmenides and his school, the the physics of the empirical scientist are alike
existence of change has never been denied. Nor inquiries concerning the nature of things, not in
can it be without rejecting all sense-perception every respect but in regard to their change and
as illusory, which is precisely what Zeno's para- motion. The conclusions of both inquiries have
doxes seem to do, according to one interpreta- metaphysical implications for the nature of the
tion of them. But if argument cannot refute physical world and for the character of physi-
the testimony of the senses, neither can reason- cal existence.
ing support it. The fact of change, because it The philosopher draws these implications for
is evident to the senses, does not need proof. being from the study of becoming. The scien-
Thai change is, is evident, but what change is, tist, in turn, draws upon philosophical dis-
is neither evident nor easy to define. What prin- tinctions in order to define the objects of his
ciples or factors are common to every sort of study. Galileo, for example, in separating the
change, how change or becoming is related to problem of freely falling bodies from the
permanence or being, what sort of existence be- motion of projectiles, employs the traditional
longs to mutable things and to change itself philosophical distinction between natural and
these are questions to which answers are not violent motion. The analysis of time and space
obtainable merely by observation. Nor will (basic variables in Newtonian mechanics), the
simple observation, without the aid of experi- distinction between discontinuous and contin-
ment, measurement, and mathematical calcu- uous change, and the problem of the divisibility
and properties of mo-
lation, discover the laws of a continuous motion —
these are philosoph-
tion. ical considerations pre-supposed by the scien-
193
— —
in which bodies change from place to place; rolls from here to there, or the organism an
(2) alteration or qualitative motion, in which animal of a certain kind when it grows in size.
bodies change with respect to such attributes In all these cases, "the substratum"
— "persists and — that
as color, texture, or temperature; (3) increase which is the subject of change
and decrease, or quantitative motion, in which changes in its own properties. . The body,
. .
bodies change in size. And, in addition, there although persisting as the same body, is now
is the one kind of change which is not motion healthy and now ill; and the bronze is now
generation and corruption. This consists in the sphericaland at another time angular, and yet
coming to be or passing away of a body which, remains the same bronze."
while it has being, exists as an individual sub- Because the substance of the changing thing
stance of a certain sort. remains the same while changing in its proper-
Becoming and perishing are most readily ex- ties i.e., in such attributes or accidents as
emphfied by the birth and death of living quality, quantity, and place — Aristotle groups
things, but Aristotle also includes the transfor- the three kinds of motion together as accidental
mation of water into ice or vapor as examples of change. The changing thing does not come to be
generation and corruption. One distinctive or pass away absolutely, but only in a certain
characteristic of generation and corruption, respect. In contrast, generation and corruption
in Aristotle's conception of this type of change, involve a change in the very substance of a
is their instantaneity. He thinks that the other thing. "When nothing perceptible persists in
three kinds of change are continuous processes, its identity as a substratum, and the thing
taking time, whereas things come into being changes as a whole," then, according to Aris-
or pass away instantaneously. Aristotle thus totle, "it is a coming-to-be of one substance,
applies the word "motion" only to the con- and the passing-away of another."
tinuous changes which time can measure. He In such becoming or perishing, it is matter
never says that time is the measure of change, itself rather than a body or a substance which
But the contrast between the one mode of form of a certain kind of substance. For exam-
change which is not motion and the three kinds ple,when the nutriment is assimilated to the
of motion involves more than this difference form of a living body, the bread or corn be-
with regard to time and continuity. Aristotle's comes the flesh and blood of a man. When an
analysis considers the subject of change — that animal dies, its body decomposes into the ele-
Chapter 10: CHANGE 195
ments of inorganic matter. Because it is a mode of change which is local motion ? Even
change of substance itself, Aristotle calls the supposing that the kinds of change are not re-
one kind of change which is not motion sub- ducible to one another, is local motion pri-
stantial change, and speaks of it as "a coming-to- mary in the sense that it is involved in all the
be or passing-away simply" — that is, not in a others?
certain respect, but absolutely or "without When mechanics dominates the physical
qualification." sciences (as has been so largely the case in
These distinctions are involved in a long modern tendency to reduce all
times), there is a
tradition of discussion and controversy. They the observable diversity of change to various
cannot be affirmed or denied without opposite appearances of local motion. Newton, for ex-
sides being taken on the fundamental issues ample, explicitly expresses this desire to formu-
concerning substance and accident, matter and late all phenomena in terms of the
natural
form, and the causes of change or motion. The mechanics of moving particles. In the Preface
adoption or rejection of these distinctions af- to the first edition of his Mathematical Princi-
fects one's view of the difference between inor- ples, after recounting his success in dealing with
ganic and organic change, and the difference celestial phenomena, he says, "I wish we could
between the motions of matter and the changes derive the rest of the phenomena of Nature by
which take place in mind. The statement of the same kind of reasoning from mechanical
certain problems is determined accordingly; principles, for I am induced by many reasons
as, for example, the problem of the transmu- to suspect that they may all depend upon cer-
tation of the elements, which persists in various tain forcesby which the particles of bodies, by
forms from the physics of the ancients through some causes hitherto unknown, are either mu-
mediaeval alchemy and the beginnings of tually impelled towards one another, and co-
modern chemistry to present considerations here in regular figures, or are repelled and re-
of radioactivity and atomic fission. cede from one another."
The notion that all change can be reduced to
Since the 17TH century, motion has been the results of local motion is not, however, of
identified with local motion. "I can conceive modern origin. Lucretius expounds the theory
no other kind" of motion, Descartes writes, of the Greek atomists that all the phenomena
"and do not consider that we ought to conceive of change can be explained by reference to the
any other in nature." As it is expressed "in com- local motion of indivisible particles coming to-
mon parlance," motion, he says, "is nothing gether and separating. Change of place is the
more than the action by which any body passes only change which occurs on the level of the
''
from one place to another. ultimate physical reality. The atoms neither
This can hardly be taken to mean that come to be nor pass away, nor change in quality
change of place is the only observable type of or size.
change. That other kinds of change are ob- But though we find the notion in ancient
servable cannot be denied. The science of atomism, it is only in modern physics that the
mechanics or dynamics may be primarily or ex- emphasis upon local motion tends to exclude all
clusively concerned with local motions, but other kinds of change. It is characteristic of
other branches of natural science, certainly what James calls "the modern mechanico-
chemistry, deal with qualitative transforma- physical philosophy" to begin "by saying that
tions;and the biological sciences study growth the only facts are collocations and motions of
and decay, birth and death. primordial solids, and the only laws the changes
The emphasis on local motion as the only of motion which changes in collocation bring."
kind of motion, while it does not exclude ap- James quotes Helmholtz to the effect that "the
parent changes of other sorts, does raise a ques- ultimate goal of theoretic physics is to find the
tion about their reality. The question can be last unchanging causes of the processes of Na-
put in several ways. Are the various apparently ture." If, to this end, "we imagine the world
different kinds of change really distinct, or can composed of elements with unalterable quali-
they all be reduced to aspects of one underlying ties," then, Helmholtz continues, "the only
196 THE GREAT IDEAS
changes that can remain in such a world are is it an unconnected fact that the analytical
forces are motor forces dependent for their ef- The central point on which the two defini-
fect on spatial relations." tions are opposed constitutes one of the most
In the history of physics, Aristotle represents fundamental issues in the philosophy of nature.
No one of the four kinds of
the opposite view. Does motion involve a transition from poten-
change which he distinguishes has for him tial to actual existence, or only the substitution
greater physical reality than the others. Just as of one actual state for another — only a "trans-
quality cannot be reduced to quantity, or either portation," as Descartes says, from one place to
of these to place, so in his judgment the mo- another.?
tions associated with these terms are irreducible While motion is going on, the moving thing,
to one another. Yet Aristotle does assign to lo- according to Aristotle's definition, must be
cal motion a certain primacy. "Motion in its partly potential and partly actual in the same
most general and primary sense," he writes, "is respect. The leaf turning red, while it is altering^
change of place, which we call locomotion." He has not yet fully reddened. becomes When it
does not mean merely that this is the primary as red as it can get, it can no longer change in
sense of the word, but rather that no other that respect. Before it began to change, it was
kind of motion can occur without local motion actually green; and since it could become red,
being somehow involved in the process. Show- it was potentially red. But while the change is
ing how increase and decrease depends on alter- in process, the potentiality of the leaf to be-
ation, and how that in turn depends on change come red is being actualized. This actualization
of place, he says that "of the three kinds of progresses until the change is completed.
motion ... it is this last, which we call locomo- The same analysis would apply to a ball in
tion, that must be primary." motion. Until it comes to rest in a given place,
its potentiality for being there is undergoing
The shift in meaning of the word "motion" progressive actualization. In short, motion in-
would not by itself mark a radical departure in volves some departure from pure potentiality
the theory of change, but accompanied by
it is in a given respect,and never complete attain-
a shift in thought which has the most radical ment of in that same respect.
full actuality
consequences. At the same time that motion is When there is no departure from potentiality,
identified with local motion, Descartes con- motion has not yet begun; when the attain-
ceives motion as something completely actual ment of actuality is complete, the motion has
and thoroughly intelligible. For the ancients, terminated.
becoming of any sort had both less reality and The Aristotelian definition of motion is the
less intelligibility than being. object of much ridicule in the 17th century.
Aristotle had defined motion as the actuality Repeating the phrasing which had become tra-
to what Descartes calls its strict as opposed to potential" — Descartes asks: "Now who under-
its popular meaning, motion is "the transfer- stands these words ? And who at the same time
ence of one part of matter or one body from does not know what motion is? Will not every-
the vicinity of those bodies that are in immedi- one admit that those philosophers have been
ate contact with it, and which we regard as in trying to find a knot in a bulrush .f*" Locke also
repose, into the vicinity of others." This defi- finds it meaningless. "What more exquisite
nition — contrasted with the Aristotelian con- jargon could the wit of man invent than this
ception which it generally supersedes in the definition which would puzzle any rational
. . .
revolutionary as the Cartesian analytical geom- famous absurdity, to guess what word it could
etry is by comparison with the Euclidean. Nor ever be supposed to be the explication of. If
Chapter 10: CHANGE 197
Tully, asking a Dutchman what beweeginge stated by Newton as the first of his "axioms or
was," Locke continues, "should have received laws of motion." "Every body,-" he writes,
this explication in his own language, that it "continues in its state of rest, or of uniform
was actus entis in potentia quatenus in potentia\ motion in a right line, unlesscompelled to
it is
I ask whether any one can imagine he could change that state by forces impressed upon it."
thereby have guessed what the word beweeginge As applied to the motion of projectiles, the
signified?" law declares that they "continue in their mo-
Locke does not seem to be satisfied with any tions, so far as they are not retarded by the re-
definition of motion. "The atomists, who define sistance of air, or impelled downwards by the
motion to be *a passage from one place to an- force of gravity."
what do they more than put one synon-
other,' In his experimental reasoning concerning the
ymous word for another? For what is passage acceleration of bodies moving down inclined
other than motion} . . . Nor will 'the successive planes, Galileo argues that a body which has
application of the superficies of one body to achieved a certain velocity on the descent
those of another,' which the Cartesians give us, would, if it then proceeded along a horizontal
prove a much better definition of motion, when plane, continue infinitely at the same velocity
well examined." But though Locke rejects the — except for the retardation of air resistance
definition of the atomists and the Cartesians and friction. "Any velocity once imparted to a
on formal grounds, he accepts their idea of moving body," he maintains, "will be rigidly
motion as simply change of place; whereas he maintained as long as the external causes of ac-
dismisses the Aristotelian definition as sheer celeration or retardation are removed." So in
absurdity and rejects the idea that motion or the case of projectiles, they would retain the
change necessarily involves a potentiality capa- velocity and direction imparted to them by the
ble of progressive fulfillment. cannon, were it not for the factors of gravity
As we have already remarked, the omission and air resistance.Bodies actually in motion
of potentiality from the conception of motion possess their motion in themselves as a complete
is a theoretical shift of the deepest significance. actuality. They need no causes acting on them
It occurs not only in Descartes' Principles of to keep them in motion, but only to change
Philosophy and in the atomism of Hobbes and their direction or bring them to rest.
Gassendi, but also in the mechanics of Galileo The motion of projectiles presents a difficulty
and New^ton. According to these modern philos- for the theory which describes all motion as a
ophers and scientists, a moving body is always reduction of potency to act. "If everything that
actually somewhere. It occupies a different is in motion, with the exception of things that
place at every moment in a continuous motion. move themselves, is moved by something else,
The motion can be described as the successive how is it," Aristotle asks, "that some things,
occupation by the body of different places at e.g., things thrown, continue to be in motion
different times. Though all the parts of the mo- when their movent is no longer in contact with
tion do not coexist, the moving particle is com- them ?" This is a problem for Aristotle precisely
pletely actual throughout. It loses no reality because he supposes that the moving cause
and gains none in the course of the motion, must act on the thing being moved throughout
since the various positions the body occupies the period of the motion. For the potentiality
lie totally outside its material nature. It would, to be progressively reduced to actualit}', it
tain itself in motion beyond a point propor- them. As constituents of the changing thing,
tionate to the quantity of the impressed force they are the principles of its mutable being,
which originally set it in motion. principles of its being as well as of its being
mutable.
For the ancients, the basic contrast between The explanation of change by reference to
being and becoming (or between the permanent what does not change seems to be common to
and the changing) is a contrast between the in- all theories of becoming. Lucretius, as we have
telligible and the sensible. This is most sharply already seen, explains the coming to be and
expressed in Plato's distinction between the passing away of all other things by the motions
sensible realm of material things and the intel- of atoms which neither come
to be nor pass
ligible realm of ideas. "What is that which al- away. The eternity of the atoms underlies the
ways is and has no becoming," Timaeus asks; mutability of everything else.
"and what is that which is always becoming Yet the atoms are not completely immutable.
and never is?" He answers his own question by They move forever through the void which,
saying that "that which is apprehended by in- according to Lucretius, is required for their
telligence and reason is always in the same state; motion. Their local, motion is, moreover, an
but that which is conceived by opinion with actual property of the atoms. For them, to be
the help of sensations and without reason, is al- is to be in motion. Here then, as in the Cartesian
ways in a process of becoming and perishing, theory, no potentiality is involved, and motion
and never really is." is completely real and completely intelligible.
Even though Aristotle differs from Plato in
thinking that change and the changing can be The notions of time and eternity are insep-
objects of scientific knowledge, he, too, holds arable from the theory of change or motion. As
becoming to be less intelligible than being, pre- the chapters on Time and Space indicate, local
cisely because change necessarily involves po- motion involves the dimensions of space as well
tentiahty. Yet becoming can be understood to as time, but all change requires time, and time
the extent that we can discover the principles itself is inconceivable apart from change or mo-
of its being — the unchanging principles of tion. Furthermore, as appears in the chapters
change. "In pursuing the truth," Aristotle re- on Time and Eternity, the two fundamentally
—
marks and this applies to the truth about opposed meanings of eternity differ according to
change as well as every tiling else "one must
— whether they imply endless change or absolute
start from the things that are always in the changelessness.
same state and suffer no change." Eternity is sometimes identified with infinite
For Aristotle, change is intelligible through time. It is in this sense that Plato, in the Ti-
the three elements of permanence which are its maeus, refers to time as "the moving image of
principles: (i) the enduring substratum of eternity" and implies that time, which belongs
—
change, and the contraries (2) that to which, to the realm of ever-changing things, resembles
and (3) that from which, the change takes the eternal only through its perpetual endur-
place. The same principles are sometimes stated ance. The other sense of the eternal is also im-
to be (i) matter, (2) form, and (3) privation; plied — which eternity belongs to
the sense in
the matter or substratum being that which the realm of immutable being. TTie eternal in
both lacks a certain form and has a definite po- this sense, as Montaigne points out, is not mere-
tentiality for possessing it. Change occurs when ly that "which never had beginning nor never
Chapter 10: CHANGE 199
shall have ending," but rather that "to which who affirm, as an article of their religious faith,
time can bring no mutation." that "in the beginning God created heaven and
There are two great problems which use the earth." The world's motions, like its existence,
word "eternity" in these opposite senses. One have a beginning in the act of creation. Crea-
is the problem of the eternity of motion: the tion itself,Aquinas insists, is not change or mo-
question whether motion has or can have either tion of any sort, "except according to our way
a beginning or an end. The other is the prob- of understanding. For change means that the
lem of the existence of eternal objects im- — same thing should be different now from what
mutable things which have their being apart it was previously. But in creation, by which
. . .
from time and change. the whole substance of a thing is produced, the
The two problems are connected in ancient same thing can be taken as different now and
thought. Aristotle, for example, argues that "it before, only according to our way of under-
is impossible that movement should either have standing, so that a thing is understood as first
come into being or cease to be, for it must al- not existing at and afterwards as existing."
all,
ways have existed." Since "nothing is moved Since creation is an absolute coming to be from
atrandom, but there must always be something non-being, no pre-existent matter is acted upon
present to move it," a cause is required to sus- as in generation, in artistic production, or in
tain the endless motions of nature. This cause, any of the forms of motion.
which Aristotle calls "the prime mover," must
be "something which moves without being The philosophical and theological issues con-
moved, being eternal, substance, and actual- cerning creation and change, eternity and time,
ity." on Cause,
are further discussed in the chapters
prime mover sets up a
Aristotle's theory of a Eternity, and World. Other problems aris-
hierarchy of causes to account for the different ing from the analysis of change must at least
kinds of motion observable in the universe. The be briefly mentioned here.
perfect circular motion of the heavens serves to Though less radical than the difference be-
mediate between the prime mover which is tween creation and change, the difference be-
totally ujimoved and the less regular cycles of tween the motions of inert or non-living things
terrestrial change. The "constant cycle" of and the vital activities of plants and animals
movement in the stars differs from the irregular raises for any theory of change the question
cycle of "generation and destruction" on whether the same principles apply to both. The
earth. For the first, Aristotle asserts the neces- rolling stone and the running animal both move
sity of"something which is always moved with locally, but are both motions locomotion in the
an unceasing motion, which is motion in a cir- same sense.? Augmentation occurs both in the
cle." He calls this motion of the first heavenly growth of a crystal and the growth of a plant,
sphere "the simple spatial movement of the but are both of them growing in the same sense ?
universe" as a whole. Besides this "there are In addition, there seems to be one kind of
other spatial movements — those of the planets change in living things which has no parallel in
— which are eternal" but are "always acting in the movements of inert bodies. Animals and
different ways" and so are able to account for men learn. They acquire knowledge, form hab-
the other cycle in nature — the irregular cycle its and change them. Can change of mind be
not only for the natural scientist, but for the his emptiness." Darwin does not think that the
historian — the natural historian or the histori- desire for change is peculiar to man. "The lower
an of man and society. The considerations animals," he writes, "are . . . likewise capricious
relevant to this aspect of change receive treat- in their affections, aversions, and sense of beau-
ment in the chapters on Evolution, History, ty. There is also reason to suspect that they love
cable without reference to change of state in re- not merely an old man's view. For the most
gard to desire and aversion —
the motion from part, it is permanence rather than transiency,
want to satisfaction, or from possession to dep- the enduring rather than the novel, which the
rivation. Change is not only a factor in the poets celebrate when they express man's dis-
analysis of emotion, but it is also itself an object content with his own mutability. The with-
of man's emotional attitudes. It is both loved ering and perishing of all mortal things, the
and hated, sought and avoided. assault of time and change upon all things fa-
According to Pascal, man tries desperately to miliar and loved, have moved them to elegy
avoid a state of rest. He does everything he can over the evanescent and the ephemeral. From
to keep things in flux. "Our nature consists in Virgil's Sunt lacrimae rerum et mentem mortalia
motion," he writes; "complete rest is death. . . . tangunt to Shakespeare's "Love is not love
Nothing is so insufferable to man," he contin- which alters when it alteration finds," the poets
ues, "as to be completely at rest, without pas- have mourned the inevitability of change.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGB
1. The nature and reality of change or motion 202
3. Cause and effect in motion: the relation of mover and moved, or action and passion
6a. The reducibility of all modes of motion to one kind of change 206
9. Change of quality
ga. Physical and chemical change: compounds and mixtures 210
gb. Biological change: vital alterations
loa. Substantial change in the realm of bodies: the transmutation of the elements 211
I or. The incorruptibility of atoms, the heavenly bodies, and spiritual substances
14. The theory of the prime mover: the order and hierarchy of movers and moved 214
;28£-:b08!:
202 THE GREAT IDEAS
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Homer: Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 James Psychology, 116a-119b,the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 Plato: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
Author's Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as part, bk, ch,
sect) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d.
Bible References The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
:
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g.. Old Testa-
ment: Nehemiah, 7:45— (D) // Esdras, 7:46.
Symbols: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas^ consult the Preface.
The nature and reality of change or motion [778^2-7] 320c-d / Ethics, bk x, ch 4 [1174*13-
7 Plato: Cratylus, 86b-89b; 94c-d; 99b-104b; ^14] 428b-429a
ll23i-llAsi,c / Phaedrus, 124c-126c / Symposium, 10 Galen: Natural Faculties, bk i, ch 2 167b-
165c-166b / Phaedo, 231c-232b / Republic, bk 168c
ii, 322d-323a; bk v, 370a-373c / Timaeus, 11 Nicomachus: Arithmetic, bk i, 811b-d
447b-d; 455c-458b passim; 460c-d / Par- 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk i [146-448]
menides, 504c-505c / Theaetetus, 517d-534b 2d-6c; BK II [62-332] 15d-19b; [1105-1174]
esp 517d-518b, 532a-534b / Sophist, 564d- 29a-30a,c; bk v [235-415] 64a-66c
574c / Statesman, 587a-b / Philebus, 632a-d / 12 Aurelius: Meditations, bk iv, sect 35-36
Laws, bk X, 760a-765d esp 762b-765d 266d; sect 42-43 267b; sect 46 267c; bk v,
8 Aristotle: Physics, bk i, ch 2 [184*^15-185*14] sect 23 272b; bk vi, sect 15 275a-b; bk vii,
259b-d; ch 4-9 262a-268d; bk hi, ch 1-3 sect 18 281a; sect 50 283a; bk viii, sect 6
278a-280c; bk iv, ch ii [219^9-31] 299b-d; 285d-286a; bk ix, sect 19 293b; sect 28
bk VI, CH 6 319c-321a / Heavens, bk iv, ch 3 293d-294a
[310^22-311*12] 402b-c; CH 4 [311^29-33] 403c 16 Kepler: Harmonies of the World, 1051b
/ Generation and Corruption, bk ii, ch 10 17 Plotinus: Second Ennead, tr i, ch 3-4 36b-
[336^25-34] 438d / Metaphysics, bk i, ch 3-10 37b; tr v 57d-60c / Sixth Ennead, tr i, ch
501c-511d passim; bk iv, ch 2 [1004^27-29] 15-22 260c-264c; tr hi, ch 21-28 293a-297b
523d; CH 5 [1010*6-38] 529c-530a; ch 8 18 Augustine: Confessions, bk iv, par 15-17
[1012^22-33] 532d; BK IX, ch 3 [1047*10-29] 23a-c; bk vii, par 17-18 49a-b; bk xi, par 6
572b-c; ch 6 573c-574c; ch 8 [1049^29-1050*3] 90c-d
575c-d; ch 10 [1051^28-30] 578a; bk xi, ch 6 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 2,
590d-592b; ch 9 593d-594d; ch 11-12 596a- A ANs 12c-14a; q 9, a i, ans and rep i 38c-
3,
598a,c esp ch ii [1067^15-1068*7] 596b-d, ch 39c; Q 10, A 4, rep 3 43b-44b; a 5, ans 44b-
12 [1068^20-25] 597c-d; bk xii, ch 5 [1070^36- 45c; Q 18, a I, ans 104c-105c; a 3, rep i
1071*4] 600b-c / Soul, BK I, ch [406^11-14!
7, 106b-107c; q 23, a i, rep 3 132c-133b; q 53,
636a; bk hi, ch 7 [431*1-8] 663c A I, rep 2-3 280d-282a; a 3, ans 283b-284d;
2 to la Chapter 10: CHANGE 203
Q A 4 342b-343c; q 67, a 3, rep
65, 351b- i 93c; 120c 129c esp 121a 124d. 126a 128b;
352a; a 4, ans 352a-354a; q 7^, a i, rep 2 141b,d-145c; 200c-204c
370a-371a; a 2, ans 371b-d; q 79, a 9, ans
422b-423d; q 103, a 5, rep 2 531b 532b; 2a. The constituents of the changing thing
PART i-ii, Q 10, A I, REP 2 662ci-663d; q 2:^, 7 Plato: Timaeus, 458a-460d / Philebus, 610d-
AA 3-4 725c-727a; q 25, a i, ans and rep 2 619d
730b-731b; q 31, a 3, rep 2 754a-d; a 8 8 Aristotle:Physics, bk i, ch i 259a-b; ch 6-9
758b-759a 264c 268d; bk hi, ch 1-3 278a-280c; bk iv,
20 Aquinas: Sunmia Theologica, part hi, q 15, CH 9 ch 1225*12-
[2i7"2o-^27] 297a-c; bk v, i
A 10, rep I 795b-796a; q 62, a 4 861a-862a; 29] 305b-c; bkch 10 [240^8-24 1'*26] 324c-
vi,
part III suppL, Q 91, A 3, rep 2 1020d-1022c 3Mb / Heavens, bk i, ch 3 [270*12-17) 361b;
22 Chaucer: Knight's Tale [2987-3040] 209a- BK IV, ch 4 [312^*3-22] 403c-d / Generation and
210a Corruption, bk i, ch i [3i4'^26-:5i5*^) 410a-b;
25 Montaigne: fj/fljV^, 292d-294b CH 3 413c-416c esp [318*1-319^4] 414b-416c;
28 Galileo: Two New Sciences, third day- CH 4 [320*2-6] 417a; bk ii, ch i [329*24-''2]
fourth DAY 197a-260a,c esp third day, 224d 429a-b / Metaphysics, bk i, ch 6 [987^30-
30 Bacon: Novum Organum, bk i, aph 66 114d- 988^8] 506a; ch 8 [988^22-989^24] 506d-508a;
115c; BK II, aph 48 179d-188b bk III, ch 4 [999=^24-^24] 518a-c; bk iv, ch 5
31 Descartes: Rules, xii, 24a [1009*22-38] 528d; bk v, ch i [1013=^:5-71 533a;
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part ii, lemma 3 378d-379a ch 2 [1013*24-27] 533b; ch 4 534d-535c; bk
33 Pascal: Geometrical Demonstration, 433b- VII, CH 8-10 556b-559d; ch 15 [1039^20-
(2. The unchanging principles of change^ [202*2]-cH3[ 202^29] 279c-280c; bk vii, ch 1-2
326a-329a; bk viii, ch 10 [266^27-267*21]
2b. The factor of opposites or contraries in 354b-d / Heavens, bk i, ch 3 [270*12-17] 361b;
change CH 7 [275*1-^29] 366a-367a; ch 8 [277^1-8]
7 Plato: Symposium, 165c-l66h / Phaedo,226d' 368c-d; bk hi, ch 2 [300^8-301*12] 391d-392c;
228a; 243c-246c / Republic, bk iv, 350d-351b [301^2-32] 392d-393b; bk iv, ch 3 401c-402c /
/ Theaetetus, 519d-520b / Sophist, 565a-c / Genei-ation and Corruption, bk i, ch 6 [323*12-
Laws, BK X, 760a-c; 762b-764c 34] 421b-c; CH 7-9 421d-426c; bk ii, ch 9-10
8 Aristotle: Categories, ch 5 [4'*io-^i9] 8b-9a; 436d-439c / Metaphysics, bk i, ch 6 [987''3o-
CH 10 [13^17-37] 18d-19a; ch 14 [15^1-16] 988*8] 506a; ch 7 [988*31-^16] 506c-d; bk v,
21b-c / Physics, bk i, ch 5-9 263c-268d; bk ii, ch 2 [1013^3-16] 533c-d; bk ix, ch 1-5
CH I [193^19-22] 270a; bk hi, ch i [201^4-8] 570b,d-573c; ch 7 [1048^35-1049*18] 574c-d;
278c; bk iv, ch 9 [217=^20-^26] 297a-c; bk v, BK XI, CH 9 [1066*27-34] 594d; bk xii, ch 3
CH [224^27-225*12] 304d-305a; [225*34-^9]
I [1069^35-1070*9] 599a-b; [1070*21-30] 599c-d;
305d; CH 2 [226^23-^9] 306d-307a; ch 3 CH 4 [io7o^22]-cH 8 [1074^14] 600b-605a; ch
[226^24-34] 307c; CH 5 310a-311a; ch 6 10 [1075^1-37] 606b-d / Soul, BK II, CH 5
[230^27-231^*2] 312b-c; BK VI, ch 4 [234^10-21] 647b-648d; bk iii, ch 2 [426*2-6] 658a-b
316d-317a; bk viii, ch 2 [252^9-11] 336b-c; 9 Aristotle: Motion of Atiimals, ch 8 [702*5-
-
CH 7 [260^29-^1] 346b'C / Heavens, bk i, ch 3 22] 237b-c / Generation ofAnimals, bk i, ch 20
[270*13-23] 361b-c; ch 4 362a-c; ch 8 [277*13- [729*9]-cH 21 [729^21] 269b-270a; bk ii, ch 4
34] 368b-c; ch 12 [283^17-23] 375c-d; bk iv, [740^18-26] 281c-d; bk iv, ch 3 [768*^16-24]
ch 3 401c-402c; ch 4 [311^29-312^22] 403c-d 310b-c
/ Generation and Corruption, bk i, ch 4 416c- 10 Galen: Natural Faculties, bk i, ch 2, 168b-c;
ch 7 421d-423b; bk ii, ch 1-5 428b,d-
417a; BK III, CH 7, 203b-c
433d esp ch 4-5 431b-433d / Metaphysics, 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk ii [80-141]
bk I, CH 8 [989*18-29] 507b-c; bk ii, ch 2 16a-d; [184-293] 17b-18d
[994*19-^6] 512c-d; bk iv, ch 7 [1011^29-38] 16 Kepler: Epitome, bk iv, 854b; 855b; 940b-
531d; bk viii, ch 5 569b-d; bk ix, ch 9 941a; 959a-960a
[1051*4-13] 577a; bk x, ch 7 [1057*18-34] 17 Plotinus: Sixth Ennead, tr i, ch 15-22 260c-
584c-d; bk xi, ch 9 [io65''5-i4] 593d-594a; 264c; TR III, CH 23 294d-295a
ch II 596a-d; bk xii, ch 2 598c-599a; ch 10 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 8, a i,
[1075*25-34] 606a / Soul, bk ii, ch 4 [416*18- ANS and rep 2 34d-35c; q 41, a i, rep 2 217d-
^8] 646c-d / Longevity, ch 3 710d-711b 218c; Q 44, A 2, REP 2 239b-240a; q 48, a i,
9 Aristotle: Generation of Animals, bk i, ch 18 REP 4 259b-260c; q 60, a i, rep 2 310b-311a;
[724*20-^13] 264b-d; bk iv, ch 3 [768*2-7] q 75, A I, rep 3 378b-379c; q 80, a 2, ans
309c / Ethics, bk viii, ch 8 [1159^19-23] 411d 428a-d; q 115, a i 585d-587c; part i-ii, q i,
10 Galen: Natural Faculties, bk i, ch 2, 167b-d A 3, ANS and rep i 611b-612a; a 6, ans 614a-c;
17 Plotinus: Third Ennead, tr vi, ch 8 lllc-d / q 9, A 4, ANS 660a-d; q 22 720b,d-723b; q 23,
Sixth Ennead, tr hi, ch 22 293d-294c; ch 27 a 4 726a-727a
296b-297a 20 Aquinas Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 113,
:
753c 754a
4. Motion and rest: contrary motions 20 AqivInas: Summa Theologica, part in, ^} \\\,
7 Plato: 112b/ Republic, hk i\-, 350d-
Cratyliis, A 7, REP 5 366a-367c; part \\\ slpi'l, <^ 84,
351b / Timaeus, 453b-c; 460c-d / Sophist, A 3985d 989b
567a-574c / Statesman, 587a-589c csp 587a-b 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, paradisi:, xxvh
8 Aristotle: Categories, ch 14 [i5*'i-i()] 21b-c [106-120] 148b-c
/ Physics, BK V, ch 5-6 310a-312d / Heavens, 28 Galileo: 'Tivo New Sciences, ihiko day,
BK I, CH 4 362a-c / Metaphysics, bk iv, ch 2 201a-202a
[1004^27-29] 523d; BK XI, ch 12 [1068*^20-25] 30 Bacon: Novum Organum, bk ii, \i'n 46 177c-
597c-d / Soul, BK I, CH 3 [4o6"22-27] 635c 179a
10 Galen: Natural Faculties, bk i, ch 2, 167b-d 31 Spinoza: Ethics, part ii, def 5 373b-c
11 Nicomachus: Arithmetic, bk ii, 832c 32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk v [580-582] 188a
16 Copernicus: Revolutions of the Heavenly 33 Pascal: Geometrical Demonstration, 432b-
Spheres, bk i, 517b-518a; 519b-520b 433b; 434a-439b passim
16 Kepler: Epitome, bk iv, 931b 34 Newton: Principles, definitions, schol, 8b-
17 Plotinus: Sixth Ennead, tr hi, ch 24 295b-c; 10a; 12a-b
ch 27 296b-297a 35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk ii, ch xiv,
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 10, sect 22 159d; ch xviii, sect 2 174a-b
A 4, rep 3 43b-44b; q 18, a i, rep 2 104c-105c; 36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 292a-293a
Q 53, A 3, ans 283b-284d; q 73, a 2, ans 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 27a; 29c-d; 72c-76c
371b-d; part i-ii, q 6, a i 644d-646a; a 4 45 Fourier: Theory of Heat, 249a-251b
647b-648a; q 9, a 4, rep 2 660a-d; q 41, a 3
799c-800b 'yh. The divisibility and continuity of motion
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part hi suppl, 8 Aristotle: Physics, bk iv, ch ii [219*10-13]
Q 75, A 3, ans and rep 3-5 938a-939d; q 84, 298d-299a; bk v, ch 4 308b-310a; bk vi
a 3, REP 2 985d-989b 312b,d-325d; bk vii, ch i [242'>32-^4] 326c-d;
23 HoBBEs: Leviathan, part i, 50a bk viii, ch 7 [26i*28]-cH 8 [265*12] 347c-352a
28 Gilbert: Loadstone, bk ii, 26a-b; bk vi, / Metaphysics, bk v, ch 6 [1016*4-7] 536b-c;
'^
1101} CH 13 [1020*25-33] 541c; bk x, ch i [1052*15-
30 Bacon: Novum Organum, bk ii, aph 35, 163a 578b; bk xii, ch 6 [io7i''8-ii] 601b
21]
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part ii, axiom i 378c; 9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk x, ch 4 [1174^9-14]
lemma 1-3 378c-379a 428d-429a
34 Newton: Principles, def hi 5b; law i 14a 17 Plotinus: Third Ennead, tR vii, ch 8-9 123b-
125d
5. The measure of motion 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 7, a 3,
rep 4 32c-33c; q 53 280d-284d
5a. Time or duration as the measure of motion 20 \q\jin as: Summa Theologica, parti-ii, q 113,
7 Plato: Timaeus, 450c-451d / Parmenides^ A 7 366a-367c
504c-505c 28 Galileo: Two New Sciences, third day, 2013-
8 Aristotle: Physics, bk iv, ch 10-14 297c- 202a
304a,c; 312b,d-325d esp ch 2 314a-315d
bk vi 30 B ACQ'S '.Novum Organum, bk ii, aph 6 139b-c;
/ Generation and Corruption, bk ii, ch 10 aph 41 173d-174b
[337*22-34] 439b-c / Metaphysics, bk v, ch 13 31 Descartes: Meditations, in, 87c-d / Objec-
[1020*25-33] 541c; bk X, ch i [1053*^9-12] tions and Replies, 213b-c
579c; bk xii, ch 6 [1071^6-12] 601b 33 Pascal: Geometrical Demonstration, 434a-
9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk x, ch 4 [1174^12-^14] 439b
428b-429a 34 Newton: Prificiples, bk i, lemma ii, schol,
12 AuRELius: Meditations, bk vi, sect 15 275a-b 31b-32a
17 Plotinus: Third Ennead, tr vii, ch 7-13 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 26b-27a; 74b-76c
122d-129a / Fourth Ennead, tr iv, ch 15 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk xi, 469a-d
165c-d / Sixth Ennead, tr i, ch 5, 254C'd; ch
16 260d-261c; tr hi, ch 22, 294c 6. The kinds of change
18 Augustine: Confessions, bk xi, par 12-40 7 Plato: Timaeus, 449b-450c esp 450a / Par-
92b-99a; bk xii, par 9 lOlb-c / City of God, menides, 492a-493b esp 492d-493b; 504c-505a
bk xi, ch 6 325c-d; bk xii, ch 15 351b- / Theaetetus, 533a-b / Laws, bk x, 762b-763b
352d 8 Aristotle: Categories, ch 14 20d-21c / Phys-
1-9 Aquinas Summa Theologica, part i, q 7,
: ics, bk [200^32-201*14] 278b-c; bk v,
III, CH I
^
8/0 9 Chapter 10: CHANGE 209
30 Bacon: Novum Orgamim, bk ii, ai»h ^5, vHi, CM 7 [260*29 ^\] 346b-c / Generation and
163c-d; APH 36, 166b-c; 167b-c; aph 48 179d- Corruption, bk i, cm 2 (^15*26 ''^| 410d 411a;
188b ch 5 417b 420b: hk h. cm 6 [:{^V'^5 *'^l434b;
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part ii, axiom li-mma 7 i ch 8 [^^5''i() 14] 436c / Metaphysics, bk v,
378c 380b CH 4 [1014^20-26! 535a / Soul, bk h, ch 4
34 Nkwton: Principles, def hi 5b; laws of [4i5*'28-4i6*i8] 646a-c
MOTION 14a-24a; bk i, prop 1-17 and schol 9 Aristotle: History of Animals, bk v, cm 19
32b-50a; prop 30-69 and schol 76a- 131a; [550^26-31] 77d; CM ^? [558"i7-24]
84d-85a;
prop 94-98 and schol 152b-157b; bk ii BK VH, CH I [582*21-25] 107d / Motion of
159a-267a passim / Optics, bk hi, 540a-542a Animals, cm 5 235c d / Generation <f Animals,
34 HuYGENs: Light, ch i, 558b-563b BK I, CH 18 [723*9-2^) 263a-b; cii 22 [730^:5:^-
35 Locke: Human Understanding, hk h, ch xxi, ^9] 270d; BK II, CM [7:5^^1-4] 273d; [735*1^-
I
SECT 4 178d-179c; cii xxiii, sect 17 209a; 26] 275d-276a; cm 4 [739^34-741^^2] 280d-
SECT 22 209d; sect 28-29 211b-212a 281d; CM 6 [744»'28-745»'9] 286a-d
35 Berkeley: Human Kjiowledge, sect 50 422c; 10 Galen: Natural Faculties, bk i. ch 2, 167b-d)
sect 102 432d-433a CH 5 169b-c; CH 7 170c-171a; ch ii 172b-d;
I 35 Hl'mr: Human Understanding, sect iv, div BK II, CH 3 185a-186d
27, 460c; SECT VII, div 57, 475d-476b [in 2] 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, hk i [146-264]
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk i, lb 2d-4b: bk ii [1105-1174] 29a-30a,c; bkiv[858-
45 Fourier: Theory of Heat, 169a-b 876] 55b-c
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, epilogue 11, 694d- 28 Galileo: Two New Sciences, second day,
695c 187b-d
28 Harvey: Circulation ofthe Blood, 320a-b / On
8. Change of size Animal Generation, 353b-354a; 388c-d; 408c-
409b: 412b-415b esp 415a; 441a-443b; 494a-d
8a. The increase and decrease of inanimate 49 Darwin: Origin of Species, 71a-c
bodies
7 Plato: Timaeus, 460c-d / Laws, bk x, 762b-c 9. Change of quality
16 Kepler: Epitome, bk iv, 929b-930b 510a 512a; 563a-567a; 612a-616b esp 616a;
17 Plotinus: Second Ennead, tr i, ch 1-4 35a- 634b-635a
37b; cH 8 39c-d
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 9, 12. Emotional aspects of change
A 2 39c-40d; q 10, a 2, rep 1-2 41d-42c; a 3,
ANs 42c-43b; a 5 44b-45c; q 46, a i, rep 12^. Rest and motion in relation to pleasure
2-3,5 250a-252d; q 50, a 5 274b-275a; q 58,
and pain
A 3, ANS 301d-302d; q 63, a i, rep 2 325c- 7 Plato: Gorgias, 275c-277c / Timaeus, 463d-
326c; Q 66, A 2 345d-347b; q 68, a i, ans 464b / Philebus, 619d-620b; 626a-c; 631d-
354a-355c; q 70, a 3 365b-367a; q 97, a i, ans 632d / Latus, bk vii, 713c-715a
513c-514c; q 104, a i, rep 1,3 534c-536c 8 Aristotle: Topics, bk iv, ch i [121*27-39]
20 Aquinas Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 49,
: 169b
A 4, ans 5a-6a 9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk vii, ch ii [ii52^8]-ch
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, paradise, vii [121- 12 [1153*17] 403c-404b; ch 14 [1154^20-30]
148J 116b-c; XIII [52-60] 126a 406c; bk X, ch 3 [1173*29-^7] 427c-d; ch 4
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part i 355a-372d passim, esp [1174*13-^14] 428b-429a / Politics,
bk viii,
def i 355a, def 3,6 355b, axiom 1-2 355c-d, CH 5 [1340*1-^19] 545c-546a / Rhetoric, bk i,
PROP 1-15 355d-361d CH II [1369^33-1370*17] 613a-c; [1371*26-30]
32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk i [128-142] 96a-b; 614d
BK II [81-105] 113a-b; bk vi [296-353] 202b- 17 Plotinus: Fourth Ennead, tr iv, ch 18-21,
204a esp [320-353] 203a-204a; [430-436] 205b 167a-168c
33 Pascal: Vacuum, 358a 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 32,
34 Newton: Optics, bk hi, 541b A 2 759d-760d
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 137a-140c 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part i, 50a
53 James: Psychology, 68a-b 31 Spinoza: Ethics, part hi 395a-422a,c
35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk ii, ch xxi,
11. The apprehension of change: by sense, by SECT 29-48 184d-190d passim
reason 50 Marx: Capital, 166b-c
7 Plato: Cratylus, 113c-114a,c / Phaedo, 231c- 53 James Psychology, 410a
:
232a / Timaeus, 447b-d; 457c-d / Sophist, 54 Freud: Narcissism, 403d-404a / General In-
565a-569a esp 568a-569a/ Laivs, bk x, 765a-b troduction, 592c-593a / Beyond the Pleasure
8 Aristotle: Physics, bk iv, ch ii 298c-300a Pri7iciple, 639b-640a; 648d-649c / Ego and Idy
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, hell, vii [61-96] 302b; BK viii, ch 1-4 334a-340d; cii 8 348b-
lOb-c; XIV [94-120] 20c-d; xxvi [90-142] 39a- 352a / Heavens, bk i, ch 2 [269^2- h)] 360c-d;
c; purgatory, xi [73-117] 69c-70a; xiv [91- CH3 [270*^1-24] 361c-362a; bk i, ch 9 [279*12]-
126] 74c-75a; xxviii [76-148J 96d-97c; para- BK II, CH I [284^6] 370b-376a; bk ii, cii 6
dise, xv-xvi 128b-132a 379c-380c / Generation and Corruption, bk 11,
22 Chaucer: Wife of Bath's Prologue ['^<^S^-6j{io] CH lo-ii 437d-441a,c / Meteorology, bk i, ch
256a-269b 14 [352''i6-353"27] 458b-459a,c passim; bk ii,
23 Machiavelli: Prince, cii vi, 9b-c CH 3 [356^2-357''4] 462b-c / Metaphysics, bk
23 HoBBEs: Leviathan, part i, 79c-d; part ii, IX, CH 8 [1050*^20-28] 576c-d; bk xii, ch 6
150c; 154b-c; part iv, 271d [io7i'^3]-cH 7 [1072*22] 601b-602b; ch
7
25 Montaigne: Essays, 33b-36a; 47a-51a; 131b- [1073*2-34] 603a-c
132a; 281a-282a; 292d-294b; 318c-319b; 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk i [951-1051]
458b-c; 462c-465c; 478c-479c; 540d-541c 12d-14a csp [988-1007] 13b; bk ii [80-141]
26 Shakespeare: 2nd Iletiry IV, act hi, sc i 16a-d; [294-302] 18d; [569-580] 22b
[45-56] 483b 12 AuRELius: Meditations, bk v, sect 13 271b;
27 Shakespeare: Hamlet, act i, sc ii [68-73] SECT 23 272b; bk vi, sect 15 275a-b; bk ix,
32b; ACT V, sc i [202-240] 66c-d / Troilus and SECT 28 293d-294a; bk xi, sect 27 306b
act hi, sc hi [145-189] 124a-c; act
Cressida, 16 Ptolemy: Almagest, bk xiii, 429a-b
sc IV [26-50] 128c / Ki7ig Lear, act iv, sc i
IV, 16 Kepler: Epitome, bk iv, 888b-891a
[10-12] 269c / Sonnets, xv 588b-c; xxv 590a; 17 Plotinus: Third Ennead, tr vii, ch 7-8 122d-
xlix 593d; lx 595b-c; lxiv-lxv 596a-b; 124c; CH 11-13 126a-129a / Fourth Ennead,
cxvi 604a; cxxiii 605a tr IV, CH 7-8 161d-162d
28 Gilbert: Loadstone, pref, 2a 18 Augustine: Confessions, bk xi, par 10-17
28 Harvey: Motion of the Heart, 274a; 285b-c 91d-93c; bk xii, par 8-9 lOla-c; par 12-16
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 14c-15c esp 101d-103a; par 29 105d-106a; par 33 107b-c;
15a-b; 16c-d; 61b; 65b-c; 90b-d / Novum par 39-40 109a-110a / City of God, bk xi,
Orgaman, bk i, aph 90 124d-125a CH 4-6 324a-325d; bk xii, ch 10-20 348b-
31 Descartes: Discourse, part ii, 45d 357a
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part hi, prop 4-11 398d- 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 10,
400b; part v, prop 6, schol 454a REP 2 41d-42c; a 4, ans 43b-44b; q 14,
A 2,
33 Pascal: Pensees, 129-131 195b; 135 196a; 12, ANS 85d-86d; q 46, aa 1-2 250a-255a;
A
139-143 196b-200a; 164-172 202b-203b; 181 Q 75, a I, REP I 378b-379c
204b / Vacuum, 355a-358b 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part hi suppl,
35 Locke: Government, ch xix, sect 223
Civil Q 77, A 2, ans 945a-946b; q 91, a 2 1017c-
76c- d / Human
Understanding, 85a-c 1020c
36 Swift: Gulliver, part hi, 105a-106b 28 Gilbert: Loadstone, bk ii, 56b-c
38 Rousseau: Inequality, 335c 28 Galileo: Ttvo New Sciences, third day,
43 Declaration of Independence: [15-20] lb 224d
43 Federalist: number 14, 62a-d 30 Bacon: Novum Organum, bk ii, aph 35,
43 Mill: Liberty, 293b-302c passim / Repre- 163a; aph 48, 186b-c
sentative Government, 336b-c; 350c; 377d- 31 Descartes: Rules, xiii, 27b-c
378a 34 Newton: Principles, law i 14a; bk hi, prop 10
46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, intro, 178a-c; 284a-285a / Optics, bk hi, 540a-541b
part i, 209b; 258b 35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk it, ch xiv,
47 Goethe: Faust, dedication la-b; part ii sect 26 160c-d
[11,573-586] 281b-282a; [11,612-622] 282b- 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 135a-137a,c; 152a-d;
283a 160b-161d
49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 302b; 577c-d 53 James: Psychology, 882a
214 THE GREAT IDEAS 14 to \5a
568a- b / Philebus, 634b-635b / Seventh Letter,
14. The theory of the prime mover: the order 809c-810d
and hierarchy of movers and moved 8 Aristotle: Categories, ch 5 [4*10-^^12] 8b-9a
7 Plato: Phaedrus, 124b-c / Statesman, 587a- / Posterior Analytics, bk i, ch 8 104a-b / Meta-
589c / Laws, bk x, 758d-765c physics, BK I, CH
6 505b-506b; ch 9 508c-511c;
8 Aristotle: Physics, bk vii, ch 1-2 326a-329a; bk III, CH [995^13-18] 514a; [995^31-996*1]
I
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 140b,d-145c; 177b-179b; 31 Spinoza: Ethics, part i, def 8 355c; prop 7
239a-240b / Practical Reason, 334b-337a,c / 356c; prop 8, schol 2 356d-357d; prop 17,
Judgement, 597d-599d; 610b-613a,c scHOL 362c-363c; part ii, prop 32 385c; prop
34 385d; prop 37-39 386b-387a; prop 40,
15. The immutable DEMONST 387a; prop 43-47 388c-391a
32 Milton: Areopagitica, 384a-b
15a. The immutability of the objects of 33 Pascal: Vacuum, 358b
thought: the realm of truth 35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk ii, ch ii,
Old Testament: Psalms, 100:5; 117:2; 119:160; SECT 2 128a-b; bk hi, ch hi, sect 19 259c-
146:6— (D) Psalms, 99:5; 116:2; 118:160; 145:7 260a; ch vi, sect 6 269d-270a; bk iv, ch i,
/ Proverbs, 8:22-30 SECT 9 308c-309b; ch hi, sect 31 323c-d;
Apocrypha: Ecclesiasticus, 24:9— (D) OT, Eccle- ch XI, SECT 14 358b-c
siasticus, 24:14 42 Kast. Judgement, 551a-553c
New Testament: II John, 2 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, additions, i,
7 Plato: Cratylus, 113c-114a,c / Phaedrus, 125a- 115a / Philosophy of History, intro, 156d-
b / Symposium, 167b-d / Phaedo, 231b-232b / 157b
Republic, bk v, 371a-373c / Timaeus, 447a-d; 47 Goethe: Faust, prelude [73-74I 3a
457b-458a / Parmenides, 487c-491a / Sophist, 50 Marx-Engels: Communist Manifesto, 428b-d
l5hto I5c Chapter 10: CHANGE 215
53 James: Psychology, 299a-304b csp 301a, 302a- 8 Aristotle: Physics, bk ch 6 [258^10-
viii,
304b; 869a; 879b-882a 259^^1] 344b 345d / Heavens, bk i, ch 9
[279*'23>4l370c-d; bk ii, ch [286"8-i3l377c
7,
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: The broad philosophical context of the theory of change, see Being 5; Desire i ; Form i-ib;
Matter i-ib, 2b.
The distinction between the mutable and the immutable, see Astronomy 8a; Being 7b(3);
Element 5a; Eternity ^-^d; Form la; Truth 5.
The issue concerning time and eternity in relation to change, see Astronomy 8c(i); Eter-
nity i; Time 2, 2b; World 4a.
A discussion relevant to the theory of the prime mover, see Angel 2a.
The mathematical and experimental approach to the study of local motion and the formula-
tion of its laws, see Astronomy 8c-8c(3); Mechanics 5-5f(2), 6c-6e; One and Many
3a(2); Quantity 5c; Space 2a.
The discussion of biological and psychological change, see Animal 4a, 6h-y, 8b; Cause 2;
Desire 2c-2d; Education 4, 5c, 6; Emotion ib, 2b; Habit 4b; Reasoning ib; Time 7;
Virtue and Vice 4b-4c.
Other discussions of the distinction between generation and other kinds of change, see Art
2a; Form id(2); World 4e(i); and for the problem of the transmutation of the elements,
see Element 3c.
The theory of historical change in nature and society, see Evolution 4d, 6a, 7c; History
4b; Progress la, ic-2; Time 8a.
The consideration of economic, political, and cultural change, see Constitution 7—73,
8-8b; Progress 3-4C, 6-6b; Revolution 2-2C, 4-4b; Wealth 12.
The discussion of change or becoming as an object of knowledge, see Being 8a-8b; Knowl-
edge 6a(i); Opinion i.
Other considerations of man's attitude toward change and mutability, see Custom and
Convention 8; Progress 5; Time 7.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great BooJ^s of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
Fof the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
I. II.
INTRODUCTION
CITIZEN," been and
like ''comrade," has Constitution. It is sufficient here to note that
still is Both words
a revolutionary word. the difference in the authority and power pos-
have been titles proudly adopted by men to sessed by rulers— according as it is absolute or
mark their liberation from the yoke of despo- limited — corresponds
with a difference in the
tism or tyranny. Both titles are still sought by status, the degree of freedom, and the rights
those who have not yet gained admission to the and privileges of the people ruled.
fraternity of the free and equal.
The rank and status of citizenship first ap- In ORDER TO UNDERSTAND citizeuship it is neces-
peared in the ancient world with the begin- sary to understand the several ways in which
ning of constitutional government in the city- men can belong to or be parts of a political
states of Greece. The Greeks were conscious community. There are two divisions among
of this fact, and proud of it. In terms of it, men within a community which help us to
they set themselves apart from the barbarians define citizenship.
who were subjects of the Great King of Persia According to one of these divisions, the
or the Egyptian Pharaoh. The Spartan heralds, native-born are separated from aliens or foreign-
according to Herodotus, thus address the ers. In the Greek city-states it was almost im-
Persian commander: "Thou hast experience possible for aliens to become citizens. Plutarch
of half the matter; but the other half is beyond notes that Solon's law of naturalization, which
thy knowledge. A slave's life thou under- he qualifies as "of doubtful character," would
standest; but, never having tasted liberty, not allow strangers to become citizens unless
thou canst not tell whether it is sweet or no. "they were in perpetual exile from their
Ah! hadst thou known what freedom is, thou own country, or came with their whole family
wouldst have bidden us fight for it, not with to trade there." The metics, or aliens, who
the spear only, but with the battle-axe." were allowed in the city were usually a class
citizenship is inseparable from the equally basic state. Yet a difference always remains between
distinctionbetween absolute and limited, or a citizen and a denizen, or mere resident. Ac-
between despotic and constitutional, govern- cordingly, Rousseau criticizes Bodin for con-
ment. The difference between these two modes fusing citizens with townsmen. "M. D'Alem-
of government is treated in the chapter on bert," he says, "has avoided this error, and in
218
Chapter 11: CITIZEN 219
his article on Geneva, has clearly distinguished Thi: distinction of citizen from slave, infant,
the four orders of men (or even five, counting or alien ^.Vy:^ not complete liic picture. The
mere foreigners) who
dwell in our town, of subjects of a king arc not slaves, nor are they
which two only compose the Republic." citizens of a republic. Yet like citizens, subjects
According to a second way in which men have membership in the political community.
are divided within the political community, They constitute the people the king serves as
free men are separated from slaves. The latter, well as rules, unless he is a tyrant, for only if he
though they may be native-born, are not is a tyrant does he treat them as if they were
members of the political community, but his property, to be used for his own pleasure or
merely part of its property. A slave, accord- interest. Sometimes a distinction is made be-
ing to Aristotle, is one "who, being a human tween first- and second-class citizens, and then
being, is also a possession." But, he says in the latter, who occupy an intermediate position
another place, "property, even though living between citizenship and slavery, are regarded
beings are included in it, is no part of a state; as subjects. "Since there are many forms of
for a state is not a community of living beings government," Aristotle writes, "there must be
only, but a community of equals." many varieties of citizens, and especially of cit-
On this principle, Aristotle excludes more izens who are subjects; so that under some gov-
than the chattel slave from the status and priv- ernments the mechanic and the laborer will be
ilege of citizenship. "We cannot consider all citizens, but not in others." The whole meaning
those to be citizens," he writes, "who are neces- of citizenship changes for Aristotle when the
sary to the existence of the state; for example, working classes are admitted to it.
children are not citizens equally with grown-up From a somewhat different point of view,
men. ... In ancient times, and among some Aquinas holds that a man can be "said to be a
nations," he continues, "the artisan class were citizen in two ways: first, absolutely; secondly,
slaves or foreigners, and therefore the majority in a restricted sense. A man is a citizen abso-
of them are so now. The best form of state will lutely if he has all the rights of citizenship; for
not admit them to citizenship." instance, the right of debating or voting in the
The "slaves who minister to the wants of popular assembly. On the other hand, any man
individuals," and the "mechanics or laborers may be called citizen only in a restricted sense
who are the servants of the community" are if he dwells within the state, even lowly people,
to be counted as its "necessary people" but not or children, or old men, who are not fit to enjoy
as members of the state. When he discusses the power in matters pertaining to the common
sizeand character of the population for an ideal welfare." Those who are thus disfranchised, but
"we ought not to include
state, Aristotle says, are not slaves, are subjects rather than citizens
everybody, for there must always be in cities a in the full sense.
multitude of slaves and sojourners and foreign- It is possible, of course, for men to have the
ers; but we should include only those who are dual status of subject and citizen, as is the case
members of the state, and who form an essential now England and the self-governing domin-
in
part of it." ions of the British commonwealth. This double
The exclusion of slaves and resident aliens status does not blur the distinction between cit-
from membership in the political community izen and subject; rather it signifies the mixed
has a profound bearing on the meaning of the nature of a form of government which is both
political concept expressed by the words "the —
royal at least in its vestiges of monarchy and —
people." The people is not the same as the pop- constitutional. In the time of Locke, when a
ulation — all those human beings who live with- great constitutional victory had been won
in the state's borders. Even in societies which against the despotism of the last Stuart, the
have abolished chattel slavery and in which English people did not yet regard themselves
suffrage tends to be unrestricted, infants and as citizens. Observing that the title of citizen
aliens remain outside the pale of political life. has never been given "to the subjects of any
The people is always a part — the active polit- prince, not even the ancient Macedonians,"
ical part— of the population. Rousseau finds himself compelled to add: "not
220 THE GREAT IDEAS
even the English of today, though they are the slave as he manages and uses other instru-
nearer Uberty than anyone else." ments — inanimate tools or domesticated ani-
Unlike citizens, the subjects of a king, espe- mals. "The rule of a master," xA.ristotle declares,
cially of one claiming absolute power, have no is "exercised primarily with a view to the in-
voice in their own government, and no legal terest of the master." Yet it "accidentally con-
means for protecting their natural rights as siders the slave, since, if the slave perish, the
men. So long as the absolute ruler does not rule of the master perishes with him."
tyrannize, he governs for the welfare of his Thus conceived, the slave lacks every vestige
people; and so, though a despot in the sense of of political liberty. He is treated as radically
wielding absolute power over political inferiors, inferior to his master — almost as if he were
he is benevolent in the sense of serving rather something less than a man. He has no voice in
than using them. But if he ceases to be benevo- hisown government, nor is his welfare the para-
lent and turns tyrannical, his subjects have no mount consideration of his ruler. In short, we
recourse except rebellion. They must resort to have slavery when one man governs another in
violence in order to emancipate themselves the way in which a man manages his property,
from a condition which amounts to slavery. using it for his own good.
A citizen, on the other hand, is safeguarded When one man governs another in the way
in his legal as well as in his natural rights and, in which good parents administer the affairs of
in some modern republics at least, he is pro- children as members of the household, we have
vided with juridical m.eans for rectifying sup- the type of rule which also appears in the rela-
posed injustices. For citizens, the right of re- tion between absolute kings or benevolent des-
bellion is the last, not the only, resort. pots and their subjects. "The rule of a father
over his children is royal," Aristotle writes, "for
The distinct conditions of slavery, subjec- he rules by virtue of both love and of the re-
tion, and citizenship can be summarized by de- spect due to age, exercising a kind of royal
fining three ways in which rulers are related to power. ... A king," Aristotle adds, "is the nat-
the persons they rule. These three relations ural superior of his subjects, but he should be
seem to have been first clearly differentiated by of the same kin or kind with them, and such is
governed for their own good. They are served, For the same reason- that the rcvokiiionists
not used, by their rulers; and to this extent against absolutism or despotism in the i8th cen-
they liave a degree ot political liberty. But they tury use the phrase "free government" for re-
do not have the complete liberty which exists publican institutions, tiiey also use "citizen" to
only with self-government. designate a free man, a man who possesses the
That occurs only under constitutional rule, political liberty and equality which they re-
which for Aristotle has an imperfect analogue gard as the natural right of men because they
in the family in the relation of husband and are men. Inthis respect they do not differ
wife. In the state, however, it is perfectly repre- substantiallyfrom their Greek or Roman an-
sented by the relation between the holldcrs of cestors who prize constitutional government
public ollice and other citizens. "In the consti- and citizenship as conditions of freedom and
tutional state," Aristotle says, "the citizens rule equality.
and are ruled by turns; for the idea of a consti- Furthermore, like the constitutionalists of
tutional state implies that the natures of the antiquity, the republicans of the i8th century
citizens are equal, and do not differ at all." I'he are, with few if any exceptions, not democrats
citizen, in other words, is one "who has the in the sense of extending the rights and privi-
power to take part in the deliberative or judi- leges of citizenship to all adults. In the i8th
cial administration of the state." Rousseau century slavery still exists; and a large part even
seems to have a similar conception of the citi- of those who are not in economic bondage re-
zen as both ruling and ruled, though he uses mains outside the pale of citizenship, disqual-
the word "subject" to designate the citizen as ified by accidents of birth such as race or sex,
ruled. "The people," he writes, "are called and by the lack of sufficient wealth or property
citizens, as sharing in the sovereign power, and which makes it necessary for them to labor in
subjects, as being under the laws of the State." order to live. It is not only an ancient oligarch
Because the man who holds office in a con- like Aristotle who thinks that "the ruling class
stitutional government is first of all a citizen should be the owners of property, for they are
himself, and only secondly an official vested citizens, and the citizens of a state should be in
with the authority of a political office, the citi- good circumstances; whereas mechanics" should
zen is a man ruled by his equals and ruled as an have "no share in the state." In the iSth cen-
equal. Observing these facts, Aristotle describes tury, as w^ell as in ancient Greece, extending the
citizenship as the one ''indefinite office" set up privileges of citizenship to indentured appren-
by a constitution. It is indefinite both in tenure tices, day laborers, or journeymen, is a form of
and by comparison with the various magistra- known as "extreme democracy."
radicalism
cies or other offices which have more definitely Kant may be taken as representative of an
assigned functions. Since a citizen is ruled only enlightened point of view in the iSth century.
by other citizens, and since he has the oppor- He finds that there are "three juridical attri-
tunity of ruling others in turn, citizenship in- butes" that belong by right to the citizens:
volves political liberty in the fullest sense. This "i. constitutional freedom, as the right of
does not mean freedom yrow government, but every citizen to have to obey no other law than
freedom through self-government all the free- — that to which he has given his consent or ap-
dom a man can have in society, liberty under proval; 2. civil equality, as the right of the
law and proportioned to justice. citizen to recognize no one as a superior among
Two of these three political conditions the people in relation to himself . . . and 3.
slavery and subjection — naturally receive fuller political independence, as the right to owe his
treatment in the chapter on Slavery. The existence and continuance in society not to the
discussion of the third, citizenship, belongs not arbitrary will of another, but to his own rights
only to this chapter, but also to the chapter and powers as a member of the commonwealth."
on Constitution, and to other chapters which The last attribute leads Kant to distinguish
deal with forms of constitutional government, between "active and passive citizenship." Al-
such as Aristocracy, Democracy, and Oli- though he admits that this "appears to stand in
garchy. contradiction to the definition of a citizen as
—
The foregoing discussion shows the connec- docum.ents of this historical phase.
tion between the idea of citizenship and the two The second revolution, particularly as iden-
revolutionary movements which John Stuart tified with the fight for universal suffrage, is a
Mill notes in the history of poUtical thought relatively recent event. Its roots may go back
and action. The first is the movement to obtain as far as Cromwell's time to the activity of the
"recognition of certain immunities, called po- Levellers, and in the 18th century to the writ-
litical liberties or rights, which it was to be re- ings of John Cartwright. But what is, perhaps,
garded as a breach of duty in the ruler to in- its first full expression does not appear until
fringe, and which if he did infringe, specific Mill's Representative Government. In that book,
resistance, or general rebellion, was held to be Mill lays down the principles of the franchise
justifiable." This is the revolutionary effort to reforms which began in the 19th century, but
overthrow despotism and to establish constitu- which, as in the case of woman suffrage or the
tional government, with the status of citizen- repeal of the poll tax, were carried through only
ship for at least some part of the population yesterday or are still in progress.
frequently much less than half of the total. Yet the struggle for universal suffrage— or,
The second revolutionary movement goes as Mill would say, against treating any human
further. It presupposes the existence of govern- being as a "political pariah" — does have an an-
ment by law and aims to perfect it. It therefore cient parallel in the conflict between demo-
seeks to obtain "the establishment of constitu- cratic and Greek
oligarchical constitutions in
tional checks, by which the consent of the com- political life and thought. These two types of
munity, or of a body of some sort, supposed to constitution were opposed on the qualifications
represent its interests, is made a necessary con- for citizenship and public office. The oligarchi-
dition to some of the more important acts of the cal constitution restricted both to men of con-
governing power." Since, according to Mill, it siderable wealth. At the other extreme, as Aris-
aims to make the consent of the governed ef- totle observes, the most Greek
radical forms of
fective through an adequate representation of democracy granted citizenship to the working
their wishes, this movement inevitably leads to classes, and gave no advantage to the rich in
CuAPTKR 11: CITIZEN 223
filling the magistracies, for they selected offi- give the citizen additional protection against
from the whole citizenry by lot.
cials interference in the performance of his civic
The parallelism goes no further than that. duties, such as independent political thought
Greek democracy, even when it denied special and action, or in the exercise of his human
privileges to the propertied classes, never con- privileges, such as freedom of religious worship.
templated the abolition of slavery or the polit- The invention of these consiiiuiioual devices
ical emancipation of women. sprang from the bitter experience of coercion
and intimidation under Star Chamber proceed-
There are other between ancient
differences ings, royal censorship, and unlimited poMce
and modern institutions which affect the char- power. A citizen who can be coerced or intim-
acter of citizenship. The problem of who shall idated by his government differs only in name
be admitted to citizenship is fundamental in from the subject of an absolute despot.
both epochs. Insofar as it connotes the condi- In addition to having these legal safeguards,
tion of political liberty and equality, the status modern differs from ancient citizenship in the
of citizenship remains essentially the same. But way in which its rights and privileges are exer-
the rights and duties, the privileges and im- cised. The machinery of suffrage is not the same
munities, which belong to citizenship vary with when citizens act through elected representa-
the difference between ancient and modern tives and when they participate directly in the
nor would they have had bills of rights ap- insome respects stated in almost identical terms
pended to them. The significance of these by such different political philosophers as Plato
modern innovations (which begin, perhaps, with and John Stuart Mill.
Magna Carta) lies, not in a new conception In both the Republic and the Lavus, Plato
of citizenship, but in the invention of juridical emphasizes that "education is the constraining
means to endow the primary office of citizen- and directing of youth towards that right reason
power to protect it
ship with sufficient legal which the law affirms." By this he means not
from invasion by government. only that education will affect the laws, but
In The Federalist, Hamilton maintains that also that the laws themselves have an educa-
"bills of rights are, in their origin, stipulations tional task to perform. The educational pro-
between kings and their subjects, abridgments gram is thus planned and conducted bv the
of prerogative in favour of privilege, reserva- state. The guardians — the only citizens in the
tions of rights not surrendered to the prince." Republic in the full term are
sense of the —
Defending the absence of a special bill of rights trained for public by the discipline of
life, first
in the original Constitution, he insists that "the their passions, and second by the cultivation of
Constitution is itself, in every rational sense, their minds. Their passions are disciplined by
and to every useful purpose, a bill of rights." music and gymnastics, their minds cultivated
It declares and specifies "the political privileges by the liberal arts and dialectic.
of the citizens in the structure and adminis- In the democracy which Mill contemplates as
tration of the government," and "defines cer- an ideal, "the most important point of excel-
tain immunities and modes of proceeding, lence ... is to promote the virtue and intelli-
which are relative to personal and private gence of the people themselves." He -does not
concerns." outline a specific curriculum for the training of
Nevertheless, the right of free speech and citizens, but it is clear that he thinks their edu-
free assembly and the right to trial by a jury cation cannot be accomplished in the schools
of peers, along with the immunity from un- alone. The superiority of democracy, according
warranted searches and seizures or from ex post to Mill, lies in the fact that it callsupon the
facto laws and bills of attainder, provided by citizen "to weigh interests not his own; to be
the early amendments to the Constitution, do guided, in case of conflicting claims, by another
224 THE GREAT IDEAS
rule tiian his private partialities; to apply at of the good man who is free and also a subject,
every turn, principles and maxims which have e.g. his justice, will not be one but will comprise
for their reason of existence the common good; distinct kinds, the one qualifying him to rule,
and he usually finds associated with him in the the other to obey."
same work minds more familiarized than his The virtues of the citizen direct him pri-
own with these ideas and operations, whose marily in the performance of his obligations to
study it will be to supply reasons to his under- the state. But if the welfare of the state is not
standing, and stimulation to his feeling for the the ultimate end of man, if there are higher
general interest." In this "school of public command human loyalty, if man's
goods which
spirit" a man becomes a citizen by doing the common humanity takes precedence over his
work of a and so learning to act like one.
citizen membership in a particular state, then civic
is to act hke a free man,
If the future citizen virtue does not exhaust human excellence. More
must he not also be trained in youth to think may be morally required of the good man than
like one.? Vocational training prepares a man of the good citizen. The virtues of the saint and
to be an artisan, not a citizen. Only liberal the patriot may be of a different order.
education is adequate to the task of creating On this question, the great books reveal a
the free and critical intelligence required for fundamental disagreement among morahsts and
citizenship. Hence in a state which rests on who differ as Plato and
political philosophers,
universal suffrage, the educational problem be- Hegel from Augustine and Aquinas, or
differ
comes greatly enlarged in scope, if not in from Locke and Mill, on the place of the state
intrinsic difficulty. in human fife.
With the advent of universal suffrage, which The ancients frequently appeal to a law high-
Mill advocates, the state must face the re- er than that of the state. Socrates forever stands
sponsibility for making liberal education avail- as the classic example of one who would rather
able to every future citizen. To say that all die than disobey his inner voice — the command
normal children have enough intelligence to of his conscience. A Stoic like Marcus Aurelius
become citizens, but to regard the native en- is willing to give unqualified allegiance to the
dowment of a large number of them as in- political community only when it is the ideal
capable of liberal education, makes a travesty embracing the whole human broth-
city of man,
of citizenship. Will the child who cannot profit erhood. "My city and my countr}', so far as I
by liberal education be able to discharge the am Antoninus," he says, "is Rome, but so far as
duties of the office to which he will be ad- I am a man" —
whose "nature is rational and
mitted upon coming of age.? social"
— "it is the world."
For Christian theologians, membership in the
The training of character is always more dif- city of God is a higher vocation than citizen-
ficult than the training of mind. In education ship in any earthly community — even when
for citizenship, the problem of moral training that is the city of man at its best. The city of
involves the question — discussed in the chapter God demands a higher order of virtue than the
—
on Virtue whether the good man and the city of man. Referring to the earthly city, Au-
good citizen are identical in virtue. gustine says that "the things w^hich this city de-
For x\ristotle, and seemingly also for Mill, sires cannot justly be said to be evil, for it is it-
the virtue of the good man under an ideal con- self, in its own kind, better than all other human
stitution would be identical wdth that of the goods. For it desires earthly peace for the sake
good citizen. As both ruling and being ruled, of enjoying earthly goods." It is all right for
In such circumstances, the faithful have no ment has the individual a right to demand.''
choice.They must obey God before man. How much individual sacrifice has the state a
"Laws that are contrary to the commandments right to expect? Is the state merely a means in
of God," Aquinas holds, do not "bind a man the indiv idual's pursuit of happiness, or the end
in conscience" and "should not be obeyed." to which all other goods must be ordered ? Is
statutes of heaven. For their life is not of as CoxsTiTUTiGx, Good and Evil, Law, Lib-
to-day or yesterday, but from all time, and erty, and State — but we have placed its prin-
no man knows when they were first put forth." cipal formulation in this chapter because the
The problem which Antigone faces can occur concept of citizenship signifies the ideal con-
in as many other ways as there are possibilities dition of the human individual as a member
of tension between individual conscience or de- of the political community.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. The individual in relation to the state 226
2C. The character and extent of citizenship under different types of constitutions
5. The virtues of the citizen and the virtues of the good man 229
REFERENCES
To numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
find the passages cited, use the
numbers of the passages referredFor example, in 4 Homer: Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d, the
to.
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 James Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 Plato: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
Author's Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as part, bk, ch,
sect) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d.
Bible References: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g.. Old Testa-
—
ment: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) // Esdras, 7:46.
Symbols: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
40 Gibbon: Decli?je and Fall, 14a-15c passim; a ANS and rep 2 316a-318b
3,
16c-17b; 17d; 521a-523a,c 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laivs, bk ii, 4a-6b;
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 81c-82a: 161c-162a BK XV, 114c-115b; bk xxiii, 189a
42 Kant: Science of Right, 436d-437c; 450b-d 38 Rousseau: Social Contract, bk iv, 428a-432b
43 Federalist: number 42, 138d-139c; number passim
43, 142b-c; number 54, 171a-b 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, bk hi, 168d-169a;
43 Mill: Liberty, 267b,d-268c / Representative BK IV, 269d-271d
Governmeiit, 339d-340c; 341d-344d passim; 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 14a-d; 15c; 17a-b
348c-355b: 427a-b 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 73b
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, additions, 155 42 Kant: Science of Right, 436d-437c; 450d-
142a-b / Philosophy of History, part i, 213b; 452a
PART II, 271c-d; part iv, 356d 43 Constitution of the U.S. article i, sect 8 :
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk ix, 384c-388a,c [204-205] 13b; amendments, xiv, sect 1-2
passim 18c-d; XV 19b; xix 19d; xxiii 20d
43 Federalist: number 42, 138d-139c passim;
2c. The character and extent of citizenship un- number 52, 165a-c; number 54, 171a-b;
der diflferent types of constitutions number 57, 177a; 178c-d
6 Herodotus: History, bk hi, 107c-108c 43 Mill: Representative Government, 380c-389b;
6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, bk ii, 395d- 395b-c
399a: bk vi, 520b-c
4. The rights, duties, privileges, and immuni-
7 Plato: Republic, bk viiiix, 401d-420d /
Laws, bk viii, 733d-734a tiesof citizenship
9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk viii, ch ii 413b-d pas- Old Testament: Exodus, 12:48-49; 22:21; 23:9
sim / Politics, BK III, CH I 471b,d-472c; ch 5 / Leviticus, 19:33-34; 24:22 / Numbers, 35:30 /
475a-d; ch 13 [1283^44-1284^3] 482a; bk iv, Deuteronomy, 10:18-19; 17:6; 19:15; 20:1-9
4/0 5 Chaptir IhCniZEN 220
Apocrypha: Susanna esp 48 — (D) OT, Daniel, 43 Ariiclf.s of Confederation: iv [r--56) 5b-
13:1-64 csp i3:4<S c; VI [87-93] 6b
New Testament: Marl^, 12:13-17 / Acts, i6:r6- 43 0)NST1TUTI0N OF THE U.S.: ARTICLE I, SECT 2
39; 21:27-28:^1 / Romans, 13:1-7 / Titus, y.i [5-16] lib; sect 3 [67-72] 12a; sect
9 [267-
5 EuRiPiDi:s: Suppliants [:538-364] 261 b-c 272] 13d; [289-295J 14a; article ii. sect i
5 Aristophanes: Ecclesiazusae 615a-628d csp [375 382] I4d; ARTICLE III, sect 3 15d-16a;
[7^0-876) 623c 625b article IV, sect 2 [519-521] 16a; amknd-
6 Herodotus: History, bk \ti, 233c-d xiKxrs, i-x 17a-d; xiii, sect i-xiv, si ex 2
6 TuLCYmuEs-.Peloponnesian War, bk m, 395d- 18c-d; XV I9b; xix 19d; xxiii 20d
399a; bk hi. 425a-427c; 432b-c; bk m, 520a-d 43 Federalist: number 42, 138d-139c passim;
7 Plato: Crito 213a-219a,c / Gorgias, 287c 292a NUMBER 44, 144d-145a; number 52. 165c;
/ Republic, bk viii, 409b-c / Statesman, 601b-c xuMBER 54, 171a-b; nimber 62, 188d 189a;
/ Laws, bk VI, 697a-705c "passim; bk viii, number 80, 236a-b; number 84, 251a-253d
732b-735a; bk xii, 791c / Seventh letter, 43 Mill: Liberty, 267b,d-268c; 271c-273d; 302d-
804a-b 303a / Representative Government, 348c-350a;
9 Aristotle: Politics, bk ii, ch 2 [i26i''2 ^''6] 392b-396d
456a-b; ch q [i269''*33-36] 465c; [iiji'-^iy-^^y] 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 2:50
467c; CH 10 [1272*13-17] 468b-c; bk hi, ch 1-2 75c; par 261 83a-d; par 291 97d-98a: par ^^24-
471b,d-472d; ch 5 475a-d; ch 12 [1282^15]- 326 107a-108a; additions, 141 139c / Philos-
CH 13 284^*2 480c-482a; bk vi, ch 2 520d-
[ 1 1 ophy of History, part ii, 273c; part iv. 365b-c
521b / Athenian Constitution, ch 8, par 5 556c; 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk i, 10a b
ch 42, par I 572b 54 Freud: War and Death, 757b-c
12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk hi, ch 22 195a-
201a 5. The virtues of the citizen and the virtues of
12 Aurelus: Meditations, bk i, sect 14 2 54 b-c the good man
14 Plltarch: Lycurgus, 44d-47a / Numa Pom- 5 Aristophanes: Knights 470a-487a.c csp
pilius, 51c-52c / Solon, 71b; 71 d / Crassus- [1316-1408] 486a-487a,c
Nicias, 455d-456d / Cato the Younger 620a- 6 Herodotus: History, bk v, 175b; bk vm,
648a,c passim / Tiberius Gracchus, 675b-d 233a-d; 258d
15 Tacitus: Annals, bk i, 21b-d; bk xi, 106a-d 6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, bk i, 370a-
20 Aql'ixas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 105 c; BK II, 395d-399a; 402b-404a; bk hi, 425a-
307c-321a passim 427c passim; bk vi, 511c-d
23 HoBBEs: Letiathan, part ii, 101a-104d; 113c- 7 Plato: Protagoras, 43b-47c / Mcfio, 174d-
116d 176a esp 175d-176a / Apology 200a-212a,c /
25 Montaigxe: Essays, 381a-388c Crito 213a-219a,c / Republic, bk iv. 346a-355a
27 Shakespeare: Coriolanus 351a-392a.c esp / Statesjnan, 605d-608d / Laws, bk hi, 669b-
act II, sc III [1-52] 366a-c, [165-272] 367d- 670c; 672d-674d; bk v, 686d-691b; bk vi,
369a 706b-c; BK viii. 740d-741a
30 Bacox: Advancement of Learning, 71a-75a 9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk i, ch 9 [1099^^29-32]
31 Spixoza: Ethics, part iv, prop 37, schol 2 345b; bk hi, ch 8 [iii6''i5-^3] 362b-d; bk v,
435b-436a ch I [1129^12-1130^13] 377a-c; ch 2 [11^0^25-
32 MiLTox: Areopagitica 381a-412b 29] 378b; bk vi, ch 8 [1141^23-1142^11] 390d-
36 Swift: Gulliver, part ii, 75b 391a; bk x, ch 9 434a-436a,c / Politics, bk i,
41 Gibbox: Decline and Fall, 73b; 94c-95c: 96a- 264a; sect 29 266a; bk v, sect 16 271c-d;
d;161c-d;587a sect 22 272b; bk vi, sect 14 274d-275a; bk
42 Kaxt: Intro. Metaphysic of Morals. 389c- VII, sect 5 280a-b; sect 13 280c; sect 66
390a,c / Science of Right, 400b,d-402a,c;
' 284b-c; bk ix, sect 23 293c; bk x, sect 6
429a-c; 434a; 436c-437c; 439a-441d; 450d- 297a-b; bk xi, sect 8 303a-b; sect 21 305d-
452a 306a
230 THE GREAT IDEAS (itol
6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, bk i, 370a-
(5. The virtues of the citizen atid the virtues of c; BK II, 396c-397d
the good man.) 7 Plato: Protagoras, 43a-47c / Crito 213a-219a,c
14 Plutarch: Lycurgus, 45b;48b'C/ Coriolanus, / Republic, bk ii-iii, 320c-339a; bk iv, 344b-
T74b,d-175a / Aristides, 263d / Lysander, d: BK V, 366a-c; bk vi, 380d-381a / Statesman,
361a-d / Agesilaiis, 480b,d-481a / Cleomenes, 607b-608d / Laws, bk i-ii 640a-663d esp bk
659d-660a / Demosthenes, 699c- 700a I, 644b-645c; bk vii 713c- 731d; bk viii, 732b-
20 Aquinas: Siimma Tlieologica, part i-ii, q 61, [1264*26-32] 459c; CH 7 [1266^27-35] 462b-c;
A 5 58b-59d; q 92, a i esp rep 3 213c-214c BK III, CH 4 [1277*14-^29] 474a-475a; bk iv,
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, hell, vi [58-75] 9a; CH 9 [1294^19-24] 494c; BK v, ch 9 [1310*1:5-
XI [1-66] 15a-d; xv [55-78] 21d; xvi [64-78] 22] 512b-c; BK VII, ch 13 [1332*28-^10] 537a-b;
23a-b; xxxii [70I-XXX111 [90] 48c-50c passim; CH 14 [1332^42-1334*11] 537d-538d; ch 15
PURGATORY, VI [58-151] 61b-62c; XVII [91-123] [1334^7-28] 539b-d; ch 17 541a-542a,c; bk
79b-d; paradise, xv [97]-xvi [154] 129b-132a VIII 542a-548a,c passim / Athenian Constitu-
23 HoBBEs: Leviathan, conclusion, 279a-c tion, CH 42 572b-d
25 Montaigne: Essays, 48a-b; 381a-388c; 390c- 12 AuRELius: Meditations, bk i 253a-256d
391c; 480b-482b;'486b-489b; 490c-491d 14 Plutarch: Lycurgus, 33c-34a; 39a-45b /
26 Shakespeare: Julius Caesar, act v, sc v Lycurgus-Numa 61b,d-64a,c / Solon 64b,d-
[68-81] 596a,c 77a,c passim / Agesilaus, 480b,d-481a
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 74b-c; 81d- 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, paradise, viii [115-
82a; 94b-95b 148] 118b-c
31 Descartes: Discourse, part hi, 48b-49a 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part ii, 114b-115a; L50c-
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part iv, prop 73 446c- 151a; part iv, 273a-c; conclusion, 282d-
447a 283a
32 Milton: Samson Agonistes [843-870] 358a-b 25 Montaigne: Essays, 60c-62a
33 Pascal: Pensees, 6 173a 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 23a; 79c-
35 Locke: Toleration, 15d / Human Understand- 80a
ing, BK I, CH II, sect 5-6 105a-c 32 Milton: Areopagitica 381a-412b esp 384b-
36 Swift: Gulliver, part hi, 112a-115b 389a, 398a-b
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, xxiia-d; bk hi, 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk iv 13b,d-
9b-12a; bk iv, 13b,d-15a; 15c-16a; bk v, 18d- 18d
19d; 21b- 23a; 31b-c; bk vii, 44d-45c; bk viii, 38 Rousseau: Political Economy, 373c-377b /
51a-52c; 55c-d; bk xix, 137a-c Social Contract, bk ii, 402b-403a
38 Rousseau: Inequality, 323a-328a; 360b,d 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, bk v, 303b-305c;
[fn i]; 366b-d / Political Economy, 369b-370a; 337d-343d; 347c-d
372a-377b / Social Contract, bk ii, 402b-403a; 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 6b; 669a-b
BK III, 411a-c; 412a-b; bk iv, 428a-432b 42 Kant: Judgement, 586a-587a
passim; 434b-435a 43 Feder.\list: number 27, 95c-d
39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, bk v, 337d-338c; 43 Mill: Liberty, 317d-319b; 320a-c; 322d-
340c-343d: 346c-347d 323a, c / Representative Government, 336c-341d
40 GiBBOs: Decline and Fall, 630b,d-631a; 644b- passim, esp 339a-340c; 349a-350a; 381b-387d
645c passim; 417c-418d; 424b-c
43 Federalist: number 55, 174c-d 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 187
43 Mill: Representative Government, 329b-330a; 65a-c; par 239 76d; par 315 104c; additions,
334b; 336c-341c passim, esp 337a-b; 346c- 98 133a; 147 140c; 166 145b-c; 183 148d-
350a passim 149a
44 BoswELL-: Johnson, 393a-c 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk vi, 244d-245c
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 268 54 Freud: Sexual Enlightenment of Children,
84c-d / Philosophy of History, intro, 171b-c; 122a,c
part ii, 272a-d; part iv, 365b-c
49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 314c-316a; 321b-c 7. Political citizenship and membership in the
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk244d-245d;
vi,
city of God
BK XII, 537b-538a; bk xv, 634a-635a; epi- Old Testament: I Samuel, 8:9-18 — (D) I Kings,
logue I, 668a-669c; epilogue ii, 686c-687a 8:9-18 / Jeremiah, 29:4-7 esp 29:7— (D) Jere-
mias, 29:4-7 esp 29:7
6. Education for citizenship Apocrypha: / Maccabees, 1:41-2:70— (D) OT,
5 Euripides: Suppliants [857-917] 266a-b / Machabees, 1:43-2:70 / // Maccabees, 6:8-
5 Aristophanes: Frogs [1008-1098] 576b-577c 7:42— (D) OT, // Machabees, 6:8-7:42
b b
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Other considerations of the issues involved in the relation between the individual and the
state, see Good and Evil 5d; Happiness 5b; Justice lob; State 2f, 3c, 3e, 8e.
The context of the concept of citizenship in the theory of constitutional government or
government by law rather than by men, ^^f Constitution; Law ja-yb; Liberty id, if— ig;
Monarchy ia(i); Tyranny 5-5d.
Other comparisons of citizens with subjects or slaves, see Justice gd; Slavery 6a-6c.
The bearing of different types of constitution on the character of citizenship and especially
on the extent of the franchise, see Constitution 5-5b; Democracy 4-43(2), 5b(2);
Oligarchy 5-53.
The political machinery, such as elections and representation, by which the citizen exercises
his suffrage, see Constitution gr-gh; Democracy 5b-5b(4); Government ih.
The consideration of civic virtue in relation to virtue generally, see Virtue and Vice 7b; and
for the problem of education for citizenship, see Aristocracy 5; Democracy 6; Educa-
tion 8d; State yd; Virtue and Vice 7a.
Another discussion of the distinction between the city of man and the city of God, see
State 2g; and for matters relevant to the ideal of world citizenship, see Love 4c; State lof;
War and Peace iid.
Descriptions of the historical struggle for citizenship, and for the extension of the franchise,
see Labor yd; Liberty 6b; Slavery 6c; Tyranny 8.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great BooJ^s of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date,place, and other facts cone^ning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
INTRODUCTION
THE idea of a constitution as establishing inally formed — or at least differentiated from
and organizing a political community; the the tribe and family.
principle of constitutionality as determining a Kant gives explicit expression to the notion
generic form of government having many that the invention of constitutions is coeval
varieties; and the nature of constitutional with the formation of states. "The act by which
—
government these three problems are so inti- a People is represented as constituting itself in-
mately connected that they must be treated to a State," he writes, "is termed the Original
together. We have used the word "constitu- Contract" and this in turn signifies "the right-
tion" to express the root notion from which all fulness of the process of organizing the Consti-
other matters considered in this chapter are tution."
derived. In this sense, the constitution appears to be
It is impossible to say precisely what a con- identical with the organization of a state. It
stitution is in a way that will fit the political would then seem to follow that every state, no
reality of the Greek city-states, the Roman re- matter what its form of government, is consti-
public and its transformation into the empire, tutional in character. But this would leave no
mediaeval kingdoms and communes and their basis for the fundamental distinction between
gradual metamorphosis into the limited mon- constitutional and non-constitutional or what —
archies and republics of modern times. No defi- is usually called "absolute," "royal," or "des-
nition can adequately comprehend all the vari- potic" — government.
ations of meaning to be found in the great That basic distinction among forms of gov-
works of political theory and history. But there ernment is as old as Plato and Aristotle. It is
are a number of related points in the various first made by Plato in the Statesman in terms
233
—
234 THE GREAT IDEAS
,.
government. His point, therefore, seems to be ten or unwritten, whether a product of custom
that among types of government, absolute or explicit enactment, a constitution, x\ristotle
monarchy does not fit the nature of civil writes, "is the organization of offices in a state,
society. and determines what is to be the governing
If "constitution" is used merely as a syno- body, and what is the end of each community."
nym "form" or "type," then even a state
for The idea of political office — of officials and
under absolute monarchy or despotic govern- official status — is inseparable from the idea of
ment can be said to have a constitution. Since constitution. That is why the concept of citi-
every state is of some type, it can be said that zenship is also inseparable from constitution.
it has a certain constitution, or that it is con- As the chapter on Citizen indicates, citizen-
stituted in a certain way. If, however, we use ship is the primary or indefinite office set up by
the word "constitution" to conform to the dis- a constitution. Citizenship is always the pre-
tinction between constitutional and non-con- requisite for holding any other more definite
stitutional government, we are compelled to office in a constitutional government, from
say that there are states which do not have juryman to chief magistrate. In specifying the
constitutions. quahfications for citizenship, a constitution
With this distinction in mind, the statement sets the minimum qualifications for all other
that "the constitution is the form of the state" offices which usually, though not always, de-
takes on a different and more radical meaning. mand more than citizenship of the man who is
tional constitution, its autonomy is . . . not almost always charged with some governmental
sovereignty." function" and exercises a "function of sover-
From would appear that a despotically
this it eignty."
governed community, such as ancient Persia, Since it is an arrangement of offices, a con-
is a poUtical anomaly. It is intermediate be- stitution is, therefore, also a division or parti-
tween the family and the state, for it is like a tion of the whole sovereignty of government
and in the size and character
state in its extent or at least of the exercise of sovereignty — into
of its population, yet it is not a state in its po- unitswhich have certain functions to perform,
litical form. The truly political community is and which must be given the requisite power
constitutionally organized and governed. In and authority to perform them. These units are
this sense, the English words "political" and political offices, defined according to their
"constitutional" become almost interchange- functions,and vested with a certain power and
able, and we can understand how these two authority depending on their place and pur-
English words translate a single word in Greek pose within the whole.
political discourse. Hamilton's maxim that "every power ought
to be in proportion to its object" formulates
As THE FORM of the state, the constitution is the equation by which the function of an office,
the principle of its organization. Whether writ- or its duties, determines its rights and powers,
Chapter 12: CONSTITUTION 235
privileges and immunities. And except for the constitution is judged to be unconstitutional
provision of a temporary dictatorship in the and deprived thereby of the authority of law.
is
early Roman constitution, or its modern con- "Every act of a delegated authority," Hamil-
stitutional equivalent inemergency grants of ton writes in The Federalisty "contrary to the
power, political offices under constitutional tenor of the commission under which it is
government always represent limited amounts exercised, is void. No legislative act, therefore,
of power and authority— Umited in that each contrary to the Constitution can be valid. To
is always only a part of the whole. deny this would be to affirm that the deputy is
A CONSTITUTION defines and relates the various above his master; that the representatives of
political offices. It determines the qualifica- the people are superior to the people them-
tions of office-holders. But it does not name the selves; thatmen acting by virtue of powers may
individuals who, from all those qualified, shall do not only what their powers do not authorize,
be selected for any office. Because its provisions but what they forbid."
have this sort of generality, a constitution has
the character of law. This is equally true of The conception of a constitution as a law or
written and unwritten constitutions, of those set of laws antecedent to government all acts of
shaped by custom and those enacted by con- inevitably raises the question of how or by
stituent assemblies. whom constitutions are made. If the provisions
Unlike all other man-made laws, a constitu- of a constitution were precepts of natural law,
tion is the law which creates and regulates they would, according to the theory of natural
government itself, rather than the law which a law, be discovered by reason, not positively in-
government and by which it regulates
creates stituted. But though constitutions have the
the conduct of men, their relation to one an- character of positive law, they cannot be made
other and to the state. This is perhaps the basic as other positive laws are made — by legislators,
distinction with regard to the laws of the state. i.e., men holding that office under the consti-
"The fundamental law in every common- tution.
wealth," says Hobbes, "is that which being The generally accepted answer is that a con-
taken away the commonwealth faileth and is stitution is made by the people who form the
utterly dissolved." Montesquieu distinguishes political community. But, as Madison observes,
what he calls "the law politic," which consti- some evidence exists to the contrary. "It is not
tutes the state, from ordinary legislation; and a little remarkable," he writes, "that in every
Rousseau likewise divides the laws into the case reported by ancient history, in which
"political" or "fundamental"
and the laws government has been established with delibera-
"civil laws" —
those "which determine the tion and consent, the task of framing it has not
form of the government" and those which the been committed to an assembly of men, but has
government, once it is constituted, enacts been performed by some individual citizen of
and enforces. pre-eminent wisdom and approved integrity."
In addition to being the source of all other He cites many examples from Plutarch to sup-
— for sets up the
positive laws of the state it port this observation, but he adds the comment
very machinery of lawmaking — a constitution that it cannot be ascertained to what extent
is fundamental law in that it establishes the these lawgivers were "clothed with the legiti-
standard of legality by which all subsequent mate authority of the people." In some cases,
laws are measured. Aristotle observes that "the however, he claims that "the proceeding was
justice or injustice of laws varies of necessity strictly regular."
with constitutions." What may be a just enact- The writers of The Federalist are, of course,
ment in one state may be unjust in another primarily concerned with a constitution that is
according to the difference of their consti- not the work of one man but the enactment of
tutions. a constituent assembly or constitutional con-
In American practice and that modeled upon vention. From their knowledge of British law,
it, a law which violates the letter or spirit of the they are also well aware that a constitution may
I
236 THE GREAT IDEAS
sometimes be the product of custom, growing The reality and significance of the difference
and altering with change of custom. But how- between these three political philosophers
ever it is exercised, the constitutive power is would seem to depend on the precise historical
held by them to reside in the constituents of meaning each gives to the hypothesis of men
the state, the sovereign people. This power may living in a state of nature prior to political
be exercised through force of custom to pro- association. If, prior to the state, men live in
duce an unwritten constitution, or through non-political societies, and if the state, as op-
deUberative processes to draft a written one; posed to the family or the despotically ruled
but it can never be exercised by a government community, begins to exist only when it is
except with popular consent, since all the powers constituted, then the formation of the state
of a duly constituted government derive from and the formation of its government would
its constitution. In the American if not the seem to be the product of a single convention.
British practice, the amendment of the con-
stitution also involves, at least indirectly, an The principle of constitutionafity is also
appeal to the people. necessary in order to understand the familiar
Rousseau assigns the constitutive power to a distinction between government by laws and
mythical figure he calls "the legislator" or "the government by men. Except for the divine
law-giver," describing him as the man who sort of government which is above both law
"sets up the Republic." Yet Rousseau says of and lawlessness, Plato employs "the distinction
this special office that it "nowhere enters into of ruling with law or without law" to divide the
the constitution." He thus reaffirms the essen- various forms of government into two groups.
tial point that a constitution cannot create the "The principle of law and the absence of law
office of constitution-making. will bisect them all," the Eleatic Stranger says
These remarks in the Social Contract have in the Statesman.
another significance. Rousseau tries to distin- In the ordinary meaning of law as an instru-
guish the formation of a government by the ment of government, it is difficult to conceive
constitution (the political or fundamental law government by laws without men to make and
made by the legislator) from the formation of administer them, or government by men who
the state by the social contract entered into by do not issue general directives which have the
the people in their original act of association. character of law. Government always involves
But is not the constitution also a formative con- both laws and men. But not all government
tract or convention? If it is popular in origin, rests upon the supremacy of law, a supremacy
either through custom or enactment, is there which consists in the equality of all before the
more than a verbal difference between these law and the predominance of regular law as
—
two contracts the one which establishes a opposed to arbitrary decision. Nor is all govern-
political society and the one which establishes ment based upon a law that regulates the offi-
its government? cials of government as well as the citizens, and
For Hobbes, and seemingly also for Locke, determines the legality of official acts, legisla-
the compact by which men abandon the state tive, judicial, or executive. That law is, of
of nature and establish a civil society results at course, the constitution.
the same time in the establishment of a govern- Locke makes a distinction between govern-
ment. It is, Hobbes writes, "as if every man ing by "absolute arbitrary power" and govern-
should say to every man, I authorize and give ing by "settled standing laws." It is his con-
my right of governing my self, to this iVlan or tention "whatever form the common-
that
to this Assembly of men, on this condition, wealth is under, the ruling power ought to
that thou give up thy right to him, and author- govern by declared and received laws, and not
ize all his actions in like manner." According to by extemporary dictates and undetermined
Rousseau, "there is only one contract in the resolutions, for then mankind will be in a far
State, and that is the [original] act of associa- worse condition than in a state of Nature. . . .
tion." For him, "the institution of government All the power the government has, being only
is not a contract." for the good of the society, as it ought not to
Chapter 12: CONSTITUTION 237
tional encroachments. Despite their incompati- The mixed constitution is not to be confused
bility in principle, historic circumstances have with the mixed regime, for it is a mixture of
managed combine absolute with constitu-
to different constitutional principles, not of con-
tional government. It is this combination which stitutionalism itself with absolute government.
mediaeval jurists and philosophers call "the When the word "polity" signifies constitutional
mixed regime" or the regimen regale et politi- government generally, it has the meaning
ciim, "royal and political government." which the Romans express by the word "re-
It may be thought that a foreshadowing of public" and which the constitutionalists of the
the mediaevalmixed regime can be found in 1 8th century call "free government."
Plato'sLaws, in the passage in which the The distinctive characteristics of such gov-
Athenian Stranger says that monarchy and ernment — whether it is called political, repub-
democracy are the "two mother forms of states lican, constitutional, or free — lie in the fact
from which the rest may be truly derived." He that the citizens are both rulersand ruled; that
then asserts that, to combine liberty with wis- no man, not even the chief magistrate, is above
dom, "you must have both these forms of gov- the law; that all political power or authority is
ernment in a measure." Since the Persian des- derived from and limited by the constitution
potism is cited as the "highest form" of monar- which, being popular in origin, cannot be
chy and the Athenian constitution as the arche- changed except by the people as a whole.
238 THE GREAT IDEAS
It is perhaps only in the Middle Ages that Mediaeval in origin, the institution of a
we find the mixed regime in actual existence. government both royal and political, or what
"That rule is called politic and royal," Aquinas Fortescue, describing England in the 15th cen-
writes, "by which man
over free sub-
a rules tury, called a "political kingdom," exerted
jectswho, though subject to the government of great influence on modern constitutional de-
the ruler, have nevertheless something of their velopments. As late as the end of the 17th cen-
own, by reason of which they can resist the tury, Locke's conception of the relation of king
orders of him who commands." These words and parliament, royal prerogative and legal
seem to present an accurate picture of the pe- limitations, may emphasize the primacy of law,
culiarly mediaeval political formation which but it does not entirely divest the king of per-
resulted from the adaptation of Roman law (it- sonal sovereignty. Locke quotes with approval
self partly repubUcan and partly imperial) to the speech from the throne in 1609, in which
feudal conditions under the influence of local James I said that "the king binds himself by a
customs and the Christian religion. double oath, to the observation of the funda-
The mediaeval mixed regime is not to be con- mental laws of his kingdom. Tacitly, as by
fused with modern forms of constitutional being a king, and so bound to protect as well
monarchy any more than with the mixed con- the people, as the laws of his kingdom, and ex-
stitution or polity of the Greeks. "The so- pressly by his oath at his coronation." To this
called limited monarchy, or kingship according extent the British kingdom is, as Fortescue had
to law," Aristotle remarks, "is not a distinct said, "political." But the king also retains the
form of government." The chapter on Mon- prerogative to dispense with law and to govern
archy deals with the nature of constitutional in particular matters by decree apart from law,
monarchy and its difference from the mixed and to this extent the government still remains
regime as well as its relation to purely republi- royal.
can government. The mediaeval king was not a Locke recognizes the difficulty of combining
constitutional monarch, but a sovereign person, the absolute power of the king in administra-
in one sense above the law and in another tion with the limitations on that power repre-
limited by it. sented by Parliament's jurisdiction over the
To the extent that he had powers and pre- laws which bind the king. To the question,
rogatives unlimited by law, the mediaeval king Who shall be judge of the right use of the royal
was an absolute ruler. He was, as Aquinas says, prerogative ? he replies that "between an execu-
quoting the phrase of the Roman jurists, legibus tive power with such prerogative, and
in being,
—
solutus exempt from the force of all man- depends upon his will for their
a legislative that
made law. Aquinas also describes him as "above convening, there can be no judge on earth . . .
the law" insofar as "when it is expedient, he The people have no other remedy but to . . .
can change the law, and rule without it accord- appeal to heaven."
ing to time and place." Yet he was also bound Montesquieu as well as Locke can conceive
by his coronation oath to perform the duties of monarchy, as distinct from despotism, in no
his office, first among which was the mainte- other terms than those of the mixed regime.
nance of the laws of the realm the immemorial — He separates despotism as lawless, or arbitrary
customs of the people which define their and absolute, government from all forms of
rights and hberties. The king's subjects could government by law, and divides the latter into
be released from their oath of allegiance by his monarchies and republics. Montesquieu insists
malfeasance or dereliction in office. that the ancients had no notion of the kind
To this extent, then, the mediaeval king was of monarchy which, while it is legal govern-
a responsible ruler,and the mixed regime was ment, is not purely constitutional in the sense of
constitutional. Furthermore, the king did not being republican. He calls this kind of mon-
have jurisdiction over customary law; yet archy "Gothic government," and, as Hegel
where custom was silent, the king was free to later points out, it is clear that "by 'monarchy'
govern absolutely, to decree what he willed, he understands, not the patriarchal or any an-
and even to innovate laws. cient type, nor on the other hand, the type or-
Chapter 12: CONSTITUTION 239
ganized into an objective constitution, but only In the history of political change, it is neces-
feudal monarchy." sary to distinguish change from or to constitu-
It is not until the i8th century that the tional government and, within the sphere of
slightest vestige of royalpower comes to be re- constitutional government, the change of con-
garded as inimical to law. For Rousseau "every stitutions.
legitimate government is republican"; for Kant, RepubHcs are set up and constitutions estab-
"the only rightful Constitution ... is that of a by the overthrow of despots or with their
lished
Pure Republic," which, in his view, "can only abdication. Republics are destroyed and consti-
be constituted by a representative system of the tutions overthrown by dictators who usurp the
people." The writers of The Federalist take the powers of government. Violence, or the threat
same stand. They interpret the "aversion of the of violence, usually attends these changes.
people to monarchy" as signifying their espousal The other sort of change may take place in
of purely constitutional or republican govern- two ways: either when one constitution re-
ment. In the tradition of the great books, only places another, as frequently occurs in the revo-
Hegel speaks thereafter in a contrary vein. lutions of the Greek city-states; or when an
Constitutional monarchy represents for him enduring constitution is modified by amend-
the essence of constitutionalism and the only ment, as is customary in modern republics.
perfect expression of the idea of the state. Every constitutional change is in a sense revo-
Because modern republics, and even modern lutionary, but if it can be accomplished by due
constitutional or limited monarchies, have de- process of law, violence can be avoided.
veloped gradually or by revolution out of mixed All the changes in which constitutional gov-
regimes; and because this development came ernment or constitutions are involved raise
as a reaction against the increasing absolutism fundamental questions of justice. Is republican
or despotism of kings, the principle of constitu- government always better than absolute mon-
tionality has been made more effective in mod- archy and the mixed regime— better in the
ern practice than it was in the ancient world. sense of being more just, better because it gives
In addition to asserting limitations upon gov- men the liberty and equafity they justly de-
ernments, constitutions have also provided serve? Is it better relative to the nature and
means of controlling them. They have been condition of certain peoples but not all, or of a
given the force, as well as the authority, of people at a certain stage of their development,
positive law. They have made office-holders ac- but not always? In what respects does one con-
countable for their acts; and through such ju- stitution embody more justice than another?
ridical processes as impeachment and such po- What amendment or reform can rectify
sorts of
litical devices as frequent elections and short the injustice of a constitution? Without an-
terms of office, they have brought the adminis- swering such questions, we cannot discriminate
tration of government within the purview of between progress and decline in the history of
the law. constitutionalism.
Following Montesquieu, the Federalists rec- Divergent answers will, of course, be found in
ommend the separation of powers, with checks the great books. Among the political philoso-
and balances, means of enforc-
as the essential phers, there are the defenders of absolutism
ing constitutional limitations of office and of pre- and those who think that royal government is
venting one department of government from most like the divine; the exponents of the su-
usurping the power of another. The citizens are premacy of the mixed regime; the republicans
further protected from the misuse of power by who insist that nothing less than constitutional
constitutional declarations of their rights and government is fit for free men and equals. And
immunities; and constitutional government is there are those who argue that the justice of
itself safeguarded from revolutionary violence any form of government must be considered
by such institutions as judicial review and by relative to the condition of the people, so that
the availability of the amending power as a republican government may be better only in
means of changing the constitution through some circumstances, not in all.
due process of law. The issue arising from these conflicting views
240 THE GREAT IDEAS
concerning constitutional and absolute govern- ditions. The territorial extent and populousness
ment is treated in the chapters on Citizen, of the nation-state as compared with the an-
Monarchy, and Tyranny. But one other cient city-state makes impossible direct partici-
issue remains to be discussed here. It concerns pation by the whole body of citizens in the
the comparative justice of diverse constitutions. major functions of government.
Constitutions can differ from one another in the Considering the ancient republics of Sparta,
way in which they plan the operations of gov- Rome, and Carthage, the writers of The Fed-
ernment, or in the qualifications they set for eralist try to explain the sense in which the
citizenship and public office. Usually only the principle of representation differentiates the
second mode of difference seriously affects American republic from these ancient consti-
their justice. tutional governments. "The principle of repre-
In Greek political life, the issue of justice as sentation," they say, "was neither unknown to
between the democratic and the oligarchical the ancients nor wholly overlooked in their
constitution is a conflict between those who political constitutions. The true distinction be
think that all free men deserve the equality of tween these and the American government lies
citizenship and the opportunity to hold office, in the total exclusion of the people, in their collec-
and those who think it is unjust to treat the tive capacity, from any share in the latter, and
rich and the poor as equals. The latter insist not in the total exclusion of the representatives of
that citizenship should be restricted to the the people from the administration of the
wealthy and that the magistracies should be former.''
reserved for men of considerable means. The Federalists then go on to say that "the
Finding justice and injustice on both sides, distinction . . . thus qualified must be admitted
Aristotle favors what he calls "the mixed con- to leave a most advantageous superiority in
stitution." This unites the justice of treating favor of the United States. But to insure to
free men alike so far as citizenship goes, with this advantage its full effect, we must be careful
the justice of discriminating between rich and not to separate from the other advantage of
it
poor with respect to public office. Such a mix- an extensive For it cannot be be-
territory.
ture, he writes, "may be described generally as lieved that any form of representative govern-
a fusion of oligarchy and democracy," since it ment could have succeeded within the narrow
attempts "to unite the freedom of the poor and limits occupied by the democracies of Greece."
the wealth of the rich."The mixed constitution, In their opinion, representative government
accompanied by a numerical pre-
especially if is not merely necessitated by the conditions of
dominance of the middle class, seems to him to modern society, but also has the political ad-
have greater stability, as well as more justice, vantage of safeguarding constitutional govern-
than either of the pure types of constitution ment from the masses. As pointed out in the
which, oppressive to either poor or rich, pro- chapter on Aristocracy, where the theory of
voke revolution. representation is discussed, the officers of gov-
In modern political life, the issue between ernment chosen by the whole body of citizens
oligarchy and democracy tends toward a differ- are supposed —
at least on one conception of
ent resolution. The last defenders of the oligar- representatives —
to be more competent in the
chical constitution were men like Burke, Ham- business of government than their constituents.
ilton, and John Adams in the i8th century. It is in these terms that the Federalists advo-
Since then, the great constitutional reforms cate what they call "republican government"
have progressively extended the franchise al- as opposed to "pure democracy."
most to the point of universal suffrage. These Like the idea of political offices, the prin-
matters are, of course, further treated in the ciple of representation seems to be inseparable
chapters on Democracy and Oligarchy. from constitutionalism and constitutional gov-
ernment. Though the principle appears to a
Political representation, with a system of certain extent in ancient republics whether —
periodic elections, seems to be indispensable to oligarchies or democracies — ancient political
constitutional government under modern con- writing does not contain a formal discussion of
Chapter 12: CONSTITUTION 241
the theory of representation. That begins in representative assemblies— that the idea of rep-
mediaeval treatises which recognize the consult- resentation and the theory of its practice as-
ative or advisory function of those who repre- sume a place of such importance that a poHiical
sent the nobles and the commons at the king's philosopher like Mill does not hesitate to idcn-
court. But it is only in recent centuries — when tify representative with constitutional govern-
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. The between government by law and government by men: the nature of
difference
constitutional government 242
6. The origin of constitutions: the lawgiver, the social contract, the constituent assembly 246
ga. The functions and duties of representatives: their relation to their constituents
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred For example, in 4 Homer: Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d, the
to.
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 James Psychology, 116a-119b,the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 Plato: Sy?nposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
Author's Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as part, bk, ch,
sect) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d.
Bible References: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., Old Testa-
ment: Nehemiah, 7:45— (D) // Esdras, 7:46.
Symbols: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
14b passim
Sb, The violation and overthrow of constitu- 43 Federalist: number 10, 51d-53a esp 51d-
tional government 52a; number 14, 60a-61b; number 35, 113a-
6Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, bk hi, 114b; NUMBER 52-66 165a-203a passim, esp
438a-b; bk viii, 579c-583c; 585d-586b; 587a- number 57, 176d-178b, number 63, 193c-
589a; 590a-c 194a; number 76, 227a; number 78, 231a-c
9 Aristotle: Politics, bk iv, ch 4 [1292*5-37] 43 Mill: Liberty, 268b-c / Representative Goverfi-
491b-d; ch 5 [1292^6-11] 492a; ch 6 [1293*1- md'/?/327a-442d passim, esp 338a-b,355b-362c,
10] 492c; [1293*27-34] 492d-493a; bk v, ch 370a-372b, 401a-406a
5-7 506b-509d; bk vi, ch 4 [i3i9''2-3i] 523a- 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par
b; ch 6 [1320^29-37] 524c / Athenian Consti- 301-303 100b-102a; par 308-311 102c-104a;
tution, ch 14-19 558d-561d / Rhetoric, bk i, additions, 182 148c-d / Philosophy of History ^
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Other considerations of the distinction between government by law and government by men,
and for the comparison of constitutional government with other forms of government, see
Aristocracy 4; Law 6b, ya-yb; Liberty id, if; Monarchy ia-ia(2), 4c-4e(4);
Tyranny 5— 5d.
The exposition of different types of constitutions and different forms of constitutional govern-
ment in themselves and in relation to one another, see Aristocracy i-2e; Citizen 2C-3;
Democracy 3-3C, 4a(i)-4a(2), 4d; Oligarchy 1-2, 4, 5a.
Other discussions of the mixed regime and the mixed constitution, see Aristocracy 2b;
Democracy 3a—3b; Government 2b; Monarchy ib(i)— ib(2).
The idea of citizenship in relation to constitutional government, see Citizen 2a-2b; and for
the conception of the statesman as a constitutional office-holder, see State 8.
The conception of constitutional law and its relation to other bodies of law and legal justice,
see Justice 9c, loa; Law 7a.
Matters relevant to the conventional character of constitutions and the relation of the idea of
a constitution to the theory of the social contract, see Custom and Convention 6a; Law
yc; Nature 2b; State 3d.
Constitutional government in relation to the theory of sovereignty, see Democracy 4b;
Government ig(i)-ig(3); Law 6b; Monarchy State 2c; Tyranny 5c.
4e(3);
Other discussions of the safeguards of constitutional government and of the theory and
machinery of representation, ^<?d' Aristocracy 6; Democracy 4b, 5-5C; Government ih;
Liberty ig.
The problem of constitutional change and the stability of different types of constitution, see
Aristocracy 3; Democracy 7-73; Revolution 2a, 3c(2); State 3g.
The issues involved in the development of constitutional government and the establishment
of liberty under law, see Government 6; Liberty 6b; Monarchy 4e(2); Progress 4a;
Revolution 3a; Tyranny 4b, 8.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Greai Boo\s of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
INTRODUCTION
THE heroes of history and poetry
cruel, violent, self-seeking, ruthless,
may be
intem-
it is not because nothing affrights them or turns
their blood cold. Fear seizes them, as does anger,
perate, and unjust, but they are never cowards. with all its bodily force. They are fearless only
They do not falter or give way. They do not in the sense that they do not act afraid or fail
despair in the face of almost hopeless odds. They to act. Their courage always equal to the
is
have the strength and stamina to achieve what- peril sensed or felt, so that they can perform
ever they set their minds and wills to do. They what must be done as if they had no fear of pain
would not be heroes if they were not men of or death.
courage. Yet brave men often speak of courage as if it
This is the very meaning of heroism which were fearlessness and mark the coward as one
gives the legendary heroes almost the stature who is undone by fear. An ambush, Indomen-
of gods. In the Homeric age they do in fact con- eus says in the Iliad, will show "who is coward-
tend with gods as well as men. The two Homeric ly and who is brave; the coward will change
epics, especially the Iliad, are peopled with men color at every touch and turn; he is full of fears,
who cannot be dared or daunted. In Tenny- and keeps shifting his weight first on one knee
son'spoem, Ulysses, now restive in Ithaca, and then on the other; his heart beats fast as he
remembering the years at Troy and the long thinks of death, and one can hear the chatter-
voyage home, says to his companions, ing of his teeth." The brave man, mastering
fear, will appear to be fearless.
Some work of noble note may yet be done
Not unbecoming men that strove with Gods
This is the courage of men of action, men in
252
Chapter 13: COURAGE 253
an endless round of duties. "In the morning undergo dangers in order to promote the power
when thou risest unwilling," he reminds him- of another; but those that are free undertake
self, "let this thought be present — I am rising dangers on their own account and thus . . .
to the work of a human being." How he con- their institutions contribute not a little to their
ceives the work of an emperor, he makes plain. courage."
"Let the deity which is in thee be the guardian For Hegel, on the contrary, civic courage
of a living being, manly and of ripe age, and en- consists in undertaking dangers, even to the
gaged in matter political, and a Roman, and a point of sacrifice, for the state. Moreover, for
ruler, who has taken his post like a man waiting him true courage is entirely a civic virtue. "The
for the signalwhich summons him from life, worth of courage as a disposition of the
intrinsic
and ready to go, having need neither of oath mind," he writes, "is to be found in the gen-
nor of any man's testimony." The burdens are uine, absolute, final end, the sovereignty of the
heavy, the task difficult but not impossible, for state. The work of courage is to actualize this
a man "can live well even in a palace." final end, and the means to this end is the sacri-
Civil courage is as necessary for the citizen as fice of personal actuality." Though he admits
for the ruler. This virtue, in Mill's opinion, is that courage "is multiform," he insists that
especially necessary for citizens of a free gov- "tl|g mettle of an animal or a brigand, courage
ernment. "A people may prefer a free govern- for the sake of honor, the courage of a knight,
ment," he writes, "but if, from indolence, or these are not true forms of courage. The true
carelessness, or cowardice, or want of public courage of civilized nations is readiness for sac-
spirit, they are unequal to the exertions neces- rifice in the service of the state, so that the
sary- for preserving it; if they will not fight for individual counts as only one amongst many."
it when it is directly attacked; if they can be
deluded by the artifices used to cheat them out The work of man is learning as well as ac-
of it; by momentary discouragement, or tem-
if tion. Man has a duty to the truth as well as to
porary panic, or a fit of enthusiasm for an in- the state. The abiUty to face without flinching
dividual, they can be induced to lay their liber- the hard questions reality can put constitutes
ties at the feet even of a great man, or trust him the temper of a courageous mind. "The huge
with powers which enable him to subvert their world that girdles us about," William James
institutions; in all these cases they are more or writes, "puts all sorts of questions to us, and
less unfit for liberty: and though it may be for tests us in all sorts of ways. Some of the tests we
their good to have had it even for a short time, meet by actions that are easy, and some of the
they are unlikely long to enjoy it." questions we answer in articulately formulated
The courage or pusillanimity of a people is words. But the deepest question that is ever
sometimes regarded as the cause, and sometimes asked admits of no reply but the dumb turning
as the effect, of their political institutions. "The of the will and tightening of our heart-strings
inhabitants of Europe," Hippocrates writes, are as we say, 'Yes, I will even have it so!' When a
"more courageous than those of Asia; for a dreadful object is presented, or when lite as a
climate which is always the same induces indo- whole turns up its dark abysses to our view,
lence, but a changeable climate, laborious exer- then the worthless ones among us lose their hold
tions, both of body and mind; and from rest on the situation altogether . . . But the heroic
—"
ing them, courage is required. The story which tional or appetitive, the ally of sundry pleas-
St. Augustine tells in the Confessions, of his per- ures and satisfactions." The third part is "pas-
sistent questioning of doctrines and dogmas, his sion or spirit" which "when not corrupted by
refusal to rest in any creed which did not bad education is the natural auxiliary of reason.
wholly satisfy his mind, is a story of speculative Corresponding to these three parts of the
courage, capped by the fortitude with which he soul, there are, or should be, according to Plato,
bore the agony of irresolution and doubt. three classes in the state: the guardians or rulers,
Learning is never an easy enterprise, nor the husbandmen and artisans, or the workers,
truth an easy master. The great scientists and and the auxiliaries or the soldiers.
philosophers have shown the patience and per- The virtues which belong to the several parts
severance of courage in surmounting the social of the soul also belong to the corresponding
hardships of opposition and distrust, as well as parts of the state. Wise is the man, Socrates de-
the intellectual difficulties which might discour- clares, "who him
little part which
has in that
age men less resolved to seek and find the truth. rules, and which proclaims commands, that
The great religious martyrs, as indomitable in part too being supposed to have a knowledge of
their humility as soldiers are in daring, have what is for the interest of each of the three
—
been as resolute never yielding to a despair parts and of the whole." Courageous is he
which would have dishonored their faith. "whose spirit retains in pleasure and in pain the
In all these types of fortitude, different mo- commands of reason about what he ought or
tivations are apparent, as diverse as the forms ought not to fear."
which courage takes under the various demdtids Temperance, however, instead of being ex-
of life. Not all the forms of courage may be clusively the perfection of one part, pervades
equally admirable, partly because they are un- the whole, and is found, according to Socrates,
equal in degree, but also partly because the in the man "who has these same elements in
courageous acts themselves, or the purposes for friendly harmony, in which the one ruling prin-
which fortitude is needed, are not of equal ciple of reason, and the two subject ones of
moral worth. Yet the essence of courage seems spirit and desire are equally agreed that reason
courage or fortitude among the four principal fends the laws and peace, and temperance bal-
virtues. The other three are temperance, jus- ances the economy. Wisdom would belong most
tice, and either wisdom or prudence, according properly to the guardians, courage to the aux-
to the enumeration of different writers. iliaries, while all three classes would need tem-
Plato names these virtues when, in the Re- perance. Hegel also associates courage with "the
public, hecompares the parts of the state with military class"
— "that universal class which is
the parts of the soul. "The same principles charged with the defence of the state" and
Chapter 13: COURAGE 255
whose duty it is "to make real the ideality im- nor to gratify one's lust." Not only may the
plicit within itself, i.e.y to sacrifice itself." But law-abiding man be called upon to be coura-
whereas for Hegel courage seems to be the fore- geous in the respects which Aristotle indicates,
most political virtue, Plato puts it last in the but it may sometimes take great courage to up-
order of goods. "Wisdom is chief," the Athe- hold the law itself against many temptations to
nian Stranger says in the Laws; "next follows the contrary. "After the death of Moses . . . the
temperance; and from the union of these two Lord spake unto Joshua," and said unto him:
with courage springs justice, and fourth in the "Be thou strong and very courageous, that
scale of virtue is courage." thou mayest observe to do according to all the
In the context of a different psychological law which Moses my servant commanded thee:
and a theory of the virtues which con-
analysis, turn not from it to the right hand or to the
sidersthem primarily as habits, Aristotle's con- left."
ception of courage differs from Plato's in a The fourth virtue with which courage, tem-
number of respects. It is most closely allied perance, and justice are associated in the con-
with temperance. These two virtues together duct of private or public life is prudence, or
belong to the irrational part of the soul— the "practical wisdom." Though Aristotle classifies
passions or appetites— and are concerned with prudence as an intellectual virtue, consisting in
our attitude toward pleasure and pain. They the capacity for making a
judgment about
right
discipline us, both in feeling and action, with things to be done, he also regards prudence as
regard to the pleasurable objects of desire and inseparable in origin and exercise from these
the painful objects of fear or aversion. Aris- other three virtues which he calls "moral"
totle seems to think courage more praiseworthy rather than "intellectual." Later writers call
than temperance, "for it is harder to face what the four virtues taken together — courage, tem-
is painful than to abstain from what is pleasant." perance, justice, and prudence— the "cardinal'*
Just as the temperate man
one who habit-
is virtues in order to signify, as Aquinas explains,
ually forgoes certain pleasures and seeks other that the whole of moral life "hinges" upon them.
pleasures moderately for the sake of achieving The theory of the cardinal virtues, and of
some greater good, so the courageous man is one their connection with one another in such wise
who can at any time endure pain and hardship, that none can be perfect in the absence of the
or overcome fear of danger and death, in order others, is treated in the chapter on Virtue.
to achieve a paramount end. Since death is "the The chapters on Justice, Temperance, and
most terrible of all things," Aristotle declares Prudence discuss the doctrine that each of
that "properly, he will be called brave who is these virtues is only a part of virtue, which
fearless in face of a noble death, and of all must be integrated with the other parts. The
emergencies that involve death." But it must special role which prudence plays in relation to
be "for a noble end that the brave man endures virtues like courage and temperance at least —
and acts as courage directs." according to Aristotle's view that "it is not pos-
The paramount end, the greatest good, which sible to be good in the strict sense without prac-
the moderation of temperance and the endur- ticalwisdom, nor practically wise without moral
ance of courage serve, is for Aristotle happi- virtue" —
must be reserved for the chapter deal-
ness. Yet through their relation to justice, ing with that virtue. Nevertheless, it is neces-
which concerns the good of others and the wel- sary to consider here how its dependence on
fare of the state, temperance and courage help prudence may qualify the meaning or nature of
a man to perform his social duties, whether courage.
as ruler or citizen, in peace or war. The man
who acts lawfully will not only be just, but also The connection which some writers see be-
courageous and temperate, for, in Aristotle's tween courage and prudence affects the defini-
view, "the law bids us do both the acts of a tion of courage in two ways. The first involves
brave man, e.g., not to desert our post nor take the doctrine of the mean which enters into the
to flight nor throw away our arms, and those of consideration of all the moral virtues, but espe-
a temperate man, e.g., not to commit adultery cially courage and temperance.
256 THE GREAT IDEAS
Aristotle originates the analysis of virtue as By uniting caution and confidence, we avoid
"a mean between two vices . . . because the the extremes of foolhardiness and cowardice
vices respectively fall short of or exceed what is and achieve the mean in which Aristotle says
right in both passions and actions." It requires courage consists. Both are necessary. Coward-
prudence to decide what things should be feared, ice is not the only vice opposed to courage. The
when they should be feared, and how much; man who acts without caution in the face of
and so a prudent judgment is involved in fear- danger, recklessly disregarding what might be
ing the right things at the right time and in the reasonably feared, is foolhardv rather than cou-
manner — neither loo much nor too little.
right rageous; even as the coward is held back by fears
"The coward, the rash man, and the brave which his reason tells him should be overcome.
man," Aristotle writes, "are concerned with the Because he agrees that courage consists in
same objects but are differently disjx)sed to avoiding both extremes, Spinoza writes that
them; for the first two exceed and fall short, "flight at the proper time, just as well as fight-
while the third holds the middle, which is the ing, is to be reckoned as showing strength of
right, position; and rash men are precipitate mind." These two acts are allied, since it is by
and wish for dangers beforehand but draw back "the same virtue of the mind" that a man
when they are in them, while brave men are "avoids danger and seeks to overcome it."
. . .
keen in the moment of action, but quiet before- To determine at a given moment whether to
hand." flee or to fight, so as to avoid either foolhardi-
Aristotle is not the only one to define cour- ness or cowardice, obviously involves a decision
age as a middleground between contrary ex- of reason. Such a decision, according to Spinoza,
tremes. Most writers who devote any attention demands "strength of mind," bv which he
to the nature of courage come to somewhat the means "the desire by which each person en-
same conclusion. Epictetus, for example, in de- deavours from the dictates of reason alone to
claring that we should "combine confidence preserve his own being." Without rational di-
with caution in everything we do," seems also rection or, as Aristotle would say. without
to make courage a mean. He points out that prudence, one may be fearless but not cou-
such a combination at first "may appear a para- rageous.
dox" since "caution seems to be contrary to Those who, like Hobbes, do not include rea-
confidence, and contraries are by no means son or prudence as an essential element in their
compatible." But this, he says, is only due to conception of courage, treat courage as an emo-
"confusion." There would be a paradox "it we tion rather than a virtue, and tend to identify
really called upon a man to use caution and con- it with fearlessness, making its opposite the
fidence in regard to the same things ... as unit- condition of being over-fearful. '"Amongst the
ing qualities which cannot be united." But, as passions," writes Hobbes, ''courage (by which I
Epictetus explains, caution and confidence can mean the contempt of wounds and violent
be united because they concern different ob- death) inclines men to pri\ate revenges, and
jects. sometimes to endeavor the unsettling of the
The difference in objects which he has in public peace; and timorousness many times dis-
mind becomes clear in the light of the Stoic poses to the desertion of the public defense."
maxim, "Be confident in all that lies beyond As Hobbes describes courage, it may be of
the will's control, be cautious in all that is de- doubtful value to the individual or to the state.
pendent on the will." Sharply distinguishing Melville seems to have this meaning of courage
between what does and does not lie within our in mind when he says that "the most reliable
control, Epictetus tells us to look with care and and useful courage is that which arises from the
caution only to those things in which we can do fair estimation of the encountered peril"— the
evil by making an evil choice. "In such matters lack of which makes "an utterly fearless man
of will it is right to use caution." But in other ... a far more dangerous companion than a
matters, "in things outside the will's control, coward."
which do not depend on us . . . we should use If apparent fearlessness were courage, then
confidence." certain animals might be called "courageous,"
CiiAPTi-R 13: COURAGE 257
and men of sanguine temperament, extremely ism which knows no such motivation and flouts
self-confident or at least free from fear, would danger in the spirit of Anzengruber's Mans the
be as courageous as those who succeed in mas- Road-Mender: 'Nothing can happen to me.' "
tering their fears in order to do what is expected But Aquinas, who emphasizes rational motiva-
of them. But, as Aristotle observes, drunken tion as much as Freud discounts it, insists that
men often behave fearlessly and we do not courageous men "face the danger on account of
praise them for their courage. Plato likewise the good of virtue, which is the abiding object
presents a view of courage which requires fore- of their however great the danger be."
will,
thought and a genuine concern for danger. Courage as Aquinas conceives it, though only
**I do not call animals which have no fear
. . . a part of virtue in the sense of being one virtue
of dangers, because they are ignorant of them, among many, nevertheless represents the whole
courageous," says Nicias in the Laches. They moral life from one point of view. The quality
are "only fearless and senseless . . . There is a of courage, he points out, "overflows into the
difference to my way of thinking," he goes on, rest" of the virtues, as these in turn enter into
"between fearlessness and courage. I am of the courage. "Whoever can curb his desires for the
opinion that thoughtful courage is a quality pleasures of touch," Aquinas writes, "so that
possessed by very few, but that rashness and they keep within bounds, which is a very hard
boldness, and fearlessness, which has no fore- thing to do, for this very reason is more able to
thought, are verycommon qualities possessed check his daring in dangers of death, so as not
by many men, many women, many children, to go too far, which is much easier; and in this
and many animals." According to this concep- sense fortitude is said to be temperate.
stand sturdily, and wisely to keep itself from As the man who is temperate because he has
dangers that are wicked, and to wrestle against rationally ordered his actions to a certain end
the assaults of the Devil. For it enhances and can be expected to be courageous for the same
strengthens the soul ... It can endure, by long reason, so, according to Aquinas, he will also be
suffering, the toils that are fitting." prudent, since both his temperance and his
To be able to make decisions of this sort in courage result from a prudent or rational choice
particular cases, a man must have some view of of means to the end he pursues.
the order of goods and the end of life.For a Writing as a theologian, Aquinas distinguishes
man to act habitually in a courageous manner, what he calls "the perfecting virtues" of the
he must be generally disposed to value certain religious life from "the social virtues" of the
things as more important than others, so that political life — the virtues with which the moral
he is willing to take risks and endure hardships philosopher is concerned. He holds courage to
for their sake. be inseparable from the other virtues on either
Freud seems to be skeptical of what he calls plane — whether directed to a natural or super-
"the rational explanation for heroism," accord- natural end — because the sameness of the
it is
ing to which "it consists in the decision that the end in each case which binds the virtues to-
personal life cannot be so precious as certain gether. "Thus prudence by contemplating the
abstract general ideals." More frequent, in his things of God," he explains, "counts as nothing
opinion, "is that instinctive and impulsive hero- all the things of this world" and "temperance, so
—
Plutarch, in his life of Lycurgus, shows how trained to be good citizens, not mcrcK' good
"the city was a sort of camp." The training and soldiers. Arguing that no sound legislator would
education of all was directed to military valor. order "peace for the sake of war, and not war
"Their very songs had a life and spirit in them for the sake of peace," the Athenian Stranger
that inflamed and possessed men's minds with suggests that a broader conception of courage
an enthusiasm and ardour for action The . . . than the Cretans and Spartans seem to have
subject always serious and moral; most usually, would recognize its use, not only in external
it was in praise of such men as had died in de- warfare, but in the tasks of peace — in the strug-
fence of their country, or in derision of those gle to lead a good life and build a good society.
that had been cowards; the former they de- "What is there," he asks Megillus the Spartan
clared happy and glorified; the life of the latter and Cleinias the Cretan, "which makes your
they described as most miserable and abject." citizens equally brave against pleasure and pain,
The result was, according to Plutarch, that conquering what they ought to conquer, and
"they were the only people in the world to superior to the enemies who are most dangerous
whom war gave repose." and nearest home?"
Both Plato and Aristotle criticize the con- Nevertheless, through the centuries the type
stitutions of Crete and Sparta for making war of courage which the poets and historians cele-
the end of the state and exalting courage, which brate has been the bravery of men who put
is only a part, above "the whole of virtue." their very lives in jeopardy for their fellow
Courage must be joined with the other virtues to men — the courage of the citizen doing his duty,
make a man good, not only as a citizen but as a or, what more spectacular, of the soldier
is still
man. "Justice, temperance, and wisdom," says confronting the enemy. This fact among others
the Athenian Stranger in the Laws, "when is one reason why many writers, from the Greeks
united with courage are better than courage to Hegel, have found a moral stimulus in w^ar;
only." or, like William James, have sought for its moral
Furthermore, military courage is not even equivalent. On this point they are answered
the whole of courage. While recognizing the not merely by those who see only degradation
need for it, Plato thinks that a wise statesman in war, but also by the many expressions of the
would put it in its proper place, if men are to be insight that peace can have its heroes too.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1 The nature of courage 260
3. The passions in the sphere of courage: fear, daring, anger, hope, despair
5. The motivations of courage: fame or honor, happiness, love, duty, religious faith 263
ya. The courage required of citizens and statesmen: the political recognition of
courage
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred For example, in 4 Homer: Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d, the
to.
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. Forexample,in53 James :Pjrv<:Ao/o^v,116a-119b, the passage
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halvesof the right-hand sideof
the page. For example, in 7 Plato: Symposiufv, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
Author's Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as part, bk, ch,
sect) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d,
Bible References The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
:
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g.. Old Testa-
ment: Nehemiah, 7:45— (D) // Esdras, 7:46.
Symbols: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
350a; ch 6 [i 107^9 ]-ch 7 [1107*^3] 352c-353a; 377a / Timon of Athens, act hi, sc v [24-58]
BK III, CH 6-9 361a-364b / Rhetoric, bk i, ch 9 407a-c
[1366^33-^14] 608d-609a 29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, part ii, 256c-d;
12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk ii, ch i 138b,d- 291d
140c 31 Spinoza: Ethics, part hi, prop 59, schol
12 Aurelius: Meditatio?JS, bk xi, sect 18 304b- 415d-416b; part iv, prop 69, corol and
305b schol 445c; prop 72-73 446b-447a
13 Virgil: Aejieid,bk x [466-472] 315a 32 Milton: Sa?nson Agonistes [652-666] 353b-
14 Plutarch: Niima Pompilius, 50c / Pelopidas, 354a
232a-233a / Clcomenes, 659d-660a 37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 70a-b
15 Tacitus: Histories, bk ii, 227a 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 93a-
19 Aquinas: Sufnma Theologica, part i, q 59, 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 159a
a 4, rep 3 309a-310a; part i-ii, q 45, a 4, 42 Kant: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals^
ANs 812b-813a 256a b
Itol Chapter 13: COURAGE usv
46 Hi;gfl: Philosophy of Right, part in, par 327- 19 AouiNAs: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, o 44,
32(S 108a-c; additions, 189 149d / Philosophy A 4, ANs 809c-810a; q 45, a 4, ans 812b 813a
of History, intro, 195c-d; part i, 243d 244c; 20 Agi iNAs: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 105,
PART IV, 343d-344a A 3, REP 5 6 316a-318b
48 Melmlle: Moby Dic{, 83a-86b 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, hell, i-ii la-4a; iii
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk 11. 77d-78a; hk [22-69] 4b-d; VIII [67]-ix [105] llc-13b
IX, 369c-d; bk xi, 480a-482b csp 481d-482a; 23 Machiavelli: Prince, cii xii-xiii 17d-21a
BK xiii, 577a-578b; bk xiv, 589c-590c csp 23 Hobbes: I^eviathan, part h, 115d
590a; 605b-d 24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, bk iv,
53 James: Psychology, 826a-827a 264c-265a
25 Montaigne: Essays, 22d-24a; 25c-26d; 115b-
2. The vices opposed to courage: cowardice, 119d; 167a-170a; 334b-335a; 337b-c
foolhardiness 26 Shakespeare: Jst Henry VI, act iv, sc [9- i
Old Testament: Exodus, 14:9-14 / Leviticus^ 47] 20a-b / 1st Henry IV, act ii, sc iv [126-
26:^2-40 / Detiteronojny, 20:8 / / Satmiel, 17 312] 445c-447b; act iv, sc hi [1-29] 459b-c /
esp 17:11, 17:24— (D) / Kings, 17 csp 17:11, Julius Caesar, act ii, sc ii [32-37] 578c
17:24 / Proverbs, 28:1 / Isaiah, 30:15-18 (D) — 27 Shakespeare: Hamlet, act ii, sc ii [575-6:53]
Isaias, 30:15-18 46b-d; act iv, sc iv [31-66] 59a-c / Macbeth,
Apocrypha: Ecclesiasticus, 3:26— (D) OT, Eccle- ACT I, sc VII [29-82] 289c-290b
siasticiis, 3:27 29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, part h, 256c-d;
New Testament: Matthew, 26:56,69-75 / MarJ{, 291c-d
14:50,66-72 / Lu\e, 22:55-61 / John, 7:13; 32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk ii [204-208] 115b
18:15-18,25-27 37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 272b
4 Homer: Iliad, bk hi 19a-23d; bk xiii [266- 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk xxviii,
294] 91a-b: bk xxii [1-366] 155a-159a / 239d-240a
Odyssew bk ix [461-542] 234a-d; bk xii [iii- 43 Mill: Representative Government, 392 b-c
i26J251b 47 Goethe: Fa«^/, part 11 [9711-9904] 235b-240b
5 Aeschylus: Seven Against Thebes [631-723] 48 Melville: Moby Dicl{, 305a-307a
34a-35a 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk i, 16a-18b; bk it,
5 Sophocles: Ajax [733-783] 149b-d / Electra 80d-81b: 102a-c; bk v, 203c-d; bk viii, 330d-
[947-1057] 163d-164d 332a; bk ix, 344b-346a; 366d-367b; bk x,
5 Euripides: Suppliants [473-510] 262c-d 419b-420d; 426b; bk xi, 475b-476c; 480a-
5 Aristophanes: Frogs [277-311] 567c-d; [460- 482b; BK xiii, 569d-570a; bk xiv, 596c-d;
674] 569c-571d 603a-604b; 610c-611c; bk xv, 618d-619d;
6Herodotl"s: bk hi, 120d-121b; bk
History, epilogue I, 648b-c
216b-218b; 225c-d; bk ix, 303c-304a
VII, 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, bk x,
6 Thucydides: Peloponnesiati War, bk i, 370a- 273a-d
c; bk n, 389d-390b; bk iv, 462d-463a; bk v,
484a-c 3. The passions in the sphere of courage: fear,
288b; BK X, ch 21 311c-312a; bk xix, ch 4 224d-225a; part hi, 308b-c; part iv, 322c;
511a-513c esp 512b-513c 341a-c
19 Aquinas Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 45,
: 47 Goethe: Faust, part i [884-902] 23a; part ii
A 4, ANs 812b-813a [9855-9862] 239b; [10,407-422] 253b
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part hi suppl, 48 Melville: Moby Dic{, 45b-46a; 118a-122b;
Q 96, A 6 1058a-1061b 174a-b; 349a-350a
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, hell, i-ii la-4a; 49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 311a-d;316a-c;322c
HI [22-69] 4b-d; viii [67]-ix [105] llc-13b; 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk i, 21d-22b; bk
XXVI [85-142] 39a-c; paradise, xvii [106-142] II, 77c-81b; 89b-d; 97c-106d; bk hi, 135c-137c
440d; ACT II, sc hi 443b-444b; act iv, sc hi bk VII, 233a-d; bk ix, 314a,c
[1-29] 459b-c; act v, sc i [127-143] 462a-b / 6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, bk ii, 396d-
Henry V, act hi, sc i 543d-544b; act iv, sc 397a; bk v, 501a-b
HI [1-78] 555c-556c; sc v 558a-b / Julius 7 Plato: Laches, 26a-32a / Symposium, 152b-
Caesar, act i, sc ii [84-96] 570b; act v, sc v 153b / Republic, bk ii-ih, 320c-339a / Laws,
[68-81] 596a,c bk I 640a-652d; bk viii, 732d-733b
27 Shakespeare: Hamlet, act ii, sc ii [575-633] 9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk ii, ch i [1103^14-26]
46b-d; act iv, sc iv [39-66] 59b-c / Troilus 349a-b; ch 2 [iio4*i9]-ch 3 [1104^13] 349c-
and act ii, sc ii 113c-115d / Mac-
Cressida, 350a / Politics, bk vh, ch 2 [1324^5-23] 528c-
act I, sc VII 289b-290b / Timon of
beth, d; BK VIII, CH 3 [1337^24-27] 542d-543a; ch 4
Athens, act hi, sc v 406d-408a [1338^^8-38] 544a-b
29 Cervantes: Don Quixote esp part i, 41b-c, 10 Hippocrates: Airs, Waters, Places, par 16
147b-d, part ii, 203a-b, 227c-228d, 256a-d, 15d-16a; par 23 18a-c
280b-c 12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk i, ch 2 106d-108b;
32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk ix [856-1016] 266a- BK II, ch i 138b,d-140c; bk hi, ch 3 178d-
269b 180a; BK IV, ch i 213a-223d
d
BK IX [590-620] 295a-b; hk xii [425-440] 365b 17 Plotinus: Third Enncad, tr ii, ch 8, 86d 87b
14 Plutarch: Lycurgus, 39a-45c / Corio/anus, 20 Aquinas: Summa Thcologica, pari' n, 9 105, i
175b / Pelopidas, 238b-239c / Cleomenes, 661a- a 3, ans and rep 5-6 316a-318b
663c 23 Machiavelli: Prince, ch hi, 5c; ch vi, 9b c;
24 Rabrlais: Gargantiia and Pantagnicl, bk i, CH VIII, l^b c; ch IX, 15a b; en x, 16b c;
28a-29b ch xvii 23d-24d; cii xix 26a 30a; ch xxi,
25 Montaigne: Essays, 331a-332a; 336c 337b 32a-d; cii xxiv-xxvi, 34d-37d
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 23a 23 HoBBEs: Leviathan, part ii, 115d; conclu-
39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, bk v, 303b-305c; sion, 279b-c
337d-338a 25 Montaigne: Essays, 53c-55d; 181d 183c;
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 93d-94b; 644b- 327d-329d; 331a-332a
645d csp 645a 26 Shakespeare: Richard III, act v, sc hi [237-
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 223a; 224a 341] 146b-147c / He?jry V, act hi, sc i 543d-
42 Kant: Practical Reason, 325d-327d / Judge- 544b; ACT iv, sc iii [1-78] 555c-556c; sc v
ment, 504a-b 558a-b / Julius Caesar 568a-596a,c esp act i,
43 Mill: Liberty, 282b-283a sc II [84-96] 570b, ACT V, sc V [68-81] 596a,c
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk iv, 175a-b; bk 27 Shakespeare: Troilus and Cressida, act i,
IX, 369c-d; bk xi, 481a-482a; bk xiv, 605b-d sc III [33-54] 108c / Coriolanus, act ii, sc ii
53 James: Psychology, 82b-83a [86-138] 365a-c; act iv, sc i [i-ii] 377a /
Timon of Athens, act hi, sc v 406d-408a /
7. The political or civic significance of courage Cymbeline, act v, sc hi 479d-480d / Henry
VHI, ACT I, sc II [68-88] 553c-d
7a. The courage required of citizens and states-
29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, part i, 40d
men: the political recognition of courage 30 Bacon: AdvancetnetJt of Learning, 23a
4 Homer: Iliad, bk xii [310-328] 85b-c 31 Spinoza: Ethics, part iv, prop 72-73 446b-
5 Sophocles: Ajax [1264-1363] 154a-d / Phil- 447a
octetes [1418-1433] 195a 32 Milton: Lord Gen. Cromtvell 69a-h / Sr Henry
5 Euripides: Rhesus [150-202] 204c-205a / Vane 69b / Paradise Lost, bk ii [430-456] 120b-
Hcracleidae [489-573] 252c-253a / Suppliants 121a
[297-356] 261a-c / Hecuba [300-330] 355b-c / 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk hi, 12b-c;
Phoenician Maidens [991-1018] 387a-b / Iphi- BK IV, 15a-c; bk xiv, 107b-d; bk xxx, 281a
genia at Aulis [1368-1562] 437c-439b 38 Rousseau: Political Economy, 375a / Social
5 Aristophanes: Knights [565-580] 477a-b / Contract, bk hi, 411b-c; bk iv, 437d-438c
Wasps [1060-1121] 520c-521b 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 23c; 369d-370c;
6 Herodotus: History, bk vii, 225c-d; 226b-c; 427a-c; 630b,d-631a; 644d-645c
233a-234b; 239a-c; 256d-25rc; bk viii, 282c- 43 Mill: Representative Government, 329b-c;
283a; bk ix, 291c-292a; 293c-294d 334b-c; 392b-c
6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, bk ii, 396b- 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 325
399a; 402c-404a; bk vii, 555b-557b; 559d- 107d; par 328 108b-c; additions, 189 149d /
560b Philosophy of History, part i, 213d-214a
7 Plato: Apology, 207b-d / Crito, 217b-c / 49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 315b-c; 321b-c
Republic, bk ii, 319c-320c; bk iv, 347a-d; bk 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk i, 9c-10d; bk iii,
V, 366c-367b / Statesman, 605d-608d / Laws, 149d-150a; bk x, 445c; bk xi, 475b-476c;
bk i, 644a-645c; bk xii, 784d-786b 513d-515a; bk xii, 537b-538a; bk xiv, 610c-
9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk hi, ch 8 [1116*15-^3] 611c; epilogue i, 648b-c; 668a-669c
362b-d; bk v, ch i [1129^19-24] 377a / Politics.
bk III, ch 4 [1277*8-25] 474a-b; ch 12 [1283* lb. Courage in relation to law and liberty
18-20] 481b; bk VII, ch 2 [1324^5-23] 528c-d; 6 Herodotus: History, bk v, 175b; bk vii,
ch 7 531d-532c; ch 15 [1334*11-^6] 539a-b; 232c-233d; 238a-c; 239a-c
bk VIII, CH 4 [1338^8-38] 544a-b 6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, bk ii, 396b-
12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk ii, ch 10 148c- 399a; 402c-404a; bk iv, 469d-470b; 478d-
150a; bk hi, ch 24 203c-210a 479b; BK V, 484a-c; bk vii, 555b-557b
12 AuRELius: Meditations, bk hi, sect 5 261a; 7 Plato: Apology 200a-212a,c / Crito 213a-
BK V, SECT I 268b, 219a,c / Laws, bk i, 644a-645c; bk iii, 675a-c;
13 Virgil: Aeneid, bk vi [781-807] 232a-b; bk bk xii, 784d-786b
XI [225-444] 334a-340a 9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk hi, ch 8 [1116*15-^24]
14 Plutarch: 40c-45c / Poplicola,
Lycurgus, 362b-363a / Politics, bk v, ch 10 [1312*18-39]
83b-84a 177b-179a; 180d-181b
/ Coriolanus, 514d; CH II [1313*34-^10] 516a-b; bk vii, ch 7
/ Aemilius Paulus, 226c-229c / Pyrrhus, 328c- 531d-532c; ch 15 [1334*19-22] 539a / Rhetoric,
330a / Nicias, 423a-430d / Cato the Younger BK I, CH 9 [i366'°i-i4] 608d-609a
620a-648a,c / Cleomenes, 659d-660a / Demos- 10 Hippocrates: /4/n-, Waters, Places, par 16 15d-
thenes, 695d-703b / Aratus, 835b-c 16a; par 23 18a-c
266 THE GREAT IDEAS Ic
501a-b; bk vi, 522b-c; 527b-c; bk vii, 555b-
(7. The political or civic significance of courage, 557b; 559b-560b; 561a-b
lb. Courage in relation to law and liberty.^ 7 Plato: Laches, 32a-c / Symposium, 172a-b /
14 Plutarch: Cato the Voww^^ 620a-648a,c esp Apology, 205d-206a / Crito, 217b-c / Republic,
643a-644b / Cleomenes, 659d-660a / Aratus, bk hi, 324c-325b; bk iv, 347a-d; bk v, 366c-
826c-836d 367b/ Timaeus, 445d-446b/La«/i-, bk i,642b-
15 Tacitus: Afinals, bk xii, 117a; bk xvi, ISOd- 643a; bk xii, 784d-786b
184a / Histories, bk iv, 271b 8 Aristotle: Topics, bk vi, ch 13 [151^3-13]
17 Plotinus: Third Ennead, tr ii, ch 8, 86d- 205d
87b 9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk hi, ch 6 [1115^24-35]
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 105, 361b-c; CH 8 [1116*^15-^24] 362b-363a; bk v,
A 3, ANS and REP 5-6 316a-318b ch I [ii29''i9-24] 377a / Politics, bk ii, ch 9
23 Machiavelli: Prince, ch v 8a-c; ch x, 16b-d; [1269^34-39] 466a; bk hi, ch 7 [1279^40-^3]
CH XXVI 36b-37d 476d; bk v, ch 10 [1312^25-39] 514d; bk vii,
23 HoBBEs: Leviathan, part ii, 113b CH II [1330^^32-1331^8] 535c; BK viii, ch 4
25 Montaigne: Essays, 23b-24a [i338''8-38] 544a-b / Rhetoric, bk i, ch 9
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part iv, prop 72-73 446b- [1366^1-14] 608d-609a
447a 10 Hippocrates: Airs, Waters, Places, par 16
32 Milton: Lord Gen. Fairfax 68b-69a / Samson 15d-16a; par 23 18a-c
Agonistes [888-902] 359a 13 Virgil: Aeneid, bk ii 124a-146b; bk ix-xii
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk hi, 12b-c; 279a-379b
BK IV, 15a-c; bk xiv, 107b-d; bk xvii, 122a-b 14 Plutarch: Lycurgus,
40c-45c / Poplicola,
38 Rousseau: Inequality, 324c / Social Contract, 83b-84a / Coriolanus,177b-179a / Aemilius
bk I, 388c; bk hi, 411b-c; bk iv, 437d-438c Paulus, 219d-229c / Pelopidas, 232a-233a;
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 23c; 523d-524a 238b-239c / Marcellus 246b,d-261a,c/ Marcel-
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 223a; 224a; 324c- lus-Pelopidas 261a-262d / Philopoemen 293a-
325a 302a,c / Pyrrhus, 328c-330a / Nicias 423a-438d
42 Kant: Science of Right, 448d-449c / Caesar, 583b-585d / Cleomenes, 659d-660a;
43 Mill: Liberty, 282b-283a / Representative 661a-663c / Demosthenes, 695d-703b / Aratus,
Government, 329b-c 826c-836d
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 324, 15 Tacitus: Annals, bk ii, 44d-45a; bk hi, 49d-
107c-d 50a; bk xii, 117a-b / Histories, bk i, 210c;
47 Goethe: Faust, part ii [9855-9862] 239b 211c-212b; bk ii, 226d-227a; 232d-233a; bk
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk xi, 513d-515a; III, 246b-c; 248b-c; 249a
CKOSS-KEFEKENCBS
For: The general theory of virtue and the virtues, see Virtue and Vice.
The virtues most closely related to courage, see Justice; Prudenxe; Temperance.
The relation of these other virtues to courage, see Prudence 3a-3b, 3e; Temperance la;
Virtue and Vice 2-3b.
Courage and other virtues in relation to happiness and duty, see Happiness 2b(3); Virtue
and Vice id, 6a.
Matters relevant to the emotional aspects of courage, see ExMOTion 4b(i); Pleasure and
Pain 8a; Virtue and Vice 5a.
The general consideration of moral training, see Education 4-4d; Virtue and Vice 4-4e(3).
The general consideration of civic virtue, see Citizen 5; State 8b-8c; Virtue and Vice
y-yd; and for courage as a military virtue, see War and Peace ioc.
The analysis of the heroic and the conception of the hero, see Honor 5-53, 5c.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great BooJ^s of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
Aquinas. Summa Theologica, part ii-ii, qq 123-140 Morgann. Essay on the Dramatic Character of Sir
F. Bacon. "Of Boldness," in Essays John Falstaff
Milton. The Readie and Easie Way to Establish a Leopardi. Essays, Dialogues, and Thoughts
Free Commonwealth Stendhal. The Charterhouse of Parma
Dostoevsky. The Idiot T. Carlyle. On Heroes, Hero- Worship and the He-
roic in History
II.
Emerson. "Courage," in Society and Solitude
Theophrastus. The Characters T. H. Green. Prolegomena to Ethics, iv
Cicero. De Officiis (On Duties), iii Crane. The Red Badge of Courage
Seneca. De Const antia Sapient is (On the Firmness of Rostand. Cyrano de Bergerac
the Wise Man) Rank. The Myth of the Birth of the Hero
Sir Gawain and the Green Knight G. W, Russell. The Hero in Man
P. Sidney. The Countess of Pembroke's Arcadia Routh. God, Man, and Epic Poetry
Cor.neille. Polyeucte Raglan. The Hero
—
INTRODUCTION
THE contrast between the artificial and the
natural is generally understood in terms of
and "convention" cannot be treated simply
as synonyms.
the contribution which man does or does not In the tradition of the great books, the word
make to the origin or character of a thing. Works "convention" has at least two meanings, in
of art are man-made. The artificial is somehow only one of which is it synonymous with "cus-
humanly caused or contrived. The contrast be- tom." When "convention" is used to signify
tween the natural and the conventional or cus- habitual social practices it is, for the most part,
tomary involves the same point of difference. interchangeable with "custom." In this signif-
Though customs are not, in the strict sense, icance, the notion of convention, like that of
made by man, as are works of art, they do grow custom, is an extension of the idea of habit.
only as the result of the kind of acts which men What habit is in the behavior of the individual,
perform voluntarily rather than instinctively. customary or conventional conduct is in the be-
Similarly, conventions, like contracts, are so- havior of the social group.
cial arrangements or agreements into which The other mxaning of "convention" does not
men enter voluntarily. connote the habitual in social behavior, but
The fundamental notions with which this stresses rather the voluntary as opposed to the
chapter deals are thus seen to be closely related instinctive origin of social institutions, arrange-
to ideasand distinctions treated in the chapters ments, or practices. For example, different sorts
on Art and Nature. For example, the distinc- of family organization are conventional in the
tion between human action and production, or sense that at different times or in different com-
doing and making, helps us to understand how munities men have set up their domestic ar-
the conventional and the artificial differ from rangements in different ways. In each case they
one another as opposites of the natural. Art in- tend to perpetuate the particular institutions
volves voluntary making. Customs result from which they or their ancestors originated. What-
voluntary doing. In both cases, the distinction ever is conventional about social institutions
between the voluntary and the instinctive might have been otherwise, if men had seen fit
the latter representing the natural — seems to to invent and adopt different schemes for the
be presupposed. organization of their social life. This indicates
A third term — habit — is traditionally associ- the connection between the two senses of the
ated with the consideration of the voluntary word "convention," for all customs are con-
and the instinctive. Like these others, it seems ventional in origin, and all conventions become
to have a critical bearing on the discussion of customary when perpetuated.
custom and art. Aristotle, for example, con-
ceives art as an intellectual virtue, that is, a The fact that men can depart from, as well as
habit of mind, an acquired skill. For Hume abide by, their conventions — that they can
the customary and the habitual are almost conform to custom seems
transgress as well as —
the same. Whether they are to be identified to indicate that custom and convention belong
or are only connected causally, the relation of to the sphere of human freedom. Yet there is
habit to custom not only throws some light also a sense in which custom is a constraining
on the nature of custom, but also calls our at- force, which reduces the tendency of individ-
tention to the fact that the words "custom" uals to differ from one another, and which has
268
Chapter 14: CUSTOM AND CONVHN'l'lON 269
the effect of moulding them alike and regi- that no uniformity at all exists in the actions of
menting their lives. men. "Were there no uniformity in human ac-
The repressive effect of custom can be seen, tions," Hume points out, it would be impossible
according to Freud, in the neurotic disorders "to collect any general observations concerning
from which men suffer when their instinctive mankind," At least enough uniformity is found,
impulses come into conflict with "accepted cus- in his opinion, for it to be "universally acknowl-
tom." Discussing the influence of custom upon edged that human nature remains still the
the developing individual, he s;iys that "its or- same." To whatever extent human behavior is
dinances, frequently too stringent, exact a great purely natural or instinctive, it is common to
deal from him, much self-restraint, much re- all members of the species, and does not, like
nunciation of instinctual gratification." It be- customary conduct, vary remarkably from one
comes, therefore, one of the aims of psychoan- part of the human race to another, or from
alytic therapy to release the individual from generation to generation.
hisbondage to custom, or at least to make him The and variation of customs seems
diversity
conscious of the way in which certain desires show that
therefore to be of their essence and to
have been submerged or distorted, and his they are both man-made and voluntary in or-
whole personality shaped, by the constraints igin. "If they were not devices of men," Augus-
which the mores and taboos of the tribe have tine writes, "they would not be different in dif-
imposed upon him. ferent nations, and could not be changed among
Considered in relation to society, custom also particular nations." The distinction between
seems to exercise a conservative, if not repres- nature and convention can be formulated,
sive effect. Established customs tend to resist therefore, partly in terms of the contrast be-
change. They are sometimes thought to impede tween the constant and the variable, and partly
progress. But to the extent that they conserve in terms of the difference between the instinc-
the achievements of the past, they may be in- tive and the voluntary.
dispensable to progress because they provide The early Greeks had an apt v/ay of express-
the substance of what we call "tradition." A ing this. As Aristotle phrases their insight, they
passage in Bacon's Advancement of Learning il- referred to the natural as "that which every-
lustrates these apparently contrary effects of where has the same force and does not exist by
custom. ?u3 Amm people's thinking this or that," as, for example,
Over-emphasis upon either antiquity or nov- "fire burns both here and in Persia." The con-
elty seems to Bacon a disease of learning, or an ventional and those things which are "not by
obstacle to its advancement. "Antiquity en- nature but by human enactment are not every-
vieth there should be new additions," he writes, where the same." The laws of Persia differ from
"and novelty cannot be content to add but it the laws of Greece, and in Greece or in Persia,
must deface." If custom tends to support an- they change from time to time.
tiquity against novelty, it may also encourage
inventions or discoveries which genuinely en- The variability of custom in contrast to the
hance the tradition without defacing it. "An- constancy or uniformity of nature puts the dis-
tiquity deserveth that reverence," Bacon says, tinction between nature and convention at the
"that men should make a stand thereupon and service of the skeptic. One form of the skeptical
discover what is the best way; but when the attack upon natural law, universal moral stand-
discovery is well taken, then to make progres- ards, and the objectivity of truth or beauty
sion." As the preserver of antiquity, custom consists in making custom the only measure of
thus appears to afford a basis for progress. the acceptability of human actions or judg-
One other fact about customs which most ments. To say, for example, as Hume does, that
commentators from Herodotus to Montaigne the connection which the mind seems to make
and Freud have observed is their variet}- and between cause and effect is based on custom
variability. Customs differ from time to time, rather than reason, has the skeptical effect which
and from place to place. But this diversity and Hume intends. It substitutes the arbitrary for
variation in custom does not necessarily mean the rational. It dispossesses reason as a source of
270 THE GREAT IDEAS
either the vaHdity or the intelhgibiUty of our In the Gorgias, which is named after another
conclusions concerning cause and effect. of the leading sophists of the day, Plato puts
As the chapters on Knowledge and Opinion into the mouth of Callicles the sophistic posi-
indicate, the skeptical argument takes other tion that there is no law or standard of justice
forms. The reduction of all human judgments except the rule of the stronger. Insisting that
to opinion makes the differences between men, "convention and nature are generally at vari-
in either action or thought, unresolvable by ar- ance.with one another," CaUicles attempts to
gument or debate. One opinion can predomi- show that all of Socrates' efforts to discover an
nate over another only by force or by the weight absolute standard of justice come to naught, be-
of numbers. When it predominates by weight cause he cannot help but resort "to the popular
of numbers, it by custom or conven-
prevails and vulgar notions of right, which are not natu-
tion. It is the opinion which the majority have ral, but conventional."
agreed upon at a given time or place. To settle As they appear in Plato's dialogues, the soph-
every controversy about what men should think ists are obviously impressed by the kind of in-
or do by counting heads is to hold that every- formation which fills the History of Herodotus
thing is a matter of opinion and purely conven- — information about the great diversity of hu-
tional. man beliefs and practices which anyone could
Whether the skeptic reduces everything to discover for himself if he traveled, as Herodotus
opinion or to convention, he achieves the same did, from people to people, observing their in-
effect. What he means by calling everything an stitutions and collecting their legends. Herodo-
"opinion" or a "convention" is equally inimical tus himself does not explicitly draw the skep-
to reason. In either case, the willful or arbitrary tical conclusion, yet his own suspended judg-
isenthroned in reason's place and only force can ment on many matters betokens a turn of mind
—
be finally decisive. The two ideas opinion and made cautious by the impact of contrary opin-
convention — seem to be corollaries of one ions and conflicting customs.
another. Both imply a kind of relativity. Opin- In the Hellenistic period when the main stream
ion normally suggests relativity to the individ- of Greek philosophy divides into a number of
ual, custom or convention relativity to the so- Roman schools of thought, the skeptical posi-
cial group. Either may be involved in the or- tion receives what is perhaps its fullest and most
igin of the other. The individual may form his explicit statement. But in the writings of Lu-
opinions under the pressure of prevailing cus- cian and Pyrrho, to take two examples, it is not
toms of thought or action; the customary be- so much
the conflict of customs as it is what
liefs or practices of a society or culture may, and Lucian calls "the warfare of creeds," which oc-
usually do, result from opinions which have casions universal doubt. Yet whatever the
come to prevail. source of doubt, Pyrrhonism states the tradi-
The Greek sophists, we learn from the dia- tional denials of the skeptic in their most ex-
logues of Plato, appealed to the distinction be- treme form. The senses are entirely untrust-
tween nature and convention and to the distinc- worthy. Reason is both impotent and self-de-
tion between knowledge and opinion in exactly ceiving. Men possess no knowledge or science.
the same way. They used the notions of opinion No truth is self-evident; none can be demon-
and convention with equal force in their efforts strated.
to question absolute standards of conduct and
the objectivity or universality of truth. The The critical temper of the Greek sophists,
most familiar of all the sophistical sayings the — and of an observer of men and manners like
remark attributed to Protagoras that "man is Herodotus, reappears later in the questionings
the measure of all things" —
is interpreted by of Montaigne — sharpened somewhat, perhaps,
both Plato and Aristotle to mean that what men by his acquaintance with the Roman skeptics.
wish to think or do determines/or them what is In his case, perhaps more than any other, it is
true or right. Man's will governs his reason, and the implications of custom which, everywhere
convention, or the agreement of individual expatiated on in his Essays, give them their
wills, decides what is acceptable to the group. skeptical tone. Not himself a traveler in distant
Chapter 14: CUSTOM AND CONVENTION 271
parts, Montaigne traverses the world of time we reduce truth and falsity "to the measure of
and space by reading. He becomes conversant our capacity and the bounds of our sufhcicncy."
with the strange customs of the aborigines and When new ideas or the strange beliefs of others
of the Orient through the reports of returned at seem incredible simply because they are
first
explorers. He culls from the historians and ge- not our own, "we shall find that it is rather cus-
ographers of antiquity every difference in cus- tom than knowledge that takes away their
tom which their books set forth as fact or fable. strangeness." For his own part, Montaigne
Montaigne's insatiable appetite for collecting makes his "emblem" the question, "What do I
and comparing customs is not an aimless fascina- know?" This, he says, sums up his Pyrrhonian
tion on his part with the spectacle of human va- philosophy.
riety. It steadfastly leads him to the conclusion
which is for him the only one possible. Since According to the modern social scientist who
every belief or practice can be paired with its claims that custom is the ultimate standard of
opposite in the customs of some other time or conduct and that it provides the only criterion
place, no belief or practice can demand unquali- of moral judgment, no questions can be raised
fied or universal assent. "There is nothing," he about the goodness or evil of particular cus-
writes, "which custom does not, or may not do; toms. The customs of one people cannot be
and therefore, with every good reason it is that judged by another, at least not objectively or
Pindar calls her the ruler of the world." impartially, for those who judge must do so on
To say, as Montaigne does, that "the taste for the basis of their own customs. Since there is no
good and evil depends in good part upon the arbiter above conflicting customs to say which
opinion we have of them" and that "everyone is right, a particular custom has validity only
is well or ill at ease, according as he so finds him- for thegroup in which it prevails. Within that
self," amounts to saying that all moral judg- socialgroup the character or conduct of its in-
ments are matters of opinion, either individual dividual members is measured by conformity
or customary in origin. Beauty, too, is a matter to the prevailing customs.
of taste. "We fancy its forms," Montaigne The descriptive science of sociology or com-
thinks, "according to our own appetite and lik- parative ethnology thus tends to replace the
ing." As may be seen in the chapter on Beauty, normative science of ethics — or moral philoso-
Montaigne assembles an abundance of evidence phy. The only scientifically answerable questions
to show that standards of beauty vary with dif- about human conduct take the form of "How do
ferent peoples. The tastes or preferences of one men behave ?" or "How have they acted individ-
group are as unaccountable as they are frequent- ually or in groups ?" but not "How should they V
ly revolting to another. The study of morality, Sumner's Fol]{waySy
as in
Even in the field of speculative thought about becomes a study of the mores how the customs—
the nature of things, Montaigne regards the which measure conduct develop and dominate;
things men hold to be true as nothing more than or, as in the writings of Freud, it becomes a
prevailing opinions — the cultural conventions study of how the individual is psychologically
of a time or place. "We have no other level of formed or deformed by the mores of his tribe
truth and reason," he declares, "than the exam- and culture, according to the way in which the
ple and idea of the opinions and customs of the growing child reacts to the pressures which the
place wherein we live: there is always the per- community imposes through parental discipline.
most perfect govern-
fect religion, there the With these views, many philosophers and the-
ment, there the most exact and accomplished ologians, both ancient and modern, take issue.
usage of all things." But their opposing doctrine seldom goes so far
Of all human deceptions or impostures, none as to deny that morality has certain conven-
is worse than that which flows from a man's un- tional aspects. In arguing that there are "no in-
willingness to qualify every remark with the ad- nate practical principles," Locke, for example,
mission that this is the way it seems to me. In like Montaigne, cites instances of contradictory
Montaigne's eyes, "there is no greater folly in customs to show that "there is scarce that prin-
the world" than the failure to recognize that ciple of morality to be named, or rule of virtue
272 THE GREAT IDEAS
to be thought on which is not, somewhere or
. . . equivalent distinction in terms of law rather than
other, shghted and condemned by the general justice. In his analysis, Aquinas follows the Lat-
fashion of whole societies of men, governed by in, not the Greek vocabulary.
practical opinions and rules of living quite op- The Roman system of jurisprudence. Gibbon
posite toothers." tells us, distinguished between those laws which
But Locke does not leave this observation of are "positive institutions" and those which "rea-
the diversity of customs unqualified. He goes on son prescribes, the laws of nature and nations."
to assert that "though perhaps, by the different The former are man-made — the "result of cus-
temper, education, fashion, maxims, or interest tom and prejudice." This holds true of both
of different sorts of men, it fell out, that what written and unwritten laws, although only the
was thought praiseworthy in one place, escaped unwritten precepts are now usually called "cus-
not censure in another; and so in different soci- tomary laws." These customary laws are positire
eties, virtues and vices were changed: yet, as to in the sense that they are humanly instituted or
the main, they for the most part kept the same enacted — posited by the will of the legislator
everywhere. For, since nothing can be more nat- rather than merely discovered by the reason of
ural than to encourage with esteem and reputa- the philosopher. They are conventional in the
tion that wherein every one finds his advantage, some voluntary agree-
sense that they represent
and to blame and discountenance the contrary; ment on the part of the members of the com-
it is no wonder that esteem and discredit, vir- munity they govern, whether that consist in
tue and vice, should, in a great measure, every- obeying the edicts of the emperor or in giving
where correspond with the unchangeable rule of consent to the enactments of the senate.
right and wrong, which the law of God hath es- So far as it is conventional, the law of one
tablished. . . . Even in the corruption of man- community from another; and within the
differs
ners, the true boundaries of the law of nature, community, the positive law
history of a single
which ought to be the rule of virtue and vice, changes from time to time. But such bodies of
were pretty well preferred." law, "however modified by accident or custom,"
For Locke, then, as for many others, there ap- the Roman jurists, Gibbon says, conceived as
pear to be, underlying the variety of customs, "drawn from the rule of right." The fact that
moral principles of universal validity that draw "reason prescribes" this rule was their explana-
their truth from the nature of man which rep- tion of certain common elements which all bod-
resents a constant and common factor through- ies of positive law seem to contain.
out the diversity of cultures. Accordingly, it The principles underlying all codes of civil
would seem to follow that just as habits are law, whether discovered directly by reason or
modifications of instinct or developments of the drawn inductively, as Grotius later suggests,
individual's native capacities for action, so cus- from the comparative study of diverse legal sys-
toms are conventional elaborations of what is tems, comprise the precepts of what the Ro-
natural to man as a social animal. On this mans, and later Aquinas, call "natural law."
theory, the conventional cannot be understood Thus these writers seem to re-affirm, though in
except by reference to the natural, i.e., the somewhat different language, Aristotle's point
nature of man or society. that what is naturally just is the same for all
men everywhere and always, while the laws of
The view that conventions have a natural Greece and Persia represent diverse convention-
basis is most readily exemplified by Aristotle's al determinations of the universal principles of
theory of natural and legal (or conventional) justice.
justice, and by the teaching of Aquinas concern- The theory of natural right and natural law,
ing natural and positive law. For the Greeks the as expressed in the writings of Hobbes, Locke,
legal and the conventional are almost identical, and Kant, as well as in the ancient and mediae-
so that it is a kind of justice rather than a kind val tradition, is, of course, more fully treated in
of law which Aristotle calls "natural." Roman the chapters on Justice and Law. But one ex-
philosophers like Cicero, and Roman jurists like ample of the distinction between natural and
Gains and Ulpian, make what seems to be an conventional justice may be instructive here.
:
Aquinas conceives positive rules as "deter- The deepest of all moral issues therefore ex-
minations" of, rather than "deductions" from, between those who think that moralitv some-
ists
natural law. He treats such precepts as "Thou how derives from nature or reason and those
shalt not kill" and "Thou shalt not steal" as who, like the ancient sophists or Montaigne or
conclusions that reason can draw deductively Freud, find its source in custom and convention.
from the first principle of natural law, which is Accordmg to the side a man takes on this issue,
sometimes stated in the form of the command: he does or docs not believe it possible to discover
Do good, harm no one, and render to each his own. standards independent of custom, thereby to
Because these precepts are the prescriptions of judge whether customs are good, bad, or indif-
reason rather than enactments of the state, they ferent. On one belief, public manners are con-
can be interpreted murder and
as declaring that ventional determinations of moral principles or
larceny are always and everywhere unjust. But they are sometimes violations of them, just as
what -sort of killing and taking of what is not positive laws are either determinations or vio-
one's own shall be defined as murder and theft; lations of natural law. On the other belief, the
and how offenders shall be tried, judged, and individual may be approved or condemned for
—
punished these are matters which natural jus- conforming to or transgressing the manners or
tice or the precepts of natural law leave open for mores of his group; but those manners or mores,
determination by the positive laws of each com- whether they are liked or disliked by the in-
munity, according to its own constitution and dividual, arc above any tenable, objective criti-
its local customs. cism.
The theory thus exemplified, of the relation The controversy
in jurisprudence and moral-
between conventional and natural justice, or be- ity between the naturalists or rationalists who
tween positive and natural law, applies to moral appeal to man's nature or reason, and the posi-
rules and ethical standards generally. For the tivists who hold that human customs cannot be
same reason that a positive law which violates appealed from, parallels a controversy in the
natural justice cannot be called "just" even theory of knowledge or science. The parallel is-
though it is harmonious with the customs of the sue, considered at greater length in the chapters
community, so no rule of conduct, however on Hypothesis and Principle, can be stated by
much it represents prevailing custom, can be the question whether the foundation of science
approved as morally right if it violates the right — even of such sciences as logic and mathemat-
as reason sees it. The defenders of natural law, ics — consists of postulates or axioms.
which is also sometimes called "the law of rea- Axioms, like the precepts of natural law, are
son," proclaim the existence of an absolute supposed to have a universality derived from
standard, above the diversity and conflict of the nature of human reason. They are self-evi-
customs, by which their soundness is measured. dent truths, compelling assent. Postulates, on
Conflicting ethical doctrines raise many is- the contrary, are like rules of positive law — vol-
sues concerning what it is right for men to do or untarily accepted assumptions which, when
good for them to seek; but the moralists at agreed upon by the experts in a certain science,
least agree that morality is based on reason or become its conventional basis. In science as in
nature. For them the facts of human nature or law, the positivists recognize nothing beyond
the intuitions of reason will ultimately decide the agreement of men to determine what shall
the points in issue. However far apart Plato be taken for granted as true or just.
and Aristotle, Aquinas and Hegel, Kant and
Mill may be in their conceptions or analyses The difference between nature and conven-
of the right and the good, they stand together, tion also enters into the traditional discussion of
at least negatively, on the question of how their two of the most characteristic activities of man
disputes can be resolved: not by appealing to speech and political association.
the mores of the tribe, not by looking to the No one disputes whether the faculty of speech
conventions of the community as a measure, is natural to man. It is as natural for man to
not by letting the customs of the majority speak as for dogs to bark or birds to sing. But
decide. the question is whether any human language,
274 THE GREAT IDEAS
having a certain vocabulary and syntax, is nat- ciety, the question is whether the family and
ural or conventional. The answer seems to be the state are wholly natural, wholly convention-
dictated at once by the facts of the matter. al, or partly one and partly the other — their in-
Human languages exist or have existed in stitutions being erected by choice and custom
greatnumber and diversity, and those which upon a natural basis. And as in the case of lan-
endure have gradually developed and are
still guage, here too the great books do not, for the
undoubtedly subject to further change. Hence, most part, give either of the extreme answers.
according to the traditional understanding of They do not say that the state is entirely natu-
the natural and the conventional, these various ral, that it is the expression of human instinct
tongues must represent conventional languages as the bee-hive and the ant-mound are instinc-
— originally invented by this human group or tive formations. Nor do they say that the state
that, perpetuated by custom, altered by the is completely conventional, that it comes into
conventions of usage. In contrast, the expres- existence only as the result of voluntary associa-
sive sounds instinctively made by other ani- tion on the part of men contracting to live to-
mals show themselves to be natural by the fact gether in a political community.
that they are common to all members of a spe- While Aristotle says that "man is by nature a
cies and do not change as long as the species political animal," and that the state is, there-
endures. fore, "acreationof nature, "he also distinguishes
Nevertheless, as the chapter on Language in- between the ways in which men and other ani-
dicates, the writers of the great books consider mals are gregarious. Unlike the association of
the hypothesis of a natural human language. animals, which he attributes to instinct, the so-
The Old Testament story of the Tower of Ba- ciety of men rests on reason and speech. "Man
bel is sometimes interpreted as implying the ex- is the only animal," he writes, "endowed with
istence ofone language for all men before God the gift of speech . . . intended to set forth the
confounded their speech and diversified their expedient and the inexpedient, and therefore
tongues. The story of Adam's giving names to likewise the justand the unjust." Because of
the various species of plants and animals in the from one another, as
these things, cities differ
Garden of Eden is also cited by those who think bee-hives or ant-mounds do not.
there can be natural as well as conventional The diversity of states represents for Aristotle
signs. In Plato's Cratylus the attempt is made to a deliberate inventiveness on the part of reason
discover the natural names for things, or at least and an exercise of free choice — certainly inso-
to discern some natural basis for the words of a far as states are politically constituted, each with
conventional language like Greek. its own constitution. Aristotle's remark that
These who reject the hypothesis of a single while "a social impulse is implanted in all men
human language from which all others have de- by nature," yet "he who first founded the state
veloped by di versifica tion or who regard a pu rely
, was the greatest of benefactors," may look self-
natural language as impossible in the very na- contradictory; but its two parts can be read as
ture of the case, sometimes acknowledge the quite consistent with one another, if the first is
possibility of certain common elements — prin- taken as signifying the natural basis of the state
ciples of syntax, if not words — present in all hu- (in a social impulse), and the second as saying
man languages. The discovery of the common that a certain convention (a constitution) is re-
rules of speech was the object of the speculative quired to shape that impulse before any state is
express what men can naturally perceive or pretation is based on the sharpness with which
think. each of them distinguishes between men living
As in the case of language, so in the case of so- in a state of nature and in a state of civil society.
—
Though they differ among themselves in their longer spoken or a law no longer observed. This
exposition of these two conditions of man, they general compliance consists in nothing more
seem to agree that for men to pass from a state than a certain conformity among the habits of
of nature, whether hypothetical or historical, in individuals.
which men live in anarchy or at least in isola- The continuity between custom and statute
tion, it is necessary for them to enter into a as parts or phases of the positive law rests upon
contract or compact with one another. Since the relation of both to habit. "Custom," accord-
this social contract is the original, or origi- ing to Aquinas, "has the force of a law, abolishes
nating, convention by which the common- law, and is the interpreter of law" precisely be-
wealth or civil society is established, it would cause it operates through the habits of the peo-
seem to follow that, on their view, the state is ple. "By repeated external actions," such as
entirely a product of convention, and in no produce a custom, "the inward movement of
way natural. the will and the conceptions of the reason are
Yet Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, each in most revealingly declared," and, according to
his own way, add a qualification in favor of the Aquinas, "all law proceeds from the reason and
naturalness of the state, just as Aristotle qualifies will of the lawgiver." The law which a prince or
hisremark that "the state is a creation of na- a people enacts, to become effective as social
ture" by praising the man "who first founded regulation, must develop a particular habit of
the state." The exponents of the social contract conduct in many individuals. Then and only
theory of the state's origin find in the nature of then does a new enactment obtain the full force
man or in his reason an instinct, a need, or a law of law. To remain effective it must continue to
which impels or bids him to seek association have the support of "the customs of the coun-
with others for the sake of advantages which he
cannot enjoy apart from civil society. This suf- Without that support it may be a law on the
fices to affirm the existence of a natural basis books but not in practice, for the authority of a
for the convention or contract which establishes law cannot long prevail against a contrary cus-
the state. tom, except through a degree of coercion so op-
These apparently opposed theories of what is pressive as to produce rebellion. That is also
natural and what conventional about the state why the customary or unwritten rule — usually
thus appear to approach each other, though one the primitive form of positive law — is less flex-
ness, the other from its conventional origin. The Custom is a conservative factor. "There is
whole problem is, of course, further treated in nothing more difficult to take in hand," writes
the chapters on Family and State; but one Machiavelli, nothing "more perilous to con-
point which the foregoing discussion suggests duct, or more uncertain in its success, than to
receives special consideration in still another take the lead in the introduction of a new order
chapter. The point concerns the relation be- of things. The innovator has for enemies all
tween th.e idea of a constitution and the idea of those who have done well under the old con-
a social contract. Both are conceived as the ditions, and lukewarm defenders in those who
basic or primary convention which establishes may do well under the new."
the state. The question whether the two ideas Just as custom may either support the written
are interchangeable or only analogous is exam- law or render it ineffective, so custom works in
ined in the chapter on Constitution. opposite directions as a social force. It is both a
factor of cohesion and of division among men
Custom is both a cause and an effect of habit. a cause of what is called "social solidarity" and a
The habits of the individual certainly reflect the barrier separating peoples from one another.
customs of the community in which he lives; When the Athenians refuse to ally themselves
and in turn, the living customs of any social with the Persians, they chide the Spartans, ac-
group get their vitality from the habits of its cording to Herodotus, for fearing that they
members. A custom which does not command "might make terms with the barbarian." For
general compliance is as dead as a language no allthe gold on earth, they tell the Spartan
276 THE GREAT IDEAS
envoys, they could not "take part with the The FederaUsts, advocating the poHtical union
Medes." To do so would betray "our common of the thirteen American states, could urge its
brotherhood with the Greeks, our common feasibility on the ground that a social union al-
language, the altars and sacrifices of which we ready existed. "Providence has been pleased to
all partake, and the common character which give this one connected country," Jay writes,
we bear." "toone united people— a people descended from
The barbarians or the gentiles — to use the the same ancestors, speaking the same language,
traditional names for aliens or foreigners are — professing the same religion, attached to the
excluded by a social, not a geographic, bound- same principles of government, very similar in
ary line, the line drawn between those who their manners and customs."
share a set ofcustoms and all outsiders. When the Those who today advocate world federal
stranger is assimilated, the group does not adopt union cannot similarly point to a world society
him; he adopts the customs of the community. already in existence. They can only hope that
The ver\^ word "community" implies a multi- if the separate states were to unite politically,
tude having much in common. More important the social cohesion of the world's people might
than the land they occupy are the customs they subsequently develop as a result of the fostering
share. of universal customs by universal law.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGB
1. The distinction between nature and convention: its application to the origin of the
state and of language 277
5^. The effect of custom on the training and character of men 280
8. Custom in relation to order and progress: the factors of tradition and invention 283
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To find the passages cited, use the numbers in lieavy type, which are the vokime and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Homrr: Iliads hk ii [265-283) 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the vohime in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 James :Pi3'<:-^o/o^v,116a-l 19b, the passage
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b relcr to the upper and low cr halves of the left-
hand side of the page, theletters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. Forexample,in7 Plato; Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
Author's Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as part, bk, ch,
sect) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d.
Bible References: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (Z)), follows; e.g., Old Testa-
ment: Nehemiah, 7:45 — (D) U Esdras, 7:46.
Symbols: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
142] 146c-147b esp [124-138] 147a-b 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 409d-410a
278 THE GREAT IDEAS 2/0 3
46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, part ii, 259c-d;
(1. The distinction between nature and conven- 265c-266a; part iv, 315d-316b; 347b-d;
tion: its application to the origin of the state 351d-353a;367a-b
and of language.^ 48 Melville: Moby Dic\, 228b-229b
42 Kant: Science of Right, 402c; 405d-406c; 49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 317a-c; 318b-c
433c-434d esp 433d-434a; 435a-436b; 437c-d 54 Freud: Civilization and Its Discontents, 799a-
43 Mill: Liberty, 294b-295b / Representative 800c / Netv Introductory Lectures, 834b-c
Government, 327b,d-332d
44 Boswell:/o^«50/2, 363c-364a 3. The conflict of customs: their variation from
tian Doctrine, bk ii, ch 25 649b-d esp 649d; 35a-c; par 11-13 38b-39c / City of God, bk xv,
bk III, ch 12 662c-663c; ch 18-22 664d-666c ch 16 410b-411d / Christian Doctrine, bk ii,
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 97, ch 19-26 646b-650a; ch 39-40 654c-656a;
A 2 236d-237b; a 3, rep 1-2 237b-238b bk hi, ch 10, 661d-662a; ch 12-14 662c-663d;
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, hell, xvi [64-78] CH 18-22 664d-666c
23a-b; purgatory, vi [58-151] 61b-62c; xi 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part i, 61d-62a; 75a-b;
[73-117] 69c-70a; paradise, xv [97]-xvi [154] 78b-c; 96a; part ii, 140b
129b-132a; xxvi [124-138] 147a-b 24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, bk hi,
22 Chaucer Troilus and Cressida, bk 11, stanza 4
: 141d-142b
22a 25 Montaigne: Essays, 46b-47c; 93b-c; 102a-
25 Montaigne: Essays, 131b-132a; 143c-145c 103a; 143c-144a; 281a-284c; 307b; 424d-
33 Pascal: Pensees, 294 225b-226b 426b
35 Locke: Civil Government, ch xiii, sect 157 27 Shakespeare: Hamlet, act ii, sc ii [249-259]
61c-d 43b and Cressida, act ii, sc ii [1-206]
/ Troilus
35 Hume: Human Understanding, sect viii, div 113c-115c / King Lear, act i, sc ii [1-22] 247d-
66, 480b 248a / Henry VUI, act i, sc hi [3-5] 555b
36 Swift: Gulliver, part hi, 105a-106b; 128a 29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, part i, 32c-33a
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk xiv, 104c; 31 Descartes: Discourse, part ii, 46b-c; part
bk XIX 135a-146a,c esp 136c; bk xx, 146a-b HI, 48b-49d
38 Rousseau: Social Contract, bk ii, 402b-c 31 Spinoza: Ethics, part hi, the affects, def
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 545c-d; 638c- 27 419a-b
639a 33 Pascal: Pensees, 309 228b; 312 229a; 325
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 6b; 107b; 485b- 230b-231a; 381-385 238b-239a
486b 35 Locke: Human Understanding, 90a-d; bk i,
43 Mill: Liberty, 269c-d; 300d-302c/ Representa- CH II, sect 8-12 105d-107d passim; sect 21-26
tiveGovernment, 377d-378a llla-112b; bk h, ch xxi, sect 71, 197d; ch
44 Boswell: Johnson, 204c-205b XXVIII, SECT 10-13 230b-231c
49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 528c-529a; 579b- 35 Hume: Human Understanding, sect xii, div
582a passim 132, 509c-d
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk x, 403a-c; bk xi, 36 Swift: Gulliver, part i, 21b-23a; part ii,
498a-499a; epilogue i, 647b-c 76b'77a
280 THE GREAT IDEAS 'Sb to 6a
Q 95, A I, ANS 226c-227c; a 3 228c-229b; q 97,
(5. Custom atuf convention in the moral order. aa 2-3 236d-238b
5a. Tbe conventional determination of 21 Dante: Diviyie Comedy, hell, xvi [64-78]
moral judgments: the moral evaluation of 23a-b; purgatory, vi [58-151] 61b-62c; para-
conventions.) dise, XV [97]-xvi [154] 129b-132a
36 Sterne: Tristram Shatidy, 261a-b 23 HoBBEs: Leviathan, part i, 78b-c
37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 295b; 303d 25 Montaigne: Essays, 22a-c; 42b-43d; 46b-
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk xviii, 132c; 47c; 63d-64b; 131b-132a; 524b-525d
BK XIX, 139b-140d 27 Shakespeare: Ha?nlet, act hi, sc iv [161-
38 Rousseau: Inequality, 362a-b / Political Econ- 170] 56b
omy, 369a-370a / Social Contract, bk iv, 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 78d-80a
434b-435a 31 Descartes: Discourse, part ii, 46b-c; part
39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, bk v, 346c-347a III, 48b-49d
42 Kant: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals,210d- 33 Pascal: Pensees, 6 173a; 97-98 190b
271a / Practical Reason, 307a-b / Intro. Meta- 35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk i, ch ii,
physic of Morals, 387b; 387d-388a sect 8-12 105d-107d passim; sect 20 110c-
43 Mill: Liberty, 269b-271d; 286b-287a; 293b- 111a; sect 25 llld-112a; bk ii, ch xxi, sect
302c passim; 307b'312a / Utilitarianism, 457c- 71, 197d
458a; 475a-d 35 Hume: Human Understanding, sect viii, div
44 Bos\VELL:/oA/7yo;2, 197a-b; 198b-d 66, 480b
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, pref, 2b-c; part 37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 303d
par 132, 46c-d; par 138 48c-d; part hi, par
II, 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk v, 21d-22b;
150-152 56c-57b; par 339 110b; par 355 112d- bk VII, 50c; BK XIX, 138c-140d
113a; additions, i 115a-d; 89 129d-130a; 91 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 347a-b
131a-d; 96-97 132c-133a / Philosophy of His- 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, bk v, 337c-338c
tory, INTRO, 166a-b; 170d-171c; part ii, 271d- 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 92c-94b; 101b;
272d; 273c; 279c-d; 280b-281b; part hi, 291d-292d; 409d-413b passim
311a-b; part iv, 333b-d 41 Gibbon: Decline afid Fall, 389h-390h esp 389d
49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 305a; 313b-d; 314c- 42 Kant: Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 387b;
316a; 317a-d; 592d-593a 387d-388a
50 Marx-Engels: Co7nmunist Manifesto, 427a- 43 Federalist: number 49, 159d-160a; number
b; 428b-d 60, 184d
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk i, 15d-16a; bk 43 Mill: Liberty, 269b-c; 293b-302c passim /
IV, 177d-178a; bk vi, 263a-265d passim; bk Utilitarianism, 449c-d; 458a-b; 460a-461c
303a-305b esp 304c-305a; bk x, 403a-
VIII, 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 150-
405a; 442c-443b; bk xi, 476c-480a passim; 152 56c-57b; par 164 59a-d; par 257 80b;
514c-d; bk xii, 542d; bk xiv, 589a-c; 611a-c; ADDITIONS, 96-97 132c-133a; 106 134a /
epilogue I, 645a-646c; 647b-649d Philosophy of History, part ii, 271c-273c
53 James: Psychology, 190a-191a; 886b-887a 49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 313a-314b; 317a-d;
54 Freud: General Introduction, 625a / War and 328c-d
Death, 757d-759a esp 759a / Civilization and 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk v, 221b-d; bk
Its Discontents, 792 b-c 303a-305b esp 303d-304b; 309b-c; bk
VIII,
XII, 542d; bk xv, 640d-641a
5b. The QS.QCt of custom on the training and 53 James: Psychology, 733b-734b
character of men 54 Fke^jt): Sexual Enlightenment of Children 119a-
5 Aristophanes: Clouds [886-1 no] 499b-502b 122a,c passim / War and Death, 757d-759d /
6 Herodotus: History, bk i, 35c-d Civilization and Its Discontents, 799c-801a esp
7 Plato: Republic, bk 11, 314b-c; bk iv, 344b- 800c-801a / New Introductory Lectures, 834b-c;
d; BK VI, 377a-379c / Laws, bk vii, 717d- 843c; 854d-855a
718c
8 Aristotle: Metaphysics, bk ii, ch 3 [994^31- 6. Custom in relation to law
995^51 513c
10 Hippocrates: Airs, Waters, Places, par 23 6a. Constitutions, social contracts, positive
18a-c laws, and manners as conventions
12 Aurelius: Meditations, bk iv, sect 18 264d 7 Plato: Sy7nposium, 154a-c / Crito, 216d-
14 Plutarch: Lysander, 361a-d / Cleomenes, 219a,c / Republic, bk h, 311b-c / Theaetetus,
663b-c 528b-c; 531a-532a / Statesman, 600a-b / Laws,
18 Augustine: Confessions, bk i, par 14-16 4c- bk HI, 665c-666c; bk vii, 716a-b; 718b-c;
5b; par 19-30 5d-8d; bk vi, par 2 35a-c; par 730d-731d; bk viii, 736c-737a; bk x, 760a-b
11-13 38b-39c / Christian Doctrine, bk hi, ch 8 Aristotle: Sophistical Refutations, ch 12
12-13 662c-663c; ch 18-22 664d-666c [173=^27-31] 238c
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 92, 9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk v, ch 7 [ii34'*i8-
A I, rep I 213c-214c; a 2, rep 4 214d-215a,c; 1135^7] 382c-383a / Politics, bk hi, ch 16
6b to la Chaptir 14: CUSTOM AND CONVENTION 281
[1287^5-7] 486a / Rhetoric, bk i, ch i
^ [iT^y^i- [i28/'5-8] 486a; BK v,ch 8 [i307*'3o-38] 509d-
17] 617c-d 510a; CH 9 [1:510*12-19] 512b-c
14 Plutarch: Lycurgus, 33d'34b / Themistocles, 14 Phtarch: Lycurgus, 36b-37b; 38b d; 46b c;
99b-c 47a-48a / Lycurgus-Numa, 63d-64a / Solon,
18 Augustine: Confessions, hk hi, par 15 17a-b/ 73d-74b
City of God, bk iv, ch 4 190d; uk xix, en 17, 15 Tacitus: Annals, bk hi, 57d-58b; bk iv,
522d-523a; ch 24 528b c 67d-68a; bk xi, 106a-107b; bk xir, lllb-c;
20 Aquinas: Siimmu Theologica, part i-ii, q 95, BK XIV, 151d-152c
AA 2-3 227c-229b; a 4, ans 229b-230c 18 Augustine: Confessions, bk hi, par 15 17a-b;
23HoBBi:s: Leviathan, part 1, 78b-c; part h, BK V, par 14 30c-31a / City of God, bk xv,
99a-101b csp 100c, lOla-b; 140b CH 16 410b-411d
25 Montaigne: Essays, 46b-48b: 93b-94a; 102a- 20 Aquinas: Sumrna Theologica, part i-ii, q 95,
b: 281a-283c; 426a-b; 462d 463b; 519a-520b A 3 228c-229b; q 96, a 2, ans 231c-232b; q 97,
27 Shakespeare: Kifig Lear, act i, sc ii [1-22] AA 2-3 236d-238b
247d-248a 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part i, 78b-c; part ii,
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 94d-95b 108c; 130d-131a; 131c; 136d
31 Descartes: Discourse, part ii, 45b-d 25 Montaigne: Essays, 47a-51a; 131b-132a;
33 Pascal: Pensees, 291-338 225a-233a csp 294 283c; 462c-465c
225b-226b, 312 229a, 325-326 230b-231a 27 Shakespeare: Measure for Measure, act ii,
35 Locke: Civil Govermnent, ch ii, sect 12 27d- sc I [1-4] 178d-179a
28a; sect 14-15 28b-c; ch vii, sect 94-cH 30 Bacon: New Atlantis, 205d-206b
VIII, sect 122 46a-53c esp ch viii, sect 95-99 31 Descartes: Discourse, part ii, 45b-d
46c-47c; ch x, sect 132 55a-b; ch xiii, sect 33 Pascal: Pensees, 308 228b; 312 229a; 325-326
157-158 61c-62b: ch xv, sect 171 65a-b; ch 230b-231a
XIX, sect 243 81d 35 Locke: Human Understatiding, bk ii, ch
36 Swift: Gulliver, part i, 22a-23a; 28a-b xxviii, sect 10-13 230b-231c
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk i, Ic-d; 36 Swift: Gulliver, part i, 22a-23a
2d-3d; bk xix, 140C'142b; bk xxvi, 214d- 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk i, 3c-d;
215a; bk xxviii, 240b; 261a-262a,c BK X, 65b; bk xiv, 106b; bk xviii, 127c;
38 Rousseau: Social Contract, bk i 387b,d-394d BK xix, 135b-136b; 137c-140c; bk xxi, 168d-
esp 391a-d 169a;bk xxiii, 188b-189a; 189d; 197c-198a;
40 Gibbon: and Fall, 616d'617a
Declifie BK XXV, 212a; bk xxvi, 218d; 221a-c; 223a-c;
41 Gibbon: Declifie and Fall, 71d-73a passim; bk XXVIII, 237a-d
75b-d; 86d-89c esp 87a, 87d 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 324d / Social Contract,
42 Kant: Scie?ice of Right, 419a-420b; 435a-436c; BK II, 402b-c; 406c-d; bk iii, 419d-420a; bk
437c-d; 450d-451c IV, 434b-435a
43 Declaration of Independence: [7-28] la-b 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 464c-d
43 Mill: Liberty, 269c-d; 270c-271b; 305b-312a 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 77c-d; 80a;
passim, esp 307 b-d / Representative Govern- 96b-c
ment, 327b,d-332d passim 42 Kant: Science of Right, 448d-449c
44 B0SWEI.1.: Johnson, 276a-b 43 Declaration of Independence: [15-22] lb
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 211 43 Federalist: number 27, 95C-d; number 49,
70a-c; par 217 72b-c; par 234 75d-76a / 159d-160a
Philosophy of History, part ii, 271c-273c; 43 Mill: Liberty, 270c-271b; 308b [fn i] / Rep-
part IV, 365b-c resentative Government, 329d-330a; 330d-331a
47 Goethe: Faust, part i [1972-1979] 46b-47a 44 B0SWEI.1.: Johnson, 204c-205b; 276a-b; 277b
48 Melville: Moby Dic\, 292a-297a esp 294a 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 257
50 Marx-Engels: Communist Manifesto, Ml3.-\i 80b; par 274 92a; par 339 110b; par 355 112d-
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, epilogue ii, 680b- 113a; additions, 132 137d-138b / Philosophy
684a of History, part ii, 271c-273c; 277c-d; part
III, 294c-d
€>h. The force of custom with respect to law 47 Goethe: Faust, part i [1972-1979] 46b-
5 Euripides: Bacchantes [877-911] 347b-c / 47a
Hecuba [798-805] 359d 48 Melville: Moby Dic\, 292a-297a esp 294a
6 Herodotus: History, bk hi, 97d-98a 49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 317a-b
7 Plato: Republic, bk iv, 344b-d;BK vii,401c-d 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk hi, 137c-139a
/ Laws, bk hi, 665c-666c; bk iv, 678d-679a;
BK V, 692b-c; bk vii, 713c-714c; 716a-b; 7. Custom in social life
lb. Custom as a barrier between communities Id. The influence of custom on the liberty of
4 Homer: Odyssey, bk vii [27-36] 218b the individual
5 Aeschylus : Suppliant Maidens [825-965] lld- 6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, bk ii,396c-d
13b 25 Montaigne: Essays, 22a-c; 42b-c; 46b-47c;
6 Herodotus: History, bk i, 2a; 31d-32a; bk iv, 143c-144a 307b 424d-426b esp 426a-b
; ;
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part i, 96a 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk viii, 303a-305b
25 Montaigne: Essays, 44b-c; 46b-47a; 91d-98b 54 Freud: Origin and Development of Psycho-
esp 93b-94a; 477d-478a; 524b-d Analysis, 20c-d / General Introduction, 452c-d;
26 Shakespeare: Richard II, act i, sc hi [154- 573c / War and Death, 755d; 757c-759d /
173] 325b / Merchant of Venice, act i, sc hi Civilization and Its Discontents, 776b-802a,c
8 to % Chapter 14: CUSTOM AND CONVENTION 283
esp 780d-781d, 783b 785a, 788d 789b, 796b c, 45 Lavoisii.r: Elements of Chemistry, part i, 33a
799a-801c / New Introductory Lectures, 853a b 46 Hecll: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 274
92a; par 355 112d-113a; additions, 166 145b-
8. Custom in relation to order and progress: c / Philosophy of History, intro, 166d; 187d-
the factors of tradition and invention 188b; PART 209b; 222a 224a; 235d 236c;
I,
7 Plato: Republic, bk iv, 344b-d / Laws, bk ii, 257a-c; part 260b-c; 280b 281b; part iv,
ii,
CROSS-REFERENCES
'iTO<:-ba
For: Other discussions of the distinction between nature and convention, and for the examination
of related distinctions, see Art 2c; Habit 1,7; Nature 2a—2c.
The consideration of the natural and the conventional in language and society, see Family i ;
Language 2-2b; Nature 2b, 5c; Sign and Symbol la— if; State 3b-3d.
Applications of the distinction between nature and convention in law and jurisprudence, see
Law 4-4!!, 5c, 7c; and for the relation of law to custom and habit,
Justice 6a-6b, 9a, loa;
see Habit ^L
7; Law
The discussion of custom as a conservative force in relation to progress, see Change 12b;
History 4b; Progress 4a, 5.
The bearing of custom and convention on the issues of morality, see Good and Evil 3a, 6d;
Nature 5a; Opinion 6a; Relation 6c; Universal and Particular 7b.
The relativity of truth to the customs of the time and place, and for the theory that the
foundations of science are conventional, see Hypothesis 3; Knowledge 4b, 5c; Opinion
3c; Principle 30(2), 5; Relation 6b; Truth J-jh; Universal and Particular 7a.
Matters relevant to the influence of custom on taste or judgments of beauty, see Beauty 5;
Nature 5d; Relation 6c; Universal and Particular 7c.
The significance of nature and custom in the sphere of economic activity, see Nature 5b;
Wealth i, lob.
Chapter 14: CUSTOM AND CONVENTION 285
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not incliuicd in Great Boof^s of the Western World, but relevant lo the
idea and topics with whicii this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings, which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
INTRODUCTION
DEFINITION has been variously defined Aristotle and Spinoza, Hobbes and Locke, Aqui-
in the tradition of the great books. These nas and William James. Their views of the way
diverse conceptions of what a definition is raise in which definitions should be constructed or
many issues. their conceptions of the function of definitions
At one extreme, writers Uke Hobbes look determine and reflect lines of agreement and
upon definition as nothing more than an at- opposition on many other matters. The use of
tempt to say what a word means how it has — definitions in the great works of mathematics
been or is being used. At the other, writers like —
and natural science by Euclid, Descartes,
Aquinas regard definition as that act of the Galileo, Newton, Lavoisier, and Darwin
mind by which it expresses the nature of a thing tends to exemplify now one, now another,
or formulates its essence. theory of definition. Modern discussions of the
In one technical view associated with the nature of science and mathematics, especially
name of Aristotle, to define is to state the genus discussions influenced by the development of
and differentia by which the species of a thing mathematical logic — from Whewell,
Mill, and
is constituted. In another theory of definition Poincare to Whitehead, Russell, and Dewey
advanced by Locke and others, any combina- focus critical attention on the nature and role
tion of traits which distinguishes one class or of definitions.
kind of thing from another defines the charac-
ter common to all members of that class. In still Many other chapters provide an illuminating
another view, to be found in Spinoza, definition context for topics discussed in this one, espe-
consists in giving the cause or genesis of a thing, cially the chapterson Language and Logic,
in saying how the thing originated or was Idea, Principle and Reasoning, Philosophy
produced. and Science, and Truth. Though the issues
Sometimes definition through causes employs concerning definition cannot be resolved apart
the final rather than the efficient or productive from this larger context of controversy about
cause, and characterizes the thing by the end it the mind, reality, and knowledge, we can nev-
naturally serves. And sometimes, as with Wil- ertheless formulate these issues in isolation. But
liam James, definitions simply express the pur- in doing so we ought to bear in mind that they
poses or interests which we have in mind when can be more readily understood in proportion
we classify things to suit ourselves. as they are seen in the fight of other relevant
In the tradition of the liberal arts of gram- considerations.
mar, rhetoric, and logic, these various concep- There is, first of all, the question about the
tions of definition are connected with contro- object of definition. What is being defined
versies concerning the power and activity of when men make or defend definitions? This
the human mind, the relation of language to question broadens into the problem of nominal
thought, the structure of science or, more gen- as opposed to real definitions. That is a complex
erally, the nature of knowledge, and the con- problem which raises a number of further ques-
stitution of reality, with particular reference to tions. Are all definitions arbitrary, expressing
the existence of universals and individuals and the conventions of our speech or the particular
their relation to one another. purpose we have in mind when we classify
These connections appear in the thought of things ? Or do some, if not all, definitions ex-
286
Chapter 15: DEFINITION 287
bearing on all these issues; and through them selves, according as the reckoning proceeds."
all run the divergent conceptions of how defini- For Hobbes, then, definition is verbal; yet
tions can or should be constructed. definitions can also be true or false, and on the
truth of definitions depends the distinction be-
When in the course of argument one man dis- tween knowledge and opinion. "In the right
misses the opinion of another by saying, "That definition of names," he says, "lies the first use
is matter of definition," the usual im-
just a of speech; which is the acquisition of science."
plication is that the rejected opinion has no Only when discourse "begins with the defini-
truth apart from the way in which the man tions of words" can it reach conclusions that
who proposed it uses words. He may even be have the character of knowledge. "If the first
accused of begging the question, of framing ground of such discourse be not definitions . . .
definitions which implicitly contain the con- then the end or conclusion is opinion."
clusion he subsequently draws from them. Hobbes accurately reports the nature of ge-
The underlying supposition here seems to be ometry when he says that in that science defini-
expressed by Pascal when, in his essay On Geo- tions serve as principles in reasoning or proof.
metrical Demonstration, he asserts that "there is The words "by definition" mark one of the
great freedom of definition and definitions are steps in many Euclidean proofs. Descartes and
never subject to contradiction, for nothing is Spinoza, proceeding in the geometrical man-
more permissible than to give whate\-er name ner, place definitions at the head of their works
we please to a thing we have clearly pointed as ultimate principles to be used in validating
out." He calls "true definitions" those which their conclusions. But, unlike Hobbes, these
are "arbitrary, permissible, and geometrical." writers do not seem to regard their definitions
The only restriction he would place upon our as merely verbal. Euclid goes further, as we
freedom to make definitions is that "we must shall presently see, and offers what amounts
be careful not to take advantage of our freedom to proofs of his definitions, or at least of their
to impose names by gi^'ing the same name to geometrical reality. Aristotle and Aquinas cer-
two different things." And even this case, he tainly take the position not only that definitions
claims, is permissible "if we avoid confusion by are principles, but also that definitions them-
not extending the consequences of one to the selves are capable of being demonstrated. But
other." they complicate the matter by insisting that
If we are free to make whatever definitions definitions are neither true nor false, since, as
we please, it would seem to follow that defini- Aristotle says, they do not involve "the asser-
tions cannot be matters of argument; and dif- tion of something concerning something."
ferences of opinion which result from differ- At least two questions seem to be involved in
ences in definition would seem to be irrecon- this familiar dispute about the arguability of
cilableby any appeal to reason or to fact. definitions and their role in argumentation. To
Such a conception of definition as verbal avoid confusion, they should be kept distinct.
does not seem to prevent Hobbes from holding One is the question of the truth and falsity of
288 THE GREAT IDEAS
definitions. It should be separated from, even But are they merely nominal ? Are they en-
though it is related to, the other question about tirely arbitrary ? That this word should be used
whether all definitions are nominal, i.e., con- to name this thing is arbitrary, but that when
cerned only with assigning meanings to the it is so used a certain definition also applies
words by which we name things. To under- may not be arbitrary. Among the several verbal
stand what is involved in this second question, which applies in
definitions of a word, the one
it may be helpful to consider the relation of any particular case depend upon the char-
will
words, thoughts, and things in the process of acter of the thing which the word is used
definition. to name.
For example, if John and James are sons of
A DICTIONARY IS supposcd to Contain defini- the same parents, the name "brother" applies,
tions. It does in part —
insofar as the meaning of but not with the same definition which is re-
any word is expressed in a phrase containing quired for the application of the name to Mark
other words which are not synonyms for the and Matthew who, unrelated by blood, are
word in question. The combined meanings of members of the same monastic order. What the
these other words determine the meaning of word "brother" is used to mean may be arbi-
the word being defined. trary, but when it isused now of John and
For example, one definition of the word James, and now of Mark and Matthew, it
"brother" is "a male relative, the son of the would be misapplied if it did not carry the ap-
same parents or parent." Another is "a male propriate definition. Which definition is appro-
member of a religious order." These two defini- priate in each case does not seem to be arbi-
tions give different meanings for the same word. trary, since that appropriateness depends not
The dictionary is here recording two ways in on our will but on the objective facts of the
which, as a matter of historical fact, the word case— the actual relation of the persons called
has been used. It has been and can be used in "brothers."
still other ways. No one of these definitions can Precisely because the w ord is used to name a
be called "right" and the others "wrong." thing, the definition of the word as so used does
Dictionary definitions seem to be verbal and more than state the meaning of the word. It
arbitrary in a number of ways. That the word states something about the character of the
"brother" should carry any of the meanings thing named. Definitions remain merely verbal
which the dictionary records is an accident of only so long as the words they define are not
English usage. It is arbitrary that that partic- actually used to name or to signify things in
ular sound or mark should be the name for a some way. Whenever a thing is named or sig-
male relative who is the son of the same par- nified, the definition which gives the meaning
ents. It would be equally arbitrary to restrict of the word must also signify something about
the meaning of the word "brother" to any one the nature of the thing.
of its definitions. "In the natural order of ideas," writes Lavoi-
Nothing about a word limits the number of sier, "the name of the class or genus is that
distinct meanings with which it can be used. As which expresses a quality common to a great
Locke says, "every man has so inviolable a lib- number of individuals; the name of the species,
erty to make words stand for what ideas he on the contrary, expresses a quality peculiar to
pleases, that no one hath the power to make certain individuals only. These distinctions are
others have the same ideas in their minds that not, as some may imagine, merely metaphysical,
he has, when they use the same words that he but are established by Nature."
does." A word is thus a conventional sound or
mark, which can be given any meaning con- Yet it may be said that the definition is still
vention assigns to it. When that meaning is ex- nominal, for depends entirely on the mean-
it
pressed in other words, we have a \'erbal defini- ings of the words which express it. For example,
tion, and such definitions are certainly nominal one definition of "brother" involves the mean-
in this sense —
that they state the meaning of ings of such words as "male" and "relative,"
"son," "parent," and "same." If we were to
Chapter 15: DEFINITION 289
look these words up in a dictionary, the def- tion, impose themselves upon our minds as prin-
initions ue found would involve the meanings ciples, leaving us no choice, parallels the issue
of still other words, and so on in an endlessly between the view that the principles of a sci-
circular fashion. Furthermore, we would find ence consist of postulates voluniarilv assumed
the account of certain words, such as "relative" and the view that they are axiomatic or un-
and "same," somewhat unsatisfactory as defini- avoidable.
tions because the meaning of the defining \\ ords Far from regarding such basic indefinable
would immediately involve the meaning of the terms as clearest and most indisputable in mean-
word to be defined. To say that "same" means ing, Spinoza thinks that "these terms signify
"not other" or "not different" seems the same ideas in the highest degree confused." For him
as saying "same" means "same." Yet we must "the true definition of any one thing . . . ex-
know the meaning of "same," for otherwise we presses nothing but the nature of the thing de-
could not understand the meaning of "brother," fined." But to arrive at the true definition, it is
in the definition of which the word "same" necessary to discover the cause of the thing.
appears. For "every existing thing," he writes, "there is
That some words seem to have indefinable some certain cause by reason of which it exists."
meanings suggests that not all meanings are This cause "must either be contained in the
merely verbal or nominal, and that the mean- nature itself and definition of the existing thing
ing of every word cannot be found in the mean- ... or it must exist outside the thing." In the
ings of other words. In the Preface to his dic- latter case, the definition of the thing always
tionary, Dr. Johnson observes that "as nothing involves a statement of the external cause of its
tain terms, such as being, same, one, and rela- formula of the essence of each thing" and, he
290 THE GREAT IDEAS
adds, "there is an essence only of those things the beings to which we also arbitrarily assign
whose formula is a definition." the name "man."
Even supposing the truth of these state-
ments, which Hobbes or Locke certainly would The process of verification by which a nom-
question, the problem of real as opposed to inal is converted into a
real definition can be
nominal definition requires further examina- regarded as the demonstration of a definition.
tion. To explore the matter further, let us take Strictly speaking, it is not the definition which
two of the most famous definitions to be found is thereby proved. It is rather a proposition in
in the great books. Both are definitions of man which the subject of the definition is affirmed
— "featherless biped" and "rational animal." to exist, or in which a subject already known to
As we have seen, these definitions must remain exist is said to have a certain definition. For
—
purely nominal only stating the meaning of example, it is not the definition "rational ani-
the word "man" —
until that word is used to mal" which is proved, but the proposition
name some kind of thing. If, however, we apply "there exists an animal which differs from other
the word "man" to existing entities which animals in being rational," or the proposition
combine the characteristics of having two legs "the real being which we call 'man' is both an
and lacking feathers, then "featherless biped" animal and rational, and he alone is rational."
defines, not the word "man," but a class of real, If these propositions cannot be proved, "ration-
that is, existing things. In addition to being al animal" remains a purely nominal definition.
nominal, the definition is now also real in the That definitions are not as such either true or
sense that the class or kind which it determines false is unaffected by the distinction between
has existing members. real and nominal definitions. The point is sim-
That animals exist may similarly be a fact of ply that a definition, which is always linguisti-
observation. But "animal" is only one of the cally expressed by a phrase, never a sentence,
two terms in the other nominal definition of neither affirms nor denies anything, and so can-
"man." In order to make "rational animal" not be either true or false. "Featherless biped"
more than a nominal definition, it is necessary or "son of the same parents" makes no assertion
to verify the existence of animals which possess about reality or existence.
a certain characteristic, rationality, not pos- Yet there is which defini-
a special sense in
sessed by all some de-
animals. If rationality in tions can be true or false, which does have a
gree belonged to all animals, then the word bearing on the distinction between real and
"man" (nominally defined by "rational ani- nominal definitions. Pascal suggests three alter-
mal") would be synonymous with "animal." natives with regard to the truth or falsity of
But, unlike feathers, the presence or absence of definitions. "If we find it impossible," he
which seems readily observable, the possession writes, "it passes for false; if we demonstrate
or lack of rationality is difficult to ascertain. that it is true, it passes for a truth; and as long
Here we face two possibilities. One is that we as it cannot be proved to be either possible or
can never be sure that some existing animals impossible, it is considered a fancy."
are and some are not rational. Then the defini- According to Aquinas, there are two ways in
tion "rational animal" will never become real. which a definition can be false. In one way,
It will always remain merely nominal, the state- when the intellect appUes "to one thing the
ment of a possible meaning for "man," but one definition proper to another; as that of a circle
which we cannot employ when we apply the to a man. In another way, by composing a def-
word to name any existing thing. The other inition of parts which are mutually repugnant.
possibiUty is that we can infer the existence of a A definition such as 'a four-footed rational ani-
special class of animals (distinguished by the mal' would be of this kind ... for such a state-
possession of reason) from such evident facts as ment as 'some rational animals are four-footed'
the activities of reading and writing, activities is false in itself."
not performed by all animals. Then, members But the truth or falsity of that statement can
of the class defined having been found to exist, conceivably be argued, and therefore it is not
"rational animal" becomes a real definition of so clear an example of a false definition as one
Chapter 15: DEFINITION 291
which, in Pascal's terms, plainly represents an all sciences. Until a definition ceases to be nom-
impossibility. Suppose someone offered "round inal and becomes cannot be used scien-
real, it
square" as the nominal definition of "rectacy- tifically in the demonstration of other conclu-
cle." The phrase "round square" expresses a sions; to use a merely nominal definition in llie
self-contradiction, and in consequence the defi- proof begs the question.
nition is false. Its falsity is tantamount to the If the existence of the thing defined is either
impossibility of there being any such figure as a directly observable or self-evident, no proof or
rectacycle which has the definition proposed. postulation of existence is required. In theol-
The truth of a definition which is nothing — ogy, for example, there are those who think
more than its freedom from self-contradiction that the existence of God
immediately seen
is
— is equivalent to the possibility, as opposed to in the definition of God. Descartes and Spinoza
the impossibility, of the thing defined. To call seem to be of this opinion.
the definition "son of the same parents" or Descartes argues that "eternal existence" is
"featherless biped" true is to say that the words necessarily included in the idea of God as "a
defined
— "brother" or "man" — signify possible supremely perfect Being." This is so evident,
existences. In short, only those nominal defini- he declares, that "existence can no more be
tions which are true can ever become real, and separated from the essence of God than can its
they become real only when the possibility having its three angles equal to two right angles
they signify is actually known to be realized in be separated from the essence of a triangle, or
existence. the idea of a mountain from the idea of a val-
ley." Concerning substance or God, Spinoza
The method of Euclid's Elements illustrates holds that, since it pertains to its nature to
the foregoing points. Euclid defines certain geo- exist, "its must involve necessary
definition
metrical figures, such as triangle, parallelogram, existence, and consequently from its definition
square. These definitions may appear to be free alone its existence must be concluded."
from contradiction, but that does not tell us On the other hand, there are those who think
whether they are more than nominal. The de- that the existence of God must be proved by
fined figures are possible, but the question is inference from effect to cause. Supposing that a
whether they exist in the space determined by man understands the meaning of the word
Euclid's postulates. "God," Aquinas maintains that it "does not
To show do exist, Euclid under-
that they therefore follow that he understands that what
takes to construct them according to his postu- the name signifies exists actually, but only that
lates which permit him the use of a straight it exists mentally." Hence, he declares, it is nec-
edge and a compass for purposes of construc- essary to prove the existence ofGod, "accept-
tion. When in Proposition i Euclid proves that ing as a middle term the meaning of the name,"
he can construct an equilateral triangle, he es- but using an effect in "place of the definition of
tablishes the geometrical reality of the figure the cause in proving the cause's existence."
defined in Definition 20. A geometrical con- The difference between these two positions
struction is thus seen to be what is called an might be summed up by saying that Descartes
"existence proof." It converts a nominal into a and Spinoza, like Anselm before them, think
real definition. Figures which cannot be con- the definition of God is intrinsically real, where-
structed must be postulated; as, for example, as Aquinas thinks we must begin with a nom-
the straight line and the circle. Postulates i and inal definition of God, which becomes real only
3 ask us to assume that a straight line can be with proof of God's existence. For some con-
drawn between any two points and that a circle firmed atheists, any definition of God is not
can be described with any center and radius. only nominal, but false — the definition of an
These postulates give Definitions 4 and 15 their impossible being, incapable of existing.
geometrical reality.
Though the method of construction is pecu- There is still another issue about nominal and
liar to geometry, the relation of definitions to real definitions. The point involved is the one
proofs or postulates of existence is the same for raised by Locke's discussion of nominal and real
292 THE GREAT IDEAS
essences. It Is also raised by Aristotle's discrim- in the mind of the speaker, stand for we know
ination between essential and accidental uni- not what; and the extent of these species, with
the difference between the unity sig-
ties, i.e., such boundaries, are so unknown and undeter-
nifiedby the phrase "featherless biped" and by mined, that it is impossible with any certainty
the phrase "black man." Both phrases look like to affirm, that all men are rational, or that all
definitions. Each designates a possible class of gold is yellow."
individuals and sets up the conditions for mem-
bership in that class or exclusion from it. This issue has many ramifications. In one
The distinction between them does not rest, direction it leads into Aristotle's quarrel with
according to Aristotle, on the criterion of exist- Plato over the method of definition by division
ence. Both of the objects defined may exist, but or dichotomy. In the Sophist and the Statesman,
whereas the first is truly a species, the second is the search for definitions proceeds by the divi-
only, in Aristotle's opinion, an accidental vari- sion of a class of things into two sub-classes, one
ety within the species 7nan. Man, being a spe- of which then further subdivided, and so on
is
cies, can havea real essence, and so any defini- until a class is reached which has the character-
tion of man — whether "featherless biped" or istics of the object to be defined. The attempt
"rational animal" — can be a real definition, con- to define a sophist, for example, starts with the
stituted by genus and differentia. But negro or notion that he is a man of art, and proceeds by
aryan, not being a species, but only a race or dividing and subdividing the various kinds of
variety, has no essence as such. The definitions art.At one point in the course of doing this, the
— "black man" and "white man" — indicate Athenian Stranger summarizes the process to
this in that they are constituted by two terms that point.
which are related as substance and accident, not "You and I," he says to Theaetetus, "have
as genus and differentia. come to an understanding not only about the
Though Aristotle distinguishes these two name of the angler's art, but about the defini-
types of formulae as essential and accidental tion of the thing itself. One half of all art was
definitions rather than as real and nominal defi- acquisitive — half of the acquisitive art was con-
nitions, the one principle of distinction is close- quest or taking by force, half of this was hunt-
ly related to the other, for only essential defini- ing, and half of hunting was hunting animals,
tions can have real essences for their objects. half of this was hunting water animals — of this
Accidental definitions do more than state
little again, the under half was fishing, half of fishing
the meanings of words, or express what Locke was striking; a part of striking was fishing with
calls the "nominal essences" of things. He a barb, and one half of this again, being the
doubts that the definition of anything except a kind which strikes with a hook and draws the
mathematical object can ever grasp the real es- fish from below upwards, is the art which we
sence of a thing. For him all definitions are have been seeking, and which from the nature
nominal, which is equivalent to saying that we of the operation is denoted angling or drawing
never define by means of the true genus and up . . . And now, following this pattern," he
differentia, but always by accidental and exter- continues, "let us endeavor to find out what a
nal signs, or by stating the component parts of Sophist is."
plains, "or any other species of natural sub- discarded while the other is subject to further
stance, as supposed constituted by a precise and subdivision. Aristotle's criticism of this pro-
real essence which nature regularly imparts to cedure turns partly on the fact that the divi-
every individual of that kind, whereby it is sion is always dichotomous, or into two sub-
made to be of that species, we cannot be certain classes, and partly on the fact that the terms
of the truth of any affirmation or negation which Plato uses in a succession of subdivisions
made of it. For man or gold, taken in this sense, do not seem to have any systematic relation to
and used for species of things constituted by one another. If the class of animals, for exam-
real essences, different from the complex idea ple, is divided into those with and those with-
Chapti,r 15: DEFINITION 293
out feet, it makes a difTcrence, according to vary from man to man and from hour to hour."
Aristotle, what terms are then used to differ- In a footnote James adds: "A substance like
entiate footed animals into their proper sub- oil has as many different essences as it has uses
classes. to different individuals." The classification ol
"It is necessary," he insists, "that the divi- natural as well as artificial objects should there-
sion be by the differentia of the differentia\ e.g.y fore proceed according to the advice Mepiiis-
'endowed with feet' is a differentia of 'animal'; topheles gives to the student in Cjocthe's Faust.
again the differentia of 'animal endowed with "You will have more success," he sa\s, "if you
feet' must be of it qua endowed with feet. will learn to reduce all, and to classify each ac-
Therefore we must not say, if we are to speak cording to its use." But if this is so, then no one
rightly, that of that which is endowed with feet scheme of classification, more than any other,
one part has feathers and one is featherless (if represents the real structure or order of nature.
we do this we do it through incapacity); we Nature indifferently submits to any and all divi-
must divide it only into cloven-footed and not- sions which we wish to make among existing
cloven; for these are differentiae in the foot; things. Some classifications may be more sig-
cloven-footedness is form of footed ness. And
a nificant than others, but only by reference to
the process wants always to go on so till it our interests, not because they represent reality
reaches the species that contains no difference. more accurately or adequately. It does not mat-
And then there will be as many kinds of foot as ter, therefore, whether we define by genus and
there are differentiae, and the kinds of animals differentia, by other characteristics in combina-
endowed with feet will be equal in number to tion, or by reference to origins or functions.
the differentiae. If then this is so, clearly the Darwin's scheme of classification provides
last differentia will be the essence of the thing evidence relevant to this whole issue. As indi-
and its definition." cated in the chapters on x\nimal and Evolu-
As Aristotle quarrels with Plato's method of Tiox, Darwin thinks that his genealogical clas-
division, so William James takes issue with Aris- sification of plants and animals comes nearer to
totle's theory that a real essence is defined when the natural system of living organisms than the
the right differentia is properly chosen within a classifications proposed by his predecessors.
certain genus of things. He tends to follow "The Natural System," he writes, "is a genea-
Locke's notion that definitions indicate no logical arrangement, with the acquired grades
more than the nominal essences of things, but of difference, marked by the terms, varieties,
he gives this theory a special twist by adding species, genera, families, etc.; and we have to
the notion that all our definitions merely group discover the lines of descent by the most per-
things according to the interest or purpose, manent characters whatever they may be and
whether theoretical or practical, which moti- of however slight vital importance." Hence-
vates our classification of them. This has come forth, following his method, "systematists will
to be known as the pragmatic theory of have only to decide whether any form be
. . .
tific or dialectical efforts to clarify discourse, to most dramatic exemplification in the dialogues
achieve precision of thought, to focus issues and of Plato. Socrates usually leads the conversation
to resolve them. in quest of them; though it is only in certain
Men have no other way of coming to terms dialogues, such as the Sophist and the States-
with one another than by defining the words w^;2, that the making of definitions is practiced
they use to express their concepts or meanings, in detail. Two other books in this set are largely
They make terms out of words by endowing concerned with ways of reaching and defending
words with exactness or precision of meaning, definitions —
Aristotle's Topics (which should be
Definition does this and makes possible the considered together with the opening chapters
meeting of minds either in agreement or in dis- of his Parts of Animals) and Bacon's Novum
pute. Definition also makes it possible for any Organum.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. The theory of definition 295
la. The object of definition: definitions as arbitrary and nominal or real and con-
cerned with essence
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Homilr: Iliad, hk ii [265-28^] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d ot page 12.
Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 James Psychology, 1 16a-119b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
prmted in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand sideof the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 Plato: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
Author's Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as part, bk, ch,
sect) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d.
Bible References: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g.. Old Testa-
—
ment: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) // Esdras, y:^6.
Symbols: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
(1. The theory of definition, la. The object of lb. The purpose of defiaition: the clarification
definition: definitions as arbitrary and nam' of ideas
inal or real and concerned with essence.) 7 Plato: Phaedrus, 120a-b / Me?2o, 174a-179b /
CH I [1025^28-1026-^6] 547d-548a; bk vii, Euthyphro, 193c / Seventh Letter, 809c-810b
CH I [io28''3i-37] 550d; ch 4-6 552b-555a; 8 Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, bk ii, ch 14
CH 10-17 558a-566a,c; bk viii, ch 2-3 566d- [98*1-2] 133c-d / Topics,' BK i, ch 18 [io8«
568d; CH 6 569d-570d; bk x, ch i [1052^1- 17-37] 152b-d; bk vi, ch i [139^*1 1-15]
15] 578d-579a; bk xi, ch 5 590a-d; bk 192b-c; ch 4 [141*26-32] 194c; bk viii, ch 3
XIII, ch 4 [1078^18-32] 610b-c / Soul, BK I, [158^31-159*2] 214d-215c / Metaphysics, bk
ch I 631a-632d; bk hi, ch 6 [430^26-31] IV, ch 4 525a-528b; bk xi, ch 5 590a-d / Soul,
663b-c BK I, CH I [402^15-403*2] 631d-632a
9 Aristotle: Parts of Animals, bk i, ch i 9 Aristotle: Parts of Animals, bk ii, ch 2
[641^*14-31] 163d-164a; ch 2-4 165d-168c [648^1-5] 172d / R/tetoric, bk ii, ch 23 [1398*
19 Aquinas: Su?nma Theologica, part i, q i, a 15-27] 646c
7, REP I 7a-c; Q 2, A I, REP 2 lOd-lld; a 2, 12 Aurelius: Meditations, bk hi, sect ii 262a-b
REP 2 lld-12c; Q 3, A 3, ANS 16a-d; a 5, ans 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 85,
17c-18b; Q 17, A 3 102d-103c; q 29, a i, A 3, REP 3 455b-457a
REP 1,3-4 162a-163b; a 2, rep 3 163b-164b; 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part i, 56b; 58d-59a;
Q 44, A I, REP I 238b-239a; a 3, rep 3 240b- PART IV, 269b-c
241a; q 58, a 5 303c-304c; q 75, a 4, ans 28 Galileo: Two New Sciences, first day,
381b-382a; q 85, a 6 458d-459c; Q 116, a i, 142d-143a
contrary 592d-593d 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 60b-c;
20 Aquinas Stimma Theologica, part ii-ii, q 4,
: 61b-c / Novum Organum, bk i, aph 59
a I, ANS 402a-403d; part hi, q 2, a 2, ans 112b-c
711d-712d; q 60, a 4, rep i 849c-850b 31 Descartes: Rules, xii, 23c-24a; xiii, 26b-c
23 HoBBES Let'iathan, part i, 55b-c; 56b; 59c-d;
: 33 Pascal: Geometrical Demonstration, 430b-
PART IV, 270a-c 434b passim
25 Montaigne: Essays, 518d-519a 34 Newton: Principles, definitions, schol, 8b
28 Galileo: Ttvo New Sciences, first day, 142d- 35 Locke: Human Understaiiding, bk hi, ch iv,
143a sect 6-14 260d-263a
30 Bacon: Novum Organum, bk ii, aph 4 137d- 35 Hume: Human Understanding, sect viii,
138b Div 62 478b-c; div 74 484a-c
31 Descartes: Rules, xiii, 26b-c / Objections 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 113b-c / Practical Reason,
and postulate iv 131a-b
Replies, 293c-294b
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part i, prop 8, schol 2 44 Boswell: /oAwi^ow, 377d
356d-357d; part ii, prop 40, schol i 387b- 45 Lavoisier: Elements of Chemistry, pref, 4a-
388a; part hi, prop 4 398d 5c; PART I, lOa-b; 21a-22c
33 Pascal: Vacuum, 372b-373b; 376b-377a / 45 Faraday: Researches in Electricity, 361a-b
Geometrical Demonstration, 430b-431b 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, intro, par 2
35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk ii, ch 9b-10a
XXXI, sect 6-13 240d-243b; ch xxxii, 49 Darwin: Origin of Species, 207d-208a
sect 18 246c-247a; sect 24 247c-d; bk hi, 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, epilogue ii, 694b-d
CH HI, sect 11-20 257a-260a esp sect 18-20 53 James: Psychology, 314a-b; 669a-671a; 871a-b
259b-260a; ch v, sect 14 267b-c; ch vi
268b-283a; ch x, sect 17-21 295d-297b; ch ic. The limits of definition: the definable and
XI, SECT 15-24 303b-305d; bk iv, ch iv,
the indefinable
sect 11-17 326b-328d passim; ch vi, sect 7 Plato: Republic, bk vi, 384a-388a / Theaete-
4-16 331d-336d passim; ch xii, sect 9 360d- tus, 544c-547c / Seventh Letter, 809c-810b
361b 8 Aristotle: Metaphysics, bk i, ch 9 [992^
35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, intro, sect 24-993*1] 511a-b; bk ii, ch 2 [994^16-27]
18 410a-c 513a-b; bk v, ch 3 [1014^3-13] 534d; bk vii,
42 Kant: Pure Reaso?i, 179d-182b; 215d-216c / CH 4-5 552b-554a; ch io-ii 558a-561a; ch
Science of Right, 404d; 423d-424b 13 [1039*15-23] 563a; ch 15 563c-564c; bk
45 Lavoisier: Elements of Chemistry, part i, VIII, CH 3 [1043^23-33] 568b; bk x, ch 8-9
lOa-b 585b-586c
46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, intro, 176c; 17 Plotinus: Fifth Ennead, tr v, ch 6 231b-d
184d-185a 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q i, a
49 Darwin: Origin of Species, 27b-29a esp 29a 7, REP I 7a-c; q 2, a I, rep 2 lOd-lld; a 2,
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, epilogue ii, REP 2 11d-12c; q 3, A 3, ANS 16a-d; a 5, ans
694b-d 17c-18b; Q 29, A I, REP I 162a-163b; a 2,
53 James: Psychology, 106a; 185a-b; 668a-671a; REP 3 163b-164b; q 44, a 3, rep 3 240b-
882b-883a 241a; q 85, a i, rep 2 451c-453c
b
Id. The unity of a definition in relation to the 2a. The use of division or dichotomy in defi-
unity of the thing defined nition
7 Plato: Laches, 32a-33a / Cratylus 85a-114a,c 7 Plato: Phaedrus, 134a-c / Sophist, 552b-561d;
esp 85a-89a, 104b-114a,c / Meno, 174a-179b 577c-579d / Statesman 580a-608d / Philebus,
/ Theaetetus, 514b-515d / Sophist, 559a-c 610d-613a
8 Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, bk ii, ch 6 8 Aristotle: Prior Analytics, bk i, ch 31
[92^28-33] 126b; CH 10 [93^28-94^7] 128b-c; 64b-65a / Posterior Analytics, bk ii, ch 5 125b-
ch 13 [97^6-25] 133a- b / Topics, bk vi, ch d; CH 13 [96^^25-97^6] 132a-133a / Topics, bk
4 [141^26-^2] 194c-d; CH 5 [142^30-143^12] VI, CH 6 [143^11-144*4] 197b-c / Metaphysics,
196b-c; CH 13-14 204c-206d; bk vii, ch 3 BK VII, CH 12 [1037^28-1038*35] 561c-562a
[i53'*6-22]208a-b; [154^3-11] 209b / Physics, 9 Aristotle: Parts of Animals, bk i, ch 2-4
bk I, CH 3
[186^14-30] 261c-d / Metaphysics, 165d-168c
BK I, [986^8-987^1] 504c-505a; bk v, ch
CH 5 17 Plotinus: First Ennead, tr hi, ch 4 lla-c /
6 [1016^33-^11] 536d-537a; bk vii, ch 4-6 Sixth Ennead, tr hi, ch 8-10 285a-286d; ch
552b-555a; ch 10-17 558a-566a,c; bk viii, 16-18 289c-291d
CH 2-3 566d-568d; ch 6 569d-570d; bk x, 18 Augustine: Christian Doctrine, bk ii, ch 35
ch I[1052^28-37] 578d / Soul, bk ii, ch 3 653b-c
[414^20-415^14] 644d-645b
30 Bacon: Novum Organum, bk ii, aph 35 162a- 2h. Definition by genus and differentia: proper-
ties
164a
35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk ii, ch 7 Plato: Theaetetus, 548c-549d
sect 4 201c-d; ch xxiii, sect 1-2
xxii, 8 Aristotle: ch 3 [1^16-24] 5d;
Categories,
204a-c; bk hi, ch v, sect 4 264b; ch vi, CH 5 ch 13 [14^32-15*8]
[2*11-3^24] 6a-8a;
sect 21 273c-d; sect 28-30 276a-277b 20c-d / Prior Analytics, bk i, ch 27 [43*25-44]
35 Berkeley: Hitman Knowledge, sect i 413a-b 60c-d / Posterior Analytics, bk i, ch 22 113b-
53 James: Psychology, 503a-b 115b; bk ii, ch 13-14 131b-134a / Topics, bk
I, ch 4-9 144b-147b; ch 18 [108*38-^9] 152d;
Xe. The truth and falsity of definitions [108^19-32] 153a,c; bk iv-vii 168b,d-211a,c
7 Plato: Cra/>'/«^85a-114a,c esp 85a-89a, 104b- / Physics, bk i, ch 3 [186^14-34] 261c-262a /
114a,c / Seventh Letter, 809c-810b Metaphysics, bk hi, ch i [995^27-31] 514b;
8 Aristotle: Topics, bk vi-vii 192a-211a,c ch 3 517a-518a; bk v, ch 3 [1014^3-13] 534d;
passim, esp bk vi, ch 4-14 194c- 206d / Meta- ch 25 [1023^22-25] 545c; ch 28 [1024*37-^9]
physics, BK V, ch 29 [1024^27-38] 546d-547a; 546b-c; bk vii, ch 4 [1030*7-14] 552d; ch
BK VI, ch 4 [1027^17-28] 550a,c; bk ix, ch 12-14 561b-563c; bk viii, ch 3 [1043^24-1044*
10 [1051^18-33] 577d-578a / Soul, bk hi, ch 14] 568b-d; ch 6 569d-570d; bk x, ch 8-9
6 [430^26-30] 663b-c 585b-586c; bk xi, ch i [1059^21-1060*1]
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 2, a 587d-588a / Soul, bk i, ch i [402^15-403*2]
I, rep 2 lOd-lld; q 17, a 3 102d-103c; q 58, 631d-632a
A 5 303c-304c; q 85, a 6 458d-459c 9 Aristotle: History of Animals, bk i, ch i
initions 1 191a-b esp 1,3 191a; definitions ii 35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk ii, ch
229a; definitions hi 264b; bk xi, defini- xxiii, SECT 3-10 204c-206d; sect 14-18 208b-
tions 301a-302b esp 14 301b, 18,21 302a 209a; sect 37 213d-214b; bk iii, ch ix, sect
11 Archimedes: Sphere and Cylinder, bk i, def- 15-17 288d-290a; ch xi, sect 10 302b; sect
initions 404a / Conoids and Spheroids, 452a- 19-25 304b-306c
454a passim; definitions 455a-b / Spirals, 35 Hume: Human Understanding, sect ii, div
definttions 490a / Equilibrium of Planes, bk 17, 457b,d [fn i]; sect vii, div 48-49 470d-
II, 511a / Sand'Recl^oner, 524a-b / Quadrature 471d; SECT VIII, div 74 484a-c
ofthe Parabola, def 534b- 535a 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 15c-16c; 215d-216d;
11 Apollonius: Conies, bk i, first defini- 243c-244c / Practical Reason, 293c-294b / In-
tions 604a-b esp i 604a; second definitions tro. Metaphysic of Morals, 388a-c /Judgement,
626a 603b-d
11 NicoMACHUs: Arithmetic, bk i, 814b-c 43 Federalist: number 37, 119b-120b
16 Kepler: Epitome, bk v, 986b-1004a passim 45 Lavoisier: Elements of Chemistry, part i, 10a-
17 Plotinus: Sixth Ennead, tr hi, ch i, 281a-b b; 21a-22c; 25c-29d
6c Chapter 15: DEFINITION 301
45 Fourhr: Theory of 11 ejt. 184a-187b lllb; Q 90 205a-208b; part ii-ii, q 4, a i
45 Farap.w: Researches in Electricity, 361a-d 402a 403d
46 Hec.il: Philosophy of Rights imro, par 2 23 I Iobbes: leviathan, pari i, 57d-58a
9b 10a 35 LocKi;: Human Understanding, i;k in, en xi,
51 Toi.srov: War and Peace, ki'iloc;lk ii. 690b; sect 17 303d-304a; bk iv, cii m, sect 20,
694b-d 319b
53 James: Psxchologw 3b-4a: 869a-871a csp 870a- 35 Hume: f It/man Understanding, sect vii, div
871a 48-49 470d-471d
54 Freuo: \arcissisni, 400d-401a / Instincts, 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Imws, bk ii, 4a
412a-413b 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 330a-d
42 Kant: Pund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 271a-
6c. The role of definitions in practical or moral c; 280d-281a / Practical Reason, 297a 314d;
philosophy and the social sciences 330d-331a / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 386b-
7 Plato: Phaedrus, 120a-c / Seventh iMter, d; 390b.d-391a / Science of Right, 398c-399c
809c-810b 43 I'ederalist: number 37, 119b 120b; number
9 Arisiotle: Ethics, bk i, ch i-bk ii, ch 6 39 125a-128b passim, esp 125b-c; number 42,
339a-352d passim; bk x, ch i-8 426a-434a / 137a-b
Politics, BK I, CH 1-2 445a-446d; bk hi, ch 43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 469a -b
1-6 471b,d-476c; en 9 [i28o''25-i28i^2] 477d- 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, tniro, par 2 9b-
478c 10a / Philosophy of History, iniro, 158a-162a
12 Aurelius: Meditations, bk hi, sect ii 262a-b 50 Marx: Capital, 6c-lld passim; 178d-179c
18 Augustine: City of God, bk xix, ch 21-24 passim; 265a-266a; 267c-d
524b-528c esp ch 21 524b-525a, ch 24 528b-c 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk ix, 365a-b;
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 49 epilogue ii, 683d-684a; 690b
la-6a; q 55, a 4 28c-29d; q 71, a 6 110b- 53 James: Psychology, 887a-888a
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: The linguistic aspects of definition and the general theory of the meaning of words, see
Language la; Sign and Symbol 4a.
The logical aspects of definition, see Idea 4a.
Other discussions of the object of definition and the problem of essences or universals, see
Being 8c; Nature 4a; Universal and Particular 2a-2C.
The notions of genus and differentia, species and property, see Being 8d; Idea 4b(3);
Nature ia(i); Relation 5a(4); Universal and Particular 5b.
Other considerations of indefinable terms, see Infinity 2c; Principle 2a(3); and for the
indefinability of individuals, see Universal and Particular 4e.
The use of definitions as principles in reasoning or proof, and for the problem of demonstrat-
ing definitions, see Principle 2a(2); Reasoning 5b(2).
The discussion of matters related to the truth or falsitv of definitions, .<;ee Idea 6f; Trlith
3b(0-
The role of definitions in dialectic and science, and in the various sciences, see Dialectic
2a(2), 2b(i); Mathematics 3a; Matter 4b; Metaphysics 2b; Philosophy 3b-3c;
Physics 2a; Science 4a.
302 THE GREAT IDEAS
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great BooJ^s of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
tory), BK VII, ch 3
.
Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, ch
Sextus Empiricus. Outlines of Pyrrhonism, bk 13, 16-17
II Whitehead. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of
loHN OF Saint Thomas. Cursus Philosophicus Tho- Natural Knowledge, ch 8-13
misticus, Ars Logica, part ii, qq 6-12 .The Concept of Nature, ch 4
Arnauld. Logic or the Art of Thinl^ng, part i, W\ E. Johnson. Logic, part i, ch 7-8
CH 12-14; PART IV, CH 4-5 Ogden and Richards. The Meaning of Meaning
Leibnitz. Netu Essays Concerning Human Under- Dubislav. Die Definition
standing, BK III, CH 3 Maritain. The Degrees of Knowledge, ch 3
T. Reid. Essays on the Intellectual Potvers of Carnap. The Logical Syntax of Language, part i,
Man, I sect 8; PART II, SECT 22; PART III, SECT 29
].Mill. Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Dewey. Logic, the Theory of Inquiry, ch 13-14,
Mind, CH 8 16-18, 20.
W. Hamilton. Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic, Dewey and Bentley. Knowing and the Known^
VOL II (24) CH 7
—
INTRODUCTION
OF all the traditional names for forms of
as recently as the i8th century, some of the favours the many instead of the few." Close to
American constitutionalists prefer a republican our own day. Mill likewise holds that democ-
form of government to democracy; and at other racy is "the government of the whole people by
times, both ancient and modern, oligarchy or the whole people" in which "the majority . . .
vergent views. Plato, for example, in the States- government; for Montesquieu and Locke, be-
man, claims that democracy has "a twofold tween government by law and despotism; for
meaning" according as it involves "ruling with Rousseau and Kant, between a republic and a
law or without law." Finding it "in every re- monarchy.
spect weak and unable to do either any great The authors of The Federalist definitely
good or any great evil," he concludes that it is show their preference for "popular govern-
"the worst of all lawful governments, and the ment" as opposed to monarchy, aristocracy, or
best of all lawless ones." The rule of the many is oligarchy. They usually refer to it as a "repub-
good or evil. But in the
least efficient for either lic," by which they mean "a government which
Republic^ he places democracy at only one re- derives all its powers directly or indirectly from
move from tyranny. On the ground that "the the great body of the people, and is administered
excessive increase of anything often causes a re- by persons holding their offices during pleasure,
action in the opposite direction," tyranny is for a limited period, or during good behavior."
Chapter 16: DEMOCRACY 305
Alexander Hamilton and others involved in the stitutional discriminations based on wealth, race,
American constitutional debates, as for example or previous condition of servitude.
James Wilson, occasionally call this system a With Mill, all means every human person
"representative democracy," but in The Federal' without regard to the accidents of birth or for-
ist a republic is sharply differentiated from a tune. "There ought to be no pariahs m a full-
democracy. The "great points of difference," grown and civilized nation," he writes, "no per-
however, turn out to be only "the delegation sons disqualified, except through their own de-
of the government (in a republic) to a small fault." Under the latter condition, he would
number of citizens elected by the rest," and the withhold the franchise from infants, idiots, or
"greater number of citizens, and greater sphere criminals (including the criminally indigent),
of country" to which a republic may extend. but with these exceptions he would make suf-
The difference, as already noted, is best ex- frage universal. He sums up his argument by
pressed in the words "representative" and "di- claiming that "it is a personal injustice to with-
rect" democracy. hold from any one, unless for the prevention of
In Mill's Representative Government we find greater evils, the ordinary privilege of having
democracy identified with the ideal state. "The his voice reckoned in the disposal of affairs in
ideally bestform of government," he writes, "is which he has the same interest as other people,"
that in which the sovereignty, or supreme con- and whoever "has no vote, and no prospect of
trolling power in the last resort, is vested in the obtaining it, will either be a permanent malcon-
entire aggregate of the community, every citi- tent, or will feel as one whom the general affairs
zen not only having a voice in the exercise of of society do not concern." But it should be
that ultimate sovereignty, but being, at least oc- added that for Mill the franchise is not merely a
on to take an actual part in the
casionally, called privilege or even a right; "it is," he says,
government, by the personal discharge of some "strictly a matter of duty." How the voter uses
public function, local or general." Though Mill the ballot "has no more to do with his personal
recognizes the infirmities of democracy and wishes than the verdict of a juryman. ... He is
though he readily concedes that it may not be bound to give it according to his best and most
the best government for all peoples under all conscientious opinion of the public good. Who-
circumstances, his argument for its superiority ever has any other idea of it is unfit to have the
to all other forms of government remains sub- suffrage."
stantially unqualified. The notion of universal suffrage raises at once
the question of the economic conditions pre-
In Mill's construction of the democratic ideal democra-
requisite to the perfection of political
as providing liberty and equality for all, the es- cy. Can men freedom of
exercise the political
sential distinctionfrom previous conceptions lies citizenship without freedom from economic de-
in the meaning of the word all. The republicans pendence on the will of other men ? It was com-
of the 1 8th century, in their doctrines of popu- monly thought by i8th century republicans
lar sovereignty and natural rights, understood that they could not. "A power over a man's sub-
citizenship in terms of equality of status and sistence," Hamilton declares, "amounts to a
conceived liberty in terms of a man's having a power over his will." On that basis it was urged
voice in his own government. The ancients, see- by many during the Philadelphia convention
ing that men could be free and equal members that a property qualification was necessary for
of a political community only when they lived suffrage.
as citizensunder the rule of law, recognized that Kant also argues that suffrage "presupposes
the democratic constitution alone bestowed the independence or self-sufficiency of the in-
such equality upon all men not born slaves. dividual citizen." Because apprentices, servants,
But generally neither the ancients nor the i8th minors, women, and the like do not maintain
century repubUcans understood liberty and themselves, each "according to his own industry,
equality yor all men to require the abolition of but as it is arranged by others," he claims that
slavery, the emancipation of women from polit- they are "mere subsidiaries of the Common-
ical subjection, or the eradication of all con- wealth and not active independent members of
306 THE GREAT IDEAS
it," commanded and pro-
being "of necessity and of the country," and this, according to
tected by others."For this reason, he concludes, Montesquieu, is generally "conducive to purity
they are "passive," not "active," citizens and of morals."
can be rightfully deprived of the franchise. Universal schooling by itself is not sufficient
For political democracy to be realized in prac- for this purpose. Democracy also needs what
tice, more may be required than the abolition Mill calls the "school of public spirit." It is only
of poll taxes and other discriminations based on by participating in the functions of govern-
wealth. In the opinion of Karl Marx, the "bat- ment that men can become competent as citi-
tle for democracy" will not be won, nor even zens. By engaging in civic activities, a man "is
the "first step" taken towards it, until "the made to feel himself one of the public, and
working class raises the proletariat to the posi- whatever is for their benefit to be for his bene-
tion of ruling class." Quite apart from the mer- fit." The "moral part of the instruction afforded
its of the revolutionary political philosophy by the participation of the private citizen, if
which Marx and those of other
erects, his views, even rarely, in pubfic functions," results, ac-
social reformers of the 19th century, have made cording to Mill, in a man's being able "to
it a central issue that democracy be conceived in weigh interests not his own; to be guided, in
social and economic terms as well as political. case of conflicting claims, by another rule than
Otherwise, they insist, what is called "democ- his private partialities; to apply, at every turn,
racy" will permit, and may even try to con- principles and maxims which have for their
done, social inequalities and economic injustices reason of existence the common good." If
which vitiate political liberty. national affairs cannot afford an opportunity
for every citizen to take an active part in govern-
There is one other condition of equahty which ment, then that must be achieved through local
the status of citizenship demands. This is equal- government, and it is for this reason that Mill
ity of educational opportunity. According to advocates the revitalization of the latter.
become citizens deserve the sort of education ist, becomes almost indispensable when the
which fits them for the life of political freedom. people is too large and too dispersed for assem-
Quantitatively, this means a system of educa- bly or for continuous, as well as direct, partici-
tion as universal as the franchise; and as much pation in nationalaffairs. The pure democracy
for every individual as he can take, both in which the Federalists attribute to the Greek
youth and adult life. Qualitatively, this means city-states may still be appropriate for local
liberal education rather than vocational train- government of the town-meeting variety, but
ing, though in contemporary controversy this for the operations of federal or national govern-
point is still disputed. ment, the Federalists think the republican in-
The way in which it recognizes and discharges stitutions of Rome a better model to follow.
its educational responsibility tests the sincerity The Federalists have another reason for es-
ofmodern democracy. No other form of govern- pousing representative government. The "mor-
ment has a comparable burden, for no other tal disease" of popular government, in their
calls all men to citizenship. In such a govern- view, is the "violence of faction" which decides
ment, Montesquieu declares, "the whole power measures "not according to the rules of justice
of education is required." Whereas despotism and the rights of the minor party, but by the
may be preserved by fear and a monarchy by a superior force of an interested and overbearing
system of honor, a democracy depends on civic majority." Believing the spirit of faction to be
virtue. For where "government is intrusted to rooted in the nature of man in society, the
private citizens," it requires "love of the laws American statesmen seek to cure its evil not by
—
pose, the best men are also likely to be men of "two great requisites of government: responsi-
breeding and property, representative govern- bility to those for whose benefit political power
ment would safeguard the interests of the gen- ought to be, and always professes to be, em-
try, as well as the safety of the republic, against ployed; and jointly therewith to obtain, in the
the demos — in Hamilton's words, "that great greatest measure possible, for the function of
beast." Their concern with the evil of factions government the benefits of superior intellect,
seems to be colored by the fear of the dominant trained by long meditation and practical disci-
faction in any democracy —
the always more pline to that special task." Accordingly, Mill
numerous poor. would preserve some measure of independent
judgment for the representative and make him
The leavening of popular government by both responsive and responsible to his constit-
representative institutions in the formation of uents, yet without directing or restraining him
modern democracies raises the whole problem of by the checks of initiative, referendum, and
the nature and function of representatives. To recall.
what extent does representation merely pro- Mill's discussion of representation leaves few
vide an instrument which the people employs to crucial questions unasked, though it may not
express its will in the process of self-govern- provide clearly satisfactory answers to all of
ment? To what extent is it a device whereby them. It goes beyond the nature and function
the great mass of the people select their betters of the representative to the problem of securing
to decide for them what is beyond their com- representation for minorities by the now famil-
petence to decide for themselves ? iar method of proportional voting. It is con-
According to the way these questions are cerned with the details of electoral procedure
answered, the conception of the representative's the nomination of candidates, public and secret
function — especially in legislative matters — will balloting, plural voting— as well as the more
vary from that of serving as the mere messenger general question of the differences among the
of his constituents to that of acting indepen- executive, judicial, and legislative departments
dently, exercising his own judgment, and rep- of government with respect to representation,
resenting his constituents not in the sense of do- especially the difference of representatives in
ing their bidding, but only in the sense that he the upper and lower houses of a bicameral
has been chosen by them to decide what is to legislature. Like the writers of The Federalist,
be done for the common good. Mill seeks a leaven for the democratic mass in
At one extreme, the representative seems to the leadership of men of talent or training. He
be reduced to the ignominious role of a mouth- would qualify the common sense of the many
piece, a convenience required by the exigencies by the expertness or wisdom of the few.
308 THE GREAT IDEAS 1
The ancient issue between the democratic equals. "Tried by an absolute standard," Aris-
and the ohgarchical constitution turns primari- totle goes on to say, "they are faulty, and,
ly on a question of justice, not on the relative therefore, both parties, whenever their share
competence of the many and the few to rule. in the government does not accord with their
Either form of government may take on a preconceived ideas, stir up a revolution."
more or less aristocratic cast according as men Plato, Thucydides, and Plutarch, as well as
of eminent virtue or ability assume public Aristotle, observe that this unstable situation
office, but in neither case does the constitution permits demagogue or dynast to encourage
itself guarantee their choice, except possibly on lawless rule by the mob or by a coterie of the
the oligarchical assumption that the possession of rich. Either paves the way to tyranny.
wealth signifies superior intelligence and virtue. To and to remove injus-
stabilize the state
The justice peculiar to the democratic con- tice, Aristotle proposes a mixed constitution
stitution, Aristotle thinks, ''arises out of the which, by a number of different methods, "at-
notion that those who are equal in any respect tempts to unite the freedom of the poor and
are equal in all respects; because men are equally the wealth of the rich." In this way he hopes to
free, they claim to be absolutely equal." It does satisfy the two requirements of good govern-
not seem to him inconsistent with democratic ment. "One is the actual obedience of citizens
justice that slaves, women, and resident aliens to the laws, the other is the goodness of the
should be excluded from citizenship and public laws which they obey." By participating in the
office. making of laws, all free men, the poor included,
In the extreme form of Greek democracy, the would be more inclined to obey them. But
qualifications for public office are no different since the rich are also given a special function,
from the qualifications for citizenship. Since there is, according to Aristotle, the possibility
they are equally eligible for almost every gov- of also getting good laws passed, ^ince "birth
ernmental post, the citizens can be chosen by and education are commonly the accompani-
lot rather than elected by vote. Rousseau agrees ments of wealth."
with Montesquieu's opinion of the Greek prac- To Aristotle the mixed constitution is per-
tice, that "election by lot is democratic in na- fectly just, and with an aristocratic aspect added
ture." He thinks it"would have few disad- to the blend, it approaches the ideal polity.
vantages in a real democracy, but," he adds, Relative to certain circumstances it has "a
"I have already said that a real democracy is greater right than any other form of govern-
only an ideal." ment, except the true and ideal, to the name of
The justice peculiar to the oligarchical con- the government of the best."
stitution is, according to Aristotle, "based on Yet the true and the ideal, or what he some-
the notion that those who are unequal in one times calls the "divine form of government,"
respect are in all respects unequal; being un- seems to be monarchy for Aristotle, or rule by
equal, that is, in property, they suppose them- the one superior man; and in his own sketch of
selves to be unequal absolutely." The oligarchi- the best constitution at the end of the Politics —
cal constitution consequently does not grant the best practicable, if not the ideal — Aristotle
citizenship or open public office to all the free- clearly opposes admitting all the laboring classes
born, but in varying degrees sets a substantial to citizenship.
property qualification for both.
Though he admits that the opposite claims As INDICATED IN thc chapter on Constitu-
of the oligarch and the democrat "have a kind tion, Aristotle's mixed constitution should be
of justice," Aristotle also points out the in- distinguished from the mediaeval mixed re-
justice of each. The democratic constitution, gime, which was a combination of constitu-
he thinks, does injustice to the rich by treating tional with non-constitutional or absolute gov-
them as equal with the poor simply because ernment, rather than a mixture of different con-
both are freeborn, while the oligarchical con- stitutional principles. The mixed regime or —
stitution does injustice to the poor by failing "royal and political government" seems to —
to treat all free men, regardless of wealth, as have come into being not as an attempt to
CuAPTHR 16: DEMOCRACY 309
reconcile conflicting principles of justice, but to the nature of man. Peoples whose accidental
as the inevitable product of a decaying fcutlal- circumstances temporarily justify less just or
ism and a risingYet Acjuinas
nationalism. even unjust forms of government, such as oli-
claims that a mixed regime was established by garchy or despotism, must not be forever con-
divine law for the people of Israel; for it was demned to subjection or disfranchisement, but
"partly kingdom, since there is one at the head should rather be raised by education, experi-
of all; partly aristocracy, in so far as a number ence, and economic reforms to a condition in
of persons are set in authority; partly democra- which the ideal polity becomes appropriate for
cy, government by the people, in so far as
i.e.y them.
the rulers can be chosen from the people, and
the people have the right to choose their rul- Thi: basic problems of democratic govern-
ers." In such a system, the monarchical princi- ment—seen from the point of view of those who
ple is blended with aristocratic and democratic either attack or defend it — remain constant
elements to whatever extent the nobles and the despite the altered conception of democracy in
commons play a part in the government. But various epochs.
neither group functions politically as citizens At all times, there is the question of leader-
do under purely constitutional government. ship and the need for obtaining the political
The question of constitutional justice can, services of the best men without infringing on
however, be carried over from ancient to the political prerogatives of all men. The differ-
modern times. Modern democracy answers it ence between the many and the few, between
differently, granting equality to all men on the the equality of men as free or human and their
basis of their being born human. It recognizes individual inequality in virtue or talent, must
in wealth or breeding no basis for special politi- always be given political recognition, if not by
cal preferment or privilege. By these standards, superiority in status, then by allocation of the
the mixed constitution and even the most ex- technically difficult problems of statecraft to
treme form of Greek democracy must be re- the expert or specially competent, with only
garded as oligarchical in character by a writer certain broad general policies left to the deter-
like Mill. mination of a majority vote. Jefferson and Mill
Yet Mill, no less than Aristotle, would agree alike hope that popular government may abol-
with Montesquieu's theory that the rightness ish privileged classes without losing the bene-
of any form of government must be considered fits of leadership by peculiarly gifted individ-
with reference to the "humor and disposition of uals. The realization of that hope, Jefferson
the people inwhose favor it is established." The writes Adams, depends on leaving "to the citi-
constitution and laws, Montesquieu writes, zens the free election and separation of the
"should be adapted in such a manner to the aristoi from the pseudo-aristoi, of the wheat
people for whom they are framed that it would from the chaff."
be a great chance if those of one nation suit At all times there is the danger of tyranny
another." by the majority and, under the threat of rev-
Mill makes the same point somewhat differ- olution, the rise of a demagogue who uses mob
ently when he says, "the ideally best form of rule to establish a dictatorship. Hobbes phrases
government . . . does not mean one which is this peculiar susceptibility of democracy to the
practicable or eligible in all states of civiliza- mischief of demagogues by saying of popular
tion." But although he is willing to consider assemblies that they "are as subject to evil
the forms of government in relation to the his- counsel, and to be seduced by orators, as a
toric conditions of a people, not simply by ab- monarch by flatterers," with the result that
solute standards, Mill differs sharply from democracy tends to degenerate into govern-
Montesquieu and Aristotle in one very impor- ment by the most powerful orator.
tant respect. For him, as we have seen, repre- The democratic state has seldom been tempt-
sentative democracy founded on universal suf- ed to undertake the burdens of empire without
frage is, absolutely speaking, the only truly suffering from a discordance between its domes-
j
ust government— the only one perfectly suited tic and itsforeign policy. Again and again,
310 THE GREAT IDEAS
Thucydides describes the efforts of the Atheni- to extend it, for, if we cease to rule others, we
ans to reconcile their imperiahsm abroad with are in danger of being ruled ourselves." In the
democracy at home. diplomatic skirmishes which precede the in-
In his oration at the end of the first year of vasion of Sicily, Hermocrates of Syracuse tries
the Peloponnesian war, Pericles praises the to unite the Sicilian cities so that they may es-
democracy of Athens and at the same time cele- cape "disgraceful submission to an Athenian
brates the might of her empire. "It is only the master." The Athenian ambassador, Euphemus,
Athenians," he says, "who, fearless of conse- finds himself compelled to speak at first of
"our
quences, confer their benefits not from calcu- empire and of the good right we have to it";
lations of expediency, but in the confidence of but he soon finds himself frankly confessing
liberality." But four years later, after the re- that "for tyrants and imperial cities nothing is
of empire," but "never more so than by your Tacitus, commenting on the decay of republi-
present change of mind in the matter of Mity- can institutions with the extension of Rome's
lene." He urges them to return to their earlier conquests, underlines the same theme. It is still
decision to punish the Mitylenians, for, he says, the same theme when the problems of British
if they reverse that decision they will be "giv- imperialism appear in Mill's discussion of how a
ing way to the three failings most fatal to empire democracy should govern its colonies or de-
— pity, sentiment, and indulgence." pendencies.
Diodotus, who in this debate recommends a The incompatibility of empire with democ-
policy of leniency, does not do so in the "con- racy is one side of the picture of the democratic
fidence of liberality" which Pericles had said state in external affairs. The other side is the
was the attitude of a democratic state toward tension between democratic institutions and
its dependencies. "The question is not of jus- military po\\er or policy — in the form of stand-
tice," Diodotus declares, "but how to make ing armies and warlike maneuvers. The in-
how by moderate chastisements we may be en- mocracy weak or pusillanimous in the face of
far more useful for the preservation of our in the effect ofwar upon its institutions and on
empire," he concludes, "voluntarily to put up the morality of its people As Hamilton writes
with injustice, than to put to death, however in The Federalist: "The violent destruction of
justly, those whom it is our interest to keep life and property incident to war, the continual
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
I. Conceptions of democracy: the comparison of democracy with other forms of govern-
ment 312
2. The derogation of democracy: the anarchic tendency of freedom and equaHty 313
2a. Lawless mob-rule: the tyranny of the majority
2b. The incompetence of the people and the need for leadership: the superiority of
monarchy and aristocracy
3^. Comparison of the political wisdom of the many and the few: the mixed regime
as including both
3^. Comparison of democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy with respect to efficiency 315
(2) The problem of economic j ustice : the choice between capitalism and socialism 3 1
/\d. The suitability of democratic constitutions to all men under all circumstances:
conditions favorable to democracy; progress toward democracy 317
5c. The distribution of functions and powers: checks and balances in representative
democracy 319
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred For example, in 4 Homer: Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d, the
to.
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 James Psychology, 116a-119h, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 Plato: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
Author's Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as part, bk, ch,
sect) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d.
Bible References: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., Old Testa-
ment: Nehemiah, 7:45— (D) // Esdras, 7:46.
Symbols: The abbreviation '*esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
39, 125b; number 55, 174c-d ber 28, 97b-d; number 35, 113a-114b;
318 THE GREAT IDEAS 5^(1) to 5^(4)
43 Federalist: number 52, 165a-c; number 54
(5. Democracy and representative government. 170a-172b; number 57, 177a
5b. The theory of representation.)
43 Mill: Representative Government, 375a-b;
NUMBER 52-66 165a-203a passim, esp num- 380c-389b passim, esp 382c-383c; 394b-
ber NUMBER 63, 192b-194a;
57, 176d-178b, 396d
NUMBER 76, 227a; number 78, 231a-232c 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 311
43 Mill: Liberty, 268b-c / Representative Govern- 103d-104a
ment 327a'442d passim, esp 329d-330b,
338a-b, 350a, 355b-356b, 370a-372b, 389c- 5^(3) Methods of election and voting
392 b, 401a-406a 7 Plato: Laws, bk vi, 697a-705c; bk XII,
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 301- 786b-787b
303 100b-102a; par 308-311 102c-104a; addi- 9 Aristotle: Politics, bk iv, ch 9 [1294^6-13]
tions, 182 148c-d / Philosophy of History, 494c; CH
14 [1298^13-1299*1] 499a-c; ch 15
INTRO, 175b-c [1300*9-^4] 500d-501b
14 Plutarch: Lycurgus, 45d
5^(1) Majority rule and minority or propor- 15 Tacitus: Annals, bk i, 6a-b / Histories, bk
tional representation IV, 267d-268c
9 Aristotle: Politics, bk hi, ch 10 478d-479a; 35 Locke: Civil Government, ch xiii, sect 154-
CH 13 [1283^21-^34] 481b-d; ch 15 [1286^22- 158 60d-62b; ch xix, sect 216 74d
*'22]484c-485a; bk iv, ch 8 [1294*12-15] 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk ii, 5b-6a
493d-494a; bk v, ch
[1310*25-35] 512c;
9 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 324c-325b / Social
BK VI, CH 2 [1317^2-16] 520d; ch 3 [1318*19- Contract, bk iv, 426c-428a
^5] 521c-522a; ch 4 [1318^21-26] 522b 43 Constitution of the U.S.: article i,
33 Pascal: Pensees, 301-303 227b; 878 345a-b sect 2 [5-10] lib; sect 2 [i7]-sECT 3 [66]
35 Locke: Civil Government, ch viii, sect 95-99 llb-12a; sect 4 [96-102 SECT 5 [107-109]
,
46c-47c; ch x, sect 132 55a-b; ch xi, sect 12b; ARTICLE II, sect [321-374] 14b-d;
140 58a amendments, XII 18a-c; XVII 19b-c; XXIII
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk ii, 4b-6d 20d
38 Rousseau: Social Contract, bk i, 391b; bk 43 Federalist: number 52-61 165a-188d pas-
IV, 425d-427a esp 426d-427a sim; number 62, 189a-b; number 68 205b-
39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, bk iv, 269d-271d 207a
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 91b 43 Mill: Representative Government, 370a-406a;
43 Articles of Confederation: v [49-73] 412a-414d
5d-6a 44 B0SWEI.1.: Johnson, 176a-b; 251a
43 Constitution of the U.S.: amendments, 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par
XIV, sect 2 18d 309-311 103b-104a / Philosophy of History^
43 Federalist: number 10 49c-53a; number PART II, 277c-d
22, 82a-83a; number 35, 113a-114b; num-
ber 37, 120b-c; NUMBER 43, 141d-142d;
5b{4) The role of political parties: factions
number 51, 164a-165a passim; number 54 5 Aristophanes: Lysistrata [577-580] 590c
170a-172b; number 58, 181d-182a; number 6Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, bk hi,
62, 189b-d 434c-438b; bk iv, 458d-459c; 463a-465c; bk
43 Mill: Liberty, 268d-271c; 298b-302c; 307b- V, 502d-504a; bk viii 564a-593a,c esp 568d-
312a / Representative Government, 366a-380b; 569a, 575c-576c, 577b-d, 579c-583c, 584b-
386a-387d; 406d-407d; 410b-c 585a, 585d-586b, 587a-590c
44 BoswEL,!.: Joh?Json, 261c-d 7 Plato: Laws, bk v, 695a-c; bk ix, 744c-d
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk ix, ch 6 420c-421a /
3 1 1-3 13 103d-104b / Philosophy of History, Politics, BK V, CH 9 [1309*^14-1310*12] 511d-
INTRO, 172d-173a; part iv, 365a 512b / Athenian Constitution, ch 5 554d-555a;
CH 8, par 5 556c
5^(2) Ultimate limitations on the franchise 14 Plutarch: Solon, 68d; 75c-d / Pericles,
7 Plato: Laws, bk vi, 697d-700b; bk viii, 126c-d / Pompey, 521d
740d-741a 15 Tacitus: Annals, bk vi, 97b-c / Histories^
9 Aristotle: Politics, ch 6 492b-493a;
bk iv, BK II, 224d-225a
BK VI, CH 3 521c-522a; ch 4 [1319^2-32] 23 Machiavelli: Prince, ch ix, 14c-d
523a-b; bk vii, ch 9 533a-d / Athenian Con- 23 HoBBEs: Leviathan, part ii, 121c-d; 148d-
stitution, CH 4 554b-d; ch 42 572b-d 149b; 150b
14 Plutarch: Lycurgus-Numa, 62b-d 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk hi, 9d; bk
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk ii, 4a-5c XIX, 142b-143a
38 Rousseau: Social Contract, bk iv, 427c-432b 38 Rousseau: Social Contract, bk ii, 396b-d;
42 Kant: Science of Right, 436d-437c BK III, 424b
43 Constitution of the U.S.: article i, sect 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, bk iv, 269d-271a;
2 [5-10] lib BK V, 420c-421a
5c to 7 Chapter 16: DEMOCRACY 319
40 ChBBON: Decline and Fall, 652b-655c 7 Plato: Laws, bk hi, 675c-676b
43 Federalist: number io 49c 53a; number 9 Aristotle: Politics, bk iv, ch 9 [i294''i9 24]
43, 141d-142d; number 50, 161d-162c passim; 494c; bk v, ch 9 |iy()'»i2 ^5] 512b-c; hk vii,
NUMBER 51, 164a-165a; number 60, 185b- CH 14 537b-538d; bk vhi, ch 542a-b i
(7. The growth and vicissitudes of democracy^ 14 Plutarch: Romulus, 21a-27c esp 22c / Peri-
cles, 129a-141a,c passim
la. Demagoguery and the danger of revolution 15 Tacitus: Histories, bk ii, 224d-225a
5 Euripides: Suppliants [399-462] 261d-262b 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part ii, 107a; 107c
5 Aristophanes: Knights 470a-487a,c esp 35 Locke: Civil Goverriment, ch xvi 65d-70c
[1111-1150]483d-484b / Wasps [655-724] 36 Swift: Gulliver, part
182b-183a
iv,
515c-516d Peace [601-692] 532d-534a
/ 38 Montesquieu: of Laws, bk x, 64a-d
Spirit
6 Herodotus: H/V/or)', bk hi, 108a-c 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, bk iv, 252d-253a;
6Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, bk hi, 267c-271d
434c-438b; bk iv, 463a-465c; 466a'469b; 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 79b-d; 630b,d-
BK VI, 519c-d; 520a-d; 533a-c; bk viii, 575c- 631b
582c esp 575c-576c, 577b-d, 579c-581c, 42 Kant: Scie7ice of Right. 413d; 454a-455a
582a-c 43 Declaration of Independence: la-3b
7 Plato: Republic, bk viii, 411d-414b / Laws, 43 Mill: Representative Government, 427a-b;
bk IX, 744c-d 433b-442d
9 Aristotle: Politics, bk ii, ch 12 [1273^36-
1274^14] 470c-d; bk v, ch i [i302'*8-i6] 503b;
7c. The challenge of war and peace: the citizen
CH 5 506b-507a; ch 8 [1308*11-24] 510a-b; army
CH 9 [13(59^14-13 io'*i2] 511d-512b; bk vi, ch 5 Euripides Suppliants [399-462] 261d-262b
:
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: The general theory of government and the forms of government, see Government; and
for the forms of government most closely related to democracy, see Aristocracy;
Oligarchy.
The theory of constitutional or representative government, in itself and in contrast to
The problem of suffrage and the debate concerning the extension of the franchise, ^^^ Citizen
2C-3; Labor yd; Oligarchy 4, 5a; Slavery 5b.
The relation between economic and political democracy, and the problems of economic as
well as political justice, see Labor y{; Liberty 2d; Slavery 5a-5b.
The theory of popular sovereignty and natural rights, see Government ig(3); Justice 6-6c;
Law yh-yc; State 2c; Tyranny 5c.
The consideration of majority rule and the tyranny of the majority, see Opinion y-jb;
Tyranny 2c.
Other discussions of the theory of representation, see Aristocracy 6; Constitution g-gb.
Matters relevant to the educational problems of democracy, see Aristocracy 5; Education
8d; State yd.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great BooJ{S of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
INTRODUCTION
Darwin, Mill, James, and Freud, at tlic be defined as appetite of which we are con-
INmodern end of the great tradition, the word scious."
"desire" primarily signifies a cause of animal and Spinoza here seems to be reflecting the dis-
human one of the basic terms in
behavior. It is tinction made by earlier writers between
psychological analysis, covering that whole natural appetite and conscious desire, which we
range of phenomena which are also referred to today would, perhaps, express in terms of
by such terms as wanting, needing, craving, wish- "need" and "wish." The ancient conception
ing, willing, all of which are discussed in con- of tendencies inherent in all things— inanimate
nection with theories of instinct and emotion, as well as living —
which seek a natural fulfill-
libido and love, motivation and purpose. ment broadens the meaning of appetite or de-
If we turn to traditional beginnings, to the sire. When Aristotle says that "each thing seeks
writings of Plato, Aristotle, Galen, and Ploti- its own perfection" and that "nature does
nus, we find that the psychological considera- nothing in vain," he is thinking of non-living
tion of desire is part of a much larger context. as well as living bodies. Wherever in the phys-
The ancients are, of course, concerned with the icalworld things seem to have a natural tend-
role of desire in causing animal or human be- ency to move in a certain direction or to change
havior, and with the causes of such desire, but in a certain way, there appetite, belonging to
they are also interested in cravings which seem the very nature of the moving thing, operates
to be present in plants as well as animals. Plato, as a cause. Adopting this view, Dante declares
for example, attributes to plants "feelings of that "neither Creator nor creature was ever
pleasure and pain and the desires which accom- without love, either natural or of the mind";
pany them." The vegetative activities of nu- and in his Comivio he shows how each thing
trition, growth, and reproduction seem to has its "specific love." The love, or desire, of
spring from basic appetites or, in modern — the elements is their "innate affinity to their
phraseology, "biological needs" — inherent in proper place"; minerals desire "the place where
all living matter. their generation is ordained" with the result
Because hunger and thirst so readily sym- that "the magnet ever receives power from the
bolize the essence of desire (or certainly repre- direction of its generation."
sent most general manifestation in living
its According to this view it is possible to speak
things), the words "appetite" and "desire" are of the natural desire of raindrops to fall or of
frequently used as synonyms in the earlier smoke to rise. Such a manner of speaking may
phase of the tradition. As Hobbes observes, at first seem metaphorical — an expression of
when he proposes to use "appetite" and "de- primitive animism or anthropomorphism — but
sire" as synonyms, desire is "the general name," the ancients, observing different natural tend-
and appetite is "oftentimes restrained to signify encies in heavy and light bodies, mean this
the desire for food, namely hunger and thirst." literally.
So, too, Spinoza says that "there is no difference The sense of such statements is no different
between appetite and desire," yet he adds, from what is meant when it is said that the sun-
"unless in this particular, that desire is gener- flower, without consciousness, naturally tends
ally related to men in so far as they are con- to turn toward the sun, or that all men by
scious of their appetites, and it may therefore nature desire to know.
323
324 THE GREAT IDEAS
From its narrowest meaning with reference fies the tendency of its nature. That nature
to the behavior of animals and men, desire does nothing in vain means simply that no
gains a wider connotation when it is conceived natural desire— need or appetite— exists with-
as covering the appetites found in Uving organ- out the possibility of fulfillment.
isms. But in its broadest significance, it refers
to the innate tendency inherent in matter it- Considering the design of the universe and
self.As we shall presently see, appetite, desire, the relation of creatures to God, theologians like
or tendency is seated in matter according to Augustine and Aquinas use the concept of de-
that conception of matter which identifies it sire in both its psychological and its meta-
their significance for the notion of desire can to be inwant of some perfection. Hence desire
be briefly indicated here. can in no way enter into the immutable, infi-
Plotinus suggests the basic insight when he nite, and perfect being of God. In desire,
describes matter as "in beggardom, striving as Aquinas points out, "a certain imperfection is
itwere by violence to acquire, and always dis- implied," namely, the lack "of the good which
appointed." Matter is that in natural things we have not." Since God is perfect, desire can-
which is the reason for their motion and change. not be attributed to Him, "except metaphor-
Considering natural change, Aristotle names ically." Love, however, implies perfection
what he thinks are its three principles. In addi- rather than imperfection, since it flows from
tion to "something divine, good, and desirable," the act of the will "to diffuse its own goodness
he writes, "we hold that there are two other among others." For that reason, although the
principles, the one contrary to it, the other such infinite perfection of God precludes desire, it
as of its own nature to desire and yearn for it." does not preclude love.
These are respectively form, privation, and The theologian goes beyond the metaphysi-
matter. The relation between matter and form cian or physicist when he carries the analysis of
is expressed by Aristotle in terms of desire. desire to the supernatural plane. As God is the
"The form cannot desire itself," he says, "for supernatural eflicient cause of all created things,
it is not defective; nor can the contrary desire so God is also the supernatural final cause — the
it, for contraries are mutually destructive. The end or ultimate good toward which all creatures
truth is that what desires the form is matter, tend. The metaphysical maxim that each thing
as the female desires the male." seeks its own perfection is then transformed.
Conceived most generally as natural appe- "All things," Aquinas writes, "by desiring
tite or tendency, desire becomes a physical or their own perfection, desire God Himself, inas-
metaphysical term. ''Natural appetite,'' says much as the perfections of all things are so
Aquinas, "is that inclination which each thing many similitudes of the divine being. ... Of
has of its own nature." The significance of de- those things which desire God, some know Him
sire in this sense extends, far beyond psycho- as He is Himself, and this is proper to the ra-
logical phenomena, to all things in motion tional creature; others know some participation
under the impetus or inclination of their own of His goodness, and this belongs also to sensible
natures, rather than moved violently by forces knowledge; others have a natural desire with-
impressed on them from without. out knowledge, as being directed to their ends
throughout nature in the order of change. The of God in which the souls of the blessed come
tclos of each thing is the perfection which satis- to rest is, according to the theologian, the ulti-
CiiAPiiR 17: DESIRE 325
mate gift of grace. Hence, in man's case at Icasi, With regard lo the frantic pursuit of diversions,
it becomes necessary to ask whether he can have he claims that "lK)th the censurcrs and the cen-
a purely natural desire to see God if the goal sured do not understand man's true nature"
of such desire cannot be achieved by purely and the "misery of man without CkxI." In such
natural means. restlessness and vain seeking, the theologian sees
The question is not whether men to whom evidence of man's natural desire to be wr/h God.
God has revealed the promise of ultimate glory Admitting the same facts, the skeptics inter-
can consciously desire the beatific vision. C'lear- pret the infinity of man's desire as a craving to
though to sustain such desire
ly that is possible, be God. If this is not every man's desire, it is
the theological virtue of hope, inseparablefrom certainly Satan's in Paradise Lost. Skeptic or
faith and charity, may be required. Rather the believer, every man understands the question
question is whether the beatific vision which is which Goethe and Dante among the great
man's supernatural end can be the object of poets make their central theme. At what mo-
natural desire. On this the theologians appear ment, amid man's striving and restlessness, will
to be less clearly decided. the soul gladly cry, "Ah, linger on, thou art so
Aquinas holds that "neither man, nor any fair?" Confident that there can be no such
creature, can attain final happiness by his nat- moment, Faust makes that the basis of his
ural powers." Yet he also seems to maintain wager with Mephistopheles.
that man has a natural desire for the perfect The two poets appear to give opposite an-
happiness of eternal life. "The object of the swers to the question. Faust finds surcease in an
will, i.e., of man's appetite," he writes, "is the earthly vision of progressive endeavor. Heaven-
universal good, just as the object of the intel- ly rest comes to the soul of Dante at the very
lect is the universal truth." Man's natural de- moment it relinquishes its quest, winning peace
sire to know the truth — not just some truths through surrender.
but the whole truth, the infinite truth —
would
seem to require the vision of God for its fulfill- In the broadest or theological sense of the
ment. Aquinas argues similarly from the will's word, God alone does not desire. In the nar-
natural desire for the infinite good. "Naught rowest or psychological sense, only animals and
can lull man's will," he writes, "save the uni- men do. The contrast of meanings is useful.
versal good ... to be found not in any creature, Natural appetite or tendency throws light on
but in God alone." Some writers find this con- the nature of conscious desire.
firmed in the fact that whatever good a man In order to "determine the nature and seat of
sets his heart upon he pursues to infinity. No desire," Socrates in the Philebus considers such
finite amount of pleasure or power or wealth things as "hunger, thirst, and the like" as "in
seems to satisfy him. He always wants more. the class of desires." He points out that "when
But there no end to wanting more of such
is we say 'a man thirsts,' we mean to say that he
things. The infinity of such desires must result 'is empty.' " It is not drink he desires, but re-
in frustration. Only God, says the theologian, plenishment by drink, which is a change of
only an infinite being, can satisfy man's infinite state. This insight Socrates generalizes by say-
craving for all the good there is. ing that "he who is empty desires . . . the op-
Seeing man's restlessness, no matter where he posite of what he experiences; for he is empty
turns to find rest, Augustine declares: "Thou and desires to be full." In the Symposium, using
madest us for Thyself, and our heart is restless, the words "love" and "desire" as if they were
until it repose in Thee." Pascal reaches the interchangeable, Socrates declares that "he who
same conclusion when he considers the ennui desires something want of something" and
is in
of men which results from the desperation of "love is of something which a man w ants and
their unending search. "Their error," he has not."
writes, "does not lie in seeking excitement, if In the psychological sphere, desire and love
they seek it only as a diversion; the evil is that are often identified — at least verbally. The one
they seek it as if the possession of the objects of word is frequently substituted for the other.
their quest vrould make them really happ)." Here the fact already noted, that God loves but
326 THE GREAT IDEAS
does not desire, suggests the root of the distinc- which we seek to avoid as somehow injurious
tion between desire and love. Desire ahvays in- rather than beneficial to us.
volves some lack or privation to be remedied by There is no question that desire and aversion
a change; whereas love, certainly requited are psychologically connected with estimations
love, implies the kind of satisfaction which ab- of good and evil or pleasure and pain. This is
hors change. Love and desire are, of course, the case no matter how we answer the moral-
frequently mixed, but this does not affect their ist's question, Do we desire something because
essential difference as tendencies. They are as it is good, or do we call it "good" simply be-
different as giving and getting. Love aims at cause we desire it? The ethical significance of
the well-being of the beloved, while desire seeks the question, and of the opposite answers to it,
to enjoy a pleasure or possess a good. is discussed in the chapter on Good and Evil.
Not all writers, however, contrast the gener-
osity of love with the acquisitiveness of desire. The metaphysical conception of natural de-
Locke, for example, finds self-interest and self- sire provides terms for the psychological anal-
seeking in both. The meaning of love, he ob- ysis of conscious desire and its object. Viewed
serves, is known toanyone who reflects "upon as belonging to the very nature of a thing,
the thought he has of the delight which any appetite, according to Aristotle, consists in the
present or absent thing is apt to produce in him. tendency toward "something we do not have"
. . . For when a man declares
autumn when in and "which we need." Both factors are essen-
he is eating them, or in spring when there are tial —
the privation and the capacity, or poten-
none, that he loves grapes, it is no more but tiality, for having what is lacked. Privation in
that the taste of grapes delights him." The the strict sense is always correlative to poten-
meaning of desire is, in Locke's opinion, closely tiality.
related. It consists in "the uneasiness a man The writers who use these terms would not
upon the absence of anything
finds in himself speak of the sunflower being deprived of wis-
whose present enjoyment carries the idea of dom, even as they would not call a stone blind.
delight with it." We desire, in short, the things Blindness is the deprivation of sight in things
we love but do not possess. which have by nature a capacity to see. So
The distinction between love and desire, the when it is said that man by nature desires to
question whether they are distinct in animals know, or that certain animals, instinctively
as well as in men, and their relation to one gregarious, naturally tend to associate with one
another when they are distinct, are matters another in herds or societies, the potentiality of
more fully discussed in the chapter on Love. knowledge or social life is indicated; and pre-
It is enough to observe here that when writers cisely because of these potentialities, ignorance
use the two words interchangeably, they use and solitariness are considered privations.
both words to signify wanting and seeking. We observe here two different conditions of
In the case of animals and men, the thing appetite or desire. As the opposite of privation
wanted is an object of conscious desire only if is possession — or of lacking, having — so the op-
it is something known. In addition to being posite states of appetite are the drive toward
known as an object of science is known, it must the unpossessed and satisfaction in possession.
also be deemed good or pleasant in other — We do not strive for that which we have, unless
words, worth having. For Locke, desire, as we it be to retain our possession of it against loss;
have seen, is no more than "an uneasiness of the and we do not feel satisfied until we get that
mind for want of some absent good," which is which we have been seeking.
measured in terms of pleasure and pain. "What "If a man being strong desired to be strong,"
has an aptness to produce pleasure in us is that says Socrates in the Symposium, "or being swift
we call good, and what is apt to produce pain desired to be swift, or being healthy desired to
in us we call evil.'' That which we consciously be healthy, he might be thought to desire some-
desire, that which we judge to be desirable, thing which he already has or is." This would be
would thus be something we regard as good for a misconception which we must avoid. To any-
us, while the "bad" or "evil" would be that one who says "I desire to have simply what I
—
"desires that which he has not already, which is learned, or acquired through experience, we
future and not present and of which he is
. . . call the instinctive desire "natural," it is well
in want." to remember that we are not here using the
The object of desire — natural or conscious word to signify lack of consciousness. Yet both
thus seems to be an altered condition in the instinctive and acquired desires may operate
desirer, the result of union with the object de- unconsciously.
sired. Man's natural desire to know impels him What Freud means by a repressed desire
to learn. Every act of learning which satisfies illustrates this point. The repressed desire,
this natural desire consists in a changed condi- whether instinctual in origin or the result of
tion of his mind, a change which both Plato some acquired fixation of the libido on object
and Aristotle describe as a motion from igno- or ego, would be a conscious tendency if it were
rance to knowledge. not repressed. Freud compares the process of re-
When we consciously desire food, it is not pression to the efforts of a man to get from one
the edible thing as such we seek, but rather the room to another past the guard of a door-
eating of it. Only the eating of it will quiet our keeper. "The excitations in the unconscious
desire, with that change in our condition we ... to begin with, remain unconscious. When
call "nourishment." That the edible thing is they have pressed forward to the threshold and
only incidentally the object of our desire may been turned back by the door-keeper, they are
be seen in the fact that no way in which we can 'incapable of becoming conscious'; we call
possess food, other than eating ity satisfies hunger. them then repressed. . . . Being repressed, when
applied to any single impulse, means being
The distinction between natural and con- unable to pass out of the unconscious system
scious desire is complicated by other closely re- because of the door-keeper's refusal of admit-
lated distinctions which psychologists have tance into the preconscious."
made. Freud, for example, distinguishes be- The repressed desire is made to operate un-
tween conscious and unconscious desire; Dar- consciously by being repressed, which does not
win separates instinctive from learned desires; prevent it from influencing our conduct or
and James observes how a conscious desire may thought, but only from intruding its driving
become habitual and operate almost automat- force and its goal upon our attention. In con-
ically, without our awareness of either its trast, the desire which works habitually and
object or its action. therefore to some extent unconsciously, is not
Part of the complication is verbal and can be repressed, but merely one which no longer de-
removed by referring to natural desires as non- mands our full attention.
cannot have natural appetites. Man's natural sometimes all the emotions are treated as mani-
desire to know is a case in point. That natural one type of conscious appetite,
festations of just
human tendency is not excluded by the fact namely, animal as opposed to rational desire.
—
flex type . . . called forth by determinate sen- totle and Aquinas, who claim that "there must
sory stimuli in contact with the animal's body, be one appetite tending towards the universal
or at a distance in his environment," arousing good, which belongs to reason, and another
"emotional excitements which go with them." with a tendency towards the particular good,
The emotional part of the instinctive behavior which appetite belongs to sense." The tradi-
is perform certain acts
at once an impulse to tional name for the intellectual appetite, or the
and the feeling which accompanies the acts faculty of rational desire, is "will." In Spinoza's
performed. The sheep, instinctively recogniz- vocabulary, the effort of desire, "when it is re-
ing the wolf as dangerous, fears and flees. It lated to the mind alone, is called will^ but when
runs away because it is afraid and feels fear in it is related at the same time both to the mind
the act of flight. When, in his theory of the and the body, is called appetite.''
emotions, James goes so far as to say that the Psychologists who attribute these diverse
from running away, he
feeling of fear results modes of desire, as they attribute sensation and
does not mean to deny that the emotion of fear thought, to a single faculty called "mind" or
involves the impulse to flee. "understanding," nevertheless deal with the
In its aspect as impulse — or tendency to act whole range of appetitive phenomena, includ-
— an emotion is a desire, consciously aroused by ing both the animal passions and acts of will.
sense-perceptions and accompanied by conscious James, for example, treats the instinctive acts
feelings. This conception of emotion has been associated with the emotions as "automatic and
variously expressed in the tradition of the great reflex" movements, and separates them from
books. Aquinas, for example, calls all the emo- "voluntary movements which, being desired
tions or passions "movements of the sensitive and intended beforehand, arc done with full
appetite." But he also uses the words "desire" prevision of what they are to be." In so doing,
and "aversion" along with "love" and "hate," he draws a line between emotional impulses and
"anger" and "fear" to name specific emotions. acts of will, even though he does not distin-
Hobbes recognizes the appetitive tendency guish two appetitive faculties.
which is common to all the emotions when he With or without the distinction in faculties,
finds at their root what he calls "endeavor" almost all observers of human experience and
"those small beginnings of motion, within the conduct seem to agree upon a distinction in
body of man, before they appear in walking, types of conscious desire, at least insofar as they
speaking, striking, and other visible actions. . . . recognize the ever-present conflict between the
This endeavor," he goes on to say, "when it is passions and the will. These matters are more
toward something which causes it, is called ap- fully considered in the chapters on Emotion
petite or desire." Spinoza makes the same point and Will.
in somewhat different terms. "Desire," he
writes, "is the essence itself or nature of a per- The role of desire in human life — especially
son in so far as this nature is conceived from its emotional desire — is so intimately connected
given constitution as determined towards any with problems of good and evil, virtue, duty,
action. ... As his nature is constituted in this and happiness, that until quite recently the
or that way, so must his desire vary and the subject was discussed mainly in books on ethics,
nature of one desire differ from another, just politics, or rhetoric rather than psychology.
as the affects from which each desire arises dif- Even Freud, who tries to separate psychological
fer. There are as many kinds of desire, there- description and explanation from moral princi-
fore, as there are kinds of joy, sorrow, love, etc., ples or conclusions, cannot avoid treating the
and in consequence ... as there are kinds of effects of morality upon the dynamics of desire
objects by which we are affected." and the life of the passions. Many of the funda-
Chapter 17: DRSIRE 329
mental terms of psychoanalysis— conflict, re- mesticating" them, as one would train a beast
pression, rationalization, sublimation, to name to serve the ends of human life.
only some — carry the connotation of moral The implication, in Aristotle and Spinoza as
issues, even though they imply a purely psy- well as in Freud, docs not seem to be that man's
chological resolution of them. animal appetites are in themselves bad, but
Contrary to a popular misconception, Freud that, if they are undisciplined or uncontrolled,
expressly declares that "it is out of the cjucstion they cause disorder in the individual life and
that part of the analytic treatment should con- in society. Some moralists, however, take an
sist of advice to 'live freely.' "The conflict "be- opposite view. For them desire is intrinsically
tween libidinal desires and sexual repression," evil, a factor of discontent, and fraught with
he explains, is "not resolved by helping one pain.
win a victory over the other." Although
side to "While what we crave is wanting," Lucretius
Freud thinks that "what the world calls its writes, "it seems to transcend all the rest; then,
code of morals demands more sacrifices than it when it has been gotten, we crave something
is worth," he also declares that "we must be- else"; yet as often as a man gains something
ware of overestimating the importance of ab- new, he discovers afresh that "he is not better
stinence in effecting neurosis." off." Either our desires are unsatisfied, and then
What Freud calls emotional infantilism re- we suffer the agony of frustration; or they are
sembles to some degree what a moralist like satiated —
and so are we desperate with ennui.
Aristotle calls self-indulgence or incontinence. Hence, freedom from all desires, not just their
To give vent to all the promptings of desire, moderation, seems to be recommended for
without regard to the demands of society or peace of mind; as centuries later Schopenhauer
reality is to revert to infancy — a state charac- recommended the negation of the will to live in
terized, according to Freud, by "the irrecon- order to avoid frustration or boredom.
cilability of its wishes with reality." Because Marcus Aurelius and the Stoics, and later
children "live at the beck and call of appetite, Kant, similarly urge us "not to yield to the
and it is in them that the desire for what is persuasions of the body and never to be
. . .
pleasant is strongest," Aristotle thinks it fitting over-powered either by the motion of the senses
that we should speak of self-indulgence when or of the appetites." But whereas the Stoics
it occurs in an adult as a "childish fault." would restrain desire "because it is animal" and
Aristotle and Freud seem to be looking at in order to avoid pain, Kant argues that the re-
the same facts of human nature and seeing them nunciation of desire should be undertaken "not
in the same light. What Freud describes as the merely in accordance with duty . . . but from
conflict between the "pleasure-principle" and duty, which must be the true end of all moral
the "reality-principle," Aristotle and with — cultivation."
—
him Spinoza treats as a conflict between the The opposition between these two views of
passions and the reason, and Kant conceives in desire in the moral life represents one of the
terms of the opposition between desire and major issues in ethical theory, further discussed
duty. What Freud says of the reality-principle in the chapters on Duty and Virtue. The doc-
—that it "demands and enforces the postpone- trine of natural appetite is crucially relevant to
ment of satisfaction, the renunciation of mani- the issue. If the naturalist in ethics is right, he
fold possibilities, and the temporary endurance is by virtue of the truth that natural tend-
so
of pain" — parallels traditional statements con- encies are everywhere the measure of good and
cerning the role of reason or of duty in the evil. If, however, there is no truth in the doc-
moral life. Where the moralists speak of the trine of natural desire, then the impulses which
necessity for regulating or moderating emo- spring from man's animal passions can claim no
tional desires, Freud refers to the need of "do- authority in the court of reason.
330 THE GREAT IDEAS
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. Desire and the order of change: eros and telos ooi
5. Desire as ruler
5^. Desire ruling action: the unchecked expression of desires; incontinence 339
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the vohimc and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Homhr: Iliad, bk ii [265-28:5] 12d, tlie
number 4 is the number ot the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d ot page 12.
Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 James Psyc/iology, 1 16a-l 19b,the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand sideof the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 Plato: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
Author's Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as part, bk, ch,
sect) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d.
Bible References: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g.. Old Testa-
ment: Nehemiah, 7:45 — (D) // Esdras, 7:46.
Symbols: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed mtermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
A 2, ANS 221d-223a; part hi suppl, q 98, VI, CH 2 387d 388b / Politics, bk ii, ch 7
A 3 1074a-c [i267''^-8] 462c-d / Rhetoric, bk i, ch 10
21 Dante: Divine Comedy^ purgatory, xvii 611c 613a
[9i]-xviii [75] 79b-80c; paradise, v [1-12] 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk ii [251-293]
112a-b 18b-d; BK IV [877-906] 55d-56a
23 HoBBEs: Leviathan, part i, 61a-62c; 76c-77b; 17 Plotinus: Third Ennead, tr v, ch 10 105d-
96a; part iv, 272c 106b / Fourth Ennead, tr iv, ch 18-21 166d-
29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, part ii, 381d- 168c / Sixth Ennead, tr viii, ch 4 344b-d
382a 18 Augustine: Confessions, bk iv, par 25 25c;
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 73a-74a bk viii, par 19-27 58b-60c / City of God, bk
31 Descartes: Discourse, part hi, 50b XII, CH 6 345b-346c
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part hi, prop 4-13 398d- 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 14, a
400d; prop 39, schol 408b-d; prop 56 8, ans and rep
i 82c-83b; q 18, a 3, ans 106b-
414a-d; the affects, def 1-3 416b-417a; 107c; q A 4 lllc-112c; q 41, a 2 218c-219d;
19,
part IV, def 1-2 424a; prop 9-13 426d-428a; q 57, A 4, rep 3 298a-299a; q 59. a i, rep 3
prop 19-28 429d-431c; prop 63 443d-444a; 306c-307b; q 75, a 3, rep 3 380c-381b; q 78,
prop 65-66 444b-d A I, ANS and REP 4 407b-409a; q 80, a 2,
33 Pascal: Pensees, 81 186b rep 3 428a-d; q 81, a 3, ans and rt.p 2
35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk i, ch ii, 430c-431d; part i-ii, q i, aa 1-6 609b-614c;
sect 3 104b-d; bk ii, ch vh, sect 3 131d- q 6 644a-651c; qq 16-17 684a-693d; q 22, a 2,
132a; ch xx, sect 6 177a-b; ch xxi, sect rep 2 721c-722c; q 28, a 6 744b-d
29-48 184d-190d passim, esp sect 31 185c-d, 21 Dante: Divifie Comedy, purgatory, xxiii
sect 42 188c; sect 55-56 192c-193b; sect [19-75] 80a-c
61-62 194b-d; sect 70 197a-b; sect 73 198c- 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part i, 53a; 61a-c; 64a-c;
199c 76c; part ii, 112d-113c
42 Kant: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 31 Descartes: Discourse, part v, 60b
264d-265b / Practical Reason, 298a-300d; 31 Spinoza: Ethics, partiii, the affects, def i
315c-317b; 330c-331a; 341c-342a / Judge- 416b-d; part iv, def 7 424b; proi' 19 429d;
ment, 605d-606b [fn 2] prop 59 442b-d
43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 448a-450b; 461c-464d 33 Pascal: Provincial Letters, 24b- 26b
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part ii, par 123- 35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk i, ch ii,
124 44a-d / Philosophy of History, part iv, SECT 3 104b-d; sect 13 107d-108c; bk ii, ch
319b-320a XX, SECT 6 177a-b; ch xxi, sect 29-48 184d-
47 Goethe: Faust, part i [1194-1216] 29b-30a; 190d passim, esp sect 33 186a; sect 73
part ii [11,559-586] 281b-282a 198c-199c
49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 308a-b; 316a-317a; 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 338c-339b
592d 42 Kant: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals,
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk xi, 524c-527a; 262a-c; 271c-d; 279b; 282d-'283d / Practical
BK XII, 560a-561c; bk xiii, 577a-578b esp Reason, 293d [fn 3]; 298d-300a; 303b-304b;
577d-578a; bk xiv, 605b-d; bk xv, 630c- 341c-342a / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals,
631c 385a-386d
53 James: Psychology, 198b-211a; 808b-814b esp 43 Mill: Representative Government, 346c-348c /
812b-813a Utilitarianism, 461c-464d
54 Freud: Instincts, 414a-b; 418d-420b esp 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, intro, par 11
420a-b / General Introduction, 592c-593a / Be- 15a-b; par 17 16c; part ii, par 123 44a-b /
yond the Pleasure Principle, 639a-640c / Civi- Philosophy of History, intro, 162a-c; 164b-
lization and Its Discontents, 772a-b 166b
49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 308a-314c passim;
2c. Desire as a cause of action: motivation or 316a-317a
purpose; voluntariness 53 James: Psychology, 4a-7a; 8a-9a; I3a 15a;
7 Plato: Cratylus, 95a- b / Symposium, 163a- 51a-b; 767a-768a; 788a-799b
166b / Republic, bk iv, 352d-353b / Ttmueus, 54 Freud: Interpretation of Dreams, 363b-364d;
474b-d / Laws, bk vi, 712b; bk ix, 751b-d 377c-378b / Instincts, 4l2c-413a; 418d-419a /
8 Aristotle: M^/^/j/zj'i/r^v.BK 11, ch 2 [994^^9-16] General Introduction, 453b-476a,c passim, esp
512d-513a; bk vi, ch i [1025^23-25] 547d; 469a-470c, 473b-d / Civilization and Its Dis-
bk IX, CH 5 [1047^35-1048*24] 573b-c; en 7 contents, 768b-c
334 THE GREAT IDEAS Id to la
(2. The analysis of desire or appetite.) 18 Augustine: Confessions, bk x, par 29-33
78d-80b
2d. The satisfaction of desire: possession and 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 6,
enjoyment A I,rep 2 28b-d; q 19, a i, ans 108d-109c;
7 Plato: Symposium, 162b-c / Gorgias, 275b- Q 59, A I, ANS 306c-307b; q 78, a i, rep 3
276b / Republic, bk ix, 421a-425b / Philebus, 407b-409a; q 80 427a-428d; part i-ii, q 5,
620a-b A 8, REP 3 642d-643d; q 8, a i, ans 655b-
8 Aristotle: Topics, bk vi, ch 8 [146^13-19] 656a; Q 26, a i 734a-d
200c 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, purgatory, xvii
9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk hi, ch io-ii 364b- [9i]-xviii [75] 79b-80c esp xvii [91-96] 79b
365d; BK X, ch 4-5 428b-430d esp ch 4 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part i, 61a-62a
[1175*10-22] 429c 31 Spinoza: Ethics, part hi, prop 9 399b-c;
12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk hi [1003- prop 56-57 414a-415b; the affects, def i
loio] 43a; bk iv [1073-1120] 58a-d 416b-d; part iv, prop 59 442b-d; appendix,
18 Augustine: Confessions, bk ii, par 2-4 9b-d; i-iii 447a-b; part v, prop 4, schol 453b-d
BK IV, par 15 23a-b; bk vi, par 9-10 37c-38b; 49 Darwin: Origin of Species, 119a-b / Descent
par 26 42d-43a; bk viii, par 6-8 54c-55a / of Man, 287d-289a
Christian Doctrine, bk i, ch 3-4 625b-c 53 James: Psychology, 8a-17b esp 8a-9a, 13a-15a;
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 5, a 47b-52b esp 49b-50a, 51a-52a
6, ANs and rep 2 27c-28b; part i-ii, q i, aa 54 Freud: General Introduction, 591d-593b /
7-8 614c-615c; q 2, a 6 619d-620d; q 3, a 4 War and Death, 757d-759d esp 758d-759a
625a-626b; q 4, aa 1-2 629d-631a; q 5, a 8,
^a. Natural appetite: desires determined by
REP 3 642d-643d; q ii 666b,d-669b; q 27, a 3,
ANS 738c-739c; q 30, a 4, rep 3 751c-752b; nature or instinct
QQ 31-34 752b-772b 7 Plato: Phaedrus, 120b-c / Symposium, 165b-c
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part ii-ii, qq / Republic, bk ii, 311b-312b / Timaeus,
28-29 527b-533a; part hi suppl, q 69, a 4, 474b-d / Philebus, 621c-622b / Laws, bk vi,
ans 889c-890c 712b
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, purgatory, xviii 8 Aristotle: Physics, bk i, ch 9 [192*16-24]
[19-39] 80a-b; paradise, hi [34-90] 109d- 268b-c; bk viii, ch 4 [255*30-^31] 340a-c /
110b; XXXII [52-72] 155b-c; xxxiii [46-48] Metaphysics, bk i, ch i [980*22-28] 499a
156c 9 Aristotle: History of Animals, bk v, ch 8
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part i, 76c-d [542*17-^4] 68d-69a; bk vi, ch i8-bk vh,
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part hi, prop 32 406b-c; CH 2 97b-108c passim, esp bk vi, ch 18 97b-
PROP 35-36 406d-407c; prop 39, scHOL408b-d 99c, bk VII, CH I 106b,d-108a; bk viii, ch
33 Pascal: Pensees, 109 193b-194a I [589*4-9] 115b / Ethics, bk hi, ch ii [1118^
38 Rousseau: Inequality, 346b 8-18] 365a-b / Rhetoric, bk i, ch ii [1370*
42 Kant: Practical Reason, 298a-300a; 341c- 18-25] 613c; BK II, ch 7 [1385*21-25] 631d
342a / Judgement, 470a-471b 10 Galen: Natural Vacuities, bk hi, ch 6 202d-
43 Mill: Representative Government, 347b-348b / 203a; ch 8 205a-207b; ch 13, 211d-212d
Utilitarianism, 448d-449c 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk ii [1-61]
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part i, par 45 15a-d; bk iv [858-876] 55b-c; [1037-1057]
23c-d; par 59 27a-b; part ii, par 124 44b-d; 57d
PART HI, par 154 57c; par 182 64a / Philosophy 15 Tacitus: Histories, bk ii, 224d-225a
of History, intro, 165b-166a 17 Plotinus: Third Ennead, tr v 100c-106b /
47 Goethe: Faust esp part i [2605-3216] 63b- Fourth Ennead, tr hi, ch 28, 157a-b
79a, PART II [9192-9573] 223b-232a 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 6, a
49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 308a-309d passim; I, rep 2 28b-d; q 12, a i, ans 50c-51c; a 8, rep
7 Plato: Protagoras, 59a-62d / Phaedrus, 120b-c q II, A 2 667b-d; q 12, a 5 672a-c; q 13, a 2
/ Philebus, 621c-622b 673c-674c; q 15, a 2 682a-c; q 16, a 2 684d-
8 Aristotle: Topics, bk vi, ch 8 [146^36- 685b; Q 17, A 2 687d-688b; q 22, a 3 722d-
147*11] 200d-201a / Metaphysics, bk xh, 723b; Q 24, A 2, ans 727d-728c; q 26, a i,
ch 7 [1072*26-30] 602b / Soul, BK II, ch 2 ans 734a-d; q 30, a i 749a-d; a 3 750d-751c;
[413^19-24] 643d; CH 3 [414*28-^16] 644c-d; Q 31, AA 3-4 754a-755c
BK HI, CH 3 [427^21-24] 660a; ch 7 [431*8-^12] 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part hi, q 18,
663c-664b A 2 811d-812b
9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk hi, ch 3 [1113*3-13] 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, purgatory, xvhi
359a / Rhetoric, bk i, ch ii [1370*17-28] 613c [19-75] 80a-c
17 Plotinus: Fourth Ennead, tr hi, ch 28, 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part i, 63a; 64a-c; part
157a-b; tr iv, ch 20, 168a-b / Sixth Ennead^ ii, 162c
581b; 617c 618a / Group Psychology, 673b- esp part prop 31 405d-406a, !>\ri iv,
III,
674a; 679a-b; 681c-683a; 693a 694b / Cii'ili- OFF 5 424b, prop 7, coRoi, 426b, i»kop 15-18
zation and Its Discontents, 783b-c / New Intro- 428a-429d, prop 60 61 442d-443b
ductory Lectures, 847d-848a 46 IIi-(;i:l: Philosophy of Right, imuo. par 17
16c; additions, 1:5 118c
3#/. Desire and aversion as emotional opposites 47 Goethe: Faust csp part i
[^554 513] 11a 14b,
7 Plato: Republic, bk iv, 352d-353a [614-685] 17a-18a, [1110-1117J 27b-28a
8 Aristotle: Souly bk hi, ch 7 [431 "8 ^'9] 48 Melville: Moby Dic{, 394a-397a
663c-664a 49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 309c-313a; 318d-
9 Aristotlr: Ethics, rk vt, ch 2 [ir^Q'*2i^i] 319a
387d-388a; bk x, ch 2 [ii73'*5-i3] 427a-b 50 Marx: Capital, 293c-294a
18 Augustine: City of God, bk xiv, ch 6 380b-c 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karaniazov, v.k hi,
19 Aquinas: Sutnma Theologica, part i-ii, q 53d-54b
23, A 2 724c-725c; a 4 726a-727a; q 25, aa 53 James: Psychology, 199b-204b; 705a-706b;
1-2 730b-732a; a 3, rep 3 732a-733a; q ^50 717a-718a; 720b;'734b-735a; 791a-798b pas-
749a-752b; q 35, a 6 777b-778c sim, csp 794a'795a
23 Hobbes: Lei'iathan, part i, 61a-d 54 Freud: Origin and Developmait of Psycho-
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part hi 395a-422a,c csp Analysis, 7a-8a / Hysteria, 65c-66a; 82c-83a;
PROP 12-13 400b-d, PROP 15-48 401a 411a, 117a / Interpretation of Dreams, 370b / Nar-
prop 51 411c-412a, the affects, def 2-3 cissism, 407a-c / Unconscious, 433d-436c esp
416d-417a, def 6-7 417b-d; part iv, def 5 436b-c/ General Introduction, 467b-47Ga,c csp
424b 469c-470c, 474d-475a; 501d-504b; 589c-593b
35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk ii, ch xx, esp589c-591d;599d-600d;615b'616c:624b-d;
sect 4-5 176d-177a 633d-635d / Beyond the Pleasure Principle,
42 Kant: Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 385a -c 640c-d / Ego and 699a-c; 704d; 712a-717a,c
Id,
53 James: Psychology, 7b8a-709a passim / hihibitions, Symptofns, and Anxiety,
54 Freud: Instincts, 418c-421a,c esp 418c / Be- 720a-733c passim, esp 722b-d, 724a-725a,
yond the Pleasure Principle, 659b-d / Group 731C'd / Civilization atid Its Discont^its, 783d-
Psychology, 677c-678c / Ego and Id, 708d- 784a; 789b-791d passim / New Introductory
710c esp 709d-710c / War and Death, 766a-b Lectures, 843d-845a
/ Civilization and Its Discontents, 790a- 791b
4b. The attachment of desires: fixations, pro-
4. The economy of desire in human life jections, identifications, transferences
373a esp 363c-d, 364d-365c, 369a-370a / Nar- AA 5-10 131d-137c; q 77, a i, ans 145a-d
cissism, 407c-408a / General Introduction, 452c- 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part i, 52d-53a
d; 495a-499b esp 496a-497b; 527c-539c esp 24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel^. bk hi,
532d-535d; 587d-588b; 592c-593a / Beyond 148d-150d; 154a-156c; 159d-163c; 166a-168a
the Pleasure Principle, 641d-643c / Group Psy- 25 Montaigne: Essays, 210b-212a; 273b-276a;
chology, 693b-694b / Ego and Id, 704b-c; 710c- 490d-491d
712a / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 26 Shakespeare: Srd Henry VI, act hi, sc 11
739a-c; 745a; 751b-d/ Civilization and Its Dis- [123-195] 87c-88a
contents, 773d-774c; 781a-c / New Introductory 27 Shakespeare: Troilus and Cressida, act v,
Lectures, 847a-b sc II [106-114] 136a
28 Gilbert: Loadstone, bk hi, 60d-61a
5. Desire as ruler 28 Harvey: Circulation of the Blood, 306a-c;
309d
5a. Desire ruling imagination: daydreaming 30 Bacon: Novum Organum, bk i, aph 49 Ilia
and fantasy 31 Descartes: Meditations, iv 89a-93a / Objec-
7 Plato: Republic, bk v, 361a tions and Replies, 215d-216a
8 Aristotle: Dreams, ch 2 [460^33-^27] 704b-d 31 Spinoza: Ethics, part hi, prop 39, schol
18 Augustine: Confessions, bk x, par 42 82a 408b-d
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 77, 33 Pascal: Pensees, 82-87 186b-189a; 99-100
A I, ans 145a-d 191a-192b / Geometrical Demonstration, 439b-
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part i, 52d-53a; part ii, 442a
138d-139a 35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk ii, ch
25 Montaigse: Essays, 37a-b; 405d-406a XXI, sect 12 180d-181a; sect 65-67 195b-
26 Shakespeare: Srd Henry VI, act hi, sc ii 196c; bk IV, ch xx, sect 12 392c
[123-195] 87c-88a / Richard II, act v, sc v 43 Federalist: number i, 29b-30a; number
[1-4 1 ] 349d-350a 31, 103c-104a; number 50, 162a-b
3 b
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part iv, prop 9-18 426d- 495a-504d, 532d-539b; 557b 631b csp 563a-
429d; part v, prop 2 452d-453a; prop 6 569c, 586b-590a, 593b-600d, 614b 615a;
453d-454a; prop 42 463b-d 633d-635d / Group Psychology, 690a-c / Ego
32 Milton: Comus [420-475] 42b-44a; [716-765] and Id, 712c-715c esp' 713c-714b, 715a-b /
49a-50a / Areopagitica, 390b-391a Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety 718a-
33 Vascai.: Provincial Letters, 64b-65b 754a,c esp 720a, 721c-d, 722c-723d, 728b-
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 192a-193c; 596c-d 733c, 741d [fn i], 745d-747b/ War and Death,
42 Kant: Practical Reason, 346a-d / Pref Meta- 759c-d / Civilization and Its Discontents, 781c-
physical Elements of Ethics, 378d-379a d; 793a-794a; 796a-c; 798c-799a; 800d-801c
44 BoswEi.!.: Johnson, 283a / Netv Introductory Lectures, 810d-813c esp
46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, part i, 224a- 811b-812b; 817a-818b; 840a-846a
225a
7. Desire and infinity
47 Goethe: Faust, part i [1544-1571] 37b-38a
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk hi, 122b-c; bk
v, 201a-c; 248b-250a; bk ix, 373b-374a;
bk vi,
7a. The infinite tendency of desires
BK xiii, 577a-578b esp 577d-578a; bk xiv, Old Testament: Proverbs, 27:20 / Ecclesiastes,
605b-d; bk xv, 630c-631a 2:5— (D) Habacuc, 2:5
6:7 / Habal{ku}{,
52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, bk vi, Apocrypha: Ecclesiasticus, 14:9— (D) OT, Ec-
164d-165a clesiasticus, 14:9
53 James: Psychology, 80b-83b esp 81a; 199b- New Testament: /o/jw. 4:13-14
202a esp 200b-201a; 720a; 725a; 734b-735b; 7 Plato: Gorgias, 275b-277c / Republic, bk v,
799a-800a 370a-c; bk ix, 416a-418c
54 Freud: Origin and Development of Psycho- 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk hi [1003-
Analysis, 6d-8b esp 7a-c; 16c / Interpretation of ioio]43a; [io76-io94]44a,c; bk vi [i-42]80a-c
Dreams, 377d-378d esp 378b-d / Repression 12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk hi, ch 9, 185d;
422a-427a,c esp 422c-d / Unconscious, 432d- BK IV, CH 9, 237d-238a
436b / General Introduction, 566a-568a; 573c- 14 Plutarch: Caius Marius, 353d-354a.c
d; 585b-586d esp 586d / Beyond the Pleasure 18 Augustine: Confessions, bk i, par 19 5d
Principle, 640c / Ego and Id, 699a; 706b-c / 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q r
37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 283a-b 22 Chaucer: Tale ofMelibeus, par 18, 408a
38 Rousseau: Inequality, 364a-b 25 Montaigne: Essays, 122a-124c
42 Kant: Judgement, 584d-585b; 586d 31 Spinoza: Ethics, part iv, appendix, xxviii-
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 185 XXIX 450a
64b-d 36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 237a
47 Goethe: Faust, part i [3217-3250] 79a-b 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 364a-b
52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, bk hi, 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, bk i, 71b-d
53b-54b 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 510b
43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 462c-463a
7a{2)The lust for power 44 BoswEL,!.: Johnson, 125a-b
Old Testament: Isaiah, (D) Isaias^
14:12-14 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 185
14:12-14 / Habakjiu^, 2:5 — (D)
Habacuc, 2:5 64b-d; par 195 66d-67a
6 Herodotus: History, bk vii, 215c-216b 47 Goethe: Faust, part ii [5505-6172] 136a-
6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, bk v, 506b-c 151a; [11,151-287] 271b-274b esp [11,151-162]
7 Plato: Gorgias, 275b-277c 271b, [11,239-258] 273b-274a
12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk hi [59-86] 50 Marx: Capital, 60d-62d esp 62a-b; 71d-72c
30d-31b; [995-1002] 42d-43a esp 72a-c; 292c-295a esp 293c-294a
;
CWSS-KEFEKENCES
For: Matters relevant to the metaphysical conception of desire, see Being 7c-7c(3); Change i;
Discussions bearing on the theory of natural appetite or desire, see Habit 3a; Happiness i ;
Other discussions of the distinction between conscious and natural desire, and of animal
appetite in contrast to the human will, see Animal 13(3); Man 4b; Sense 3e; Will i,
2b(2).
The consideration of voluntary acts or movements, see Animal 4b; Nature 3c(2); Will
3a(i)-3a(2).
Other treatments of the objects of desire in general, see Being 3b; Good and Evil la, 3c;
Happiness i, 4-4b; Pleasure and Pain 6a-6b; and for particular objects of desire, see
Honor 2b; Life and Death 8b; Wealth loa-iob, ioe(3).
The conception of pleasure as the satisfaction of desire, see Pleasure and Pain 6d.
Another comparison of desire and love, see Love ic, 2a—2a(4).
Further psychological analysis of emotional desires and impulses, see Emotion 3-3c(4);
Love 2a(3)—2a(4); Medicine 6c(2).
Other discussions of the influence of emotional desires on imagination and thought, see
Emotion 3b; Memory and Imagination 8c, Be; Opinion 2a; Will 3b(i).
The psychological or ethical consideration of problems arising from the conflict between de-
sire and reason or duty, see Duty 8; Emotion 4-4b(2); Liberty 3a-3b; Mind ie(3), 9b;
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below arc works not included in Great BooJ^s of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date,place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas,
Marlowe. Tamburlaine the Great Bain. The Emotions and the Will
Suarez, Disputationes Metaphysicae, x (i), xxiii- E. Hartmann. Philosophy of the Unconscious
XXIV, XXX (16), xLvii (14) H. SiDGwicK. The Methods of Ethics, bk i, ch 4
loHN OF Saint Thomas. Cursus Philosophicus Tho- Zola. Nana
misticus, Philosophia Naturalis, part iv, q 12 France. The Crime of Sylvestre Bonnard
Moliere. Uavare {The Miser) T. H. Green. Prolegomena to Ethics, bk h, ch 2
Malebranche. De la recherche de la verite, bk L. Stephen. The Science of Ethics, ch 2
IV Ibsen. The Master Builder
Racine. Phedre Chekhov. The Sea-Gull
. Athalie RiBOT. The Psychology of the Emotions
Bos suet. Traite de la concupiscence Bradley. Collected Essays, vol i (14)
Leibnitz. New Essays Concerning Human Under- Moore. Principia Ethica, ch 2 (39-47)
standing, BK
CH 21II, ScHELER. Der Formalismus in der Ethil{ und die ma-
J. Butler. Fifteen Sermons upon Human Nature, teriale Wertethi/{
i-ii B. Russell. The Analysis of Mind, lect 3
HuTCHESON. A System of Moral Philosophy, bk i, Dewey. Hu?nan Nature and Conduct, part hi (8)
CH 2-3; BK II, CH 2 Fitzgerald. The Great Gatsby
. An Essay on the Nature a?id Conduct of the O'Neill. Desire Under the Elms
and Affections
Passions F. Alexander. Psychoatialysis of the Total Person-
Helvetius. Traite de Vesprit, iii, ch 9-1 i ality
T. Reid. Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Beebe-Center. The Psychology of Pleasantness and
Mind, III, part ii, ch 1-2 Unpleasantness
J.G. Fichte. The Vocation of Man Nygren. Agape and Eros
Schopenhauer. The World as Will and Idea RouGEMONT. Love in the Western World
Brown. Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Maritain. Scholasticism and Politics, ch vi
Mind, vol ii, pp 153-179 D'Arcy. The Mind and Heart of Love
Chapter i8: DIALECTIC
INTRODUCTION
THE words are currently used
"dialecticar'
more often
and "dialectician"
in a deroga-
the only avenue to God condemned
lecticians—the philosophers or theologians
the dia-
who
tory than in a descriptive sense. The person tried to use reason discursively rather than pro-
who criticizes an argument by saying, "It's just ceed by intuition and vision. With the Refor-
a matter of definition" is also apt to say, "That mation and with the Renaissance, men like Mar-
may be true dialectically, but . .
." or "You're tin Luther and Francis Bacon regarded dialec-
just being dialectical." Implied in such remarks tic as the bane of mediaeval learning. Because
is dispraise of reasoning which, however excel- of its dialectical character, Luther dismissed all
lent or skillful it may be as reasoning, stands theological speculation as sophistry. Bacon, for
condemned for being out of touch with fact or the same reason, stigmatized scholastic philoso-
experience. phy as consisting in "no great quantity of mat-
Still other complaints against dialectic are ter and infinite agitation of wit."
that it plays with words, begs the question, On grounds which were common as well as
makes sport of contradictions. When the theo- opposite, both mystics and experimentalists at-
logian Hippothadeus almost convinces Panurge tacked dialectic as a futile, if not vicious, use
that he "should rather choose to marry once, of the mind — as "hair-splitting" and "logic-
than to burn still in fires of concupiscence," chopping." Even when they admitted that it
Rabelais has Panurge raise one last doubt might have some virtue, they approved of it as
against the proposal. "Shall I be a cuckold, a method of argument or proof, proper enough
father," he asks, "yea or no?" Hippothadeus perhaps in forensic oratory or political debate,
answers: "By no means . . .will you be a cuck- but entirely out of place in the pursuit of truth
precepts of the dialectic faculty, admit of all who argues rather than observes, who appeals
contradictions and impossibilities. If my Trans- to reason rather than experience, who draws
alpine mule had wings, my Transalpine mule implications from whatever is said or can be
would fly. If it please God, I shall not be a said, pushing a premise to its logical conclusion
cuckold, but I shall be a cuckold if it please or reducing it to absurdity. This aspect of dia-
him." lectic appears to be the object of Rabelais' satire
Asterm of disapproval, "dialectical" has
a in the famous dispute between Panurge and
been used by scientists against philosophers, Thaumast, which is carried on "by signs only,
by philosophers against theologians and, with without speaking, for the matters are so ab-
equal invective, by religious men against those struse, hard, and arduous, that words proceed-
who resort to argument concerning matters ing from the mouth of man will never be suffi-
of faith. cient for the unfolding of them."
The
early Middle Ages witnessed a conflict In view of those who think that truth can be
between the mystical and the rational ap- learned only by observation, by induction from
proaches to the truths of religion. Those for particulars, or generalization from experience,
whom religious experience and revelation were the technique of dialectic, far from being a
345
346 THE GREAT IDEAS
method of inquiry, seems to have virtue only The connection of dialectic with disputation
for the purpose of disputation or criticism. and rhetoric has some foundation in the his-
"The human faculties," writes Gibbon, "are torical fact that many of the techniques of
fortified by the art and practice of dialectics." dialectic originated with the Greek sophists who
Itis "the keenest weapon of dispute," he adds, had primarily a rhetorical or forensic aim.
but "more effectual for the detection of error Comparable to the Roman rhetoricians and to
than for the investigation of truth." the law teachers of a later age, the sophists
Mill describes "the Socratic dialectics, so taught young men how to plead a case, how to
magnificently exemplified in the dialogues of defend themselves against attack, how to per-
Plato," as a "contrivance for making the diffi- suade an audience. Skill in argument had for
culties of the question . . . present to the learn- them a practical, not a theoretical, purpose;
er's consciousness . . . They were essentially a not truth or knowledge, but success in litiga-
negative discussion of the great questions of tion or in political controversy. The familiar
philosophy and life," he continues, "directed charge that the method they taught enabled
with consummate skill to the purpose of con- men "to make the worse appear the better rea-
vincing anyone who has merely adopted the son," probably exaggerates, but none the less
commonplaces of received opinion that he did reflects, the difference between the standards
not understand the subject . . . The school dis- of probability in disputation and the standards
putations of the Middle Ages had a somewhat of truth in scientific inquiry. This has some
similar object." In Mill's opinion, "as a disci- bearing on the disrepute of sophistry and the
pline to the mind, they were in every respect derogatory light cast on the dialectical when it
inferior to the powerful dialectics which formed is identified with the sophistical.
the intellects of the 'Socratic viri'; but the But there is another historical fact which
modern mind," he says, "owes far more to both places dialectic in a different light. In the tra-
than it is generally willing to admit, and the dition of the liberal arts, especially in their
present modes of education contain nothing Roman and mediaeval development, "dialec-
which in the smallest degree supplies the place tic" and "logic" are interchangeable names for
either of the one or of the other." the discipline which, together with grammar
comment on dialectic comes not
Disparaging and rhetoric, comprises the three liberal arts
only from those who contrast it unfavorably known as the "trivium." In his treatise On
with the methods of experiment or empirical Christian Doctrine Augustine uses the word
research. It is made also by writers who trust "dialectic" in this way. Whatever else it means,
reason's power to grasp truths intuitively and the identification of dialectic with logic impfies
to develop their consequences deductively. its distinction from rhetoric, and certainly
view, dialectic provides no method for estab- as to deceive not only dull people, but clever
lishing premises or for discovering first princi- men too, when they are not on their guard."
ples, it can "contribute nothing at all to the He gives as an example the case of one man say-
discovery of the truth ... Its only possible use ing to another, "What I am, you are not." The
is to serve to explain at times more easily to other man may assent to this, thinking, as
others the truths we have already ascertained; Augustine points out, that "the proposition is
hence it should be transferred from Philosophy in part true, the one man being cunning, the
to Rhetoric." other simple." But when "the first speaker
Chapter 18: DIALECTIC 347
adds: 'I am a man' " and **the other has given to it is apt to have a bad name with the rest of
draws his con-
his assent to this also, the first the world . . . But when a man begins to get
"
clusion:'Then you are not a man.' older, he will no longer be guilty of such in-
According to Augustine, "this sort of en- sanity; he will imitate the dialectician who is
snaring argument" should not be called dia- seeking for truth, and not the sophist, who is
lectical, but sophistical. He makes the same contradicting for the sake of amusement."
sort of observationabout the abuse of rhetoric In the hands of the philosopher dialectic is an
in speechwhich "only aims at verbal ornamen- instrument of science. "There is," according to
tation more than is consistent with seriousness Socrates, "no other method of comprehending
of purpose." That, too, he thinks, should be by any regular process all true existence or of
"called sophistical" in order to avoid attaching ascertaining what each thing is in its own na-
the name of rhetoric to misapph cat ions of the ture." It passes beyond the arts at the lowest
art. level, "which are concerned with the desires or
Dialectic for Augustine is the art which opinions of men, or are cultivated with a view
"deals with inferences, and and
definitions, to production and constructions." It likewise
divisions"and "is of the greatest assistance in the transcends the mathematical sciences, which,
discovery of meaning." Rhetoric, on the other while they "have some apprehension of true
hand, "is not to be used so much for ascertain- being leave the hypotheses which they use
. . .
ing the meaning as for setting forth the mean- unexamined, and are unable to give an account
ing when it is ascertained." Dialectic, in other of them." Using these as "handmaids and
words, is divorced from the practical purpose of helpers," dialectic "goes directly to the first
stating and winning an argument, and given principle and is the only science which does
theoretical status as a method of inquiry. away with hypotheses in order to make her
ground secure."
This conception of dialectic originates in the The dialectic of Plato has an upward and a
dialogues of Plato. Not himself a sophist, either downward path which somewhat resemble the
by profession or in aim, Socrates found other inductive process of the mind from facts to
uses for the analytical and argumentative devices principles, and the deductive process from
invented by the sophists. The same skills of mind principles to the conclusions they validate.
which were practically useful in the public as- Dialectic, says Socrates, ascends by using hy-
sembly and in the law courts could be used or potheses "as steps and points of departure into
adapted for clarification and precision in specu- a world which above hypotheses, in order
is
base, and must be carefully distinguished from in lies the path to the principles of all inquiries."
sophistr\', which it resembles in method. "Dia-
lecticians and sophists assume the same guise as There are four major expositions of dialectic
the philosopher," Aristotle writes, "for sophis- in the tradition of the great books. It is as pivot-
wisdom which exists only in semblance,
tic is al a conception in the thought of Kant and
and dialecticians embrace all things in their Hegel as it is and
in the philosophies of Plato
dialectic, and being is common to all things; but Aristotle. With which may be more
differences
evidently their dialectic embraces these sub- important than the similarities, the Kantian
jects because these are proper to philosophy. treatment resembles the Aristotelian, the
Sophistic and dialectic," he continues, "turn on Hegelian the Platonic.
the same class of things as philosophy, but Like the division between the Posterior
philosophy differs from dialectic in the nature Analytics and the Topics in Aristotle's Organon,
of the faculty required and from sophistic in the transcendental logic of Kant's Critique oj
respect of the purpose of the philosophic life. Pure Reason falls into two parts — the analytic
Dialectic is merely where philosophy
critical and the dialectic. The distinction between his
claims to know, and sophistic is what appears to transcendental logic and what Kant calls "gen-
be philosophy but is not." eral logic" is discussed in the chapter on Logic,
but here it must be observed that for Kant
According to Aristotle, dialectic is neither "general logic, considered as an organon, must
itself a science nor the method of science. It is always be a logic of illusion, that is, be dialecti-
that part of logic or method which he treats in cal." He thinks that the ancients used the word
the Topics, and it differs from the scientific "dialectic" in this sense, to signify "a sophisti-
method expounded in the Posterior Analytics cal art for giving ignorance, nay, even inten-
as argument in the sphere of opinion and proba- tional sophistries, the coloring of truth, in which
bilities differs from scientific demonstration. the thoroughness of procedure which logic re-
Unlike the conclusions of science, the conclu- quires was imitated." For his own purposes,
sions of dialectical reasoning are only probable, however, he wishes "dialectic" to be under-
because they are based on assumptions rather stood "in the sense of a critique of dialectical
than self-evident truths. Since other and oppo- illusion."
site assumptions cannot be excluded, one dia- When he comes to his own transcendental
lectical conclusion is usually opposed by another logic, therefore, he divides it into two parts.
in an issue of competing probabilities. The first part deals with "the elements of pure
Intermediate between science and rhetoric, cognition of the understanding, and the princi-
dialectic can serve both. In addition to its prac- ples without which no object at all can be
tical employment in forensics, it is useful in the thought." This is the "Transcendental Analyt-
philosophical sciences because it develops skill ic, and at the same time a logic of truth"
in making and criticizing definitions, and in a logic of science. Since in his view "it ought
asking or answering questions. "The ability to properly to be only a canon for judging of the
raise searching difficulties on both sides of a empirical use of the understanding, this kind of
subject," Aristotle says, "will make us detect logic is misused when we seek to employ it as
Chapii:f{ 18: DIALECIIC 349
an organon of the universal and unlimited exer- But "transcendental on the contrary,"
illusion,
cise of the understanding." he writes, "does not cease to exi>l even after it
When it is thus misused, "the exercise oi the has been exposed and its nothingness has been
pure understanding becomes dialectical. The clearly perceived by means of transcendental
second part of our transcendental logic,' Kant criticism."
writes, "must therefore be a critique of dia- The reason for this, Kant explains, is that
lectical illusion, ajid this critique we shall term "here we have to do with a natunii'dnd unavoid-
Transcendental Dialectic — not meaning it as able illusion, which rests upon subjective prin-
an art of producing dogmatically such illusion ciples, and imposes these upon us as objective.
^an art which is unfortunately too current . . . There is, therefore," he continues, "a
among the practitioners ot metaphysical jug- natural and unavoidable dialectic of pure rea-
gling), but as a critique of understanding and son" which arises because the mind seeks to
reason in regard to their hyperphysical use." answer questions "well nigh impossible to
Kant goes further than Aristotle in separat- answer," such as "how objects exist as things in
ing dialectic from science. With regard to the themselves" or "how the nature of things is to
sensible or phenomenal world of experience, be subordinated to principles." In its effort to
own structure, the supreme sort of science is warnings of criticism" — the mind cannot escape
possible. But when reason tries to use its ideas the frustration, the dialectical illusion, "which
for other objects, and then regards them "as is an inseparable adjunct of human reason."
conceptions of actual things, their mode of It is not, Kant repeatedly insists, that "the
application is transcendent and delusive." Kant ideas of pure reason" are "in their own nature
explains that "an idea is employed transcen- dialectical; it is from their misemployment alone
dentally, when it is applied to an object falsely that fallacies and illusions arise."
believed ... to correspond to it; immanently,
when it is applied solely to the employment For Hegel as for Plato dialectic moves in the
of the understanding in the sphere of experi- realm of truth and ideas, not probabilities and
ence"; and he maintains that when ideas are illusions. But for Hegel dialectic is always the
used transcendentally, they do not give rise to process of mind, or of the Idea, in interminable
science, but "assume a fallacious and dialectical motion toward absolute truth — never resting in
character." the intuition of that truth. The Idea, he writes,
A conclusion of dialectical reasoning, ac- "is self-determined, it assumes successive forms
cording to Kant, is either opposed by a con- which it successively transcends; and by this
clusion equally acceptable to reason
— "a per- very process of transcending its earlier stages,
fectly natural antithetic" — as in the antinomies gains an affirmative, and, in fact, a richer and
of pure reason; or, as in the paralogisms, the more concrete shape."
reasoning has specious cogency which can be The dialectical process is a motion in \\ hich
shown to "conclude falsely, while the form is contrary and defective truths are harmonized.
correct and unexceptionable." In this balance The synthesis of thesis and antithesis results in
of reason against itself lies the illusor}^ character a more complete mean-
truth. To illustrate his
of the transcendental dialectic. ing, Hegel uses the example of building a house.
Where Aristotle recognizes that reason can For such a purpose, we must have "in the first
be employed on both sides of a question be- instance, a subjective aim and design" and as
cause it involves competing probabilities, Kant means, "the several substances required for
in calling dialectic "a logic of appearance" ex- the work — iron, wood, stones." In rendering
plicitly remarks that "this does not signifv a these materials suitable for our purpose, we
doctrine of probability." He further distin- make use of the elements: "fire to melt the
guishes what he calls "transcendental illusory iron, wind to blow the fire, water to set the
appearance" from "empirical illusory appear- wheels in motion, in order to cut the wood,
ance" and ordinary "logical illu-sion." The etc."
latter two can be corrected and totally removed. Yet the house that we build is, according to
—
resulting synthesis, this example does not fully reasonable only if there are two sides to the
exhibit the dynamic character of the Hegelian question in dispute, so reason can operate dia-
dialectic. If the resulting synthesis is not the lectically only with regard to genuinely argu-
whole truth, it too must be defective and re- able matters. The familiar topics concerning
quire supplementation by a contrary which is which men disagree represent the commonplace
defective in an opposite way. These two to- issues of dialectic, since for the most part they
gether then become the material for a higher are formed from debatable propositions or ques-
synthesis, another step in that continuing dia- tions."Nobody in his senses," Aristotle be-
lectical process which is the life mind — both
of lieves,"would make a proposition of what no
the subjective dialectic of the human mind and one holds; nor would he make a problem of
the objective dialectic of the Absolute Mind or what is obvious to everybody or to most peo-
the Idea. ple." Each of the conflicting opinions will
therefore have some claim to probability. Here
The thread of common meaning which runs the dialectical process ends neither in a synthe-
through these four conceptions of dialectic is sis of incomplete opposites nor in a rejection of
to be found in the principle of opposition. In both as illusory; but, having "an eye to general
each of them dialectic either begins or ends opinion," it seeks to ascertain the more reason-
with some sort of intellectual conflict, or de- able view — the more tenable or probable of the
velops and then resolves such oppositions. two.
For Kant dialectical opposition takes the ex- In the Platonic theory of dialectic, the ele-
treme form of irreducible contradictions from ment of opposition appears in the tension be-
which the mind cannot escape. "It is a melan- tween being and becoming, the one and many,
choly reflection," he declares, "that reason in or the intelligible and the sensible, which is
its highest exercise, falls into an antithetic." found present in every stage of the mind's dia-
This comes about because "all statements enun- lectical ascent to the contemplation of ideas.
ciated by pure reason transcend the conditions So fundamental is this tension that Socrates uses
of possible experience, beyond the sphere of it to define the dialectician as one who is "able
which we can discover no criterion of truth, to see 'a One and Many' in Nature"— by com-
while they are at the same time framed in ac- prehending "scattered particulars in one idea"
cordance with the laws of the understanding, and dividing it "into species according to their
which are applicable only to experience; and natural formation." Here as in the Hegehan
thus it is the fate of all such speculative dis- theory the oppositions apparent contradic-
cussions, that while theone party attacks the tions in discourse — can be resolved by dialectic,
weaker side of his opponent, he infallibly lays and through their resolution the mind then
open his own weaknesses." rises to a higher level.
Chapter 18: DIALECTIC 351
It is only in the writings of Hegel or his fol- ment," yet it is also conceived as working
lowers that the meaning of dialectic is not towards a definite end — the revolution which
limited to the activity ot human thought. has as its result the peace of the classless society.
Hegel expressly warns that "the loftier dia- Bourgeois industry, by bringing about the con-
lectic ...is not an activity of subjective think- centration and association of the proletariat,
ing applied to some matter externally, but is produces "its own grave diggers; its fall and the
rather the matter's very soul putting forth its victory of the proletariat" are "equally inevi-
branches and fruit organically." It is the "de- table."
velopment of the Idea," which is "the proper In Marx's vocabulary the phrases "historical
activity of its rationality." If the whole world materialism" and "dialectical materialism" are
in its existence and development is the thought strictly synonymous. But Marx's protest to
and thinking of an Absolute Mind, or the Idea, the contrary notwithstanding, a comparison of
then the events of nature and of history are Marx and Hegel seems to show that a dialectic
moments in a dialectical process of cosmic pro- of history is equally capable of being conceived
portions. The principles of dialectic become in terms of spirit or of matter.
the principles of change, and change itself is The question whether there is a dialectic of
conceived as a progress or evolution from lower nature as well as a dialectic of history remains a
to higher, from part to whole, from the inde- point of controversy in Marxist thought, de-
terminate to the determinate. which Hegel's Science of Logic
spite the bearing
The dialectical pattern of history, conceived and Phenomenology of Mind might have upon
by Hegel as the progressive objectification of the question. Engels tries in his Dialectics of
spirit, is reconstructed by Karl Marx in terms Nature to give a fuller rendering of the Hege-
of the conflict of material forces. Marx himself lian dialectic in strictly materialistic terms. Its
exphcitly contrasts his dialectic with that of universal scope, including all of nature as well
Hegel. "My method," he writes, "is
dialectic as all of history, is also reflected in certain post-
not only different from the Hegelian, but is Darwinian doctrines of cosmic evolution.
its direct opposite." Hegel, he claims, thinks
that "the real world is only the external, Considerations relevant to the Hegelian or
phenomenal form of 'the Idea,' " whereas Marxist dialectic will be found in the chapters
his own view is that "the ideal is nothing on History and Progress. Without judging
else than the material world reflected by the the issues which Hegel and Marx have raised in
human mind, and translated into forms of the thought of the last century, it may be per-
thought." missible to report the almost violent intellectual
Nevertheless, with respect to dialectic, Marx aversion they have produced in certain quarters.
praisesHegel for being "the first to present its Freud, for example, is as unsympathetic in his
general form of working in a comprehensive criticism of Marx and as uncompromising in his
and conscious manner." The only trouble is rejection of dialectical materialism, as James be-
that with Hegel, dialectic "is standing on its fore him is extreme in the expression of his dis-
head." It must therefore "be turned right side taste for Hegel. Mocking "the Hegelizers" who
up again," a revolution which Marx thinks he think that "the glory and beauty of the psychic
accomplishes in his dialectical materialism. life is that in it all contradictions find their re-
Having put on its proper basis,
dialectic conciliation," James declares: "With this intel-
Marx constructs the whole of history in terms lectual temper I confess I cannot contend."
of a conflict of material forces, or of social The Hegelian dialectic and what James calls
classes ineconomic strife, according to a dialec- "the pantomime-state of mind" are, in his opin-
tical pattern which provides "recognition of ion, "emotionally considered, one and the same
the existing state of things, at the same time thing. In the pantomime all common things are
also the recognition of the negation of that represented to happen in impossible ways, peo-
state, of its inevitable breaking up." History is ple jump down each other's throats, houses turn
thus viewed dialectically "as in fluid move- inside out, old women become young men,
352 THE GREAT IDEAS
everything 'p^^-^^^ ^'''^^^ i^^ opposite' with incon- object, many and one) must first be translated
ceivable celerity and skill \nd so in the into and contradictions, then
impossibilities
Hegelian logic," James continues, "relations 'transcended' and identified by miracle, ere the
elseu here recognized under the insipid name of proper temper is induced for thoroughly en joy-
distinctions (such as that between knower and ing the spectacle they show."
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. Definitions of dialectic
^53
yj. The opposition between being and becoming, the one and the many, the same
and the other
7,b. The opposed premises of dialectical argument: dialectical problems and theses;
the conflict of probabilities
3r. The opposed conclusions of dialectical reasoning: the antinomies and paralogisms
of a transcendental dialectic
7^d. Thesis and antithesis as moments in the advance toward a dialectical synthesis
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the vohimc and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Ho.viiiR: Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates tliat llic pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 James Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower halt of page 119. When the text is
printed in tw'o columns, the letters a and b reter to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 Plato: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand sicle of page 164.
Author's Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as part, bk, ch,
sect) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d.
Bible References: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., Old Testa-
ment: Nehemiah, 7:45— (D) II Esdras, 7:46.
Symbols: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
CWSS-KEFEKENCES
For: The consideration of dialectic as logic or a part of logic, and of its relation to the other liberal
Language 7; Logic i, ib, 3-3 b; Rhetoric la.
arts, see
Other discussions of the conception of dialectic as the highest science, the supreme form of
knowledge or wisdom, see Metaphysics i; Philosophy 2b; Science ia(2); Wisdom la.
Other discussions of dialectic as a method of argument in the sphere of opinion, see Opinion
2c; Reasoning 5c; Rhetoric 40—40(3); and for matters relevant to the use of dialectic as
a method of inquiry, see Definition 4; Hypothesis i; Principle 30(2).
The role of dialectic in the philosophy of history, see History 4a(2)-4a(3); Progress la.
The discussion of the types of opposition which have significance for dialectic, see Opposi-
tion le, 2b, 2e; Reasoning 5c.
Dialectic in relation to philosophy and theology, see Metaphysics 3c; Philosophy 3c;
Theology 5.
Discussions of sophistry, and for the condemnation of dialectic as sophistry, see Logic 5;
Metaphysics 4a; Philosophy 6b; Theology 5; Truth 8e; Wisdom 3.
Chaptlr 18: DIALECTIC 357
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below arc works not included in Crcal BooI(S of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and U)pics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided HI to two groups:
•
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography ol Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of lite Great Ideas.
INTRODUCTION
IOCKE, discussing in the course of his essay power. Those whom the law binds in conscience
^ on Human Understanding "why a man rather than by its coercive force obey the law
must keep his word," notes that we meet with because it is morally right to do so. The sense
three different answers to this question. "If a of the law's moral authority is for them the
Christian be asked, he will give as reason: Be- sense of duty from which the dictates of con-
cause God, who has the power of eternal life science flow.
and death, requires it of us. But if a Hobbist be Locke's third answer — that of the ancient
asked why? he will answer: Because the public philosophers — shows that duty
is sometimes
a man, and opposite to virtue, the highest per- no superior commands the act. Here, further-
fection of human nature, to do otherwise." more, the obligation seems to be to another
With these three answers Locke introduces individual— to a person who may be our equal
us to some of the alternative views on what is — rather than to the state or God.
perhaps the central problem concerning duty. As indicated by Locke's statement of this
All three acknowledge the existence of duty ancient view, it is the honest or just man who
and the force of obligation. By accepting the acknowledges such obhgations apart from the
question they affirm the proposition that a man law or his relation to any superior. Virtue may,
must or ought to keep his word. But why ? What of course, also direct a man to act for the com-
creates the ought or obligation ? mon welfare and to obey the laws of the state
Two of the answers Locke cites — that of the or the commandments of God. But the imme-
Christian and that of the Hobbist — seem to diate source of the obligation to act in a certain
derive duty from the commands of law, the law way toward one's fellow men is placed by the
of God or of the state, in either case a law to be ancients, according to Locke, in "virtue, the
enforced by the sanctions of a superior power. highest perfection of human nature." On this
Accordingly, the citizen has duties to the state, view, virtue alone provides the motivation.
the religious man to God. Yet it does not seem Without it men would act lawfully only be-
to be entirely the case that such duties rest ex- cause of the law's coercive force. Without it
clusively on the superior power of God or the men would recognize no obligations to their
state. Men who obey either divine or civil law fellow men or to the state.
from fear of punishment alone, are said to act
not from duty but from expediency in terms — These two conceptions of duty — for the mo-
of a calculation of risks and consequences. ment grouping the Christian and Hobbist an-
Obedience to law would appear to be ac- swers together against the ancient view — may
knowledged as a duty only by those who recog- seem at first to be only verbally different. It
nize the authority of the law or the right of the seems certain that dutiful conduct would fre-
lawmaker to command. They would be willing quently be the same on either view. Yet they
to obey the law even if no external sanction do conflict with one another, and each, if
his hands off what was not his own when he when they are isolated from justice, concern
could safely take what he Hked." He could "in the well-being of the individual himself. That
all respects be like a God among men." is why only justice entails duties, which are ob-
Against this Socrates sets his conception of ligations to act in a certain way for the welfare
the "just man" who does what he ought to do of others. If the good of no other individual is
because it is just,and because justice is essential involved, it seems that a man has no duty to be
to the very life and health of the soul. Accord- temperate or courageous, even when he possesses
ing to Socrates' way of thinking, it is ridiculous these virtues.
to ask "which is the more profitable, to be just Precisely because of the essentially social
and act justly and practise virtue, whether seen character of justice, Aristotle raises the ques-
or unseen of gods and men, or to be unjust. . . . tion "whether a man can treat himself unjustly
We know that, when the bodily constitution is or not." He is willing to admit that a man can
gone, no longer endurable, though pam-
life is do justice or injustice to himself only in a meta-
pered with all kinds of meat and drinks, and phorical sense. What he calls "metaphorical jus-
having all wealth and all power; and shall we be tice" is not a relation between a man and him-
told that when the very essence of the vital self,but a relation between one part of himself
principle undermined and corrupted, life is
is and another.
still worth having to a man, if only he be al- Aquinas seems to follow Aristotle in connect-
lowed to do whatever he likes with the single ing duty with justice and with no other virtue.
exception that he is not to acquire justice and "Justice alone of all the virtues," he writes,
virtue, or to escape from injustice and vice?" "implies the notion of duty." If he also inti-
On this view, it seems to be the virtue of mates that duty may somehow enter into the
justice which lies at the root of duty or obliga- acts of other virtues — as when he says that "it
tion. But for Plato justice, though only one of is not so patent in the other virtues as it is in
the virtues, is inseparable from the other three justice" — his position still remains fundamen-
— temperance, courage, and wisdom. It is al- tally Aristotelian. Referring to that "kind of
most indifferent therefore whether one attrib- metaphorical justice" to which Aristotle ap-
utes moral obligation to the particular virtue peals in stating the sense in which a man can
of justice or to virtue in general. As the chap- treat himself unjustly, Aquinas explains how
ters on Justice and Virtue indicate, Aristotle "all the other virtues" can be said to "involve
differs from Plato, both with respect to the the duty of the lower powers to reason." Apart
virtues in general and to justice in particular. from this metaphorical duty of the passions to
For Aristotle it is justice alone, not virtue in obey reason, duty in the strict sense comes, in
general or any other particular virtue, which the opinion of Aquinas, only from the precepts
gives rise to duty or obligation. of justice, which concern the relation of one
Justice differs from the other virtues, accord- person to another.
ing to Aristotle, in that it "alone of the virtues
is thought to consider 'another's good' because On this theory, duty is not co-extensive with
it concerns the relation of a man to his neigh- morality, the sense of duty is not identical with
bor." The other virtues, such as temperance the moral sense, and specific duties obligate a
360 THE GREAT IDEAS
man to othermen even when no general law- state ? Can duty be co-extensive with morality
exists to be obeyed. Difficulty is found with if the only rules of conduct to be obeyed are
this theory by those critics who think that the laws imposed from without —
regulations which
whole of morality, not simply one part of it, have authority simply because they come from
involves duties. Does not the sense of duty one who has the right to command ? Again, as
operate, they ask, in matters whichdo not affect we shall see, Kant would say No.
any other individual or even the common good ?
Does a man, for example, have a duty to tell the We have now stated the questions about duty
truth only to others, but not to seek it for him- which raise difficulties for Aristotle and Hobbes.
self? Kant, as we shall see, holds that there are Though they differ in their theories of law and
private as well as public duties, or, in his lan- justice, as well as in their
conceptions of duty,
guage, internal duties in the realm of ethics as they seem to concur in thinking that doing
well as external duties in the realm of juris- one's duty does not exhaustively solve all moral
prudence. problems.
The Hobbist theory of duty seems to face* The same questions do not, however, seem to
The specific duties which are
similar difficulties. present difficulties to other moralists — to Kant
determined by the precepts of justice may, as and to the Stoics of antiquity, such as Marcus
we have seen, not always be the same as the Aurehus and Epictetus. On the contrary, their
specific duties imposed by civil law, though moral philosophy, by making the sphere of duty
they will be identical whenever the law of the co-extensive with the whole of the moral life,
state is itself an expression or determination of seems to prevent such questions from being
justice. But when law rather than justice is the raised.
not properly laws, but quafities that dispose he also seems to agree with Kant and the Stoics
men to peace, and to obedience," until "a Com- about the pervasiveness of duty in the realm of
monwealth is once settled," and then they be- morals. Locke's statement of the Christian posi-
come "the commands of the Commonwealth." tion, which selects one aspect of it only, may
In other words, "it is the Sovereign power that therefore be inadequate.
obliges men to obey them," and obedience, The point which unites Kant, the Stoics, and
which is said to be "part also of the law of Aquinas is agreement concerning the ex-
their
nature," is its proper expression. istence of a law which is neither enacted by the
So far the two conceptions conflict or at least state nor proclaimed by God in his revealed
diverge. But if the legal theory of duty goes no commandments. This law the Stoics speak of as
further than the enactments of the state, the "the law of reason," Aquinas calls "the natural
same question arises here as before. Does a man law," and Kant conceives to be "the moral law
have no duties apart from his relation to the within." The common conception thus vari-
— —
ously expressed is more fully treated in the every case to obey the law. It is not a duty to
chapter on Law; but that ampler discussion is persons, except as the moral law commands us
not needed to perceive that the law of reason to respect the dignity of the human person,
or of nature is a moral law, in that its general ourselves and others alike.
principles and detailed precepts govern the en- The element of a superior commanding an
tire range of moral acts. inferior seems to be present conception in this
"Morality," according to Kant, "consists in of duty through the relation of reason to the
the reference of all action to the legislation will and appetites of man. Acting dutifully con-
which alone can render a kingdom of ends pos- sists in the submission of the will to reason,
sible." By this he means that "the will is never and overcoming all contrary inclinations or
in
to act on any maxim which could not without desires. But though Kant sometimes speaks in
contradiction be also a universal law." This law these terms, he also conceives duty as carrying
is also moral in the sense that it exercises only with it an obligation to God. "The subjective
moral authority and should prevail even with- principle of a responsibility for one's deeds be-
out the support of the external sanctions which foreGod," he says, is "contained, though it be
accompany the positive commands of a supe- only obscurely, in every moral self-conscious-
rior. "The idea of duty," Kant declares, "would ness."
alone be sufficient as a spring [of action] even if Nevertheless, Kant insists that "the Christian
the spring were absent which is connected by principle of morality itself is not theological."
forensic legislation . . . namely external com- It rests, in his opinion, on the "autonomy of
pulsion." pure practical reason, since it does notmake
Making the natural or moral law^ the princi- the knowledge of God and his will the founda-
ple of duty introduces the element of obligation tion of these laws, but only of the attainment of
into every moral act. Whatever is right to do the summum bonum, on the condition of follow-
we are obliged to do in conformity to the law ing these laws, and it does not even place the
of nature or in obedience to the commands of proper spring of this obedience in the desired
the moral law. We need no external promulga- results, but solely in the conception of duty, as
tion of this law i.e., no express formulation in that of which the faithful observance alone con-
—
words by a lawgiver for this law is inherent in stitutes the worthiness to obtain those happy
reason itself. Its various maxims or precepts can consequences."
be deduced from what Aquinas calls the "first It is "through the summum homun as the
principle ... of the practical reason" and Kant object and final end of pure practical reason"
"the categorical imperative." Or, as the Stoics that, in Kant's view of Christian morality, we
say, since reason is the "ruUng principle" in pass from moral philosophy to ^'religion, that is,
man, man's duty consists in "holding fast" to it to the recognition of all duties as divine com-
and "going straight on" so that it has "what is mands.''' A Christian theologian like Aquinas,
its own." however, seems to go further than Kant in
On this theory, we are obliged in conscience equating conformity to the moral law — or the
to do whatever reason declares right, whether natural law of reason — with religious obedience
or not others are directly involved. The dis- to God. Nor does he explain this equivalence
between public and private morality
tinction by reference to the fact that God has made
between the spheres of justice and the other man's attainment of the summum bonum — or
virtues — is irrelevant to conscience. Conscience, eternal happiness — depend on his free compli-
according to Kant, functions equally in the ance with the moral law. Rather, for Aquinas,
spheres of internal and external duty. In both the natural law is "nothing else than the ra-
the realm of ethics and the realm of jurispru- tional creature's participation in the eternal
dence, conscience, applying the moral law, dic- law" of God — the "imprint on us of the divine
tates our duty in the particular case. We stand light." As God is the author of man's nature
in no different relation to ourselves and others, and reason, so is He the ultimate authority be-
since the moral law is universally and equally hind the commands of the natural law which
binding on all persons. The obligation is in He implanted in man's reason at creation.
362 THE GREAT IDEAS
For a Christian theologian Hke Aquinas, duty this, that pain hold aloof from the body, and
to God involves obedience to the moral law she in mind enjoy a feeling of pleasure exempt
which reason can discover by itself, no less than from care and fear." The hfe he describes— so
obedience to those positive commandments disciplinedand moderated that all but the
which God has revealed to man. Aquinas seems simplest pleasures are relinquished in the effort
to think that violation of the natural law is as to avoid pain — seems to leave no place for
much a sin as violation of the divine law. Both obUgation or social responsibility.
involve a rupture of that order laid down by In the much more elaborate moral philosophy
God, the one "in relation to the rule of reason, of Aristotle, virtue entails moderation in the
our actions and passions should be
in so far as all avoidance of pain as well as in the pursuit of
'
commensurate with the rule of reason, the other ' pleasure. Though he admits that "most pleas-
"in relation to the rule of the divine law." Thus, ures might perhaps be bad without qualifica-
in all moral matters, it would appear that duty tion," Aristotle claims that "the chief good,"
is, Wordsworth's phrase, "stern daughter of
in which is happiness, "would involve some
the voice of God." If the natural law commands pleasure." But even as a good, pleasure is
us to use our faculties to the ends for which they not the only good, for there are other objects
were created, then the possession of a mind im- of desire.
poses upon us what Socrates in the Apology The happy man, according to Aristotle, is
calls man's "duty to inquire." If we fail to seek one who somehow succeeds in satisfying all his
the truth, we sin against God by sinning against desires by seeking the various kinds of goods in
our nature, even though "Thou shalt seek the some order and relation to one another. Happi-
truth" is nowhere explicitly prescribed in Holy ness itself is something that "we choose always
Writ. for itself and never for the sake of something
else." Although we may also choose other things
Ethical doctrines can be classified according in some sense for themselves, such as "honor,
to the role which they assign to duty as a moral pleasure, reason, and every virtue," still they
principle. There is perhaps no more fundamen- are chosen "for the sake of happiness," since we
tal issue in moral philosophy than that between judge them as "the means by which we shall be
the ethics of duty and the ethics of pleasure or happy."
happiness. This issue obviously belongs to the In Aristotle's ethics of happiness, duty is not
chapters on Happiness and Pleasure as well entirely excluded, but neither is it given any
as the present one. All three must be read to- independent significance. As we have seen, it is
—
gether and perhaps also the chapters on De- merely an aspect of the virtue of and justice,
prominent in the ethics of duty. duty, as far as is possible, be content; and no one
At one extreme, there is the position which is able to hinder thee so that each act shall not
totally excludes the concept of duty. This fact do its duty." Man is not destined to be happy;
more than any other characterizes the Epicure- his happiness consists rather in doing what is
anism of Lucretius. The good life for him is one required of him at his post of duty in the order
where "nature craves for herself no more than of the universe. The only good is a good will,
Chapter 19: DUTY 363
a dutiful will, a will which conforms itself to the moral can therefore consist in notliing else than
law of nature. the conception of law in itself, which certainly
Kant's much more elaborate moral philos- is only [X)ssiblc in a rational being in so far as
ophy presents the same fundamental teachings. this conception, and not the expected effect,
This is indicated by the fact that he associates determines the will."
what he calls eudaetnonism {i.e., the ethics of This law, which is the source of duty and of
happiness) with hedonism {i.e., the ethics of all moral action, is Kant's famous "categorical
pleasure). Happiness, he writes, is "a rational imperative" — or, in other words, reason's un-
being's consciousness of the pleasantness of life conditional command. According to its decree,
uninterruptedly accompanying his whole ex- Kant declares, "I am never to act otherwise
istence," and its basis is "the principle of self- than so that I could also will that my maxim
love." Therefore, according to Kant, both eu- should become a universal law." By obeying
daemonism and hedonism commit the same the categorical imperative, we can know and do
Both "undermine morality and destroy
error. our duty and rest assured that our will is mos-
its sublimity, since they put the motives to ally good. "I do not, therefore, need any far-
virtue and to vice in the same class, and only reaching penetration to discern what I have to
teach us to make a better calculation." Both do," Kant writes, "in order that my will may
admit desire as a moral criterion of good and be morally good. Inexperienced in the course
evil. Both are utilitarian in that they are con- of the world, incapable of being prepared for
cerned with consequences, with means and ends. contingencies, I only ask myself: Canst
all its
Both measure the moral act by reference to the thou also will that thy maxim should be a uni-
end it serves. versal law.? If not, then it must be rejected, and
For Kant, "an action done from duty de- that not because of a disadvantage accruing
rives its moral worth, not from the purpose from it to myself, or even to others, but because
which is to be attained by it, but from the it cannot enter as a principle into a possible
action, must be done because it is right, because maintain "an opposition" between them and
the law commands it, and for no other reason. morality. But he claims that "the moment duty
The recommendation of any action solely on is in question we should take no account of
the ground that it will contribute to happiness happiness." Just as Aristotle treats duty only in
as satisfying the inclination of the person and terms of justice, so Kant considers happiness to
achieving the object of the will, is completely have a moral quality only insofar as to be
ruled out. That would be a judgment of pure worthy of it is an end set by the moral law.
expediency. Worse than not moral, it is, in the
opinion of Kant, immoral. Two OTHER voices join in this great argument
"An action done from duty," Kant writes, concerning duty and happiness. One is that of
"must wholly exclude the influence of inclina- John Stuart Mill, whose Utilitarianism recog-
tion, and with it every object of the will, so that nizes Kant as the chief opponent of an ethics of
nothing remains which can determine the will happiness. Though Mill differs from Aristotle
except objectively the law, and subjectively on many points, particularly in regard to the
pure respect for this practical law, and conse- virtues as means to happiness. Mill's answer to
quently the maxim that I should follow this Kant can be read as a defense of Aristotle as
law even to the thwarting of all my inclina- well as of his own theory.
tions. . . . The pre-eminent good which we call From Kant's point of view, they are both
364 THE GREAT IDEAS
utilitarians. They both argue in terms of means is a constant theme in the great poems. It is
and ends. They both make purely pragmatic, pivotal to the plot of most of the great love
—
not moral, judgments judgments of expedi- theme of tragedy, for in which-
stories. It is a
ency instead of judgments of right and wrong. ever direction the tension is resolved— whether
From Mill's point of view, Aristotle like him- in the line of duty (as by Aeneas forsaking
self needs no other principle of morality than Dido) or in disobedience to law (as by Adam
happiness, an ultimate end which justifies every yielding to Eve in Paradise Lost)— ruin results.
means that tends towards its reaUzation. "The The tragedy of being both rational and ani-
ultimate sanction of all morality, external mo- mal seems to consist in having to choose between
tives apart," Mill writes, "is a subjective feeling duty and desire rather than in making any par-
in our own minds." He asserts that "when once ticular choice. It may be significant, however,
the general happiness is recognized as the ethical that the tragic heroes of poetry more frequently
standard," it will appeal to "a powerful natural abandon duty than though sel-
desire or love,
sentiment." Man's nature as a social being, he dom without mortal punishment, preceded by
holds, "tends to make him feel it one of his a deep sense of their transgression. Sometimes,
natural wants that there should be harmony however, they are self-deceived, and cloak de-
between his feelings and aims and those of his sire in the guise of duty.
fellow-creatures." There is another source of tragic conflict in
This conviction, in persons who have it, the sphere of duty. Men are torn by competing
"does not present itself to their minds as a loyalties, obligations which pull them in oppo-
superstition of education, or a law despotically site directions. In the basic relationships of the
imposed by the power of society, but as an family, the duty a man owes to his parents often
attribute which it would not be well for them cannot be discharged without violating or ne-
to be without." This conviction, rather than glecting obligations to his wife. When the moral
an internal sense of obligation or fear of external law and the law of the state command contrary
sanctions imposed by a superior power, is for actions, weighed against duty in an
duty is
Mill "the ultimate sanction of the greatest hap- ordeal of conscience. Sometimes, however, one
piness morality" — which aims at the greatest obligation seems to take clear precedence over
happiness for the greatest number. another, as in the mind of Sophocles' Antigone,
Where Mill answers Kant by excluding duty for whom the king's edict loses its authority
— even from considerations of justice — Aquinas when it runs counter to the law of God. Creon
seems to develop an analysis in which every the king, not Antigone his subject, may be the
moral act can be regarded as obeying or dis- play's more tragic personage. He sacrifices a
obeying the natural law and yet, at the same dearly beloved son to uphold the authority he
time, be judged as a means which serves or fails considers it his duty as a ruler to maintain.
to serve the ultimate end of man's natural de- If man is not a rational animal or if, whatever
sire. "The order of the precepts of the natural his nature, reason is not its ruling principle,
law is," in the words of Aquinas, "according to then the sense of duty would appear to be an
the order of natural inclinations." The dilemma imposture that draws its driving force from
set up by the opposition between duty and the emotional energies with which certain man-
happiness seems to be denied, or at least avoided, made rules of conduct are invested. Rather than
by a theory which finds a perfect parallelism acting as a counterweight to desire, duty is
between the precepts of natural law and the itself the shape which certain desires take to
objects of natural desire, a parallelism resulting combat others.
fromi their common source in the creation of Conscience, or the super-ego, according to
human nature by God. Freud, born of the struggle between the ego
is
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. The concept of duty or obligation: its moral significance 366
2. Comparison of the ethics of duty with the ethics of happiness, pleasure, or utility
3. The di\isionsofduty: internal and external duty; the realms ofethics and jurisprudence 367
5. The derivation of duty from divine, natural, and civil law, and from the categorical
imperative of reason
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred For example, in 4 Homer: Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d, the
to.
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upperandlower halves of the page. For example, in 53 ]ames: Psychology, 116a-l 19b, the passage
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 Plato: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
Author's Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as part, bk, ch,
sect) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d.
Bible References The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
:
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g.. Old Testa-
—
ment: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) // Esdras, 7:46.
Symbols: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 235a-b; 236b-239a / 2b3c / Fllectra 327a-339a,c / Phoenician Maid-
Fund. Prin. Metaph\sic of Morals, 256a-257d; ens [1625-1766J 392b-393d
258d-264a; 265b; 267b-d; 280d-281a; 282b- 6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, bk ii,
283d; 286a c / Practical Reason, 297a-319b 397d-398c
esp 298a-300a, 304d-307d; 325a-331a; 338c- 7 Plato: Euthydemus, 70d-71b / Meno, 183a-b
355d esp 345d-347a / Pref Metaphysical Ele- / Apology, 206b-d / Crito 213a-219a,c / Re-
ments of Ethics, 365b-366d; 369c-373b / Intro. public, BK VH, 390b-391b
Metaphysic of Morals, 387b-388a; 389a- 12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk i, ch 5 llOb-c
390a, c / Science of Right, 446b-c / Judgement, 12 Aurelius: Meditations, bk vih, sect 32
478a-479c; 584d-587a; 588b [fn 2]; 591b-592a; 287d-288a
594c-596c; 605d-606b [fn 2] 14 Plutarch: Marcus Cato 276b,d-290d esp
43 Mill: 296a-297b / Utilitarianism
Liberty, 282a / Cato the Younger 620a-648a,c esp
445a-476a,c esp 457c-461c, 464d-476a,c 626d-627b, 632b-c
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part ii, par 124 22 Chaucer: Knight's Tale [859-1004] 174a-
44b-d; par 134-135 47b-d; additions, 85-87 176b
129b-d 25 Montaigne: Essays, 301d-303c; 467d-468b
53 James: Psychology, 813a-814a 26 Shakespeare: As You Li^e It, act ii, sc hi
54 Freud: Civilization and Its Discontents, 800c- [56-65] 605a
801b 29 Cervantes: Dow Quixote, part i, 81b-88b
32 Milton: Comus [170-229] 37a-38b / Paradise
3. The divisions of duty: internal and external Lost, BK HI [194-197] 139b
duty; the realms of ethics and jurispru- 42 Kant: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morali^
dence 253d-254b / Practical Reason, 325c-327d;
7 Plato: Gorgias, 269d-270c 333a-334a / Pref Metaphysical Elements of
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 16, Ethics, 37 5a-h / Judgement, 593a-d; 599b-d
a 4, rep 3 97a-c 43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 458b-461c esp 458b-c
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 310a-314a esp
99, A 5, ans 249a-250a; q 100, a 2, rep 2 310c-d, 314a; 592b-c
252b-253a 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk vh, 275a; bk x,
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part i, 95d-96a 465c-467a; bk xi, 513d-514d; 527b-528b
25 Montaigne: Essays, 7a 53 James Psychology, 807a-808a
:
5 Aristophanes: Clouds [791-885] 498b-499b; 41 Gibson: Decline and Fall, 82b-84a; 86b-
[1321-1451] 504c-506b 42 Kant: Science of Right, 404d; 419a-422d esp
6 Herodotus: History, bk ii, 56c; bk hi, 104c- 419b-c, 420a-d; 445c-446a
105a; BK viii, 281c 43 Mill: Liberty, 317c-318a
7 Plato: Latvs, bk iv, 683b-c; bk xi, 779b- 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 174
781c / Seventh Letter, 803d-804a 61b; additions, hi 134d-135a / Philosophy of
9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk viii, ch 9 [1159^25- History, part i, 211c-213a
1160^9] 411d-412b; ch 10 [ii6o^23]-ch ii 51 Tolstoy: War and
Peace, bk vi, 249b-d;
[1161^29] 413a-c / Politics, bk i, ch 12-13 267c-d; bk vi-vii, 271c-276b; bk vii, 291a-
453d-455a,c 292b; 301b-302d; bk viii, 305b-307a
14 Plutarch: Agis, 654c-655a 54 Freud: Interpretation of Dreams, 244a-c /
18 Augustine: Confessions, bk ii, par 3-8 9b- New Introductory Lectures, 876c
lOd; BK XIII, par 47, 123d/ City of God, bk
XIX, CH 14-16, 520c-522a 10. Political obligation: cares, functions, loy-
alties
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q
105, A 4 318b-321a Old Testament: Exodus, 20:13-17 / Leviticus,
22 Chaucer: Tale of Man of Laiv [4701-4707] 19:9-20,32-37; 25:14-55 / Numbers, 35 /
239a / Wife of Bath's Prologue [5583-6410] Deuteronomy, 5:17-21; 15; 17:8-20; 19; 22:1-
256a-269b esp [5893-5914] 261a-b, [6385-6410] 4; 23:15-25; 24:10-13; 27:17-19,24-25 / Prov-
269a-b / Tale of Wife of Bath [6619-6627] erbs, 3:27-28; 16:10-15; 28:15-18; 29:2,4,12,
273a-b / Cler}(s Tale 296a-318a esp [9053- 14 / Jeremiah, 29:7— (Z)) Jeremias, 29:7 /
9088] 317a-318a / Merchant's Tale 319a-338a Zechariah, 8:16-17— (Z)) Zacharias, 8:16-17
esp [9249-9266] 321a / Franklin's Tale [11,041- New Testament: Matthew, 5:21-24; 22:17-21 /
iio] 351b-352b / Tale of Melibeus, par Marl{, 12:14-17 / Lul{e, 20:20-26 / Romans,
13-16 404b-407b / Parson's Tale, par 79-80, 13:1-7 / Titus, 3:1 / I Peter, 2:13-19
541a-b 4 Homer: Iliad, bk ix [1-172] 57a-58d
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part ii, 109c-110b; 121a; 5 Aeschylus: Seven Against Thebes [1-77] 27a-
155b 28a
24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, bk hi, 5 Sophocles: Oedipus the King [1-77] 99a-d /
219b-222b Antigone [631-680] 136c-137a / Phtloctetes
25 Montaigne: Essays, 184a-191c; 410a-422b; 182a-195a,c
427d-430a 5 Euripides: Suppliants [297-331] 261a-b /
26 Shakespeare: Comedy of Errors, act ii, sc Iphigenia at Aulis [1368-1401] 437c-d
372 THE GREAT IDEAS 10
29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, part ii, 331a-
(10. Political obligation: cares, functions, loyal- 336a; 340b-343a; ^345a-348c; 352b-356d;
ties.)
360d-364a; 366d-369b
6 Herodotus: History, bk vii, 223c-d; 239a-c 30 Bacon: Advancement of Lear?7ing, la-2c; 24b;
6 Thucydides Peloponnesian War, bk i, 355b-c;
: 74b-75a
359b-360c; 370d; 378c-d; bk ii, 395d-399a; 31 Spinoza: Ethics, part iv, prop 51, schol
402b-c; 403b-c; 406a-407b; bk hi, 430c; 439d
432c-d; bk vi, 513a; bk vii, 555d-556a 32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk ii )6] 120b-
Plato: Apology, 206a-d / Crito 213a-219a,c 121a / Samson Agonistes [843-902] 358a-
esp 216d-219a,c / Republic, bk iv, 342a'd; 359a
344a; bk vii, 390b-391b; 401a-b / Seventh 35 Locke: Toleration, 3a: 16c-18c / Civil Gov-
Letter, 802b-804b; 814b-c ernment, CH II, SECT 4-6 25d-26c; ch vi, sect
Aristotle: Rhetoric, bk ii, ch 17 [1391^20-26] 57-63 36d-38c; ch vih, sect 96-98 47a-c;
638c-d sect 1 13-122 51b-53c; ch ix, sect 128-
Epictetus: Discourses, bk i, ch 23 128c-d; 131 54b-d; ch xi, sect 134-135 55b-56b; ch
bk III, CH 22 195a-201a XH, sect 143 58c-d; ch xih-xix 59b-81d
Aurelius: Meditations, bk hi, sect 4 260b- passim
261a; bk ix, sect 42 295c'296a,c 36 Swift: Gulliver, part ii, 75b
Virgil: Aeneid, bk hi [90-98] 149b; bk iv 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk hi, 12d-
[189-278] 172a-174b; bk vi [845-853] 233b- 13c; BK XI, 68b,d-75a; bk xii, 93c-95b
234a 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 356b'359a; 366c-d /
Plutarch: Lycurgtis 32a-48d esp 45a-c, Political Economy 367a-385a,c passim, esp
48a-b / Ntima Pompilius, 51c-52b / Sohn, 369c, 370b-373b, 377b-c / Social Contract,
71d / Marcus Cato 276b,d-290d esp 282a / BK I, 388c-391b; 392b-393c; bk h, 396d-
Crassus-Nicias, 455d-456d / Agesilaus, 480b,d- 398b; BK HI, 414d; 419a; 421c-423a; bk iv,
481a; 486d-487b / Cato the Younger 620a- 427b
648a,c esp 626d-627b, 632b-c / Cleomenes, 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, bk v, 303b-
659d-660a / Galba, 859a-b 304c
Tacitus: Annals, bk ii, 32b-d / Histories, 40 Gibbon: Decliiie and Fall, 130b-d; 242c-246c
BK I, 211c-212b; bk ii, 234b-235a passim; 288b-289a; 292b-d; 338d-339c;
Augustine: Confessions, bk hi, par 15 17a-b/ 342a-c; 577c-d; 630d
City of God, bk xix, ch 6 514b-515a 41 Gibbon: Decli?ie and Fall, 102d-103a; 504c-
Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-h, q 13, 505a
A 5, REP 3 675c-676b 42 Kant: Science of Right, 433a-b; 438d-439a;
Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 61, 457a-458a,c
A 5, rep 3 58b-59d; q 96, aa 4-6 233a- 43 Declaration of Independence: la-3b pas-
235d; Q 105, AA 1-3 307d-318b sim
Dante: Divine Comedy, purgatory, vi [76- 43 Articles of Confederation: 5a-9d passim
151] 61c-62c 43 Constitution of the U.S.: lla-20d passim
Machiavelli: Prince, ch ix-x 14c-16d pas- 43 Federalist: number 40, 130c-132a; num-
sim; CH xiv 21b-22a; ch xvh, 24a-b; ch ber 44, 147a-b; number 62, 190a-b; num-
XVIII, 25a-b; ch xxi, 32d-33a ber 65 198a-200c passim; number 70, 212c-
HoBBEs: Leviathan, part i, 86c-96b; part 213c; NUMBER 75, 223c-d; number 76, 225d-
H, 101a-104d; 110b-117b; 132b-136b; 138c-d 226b; number 85, 256d-257a
143c-d; 152d-160a; 164a,c; part hi, 165a 43 Mill: Liberty, 272b-c: 290d-291a; 302d-303a;
199b-204a; 245c-246a,c; part iv, 270c-d 317c-319d / Representative Government, 348c;
273b-c; conclusion 279a-283a,c 350a; 355b-362c; 392b-393c; 401a-406a;
Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, bk hi, 410a-d; 436b-c; 439b-c
127b,d-130a; 131b,d-133b 44 Boswell: Johnson, i45b; 247c-d; 355b-d;
Montaigne: Essays, 7a-d; 24c-25c; 48a-51a 379b-c
passim; 67c-d; 303a-c; 381a-388c esp 383c-d, 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par
386b-d; 486b-488b 290-296 97d-99b; par 299 99c-100b: par 309-
Shakespeare: Richard II, act v, sc ii [71]- 311 103b-104a; par 324 107a-d / Philosophy of
sc III [146] 347a-349c / 1st Henry IV, act i, History, intro, 171b-c; part i, 211b-214d;
sc II [218-240] 437c-d; act hi, sc ii [93-161] part iv, 342c-d; 365b-c
453d-454c / 2nd Henry IV, act iv, sc v 494b- 47 Goethe: Faust, part ii [10,252-259] 249b-
496d; act v, sc ii [35-145] 498b-499b; sc v 250a; [10,455-500] 254b-255b
[60-75] ^^2a / Henry V, act iv, sc i [123-301] 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk ii, 89b-d; bk v,
552d-554c 206d-207a; 232a-234a esp 233b-234a; bk ix,
27 Shakespeare: Coriolanus, act ii, sc iii 365d-366a; bk xi. 475b 476c; epilogue i,
366a-369a: act v, sc iii [93-209] 388a-389b / 668a-669c; 670d-671ci
Henry VHL act i, sc 11 [18-102] 552d-553d 54 Freud: War an^l Death, 757b-c
11 Chapter 19: DUTY 373
12 Ltjcrktius: Nature of Things, bk vi [56-79)
1 1. Duty to God: piety and worship 81a b
Old Testament: Genesis, 4:2-5; 8:18-22; 12:7-8; 12 Lpictetus: Discourses, i, ch 16 121d 122d;
ijk
13:1-4; 22:1-19 esp 22:18; 28:18-22 / Exodus, ch 27, 132c-133a; bk ch 16, 158b-d; bk
ii,
12-13: 35-40 / Letiticus passim, csp 1-7, 16, HI, CH 24 203c 210a; bk iv, ch 3 224b d; cii
23 / Numbers, 9:1-14; 19 / Deuteronomy, 6; 8; 12 242d 244a
10-12; i\.i!.\-i-i^ I Joshua, 22:1-6; 24:14-28 — 12 At kklius: Meditations, bk i, sect 17 255d-
(D) ]osue, 22:1-6; 24:14-28 / Judges, 11:28- 256d; bk ii, sect 13 258c; bk v, sect 7 269d;
40 / / Samuel, 15:10-35 —
(D) / Kings, 15:10- bk IX, SECT 291a-c; sect 40 295b
I
35 / U
Kings, 12:1-16— (D) IV Kings, 12:1-16 13 Virgil: Aeneid, bk v [42-103] 188a-190a
/ / Chronicles, 16:29— (D) / Vuralipome- 14 Plutarch: Aeinilius Paulus, 214b-d
non, 16:29 / // Chronicles, 1-7; 29-31 (D) — 15 Tacitus: Histories, bk iv, 282d-283b
// Paralipomenon, 1-7; 29-31 / Ezra—{D) 16 Kepler: Harmonies of the World, 1011a
I Esdras / Nehemiah —
{D) II Esdras / Psalms 18 Augustine: Confessions, bk i, par 4 2a; bk
passim / Ecclesiastes, 5:2-7; 12:13 (D) ^^' — HI, par 15 17a-b / City of God, bk vii, ch
clesiastes, 5:1-6; 12:13 / Isaiah, 1:11-20— (D) 27 31 259c 262a; bk x, ch 1-7 298b,d-303a;
Isaias, 1:11-20 / Daniel, 9 / Micah, 6:8 (D) — CH 16 308b-309c; ch 19 310d-311b; bk xix,
Micheas, 6:8 CH 14-16, 520c-522a; ch 19 523b-d / Christian
Apocrypha: Tobit, 4:5-11,19; 12:8-10— (D) OT, Doctrine, bk i, ch 10 627b; ch 22-30 629b-
Tobias, 4:6-12,20; 12:8-10 / Judith, 4; 8-9— 633b
(D) OT, Judith, 4; 8-9 / Ecclesiasticus, 18:22- 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 63,
24; 35:4-12 — (D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 18:22- A I, ans 325c-326c; part i-ii, q 19, a 5, rep
24; 35:6-15 / Baruch, i; 4:1-3 (D) OT, — 1-2 705d-707a; a 6, ans and rep 2 707a-708a;
Baruch, i; 4:1-3 / Bel and Dragon, 2-28 (D) — Q 21, A 4 719d-720a,c
OT, Daniel, 14:1-27 / / Maccabees, 4:38-61 — 20 Aquinas: Sumtna Theologica, part i-ii, q 91,
(D) OT, I Machabees, 4:38-61 AA 4-5 210c-212c; q 96, a 4 233a-d; qq 98-
New Testament: Matthew, 4:1-11; 5:33-36; 108 239b-337d; part ii-ii, q 4, a 7, rep 3
6:1-8,16-18; 18:23-35; 22:21,34-40 /
7:21; 407d-409a; q 16 454c-456d; q 22 480d-482c;
MarJ{, 12:28-34 / Luf{e, 2:21-24; 4:1-13; 9:23- q 44 592d-598c; qq 183-189 625a-700d; part
26,57-62; 10:25-42; 17:7-10; 18:1-14; 20:25 HI, Q 25 839c-845a
/ Acts, 5:17-32; 20:22-24 / Romans, 12-13 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, purgatory, xiii
/ Ephesians, 4 esp 4:17-32 / Colossians, 3 / [103-129] 73a-b; xvii [82]-xviii [75] 79b-80c;
/ Timothy, 2:1-8 / // Timothy / Ja?7ies, 5:13- xxx-xxxi 99b-102b; paradise, hi [i]-v [87]
18 / I John esp 2:3-11, 2:15, 3:23, 4:7-5:5/ 109b-113a passim; vii [25-33] 115c; [64-102]
II John 115d-116a; xxvi [115-117] 147a
4 Ho.mlr: Iliad, bk i [206-222] 5b; bk ix [485- 22 Chaucer: Second Nim's Tale [15,829-16,021]
514] 62a-b; bk xxiv [424-431] 175d / Odyssey, 468a-471b
BK XIII [125-184] 256b-257a 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part i, 80c; part ii,
5 Aeschylus: Suppliant Maidens la-14a,c esp 137b-138b; part ii-iii, 159d-167b; part hi,
[600-709] 8d-10b / Agamemnon [369-398] 177c-180d; 198a-207b; 240a-246a,c; part iv,
56a-b Ewnenides [490-565] 86b-87a
/ 261d-262a
5 SopiiocLr.s: Oedipus the King [863-910] 25 Montaigne: Essays, 152b-156d; 233a-b
107b-c / Oedipus at Colonus [461-509] 118b-d 26 Shakespeare: Richard II, act i, sc ii [1-41]
/ Antigone 131a-142d esp [441-470] 134d- 322d-323a
135a, [1347-1353] 142d / Ajax [748-779] 27 Shakespeare: Hetiry VIII, act hi, sc ii
149c-d; [1316-1421] 154b-155a,c / Electra [4^5-457] 573c-d
[1058-1097] 164d-165a / Philoctetcs [1440- 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 80b-81a;
1444] 195a,c lOOd'lOla
5 Euripides: Suppliants 258a-269a,c esp [1-41] 31 Descartes: Meditations, 69b
258a'b, [513-563] 262d-263b / Electra [167- 31 Spinoza: Ethics, part v, prop 41 462d-463b
212] 328c-d / Bacchantes 3^0a-3S2a,c / Hecuba 32 Milton: Sonnets, xvi 66b-67a / Paradise Lost
[799-805] 359d 93a-333a csp bk i [242-283] 98b'99b, bk iv
5 Aristophanes: Birds 542a-563d csp [1170- [411-439] 161b-162a, [720-739] 168a-b, bk v
1266] 557b-558b [136-210] 178a-179b, [506-543] 186a-187a, bk
6 Herodotus: History, rk v, 171d-172a; bk vi, VII [449-518] 227a-228b, bk viii [311-333]
201d-202c; bk viii, 282b-c; bk ix, 308a-c 239a-b, [630-643] 246a, bk ix [647-654] 261b,
7 Plato: Euthyphro 191a-199a,c / Apology, BK XI [133-161] 302a'b, BK XII [386-410]
206b-d / Timaeus, 447a / Laivs, bk iv, 682d- 327b-328a / Sajnson Agonistes [1334-1409]
683b; bk x, 769c-771b 368b-370a / Areopagitica, 402a-b
8 Aristotle: Topics, bk 1, ch ii [105^2-6] 148c 33 Pascal: Provincial Letters, 78b-80b / Pensees,
9 Aristotle: Politics, bk vii, ch 9 [i329'*26-34] 476 256b-257a; 482 258a; 489,491 259a; 539
533d 265b
d
CWSS-KEFEKENCES
For: Other discussions of the issue between the ethics of duty and the ethics of happiness or pleas-
ure, see Pleasure and Pain 6-6a, 8b.
Happiness 3;
Matters relevant to Desire 2b, 3a; Good and Evil 3a-3b(2); Justice le-if,
this issue, see
4; Law 3a(i), 4-4a, 4C-4d; Temperance 3; Virtue and Vice id, 6a; Will 8b(2), 8c-8d.
Other treatments of conscience, both psychological and ethical, see Honor 2a; Punishment
5c; Sin 5; Temperance 3.
The consideration of duty in relation to law, justice, and rights, see God 3d; Justice le, 3,
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great BooJ^s of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
J. Butler. Fifteen Sermons upon Human Nature, in, Nietzsche. The Genealogy of Morals, 11
X, XIII Bren lANo. The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and
T. Reid. Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Wrong, par i-i 3
Mind, III, PART III, CH 5-8 Spencer. The Principles of Ethics, vol h, part iv,
D. Stewart. Outlines of Moral Philosophy, i'art ii, ch 9-29; part v-vi
CH 2 Dewey. "The Idea of Obligation," in Outlines of a
J. G. Fichte. The
Vocation of Man, part hi Critical Theory of Ethics
Wordsworth. Ode to Duty . The Study of Ethics, ch 7-8
Bentham. Deontology BosANQUET. Science and Philosophy, 16
Whewell. The Elements of Morality, bk ii, ch 5-12; Croce. The Philosophy of the Practical, part i, sect
BK V, CH 2, 10-17 ii; part ii, sect i (iv); sect ii (i); part hi (iv)
INTRODUCTION
THE great books assembled in this set are
offered as means to a liberal or general
Plato's Republic, Aristotle's Politics, Augustine's
Christian Doctrine, Bacon's Advancement of
education. The authors of these books were Learning, Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations,
educated men; more than that, they typified Hegel's Philosophy of Right, and the psychologi-
the ideal of education in their various epochs. cal writings of James and Freud. But in no case
As their writings reveal, their minds were large- is education the principal theme of these books,
ly formed, or at least deeply impressed, by as it is for most of the works cited in the Hst of
reading the works of their predecessors. Many Additional Readings, among which will be
of them were related as teacher and student, found treatises on education by authors in this
sometimes through personal contact, sometimes set.
ing in Gargantua's letter to Pantagruel. Some- some of the special questions which together
times they report the way in which other men make up the complex problem of education.
were trained to greatness, as does Plutarch; For example, the nature of teaching and learn-
or, like Gibbon, Hegel, and Mill, they de- ing is examined in the wider context of psy-
scribe and comment on the historic systems of chological considerations concerning man's
education. abilities, theway in which knowledge is ac-
In still other instances the great books con- quired, and how it is communicated by means
tain sections or chapters devoted to the ends of language or other symbols. Different con-
and means of education, the order of studies, ceptions of the nature of man and of the rela-
the nature of learning and teaching, the train- tion of his several capacities surround the ques-
ing of statesmen and citizens; as for example, tion of the ends of education. In this context
376
—
questions also arise concerning the parts of takes precedence over individual ha|)pincss,
education — the training of man's body, the then education must be directed to training
formation of his character, the cultivation of men for the role they play as parts of a larger
his mind— and how these are related to one organism. Education then serves the purpose of
another. preserving the state. Of all things, Aristotle
The whole theory of the virtues and of habit "that which contributes most to the per-
says,
education," Plato writes, "the answer is easy could procure of the so-called liberal arts, I,
that education makes good men, and that good the vile slave of vile affections, read by myself
men act nobly, and conquer their enemies in and understood ? . For I had my back to the
. .
battle, because they are good." Men should light, and my face to the things enUghtened;
enter upon learning. Bacon declares, in order whence my face, with which I discerned the
"to give a true account of their gift of reason, things enlightened, was not itself enlightened.
to the benefit and use of men"; while William Whatever was written, either on rhetoric, or
lames stresses the need for "a perfectly-rounded logic, geometry, music and arithmetic, by my-
development." Thus it would seem to be a self without much difficulty or any instructor,
common opinion in all ages that education I understood. Thou knowest, O Lord my God;
should seek to develop the characteristic ex- because both quickness of understanding and
cellences of which men are capable and that its acuteness in discerning, is Thy gift; yet did I
ultimate ends are human happiness and the not thence sacrifice to Thee." Wherefore, Au-
welfare of society. gustine concludes concerning this stage of his
Within this area of general agreement there learning, "it served not to my use but to my
are, of course, differences which
from the
result perdition." But Augustine does not therefore
different views that are taken of man's relation conclude that, under no circumstances, can
to the state or to God. If the good of the state liberal education be put to good use. In his
378 THE GREAT IDEAS
treatise On Christian Doctrine, he considers in industry —
the training they may need to per-
detail how the Uberal arts, which serve so well form these functions does not fully develop
in the study of Sacred Scripture, may also serve their common humanity. It is not adequate to
to bring the soul to God. make them good as men, as citizens, or as
children of God.
Such differences do not, however, annul The traditional meaning of the word "lib-
one consequence of the general agreement, eral" as applied to education entails a distinc-
namely, the conception that education is con- tion between free men and slaves. Slaves, like
cerned with the vocation of man, and pre- domesticated animals, are trained to perform
pares him in thought and action for his purpose special functions. They are not treated as ends,
and station in life. In these terms Adam Smith but as means, and so they are not educated for
argues for a minimum general education. He their own good, but for the use to which they
claims that "a man without the proper use of are put. This is true not only of slaves in the
man, is, if pos-
the intellectual faculties of a strict sense of household chattel; it is also true
sible, more contemptible than even a coward, of all the servile classes in any society which
and seems to be mutilated and deformed in a divides its human
beings into those who work
still more essential part of the character of and those who live off the work
in order to live
human nature." He explicitly points out that of others and who therefore have the leisure in
this is the condition of "the great body of the which to strive to live well.
people," who, by the division of labor, are con- In accordance with these distinctions, Aris-
fined in their employment "to a few very sim- totle divides education into "liberal" and "il-
ple operations," in which the worker "has no liberal." Certain subjects are illiberal by na-
occasion to exert his understanding, or to exer- ture, namely, "any occupation, art, or science,
cise his invention in finding out expedients for which makes the body or soul of the freeman
removing difficulties which never occur." The less fit for the practice or exercise of virtue."
result, according to Smith, is that "the torpor In this category Aristotle includes "those arts
of his mind renders him, not only incapable which tend to deform the body, and likewise
of relishing or bearing a part in any rational allpaid employments, for they absorb and
conversation, but of conceiving any generous, degrade the mind."
noble, or tender sentiment, and consequently It is not only the nature of the subject, but
of forming any just judgment concerning also the end which education serves, that de-
many even of the ordinary duties of private termines whether its character is liberal or
life." illiberal. Even a liberal art becomes, in Aris-
When the vocation of man is thus under- totle's opinion, "menial and servile . . . if done
stood, a general or liberal education is voca- for the sake of others." A man's education "will
tional in that it prepares each man for the com- not appear iUiberal" only so long as "he does
mon conditions and callings of human life. In or learns anything for his own sake or for the
this sense specialized training, which by im- sake of his friends, or with a view to excel-
plication at least seems to be the object of lence." In other words, to be liberal, education
Smith's criticism, is not vocational. It fits a must serve the use of leisure in the pursuit of
man only for some specialized function, ac- excellence. It must treat man as an end, not as
cording to which he or his social class is differ- a means to be used by other men or by the
entiated from some other man or class. state.
In our day, the word "vocational" is used It follows that any society which abolishes
in the opposite sense to mean specialized train- the distinction of social classes and which calls
ing, whether it is preparation for the least all men to freedom, should conceive education
skilled of trades or for the most learned of as essentially liberal and for all men. It should,
professions. Since all men are not called to the furthermore, direct education, in all its parts
practice of law or medicine — any more than all and phases, to the end of each man's living well
are called to productive work in the various rather than to the end of his earning a living
arts and crafts, or the tasks of commerce and for himself or others.
Chapter 20: EDUCATION 379
In the classification of the kinds of educa- ing of the soul." Gymnastic as well as music, he
tion, the word "Hberal" is frequently used in a claims, has "in view chiefly the improvement
more restricted sense to signify not all education of the soul," <nul he considers the two as bal-
designed for free men, but only the improve- ancing antl tempering one another.
ment of the mind through the acquisition of Whether they produce competence in gym-
knowledge and skill. In this sense liberal educa- nastic or athletic feats, or, like the
manual arts,
tion is set apart from physical education which proficiency in productive work, all bodily skills,
concerns bodily health and proficiency, and even the simplest, involve the senses and the
moral education which concerns excellence in mind as well as bones and muscles. They are
action rather than in thought. no less than music or logic. Apart from their
arts
These divisions are clearly made, perhaps for utility, they represent a certain type of human
the first time, in Plato's Republic. The educa- excellence, which will be denied only by those
tion described there begins in the early years who can see no difference between the quality
with music and gymnastic. Gymnastic "pre- of a racehorse and the skill of his rider. Whether
sides over the growth and decay of the body." these skills as well as other useful arts are part of
Music, which includes literature as well as the liberal education in the broader sense depends,
arts ofharmony and rhythm, is said to educate as we have seen, on the end for which they are
its students "by the influence of habit, by taught or learned. Even the arts which are
harmony making them harmonious, by rhythm traditionally called liberal, such as rhetoric or
rhythmical," and its function is to develop logic,can be degraded to servility if the sole
moral as well as aesthetic sensibilities. motive for becoming skilled in them is wealth
The second part of Plato's curriculum, won by success in the law courts.
"which leads naturally and draws
to reflection"
"the soul towards being," consists in the mathe- In the two traditional distinctions so far dis-
matical arts and sciences of arithmetic, geome- cussed, "liberal education" seems to have a
try, music, and astronomy. The program is somewhat different meaning when it signifies
capped by the study of dialectic, to which all the opposite of servile training and when it
the rest is but "a prelude"; for "when a person signifies the opposite of moral cultivation. In
starts on the discovery of the absolute by the the first case, the distinction is based upon the
light of reason only,and without any assistance purpose of the education; in the second, it
of sense, and perseveres until by pure intelli- refers to the faculties or functions being cul-
gence he arrives at the perception of the ab- tivated. When the second is stated in terms of
solute good, he at last finds himself at the end the distinction between the intellectual and
of the intellectual world." the moral virtues, liberal {i.e., intellectual)
Up to this point, the program can be taken education is conceived as aiming at good habits
as liberal education in the narrow sense of learn- of thinking and knowing, and moral education
ing how and what to think. The fifteen years of is thought of as aiming at good habits of will,
experience in civic affairs and the tasks of gov- desire, or emotion, along with their conse-
ernment, which Plato interposes at the age of quences in action.
thirty-five, seem to function as another phase Although he does not use these terms, Mon-
of moral training. This period provides "an taigne seems to have the contrast between
opportunity of trying whether, when they are moral and intellectual training in mind when
drawn all manner of ways by temptation, they he criticizes the education of his day for aiming
will stand firm or flinch." "at nothing but to furnish our heads with
To the extent that physical training aims, knowledge, but not a word of judgment and
beyond health, at the acquirement of skill in virtue." It is, to him, a "pedantic education,"
a coordinated use of one's body, it can be an- which not only fails to achieve the highest edu-
nexed to liberal rather than moral education. cational purpose, but also results in a great
Plato notes, for example, that gymnastic should evil, in that "all knowledge is hurtful to him
not be too sharply distinguished from music who has not the science of goodness."
as "the training of the body" from the "train- A too sharp separation of the intellectual
380 THE GREAT IDEAS
and the moral may be questioned, or at least cal theories of the good man and the good life,
qualified, by those who, like Socrates, tend to and according to differing enumerations
and
identify knowledge and virtue. Yet they sel- definitions of the virtues. It will differ
even
dom go to the opposite extreme of supposing more fundamentally according to whether the
that no distinction can be made between the primary emphasis is placed on pleasure and
task of imparting knowledge to the mind and happiness or duty. The parties to this basic
that of forming character. Socrates, for exam- issue in moral philosophy, which is discussed
ple, in the Meno, recognizes that a man cannot in the chapters on Duty and Happiness, in-
be made temperate, courageous, or just in the evitably propose different ways of forming
same way that he can be taught geometry. good character— by strengthening the will in
From another point of view, the notion of obedience to law, or by habituating the ap-
moral training is questioned by those who, like petites to be moderate or reasonable in their
Freud, think that the patterns of human desire inclinations.
or emotion can be beneficially changed apart On either theory,
the basic problem of moral
from moral discipline. It is the object of psy- education whether morality can be taught
is
choanalysis, he writes, "to strengthen the ego, and how. The Greeks formulated this question
to make it more independent of the super-ego, in terms of virtue, by asking whether such
to widen its field of vision, and so to extend its things as courage and temperance are at all
organization that it can take over new portions teachable, as geometry and horsemanship
of the id." To do this is radically to alter the plainly are. The problem remains essentiallv
individual's behavior-pattern. "It is reclama- the same if the question is how the will can be
tion work," Freud says, "like the draining of trained. Can it be trained by the same methods
the Zuyder Zee." Emotional education, so as those which work in the improvement of the
—
conceived, is therapeutic more like preven- understanding ?
tive and remedial medicine than moral training. The answer to the question, whichever way
Religious education is usually regarded as it is formulated, depends on the view that is
both intellectual and moral, even as the science taken of the relation between moral knowl-
of theology is said to be both speculative and edge and moral conduct. Do those who under-
admonition of St. James,
practical. Citing the stand the principles of ethics or who know the
"Be ye doers of the word, and not hearers moral law necessarily act in accordance with
only," Aquinas holds that religious education their knowledge ? Can a man know what is good
is concerned with the knowledge not only of or right to do in a particular case, and yet do
"divine things" but also of the "human acts" the opposite? St. Paul seems to suggest this
by which man comes to God. Since man is when he says,"For the good that I would I do
infinitely removed from God, he needs for this not: but the evil which I would not, that I do."
purpose the grace ot God, which, according to If something more than knowledge or straight
Aquinas, "is nothing short of a partaking of the thinking is needed for good conduct, how is it
divine nature." acquired and how can one man help another to
Both on the side of man's knowledge of God acquire it ? Certainly not by learning and teach-
and on the side of his love and worship of God, ing in the ordinary sense which applies to the
religious education involves the operation of arts and sciences. Then how —
by practice, by
supernatural factors — revelation, grace, sacra- guidance or advice, by example, by rewards and
ments. Hence God is Himself the primary punishments; or if by none of these, then by a
source of religious education. But as the dis- gift of nature or by the grace of God }
penser of the sacraments whereby "grace is in- These questions are necessarily prior to any
strumentally caused," the church, according to discussion of the role of the family, the state,
Aquinas, functions instrumentally in the serv- and the church moral training.
in the process of
ice of the divine teacher. They background for
also provide the general
the consideration of particular influences on
The conception of the means and ends of character formation in men and children, such
moral education will differ with different ethi- things as poetry and music, or laws and cus-
Chapter 20: EDUCATION 381
toms. All of these related problems of moral tract Concerning the Teacher, between tiic art
education have a political aspect, which ap- oi teaching and the art oi healing. Both are co-
pears in the issue concerning the state's right operative arts, arts which succeed only as "min-
to censor or regulate the arts for morality's isters of nature which is the principal actor,"
sake; in the question of the primacy of the and not by acting, like the art of the cobbler or
family or the slate in the moral guidance of the sculptor, to produce a result by shaping |ilastic
young; in the distinction between the good but dead materials.
man and the good citizen or ruler, and the The comparison which Hippocrates makes of
possible difference between the training appro- instruction in medicine with "the culture of
priate for the one and for the other. the productions of the earth" exhibits the same
conception of teaching. "Our natural disposi-
The MAIN" PROBLEM of intcllcctual education tion," he writes, "is, as it were, the soil; the
seems to be the curriculum or course of study. tenets of our teacher are, as it were, the seed;
The traditional attempts to construct an ideal instruction in youth is like the planting of the
curriculum turn on such questions as what seed in the ground at the proper season; the
studies shall be included, what shall be their place where the instruction is communicated
order, and how shall they be taught or learned. is like the food imparted to vegetables by the
A variety of answers results from a variety of atmosphere; diligent study is like the cultiva-
views of man's faculties or capacities, the nature tion of the fields; and it is time which imparts
of knowledge itself, the classification and order strength to all things and brings them to ma-
9f the arts and sciences. Especially important turity."
are the various conceptions of the nature and This conception of teaching as a cooperative
function of the liberal arts. Subordinate ques- art, analogous to medicine or to agriculture,
tions concern the place of the fine and useful underlies the principles of pedagogy in the
arts in liberal education, and the role of ex- Great Didactic of Comenius. It gives signifi-
perience and experiment —
both in contrast to cance to the distinction that Aquinas makes be-
and in cooperation with the role of books and tween learning by discovery, or from experi-
teachers. ence, and learning by instruction, or from a
In addition to the problem of the curriculum teacher — even as a person is healed "in one way
and its materials, the theory of intellectual edu- by the operation of nature alone, and in
cation necessarily considers methods of teach- another by nature with the administration of
ing and learning. Here the various proposals medicine."
derive from different views of the learning In addition to the technical considerations
process — of the causes or factors at work in raised by the nature of the learning process,
any acquisition of skill or knowledge. the discussion of teaching deals with the moral
The contribution of the teacher cannot be or emotional aspect of the relation between
understood apart from a psychological analysis teacher and student. Without interest, learn-
of learning, for the teacher is obviously only ing seldom takes place, or if it does, it cannot
one among its many causes. It makes the great- rise above the level of rote memory. It is one
est difference to the whole enterprise of learn- thing to lay down a course of study; another to
ing whether the teacher is regarded as the motivate the student. Though he does not
principal cause of understanding on the part hesitate to prescribe what is to be learned by
of the student; or whether the teacher is, as the student, Plato adds the caution that there
Socrates describes himself, merely "a midwife" must be no "notion of forcing our system of
assisting the labor of the mind in bringing education."
knowledge and wisdom to birth, and "thor- More than interest is required. Teaching,
oughly examining whether the thought which Augustine declares, is the greatest act of char-
the mind . . . brings forth is a false idol or a ity. is facilitated by love. The cour-
Learning
noble and true birth." between Dante and Virgil in the Divine
tesies
This Socratic insight is later reformulated in Comedy present an eloquent picture of love
the comparison which Aquinas makes, in his between student and teacher, master and dis-
382 THE GREAT IDEAS
ciple. Not only love, but docility, is required itscitizen." Yet he deprecates the idea of a
on the part of the student; and respect for the "general state education" as a "mere contriv-
student's mind on the part of the teacher. In- ance for moulding people to be exactly hke
tellectual education may not be directly con- one another."
cerned with the formation of character, yet the Discussing the pro's and con's of this issue,
moral virtues seem to be factors in the pursuit Mill touches upon most, if not all, of the ques-
of truth and in the discipline of the learning tions just raised. He believes that the difficul-
process. ties could be avoided if the government would
leave it "to parents to obtain the education
We have already noted some of the political where and how they pleased, and content itself
problems of education. Of these probably the with helping to pay the school fees of the
chief question is whether the organization and poorer classes of children, and defraying the
institution of education shall be private or pub- entire school expenses of those who have no
lic. Any answer which assigns the control of one else to pay for them." Schools completely
education largely or wholly to the state must established and controlled by the state, he
lead to a number of other determinations. maintains, "should only exist, if they exist at
Who shall be educated, all or only some? all, as one among many competing experiments,
Should the education of leaders be different carried on for the purpose of example and
from the education of others? If educational stimulus, to keep the others up to a certain
opportunity is to be equal for all, must the standard of excellence."
same kind as well as the same quantity of edu- So far as the problem of adult education
cation be offered to all? And, in every case, to concerns citizenship. Mill's answer, like Mon-
what end shall the state direct the education tesquieu's and Plato's before him, is that noth-
—
of its members to its own welfare and secur- ing can take the place of active participation
ity, or to the happiness of men and the greater in politicallife. Men become citizens by living
glory of God ? Should education always serve and acting as citizens, under the tutelage of
the status quo by preserving extant customs good laws and in an atmosphere of civic vir-
and perpetuating existing forms of govern- tue. So far as the problem of adult education
ment; or can and should it aim at a better so- concerns the continued growth of the mind
ciety and a higher culture ? throughout the life of mature men and women,
These are some of the questions with which the answer is not to be found in the great books
statesmen and political philosophers have dealt, in the words of their authors. Yet the great
answering them differently according to the books as a whole may constitute a solution to
institutions of their time and in accordance that problem.
with one or another theory of the state and its The authors of these books, from Homer to
government. There are still other questions. Freud, are the great original teachers in the
Is freedom of expression, in teaching and dis- tradition of our culture. They taught one
cussion, indispensable to the pursuit of truth another. They wrote for adults, not children,
and the dissemination of knowledge ? To what and in the main they wrote for the mass of men,
extent shall the state control the content and not for scholars in this or that specialized field
He education be supported? Should it be car- the process of teaching. They contain, more-
ried beyond childhood and youth to all the over, expositions or exemplifications of the lib-
ages of adult hfe; and if so, how should such eral arts as the arts of teaching and learning in
education be organized outside of schools ? every field of subject matter. To make these
Mill, for example, holds it to be "almost a books and their authors work for us by working
self-evidentaxiom that the State should re- with them is, it seems to the editors and pub-
quire and compel the education, up to a certain lishers of this set of books, a feasible and de-
standard, of every human being who is born sirable program of adult education.
Chapter 20: EDUCATION 383
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. The ends of education 384
I a. The ideal of the educated man 385
lb. The disadvantages of being educated
3. The training of the body and the cultivation of bodily skills: gymnastics, manual work
4^. The possibility and limits of moral education: knowledge and virtue 387
j\b. The influence of the family in moral training 388
^c. The role of the state in moral education: law, custom, public opinion
4^. The effect upon character of poetry, music, and other arts: the role of history and
examples 389
5/. Learning apart from teachers and books: the role of experience
393
6. The acquisition of techniques: preparation for the vocations, arts, and professions 394
7. Religious education
yb. The teaching function of the church, of priests and prophets 395
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Homer: Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upperandlovverhalvesofthepage. For example, in 53 James :/'jrv<r/ro/o^v,116a-119b, the passage
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 Plato: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lov.er half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
Author's Divisions One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as part, bk, ch,
:
sect) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d.
Bible References: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (£)), follows; e.g., Old Testa-
—
ment: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) // Esdras, 7:46.
Symbols: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
43 Mill: Uherty, 303b-d / Represent at iic Govern- 50 Marx: Capital, 176d-178a; 238b c
ment, 344b-c; 424b-c 52 OosTOEVsKv: Brothers Karamazov, epilogue,
46 HEf;tL: Philosophy of Right, intro, par 20 17a; 411b-412d
PAkf 111, par 187 65a-c; adoitions, 97 132c- 53 I AMES Psychology, 736b-737a
:
133a
50 Marx: Capital, 238b-c \b. The disadvantages of being educated
51 ToLsrov: War and Peace, bk i, 47b-c: bk \i, 5 I'ARiPiDEs: Medea [276-505! 214c-d
244d-245d 5 Aristophanes: C7oi/^:f 488a-506d
53 Jamls: Psychology, 274b 275a; 7 lib- 7 12b 6 I'hucydides: Peloponnesian War, bk i, 370a-c
54 RLC d: Sew Introductory Lectures, 868d-871a
I 7 Plato: Protagoras, 47a-b / Gorgias, 272b
csp 870a-871a 9 Aristotle: Rhetoric, bk it, ch 21 [i394"29-34l
642a; [i394''25-32] 642c; ch 22 [1395^27-32]
\a. The ideal of the educated man 643d; CH 23 [i399"i2-i7] 647c
7 Plato: Lysis, 16c-18b / Laches, 37c-d / Re- 12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk hi, ch 21 193d-
public, BK II, 319c -320c; bk hi, 33Sa-339a; 195a; ch 24, 205c-206a; 207d-208a; bk iv,
BK VII 388a-401d esp 390b-391b / Timaeus, ch i, 221b-c; ch 8 235b-237d
454a / Laws, bk i, 649b-d; bk ii, 653a-654a; 12 AuRELius: Meditations, bk ii, sect 3
BK VI, 704a-b; bk xii, 796b-799a,c 257a-b
8 Aristotle: Topics, bk i, ch 3 144a-b / Meta- 18 Augustine: Confessions, bk i, par 25-26 7a-c;
physics, BK I, CH 1-2 499a-501c esp ch 2 bk IV, par 28-31 26a-27a
[982-'^5-2o] 500b-c 22 Chaucer: Miller's Tale [3448-3464] 217a
9 Aristotle: Parts of Animals, bk i, ch i 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part i, 56d; part ii,
bk II, 653b-654a; 663a-b; bk vii, 717b-d; sect 7-9 253b-254a, sect i i 254b, sect 14-16
721d-722c; 726a-727c; bk vhi, 734a- 735a 254b-255d, bk ii, sect 17 259b-d, bk iv,
8 Aristotle: Physics, bk vii, ch 3 [246^10-^19] SECT 18 264d, BK V, SECT 14 271b, sect 16
329c-330a / Heavens, bk ii, ch 12 [292^14-^18] 271C-d, BK VI, SECT 12 274c, BK VII, SECT 69
383d-384b 284d, BK VIII, SECT I 285a-b, sect 13 286c,
9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk ii, ch 6 [1106^*35-^8] BK IX, SECT 41 295c
352a/Po////<:/, BKiv, ch i [1288^10-20] 487a-b; 13 Virgil: Aeneid, bk ix [590-620] 295a-b
BK VII, CH 15 [1334^7-28] 539b-d; ch 17 14 Plutarch: Lycurgus-Numa, 63d-64a / Peri-
[1336^4-39] 541a-c; bk viii, ch 3-4 542d-544c cles, 121a-122b / Coriolanus, 174b,d-175a
10 Hippocrates: Articulations, par 52 109b-110a; 15 Tacitus: Annals, bk xih, 125d-126a
par 55, 111c; par 58 112b-113a / Aphorisms, 17 Plotinus: First Ennead, tr hi, ch 2 lOd; ch
sect I, par 3 131a-b; sect ii, par 49-50 133d 6 lld-12b
12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk hi, ch 15, 190a-c 18 Augustine: Confessions, bk i, par 13-31 4b-9a
13 Virgil: Aeneid, bk ix [590-620] 295a-b 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 96,
14 Plutarch: Lycurgus, 40c-42a / Coriolanus, A 2, ANS 231c-232b; q 99, a 6, ans 250a-251a;
175b / Philopoernen, 293d-294a Q 100, A 9 261b-262b; q 105, a 4, ans 318b-
17 Plotinus: Third Ennead, tr ii, ch 8, 86d-87b 321a; q 108, a 3 334a-336b
4fl Chapter 20: EDUCATION 387
21 Dante: Divine Comedy bk I, 649b-d / Seventh letter, 801b 802d;
22 Chaucer: Tale of Wife of Bath (6691 6788] 806b c; 809c 810d esp 810c-d
274b-276a / CleTl(i Tale [8031-80^7] 298a; 8 Aristotle: Categories, ch 10 [i3''i6-3i) 18d /
[8269-8317] 302b-303a Prior Analytics, bk 11, ch 25 [69''2o-28] 91a
24 Rabelais: Gargantiia and Pantagruel, bk ii, 9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk i, ch ^ [io94^27-io95*
81a83b 11] 340a; cii 9 345a-c; bk ii, ch 1-4 348b,d-
25 Montaigne: Essays, 16c; 43a-c; 55d-62a csp 351b; BK VI, CH 1-2 387a 388b; ch 12-13
60c 61c; 63d-75a 393b-394d; bk vh, ch 23 395c 398a; bk x,
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 76a-81c csp ch 9 [ii79''S1^3"l 434a-c / Politics, bk v,
78d-80b ch 12 [i:5i6'*i-io] 518d-519a; bk vii, ch 13
32 Milton: Areopagitica, 394b-395b [i332'*39-^ii]537a-b
35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk ii, ch xxi, 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk hi \T,o'j--i^22\
54 Freud: General Introduction, 573c / Ego and 27 Shakespeare: Troilus and Cressida, act ii,
Id, 706b-708c esp 707a-d / War and Death, sc ii [163-173] 115b
757d-759d / Civilization and Its Discontents, 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 26c-27a;
792a-796c esp 794c-795a / New Introductory 69d-70a; 76d-78d
Lectures, 844b-c 32 Milton: Areopagitica, 390b-391a
33 Pascal: Pensees, 88 189b
4a. The possibility and limits of moral educa- 35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk i, ch ii,
tion: knowledge and virtue SECT 8 105d-106a; bk ii, ch xxi, sect 71
Old Testament: Proverbs, 1:20-2:22; 4:1-12; 197b-198a
8; 14:16; 15:21 35 Hume: Human Understanding, sect i, div i
5 Euripides: Hippolytus [373-430] 228b-d / 451a-b; div 3 451d; sect viii, div 66, 480b
Supplia?2ts [857-917] 266a-b / Iphigenia at 37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 122d-123a; 313a
Aulis [543-572] 429d-430a 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 344d-345c / Political
5 Aristophanes: Clouds 488a-506d Economy, 375d-377b
7 Plato: Charmides, 7b-c / Laches 26a-37d / 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 34d; 435b-d
Protagoras 38a-64d esp 42d-47c, 56b, 57d, 42 Kant: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals,
62a-b / Euthydemus, 66b-67b / Symposium, 258b-c; 260d-261d; 265b; 282b-283d / Prac-
166c-167d / Meno 174a-190a,c esp 174a-c, tical Reason, 357c-360d / Pref. Metaphysical
177d-178b, 183b-190a,c / Apology, 203c-204b Elements of Ethics, 365b-d; 368d / Judgement,
/ Gorgias, 258d-259b; 262d-263c; 277d; 287c- 513d-514b
291b / Republic, bk ii, 319d-320c; bk vii 43 Mill: Liberty, 303 b-d; 306c-307a / Utilitar-
388a-401d esp 389d-391b, 397a-401d; bk x, ianism, 464b-c
439b-441a,c / Timaeus, 474c-475c / Sophist, 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part ii, par 132
556c-558d / Statesman, 607b-608d / Laws, 46b-47a; additions, hi 134d-135a; 119 136b
388 THE GREAT IDEAS 4^ to 4c
42 Kant: Science of Right, 420b-421c
(4. The formation of a good character, virtue, a 44 Bos well: Johnson, 372c
The possibility and limits of
right will. Aa. 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 173-
moral education: knowledge and virtue^
175 61a-d; par 239 76d; additions, hi 134d-
49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 313d-314b; 317c- 135a; 147 140c
319a 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, bk xii,
51 Tolstoy: War and Fence, bk vi, 244d-245d 395b-d
52 T>ostov.wsk.y: Brothers Karamazov, epilogue, 54 Freud: Origin and Development of Psycho-
411b412d Analysis, 17d-18a / Sexual Enlightenment of
53 James Psychology, 806a-808a
: Children 119a'122a,c passim / Narcissism, 408b
54 Freud: General Introduction, 573c-d; 592b-c; / Ego and Id, 704d- 707d / Civdhation and Its
596b-c; 624d-625b / Civilization and Its Discontents, 794c-795a esp 795b ifn 2] / New
Discontents, 781a-d; 784a-789b; 796d [fn2]; Introductory Lectures, 834b-c; 844b-c; 876b-c
800c-801a / New Introductory Lectures, 870a-c
Ac. The role of the state in moral education:
4^.The influence of the family in moral training law, custom, public opinion
Old Testament: Exodus, 20:12 / Deuteronomy, 5 Aristophanes: Clouds 488a-506d
5:16; 6:6-7; 11:18-19; 27:16 / Proverbs, 1:8-9; 6 Herodotus: History, bk i, 35c-d
3:12; 6:20-24; i3:i»24; 15:5; 19:18; 22:6,15; 6 THucYmmis Pelopofi7iesian War, bk i.370a-c;
:
New Testament: Ephesians, 6:1-4 / Colossians, 474c-d / Statesman, 607a-608a / Laws 640a-
3:20-21 799a, c esp bk i, 643a-644a, 645c-646d, bk in,
7 Plato: Protagoras, 45d-47a / Meno, 186a- 676b-c, BK IV, 683d-685a, bk v-vi, 696c-697d,
187b / Republic, bk v, 366a-c / Laws, bk v, BK VI, 704a-c, 710d-711c, bk vii 713c-731d,
687d-688a; bk vii, 713c-716d BK VIII, 735c-738c, bk ix, 757a, bk xii, 792c-d
9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk x, ch 9 [i 180^25-^^14] / Seventh Letter, 800b-c
435a-c / Politics, bk iv, ch ii [1295^14-18] 9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk i, ch 9 [1099^29-32]
495d; bk vii, ch 17 [1336^23-^3] 541b-c 345b; CH 13 [1102^8-25] 347c; bk ii, ch i
12AuRELius: Meditations, bk i 253a-256d esp [1103^3-7] 349a; bk v, ch i [1129^12-24] 377a;
SECT 1-4 253a, sect 14 254b-c, sect 16 254d- CH 2 [1130^20-30] 378b; bk x, ch 9 [i 179*^31-
255d 1180^28] 434c-435c / Politics, bk ii, ch 5
14 Plutarch: Marcus Cato, 286c-287b [1263^36-1264^*1] 459a; ch 7 461d-463c; bk
18 Augustine: Confessions, bk i, par 14-15 4c- vii, ch 13-17 536b-542a,c; bk viii, ch i
5a; bk ii, par 2-8 9b-10d esp par 7 lOb-c; 542a-b
BK III, par 19-20 18b-19a; bk ix, par 19-22 12 Aurelius: Meditatioiis, bk iv, sect 18 264d
67a-d 13 Virgil: Aeneid, bk vi [845-853] 233b-234a
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 95, 14 Plutarch: Lycurgus 32a-48d / Lycurgus-
A I, ANs 226c-227c; q 105, a 4, ans 318b-321a Numa, 63d-64a / Solon 64b,d-77a,c passim /
22 Chaucer: Physician's Tale [12,006-037] 367b- Marcus Cato, 284b- 286b / Lysander, 361 b-d /
368a Agesilaus, 480b,d-481a
24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, bk ii, 18 Augustine: Confessions, bk i, par 14-16 4c-
83a-b 5b; par 19-30 5d-8d; bk vi, par 2 35a-c; par
25 Montaigne: Essays, 16c; 43a-c; 63d-64b; 11-13 38b-39c / Christian Doctrine, bk hi, ch
66c-67a; 184a-187d; 344a-c; 414a-d; 534c-d 12-13 662c-663c; ch 18-22 664d-666c
29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, part ii, 251b 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 92,
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part hi, prop 55, schol, a i 213c-214c; a 2, rep 4 214d-215a,c; q 95,
413d; the affects, def 27 419a-b; part iv, a I 226c-227c; a 3 228c-229b; q 96, aa 2-3
appendix, XX 449a 231c-233a; q 98, a 6, ans 244c-245b; q 100,
35 Locke: Civil Government, ch vi, sect 55-69 A 9 26ib-262b; q 105, a 4, ans 318b-321a
36c-40b; ch xv, sect 170 64d-65a 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, purgatory, xvi [52-
36 Swift: Gulliver, part i, 29b-30a; part iv, 105] 77b-d
166b 23HoBBEs: Leviathan, part ii, 149b-c; 154a-
36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 250b-251a 156b; part iv, 272c
37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 108c-110c: 136a-c; 25 Montaigne: Essays, 42b-43c; 46b-48b; 60c-
217d-219c; 283c-d; 310b-313b; 359b-362c 61d; 63d-64b; 13l'b-132a
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk iv, 15c 27 Shakespeare: Measure for Measure, act ii,
38 Rousseau: /,'2^^«^//>v, 326c-327a; 327c-328a / sc I [225-270] 181a-c; act hi, sc ii [91-12S]
Political Economy, 376b-377a 190c-d
39 Smith: Wealth ofSations, bk v, 337c-d 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, ySdSOa
4./ Chapter 20: EDUCATION 389
31 Simnoza: Ethics, PART III, THE Al-IECTS, DCF 7 Plato: Protagoras, 46b c / Phaedrus, 136b c /
27 419a-b Republic, hk ii hi, 320c 339a; bk iv, 344b d;
32 Milton: Paradise Lo>t, b;< xii [285-306] 325b- BK VII 388a 401 d csp 391b 398c; bk x. 427c-
326a / Areopagitica, 383a-395b csp 394b 395a 434c / Timaeus, 455c / Laws, hk h 653a 663d;
IZ P\s( Ai.: Pensets, 6 173a BK III, 675c 676b; bk v, 696b d; bk vh, 717b-
35 Lock I.: Toleration, 15c-d / Human Under- 721a: 724b 725d; 726d-728b
standing, BK I, CH II, SECT 8 105d-106a; sect 9ARisTorLE: Politics, bk vii, ch 17 [i336"^()-
20 llOc-llla; BK II, CH XXI, sect 71, 197d; ^24] 541b-d; bk viii, ch 3 542d-543d; ch 57
CM xxviii, sect 10-12 230b- 231c esp sect 12 544c-548a,c
231bc 12 AuRELius: Meditations, bk 253a-256d csp i
89a-b; par 315 104c; additions, 96-98 132c- 29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, part i, 12b-16c;
i33a; 131 137d; 162, 143b-144a; 183 148d- 186d-187c; part iir427c-429a
149a / Philosophy of History, part iv, 365c 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 4c-6c; 38c-
49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 310c-317d esp 39d esp 38d-39a; 78a-d; 79c-80a; 85a-c
317a-c 31 Descartes: Discourse, part i, 43a-b
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk vi, 244d-245d; 31 Spinoza: Ethics, part hi, prop 55 413b-
bk viii, 303a-305b esp 303d-304b 414a
52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, bk xii, 32 MihTos Paradise Lost, bk ix [1-47] 247a-248a
:
17 Plotinus: First Ennead, tr hi, ch i-:^ 10a- physics, BK I, CH I [980*28-981"! ^5] 499a-c; ch
11a 9 [992''24-99^''7] 511a-c; bk ii, ch 2 [9(>4"25-
18 Augustine: Confessions, bk i, par 13 4b-c; 30] 512c; BK IX, CH 6 (io4H**i8-:^4) 574a-c;
par 19-20 5d'6a; par 23 6d-7a / Christian CH 8 [1049^29-1050*3] 575c-d / Soul,
bk ii,
Doctrine, bk 11, ch 6 638a-d; ch 36-37 653d- CH 5 [417*21-418*3] and the
647d-648c / Sense
654b; BK IV 675a-698a,c Sensible, ch i [436'^i8-437*i7J 673d-674a /
19 Aquinas: Siimma Theoiogica,PROLOGViL lab; Memory and Reminiscence, ch 2 [45i'*i9-'*9]
PART I, Q I, A 5, REP 2 5c-6a; A 9 8d-9c; q 79, 692b-d; [452*4-7] 693c
A 10, REP 3 423d-424d; q 84, a 3, rep 3 9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk vii, ch 3 [1147*18 23]
443d-444d; q 106, a i, ans 545d-546d; g iii, 397b-c / Poetics, ch 4 [1448^4-20] 682c-d
A I, ANS 568c-569b; q 117, a i 595d-597c 10 Hippocrates: The Law, par 2-3 144b-d
20 Aquinas: Summa Theohgica, part ii-ii, q i, 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk iv [1-25]
A 7, rep 2 385c-387a; q 181, a 3, ans and rep 44a-b
2 618c-619b 12 Hpictetus: Discourses, bk i, ch 26 131b-
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part i, 55a 132b; BK hi, ch 23, 202d-203a
24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, bk i, 14 Plutarch: Cato the Younger, 620b-c
18b-19a; 26d-30c passim 17 Plotinus: First Ennead, tr hi 10a-12b
25 Montaigne: Essays, 57b-61c passim; 63d-80b 18 Augustine: Confessions, bk i, par 13 4b-c;
passim, esp 73b-74a; 446d-450a; 453c-454d par 23 6d-7a; bk iv, par 28-31 26a-27a /
28 Harvey: Motion of the Heart, 268c / On Christian Doctrine, bk i, ch 2 624d-625a; bk
Animal Generation, 336d-337a,c H, CH 36-37 653d-654b
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 16c; 31a-d; 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 76, a
39b-d; 61d-62c; 64b-c; 65a-c; 68b-69c 2, rep 5 388c-391a; q 84, a 3, rep 3 443d-
31 Descartes: Discourse, part i, 42b; 42d-43a 444d; Q 117, A I, ans and rep 4 595d-597c
32 Milton: Areopagitica, 384a 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part ii-ii, q i,
33 Pascal: Pensees, 9-10 173b; 40 177b-178a A 7, REP 2 385c-387a; q 2, a 3, ans 392d-393c;
35 Locke: Toleration, 3c-4a; 7a-b; 15c / Human PART HI, q 9, a 4, REP I 766b-767b; q 12
Understanding, bk hi, ch x, sect 34 299d- 776c-779d
300a; bk iv, ch vti, sect ii, 340d-341a 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part i, 55d-56a; 66c-d;
36 Swift: Gulliver, part hi, 109b-110b 68b
36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 417b-418a; 421b- 24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, bk i,
422b 18b-19a; 26d-30c
37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 42a-c 25 Montaigne: Essays, 55d-62a passim; 63d-
38 Rousseau: 339d-340a
Inequality, 75a esp 64c-66b; 446a-450a; 453c-454d
39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, bk v, 337c-d 28 Harvey: Motion of the Heart, 268c / On
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 2d-4a,c / Practical Reason, Animal Generation, 332a-335c esp 334d-335c
335b-c 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 16a; 57d-
43 Mill: Liberty, 283c-288c esp 284b-d / Repre- 58b; 64b-c / Novum Organum, pref 105a-
sentative Government, 331a; 424b-c 106d
44 Bos^'ELi.: Johnson, 7d-8a; 144c; 191b-c; 199d- 31 Descartes: Rules, iii-iv 3b-7d; xii-xiii
200b; 448a-b; 471d 18b-27d esp xii, 23c, 24d-25a / Discourse,
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 175, PART VI, 61d-62c; 63a-b / Meditations, i 75a-
61c-d 77c / Geometry, bk i, 297a-b; bk hi, 341b
47 Goethe: Faust, part i [522-601] 15a-16b 33 Pascal: Pensees, 6 173a
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk i, 48b-d 35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk i, ch i,
53 James: Psychology, 290a-291a; 692a-b; 711b- sect 15 98d-99a; sect 23 101b-102a; ch hi,
712b sect 25 120c-d
54 Freud: General Introduction, 'H9aA51bpsiSsim 36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 221a-222a
37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 99d-100a
5c. The nature of learning: its several modes 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 528c
7 Plato: Laches, 29d-30b / Euthydemus, 67b- 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 14a-15c; 113b-114a; 244c-
68d / Cratylus, llld-112d / Phaedrus, 124a- 245c / Judgement, 526a-527b
126c esp 126a-c 139b-140b / Meno, 179b-183a
; 43 Mill: Liberty, 283c-288c
188d-189a / Phaedo, 228a-230c / Republic, bk 44 Bosv^'ELi.: Johnson, 121d; 126d; 257c
vi-vii, 383d-401d / Theaetetus, 541d-543a / 45 Lavoisier: Elements of Chemistry, pref, lc-2b
Philebus, 610d-613a 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part i, par 69,
8 Aristotle: Prior Analytics, bk ii, ch 21 [67* 30b-c
21-25] S^ / Posterior Analytics, bk i, ch i 48 Melville: Moby Dic\, 245b
97a-d; bk ch 19 136a-137a,c / Sophistical
ii, 53 James: Psychology, 15b-17a; 49b-52b esp 52a;
Refutations, ch 2 [165^38-^3] 227d-228a / 71a-73b; 83a-b; 110b; 331b-336a passim;
Physics, bk vii, ch 3 [247^1-248^6] 330b-d; 362b-364a; 433a-438a; 443a-444a; 448b-
BK VIII, ch 4 [255^30-^23] 340a-c / Meta- 450a; 664b-665a; 691a-b; 827a-835a
m THE GREAT IDEAS 5dto5e
(5. The improvement of the mind by teaching and 44a; part ii, 47a-b; part vi, 61d-62c /
learning.) Geometry, bk i, 297a-b; 298b; bk hi, 341b
35 Locke: Human Understanding, ek i, ch i,
5d. The order of learning: the organization of sect 15 98d-99a; sect 20 lOOc-d; sect 23
the curriculum 101b-102a; ch hi, sect 13 116a-b; bk ii, ch i,
7 Plato: Protagoras, 46b-c / Meno, 179b'183a / SECT 6-8 122b-123a; sect 22 127a; ch xi,
Gorgias, 272b-273b / Republic, bk ii, 320c- sect 8-9 145b-c; bk hi, ch ii, sect 7 254a-b;
321a; bk in, 333b-334b; bk vi, 380d-381a; CH III, sect 7-9 255d-256c; ch v, sect 15
BK vi-vii, 383d-401d / Timaeus, 465d-466a / 267c-d; ch ix, sect 9 286d-287b; bk iv, ch
Sophist, 552b-c / Philebus, 610d-613a / Laws, VII, sect 9 338d-339b; sect ii 340a-342d
BK II, 653a-654a; bk v, 696b-d; bk vii, 728b- passim, esp 340d-341a; ch xii, sect 3 358d-
730c; bk XII, 798a-799a,c / Seventh Letter, 359c
809c-810d 36 Swift: Gulliver, part ii, 78b
8 Aristotle: Physics, bk i, ch i 259a-b; ch 7 36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 421b-422b
[189^30-33] 265b-c / Metaphysics, bk ii, ch 3 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, bk v, 334c-337b;
[995*12-14] 513c; bk IV, CH 3 [1005^2-5] 524c; 338c-d; 342b
CH 4 [1006*5-12] 525a-b; bk v, ch i [1013*1-3] 42 Kant: Practical Reason, 2948- b / Judge7nejit^
533a; bk vii, ch 3 [1029*35-^12] 552a; bk ix, 551a-552c; 572a-b
CH 8 [1049^29-1050*3] 575c-d / Soul, bk i, 44 Boswell: Johnson, llb-d; 15a-c; 23d-24b;
CH I [402^15-403*2] 631d-632a; bk ii, ch 2 121d; 128c; 135b-c; 273a-b; 309c-d; 448a-b
[413*11-13] 643a 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, part i, 213c
9 Aristotle :
of Animals, bk i, ch i
Parts 47 Goethe: Faust, part i [1868-2045] 44b-48a
[639*12-^12] 161b-d / Ethics, bk i, ch 3 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, bk x,
[1094^28-1095*3] 340a; bk vi, ch 3 [1139^25- 291d-292b
29] 388c / Politics, bk vii, ch 15 [1334^20-28] 53 James: Psychology, 317b-319a; 323a-b; 360a;
539c-d; bk viii, ch 3 542d-543d 406a-b; 453a-457a esp 453b, 456b-457a; 503b;
11 NicoMACHUs: Arithmetic, bk i, 812b-813d 524b-525a; 711b-712b
12 Eptctetus: Discourses, bk i,ch 26 131b-132b; 54 Freud: Civilization and Its Discontents, 768b-c
BK II, CH 25 174b-c
16 Ptolemy: Almagest, bk i, 5a-6b passim 5e, The emotional aspect of learning: pleasure,
Kepler: Epitome, bk iv, 847b-848a desire, interest
16
17 Plotinus: First Ennead, tr hi, ch 1-4 lOa-llc 7 Plato: Republic, bk vi, 374a-375a; bk vii,
18 Augustine: Confessions, bk i, par 13-31 4b- 388a-389c; 399b-401a esp 399c; bk ix, 421a-
9a; bk iv, par 30 26b-c / Christian Doctrine, 422b / Laws, bk ii, 660b / Sevejith Letter,
BK II, ch 8-42 639d-656d 808b-809a
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, prologue la-b; 8 Aristotle: Metaphysics, bk i, ch i [980*22-
part i, q i, a 9 8d-9c; q 2, aa 1-2 10d-12c; 27] 499a
Q 10, a I, ANS and rep i 40d-41d; a 2, rep i 9 Aristotle: Parts of Animals, bk i, ch 5 [644^
41d-42c; a 6, ans 45c-46d; q 11, a 2, rep 4 22-645*37] 168c-169b / Ethics, bk vii, ch 12
47d-48d; q 14, a 6, rep 2 80a-81c; q 18, a 2, [1153*22-24] 404c; BK x, ch i [1172*16-21]
ans 105c-106b; q 84, a 3, rep 3 443d-444d; 426a / Politics, bk viii, ch 5 [i 339*25-3 i]544d;
A 6 447c-449a; Q 85, a i 451c-453c; a 3 455b- [1339^10-20] 545a; ch 6 [1340^25-30] 546b /
457a; a 8 460b-461b; Q 117, a i, ans 595d- Rhetoric, bk i, ch ii [1371^30-33] 614d; bk
597c III, CH 10 [1410*^9-12] 662c / Poetics^ ch 4
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, parti-ii, q 100, [1448V19] 682c-d
A 6, ANS and rep 2 257c-258c 10 Hippocrates: The Law, par 2 144b
23 HoBBEs: Leviathan, parti, 56b; 59b-c; 71c-d; 10 Galen: Natural Faculties, bk hi, ch 10, 207d
72a-d; part iv, 268c-269b 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things^ bk i [41-53]
24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, bk i, Ic-d; bk II [1023-1047] 28a-b; bk hi [1-30]
18b-19d; 25a-30c; bk ii, 75c-77a; 78b-80d; 30a-b; bk iv [1-25] 44a-b
82c-83b 12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk iv, ch 4 225a-228a
25 Montaigne Essays, 63d-80b passim, esp 69d-
: 17 Plotinus: First Ennead, tr hi, ch 1-3 lOa-lla
70c 18 Augustine: Confessions, bk i, par 14-16 4c-
28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 332a-336a 5b; par 19-27 5d-7d
esp 334c-d, 335c-336a 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 12,
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 4C'5b; 14c- A I, ANS 50c-51c; A 8, rep 4 57b-58b; part
15a; 30b-c; 31a-d; 44c; 56b-66a; 68c-69c; i-ii, Q 3, A 8, ANS 628d-629c; q 30, a i, rep i
esp XXIV [52-147] 143b-144a, xxv [64-96] 16:14-20 / LuJ{e, 9:1-6; 10:1-20 /John, 21:15-
145a-b 17 / Romans, 10:14-18 / / Corinthians, 14 / //
22 Chaucer: Second Nun's Tale [15,787-816] Corinthians, 3-4 / Ephesians, 3:1-12; 4:11-15 /
467a-b / Timothy, 3:2; 4 / // Timothy, 2:24-26;
23 HoBBEs: Leviathan, part ii, 137b-138b; 4:1-5 / Titus passim
160b-c; part iii, 165a-167b; 176d-177b; 18 Augustine: City of God, bk xx, ch 9, 538d-
181a-186c; 205b-d; 241c-242a; conclusion, 539a / Christian Doctrine, bk ii, ch 15 643c-
281d-282a 644a
25 Montaigne: Essays, 239b-c; 267c-268a; 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, prologue la-b
273a-b 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, partii-ii, q i,
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 19b-c; 38a; A I, rep 3 385c-387a; q 184, a 5, ans 633c-
54b-c; 95b-101d 634c; Q 185, A 3, ans 643a-644a; q 187, a i
32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk v [2I9]-bk viii 663c-665a; q 188, aa 4-6 678b-682c; part hi
[653] 180a-246b esp bk viii [283-451] 238b- SUPPL, Q 96, A 7 1061b-1062a; aa 11-12 1063d-
242a; bk xi [99]-bk xii [649] 301b-333a 1065b
33 Pascal: Pensees, 185 205a; 622 286a; 642-692 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, paradise, xii [22-
290b-301a 105] 123d-124d; xxix [67-126] 151a-c
35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk iv, ch 22 Chaucer: Prologue [477-528] 167b-168a
XVI, SECT 14 371b-c; ch xviii-xix 380d-388d 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part ii, 123a-b; part
passim, esp ch xviii, sect 2-5 381a-382d, III, 166a-b; 182d-183a; 208d-211c; 224d-225c
SECT 7 383b, ch XIX, sect 4 385a-b, sect 14 32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk xi [656-749] 313b-
387d-388a, sect 16 388c-d 315b; [802-834] 316b-317b; bk xii [235-248]
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 307d-308a 324b
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 231a-d 33 Pascal: Pensees, 585-588 277a-b; 622 286a
43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 455a-c 35 Locke: Toleration, 7d-8c; lOd-lla; 18c /
46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, intro, 159b-d; Human Understanding, bk iv, ch xviii, sect
part III, 306d-308a 4 381d-382a; sect 6 382d-383a
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk i, 50b-c 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, bk v, 343b,d-348a
396 THE GREAT IDEAS 8/08^
43 Mill: Liberty, 317d-319b passim / Representa-
(7. Religious education, lb. The teaching func- tive Government, 382c-383b
tion of the church, of priests and prophets.) 44 ^os^NEYA.: Johnson, 300a-c
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 194d; 302d-304a 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, part iv, 325d
passim, esp 303d; 307d-308a; 355b-d; 601b-c
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 230c-231d; 522d- 8c. The political regulation and censorship of
523a education
43 Mill: Liberty, 285b / Representative Govern- 5 Aristophanes: Acharnians [366-384] 459c-d;
me72t,341a-c [497-508] 460d-461a
44 BoswEi.!.: Johnson, 313d-316d 7 Plato: Republic, bk ii-iii, 320c-339a; bk iv,
46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, part hi, 308b-c 344b-d; bk v, 365d-366c; bk x, 427c-434c
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk vi, 245a-b esp 432d-434c / Statesman, 601c-602c / Laws,
52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karajnazov, bk vi, bk II, 654c-655b; bk hi, 675c-676b; bk vii
152a-153a; 164a-165a 713c- 731d; bk viii, 732c-d; bk xi, 782d-783b
54 Freud: Civilization and Its Discontents, 793c 9 Aristotle: Politics, bk i, ch 13 [1260^9-19]
455c; BK V, CH 11 [1313*38-^5] 516a; bk vii,
8. Education and the state CH [1336*30-^24] 541b-d; bk viii, ch i
17
[1337*10-19] 542a
Sa. The educational responsibility of the fam- 14 Plutarch: Lycurgus-Numa 61b,d-64a,c pas-
ily and the state sim / Solon, 76a
7 Plato: Crito, 217a-b / Laws, bk vii, 721d- 15 Tacitus: Annals, bk hi, 56d-57b; bk iv, 67c;
722c; BK viii, 723c-d; bk xi, 778d 72b-73a; bk xiv, 152d-153c
9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk x, ch 9 [ii79''3i-ii8o^ 18 Augustine: City of God, bk ii, ch 9 154a-c;
13] 434c-435b / Politics, bk i, ch 13 [1260'' CH 12-14 155c-157c; bk viii, ch 13 273b-d
9-19] 455c; BK VIII, CH i 542a-b 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part ii, 102d-103a; 114d-
12 AuRELius: Meditations, bk i, sect 4 253a 115a; 123a-b; 150c-151a; part hi, 224d-225d;
14 Plutarch: Lycurgus, 39a-45b esp 40c-41a / conclusion, 282d-283a
Lycurgus-Numa, 63d-64a,c 29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, part i, 117d-119d;
20 Aquinas: Sumfna Theologica, part i-ii, q 95, 184a-187c
a I, ANS 226c-227c; q 105, a 4, ans and rep 5 30 Bacon Advancement of Learning, 7a / New
:
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 669d-670d 366a-c; bk vi-vii, 383b-401d esp bk vii, 389d-
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 298c 401 d / Tifnaeus, 442c-d / Statesman, 607b-
^dto 9 Chapter 20; EDUCATION 397
608d / Laws 640a-799a,c 640d 641a,csp bk i, 43 Mill: Liberty, 284d 285b; 298b 299a; 302a c;
644b-645c, bk in, 672d 676b, bk iv, 683d- 317d 323a,c / Representative Goverrnricnt, 336c-
685a, BK v-vi, 696c-697d, bk vi, 704a-c, 341d: 344b c; 349a 350a; 351b-c; 357c; 362c-
706c, BK vii-viii, 713c-735b, bk xii, 784d- 366a; 375a 377a; 380c 389b passim, r-^p 3«2c-
785b, 796b'799a / Serent/i Letter, 801c-802d 383b; 401a 406a passim, esp 405d 406a; 407d-
Q Aristotle: Polities, bk i, ch 13 [1260^9-19] 408b; 415a 417c; 418b d; 420b d; 424b c
455c; BK II, CH 5 [i264"i2-4o] 459b-c; ch 7 44 Boswell: Johnson, 201 b-c; 307d
[i266^26-i267''2] 462b-c; bk hi, ch 4 [1277* 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, |)ar
i4-*'i3l474a-c: en 18 [r288'^:54-''3] 487a,c; bk 151-153 57a-c; par 209 69d; par 296-297
IV,CH 9 [1294^18-28] 494c-d; en 15 [i3oo*'3-8] 99a-b; additions, 98 133a; 169 145d; 171
500d; BK V, CH 9 [i3io'*i2-36] 512b-c; bk vii, 146b-c / Philosophy of History, part i, 21 2d-
CH 14 537b-538d; bk viii 542a-548a.c / 214d; 243b c; part n, 281d; part iv, 368b
Athenian Constitution, en 42 572b'd / RhetoriCy 50 Marx: Capital, 237d-241d csp 238b c. 240c-
bk i, CH 8 365*^32-39] 608a-b
[ 1 241a
12 AuRELius: Meditations, bk hi, sect 5 261a 50 Marx-Engels: Communist Manifesto, 427c;
13 Virgil: Aeneid, bk viii [508-519] 272b-273a 429b
14 Plutarch: Lycurgus 32a-48d / Lyewgus- 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk vi, 244d 245d
Numa, 63d-64a / Solon 64b,d-77a,c passim, 54 Freud: Sexual Enlightenrnent nf Children,
esp 64b,d-65c, 74b-75b / Pericles, 122d-123d / 122a,c
Alcibiades, 156b-158b passim / Lysander,
354b,d-355a / Agesilaus, 480b,d-481a / Alex- 9. Historical and biographical observations
ander, 542d-544a / Dion, 781b,d-788b concerning the institutions and practices
15 Tacitus: Annals, bk xii, Hid; bk xni, 125d- of education
126a; bk xiv, 153d-155a / Histories, bk iv, 5 Aristophanes: C/ow^i" 488a-506d
267c 6 Herodotus: History, bk i, 32a-b
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, paradise, viii [115- 6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, bki, 370a c;
148] 118b-c bk II, 396d-397a
23 Machiavelli: Prince la-37d esp ch vi, 8c-d, 7 Plato: Gorgias, 290b-291b / Laws, bk i,
ch xiv-xix 21b-30a 644b-646b; bk hi, 672d-673d
23 Ho bees: Leviathan, intro, 47b-d; part i, 9 Aristotle: Politics, bk iv, ch 9 [1294^18-28]
94b-c; part ii, 114d-115a; 128c-130a; 150c- 494c-d; BKVii,cHi4[i333*4i-i334*io]538b-d;
151a; 153a-156b; 158b-d; 164a,c; part iv, BK VIII, ch I [1337*19-33] 542b; en 4 544a-c
273a-c; conclusion, 282d-283a 10 Hippocrates: The Oath, xiiia
24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, bk i, 12 Aurelius: Meditations, bk i 253a-256d
18b-19d; 24a-30c; bk ii, 75a-77a; 78b-83b 14 Plutarch: Lycurgus, 38a-45b passim / Alci-
25 Montaigne: Essays, 60a-62a; 63d-64d; 71d- 155b,d-158b / Marcus Cato, 286c-
biades,
72b 287b / Alexander, 542d-544a / Demosthenes,
26 Shakespeare: 1st Henry IV, act i, sc ii [218- 691b,d-692b / Dion, 782c-788b
240] 437C'd / Henry V, act i, sc i [22-66] 18 Augustine: Confessions, bk i, par 14-31
533b-c / As You Like It, act i, sc i [1-28] 4c-9a; bk hi, par 6-7 14b-d
597a-b 23 HoBBEs: Leviathan, part it, 155d-156b; part
29 Cervantes Don Quixote, part
: ii, 332C'336a; IV, 267c-269c
362a-c 24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, bk i,
30 Bacon: Advaficewent of Learning, 20b-28d; 18b-19d; 24a-30c; bk it, 75c-83b
94b-95a 25 Montaigne: Essays, 57b-63d; 68b-69a; 77d-
32 Milton: Areopagitica, 384b-389a 80b; 194c-199c; 395b 401a
36 Swift: Gulliver, part i, 29b'31a; part iv, 29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, part i, xia-xvid
166b-167a 30 Bacon: Advanceinent of Learning la-lOld pas-
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk iv 13b,d- sim, esp 8c-d, 29c-32c / Novum Organum, bk
18d I, aph 78 119b-c; aph 80-81 120a-c; aph 90
38 Rousseau: Political Economy, 372a-377b esp 124d-125a
375d-377b / Social Contract, bk hi, 414b 31 Descartes: Discourse 41a-67a,c / Medita-
39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, bk v, 303b-304c; tions, I 75a-77c / Objections and Replies, 278a-
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Matters relevant to physical education or the training of bodily skills, see Art 9b; Habit 5a;
Labor 2b.
Matters relevant to moral education, see Art loa; Custom and Convention 5b; Good and
Evil 6a;Habit 5b; History 2; Knowledge 8b(i); Pleasure and Pain loa; Poetry 9a;
Punishment 3a; Virtue and Vice la, 4-4C, 4d(2), 4d(4), 8b; and for the training of
specific virtues, see Courage 6; Temperance 4.
Matters relevant to liberal education or intellectual training, see Art 6b; Habit 4a-4b, 5d;
History 2; Knowledge 9a; Man 6a; Mind 4a-4c; Pleasure and Pain loa; Poetry 5a,
9a; Truth 3d(3); Virtue and Vice 4b-4c; and for discussions of the Hberal arts, see
Language la, 7-8; Logic 3-3b; Mathematics ib; Rhetoric ib, 2c-2d, 6.
Matters relevant to professional education or training in the useful arts and crafts, see
Law 9; Medicine i, 2c; Philosophy 5; Rhetoric 6; State 8c.
Matters relevant to religious education, see God 6c(i)-6c(3); Knowledge 6c(5); Proph-
ecy ic-id; Religion ia-ib(3), 5c; Theology 2, 4a-4c; Virtue and Vice 8b, 8e;
Wisdom ic.
The consideration of factors involved in learning and teaching, see Emotion 5d; Experience
2-3b; Habit 4a-4b; Knowledge 4a-4b, 9a; Language 8; Logic 4; Mind 4c; Pleasure
AND Pain 4c(2); Truth 3d(3), 8e; Virtue and Vice 4b-4c.
The role of the family in education, see Family 2c, 6d; Virtue and Vice 4d(i).
The role of the state in education, see Law 6d; Virtue and Vice 4d(3), 7a; and for the
problem of education in relation to different forms of government, see Aristocracy 5;
Citizen 6; Democracy 6; Monarchy 3a; State 8c.
The discussion of freedom in the conmiunication of knowledge and art, see Art lob; Knowl-
edge 9b; Liberty 2a; Opinion 5b; Poetry 9b; Truth 8d.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great BooJ^s of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
J. S. Mill.
"Professor Sedgwick's Discourse on the Whewfll. Of a Liberal Education
Studies of the University of Cambridge," \n vol i, The Elements of Morality, bk v, ch 5
.
i
Hugh of Saint V^ictor. Didascalicon: De Studio H. Adams. The Education of Henry Adams
Legendi MoNTESsoRi. Method of Scientific Pedagogy
John of Salisbury. Metalogicon Bryce. The Functions of a University
T. More. Utopia, bk i Shaw. Pygmalion
Luther. To the Councilmen of All Cities in Germany T. Veblen. The Higher Learning in America
That They Establish and Maintain Christian Schools Whitehead. The Organization of Thought, ch 1-5
Castiglione. The Bool{ of the Courtier The Aims of Education
.
Erasmus. The Education of a Christian Prince Kelso. The Doctrine of the English Gentleman in the
De Pueris Statim ac Liberaliter Instituendis {On Sixteenth Century
—
.
Liberal Education) Gorky. Forty Years the Life of Clim Samghin, vol i,
Elyot. The Governour Bystander
VivES. On Education B. Russell. Education and the Good Life
Ignatius of Loyola. Constitutions Skeptical Essays, xiv
.
INTRODUCTION
THE words "atom" and "element"
basic notions in the analysis of matter.
express
To
composition and into them it is
some extent their meaning seems to be the eral are sim^ple bodies, fire, water, air, and earth;
same. Atoms or elements are usually under- for out of them in the first instance we account
stood to be ultimate units, the parts out of for the constitution of the universe, and into
which other things are formed by combination. them finally we conceive of it as being re-
But as soon as further questions are asked solved."
about the divisibility or indivisibility of these This explains why books in so many different
units, or about their number and variety— we fields have the word "element" in their titles.
are confronted with differing conceptions of There are the elements of grammar or logic, the
the atom, and with a theory of the elements elements of language or music, the elements of
w^hich is opposed to the atomic analysis of psychology or economics. Elements in one sub-
matter. ject matter or science are analogous to elements
Even when the two notions are not opposed in another because in each sphere they stand to
to one another, they are not interchangeable. everything else as the simple to the complex,
"Atom" has a much narrower meaning. It the pure to the mixed, the parts to the whole.
usually designates a small particle of matter, Thus the factors of price may be said to func-
whereas "element" signifies the least part into tion in economic analysis as do the parts of
which anything at all can be divided. It is this speech in grammatical analysis.
broader meaning of "element" which permits Another illustration comes from the theory
Euclid to call his collection of the theorems in of the four bodily humors in ancient physiol-
terms of which all geometric problems can be ogy. In the traditional enumeration, which
solved, the "elements" ot geometry. According goes back to Hippocrates, they are blood,
to Aristotle, this is true, not only of geometrical phlegm, yellow and black bile, and they
bile,
proofs, but also "in general of the elements of function analytically as do fire, water, air, and
demonstration; for the primary demonstra- earth in ancient physics. They "make up the
tions, each of which is implied in many demon- nature of the body of man," according to a
strations," he says, "are called elements of Hippocratic treatise on the nature of man,
demonstration." From this it follows that ele- "and through them he feels pain or enjoys
ments will be found in any subject matter or health." Perfect health is enjoyed by a man
science in which analysis occurs, and not only "when these elements are duly proportioned
in physics. to one another in respect of compounding,
"An element," writes Nicomachus in his In- power, and bulk, and when they are perfectly
trodiiction to Arithmetic, "is the smallest thing mingled." Galen, in an analysis of tempera-
which enters into the composition of an object, ments, explains all varieties of temperament and
and the least thing into which it can be ana- all complexions of physique in terms of these
lyzed. Letters, for example, are called the ele- humors, either by their mixture or by the pre-
ments of literate speech, for out of them all dominance of one or another. Thus the san-
articulate speech is composed and into them guine, phlegma-tic, choleric, or melancholic
finally it is resolved. Sounds are the elements of temperament is accounted for by the excess of
all melody; for they are the beginning of its one and a deficiency of the other humors.
400
Chapter 21: ELEMENT 40!
Still another physiological application of the The two words are often used as synonyms.
notion of element is to be found in the ancient Lavoisier, for example, says that we can use
(.li\'ision of tissue into flesh and bone, or in the "the term elements or principles of bodies, to
,
more elaborate modern analysis of the types of express our idea of the last point which analysis
which comprise all li\'ing matter.
cells is capable of reaching."
To discover any diflerence in the meaning of
These illustrations indicate that the irrc- "element" and "principle," it is necessary to
ducibility of elements to anything simpler than specify their correlatives precisely. Out of ele-
themselves does not necessarily mean that they ments, compounds or mixtures are formed.
are absolutely indivisible. Cells can be further From principles, consequences are derived. In
divided into nucleus, protoplasm, and mem- logic, for example, we say that terms are the
brane without ceasing to be the elements of elements of propositions (the proposition 'Soc-
tissue. The parts of speech — nouns, verbs, ad- rates is a man' comprising the terms 'Socrates'
jectives — can be further divided into syllables and 'man'), but we say that axioms are the
and letters without ceasing to be the elements principles from which conclusions are derived.
of significant utterance. Letters, treated as the This does not prevent the same thing from be-
elements of language, can be physically divided. ing viewed in djlferent connections as both ele-
The fact that terms are sometimes regarded as ment and principle— as an element because it
the logical elements out of which propositions is the simple part out of which a more complex
and syllogisms are formed does not prevent a whole is composed, and as a principle because it
distinction from being made between simple is the source from which something else is de-
and complex terms. Nicomachus calls the tri- rived. The parts of speech in grammar are the
angle elementary among all plane figures, "for elementary components of phrases and sen-
everything else is resolved into it, but it into tences; they are also the principles from which
nothing else"; yet the triangle is divisible into the rules of syntax are derived.
the lines which compose it and these lines in The third notion which belongs with ele-
turn are divisible into points. ment and principle is cause. Its correlative is
When Nicomachus says that the triangle is effect. Again it can be said that that which is an
the element of all other figures "and has itself element in one connection and a principle in
no element," he does not mean that the tri- another can be regarded as a cause from still a
angle is absolutely indivisible, but only rela- third point of view. In Aristotle's physical trea-
tively so. Relative to the analysis of plane fig- tises, for example, matter is regarded in all three
ures, there is no simpler figure out of which the ways: an element of all bodies, for they are
it is
triangle can be formed. Similarly, relative to substances composed of matter and form; it is a
the analysis of significant speech, there is no principle of change, since from matter, form,
simpler part than the word. Relative to the and privation change is derived; it is a cause
analysis of melody, there is no simpler part than {i.e., the material cause) of certain results.
the tone. Musical tones may be physically, but But it must also be observed that everything
they are not musically, complex. which is any one of these three is not necessar-
ily both of the others also. Since an element,
The definition of element can also be ap- according to Aristotle, is a "component im-
proached by comparing its meaning with that manent in a thing," anything that is an extrin-
of principle and cause. All three terms are sic principle or cause cannot be an element.
brought together by Aristotle in the beginning Thus the action of one body upon another is a
of his Physics^ when he declares that we attain cause and a principle, but not an element. Re-
"scientific knowledge" through acquaintance ferring to these distinctions, Aquinas declares
with the "principles, causes, and elements" of that ''principle is a wider term than cause, just
things. as cause is more common than element.'' The
The word "principle" occurs almost as fre- chapters on Cause and Principle tend to sub-
quently as "element" in the titles of books stantiate this observation about the scope of
which claim to be basic expositions or analyses. these ideas in the tradition of western thought.
402 THE GREAT IDEAS
The basic issues concerning elements occur In terms of these simple bodies and the ele-
in the analysis of matter. Before Plato and mentary qualities all other material things can
Aristotle, the early Greek physicists had asked be explained.
such questions as, From what do all things In contrast to the elements stand the mixed,
come ? Of what are all things made ? A number or compound, bodies, in the constitution of
of answers were given, ranging from one kind of which two or more elements combine. There
ultimate, such as earth or fire, through a small may be many kinds of mixed bodies, but none
set of ultimate kinds, to an infinite variety. is irreducible in kind, as are the four elements;
The classical theory of the four elements is the any mixed body can be divided into the differ-
middle answer, avoiding the extremes of unity ent kinds of elementary bodies which compose
and infinity. it, whereas the elementary bodies cannot be
According to Galen, it was Hippocrates who divided into parts which are different in kind
"first took in hand to demonstrate that there from themselves. A living body, for example,
are, in all, four mutually interacting qualities" may contain parts of earth and water, but the
and who provided "at least the beginnings of parts of earth are earth, the parts of water,
the proofs to which Aristotle later set his hand" water.
in developing the theory of the four elements. It is precisely the mode of divisibility that
Galen was a subject of
also indicates that it Aristotle declares is "the fundamental ques-
controversy among the ancients whether the tion." In answering this question he opposes the
"substances as well as the qualities" of the theory of the four elements to another Greek
four elements "undergo this intimate mingling" account of the constitution of matter the —
from which results "the genesis and destruc- atomic theory, developed by Leucippus and
tion of all things that come into and pass out Democritus, and expounded for us in Lucretius'
of being." poem On the Nature of Things,
Aristotle, in his treatise On Generation and
Corruption, enumerates the various senses in According to the Greek atomists, matter is
which the physicist considers elements. "We not infinitely divisible. "If nature had set no
have to recognize three 'originative sources' limit to the breaking of things," Lucretius
(or elements)," he writes: "firstly, that which writes, "by this time the bodies of matter could
is potentially perceptible body; secondly, the have been so far reduced . . . that nothing
contrarieties {e.g., heat and cold); and thirdly. could within a fixed time be conceived out of
Fire, Water, and the like." The "potentially them and reach its utmost growth of being."
perceptible body" is identified with prime mat- There must then be "a fixed limit to their
ter, and, since this "has no separate existence, —
breaking" a limit in physical division which
but is always bound up with a contrariety," ultimately reaches units of matter that are ab-
it can be ruled out from the usual notion solutely indivisible. Lucretius calls them "first
of element. The elementary qualities, the beginnings ... of solid singleness, . . . not com-
"contrarieties" named secondly, are the hot pounded out of a union of parts, but, rather,
and cold and dry and moist. The so-called strong in everlasting singleness" — the "seeds of
elements. Fire, Air, Water, and Earth, are left things," or atoms. The Greek word from which
to the last, and are mentioned "only thirdly," "atom" comes literally means uncuttable.
Aristotle says, because they "change into one From this it is evident that Aristotle can
another . whereas the contrarieties do not
. . deny the existence of atoms while at the same
change," time he affirms the existence of elementary
The elementary quafities "attach them- bodies. The elements, unlike the atoms, are not
selves" by couples to the "apparently 'simple' conceived as indivisible in quantity, but only
bodies." In consequence, Aristotle writes, "Fire as incapable of division into diverse kinds of
cold and dry." Each of them, however, "is ment, the difference between them lies in this
characterized par excellence by a single quality." distinction between quantitative and qualita-
Chapter 21: ELEMENT 403
tive indivisibility. The atom is the least quan- still retained when we speak of men struggling
tity of matter. It cannot be broken into quan- against or battling with "tlic clcmcnls."
titative parts. The elementary body is not
atomic. It is always capable of division into "It will no doubt be a matter of surprise,'*
smaller units, but all of these units must be of Lavoisier writes in the Preface to his Elements
the same kind as the elementary body under- of Chemistry, "that in a treatise upon the ele-
going division. ments of chemistry, there should be no chapter
The element is indivisible only in the sense on the constituent and elementary parts of
that it cannot be decomposed into other l^inds matter; but I shall take occasion, in this place,
of matter, as a mixed body can be decom- to remark that the fondness for reducing all the
posed into its diverse elements. The atom can- bodies in nature to three or four elements,
not be divided in any way. Only compound proceeds from a prejudice which has descend-
bodies can be divided into their constituent ed to us from the Greek philosophers. The
atoms, all of which are alike in kind, differing notion of four elements, which, by the variety
only quantitatively — in size, shape, or weight. of their proportions, compose all the known
Different kinds of matter occur only on the substances in nature, is a mere hypothesis,
level of compounds and as the result of diverse assumed long before the first principles of ex-
combinations of atoms. perimental philosophy or of chemistry had
This last point indicates another contrast any existence."
between atoms and elements in ancient physi- This does not mean that Lavoisier entirely
cal theory. The elements are defined, as we have rejects the notion of elements in chemical anal-
seen, by their qualitative differences from one ysis. On the contrary, he says that "we must
another; or, more strictly, according to combi- admit, as elements, all the substances into which
nations of elementary sensible qualities — hot we are capable, by any means, to reduce bodies
and and dry. By virtue of the quali-
cold, moist by decomposition." His quarrel with the an-
ties peculiar to them, the four elements stand cients chiefly concerns two points. The first is
in a certain order to one another. Water and on the number of the elements, which he thinks
air, according to Plato, are "in the mean be- experiment has shown to be much greater than
tween fire and earth" and have "the same pro- the four of classical theory. The second is on
portion so far as possible; as fire is to air so is the simplicity of the experimentally discovered
air to water, and as air is to water so is water to They can be called atoms or simple
elements.
earth." The two of the elements
quality which if we do not thereby imply that we
bodies only
have in common provides the mean. Thus fire know them to be absolutely indivisible — either
and air are joined by the common quality of qualitatively or quantitatively. We are not en-
hot; air and water by moist; and water and titled "to affirm that these substances we con-
earth by cold. sider as simple may not be compounded of two,
When their analysis reached its greatest re- or even of a greater number of principles"
finement, the ancients recognized that the merely because we have not yet discovered
earth, air, fire, and water of common experience "the means of separating them."
do not actually have the purity requisite for modern physics and chemistry, the dis-
In
elements. They are "not simple, but blended," tinction between element and atom seems to
Aristotle writes, and while the elements "are be abolished. The same unit of matter is at once
indeed similar in nature to them, [they] are both an atom and an element. The table of
not identical with them." The element "corre- atomic weights is also a chart of the elements.
sponding to fire is 'such-as-fire,' not fire; that The atoms is both quantitative
classification of
which corresponds to air is 'such-as-air,' and so —
and qualitative qualitative in the sense that
on with the rest of them." Thus the four ele- the atoms of different elementary kinds of mat-
ments are only analogous to, for they are purer ter differ in their active properties.
than, ordinary earth, air, fire, and water; yet According to the ancient meaning of the
their names continued to be used as symbols terms, the molecule would seem to be both a
for the true elements, a connotation which is mixture and a compound mixed, in that it can
404 THE GREAT IDEAS
be broken up into other \inds of matter; com- atomic change; the meaning of "element" has
pound, in that it can be divided into smaller moved equally far from its original sense.
units of matter.But in modern theory the
meanings of "compound" and "mixture" have Do THESE ALTERED meanings change the basic
also changed, the molecule being classilied as a issues in the philosophy of nature } Are these
compound rather than a mixture. The combi- issues resolved or rendered meaningless by ex-
nation of the elements to form molecular com- perimental science ?
of forces or powers, not particles of matter, in atomist whether the particles which constitute
which the powers themselves reside." The atom molecules or the particles— the electrons and
thus ceases to be "a little unchangeable, im- protons, the neutrons and mesons which con- —
penetrable piece of matter," and "consists of stitute "atoms," are atomic. Even if further ex-
the powers" it exercises. What was ordinarily perimental work should succeed in dividing
referred to "under the term shape" becomes these "sub-atomic" particles, the question
the "disposition and relative intensity of the could still be asked: Is matter infinitely divisi-
forces" that are observed. ble, regardless of our actual power to continue
With Faraday it is evident that the meaning making divisions ad infinitum ? Since the ques-
of "atom" has departed far from the sense in tion, when thus formulated, cannot be put to
which Lucretius speaks of "units of solid single- experimental test, the issue concerning atoms
ness" or Newton of "solid, massy, hard, im- would remain.
penetrable, movable particles . . . incompara- That issue would not refer to any particle of
bly harder than any porous bodies compounded matter defined at a certain stage of physical
of them; even so very hard as never to wear or analysis or experimental discovery. It would
break in pieces; no ordinary power being able consist in the opposition of two views of the
to divide what God himself made one in the nature of matter and the constitution of the ma-
first creation." With the conception of the ele- terial universe: the affirmation, on the one
ments as different kinds of atoms; then, with hand, that truly atomic particles must exist;
the discovery of radio-active elements under- and the denial, on the other, that no particle
going slow disintegration; finally, with the pro- of matter can be atomic. The affirmative argu-
duction of isotopes and new elements through ments of Lucretius and Newton make the con-
CllAPTUR 21 ELEMKN'I' 405
slaiicy of nature ami ilic indestructibility of all"mutually penetrable." He compares the
matter depend on the absolute solidity and combination and separation of two atoms with
impenetrability of matter's ultinuite parts. The "the conjunction oi two sea waves of different
negative arguments of Aristotle and Descartes velocities into one, their perfect union lor a
proceed from the divisibility of whatever is time, and final separation into the constituent
continuous to the conclusion that any unit of waves." Such a view of the constitution of mat-
matter must have parts. ter, Faraday writes, leads to "the conclusion
The philosophical doctrine of atomism, in the that matter fills all space, or at least all space to
form which Lucretius adopts it from Epicu-
in which gravitation extends."
rus, insistsupon void as the other basic princi- The very continuity — the voidlessncss or
ple of the universe. "Nature," he writes, "is lack of pores— which the opponents of atom-
founded on two things: there are bodies and ism insist is the source of matter's infinite divis-
there is void in which these bodies are placed ibility, the atomists seem to give as the reason
and through which they move about." Com- why the ultimate particles are without parts,
pound lx>dies are divisible because the atoms of hence simple, solid, and indivisible.
which they are composed arc not absolutely
continuous with one another, but are separated On still other poixts, there is disagreement
by void or empty space. That is why they are among the atomists themselves. Not all of
not solid or impenetrable, as are the atomic them go to the extreme of denying existence or
particleswhich are composed of matter en- reality to anything immaterial; nor do all insist
tirely In Newton's language
without void. that whatever exists is either an atom or made
hardness must be "reckoned the property of all up of atoms and void. In the tradition of the
uncompounded matter," for if "compound great books, the extreme doctrine is found in
bodies are so very hard as we find some of them Lucretius alone. Though it is shared by Hobbes,
to be, and yet are very porous," how much and is reflected in the Leviathan, it is not ex-
harder must be "simple particles which are pounded there. It is developed in his treatise
void of pores." Concerning Body.
The opponents of atomism tend to deny the For Lucretius, the atoms are eternal as well
existence not only of atoms, but of the void as as indestructible. The "first beginnings" of
well. Descartes, for example, denies that there all other things are themselves without be-
can be "any atoms or parts of matter which are ginning. "In time gone by," Lucretius writes,
indivisible of their own nature. . . . For how- "they moved in the same way in which now
ever small the parts are supposed to be, yet they move, and \\\\\ ever hereafter be borne
because they are necessarily extended we are along in like manner" through an endless suc-
always able in thought to divide any one of cession of worlds, each of which comes to be
them into two or more parts." For the same through a concourse of atoms, each in turn
reason, he maintains, there cannot be "a space perishing as with decay that concourse is dis-
in which there is no substance . . . because the solved. Newton writes in what seems to be a
extension of space or internal place is not dif- contrary vein. "It seems probable to me," he
ferent from that of body." The physical world, says, "that God in the beginning formed mat-
on view, is conceived as what the ancients
this ter in solid, massy, hard, impenetrable, mova-
called a plenum, continuously filled with mat- ble particles." "All material things," he contin-
ter. This controversy over void and plenum is ues, "seem to have been composed of the hard
elaborated in the chapter on Space. and above mentioned, variously
solid particles
Although he uses the language of the atom- associated in the first Creation b} the counsel
ists, Faraday seems to agree with Descartes of an intelligent Agent."
rather than with Newton. He pictures matter Nor does Newton appeal to the properties
as "continuous throughout," with no distinc- and motions of the ultimate particles except to
tion between "its atoms and any intervening explain the characteristics and laws of the phys-
space." Atoms, he thinks, instead of being ab- ical world. Unlike Lucretius and Hobbes, he
OUTLINE OF TOPICS'
PAGE
1. The concept of element 407
3. The theory of the elements in natural philosophy, physics, and chemistry 408
3^. Element and atom: qualitative and quantitative indivisibility
5^. Arguments for and against the existence of atoms: the issue concerning the
infinite divisibility of matter
5^. The number, variety, and properties of atoms: the production of sensible things
by their collocation 411
5y. The atomic constitution of mind and soul: its bearing on immortafity
5g. The explanation of natural phenomena by reference to the properties and mo-
tions of atoms
5^. The atomistic account of the origin and decay of the world, its evolution and
order 412
Chapter 21: ELEMENT 407
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy tvpc, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Homur: Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upperand lower halves of the page. For example, m5S]AMEs: Psychology, 116a'119h, the passage
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halvesof the right-hand sideof
the page. For example, in 7 Plato: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
Author's Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as part, bk, ch,
sect) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d.
Bible References: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., Old Testa-
—
ment: Nehemiah, 7:45 (Z)) // Esdras, 7:46.
Symbols: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
4a; PART III, 87c-d; 103b-c; 105d 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk vi, 248d-249a
3b. The enumeration of the elements: their 3c. The mutability of the elements: their trans-
properties and order mutation
7 Plato: Cratylus, 98d / Phaedo, 247b'248c / 7 Plato: Timaeus, 456b-c; 458d-460b
Timaeus, 448b-d; 458b-460b / Philebus, 618c- 8 Aristotle: Heavens, bk i, ch 3 360d-362a;
619a / Laws, bk x, 760a- 761 d BK III, CH I [298*^24-299*1] 389b,d-390b; ch
8 Aristotle: Physics,bk hi, ch 5 [204*^10-205^ 2 [301*^33-302^9] 393b; CH 6 [304*'23]-ch 8
6] 282c-283a; bk iv, ch i [208*^8-22] 287b / [306*^29] 396a-398a / Generation and Corrup-
Heavens, bk i, ch 1-8 359a-369a; cii 9 [278*^ tion, BK I, CH I 409a-410c; ch 6 [322*^1-21]
22-35] 370a; bk ii, ch 3 377c-378a; bk hi, 420b-d; bk ii, ch 4-6 431b-435a / Meteorol-
ch I 389b,d-391c; ch 3-5 393c-396a; bk hi, BK I, ch 3
ogy, [339*36-*'3] 445 d / Metaphysics,
ch 7 i3o6''i]-BK ly, ch 6 [3i3''24] 397b-405a,c BK CH 8 [989*18-29] 507b-c
I,
esp BK IV, CH 3-5 401c-404d / Generation and 10 Galen: Natural Faculties, bk i, ch 2, 167d-
Corruption, bk i, ch i 409a-410c; bk ii, ch 168b; BK II, ch 3, 185c-d
1-3 428b.d-431a / Meteorology, bk i, ch 2-3 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk i [635-829]
445b-447d; bk iv, ch i [378^10-26] 482b,d- 8d-lla; BK V [235-305 64a-65a; [380-415] 66a-c
j
Q 74, AA 1-6 925c-932b passim; q 91, a 5, ans 30 Bacon: Novum Organum, bk i, aph 66 114d-
and RKP 4 1024a 1025b 115c; BK 11, APH 7 139c 140a; aph 40, 171a-
21 Dantk: Diiine Comedy, paradisi., vii (121- 173a; aph 48, 181a 184a
148] 116b-c 33 Pascal: Vacuum, 367a b
22 Chaucer: Canon's Yeoman s Prologue 471b- 35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, sect 65
474a / Canon s Yeoman s 7 rf/c 474b-487a 425d-426a
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 14b-c 45 Lanoisier: Elements of Chemistry, part i, 22c-
34 Newton: Optics, bk hi, 531a- 52a,c; part ii, 54b,d 55d; 57c 86a, c; part
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 148a-b in, 87c-d; 103b-c; 105d; 117a 128c csp 117a-
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 299d-300a 118a
44 BoswELh: Johnson, 262c 45 Faraday: Researches in Electricity, 309a-312a;
45 Lavoisier: Elements of Chemistry, PARTi,41b-c 312c-313d; 314a b; 315a-b; 327'a 422a,c pas-
sim; 541b,d-584a,c passim
3</. Combinations of the elements: compounds 51 ToLSTf)Y: War and Peace, bk vi, 248d-249a
and mixtures 53 James: Psychology, 104a-105a; 876a
7 Plato: Timaeiis, 448b-d; 449c-450a; 452d-
454a; 460b-462c 4. The discovery of elements in other arts and
8 Aristotle: Topics, bk vi, ch 14 [i5r''2o-32] sciences
206a / Physics, bk hi, ch 5 [204^10-22] 282c-d; 7 Plato: Cratylus, 104c-110d esp 106a-107b /
BK VII, ch 3 [246^2 19] 329c-330a / Heavens, Republic, bk hi, 333c-d / 'Theaetetus, 544c-
BK I, CH 2 [268^27-269*30] 360a-c; ch 5 548c / Philcbus, 615c-617d; 618d-619b; 635b-
[271^18-23! 362d-363a; bk hi, ch 3 [302'*io]- 639a,c
CH 4 [302^28] 393c-394a; ch 8 [306^22-29] 8 Aristotle: Categories, ch 2 [1*17 iq] 5b / In-
398a; bk iv, ch 4 [311*30-^14] 402d-403a / terpretation, CH 4 [16^27-35] 26a / Prior Analyt-
Generation ajid Corruption, bk ch i [314*25-
i, ics, BK I, CH I [24^17-22] 39c; CH 2:5 [40*^18-
^2] 409c; ch 2 [315*28-33] 410d; ch 10 426c- 22] 57b; [41*4-7] 57d / Posterior Analytics, bk
428d; bk it, ch 6-8 433d-436d / Meteorology, I, CH 4 [73*33-^2] lOOb-c; CH7 [75=*38-^7|
bk hi, ch 6 [378*i3]-bk iv, ch 12 [390^21] 103c; CH 23 [84^19-85*1] 115c-116a; ch 27
482c-494d / Metaphysics, bk vii, ch 17 [1041^ 119b bk i, ch 4-9 144b-147b esp ch
/ Topics,
12-33] 565d-566a,c / Soul, bk i, ch 2 [404^7- 4 [101^11-25] 144b-c; BK VI, CH i [i39='24-:52]
29] 633d-634a; [405'^8-3i] 634d-635a; ch 5 192a; ch 13 204c-206a / Metaphysics, bk i,
[409^18-411*7] 639c-641a; bk hi, ch 13 CH 5 [985^22-986*21] 503d-504b; ch 6 [987*^
[435*11-^4] 668a-c / Sense and the Sensible^ 19-23] 505d; [988*7-16] 506a-b; ch9 [992''
CH 2-3 674a-678b 18-993*10] 511a-c; BK HI, CH 3 [998*20-^11]
9 Aristotle: Parts of Animals, bk i, ch i 517a-b; ch 6 [1002^11-25] 521b-c; bk v, ch 3
[640^5-18] 163a-b; bk ii, ch i [646*i2-'^2o] 534c-d; bk xii, ch 4-5 599d-601a / Sold, bk i,
170a-d CH2 [404*^7-29] 633d-634a; ch 5 [409^23-411*
10 Hippocrates: Ancient Medicine, par 15 5c-d 23] 639d-641b; bk hi, ch 5 [430*10-14] 662c
10 Galen: Natural Faculties, bk i, ch 2-3 167b- 9 Aristotle: Parts of Animals, bk ii, ch i
169a; ch 6 169c-170c; bk ii, ch 8, 193b-d [646*1 o]-cH 2 [647^30] 170a-172a / Politics, bk
12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk i [635-920] I, CH I [1252*18-24] 445b; bk hi, ch i [1274^^
XV, sect 9 164b-d; ch xvi, sect i 165c-d; 35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk iv, ch hi,
CH xxi, sect 75 200b-d; bk hi, ch iv, sect sect 25 321a-b
15-16 263a'C 45 Faraday: Researches in Electricity, 386c-d;
39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, bk i, 20b-23b esp 850b,d-855a,c
20b-21c, 22b-c 53 James: Psychology, 68a
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 341
110c 5b. Arguments for and against the existence of
50 Marx: Capital, 6b-c; 19c-26d passim, esp atoms: the issue concerning the infinite
20b-22a, 25d-26d; 62a; 85d'88d esp 85d, divisibility of matter
I, CH
7 [275^30-276*18] 367a-b; ch 9 [279*12- 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 84, a
18] 370b-c; BK HI, en 6 [305«i4-22] 396b c; 6, ANs 447c-449a
BK IV, CH 2 [308^29-3 lo"! 4 400b-401c; ch 5 1 34 Newton: Optics, bk hi, 518b-519b; 522a
[312^20-313*14] 404b-d / Generation and Cor- 35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk hi, ch
ruption, BK I, CH 8 423b-425d / Metaphysics, IV, SECT 10 261b d; bk iv, ch x, sect 5
BK I, ch 4 [985^^-19] 503c-d; bk iv, ch 5 350a-b
[1009*22-37] 528d; BK vii, ch 13 [1039*2-11] 53 James: Psychology, 98a-117b csp 98b 103b,
562d 115a
10 Galen: Natural Faculties, bk i, ch 12, 173a;
BK II, ch 6 188c-191a csp 189a-b 5/. The atomic constitution of mind and soul:
12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk
its bearing on immortality
i [265-634]
4b-8d esp [418-448] 6b-c 8 Aristotle: Soul, bk i, ch 2 [403*^28-404*
28 Galileo: Ttvo New Sciences, first day, 633a-b; [405*8-13] 634b; ch 3
15] [406^15-
141c-d 26] 636a-b; ch 4 [409*io]-ch 5 [409^18]
30 Bacon: Novum Organum, bk ii, aph 8 140b 639a-c
34 Newton: Principles, bk hi, prop 6, corol 10 Galen: Natural Faculties, bk i, ch 12 172d-
iii-iv 281b / Optics, BK III, 528b 173c
45 Faraday: Researches in Electricity, 850b, d- 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk hi [94-869]
855a,c 31b-41a esp [161-322] 32b-34b; bk iv [916-
53 James: Psychology, 106a; 882a-883a 961] 56b-d
17 Plotinus: Second Ennead, tr iv, ch 7, 52c;
5d. The number, variety, and properties of tr ix, ch 5, 68b / Third Ennead, tr i, ch 3
atoms: the production of sensible things 79b-c / Fourth Ennead, tr vii, ch 2-4 192a-
by their collocation 193c
8 Aristotle: Physics, bk i, ch 2 [184^15-22] 35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, sect 93 431b;
259b-c; ch 5 [188*18-25] 263c; bk hi, ch 4 sect 141 441a-b
[203*33-^2] 281b / Heavens, bk i,ch 7 [275^ 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 126c-d
30-276*18] 367a-b; bk hi, ch 4 [303*3-^8] 53 James: Psychology, 95a-118b esp 95b-98a,
394b-d; ch 7 [305^27-306*1] 397a-b; bk iv, 103a-106b, 117a-118b
CH 2 [308^29-310*14] 400b-401c / Generation
and Corruption, bk i, ch i [314*22-24] 409b-c; 5g. The explanation of natural phenomena by
CH 2 [315*34-316*4] 410d-411c; ch
id [327^
reference to the properties and motions
34-328*18] 427b-c / Metaphysics, bk i, ch 4
of atoms
[985''3-i9] 503c-d 8 Aristotle: Heavens, bk iv, ch 2 [308^29-
10 Galen: Natural Faculties, bk i, ch 12, 310*14] 400b-401c; ch 4 [311*30-^1] 402d-
173a-b; bk ii, ch 6, 189a-190a 403a; ch 5 [3I2*'2o]-ch 6 [313^25] 404b-
12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk ii [62-141] 405a,c / Generation and Corruption, bk i, ch
15d-16d; [184-250] 17b-18b; [333-599] 19b- 2 410d-413c; ch 8 423b-425d
22c; [730-1022] 24b'28a 10 Galen: Natural Faculties, bk i, ch 12, 172d-
17 Plotinus: Third Ennead, tr i, ch 3, 79b 173b; CH 14, 177a-178d; bk ii, ch 6 188c-
28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 495c'496a 191a
34 Newton: Optics, bk hi, 536b-537b; 539a-b 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk i [265-328]
34 Huygens: Light, ch hi, 566b-569b 4b-5a; bk ii [184-215] 17b-d; [333-477] 19b-
35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk 11, ch 21a; [522-540] 21c-d; [757-771] 24c-d; bk iv
XXVI, SECT 2 217b-d; bk iv, ch xx, sect 15, [524-614] 51a-52b; bk vi 80a-97a,c
393b 17 Plotinus: Third Ennead, tr i, ch 2, 78d; ch
35 Hume: Human Understanding, sect xi, div 3 79b-c
498c
104, 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 115,
45 I^woisi^k: Elements of Chemistry parti, 13a-d , A I, ANS and REP 3,5 585d-587c
45 Faraday: Researches in Electricity, 850 b,d- 28 Gilbert: Loadstone, bk ii, 34c-35a
855a,c 28 Galileo: Two New Sciences, first day, 139c-
53 ]\^'Es: Psychology, 104a-b; 876a 141d; 151d-153a
28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 355b-d;
5e. The atomistic account of sensation and 495c-496d
thought: the idola 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 45b-c
7 Plato: Meno, 177b-c 34 Newton: Principles, lb-2a / Optics, bk hi,
12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk ii [398-443] 531b-542a
20a-c; [865-990] 26a-27c; bk hi [231-395] 34 Huygens: Light, ch hi, 566b-569b
33a-35a; bk iv [26-906] 44b-56a esp [26-268] 35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk iv, ch hi,
44b-47d, [722-817] 53d-54d SECT 25-26 321a-c
17 Plotinus: Third Ennead, tr i, ch 2, 78d; ch 45 Faraday: Researches in Electricity, 850b,d-
3 79b-c / Fourth Ennead, tr vii, ch 6-8, 194b- 855a,c
196c 53 James: Pj:;'<r/^o/o^;', 882a-884b
412 THE GREAT IDEAS 5h
(5. The theory of atomism: critiques of atomism.) 12 AuRELius: Meditations, bk vi, sect 10
274b-c
5h. The atomistic account of the origin and de- 17 Plotinus Third Ennead, tr
: i, ch 3 79b-c
cay of the world, its evolution and order 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 47, a
12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk i [ioo8- ANs 256a-257b; a 3, ans 258c-259a
I,
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: The discussion of the ideas most closely associated with element, see Cause; Principle.
Matters relevant to the conception of elements or atoms as simple parts of a whole, see
One and Many 2b-2c; and for another discussion of the distinction between elements
or atoms and compounds or mixtures, see Change 9a; Matter 2.
The problem of the transmutation of the elements, see Change loa.
The issue concerning the divisibility of matter and the existence of a void, see Infinity
4b; One and Many 3a(3); Space 2b(i)-2b(3); and for the question of the number of
the elements or of the atoms, see Infinity 5-5b; Quantity 7.
Other considerations of atomistic materialism, see Matter 3a, 6; Mechanics 4c; Mind 2e;
Soul 3d; World ib, 4c.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Bool^s ofthe Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date,place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
Maimonides. The Guide for the Perplexed, part ii, Atomic Structure
CH 10 Atomic Theory and the Description of Nature
.
John of Saint Thomas. Cursits Philosophicus Tho- Jeans. The Universe Around Us, ch 2
misticus, Philosophia Naturalis, part hi, q 10 C. G. Darwin. The New Conceptions of Matter
Boyle. The Sceptical Chymist Soddy. The Interpretation of the Atom
Leibnitz. New Essays Concerning Human Under- Stranathan. The ''Particles'' of Modern Physics
standing, appendix, ch 3 Smyth. Atomic Energy for Military Purposes
Monadology, par 1-9
. Gamow. Atomic Energy in Cosmic and Human
Voltaire. "Atoms," in A Philosophical Dictiofiary Life
Dalton. a New System of Chemical Philosophy Andrade. The Atom and Its Energy
Whewell. The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Atom
IIecht. Explaining the
vol I, bk VI G. Thomson. The Atom
Chapter ir EMOTION
INTRODUCTION
THE emotions
We ways.
claim our attention in two
experience them, sometimes in
psychoanalyst— to the extent that
or therapeutic — has a
it is
a manner which overwhelms us; and we analyze works of poetry and history no
In the great
them by defining and classifying the several from Homer
similar shift takes place as one goes
passions, and by studying their role in human and Virgil to Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, from
life and society. We seldom do both at once, Greek to Shakespearean tragedy, from Plu-
for analysis requires emotional detachment, and tarch and Tacitus to Gibbon. What Words-
moments of passion do not permit study or worth said of the lyric poem — that it is "emo-
reflection. tion recollected in tranquillity" — may not ap-
With regard to the emotions the great books ply to the narratives in an identical sense. Yet
are similarly divided into two sorts — those they too re-enact the passions in all their vi-
which are theoretical discussions and those tality. Their pages are filled with the emotions
which concretely describe the passions of par- of men in conflict with one another or suffering
ticular men, exhibit their vigor, and induce conflict within themselves.
in us a vicarious experience. Books of the This is no less true of historical narrative than
first sort are scientific, philosophical, or theo- of fiction. The memorable actions of men on
Books of the second sort are
logical treatises. the stage of history did not occur in calm and
the great epic and dramatic poems, the novels quiet. We would certainly not remember them
and plays, the literature of biography and as well if the historian failed to re-create for us
history. the turbulence of crisis and catastrophe, or the
We customarily think of the emotions as biographer the storm and stress which accom-
belonging to the subject matter of psychology panies the inward resolution of heroic lives.
— proper to the science of animal and human It is impossible, of course, to cite all the rele-
oric, as in certain dialogues of Plato and in nificance in relation to a particular topic; but
Aristotle's Rhetoric; in the Greek discussions of for the whole range of topics connected with
virtue and vice in the moral theology of Aqui-
; emotion, the reader should certainly seek fur-
nas and in Spinoza's Elhics; and in books of po- ther in the realms of history and poetr}' for the
litical theory, such as Machiavelli's Prince and raw materials which the scientists and philoso-
Hobbes' Leviathan. phers have tried to analyze and understand.
on The Passions of the Soul
Descartes' treatise To the student of the emotions, Bacon rec-
is first discourses on the sub-
probably one of the ommends "the poets and writers of histories"
ject to be separated from the practical consider- as "the best doctors of this knowledge; where
ations of oratory, morals, and politics. Only we may find painted forth with great life, how
subsequently do the emotions become an ob- affections are kindled and incited; and how
ject of purely theoretic interest in psychology. pacified and refrained; and how again con-
But even then the interest of the psychiatrist or tained from act and further degree; how they
413
414 THE GREAT IDEAS
disclose themselves; how they work; how they only mild feelings of pleasure and pain or en-
vary; how they gather and fortify; how they during sentiments. Nevertheless, sentiments
are enwrapped one within another; and how may be emotional residues— stable attitudes
they do fight and encounter one with an- which pervade a life even during moments of
other; and other like particularities." emotional detachment and calm and pleasure —
and pain may color all the emotions. "Pleasure
Four words — "passion," "affection" or "af- and pain," Locke suggests, are "the hinges on
fect," and "emotion" — have been traditionally which our passions turn." Even though they
used to designate the same psychological fact. may not be passions in the strict sense, they
Of and "affect" have ceased
these, "affection" are obviously closely connected with them.
to be generally current, although we do find
them in Freud; and "passion" is now usually That the emotions are organic disturbances,
restricted to mean one of the emotions, or the upsetting the normal course of the body's func-
more violent aspect of any emotional experi- tioning, sometimes thought to be a modern
is
ence. But if we are to connect discussions col- discovery, connected with the James-Lange
lected from widely separated centuries, we theory that the emotional experience is nothing
must be able to use all these words inter- but the "feeling of the bodily changes"
. . .
appetite, hope, or fear, our body suffers, the afraid because we tremble." In other words, we
countenance changes, and the blood appears to do not run away because we are afraid, but are
course hither and thither. In anger the eyes are afraid because we run away.
fiery and the pupils contracted; in modesty the This fact about the emotions was known to
cheeks are suffused with blushes; in fear, and antiquity and the Middle Ages. Aristotle, for
under a sense of infamy and of shame, the face example, holds that mere awareness of an ob-
is pale" and "in lust how quickly is the member ject does not induce flight unless "the heart is
distended with blood and erected!" moved," and Aquinas declares that "passion is
of the skin and other tissues. Though some de- cording and, in some cases, measuring the phys-
gree of bodily disturbance would seem to be an iological changesaccompanying experimentally
essential ingredient in all emotional experience, produced emotions —
in both animals and men.
the intensity and extent of the physiological Modern theory also tries to throw some fight
reverberation, or bodily commotion, is not the on these organic changes by pointing out their
same or equal in all the emotions. Some emo- adaptive utility in the struggle for existence.
tions are much more violent than others. This This type of explanationis advanced by Dar-
leads William James to distinguish what he calls win in The Expression of Emotions in Man
the "coarser emotions ... in which every one and Animals, and is adopted by other evolu-
recognizes a strong organic reverberation" from tionists. "The snarl or sneer, the one-sided un-
the "subtler emotions" in which the "organic covering of the upper teeth," James writes, "is
reverberation is less obvious and strong." accounted for by Darwin from the
as a survival
This fact is sometimes used to draw the line time when our ancestors had large canines, and
between what are truly emotions and what are unfleshed them (as dogs now do) for attack. . . .
Chapter 22: EMOTION 415
The distention of the nostrils in anger is inter- disagreeable things only as affecting the sense"
preted by Spencer as an echo of the way in — that is, the exterior senses
— "there would be
which our ancestors had to breathe when, dur- no need Aquinas writes, "that an
to suppose,"
ing combat, their 'mouth was filled up by a part animal has a power besides the apprehension of
of the antagonist's body that had been seized' those forms which the senses perceive, and in
. The redding of the face and neck is called
. . which the animal takes pleasure, or from which
by Wundt a compensatory arrangement for it shrinks with horror." But animals need to
relieving the brain of the blood -pressure which seek or avoid certain things on account of their
the simultaneous excitement of the heart advantages or disadvantages, and such emo-
brings with it. The effusion of tears is explained tional reactions of approach or avoidance re-
both by this author and by Darwin to be a quire, in his opinion, a sense of the useful and
blood-withdrawing agency of a similar sort." the dangerous, which is innate rather than
Reviewing statements of this sort, James is learned. The estimative power thus seems to
willing to concede that "some movements of play a role which later writers assign to instinct.
expression can be accounted for as weakened The relation of instinct to the emotions and to
repetitions of movements which formerly (when fundamental biological needs is further con-
they were stronger) were of utility to the sub- sidered, from other points of view, in the chap-
ject''; but though we may thus "see the reason ters on Desire and Habit.
for a few emotional reactions," he thinks
"others remain for which no plausible reason Like desire, emotion is neither knowledge
can even be conceived." The latter, James sug- nor action, but something intermediate be-
gests, "may be reactions which are purely me- tween the one and the other. The various pas-
chanical results of the way in which our nervous sions are usually aroused by objects perceived,
centres are framed, reactions which, although imagined, or remembered, and once aroused
permanent in us now, may be called accidental they in turn originate impulses to act in certain
as far as their origin goes." ways. For example, fear arises with the percep-
Whether or not all the bodily changes which tion of a threatening danger or with the imagi-
occur in such emotions as anger or fear serve nation of some fancied peril. The thing feared
the purpose of increasing the animal's efficiency is somehow recognized as capable of inflicting
in combat or flight — as, for example, the in- injury with consequent pain. The thing feared
crease of sugar in the blood and the greater sup- is alsosomething from which one naturally
ply of blood to arms and legs seem to do — the tends to flee in order to avoid harm. Once the
basic emotions are generally thought to be con- danger is known and until it is avoided by
nected with the instinctively determined pat- flight or in some other way, the characteristic
terns of behavior by which animals struggle to feeling of fear pervades the whole experience.
survive. "The actions we call instinctive," It is partly a result of what isknown and what
James writes, "are expressions or manifestations is done, and partly the cause of how things
of the emotions"; or, as other writers suggest, seem and how one behaves.
an emotion, whether in outward expression or Analytically isolated from its causes and ef-
in inner experience, is the central phase of an fects, the emotion itself seems to be the feeling
instinct and emotion does not belong exclu- condition. It also involves the felt impulse to
sively to modern, or post-Darwinian, thought. do something about the object of the passion.
The ancients also recognize it, though in differ- Those writers who, like Aquinas, identify
ent terms. Following Aristotle's analysis of the emotion with the impulse by which "the soul
various "interior senses," Aquinas, for example, is drawn to a thing," define the several passions
speaks of the "estimative power" by which ani- as specifically different acts of appetite or de-
mals seem to be innately prepared to react to sire — specific tendencies to action. Aquinas, for
things useful or harmful. instance, adopts the definition given by Dam-
"If an animal were moved by pleasing and ascene: "Passion is a movement of the sensi-
416 THE GREAT IDEAS
tive appetite when we imagine good or evil." are common to men and animals and that they
Other writers who, like Spinoza, find that are more closely related to instinct than to
"the order of the actions and passions of our reason or intelligence. Darwin presents many
body is coincident in nature with the order of instances which, he claims, prove that "the
the actions and passions of the mind," stress the senses and intuitions, the various emotions and
cognitive rather than the impulsive aspect of faculties, such as love, memory, attention, cu-
emotion. They accordingly define the passions riosity, imitation, reason, etc., of which man
in terms of the characteristic feefings, pleasant boasts, may be found in an incipient, or even
and unpleasant, which flow from the estima- sometimes in a well-developed, condition in
tion of certain objects as beneficial or harmful. the lower animals." Where Darwin remarks
Spinoza goes furthest in this direction when he upon "the fewness and the comparative sim-
says that "an affect or passion of the mind is a plicity of the instincts in the higher animals . . .
signifies the passions as opposed to the reason, teria of definition. As previously noted, it is
not the purely vegetati\"e functions which man but recently that the experimental observ-ation
shares with plants as well as animals. of bodily changes has contributed to the differ-
There seems to be no doubt that emotions entiation of emotions from one another.
Chapter 22: RMOTION 417
Spinoza offers the longest listing of the pas- simply" {i.e., love, hate, desire, aversion, jov,
sions. For him, the emotions, which arc all sorrow), and the "irascible," which "regard gocxl
"compounded of the three primary afTects, de- or evil as arduous through Ix^ing difficult to
and sorrow," develop into the follow-
sire, joy, obtain or avoid" {i.e., fear, daring, hojx', de-
ing forms: astonishment, contempt, love, ha- spair, anger).
tred, inclination, aversion, devotion, derision, Within each of these groups, Aquinas pans
hope, fear, confidence, despair, gladness, re- particular passions as oppositcs, such as jov and
morse, commiseration, favor, indignation, over- sorrow, or hope and despair, either according
estimation, envy, compassion, self-satisfaction, to the "contrariety of object, i.e., of good and
humihty, repentance, pride, despondency, self- evil ... or according to approach and with-
exaltation, shame, regret, emulation, gratitude, drawal." Anger seems to be the only passion
benevolence, anger, vengeance, ferocity, au- for which no opposite can be given, other than
dacity, consternation, courtesy, ambition, lux- that "cessation from its movement" which
uriousness, drunkenness, avarice, lust. Aristotle calls "calmness" and which Aquinas
Many of the foregoing are, for Hobbes, de- says is an opposite not by way of "contrarietv
rived from ^^•hat he calls "the simple passions," but of negation or privation."
which include "appetite, desire, love, aversion, Using these distinctions, Aquinas also de-
hate, joy, and grief." There are more emotions scribes the order in which one passion leads to or
in Spinoza's list than either Aristotle or Locke generates another, beginning with love and
or James mentions, but none which they in- hate, passing through hope, desire, and fear,
clude is omitted. Some of the items in Spino- with their opposites, and, after anger, ending
za's enumeration are treated by other writers in joy or despair. On one point, all observers
as virtues and vices rather than as passions. and theorists from Plato to Freud seem to
The passions have been classified by reference agree, namely, that love and hate lie at the root
to various criteria. As we have seen, James dis- of all the other passions and generate hope or
tinguishes emotions as "coarse" or "subtle" in despair, fear and anger, according as the aspira-
terms of the violence or mildness of the accom- tions of love prosper or fail. Nor is the insight
panying physiological changes; and Spinoza that even hate derives from love peculiarlv
distinguishes them according as "the mind pass- modern, though Freud's theor\' of what he
es to a greater perfection" or "to a less perfec- calls the "ambivalence" of love and hate to-
tion." Spinoza's division would also seem to ward the same object, seems to be part of his
imply a distinction between the beneficial and own special contribution to our understanding
the harmful in the objects causing these two of the passions.
types of emotion, or at least to involve the
opposite components of pleasure and pain, for The role of the emotions or passions in hu-
in his view the emotions which correspond to man behavior has always raised two questions,
"a greater or less power of existence than be- one concerning the effect of conflict between
fore" are attended in the one case by "pleasur- diverse emotions, the other concerning the con-
able excitement" and in the other by "pain." flict between the passions and the reason or w ill.
Hobbes uses another principle of division. It is the latter question which has been of the
The passions differ basically according to the greatest interest to moralists and statesmen.
direction of their impulses — according as each Even though human emotions may have in-
or right and wrong. As Socrates discusses the The ancients did not underestimate the force
problem of knowledge and virtue, it would of the passions, nor were they too confident of
seem to be his view that a man who knows the strength of reason in its struggle to control
what is good for him will act accordingly. Men them, or to be free of them. They were ac-
may "desire things which they imagine to be quainted with the violence of emotional excess
good," he says, "but which in reality are evil." which they called "madness" or "frenzy." So,
Hence their misconduct will be due to a mis- too, were the theologians of the Middle Ages
taken judgment, not to a discrepancy between and modern philosophers like Spinoza and
action and thought. Eliminating the case of Hobbes. But not until Freud— and perhaps
erroneous judgment, Socrates gets Meno to also William James, though to a lesser extent
admit that "no man wills or chooses anything do we find in the tradition of the great books
evil." insight into the pathology of the passions, the
Aristotle criticizes the Socratic position which origin of emotional disorders, and the general
he summarizes in the statement that "no one theory of the neuroses and neurotic character as
. . . when he judges acts against what he judges the consequence of emotional repression.
best — people act badly only by reason of igno- For Freud, the primary fact is not the con-
rance." According to Aristotle, "this view plain- flict between reason and emotion, or, in his
ly contradicts the observed facts." Yet he ad- language, between the ego and the id. It is
mits that whatever a man does must at least rather the repression which results from such
seem good to him at the moment', and to that conflict. On the one side is the ego, which
extent the judgment that something is good or "stands for reason and circumspection" and has
bad would seem to determine action accord- "the task of representing the external world,"
ingly. In his analysis of incontinence, Aristotle or expressing what Freud calls "the reaUty-
tries to explain how a man may act against what principle." Associated with the ego is the super-
is judgment and yet, at the moment
his better ego
— "the vehicle of the ego-ideal, by which
of action, seek what he holds to be good. the ego measures itself, towards which it
Action may be caused either by a rational strives, and whose demands for ever-increasing
judgment concerning what is good or by an perfection it is always striving to fulfill." On
emotional estimate of the desirable. If these the other side is the id, which "stands for the
two factors are independent of one another untamed passions" and is the source of in-
more than that, if they can tend in opposite stinctual life.
directions —
then a man may act under emo- The ego, according to Freud, is constantly
tional persuasion at one moment in a manner attempting "to mediate between the id and
contrary to his rational predilection at another. reality" and measure up to the ideal set by
to
That a man may act either em.otionally or the super-ego, so as to dethrone "the pleasure-
rationally, Aristotle thinks, explains how, un- principle, which exerts undisputed sway over
der strong emotional influences, a man can do the processes in the id, and substitute for it the
the very opposite of what his reason would tell reality-principle, which promises greater se-
him is right or good. The point is that, while curity and greater success." But sometimes it
the emotions dominate his mind and action, he fails in this task. Sometimes, when no socially
garded as accidental or as rationally deter- between those who think that the passions are
mined. In fact, Freud sometimes goes to the intrinsically evil, the natural enemies of a good
extreme of insisting that all apparently rational will, lawless elements always in rebellion against
processes — both of thought and decision — are duty; and those who think that the passions
themselves emotionally determined; and that represent a natural desire for certain goods
most, or all, reasoning is nothing but the ration- which belong to the happy life, or a natural
alization of emotionally fixed prejudices or be- aversion for certain evils.
liefs. "The ego," he writes, "is after all only a Those who, like the Stoics and Kant, tend to
part of the id, a part purposively modified by adopt the former view recommend a policy of
its proximity to the dangers of reality." attrition toward the passions. Their force must
The
ancient distinction between knowledge be attenuated in order to emancipate reason
and opinion seems to be in essential agreement from their influence and to protect the will
with the insight that emotions can control the from their seductions. Nothing is lost, accord-
course of thinking. But at the same time it de- ing to this theory, if the passions atrophy and
nies that all thinking is necessarily dominated die. But if, according to the opposite doctrine,
by the passions. The sort of thinking which is the passions have a natural place in the moral
free from emotional bias or domination may life, then the aim should be, not to dispossess
result in knowledge, if reason itself is not de- them entirely, but to keep them in their place.
fective in its processes. But the sort of thinking Aristotle therefore recommends a policy of
which is directed and determined by the pas- moderation. The passions can be made to serve
sions must result in opinion. The former is reason's purposes by restraining them from ex-
reasoning; the latter what Freud calls "ration- cesses and by directing their energies to ends
alization" or sometimes "wishful thinking." which reason approves.
As Aristotle conceives them, certain of the
Because they can be ordered when they get virtues —
especially temperance and courage
out of order, the emotions raise problems for are stable emotional attitudes, or habits of emo-
both medicine and morals. Whether or not tional response, which conform to reason and
—;
or physiological aspect insofar as certain ele- general agreement that the passions are a force
ments in human physique the four bodily — to be reckoned with in the government of men;
humors of the ancients or the hormones of that the ruler, whether he is despotic prince or
—
modern endocrinology seem to be correlated constitutional oflBceholder, must move men
with types of personality. through their emotions as well as by appeals to
reason.
One of the great issues in political theory The two political instruments through which
concerns the role of the passions in human asso- an influence over the emotions is exercised are
ciation. Have men banded together form to oratory (now sometimes called "propaganda")
states because they feared the insecurity and and law. Both may work persuasively. Laws,
the hazards of natural anarchy and universal like other discourses, according to Plato, may
war, or because they sought the benefits which have preludes or preambles, intended by the
only political life could provide ? In the polit- legislator "to create good- will in the persons
ical community, once it is formed, do love and whom he addresses, in order that, by reason of
friendship or distrust and fear determine the this good-will, they will more intelligently re-
relation of fellow citizens, or of rulers and ruled ? ceive his command." But the law also carries
Should the prince, or any other man who with it the threat of coercive force. The threat
wishes to get and hold political power, try to of punishment for disobedience addresses itself
inspire love or to instill fear in those whom he entirely to fear, whereas the devices of the ora-
seeks to dominate ? Or are each of these emo- tor — or even of the legislator in his preamble
tions useful for different pohtical purposes and are not so restricted. The orator can play upon
in the handling of different kinds of men ? the whole scale of the emotions to obtain the
Considering whether for the success of the actions or decisions at which he aims.
prince it is "better to be loved than feared or Finally, there is the problem of whether the
feared than loved," MachiaveUi says that "one statesman should exercise pohtical control over
should wish to be both, but, because it is diffi- other influences which affect the emotional life
cult to unite them in one person, it is much of a people, especially the arts and public spec-
safer to be feared than loved, when, of the two, tacles. The earhest and perhaps the classic
either must be dispensed with. Neverthe- . . . statement of problem is to be found in
this
less," he continues, "a prince ought to inspire Plato's Republic 3ind in his Laws. Considerations
fear in such a way that, if he does not win love, relevant to the question he raises, and the im-
he avoids hatred; because he can endure very plications of diverse solutions of the problem,
well being feared whilst he is not hated." are discussed in the chapters on Art, Liberty,
According to Hobbes, when men enter into a and Poetry.
Chapter 22: F.MOTION 42!
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAG I
1. The nature and causes of the emotions or passions 422
la. Emotion in relation to feelings of pleasure and pain 423
i/». Bodily changes during emotional excitement
(2) Attenuation and atrophy of the passions: the liberation of reason 431
5^. The regulation of art for the sake of training the passions
422 THE GREAT IDEAS
REFERENCES
To numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
find the passages cited, use the
For example, in 4 Homer: Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d, the
numbers of the passages referred to.
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 J am es Psychology, 1 16a-l 19b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
thepage. For example, in 7 Plato: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
Author's Divisions One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as part, bk, ch,
:
sect) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, arc given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d.
Bible References: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., Old Testa-
ment: Nehemiah, 7:45 — (D) II Esdras, 7:46.
Symbols: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
1* The nature and causes of the emotions or Q 82, a i, ans 968a-970c; q 86, a 3, ans and
passions rep 3-4 994d-996a,c
7 Plato: Republic, bk iv, 350c-353d; bk ix, 23 HoBBEs: Leviathan, intro, 47c-d; part i,
416b-c; 421a-b / Timaeus, 466b-d / Philebus, 61a-65b esp 61a-c; 68b-c; 77b-c; part ii, 162c
621c-622b; 627c-628a; 628d-630c / Laws, bk 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 55b-c
IX, 748a 31 Descartes: Meditations, in, 82d-83a
8 Aristotle : Soul, bk i, ch i [403*2-^3] 31 Spinoza: Ethics, part ii, axiom 3 373d;
632a-c; ch4 [408^34-^31] 638b-d; bk hi, ch PART III 395a-422a,c esp 395a-d, def 1-3
3 [427^21-24] 660a; ch 9 [432^26-433*2] 665c 395d-396a, prop i 396a-c, prop 3 398b-c,
9 Aristotle: Parts of Animals, bk iv, ch ii PROP 56 414a-d, THE AFFECTS 416b-422a,c;
[692*22-27] 224b-c / Ethics, bk ii, ch 5 PART IV, DEF 7 424b; PROP 1-4 424c-425d;
[1105^19-1106*6] 351b-c / Politics, bk vii, ch PROP 9-13 426d-428a; appendix, i-ii 447a-b;
7 [1327^40-1328*18] 532a-c / Rhetoric, bk ii, PART V, axiom 2 452c; prop 34 460c-d
CH I [i378*2o]-cH II [1388^30] 623b-636a 35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk ii, ch xx
12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk hi [136-160] 176b-178a esp sect 3 176d; ch xxxiii, sect
31d-32a; [231-322] 33a-34b 5-15 248d-250c
13 Virgil: Aeneid, bk vi [724-734] 230b 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 338c-d
17 Plotinus: First Ennead, tr i, ch i la-b; ch 5 42 Kant: Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics,
2d-3c; CH 9-1 1 4c-5c / Third Ennead, tr vi, ch 378b-c / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 385a-d;
3-4 108a-109b / Fourth Ennead, tr iv, ch 18 386b-d / Judgement, 483d-484b; 508d [fn i]
166d-167b; ch 20-21 167d-168c; ch 28 172a- 43 Federalist: number 17, 69c
173b / Sixth Ennead, tr i, ch 19-22 262a-264c 53 James: Psychology, 49b-50a; 87b; 209a-b;
18 Augustine: City of God, bk ix, ch 4-5 287a- 327b-328a; 738a-766a esp 738a-b, 742a-746a,
289a 758a-759a, 761a-765b
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 81, 54 Freud: Origin and Development of Psycho-
AA 2-3 429c-431d; part i-ii, qq 22-48 720b,d- Analysis, 4d-5a / Interpretation of Dreams,
826a,c 363c-d / Repression, 424d-425b / Uncon-
la to \b Chapter 22: EMOTION 42J
scious,432c-433d esp 433b / General Introduc- [4o8"34 ''^^i] 638b-d; bk hi, ch 9 [432^26-
tion, 608d; 623 b-c / Inhibitions, Symptoms, 43V'il 665c / Memory and Reminisceiice, ch 2
and Anxiety, 720c-721b; 736d-741c / Netv (45 V' 5^3 J 1 695b-d / Dreams, en 2 [460*32-
Introductory Lectures, 837b-d *'i8| 704b-c
thians, 7:8-16 / / Timothy, 6:9-10 / I John, 25 Montaigne: Essays, 5a-6c; 20d-22a; 25c-
2:15-17; 3:14-16 26d 36c-41a passim, esp 39b-40a 109a-c 1 59a-
; ; ;
4 Homer: Odyssey, bk xii [153-200] 251d-252b 167a; 184a-d; 200d-205b esp 203c-205b;
5 Euripides: Medea [627-641] 217c / Hippoly- 232b-238d passim; 273b-276a; 346b-347c;
225a-236d
tus 350d-354b; 402c-404b; 418c-d; 420d-421d;
5 Aristophanes: Lysistrata 583a-599a,c 435b-d; 491c-495a
6 Herodotus: History, bk hi, lOOb-lOlb; bk 26 Shakespeare: 3rd Henry VI, act i, sc hi
VII, 218c; 222c-d 73d-74b / Romeo and Juliet 285a-319a,c /
6Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, bk hi, Merchant of Venice, act i-iv 406a-430c
438a- 27 Shakespeare: Troilus and Cressida 103a-
7 Plato: Charmides, 2b-c / Protagoras, 59b- 141a,c / Othello 205a-243a,c / Antony and
61c / 120a-122a / Symposium,
Phaedrus, Cleopatra 311a-350d
168a / Phaedo, 232d-234c / Republic, bk i, 28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 347c-d
296b-c; bk ix, 416a-418c / Timaeus, 474b-d / 30 Bacon Advancement of Learning, 67a- b; 78a-d
:
Laws, bk \tii, 735a-738c passim 31 Spinoza: Ethics, part iv, prop 1-18 424c-
8 Aristotle Memory and Reminiscence, ch 2
: 429d
[453"! 5-31} 695b-d / Dreams, ch 2 [460*32- 32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk viii [561-594]
^18] 704b-c 244b-245a; bk ix [990-1066] 269a-270b; bk
9 Aristotle: History of Ariimals, bk vh, ch i xii [80-110] 321a-b / Samson Agonistes [521-
[581^11-22] 107b / Ethics, bk i, ch 3 [1094^ 576] 351a-352a
29-i095"i2] 340a-b; bk hi, ch i [i 109^*30- 33 Pascal: Pensees, 360 235a
1110^15] 355b,d-356b; [1111*21-^3] 357a-b; 35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk ii, ch xxi,
bk IV, ch 9 [1128^15-20] 376a; bk vi, ch 5 sect 39 187c-d; sect 54 192b-c; bk iv, ch
[1140^8-19] 389b-c; bk vii, ch i-io 395a- XX, sect 12 392c
403c passim; bk vih, ch 3 [ii56*3i-*'5] 408a; 35 Hume: Human Understanding, sect i, div 3
bk IX, CH 8 [1168^11-28] 422a-b; bk x, ch 9 451d
[ii79''4-i 180*24] 434b-435a / Politics, bk i, 36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 239b-243a
CH 2 [1253*31-37] 446d; bk hi, ch 15 [1286* 37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 109c
16-20] 484b-c; [1286*33-37] 484d; ch 16 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 329b
[1287^28-32] 485d; BK V, ch 10 [1312^25-33] 42 Kant: Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 385c-
515b; CH II [1315*25-31] 518a-b; bk vii, ch 386b / Judgement, 586a-587a
7 [1327^40-1328*18] 532a-c / Rhetoric, bk h, 43 Federalist: number i, 29d-30a; number 6,
CH 636b-
12 [1389*3-*' 11] 40a-b; number 50, 162a-b; number 55, 173a
12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk hi [307-322] 44 Boswell: Johnson, 174b-c; 176d; 214b-c;
34a-b 341c-d
12 Aurelius: Meditations, bk h, sect 10 257d- 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, intro, 167c-
258a; bk vii, sect 55 283b-c 168a; part iii, 300c-d
13 Virgil: Aeneid, bk iv 167a-186b; bk xii 47 Goethe: Faust, part i [1110-1117] 27b-28a;
[i-8o]354a-356a; [593-61 i]370a [3217-3373] 79a-82a; part ii [6566-6569] 161a
14 Plutarch: Pericles, 139a-c / Coriolanus 48 Melville: Moby Dick,, 135a-136b; 411a-412a
174b,d-193a,c / Lysander, 362b-365a / Pom- 49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 311d-312b
pey, 533a-c / Antony 748a- 7 79d 51 Tolstoy: War arid Peace, bk i, 15b-16a; bk
15 Tacitus: Annals, bk hi, 58a; bk xiii, 137b-c / hi, 122b-c; bk vi, 251d-252d; epilogue i,
Histories, bk iv, 267d 655c-656b
430 THE GREAT IDEAS 4«(2) to 4^(1)
315b-c; 346b,d [fn i] / Pref Metaphysical
{4a. The conflict between reason and emotien.
Elements of Ethics, 365b-366a / Intro. Meta-
4a (1) Thejorce of the passions.^
physic of Morals, 386b-d / Judgement, 483d-
52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, bk i, 484b; 586a-587a; 605d-606b [fn 2]
4a-d; bk ii, 39b'40a; bk hi, 50c-62a; bk vii, 43 Mill: Representative Government, 332c-d /
177c; bk XII, 397c-398d Utilitarianism, 463d-464c
53 James: Psychology, 799a-b 49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 312a-c; 313d-314a;
54 Freud: Hysteria, 110c / General Introduction, 318d-319a
502a-504b esp 503d-504a / Group Psychology, 53 ]aiaes: Psychology, 798b-800a; 807a-808a
690a-c / Ego and Id, 701d-702d; 715d-716a / 54 Freud: Hysteria, 110c / Interpretation of
Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 745d- Dreams, 384c-385c; 386d-387a / Uncon-
747b / War and Death, 760d-761a / Civiliza- scious, 433b-c / Group Psychology, 690a-c / Ego
tion and Its Discontents, 787b-c / New Intro- and Id, 702c-d; 715c-716c / Inhibitions, Symp-
ductory Lectures, 837b-839b esp 838c-839b toms, and Anxiety, 721d-722c; 744a / War and
Death, 760d-761a / Civilization and Its Dis-
Aa{l) The strength of reason or will contents, 800d-801a / New Introductory Lec-
4 Homer: Odyssey, bk iv [265-295] 201d-202a; tures, 837d-839b; 845b; 880a
BK IX [82-104] 230a; bk xix [203-219] 291b
7 Plato: Symposium, 168a-173a,c / Apology, 4b. The treatment of the emotions by or for
205d-206d / Crito, 214d-215d / Phaedo, 220b- the sake of reason
221a; 225b-226c; 232b-234c; 250b-251d /
Laws, bk I, 649d-650b 4^(1) Moderation of the passions by reason:
9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk ix, ch 8 [1168^28- virtue, continence, avoidance of sin
1 169^^1 1] 422b-d / Politics, bk i, ch
5 [1254^ Old Testament: Exodus, 20:14,17; 23:4-5 /
i§_b8] 447d-448a Leviticus, 19:17-18 / Numbers, 15:37-41 / Deu-
12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk hi [307- teronomy, 5:18,21 / Psalms, 32:8-10; 37:1-8 —
322] 34a-b (D) Psalms, 31:8-10; 36:1-8 / Proverbs, 7;
12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk i, ch 3 108b-c; 15:1; 23; 30:7-9 / Ecclesiastes, 7:8-9— (D)
BK II, CH 23 170a-172d Ecclesiastes, 7:9-10
12 AuRELius: Meditations, bk vii, sect 55 Apocrypha: Ecclesiasticus 18:30-33; 31; 38:16-
,
283b-c; bk viii, sect 39 288c; bk ix, sect 7 23— (£)) OT, Ecclesiasticus^ 18:30-33; 31;
292b; bk xi, sect 18 304b-305b 38:16-24
14 Plutarch: Pericles, 139a-140d New Testament: Matthew, 5:21-26,43-48 /
18 Augustine: Confessions, bk vi, par 11-13 / Corinthians, 13:4-8 / Ephesians, 4:31-32 /
38b-39c; par 16 40a-c; bk viii, par lo-ii 55c- Colossians, 3:5-15 / / Thessalonians, 4:3-8 /
56b; par 19-27 58b-60c / City of God, bk ix, / Timothy, 6:3-12 / Titus, 2:11-14; 3'i-7 /
CH 4-5 287a-289a; bk xiv, ch 8-9 381c- James, '^:i-j I I Peter, 2:11-12
385b 5 Aristophanes: Clouds [866-1 114] 499a-502b
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 81, 7 Plato: Charmides, 5a-b / Laches, 31d-37a /
A 3 430c-431d; q hi, a 2, ans 569c-570b; Protagoras, 59b-64a / Phaedrus, 120b-c / Sym-
part i-ii, q 10, a 3 664d-665c; q 17, a 7 690d- posium, 153b-157a; 168a-173a,c / Phaedo,
692a 225b-226c; 233c-234c / Republic, bk hi,
23 HoBBEs: Leviathan, part ii, 141a-b 325b-326b; bk iv, 346a-356a; bk ix, 416a-c;
25 Montaigne: Essays, 20d-22a; 36c-41a esp bk X, 431b-434a / Timaeus, 466a-467a / Laws,
39b-40a; 159a-167a; 184a-d; 200d-205b; bk I, 649d'650b; bk vii, 713c-716a esp 715d-
273b-276a 716a; bk viii, 735c-738c
27 Shakespeare: Othello, act i, sc hi [322- 8 Aristotle: Topics, bk iv, ch 5 [125^20-28]
337] 212b-c 174d-175a
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 27a-c 9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk i, ch 13 347b-348d;
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part iv, prop 15-17 428a-d; bk II, CH i-BK HI, CH I 348b,d-357b; bk hi,
PROP 59-73 442b-447a; appendix, i-hi ch 6-bk IV, CH 9 361a-376a,c; bk vii 395a-
447a-b; xxxii 450c-d; part v 451a-463d 406a,c;bk ix, ch 8 [1168^28-1169^11] 422b-d /
32 Milton: Comus [414-475] 42b-44a / Paradise Politics, bk I, CH 5 [1254^18-^8] 447d-448a /
Lost, BK VIII [500-617] 243a-245b Rhetoric, bk 11, ch 14 637d-638a
33 Pascal: Pensees, 350 234a 11 NicoMACHus: Arithmetic, bk i, 826d-827a
35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk ii, ch 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk ii [1-61]
xxi, SECT 54 192b-c 15a-d; bk hi [307-322} 34a-b; [1053-1094]
38 Rousseau: Inequality, 344d-345c 43c-44a,c; bk v [1-54] 61a-d; [1117-1135] 75d;
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 164a-165c; 235c-d / BK VI [1-42] 80a-d
Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 259a-c; 12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk i, ch i 105a-106c;
264d-265b; 271c-d; '279b; 282d-283d; 284d- CH 3 108b-c; BK II, ch 2 140c-141c; ch ii,
285a / Practical Reason, 303b-304b; 314a-d; 151a-b; ch 18 161a-162b
4^(1) to 4/^(2) Chapter 22: EMOTION 431
12 Ai RELius: Meditations, bk ii, sect 5 257b-c; 49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 310c 319a esp
BK IV, SECT 24 265c-d; bk vii, sect 55 313d 314b, 318d 319a; 322c d; 592b c: 593a-b
283b c; bk viii, sect 39 288c; bk ix, sect 7 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, hk hi, 122b-c;
292b BK V, 201a-c; bk vi, 245b c; 247d-250a; epi-
14 Plutarch: Dion, 798b-d logue I, 655c 656b
18 Augustine: Confessions, bk ii, par 2-4 9b-d; 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, bk vi,
bk III, par 13b-c; bk iv, par 25 25c; bk vi,
I 164a-167a
par 18-26 40d-43a; bk viii, par 1-2 52c-53b; 53 James: Psychology, 807a-808a; 816a-819a esp
par lo-ii 55c-56b; par 25-27 60a-c / Cit\ of 817a 818a
God, BK IV, CH 3 190a-c; bk ix, ch 5-6 288b- 54 Freud: Origin and Development of Psycho-
289b; BK XIV, ch 6-9 380b 385b; bk xix, ch Analysis, 9a; 20a-c / Hysteria, 110c / Narcis-
15 521a-c / Christian Doctrine, bk i, ch 24 sism, 407b-408a / Ego and Id, 702c; 706d-
630c-631a 707d; 715a-716a / War and Death, 757d-
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 95, 759c / Civilization and Its Discontents, 773b-c /
AA 2-3 507c-509b; q 98, a 2 esp rep 3 517d- New Introductory Lectures, 838c-839b; 844b-c
519a; part i-ii, q 20, a 4, ans 714c-715b;
Q 24 727a-730a 4^(2) Attenuation and atrophy of the passions:
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 56, the liberation of reason
A 4 32b-33c; q 59 45d-49d; q 60, a 4-Q 6r, a 5 7 Plato: Phaedo, 233c-234c / Republic, bk i,
52b-59d; q 64, aa 1-2 66d-68b; q 65, a i 295d-296c
70b-72a; part hi, q 15, aa 4-9 790d-795b 9 Aristotle: Rhetoric, bk ii, ch 13 [1389^12-
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, purgatory, xviii 1390*^24] 637a-c
[19-75] 80a-c 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk v [1-54]
22 Chaucer: Tale of Melibeus, par 4-7 401b- 61a-d
402b / Parsons Tale, par 12, 503b-504a 12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk i, ch i 105a-106c;
23Hobbes: Leviathan, part i, 93d-94a; 95d- CH 4 108d-110a; bk ii, ch 2 140c-141c; ch
96b 17-18 158d-162b; bk hi, ch 8 184b-c; ch 22
24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, bk iv, 195a-201a; bk iv, ch 4 225a-228a; ch 12
234a-240a 242d-244a
25 Montaigne: Essays, 20d-22a; 89b-91b; 12 Aurelius: Meditations, bk ii, sect 2 257a;
159a-167a; 184a-d;' 200d-205b; 232b-238d; sect 5 257b-c; sect 10 257d-258a; sect 16-
251a-c; 346b-347c; 353c-354b; 402c-404b; 17 259a-d; bk hi, sect 4 260b-261a; sect 6
431c-432d; 486b-495a 261a-c; sect 12 262b-c; bk iv, sect 39
26 Shakespeare: Romeo and Juliet, act ii, sc 267a; bk v, sect 8 269d-270b; sect 26 272c;
VI [1-15] 300c / Henry V, act i, sc i [24-69] BK VI, SECT 40-46 277d-278d; bk vii, sect
533b-c 55 283b-c; sect 68-69 284c-d; bk ix, sect 7
27 Shakespeare: Hamlet, act i, sc hi [5-51] 292b
34c-d; act hi, sc ii [68-79] 49c-d 17 Plotinus Third Ennead, tr vi, ch 4-5 108c-
:
42 Kant: Fund, Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 253d- 344b-d; bk x, 431b-434a / Laws, bk vii,
254b / Practical Reason, 321b-329a esp 325d- 717b-721a; 726d-728b
326b / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 383a-b 9 Aristotle: Politics, bk vii, ch 17 [1336^12-
43 Federalist: number 15, 65a-d; number 16 23] 541c-d; BK VIII, CH 5 [1339*^11-1340^19]
66c-68d passim, esp 67d-68a; number 17, 545a-546a; ch 7 547b-548a,c
69d-70a; number 27, 95b-96a 17 Plotinus: First Ennead, tr hi, ch 1-2
43 Mill: Liberty, 295d-296a / Representative lOa-d
Government, 329c-330a 29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, part i, 184a-187c
46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, part iv, 328b- passim
329c 32 Milton: Areopagitica, 384b-386b; 387b-
49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 314a-b 394b
52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, bk ii, 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk iv, 17b-
30d-31a 18d
54 Freud: War and Death, 757c 44 BoswEhi.: Johnson, 308b-c
Chapter 22: EMOTION 435'
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: The general theory of instinct, see I Iabit 3-3e; and for the consideration of instinctual drives,
see Desire 2a, 3a.
The relation of pleasure and pain to the emotions, see Pleasure and Pain 4a.
The conception of the emotions as forms of animal appetite or sensitive desire, see Desire
3b(l);WlLL2b(2).
The analysis of the one emotion which is held to be the root of all the others, see Love
2a-2a(3).
Other discussions of the conflict between the passions and reason, or between one emotion
and another, see Desire 3d, 4a, 6c; Duty 8; Mind 9b-9c; Opposition 4a-4b, 4d.
Other discussions of emotional disorder from a psychological or medical point of view, see
Desire 4a-4d; Medicine 6c(2); Mind 8b; One and Many 3b(5); Opposition 4c.
The influence of the emotions upon imagination or thought, see Desire 5a— 5b, 6c; Memory
AND Imagination 8c, 8d(i); Opinion 2a; Truth 3d(2).
The moral problems raised by the conflict between reason and emotion, see Desire 6a-6b;
Duty 4-4b; Liberty 3a-3b; Mind 9c-9d; Sin 5; Slavery 7; Tyranny 5d; Virtue and
Vice 5a.
The significance of the passions in relation to law, government, and the state, see Law 5, 6a;
Punishment ic-id; State 3e-3f; and for the problem of political censorship or regulation
of the arts because of their emotional influence, see Art lob; Liberty 2a; Poetry 9b.
The consideration of emotion by the orator, see Rhetoric 4b.
Emotion in relation to artistic inspiration or expression, see Art 8; Poetry 3.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great BooJ^s of the Western Worlds but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
INTRODUCTION
THE two
notionof
has
eternity, like that of infinity,
meanings. One meaning mav refer
that go beyond experience, and have some
meaning even if they lack imaginative content.
to something positive, yet both seem to be for- Locke indicates this other aspect of the matter
mulated by the human mind in a negative way. when he criticizes those who assert dogmatically
We grasp one meaning of eternity by saying that "the world is neither eternal nor infinite."
that there is fjo beginning or end to times It seems to him that the world's eternity or the
process. The other sense of eternity wc con- world's infinity is "at least as conceivable as
ceive by denying time itself and, with it, change the contrary."
or mutability. It may not be inconsistent, therefore, to say
Considering eternity as infinite duration, that infinite time, while unimaginable, remains
Locke says that we form this notion "by the quite conceivable; for to say that eternity is
same means and from the same original that we conceivable simply to say that endless time
is
come to have the idea of time viz., having . . . is neither more nor less possible than time with
got the idea of succession and duration we . . . a beginning and an end. The first conception
can in our thoughts add such lengths of dura- is as meaningful as the second. It is in fact
tion to one another, as often as we please, and formed from the second by negation by sub- —
apply them, so added, to durations past or to stituting the word "without" for "with" with
come. And this we can continue to do, with- respect to "a beginning and an end." But un-
out bounds or limits, and proceed in infinitNtvy like our conceptions, our images cannot be
The unimaginabilit}' of the infinite is no formed by negation. When we imagine, as when
different in the sphere of time than in that of we perceive, the object before us is positive
space or number. The ditficulty, Locke points and definite. Wc cannot imagine, as we cannot
out, is the same in all three cases. "The idea experience, a duration, or a span of time, with-
of so much and clear. The idea of
IS positive out a beginning and an end.
greater is also clear." But these do not yet give
us the idea of the infinite. That only comes with With regard to the other traditional mean-
"the idea of so much greater as cannot be com- ing of "eternity," Locke takes a difterent posi-
prehended, and this is plainly negatixe, not tion. It too might be defended as a negative
positive . . . What beyond our positive idea
lies conception, so far as human comprehension is
towards infinity," Locke continues, "lies in ob- concerned, since it involves the denial of time
scurity, and has the indeterminate contusion itself, i.e., ol a duration comprising a succession
of a negative idea, wherein I know I neither of moments. But here Locke says that there is
do nor can comprehend all I would, it being "nothing more inconceivable to me than dura-
too large for a finite and narrow capacity." tion without succession. If our weak appre-
. . .
In insisting that we can have no positive idea hensions," he continues, "cannot separate suc-
of infinity — whether of space, time, or number cession from any duration whatsoever, our idea
— Locke's point seems to be that it is beyond of eternity can be nothing but of an infinite
our finite capacity to form an image of an in- succession of moments oi duration, wherein
finite object.But though our imaginations may anything does exist."
be limited in this way, we do seem able to con- Nevertheless, Locke affirms that "we can
struct—in a negative manner conceptions — easily conceive in God infinite duration, and
437
438 THE GREAT IDEAS
we cannot avoid doing so." Whether he means Eternity so conceived is perhaps even more
by God's eternity involves temporal
this that unimaginable than the eternity which is in-
succession, must be determined by an inter- finite time. We may feel that we have some
pretation of the passage in which he maintains sense of an infinite duration when we talk, as
that "God's infinite duration being accompa- Ivan does in the Brothers Karamazov, about a
nied with infinite knowledge and infinite pow- billion years or "a quadrillion of a quadrillion
er, all things past and to come; and they
he sees raised to the quadrillionth power." Infinite
are no more distant from his knowledge, no time is like that, only longer. But because all
farther removed from his sight, than the pres- our experience is tem^poral through and
ent; they all lie under the same view." through, it is more difficult to get any sense of
If this passage means that time stands still that which is both absolutely timeless and
for God in a single moment in which all things endlessly enduring.
are co-present, then Locke may not be as reso- Poets, and sometimes philosophers turned
lute as Hobbes in rejecting the theologian's poets, have struggled to give this concept imag-
conception of God's eternity. Criticizing the inative content by contrasting "the white radi-
Scholastics, Hobbes says that "for the meaning ance of eternity" with a "many-colored glass,"
of Eternity, they will not have it be an endless or by speaking of time itself as "the moving
succession of time." Instead, "they will teach image of eternity." When Dimmler in War and
us that eternity is the standing still of the pres- Peace tells Natasha that "it is hard for us to
ent time, a Nunc-stans (as the Schools call it)." imagine eternity," she replies that it does not
This, Hobbes thinks, "neither they nor anyone —
seem hard to her that eternity "is now today,
else understands, no more than they would a and it will be tomorrow, and always, and was
Hic'Stans for an infinite greatness of place." there yesterday and the day before. ..."
A theologian like Aquinas tries to avoid the These and similar attempts may not succeed
which Hobbes finds in this conception
difficulty as much as the insight that if we could hold the
by distinguishing between the now of eternity present moment still, or fix the fleeting instant,
and the now of time. "The now of time is the we could draw an experience of the eternal from
same," he writes, "as regards its subject in the the heart of time. "The now that stands still,"
whole course of time, but it differs in aspect." Aquinas writes, "is said to make eternity ac-
Furthermore, "the flow of the now, as altering cording to our apprehension. For just as the
in aspect, is time. But eternity remains the apprehension of time is caused in us by the
same according to both subject and aspect; and fact that we apprehend the flow of the now,
hence eternity is not the same as the now of so the apprehension of eternity is caused in us
time." by our apprehending the now standing still."
but eternal and impassible." Aristotle calls the have no succession, so it has no beginning, and
heavenly bodies "eternal and incorruptible." no end." Yet Aquinas preserves the sharp dis-
For Lucretius and the atomists, the atoms and tinction between the two meanings when he
the atoms alone are eternal. They are, he says, differentiates the sense in which the world
"everlasting, though all things else are dis- might be called eternal and the sense in which
solved." Unless they were eternal, "all things he would attribute eternity to God alone.
before this would have utterly returned to "Even supposing that the world always was,
nothing." If the atomic particles "were to wear it would not be equal to God in eternity," he
away, or break in pieces," Newton argues, "the writes; for "the divine being is all being simul-
nature of things depending on them, would be taneously without succession, but with tlie
very essence. Imperishable in existence, they theologians who make eternity in this sense one
are also endlessly in motion. In Aristotle's view, of the prime attributes of God.
local motion can be perpetual or eternal only Augustine, for example, invokes God as
if it is circular. Circular motion alone has "that everfixed Eternity" in whom "nothing
neither beginning nor end. passeth, but the whole is present." Since time
The eternal circular motion of the heavens, is for him inconceivable apart from change or
according to Aristotle, in turn communicates motion, that which exists immutably does not
an eternal cyclical movement to the rest of exist in time. Referring to God's eternity, he
reality. "Since the sun revolves thus, the sea- says, "Compare it with the times which are
sons in consequence come-to-be in a cycle .... never fixed, and see that it cannot be com-
and since they come-to-be cyclically, so in their pared. . . . Thy years neither come nor go;
turn do the things whose coming-to-be the whereas ours both come and go, that they all
seasons initiate." Such an eternal return, it may come. . .Thy years are one day and Thy
. ;
would seem, is also applied by Aristotle to hu- day is not daily, but To-day. Thy To-day . . .
or eternal, they cannot be eternal in the second the proper measure of being," Aquinas writes,
meaning of "eternity," which is the very oppo- "so time is the proper measure of movement."
site of the first, not a variation or extension of The eternal and the temporal are similarly
it. In this meaning, the eternal is an existence distinguished by Plato in terms of the realms
absolutely immutable —a being which neither of being and becoming
— "the world of immu-
comes to be nor passes away, nor changes, nor table being" and "the world of generation." In
moves in any respect whatsoever. Aquinas uses the one we find "the parts of time, and the past
the word in this sense when he says that "the and the future," which do not apply to the
nature of eternity" consists in "the uniformity other. "We unconsciously but wrongly transfer
of what is absolutely outside of movement." them," Plato declares, "to the eternal essence
440 THE GREAT IDEAS
... but the truth is that 'is' alone is properly As indicated on Change, the
in the chapter
attributed to and 'was' and 'will be' are only
it, Aristotelian analysis ofmotion finds in matter
to be spoken of becoming in time, for they are or the substratum of change, and in the con-
motions, but that which is immovably the same trary iormsfrom which and to which a motion
cannot become older or younger by time . . . takes place, the elements of permanence under-
nor is it subject at all to any of those states lying change. When a green leaf turns red, for
which affect moving and sensible things of instance, green has notchanged into red; the
which generation is the cause." leaf haschanged from one color to another.
For Spinoza, the distinction consists in two The changing leaf is not eternal, but red and
ways of viewing the order of nature. "Things green are, since they are incapable of change.
are conceived by us as actual in two ways," he This is the sense of eternity in which the un-
writes; "either in so far as we conceive them to changing instant is eternal, or the past is eter-
exist with relation to a fixed time and place, nal, even though both are somehow elements
or in so far as we conceive them to be contained or aspects of time and the process of change.
in God, and from the necessity of the
to follow The past may be eternal but it no longer
divine nature." Only in the second way do "we exists. The passing moment may be eternal,
conceive things under the form of eternity." but it has no duration. Lack of existence and
We can view things under the aspect of eter- lack of duration together distinguish that
nity only insofar as we know God and, through meaning of "eternal" which it merely sig-
in
knowing God, are able to know all things ac- nifies the unchanging, from the meaning in
cording as "their ideas involve the eternal and which it signifies that which exists or endures
infinite essence of God." forever without changing. It is only in the
The separation of time and eternity into dis- second of these two meanings that the eternal
tinct spheres of reality, or even into distinct can be conceived as that which exists entirely
ways of conceiving the whole of being, is chal- outside the realm of time.
lenged by thinkers who find the eternal within
the process of time. For both Jew and Christian, As WE HAVE ALREADY observed, the basic phil-
the eternal God intervenes directly in the osophical and theological issues concerning
temporal order. The most radical form which eternity cannot be intelligibly stated unless
this fusion takes is perhaps exemplified in the these meanings of "eternity" and "the eternal"
doctrine of the Incarnation of Christ, when are kept distinct.
"the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among The traditional problem of the eternity of
us." the w^orld asks, for example, not whether the
Whitehead challenges the sharpness of the order of nature is free from change or succes-
separation from another point of view. He not sion, but whether the changing physical uni-
only makes "eternal objects'* ingredients in verse ever had a beginning or ever will end.
actual occasions or temporal events; but since As indicated in the chapters on Change, Time,
the events which constitute the process of and World, it is a question of the infinity of
change are themselves unchangeable, they are time; or, in another formulation, a question of
for him eternal —
even though they have their the interminability of change or motion.
being within the sphere of change. Aristotle appears to answer these questions
A similar point seems to be made in Aris- affirmatively, especially in the last book of his
totle's theory of change. When change is con- Physics where he claims to demonstrate the im-
ceived as consisting in a transformation of mat- possibility of there having been a beginning to
ter, it is the thing composed of matter and form motion. Aquinas, on the other hand, does not
which changes, and neither the matter nor the think that the eternity of the world can be
form. Matter as matter, Aristotle writes, "does demonstrated; and of Aristotle's arguments he
not cease to be in its own nature, but is nec- says that they are not "absolutely demonstra-
essarily outside the sphere of becoming and tive, but only relatively so— viz., as against the
ceasing to be." The remark would seem to hold arguments of some of the ancients who asserted
true as well of the form as form. that the world began to be in some actually
Chaptlk 23: ETP.RNITY 441
impossible ways." In support of this conten- endless motion "cannot be decided by pr(K)f,
tion, he remark made by Aristotle in
cites a neither in the affirmative nor in the negative."
the TopicSy that among "dialectical problems Just as for Augustine and Aquinas, so for him
which we cannot solve demonslratixcly," one it is indilferent —
from a philosophical point of
is ''whether the world is eternal.'' view— whether the created work! and its Crea-
For Kant the problem is typically dialectical. tor are co-eternal or whether, as Genesis says,
It occurs as part of the first antinomy in the "in the beginning God created heaven and
Transcendental Dialectic, the thesis of which earth."
world has a beginning in time"
asserts that *'the But both alternatives are not equally ac-
and the antithesis that "the world has no be- ceptable to the theologian. Since there is no
ginning, but is infinite in respect both to time proof on either side "sufficient to convince us,'*
and space." The fact that apparently cogent ar- Maimonides writes, "we take the text of the
guments can be marshalled for both of these Bible literally, and say that it teaches us a
contradictory propositions shows, in Kant's truth which we cannot prove"— namely, that
opinion, that the reasoning on either side is the world had a beginning in time. Aquinas
not demonstrative, but only dialectical and, comes to the same conclusion. "That the
as he says, "illusory." world did not always exist," he writes, "we hold
The Jewish and Christian doctrine of the by faith alone." It is not "an object of dem- . . .
world's creation by God might seem to require onstration or science." For Christian and Jew
the denial of the world's eternity. But in fact alike, the religious dogma that the world is not
the theologians find either alternative com.- only created by God, in the sense of depending
patible with divine creation, which they con- for its upon God as cause, but was
existence
ceive as the cause of the world's being, not also initiated by God, or caused to begin to
necessarily of its beginning. Augustine, for ex- exist and move, is based on the revealed word
ample, examines the sense in which the world of God in Holy Writ.
isheld by some to be co-eternal with God, even Those who, on philosophical grounds, deny
though made or created by God. "It is as if a creation ex nihilo also deny the world's begin-
foot," he interprets them to say, "had been ning. Pursuant to his theory of the world as a
always from eternity in the dust; there would necessary and perpetual emanation from the
always have been a print underneath it; and One, Plotinus, for example, declares that "the
yet no one would doubt that this print was Kosmos has had no beginning and this is . . .
made by the pressure of the foot, nor that, warrant for its continued existence. Why
though the one vv^as made by the other, neither should there be in the future a change that has
was prior to the other." So. he goes on, it might not yet occurred.?" For Spinoza likewise, "all
also be said that the world has always existed things which follow from the absolute nature
and yet is always, throughout eternity, created, of any attribute of God must for ever exist";
i.e., caused to exist, by God. and to this extent at least, the world is eternal
Commenting on this passage, Aquinas adds and uncreated.
the observation that if an "action is instanta- The man of faith, however, beUeves in a God
neous and not successive, it is not necessary for who is free to create or not to create, not one
the maker to be prior in duration to the thing from whom the world emanates as a necessary
made." Hence it does not follow necessarily, effect from its source. When, therefore, he af-
he writes, "that if God is the active cause of firms that God freely chose to produce the world
the world. He must be prior to the world in out of nothing, he seems to meet the question,
duration; because creation, by which He pro- "What was God doing before He made heaven
duced the world, is not a successive change" and earth.?" To the questioner Augustine does
— but an instantaneous act. not wish to give "the jesting answer said to —
Writing both as a philosopher and as a theo- have been given by one who sought to e\'ade
logian, —
Maimonides many centuries before the force of the question— 'He was getting
"
Kant stated his —
antinomy thinks he is able to who pry too deep.'
Hell ready for people
show that the question of infinite time and Instead he points out that the question itself
442 THE GREAT IDEAS
is illicit for it assumes a time before time be- To the first question, it does not suffice to
gan. "If before heaven and earth were made," reply by affirming the existence ofGod. Some
he writes, "there was no time, then what is modern deny God's absolute im-
theologians
meant by the question 'What were You doing mutabihty, and so deny the eternality of His
then V If there was notany time, there was not being in the precise sense under consideration.
any 'then.' " In the phrase "before creation" With regard to the second question, we must
the word "before" has no temporal significance. observe that, in the tradition of the great books,
It signifies a different kind of priority — the eternality has been claimed for two things other
sense in which eternity precedes time, the sense than God, namely, for truth and ideas. What-
in which Augustine says of God that "it is not ever produced by reasoning aright," Hobbes
"is
in time that You are before all time. . . . You says, "general, eternal, and immutable
is
are before all the past by the eminence of Your truth." On somewhat different grounds James
ever-present eternity." declares, "there is no denying the fact that
the mind is filled with necessary and eternal
Turning from eternity in the sense of infinite relations which it finds between certain of
time to the eternal in the sense of the timeless its ideal conceptions, and which form a de-
and unchanging, the great question is whether terminate system, independent of the order of
anything eternal exists. The atoms of Lucretius frequency in which experience may have as-
are not eternal in this sense, nor are the sup- sociated the conception's originals in time and
posedly imperishable heavenly bodies. Nor is space." He
quotes Locke to the effect that
it suj9&cient to point out that change itself in- "truths belonging to the essences of things . . .
volves aspects or elements of permanence; for are eternal, and are to be found out only by the
the question, strictly interpreted, asks whether contemplation of those essences."
anything and of itself which, having no
exists in The common phrase— "the eternal verities"
beginning or end, also has no past, present, or —which James uses testifies to the prevalence
—
future no temporal phases in its continued of the notion that truth itself cannot change,
endurance. Only such a thing would be utterly and that when men speak of a new truth or
non- temporal or changeless. the growth of truth, the change they refer to
Since nothing made of matter is exempt from is only a change of mind with respect to what
motion, it is generally supposed that no ma- men think is true or false, not a change in the
terial thing is eternal in this sense. Not even truth itself. Whatever is true now, always was
God is eternal unless God is absolutely immu- true and always will be. Time and change make
table as well as spiritual. The angels are spiritual no difference to the truth oi two plus two equals
beings, yet, according to Christian theology, four.
they cannot be called "eternal" because, in But even so it can still be asked how the
the first place, they are creatures and had an truth exists, for the attribution of eternity to
origin; and, in the second place, they are sub- anything also requires us to consider its mode
ject to spiritual change even if they are not of being. If, for example, the truth exists only
involved in the sorts of motion to which bodies in the mind, then it exists unchangingly only
are susceptible. The theologians, therefore, use in themind of an absolutely infallible knower,
the word "aeviternal" to signify the mode of a mind which neither learns nor forgets, nor
angelic existence in that it is "a mean between changes in any respect with regard to what it
eternity and time." Aeviternity, Aquinas ex- knows. If God is such a knower, eternal truth
plains, has "a beginning but no end," while can have existence in God's mind.
"eternity has neither beginning nor end . . . The theologians sometimes go further and
and time both beginning and end." identify absolute truth, as they identify ab-
solute goodness, with God. Aquinas writes, for
The question about the eternal as timeless example, that "if we speak of truth as it is in
and immutable existence has two parts: Does things, then all things are true by one primary
an immutable God exist? Does anything else truth; to which each one is assimilated accord-
exist which is immutable } ing to its entity, and thus, although the es-
Chapter 23: ETERNITY 443
sences or forms of things are many, yet the theologians give it a positive rather than a
truth ot the divine intellect is one, in con- negative significance. They mean by it the ac-
formity to which all things are said to be true." tual infinity of perfect being and absolute pow-
On this view, it would appear that there are er, in sharp distinction from the potential in-
not two eternal beings, but only one. finity by which the mathematicians signify the
William James finds immutability not only lack^oidi limit in addition or division.
in the truth, but also in the concepts of the These two meanings of "infinity" seem to par-
human mind. "Each conception," he writes, allelthe two meanings of "eternity" which we
"eternally remains what it is, and never can have dealt with throughout this chapter— one
become another. The mind may change its the negative sense in which it means the lack^
states, and its meanings, at different times; may of a beginning or an end to time, the other the
drop one conception and take up another, but positive sense in which God's eternity consists
the dropped conception can in no intelligible in that fullness of being which can exist apart
sense be said to change into its successor. . . . from time and change. Because our intellects
Thus, amid the flux of opinions and of physical are finite, we may apprehend eternal being in a
things, the world of conceptions, or things in- negative manner by calling it "timeless" or by
tended to be thought about, stands stiff and conceiving it as infinite duration, but Spinoza
immutable, like Plato's Realm of Ideas." cautions us against supposing that it can be
In the case of ideas, however, the problem "explained by duration or time, even if the
is complicated by the question whether ideas duration be conceived without beginning or
exist in and by themselves, outside the mind end."
of God or man. If, according to a doctrine at- One other theological discussion raises issues
tributed to Plato and the Platonists, the Ideas which involve in a unique way the two mean-
or Forms exist separately, then they constitute ings of eternity. It deals with the revealed doc-
a realm of eternal beings, for their immutability trine of perdition and salvation as eternal death
is unquestionable. from an opposite point of
If, and eternal life. Is the eternality of Hell and
view, the realm of unchanging ideas is identical Heaven equivalent to a period of endless dura-
with the divine intellect, then no eternal being tion or does it mean —
more fundamentally
or beings exist apart from God. the unchanging sX.2itt of souls after the Last Judg-
ment ?
The proposition that God is the only eternal According to Augustine and Aquinas, the
being, the only uncreated and immutable exist- eternity of Heaven and Hell means the moral
ence, is inextricably connected with the propo- immutability of the immortal soul as well as the
sition that God is the only actually infinite interminability of the beatitude it enjoys or the
being, the ens realissimum having all perfec- punishment it suffers. Only in Purgatory does a
tions. "Eternity is the very essence of God," change of moral state occur, but the process of
Spinoza writes, "in so far as that essence in- purification which takes place there is always
volves necessary existence." In saying this he limited in period. Purgatory is, therefore, not
appeals to his definition of eternity, by which eternal in either sense.
we are to understand "existence itself, so far As Kant sees it, however, the after-life must
as it is conceived necessarily to follow from the not only be interminable, or of infinite duration,
definition alone of the eternal thing." For but it must also permit a progressive moral de-
Spinoza, as well as for Aquinas, the same fact velopment without end. Man is justified, ac-
which makes God —
namely, the iden-
eternal cording to Kant, "in hoping for an endless du-
tity of his essence and existence also consti- — ration of his existence" only on the ground that
tutes his infinity and uniqueness. It is impossi- "the holiness which the Christian law requires
ble, Spinoza argues, for there to be two infinite . . . leaves the creature nothing but a progress
substances. For the same reason, there cannot in infinitum^ From still another point of view.
be two eternal beings. Dr. Johnson questions the traditional Christian
As indicated in the chapter on Infinity, dogma that the souls of the blessed are secure in
when the word "infinite" is applied to God, the a perpetual state of rectitude— in this respect
444 THE GREAT IDEAS
like the good angels who are confirmed in their On Dr. Johnson's theory, the moral condi-
goodness from the first instant of creation. tion of the damned seems to be immutable. It
Boswell had "ventured to ask him whether, is irremediable even by the punishments which,
although the words of some texts of Scripture according to him, may
exercise some deterrent
seemed strong in support of the dreadful doc- effect upon the who, he seems to think,
blessed
trine of an eternity of punishment, we might are not as unalterably set in the path of right-
not hope that the denunciation was figurative, eousness as the wicked are in their iniquity.
and would not be literally executed." To this, On any of these conceptions of Heaven and
Dr. Johnson replied: "Sir, you are to consider Hell, and of the state of the soul in the after-
the intention of punishment in a future state. life, the meaning of "eternity" is somewhat
We have no reason to be sure that we shall then altered; for eternal life or eternal death is con-
be no longer able to offend against God. We do ceived as having a beginning, if not an end, for
not know that even the angels are quite in a the individual soul. As in the case of all funda-
state of security. ... It may, therefore, perhaps mental religious dogmas, the truth asserted re-
be necessary, in order to preserve both men and mains obscure and mysterious. It is not only
angels in a state of rectitude, that they should beyond imagination, but also beyond any ade-
have continually before them the punishment quate rational conception, analysis, or demon-
of those who have deviated from it." stration.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. Eternity as timelessness and immutability or as endless and infinite time: the distinc-
tion between eternity and time 445
I a. The priority of eternity to time 446
lb. Aeviternity as intermediate between eternity and time
2. The issue concerning the infinity of time and the eternity of the world or of motion
4^. The imperishable in the physical order: matter, atoms, celestial bodies 448
4^. The eternity of Heaven and Hell: everlasting life and death 449
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Homek Iliad, bk ii (265-28^) 12d, the
:
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 James Psychology, 1 16a-l 19b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. F'or example, in 7 Plato: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
Author's Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as part, bk, ch,
sect) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d.
Bible References The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
:
and Douay versions differ in title ot books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g.. Old Testa-
—
ment: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) // Esdras, 7:46.
Symbols: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
Q 91, A 2 1017c-1020c
2. The issue concerning of time and
the infinity 23 HoBBEs: Leviathan, part i, 50a; part ii, 162b
the eternity of the world or of motion 30 Bacon: Novum Organum, bk i, aph 48, llOd
Old Testament: Genesis, 1:1-2 / Nehemiah, 9:6 31 Descartes: Rules, xiii, 27b-c / Objections
— (D) // Esdras, 9:6 / Job, 38:1-13 / Psalms, and Replies, 228a-b
90:2; 95:4-5; 102:25-26; 104:5-6; 119:90-91; 32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk i [6-10] 93b; bk ii
136:5-9; 148:1-6— (D) Psalms, 89:2; 94:4-5; [850-1009] 129b-133a esp [890-969] 130b-
101:26-27; 103:5-6; 118:90-91; 135 :5-9; 148:1- 132a; bk v [577-599] 187b-188a; bk vii [70-
6/ Proverbs, 3:19; 8:22-29 / i^^^^h, 45:12,18; 108] 218b-219b
48:13; 65:17-25 —
(Z)) Isaias, 45:12,18; 48:13; 33 Pascal: Pensees, 121 195a
65:17-25 / Jeremiah, 51:15— (D) Jeremias, 34 Newton: Optics, bk hi, 540a-541b
51:15 35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk ii, ch xiv,
Apocrypha: Wisdom of Solomon, y:iy-iS—(D) sect 26 160c-d
OT, Bool^ of Wisdom, 7:17-18 / Ecclesiasti- 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 20a; 26d; 130b-133c esp
cus, 23:19-20; 24:9— (Z)) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 130b-131c, 132d-133a; 135a-137a,c; 152a-d;
23:28-29; 24:14 / II Maccabees, 7:23— (D) 160b-161d; 239b-c / Practical Reason, 334b-
OT, II Machabees, 7 :23 335c esp 335a-b
New Testament: Matthew, 13:24-30,36-43,49- 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, epilogue ii, 693c-
50; 24:3-35 / MarJ^, 13:3-33 / Luke, 21:5-33 / 694a passim
3 to 4j Chapter 23; ETERNITY 447
34 Newton: Principles, bk hi, general schol,
3. The eternity of God 370a371a
Old Testament: Exodus, 15:18 / Deuteronomy, 35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk n, ch xv,
32:39-40 / Pifl/m.s 9:5-8; 29:10-11; 33:10-11; SECT 3-4 162d 163b; ch xvii, sect 16-17
48 esp 48:8, 48:14; 90 esp 90:1-6; 93; 102:12- 172a-c; sect 20 172d-173c; bk ir, ch x 349c-
28; 103:14-18; 136; 145:10-13; 146:5-10— (D) 354c passim, esp sect 3-5 349d-350b, sect
Psalms, 9:6-9; 28:10; 32:10-11; 47 esp 47:9, 8-11 351a 352a
47:15; 89 esp 89:1-6; 92; 101:13-29; 102:14-18; 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 81b-c
135; 144:10-13; 145:5-10 / Isaiah, 40:28-29; 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 175d-176c; 190c; 201b c /
43:10-13; 57:15 —
(D) Isaias, 40:28-29; 43:10- Practical Reason, 334b-335c; 344b-c / Judge-
13; 57-15 / Jeremiah, 10:10— (D) Jeremias, ment, 592a-c
10:10 / Lamentations, 5:19 / Daniel, 6:25-27 / 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, intro, 156d-
Malachi, y.6—{D) Malachias, 3:6 157b; 206c
Apocrypha: Ecclesiasticus, 39:20; 42:21 — (D) 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk xv, 631a-c
OT, Ecclesiasticus, 39:25; 42:21-22
New Testament: Matthew, 24:35 / Colossians,
4. The things which partake of eternity
1:16-17 / / Timothy, 1:17 / Hebrews, 1:10-12;
13:7-8 / Revelation, 1:17-18; 10:6— (D) Apoc-
4a. The imperishability of angels, spiritual
alypse, 1:17-18; 10:6
substances, souls
5 Sophocles: Oedipus at Colonus [607-615] 7 Plato: Phaedrus, 124b-c / Meno, 179d-183a
120a esp 180a / Phaedo, 223c-246c esp 226c-228b,
8 Aristotle: Physics, bk viii, ch 6 [258^10- 230c-232c, 245d-246c / Republic, bk x, 434d-
259^31] 344b-345d / Heavens, bk ii, ch 3 436a / Timaeus, 452c-d
[286*3-13] 377c / Metaphysics, bk v, ch 5 8 Aristotle: Interpretation, ch 13 [23*18-26]
[1015^9-16] 536a; bk ix, ch 8 [1050^6-20] 35b-c / Metaphysics, bk xii, ch 3 [1070*21-27]
576b-c; bk xii, ch i [1069*30-^2] 598b-c; 599c; CH 8 603b-605a / Soul, bk ii, ch 2
CH 6-7 601b-603b; ch 9 605a-d esp [1075*5- [413^24-29] 643d-644a; bk hi, ch 5 [430*20-
11] 605C'd; bk xiv, ch 2 [1088^14-28] 620d- 25] 662d
621a / Soul, bk ii, ch 4 [415*22-^8] 645c-d 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk hi [417-869]
16 Kepler: Harmonies of the World, 1071b 35c-41a
17 Plotixus: Third Ennead, tr vn, ch 5 121c- 16 Kepler: Epitome, bk iv, 890b-891a
122a / Sixth Ennead, tr viii, ch ii 348b-c 17 Plotinus: Fourth Ennead, tr iv, ch 6 161b-c;
18 Augustine: Confessions, bk vii, par 1-4 43b- tr vii 191c-200c esp ch 8, 195d-196a, ch 9-15
44c; par 6 44d-45a; par 16-18 48c-49b; par 21 198b-200c
49d-50a; par 23-24 50b-51a; bk xi, par 12-16 18 Augustine: Confessions, bk xii, par 9 lOlb-c;
92b-93a; bk xii, par 11 lOlc-d; par 18 103a-c; par 12 101d-102a; par 15-16 102b-103a; par
par 40 109b-110a; bk xiii, par 44 122d / City 18-22, 103b-104a; par 28, 105c / City of God,
of God, BK XI, CH 21 333a-d; bk xii, ch 14-17 bk X, ch 31 319b-d; bk xii, ch 15 351b-352d;
350d-354a / Christian Doctrine, bk i, ch 5-6 bk xiii, ch I 360a-b; ch 16-17 367a-368d
625d-626b; ch 22 629b-630a 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 10,
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 10 A 2, rep 1-2 41d-42c; a 3, ans and rep i
40d-46d; q 14, a 9, ans 83b-d; a 13, ans and 42c-43b; aa 5-6 44b-46d; q 50, a 5 274b-
rep 3 86d-88c; q 18, a 3 106b-107c; q 22, a i, 275a; q 61, a 2 315c-316a; q 75, a 6 383c-384c;
rep 2 127d-128d; q 42, a 2 225d-227a; q 43, Q 104, A I, ANS and rep 1,3 534c-536c
A 2 230d-231c; q 61, a 2, ans 315c-316a 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, paradise, vii [64-75]
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, paradise, vii [64-72] 115d-116a; [121-148] 116b-c; xiii [52-72] 126a
115d; XIII [52-60] 126a; xxiv [130-141] 144a; 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part hi, 192c-193c; part
xxix [10-45] 150b-c; xxxiii 156b-157d esp IV, 250c-251b; 253b-254a
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part i, def i 355a; def 3,6 97a; bk ii [81-105] 113a-b; bk v [889-892]
355b; DEF 8 355c; prop 6-8 356b-357d; prop 194b; BK VI [296-353] 202b-204a; [430-436]
lo-ii 358a-359b; prop 19-20 363c-364a; 205b; [853-855] 215a
PROP 33, scHOL 2, 367d-368c: part ii, prop 33 Pascal: Pensees, 194-195, 206b-210b
44, coROL 2-PROP 47 390a-391a 35 Berkeley: Hitman Knowledge, sect 141
32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk hi [1-12] 135b; 441a-b
[372-382] 143b 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 186a-b
448 THE GREAT IDEAS 4^ to 4r
30 Bacon: Novum Organum, bk ii, aph 48,
(4. The things which partake of eternity. 4a. 186b-d
The imperishability of angels, spiritual
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part i, prop 15, scHOL360b-
substances, souls.)
361d
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 121a-128b esp 124d-126c; 33 Pascal: Vacuum, 358a
203d-204c / Practical Reason, 348d 34 Newton: Optics, bk hi, 541b
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk v, 216d-218b; 35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk iv, ch x,
BK VII, 295b-c; bk xiv, 608a-b sect 10-19 351b-354c passim
40 Gibbon: Decline afid Fall, 346d
4b, The imperishable in the physical order: 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 226b
matter, atoms, celestial bodies 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 18d-19a; 74b-76c
7 Plato: Timaeus, 450c-451a; 457a-b 45 Lavoisier: Elements of Chemistry, part i,
8 Aristotle: Physics, bk ii, ch i [193*9-28] 41b-c
269b-c / Heavens, bk i, ch 3 360d-362a; bk i,
CH 9 [279^i2]-bk II, CH I [284''6] 370b-376a; 4c.The immutability of truth and ideas
bk II, CH 6 379c-380c; bk hi, ch 6 396a-c / Old Testament: Psalms, 100:5: 117:2; 119:160;
Generation and Corruption, bk ii, ch io-ii 146:5-6— (D) Psalms, 99:5; 116:2; 118:160;
437d'441a,c esp ch 10 [336^25-34] 438d / 145:5-6 / Proverbs, 8:22-30
Metaphysics, bk i, ch 3 [983^7-984*17] 501d- Apocrypha: Wisdom of Solomon, 7:24-26— (D)
502b; bk hi, ch 2 [997*34-^12] 516a-b; ch 4 OT, Bool^ofWisdo7n, 7:24-26 / Ecclesiasticus,
[999^1-16] 518b-c; [1000*5-1001*3] 518d-519d; 24:9— (D) OT, Ecclesiasticus. 24:14
bk IX, CH 8 [1050^16-28] 576c-d; bk xi, ch 2 New Testament: H John, 1-2
[1060*3-36] 588a-c; ch 6 [1063*10-16] 591b; 7 Plato: Phaedrus, 125a-b / Symposium, 167b-d
BK XII, CH 3 599a-d; ch 6-8 601b-605a / Soul, / Meno, 184d / Phaedo, 231b-232b / Timaeus,
BK II, CH 4 [415*23-^8] 645c-d 447b-d; 457b-458b
9 Aristotle: Motion of Animals, ch 4 [699^^14- 8 Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, bk i, ch 8
700*6] 234d-235a 104a-b / Metaphysics, bk i, ch 6 [987*29-^18]
12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk i [146-264] 505b-d; bk ii, ch i [993*^19-31] 512a-b; bk
2d-4b; [483-634] 7a-8d; bk ii [294-307] 18d- III, CH 2 [997*34-^12] 516a-b; bk ix, ch 10
A I, REP 2 325c-326c; q 65, a i, rep i 339b- 23 HoBBEs: Leviathan, part iv, 267b
340b; Q 66, A 2 345d-347b; q 75, a 6, ans 25 Montaigne: Essays, 276b-285c passim, esp
383c-384c; q 84, a i, rep 3 440d-442a; q 104, 279b-282a
A I, REP 1,3 534c-536c; q 113, a i, ans 576a-d; 30 Bacon: Novum Organum, bk i, aph 56 112a
Q 115, A 3, ans 588c-589c 31 Descartes: Objections and Replies, 216d-
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part hi suppl, 217c; 228a-b; 229c-d
Q 77, A 2, ANS and rep i 945a-946b; q 91 31 Spinoza: Ethics, part i, def 8 355c; prop 8,
1016a-1025b scHOL 2 356d-357d; prop 17, schol 362c-
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, paradise, 1 [64-81] 363c; PROP 19, SCHOL 363d; prop 20, corol i
106d-107a 364a; prop 33, schol 2 367d-369a; part ii,
28 Harvjiy: On Animal Generation, 390b-d prop 44, corol 2-prop 47 390a-391a
4^/0 5 CHAPTtK 23: K 1-RNirV
1 449
32 Milton: Paradise Lost, rk k (142 151] 114b 23 IIoHHEs: Leviathan, paki in, 191b 198a; pakt
33 Pascal: Vacuum, 358b IV, 250c 251b; 253b 255b
35 LocKc: Human Understanding, hk iv, cm hi, 25 M()Ntai(;ni.: lissays, 265b c
SECT 31 323c-d; cii xi, si.cr 14 358b c 26 Shakespeare Richard Iff, act i, sc iv [42-
:
-
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 113c-118a csp 113c-114b, (M,] 115a-b
156d-157b; 168b-d; part lii, 310d [242 ^:5o] 98b 100b; hk ii [85-92] 113a; [i.\i
53 James: Psychology, 301a; 879b 882a 18S] 114b-115a; bk hi [274-:}4:^] 141b-143a;
BK X [782 844J 291b-292b; bk xii [5^,7 556]
4d. The eternity of Heaven and Hell: everlast-
331a
ing life and death 33 Pascal: Pcnsces, 194-195, 206b 210b; 2^^,
Old Testament: Psalms, 16 esp r6:io-ii; 73 214b 215a
esp 73:24-28; 145:10-13 —
(D) Psalms, 15 esp 35 Locke: Toleration, 5b c; 15d-16a / Human
15:10-11; 72 csp 72:24-28; 144:10-13 / Daniel, Understanding, bk 11, en xxi, sect 38 187b c;
7:13-18 csp 7:18 sect 62 194c-d
Apocrypha: Wisdom of Solomon, 1-5 csp 3-5 — 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 233d-234d
(D) OT, Bool{ of Wisdom, 1-5 esp 3-5 42 Kant: Practical Reason, 346b-347c
New Testament: Matthew, 6:19-21; 18:8-9; 44 Bosw ell: Johnson, 363a-b
25:31-46 / Mar{, 9:43-50; 10:17-31 (D) — 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, part iv, 315d
Marl^, 9:42-49; 10:17-31 / Luke, 10:25-37 / 48 Melville: Mohy Dicl{, 347a
John, 6:37-40; 8:51; 10:24-30; 11:23-27; 17:1-
5. The knowledge and imagery of eternity
3 / Romans, 6 esp 6:23 / / Corinthians, 15:34-
'yS / II Corinthians, 4:12-5:10 / Galatians, 6:8 / 7 Plato; Apology, 211b-c / Timaeus, 450b-451a
I Peter, 1:3-7,22-25 / I John, 2:16-17;5:11-12/ 8 Aristotle: Topics, bk i, ch ii [104*^13-18]
Jude, 5-8 / Revelation, 2:7-11; 3:5; 20-22 esp 148a-b / Memory and Remitiiscence, ch i
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Other discussions of the distinction between eternity as infinite time and eternity as time-
lessness, see Time 2; and for the relation of eternity to time, see Time 2c.
to eternity and time, see God 7a; Time 2c; World 46(2).
The notion of permanent elements or principles of change, see Change 2.
Other discussions of the eternity of God, see Change 15c; God 4d.
The conception of the angels as aeviternal, see Angel 3c; Time 2a.
The discussion of imperishable or incorruptible bodies, see Astronomy 8a; Being 7b(3);
Change ioc; Element 5a.
The consideration of the eternality of truth and of ideas, see Change 15a; Form 2b; Idea le;
Immortality 6c; Truth 5.
The conception of the eternity of Heaven and Hell or of eternal salvation and damnation, see
Happiness 7c; Immortality 5e-5f; Punishment 5e(i); Sin 6d.
The problem of the knowability of the infinite, ^d'd' Infinity 6b; Knowledge 5a(4).
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great BooJ^s of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and otherfacts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
CH 13-16, 18, 22-23 Royce. The World and the Individual series ii (3)
Bonaventura. Breviloquium, part vii Pohle. Eschatology
Duns Scotus. Opus Oxoniense, bk ii, dist 2, Hugel. The Mystical Element of Religion
Q 2 Bergs ON. The Creative Mind, ch i, 5
Tractatus de Primo Principio {A Tract Con-
. A. E.Tayi^or. The Faith of a Moralist, series i (^,6)
cerning the First Principle) Dewey. The Quest for Certainty, ch 2
Eckhart. Sermons and Collations, xxv Whitehead. Process and Reality, part i, ch 2; part
Suarez. Disputationes Metaphysicae, xxx (7-9), n, ch i; part iv, ch i (5-6); part v, ch 2
L (3-6) Adventures of Ideas, ch 11-15
.
Chapter 14: EVOLUTION
INTRODUCTION
THIS chapter belongs to Darwin. Not that only on philosophical thought, but also on the
his writings, which are cited under almost direction of research in all the biological sciences.
all headings, stand alone in the various places
they appear. The point is rather that many of With regard to Darwin's predecessors the
the topics are dictated by and draw their mean- question is not so much one of their influence
ing from his thought, and that he figures in all upon him as ot their anticipation, in one way or
the major issues connected with the origin of another, of his discoveries, his conceptions, and
species, the theory of evolution, and the place his theory.
of man in the order of nature. With respect to The observation made in antiquitv concern-
the matters under consideration in this chapter, ing a hillside deposit of marine fossils is some-
the other writers in the tradition of the great times taken as implying an early recognition of
books cannot escape from being classified as the evolution of terrestrial life. More apposite
coming before or after Darvvin, or as being with perhaps is the statement by Lucretius that "the
or against him. new earth first put forth grass and bushes, and
Darwin's influence on later writers may be next gave birth to the races of mortal creatures
variously estimated, but it is plainly marked by springing up many in number in many ways
their use of his language and their reference to after divers fashions." Lucretius also speaks of
his fundamental notions. James' Principles of strange monsters which nature did not permit
Psychology, especially in its chapters on instinct to survive. "Nature set a ban on their increase
and emotion, views the behavior of men and and they could not reach the coveted flower of
animals and the phenomena of intelligence or age nor find food nor be united in marriage . . .
mind in evolutionary terms. The writings of And many races of living things must then have
Freud are similarly dominated by the genetic died out and been unable to beget and continue
approach and by an appeal to man's animal their breed." Those which survived, he adds,
ancestry in order to explain the inherited con- had qualities which "protected and preserved
stitution of his psyche in conformity with the each particular race."
doctrine of evolution. Apparently susceptible to similar interpreta-
Outside psychology the concept of evolution tion are Aristotle's statements that "nature
is reflected in theories of progress or of a dia- proceeds little by little from things lifeless to
lectical development in history; as, for example, animal life"; that "there is observed in plants
in the dialectical or historical materialism of toward theanimal";
a continuous scale ofascent
Marx and Engels, which is set forth in the and that "throughout the entire animal scale
latter's Dialectics of Nature. An even more there is a graduated differentiation in amount
general re-orientation of philosophy, which of vitality and in capacity for motion." Augus-
stems from an evolutionary way of thinking, is tine's commentary on the first chapter of
to be found in the writings of Bergson and Genesis seems even more explicitly to contem-
Dewey, such as Creative Evolution and The In- plate the successive appearance of the various
fluence of Darwin on Philosophy. These, along forms of life. Plants and animals did not actually
with many of the specifically biological works exist when the \^'orld began. Though their
cited in the list of Additional Readings, give causes were created by God and existed from
some measure of the influence of Darwin not the beginning, the actual production of plants
451
452 THE GREAT IDEAS
and animals is, as Aquinas
in their various kinds but also the disposition of their remaining parts,
tells summarizing Augustine's view,
us while and when we find here the wonderful simplicity
"the work of propagation"— not of creation. of the original plan, which has been able to
Like Aristotle, both Aquinas and Locke repre- produce such an immense variety of species by
sent the world of living organisms as a graduated the shortening of one member and the length-
scale ascending from less to more perfect forms ening of another, by the involution of this part
of life. But where Aquinas tends to conceive and the evolution of that, there gleams upon
that graduated scale as a hierarchy involving the mind however faint, that the
a ray of hope,
essential differences, Locke sees an almost per- principle of the mechanism of nature, apart
fect continuity involving only ditterences in from which there can be no natural science at
degree. "In all the visible world," he writes, all, may yet enable us to arrive at some explana-
"we see no chasms or gaps." To illustrate this, tion in the case of organic life. This analogy of
he points out that "there are fishes that have forms, \\'hich in all their differences seem to be
wings, and are not strangers to the airy region; produced in accordance with a common type,
and there are some birds that are inhabitants strengthens the suspicion that they have an
of the water, whose blood is cold as fishes . . . actual kinship due to descent from a common
There are animals so near of kin to both birds parent. This we might trace in the gradual
and beasts that they are in the middle between approximation of one animal species to another,
both: amphibious animals link the terrestrial from that which the principle of ends seems
in
and aquatic together and the animal and
. . . best authenticated, namely from man, back to
vegetable kingdoms are so nearly joined, that, the polyp, and from this back even to mosses
if you will take the lowest of one and the highest and lichens, and finally to the lowest perceiv-
of the other, there will scarce be perceived any able stage of nature."
great difference between them: and so on, till
we come to the lowest and the most inorganical Finding anticipations of Darwin involves
parts of matter, we shall find everywhere that judgments much more subject to controversy
the several species are linked together, and than tracing his influences. It is questionable,
differ but in almost insensible degrees." for example, whether the suggestive passages
But for the theory of evolution the observa- in Lucretius and Locke bear more than a super-
tion of a hierarchy in nature, or even of a con- ficial resemblance to Darwin's thought. The
tinuity in which the species differ by "almost matter is further complicated by Darwin's own
insensible degrees," constitutes only back- sense of his divergencefrom and disagreement
ground. What the theory of evolution brings —
with his predecessors both immediate precur-
to the fore is the notion of a developmental or sors like Buffon and Linnaeus and earlier phi-
genetic relation among the various forms of losophers and theologians.
life. Because it seems to contain this insight, Darwin tells us himself of his quarrel with
the anticipation of Darwin to be found in the theologians. His followers elaborate on the
Kant's Critique of Judgement is perhaps the opposition between his conception of species
most remarkable; even though, in a closely and that of Aristotle, an opposition which Dar-
related passage in which Kant discusses epi- win intimates by the great stress he lays on the
genesis, he uses the word "evolution" in a sense difference between a static taxonomy and a
quite contrary to Darwin's conception. dynamic or genealogical classification of living
"It is praiseworthy," Kant writes, "to em- things.
ploy a comparative anatomy and go through We must therefore try to locate the central
the vast creation of organized beings in order points of Darwin's theory in order to judge
to see if there is not discoverable in it some comparable views for their agreement or dis-
cerncd. He is concerned with establishing the phyla, families, and orders. But there are also
fact that new species do originate in the course smaller groupings within a species. There are
of time, against those who suppose the species races or varietiesand sub-varieties, the mem-
of Hving things to be fixed in number and im- bers of which share the characteristics of the
mutable in type throughout the ages. He is species but differ from one anotiier in other
concerned with describing the circumstances respects. Ultimately, of course, within the
under w hich new species arise and other forms smallest class the systematist bothers to define,
cease to ha\e the status of species or become each individual differs from every other in the
extinct. He is concerned with formulating the same group with whom, at the same time, it
various factors in the differentiation of species, shares certain characteristics of the race, the
and w'ith sho\\ing, against those who think a species, the genus, and all the larger classes to
new species requires a special act of creation, which they belong.
that the origin of species, like their extinction, This general plan of botanical or zoological
is which requires no
entirely a natural process classification does not seem to give species pe-
factors other than those at work every day in culiar status in the hierarchy of classes or group-
the life, death, and breeding of plants and ings or to distinguish it from other classes
animals. Only as a consequence of these pri- except as these are more or less inclusive than
mary considerations does he engage in specula- itself. Why then should attention be focused
tions about the moving panorama of life on on the origin of species, rather than of varieties
earth from its beginnings to its present and its or of genera ?
when we group them and separate them in our species, however much they vary among them-
classifications. "The boundaries of species, selves as individuals within the group. Further-
whereby man sorts [things], are made by men," more, the sub-groups — the races or varieties
he writes; "the essences of the species, dis- of a species are able to breed with one another,
tinguished by different names, are . . . of man's but diverse species cannot interbreed. Organ-
making." isms different in species either cannot mate
Species is not the only term oi classification. productively at all, or if crossbred, like the
A genus, for example, more inclusive group
is a horse and the ass, they produce a sterile hy-
than a species. Groups which differ specifically brid like the mule.
belong to the same genus if their difference is In the hierarchy of classes, then, species
accompanied by the possession of common would seem to be distinguished from all smaller
traits. As species differ from one another within groupings by their stability from generation to
a generic group, so genera are in turn sub- generation. If species are thus self-perpetuating,
classes of more inclusive groupings, such as they in turn give stability to all the larger
454 THE GREAT IDEAS
groupings — which
the genera, phyla, famihes — varieties to breed true; his own observations
remain from generation to generation
as fixed of the geographical distribution of species of
as the species which constitute them. Hence floraand fauna, especially those separated from
the question of origin appUes pecuharly to one another by impassable barriers; the facts of
species rather than to varieties or to genera. comparative anatomy and embryology which
On the supposition stated, no origin of reveal affinities in organic structure and de-
species would seem to be possible except by a velopment between organisms distinct in
special act of creation. Either all the existing species; and the geological record which in-
species of organisms have always existed from dicates the great antiquity of life upon the
the beginning of life on earth; or, if in the earth, which gives evidence of the cataclysmic
course of ages new species have arisen, their changes in the earth's surface (with conse-
appearance cannot be accounted for by natural quences for the survival of fife), and which
generation. By the law of natural generation, above all contains the fossil remains of forms of
offspring will always be of the same species as life now extinct but not dissimilar from species
the parent organisms. alive in the present age.
Spontaneous generation, of course, remains a Briefly stated, Darwin's insight is that new
possibility. A new species of organism might species arise when, among the varieties of an ex-
come to be without being generated by other isting species, certain intermediate forms be-
living organisms. But apart from the question come extinct, and the other circumstances are
of fact {i.e., whether spontaneous generation now become
such that the surviving varieties,
ever does occur), such origin of a form of hfe more sharply separated from one another in
seems to lie outside the operation of natural type, are able to reproduce their kind, and, in
causes and to imply the intervention of super- the course of many generations of inbreeding,
natural power. also tend to breed true. They thus perpetuate
The possibility of spontaneous generation their type until each in turn ceases to be a spe-
was entertained in antiquity and the Middle ciesand becomes a genus when its own extreme
Ages, and was even thought to be supported by varieties, separated by the extinction of inter-
observation, such as that of maggots emerging mediates, become new species, as they them-
from putrefying matter. But modern science selves did at an earlier stage of history. For the
tends to affirm the biogenetic law that living or- very same reason that Darwin says "a well-
ganisms are generated only by living organisms. marked variety may be called an incipient
To Kant, the notion that "life could have species," a species may be called an incipient
sprung up from the nature of what is void of genus.
life," seems not only contrary to fact, but The point is misunderstood if it is supposed
absurd or unreasonable. Yet, while affirming that when new species originate from old, both
the principle that like produces like by insisting the new and the old continue to survive as
upon "the generation of something organic species. On the contrary, when in the course
from something else that is also organic," of thousands of generations some of the varie-
Kant does not carry that principle to the point ties of a species achieve the status of species,
where it would make the generation of a new the species from which they originated by
species impossible. "Within the class of organic variation ceases to be a species and becomes
beings," he writes, it is possible for one organ- a genus.
ism to generate another "differing specifically "The only distinction between species and
from it." well-marked varieties," Darwin writes, "is that
the latter are known, or believed, to be con-
Against the background of these various nected at the present day with intermediate
suppositions, Darwin is moved to a new in- gradations, whereas species were formerly thus
sight by the conjunction of certain types of connected ... It is quite possible that forms
fact: the results of breeding under domestica- now acknowledged to be merely
generally
tion which exhibit the great range of variation varieties may hereafter be thought worthy of
within a species and the tendency of inbred specific names; and in this case scientific and
Chapter 24: EVOLUTION 455
common language will come into accordance. tween two given species must be infinite in
we shall have to treat species in the
In short, number, which is impossible."
same manner as those naturalists treat genera The Russian geneticist, Theodore Dobzhan-
who admit that genera are merely artificial sky, gives an interpretation of continuity in
combinations made for convenience , . . Our nature which differs from Kant's in that it
classifications will come to be, as far as they follows and applies Danvin's conception of
can be so made, genealogies." species and their origin. According to him, if
The origin of species thus seems to be identical we suppose the extreme case of all possible
with the extinction of intermediate varieties, com- genetic variations being alive on earth to-
bined with the survival of one or more of the gether, the result would be not an infinite
extreme varieties. These seem to be simply two number of species, but no species and genera at
ways of looking at the same thing. Still another The array of plants and animals would
all.
way of seeing the point may be achieved by approach a perfectly continuous series in which
supposing, contrary to fact, the survival of all there would only be individual differences.
the varieties ever produced through the breed- There would be no specific or generic group-
ing of organisms. ings of the sort now made in our classification
"If my theory be true," Darwin writes, of the forms of life.
pothesis of the origin of species by the exlinc- number. Analogy would lead me one step
I
tion of intermediate varieties. farther, namely, to the belief that all animals
In comparing Danvin with certain of his and plants are descended from some one proto-
predecessors, notably Aristotle and Aquinas, it type. But analogy may be a deceitful guide."
seems necessary to apply another kind of test. It is immaterial to the theory of evolution, he
Here the problem is not so much one of dis- adds, whether this inference, "chiefly grounded
covering affinities or disagreements, as one of on analogy ... be accepted."
determining whether they are talking about The issue between Darwin and the theo-
the same thing and therefore, when they ap- logians may or may not be genuine according
pear to disagree, whether the issue between to the interpretation of this passage, and ac-
them is genuine. They do not seem to conceive cording to the possibility of a double use of the
a species in thesame way. Certainly they use word "species" — for both the small number of
the word differently. This affects the way in progenitors from which all the extant types of
which the whole problem of origins is under- plants and animals have evolved, and for a very
stood. The controversies concerning the fixity large number of those extant types. If the
or mutability of species, concerning evolution theologians use the word "species" in the first
and creation, and concerning the origin of man sense, and Dar\vin in the second, they need not
involve genuine issues only if those who seem be in disagreement. The "view of life" which
to disagree do not use the word "species" in Darwin attributes to certain eminent authori-
widely different senses. ties, he himself does not flatly reject, namely,
It is possible that certain forms of life do not that life, "with its several powers [has] been
originate by descent from a common ancestor originally breathed by the Creator into a few
and do not derive their status as quite distinct forms or into one."
types from the mere absence of intermediate Is there common ground here in the ad-
varieties — varieties
which once must have ex- mitted possibility that life may have been
isted but are now extinct. If such forms were originally created in a small number of distinct
to be called "species," the word would have a forms and that these are to be regarded as
different meaning from the meaning it has species in one conception, though not in
when applied to types of pigeons, beetles, or another.? If so, the affirmation of a certain
rats. fixity would apply only to a few-
to species
The first of these two meanings may express primordial Concerning forms which
forms.
the philosophical conception of a living species have appeared with the passage of time, two
as a class of organisms having the same essential questions would have to be answered. First,
nature, according to which conception there are they species in the philosopher's sense of
never could have been intermediate varieties. distinct and immutable essences, or species in
The second meaning may be that of the scien- the scheme of systematic biological classifica-
tific taxonomist in botany or zoology who con- tion? Second, is their first appearance at an
structs a system of classification, genealogical historical moment due to a special act of
or otherwise. On this meaning, one million creation, to spontaneous generation, or to
and a half would be a conservative estimate of evolution from already existing organic forms
the number of plant and animal types classi- by "descent with modification" .?*
fied by the systematist as "species." In contrast, To join issue with Darwin, it would seem to
the number of species, in the philosophical be necessary for the person answering these
sense of distinct essences, would be extremely questions to use the word "species" in the
small. biologist's sense and at the same time to ac-
Danvin, for example, says, "I cannot doubt count for the historical origin of the ne\v species
that the theory of descent with modification by special creation or spontaneous generation.
embraces all the members of the same great But in the tradition of the great books, theo-
class or kingdom. I believe that animals are logians like Augustine and Aquinas do not
descended from at most only four or five pro- attribute to God any special acts of creation
genitors, and plants from an equal or lesser after the original production of the world,
—
"Nothing entirely new was afterwards made may have preexisted in other creatures as an
by God," Aquinas writes, "but all things effect preexists in its causes. But he adds the
subsequently made had in a sense been made qualification that it preexists in its causes only
before in the work of the six days Some ex- . . . in the manner of a "passive potentiahty," so
isted not only in matter, but also in their that "it can be produced out of pre-existing
causes, as those individual creatures that are matter only by God." A Christian theologian
now generated existed in the first of their kind. hke Aquinas might entertain the hypothesis of
Species also that are new, if any such appear, emergent evolution as appfied to the human
existed beforehand in various active powers; so organism, but only with the qualification that
and perhaps even new species of
that animals, natural causes by themselves do not suffice for
animals, are produced by putrefaction by the the production of man.
power which the stars and elements received at On the second view, which is Darwin's, man
the beginning. Again, animals of new kinds and the anthropoid apes have descended from a
arise occasionally from the connection of in- common ancestral form which is now extinct,
dividuals belonging to different species, as the as are also many of the intermediate varieties
mule is the offspring of an ass and a mare, but in the chain of development — unless, as it is
even these existed previously in their causes, in sometimes thought, certain fossil remains sup-
the work of the six days." ply some of the missing links. "The great break
in the organic chain between man and his near-
Whether or not the theologian's conception est allies, which cannot be bridged over by any
of an historical development of the forms of life extinct or living species, has often been ad-
conforms to the evolutionist's hypothesis, even vanced," Darwin admits, "as a grave objection
though it does not offer the same type of ex- to the belief that man is descended from some
planation, is which the reader of the
a matter lower form; but this objection," he continues,
texts must decide. But one issue, which still "will not appear of much weight to those who,
remains to be discussed, can leave little doubt from general reasons, believe in the general
of a basic controversy between Darwin and principle of evolution. Breaks often occur in all
some of his predecessors, especially the theo- parts of the series, some being wide, sharp and
logians. defined, others less so in various degrees, as
It concerns the origin and nature of man. It between the orang and its nearest allies be- —
can be stated in terms of two views of human tween the Tarsius and the other Lemuridae
nature. One is that man is a species in the between the elephant, and in a more striking
philosophical sense, essentially and abruptly manner between the Ornithorhynchus or
distinct from brute animals; the other, that Echidna, and all other mammals." Further-
man is and
a species in the biologist's sense, more, Darwin insists, no one who has read
differs from other animals only by continuous Lyell's Antiquityof Man "will lay much stress
variation. ... on the absence of fossil remains"; for Lyell
On the first view, either man would have to be has shown "that in all the vertebrate classes the
created, in body as well as soul; or if thehuman discovery of fossil remains has been a very slow
species has an origin which in part or whole in- and fortuitous process. Nor should it be forgot-
volves the operation of natural causes, mustit ten that those regions which are the most likely
be conceived as emerging from a lower form of to afford remains connecting man with some
hfe.The rational soul, Aquinas maintains, "can- extinct ape-like creature, have not as yet been
not come to be except by creation." But it is searched by geologists."
not only man's soul which, according to Aqui- On two conflicting views, the
either of these
nas,"cannot be produced save immediately by organic affinities between man and the most
God." He also insists that "the first formation highly developed mammals would be equally
of the human body could not be by the instru- intelligible, though they would be differently
mentality of any created power, but was im- interpreted by Aquinas and Darwin. But ac-
Chapter 24: EVOLUTION 459
cording to the doctrine of man's creation by potentiality for a variety of forms, Darwin's
God, or even on the hypothesis of emergent theory of descent with modification seems to
evolution, there need not be— strictly speak- be definitely opposed to the hypothesis of
ing, there cannot be —a missing link between emergent evolution. Speaking as a Darwinian,
ape and man, for the emergent species is a James says that "the point which as evolution-
whole step upward in the scale of life. Man is we are bound to hold fast
ists to is that all llic
thus not one of several organic types which new forms of being that make their appearance
have become species through the extinction of are really nothing more than results of ihc
intermediate varieties, and hence he differs redistribution of the original and unchanging
from other animals not in an accidental, but materials . . . No new natures, no factors not
rather in an essential manner —
that is, he dif- present at the beginning, are introduced at
fers in kind rather than degree. any later stage."
This issue concerning human nature is dis- In this dispute between two theories of evo-
cussed from other points of view in the chap- lution, does not the solution depend in every
ters on Animal and Man. Here the issue, case upon a prior question concerning the rela-
stated in terms of man's origin, seems to in- tion of the species under consideration
volve three possibilities: special creation, evo- whether or not it is possible for them to be or to
lution by descent from a common ancestor, have been developmentally connected by in-
and emergent evolution. But these three termediate varieties? If, for example, the
possibilities apply not only to man, but to the evidence were to prove that man and ape, as
origin of every species w^hich did not exist at they now exist in the world, are essentially
the first moment of life on earth. distinct — different in kind — then no inter-
The hypothesis of special creation does not mediate varieties could ever have existed to
seem to be held by the theologians, at least not account for their descent from a common an-
in the tradition of the great books. The hy- cestor. If, on the oth&r hand, the evidence
pothesis of emergent evolution raises questions were to prove that they differ only in degree,
concerning the factors — natural or super- then no difficulty stands in the way of the
natural — which must be operative to cause the Darwinian hypothesis. The ultimate issue con-
emergence of higher from lower forms of or- cerning the origin of species would thus seem to
ganic matter. Whether or not Aristotle and reduce to the problem of which meaning of
Aquinas can supply an answer to these ques- "species" applies to the organic types in ques-
tions in terms of their theory of matter's tion.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
I. The classification of animals 461
lb. The criteria for distinguishing races or varieties, species, genera, and all higher
taxonomic groupings
2a. Comparison of variation under conditions of natural and artificial breeding 462
2b. Characteristics which are more and less variable genetically: their bearing on
the distinction of races, species, and genera
3^. The inheritance of acquired characteristics: the use and disuse of parts
:
4^. The question of ultimate origins: the creation of primordial life in one or many
forms; the original generation of life from inorganic matter
4c. The origin of new formsof life: special creation, spontaneous generation, or
descent with modification from older forms
5. The theory of evolution: the origin of new species from a common ancestry
5^. The geographical and physiological factors in breeding: accessibility, fertility, and
sterility
6b. The geographical distribution of the forms of life in relation to the genealogy of
existing species
jb. The theory of the evolutionary origin of man from lower forms of animal life
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Homer: Iliad, hk ii (265-28^] I2d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 James Psychology, 1 16a-l 19b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 Plato: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the loxver half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
Author's Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as part, bk, ch,
sect) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d.
Bible References: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., Old Testa-
—
ment: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) // Esdras, 7:46.
Symbols: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
taxonomic groupings
8 Aristotle: Categories, ch [14^32-15*8]
2. Genetic variation in the course of generations
13
20c-d / Topics, bk vi, ch 6 [144*27-145*2] 7 Plato: Republic, bk viii, 403b-d
197d 198c passim / Metaphysics, bk v, ch 28 9 Aristotle: Rhetoric, bk ii, ch 15 [1390^24-31]
546b-c 638a-b
462 THE GREAT IDEAS 2a to 3c
bk I, CH
17 [721^18-722^1] 261c-d; ch 18
(2. Genetic variation in the course of generations.^
[724-3-7] 264a
30 Bacon: Novum Organum, bk ii, APH29l59b-c 10 Hippocrates: Airs, Waters, Places, par 14
36 Swift:Gulliver, part ii, 79b 15a-b
42 Y^\y>T: Judgement, 579b-c 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 81,
49 Darwin: Origin of Species. 6d-7a; 9a-31d esp A 2 164d-165c
9a-12a, 23c-d, 29a-31d; 53b-59d passim; 65a- 25 Montaigne: Essays, 367c
79d; 99a-103c esp lOOd; 149b-150c; 182d-183a; 28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 455d-456a
234a-c / Descent of Man, 266a-271a esp 266a- 42 Y^ast: Judgement, 580a
268a; 275c-d; 284c-285d esp 285b-c; 347d- 49 Darwin: Origin of Species, Ic; 10d-12c; 66a-
348c 69c esp 66a-c, 69c; 82d-85c; 103c-116d passim,
53 James: Psychology, 857b-858a espll5d; 119c-120a; 223c; 227c-228b/Z)(fy<:^^
of Man, 258d-259a; 269b-271a; 283a-284b;
2a. Comparison of variation under conditions 299a-c: 318a-c; 319a; 320b-321b; 358d-359a;
of natural and artificial breeding
587d-588a
30 Bacon: Novum Organum, bk ii, aph 29 53 James: Psychology, 52a; 691a-b; 890b-897a
159b-c / New Atlantis, 211c-212a 54 Freud: General Introduction, 594d-595a /
49 Darwin: Origin of Species, 7a-b; 9a-31d esp Ego and Id, 70 7 d- 708b
9a-b, 12a-c, 24a-c; 40a-42d; 53b-55a; 65a-
66a; 117a-c; 149b-d; 233b-d / Descent of "hb. The inheritance and variability of in-
Man, 377a; 486d stincts
5a. The struggle for existence: its causes and 5c. The geographical and physiological fac-
consequences tors in breeding: accessibility, fertility,
6 Herodotus: History, bk hi, 112d-113a and sterility
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Other discussions of the classification of animals, see Animal 2a—2c; Life and Death 3—3b;
and for the distinction between species and genera in relation to definition and classifica-
tion, see Definition Relation 5a (4); Same and Other 33(1).
la, 2b, 2d;
Other considerations of the problem of heredity, see Animal 10; Family 6b; Habit 3e.
Matters relevant to the origin of life, and of the major forms of life, see Animal ib, 8a-8b;
Life and Death 2, 3a.
Another treatment of the conflict of organisms in the struggle for existence, see Opposition
Matters relevant to the origin of man and to his affinity with other animals, see Animal ic-
ic(2); Man la-ic, 4b-4c, 8-8c; Mind 3a-3b; Soul 2c(2)-2c(3).
Evolution in relation to the idea of progress, seeProgress 2; and for matters bearing on social
and mental evolution in human history, see History 4b; Man 9c; Mind 3c; Progress ib,
6; Time 8a.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Boo\s of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the pubUcation of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
Chambers. Vestiges of the Natural History of Crea- Cope. The Primary Factors of Organic Evolution
tion Fiske. Essays: Historical and Literary, vol ii (9)
Tennyson. Loc^sley Hall Vries. The Mutation Theory
In Memoriam
. ' Dewey. The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy,
Spencer. Progress: Its Law and Cause Title Essay
Wallace. Contributions to the Theory of Natural Hobhouse. Mind in Evolution
INTRODUCTION
EXPERIENCE is regarded as a source of dictory. According to the context of the dis-
knowledge. It is also spoken of as contain- cussion or the subject matter under considera-
ing what is known. tion, the same author will shift from one mean-
Sometimes it is identified with sense-percep- ing to another.
tion; sometimes it involves more memory and — For example, in his account of the origin of
the activity of the imagination. Sometimes it science, Aristotle says that "out of sense-per-
includes thoughts, feelings, and desires as well, ception comes to be what we call memory, and
all the contents of consciousness, every phase of out of frequently repeated memories of the
mental or psychic life. The temporal flow of same thing develops experience; for a number
experience is then identified with the stream of of memories constitute a single experience."
consciousness. The further product of experience
— "the uni-
Experience may connote something which is versal stabilized in its entirety within the soul"
private or public, subjective or objective — is obtained by abstraction and the related act
something which no man can share with an- of induction or generaHzation. Art or science
other or something which is common to all men arises, Aristotle writes, "when from many no-
who live in the same world and who are ac- tions gained by experience, one universal judg-
quainted with the same objects. ment about a class of objects is produced."
There are still other divisions of experience Hence it can be said, he thinks, that from ex-
intuitive or aesthetic experience, religious ex- perience "originate the skill of the craftsman,
perience, and mystical experience. the knowledge of the man of science, skill in the
Experience is said to be that which m.akes a sphere of coming to be and science in the sphere
man expert in an art or in a sphere of practical of being."
activity. A man is better able to do or make In the study of nature, experience, according
that which he has much experience in doing or to Aristotle, is essential for "taking a compre-
making. He is also better able to judge what hensive view of the admitted facts" which can
should be undertaken or what has been ac- come only from dwelling "in intimate associ-
comphshed by others as well as by himself. In ation with nature and its phenomena." In the
this connection experience is called practical, context of ethical or political problems, he
both because it is the result of practice and be- treats experience as the basis for a prudent
cause it is a means to be used in directing action. judgment, which is not "concerned with uni-
But it is also praised for the opposite reason versal only," but "must also recognize the par-
as som.e thing to be enjoyed for its own sake, ticulars." This fact, Aristotle writes, explains
serving no end beyond itself unless it be the "why some who do not know," but who "have
enrichment of life by the widest variety of experience, are more practical than others who
experiences. know." In the field of poetry, as in moral mat-
ters, it is theman of experience, according to
These are some of the myriad meanings of Aristotle, who can best judge what is good or
"experience" — not all, but those which occur bad; he can "judge rightly the works pro-
with major emphasis in the tradition of the duced . . . and understand by what means or
great books. No author uses the word in all how they are achieved, and what harmonizes
these senses. Some of these senses are contra- with what," whereas "the inexperienced must
468
Chapter 25: EXPERIENCE 469
be content if ihcy do not fail to sec whether the The order of nature — the object of the theo-
work has been well or ill made." retic sciences is the order of experience. In
Hobbes and William James also use the word Kant's technical sense of moglichc crfahriingy
for the possession of expertness or sound judg- nature is the realm of all possil)le experience.
ment in practical affairs, as well as in connection His distinction between judgments of percep-
with the origin or nature of knowledge. Hobbes, tion and judgments of experience differentiates
like Aristotle, says that "much memory, or what for other writers is subjective sense-expe-
memory of many things, is called Experienced rience, from knowledge of reality or of objects
He connects it with prudence. It is that knowl- shared by many minds.
edge, he writes, which "is not attained by rea- Experience is the domain of such public ob-
soning, but found as well in brute beasts as in jects precisely because its sense-materials are
man; and is but a memory of successions of formed and ordered by the structure of the
events in times past, wherein the omission of —
mind itself by the forms of intuition and the
every little circumstance altering the effect, categories of the understanding in a synthesis
most prudent."
frustrates the expectation of the which Kant calls the "transcendental unity of
For James, however, experience is usually apperception." Without this synthesis, experi-
identified with the stream of consciousness. ence "would be merely a rhapsody of [Percep-
^'Experience moulds us every hour," he writes, tions, never fitting together into any connected
"and makes of our minds a mirror of the time- text, according to rules of a thoroughly united
and-space-connections between the things in (possible) consciousness, and therefore never
the world." He distinguishes it from concep- subjected to the transcendental and necessary
tion, reasoning, or thought, and associates it unity of apperception."
with sensation and feeling. "The way of 'experi- Though it may not seem possible, William
ence' proper is the front door," he writes, "the James goes further than Kant in the conception
door of the five senses." of experience as a realm of being. Kant does not
For the most part, experience is a term in think that all possible experience circumscribes
I
psychological analysis, with implications for the reality."That which is not phenomenon," he
development of theoretic knowledge or prac- writes,"cannot be an object of experience; it
tical wisdom. That is the way it is chiefly used can never overstep the Hmits of sensibiHty,
by Aquinas, Bacon, Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, within which alone objects are presented to us."
and Hume, as well as the authors already men- In contrast to this phenomenal reality with
tioned. It is still a term in the dimension of which he identifies experience, Kant posits a
psychology when it is used by Plotinus and by —
noumenal world a world of intelligible or
the theologians to discuss the mystical union of supra-sensible beings. To this realm, Kant
the soul with God. writes, belong those "possible things which are
But with Hume experience also is reaHty or, not objects of our senses, but are cogitated by
in his phrase, the realm of "matters of fact and the understanding alone." Since the things
existence," as opposed to "relations of ideas." Kant calls ding-an-sich are unconditioned, that
He tends to identify the order of nature with is, not subject as they are in themselves to the
the succession of events in experience, though forms of intuition or the categories of the un-
he also seems to conceive a "pre-established derstanding, they cannot have an empirical or
harmony between the course of nature and the sensible reaUty, but only an intelligible exist-
succession of our ideas." Nature, he goes on to ence.
say, "has implanted in us an instinct, which William James goes further in his Essays in
carries forward the thought in a correspondent Radical Empiricism, when he takes experience
course to that which she has established among as equivalent to the whole of reality, including
external objects." the actual and the possible or imaginary, the
Hume's difficulty or indecision with regard concrete and the abstract, the objective and
to the objectivity of experience does not appear the subjective. All differentiations must be
in Kant, for whom experience ceases to be psy- made within experience, and experience itself
chological in any subjective sense of that word. is neutral with respect to all distinctions — re-
470 THE GREAT IDEAS
ceptive of all. There can be no meaningful dis- preached that God has revealed to man all he
tinction between experience and some other needs to know in order to live well and be saved.
realm of existence. It is in this all-inclusive sense But this extreme position rejects the construc-
that experience is said to be the central term in tions of reason as well as the materials of ex-
the philosophy of John Dewey when it func- perience.
tions as mind does for Hegel, substance for Among philosophers and scientists, concerned
Spinoza, or being for Aquinas and Aristotle. with what man can learn by the exercise of his
own powers, the controversy over experience
We have gone from one extreme to another usually involves a distinction between the senses
in passing from a purely psychological to some- and the reason or intellect. As indicated in the
thing like a metaphysical conception of expe- chapters on Idea, Mind, and Sense, whether
rience. These are opposite in a way which sug- this distinction can be validly made is itself a
gests the contrast between the practical and major issue in the tradition of the great books.
the aesthetic values of experience — the actively Those who make it, however, tend to regard
useful and the intrinsically enjoyable. At least experience as something which results from the
the metaphysical identification of experience activity of the senses. For them the problem is
with all existence seems analogous to the aes- —
whether our ideas the general notions or con-
thetic ideal of a life which embraces every va- cepts that enter into our scientific judgments
riety of experience. —
and reasoning come from sense-experience,
There some intimation of this ideal in the
is which either is or originates from the percep-
lust for adventure which motivates Odysseus tion of particulars. The contrast between the
and his men. Dante, in fact, finds the secret of particular and the universal, between percept,
his character in the ardor of Odysseus "to be- sense-impression, or concrete image on the one
come experienced of the world, and of the vices hand, and concept or abstract idea, on the
of men, and of their virtue," which leads him other, lies at the heart of the problem.
"to pursue virtue and knowledge," even to the One possibility is that the mind, by processes
point of his "mad flight." of abstraction or induction, somehow draws all
Wife of Bath, in Chaucer's tale. But the great "like a tablet on which nothing is written."
poetic expression of this ideal is written in This tabula rasa depends upon the senses and
Faust — in the worlds of experience Mephistoph- the imagination for the materials out of which
eles opens to the man who has wagered his soul concepts are formed. "For the intellect to un-
for one ultimately satisfying moment. derstand actually," Aquinas writes, "not only
Whatever to all mankind is assured, when it new knowledge, but also when
acquires
I, in my
inmost being, will enjoy and know. it knowledge already acquired, there is
uses
Seize with my soul the highest and most deep; need for the act of the imagination and of the
Men's weal and woe upon my bosom heap; other powers."
And thus this self of mine to all their selves
expanded,
Without experience the mind would remain
Like them I too at last be stranded. empty, but experience itself does not fill the
intellect with ideas. The activity of the sensi-
The basic issue concerning the role of experi- tive faculty is not by itself the cause of knowl-
ence in the origin of knowledge, especially the edge. The perceptions and images furnished by
organized knowledge of the arts and sciences, sense-experience, Aquinas writes, "need to be
turns on whether it is the source or only a source. made actually intelligible," and this requires
It is rarely if ever supposed that nothing can be the activity of the intellect, not merely its pas-
learned from experience, or that everything sivity in receiving impressions from experience.
worth learning can come to be known entirely For this reason, he concludes, "it cannot be
apart from experience. During the early cen- said that sensitive knowledge is the total and
turies of Christianity, devoutly religious men perfect cause of intellectual knowledge, but
Chapter 25: EXPERIENCE 471
rather that it is in a way the material cause." The foregoing views are not a necessary con-
Although experience is the indispensable source sequence of the distinction between the facul-
of the materials on which the intellect actively ties of sense and reason. The theory of innate
works, knowledge worthy of the name of sci- ideas presents another possibility. As expressed
ence or of art does not come from experience by Descartes, for example, this theory holds
alone. that there are "purely intellectual [ideas]
which
Thus we see that those who, like Aquinas, our understanding apprehends by means of a
I
affirm that there is nothing in the intellect certain inborn light." Hence it would seem that
which was not previously in the senses do not experience can be dispensed with, except for
mean to imply that the materials of sense- its value in dealing with particulars. But for
experience reach the intellect untransformed. most of the writers who take this view, experi-
direct source is truths already known, which experience can supply him about this stone,
must in turn have come from experience by and from these he will next try to deduce its
induction. character."
Harvey criticizes those who misconceive the The extreme position which denies
any role
part which reason should play in relation to the to experience can be taken only by those who
I
senses. In the fieldof his own inquiries, "some think that the growth of actual knowledge
weak and inexperienced persons," he writes, from innate ideas requires no outside impetus;
"vainly seek by dialectics and far-fetched argu- and perhaps also by those who make ideas the
ments, either to upset or establish things that are objects of the mind's intuitive apprehension. It
only to be founded on anatomical demonstra- is questionable whether anyone goes to this
tion, and believed on the evidence of the senses. extreme without the qualification that, for par-
. . . How difficult it is," he continues, "to teach ticulars at least, sense-experience is knowledge.
those who have no experience, the things of The other extreme — that experience is the
which they have not any knowledge by their only source of knowledge — is approached by
senses!" those who deny the distinction in faculties,
As in geometry, so in all the sciences, ac- and substitute for the duality of sense and
cording to Harvey, it is the business of reason reason, each with its characteristic contribution
"from things sensible to make rational demon- to human knowledge, a distinction between the
stration of the things that are not sensible; to function of perceiving and that of reworking
render credible or certain things abstruse and the received materials. Though in different
beyond sense from things more manifest and bet- ways. Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume all
ter known." Science depends upon both reason appear to take this position.
and sense; but sense, not reason, is the ultimate They represent, according to James, "the
arbiter of what can be accepted as true. "To empirical school in psychology." He tries to
test whether anything has been well or ill ad- summarize their view by saying that "if a// the
vanced, to ascertain whether some falsehood connections among ideas in the mind could be
does not lurk under a proposition, it is impera- interpreted as so many combinations of sense-
tive on us," Harvey declares, "to bring it to the data wrought into fixity . . . then experience in
proof of sense, and to admit or reject it on the the common and legitimate sense of the word
decision of sense." would be the sole fashioner of the mind." If,
—
ters on Idea, Sense, and Universal. Locke's ticulars, by ascending continually and gradu-
treatment of abstract ideas and the special con- ally, till it finally arrives at the most general
sideration given by Hume to the concepts of axioms." All axioms, on this view, are a posteriori
mathematics suggest that there are kinds or propositions.
aspects of knowledge which cannot be accounted Descartes and Kant, while differing in the
for by reduction to experience. Both men in- terms of their analysis, think, as we have seen,
troduce a certain qualification upon their em- that the mind itself provides the ground for
piricism.However slight that may be, it does certain judgments which are therefore a priori.
not appear in Hobbes and Berkeley, for they It does not even seem to be the case that those
completely deny the existence of abstract or who make experience the only source of knowl-
universal notions in the mind. If ''abstract," edge regard all propositions as a posteriori.
"universal," or ''general" applies to names Hume's treatment of mathematical proposi-
alone, then the mind or understanding adds tions and James' treatment of axioms or nec-
nothing to, and does not radically transform, essary truths seem to be the exceptions here.
the materials of experience. There is still another way in which the issue
can be stated. The question is whether human
The controversy concerning experience and knowledge extends to objects beyond experi-
knowledge can also be stated in terms of the ence, to things or beings which are not sensible
opposition between the a priori 2ind the a poste- and which transcend all possible experience.
riori. These terms are sometimes used to signify Again it might be supposed that those who
what is possessed before and what comes after take an a posteriori view of the origin of knowl-
or from experience, and sometimes they are edge would also limit apprehension to things
used to indicate, without reference to the time experienceable. But Aristotle and Aquinas seem
order, what is independent of and what is de- to say that the origin of knowledge from experi-
pendent upon experience. ence does not restrict the knowable to things
The distinction between the a priori and the capable of being experienced. Aquinas cites
a posteriori is not made in the same way with Aristotle's work on the heavens to show that
respect to propositions or judgments and with "we may have a scientific knowledge" of things
respect to reasoning or inference. The distinc- we cannot experience, "by way of negation and
tion and its and phi-
significance for science by their relation to material things." He would
losophy are discussed in the chapters on Judg- hold what is true of astronomy to be even more
ment and Reasoning. It is sufficient here to the case in metaphysics and theology. Even
point out that an a priori judgment is not though all our concepts are abstracted from
determined by experience nor does it need experience, we can by means of them reach be-
empirical verification. yond the sensible world to purely intelligible
It might at first be supposed that those who realities —
to immaterial and non-sensible beings
agree in thinking that experience is just one or aspects of being. Locke, who may be thought
Chapter 25: EXPERIENCE 473
even more emphatic than Aristotle or Aquinas whether some other s])here of matter exists."
in his insistence on the empirical origin of What transcends all possible experience, in
knowledge, goes as far as they do in affirming other words, cannot be known, at least not in
man's knowledge of God and the soul. the manner of the speculative sciences; only the
Hume, in contrast, holds that knowledge moral sciences, proceeding in a different fashion,
may go beyond experience only if it is knowl- have access to the realm of the supra-sensible.
edge of the relation of our ideas, as exemplified Kant's position seems to resemble Hume's.
in the science of mathematics. Precisely because But it involves a quite different conception of
mathematics is not knowledge of matters of mathematics and natural science, especially the
fact or real existence, its propositions are, ac- latter, which Kant divides into pure and em-
cording to Hume, "discoverable by the mere pirical physics. Kant identifies "pure physic"
operation of thought, without dependence on with the "metaphysic of nature" in distinction
what is anywhere existent in the universe." from the "metaphysic of morals," the one a
But with regard to "matters of fact," Hume theoretic, the other a practical science. For
thinks that "experience is our only guide." Kant the principles of both mathematics and
Any science which claims to be knowledge of pure physics are a priori rather than a posteriori;
reality or existence rather than of the relations the objects of both are objects of actual or
between ideas, is thus limited to the realm of possible experience.
experienceable objects. According as the ob-
jects of a science fall within experience, so also In the classification of sciences, the natural
must its conclusions be verified by reference to from mathematics,
sciences are usually set apart
experience. Experience is the ultimate test of as well as from metaphysics, by being called
what truth there is in the propositions of natu- "empirical" or "experimental." These names
ral science. Only the propositions of mathe- signify not merely the inductive method by
matics can have a validity which does not re- which the knowledge is obtained from experi-
quire empirical verification. ence; they also imply that hypotheses, however
By these criteria Hume challenges the valid- formulated, and conclusions, however reached,
ity of metaphysics or natural theology. Such must be verified by the facts of experience.
disciplines claim to be knowledge of real exist- Newton states it as a rule of reasoning "in ex-
ences, but their objects are not experienceable perimental philosophy [that] we are to look
and their conclusions cannot be empirically upon propositions inferred by general induction
The existence of God and the im-
verified. from phenomena as accurately or very nearly
mortahty of the soul may be objects of faith, true, notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses
but they are not verifiable conclusions of sci- that may be imagined, till such time as other
ence; nor for that matter can metaphysics give phenomena occur, by which they may either
us scientific knowledge of the ultimate con- be made more accurate, or liable to exceptions."
stitution of the physical world if that involves In similar tenor, Lavoisier says that "we ought,
knowledge of substances and causes which lie in every instance, to submit our reasoning to
behind the phenomena and outside of experi- the test of experiment, and never to search for
ence. "All the philosophy in the world," Hume truth but by the natural road of experiment
writes, "and all the religion . . . will never be and observation."
able to carry us beyond the usual course of The two words "empirical" and "experi-
experience." mental" should not, however, be used inter-
Kant, like Hume, fimits theoretic knowledge changeably. No science can be experimental
to mathematics and the study of nature. A without being empirical, but, as the chapter on
metaphysics which pretends to know objects Astronomy indicates, the converse does not
outside the phenomenal order cannot be de- appear to be true.
fended. "The understanding has no power to There seem to be three different types of
decide," he writes, "whether other perceptions experience from which knowledge can be de-
besides those which belong to the total of our rived: (i) the ordinary everyday experiences
possible experience [exist], and consequently which men accumulate without making any
474 THE GREAT IDEAS
special effort to investigate, explore, or test; which are both mathematical and experimental,
(2) the special data of experience which men the experiment enables the scientist to make
collectby undertaking methodical research and exact measurements of the phenomena and so
making systematic observations, with or with- to determine whether one or another mathe-
out apparatus; and (3) experiences artificially matical formulation fits the observable facts of
produced by men who exercise control over the nature. Investigating accelerated motion, Gali-
phenomena and with respect to which the ob- leo seeks not only to demonstrate its definition
server himself determines the conditions of his and its show that "ex-
properties, but also to
experience. "Those experiences which are used perimental results agree with and exactly
. . .
to prove a scientific truth," James writes, "are correspond with those properties which have
for the most part artificial experiences of the been, one after another, demonstrated by us."
laboratory, gained after the truth itself has been The experiment of the inclined plane yields
conjectured." measurements which exempfify those ratios be-
Of these three only the last is an experimental tween space and time that are determined by
experience. The first type of experience may be one rather than by another mathematical defini-
employed by the scientist, but it is seldom suffi- tion of the acceleration of a freely falUng body.
cient or reliable enough for his purposes. The The experiment is thus used to decide between
distinction between the empirical sciences which two competing mathematical theories, choosing
are and those which are not experimental turns that one "best fitting natural phenomena." In
on the difference between the second and third those sciences, Galileo writes, "in which mathe-
types. matical demonstrations are applied to natural
It is not always possible for the scientist to phenomena the principles, once established
. . .
perform experiments, as, for example, in as- by well-chosen experiments, become the foun-
tronomy, where the phenomena can be me- dation of the entire super-structure."
thodically observed and exactly recorded, but Concerned with the phenomena of heat,
cannot be manipulated or controlled. Among Fourier makes the same point concerning the
the great books of natural science, the biological relation of mathematics and experiments.
writings of Hippocrates, Aristotle, Galen, and "Mathematical analysis," he says, "can deduce
Darwin, the astronomical works of Ptolemy, from general and simple phenomena the ex-
Copernicus, Kepler, and Newton, and the clin- pression of the laws of nature; but the special
ical studies of Freud are examples of scientific application of these laws to very complex effects
works which are more or less empirical, but not demands a long series of exact observations"
experimental. In contrast, Galileo's Two New for which experiments are needed.
Sciences, Newton's Optics, Harvey's Motion of In addition to testing hypotheses and provid-
the Heart and Blood, Lavoisier's Elements of ing measurem.ents whereby mathematical for-
Chemistry, and Faraday's Experimental Researches mulations can be applied to nature, experiments
in Electricity represent empirical science which function as the source of inductions. A crucial
has recourse to experimentation at crucial experiment constitutes a single clear case from
points. which a generafization can be drawn that is
applicable to all cases. Newton's optical experi-
On the side of their production, experiments ments are of this sort. He calls this use of ex-
are like inventions. They do not happen by periments "the method of analysis." It consists
chance or without the intervention of art. They in "making experiments and observations, and
are usually performed under carefully controlled in drawing general conclusions from them by
conditions and by means of apparatus artfully induction. And although the arguing from
. . .
contrived. This explains the interplay between experiments and observations by induction be
technology and experim.ental science. Progress no demonstration of general conclusions, yet it
in each occasions progress in the other. is the best way of arguing which the nature of
in scientific work. In those branches of physics tion of new fields of phenomena, for purposes
Chapter 25: EXPERIENCE 475
of discovery rather than of induction or vcri- Experimental exploration, apart from the
fication. Hypotheses may result from such ex- direction of hypotheses, seems to be a procedure
plorations, but in the first instance, the experi- of trial and error. I^^xperimentation in this sense
mentation may be undertaken without the reflects what Hippocrates had in mind when he
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. Various conceptions of experience 476
7,a. Particular experiences and general rules as conditions of expertness or skill: the
contrast between the empiric and the artist
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Homer: Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 James Psychology, 116a-119b,the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 Plato: Sy7nposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
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:
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12] 435b-436a,c esp 377a-d; 450d-451a; 523c-524a
3>b to 4a Chapter 25: EXPERIENCE 479
30 Bacon: Advancement of learning, 5b-6a; 48d- 34 Newton: Principles, bk in. rile hi iv 270b-
49a; 53a-b; 56c-57b; 74b-d; 82c-d / Novum 271b / Optics, BK in, 543a b
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31 Descartes: Discourse, part vi, 61b-c xxiii, sect 7^ 204c-d; sect 6-7 205b 206a;
35 Hlme: Human Understanding, sect v, div t,6, SECT 28-29 211b-212a; sect :52-:57 212c-214b;
465a-d [fn i]; 465c; sect viii, div 65, 479d- BK in, CH XI, SECT 21-2^ 304d 305b; bk iv,
480a ch III, SECT 14 316b-d; sect i6 317a-c; sect
37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 296b,d-297c 25-29 321a-323a passim; ch vi, sect 13
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk ix, 361d-365c 335c-d; ch xii, sect 9-1 ^ 360d-362d; ch xvi,
53 James: Psychology, 666b-667a; 673a-674b; SECT 12 370b-371a
689b-690a 35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, sect 30 418c;
54 Freud: Psycho- Analytic Therapy, 125a SECT 58-59 424a-b; sect 104 433a-b; sect
107 433d-434a
3^. The issue concerning the role of experience 35 Hume: Human Understanding, sect iv, div
in science 20-SECT V, DIV 38 458a-466c passim; sect vii,
7 Plato: Phaedo, 224a-225a; 228a-230c / Re- DIV 48, 471b-c; DIV 60 477a-c; sect viii, div
public, BK VI, 383d-388a; bk vii, 391b-398c / 65, 479b-c; sect xi, div 111-113 501b-502d
Timaeus, 455a-c / Theaetetus, 534d-536b / esp div 112 501c-502a
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10 Hippocrates: Articulations, par 10, 94d 23 Machiavelli: Prince la-37d
12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk i, ch 8, 114a-b 23 HoBBEs: Leviathan, part i, 67d-68a; part ii,
14 Plutarch: Fabius-Pericles, 154a-d 112c-d; 128c-129b; part hi, 165a
20 Aquinas Summa Theologica, part
: i-ii, q 95, 25 Montaigne: Essays, 24a-25c; 68b-69d; 198c-
a i, rep 2 226c-227c 200d; 450d-451a; 455d-456c
22 Chaucer: Troilus and Cressida, bk i, stanza 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 4c-7c;8Sa-c;
90-93 12b-13a / Knight's Tale [2438-2452] 94b-d
200a 35 Locke: Civil Government, ch viii, sect 107
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part i, 53c-54a; 60c-d; 49b-d
66d-67b; 67d-68a 35 Hume: Human Understanding, sect v, div ^6y
25 Montaigne: Essays, 24a-c; 55d-62a esp 61a- 465a-d[fn i];465c
62a; 63d-75a esp 66b-69d; 176c-180b; 450d- 38 Rousseau: Social Contract, bk hi, 411c
451a; 520b-522d 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 284a-c; 449a; 632a-
27 Shakespeare: Troilus and Cressida, act ii, 634a,c passim
sc II [163-173] 115b 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 13d; 194b; 326d
29 Cervantes: Don jPw/a:o^(?, PARTii,340b-343a; 42 Kant: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 266d
345a-348c; 352b-356d; 360d-364a [fn2]
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 5b-6a; 79c- 43 Federalist: number 6, 39a; number 28,
80a; 86b-89b 96c; NUMBER 38, 121b-122b; number 53,
31 Descartes: Discourse, part i, 43a; 44a-c; 168b-169b; number 72, 217d-218a; number
PART III, 50b-d 85, 258d-259a
35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, sect 30-31 43 Mill: Liberty, 320a-323a,c passim / Repre-
418c-d sentative Government, 357b-d
35 Hume: Human Understanding, sect v, div 36, 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, intro, 155b-d;
465a-d [fn i]; 465c; sect viii, div 65, 479d- PART IV, 367d-368b
480a 50 Marx: Capital, 7b
37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 99d-100a; 274c
42 Kant: Practical Reason, 305d / Intro. Meta- 7. Mystical or religious experience: experience
of the supernatural
physic of Morals, 387b
43 Federalist: number 2, 32b-d; number 72, Old Testament: Genesis, 15; 17:1-19:23; 22:1-
217d 18; 26:1-6; 28:10-22; 32:34-32; 46:1-4 /
43 Mill: Liberty, 287b-c / Utilitarianism, 448d; Exodus, 3-4; 7-1 1 ; 19; 24 / Numbers, 12;
450a-c;456a-d 22:22-7,^ / Joshua, 3:7-8; 5:13-6:5 (Z))/o^w^,—
44 Bosw¥.i.j^: Johnson, 106d 3:7-8; ^•.17,-6 :<^ / Judges, 6:11-40; it, /I Samuel,
49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 592d-593a 3; 16— (D) / Kings, 3; 16 / / Kings, 3:5-15;
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk v, 211a-213a; bk 9:1-9; 19— P) i^i Kings, 3:5-15; 9:1-9; 19 /
vii, 277a-278a; bk x, 424a-b; bk xii, 559d; I Chronicles, ij—{D) I Paralipomenon, ly / Job,
BK xiii, 584c-585b 38:1-42:8 / Isaiah, 6—(D) Isaias, 6 / Jeremiah,
53 James: Psychology, 13a-15a; 886b-888a i — {D) Jeremias, i / Ezei^iel, 1-4 esp i; 8-12
7/0 8 Chapter 25: EXPERIENCE 483
esp 10 ; 40-48 passim— (D) Ezechiel, 1-4 csp 40C7ihbon: Decline and Fall, 81a; 189b 191a;
i; 8-12 esp 10; 40-48 passim / Daniel, 7-12 / 294d 296b; 605b d
Hosea, 1-3 —
(D) Osee, 1-3 / Amos, 7-8 / 41 Cm H Hon: Decline and Fall, 476b-477a
Zechariah, 1-6— {D) Zacharias, 1-6 42 Kant: Practical Reason, 320c 321b
New Testament: Matthew, 1:20-25; 3:16-17; 47 Goethe: Faust, part [354-514] lla-14b;
i
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: The mind which are related to experience, see
discussion of the faculties or the acts of the
Idea ic, 2b, 2e-2g; Judgment 8c; Knowledge 6b(i), 6c(^); Memory
Induction la, 2;
AND Imagination la, 3c, 5a-5b, 6c(i)-6c(2); Mind ia(i)-ia(2), ie(i); Reasoning ic, 4c,
5b(3); Sense la, ic-id, 3c(5), 4b, 5a; Universal and Particular 4c.
The consideration of the empirical foundations or sources of science and art, see Art 5;
Dialectic 2a(i); Medicine 2a; Metaphysics 2c; Philosophy 3a; Physics 2; Science
lb, IC, 5a; Sense 5b-5c.
The discussion of experience in relation to the conditions or limits of human knowledge,
see Induction 2; Knowledge 5a-5a(6); Memory and Imagination 6d; Metaphysics
4b; Mind 5b.
Other treatments of the empirical verification of hypotheses or theories, ^^^ Hypothesis 4d;
Physics 4c; Science 5e; Sense 5c; Truth la.
Other discussions of the role of experimentation in scientific inquiry, see Induction 5; Logic
4b; Mechanics 2a; Physics 4-4d; Science 5a.
Experience as a factor in education, see Education 5f.
The treatment of religious or mystical experience or of related matters, see God 6c(3);
Prophecy ib; Religion ib(2)-ib(3); Sign and Symbol 5b.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great BooI{s of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
II.
Peguy. Basic Verities (Innocence and Experience)
R. Bacon. Opus Majus, part vi Men and Saints (The Holy Innocents)
.
Duns Scotus. Oxford Commentary, bk i, dist 3, q 4 Hugel. The Mystical Elcfnetit of Religion
(9) Lenin. Materialism and Empiriocriticism
Leibnitz. New Essays Concerning Human Under- Bradley. Appearance and Reality, bk i, ch ii
standing Essays on Truth and Reality, ch 6
.
Meditations Cartesiennes
. B. Russell. The Problems of Philosophy, ch i
Bergson. Time and Free Will .An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, ch 8-11,
Two Sources of Morality and Religion,
. ch 4 16-18, 21-23
GiLBY. Poetic Experience . Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits,
Fisher. The Design of Experiments part III, ch 1-5; PART VI, CH 4, 10
Chapter ±6: FAMILY
INTRODUCTION
THE human
mostis "the
family, according to Rousseau,
ancient of all societies and the
wise
we
Maker hath set to the works of His hands,
find the inferior creatures steadily obey."
only one that is natural." On the naturalness Yet Locke does not reduce the association of
of the family there seems to be general agree- father, mother, and children entirely to a di-
ment in the great books, although not all would vinely implanted instinct for the perpetuation
claim, like Rousseau, that it is the only natural of the species. "Conjugal society," he writes,
society. The state is sometimes also regarded as "is made by a voluntary compact between man
a naturalcommunity, but its naturalness is not and woman, and though it consists chiefly in
as obvious and has often been disputed. such a communion and right in one another's
The word "natural" applied to a community bodies as is necessary to its chief end, procrea-
or association of men can mean either that men tion, yet it draws with it mutual support and
instinctively associate with one another as do bees assistance,and a communion of interests, too."
and buffaloes; or that the association in ques- If the human
family were entirely an instinc-
tion, while voluntary and to that extent con- tively formed society, we should expect to find
ventional, is also necessary for human welfare. the pattern or structure of the domestic com-
It is in this sense of necessity or need that Rous- munity the same at all times and everywhere.
seau speaks of family ties as natural. "The chil- But since the time of Herodotus, historians and,
dren remain attached to the father only so long later, anthropologists have observed the great
as they need him for their preservation," he diversity in the institutions of the family in
writes. "As soon as this need ceases, the natural different tribes or cultures, or even at different
bond is dissolved." If after that "they remain times in the same culture. From his own travels
united, they continue so no longer naturally, among Herodotus reports a
different peoples,
but voluntarily; and the family itself is then wide variety of customs with respect to mar-
maintained only by convention." riage and the family. From the travels of other
Locke appears to attribute the existence of men, Montaigne culls a similar collection of
the human family to the same sort of instinc- stories about the diversity of the mores with
tive determination which establishes familial respect to sex, especially in relation to the
ties among other animals, though he recognizes rules or customs which hedge the community
that the protracted infancy of human offspring of man and wife.
make "the conjugal bonds . . . more firm and Such facts raise the question whether the
lasting in man than the other species of ani- pattern of monogamy pictured by Locke repre-
mals." Since with other animals as well as in sents anything more than one type of human
the human species, "the end of conjunction family — the type which predominates in west-
between male and female [is] not barely pro- ern civilization or, even more narrowly, in
creation, but the continuation of the species," Christendom. Marx, for instance, holds that
it ought to last, in Locke's opinion, "even after the structure of the family depends on the
procreation, so long as is necessary to the nour- character of its "economical foundation," and
ishment and support of the young ones, who insists that "it is of course just as absurd to hold
are to be sustained by those who got them till the Teutonic-Christian form of the family to be
they are able to shift and support for them- absolute and final as it would be to apply that
selves. This rule," he adds, "which the infinite character to the ancient Roman, the ancient
486
Chapter 26: FAMILY 487
Greek, or the Eastern forms which, moreover, for Locke, the naturalness of the family not
taken together form a series in historic develop- only points to a natural development of the
ment." state, but also helps to explain how, in the
Though the observation of the various forms from the family to the state, paternal
transition
which the human family takes has led some government gives rise to royal rule or absolute
writers to deny the naturalness of the family monarchy. Even Rousseau, who thinks that the
at least so far as its "naturalness" would mean family is the only natural society, finds, in the
a purely instinctive formation —
it has seldom correspondence between a political ruler and a
been disputed that the family fulfills a natural father, reason for saying that "the family . . .
human need. Conventional in structure, the may be called the first model of political so-
family remains natural as a means indispensable cieties.
exclude, but on the contrary emphasize, the even four generations. Sancho Panza's wife, for
further fact that wherever men live together instance, pictures the ideal marriage for her
at all, they also live in famiUes. daughter as one in which "we shall have her
Whether or not the political community is always under our eyes, and be all one family,
also a natural society, and if so, whether it is parents and children, grandchildren and sons-
natural in the same way as the family, are ques- in-law, and the peace and blessing of God will
tions reserved for the chapter on State. But dwell among us." Even though they belong to
it should be noted here that for some writers, the nineteenth century, the families in War
for Aristotle particularly and to a lesser extent and Peace indicate how different is the domestic
—
restricted than that of other groups, although identical with household management, accord-
blood-relationships, often more remote, may ing to others, a principal part of it." In his own
also operate to limit the membership of the judgment, "property is a part of the house-
tribe or the state. Its function, according to hold, and the art of acquiring property is a
was to "supply
Aristotle, at least in origin, part of the art of managing the household"
men's everyday wants," whereas the state went but a part only, because the household includes
beyond this in aiming at other conditions '*of human beings as well as property, and is con-
a good life." cerned with the government of persons as well
In an agricultural society of the sort we find as them^anagement of things.
among the ancients, the household rather than The
foregoing throws Ught on the extraor-
the city is occupied with the problems of dinary shift in the meaning of the word "eco-
wealth. In addition to the breeding and rear- nomics" from ancient to modern times. In the
ing of children, and probably because of this in significance of their Greek roots, the word
part, the family as a unit seems to have been "polity" signifies a state, the word "economy"
concerned with the means of subsistence, on the a family; and as "politics" referred to the art of
side ofboth production and consumption. Its governing the political community, so "eco-
members shared in a division of labor and in a nomics" referred to the art of governing the
division of the fruits thereof. domestic community. Only in part was it con-
Apart from those industries manned solely cerned with the art of getting wealth. As the
by slave labor in the service of the state, the chapter on Wealth indicates, Rousseau tries to
production of goods largely depended on the preserve the broader meaning when he uses the
modern times
industry of the family. In this phrase economy"
"political for the general
system of production came to be called the problems of government but ; for the most part
"domestic" as opposed to the "factory" system. in modern usage "economics" refers to a science
It seems to persist even after the industrial or art concerned with wealth, and it is "pofiti-
revolution. But, according to Marx, "this mod- cal" in the sense that the management of
ern so-called domestic industry has nothing, wealth, and of men with respect to wealth, has
except the name, in common with the old- become the problem of the state rather than
fashioned domestic industry, the existence of the family. Not only has the industrial economy
which presupposes independent urban handi- become more and more a political affair, but
crafts, independent peasant farming, and above the character of the family as a social institution
all, a dwelling house for the laborer and his has also changed with its altered economic
family." status and function.
In effect, the industrial revolution produced
an economy in which not only agriculture but The chief question about the family in rela-
the family ceased to be central. The problem tion to the state has been, in ancient as well as
shiftsfrom the wealth of families to the wealth in modern times, whether the family has natu-
of nations, even as production shifts from the ral rights which the state cannot justly invade
family to the factory. "Modern industry," ac- or transgress.
cording to Marx, "by assigning an important The proposal in Plato's Republic— ''that the
part in the process of production, outside the wives of our guardians are to be common, and
domestic sphere, to women, to young persons, their children are to be common, and no parent
and to children of both sexes, creates a new is to know his own child, nor any child his
economical foundation." parent"— was as radical in the fifth century
Chapter 26: FAMILY 489
B.C. as its counterpart would be today. When duties of care and obedience which bind its
Socrates proposes this, Glaucon suggests that members For the state to interfere in
together.
"the possibihty as well as the utility of such a those relationships between parents and chil-
law" may be subject to "a good many doubts." dren or between husband and wife which fall
But Socrates does not think that "there can be under the regulation of divine law would be to
any dispute about the very great utility of hav- exceed its authority, and hence to act wiiJiout
ing wives and children in common; the possi- right and in violation of rights founded upon a
bility," he adds, "is quite another matter, and higher authority.
will be very much disputed." In the Christian tradition philosophers like
Aristotle questions both the desirability and Hobbes and Kant state the rights of the family
possibility. "The premise from which the argu- in terms of natural law or defend them as natu-
ment of Socrates proceeds," he "'the says, is ral rights. "Because the first instruction of chil-
greater the unity of the state the better.' " He dren," writes Hobbes, "depends on the care of
denies this premise. "Is it not obvious," he their parents, it is necessary that they should be
asks, "that a state may at length attain such a obedient to them while they are under their
degree of unity as to be no longer a state.? tuition. . . . Originally the father of every man
since the nature of a state is to be a plurality, was also his sovereign lord, with power over
and from being a
in tending to a greater unity, him of life and death." When the fathers of
state, itbecomes a family, and from being a families relinquished such absolute power in
family, an individual." Hence "we ought not order to form a commonwealth or state, they
to attain this greatest unity even if we could, did not lose, nor did they have to give up, ac-
for it would be the destruction of the state." cording to Hobbes, all control of their children.
In addition, "the scheme, taken literally, is im- "Nor would there be any reason," he goes on,
practicable." "why any man should desire to have children,
It is significant that Aristotle's main argu- or take the care to nourish and instruct them,
ment "communism" (which in-
against Plato's ifthey were afterwards to have no other benefit
cludes the community of property as well as from them th^n from other men. And this," he
the community of women and children) is says, "accords with the Fifth Commandment."
based upon the nature of the state rather than In the section of his Science of Right devoted
on the rights of the family. It seems to have been to the "rights of the family as a domestic so-
a prevalent view in antiquity, at least among ciety," Kant argues that "from the fact of pro-
philosophers, that the children should be "re- creation there follows the duty of preserving
garded as belonging to the state rather than to and rearing children." From this duty he de-
their parents." Antigone'sexample shows, how- rives "the right of parents to the management
ever, that this view was by no means without and training of the child, so long as it is itself
exception. Her defiance of Creon, based on incapable of making proper use of its body as an
"the unwritten and unfailing statutes of organism, and of itsmind as an understanding.
heaven," undertaken for "the majesty of
is also This includes its nourishment and the care of
kindred blood." In this sense, it constitutes an its education." It also "includes, in general, the
affirmation of the rights and duties of the fam- function of forming and developing it practi-
parents and children. as well upon their husband as their love, and to
With regard to the first, there are questions of have mastery their man above." The Clerk of
equality and administrative supremacy. Even Oxford, in his tale of patient Griselda, presents
when the wife is regarded as the complete the wife who freely admits to her husband,
equal of her husband, the administrative ques- "When first I came to you, just so left I my will
tion remains, for theremust either be a division and all my liberty." The Franklin in his tale
of authority, or unanimity must prevail, or one allows the mastery to neither wife nor husband,
— either the husband or the wife must have — "save that the name and show of sovereignty"
the last word when disagreement must be over- would belong to the latter. He dares to say
come to get any practical matter decided. So
That friends each one the other must obey
far as husband and wife are concerned, should If they'dbe friends and long keep company.
the family be an absolute monarchy, or a kind Love will not be constrained by mastery; . .
to answer this question in the same way. "A Thus did she take her servant and her lord,
husband and father," Aristotle says, "rules over Servant in love and lord in their marriage;
wife and children, both free, but the rule dif- So was he both in lordship and bondage.
fers, the rule over his children being a royal,
over his wife a constitutional rule." Yet the re- While there may be disagreement regarding
lation between husband and wife, in Aristotle's the relation between husband and wife, there
view, is not perfectly constitutional. In the is none regarding the inequality between par-
state "the citizens rule and are ruled in turn" ents and children during the offspring's imma-
Chapter 26: FAMILY A9\
turity. Although every man may enjoy "equal natural master of his family. "The rights and
right ... to his natural freedom, without being consequences of both paternal and despotical
subjected to the will or authority of any other dominion," Hobbes maintains, "are the very
men," children, according to Locke, "are not same with those of a sovereign by institution."
born in this full state of equality, though they On the other hand, Rousseau, an equally
are born to it." staunch opponent of absolute rule, uses the
Paternal power, even absolute rule, over word "despotism" only in an invidious sense
children arises from this fact. So long as the for what he regards as illegitimate government
child "is inan estate wherein he has no under- — absolute monarchy. "Even if there were as
standing of his own to direct his will," Locke close an analogy as many authors maintain be-
thinks he "is not to have any will of his own to tween the State and the family," he writes, "it
follow. He him must will
that understands for would not follow that the rules of conduct
for him must prescribe to his will, and
too; he proper for one of these societies would be also
regulate his actions." But Locke adds the im- proper for the other."
portant quahfication that when the son "comes Rousseau even goes so far as to deny that
to the estate which made his father a free man, parental rule is despotic in his sense of that
the son is a free man too." term. "With regard to paternal authority, from
Because children are truly inferior in com- which some writers have derived absolute gov-
petence, there would seem to be no injustice in ernment," he remarks that "nothing can be
their being ruled by their parents; or in the rule further from the ferocious spirit of despotism
being absolute in the sense that children are than the mildness of that authority which looks
precluded from exercising a decisive voice in more to the advantage of him who obeys than
the conduct of their own or their family's af- to that of him who commands." He agrees with
fairs. Those who think that kings cannot claim Locke in the observation that, unlike the politi-
the absolute authority of parental rule fre- cal despot, "the father is the child's master no
quently use the word "despotic" to signify un- longer than his help is necessary." When both
justified paternalism —a transference to the are equal, the son is perfectly independent of
state of a type of dominion which can be justi- the father, and owes him "only respect and not
fied only in the family. obedience."
The nature of despotism as absolute rule is Misrule in the family, then, would seem to
discussed in the chapters on Monarchy and occur when these conditions or limits are vio-
Tyranny, but its relevance here makes it lated. Parents may try to continue their abso-
worth repeating that the Greek word from lute control past the point at which the children
which "despot" comes, like its Latin equivalent have become mature and are competent to
paterfamilias, signifies the ruler of a household take care of their own affairs. A parent who
and carries the connotation of absolute rule does not relinquish his absolutism at this point
the complete mastery of the father over the can be called "despotic" in the derogatory
children and the servants, if not over the wife. sense of that word.
Accordingly there would seem to be nothing Applying a distinction made by some politi-
invidious in referring to domestic government cal writers, the parent is tyrannical rather than
as despotic, at least not to the extent that, in despotic when he uses the children for his own
the case of the children, absolute rule is justified good, treats them as property to exploit, even
by their immaturity. The problem arises only at a time when his absolute direction of their
with respect to despotism in the state, when affairs would be justified if it were for the
one man rules another mature man as absolutely children's welfare. The existence of parental
as a parent rules a child. tyranny raises in its sharpest form the question
The great defender of the doctrine that the of the state's right to intervene in the family for
sovereign must be absolute, "or else there is no the good of its members.
sovereignty at all," sees no difference between
the rights of the ruler of a state — the "sovereign The central element in the domestic estab-
by institution" — and those of a father as the Ushment is, of course, the institution of mar-
492 THE GREAT IDEAS
riage. The discussion of marriage in the great culture to culture; but in Freud's opinion the
books deals with most of the moral and psycho- "high-water mark in this type of development
logical, if not all of the sociological and eco- has been reached in our Western European
nomic, aspects of the institution. The most pro- civilization."
found question, perhaps, is whether marriage is The conception of marriage— whether it is
merely a human institution to be regulated merely a civil, or a natural, and even a divine
solelyby custom and civil law, or a contract institution— obviously affects the position to be
under the sanctions of natural law, or a religious taken on monogamy, on divorce, on chastitv
sacrament signifying and imparting God's and adultery, and on the comparative merits of
grace. The last two of these alternatives may the married and the celibate condition. The pa-
not exclude one another, but those who insist gans, for the most part, regard celibacy as a mis-
upon the first usually reject the other two. fortune, especially for women, as witness the
Some, like the Parson in the Canterbury tragedy of the unwedded Electra. Christian-
Tales, consider marriage not only a natural but ity, on the other hand, celebrates the heroism
individual can entirely escape. Marriage is not this modern problem are
Matters relevant to
human problem, but it is the
only a typically discussed in the chapter on Love. As is there
one problem which, both psychologically and indicated, romantic love, though it seems to be
morally, touches every man, woman, and child. of Christian origin, may also be a distortion
Sometimes the resolution is tragic, sometimes —
even an heretical perversion of the kind of
the outcome seems to be happy, almost blessed; Christian love which is pledged in the recipro-
but whether a human Ufe is built on this foun- cal vows of holy matrimony.
dation or broken against these rocks, it is vio-
lently shaken in the process and forever shaped. We have already considered some of the
To some degree each reader of the great problems of the family which relate to children
books has, in imagination if not in action, par- and youth — the immature members of the hu-
ticipated in the trials of Odysseus, Penelope, man race — such as whether the child belongs to
and Telemachus; in the affections of Hector the family or the state, and whether the family
and Andromache, Alcestis and Admetus, Tom is solely responsible for the care and training of
Jones and Sophia, Natasha and Pierre Bezukhov, children, or a share of this responsibility falls to
in the jealousy of Othello, the anguish oi Lear, the state or the church.
494 THE GREAT IDEAS
There are other problems. Why do men and versions of love, the qualitative distinctions of
women want offspring and what satisfactions do romantic, conjugal, and iUicit love, the factors
they get from rearing children? For the most which determine the choice of a mate and
part in Christendom, and certainly in antiqui- success or failure in marriage, and the condi-
ty, the lot of the childless is looked upon as a tions which determine the emergence from
grievous frustration. To be childless is not emotional infantilism — all these can be under-
merely contrary to nature, but for pagan as well stood only by reference to the emotional life of
as Christian it constitutes the deprivation of a the child in the vortex of the family.
blessing which should grace the declining years The child's "great task," according to Freud,
of married life. The opposite view, so rarely is that of "freeing himself from the parents,"
taken, is voiced by the chorus of women in the for "only after this detachment is accomplished
Medea of Euripides. can he cease to be a child and so become a mem-
"Those who are wholly without experience ber of the social community. These tasks . . .
and have never had children far surpass in hap- are laid down for every man" but, Freud
piness those who are parents," the women chant writes, "it is noteworthy how seldom they are
in response to Medea's tragic leave-taking from carried through ideally, that is, how seldom
her own babes. "The childless, because they they are solved in a manner psychologically as
have never proved whether children grow up well as socially satisfactory. In neurotics, how-
to be a blessing or a curse to men, are removed ever," he adds, "this detachment from the par-
from all share in many troubles; whilst those ents is not accomplished at all."
who have a sweet race of children growing up In one sense, it is never fully accomplished
in their houses do wear away their whole . . . by anyone. What Freud calls the "ego-ideal"—
life through; first with the thought how they which represents our higher nature and which,
may train them up in virtue, next how they in the name of the reality-principle, resists in-
shall leave their sons the means to live; and stinctual compliance with the pleasure-prin-
after all this 'tis far from clear whether on good ciple — is said to have its origin in "the identifi-
or bad children they bestow their toil." cation with the father, which takes place in the
Still other questions arise concerning chil- prehistory of every person." Even after an in-
dren, quite apart from the attitude of parents dividual has achieved detachment from the
toward having and rearing them. What is the family, this ego-ideal acts as "a substitute for
economic position of the child, both with re- the longing for a father"; and in the form of
spect to ownership of property and with respect conscience it "continues ... to exercise the
to a part in the division of labor ? How has the censorship of morals."
economic status of children been affected by
industrialism ? What are the mental and moral One other group of questions which involve
characteristics of the immature which exclude the family — at background concerns
least as —
them from participation in political life, and the position or role of We have already
women.
which require adult regulation of their affairs ? considered their relation to their husbands in
What — emotional and mental
are the criteria the government of the family itself. The way
as well as chronological — which determine the in which that relation is conceived affects the
classification of individuals as children or adults, status and activity of women in the larger com-
and how is the transition from childhood to munity of the state, in relation to citizenship
manhood effected economically, politically, and and the opportunities for education, to the pos-
above all emotionally ? session of property and the production of
The authors of the great books discuss most wealth (for example, the role of female labor
of these questions, but among them only Freud in an industrial economy).
sees in the relation of children to their parents Again it is Euripides who gives voice to the
the basic emotional determination of human plight of women in a man's world, in two of his
life. The fundamental triangle of love and hate, great tragedies, the Trojan Women and Medea.
devotion and rivalry, consists of father, mother, In the one, they cry out under the brunt of the
and child. For Freud all the intricacies and per- suffering which men leave them to bear in the
Chapter 26: FAMILY 495
backwash of war. In the other, Medea passion- Mill's tract on The Subjection of Women is his
ately berates theignominy and bondage which fullest statement of the case for social, eco-
women must accept in being wives. "Of all nomic, and political equality between the sexes.
things that have life and sense," she says, "we In Representative Government, his defense of
women are the most hapless creatures; first must women's rights deals primarily with the ques-
we buy a husband at great price, and then o'er tion of extending the franchise to them. Differ-
ourselves a tyrant set, which is an evil worse ence of sex, he contends, is "as entirely irrele-
than the first." vant to political rights, as difference in height,
The ancient world contains another feminist or in the color of the hair. All human beings
who goes further than Euripides in speaking have the same interest good government
in . . .
for the right of women to be educated like men, Mankind have long since abandoned the only
to share in property with them, and to enjoy premisses which will support the conclusion
the privileges as well as to discharge the tasks of that women ought not to have votes. No one
citizenship. In the tradition of the great books, now holds that women should be in personal
the striking fact is that after Plato the next servitude; that they should have no thought,
great declaration of the rights of women should wish, or occupation, but to be the domestic
be written by one who is as far removed from drudges of husbands, fathers, or brothers. It is
him in time and temper as John Stuart Mill. allowed to unmarried, and wants but little of
In Plato's Republic, Socrates argues that if being conceded to married women to hold
the difference between men and women "con- property, and have pecuniary and business in-
sists only in women bearing andmen begetting terests, in the same manner as men. It is consid-
children, this does not amount to proof that a ered suitable and proper that women should
woman differs from a man in respect to the sort think, and write, and be teachers. As soon as
of education she should receive." For the same these things are admitted," Mill concludes,
reason, he says, "the guardians and their wives "the political disqualification has no principle
ought to have the same pursuits." Since he to rest on."
thinks that "the gifts of nature are aUke dif- Though no other of the great books speaks
fused in both," Socrates insists that "there is so directly for the emancipation of women from
no special faculty of administration in a state domestic and political subjection, many of
which a woman has because she is a woman, or them do consider the differences between men
which a man has by virtue of his sex. All the and women in relation to war and love, pleas-
pursuits of men are the pursuits of women ure and pain, virtue and vice, duty and honor.
also."Yet he adds that "in all of them a woman Some are concerned explicitly with the pivotal
is man." Therefore when he pro-
inferior to a question — whether men and women are more
poses to let women "share in the toils of war alike than different, whether they are essential-
and the defence of their country," Socrates ly equal in their humanity or unequal. Since
suggests that "in the distribution of labors the these are matters pertinent to human nature
lighter are to be assigned to the women, who itself, as it is affected by gender, the relevant
arc the weaker natures." passages are collected in the chapter on Man.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAOB
1. The nature and necessity of the family 497
2a. Comparison of the domestic and political community in origin, structure, and
function
2b. Comparison of the domestic and political community in manner of government 498
2c. The place and rights of the family in the state: the control and education of
children
1
5^. The status of women in the state: the right to citizenship, property, education 504
6d. The care and government of children: the rights and duties of the child; parental
despotism and tyranny 507
6e. The initiation of children into adult life 508
yb. The continuity of the family: the veneration of ancestors; family pride, feuds,
curses 509
yc. Patterns of friendship in the family: man and wife; parents and children; brothers
and sisters 510
yd. The emotional impact of family upon the
life child: the domestic triangle; the
symbolic roles of father and mother 5 1
Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
uppcrandlovverhalvesof the page. For example, in 53 James :Pjr)'f/!o/o^^,116a-l 19b, the passage
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand sideof the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand sideof
the page. For example, in 7 Plato: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
Author's Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as part, bk, ch,
sect) arc sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, bk it [265-283] 12d.
Bible References: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., Old Testa-
—
ment: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) // Esdras, 7:46.
Symbols: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
\
498 THE GREAT IDEAS 2b to Ic
23 Hobbes: leviathan, part i, 67d-68a; 86a;
(2. The family and the state. 2a. Comparison of PART II, 109b-lllb; 121a; 155b; part hi,
the domestic and political community in
228b-c
origin, structure, and function.^
30 Bacon: Nd-w^ Atlantis, 207b-209d
13 Virgil: Aeneid, bk v [35-103] 188a-190a; bk 32 Milton: Samson Agonistes [1010-1060] 361b-
VI [679-702] 229a-b; [756-789] 231a-232a; 362b
BK vm
[66-80] 260b-261a; bk x [1-117] 302a- 35 Locke: Civil Government, ch
sect 1-2 i,
305a 25a-c; ch ch
sect 66-75
vi-vii 36a-46c esp vi,
14 Plutarch: Lycurgus, 36a-b 39b-42a; ch viii, sect 105-112 48c-51b;cH
18 Augustine: City of God, bk xix, ch 12, XIV, sect 162 63a; ch xv 64c-65d
517c-d; CH 13-17 519a-523a 36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 214b-217b esp
20 Aquinas Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 90,
: 216b;410a-411a
A 3, REP 3 207a-c 37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 21a-22d; 120c-121a,c
23 HoBBEs: Leviathan, part ii, 99b-c; llla-b 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk i, 3b; bk
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 34a IV, 13b; BK V, 28b-29a; bk xvi, 118b-c; bk
35 Locke: Civil Government, ch vi-vii 36a-46c; XIX, 140a-c
CH XV 64c-65d 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 357a-b / Political Econ-
36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 214b-217b esp omy, 367a-368c / Social Contract, bk i, 387d-
216b;410a-411a 388a; bk iii, 411c-d; 414c
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk iv, 13b 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 412c-413b
38 Rousseau: Inequality, 359b-c / Political Econ- 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 82b-83c
omy, 367a-368c / Social Contract, bk i, 387d- 42 Kant: Science of Right, 421c-422d
388a 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, additions, 47
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part i, par 75 124a-b; in 134d-135a; 157 142 b-c / Philoso-
31d-32b; part hi, par 157 57d; par 181 63c-d; phy of History, intro, 172b-d; part i, 211a-
25 Montaigne: Essays, 44c-46b passim; 47a-c; 49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 276c; 313c-d;
89d-90c; 185d-186c; 409d-434d passim 315c-d; 565a-b; 578b-580c passim; 581d-582c;
26 Shakespeare: 1st Henry VI, act v, sc v 31b- 584d-585d
32a,c / 2nd Henry VI, act i, sc i [1-74J 33b,d- 50 Marx-Engels: Commtmist Manifesto, 427d-
34c / Comedy of Errors, act ii, sen [i 12-148] 428a
154c-d; ACT III, sc 11 [1-70] 157c-158b / Tam- 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk hi, 119a-128d;
ing of the Shrew, act sc i [48-101] 203a-c;
i, BK 177a-179a; bk vi, 250a-251c; bk vh,
IV,
ACT II, sc I [37-413] 208c-212c / Romeo and 291a-292b; bk xi, 476c-479d; bk xh, 540d-
Juliet, ACT II, sc II [142-158] 295d-296a; sc in 541a; 545d
[55-94] 297a-b; sc vi 300c-d; act hi, sc iv-v 54 Freud: General Introduction, 531c-d; 555a-b;
306d-309d / Much Ado About
Nothing 503a- 583c-d / Civilization and Its Discontents, 784a-d
531a, c esp act iv, sc 520b-523a
i [1-256]
/ As You Like It, act hi, sc hi 613d-614d;
4e. Divorce
ACT IV, sc i [127-180] 618b-c Old Testament: Deuteronomy, 24:1-4 / Mala-
27 Shakespeare: Hamlet, act i, sc ii [138-159] chi, 2:11-17 — (^) Malachias, 2:11-17
33a; sc v [42-91] 37b-d; act hi, sc iv [39- Apocrypha: Ecclesiasticus, 7:19 — (D) OT, Ec-
170] 55a-56b / Merry Wives of Windsor 73a- clesiasticus, 7:21
102d / Troilus and Cressida, act ii, sc ii [173- New Testament: Matthew, 5:31-32; 19:3-9 /
206] 115b-c / Othello, act i, sc hi [52-209] Mar\, 10:2-12 LuJ^, 16:18 / Romans, 7:1-3 /
/
209c-211a; act iv, sc hi [60-108] 236c-237a / / Corinthians, 7:10-16,39
King Lear, act iv, sc vi [109-135] 274c-d / 5 Euripides: Medea [131-268] 213b-214b
Pericles421a-448a,c esp act i, prologue-sc 7 Plato: Laws, bk vi, 712c-713c; bk xi, 780a-c
II 421b-425a / Cymbeline 449a-488d esp act 14 Plutarch: Romulus, 26a-b / Lycurgus-Numa,
II, sc iv-v 461b-463c, act hi, sc iv 466d- 62d-63c / Alcibiades, 158b-d / Aemilius
468d / Winter's Tale, act i, sc ii [186-228] Paulus, 215a-b / Pompey, 502d-503a / Cato the
492a-c; act hi, sc ii [1-117] 501b-502c Younger, 629a-c
29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, part i, 124a-c; 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q
part II, 270c-271a 102, A 5, REP 3 283c-292c; q 105, a 4, ans and
30 Bacon: New Atlantis, 209a-d REP8 318b-321a
32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk xi [708-721] 25 Montaigne Essays, 299c
:
314b-315a / Samson Agonistes [30-1060] 340a- 29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, part ii, 261c-
362b esp [292-325] 346a-b, [1010-1060] 361b- 262a
362b 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 84b
35 Locke: Civil Government, ch vh, sect 81-83 32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk ix [952-959]
43a-c 268a
36 Swift: Gulliver, part hi, 98b-99a; 127b; 35 Locke: Civil Govermnent, ch vh, sect 81-82
PART IV, 166a-b 43a-b
36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 210b-213a; 258b- 36 Swift: Gulliver, part hi, 127b
261a;374b-376a 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk xvi, 120b-
37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 297d-298a; 375b-d; 122a,c; bk xxvi, 215c; 217c-218d
388c-d 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 92c
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk vh, 48a- 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 84c-85c; 759b
50a; bk x, 67a-b; bk xiv, 108a-b; bk xv-xvi, [n3o]
115c-122a,c; bk xviii, 132b-c; bk xix, 141c- 42 Kant: Science of Right, 419c-420a; 421c-d
142a; bk xxhi, 187d-189d; 193a-197c; bk 43 Mill: Liberty, 316d-317c
XXVI, 215b-c; 217c-218d; 219b-221c; 223a-c 44 Boswell: Johnson, 220d-221a; 304a-b; 411d
38 Rousseau: Social Contract, bk iv, 439b, 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 176
[fn2] 61d-62a; additions, 105 133d-134a; 113
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 92c-d; 579a-b; 135a-b / Philosophy of History, part hi, 288c-
650c-d; 742b [n 93]; 750d [n 52] 289a
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 83d-86a; 93c-94a; 49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 584d-585c
174b; 177d-178b; 245b-246a; 319b-d; 759b 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk iv, 177a-179a;
[n3oJ bk V, 203a-d; bk xi, 476c-479d
b
37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 7b-c; 283b-c 22 Chaucer: Knight's Tale [859-1004] 174a-
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk vii, 47c- 176b
50d; bk XII, 90c-d; bk xiv, 107d-108c; bk 24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, bk hi,
XVI 116a-122a,c; bk xix, 137a; 137c-138c; 140c-141c; 144b-c
145c; bkxxvi, 215b-216a 26 Shakespeare: King John, act hi, sc i [299-
38 Rousseau: Inequality, 327c-d 338] 389b-c / 1st Henry IV, act ii, sc hi
39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, bk hi, 165b-166a; [77-120] 444a-b / 2nd Henry IV, act u, sc hi
bk V, 340b-c 477d-478c
6 to 6a Chapter 26: FAMILY 505
27 Shakespeare: Troilus and Crcssida, act ii, 35 Locke: Civil Government, en vi 36a 42a
sc II [16:5-206] 115b-c / Corioianus, act v, sc 36 Swift: Gulliver, part i, 29b-31a; part iv,
III 387a-389b 165b 167a
35 Loc;ke: Cifil GovernmerU, ch xvi, sect 182- 36Sti:rne: 'Tristram Shandy, 191b 192a; 210b-
183 67c-68b 213a; 352a 353b; 400a-402a
39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, uk v, 301 b-c 37 Fielding: 'Tom Jones, 44b d; 305b
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 93a b; 509d-510b 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 364d-365b / Political
41 Gibbon: Decline and fall, 437b c; 551d 552c Economy, 367a-368c / Social Contract, bk i,
49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 565a-b 387d-388a
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk i, 13a-14b; 55c- 42 Kant: Science of Right, 420b-421c
59d; bk II, 76a-b; 90c-91a; bk v, 222d-223a; 44 Bosw ell: Johnson, 510b-c
bk IX, 367c-369a; bk x, 392a-b; 397a-398c; 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 173
410c-42Ic; bk xi, 485a-488c; 518b c; 528b- 61a-b
531d; BK XII, 538a-539c; bk xiii, 580c-d 49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 579d-580a
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace
6. Parents and children: fatherhood, mother- 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, bk xii,
hood 395a-398d
Old Testament: Exodus, 20:5-6,12 / Proverbs, 53 James: Psychology, 189a; 717b
20:20 / Jeremiah, 31:29-30 —
(D) Jerenuas, 54 Freud: Narcissism, 406b-c / New Introductory
—
31:29-30 / Ezel{iel, 18 (D) Ezechiel, 18 Lectures, 863a-c; 876a-d
Apocrypha: Tobit—{D) OT, Tobias / Ecclesiasti-
cus,y.'i.-i6—{D) OT, Ecclesiasticiis, 3:1-16 6a.The desire for oflfspring
4 Homer: bk xxii [429-515] 159d-160d /
Iliad, Old Testament: Genesis, 15:1-6; 19:30-38;
Odyssey, bk ii 188a-192d; bk xi [458-540] 25:19-26; 30:1-24 / / Samuel, i:i'2:ii — {D)
247c-248b; bk xv-xvi 266a-276d I Kings, 1:1-2:11
5 Euripides: Medea [1081-1115] 221b-c Apocrypha: Tobit, 8:4-8 — (D) OT, Tobias,
6 Herodotus: History, bk vi, 212c-213a 8:4-10
6 Thu cYDiDES Pelopo?7nesian War, bk ii, 398c-d
: New Testament: Luf^e, i :5-25
7 Plato: Laches, 29b / Sytnposium, 165b-167a 5 Euripides: Medea [1081-1115] 221b-c / Ion
/ Crito, 214c 282a-297a,c / Andromache 315a-326a,c esp
9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk viii, ch 12 [1161^16-32] [309-420] 318a-d
414a-b / Politics, bk i, ch 12 453d-454a; bk ii, 6 FIerodotus: History, bk i, 32a-b
CH 3 [1262^14-24] 457a; bk vii, ch 16-17 7 Plato: Symposium, 165b-167a / Laws, bk iv,
539d-542a,c / Rhetoric, bk i, ch 5 [1360^9- 685a-c; bk vi, 708a-b
1361*11] 601a-c 9 Aristotle: Politics, bk i, ch 2 [1252*27-30]
10 Galen: Natural Faculties, bk i, ch 12, 173b-c 445c
12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk hi, ch 22, 198c- 12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk hi, ch 22, 198c-
199c 199c
13 Virgil: Aeneid, bk vi [679-698] 229a-b; bk 13 Virgil: Aeneid, bk i [657-722] 121a-123a;
viii [508-519] 272b-273a; bk ix [224-313] bk IV [296-330] 175a-176a
285a-287a 14 Plutarch: Cato the Younger, 629a-c
18 Augustine: Confessions, bk v, par 15 31a-c 15 Tacitus: Annals, bk hi, 51a; bk xv, 162b-c
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 27, 18 Augustine: Confessions, bk ii, par 6 lOa-b;
a 2 154c-155b; q 28, a 4, ans and rep 5 160c- BK IV, par 2 19d / City of God, bk xiv, ch
161d; Q 30, A 2, ans and rep 1-2 168a-169b; 21-22 392b-353b / Christian Doctrine, bk hi,
Q 31, a 2 172b-173c; q 32, a 2, ans and rep 2 ch 12, 663a-c
178a-179b; a 3, ans and rep 4-5 179b-180b; 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 98,
Q 33 180d-185a; q 39, a 8 210a-213a; qq 40- A2 517d-519a
42 213a-230a passim; q 43, a 4 232c-233a; q 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 84,
93, A 6, REP 2 496b-498a; Q 119, a 2, rep 2 A 4, ANS 176d-178a; part hi, q 65, a i 879c-
607b-608d 881 d
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 81 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part ii, 155b
162d-167d passim 25 Montaigne: Essays, 484c
25 Montaigne: Essays, 184a-b; 191c-192d 27 Shakespeare: Sonnets, i-xvii 586a-588d
26 Shakespeare: 1st Henry VI, act iv, sc v-vii 30 Bacon: Adva?2cement of Learning, 72c-73a
23d-26a / 3rd Henry VI, act ii, sc v [55-122] 31 Spinoza: Ethics, part iv, appendix, xx 449a
82b-d 32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk iv [720-775] 168a-
27 Shakespeare: King Lear, act i, sc ii [1-22] 169a; bk x [966-1053] 295b-297a
247d-248a 36 Swift: Gulliver, part iv, 165b-166b
30 Bacon: New Atlantis, 207c-208d 36 Sterne: Tristram Shaiidy, 522a-523a; 549a
32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk v [388-403] 183b- 37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 21c-d
184a; bk x [182-196] 278b 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 364d-365b
506 THE GREAT IDEAS 6b to 6c
537c-d; ch 15 [1334^8-28] 539b-d; ch 17
(6. Parents and children: fatherhood, mother- 541a-542a,c / Rhetoric, bk ii, ch 12 636a-d
hood. 6a. The desire for offspring.) 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk v [222-234]
39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, bk i, 29d-30d 64a
44 BoswEi.1.: Johnson, 293d 12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk hi, ch 6, 182b
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part in, par i6i 12 AuRELius: Meditations, bk i, sect 17 255d-
58b 256d
54 Freud: Instincts, 415a-b / New Introductory 14 Plutarch: Alexander, 540b,d-549c
Lectures, 860d-861a; 863a-b 18 Augustine: Confessions, bk i, par 7-31 2c-9a;
BK II, par 3-9 9b-lla / City of God, bk xxi,
6b. Eugenics: control of breeding; birth control CHi6 573b-574a
6 Herodotus: History, bk iv, 143b-c 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, qq
7 Plato: Republic, bk v, 361c-363b; bk viii, loo-ioi 520d-523d; part i-ii, q 34, a i, rep
403a-d / Timaeus, 443a / Statesman, 605d- 2 768c-769d; q 40, a 6 796c-797a
608d esp 608a-c / Laws, bk v, 693a-c; bk vi, 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 94,
707b-709a; 712b-713c A I, REP to CONTRARY 221a-d; Q 95, A I 226c-
9 Aristotle: History of Animals, bk vii, ch 3 227c
[583^14-25] 108d / Politics, bk ii, ch 6 [1265^ 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, purgatory, xvi [85-
38-^18] 460d-461a; ch 9 [1270^39-^6] 466c; 96] 77d
CH 10 [1272*23-24] 468c; bk vii, ch 16 539d- 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part i, 60b; 78b; part
541a II, 132b-c
112c-113a,c / Oedipus at Colonus 114a-130a,c / 319a,c esp act hi, sc v [127-215] 308c-309c /
Antigone [626-767] 136c-137d / Electra 156a- Midsummer-Night' s Dream, act i, sc i [1-121]
169a,c / Trachiniae [i 157-1278] 180a-181a,c 352a-353c / 1st Henry IV, act hi, sc ii 452d-
5 Euripides :^/(r^:f//.j [280-325] 239c-240a; [611- 454d
738] 242c-243c / Heracles Mad [562-584] 27 Shakespeare: Othello, act i, sc hi [175-189]
369d-370a; [622-636] 370c / Phoenician 210d-211a / King Lear 244a-283a,c esp act i
Maidens 378a-393d esp [i 485-1 766] 391a- 244a-254c / Cymbeline, act i, sc i [125-158]
393d / Orestes 394a-410d 451a-c
5 Aristophanes: Clouds [791-888] 498b-499b; 29 Cervantes: Do« Quixote, part ii, 218c-220c;
[1321-1451] 504c-506b / Birds [1337-1371] 251b;261c-262a
558d-559b; [1640-1675] 562b-c 30 Bacon: New Atlantis, 207b-209d
6 Herodotus: History, bk ii, 76a; bk iv, 155c- 31 Spinoza: Ethics, part iv, appendix, xx 449a
156a; bk v, 160d-161a; bk viii, 281c 35 Locke: Civil Government, ch vi, sect 52-cH
7 Plato: Lysis, 16c-17c / Laches, 26a-27d / VII, sect 81 36a-43a; ch xv, sect 170 64d-
Protagoras, 42d-43d; 45d-47c / Syrnposium, 65a; sect 173-174 65c-d / Human Understand-
165c-166b / Meno, 186a-187b / Euthyphro, ing, bk I, CH II, sect 9, 106a-b; sect 12
192a-c / Crito, 214c; 216d-217d / Republic, 107b-d; BK II, CH xxxiii, sect 7-10 249b-d
BK II, 321b-c; BK V, 360d-365d / Timaeus, 36 Swift: Gulliver, part i, 29b; part iv, 166a-
442d-443a / Latvs, bk hi, 672d-673d; bk iv, 167a
683b-c; bk v, 686d-688b esp 687d-688a; bk 36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 191b-192a; 250b-
vii, 713c-716c; 723c-d; bk ix, 750d-751b; 251a; 400a-402a; 410a-411a; 423b-424b
755a-757c; bk xi, 779b-781c / Seventh Letter, 37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 35a-49a,c; 65b-c;
804a 108c-110c; 120c-121a,c;124a-126c; 136a-c;
9 Aristotle: History of Animals, bk vii, ch i 217d-219c; 283c-d; 310b-313b; 321b-324b;
[581^11-22] 107b / Ethics, bk hi, ch 12 [1119^ 338d-345d; 359b-364d
33-^18] 366a,c; bk v, ch 6 [1134^8-17] 382b-c; 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk v, 22d-23a;
BK VIII, cH 10 [1160^23-32] 413a; bk ix, ch 2 BK xxiii, 187d-188a; 189b-d; bk xxvi, 216a-
417c-418b; bk x, ch 9 [1180^14-^14] 434d- 217b;220a-b
435c bk i, ch 12-13 453d-455a,c
/ Politics, 38 Rousseau: /;z(f^«a//>y,326c-d;357a-b;365a-b
bk hi, ch 6 [i278'^30-i279*2] 476a-b;
passim; / Political Economy, 367a-368c; 377a / Social
BK IV, CH II [1295^14-20] 495d; bk vii, ch 15 Contract, bk i, 387d-388a; 389c
[1334^8-28] 539b-d; ch 17 541a-542a,c; bk 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, bk i, 29d-30d;
VIII, CH 3 [1338^30-^8] 543c-d BK V, 338c-d
12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk i, ch ii 116d- 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 45b-c; 82b-83c
118d; ch 23 128c-d; bk hi, ch 22, 198c-199c 42 Kant: Science of Right, 404d; 420b-422d
12 Aurelius: Meditations, bk i 253a-256d 43 Mill: Liberty, 316d-319d passim, esp 31 7d
13 Virgil: Eclogues, iv [60-64] ^^^ / Aeneid, bk 44 BoswEi.1.: Johnson, 199d-200d; 247c-d; 301d-
VIII [508-519] 272b-273a; bk ix [224-313] 302a;424d-425a
285a-287a 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 159
14 Plutarch: Lycurgus, 40c-41a / Fabius, 58a; par 173-175 61a-d; additions, hi 134d-
152b-d / Coriolanus, 174b,d-175a; 189d-191d 135a / Philosophy of History, part i, 211d-
/ Marcus Cato, 286c-287b 212c; part hi, 288c-289b
508 THE GREAT IDEAS 6e to la
54 Freud: Origin and Development of Psycho-
(6. Parents and children: fatherhood, mother- Analysis, 17d-18a / Sexual Enlightenment of
hood. 6d. The care and government oj chil- Children 119a-122a,c passim / General Intro-
dren: the rights and duties of the child; duction, 512a; 583c-d; 584b-c / Group Psy-
parental despotism and tyranny.) chology, 682a-b / Civilization ajid Its Discon-
50 Marx: Capital, 193a'194b; 241a-d tents, 783 d
50 Marx-Engels: Communist Manifesto, 'Mlo.
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk i, 2c-3a; 22b- 7. The life of the family
23a; 34d-35b; 47b-48d; bk hi, 119a-128d; bk
IV, 192b-193d; bk v, 207b-208a; 210b-211a;
7a. Marriage and love: romantic, conjugal,
BK VI, 252d-254c; 271c-274a,c; bk vii, 291a- and illicit love
292b; BK VIII, 305b-307d; 324b-325c; 335d- Old Testament: Genesis, 2:23-24; 24:67; 29:16-
336a; bk ix, 356b-358b; 381b-c; 382a-384b; 30 / Ruth I I Samuel, 1:1-8— (Z)) / Kings,
BK x, 406c-410c; epilogue i, 659d-674a,c 1:1-8 / // Samuel, 11; 13:1-20— (£>) // Kings,
passim II ; 13:1-20 / Proverbs, 5; 6:20-7:27 / Ecclesias-
52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, bk i, 2d- tes, 9:9 / Song of Solomon— {D) Canticle of
BK XII, 370b-d; 395a-398d
11a; Canticles
54 Freud: Origin and Development of Psycho- Apocrypha: Tobit, 6:10-17— (D) OT, Tobias,
Analysis, 17d-18a / Sexual Enlightenment of 6:11-22 / Ecclesiasticus, 7:26; 25:1; 40:23 —
Children 119a-122a,c passim / Interpretation of ip) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 7:28; 25:1-2; 40:23
Dreams, 244a-c / Narcissism, 406b-c / General New Testament: Matthew, 19:4-6 / Mar\,
Introduction, 573b-d / hihibitions, Symptoms, 10:6-9/ / Corinthians, 7:1-15,32-34 / Ephe-
and Anxiety, 751 d / Civilization and Its Dis- sians, 5:22-33 / Colossians, 3:18-19 / / Peter,
contents,794c-795a esp 795b [fn 2] / New In- 3:1-7
troductory Lectures, 832b-c; 834b-c; 868d- 4 Homer: Iliad, bk ix [334-347] 60c-d; bk xiv
871a esp 869b-c, 870a-c; 876c [229-360] lOGc-lOld / Odyssey, bk xxiii [152-
365] 313d-316a; bk xxiv [191-202] 319a
6e. The initiation of children into adult life 5 Aeschylus: Agamemnon [681-781] 59b-60b
New Testament: Lul^, 2:41-52 / Choephoroe [585-651] 75d-76b; [892-930]
4 Homer: Odyssey, bk i-ii 183a-192d,' bk xi 78d-79b
[487-540] 247d-248b 5 Sophocles: Trachiniae 170a-l81a,c
6 Herodotus: History, bk iv, 125c-126a; 155c- 5 Euripides: Medea 212a-224a,c esp [446-662]
156a 215d-217c / Hippolytus 225a-236d esp [373-
9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk hi, ch 12 [1119*33- 481] 228b-229b / Alcestis 237a-247a,c^ esp
^i8]366a,c [152-198] 238c-239a, [329-368] 240a-b / Sup-
12 Aurelius: Meditations, bk i 253a-256d 267a-c/ Trojan Wojnen [634-
pliants [990-1071]
14 Plutarch: Lycurgus, 41b-42b 683] 275c-d / Helen 298a-314a,c / Andromache
18 Augustine: Confessions, bk ii, par 3-8 9b-10d 315a-326a,c esp [147-244] 316c-317b / Electra
25 Montaigne: Essays, 63d-79c passim, esp 72b- [988-1122] 336a-337b
75a; 156d-158a,c;'l84a-191c esp 187a-c 5 Aristophanes: Lysistrata 583a-599a,c / Thes-
26 Shakespeare: Two Gentlemen of Verona, act mophoriazusae 600a-614d esp [383-532] 604d-
I, sc III [1-42] 232c-d / 2nd Henry IV, act v, 606a
so 497d-499b
II 6 Herodotus: History bk vi, 197a-c; bk ix,
^
CWSS-KEFEKENCES
For: The general problem of the naturalness of human association in the family or in the state, see
Nature 2b; Necessity and Contingency 5b; State la, 3b-3d.
The political significance of the domestic community, and for comparisons of government in
the family and in the state, see Education 8a; Government ib; Monarchy 4a, 4e(i);
Slavery 6b; State ib, 5b; Tyranny 4b.
The economic aspects of the family, see Labor 5a, 5c; Slavery 4a; Wealth 2, 3d.
Religious considerations relevant to matrimony and celibacy, see Religion 2c, 3d; Virtue
AND Vice 8f-8g.
Other discussions of women in relation to men, and of the difference between the sexes, see
Happiness 4a; Man 6b; War and Peace 5a.
Other discussions of childhood as a stage of human life, see Life and Death 6c; Man 6c; and
for the problem of the care and training of the young, see Duty 9; Education 4b, 8a;
Religion 5c,
A more general consideration of the problems of heredity, see Evolution 2—36.
The distinction of the several kinds of love and friendship which may enter into marriage,
see Love 2-2d; and for matters relevant to the emotional pattern of family relationships,
see Desire 4a-4d; Emotion 3c-3c(4); Love 2b(4), 2d.
Chapter 26: FAMILY 513
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Bool(s of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works arc divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
F. Schlegel. Lucinde
L Fourier. Traite de V association domestique-agricole
Plutarch. "A Discourse Touching the Training of Lamb. "A Bachelor's Complaint," in The Essays of
Children," "Concerning the Virtues of Women," Elia
"Conjugal Precepts," "Of Natural Affection To- Balzac. The Physiology of Marriage
wards One's Offspring," in Moralia Eugenie Grandet
.
Joyce. A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man L. Sturzo. The Inner Laws of Society, ch ii
INTRODUCTION
FATE— sometimes personified, sometimes out man's willing them may happen by chance
abstractly conceived — is the antagonist of or fortune.
freedom in the drama of human hfe and his- It is sometimes supposed that "fate" and
tory. So at least it seems to the poets of antiq- "fortune" are synonyms, or that one has a
uity. In many of the Greek tragedies, fate sets tragic and the other a happy connotation. It is
the stage. Some curse must be fulfilled. A doom as if fortune were always good and fate always
impends and is inexorable.But the actors on malevolent. But either may be good or evil
the stage are far from puppets. Within the from the point of view of man's desires. Al-
framework of the inevitable the tragic hero though fate and fortune are hardly the same,
works out his own destiny, making the choices there is some reason for associating them. Each
from which his personal catastrophe ensues. imposes a limitation on man's freedom. A man
Oedipus, doomed to kill his father and marry cannot compel fortune to smile upon him any
his mother, is not fated to inquire into his past more than he can avoid his fate. Though alike
and to discover the sins which, when he sees, he and fortune are also opposed
in this respect, fate
wills to see no more. The curse on the house of to one another. Fate represents the inexorable
Atreus does not require Agamemnon to bring march of events. There is no room for fortune
Cassandra back from Troy or to step on the unless some things are exempt from necessity.
I
purple carpet. The furies which pursue Orestes Only that which can happen by chance is in
he has himself awakened by murdering his the lap of fortune.
mother, Clytemnestra, a deed not fated but It would seem that fate stands to fortune as
freely undertaken to avenge his father's death. the necessary to the contingent. If everything
The ancients did not doubt that men could were necessitated, fate alone would reign. Con-
choose and, through choice, exercise some con- tingency would be excluded from nature.
trol over the disposition of their lives. Tacitus, Chance or the fortuitous in the order of nature
for example, while admitting that "most men and freedom in human life would be reduced
. . . cannot part with the belief that each per- to illusions men cherish only through ignorance
son's future is fixed from his very birth," claims of the inevitable.
that "the wisest of the ancients . . . leave us the In a sense fortune is the ally of freedom in the
capacity of choosing our life." At the same time struggle against fate. Good fortune seems to aid
he recognizes an order of events beyond man's and abet human But even misfortune
desires.
power to control, although he finds no agree- signifies the element of chance which is more
ment regarding its cause whether it depends— congenial than fate, if not more amenable, to
"on wandering stars" or "primary elements, man's conceit that he can freely plan his life.
and on a combination of natural causes." For
his own part, Tacitus declares, "I suspend my The terms necessity and contingency cannot be
judgment" on the question "whether it is fate substituted iov fate and fortune without loss of
and unchangeable necessity or chance which significance. As the chapter on Necessity and
governs the revolutions of human affairs." In Contingency indicates, they are terms in the
so doing, he grants the possibility that not philosophical analysis of the order of nature
everything which lies beyond man's control is and causality. They may have, but they need
fated. Some of the things which happen with- not have, theological implications. Necessity
515
516 THE GREAT IDEAS
and contingency can be explained without any rather than on freedom. This is certainly so if
reference to the supernatural, as is evident from Zeus is not the master of even his own fate,
the discussion of these matters in the chapter much less the omnipotent ruler among the
on Chance. But fate and fortune, in their ori- gods or the arbiter of human destiny. In
gin at least, are theological terms. Prometheus Bound, the Chorus asks, "Who is
In ancient poetry and mythology, both in- the pilot of Necessity?" Prometheus answers,
evitability and chance were personified as dei- "The Fates triform and the unforgetting
ties or supernatural forces. There were the god- The Chorus then
Furies." "Is Zeus of asks,
dess of Fortune and the three Fates, as well as lesser might than these ?" To which Prometheus
their three evil sisters or counterparts, the replies, "He shall not shun the lot appor-
Furies. The Latin word from which "fate" tioned." When they ask what this doom is,
comes means an oracle, and so signifies what is Prometheus tells them to inquire no more, for
divinely ordained. What happens by fate is they verge on mysteries. Later Zeus himself
fated — something destinedand decreed in the sends Hermes to wrest from Prometheus the
councils of the gods on Olympus; or it may be secret of what has been ordained for him by
the decision of Zeus, to whose rule all the other "all consummating Fate" or "Fate's resistless
divinities are subject; or, as we shall see pres- law." Prometheus refuses, saying that "none
ently, it may be a supernatural destiny which shall bend my will or force me to disclose by
even Zeus cannot set aside. whom 'tis fated he shall fall from power."
In any case, the notion of fate implies a super- The question Aeschylus leaves unanswered
natural will, even as destiny implies predestina- is whether Zeus would be able to escape his
tion by an intelligence able not only to plan doom if he could foresee what Fate holds in
the future but also to carry out that plan. The The suggestion seems to be that
store for him.
and destiny is thus distin-
inevitability of fate without omniscience the omnipotence of Zeus
guished from that of merely natural necessity cannot break the chains of Fate.
which determines the future only insofar as it
may be the inevitable consequence of causes In the tradition of Judaeo-Christian theology
working naturally. the problem of fate is in part verbal and in part
But the ancients do not seem to be fatalists real. The verbal aspect of the problem concerns
in the extreme sense of the term. To the extent the meaning of the word "fate" in relation to
that men can propitiate the gods or provoke the divine will, providence, and predestination.
divine jealousy and anger, the attitudes and With the verbal matter settled, there remains
deeds of men seem to be a determining factor the real problem of God's will and human free-
in the actions of the gods. To the extent that dom. The strictly monotheistic conception of
the gods align themselves on opposite sides of a an omnipotent and omniscient God deepens
human conflict (as in the Iliad), or oppose each the mystery, andmakes it more difficult than
other (as in the Odyssey), it may be thought the problem of fate and freedom in pagan
that what happens on earth merely reflects the thought.
shifting balance of power among the gods. If anyone "calls the will or the power of God
But human planning and willing do not seem itself by the name of fate," Augustine says,
to be excluded by the divine will and plan "let him keep his opinion, but correct his lan-
which are forged out of the quarrels of the guage. . . . For when men hear that word, ac-
gods. On the contrary, polytheism seems to cording to the ordinary use of language, they
make fortune itself contingent on the outcome simply understand by it the virtue of that par-
of the Olvmpian conflict, and so permits men ticular position of the stars which may exist
a certain latitude of self-determination. Men at the time when anyone is born or conceived,
can struggle against the gods precisely because which some separate altogether from the will
the gods may be with them as well as against of God, whilst others aflirm that this also is
them. dependent on that will. But those who are of
The ultimate power of Zeus to decide the the opinion that, apart from the will of God,
issue may, however, place the accent on fate the stars determine what we shall do, or what
Chapter 27: FATE 517
good things \vc shall possess, or what evils \vc of late, in order that cause follow not cause from
shall suffer, must be reiused a hearing by all, not everlasting," it is because in the atoms of his
only by those who hold the true religion, but makeup "there is another cause of motions . . .
by those who wish to be the worshippers ot any caused by a minute swerving of first-begin-
gods whatsoever, even false gods. For what does nings at no fixed part of space and no fixed
this opinion really amount to but no this, that time."
god whatsoever is to be worshipped or prayed Nevertheless, according to Augustine, Lu-
to?" cretius is a fatalist who disbelieves in provi-
Since the word "fate" has been used for those dence, other than which there is no fate. Each
things which are determined apart from the of them uses the word "fate," the one to deny,
will of God or man, Augustine thinks it would the other to affirm, the power of God.
be better for Christians not to use it, but to But even if a Christian avoids the supersti-
substitute "providence" or "predestination" tions of astrology, or some similar belief in a
when they wish to refer to what God wills. natural necessity which does not depend on
Aquinas, however, retains the word "fate" God, he may still commit the sin of fatahsm
but meaning to the "ordering ... of
restricts its which follows from the denial of man's free
mediate causes" by which God wills "the pro- will. Understanding fate as identical with prov-
duction of certain effects." idence, the Christian is a fatalist if, in the be-
According to the definition given by Boe- lief that every human act is foreordained by
thius which Aquinas quotes, "Fate is a disposi- God, he making no
resigns himself to his fate,
tion inherent to changeable things, by which moral effort and taking no moral responsibility
providence connects each one with its proper for his soul's welfare.,To do that is to argue like
order." Thus fate is not identified with provi- Chaucer's Troilus:
dence, but made subordinate to it. The distinc- I am, he said, but done for, so to say;
tion, Aquinas explains, depends on the way we For all that comes, comes by necessity,
consider "the ordering of effects" by God. "As Thus to be done for is my destiny.
I must believe and cannot other choose,
being in God Himself . . . the ordering of the
That Providence, in its divine foresight,
effects is called Providence." But "as being in Hath known that Cressida I once must lose,
the mediate causes ordered by God," it is called Since God sees everything from heaven's height
fate. While admitting that "the divine power And plans things as he thinks both best and right,
As was arranged for by predestination.
or will can be called fate, as being the cause of
fate," he declares that "essentially fate is the Troilus sees no way of avoiding the conclusion
very disposition or series, i.e., order, of second that "free choice is an idle dream."
causes."
The position Lucretius takes seems to be The theologians recognize the difficulty of
exactly opposite to that of Augustine and Aqui- reconciling providence and free will. The truth
nas. Lucretius condemns the fatalism of those must liesomewhere between two heresies. If
who believe that the gods control the order of it is heresy to deny God's omnipotence and
nature and who therefore attribute whatever omniscience, then nothing remains outside the
befalls them to divine ordination. For him, all-encompassing scope of divine providence,
"nature free at once and rid of her haughty nothing happens contrary to the divine will,
Thir maker, or thir making, or thir Fate; plies that "when it is increased to certainty,
As if Predestination over-rul'd freedom ceases, because that cannot be cer-
Thir will, dispos'd by absolute Decree tainly foreknown, which is not certain at the
Or high foreknowledge; they themselves decreed time; but if it be certain at the time, it is a
Thir own revolt, not I: if I foreknew,
Foreknowledge had no influence on their fault. contradiction to maintain that there can be
Which had no less prov'd certain unforeknown. afterwards any contingency dependent upon
So without least impulse or shadow of Fate, the exercise of will or anything else."
Or aught by me immutabUe foreseen. Against such difficulties Aquinas insists that
They trespass, Authors to themselves in all,
divine providence is compatible, not only with
Both what they judge and what they choose; for so
I formed them free, and free they must remain.
natural necessity, but also with contingency in
Till they enthrall themselves: I else must change nature and free will in human acts. Providence,
Thir nature, and revoke the high Decree he writes, "has prepared for some things neces-
Unchangeable, Eternal, which ordain'd
sary causes so that they happen of necessity; for
Thir freedom, they themselves ordain'd their fall.
others contingent causes, that they may happen
A solution of the problem is sometimes by contingency." Human liberty does not
developed from the distinction between God's imply that the will's acts are not caused by
foreknowledge and God's foreordination. God God who, being the first cause, "moves causes
foreordained the freedom of man, but only both natural and voluntary. Just as by moving
foreknew his fall; man ordained that himself. natural causes. He does not prevent their acts
Strictly speaking, however, the word "fore- being natural, so by moving voluntary causes.
knowledge" would seem to carry a false conno- He does not deprive their actions of being
tation, since nothing is future to God. Every- voluntary." God causes man to choose freely
thing that has ever happened or ever will is and freely to execute his choice.
simultaneously together in the eternal present
of the divine vision. The uncompromising conception of fate is
During his ascent through Paradise, Dante, that which leaves no place for chance or free-
wishing to learn about his immediate future, dom anywhere in the universe, neither in the
asks his ancestor Cacciaguida to foretell his acts of God, nor in the order of nature, nor in
fortune, for he, "gazing upon the Point to the course of history. The doctrine of absolute
which all times are present, can see contingent determinism, whether in theology, science, or
things, ere in themselves they are." Cacciaguida history, is thus fatafism unquafified.
prefaces his prediction of Dante's exile from The ancient historians are not fatalists in this
Florence by telling him that the contingency of sense. Herodotus, for example, finds much that
material things *'is all depicted in the Eternal can be explained by the contingencies of for-
Vision; yet thence it does not take necessity, tune or by the choices of men. The crucial de-
more than does a ship which is going down the cision, for example, in the defense of Athens
stream from the eye in which it is mirrored." is presented as an act of man's choice. Upon
The difference between time and eternity is receiving the prophecy that "safe shall the
conceived as permitting the temporal future wooden wall continue for thee and thy chil-
to be contingent even though God knows its dren," the Athenians exercise their freedom by
content with certitude. disagreeing about its meaning. "Certain of the
But, it may still be asked, does not God's old men," Herodotus writes, "were of the
knowledge imply the absolute predestination opinion that the god meant to tell them the
of future events by providence, since what God citadel would escape; for this was anciently
knows with certitude cannot happen otherwise defended by a palisade. Others maintained . . .
Chapter 27: FATE 519
that the fleet was what the god pointed at; and mind's freedom alone." But this development
their advice was that nothing should be thought and this freedom are entirely matters of neces-
of except the ships." Ihe eloquence of Themis- sity as far as individuals and their works are
tocles carried the latter view. To stress its im- concerned. "They are all the time the uncon-
portance, the historian observes that "the sav- scious toolsand organs of the world mind at
ing of Greece" lay in the decision that led work within them."
Athens to "become a maritime power." For Marx, history seems likewise to have the
In presenting a comparable decision by the same necessity. He deals with individuals, he
Persians, Herodotus seems to be contrasting writes in the preface to Capital, "only in so far
their fatalism with the freedom of the Greeks. as they are the personifications of economic
At first Xerxes accepts the council of Artabanus categories, embodiments of particular class-
not to go to war against the Greeks. But after relations and class-interests. My stand-point,"
a series of visions, which appear to both the he says, is one from which "the evolution of
king and his councillor, that decision is re- the economic formation of society is viewed as
versed, for, according to the dream, the war a process of natural history," and within which
"is fated to happen." the individual cannot be "responsible for rela-
The conception of fate and freedom in the tions whose creature he socially remains, how-
Aeneid seems closer to the Greek than to the ever much he may subjectively raise himself
Persian view. Even though the consummation above them." Here it is a question only "of
of history, which will come with the founding these laws themselves, of these tendencies
of the Roman empire, is projected as a divinely working with iron necessity towards inevitable
appointed destiny, the hero who brings that results."
great event to pass acts as if he were free to According to the historical determinism of
'
accept or evade his responsibilities. Hegel and Marx, which is further considered
The Christian understanding of historical in the chapter on History, men play a part
destiny in terms of providence permits — more which is already written for them in the scroll
than that, requires — men to exercise free choice of history. Human liberty apparently depends
I
at every turn. "The cause of the greatness of on man's knowledge of and acquiescence in the
the Roman empire," writes Augustine, "is nei- unfolding necessities.
ther fortuitous nor fatal, according to the judg-
ment or opinion of those who call those things Historical determinism is merely a part of
fortuitous which either have no causes or such the doctrine of a causal necessity which governs
causes as do not proceed from some intelligible all things. Causality seems to be understood by
order, and those things _/^/a/ which happen in- moderns like Spinoza, Hume, and Freud as ex-
dependently of the will of God and man, by cluding the possibility of chance or free will.
the necessity of a certain order. . . . Human Among the ancients, Plotinus alone seems to
kingdoms are established by divine provi- go as far as Spinoza in affirming the universal
dence." The fatalism which Augustine here reign of natural necessity. What Spinoza says
condemns involves independence not only of of God or Nature, Plotinus says of the All-One,
the will of God, but of man's will also. namely, that for the first principle which is the
It is only in modern times, with Hegel and cause of everything else, freedom consists in
Marx, that necessity reigns supreme in the being causa sui, or cause of itself — self-deter-
philosophy of history. Hegel spurns the notion mined rather than determined by external
that history is "a superficial play of casual, so- causes.
called 'merelyhuman' strivings and passions." "God does not act from freedom of the will,"
He also condemns those who "speak of Provi- Spinoza writes. Yet "God alone is a free cause,
dence and the plan of Providence" in a way for God alone exists and
. . . acts from the
that is "empty" of ideas since "for them the necessity of his own nature." As for everything
plan of Providence is inscrutable and incom- else in the universe, Spinoza maintains that
prehensible." For Hegel, history is "the nec- "thereis nothing contingent, but all things are
essary development, out of the concept of the determined from the necessity of the divine
520 THE GREAT IDEAS
nature to exist and act in a certain manner." dom and choice," he writes, is "quite unscien-
This applies to man, who, according to Spinoza, and it must give ground before the claims
tific,
does "everything by the will of God alone." of a determinism which governs even mental
From quite different premises, Hume seems life." He
thinks it can be shown on the basis of
to reach much the same conclusion concerning clinicalexperience that every psychic associa-
chance and "Chance," he writes,
liberty. tion "will be strictly determined by important
"when strictly is a mere negative
examined, inner attitudes of mind, which are unknown
word, and means not any real power which has moment when they operate, just as
to us at the
anywhere a being in nature." But he also thinks much unknown as are the disturbing tendencies
that liberty, "when opposed to necessity, not which cause errors, and those tendencies which
to constraint, is the same thing with chance." bring about so-called 'chance' actions."
Hume embraces the consequences of such a The fatahsm of what is often called "scien-
position. "If voluntary action be subjected to tific determinism" is that of Wind necessity.
the same laws of necessity with the operations It not only ehminates hberty and chance, but
of matter, there is a continued chain of neces- also purpose and the operation of final causes.
sary causes, pre-ordained and pre-determined, Every future event, in nature, history, or hu-
reaching from the original cause of all to every man behavior, is completely predetermined by
single volition of every human creature. No efficient causes — predetermined, but not pre-
contingency anywhere in the universe; no in- destined, for there is no guiding intelligence
the actions of men, without being the author of the things of nature divested of all intelli-
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
3. The antitheses of fate: fortune, freedom, natural necessity, chance or contingency 522
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Homer: Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 James Psychology, 1 16a-l 19b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
handsideof the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 Plato: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
Author's Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as part, bk, ch,
sect) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, bk ii [265-283I 12d.
Bible References: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g.. Old Testa-
ment: Nehemiah, 7:45— (D) // Esdras, 7:46.
Symbols: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
658] 119b; [843-861] 121c; bk xviii [97-126] 4 Homer: Iliad 3a-179d esp bk xv [47-77]
131a-c; BK XIX [74-94] 137d-138a; bk xxi 104c-d, bk xvi [843-861] 121c, bk xviii [52-
[81-84] 149a; bk xxii [131-223] 156c-157c / 137] 130c-131c, BK xxii [355-366] 159a, bk
Odyssey bk hi [225-239] 195b-c; bk xx [75]
y xxiv [522-532] 176d-177a / Odyssey, bk xviii
296d [124-150] 285b-c; bk xxii [412] 310a
5 Aeschylus: Suppliant Maidens [1032-1073] 5 Aeschylus: Suppliant Maidens [1032-1073]
14a,c / Prometheus Bound 40a-51d esp [507- 14a,c / Seven Against Thebes 27a-39a,c esp
521] 45a-b / Agamemnon [1018-1034] 63a [631-956] 34a-37d / Prometheus Bound [640-
5 Euripides: Alcestis 237a-247a,c esp [1-76] 886] 46d-49c / Agamemnon 52a-69d / Cho-
237a-238a, [213-243] 239a-b, [962-990] 245c ephoroe 70a-80d / Eumenides 81a-91d
/ Heracles Mad [1313-1357] 376c-d / Iphigenia 5 Sophocles: Oedipus the King 99a-113a,c /
Among the Tauri [1435-1499] 424a-d Oedipus at Colonus 114a-130a,c esp [939-999]
6 Herodotus: History, bk i, 20a-22a 123a-c / Antigone [944-987] 139a-c / Ajax
12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk i, ch 12 118d-120b [736-783] 149b-d; [925-935] 151a / Electra
12 Aurelius: Meditations, bk ii, sect 3 257a-b; 156a-169a,c / Philoctetes [13 16-1347] 193-d
sect 11 258a-b; bk hi, sect ii 262a-b; bk v, 194a
sect 8 269d-270b 5 Euripides: Rhesus [595-641] 208b-c / Alcestis
13 Virgil: Aeneid, bk i [1-33] 103a-104a; [261- 237a-247a,c esp [1-76] 237a-238a, [213-243]
262] 110a; bk II [428-433] 136a; bk hi [1-12] 239a-b, [962-990] 245c / Trojan Women [686-
147a; bk iv [440] 179a; [651] 185a; bk vii 705] 275d-276a / Electra 327a-339a,c / Bac-
[286-322] 243b-245a; bk x [100-117] 304b- chantes [i 327-1 392] 351b-352a,c / Heracles
305a; bk xi [108-119] 331a; bk xh [725-842] Mad [1311-1358] 376c-d / Phoefiician Maidens
373b-376b 378a-393d esp [1-87] 378a-379a, [867-928]
522 THE GREAT IDEAS 2/0 3
43 Mill: Representative Government, 347b-c
(2, The fated or inevitable in human life.) 47 Goethe: Faust, part ii [9695-9944] 235a-
385d-386b, [1595-1614]392a, [1758-1766] 241b esp [9908-9938] 241a-b
393d / Orestes [1-70] 394a-d; [807-843] 402c-d 48 Melville: Moby DicJ{, 4a-b; 120a-b; 396b-
/ Iphigenia Among the Tauri [482-489] 414d- 397a; 398a; 409b-410b
415a; [1435-1499] 424a-d 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk viii, 303d-304b;
6 Herodotus: History, bk i, 8a-10a; 20a-22a; BK 542d; 547a-549d; 553c-d; bk xih,
xii,
46c; BK II, 65b; 77a'b; bk hi, 98b-99a; 102d- 578b-582a esp 578d-579a
104b; BK IV, 153b-d; 155b-c; bk ix, 291b-c 54 Freud: Interpretation of Dreams, 246b-247c /
7 Plato: Apology, 210d / Republic, bk x, 437b- Geiteral Introduction, 581d-582a / Civilization
441a,c esp 439a-441a,c / Statesman, 587a-589c and Its Discontents, 796a-c
12 AuRELius: Meditations 253a-310d esp bk ii,
SECT 3 257a-b, sect 7 257c, bk hi, sect ii 3. The antitheses of fate: fortune, freedom, nat-
262a-b, BK IV, sect 33-35 266c-d, sect 44 ural necessity, chance or contingency
267b, BK V, sect 8 269d-270b, sect 19-20 7 Plato: Republic, bk x, 437b-441a,c esp 439a-
272a, sect 36 273d, bk vi, sect 8 274b, sect 441a,c / Statesman, 586c-589c
II 274c, SECT 20 276a, sect 39-40 277d, sect 8 Aristotle: Interpretation, ch 9 28a-29d /
50 279a-b, sect 58 279d, bk vii, sect 8 280b, Physics, BK II, CH 4-6 272c-275a / Metaphysics,
SECT 46 282c, SECT 54 283b, sect 58 283c-d, BK VI, CH 3 549c-d; bk ix, ch 5 573a-c
bk viii, sect 17 286d, sect 32 287d-288a, 9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk i, ch 9 345a-c; bk hi,
SECT35 288b, SECT 45-47 289a-c, sect 51 289d- CH 3 [1112^18-33] 358a-b
290a, bk IX, sect 41 295c, bk x, sect 3 296d, 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk ii [251-293]
sect 5-6 296d-297b, sect 25 299c, sect 33 18b-d
300c-301a, sect 35 301b, bk xii, sect 3 12 AuRELius: bk ii, sect 3-4
Meditations,
307b-d, SECT 11-14 308b-c 257a-b; bk hi, sect 262a-b; bk v, sect 8
ii
13 Virgil: Eclogues, iv 14a-15b / Aeneid, bk i 269d-270b; sect 36 273d; bk vi, sect 40
[1-33] 103a-104a; [204-207] 108b; [223-304] 277d; bk xii, sect 14 308c
109a-llla; bk hi [356-462] 157a-160a; bk 15 Tacitus: Annals, bk iv, 68a; bk vi, 91b-d
IV [218-396] 173a-178a; bk vi [752-901] 17 Plotinus: Third Ennead, tr i 78a-82b /
231a-235a; bk viii [520-540] 273a-b; bk ix Fourth Ennead, tr hi, ch 16 150c-d
[77-122] 281a-282a; bk x [100-117] 304b- 18 Augustine: City of God, bk v, ch i 207d-
305a; [621-632] 319a-b; bk xi [108-119] 331a; 208c; CH 8-10 212c-216c
bk XII [133-150] 357b-358a 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 116
14 Plutarch: Romulus, 20b-c / Camillus,\^lh-6. 592d-595c
I Aemilius Paulus, 225a-c; 228c-229c / Sulla, 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, purgatory, xvi
370c-371b / Caesar, 600a-604d / Marcus Bru- [52-84] 77b-c
tus, 814d-815c; 822a-b 23 HoBBEs: Leviathan, part ii, 163d-164a
15 Tacitus: Annals, bk hi, 49c; bk vi, 91b-d / 26 Shakespeare: Julius Caesar, act i, sc ii
Histories, bk i, 191d; 194b [135-141] 570d; ACT IV, sc iii [215-224] 590d
17 Plotinus Third Ennead, tr i 78a-82b
: 27 Shakespeare: Hamlet, act hi, sc h [220-
22 Chaucer: Troilus and Cressida, bk hi, stanza 223] 51b
89 66a; bk iv, stanza 137-155 106b-108b / 31 Descartes: Discourse, part hi, 49b-d
Knighfs Tale 174a-211a esp [1081-1111] 177b- 31 Spinoza: Ethics, part ii, prop 49, schol,
178a, [1251-1267] 180b, [1663-1672] 187b, 394c
[3027-3066] 209b-210a / Tale of Man of Law 32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk vii [170-173] 220b-
[4610-4623] 237b; [4701-4735] 239a-240a / 221a
MonI(s Prologue 432a-434a / MonI(s Tale 34 Newton: Optics, bk hi, 542b
434a-448b 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk i, la-b
24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, bk iv, 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 45b-c; 133a; 140b,d-143a;
258c-259d 146a-c; 147b; 164a-171a; 205b-209b / Fund.
25 Montaigne: Essays, 214a-c; 342a-d Prin. Metaphy sic of Morals, 264d-265a; 275b;
26 Shakespeare: Romeo and Juliet, prologue 279b,d-287d esp 281c-283d / Practical Reason,
285a-b; act i, sc iv [106-113] 291d / ]uliiis 291a-293b; 296a-d; 301d-302d; 304a-d; 307d-
Caesar, act ii, sc ii [1-107] 578a-579b 314d; 319c-321b; 331c-337a,c / Intro. Meta-
27 Shakespeare: Hamlet, act v, sc ii [4-48] physic of Morals, 386d-387a,c; 390b / Judge-
68a-b / King Lear, act i, sc ii [i 12-166] ment, 463a-467a; 571c-572a; 587a-588a
249a-c; act iv, sc hi [34-37] 272a / Macbeth 44 Boswell: Johnson, 549c
284a-310d esp act i, sc hi 285b-287b / Cym- 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 340
beline, act v, sc iv [30-122] 481c-482b llOb-c; par 342-344 llOc-llla / Philosophy of
36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 194b-195a; 202b- History, intro, 160c-165b; 166b-168a; part
208b;502b-503a IV, 368d-369a,c
37 Fielding: Tom Jo7ies, 275d-276a; 310b 48 Melville : Moby Dic{, 158b-159a
^ to 5 Chapter 27: FATE 523
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk ix, 342a-344b; 35 Ih'ME Human Understanding, sect viii, div
:
33:10-13
New Testament: Matthew, 22:1-14 / John, 5. The secularization of fate: scientific or philo-
6:22-71 esp 6:40, 6:44-45, 6:64-65 (D) — sophical determinism
John, 6:22-72 esp 6:40, 6:44-45, 6:65-66 / 7 Plato: bk x, 437b-441a,c esp 439a-441a,c
Acts, 17:24-27 / Romans, 8:28-11:36 / // Co- 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk ii [184-307]
rinthians,3-4 / Galatians, 4:4-6 / Ephesians, 17b-19a esp [251-293] 18b-d; bk v [55-58] 61d
1:4-2:10; 4:1-16 esp 4:7, 4:11 / Philippians, 12 Aurelius: Meditations, bk v, sect 8 269d-
2:12-15 /James, 4:13-15 / 1 Peter, 1:1-5 270b
12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk i, ch 12 118d- 17 Plotinus: Third Ennead, tr i 78a-82b /
120b; CH 17 122d-124a; bk ii, ch 16 156b- Fourth Ennead, tr hi, ch 16 150c-d
158d; bk III, CH 22 195a-201a; bk iv, ch i 31 Spinoza: Ethics, part i, def 6-7 355b; axiom
213a-223d; ch 3 224b-d; ch 7 232c-235a 3 355d; prop 17, schol 362c-363c; prop 25-
I 12 Aurelius: Meditations, bk hi, sect ii 262a-b; 29 365b-366c; prop 32-APPENDix 367a-372d;
BK VI, SECT 44 278b-c part II, PROP 48 391a-c; prop 49, schol,
17 Plotinus Fowr//j Ennead, tr hi, ch 16 150c-d
: 394b-c
18 Augustine: City of God, bk v, ch i 207d- 34 Newton: Optics, bk hi, 542b
208c; ch 8-10 212c-216c; ch 15-16 220d- 35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, sect 93
221b; BK XV, CH i 397b,d-398c; bk xxi, ch 12 431b
571a-c; bk xxii, ch 1-2 586b,d-588a 35 Hume: Human Understanding, sect viii 478b-
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, qq 23- 487a passim
24 132b-143c; q 116 592d-595c 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 140b,d-143a; 164a-171a /
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, hell, vii [61-96] Judgement, 463a-467a; 575b-578a
lOb-c; purgatory, xvi [52-84] 77b-c; para- 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 342-
dise, I [94-142] 107b-d; IV [49-63] 111b; 348 llOc-llld / Philosophy of History, intro,
vin [91-148] 117d-118c; xvii [13-45] 132b-c; 156d-190b esp 156d-158a, 161d-162a; 203a-
XX [31-141] 137a-138a 206a,c
22 Chaucer: Troilus and Cressida, bk iv, stanza 50 Marx: Capital, 6d; 7c; lOb-lld; 35b-c; 36c-d
137-154 106b-108b [fn2];378b-desp378d
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part ii, 113b-c 50 Marx-Engels: Communist Manifesto, 416c-d
25 Montaigne: Essays, 254b-d; 342a-c 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, epilogue ii 675a-
29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, part ii, 408b-c 696d
30 Bacon: Novum Organum, bk i, aph 93 125d- 53 James: Psychology, 291a'295b; 820b-825a esp
126a 823a-825a
31 Descartes: Objections and Replies, 141b 54 Freud: Origin and Development of Psycho-
32 Milton: Paradise Lost 93a-333a esp bk i Analysis, 13c / Interpretation of Dreams, 246b-
[1-26] 93b-94a, bk hi [80-134] 137a-138a, bk 247c / Generallntroduction, 454b-c;486d-487a;
v [224-245] 180a-b, [506-543] 186a-187a, bk 581d-582a / Beyond the Pleasure Principle,
VII [139-173] 220a-221a / Samson Agonistes 645b-646a / Civilization and Its Discontents,
[373-419] 347b-348b; [667-709] 354a-355a / 772b-c; 796a-c; 801c-802a,c / New Introduc-
Areopagitica, 394b-395b tory Lectures, 882c-883d
524 THE GREAT IDEAS
25 Montaigne: Essays, 214a-d; 462c-465c pas-
6. The historian's recognition of fate: the des- sim
tiny of cities, nations, empires 43 Federalist: number 2, 31c-d
6 Herodotus: History, bk vii, 214d-220b esp 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 340-
218b-220b; 239a-240d; bk viii, 262b-c 360 110b-114a,c esp par 342-343 llOc-Ula,
7 Plato: Republic, bk viii, 403a-d par 347 lllb-c / Philosophy of History, intro,
13 Virgil: Eclogues, iv 14a-15b / Aeneid, bk i 156d-190b esp 158c-162a; 203a-206a,c; part i,
[441-493] li5a-116b; bk vi [752-901] 231a- 241d-242b; 258b-d; part ii, 278a-c; 280b-
235a; bk viii [608-731] 275a-278b; bk x 281b; 283d-284a,c; part hi, 285b-d; 300a-
[100-117] 304b-305a; bk xii [725-842] 373b- 301c; 303c-306a; part iv, 315a; 368d-369a,c
376b 50 Marx: Capital, 6c-7d passim; 377c-378d
14 Plutarch: Rofnulus, 18d; 20b-c / Camillus, 50 Marx-Engels: Communist Manifesto, 416c-d;
107b-d; 109c-110a / Philopoemen, 300b / 421d-422c;424d-425b
Alexander, 555c / Demosthenes, 698b-c / 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk ix, 342a-344b;
Marcus Brutus, 815c bk X, 389a-391c; bk xi, 469a-472b; bk xiii-
15 Tacitus: Aniials, bk hi, 58b-d; bk vi, 91b-d XIV, 563a-590c; bk xiv, 609a-613d; bk xv,
/ Histories, bk i, 189b-190a; bk ii, 232d 618b-621b; 626d-630a; epilogue i, 645a-
IS Augustine: City of God, bk v 207b,d-230a,c 650c; epilogue ii 675a-696d
esp CH I 207d-208c, ch 12 216d-219b, ch 15 54 Freud: New Introductory Lectures, 882c-
220d-221a 883c
CWSS-KEFEKENCES
For: The basic opposites of fate, see Chance la-ib, 2a; History 43(1); Will 5-53(4), 5c; and
for other terms in which the opposition between fate and chance is expressed, see Neces-
AND Contingency 3.
sity
The problem of human hberty in relation to fate, see Liberty 4b; Necessity and
Contingency 53(3); Will 5c.
The implications of f3te in theology, or for the relation of human liberty to divine provi-
dence, see Cause 7c; God ic, 7b; History 5a; Liberty 5a-5c; Will 7c.
The foretelling of f3te or providence, see Prophecy la-ib; 3nd for the condemnstion of
astrology and divination, see Prophecy 5.
Fatalism or determinism in the philosophy of nature, see Chance 2a; Nature 3c—3c(3);
Will 5c; World ib.
The same doctrine in the philosophy of history, y^d* History 4a(i)-4a(4); Necessity and
Contingency 5f; Will 7b.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Boo\s of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
—
Voltaire. Zadig
Candide .
INTRODUCTION
THE great philosophical issues concerning
form and matter have never been resolved.
opposed on issues which represent
the whole, of the great traditional controversy
part, if not
But the terms in which these issues were stated, between Plato and Aristotle concerning form.
from their first formulation in antiquity to the
17th or 1 8th centuries, have disappeared or at There is a tendency among the historians of
least do not have general currency in contem- thought to use the names of Plato and Aristotle
porary discourse. Kant is perhaps the last great to symbolize a basic opposition in philosophical
philosopher to include these terms in his basic perspectives and methods, or even in what Wil-
vocabulary. The conceptions of matter and liam James calls "intellectual temperaments."
form, he writes, "lie at the foundation of all Later writers are called "Platonists" or "Aris-
other reflection, so inseparably are they con- totelians" and doctrines or theories are classified
nected with every mode of exercising the un- as Platonic or Aristotelian. It almost seems to
derstanding. The former denotes the determin- be assumed at times that these names exhaust
able in general, the second its determination." the typical possibilities: that minds or theories
The word "form" is no longer a pivotal term must be one or the other, or some sort of mix-
in the analysis of change or motion, nor in the ture or confusion of the two.
distinction between being and becoming, nor If this tendency is ever justified, it seems to
in the consideration of themodes of being and be warranted with regard to the problems of
the conditions of knowledge. The word "mat- form. Here, if anywhere, there may be poetic
ter" is now used without reference to form, truth in Whitehead's remark that the history
where earlier in the tradition all of its principal of western thought can be read as a series of
meanings involved "form" as a correlative or an footnotes to Plato; though perhaps the observa-
opposite. Other words, such as "participation" tion should be added that Aristotle, the first
and "imitation," have also fallen into disuse to comment on Plato, wrote many of the
or lost the meanings which derived from their principal footnotes. In Plotinus the two strains
relation to form and matter. seem to be intermingled. The issue between
The problems which these words were used Plato and Aristotle concerning form dominates
to state and discuss remain active in contem- the great metaphysical and theological contro-
porary thought. There is, for instance, the versies of the later Middle Ages, and, with some
problem of the universal and the particular, the alterations in language and thought, it appears
problem of the immutable and the mutable, the in the writings of Hobbes, Bacon, Descartes,
problem of the one and the many, or of same- Spinoza, and Locke, where it is partly a con-
ness and diversity. These problems appear in tinuation of, and partly a reaction against, the
the writings of William James and Bergson, mediaeval versions of Platonic and Aristotelian
Dewey and Santayana, Whitehead and Russell. doctrine.
Sometimes there is even a verbal approximation The most extreme reaction is, of course, to
to the traditional formulation, as in White- be found in those who completely reject the
head's doctrine of "eternal objects" or in San- term form or its equivalents as being without
tayana's consideration of the "realm of essence" significance for the problems of motion, exist-
and the "realm of matter." Whatever expres- ence, or knowledge. Bacon retains the term,
sions they use, these thinkers find themselves but radically changes its meaning. "None should
526
Chapter 28: FORM 527
suppose from the great part assigned by us to cliaptcron Mattf.r. Here we are concerned
forms," Bacon writes, "tliat we mean such with the issues arising from dilTercnt views of
forms as the meditations and thoughts of men form and its relation to matter.
have hitherto been accustomed to." He does
not mean either *'the concrete forms" or "any The popular meaning of "form" affords an ap-
abstract forms of ideas," but rather "the laws proach to the subtleties of the subject. As ordi-
and regulations of simple action. The form . . . narily used, "form" connotes figure or sliape.
of heat or form of light, therefore, means no That connotation expresses one aspect of the
more than the law of heat or the law of light." technical significance of "form." A great variety
But Hobbes and Locke tend to reject the term of things, differing materially and in other re-
itself — especially when it occurs in the notion have the same figure or shape. The
spects, can
the way by having their minds set upon fruit- have the same form, as may an indefinite num-
less inquiries after 'substantial forms'
"
— a sub- ber of other statements.
ject which Locke regards as "wholly unintelli- This illustration helps us to grasp the mean-
gible." The general skepticism about this no- ing of form, and the distinction between form
tion (or the distrust of its hollowness) in the and matter, or the formal and the material
17th and 1 8th centuries is reflected in a banter- aspects of anything. It is thus that we under-
ing remark by Tristram Shandy's father. In a stand the phrase "formal logic" to signify a
discussion of infant prodigies, he refers to some study of the forms of thought or discourse, sep-
boy- wonders who "left off their substantial arated from the subject matter being thought
forms at nine years old, or sooner, and went on about or discussed. Similarly, abstractionism or
reasoning without them." surrealism is a kind of formalism in painting
Since form and matter are supposed to be which tries to separate visible patterns or struc-
correlative, the denial to form of meaning or tures from their representative significance or
reality leads to materialism, as in the case of their reference to familiar objects.
Hobbes — the affirmation of matter alone as a Kant's doctrine of space and time as tran-
principle or cause. Materialists of one sort or scendental forms of intuition exemplifies the
another are the opponents of both Plato and meaning of form as pure order or structure di-
Aristotle, and of Platonists and Aristotelians. vorced from sensuous content. "That which in
That part of the controversy is discussed in the the phenomenon corresponds to the sensation,
— —
perceive in any way, we must have had a vides each of the two parts. The realm of be-
knowledge of absolute equality, or we could coming divides into images or shadows and into
not have referred to that standard the equals that "of which this is only the resemblance,"
which are derived from the senses." The equal- namely, "the animals which we see, and every-
ity which supplies the "standard" by which thing that grows or is made." The realm of in-
material equals are measured is the Form or telligible being he also subdivides into two
else," Socrates holds, the "Ideas or essences, From this it appears that just as we should
which in the dialectical process we define as . . . regard the form of the thing as an imitation of,
true existences . . . are each of them always or participation in, the separate Form, so should
iM
I
we regard the idea we have (that is, our under- between sensible particulars and the Ideas or
standing of the thing) as an approximation of Forms, Parmenidcs tells him that "there arc
the Idea. The Ideas are outside the human mind certain ideas oi \\hich all other things partake,
even as the Forms are separate from their sen- and from which they derive their names; that
sible, material imitations. When we apprehend similars, for example, become similar, because
things by reason we know
the Forms they imi- they partake of similarity; and great things be-
tate;when we apprehend them by our senses come great, because they partake of greatness;
we know them as imitations, or as images of the and that just and beautiful things become just
Ideas. and beautiful, because they partake of justice
and beauty." The Forms or Ideas are, Parmeni-
The Platonic theory changes the ordinary des suggests, "patterns fixed in nature, and
meaning of the word "imitation." We ordi- other things are like them, and resemblances of
narily think of imitation as involving a relation them — what is meant by the participation of
of resemblance between two sensible things, other things in the ideas, is really assimilation
both of which we are able to perceive; for ex- to them."
ample, v/e say that a child imitates his father's The fact of particularity and multiplicity
manner, or that a portrait resembles the person seems to be inseparable from the fact of partic-
who posed for it. The painter, according to ipation. That in which the many particulars
Socrates in the Republic, is not the only "crea- participate must, on the other hand, have uni-
tor of appearances." He compares the painter versality and imity. The Forms or Ideas are
who pictures a bed with the carpenter who universals in the sense that eachis a one which
our view, is the essence of the bed." The car- the many." When Socrates unhesitatingly says
penter "cannot make true existence, but only Yes, Parmenides points out to him that we then
some semblance of existence." As the bed in confront the difficulty that "one and the same
^
the picture is an imitation of the particular bed thing will exist as a whole at the same time in
made by the carpenter, so the latter is an imita- many separate individuals" and that "the ideas
tion of the Idea —
the essential bed-ness which is themselves will be divisible, and things which
the model or archetype of all particular beds. participate in them will have a part of them
Shifting to another example, we can say that only and not the whole idea existing in each of
a statue, which resembles a particular man, is them." Nor can we say, Socrates is made to
the imitation of an imitation, for the primary that "the one idea is really divisible
realize,
imitation lies in the resemblance between the and yet remains one."
particular man portrayed and the Form or Idea,
Man. Just as the statue derives its distinctive This difficulty concerning the relation of par-
character from the particular man it imitates, ticulars to the Ideas they participate in, is dis-
so that particular man, or any other, derives cussed in the chapter on Universal and Par-
his manhood or humanity from Man. Just as ticular. It is not the only difficulty which
the particular man imitates Man, so our idea Plato himself finds in the theory of Ideas. An-
of Man is also an imitation of that Idea. Knowl- other concerns the individuality of each of the
edge, according to Plato, consists in the imita- indefinite number of particulars which copy a
tion of Ideas, even as sensible, material things single model or archetype. What makes the
have whatever being they have by imitation of various copies of the same model different from
the true beings, the Forms. one another?
Another name for the primary type of imita- Plato meets this problem by adding a third
tion is "participation." To participate in is to principle. To the intelligible patterns or arche-
partake of. In the dialogue in which Plato has types and their sensible imitations, he adds, in
the young Socrates inquiring into the relation the Timaeus, the principle which is variously
530 THE GREAT IDEAS
named, sometimes "the receptacle," sometimes The criticism of the Forms or Ideas which
"space," sometimes "matter." However named, we find in the writings of Aristotle is primarily
it is the absolutely formless, for "that which is directed against their separate existence. "Plato
to receive all Forms should have no form. . . . was not far wrong," Aristotle says, "when he
The mother and receptacle of all visible and in said that there are as many Forms as there are
any way sensible things ... is an invisible and kinds of natural object"; but he immediately
formless being which receives all things and in adds the qualification: "if there are Forms dis-
some mysterious way partakes of the intelli- tinct from the things of this earth." It is pre-
gible, and is most incomprehensible." cisely that supposition which Aristotle chal-
It is this material or receiving principle which lenges.
somehow accounts for the numerical plurality Aristotle's criticism of Plato stems from his
and the particularization of the many copies own notion of substance, and especially from
of the one absolute model. When a number of his conception of sensible substances as com-
replicas of the same pattern are produced by posed of matter and form. He uses the word
impressing a die on a sheet of plastic material "substance" to signify that which exists in and
at different places, it is the difference in the of itself; or, in other words, that which exists
material at the several places which accounts separately from other things. Hence, when he
for the pluralityand particularity of the rep- says that, in addition to sensible substances,
licas.Yet the one die is responsible for the "Plato posited two kinds of substances — the
character common to them all. Forms and the objects of mathematics," he is
The sensible things of any one sort are not translating the affirmation that the Forms have
only particular because the Form they imitate being separately from the sensible world of
is somehow received in matter; they are also changing things, into an assertion that they are
perishable because of that fact. The receptacle substances.
is the principle of generation or of change. It is, "Socrates did not make the universals or the
Timaeus says, "the natural recipient of all im- definitions exist apart," Aristotle writes; but
pressions," which is "stirred and informed by referring to the Platonists, he says, ''they, how-
them, and appears different from time to time ever, gave them separate existence, and this
by reason of them, but the forms which enter was the kind of thing they called Ideas." What
into and go out of her are the likenesses of real proof is there, he repeatedly asks, for the sepa-
existences modelled after their patterns in a rate existence of the Forms, or universals, or
wonderful and inexplicable manner." the objects of mathematics.? "Of the various
Matter, as Plato here suggests, mother
is the ways in which it isproved that the Forms
of changing things, things which, between com- exist," he declares, "none is convincing." Fur-
ing to be and passing away, are what they are thermore, he objects to the statement that "all
because of the unchanging Forms. The Form other things come from the Forms"; for "to
which is received in matter for a time makes say that they are patterns and the other things
the changing thing an imitation, as the matter share in them is to use empty words and poeti-
in which the Form is received makes the chang- cal metaphors." There is the additional diffi-
ing thing a participation. culty, he thinks, that "there will be several pat-
The admittedly mysterious partaking of the terns of the same thing, and therefore several
Forms by the formless receptacle constitutes Forms; e.g., 'animal' and 'two-footed' and also
the realm of becoming, in which being and 'man himself will be Forms of man."
non-being are mixed. But the Forms or Ideas Aristotle's denial of separate existence, or
themselves, existing apart from their sensible substantiality, to the Ideas or universals stands
imitations, are "uncreated and indestructible, side by side with his affirmation of the place of
never receiving anything from without, nor forms in the being of substances and the role of
going out to any other, but invisible and im- universals in the order of knowledge. Further-
perceptible by any sense." They constitute the more, he limits his denial of the substantiafity
realm of pure being. They are the intelligible of Ideas to those Forms which seem to be the
reality. archetypes or models of sensible things. Par-
Chapter 28: FORM 5Jl
ticular physical things— familiar sensible sub- alone. If there were
form existing apart from
a
stances, such as the stone, the tree, or the man both matter and mind, it would be neither an
— are not, in his opinion, imitations of or par- inchvidual form nor an abstract universal.
models which exist apart
ticipations in universal The indwcHing forms, according to Aristotle,
from these things. He leaves it an open question arc not universals. I^xcept for the possibility of
whether there are self-subsistent Forms or Ideas Forms which dwell apart and bear no resem-
— that is, purely intelligible substances — which blance at all to sensible things, all forms are
do not function as the models for sensible things either in matter or, abstracted from matter, in
to imitate. the human mind. These are often called "ma-
Stated positively, the Aristotelian theory terialforms" because they are the forms which
consists in two affirmations. The first is that the matter takes or can take, and which the mind
determined by "in-
characteristics of things are abstracts from matter. Their being consists in
dwelling forms," which have their being not informing or determining matter, just as the
apart from but in the things themselves. To being of matter consists in the capacity to re-
illustrate his meaning he turns to the realm of ceive these forms and to be determined by
art. When we make a brass sphere, he writes, them.
"we bring the form," which is a sphere, "into
this particular matter," the brass, and "the re- The foregoing helps to explain Aristotle's use
sult is a brazen sphere." no "sphere There is of the word "composite" as a synonym for "sub-
apart from the individual spheres," and no stance" when he is considering particular sensi-
brass apart from the particular lumps of metal ble things. The independently existing, indi-
that are brass. "The 'form' means the *such,' vidual physical things which Aristotle calls
—
and is not a 'this' a definite thing," such as "substances" are all composite of form and mat-
this individual brazen sphere. ter. He sometimes also calls form and matter
Aristotle analyzes natural things in the same "substances," but when he uses the word "sub-
manner. It is from "the indwelling form and stance" strictly and in its primary sense, he
the matter," he says, that "the concrete sub- applies it only to the concrete individual. Form
stance is derived." Men such as Callias or Soc- and matter are only principles or constituents
rates, for example, consist of "such and such of the concrete thing — the composite substance.
a form in this flesh and in these bones," and The union of form and matter to constitute
"they are different in virtue of their matter physical substances also explains the Aristo-
(for that is different) but the same in form." telian identification of form with actuality and
The flesh and bones of Callias are not the flesh of matter with potentiality; and the relation of
and bones of Socrates; but though different as form and matter to a third term in the analysis
individual men, they are the same as men be- of change, namely, privation. As a physical thing
cause they have the same form. changes, its matter gives up one form to take on
The second point is that our understanding another. Its matter thus represents its capacity
of things involves the forms of things, but now or potentiality for form. Matter is the formable
somehow in the intellect rather than in the aspect of changing things. What things are
things themselves. In order to know things, actually atany moment is due to the forms they
Aristotle says, we must have within us "either possess. But they may have the potentiaUty for
the things themselves or their forms. The acquiring other forms, with respect to which
former alternative is of course impossible: it is they are in privation.
not the stone which is present in the soul," he "The mutability of mutable things," Augus-
maintains, "but its form." tine writes, "is simply their capacity for all the
The form in the thing is as individual as the forms into which mutable things can be
thing But in the mind, as the result of the
itself. changed." Change consists in a transformation
intellect's power to abstract this form from its oi matter, which is another way of saying that it
matter, the form becomes a universal; it is then consists in the actualization of a thing's poten-
called by Aristotle an "idea," "abstraction," or tialities. The Aristotelian theory of form and
"concept." Forms are universals in the mind matter is a theory of becoming as well asan
552 THE GREAT IDEAS
analysis of the being of changing things. Illus- partly actualized and partly potential, and in-
trative applications of this theory will be found volved in accidental change. "Primary mat-
in the chapters on Art, Cause, and Change. ter," Aquinas explains, "has substantial being
Some forms are sensible. Some are shapes, through its form. ... But when once it exists
some are qualities, some are quantities. But not under one form it is in potentiality to others."
all forms are perceptible by the senses; as, for Perhaps one more distinction should be men-
example, the form which matter takes when a tioned because of its significance for later dis-
plant or animal is generated and which gives cussions of form. Regarding living and non-
the generated thing its specific nature. This living things as essentially distinct, Aristotle
type of form came to be called a "substantial between the forms constituting
differentiates
form" because it determines the kind of sub- thesetwo kinds of substances. As appears in the
stance which the thing is. In contrast, the forms chapter on Soul, he uses the word "soul" to
which determine the properties or attributes of name the substantial form of plants, animals,
a thing are called its "accidents" or "accidental and men.
forms." For example, size and shape, color and
weight, are accidental forms of a man; whereas Both the Platonic theory of the separate
that by virtue of which this thing {having a Forms and the Aristotelian theory of the com-
certain size, shape, and color) is a man, is its position of form and matter raise difficulties
substantial form. which their authors consider and which become
Aristotle's distinction between substantial the subject of intense controversy among Pla-
and accidental form affects his analysis of tonists and Aristotelians in the Hellenistic and
change and his conception of matter. Genera- mediaeval periods.
tion and corruption are for him substantial The Platonic theory faces a question which
change, change in which matter undergoes arisesfrom supposing the existence of an eternal
transformation with respect to its substantial and immutable Form for every appearance in
form. The various types of motion — alteration, the sensible world of becoming. If the Idea and
increase or decrease, and local motion — are the individual are alike, then "some further
changes which take place in enduring sub- idea of likeness will always be coming to light,"
stances, and with respect to their accidental Parmenides says to Socrates; "and if that be
forms. like anything else, then another; and new
The substratum of accidental change is not ideas will be always arising, if the idea resembles
formless matter, but matter having a certain that which partakes of it." Because of this dif-
substantial form; whereas in the coming to be ficulty with the doctrine of participation,
away of
or passing substances, the substratum Parmenides suggests that it may be necessary
would seem to be a primary sort of matter, to conclude that "the Idea cannot be like the
devoid of all form. As indicated in the chapter individual or the individual like the Idea." In
on Matter, this, according to Aristotle, is "the addition, the relationships of the Forms to one
primary substratum of each thing, from which another presents a difficulty. Is the relation of
it comes to be without qualification, and which one Form to another, Parmenides asks, de-
persists in the result." He tries to help us grasp termined by the essence of each Form, or by
prime matter by using an analogy. "As the the relationships among the sensible particulars
bronze is to the statue, the wood to the bed," that imitate the Forms in question? Either
he writes, "so is the underlying nature to sub- solution seems to be unsatisfactory because of
stance" — matter absolutely formless to sub- the further difficulties which both raise.
stantial form. Yet, after propounding questions of this sort,
Aristotle sometimes speaks of the substantial and multiplying difficulties, Parmenides con-
form as a first act or actuafity, and of accidental cludes by telling Socrates why the theory of
forms as second actualities. Accordingly he also Ideas cannot be given up. "If a man, fixing his
distinguishes between a primary and secondary attention on these and like difficulties," he
kind of matter— the one absolutely potential, says, "does away with the Forms of things and
and underlying substantial change; the other will not admit that every individual thing has
Chapter 28: FORM 533
its own determinate Idea which is always one knowledge and defniition. The defniiiion which
and the same, he will have nothing on which the mind Jormulales attempts to state llie es-
his mind can rest; and so he will utterly destroy sence of the thing dehned. i'hc formulablc es-
the power of reasoning." sence ot a thing would seem to Ix* identical with
The Aristotelian theory has difficulties of its its form. But Aristotle raises the (jucstion and
own with respect to the ultimate character of his lollowers debate at length whether the es-
matter apart from all forms. Completely form- sence ol a composite substance is identical with
less matter would be pure potentiality and its substantial form or includes its matter as
would therefore have no actual being. It would well.
be completely unintelligible, since form is the Among
his followers Aquinas maintains that,
and order of the various forms which matter what the definition signifies, and in natural
can take. The question is whether matter must things the definition does not signify the form
have a substantial form before it can have any only, but the form and the matter. Hence in
accidental form; and whether it can have a natural things the matter is part of the species;
second substantial form in addition to a first, or not, indeed, signate matter, which is the prin-
is limited to having a single substantial form, ciple of individuation, but common matter."
all subsequent forms necessarily being acci- He explains in another place that "matter is
Aquinas plainly argues in favor of the unity common, such and bone; individual,
as flesh
one," he maintains, "except by one form, by the universal concept man, for example, the
which a thing has being; because a thing has intellect abstracts the notion of the species
both being and unity from the same source, "from this flesh and these bones, which do not
and therefore things which are denominated by belong to the species as such, but to the indi-
various forms are not absolutely one; as, for vidual. ... But the species of man cannot be ab-
instance, a white man. If, therefore," Aquinas stracted by the intellect horn flesh and bones.''
continues, "man were living by one form, the As will be seen in the chapters on One
vegetative soul, and animal by another form, AND Many and Universal and Particular,
the sensitive soul, and man by another form, the Platonic and the Aristotelian theories of
the intellectual soul, it would follow that man form are equally involved in the great prob-
isnot absolutely one. We must, therefore,
. . . lem of the universal and the individual. Even
conclude," he says, "that the intellectual soul, though they seem to be diametrically opposed
the sensitive soul, and the nutritive soul are in on the existence of universals whether apart —
man numerically one and the same soul." In —
from or only in minds both Plato and Aris-
other words, "of one thing there is but one sub- totle face the necessity of explaining individu-
stantial form." It is not only "impossible that ality. What makes the particular that imitates
there be in man another substantial form be- a universal Form the unique individual it is.?
sides the intellectual soul," but there is also no What makes the indwelling form of a composite
need of any other, because "the intellectual substance an individual form, as unique as the
soul contains virtually whatever belongs to the individual substance of which it is the form?
sensitive soul of brute animals and the nutritive We have already noted that both Platonists
soul of plants." and Aristotelians appeal to matter as somehow
The Aristotelian theory also has difficulties responsible for individuation or individuality,
with respect to substantial forms as objects of but that only raises further questions. The
— —
individuality of forms and substances; but it by denying that they could exist outside the
has been argued that this only begs the ques- divine mind. The divine ideas are the eternal
tion rather than solves it. exemplars and the eternal types types, Aqui-
nas explains, insofar as they are the likenesses of
The correlative terms form and matter seem things and so the principles of God's knowl-
to occur in modern thought under the guise of edge; exemplars insofar as they are "the princi-
certain equivalents; as, for example, the distinct ples of the making of things" in God's act of
substances which Descartes calls "thought" and creation.
"extension" res cogitans and res extensa — or The profound mystery of the creative act
the infinite attributes of substance which which projects the divine ideas into substantial
Spinoza calls "mind" and "body." They ap- or material being replaces the older problem of
pear more explicitly in Kant's analysis of knowl- how physical things derive their natures by
edge, related as the a priori and the a posteriori participation in the Forms. According to the
elements of experience. But it is in the great Aristotelian theory, both natural generation
theological speculations of the Middle Ages and artistic production involve the transforma-
that the most explicit and extended use of tion of a pre-existent matter. According to the
these terms made, often with new interpreta-
is Platonic myth of the world's origin, only
tions placed on ancient theories. changing things are created, neither the recep-
The doctrine of spiritual substances, for ex- tacle nor the Ideas. But the Christian dogma of
ample, has a bearing on the theory of self- creation excludes everything from eternity ex-
subsistent Forms. The angels are sometimes cept God.
called "separate forms" by the theologians. Ideas are eternal only as inseparable from
They are conceived as immaterial substances, the divine mind. Being spiritual creatures, the
and hence as simple rather than composite. But angels, or self-subsistent forms, are not eternal.
though Plotinus identifies the order of purely And in the world of corporeal creatures, mat-
intelHgible beings with the pure intelligences, ter as well as its forms must begin to be with
the Christian theologian does no^identify the the creation of things. Since matter and its
Platonic Ideas with the angels. He regards the forms cannot exist in separation from one an-
angels as intelligences. They exist as pure forms, other, the theologians hold that God cannot
and therefore are intelligible as well as intellec- create them separately. God cannot be sup-
tual substances. But they are in no sense the posed, Augustine says, "first to have made
archetypes or models which sensible things re- formless matter, and after an interval of time,
semble. formed what He had first made formless; but,"
Nevertheless, Christian theology does in- he goes on, "as intelligible sounds are made by
clude that aspect of the Platonic theory which a speaker,wherein the sound issues not formless
looks upon the Ideas as the eternal models or at firstand afterwards receives a form, but is
patterns. But, as Aquinas points out, the sepa- uttered already formed; so must God be under-
rately existing Forms are replaced by what stood to have made the world of formless mat-
Augustine calls "the exemplars existing in the ter, but contemporaneously to have created
divine mind." the world " God "concreates" form and matter,
Aquinas remarks on the fact that "whenever Augustine holds, "giving form to matter's
Augustine, who was imbued with the doctrines formlessness without any interval of time."
of the Platonists, found in their teaching any- Defending Augustine's interpretation of the
tliing consistent with faith, he adopted it; and passage in Genesis which says that the earth.
Chapter 28: FORM 535
which God in the beginning created, "was un- who, Hke Aquinas, adopt his theory must also
formed and void," Aquinas argues that "if adapt it to supernatural conditions when they
formless matter preceded in duration, it already deal with the problems of substance involved in
existed; for this is implied by duration. ... To the mystery of the Incarnation of the second
say, then, that matter preceded, but without person of the Trinity and the mystery of tran-
form, is to say that being existed actually, yet substantiation in the Fucharist.
without actuality, which is a contradiction in Furthermore, Aristotle's identification of
terms. . . . Hence we must assert that primary soul with the substantial form of a living thing
matter was not created altogether formless." makes it difficult to conceive the separate exist-
But neither, according to Aquinas, can the ence of the individual human
soul. Again an
form of any material thing be created apart adaptation is As indicated in the
required.
from its matter. "Forms and other non-sub- chapters on Immortality and Soul, the Chris-
sisting things, which are said to co-exist rather tian doctrine of personal survival is given an
than to exist," he declares, "ought to be called Aristotelian rendering by regarding the human
concreated rather than created things." soul as a form which is not completely material.
Aristotle's theor}^ of physical substances as Hence it is conceived as capable of self-subsist-
composite of form and matter raises certain ence when, with deathand thedissolution of the
special difficulties for Christian theology. Those composite nature, it is separated from the body.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. Form in relation to becoming or change 536
la. Forms as immutable models or archetypes: the exemplar ideas
2d. Angels and human souls as self-subsistent forms: the substantiality of thought
or mind in separation from extension or body 540
3a. Sensible forms, intelligible forms: the forms of intuition and understanding
3^. Form and definition: the formulable essence; the problem of matter in relation
to definition
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to.
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upperandlowerhalvesofthepage. Forexample,in53 James :Pj}'<r/!o/o|-j,116a-119b, the passage
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
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i\
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: [640*12-641^39] 162b-165a / Generation of
Animals, bk i, ch 20 [729*6]-ch 22 [730^33]
1</. The realization of forms in the sensible 269b-271a
order 12 Aurelius: Meditations, bk v, sect 13 271b;
BK VII, SECT 23 281b; bk xii, sect 30 310a-b
1</(1) Imitation or participation: the role of 17 Plotinus: Second Ennead, tr iv, ch 6-9 51d-
the receptacle 53b; TR V 57d-60c
7 Plato: Euthydetnus, 81a-b / Phaedrus, 126b-c 18 Augustine: Confessions, bk xi, par 7 90d-91a
/ Symposium, 167b'd / Phaedo, 242c-243c / 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 3,
Republic, bk hi, 333b-334b; bk v, 368c-371b; A 2, rep 3 15c-16a; q 7, a i, ans 31a-d; q 46,
bk VI, 382a-c; bk x, 427c-429b / Timaeus, A I, rep 6 250a-252d; q 65, a 4, ans 342b-
558 THE GREAT IDEAS 2/0 2^
18 Augustine: Confessions, bk i, par 9, 3a; bk
{Id. The realization offorms in the sensible order, x, par 19 76a-b; bk xi, par 7, 90d / City of God,
ld(2) Creation, generation, production: bk viii, ch 6, 269b-c; bk xi, ch 27, 337d-338a
embodiment in matter or substratum.) 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 3, a
343c; Q 66, a i, ans 343d-345c; q 84, a 3, rep 4, ANS 16d-17c; q 4, A I, rep 3 20d-21b; q 5,
2 443d-444d; q 90, a 2 481d-482c; q 104, a i, A 3, rep 4 25a-d; q 9, a 2, rep 3 39c-40d; q
ANS and REP 1-2 534c-536c; q 105, a i 538d- 13, A I, REP 2 62c-63c; q 14, a i, ans 75d-76c;
539c; Q no, A 2 565d-566d; part i-ii, q 20, A 2, ANS 76d-77d; q 15, a i, ans and rep i
A I, REP 3 712a-d 91b-92a; q 18, a 4, rep 3 107d-108c; q 44, a i,
20 Aquinas Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 52,
: rep 3 238b-239a; a 3 240b-241a; q 65, a 4
A I, ANS 15d-18a; part ii-ii, q 24, a ii, ans 342b-343c; q 84, aa 1-4 440d-446b; q 85, a i,
498b-499c REP 2 451c-453c; q no, a 2, ans 565d-566d;
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, paradise, ii [46-148] q 115, a i, ans 585d-587c; A3, rep 2 588c-
108b-109b; vii [121-148] 116b-c; xiii [52-84] 589c
126a-b 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 52,
42 Kant: Pure Reason, lOOd-lOlb; 186b-d / A I, ans 15d-18a; part hi, q 4, a 4, ans and
Judge?nent, 556d-558a; 559b-d; 561c-562a; REP 2 733a-734a
565b-d; 566d-567a; 575c-576a; 577c-d 23 HoBBEs: Leviathan, part iv, 269d-271b
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 43d-44a
2. The being of forms 31 Descartes: Meditations, v, 93b-c
35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk hi, ch hi,
2a. The existence of forms: separately, in mat- sect 11-20 257a-260a; ch v-vi 263d-283a
ter, in mind passim, esp ch v, sect 9 266a-b, sect 12 266d-
7 Plato: Cratylus, 113c-114a,c / Symposium, 267a, CH VI, SECT 2-3 268c-d; bk iv, ch iv,
167a-d / Republic, bk v, 368c-373c; bk vi, sect 6 325a-b; ch vi, sect 4 331d-332b;
385c-386c; bk ix-x, 426d-429b / Timaeus, CH IX, SECT I 349a
457b-458a / Parmenides, 487c-491a / Sophist, 35 Berkei^ey Human Knotcledge, sect 12 415b-c
:
570a-574c / Philebus, 610d-613a / Seventh 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 23b-d; 34a-b; 36b-c;
Letter, 809c-810b 45d-46a; 48d-49a; lOOd-lOlb; 176d-177a;
8 Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, bk i, ch ii 186b-187a; 211c-213a / Judgement, 461a-c;
[77^5-9] 105d-106a; ch 13 [79^6-10] 108c; ch 551a-553c; 556d-558a; 559b-d; 575c-576a;
18 [81^40-^5] lllb-c; CH 22 [83^23-35] 113c-d; 577c-d; 580b-d
CH 24 [85''i7-22] 117a / Topics, bk ii, ch 7 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, intro, 156d-
[113*24-33] 158d; bk VI, ch 6 [143^11-33] 157b
197b-c; CH 10 [148*13-22] 202b / Physics, bk 53 James: Psychology, 881b
II, CH I ch 2 [193^23-194*6]
[193^2-5] 269d;
270a-b; bk ch i [208^19-24] 2^1h-c / Meta-
iv, 2b. The eternity of forms, the perpetuity of
physics, bk i, ch 6 505b-506b; ch 9 508c- species: the divine ideas
511c; BK III, CH 2 [997*34-998*19] 516a-d; 7 Plato: Cratylus, 113a-114a,c / Phaedrus,
ch 4 [999*24-^24] 518a-c; ch 4 [iooi*4]-ch 6 125a-b / Symposium, 167b-d / Phaedo, 231c-
[1002^31] 519d-521d; bk vii, ch 2 [1028^18-28] 232b / Timaeus, 447a-d; 457c-d / Laws, bk
551a-b; ch 8 [1033^19-1034*8] 556d-557b; ch IV, 685b-c
13-14 562a-563c; ch 15 [1040*8-^4] 564a-c; ch 8 Aristotle: Generation and Corruption, bk ii,
20 Aquinas: Siimma Theologica, part hi suppl, 107c d; II [46 14SI 108b 109b; vii [121 148)
Q 92, A I, ANS 1025c-1032b 116b-c; xiii [52 84J 126a b; xxix [13-36J
31 Descartes: Meditations, v, 93b d / Objec- 150b-c
tions and Replies, 216d-217c 28 (Gilbert: Loadstone, hk ii, 30b
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part i, prop 17, schol 362c- 33 Pascal: Pensees, 512 262a
363c; prop 21-23 364a-365a 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 23b; 34a b; 36b-c; 45d-
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 113c-115a; 173b-174a / 46a; 48d-49a; lOOd-lOlb; 186b 187a; 188d-
Judgement, 551a-552c 189a
46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, intro, 156d-
157b 2c(2) The distinction between substantial and
accidental forms
2c. Form in the composite being of the in-
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q j, a 2,
dividual thing ANS 31d-32c; g 8, a 2, rep 3 35c-36b; g 29,
A 2, ANS and rep 4-5 163b-164b; g 45, a 4,
2c(l) The union of matter and form: poten- ANS 244d-245c; g 54, aa 1-3 285a-287b; q
tiality and actuality
66, A 1, REP 3 343d-345c; g 67, a 3 351b-352a;
8 Aristotle: Physics, bk ii, ch i [193*9-^19] g 76, A 4 393a-394c; a 6 396a-d; g 77, a i
269b-270a / Metaphysics, bk v, ch 4 [1014^26- 399c-401b; a 6, ans 404c-405c; part 1-11, g 7,
1015*^11] 535a-b; ch 6 [1016^12-18] 537a-b; A 4, REP 3 654b-655a
CH 538b-c; ch 24 [1023^32-^1] 545a; bk
8 20 AguiNAs: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, g 49,
VII, ch 17 565a-566a,c; bk viii, ch 6 569d- A 2, ANS 2b-4a; a 4, ans and rep i 5a-6a;
570d; bk ix, ch 6-9 573c-577c; bk xii, ch g 50, A 2 7c-8a; g 52, a i, ans 15d-18a; g 85,
4-5 599d-601a; ch 10 [1075^34-37] 606d / A I, rep 4 178b-179b; part 111, g 2, a 1, ans
Soul, BK II, CH 1-2 642a-644c 710a-711c; a 2, ans 711d-712d; part hi
9 Aristotle: Parts of Animals, bk i, ch i [640* suppl, g 70, A I, ANS 893d-895d; g 79, a 1,
i2-64i'^39] 162b-165a / Generation of Animals, REP4 951b-953b
bk I, CH 20 [729^9]-ch 21 [729^21] 269b-270a; 31 Descartes: Discourse, part 1, 41d
ch 21 [730*24]-cH 22 [730^32] 270c-271a; bk 35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk 11, ch xii,
II, CH 3 [737^6-27] 277d-278a; ch 4 [738^^1- sect 3-6 147d-148c; ch xxiii, sect 3 204c-d;
28] 279b-c CH XXXI, sect 6-13 240d-243b; ch xxxii,
12 Aurelius: Meditations, bk v, sect 13 SECT 24 247c-d; bk hi, ch hi, sect 15-19
271b 258b-260a; ch vi 268b-283a passim, esp sect
16 Kepler: Harmonies of the World, 1078a-b i-io 268b-271b, sect 21, 273c, sect 24 274c;
17 Plotinus: First Ennead, tr viii, ch 8 30d- ch IX, sect 12-13 287d-288d; ch x, sect 20
31c; CH lo-ii 32a-33d/ Second Ennead, tr iv, 296d-297a
ch 6 51d-52a; ch 8-9 52c-53b; tr v 57d-60c 42 Kant Pure Reason, 131c-d / Judgement, 580c-d
:
207c-d; 213d-215a / Fund. Priti. Metaphysic Meteorology, bk iv, cm 12 493d 494d / \teta-
of Morals, 282b-c; 283b / Practieal Reason, physics, hk 1, ch 6 505b 506b; en 7 [()H8»^4-
308a b; 319d; 335c-336a; 350b c / Judge- •^51 506c; BK II, cii 2 [994*^16-271 513a-b;
ment, 461a-c; 471b c; 517b c; 542c-d; 552b-c; bk v, ch 2 [1013*27-28] 533b; bk vi, ch i
13-15 562a-564c; bk xiii, ch 4-5 610a-611d; 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 55,
ch 10 618c-619a,c / Soul, bk hi, ch 4 [429*18- A 4, ANS and rep 1-2 28c-29d; part ii-ii, q 4,
29] 661c A I, ANS 402a-403d; part hi, q 2, a 5, ans
9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk i, ch 6 341b-342c 715a-716b
19 Aquinas: Summa part i, q 3, a 2,
Theologica, 31 Spinoza: Ethics, part i, def 4 355b; prop 8,
rep 3 15c-16a; ans 16a-d; q 4, a 3, ans
a 3, scHOL 2, 357a-d; part ii, prop 37 386b-c
22b-23b; q 11, 3, ans 49a'C; q 13, a 9, ans
a 35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk ii, ch xxiii
and REP 2 71b-72c; q 14, a 11 84c-85c; q 16, a 204a-214b; ch xxxi, sect 6-13 240d-243b; cii
7, REP 2 99a-d; q 39, a 3, ans 204c-205c; q 50, xxxii, SECT 24 247c-d; bk hi, ch iii, sect 12-
a 2, ans 270a-272a; a 4, ans 273b-274b; q 20 257b-260a; ch v-vi 263d-283a passim; ch
57, A 2 295d-297a; q 76, a 2, ans 388c-391a; q IX, SECT 11-17 287d-290a; ch x, sect 17-21
85, A 7, REP 3 459c-460b; q 86, a i 461c-462a; 295d-297b; ch xi, sect 19-20 304b-d; bk iv,
A 3 463b-d CH IV, SECT 5-8 324d-325c; ch vi, sect 4-16
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part hi, q 2, 331d-336d passim
A2, ANs711d-712d 35 Berkeley: Human Knoivledge, sect i
28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 332a-333b 413a-b
esp 333a- 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 342a
35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk hi, ch hi, 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, intro, 176c;
sect 6-20 255c-260a; ch v-vi 263d-283a pas- 184d-185a
sim, esp CH V, sect 9 266a-b, ch vi, sect 32
277c-278b, sect 36-37 279a-b; bk iv, ch iv,
4. The denial of form as a principle of being,
becoming, or knowledge
sect 5-8 324d-325c; ch vi, sect 4 331d-332b;
CH VII, SECT 9 338d-339b 7 Plato: Cratylus, 113c-114a,c / Sophist, 567a-
35 Berkeley: Human Knoivledge, intro, sect 568a
6-19 405d-410c esp sect 15-16 409a-d 8 Aristotle: Metaphysics, bk iv, ch 4 [1007*20-
38 Rousseau: Inequality, 341b-342b ^18] 526c-527a; ch 5 528c-530c passim; bk xi,
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Other discussions of the Forms or Ideas as immutable models or archetypes, see Change 15a;
Eternity 4c; Idea la, 6b.
Other discussions of forms as indwelling causes or principles in mutable things, see Cause la;
Change 2a; Matter la; and for the consideration of form and matter as co-principles of
composite substances, see Being yh(2).
Discussions of matter or the receptacle in relation to form, see Change 2-2b; Matter i-ib;
Space i a ; World 4b and for the consideration of matter apart from form, see Matter 2,3a.
;
The controversy over the separate existence of the Forms, the objects of mathematics, and
universals, see Being 7d(2)-7d(3); Mathematics 2b; Same and Other 2a; Universal
AND Particular 2a—2c; and for the problem of the cause of individuality, see Matter ic;
Universal and Particular 3.
The existence of forms in the mind as concepts abstracted from matter, see Idea 2g; Matter
4d; Memory and Imagination 6c(i); Sense 5a; Universal and Particular 4c.
Other considerations of the a priori or transcendental forms of intuition, see Sense ic;
Space 4a; Time 6c.
Comparisons of creation, generation, and production as each relates to form and matter,
see Art 2b-2c; Matter 3d; World 4e(i).
Other terms related to the distinction of form and matter or to the kinds of form, see Being
7b, 7c(i)-7c(3); Nature ia(2); Universal and Particular 6a.
The theological doctrine of the angels as self-subsistent forms or simple substances, see
Angel 2, 3b-3c; Being 7b(2); for the theological doctrine of the forms as eternal ex-
emplars or types in the mind of God, see God <^i\ Idea le; and for the theory of the soul
as the substantial form of a living thing, see Life and Death i; Man 3a; Soul ib.
Form and matter in relation to definition, see Being 8c; Definition 6a; Matter 4b;
Nature ia(2).
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Boo\s of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the pubUcation of the works cited, consult
the Bibhography of Additional Readings, which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
Suarez. Disputationes Metaphysicae, v (4), xii (3), Forest. La structure metaphysique du concret
xiii (1-9), xiv-xvi, XVIII (2-6), XXVI (2), A. E. Taylor. Philosophical Studies, ch 3
xxvii, XXX (4), XXXI (8, 10, 13), XXXIV (5-6), KoNiNCK. Le probleme de V indeterminisme
xxxv-xxxvi, xLii (2-3), xlv (4), xlvi Blanshard. The Nature of Thought
Chapter 'i.<^: GOD
INTRODUCTION
WITH the exception of certain mathema-
and physicists, all the authors of
ticians
Some of the topics
marily philosophical.
in this chapter are pri-
They belong to the sub-
the great books are represented in this chapter. ject matter of rational speculation or poetic
In sheer quantity of references, as well as in imagination in all the great epochs of our cul-
variety, it is the largest chapter. The reason is ture, regardless of differences in religious be-
obvious. More consequences for thought and lief. Other topics, however, are peculiarly re-
action follow from the affirmation or denial of stricted to matters of faith or religion. With
God than from answering any other basic ques- respect to such matters, dogmatic differences,
tion. They follow for those who regard the or differences in articles of faith, must be ex-
question as ans^^'erable only by faith or only by plicitly recognized.
the living God whom men worship in all the images which men may seek to placate. Not
acts of piety which comprise the rituals of re- philosophical constructions or mythological fig-
The most radical differences in man's concep- an infinite and everlasting whole, or as finite
tion of his own nature follow from the exclusion and temporal, but equally mysterious in its ul-
of divinity asits source or model on the one timate incomprehensibihty to the human mind.
hand, and from the various ways in which man In our civiUzation, the atheist denies the ex-
is seen as participating in divinity on the other. istence of a supernatural being, the object of
Many fundamental themes and issues are there- rehgious belief and worship among Jews, Chris-
writes, "nevertheless what the term signifies is signed — cattle to one, corn to another, wine to
found to be affirmed of God in many places of another, oil to another, the woods to another,
Scripture; as that He is the supreme self-sub- money to another, navigation to another, wars
sisting being, and the most perfectly intelligent and victories to another, marriages to another,
being." births and fecundity to another, and other
Boethius had defined a person as "an individ- things to other gods."
ual substance of a rational nature," or, as Locke That polytheism, no less than monotheism,
later said, "a thinking intelligent being." conceives the divine as personal, appears in
In applying the term person to God, in the Plato's Apology. When Socrates is accused of
meaning which Boethius had given it, Aquinas atheism, he asks whether the indictment means
comments on the difference in its meaning when that he does not "acknowledge the gods which
it is applied to men. God can be said to have a the state acknowledges, but some other new
rational nature, he writes, only "if reason be divinities or spiritual agencies in their stead."
taken to mean, not discursive thought, but, Meletus answers that he thinks Socrates is a
in a general sense, an intelligent nature . . . complete atheist who recognizes no gods at all.
God cannot be called an individual in the sense To this Socrates replies by suggesting that his
in which physical things are, but only in the enemies must be confusing him with Anaxag-
sense of uniqueness. ^'Substance can be applied oras, who had blasphemed against Apollo by
to God [only] in the sense of signifying self- calling the sun "a red hot stone." As for him-
subsistence." Aquinas does not conclude from self, he offers evidence to show that he believes
this that "person" is said improperly of God, in divine or spiritual agencies "new or old, no
but rather that when God is called "personal" matter"; and "if I believe in divine beings," he
the meaning is applied "in a more excellent asks, "how can I help believing in spirits or
way," for God does not possess, God is, an in- demigods?"
telhgence. Like the one God of Judaism and Chris-
We shall use this idea of a personal God, the tianity, the many gods of pagan antiquity have
reality of which the contemporary atheist immortal life, but they are not without origin.
denies, in order to distinguish divergent con- Zeus is the son of Kronos, and he has many
ceptions in other doctrines. Then we shall ex- offspring, both gods and demigods, who per-
amine more closely what is involved in this form different functions and are not of equal
idea itself. station in the Olympian hierarchy. The realm
of the divine includes such figures as the Titans
In the western tradition, the various pagan and the Cyclops, who are neither gods nor men;
religions — reflected especially in the poems and and demigods, like Heracles, who are offspring
Chapter 29: GOD 545
of divine and human
mating. These deities ex- ami efforts; they reward men for fidelity and
ercise superhuman powers, but none is com- virtue or punish them for impiety and sin.
pletely omnipotent or omniscient, not even Despite all other differences between pagan-
Kronos or Zeus who cannot escape the decrees ism and Christianity, these agreements are sub-
of Fate. Moreover, with the exception, perhaps, stantial enough to pro\ide many common
of that of Zeus, the power of one divinity is threads of theological speculation throughout
often challenged and thwarted by another. This our tradition, especially with regard to the
aspect of polytheism and its bearing on the in- abiding practical problems of how man shall
tervention of the gods in the affairs of men arc view himself and his destiny in relation to the
discussed in the chapter on Fate. divine or the supernatural.We have therefore
The extent to which we think of the pagans attempted to place passages from the great
as idolatrous because they made graven images books of pagan antiquity under ever^- heading
of their gods m human form, or regard the except those which are specifically restricted to
pagan conceptions of the gods as anthropomor- the dogmas of Judaism and Christianity— even
phic, depends on our interpretation of religious under headings which are worded monotheis-
symbolism. Plato for one thinks that many of tically, since even here there is continuitv of
the poets' descriptions of the gods and their thought and expression from Homer and Virgil
activities should be dismissed as unworthy, to Dante and Milton; from Plato, Aristotle,
precisely because they debase the gods to the and Plotinus to Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes,
human level. and Kant; from Lucretius to Newton and Dar-
According to Gibbon, a Greek or Roman
philosopher "who considered the system of
polytheism as a composition of human fraud The doctrines known as deism and pantheism,
and error, could disguise a smile of contempt like unquahfied atheism, are as much opposed
under the mask of devotion, without appre- to the religious beliefs of polytheism as to the
hending that either the mockery or the com- faith of Judaism and Christianity.
pliance would expose him to the resentment of Of these two, pantheism is much nearer
any invisible, or, as he conceived them, imagi- atheism, for it denies the existence of a tran-
nary powers." But the early Christians, he scendent supernatural being or beings. God is
points out, saw the many gods of antiquity "in Nature. God is immanent in the world and,
a much more odious and formidable light" and in the extreme form of pantheism, not tran-
held them to be "the authors, the patrons, and scendent in any way. Certain historic doctrines
the objects of idolatry." which are often regarded as forms or kinds of
Those who take symbols with flat literalism pantheism seem to be less extreme than this,
might also attack Christianity as anthropomor- for they do not conceive the physical universe
phic and idolatrous; in fact they have. The as exhausting the infinite being of God. The
defense of Christianity against this charge does world, for all its vastness and variety, may only
not avail in the case of Roman emperor- wor- represent an aspect of the divine nature.
ship, which consisted not in the humanization According to Spinoza, the attributes of ex-
of the divine for the sake of symbolic represen- tension and thought, in terms of which we un-
tation, but in the deification of the merely derstand the world or nature as being of the
human for political purposes. divine substance, are merely those aspects of
Although there are radical differences, there God which are known to us, for the divine sub-
are also certain fundamental agreements be- stance consists "of infinite attributes, each one
tween paganism and Judaeo-Christianity re- of which expresses eternal and infinite essence."
garding the nature of the divine. As we have In the conception of Plotinus, the whole world
already noted, the deities are conceived per- represents only a partial emanation from the
sonallv, not in terms of impersonal, brute divine source. Yet thinkers like Plotinus and
forces. Conceived as beings with intelligence Spinoza so conceive the relation of the world to
and will, the gods concern themselves with God that— as in the strictest pantheism— the
earthly society; they aid or oppose man's plans religious doctrines of creation, providence, and
— —
ism. "There is one universe made up of all of The One in absolute dependence. But The
things," Marcus Aurelius writes, "and one God One, considered in itself, is absolutely tran-
who pervades all things, and one substance, and scendent. Plotinus even denies it the name of
one law, one common reason in all intelligent God or Good or Being, saying it is beyond
animals, and one truth." He speaks of the these.
"common nature," which is apparently divine, Whether or not Spinoza is a pantheist, has
and of which "every particular nature is a part, long been debated by his commentators. An
as the nature of the leaf is a part of the nature explicit,even an extreme form of pantheism
of the plant." But, although he stresses the one- would seem to be expressed in the proposition
ness and divinity of all things, Aurelius also that "whatever is, is in God, and nothing can
at times uses language which seems to refer to be or be conceived without God." But while
a god who dwells apart from as well as in the the one and only substance which exists is at
world, as, for when he debates
example, once nature and God, Spinoza identifies God
whether the gods have any concern with human only with the nature he calls ''natura naturans.''
where, nothing containing and nothing left the necessity of the nature of God, or of any
void, everything therefore fully held by the one of God's attributes, that is to say, all the
divine." The relation between The One and modes of God's attributes in so far as they are
every other thing is compared to the number considered as things which are in God and
series. "Just as there is, primarily or secondarily, which without God can neither be nor can be
some form or idea from the monad in each of conceived."
the successive numbers —
the latter still partici- God is the infinite and eternal substance of
pating, though unequally, in the unit so the — all finite existences, an absolute and unchang-
series of beings following upon The First bear, ing one underlying the finite modes in which it
each, some form or idea derived from that variably manifests itself. Though God for Spi-
source. In Number the participation estabUshes noza is transcendent in the sense of vastly ex-
Quantity; in the realm of Being, the trace of ceeding the world known
to man, in no sense
The One establishes reality: existence is a trace does God from the whole of nature.
exist apart
of The One." Spinoza's view thus sharply departs from that
But although The One is in all things, and of an orthodox Jewish or Christian theologian.
all things depend upon it for their very exist- When the latter says that God is transcendent,
ence. The One itself has no need of them. It is in he means that God exists apart, infinitely re-
this sens^ that Plotinus says that "The One is moved from the whole created universe. When
all things and no one of them Holding all. . . the latte- speaks of God as being immanent in
—
though itself nowhere held it is omnipresent, that universe, he carefully specifies that it is not
for where its presence failed something would by His substance, but by the power of His ac-
elude its hold. At the same time, in the sense tion and knowledge. But Spinoza calls God
that it is nowhere held, it is not present: thus "the immanent, and not the transitive, cause of
—
govern it; above all they do not reward or purely transcendental, and that all we can say
)
punish man, and so they do not have to be of it is, that it possesses all reality, without be-
feared or propitiated. "To say that for the sake ing able to define it more closely." The theist,
of men they have willed to set in order the on the other hand, "asserts that reason is ca-
glorious nature of the world and therefore it is pable of presenting us, from the analogy with
meet to praise the work of the gods immortal, nature, with a more definite conception of this
and that it is an unholy thing ever to shake by being, and that its operations, as the cause of all
any force from its fixed seats that which by the things, are the results of intelligence and free
forethought of the gods in ancient days has Will."
been estabUshed on everlasting foundations for Kant even maintains that "we might, in
mankind, or to assail it by speech and utterly rigor, deny to the deist any belief in
strict
overturn it from top to bottom; and to invent God at all, and regard him merely as a main-
and add other figments of the kind ... is all tainer of the existence of a primal being or thing
sheer folly. For what advantage can our grati- — the supreme cause of all other things." In any
tude bestow on immortal and blessed beings case, deism seems to be an essentially un-Jewish
that for our sakes they should take in hand to and un-Christian or anti-Jewish and anti-Chris-
administer aught?" tian doctrine, for it denies God's supernatural
Divinity seems to have moral significance to revelation of Himself; it denies miracles and
Lucretius only insofar as the gods exemplify the every other manifestation of supernatural agen-
happy life; and immoral because its
religion is cy in the course of nature or the life of man;
superstitions concerning divine motives and it denies the efficacy of prayer and sacrament.
meddling make men servile and miserable. In short, it and practices,
rejects the institutions
When the deism of Lucretius is contrasted as well as the faithand hope, of any religion
with the more famiUar modern forms of that which claims supernatural foundation and su-
doctrine, the influence of Christianity is seen. pernatural warrant for its dogmas and rituals.
The modern deist affirms the supremacy of one Deism, which "consists simply in the worship
548 THE GREAT IDEAS
of a God considered as great, powerful, and reason's incompetence to demonstrate. He
eternal," is, in Pascal's opinion, "almost as far often accompanies the declaration with elabo-
removed from the Christian religion as atheism, rate criticisms of thearguments which may be
which is its exact opposite." offered by others. This is not always the case,
What Pascal and Kant call "deism" and however. For example, the great Jewish theolo-
Rousseau "the religion of man," others like gian, Moses Maimonides, thinks that God's ex-
Hume call "natural religion." His Dialogues istence can be proved by reason entirely apart
Concerning Natural Religion provide a classic from faith; but with regard to the essence or
statement of rationaHsm, which is the same as attributes of God, his position seems to be one
naturalism, in religion; though, as the chapter which might be called agnostic.
on Religion indicates, it may be questioned When men "ascribe essential attributes to
whether the word "religion" can be meaning- God," Maimonides declares, "these so-called
fully used for a doctrine which claims no knowl- essential attributes should not have any similar-
edge beyond that of the philosopher, and no ity to the attributes of other things, just as
guidance for human life beyond the precepts of there is no similarity between the essence of
the moralist. God and that of other beings." Since the mean-
ing of such positive attributes as good or wise is
The systematic exposition of man's knowl- derived from our knowledge of things, they do
edge of God is the science of theology. In addi- not provide us with any knowledge of God's
tion to considering all things — the whole world essence, for no comparison obtains between
and human life — in God, theology
relation to things and God. Hence Maimonides asserts that
treats especially of God's existence, essence, and "the negative attributes of God are the true
attributes. Throughout the range of its subject attributes." They tell us not what God is, but
matter and problems, theology may be of two what God is not.
sorts: it may be either natural knowledge, ob- Even though Maimonides holds that "exist-
tained by ordinary processes of observation and ence and essence are perfectly identical" in
reasoning; or knowledge which is supernatural God, he also insists that "we comprehend only
in the sense of being based on divine revelation. the fact that He exists, not His essence. . . . All
This is the traditional distinction between nat- we understand," he goes on to say, in addition
ural and sacred or, as it is sometimes called, to "the fact that He exists," is the fact that
dogmatic theology. The one belongs to the do- "He is a Being to whom none of his creatures is
main of reason; it is the work of the philosopher. similar." This fact is confirmed in all the nega-
The other belongs to the domain of faith, and tive attributes such as eternal (meaning non-
is the work of the theologian who seeks to un- temporal), infinite, or incorporeal; even as it is
derstand his faith. by all the positive attributes, expressed
falsified
These distinctions are discussed in the chap- by such names as "good" or "living" or "know-
ters on Theology, Metaphysics, and Wis- ing," insofar as they imply a comparison be-
dom. Here we are concerned with different at- tween God and creatures. When they cannot
titudes toward the problem of man's knowledge be interpreted negatively, they can be tolerated
of God. The deist, as we have seen, rejects su- as metaphors, but they must not be taken as
pernatural revelation and faith; theology, like expressing an understanding "of the true es-
rehgion, is held to be entirely natural, a work of sence of God," concerning which Maimonides
reason. The agnostic makes the opposite denial. maintains, "there is no possibility of obtaining
sense" (e.g., having literal meaning when said and admirable subtlety, was alone capable of
of creatures but being only metaphorical when such imaginations"; nevertheless, Montaigne
said of God), then, according to Aquinas, it does "not believe that means purely human are,
would follow that "from creatures nothing at in any sort, capable of doing it."
all could be known or demonstrated about According to Montaigne, "it is faith alone
God." Those who say, on the other hand, that that vividly and certainly comprehends the
"the things attributed to God and creatures deep mysteries of our religion." In his view,
are univocal" {i.e., are said in exactly the same reason by itself is incapable of proving anything,
sense), claim to comprehend more than man much less anything about God. "Our human
can know of the divine essence. When the term reasons," he writes, "are but sterile and un-
wise "is applied to God," Aquinas writes, "it digested matter; the grace of God is its form;
leaves the thing signified as uncomprehended it is that which gives it fashion and value." The
and as exceeding the signification of the name. fight and value in Sebonde's arguments come
Hence it is evident that this term wise is not from the and
fact that faith supervenes "to tint
applied in the same way to God and to man. illustrate" them, and "renders them firm and
The same applies to other terms. Hence no solid."
name is predicated univocally of God and crea- Such arguments, Montaigne says, may serve
tures" but rather all positives names "are said and first guide to a learner" and
as "direction
of God and creatures in an analogous sense." may even "render him capable of the grace of
A further discussion of the names of God God"; but for himself, skeptical of all argu-
will be found in the chapter on Sign and ments, the way of faith alone can provide "a
Symbol; and the consideration of the analogi- certain constancy of opinion. Thus have I,. . .
cal, the univocal, and the equivocal will also by the grace of God, preserved myself entire,
be found there as well as in the chapter on without anxiety or trouble of conscience, in
Same and Other. We have dealt with these the ancient belief of our religion, amidst so
matters here only for the sake of describing that many sects and divisions as our age has pro-
degree of agnosticism, according to which duced."
Maimonides, by contrast with Aquinas, is an Far from being religious as Montaigne was,
agnostic. But agnosticism usually goes further the agnostic may be a skeptic about faith as
and denies that man can have any natural well as reason. He may look upon faith either
—
knowledge of God either of His existence or of as superstition or as the exercise of the will to
His essence. believe with regard to the unknowable and the
—
ited powers and by no means endowed with and that after a long time, and with the admix-
every desirable attribute," Freud thinks that ture of many errors." Because "human reason
he nevertheless "looks back to the memory- is very deficient in things concerning God"
image of the overrated father of his childhood, "a sign of which is have
that philosophers . . .
exalts it into a Deity, and brings it into the fallen into many and have disagreed
errors
present and into reality. The emotional strength —
among themselves" men would have no
of this memory-image and the lasting nature knowledge of God "free from doubt and un-
of his need for protection" — for, as Freud ex- certainty" unless all divine truths were "de-
plains, "in relation to the external world he is livered to them by the way of faith, being told
still a child"
— "are the two supports of his to them, as it were, by God Himself Who can-
belief in God." not lie."
One is in terms of the conception of God to our conceiving a God (that is, a Being su-
as an infinite, perfect, and necessary being, premely perfect) to whom existence is lacking
whose non-existence is therefore inconceivable. (that is to say, to whom a certain perfection is
According to Anselm, God cannot be conceived lacking), than to conceive of a mountain which
in any other way than as "a being than which has no valley."
nothing greater can be conceived." But since Spinoza defines a "cause of itself as "that
"the fool hath said in his heart, there is no whose essence involves existence; or that whose
God," how shall he be made to know that the nature cannot be conceived unless existing."
God, which exists in his understanding at the Since in his conception of substance, substance
moment when he denies His real existence, also is necessarily infinite, it is also cause of itself.
really exists outside his understanding? "For Hence he concludes that "God or substance
one thing for an object to be in the under-
it is . . . necessarily exists"; for "if this be denied,
standing, and another to understand that the conceive if it be possible that God does not
— —
Aquinas, for example, interprets Anselm not as "The conception of an absolutely necessary
proving God's existence, but rather as asserting being," he writes, "is a mere idea, the objective
that God's existence is self-evident. Those who reality ofwhich is far from being established
say that the proposition "God does not exist" by the mere fact that it is a need of reason. . . .
is self-contradictory, are saying that the oppo- The unconditioned necessity of a judgment
site proposition "God exists" must be self- does not form the absolute necessity of a
evident. thing." From the fact that "existence belongs
Aquinas does not deny that the proposition necessarily to the object of the conception,"
"God exists" is intrinsically self-evident. On we cannot conclude that "the existence of the
this point he goes further than Anselm, Des- thing ... is therefore absolutely necessary
cartes, and Spinoza. Where they say God's merely," Kant says, "because its existence has
essence involves His existence, Aquinas asserts been cogitated in the conception. What- . . .
that in God essence and existence are identical. ever be the content of our conception of an
When Moses asks God, "If they should say to object, it is necessary to go beyond it, if we
me. What is His name? what shall I say to wish to predicate existence of the object. . . .
them.?" the Lord says unto Moses, "I AM The celebrated ontological or Cartesian argu-
THAT I AM," and adds, "Say to the children ment for the existence of a supreme being is
of Israel: HE WHO IS hath sent me to you." therefore insufficient."
This name — HE WHO IS — Aquinas holds to
be "the most proper name of God" because it The second main approach to the problem
signifies that "the being of God is His very of God's existence lies in the sort of proof
essence." which, Locke thinks, "our own existence and
For this reason he thinks that the proposition the sensible parts of the universe offer so clearly
"God exists" is self-evident in itself. Its subject and cogently to our thoughts." He refrains
and predicate are immediately related. Never- from criticizing the argument from "the idea
theless, Aquinas holds that the proposition is of a most perfect being," but he does insist that
not self-evident to us "because we do not know we should not "take some men's having that
the essence of God." Even supposing, he idea of God in their minds for the only
. . .
writes, "that everyone understands this name proof of a Deity." He for one prefers to follow
God as signifying something than which noth- the counsel of St. Paul, that "the invisible
ing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it things of God are clearly seen from the creation
does not therefore follow that he understands of the world, being understood by the things
that what the name signifies exists actually, but that are made, even his eternal power and God-
only that it exists mentally. Nor can it be ar- head."
gued that it actually exists, unless it be ad- We have, according to Locke, an intuitive
mitted that there actually exists something knowledge of our own existence. We know, he
than which nothing greater can be thought; and says, that "nonentity cannot produce any real
this precisely is not admitted by those who being"; and so "from the consideration of our-
hold that God does not exist." selves, pnd what we infallibly find in our con-
The writer of the First Set of Objections stitution, our reason leads us to the knowledge
to Descartes' Meditations maintains that the of this certain and evident truth That there
criticism advanced by Aquinas applies to Des- is an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing
proof." In the tradition of the great books, it Where Aristotle argues from motion and
has been formulated in many different ways. potentiality to a prime mover and a pure ac-
What is common to all of them is the principle tuality, Newton gives the a posteriori proof
of causality, in terms of which the known exist- another statement by arguing from the design
ence of certain effects is made the basis for in- of the universe to God as its designer or archi-
ferring the existence of a unique cause —a first tect. "The most wise and excellent contrivances
cause, a highest cause, an uncaused cause. him the best
of things, and final causes" seem to
Aristotle, for example, in the last book of his way of knowing God. "Blind metaphysical
Physics, argues from the fact of motion or necessity, which is certainly the same always
change to the existence of an unmoved mover. and everywhere, could produce no variety in
He sums up his elaborate reasoning on this things. All that diversity of natural things
point in the following statement. "We estab- which we find suited to different times and
lished the fact that everything that is in mo- places could arise from nothing but the ideas
tion is moved by something, and that the and will of a Being necessarily existing."
movent is either unmoved or in motion, and In similar fashion Berkeley maintains that
that, if it is in motion, it is moved either by "if we attentively consider the constant regu-
itself or by something else and so on through- larity, order, and concatenation of natural
out the series: and so we proceeded to the posi- things, the surprising magnificence, beauty,
tion that the first principle that directly causes and perfection "of the larger, and the exquisite
things that are in motion to be moved is that contrivance of the smaller parts of the creation,
which moves itself, and the first principle of the together with the exact harmony and corre-
whole series is the unmoved." spondence of the whole, but, above all, the
Aristotle's argument, unlike that of Augus- never enough admired laws of pain and pleas-
tine or Locke, does not presuppose the creation ure, and the instincts or natural inclinations,
of the world, at least not in the sense of the appetites, and passions of animals; I say if we
world's having a beginning. On the contrary, consider all these things, and at the same time
he holds the world and its motions to be as attend to the meaning and import of the at-
eternal as their unmoved mover. "It is im- tributes, one, eternal, infinitely wise, good,
possible," he writes in the Metaphysics, "that and perfect, we shall clearly perceive that they
movement should either have come into being belong to the . . . Spirit, who 'works all in all,'
or cease to be." Precisely because he thinks the and 'by whom all things consist.'" This seems
world's motions are eternal, Aristotle holds to him so certain that he adds, "we may even
that the prime mover, in addition to being assert that the existence of God is far more
everlasting, must be immutable. This for him evidently perceived than the existence of men."
means "a principle whose very essence is ac- But, according to Berkeley, all the visible
tuaUty." Only a substance without any poten- things of nature exist only as ideas in our minds,
cy, only one which is purely actual, can be an ideas which, unlike our own memories or imagi-
absolutely immutable, eternal being. nations, we do not ourselves produce. "Every-
554 THE GREAT IDEAS
thing we or anywise perceive by
see, hear, feel, which nourishes and maintains, as the life of
sense," he writes, must have some other cause trees; or that which, besides this, has also sensa-
than our own will, and is therefore "a sign or tion, as the life of beasts; or that which adds
effect of the power of God." To the "unthink- to all these intelligence, as the life of man; or
ing herd" who claim that "they cannot see that which does not need the support of nutri-
God," Berkeley replies that "God ... is in- ment, but only maintains, feels, understands,
timately present to our minds, producing in as the life of angels —
all can only be through
them all that variety of ideas or sensations Him who absolutely is. For to Him it is not
which continually affect us." one thing to be, and another to live, as though
The existence of any idea in us is for Berkeley He could be, is it to Him one
not living; nor
ground for asserting God's existence and power thing to live, and another to understand, as
as its cause. But for Descartes one idea alone though He could live, not understanding; nor
becomes the basis of such an inference. He is it Him one thing to understand, another
to
supplements his a priori or ontological argu- to be blessed, as though He could understand
ment with what he calls an ''a posteriori dem- and not be blessed. But to Him to live, to
onstration of God's existence from the mere understand, to be blessed, are to be. They have
fact that the idea of God exists in us." understood, from this unchangeableness and
That he is himself imperfect, Descartes this simplicity, that all things must have been
knows from the fact that he doubts. Even made by Him, and that He could Himself
when doubting leads to knowledge, his knowl- have been made by none."
edge is imperfect, "an infallible token" of The variety of arguments we have so far
which, he says, is the fact that "my knowledge examined seems to fit the "five ways" in which,
increases little by little." But the idea which according to Aquinas, the existence of God can
he has of God, he declares, is that of an abso- be proved a posteriori. "Theand most man-
first
lutely perfect being, "in whom there is nothing ifest way is the argument from motion," which
merely potential, but in whom all is present Aquinas attributes to Aristotle. "The second
really and actually." On the principle that way is from the nature of an efficient cause."
there cannot be more reality or perfection in Berkeley's argument or Locke's would seem,
the effect than in the cause, Descartes con- in some respects, to offer a version of this mode
cludes that his own mind cannot be
imperfect of reasoning. "The third way is taken from
the cause of the idea of a perfect being. "The possibility and necessity," and seems to develop
idea that I possess of a being more perfect than the argument from potentiality in Aristotle's
I," he writes, "must necessarily have been Metaphysics, and to contain the inference from
placed in me by a being which is really more mutability and contingency which is implicit
perfect." in the argument attributed to the Platonists
The radical imperfection of man, and indeed by Augustine. "The fourth way is taken from
of all creation, offers Augustine still another the gradation to be found in things." Proceed-
proof for God's existence, which he attributes ing from the existence of the imperfect to ab-
to the "They have seen," he
"Platonists." solute perfection, it resembles in principle the
writes, "that whatever is changeable is not the reasoning of Descartes concerning the perfec-
most high God, and therefore they have tran- tion in the cause relative to the perfection in
scended every soul and all changeable spirits the effect. "The fifth way is taken from the
in seeking the supreme. They have seen also —
governance of the world" from the fact that
that, in every changeable thing, the form which —
everything acts for an end and so is like the
makes it that which it is, whatever be its mode argument which Newton offers from final
or nature, can only be through Him who truly causes and the existence of order in the uni-
is, because He is unchangeable. And therefore, verse.
whether we consider the whole body of the These "five ways" may or may not be re-
world, its figure, qualities, and orderly move- garded as an exhaustive list of the a posteriori
ment, and also all the bodies which are in it; proofs. It may even be questioned whether the
or whether we consider all life, either that five ways are logically distinct and independ-
;
world had a beginning or is eternal, and if witnesses, the one with the credentials of pure
eternal, whether it is created or uncreated, will reason, and the other with those of empiricism
be seen in the chapters on Cause, Eternity, while, in fact, it is only the former who has
and World. changed his dress and voice."
The principle of the argument from the con-
The validity of the a posteriori argument for tingency of the world or its parts Kant states
God's existence — in one form or another — is something exists, an absolutely
as follows: "If
questioned by those who think that the causal necessary being must fikewise exist." One
principle cannot be applied beyond experience, premise in the argument, namely, that con-
or who think that our knowledge of cause and tingent things exist, has its foundation in ex-
effect is not sufficient to warrant such infer- perience and therefore Kant admits that the
ences. reasoning "is not completely a priori or onto-
"The existence of any being can only be But in order to complete the proof, he
logical."
proved by arguments from its cause or its ef- thinks must be shown that an ensrealissimum^
it
fect," Hume writes; "and these arguments or most perfect being, is the same as an abso-
are founded entirely on experience. ... It is lutely necessary being, in order for the obtained
only experience which teaches us the nature conclusion (a necessary being exists) to be trans-
and bounds of cause and effect, and enables us lated into the conclusion desired {God exists).
to infer the existence of one object from that That ''an ens realissimum must possess the ad-
of another." But Hume doubts "whether it be ditional attribute of absolute necessity" — or,
possible for a cause to be known only by its in other words, that a perfect being is identical
556 THE GREAT IDEAS
with one which necessarily exists is, according — nature has two things to shun, error and misery.
to Kant, ''exactly what was maintained in the Your no more shocked in choosing one
reason is
The controversy concerning the proof of We are incapable of knowing either that
God's existence raises issues in logic, in meta- God is or what God is, according to Pascal, be-
physics and physics, and in the theory of knowl- cause "if there is a God, He is infinitely incom-
edge. Philosophers are opposed on the ques- prehensible" and "has no affinity to us." Never-
tion whether a valid demonstration is possible. theless, proceeding on the practical level of the
Those who think it possible differ from one wager, reason may lead to Christian faith, yet
another on the way in which the proof should not in such a way as to give adequate reasons
be constructed. Those who think it impossi- for that belief, since Christians "profess a re-
ble do not always go to the opposite extreme which they cannot give a reason."
ligion for
of making the affirmation of God's existence Kant makes the affirmation of God a
also
a matter of faith; or of denying with the skep- matter of faith, but for him it is a "purely
tic that we can have any light on the ques- rational faith, since pure reason ... is the sole
tion at all. Pascal and Kant, for example, reject source from which it springs." He defines a
the theoretic arguments as inconclusive or matter offaith as any object which cannot be
untenable, but they do not think the problem known through the speculative use of reason,
is totally insoluble. They offer instead practical but which "must be thought a priori, either as
grounds or reasons for accepting God's exist- consequences or as grounds, if pure practical
ence. reason is to be used as duty commands . . .
"The metaphysical proofs of God are so re- Such is the summum bonum,'' he says, "which
mote from the reasoning of men," Pascal as- has to be realized in the world through free-
serts, compUcated, that they make
**and so dom . . . This effect which is commanded,
little impression." He will "not undertake," he together with the only conditions on which its
tells us in his Pensees, "to prove by natural possibility is conceivable by us, namely, the exist-
reasons . the existence of God." In his view
. . ence of God and the immortality of the soul,
"there are only three kinds of persons: those are matters offaith and are of all objects the only
who serve God, having found Him; others who ones that can be so called."
are occupied in seeking Him, not having found For Kant, then, the existence of God is a
Him; while the remainder live without seeking "postulate of pure practical reason ... as the
Him, and without having found Him." Since necessary condition of the possibility of the
he regards the first as "reasonable and happy," summum bonumT The moral law commands
the last as "foolish and unhappy," he addresses us to seek the highest good, with perfect happi-
himself to the middle group whom he regards ness as its concomitant; but Kant thinks that
as "unhappy and reasonable." "there not the slightest ground in the moral
is
He asks them to consider whether God is or law for a necessary connexion between morality
is not. "Reason can decide nothing here," he and proportionate happiness in a being that
says. If a choice is to be made by reason, it must belongs to the world as a part of it." Since man is
be in the form of a wager. "Which will you a part of the world or nature, and dependent
choose then ? Let us see. Since you must choose, on it, "he cannot by his will be a cause of this
let us see which interests you least. You have nature, nor by his own power make it thorough-
two things to lose, the true and the good; and ly harmonize, as far as his happiness is con-
two things to stake, your reason and your will, cerned, with his practical principles." The only
your knowledge and your happiness; and your possible solution hes in "the existence of a
Chapter 29: GOD 557
cause of all nature, distinct from nature itself, natural reason, must either use such ncg.'ili\c
and containing the principle of this connexion, attributes, as infinite, eternal, incomprehensible',
namely, of the exact harmony of happiness or superlatives, as most high, most great, and the
with moraUty." That is why, Kant explains, like; or indefinite, as good, just, holy, creator;
"it is morally necessary to assume the existence and in such sense, as if he meant not to declare
of God." what He is Tfor that were to circumscribe Him
within the limits of our fiuicy), buthow much
In the tradition of the great books, the com- we admire Him, and how ready wc would be
mon ground shared by reason and faith is to obey Him; which is a sign of humility and of
marked by the convergence of the contribu- a will to honor Him as much as we can: for
tions made by pagan, Jew, and Christian— and there is but one name to signify our conception
by poets, philosophers, and theologians to the — of His nature, and that AM: and but one
is, I
problem of God's existence and the understand- name of His and that is GOD; in
relation to us,
ing of the divine nature, the essence of God which is contained Father, King, and Lord."
and His attributes. Even when they are discussed by the philos-
Certain attributes of God, such as simplicity, ophers and reflected on by the poets, certain
immateriality, eternity, infinity, perfection, matters belong especially to theology because
and glory, are usually regarded as so many dif- they constitute the dogmas of religion — articles
ferent ways in which the human understanding of religious faith based solely on divine revela-
apprehends the divine nature in itself. Other tion, not discovered by human inquiry or
attributes, such as the divine causality, omni- speculation.That God created the world out
potence, omnipresence, omniscience, love, jus- of nothing and of His free will; that the world
tice, and mercy, are usually taken as ways of had a beginning and will have an end are, for
considering God's nature in relation to the example, dogmas of traditional Judaism and
world or to creatures. But to divide the at- Christianity. Philosophers may argue about
tributes in this way, as is done in the Outline the freedom or necessity of the creative act, or
of Topics, is to make a division which cannot about the possibility of a beginning or an end
be fully justified except in terms of convenience to time and the world, but Jewish and Christian
for our understanding. God's will, for example, theologians find in Sacred Scripture the war-
no less than God's intellect, can be considered rant for believing that which may not be thor-
in relation to Himself. God's intellect, no less oughly intelligible to reason, much less demon-
than God's will, can have the world for its strable by it. What is true of creation applies
object. So, too, the divine goodness can be con- generally to the religious belief in divine provi-
sidered with reference to things, even as God's dence and the positive commandments of God,
love can be considered with reference to Him- to the gift of grace which God bestows upon
self. men, and to the performance of miracles.
The difficulties we meet in classifying or Judaism and Christianity share certain
ordering the attributes of God confirm the dogmas, though the degree to which Jewish
opinion of almost all theologians, that our and Christian theologians commonly under-
understanding is inadequate to comprehend the stand what is apparently the same dogma varies
essence of God. The fact that we employ a from great similarity of interpretation (as in
multiplicity of attributes to represent to our- the case of creation and providence) to differ-
selveswhat in itself is an absolute unity is ences so great (as, for example, with regard to
another indication of the same point. The one grace) that there may be some doubt whether
attribute of simplicity would seem to deny us the dogm^a in question is really the same. The
the right to name others, unless we take the line of demarcation between these faiths would
plurality of attributes to signify something seem to be more easily determined than their
about man's understanding of God rather than common ground; yet even here such matters
a real complexity in the divine nature. as the resurrection of the body even when we —
"He God," Hobbes
that will attribute to take differences of interpretation into account
writes, "nothing but what is warranted by — may be regarded as a dogma shared by both.
—
nature and mission of the church, its rituals rael, of the Chosen People, of the Temple and
and its sacraments. Even within Christianity, the Torah, are indisputably drawn from the
however, there have been and still are serious Old Testament; and from the New Testament
on all these matters. The
doctrinal differences come such dogmas as those concerning Christ's
most fundamental heresies and schisms of early divinity and humanity, the Virgin Birth, the
Christianity concerned the understanding of Church as the mystical body of Christ, and the
the Trinity and the Incarnation. The great seven sacraments.
modern schism which divided Christendom Under all these topics we have assembled
arose from about the sacraments, the
issues passages from the Bible, interpretations of them
organization and practices of the church, and by the theologians, and materials from the
the conditions of salvation. great books of poetry and history, philosophy
It would seem to be just as easy to say what and science. Since the criterion of relevance
beliefs are common to religious Jews and here is the reflection of sacred or religious
Christians, as to articulate the faith common doctrine in secular literature, the writings of
to all sects of Christianity. If all varieties of pagan antiquity are necessarily excluded,
Protestant doctrine are included, little remains though they are included in the more philo-
in common except belief in the God of Abra- sophical topics of theology, such as the existence
—
ham, Isaac, and Jacob creator and provider, and nature of one God.
governor and judge, dispenser of rewards and Despite its length, this chapter by no means
punishments. exhausts the discussion of God in the great
books. The long list of Cross- References, which
One book stands out from all the rest be- follows the seventy- three topics comprising the
cause, in our tradition, it is — as the use of Reference section of this chapter, indicates the
"Bible" for its proper name imphes the various ways in which the idea of God occurs
book about God and man. For those who in the topics of other chapters. The reader will
have faith. Holy Writ or Sacred Scripture is find that list useful not only as an indication
the revealed Word of God. Its division into of the topics in other chapters which elaborate
Old and New Testaments represents the his- on or extend the discussion of matters treated
toric relation of the Jewish and Christian here, but also as a guide to other Introductions
religions. in v/hich he is likely to find the conception of
Without prejudice to the issue between be- God a relevant part of the examination of some
lief and unbelief, or between Jewish and Chris- other great idea.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
I. The polytheistic conception of the supernatural order 56.
la. The nature and existence of the gods
lb. The hierarchy of the gods: their relation to one another 562
ic. The intervention of the gods in the affairs of men: their judgment of the deserts
of men
Chapter 29: GOD 559
PA(^E
2. The existence of one God
563
2a. The revelation of one God
2i?. The evidences and proofs of God's existence ^64
2c. Criticisms of the proofs of God's existence: agnosticism
3<?. The worship of God or the gods: prayer, propitiation, sacrifice 568
3/*. The imitation of God
or the gods: the divine element in human nature; the
deification of men; man as the image of God
569
yi. God as first and as exemplar cause: the relation of divine to natural causation
5^. God as final cause: the motion of all things toward God 576
5c. The power of God : the divine omnipotence eyy
5/. God's knowledge: the divine omniscience; the divine ideas 579
5^. God's will: divine choice 580
5^. God's love: the diffusion of the divine goodness
5/. Divine justice and mercy: divine rewards and punishments 581
*jb. Providence
8r. The Law: its observance as a condition of righteousness and blessedness 594
8^. The Temple: the Ark of the Torah
8<?. The messianic hope 595
9. Specifically Christian dogmas concerning the divine nature and human destiny
9^. Christ the Saviour and Redeemer: the doctrines of original sin and salvation
9^. The Church: the mystical body of Christ; the Apostolate 598
9<?. The sacraments 599
<)f.
The second coming of Christ
10. The denial of God or the gods, or of a supernatural order: the position of the atheist
11. The denial of God as completely transcending the world or nature: the position of
the pantheist 600
12. The denial of a revealed and providential God: the pos'tion of the deist
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the vohnne and pa^c
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Homkr: Iliud, hk ii [265 2«^] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the vohrnie in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upperand lower halves of the page. Forexamplc, in 53 jAMiisiP^vfAo/o^^, 116a 119b, the passage
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand sideof the page, the letters c and d to the upperand lower halves of the right-hand sideof
the page. For example, in 7 Plato: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
Author's Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as part, bk, ch,
sect) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d.
Bible References: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. Wlien the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., Old Testa-
ment: Nehemiah, 7:45— (D) // Esdras, 7:46.
Symbols: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
[930-959] 386c, [1758-1763] 393d / Orestes 104b-d; 107b-d / Fabius, 142d-143b / Corio-
394a-410d esp [317-357] 397a-b, [1625-1693] lanus, 185b-186a; 188d-191b / Aristidcs, 268a-
410b-d/ Iphigenia Among the 7j«r/411a-424d 273c / Ly Sander, 365a-366a / Sulla, 370c-
esp [1-41] 411a-b, [939-986] 419b-d, [1435- 371b / Lucullus, 404d-405a/ Alexander, 553b-
1499] 424a-d / Iphigenia at Aulis 425a-439d 554b / Caesar, 602c-604d esp 604b-d / Pho-
esp [1185-1194] 435d-436a, [1526-1629] 439a-d cion, 615b-d / Cato the Younger, 639d / De-
5 Aristophanes Peace 526a-541d esp [195-220]
: mosthenes, 698a-699a / Dion, 781 d- 782a
528b-c / Thesmophoriazusae [655-687] 607c- 15 Tacitus: Annals, bk hi, 59d-60a; bk vi,
608a / Plutus 629a-642d esp [86-92] 630a, 91b-d; BK xvi, 179d; 183d / Histories, bk i,
[489-498] 634c-d, [653-747] 637a-d 189d-190a; bk ii, 235a-c; bk iv, 284b; 292c-
6 Herodotus: History, bk i, 7b-10a esp 9d-10a; 294a
20b-22a; bk ii, 54d-55a; 77a-b; 78d-79c; bk 17 Plotinus: Second Ennead, tr ix, ch 9, 71a /
III, 98b-c; BK IV, 124d-125a; 144c-d; 150b- Third Ennead, tr ii-iii 82c-97b
d; 151b-153d; 155b-c; 158d-159d esp 159d; 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 22,
BK VI, 190c-d; 198b-d; 199d-200a; 200c- A ans 130d-131c
3,
201a; 201d-202c; 205c-d; 211b-d; bk vii, 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, hell, xiv [43-72]
216d-217c esp 217c; 218b-220a; 224d-225a; 20a-b; paradise, iv [49-63] 111b; viii [1-12]
226d-227a; 239c-240d; 246b-247a; 250a-d; 116d
BK VIII, 262b-c; 266a-d; 269c-270a; 270c- 22 Chaucer: Troilus and Cressida, bk i, stanza
271a; 274b-c; 276b-d; 279d-280a; 283d; 30-35 5a-b; bk hi, stanza 89 66a / Knight's
284d-285a; bk ix, 302c; 308a-c; 309d-310a Tale 174a-211a esp [1303-1333] 181b-182a,
6 Thu CYDIDES Peloponnesian War, BKJ,355h-c;
: [2663-2699] 203b-204a, [3099-3108] 211a /
378a-b; bk ii, 407a-b; 415d-416c; bk v, Merchant's Tale [10,093-230] 335a-337a
506b-c; BK VII, 559d-560a 23 HoBBEs: Leviathan, part i, 81b-c
7 Plato: Protagoras, 44a-45a / Symposium, 27 Shakespeare: King Lear, act iv, sc i [33-39]
152d-153b / Apology, 211d / Republic, bk ii, 269d; [69-74] 270b; sc 11 [38-50] 270d-271a;
313b-314d; 322a-324c; bk vi, 378a-b; bk x, sc VI [35-40] 273d; act v, sc hi [166-174]
436c-437a; 437c-438c / Critias 478a-485d / 281a / Antony and Cleopatra, act ii, sc i [1-8]
Statesman, 587a-589c / Laws, bk iv, 679a-b; 317d / Cymbeline, act v, sc iv [1-151] 481a-
681b-683b; bk ix, 757a; bk x, 765d-768d; 482c; sc v [425-485] 488b-d
bk XII, 787d-788a 38 Rousseau: Social Contract, bk iv, 435a-436a
9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk i, ch 9 [1099^9-18] 47 Goethe: Eaust, part ii [8582-8590] 209a;
345a; bk x, ch 8 [1179^23-33] 434a / Rhetoric, [8610-8637] 209b-210a
bk II, CH 5 [1383^3-8] 629d; ch 17 [1391^30-
^3] 638d
2. The existence of one God
10 Hippocrates: Sacred Disease, 154a-155d
12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk ii [1090-
2a. The revelation of one God
1104] 29a;bk v [1194-1240] 76d-77b; bk vi Old Testament: Genesis, 17:1-14 / Exodus, 3
[43-79] 80d-81b; [379-422] 85b-d esp 3:6, 3:14-16; 6:1-8; 19:9-20:6 esp 20:1-6;
12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk i, ch 12 118d-120b; 20:18-22 / Deuteronomy, 4:39; 5:1-10; 6 esp
CH 22, 128a-b; bk ii, ch 8 146a-147c 6:4-5; 32:1-47 esp 32:36-43 / / Kings, 8:22-62
12 Aurelius: Meditations, bk i, sect 17 255d- esp 8:23, 8:60— (D) /// Kings, 8:22-62 esp
256d; bk ii, sect 3 257a-b; bk hi, sect ii 8:23, 8:60 / / Chronicles, 16:7-36— (D) I Para-
262a-b; bk v, sect 8 269d-270b; bk vi, sect lipomenon, 16:7-36 / Psalms, 18 esp 18:30-32
40-46 277d-278d; bk x, sect 5 296d; bk xii, — (D) Psalms, 17 esp 17:31-33 / Isaiah, 37:15-
sect 5 307d-308a 20; 43-45 passim, esp 43:3, 43:10-13, 44:6,
564 THE GREAT IDEAS 2b to Ic
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica^ part i, q 2
(2. The existence of one God. 2a. The revelation 10c-14a esp a 3 12c-14a; q 3, a 4, rep 2 16d-
of one God.) 17c; Q 8 34c-38c; q 11, a 3 49a-c; q 19, a 5,
44:8, 44:24, 45:5-7, 45:18, 45:21-22; 48:12 REP 3 112d-113c; Q 44, A I, rep i 238b-239a;
— (D) Isaias, 37:15-20; 43-45 passim, esp 43:3, q 65 339a-343c esp a i, rep 3 339b-340b; q
43:10-13, 44:6, 44:8, 44:24, 45:5-7, 45:18, 75, A I, rep I 378b-379c; q 79, a 4, ans 417a-
45:21-22; 48:12 / Jeremiah, 10 esp 10:6, 418c; Q 104, AA 1-2 534c-537b; part i-ii, q i,
10:10— (D) Jeremias, 10 esp 10:6, 10:10 / A2 610b-611b
Daniel, 6 esp 6:20, 6:26-2j / Hosea, 13:4 — 22 Chaucer: Knight's Tale [3005-3016] 209a-b
{D) Osee, 13:4 /Joel, 2:27 / Zechariah, 14:9 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part i, 78d-79a; 79d-80a
— {D) Zacharias, 14:9 / Malachi, 2:10— (D) 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learniiig, 38a; 41b-d
Malachias, 2:10 31 Descartes: Discourse, part iv 51b-54b /
Apocrypha: Wisdom of Solomon, 12:1^ (D) — Meditations, 71d-72a; iii 81d-89a; v 93a-96a /
OT, Boo/{ of Wisdom, 12:13 / Ecdesiasticus, Objections and Replies, 108a-115a,c passim;
i:8_(D) OT, Ecdesiasticus, i:S / II Macca- 120c-123a; 126b-127c; def viii 130d; postu-
bees, 1:24-29— (Z)) OT, II Machabees, 1 :2^-2g late V 131b-c; AXIOM I 131d; axiom ix-x
New Testament: Matthew, 23:9 / Marl{, 12:28- 132b; PROP i-iii 132b-133a; 137d-138a; 158b-
34 / John, 1:1-2; 10:30; 17:3 / Acts, 162a; 168d-169a; 211c-212a; 213a-d; 21 7d-
17:22-29 / Romans, 1:14-32 / I Corinthians, 218a
8:4-6; 12:4-6 / Ephesians, 4:5-6 / / Timothy, 31 Spinoza: Ethics, part i, def i 355a; def
2:5-6; 4:10; 6:14-16 / I John, 5:5-9 3,6 355b; prop 7 356c; prop ii 358b-359b;
18 Augustine: Confessions, bk vii, par 16 48c- prop 14, DEMONST and corol i 359d-360a;
49a / City of God, bk viii, ch ii, 272c / prop 20, DEMONST and corol I 363d-364a
Christian Doctrine, bk i, ch 12 627c-d; ch 32 32 M11.TON Psahn 136 8a-10a
:
part i-ii, q I, a 8 615a-c; q 2, a i, rep ^ 615d- 47 (Joethe: Paust, part (117H 1185] 29b
i
REP 3 467c-468b; a 12, ans 473d-474d; q 22, esp 3, 7, II, 35, 42-44— (Dj Jeremias passim,
A 2, ans 481d-482c; qq 23-27 482c-527b; q esp 3, 7, II, 35, 42-44 / Daniel, y.zy / Micah,
180, a I, ans and rep 2 607d-608c; a 2, rep i 6:8 -(D) Micheas, 6:8
608c-609c; a 7, ans 614d-616a; q 182, a 2, ans New Testament: Matthew, 6:io;y:2i; 12:46-50;
621d-623a; a 4, rep i 623d-624d; q 184, a 2, 26:36-39 / Mar/(,
14:32-36 / Lul^e, 22:40-45 /
ans 629d-630d; a 3, ans and rep 3 630d- John, 5:30; 18:10-11 / Acts, 5:29-32; 21 :8-i5 /
632c; A 7, rep 2 636a-637a; q 185, a 2, rep i Romans, 5:19 / // Corinthians, 10:5-6 / Philip-
641c-643a; a 4, ans 644a-645c; q 186, a 2, rep pians, 2:1-18 esp 2:7-8 / // Thessalonians,
2 651d-652d; a 7, rep 2 658d-660a; q 187, a 2, 1:7-9 / Hebretvs, 5:8-9; 11:8
ans 665a-666a; q 188, a 2, ans 675d-677a 4 Homer: Iliad, bk i [188-222] 5a-b
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, purgatory, xv [40- 5 Aeschylus: Suppliant Maidens [410-434] 6a-b
81] 75d-76a; xvii [9i]-xvni [75] 79b-80c; / Choephoroe [269-301] 72d-73a; [885-1076]
paradise, i [94-142] 107b-d; iii 109b-110c; v 78d-80d / Eumenides [490-565] 86b-87a
[1-12] 112a-b; vi [112-126] 114d-115a; xx [94- 5 Sophocles: Oedipus the King [S6^-gio] 107b-c
138] 137d-138a; xxi [52-102] 138d-139b; xxvi / Antigone131a-142d esp [374-378] 134b. [443-
[1-81] 145d-146c; xxxii [i39]-xxxiii [145] 465] 134d-135a, [1351-1353] l^2d / Ajax [666-
156a-157d 676] 148d / Electra 156a-169a,c esp [23-37]
22 Chaucer: Troilus and Cressida, bk v, stanza 156b
263-267 154b-155a / Second Nun's Ta/f 463b- 5 Euripides: Suppliants [513-563] 262d-263b /
471b / Parsons Tale, par 6, 497a; par 21 Helen [1644-1692] 313d-314a,c / Iphigenia
509a-b; par 31 517b-518b Among the Tauri [67-122] 411d-412b
23 HoBBEs: Leviathan, part hi, 240d 6 Herodotus: History, bk i, 39c-d; bk ii, 55a;
25 Montaigne: Essays, 210d-211a bk IV, 124d-125a; i26d-127a; 150b-d; 151b-
27 Shakespeare: Henry VIII, act iii, sc ii [435- 152a; bk vi, 201d-202c; bk vii, 218c-220a;
457] 573c-d BK IX, 308a-c
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 80b-81a 6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, bk i, 355b-c;
31 Descartes: Meditations, iii, 88d-89a / Objec- 382c-d
tions and Replies, 227b-228a 7 Plato: Apology, 206b-d / Laws, bk iv, 681b-
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part v, prop 14-16 456b-c; 683b
prop 18-20 456d-458a; prop 32-34 460b-d; 12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk ii, ch 16-17, 158a-
prop 36-37 461a-c 161a; BK III, ch 24, 204c-d; 208d-210a; bk iv,
32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk xii [561-566] 331b CH I 213a-223d passim, csp 218b-219a; ch 3
33 Pascal: Provincial Letters, 78b-80b / Pensees, 224b-d; ch 7, 234b; ch 12, 242d-243c
430 245a-247b; 463 255a; 468 255b-256a; 12 Aurelius: Meditations, bk hi, sect 13 262c;
471 256a-b; 476 256b-257a; 479 237b; 482- BK V, sect 27 272d; bk vi, sect 10 274b-c;
483 258a-b; 485 258b; 487-489 258b-259a; bk IX, sect I 291a-c
491 259a; 544 266a; 821 331b-332a 13 Virgil: Aeneid, bkiii [84-120] 149b-150b; bk
35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk ii, ch vii, IV [259-282) 174a-b; [356-361] 176b-177a
sect 5-6 132c-d 15 Tacitus: Histories, bk iv, 292c-294a
568 THE GREAT IDEAS
28-30 / Deuteronomy, 10-12; 14:22-17:1 /
(3. Man's relation to God or the gods. ^d. Obedi- Joshua, 22:10-34— (D) Josue, 22:10-34 / /
ence to God or the gods.) Samuel, 15 esp 15:22-23— (D) / Kings, 15 esp
18 Augustine: Confessions, bk hi, par 15 17a-b 15 :22-23 / / Kiiigs, 8 18 :2i-39— (D) /// Kings,
;
XII [386-410] 327b-328a, [561-566] 331b / 5 Euripides: Trojan Women [1277-1283] 280d
Samson Agonistes [373-419] 347b-348b / Are- / Bacchantes 340a-352a,c esp [200-209] 341c,
opagitica, 394b-395b [337-433] 342c-343b / Iphigenia at Aulis 425a-
33 Pascal: Pensees, 460 254b; 476 256b-257a; 439d
482 258a; 489,491 259a; 531 264b; 539 265b 5 Aristophanes: Peace [173-195] 528a; [922-
35 Locke: Toleration, 15d-16a; 16c / Civil Gov- 1126] 536c-539a / Birds 542a-563d
ernment, ch II, sect 6 26b-c / Human Under- 6 Herodotus: History, bk i, 6a; lOa-lld; 20 d-
standing, bk I, CH II, sect 5-6 105a-c 22a; 31a-c; 40d-41b; 48c; bk ii, 57b-60a;
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk i, 2a-b; 79a-c; 86c; bk hi, 95a-c; bk iv, 126d-127a;
bk XII, 85d-86a 134a; 140c-d; 142b-c; 155c-156a; 156d-157a;
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 259b-260a bk V, 175d-176a; bk vi, 196d-197a; 199d-
42 Kant: Practical Reason, 321b-329a; 345c- d / 200a; 200d; 205c-d; bk vii, 226c; 235a;
Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 383b,d-384a,c / 248b-c; 250b-d; bk vhi, 267a; 270b-c; 282b-c
judgement, 504b-505a; 509a-c; 593a-d; 611a-c 6 Thucydides Peloponnesian
: War, bk ii,
43 Mill: Liberty, 296b-d 407a-b; bk vi, 517d-518a
44 Bosw ELI.: Johnson, 394a 7 Plato: Phaedrus, 127c-128a / Symposium,
48 Melville: Mo^jv Dic{, 30a-36b 156d-157a / Euthyphro, 197d-198c / Phaedo,
52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, bk hi, 64c- 251d / Republic, bk i, 295a-d; 297a-b; bk
67a; bk v, 127b-137c passim; bk vii, 177b-180a n, 313d-314d; bk iv, 345d-346a / Timaeus,
54 Freud: General Introduction, 582a / Civiliza- 447a / Laws, bk iv, 683a-b; bk vii, 721a-c;
tion and Its Disco Jitents, 776b bk viii, 731d-732d; bk x, 768d-769c; bk
xii, 791d-792a
3e. The worship of God or the gods: prayer, 8 Aristotle: .Topics, bk i, ch ii [i05'*2-6] 148c
propitiation, sacrifice
/ Heavens, bk i, ch i [268-^12-15] 359a-b
Old Testament: Genesis, 4:3-7; 15:7-21; 22:1- 9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk i, ch 12 347a-b; bk iv,
18 / Exodus passim, esp 12, 13:11-16, 15:1-21, CH 2 [1122^18-23] 369c; bk viii,ch 9 [1160*19-
23:18-19 / Leviticus passim, esp 2, 4-7, 16-17, 29] 412b-c / Politics, bk vii, ch 9 [1329^26-34]
22:1-24:9, 27:1-34 / Numbers, 5-8; 15; 18-19; 533d
b
288a-289a / Franklins Tale [11,176-206] 353b- 11:44-45; 19:2; 20:7-8 / Psalms, 82:6-7— (D)
354a; [11,340-398] 356b-357a / Prioress's Tale Psalms, 81:6-7 / Isaiah, 40:10-31; 42:8; 46—
391a-395b / Parsons Tale, par 93-94 547b- (D) Isaias, 40:10-31; 42:8; 46 / Ezel^iel, 16:17-
548a 19; 28:1-19— (D) Ezechiel, 16:17-19; 28:1-19
23 Hobbes: Let'iathan, part i, 80c; 81c-d; part / Daniel, 6:7-9
n, 154d-155a; 161b-163d; part hi, 182d-183b; Apocrypha: Judith, 3:8; 5:23-6:4— (D) OT, Ju-
part iv, 261a-c dith, 3:12-13; 5:27-6:4 / Wisdom of Solomon,
570 THE GREAT IDEAS 3//o4
4, rep 1-2 487d-488c; q a 2, ans 489d-
92,
(3. Man's God or the gods. 3/. The
relation to 490c; Q 93 492a-501c; q 106, a i, rep 3 545d-
imitation ofGod or the gods: the divine 546d; PART i-ii, Q I, A 8, 615a-c; q 2, a 4, rep
element in human nature; the deification I 618a-d; q 3, a 5, rep i 626b-627a
of men; man as the image of God.) 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 55,
2.'.2y, 13-15 — {D) OT, Boof^ of Wisdom, 2:27,; A 2, REP 3 27a-d; q 87, a 8, rep 2 191d-192d;
13-15 / Ecclesiasticus, 17:1-3— (D) OT, Eccle- Q 93, A 3 217b-218a; a 6, ans 219d-220d; q
siasticus, 17:1-3 no, A 4, ans 350d-351d; part ii-ii, q 2, a 9,
New Testament: /0A72, 10:34-35 / Acts, 12:21- rep 3 398c-399b; q 10, a ii, ans 435d-436b;
23; 14:7-18; 17:27-29; 28:3-6 / i?ow^;2i-, 1:14- Q 19, A 3, rep I 466d-467c; q 31, a 3, rep 2
32 / / Corinthians, 11 :7; 15:49 / // Corinthians, 538b-539c; part hi, q 4, a i, rep 2 730d-
3:18 / Colossians, 3:8-10 / // Thessalonians, 731d; PART III SUPPL, Q 71, A 12, CONTRARY
2:3-4 / James, y-^ / I Peter, i 15-16 / // Peter, : 914c-915c; q 75, a i, rep 4 935b-937a; q 91,
1:3-4 A 2, CONTRARY 1017c-1020c; Q 92, A 3, REP 9
6 Herodotus: History, bk i, 7a-b; 12d-13b; 1034b-1037c; q 93, a i, rep i 1037d-1039a
14a-d; bk 79d-80a; bk iv, 140c-141a; bk v,
ii, 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, purgatory, xvi [85-
168d-169a; 183d-184a; bk vii, 217c; 235b-c 90] 77d; XXV [58-78] 92a; paradise, v [19-
7 Plato: Phaedrus, 127c-128a / Ion, 144b-145c 24] 112b; VII [64-84] 115d-116a; xiii [52-78]
/ Republic, bk ii-iii, 320c-328a / Timaeus, 126a-b
452c-d 466a-b 476a-b / Theaetetus, 530b-531a
; ; 22 Chaucer: Franklin's Tale [11,189-192] 353b-
/ Laws, bk IV, 681b-683b; bk v, 686d-687c 354a
8 Aristotle Metaphysics, bk i, ch 2 [982^28-
: 23 Hobbes: Let'iathan, part i, 82b-c; part iv,
983^11] 501a-b; bk xii, ch 7 [1072^14-29] 263a-d
602d-603a; ch 9 605a-d / Soul, bk ii, ch 4 25 Montaigne: fi^avi-, 215a; 233b-234a; 248a-c;
[415^22-^8] 645c-d 256c-d; 294a-b; 541d-543a,c
9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk i, ch 9 [1099^9-18] 27 Shakespeare: Hamlet, act ii, sc ii [314-322]
345a; ch 12 347a-b; bk vii, ch i [1145^15-33] 43d; ACT IV, sc iv [33-66] 59a-c
395a-b; bk x, ch 8 [1178^8-27] 433b-c 28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 428b-c
12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk v [1-54] 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 41b-d; 80b-
61a-d 81a
12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk i, ch 3 108b-c; ch 31 Descartes: Objections and Replies, 214a-d
6 110c-112b; CH 9 114c-116b; ch 13-14 120b- 32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk ii [345-353] 118b-
121c; CH 17 122d-124a esp 123d; bk ii, ch 7-8 119a; BK VII [150-173] 220b-221a; [519-528]
145b-147c; ch 14, 153d-154c; bk hi, ch 13, 228b; BK XI [466-522] 309b-310b / Areopa-
188b-d; bk iv, ch ii, 240d-241a gitica, 384a
12 AuRELius: Meditations, bk ii, sect i 256b, d; 33 Pascal: Pensees, 430-431 245a-247b; 434-435
sect 13 258c; bk hi, sect 12-13 262b-c; bk 248a-251a; 485 258b; 537 265b; 555 270a
v, sect 27 272d; bk xii, sect 2-3 307b-d 35 Locke: Civil Government, ch ii, sect 6 26b-c
13 Virgil: Aeneid, bk i [283-290] llOb-llla; 37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 187d-188a
[586-593] 119a-b 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 12b-c; 28b-d;
14 Plutarch: Romulus, 27d-29c / Numa Pom- 547a-c
pilius, 50d-51c; 52b-53c / Alexander, 541a- 41 Gibbon: Declifie and Fall, 136b; 379b-d
542a; 553b-554b / Dion, 784d-785a 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, additions, 90,
15 Tacitus: Annals, bk i, 4c-d; bk iv, 73b-d; 130d / Philosophy of History, intro, 168b-d;
80c-d / Histories, bk iv, 285d-286a; 287b PART I, 224a-228a; 234d-235c; 245a; part ii,
16 Kepler: Epitome, bk iv, 849a-b / Harmonies 266d-267a; 268b-271c esp 270c-271c; part hi,
of the World, 1038a; 1048a 306a-d; 308a-b; part iv, 339b-d; 349c-350c
17 Plotinus First Ennead, tr ii 6b-10a / Second
: 47 Goethe: Faust, part i [614-736] 17a-19b;
Ennead, tr ix, ch 15 74d-75b / Fourth Ennead, [1566-1569] 38a
TR III, ch 12, 148d 48 Melville: Moby Dic{, 84b-85a
18 Augustine: Confessions, bk ii, par 14 12a-b; 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk xi, 525c-526b
BK par 26 25c-d; par 31 26c-27a; bk vi,
IV, 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, bk v,
par 4 36a-b; bk xiii, par 32 119a-b / City of 121d-122c; bk xi, 313c-314d; 345a-c
God, BK VIII, CH 8 270a-d; bk xi, ch 26-28 54 Freud: Group Psychology, 692a-693a esp 693a
336d-338d; bk ch 23 357d-358a / Chris-
xii, / Civilization and Its Discontents, 778d-779a;
tian Doctrine, bk i, ch 22 629b-630a 790d
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 3, a
I, REP 2 14b-15b; q 14, a 2, rep 3 76d'77d;
4. The divine nature in itself: the divine attri-
butes
Q 26, A 4 151c-152a,c; q 27, a i, axs 153b-
154b; Q 59, A I, contrary 306c-307b; q 72, 7 Plato: Phaedrus, 126a / Symposium, 167b-d
A I, rep 3 368b-369d; q 77, a 2, ans and rep 9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk x, ch 8 [1178^8-23]
I 401b-d; Q 88, a 3, rep 3 472c-473a; q 91, a 433 b-c
4J to ^b Chaftkr 29: GOD 571
12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk ii, ch 8, 146a; bk 31 Descartes: Meditations, 11 1 81 d 89a; v 93a-
III, CH 13, 188b c 96a / Objections and Replies, 110a 112a; 112d-
17 Plotinus ¥ifth Ennead, tr i-vi 208a-237d pas-
:
114c; 126b-127c; poshlath v 131b c; axiom
sim/ 5/ArM Enriead, tr vii-ix 321b 360d passim I 131d; AXIOM X 132b; prop i 132b c; 158b-
18 Augustine: Confessions, bk i, par 4 2a; bk 162a; 217d 218a
IV, par 29 26b; bk vii, par 1-8, 43b 45d / City 31 Spino/.a: Ethics, part i, ni.i- i 355a; oi.i 6 8
of God, bk VIII, CH 6 268d-269c 355b-c; prop 6-8 356b 357d; prop ii 358b-
19 Aquinas: Surmna T/ieologica, part i, qq 3-1 i 359b; prop 20 363d 364a; prop 24 365a;
14a-50b; q 84, a 2, ans 442b-443c PROP 34 369a
21 Dante: Difine Comedy, paradise, xxxiii 33 Pascal: Pensees, 469 256a
[76-145] 157a-d 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 143a 145c; 153a; 177b-
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part ii, 162a-163b; part 192d csp 177b-179c, 187a c, 192c d; 205a b;
IV, 271b-c 239a-c / Practical Reason, 344c-355d csp 353a-
31 Descartes: part iv, 52b-d /
Discourse, 354d / Judgement, 570b-571c; 606d 609b csp
81d-89a / Objections and Re-
Meditations, iii 608b 609a
plies, PROP III 132d-133a; 211c-212a; 232b 46 Iecjel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 280,
I
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part i 355a-372d csp def 4,6 95a / Philosophy of History, part hi, 305c-
355b, prop 5 356b, prop 8-13 356d-359d, 306c
PROP 14, COROL 2-PROP 15 360a-361d, prop
19-20 363c-364a; part ii, prop 1-2 373d-374a 4^. The unity and simplicity of the divine nature
34 Newton: Principles, bk hi, general schol, 8 Aristotle: bk viii, ch 10 353b-355d
Physics,
369b-371a / Optics, bk hi, 542a-543a / Metaphysics, bk ch 7 [1073*2-1 603a-b;
xii, 1 ]
ANS and REP 3 41d-42c; q 11, a 4, ans 49d- REP I 711d-712d; q 3, a 2, rep 3 724a-c;
50b; q 13, a II, ANS 73c-74b; q 14, a 13, rep a 3 724c-725b; q 6, a 5, rep 2 744a-d
I 86d-88c; q 19, a 3, rep 6 llOb-lllc; q 44, 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, paradise, xhi [52-
A I, ANS 238b-239a; q 50, a 2, rep 3 270a- 66] 126a; xxiv [115-154] 143d-144b; xxix
272a; q 54, a i, ans 285a-d; a 3, rep 2 286c- [127-145] 151c-d; xxxiii [76-145] 157a-d
287b; Q 75, A 5, REP 4 382a-383b; part i-ii, 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part ii, 151d
Q 3, A 7, ans 628a-d 31 Descartes: Discourse, part iv, 52a-d /
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part hi, q 3, Meditations, iii, 86a-88b csp 88b / Objections
A 2, REP 3 724a-c and Replies, 122 b-c; 232b
572 THE GREAT IDEAS Ac to Ad
102:26-27; 103:13-18; 136; 145:10-13; 146:5-
(4. The divine nature in itself: the divine at- 10— (D) Psalms, 9:7-8; 9:16; 28:10; 32:10-11;
tributes. 4b. The unity and simplicity of the
44:7; 47 esp 47:9, 47:15; 65:7; 89 esp 89:1-4;
divine nature^ 92:1-2; loi esp 101:12-13, 101:27-28; 102:13-
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part i, prop 2-8 355d- 18; 135; 144:10-13; 145:5-10 / Isaiah, 40:8,28;
357d; prop 12-14 359b'360a; part ii, prop 43:10-13; 57:15— (D) Isaias, 40:8,28; 43:10-
4 374c; PROP 7, scHOL, 375b 135 57-15 / Jeremiah, 10:10— (£)) Jeremias,
35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk i, ch hi, 10:10 / Lamentations, 5:19 / Daniel, 6:26 /
SECT 15 116c-d; BK II, CH XXIII, SECT 35 Micah, 5:2— (Z)) Micheas, 5:2 / Malachi, 3:6
213b-c — (D) Malachias, 3:6
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 307b-c Apocrypha: Ecclesiasticus, 36:17; 39*^0; 42:21 —
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 229c-230b (D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 36:19; 39:25; 42:21-22
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 176b-c; 192c-d New Testament: Matthew, 24:35 / Romans,
46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, part i, 224a-b; 1:2o-25 / Colossians, 1 :i6-iy / I Timothy, 1 :i7;
227d-228a; part hi, 306a; part iv, 322a-c 6:15-16 / Hebrews, 1:8-12; 7:23-25; 13:7-8 /
James, 1:17 / Revelation, 1:17-18; 10:6; 11:15-
4c. The immateriality of God iy—{D) Apocalypse, 1:17-18; 10:6; 11:15-17
8 Aristotle: Metaphysics, bk xii, ch 6 [1071^ 7 Plato: Republic, bk ii, 322d-323c; 324a-b
2-23] 601 b-c; 8 [1074^31-39] 604d
cH 8 Aristotle: Physics, bk viii, ch 6 [258^10-
12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk v [146-155] 259^31] 344b-345d / Heavens, bk i, ch 9
63a [279^23-^4] 370c-d; BK II, CH 3 [286*8-13] 377c
14 Plutarch: Numa Pompilius, 53b-c / Generation and Corruption, bk ii, ch io
15 Tacitus Histories, bk v, 296a
: [337*15-23] 439a-b / Metaphysics, bk xii,
17 Plotinus: Sixth Ennead, tr i, ch 26, 266a; CH I [1069*30-^2] 598b-c; ch 6-7 601b-603b;
CH 27, 266c CH 9 605a-d esp [1075*5-11] 605c-d / Soul,
18 Augustine: Confessions, bk iv, par 29 26b; BK II, CH 4 [415*22-^8] 645c-d
par 31 26c-27a; bk v, par 19-20 32b-33a; 9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk vii, ch 14 [1154^20-31]
bk VI, par 4 36a-b; bk vii, par 1-2 43b-44a / 406c
City of God, bk viii, ch 5-6 267d-269c 15 Tacitus: Histories, bk v, 296a
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 3, a 16 Kepler: Harmonies of the World, 1071b
2 15c-16a; a 3, ans 16a-d; a 8, ans and rep 17 Plotinus: Third Ennead, tr vii, ch 2-6 119c-
3 19d-20c; Q 7, A I, ans and rep 2 31a-d; q 14, 122d esp CH 5 121c-122a / Sixth Eiinead,
A I, ans 75d-76c; a ii 84c-85c; q 40, a i, rep TR VIII, CH II 348b-c; ch 18-21 351d-353d
I 213b-214b; q 50, a i, rep i 269b-270a; a 2, 18 Augustine: Confessions, bk i, par 10 3b-c;
REP 3 270a-272a; q 54, a i, ans 285a-d; a 3, bk IV, par 26 25c-d; par 29 26b; bk vii, par
rep 2 286c-287b; q 75, a 5, rep 1,4 382a-383b; 1-7 43b-45d; par 16-18 48c-49b; par 21 49d-
Q 84, A 2, ANS 442b-443c; a 4, rep i 444d- 50a; par 23 50b-c; par 26, 51c; bk xi, par 12-
446b; Q 86, a 2, rep i 462a-463a; q 91, a 2, 16 92b-93a; bk xh, par ii lOld; par 18, 103a-b;
ANS 485b-486b; q 105, a 3, ans 540c-541b par 40 109b-110a; bk xiii, par 44 122d / City
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part hi, q 2, of God, bk vii, ch 30 261b-d; bk viii, ch ii,
a I, ans and rep 2 710a-711c; a 2, ans 711d- 272c; bk xi, ch 10 327d-328d; ch 21-22 333a-
712d; Q 25, A 3, rep i 841c-842d; part hi 334c esp CH 22, 334c; bk xii, ch 1-3 342b, d-
suppl, q 92, A I, rep 12 1025c-1032b 344b; CH 14-17 350d-354a esp ch 14 350d-
23 HoBBEs: Leviathan, part hi, 172d-173a 351b, ch 17 353a-354a / Christian Doctrine, bk
28 Gilbert: Loadstone, bk v, 105a I, CH 5-6 625d-626b; ch 8 626c-627a; ch 10
361d; PART II, def i 373a; prop 1-2 373d- rep 4 14b-15b; qq 9-10 38c-46d; q 14, a 9,
374a; prop 5-7 374c-375c ans 83b-d; a 13, ans and rep 3 86d-88c; a 15
34 Newton: Optics, bk hi, 529a 89b-90b; q 18, a 3 106b-107c; q 19, a 7 114d-
35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk i, ch hi, 115d; q 22, A I, rep 2 127d-128d; q 26, a i,
SEC^ 17 117a-c; bk ii, ch xxiii, sect 28 211b- REP 2 150b-c; Q 42, A 2 225d-227a; q 43, a 2
d; BK III, ch VI, SECT II, 271b-c; bk iv, ch 230d-231c; q 51, a 3, rep 3 277a-278c; q 61,
X, SECT 8-17 351a-353c a 2, ANS 315c-316a
42 Kant: Practical Reason, 334b-335b 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 6r,
A 5, ANS 58b-59d; q 91, a i 208b-d; part hi,
4d,The eternity and immutability of God q I, A I, rep 3 701d-703a; a 5, rep 3 707a-
Old Testament: Exodus, 15:18 / Deuteronomy, 708c; Q 2, A I, ANS 710a-711c
32:39-40 / / Chronicles, 16:34-36— (D) IPara- 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, pap^dise, vii [64-
lipomenon, 16:34-36 / Psalms, 9:6-7; 10:16; 72] 115d; xiii [52-66] 126a; xxiv [130-141]
29:10-11; 33:10-11; 45:6; 48 csp 48:8, 48:14; 144a; xxix [13-36] 150b-c; xxxiii 158b-
66:7; 90 esp 90:1-4; 93:1-2; 102 esp 102:11-12, 157d
4<f to \f Chapter 29: GOD 573
23 HoBBEs: Leviathan, part i, 79d-80a; pari hi, 33 Pascal: Pensees, 2^2^^ 213b 216a; 469 256a
173a 34 Nrwrov: Principles, bk hi, (;i;ni:rai. scik)l,
25 Montaigne: Essays, 293d 294a 370a
28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 428c 35 LocKi:: Human Understanding, hk h, cm xv,
31 \)^scKKT¥.^: Discourse, part iv, 52b-c / Medi- SECT 2 4 162c 163b; sect 12 165b-c; ch xvii,
tations, III, 84a-b; 86a; v, 94d-95a SECT I 167d 168a; sect 16-17 172a-c; sect 20
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part i, def 6 355b; def 8 172d-173c; ch xxih, sect ^-36 212d 213d:
355c; PROP 6 356b-c; prop 11-13 358b 359d; BK HI, CH VI, sect II 271b d
prop 17 362b-363c; prop 19-20 363c-364a; 35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, sect 117 436a
PROP 33, scHOL 2, 367d-368c esp 368b-c; 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 188c; 192c-d; 201b c;
part II, PROP 44, coROL 2-PROP 47 390a-391a; 205a-b / Practical Reason, 325d-326a; 344b c
PART V, PROP 17 456c-d / Judgement, 590b-d
32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk hi [1-12] 135b; 46 He(;i:l: Philosophy of History, parp i, 237d-
[372-382] 143b 238a; 246b-c
33 Pascal: Pensees, 469 256a
34 Newton: Principles, bk hi, general schol, 4/. The perfection or goodness of God
370a-371a New Testament: Mattheiu, 5:48 / Lul^, 18:19
35 Locke: Hinnan Understanding, bk h, ch xv, 7 Plato: Republic, bk h, 321d-323a / Timaeus,
sect 3-4 162d-163b; ch xvh, sect 16-17 447d-448a / Theaetetus, 530b-531a
172a'C; sect 20 172d-173c; ch xxiii, sect 21 8 Aristotle: Metaphysics, bk xh, ch 7 602a'
209c; BK IV, CH X 349c-354c esp sect 3-5 603 b
349d-350b, sect 8-1 i 351a-352a 9 Arisiotle: Ethics, bk i, ch 12 347a-b
35 Berkeley: Human Kjiotvledge, sect 117 436a 12 Epictltus: Discourses, bk h, ch 8 146a-147c
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 176b-c; 190c; 192c-d / 16 Kepler: Harmonies of the World, 1009a
Practical Reason, 334b-335b; 344b-c; 352a-b 18 Augustine: Confessions, bk i, par 12 4a; bk
/ Judgement, 592a-c hi, par 12 16b; bk iv, par 24 25b-c; bk v, par
46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, intro, 156d- 19-20 32b-33a; bk vii, par 1-7 43b-45d esp
157b; PART III, 306a par 4-7 44b-45d; par 16-23 48c-50c; bk x,
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk xiv, 608a-b; par 38 81a; bk xi, par 6 90c-d; bk xh, par
epilogue II, 684c-d 18, 103b; BK xiH, par 1-5 llOd-llld; par 53
124d-125a,c / City of God, bk xi, ch id
4^. The infinity of God: the freedom of an 327d-328d; bk xh, ch 1-3 342b,d-344b; ch
infinite being 8-9 346d-348b / Christian Doctrine, bk i,
8 Aristotle: Metaphysics, bk xh, ch 7 [1073* ch 5-7 625d-626c; ch 31-32 633b-d
3-10] 603a-b 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 2,
18 Augustine: Confessions, bk v, par 19-20 32b- a I, rep 2 lOd-lld; a 3, ans and rep i 12c-
33a; bk vii, par 7 45a-d; par 20-21 49d-50a; 14a; q 3, a I, ans 14b-15b; a 2, ans 15c-16a;
BK xiii, par 12 113b-d A 7, rep 2 19a-c; q 4 20c-23b; q 6 28b-30d; q
19 Aquinas: Stimma Theologica, part i, q 2, a 3, 13, A 2, ANS 63c-64d; a ii, rep 2 73c-74b; q
rep I 12c-14a; q 7 31a-34c; q 14, a i, ans 75d- 18, A 3 106b-107c; q 19, a i, rep 1-3 108d-
76c; A 3 77d-78b; q 25, a 2, ans and rep i 109c; Q 21, A I, rep 4 124b-125b; q 51, a i,
144c-145b; q 54, a 2, ans 285d-286c; q 75, a rep 3 275b-276b; q 61, a 3, rep 2 316a-d; q
5, rep 1,4 382a-383b; q 79, a 2, ans 414d- 62, A 8, ANS and rep 1-2 323c-324a; q 66, a i,
416a; q 86, a 2, rep i 462a-463a; part i-ii, CONTRARY 343d-345c; q 84, a 2, ans and rep
Q I, A 4, rep I 612a-613a 3 442b-443c; q 91, a i, ans 484a-485b; q 100,
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 64, A 2, ans 521c-522b; q 103 528a-534b passim;
A 4, rep 3 69b-70a; q 87, a 4, rep 2 188b-d; Q 104, A 3, rep 2 537b-d; a 4, ans 538a-c; q
PART ii-ii, q 20, A 2, rep 2 475d-476c; q 24, 105, A 4, ans 541c-542a; a 5, ans 542a-543b;
a 8, ANS 495b-496a; part hi, q i, a 2, rep 2 part i-ii, q I, a 4, REP I 612a-613a; q 2, a 4,
703a-704d; q 2, a i, ans 710a-711c; q 3, a i, rep I 618a-d; q 9, a 6 662a-d; q 18, a i, ans
REP I 723b-724a; part hi suppl, q 92, a i, 694a-d; q 19, a 4 705b-c; q 22, a 2, rep i 721c-
rep 6,12 1025c-1032b 722c; Q 24, A 3, REP 2 728c-729c
23 HoBBEs: Leviathan, part h, 162b-c 20 Aquinas: Sumtna Theologica, part i-ii, q 61,
31 Descartes: Meditations, hi, 86a-88d / Ob- A 5, ANS 58b-59d; q 64, a 4, ans and rep 3
jections and Replies, 112a-d; 123c-d; prop hi 69b-70a; part ii-ii, q 9, a 4, rep i 425d-426c;
132d-133a q 13, A I, ans 444b-445a; q 17, a i, ans
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part i, def 2 355a; def 6-7 457a-d; q 23, a 4, ans 485d-486b; q 34, a i,
355b; prop 8-14 356d-360a; prop 15, schol- ans 559a-c; q 39, a 2, rep 3 575b-576b; g
PROP 17 360b-363c; prop 21, demoxNst 364a-c; 184, A 2, ANS 629d-630d; part hi, q i, a i,
prop 29 366b-c; prop 32-35 367a-369a; part ANS 701d-703a; q 23, a i, ans 833a-d; part hi
II, prop 1-4 373d-374c SUPPL, Q 91, A 2, rep 4,10 1017c-1020c; q 99,
32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk vih [411-421] 241a A 2, REP 3 1081a-d
574 THE GREAT IDEAS 4^ to Ah
A I, REP 2 12b-13c; Q 61, A 5, ANS 58b-59d;
(4, The divine nature in itself: the divine at-
Q 93, A I 215b,d-216c; part hi, q 6, a 2, ans
tributes. 4f. The perfection or goodness of 741c-742a
God.) 30 Bacon: Novum Organum, bk ii, aph 15 149a
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, purgatory, xxviii 31 Descartes: Objections and Replies, 228a-c
[91-93] 97a; paradise, vii [64-66] 115d; xix 31 Spinoza: Ethics, part i, prop 17, schol 362c-
[40-90] 135c-136a 363c; PROP 21 364a-c; prop 32, corol 2 367b;
25 MotiT AiG^Ti: Essay s,ZQQc-d prop 33, SCHOL 2, 368b-c; part ii, prop i
31 Descartes: Discourse, part iv, 52a-d; 53d / 373d-374a; prop 3-6 374a-375a
Meditations, i, 166.-11 c; iii-iv, 86a-93a / Ob- 35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk ii, ch i,
jections and Replies, 123d-124c; def viii 130d; sect 10, 123b; ch x, sect 9 143a-c
142c 42 Kant: Pure Reason,, 33a-d; 52c-53b / Practi-
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part i, prop 33, schol 2 cal Reason, 303b-304a; 344b-c; 350c-351b /
367d-369a; part v, prop 17, demonst 456c-d Judgement, 590b-d; 592a-c; 600d-601c; 610b-
33 Pascal: Pensees, 580 276b 613a,c
34 Newton: Principles, bk hi, general schol,
370a-371a passim
The happiness and glory of God
4:h.
35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk hi, ch vi, Old Testament: Exodus, 15:1-21; 33:13-23 /
sect 11-12 271b-272b / Chronicles, 16:23-27; 29:11-13 — (D) / Par-
35 Hume: Human Understanding, sect viii, div alipomenon, 16:23-27;
29:11-13 / Psalms,
78-81 485c-487a; sect xi, div 106-107 499b- 8; 19; 24; 57:5-11; 96:3-6; 104:1; 113:4;
500b passim; div 113, 502a-b 138:5; 145:11-12— (D) Psalms, 8; 18; 23;
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 81b-c 56:5-11; 95:3-6; 103:1; 112:4; 137:5; 144:11-
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 205a-b / Fund. Prin. 12 / Isaiah, 6:1-4; 42:8— (Z)) Isaias, 6:1-4;
Metaphysic of Morals, 263a-b / Practical Rea- 42:8
son, 307a-d; 325d-326a; 342c; 345a-c; 351b- Apocrypha: Judith, 16:13— (D) GT, Judith,
352c / Judgement, 592a-c 16:16 / Rest of Esther, 13:12-14— (D) OT,
Esther, 13:12-14 / Song of Three Children, 28-
4g. The intellect of God 3i-(D) OT, Daniel, 3:51-53
8 Aristotle: Metaphysics, bk xii, ch 7 [1072^ New Testament: Mar/{, 8:38 /John, 5:44; 8:54
14-29] 602d-603a; ch 9 605a-d / Hebrews, 2:10 / I Peter, 4:7-11 / // Peter,
9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk x, ch 8 [1178^8-23] 1:16-18 / Revelation, 5:9-14; 7:9-12; 21 (D) —
433b-c Apocalypse, 5:9-14; 7:9-12; 21
bk i, ch 14 120d-121c;
12 'EvicT'ETUs'. Discourses, 8 Aristotle: Metaphysics, bk xii, ch 7 [1072^
bk II, ch
146a 8, 13-29] 602d-603a
17 Plotinus: Second Ennead, tr ix, ch i 65d-66d 9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk vii, ch 14 [1154^^20-31]
/ Fifth Ennead 208a-251d esp tr v-vi 228b- 406c; BK X, ch 8 [1178^8-23] 433b-c
237d,TRix246c-251d 18 Augustine: Confessions, bk xiii, par 4 111c /
18 Augustine: City of God, bk viii, ch 6 268d- City of God, bk v, ch 14 220a-d; bk viii,
269c; bk xi, ch 21 333a-d; bk xii, ch 17 353a- CH 6 268d'269c; bk xii, ch
17 353a-354a
354a; bk xxii, ch 29, 614b / Christian Doc- 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 26
bk i, ch 13 627d
trine, 150a-152a,c; q 62, a 3, rep 3 319c-320b; a 4,
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 3, a i, ans 320b'321b; q 63, a 3 327b-328b; q 65, a
REP 2-3 14b-15b; q 14, aa 1-4 75d-79a; q 18, 2, ans 340b-341b; q 70, a 2, ans 364b-365a;
A 3 106b-107c; q 19, a i, ans 108d-109c; a 2, q 73, A 2, REP 3 371b-d; part i-ii, q 2, a 2,
rep 4 109c-110b; a 3, rep 6 llOb-lllc; a 4, rep 2 616d-617b; a 3, ans and rep i 617b-
ans and rep 4 lllc-112c; q 26, a 2 150c-151a; 618a; q 3, a i, rep i 622c-623a; a 2, rep 1,4
Q 27, A 3, rep 3 155c-156a; q 46, a 2, rep 3 623a-624b; a 8, rep 2 628d-629c; q 5, a 3,
253a-255a; q 50, a i, ans 269b-270a; q 54, REP 2 638b-639a; a 7, ans 642a-d
a 2, ans 285d-286c; q 55, a i, ans and rep 3 20 Aquinas Summa Theologica, part hi, q 8,
:
289a-d; a 3, ans 291a-d; q 57, a i, ans 295a-d; A 4, ans 759b-d; q 16, a 4, rep 2 799b-800b;
a 2, ANS 295d-297a; q 59, a 2, ans 307c-308b; Q 26, A I, REP 2 845b-846a; part hi suppl,
Q 79, A I, ans 414a-d; a 2, ans 414d-416a; a 4, q 71, A 8, REP I 909d-910d; q 92, a i, rep 5
ANS 417a-418c; a 10, rep 2 423d-424d; q 84, 1025c-1032b
A 2, ANS 442b-443c; q 85, a 5, ans 457d- 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, paradise, i [1-9]
458d; Q 87, A I, ans 465a-466c; a 3, ans 467b- 106a; XXXIII [46-145] 156c-157d
468a; q 89, a i, ans 473b-475a; q 105, a i, 31 Spinoza: Ethics, part v, prop 17 456G-d;
rep 2 538d-539c; a 3, ans 540c-541b; q 116, PROP 35-36 460d-461c
A I, ANS 592d-593d; part i-ii, q i, a 4, rep i 32 Milton: Upon the Circumcision 12b-13a /
612a-613a; q 19, a 4, ans and rep 3 705b-c Paradise Lost, bk hi [56-415] 136b-144b
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 51, 33 Pascal: Pensees, 233, 216a
5/0 5a Chapter 29: GOD 575
42 Kant: Practical Reason, 347d-348b / Judge-
ment, 594d [fn i] 5a. God as first and as exemplar cause: the re-
lation of divine to natural causation
5. The divine nature in relation to the world or
Old Ti-srAMFNi: Genesis, 1-2; 7:4 / Nehcmiah,
creatures
9:6— (D) // Esdras, 9:6 / Job, 9:1-9; 12;
7 Plato: Republic, bk ii, 321d-322d / Timaeus, 26:7-14; 28:24-27; 36:24-42:2 / Psalms, 8:3;
447b-458b;465d-466a 33:6-9; 65:5-13; 74:16-17; 89:11-12; 95:4-5;
8 Aristotle: Physics, bk vti, ch i 326a-327b; 96:5; 102:25-27; 104; 107:23-30; 115:3;
BK viii, CH 1-6 334a-346b 119:73; 121:2; 136:5-9; 146:5-6; 147-148 (D) —
9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk vii, ch 14 [1154^20-31] Psalms, 8:4; 32:6-9; 64:6-14; 73:16-17; 88:12-
406c; BK X, CH 8 [ii78''8-27] 433b-c 13; 94:4-5; 95:5; 101:26-28; 103; 106:23-30;
12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk hi, ch 22, 195a-b; 113:3; 118:73; 120:2; 135:5-9; 145:5-6; 146-
bk IV, ch II, 240d-241a 148 / Proverbs, 3:19 / Isaiah, 40:26-28; 42:5;
12 Aurelius: Meditations, bk ii, sect 4 257b; 44:24; 45:7-12,18; 48:13; 51:13; 6^:iy-{0)
bk V, SECT 8 269d-270b; bk vi, sect 40-46 Isaias, 40:26-28; 42:5; 44:24; 45:7-12,18;
277d-278d 48:13; 51:13; 65:17 / Jeremiah, 10:12; 27:5;
16 Kepler: Harmonies of the World, 1017b- 3' -355 51:15-16— (D) Jeremias, 10:12; 27:5;
1018a; lOrib 31:35; 51:15-16 / Amos, 5:8 / Zechariah, 12:1
17 Plotinus: Fourth Ennead, tr hi, ch 13 — (D) Zacharias, 12:1 / Malachi, 2:10 — (D)
149b-d Malachias, 2:10
18 Augustine: Confessions, bk i, par 4 2a; par Apocrypha: Judith, 16:14— (D) OT, Judith, 16:17
10 3b-c; BK IV, par 25 25c; bk iv, par ^-bk v, / Rest of Esther, 13:10— (D) OT, Esther, 13:10
par I 26c-27b; bk vii, par 1-8, 43b-45d; par / Wisdom of Solomon, 1:14; 2:23; 9:1-2; 11:17
16-23 48c-50c; bk x, par 38 81a; bk xi, par 6 — (D) OT, Boo/{of Wisdom, i :i4; 2:23; 9:1-2;
90c-d; bk XIII, par 19 115c-d / City of God, 11:18 / Ecclesiasticus, 18:1; 24:8-9; 33:10-13;
BK VII, CH 29-31 261a-262a; bk viii, ch i-io 39:16-35; 43 —
(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 18:1;
264b,d-271d; bk x, ch 1-2 298b,d-300a; bk 24:12-14; 33:10-14; 39:21-41; 43 / Bel and
XI, ch 24 335c-336a / Christian Doctrine, bk i, Dragon, 5 —(Z)) OT, Daniel, 14:4 / II Macca-
CH9-io627a'b bees, 7:23,28— (D) OT, // Machabees, 7:23,28
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, qq 14- New Testament: John, 1:1-3 / Acts, 7:49-50;
25 75c-150a; q 84, a 2, ans 442b-443c 14:14-17; 17:22-28 / Colossians, 1:16-17 /
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, paradise, i [1-3] Hebrews, 1:10-11; 2:10; 3:4; 11:3 / II Peter,
106a; [97-142] 107b-d; 11 [112-148] 109a-b; x 3:5-7 / Revelation, 4:11; 10:6; 14:7— (D)
[1-27] 120b-c; XIII [52-87] 126a-b; xix [40-90] Apocalypse, 4:11; 10:6; 14:7
135c-136a; xxvii [100-120] 148b-c; xxviii 7 Plato: Republic, bk x, 427c-429c / Timaeus,
148d-150b; xxxiii [76-145] 157a-d 447a-448b / Sophist, 577d-578b / Statesman,
28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 428c-d 587a-589c / Laws, bk x, 758b-765c esp 762b-
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 38a 765c
31 Descartes: Discourse, part iv, 52a-d / Ob- 8 Aristotle: bk viii, ch 1-6 334a-
Physics,
jections and Replies, 123c-d; 214a-d; 229c-d 346b and Corruption, bk 11, ch 10
/ Generation
32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk viii [412-436] [336^25-34] 438d; [337^15-23] 439a-h/ Meta-
241a-b physics, BK I, CH 2 [983*7-9] 501b; bk xii, ch 4
34 Newton: Principles, bk hi, general schol, [1070^22-35] 600b; CH 5 [1071*30-36] 601a
369b-371a / Optics, bk hi, 542a-543a 9 Aristotle: Motion of Animals, ch 3 [699*11]-
35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk ii, ch xvii, CH 4 [700*5] 234a-235a
SECT I 167d-168a; bk hi, ch vi, sect 11-12 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk v [146-194]
271b-272b 63a-c
35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, sect 57 423d- 12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk i, ch 14 120d-121c
424a 16 Ptolemy: Almagest, bk i, 5a-b
35 Hume: Human Understanding, sect xi, div 16 Kepler: Epitome, bk iv, 853b-854a / Har-
106 499b-c; div 113 502a-d monies of the World, 1017b-1018a; 1025a-b;
37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 186c-d; 187d-188a 1049b-1050a; 1061a
38 Rousseau: Social Contract, bk iv, 439a 18 Augustine: Confessions, bk i, par 10 3b-c;
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 81b-c; 183c;307b-c; par 12 4a; bk vii, par 16-23 48c-50c; bk xi,
346b-347a par 4-1 1 90a-92b; bk xii, par 2-9 99c-101c;
42 Kant: Practical Reason, 303b-304a; 321b-c; par 14-40 102b-110a esp par 38 108d-109a; bk
325d-326a; 327d-328b; 342c; 344b-c; 345a-c; XIII, par 6-48 112a-124a / City of God, bk vii,
15; 44:20-21; 69:5; 73:11; 94:7-12; 113:4-6; 617b-618a; g 3, a 5, rep i 626b-627a; g 14,
139; 147:4-5,15-18— (D) Psalms, 32:3-15; A I, REP 2 677b-678a; g 40, a 3, rep i 794c-
43:21-22; 68:6; 72:11; 93:7-12; 112:4-6; 138; 795a
146:4-5; 147:15-18 / Proverbs, 3:19-20; 5:21; 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 51,
15:3,11; 16:2; 24:12 / Isaiah, 29:15-16; 40:13- A I, rep 2 12b-13c; g 61, a 5, ans 58b-59d;
14,27-28; 46:9-10; 47:10-11 (D) Isaias, — g 79, A I, ANS 156b-157b; g 91, a 3, rep i
29:15-16; 40:13-14,27-28; 46:9-10; 47:10-11 209d-210c; g 93, a i 215b,d-216c; g 100, a 9,
/ Jeremiah, 1:5; 16:14-17; 17:9-10; 20:12; ans 261b-262b; g 102, a i, ans 270c-271b;
23:23-24— (D) Jeremias, 1:5; 16:14-17; 17:9- g no, A 2, rep 2 349a-d; part ii-ii, g 2, a 6,
10; 20:12; 23:23-24 rep 3 395b-396a; g 9, a i, rep i 423c-424b;
Apocrypha: Rest of Esther, 13:12; 14:14-19— (D) g II, A 4, REP I 441b-442b; g 33, a 7, rep i
OT, 13:12; 14:14-19 / Wisdom of
Esther, 556a-557d; part hi, g 3, a 8, ans 729b-730b;
Solomon, 1:6-11 —
(D) OT, Bool^of Wisdom, g 5, A 4, ANS 739a-740b; g 7, a 12, ans 754c-
1:6-11 / Ecclesiasticus, 15:18-19; 16:17-19; 755c; g 13, a i, rep 2 780a-781b; g 18, a 4,
17:15,17-20; 23:18-20; 39:19-20; 42:18-21 — rep I 813a-d; g 21, a i, rep 2 823d-824d; g
(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 15:19-20; 16:16-20; 60, A 4, ANS 849c-850b; part hi suppl, g 72,
17:13-17; 23:25-29; 39:24-25; 42:18-22 / A I, ANS and REP 5 917c-919a; a 2, rep 4 919a-
Susanna, 42-44— (D) OT, Daniel, 13:42-44 920c; g 84, a 2, ans 984c-985d; g 88, a 3, ans
New Testament :/oA«, 1:1-3; 6:64,70-71; 14:6/ 1002d-1004b; g 91, a 3, ans 1020d-1022c; g
Romans, 8:27; 11:33-36 / / Corinthians, 1:25; 92, A I, REP 2 1025c-1032b; g 94, a i, rep 2
2:6-16; 3:18-20 / Colossians, 2:2-3 / Hebrews, 1040d-1041b
4:12-13 / I John, 3:18-20 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, paradise, viii [94-
7 Plato: Phaedrus, 140d / Timaeus, 465d / 112] 118a; XV [49-63] 128d-129a; xvii [13-45]
Parmenides, 489d-490d / Laws, bk x, 766d- 132b-c; XXVI [103-108] 146d-147a
767c 22 Chaucer: Troilus and Cressida, bk iv, stanza
8 Aristotle: Metaphysics, bk i, ch 2 [982^28- 138-154 106b-108b//V««VPr/<?j/Vra/f [15,236-
983^11] 501a-b; bk xii, ch 7 [1072^14-29] 256] 456b-457a
602d-603a; ch 9 605a-d; ch 10 [1075^19-24] 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part ii, 162c
606c 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 17b-c /
12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk i, ch 14 120d-121c Novum Organum, bk i, aph 23 108c; aph 124
12 Aurelius: Meditations, bk vi, sect 44, 278b 133c-d; BK II, APH 15 149a
580 THE GREAT IDEAS 5g to 5h
part III, Q 18, a I, rep 1,4 810a-811c; q 21,
(5. The divine nature in relation to the world or A I, ans 823d-824d; a 4, ans 826b-827c; q 61,
creatures. 5/. God's knowledge: the divine a 4, rep 3 857c-858b; q 64, a 7, ans 875d-
omniscience; the divine ideas.) 876c; PART III suppL, q 72, a 3, ans and rep 5
31 Descartes: Meditations^ iii, 86a / Objections 920c-922b; q 74, a 4, ans 928d-929d; q 91,
and Replies, 122a-b a I, REP 2 1016b-1017c; a 2, ans 1017c-1020c;
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part i, prop 17 362b-363c; Q 92, A 3, REP 6 1034b-1037c
PROP 21, DEMONST 364a-c; prop 33, SCHOL 2 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, paradise, hi [64-90]
367d-369a; part ii, prop i 373d-374a; prop llOa-b; XIX [85-90] 135d-136a
3-4 374a-c; prop 7, schol-prop 8 375b-376a; 23 HoBBEs: Leviathan, part ii, 113b-c; 162c;
prop 32 385c PART IV, 271b
32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk ii [188-193] 115b; 24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, bk iv,
BK III [56-134] 136b-138a; bk x [1-16] 274b 265b
35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk ii, ch x, 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 38a
SECT 9 143a-c; ch xv, sect 12 165b-c; bk hi, 31 Descartes: Objections and Replies, 228a-c;
CH VI, sect 3 268d; sect ii 271b-d; bk iv, 229c
CH x, SECT 5-6 350a-c 31 Spinoza: Ethics, part i, prop 17 362b-363c;
35 Hume: Human Understanding, sect viii, div PROP 32 367a-b; prop 33, schol 2 367d-369a;
78, 485d-486a APPENDIX, 370c-371a
42 Kant: Practical Reason, 344a-c; 351b-352c / 32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk hi [80-134] 137a-
Judgement, 592a-c 138a; bk vii [139-173] 220a-221a / Samson
44 B0SWEI.1.: Johnson, 173c; 392d-393a Agonistes [300-329] 346a-b
35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk ii, ch xxi,
5g. God's will: divine choice sect 50-51 191b-c
Old Testament: Genesis, 1-2 / Psalms, 135:6— 35 Berkeley: Human Knotvledge, sect 25-33
(D) Psalms, 134:6 / Isaiah, 14:24-27; 46:9-11 417d-419a esp sect 29-30 418c
—
(D) Isaias, 14:24-27; 46:9-11 / Jeremiah, 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 150c-151b
4:28; 51:29— (D) Jeremias, 4:28; 51:29 42 Kant: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals,
New Testament: Matthew, 18:14; 20:1-16 / 265b-c esp 265b,d [fn i]; 276b-277a; 278b-c /
John, 5:21; 6:38-40 / Romans, 8:27-29; 9:11- Practical Reason, 303b-304a; 321 b-c; 324b-
19; 12:1-2 / / Corinthians, 12 / Ephesians, 1:8- 325a; 325d-326a; 328b / Intro. Metaphysic of
12; 3:10-11 / / Thessalonians, 4:3-6; 5:18 / Morals, 393c-d
// Timothy, 1:8-10 /James, 1:18 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk vi, 272a-b; bk
5 Aeschylus: Suppliant Maidens [86-103] 2a-b XII,553b; bk xiii, 563a-b; bk xv, 631c;
5 Euripides: Bacchantes [1388-1391] 352a,c epilogue ii, 675a-677b; 680b'C; 684b-d
7 Plato: Timaeus, 452c
12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk iv, ch 3, 224d; 5h. God's love: the dififusion of the divine good-
ch 7, 232d-233a ness
12 AuRELius: Meditations, bk hi, sect ii 262a-b Old Testament: Exodus, 33:19; 34:6 / Deu-
17 Plotinus: Sixth Ennead, tr viii 342d-353d teronomy, 4:37-38; 7:7-8; 10:15,18;
32:4 /
18 Augustine: Confessions, bk vii, par 6-7 44d- / Chronicles, 16:7-34— (D) / Paralipomenon,
45d; BK XI, par 12 92b; bk xii, par 18, 103a-b; 16:7-34 / Job passim, esp 2:10 / Psalms /
bk XIII, par 5 Hid; par 19 115c-d / City of Proverbs, 3:12 / Song of Solomon —
(D) Can-
God, BK V, CH 9-10 213b-216c; bk x, ch 7 ticle of Canticles / Isaiah, 43; 45:7; 63:7-9—
302d-303a; bk xii, ch 14 350d-351b; ch 17 (D) 43 45 :7 63 :7-9 / Jeremiah, 31:1-6;
Isaias, ; ;
Romans, 2:4; 5:5; 8:28-39 / // Corinthians, 704d 706a; 4, a 5, rep 2 734b d; q 2^, a i,
13:11 / Galatians, 2:20 / Ephesians, 3:14-21; RF.P2 833a-d;Q62, a 2, contrary 859d 860c;
5:1-2 / / Timothy, 1:14 / Titus, 3:3-7 / He- part III suppL, q 71, A ^, RKP 903c 904d; I
brews, 12:6 / I John, 3-4 / Retelation, ?:i9-2i O 80, A 3, REP 3 958b 959c
—
(D) Apocalypse, 3:19-21 21 Dante: Divine (Jomedy, mkll, (^7-40] Ib-c; i
7 Plato: Republic, bk ii, 321d-322d / Timaeus, PURGATORY, III [10^145) 57a c; XI (i :^()I 68d-
447c-448a 69a; xv (40-81] 75d-76a; xxviii (91 96] 97a;
8 Aristotle: Generation and Corruption, bk ii, PARADISE, II [i 12-148] 109a-b; vii (64 75]
CH 10 [336*^25-34] 438d 115d-116a; x [i-27ll20b-c;xiii [52-87|126a-b;
12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk ii, ch 8 146a-147c XIX [86-90] 135d-136a; xxvi [1-81] 145d 146c;
14 Plutarch: Numa Pompilius, 50d-51c xxvii [97-120] 148b-c; xxix [13-36) ISOb-c;
16 Kepler: Harmonies of the World, 1049b- [127-145] 151c-d; xxxii [i^9j-xxxiii [145]
1050b; 1071b 156a-157d
17 Plotinus: Sixth Ennead, tr ix, ch 9 358d- 22 Chaucer: Troilus and Cressida, bk hi, stanza
359c 1-7 54b-55b; stanza 250-25^ 87a-b; bk v,
18 Augustine: Confessions, bk i, par 7 2c-d; par stanza 26^-267 154b-155a
31 8d-9a; bk v, par 2 27b-c; bk vii, par 16-23 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 80b-81a
48c-50c; bk xi, par 6 90c-d; bk xii, par 18, 31 r3ESCARTEs: Objections and Replies, 229c
103a-b; bk xiii, par 1-5 llOd-llld / City of 31 Spinoza: Ethics, part v, prop i7,corol 456d;
God, bk VII, CH 31 261d-262a; bk xi, ch 21-24 PROP 19 457a; prop 35-36 460d-461c
333a-336a; bk xii, ch i, 343b-c; ch 9 347b- 32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk hi [80-343] 137a-
348b; bk xix, ch 13 519a-520a; bk xxi, ch 143a esp [135-166] 138b-139a; bk iv [411-439]
15-16 572c-574a; bk xxii, ch i 586b,d-587b; 161b-162a; bk vii [499-518] 228a-b
ch 24 609a-612a / Christian Doctrine, bk i, 35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk i, ch hi,
ch 31-32 633 b-d SECT 12 115b-116a
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 2, a 3, 35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, intro, sect 3
REP I 12c-14a; q 3, a i, rep i 14b-15b; q 6, 405b-c; SECT 154 444a-b
A 4 30b-d; Q 13, A 2, ANS 63c-64d; q 19, a 2, 37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 186c-d
ANs and REP 2-4 109c-110b; a 4, ans and rep i 42 Kant: Practical Reason, 345a-c / Judgement,
lllc-112c; Q 20 119d-124a; q 21, a 3, ans 592a-c
126a-c; q 27, aa 3-4 155c-156d; q 37 197c- 44 Boswell: Johnson, 539d-540a
200c; Q 44, A 4, ans and rep i 241a-d; q 49 48 Melville: Moby DicI^, 318b
264d-268a,c; q 50, a i, ans 269b-270a; a 3, 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk vi, 272a-b
ans 272a-273b; q 51, a i, rep 3 275b-276b; 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Kara7nazov, bk 11,
Q 59, A I, ans 306c-307b; a 2, ans 307c-308b; 24a-c; bk v, 120d-137c; bk vi, 153a-d; bk vii,
A 4, ANS 69b-70a; q 65, a 5, ans and rep 3 li Kings, 9:1-10:11 — (D) IV Kings, 9:1-10:11 /
74c-75a; q 73, a 10, ans 128a-d; q 75, a 3, / Chronicles, 10:13-14; 21 — (D) / Paralipome-
ans 139b-d; q 79, a i 156b-157b; a 3, rep i non, 10:13-14; 21 / // Chronicles, 6; 12; 19:6-7;
158a-d; a 4, rep i 158d-159c; q 90, preamble, 21:12-20; 26:16-21 (D) — U
Paralipomenon, 6;
205a; q 92, a i, rep i 213c-214c; q 93, a 6, 12; 19:6-7; 21:12-20; 26:16-21 / Nehemiah,
rep I 219d-220d; q 96, a 5, rep 2 233d-234d; 9:5-38 -(D) // Esdras, 9:5-38 / Job / Psalms f
q iio, a I 347d-349a; a 4, ans 350d-351d; Proverbs, 11:1,20-21; 20:22; 22:22-23 / Ecclesi-
q III, A 3, rep I 353d-354b; part ii-ii, Q 6, astes, 12:14 / Isaiah passim, esp i, 3-4, 10, 13-
A 2, rep 2 414c-415c; q 19, a i, rep 3 465a-d; 27' 3O' 34-35. 40. 42, 47. 52-53. 59. 65-66—
A 5, rep 3 468b-469a; q 23, a 2, rep 1-2 (D) Isaias passim, esp i, 3-4, 10, 13-27, 30,
483d-484d; q 24, a 2, ans 490b-d; a 3, ans 34-35, 40, 42, 47, 52-53, 59, 65-66 / Jeremiah
491a-d; a 8, ans 495b-496a; a 11, rep i 498b- passim, esp 3-8, 15, 19, 24-25, 29-31, 33, 46-52
499c; A 12, ANS 499c-500d; q 26, a 3, ans — (D) Jeremias passim, esp 3-8, 15, 19, 24-25,
511d-512c; q 30, a 2, rep i 534b-535a; q 189, 29-31, 33, 46-52 / Lamentations / Ezekjel
582 THE GREAT IDEAS 5/
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk v, 196a-197c 182c; 183d-184a; part iv, 271c; 272b-c
25 Montaigne: Essays, 238d-239b; 256c-d
6a. The names of God: the metaphorical and 28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 428c-d; 443c
symbolic representations of God; the 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 60c-61b
anthropomorphic conception of God 31 Spinoza: Ethics, part i, prop 17, schol 362c-
Old Testament: Exodus, 3:13-15; 6:2-3; i5"3' 363c; PART II, PROP 3, schol 374b-c
20:7; 33:20-23; 34:5-7,14 / Leviticus, 19:12; 34 Newton: Principles, bk hi, general schol,
21:6; 22:32 / Deuteronomy, 5:11; 28:58 / 370a
// Samuel, 22— (D) II Kings, 22 / Psalms pas- 35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk i, ch hi,
sim, esp 18, 23, 28:7; 29:1-11, 31:2-3, 6i:i-8, sect 17 117a-c; bk ii, ch xih, sect 18 152a-c
68:4, 71:3, 78:35, 78:65. 83:18, 95:i-ii-(D) 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 176a-b; 192c-d / Judge-
Psalms passim, esp 17, 22, 27:7, 28:2-10, 30:3- ment, 547b-d; 593c-d; 598b-599b; 599d-600a
4, 60:2-9, 67:5, 70:3, 77:35, 77:65, 82:19, 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk vi, 248d
94:1-11 / Proverbs, 18:10; 30:4 / Isaiah, 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, bk xi,
17:10; 30:27-30; 40:11; 41:4; 42:8; 44:6; 47:4; 345a-c
48:2,12; 51:15; 54:5; 55:13; 63:16— (D) Isaias, 54 Freud: Civilization and Its Discontents, 771a-b
17:10; 30:27-30; 40:11; 41:4; 42:8; 44:6; / New Introductory Lectures, 875d-876b
47:4; 48:2,12; 51:15; 54:5; 55:13; 63:16 /
Jeremiah, 10:16; 16:21; 23:6; 31:35; 32:18; 6b. Natural knowledge: the use of analogies;
the evidences of nature; the light of
33:2; 50:34; 51:19— (D) Jeremias, 10:16;
16:21; 23:6; 31:35; 32:18; 33:2; 50:34; 51:19
reason
Amos, 4:13; 5:8; 9:6
/ Daniel, 7:9,13 / Old Testament: Job, 12:7-9; 26:7-14; 36:24-
Apocrypha: Wisdom of Solomon, 14:12-21 — (D) 42:2 / Psalms, 8; 19:1-^; 65; 75:1; 95:1-6;
OT, Book^ of Wisdom, 14:12-21 104; 107; 147:12-20— (D) Psalms, 8; 18:1-7;
New Testament: Matthew, 6:9 / LuJ^, 11:2 / 64; 74:2; 94:1-6; 103; 106; 147 / Ecclesiastes,
John, 10:1-18 / / Corinthians, 10:4 / Revelation, 3:11; 8:17; 11:5 / Isaiah, 45:5-8— (D) Isaias,
1:8; 21:6; 22:13— (£)) Apocalypse, 1:8; 21:6; 45:5-8
22:13 Apocrypha: Wisdom of Solomon, 13:1-5— (D)
5 Aeschylus: Agamemnon [160-175] 53d-54a OT Boo/{ of Wisdom, 13:1-5 / Ecclesiasticus,
5 Euripides: Iphigenia Among the Tauri [376- 16:26-30; 18:4-7; 42:i5-43:33-(^) OT.
391] 414b Ecclesiasticus, 1 6 :26-3 1 1 8 :2 -6 42 1 5-43 :37 /
;
; :
6 Herodotus: History, bk ii, 49d-50a; 60a-d; // Maccabees, 7:28 — (D) OT, // Machabees,
80a-c 7:28
7 Plato: Cratylus, 91c-92b; 93d-97d / Philebus, New Testament: Matthew, 6:26-30 / Lut^e,
609d-610a I Laws, bk x, 759d-760c 12:24-28 / Romans, 1:18-24
b —
33] 548b-c; bk xi, ch 7 [1064^6-13] 592d-593a 220a; bk viii [114-130] 234b 235a
12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk i, ch 6 110c- 112b; 33 1'ascal: Provincial Letters, 163a 164b / Pen-
CH 9, 114c-115a; ch 16-17 121d-124a sea, 22() 213a-b; 242 253 217b 220a; 265-290
12 AuRELius: Meditations, bk xn, sect 28 310a 221b 225a; 557 567 272b 273b
14 Plutarch: Pericles, 123c-124a / Coriolanus, 34 Newton: Principles, bk hi, general schol,
191d-192b / Nicias, 435b-d 371a
18 Augustine: Confessions, bk v, par i 27a-b; 35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk i, ch n,
bk VI, par 8 37b-c; bk vii, par 16-2:? 48c-50c; sect 12, ch
hi, sect 7-18 113d-
107c-d;
bk x, par 8-10 73b-74a; bk xi, par 6 90c-d / 117c; BK II, CH
sect 6 132d; ch xvn,
VII,
City of God, bk viii, ch 3 266a-d; bk x, ch 14 SECT I167d-168a; sect 17 172b-c; sect 20,
307c-308a / Christian Doctrine, bk i, ch 4 173a; ch xxiii, sect 33-37 212d-214b; bk
625b-c III, CH VI, sect 271b d; bk iv, ch x 349c-
1 1
20a; 38a; 39d'40a; 41b-d; 55b-c; 96c-97c esp 15; 8:35-36 7/0^,33; 34:31-32; 35:10-11; 38-
96d'97a / New Atlantis, 203a- 42 / Psalms, 25:3-5,8-12; 32:8-9; 94:10-13;
31 Descartes: Discourse, part i, 43c; part iv, 119; 143 esp 143:8-10— (Z)) Psalms, 24:4-5,8-
52a-d / Meditations, 69a-71a,c passim; 71d- 12; 31:8-9; 93:10-13; 118; 142 esp 142:8-10 /
72b; iii-iv, 81d-89b; v 93a-96a / Objections 31:8-9; 93:10-13; 118; 142 esp 142:8-10 /
and Replies, 110c-114c; 120c-122b; 127a-c; Proverbs, 2:5-6; 6:23 / Isaiah, 6:1-9; ""^-35
prop i-iii 132b-133a; 140b; 158b-161d; 28:9-13; 48:3-8 —
(D) Isaias, 6:1-9; 11:1-3;
168d-169a; 211c-212a; 212c-213a; 213d-214a; 28:9-13; 48:3-8 / Daniel, 2; 4 (D) Daniel, 2; —
215b-c; 232b; 283d-284a; 284d 3 :98-4 :34 / Joel, 2 :28-29
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part ii, def i 373a; prop Apocrypha: Ecclesiasticus, 17:5-14 (D) OT,
45-47 390a-39 la; part iv, prop 28 431c; prop Ecclesiasticus, 17:5-12
586 THE GREAT IDEAS 6^(1) to 6c(2)
295d-297a; q 61 314d-317c; qq 65-74 339a- Josue, i-ii; 23-24 / Judges, 1-16 / 7 Samuel,
377a,c; q 75, a 6, rep 1-2 383c-384c; q 84, 8-10; 15-16— (D) 7 Kings, 8-10; 15-16 / 77
A 3, rep 2 443d-444d; qq 90-93 480c-501c; Samuel, y—{D) II Kings, 7/7 Kings, 11 13-22
;
lb to 7c CuAPTF.R 29: GOD S89
passim— (D) /// Kings, ii; 13-22 passim / // 113cll4d; VIII (85-148I 117c-118c; xi-xii
Kings passim— (D) IV Kings passim / / Chron- 122a 125a csp xi [28 ^jg] 122b, \ii [^745]
icles, 17:3-15 —
(D) I Paralipomenon, 17:3 15 / 124a; XX [^1138] 137a 138a
// Chronicles, 11-36 passim —
(D) II Paralipo- 22 Chaucer: rroilits and Crcssida, iiK iv, stanza
menon, 11-36 passim / Esther csp 4:1^-14 — m8 15 106b 108b/ Knight's Vu/d-li 251 1267]
j
(D) Esther, 1:1-10:3 esp 4:13-14 I fob esp 180b; [i()()j, 1672I 187b / Tale of Man oflMW
1-2, 24, 27, 38-41 / Psalms passim, csp 3-4, 236b 255b csp [4869 4924] 242b-243b. I5247-
9h-ii, 13, 17-18, 65, 77, 104 —
(D) Psalms pas- 525^] 249b / Friar's Talc I7064-7085I 281a b
sim, esp 3-4, 9-10, 12, 16-17, 64, 76, 103 / / Franklins Tale [11,177 206] 353b 354a /
Proverbs, 16:33 / Ecclcsiastes, 3; 7:13-15; 8-9; Monl(s '7 a/f [14,021-052) 434b 435a; [14,149-
11-12. I Isaiah, 36-37; 46; 51 —
(D) Isaias, 36- 252] 437a-438b
.
37; 46; 51 I Jeremiah, 17:5-8; 18-19; 31; 45— 23 HoBBF.s: leviathan, pari i, 53d; pari ii,
\D) Jeremias, 17:5-8; 18-19; V; 45 / Daniel 113b-c; 160a; 162b; part iv, 254b: 271b
passim, esp 3:1-4:3, 6:1-28 —
(D) Daniel, 1:1- 25 Moniaigne: Essays, 98b 99a
3:23 passim, esp 3:1-23; 3:91-12:13 passim, esp 26 Shaklspeare: Richard III, aci ii, sc ii [77-
3:91-100, 6:1-28 / Jonah esp i, 4— (Z)) Jonas 95]120b-c
tspi,^/ Malachi, 1 12-^ — (D) Malachias, i :2-3 27 Shakespeare: Hamlet, act v, sc ii [i-ii]
Apocrypha: Tobit — (D) OT, Tobias / Judith csp 67d-68a; [47 53] 68b-c; [230 235) 70a
5-6, 8-i6-(D) OT, Judith esp 5-6, 8-16 / 29 (>ERVANTEs: Don Quixote, part ii, 408c
Restof Esther— {D) OT, Esther, 10:4-16:24 / 30 Bacon: Advancement of learning, 19d; 38a /
Wisdom of Solomon, 14:1-3— (D) OT, BooI^oJ Novum Organum, bk i, apii 93 125d-126a
Wisdom, 14:1-3/ 15:11-20— (D)
Ecclesiasticus, 32 Milton: Sonnets, xvi 66b-67a / Paradise Lost,
OT, Song of Three
Ecclesiasticus, 15:11-22 / BK III [80-134] 137a-138a / Samson Agonistes
Children— {D) OT, Daniel, 3:24-90 / Susanna [210-214] 344a; [373-380] 347b-348a; [667-
—(D) OT, Daniel, 13:1-64 / Bel and Dragon 709] 354a-355a / Areopagitica, 394b-395b
— {D) OT, Daniel, 13:65-14:42 / / Maccabees, 33 Pascal: Pensees, 619-641 284b-290a
3:13-26— (D) OT, / Machabees, 3:13-26 / 35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, intro, sect 3
77 Maccabees, 6:1-16— (D) OT, 77 Machabees, 405b-c; SECT 60-66 424b-426a; sect 93-94
6:1-16 431b-c; SECT 105-107 433b-434a; sect 146-
New Testament: Matthetu, 6:25-34; 7:7-11; 10 155 442a-444c
csp 10:17-20, 10:29-33; 23:37 / Luke, 11:1-13; 35 Hume: Human Understanding, sect vii, div
12:1-34; 21:12-19 / John, 6:22-71 esp 6:40, 54-57 474b-475d; sect xi, div 108 500b-d
6:44-45, 6:64-65 —
(D) John, 6:22-72 csp 37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 75c-d; 377c-378a
6:40, 6:44-45, 6:65-66 / Acts, 1:15-26; 6:8- 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 331c-d / Social Con-
7:60; 13:48 —
(D) Acts, 1:15-26; 6:8-7:59; tract, BK III, 414d; BK IV, 437d-438b
13:48 / Romans, 8:28-11:36; 13:1-2 / Ephe- 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 292d-294a
sians, 1:4-2:10; 4:1-7 / Philippians, 2:12-13 / 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 542a-b
77 Timothy, 1:9 / Hebrews, 1:1-3; 13:5-6 / 44 Boswell: Johnson, 95c-d
7 Peter, 1 :i-5 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, intro, 158c-
18 Augustine: Confessions, bk ix, par i 61c-d / 160b; 168d-170b; part iv, 321b-c: 368d-
City of God, bk i, ch 8-9 133a-135a; bk iv, ch 369a,c
33 206c-d; BK V, ch i 207d-208c; ch 8-1 i 48 Melville: Moby Dic{, 85a; 237a; 396b
212c-216d; ch 19 224b-225b; ch 21-22 226a- 397a
227a; bk x, ch 14-17 307c'310b; bk xi, ch 22 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk vi, 272a-b; bk
333d-334c; bk xii, ch 27 359c-360a,c; bk xiv, IX, 342a-344b; 357b-358b; bk x, 447c-448a;
CH 27 396c-397a; bk xxii, ch i 586b,d-587b / 465c-467c passim; bk xii, 553b; bk xiii,
Christian Doctrine, bk ii, ch 27 650a 563a-b; bk xv, 619d-620a; 631a-c; epilogue
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 3, a i, I, 650b-c; epilogue ii, 675a-677b; 680b-c;
REP I 14b-15b; q 8, a 3, ans 36b-37c; q 13, 684b-d
A 8, ANS and rep i 70d-71b; q 15, a 3, rep 4 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, ekv, 127b-
93b-94a; qq 22-24 127c-143c; q 96, a i, ans 137c passim; bk xi, 343b-c
and rep 2 510b-511b; part i-ii, q 9, a 6, rep 3 54 Freud: Civilization and Its Discontents, 771a b
662a-d
7c. Divine government and law
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 93,
a 5, REP 3 219a-d; part ii-ii, q i, a 7, ans Old Testament: Genesis, 9:1-7 / Exodus, 12-13;
385c-387a; q 25, a 11, rep 3 508d-509c; part 15:18; 19-31 esp 20:1-17; 34'"35 / Leviticus
III, Q 61, A I, ans 855a-d; part hi suppl, q 69, passim / Numbers passim, esp 5-10, 15, 18-19,
A 3, ans 887d-889c; q 71, a 5, ans 905C'908b; 27-30, 35-36 / Deuterojiomy passim, esp 5 :6-2i
Q 77, A I, ans 943a-944d; q 78, a 3, ans 950b- 29:11-12
/ 7 Chronicles, —
(D)t7 Paralipomenon,
951a 29:11-12 / Job, 9:1-13; 34:12-18; 37-41 /
21 Dante: Divijie Comedy, hell, vii [61-96] Psalms, i; 10:16; 19:7-14; 37:30-31; 40:8;
lOb-c; PARADISE, I [94-142] 107b-d; vi [i-iii] 47; 59:13; 66:7; 72:8; 78:1-8: 89:30-32; 93;
590 THE GREAT IDEAS Ic to Id
23 Hobbes: part i, 95d-96b; part ii,
Leviathan,
(7. Doctrines common to the Jewish, Mohamme- 136d-138b; 159d-164a,c; part hi, 167b-c;
dan, and Christian conceptions of God and 171a-172a; 177c-180a; 199b-204a; 216b-219d;
His relation to the world and man. lc» 240a-241a; 245c-246a,c; part iv, 247a-249b;
Divine government and law.) 272b-c
96:10-13; 97:1-2; 99:1; 103:19-22; 119 pas- 28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 491d-492a
sim; 145:11-13— (Z)) Psalms, i; 9:16; 18:8- 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 71a-b;
15; 36:30-31; 39:8-9; 46; 58:14; 65:7; 71:8; 94b-c; lOOd
77:1-8; 88:31-33; 92; 95:10-13; 96:1-2; 31 Descartes: Discourse, part v, 54c; 55b /
98:1; 102:19-22; 118 passim; 144:11-13 / Objections and Replies, 229c-d
Ecclesiastes, 12:13-14 / Isaiah, 51:4-8; 52:7— 31 Spinoza: Ethics, part ii, prop 3, schol 374b-c
(D) Isaias, 51 :4-8; 52:7 /Jeremiah, 31-34— (D) 32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk ii [237-249] 116b;
Jeremias, 31-34 / EzeJ^iel, 18— (Z)) Ezechiel, 18 [310-328] 118a; BK III [274-343] 141b-143a esp
/ Daniel, 4; 7:27— (D) Daniel,
3:98-4:34; [317-333] 142b; BK V [600-615] 188b; bk vi
7:27 / Amos, 2:1-8 / Malachi, 1:14— (D) [169-188] 200a; bk vii [139-173] 220a-221a;
Malachias, 1:14 [550-609] 229a-230b; bk xii [223-248] 324a-b
Apocrypha: Bel and Dragon, 5— (D) OT, Daniely / Samson Agonistes [667-673] 354a
14:4 33 Pascal: Pensees, 876 345a
New Testament: Matthew, 5:17-20 / Lul{e, 35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk i, ch ii,
16:17 / Romans passim, esp 2:11-16, 7:21-25, sect 5-6 105a-c; bk ii, ch xxviii, sect 8
8:7 / 7 Timothy, 1:17 / Hebrews, 1:8; 8:10; 230a; bk iv, ch hi, sect 28-29 322a-323a
10:16 / James, 2:8-12 / Revelation, 11:15-18; 35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, sect 29-33
19:6— (D) Apocalypse, 11:15-18; 19:6 418c-419a; sect 51-53 422d-423a; sect 57
18 Augustine: Confessions, bk ii, par 9, lOd; par 423d-424a; sect 60-66 424b-426a; sect 93-
14 12a-b; bk hi, par 13-17 16c-18a / City of 94 431b-c; SECT 105-107 433b-434a; sect
God, BK V, CH II 216c-d; bk vii,ch3o 261b-d; 146-155 442a-444c
BK IX, CH 22 296d-297a; bk x, ch 13-15 307b- 35 Hume: Human Understanding, sect vii, div
308b; CH 17 309c-310b; bk xi, ch 18 331d- 54-57 474b-475d; sect viii, div 78-81 485c-
332a; ch 22 333d-334c; bk xii, ch 5 345a-b; 487a
BK xix, CH 12-15 517b-521c; ch 21 524a-525a; 36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 261b-266b esp
CH 23-25 525c-528d; ch 27 529a-d; bk xxii, 261b-262a, 266b
CH 1-3 586b,d-588b; ch 24 609a-612a pas- 37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 20a-d
sim 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk i, la-2b;
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 2, a 3, BK XII, 85d-86a; bk xxvi, 214b,d-215a
ANs 12c-14a; q 21, a i, ans 124b-125b; a 2, 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 252c
ANS 125c-d; Q 26, A 4, ANS 151c-152a,c; q 47, 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 237b; 238b-240b / /«^^^-
A 3, REP I 258c-259a; q 63, a 7, ans 331c- ment, 594d [fn i]
332b; Q 65, A 3, REP I 341c-342b; q 83, a i, 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, intro, 158c-
REP 3 436d-438a; qq 103-119 528a-608d; 160b; 168d-170b; part iii, 309d-310a; part
PART i-ii, Q 10, A 4, ANS 665d-666a,c; q 17, IV, 368d-369a,c
A 8, REP 2 692a-c; q 19, a 4 705b-c; a 6, ans 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, bk v,
and REP 2 707a-708a 12 7b- 13 7c passim
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 71,
A 2, REP 4 106d-107c; a 6 llOb-lllb; q 72, a 2, Id. Grace
ANS 112b-113a; a 4, ans 114a-115a; q 74, a 8, Old Testament: Psalms, 84:11 — (D) Psalms,
REP I 134b-136a; q 91, aa 1-2 208b-209d; aa 83:12 / Proverbs, 3:1-4,21-26 / Jeremiah, 31 :i8
4-5 210c-212c; q 93 215b,d-220d; q 97, a 3, —(D) Jeremias, 31:18 / Lamentations, 5:21 /
ANS and REP I 237b-238b; a 4, rep 3 238b- Zechariah, 12:10— (D) Zacharias, 12:10
239b; qq 98-108 239b-337d; part ii-ii, q 23, New Testament: John, 1:11-18 / Acts, 4:33 /
a 6, ANS 487a-d; q 187, a 5, rep 3 671d-673b; Romans passim, esp 1:3-5, 3'i~6-23' ii'5~7 /
PART III, Q 60, A 4, rep 2 849c-850b; part hi / Corinthians, 2:11-3:10; 15:9-10 / // Corin-
suppL, Q 69, A I, ANS 885c-886c; q 72, a 2, thians, i; 4-6; 8:7-9; 9:5-15; 12 / Galatians
ANS 919a-920c I Ephesians / Philippians, 2:12-13; 4'i3 /
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, hell, vii [70-76] 10b; n Thessalonians, 2:15-16 / 11 Timothy esp
XI 15a-16b; purgatory, xvi [52-105] 77b-d; 1 :8-9 / Titus, 2 :9-3 :j / Hebrews, 2 :9; 12 :i4-29
PARADISE, I 107b-d; 11 [112-148]
[94-142] / James, 4:6 / / Peter passim, esp i, 5:5
109a-b; iii [34-90] 109d-110b; x [1-27] 120b-c; 18 Augustine: Confessions, bk i, par 5-6 2b-c;
XXVII [ioo]-xxviii [139] 148b-150b; xxxii bk II, par 15 12b-c; bk vi, par 4 36a-b / City
[37-84] 155arc of God, BK XIII, CH 3-5 361a-362c; ch 7 362d-
22 Chaucer: Knight's Tale [i 663-1672] 187b / 363b; ch 14-15 366b-d; ch 20 370c-371a; bk
MonJ(s Tale [14,221-228] 438a-b / Canon's XIII, CH 23-BK XIV, CH I 372a-377a; bk xiv,
Yeoman's Tale [16,935-949] 487a ch 26 395d-396c; ch 27, 397a; bk xv, ch 1-3
d
part III, 307a-b; part iv, 338b-c; 348d- QQ 75-86 935a-996a,c; q 93, a i 1037d-1039a
349a 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, hell, vi [94-1 11]
47 Goethe: Faust, part i [762-770] 20a 9b-c; X [1-15] 13d; xiii [85-108] 18d-19a;
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk v, 219b-220a paradise, VII [121-148] 116b-c; xiv [1-66]
52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, bk i, 126d-127c; xxv [64-129] 145a-c
lla-b; BK II, 21d-22b; bk v, 127b-137c passim; 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part hi, 191b-193c;
bk VII, 171a-177b; 189d-190a 195b-d; part iv, 253b-255b; 259b-c
25 Montaigne: E^^fl^y, 248c-249c;311a
7/.The Book of Life 32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk hi [227-343] 140b-
Old Testament: Exodus, 32:31-33; 33:19 / 143a esp [294-329] 141b-142b; bk xii [386-
69:28— (D) Psalms, 68:29 / J^^^^^h,
Psalms, 445] 327b-329a esp [411-429] 328a-b
4-3-(^) ^^^^'^^ 4:3. 35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, sect 95 431c
Apocrypha: Ecclesiasticus, 33:10-13 — (D) OT, 38 Montesquieu: 5/7/r7/ of Laws, bk xxiv, 205d-
Ecclesiasticus, 33:10-14 206a
New Testament: Matthew, 20:1-16; 22:1-14 / 41 Gibbon: Decli7ie and Fall, 233d; 234d
Luke, 10:20 /John, 5:21; 6:44; 10:26-29/ Acts, 44 Boswell: Johnson, 472a-b
13:48 / Romans, 8:28-9:23 / Ephesians, 1-3 /
// Thessalonians, 2:12-14 / ^^ Timothy, 1:8-9;
7h.The Last Judgment and the end of the world
2:19-20 / Hebrews, 12:22-23 / / Peter, 1:1-5; Old Testament: Job, 19:25-27; 21:27-34 /
2 :i-9 / // Peter, 1:10/ Revelation, 3 :4-5 13 :4-8
; Psalms, 50; 96:10-13— (D) Psalms, 49; 95:10-
17:7-8; 20:11-21:27 esp 20:15, 21:27; 22:18- 13 / Ecclesiastes, 3:16-17; 11:9-10; 12:14 /
19— (D) Apocalypse, 3:4-5; 13:4-8; 17:7-8; Isaiah, 2-4; 11:11-16; 13:6-22; 24; 26-27;
20:11-21:27 esp 20:15, 21:27; 22:18-19 3O' 34-35' 65:17-25; 66— (D) Isaias, 2-4;
18 Augustine: City of God, bk xv, ch i 397b,d- 11:11-16; 13:6-22; 24; 26-27; 30; 34-35;
398c; bk xx, ch 8 536d-538c; ch 14-16 542d- 65:17-25; 66 / Daniel, 7:21-27; 12 / Joel /
544d Micah, 4— (D) Micheas, 4 / Zephaniah—{D)
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 24 Sophonias / Zechariah, Ij\—{D) Zacharias,
141b-143c 14 / Malachi, 3-4 (D) Malachias, 3-4
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part hi, q 63, Apocrypha: Judith, 16:17- (D) OT, Judith,
a i, rep I 864c-865b; part hi suppl, q 87, a i 16:20-21 / Rest of Esther, 10:4-11:12— (D)
997b998c OT, Esther, 10:4-11:12
—
135:1-27 / Isaiah passim, esp 40:1; 42:1-6, 16:13-22 — (D) Paralipomenon, 16:13-22 /
/
18 Augustine: Confessions, bk vii, par 25 51a-c / 47 Goethe: Faust, part i [3587-3619] 87b 88a;
of God, bk ix, ch 15 293a-294a; ch 17
City PART II [11,989-12,111] 291b-294b
295a-c;bk x, ch 20 311b-c; cii 22 312a b;
cH24 312d-313c; ch 27-29 315b-318b; bk xi, 9c. Christ the Saviour and Redeemer: the doc-
CH 2 323a-c; bk xxi, ch 15-16 572c-574a / trines of original sin and salvation
Christian Doctrine, bk i, ch 14 627d-628b Old Testament: / Samuel, 2:1-10— (D) / Kings,
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 51, a 2, 2:1-10 / Isaiah, 53 — (/)) Isaias, 53 / Lamenta-
rep I 276b-277a; a 3, rep 5 277a-278c; q 113, tions, 4:20
A 4, rep I 578b-579a; q 119, a 2, rep 4 607b- New Testa-ment: Matthew, 1:21; 9:2-8; 10:32-
608d 33; 16:24-27; 18:11-14; 26:26-28 / Mark, 2:1-
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part ii-ii, q i, 12; 8:34-38; 14:22-24 / Luke, 1:67-79; 2:11;
A I, RXP I 380b-381a; q 18, a 2, rep i 462d- 5:17-26; 7:37-50; 9:23-26,56; 15; 19:1-10;
463d; PART HI, qq 4-24 730c-839c; q 25, aa 1-2 22:19-20; 24:46-47 / John esp 1:29, 3:16-18,
839d-841c; part in suppl, q 76, a i 939d-941a; 4:42, 6:31-59, 10:9-18, 14:6-7, 14:18-19, 15:1-
Q 90, AA 1-2 1012b'1014d; q 92, a 3, rep 12 4 / Acts, 3:12-26; 4:10-12; 5:30-31; 13:15-50
1034b-1037c esp 13:38-39; 16:30-31 / Romans esp 3:20-26,
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, paradise, vii [16-120] 5:1-6:23, 8:1-4 / / Corinthians, 15:3,12-23 /
115b-116b; xiii [37-45] 125d; [73-87] 126b // Corinthians esp 2:10, 4:13-14, 5:14-21, 8:9,
22 Chaucer: Parson's Tale, par 12 503b-504b 13:4-5 / Galatians passim, esp 2:20-3:14, 4:1-5
32 Milton: Christs Nativity la-7b / The Passion / Ephesians esp 1:5-7, 1:12-14, 2:1-22 / Colos-
10b-12a esp [15-21] lOb-lla / Upon the Circum- sians esp I :i2-i4, I :i9-22, 2 :i3-i4 / / Timothy,
cision 12b-13a / Paradise Lost, bk hi [56-415] 1:12-17; 2:5-6 / Titus esp 2:11-3:7 / Hebrews
136b-144b esp [238-241] 140b, [281-294] 141b; esp 2:1-18, 5:9, 'j\2^-:ij, 9:1-10:39/ I Peter esp
BK XI [22-44] 299b'300a; bk xii [307-385] 1:3-11, 3:17-4:6 / I John esp 3:16, 4:9-10, 4:14
326a-327b / Revelation passim, esp 5-7— (D) Apocalypse
33 Pascal: Pensees, 553 268a-270a; 763-765 passim, esp 5-7
322a; 785 325b 18 Augustine: Confessions, bk ii, par 15 12b-c;
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 308a bk par 18-19 23d-24b; bk vii, par 24-27
IV,
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 134b-138a esp 50d-52c; bk x, par 67-70 88b-89a / City of
134b-135b, 137a-d; 330a God, BK VII, cH 31-32 261d-262b; bk ix, ch
46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, part ii, 270d- 15 293a-294a; ch 17 295a-c; bk x, ch 4-6
271c; part hi, 306b-307a 301a-302d; ch 19-20 310d-311c; ch 22-25
52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, bk v, 312a-314c; ch 27-32 315b-322a,c; bk xi, ch
127b-137c passim; bk vii, 189c-190c 2 323a-c; bk xiii, ch 2-4 360b-362a; ch 12-
15 365d-366d; ch 23-24 372a-376a,c; bk
9*(3) Mary, the Mother of God XVII 449a-472a,c passim; bk xviii, ch 23
Old Testament: Isaiah, 7:14— (D)
Isaias, 7:14 483d-485a; ch 31-35 488a-493a; bk xx, ch
New Testament: Matthew, 1:18-25; 12:46-50 / 26 555a-556b; ch 30 557c-560a,c; bk xxi, ch
Mark, 3:31-35 / Luke, 1-2; 8:19-21; 11:27-28 15-16 572c-574a; bk xxii, ch i 586b,d-587b;
I John, 2:1-12; 19:25-27 ch 3 588a-b; ch 22-24 606d-612a; ch 29-30
18 Augustine: City of God, bk xvii, ch 16 465c- 614b-618d / Christian Doctrine, bk i, ch 11-12
466d esp 466c-d; ch 24 471d-472a,c; bk xviii, 627b-d; ch 14-18 627d-629a; ch 34 634b-c;
CH 35, 491d / Christian Doctrine, bk i, ch 14 BK II, CH 41 656a-c
627d-628b 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, pab^f i, q 97,
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part hi, q 7, A I, REP 3 513c-514c; part i-ii, q 5, a 7, rep
A 10, rep I 752c-753c; q 25, a 5 843d-844b; 2 642a-d
PART III suppl, Q 83, A 3, CONTRARY 978c- 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 85,
980d; Q 96, A 5, REP 2 1055c-1058a A 5, rep 2 181d-182d; q 87, a 7, rep 3 190c-
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, hell, ii [43-126] 191d; q 89, A 5, REP I 202c-203b; q 91, a 5,
3a-4a esp [94-99] 3c; purgatory, x [34-45I REP 2 211c-212c; Q 98, A I, ANS and rep 3
67d; PARADISE, xni [79-87] 126b; xxiii 141b- 239b-240c; a 2 240c-241b; a 4, ans and rep i
598 THE GREAT IDEAS 9c to 9d
(9. Specifically Christian dogmas concerning the 9d. The Church: the mystical body of Christ;
divine nature and human destiny. 9c. the Apostolate
Christ the Saviour and Redeemer: the doc- Old Testament: Song of Solomon — (D) Canticle
trines of original sin and salvation.^ of Canticles
242b-243c; a 6, rep 2 244c-245b; q ioo, a New Testament: Matthew, 3; 4:18-22; 8:18-23;
12 264d-265d; q ioi, a 3, ans and rep i 268a- 9:35-10:42; 11:1-15; 13:1-53; 16:17-24; 18:15-
269a; q 102, a 2, ans 271b-272a; a 4, rep 2,5- 20; 20:25-28; 24:14; 25; 28:16-20 / Mar\,
6 esp REP 6 276d-283c; a 5, rep 5 283c-292c; 1:1-9,16-20; 3:13-19; 10:42-45; 13:10; 16:14-
Q 103, A I, ANS 298b-299b; a 2 299b-300d; a 3, 20 / Lu}{e, 3:1-20; 4:43-44; 5:1-11; 6:13-16;
REP 2 300d-302a; q 104, a 3, ans 305d-306d; 8:16-17; 9:1-6; 11:48-50; 12:11-12; 22:24-30;
QQ 106-108 321a-337d r PART ii-ii,Q i, Ay, rep :l^\YI I John, 1:6-8,15-42; 4:34-38; 10; 13:31-
1,4 385c-387a; a 8, rep 4 387a-388c; Q 2, a 7 17:26; 20:19-21:24 esp 20:20-23, 21:15-17 /
396a-397c; q 14, a 2, rep 3 448d-449d; part Acts esp 1:8, 1:13-26, 2:1-47, 5-1-42, 13:47,
III, Q I 701b,d-709c; q 26 845a-846d; q 60, a 16:1-40, 22:14-15 / Romans / / Corinthians
3, ans 848d-849c; a 5, rep 3 850b-851b; q 61, passim, esp 3:1-23, 4:9-13, 6:1-20, 10:16-17,
A I, rep 3 855a-d; a 3 856c-857c; q 62, a 5, 12:12-31, 15:1-11 / II Corinthians esp 1:12-21,
REP 2 862b-863a; a 6, ans and rep 1-2 863a- 2:10-11, 3:1-4:18, 5:20-21, 7:8-13, 10:1-13:10
864c; part hi suppl, q 69, a 4 889c-890c; q / Galatians passim, esp 1-2, 3:28, 4:1-31 /
71, A 14, REP 2 916c-917b; q 75, a 2, rep 3-4 Ephesians esp 1:22-23, 3:8-12, 4:1-12, 5:23-33
937a-938a; q 76, a i 939d-941a; q 78, a i, / Philippians,1 :27-2 :4 / Colossians passim, esp
REP 3 947d-949b; q 89, a 2, ans and rep 4 1:15-29, 2:13-19, 3:6-11 / Hebrews, 3:5-6 /
1006b-1007c; a 5, ans 1009b-d; q 90 1012a- / Peter, 2:4-10 / I John
1016a; Q 95 1042c-1049d; q 99, a 3, rep i 18 Augustine: Confessions, bk vi, par 4 36a-b /
1081d-1083a City of God, bk i, ch 35 149b-c; bk x, ch 20
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, hell, iv [46-63] 5d- 311b-c; bk xiii, ch 21 371a-c; bk xvh, ch 9
6a; purgatory, xxxii [28-63] 102c-103a; 461b-d; ch ii 462c-463a; ch 15-16 465b-
XXXIII [52-72] 104d-105a; paradise, vii 466d; CH 20 469a-470c; bk xviii, ch 48-52
[16-120] 115b-116b; xiii [37-87] 125d-126b; 501b-504d; bk xix, ch 22 525b-c; bk xx, ch
XIX [103-111] 136a; xxiii 141b-142c; xxxii 7-12 535b-541d; bk xxii, ch 17-18 603a-604b
[1-138] 154d-156a / Christian Doctrine, bk i, ch 16 628c-d; ch 18
22 Chaucer: Troilus and Cressida, bk v, stanza 628d-629a; bk hi, ch 31-32 669c-670a
263-267 154b-155a / Second Nun's Tale 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 95,
[15,788-822] 467a-b / Parson's Tale, par 8 A I, REP I 506b-507c
497b-498a; par 13 504b-505a; par 68-69 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part ii-ii, q i,
533b-534b A 9, CONTRARY and REP 3,5 388d-389d; a io,
23 HoBBEs: Leviathan, part hi, 191b-192c; ANS 389d-390d; q 2, aa 6-8 395b-398b; q 5
195d-196a; 197c-198a; 204a-207b; 240c; 410a-413c; qq 183-189 625a-700d; part hi, q
242b-245a; part iv, 260b-c 8 756c-763b; part hi suppl, q 71, a 9 910d-
24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, bk iv, 912b; Q 95, A 3, ANS and rep 4 1045b-1046d;
269c-270b A 4, REP 1,5 1046d-1047d
27 Shakespeare: Measure for Measure, act ii, 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, purgatory, ix [73-
sc II [71-79] 182d 145] 66c-67b; xix [127-141] 82d-83a; xxix
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part iv, prop 68, schol [i]-xxx [21] 97d-99c; xxxii [i]-xxxiii [78]
445a-b 102b-105a; paradise, xi 122a-123c esp [28-
32 Milton: Christs Nativity la-7b passim / The 39] 122b; xii 123c-125a; xxiii [i]-xxvi [81]
Passion 10b-12a / Upon the Circumcision 12b- 141b-146c passim; xxvii [1-66] 147b-148a;
13a / Lycidas [165-185] 31b / Paradise Lost XXIX [109-114] 151b; xxx-xxxii 151d-156a
93a-333a esp bk i [1-26] 93b-94a, bk hi 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part ii, 151a-c; part iii,
[56-415] 136b-144b, BKx [615-640] 287b-288b, 198a-199a; 207b-224c; part iv, 247a-249b;
bk XI [22-44] 299b-300a, bk xii [285-484] 275a-278d
325b-329b 32 M11.TON Paradise Lost, bk xii [436-514] 328b-
:
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 329d; 334b-c 35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, sect 92-96
44 Boswell: Johnson, 173d 431a-d; sect 133, 439d-440a; sect 154-155
46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, part iv, 331d- 444a-c
332c;338a-d;349d-350a 35 Hume: Human Understanding, sect xii, div
52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, bk hi, 503c-d
116,
80c-81a 36 Swift: Gulliver, part i, 29a
b
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Other treatments of polytheism, and for discussions of the gods in relation to fate and human
life, see Angel i; Fate i; Man loa.
Man's duty and piety toward God or the gods, and for man's worship of God or the gods,
see Duty 5, ii; Justice iib; Religion 2-2g.
Man's love of God and desire to be with God, see Desire 7b; Love 5a-5b(2); Virtue and
Vice 8d(3).
Matters relevant to proving God's existence and to other ways of affirming God's existence,
see Being 7a, 8f; Change 14; Metaphysics 2d; Necessity and Contingency 2a-2b;
Reasoning 5b(3), 5b(5); Theology 4c.
The problem of God's immanence and transcendence, and for the doctrine of pantheism,
see Nature ib; One and Many ib; World 3-3b.
Matters relevant to the consideration of God as a necessary being, see Being 7a; Necessity
and Contingency 2a-2b.
The consideration of the unity and simplicity of God, see One and Many 6a.
The consideration of God's eternity and immutability, see Change 15c; Eternity 3.
The consideration of God's infinity and omnipresence, see Infinity 7-7d.
The consideration of God's perfection and goodness, see Good and Evil 2—2a; and for the
discussion of God in relation to Satan and to the problem of evil, see Angel 7—7b; Good
AND Evil id, 2b; Opposition 2d.
The consideration of God's intellect, his knowledge and wisdom, the divine ideas and the
divine truth, see Idea le; Infinity 7d; Knowledge 7a; Mind loe-iof; Truth 2d; Wisdom
id.
The consideration of God's will and love, see Love 5c; Will 4-4a.
The consideration of God's beauty, happiness, and glory, see Beauty 7a; Happiness 7d;
Honor 6-6b.
The consideration of the divine independence and God's free will, see Liberty 5d; Will 4b.
The consideration of divine causality in relation to nature, the origin of the universe by
creation or emanation, and the eternity of the world, ^^^ Art 2c; Cause 7-7a; Change 14;
Matter 3d; Nature Time 2c; World 4-4e(3); and for the special problem of
3c (4); the
creation of life and of man, see Evolution 4a, 7a; Man 8b; Soul 4c.
The consideration of God's foreknowledge and providence in relation to man's freedom and
to the course of history, see Cause 7c; Chance 2b; Fate 4; History 5a; Liberty 5a-5c;
Prophecy ib-ic; Sin 6a; Will 7c.
The consideration of divine causality as expressed in divine law and in the government of the
universe, see Astronomy 6; Cause 7c; Law 3-3b(2); Monarchy 2b; Sin i; Virtue and
Vice 8c; World ic.
The consideration of divine causality in the dispensation of grace and the performance of
Cause 7d; Liberty 5c; Nature 3c(4), 6b; Religion ib(2); Sin 7; Virtue
miracles, see
and Vice 8b, 8e; Will 7e(2).
The consideration of God's justice and mercy, and of divine rewards and punishments,
see Happiness 7c-7c(3); Immortality 5e-5f; Justice ii-iia; Punishment 5e; Sin
6c-6e.
Other discussions of the doctrine of the Messiah, the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the second
coming of Christ, see Man iic; One and Many 6b-6c; Prophecy 4c-4d; Relation 2.
Other discussions of the doctrine of original sin and man's redemption and salvation, see
Happiness 7a; Sin 3-3e, 7; Virtue and Vice 8a; Will 7e(i).
Other discussions of the Last Judgment and the end of the world, see Immortality 5c;
Prophecy 4d; World 8.
Chapter 29: GOD 603
For: Other discussions of the church as the Mystical Body of Christ, and of the theory of the
sacraments, see Religion 2c, 3a-3b; Sign and Symbol 5c.
The general theory of the relation of reason and faith in man's knowledge of God, see
Knowledge 6c (5); Logic 4f; Metaphysics 3a; Religion il>-ib(3); Theology 2, 4b-4c;
Virtue and Vice 8d(i); Wisdom ic.
The distinction between man's natural and supernatural knowledge of Ci(xi, and for the
discussion of mystical experience and the beatific vision, see Experience 7; Hai»i>i-
ness 7c(i); Knowledge 6c(5); Religion 6f; Will yd; Wisdom ic.
Other discussions of God's revelation of Himself, of Sacred Scripture, and of man's inter-
pretation of the Word of God, i^f^ Education 7a; Language 12; Prophecy 3d; Sign and
Symbol 5e.
Other discussions of the relation of creatures to God, and especially of the problem of the
resemblance between creatures and God, see Man loa, iia; Relation 3; Same and
Other 6.
Other discussions of the names of God, and for the bearing thereon of the distinction between
the univocal, the equivocal, and the analogical, see Idea 4b(4); Same and Other 3a(3)-
3b, 6; Sign and Symbol 3d, 5f.
Sciences peculiarly concerned with God, see Astronomy 6; Metaphysics 2a, 2d, 3a;
Theology.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Boo\s of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deak. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
Plutarch. "Of Isis and Osiris, or the Ancient Re- Hegel. Science of Logic, vol i, bk it, sect hi, ch i ;
n.
Aquinas. On the Trinity ofBoethius, qq 1-3
Summa Contra Gentiles, bk i; bk ii, ch 1-28;
. Hesiod. Theogony
BK III, CH 64-83, 146-162; BK IV, CH I-49, 53-55 Cleanthes. Hymn to Zeus
Quaestiones Disputatae, De Veritate, qq 2, 5-7,
. Cicero. De Natura Deorum {On the Nature of the
14, 23, 27-29; De Unione Verbi Incarnati Gods)
. On the Power of God, qq 1-3, 5-7, 9-10 Sextus Empiricus. Against the Physicists, bk i (Con-
. Summa Theologica, part hi, qq 27-59 cerning Gods, Do Gods Exist ?)
Compendium of Theology
. Proclus. The Elements of Theology, (e,l)
P. Bacon. "Of Atheism," in Essays "DioNYsius". On Mystical Theology
Descartes. The Principles of Philosophy, part i, . On the Divine Names
13-25, 29-31, 40, 51, 54; part III, 1-3 Boethius. Contra Eutychen (A Treatise Against
HoBBES. Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Gofem- Eutyches and Nestorius)
ment and Society, ch 15-18 De Trinitate {On the Trinity)
.
Knox. An Answer to the CaviHat ions of an Adversarie Bradley. Appearance and Reality, bk ii, ch 26
Respecting the Doctrine of Predestination Essays on Truth and Reality, ch 15
.
4), XII (l), XV (9), XIX (3), XX-XXII, XXIII (9), Frazer. The Golden Bough
xxiv, xxriii-xxx, XXXI (14), xlvii (15) Man, God, and Immortality, part hi
.
INTRODUCTION
THE theory of good and evil crosses the
boundaries of many sciences or subject
theology— righteousness and sin, salvation and
—
damnation arc, like virtue and vice, happi-
matters. It occupies a place in metaphysics. It ness and misery, conceptions of good and evil
is of fundamental importance in all the moral in the condition of man. (Their special theo-
sciences — ethics, economics, politics, jurispru- logical significance comes from the fact that
dence. It appears in all the descriptive sciences they consider the goodness or evil of man in
of human behavior, such as psychology and so- terms of his relation to God.) But the theologi-
ciology, though there it is of less importance calproblem which is traditionally called "the
and is differently treated. problem of evil" concerns the whole universe in
The relation of good and evil to truth and its relation to the divine perfection.
falsity, beauty and ugliness, carries the discus- That problem, which is further discussed in
sion into logic, aesthetics,and the philosophy the chapter on World, can be formulated in a
of art. The true, it is the good in
has been said, number of ways. How are we to understand the
the sphere of our thinking. So it may be said of existence of evil in a world created by a God
the beautiful that it is a quaUty which things who omnipotent and perfectly good ? Since
is
have when they are good as objects of contem- God is good and since everything which hap-
'
plation and love, or good as productions. It is pens is within God's power, how can we ac-
no less possible to understand goodness and count for the sin of Satan or the fall of man,
beauty in terms of truth, or truth and goodness with all the evil consequent thereupon, with-
in terms of beauty. out limiting God's power or absolving the err-
One aim of analysis, with respect to the true, ing creature from responsibility.? Can it be said
the good, and the beautiful, is to preserve their that this is the best of all possible worlds, if it is
distinctness without rendering each less univer- also true that this world is far from perfectly
sal. This has been attempted by writers who good, and if, as certain theologians hold, "God
treat these three terms as having a kind of par- could make other add something to
things, or
allelism in their appUcation to everything, but the present creation, and then there would be
who also insist that each of the three notions another and a better universe".'^
conceives things under a different aspect or in a
different relation. "As good adds to being the The contemporary discussion of good and evil
notion of the desirable," Aquinas writes, "so draws its terminology from economics rather
the true adds a relation to the intellect" and ; it than theology. The word "value" has almost re-
is also said that the end "of the appetite, name- placed "good" and **evil." What in other cen-
ly good, is in the desirable thing," whereas the turies were the various moral sciences are now
end "of the intellect, namely the true, is in the treated as parts of the general theory of value.
intellect itself." The substitution of "value" for "good" or of
beyond
In that part of theology which goes "value judgment" for "moral judgment" re-
understood by man. The basic terms of moral origin was treated by Aristotle, along with eth-
605
606 THE GREAT IDEAS
ics and politics, as a moral discipline. But he The word "value" does not change the prob-
made it subordinate to them because it dealt lem in any way; what does evaluating any-
for
not with the whole of human welfare, but only thing mean except judging it as good or bad,
with wealth — one of the goods. better or worse } The problem, which has a his-
In the modern development of economics, tory as long as the tradition of the great books,
the word "goods" comes have a special sig-
to isthe problem of how we can defend such judg-
nificance. It refers to commodities or utilities, ments and what they signify about the things
as in the phrase "goods and services." More judged. Are good and evil determined by na-
generally, anything which is useful or exchange- ture or convention ? Are they objects of knowl-
able has the character of an economic good. This edge or opinion }
general sense is usually conveyed by the econo- The title of an essay by Montaigne
— "that
mist's use of the word "value." According to the taste for good and evil depends in good
Adam Smith, "the word value . . . has two dif- part upon the opinion we have of them" — in-
ferent meanings, and sometimes expresses the dicates one set of answers to these questions.
utility of some particular object, and sometimes "If evils have no admission into us," he writes,
the power of purchasing other goods which the "but by the judgment we ourselves make of
possessor of that object conveys." These two them, it should seem that it is, then, in our
meanings are distinguished as "value in use" power to despise them or to turn them to good.
and "value in exchange." Marx accepts this ... If what we and torment is neither
call evil
distinction, but thinks that there is a more evil nor torment of itself, but only that our
fundamental notion of value. He thinks it is fancy gives it in us to change
that quality, it is
possible to abstract from both use-value and it." Echoing Montaigne, Hamlet remarks that
exchange-value, and to discover the underlying "there is nothing either good or bad but think-
property which gives value to all exchangeable ing makes it so." The Greek sophists, centuries
things, namely, that they are products of labor. earlier, appear to take the same view. The state-
With Smith and Marx, as with Aristotle, the ment of Protagoras that "man is the measure
theory of value does not deal with every type of all things," Plato thinks, does not significant-
of good, but only with that type which earlier ly apply to all things, but only to such things
moralists called "external goods" or "goods of as the good or the right, the true or the beauti-
fortune." But more recently the concept of ful. In the Theaetetus, Protagoras is made to say
value has been extended, by economists and that as "to the sick man his food appears to be
others, to the evaluation of everything which bitter, and to the healthy man the opposite of
men think of as desirable in any way. In con- bitter," so in general men estimate or judge all
sequence, the age-old controversy about the things according to their own condition and
objectivity or subjectivity of good and evil is the way things affect them. This theory of good
now stated in terms of the difference between and evil necessarily denies the possibility of
facts and values, or between judgments of fact moral science. Socrates calls it "a high argu-
and judgments of value. ment in which all things are said to be
The issue, as currently stated, is whether relative."
questions of value can be answered in the same Plato and Aristotle respond to the sophists by
way as questions of fact. One position main- arguing in the opposite vein. For Plato, the
tains that, unlike questions of fact which can be good is not a matter of opinion, but an object
answered by scientific investigation and can be of knowledge. Knowledge of good and evil is
objectively solved, questions of value elicit no the best fruit of the tree of knowledge. "Let
more than expressions of opinion, relative to each one of us leave every other kind of knowl-
the individual's subjective response or to the edge," Socrates says at the end of the Republic,
conventions of his society at a given time. The "and seek and follow one thing only," that is,
other side of the issue is held by those who in- "to learn and discern between good and evil."
sist that the norms of value are as objective and Aristotle does not think that ethics, or any
as scientifically determinable as the criteria of science which deals with good and evil, can have
fact or existence. as much precision as mathematics. "Our discus-
Chapter 30: GOOD AND EVIL 607
sion will be adequate," he writes, "if it has as physic of morals, wfiich must be carefully
much clearness as the subject matter admits of, cleared of everything empirical."
for precision is not to be sought for alike in all This partial inventory of thinkers who stand
discussions." This, however, does not exclude against skepticism or relativism in the field of
the possibility of our knowing with great ex- morals indicates that agreement on this point is
actitude the first principles of moral science, accompanied by some disagreement about the
such as the nature of happiness and virtue. In- reasons for holding what appears to be the same
definiteness and even a certain kind of relalivi- view. The opposite view seems also to be shared
'
ty occur only when these principles are applied by thinkers of quite different cast, such as
to particular cases. Hence, in Aristotle's view, Spinoza and Mill,who differ from each other as
the moral sciences, such as ethics and politics, Montaigne and the ancient sophists.
well as from
can have objective and universal validity no The terms "good and evil," Spinoza writes,
less than physics or mathematics, at least on the "indicate nothing positive in things considered
level of principles. in themselves, nor are they anything else than
In modern times, Locke and Kant also affirm modes of thought One and the same thing
. . .
the scientific character of ethics, but without may at the same time be both good and evil or
the qualification which Aristotle insists upon indifferent"— according to the person who
when we go from principles to practice. Locke makes the judgment of it. Spinoza therefore
explains the grounds on which he is "bold to defines "good" as "that which we certainly
think that morality is capable of demonstra- know is useful to us." Apart from society, he
tion, as well as mathematics"; for, he says, "the says, "there is nothing which by universal con-
precise real essence of the things moral words sent is good or evil, since everyone in a natural
stand for may be perfectly known, and so the state consults only his own profit." Only when
congruity and incongruity of the things them- men live together in a civil society under law
selves may be certainly discovered; in which can it be "decided by universal consent what is
consists perfect knowledge." He is confident good and what is evil."
'
that "from self-evident propositions, by neces- Holding that all men seek happiness and that
sary consequences, as incontestible as those in they determine what is good and evil in par-
mathematics, the measures of right and wrong ticular cases by reference to this end, Mill seems
might be made out, to any one that will apply to offer the standard of utility as an objective
himself with the same indifferency and atten- principle of morality. But insofar as he identi-
tion to the one as he does to the other of these fies happiness with a sum total of pleasures or
sciences." But Locke adds, "this is not to be become relative to the
satisfactions, it tends to
expected, whilst the desire of esteem, riches, or individual or the group. If competent judges
power makes men espouse the well-endowed disagree concerning which of two pleasures is
opinions in fashion." He himself seems to tend the greater or higher, there can be no appeal.
in the opposite direction when he identifies the Mill says, except to the verdict of the majority.
good with the pleasant and makes it relative to To this extent at least, judgments of value are
individual desires. expressions of opinion, not determinations of
For Kant the two major parts of philosophy science. Nor does Mill hesitate to say that "the
— physics and ethics — are on equal footing, the ultimate sanction of all morality" is "a subjec-
one concerned with the "laws of nature ^ the tive feeling in our minds."
other with the "laws oifreedom T In each case
there is both empirical and a priori knowledge. In order to clarify this basic issue it is neces-
Kant calls the latter in each case "metaphysics" sary to take note of other terms which are
and speaks of "a metaphysic of nature and a usually involved in the discussion of good
metaphysic of morals'' The nature of science, and evil— such terms as pleasure and pain,
he thinks, requires us to "separate the empirical desire and aversion, being, nature, and reason.
from the rational part, and prefix to physics In the course of doing this, we will perceive
proper (or empirical physics) a metaphysic of the relevance of the chapters which deal with
nature, and to practical anthropology a meta- those ideas.
608 THE GREAT IDEAS
It has been said, for example, that the good is cept in so far as it agrees with our nature, and
identical with the pleasant; that the good is therefore the more an object agrees with our
what men desire; that the good is a property of nature the more profitable it will be." And in
being or existence; that the good is that which another place he says, "By good I understand
conforms to the nature of a thing; that the good . everything which we are certain is a means
. .
is that which is approved by reason. It is pos- by which we may approach nearer and nearer
sible to see some truth in each of these state- to the model of human nature we set before
ments. But each, taken by itself, may be too us." That model, he tells us, is the man of rea-
great a simplification. Searching questions can son, the man who always acts "according to the
be asked by those who refuse to equate the good which are
dictates of reason," for "those desires
with the pleasant or the desirable, the real, the determined by man's power or reason are al-
natural, or the reasonable. Are there no pleas- ways good."
ures in any way bad, no pains in any way good ? Nevertheless, if desire and pleasure cannot
Are all desires themselves good, or are all be eliminated from the consideration of good
equally good ? How does calling a thing "good" and evil — at least not the good and evil which
add anything to its being or existence? Does enter into human — then the problem of
life
not evil exist or qualify existence? By what finding a purely objective foundation for our
standards can the natural and the rational be moral judgments is not solved simply by an
judged good, if the good is that which con- appeal to being, nature, and reason.
forms to nature and reason? Some help toward a solution may be found in
These questions call for more analysis of each one often reiterated fact about the relation be-
of these factors in the discussion of good and tween the good and human desire. The an-
evil and suggest that no one of these factors by cients insist that no man desires anything but
problem of defin-
itselfIS sufficient to solve the what good to him in some
at the time seems
ing good and evil or formulating their criteria. way. "No man," Socrates observes, "volun-
Of the five things mentioned, two particularly tarily pursues evil, or that which he thinks to
desire — seem to favor the objectivity of good sirable. The deception of appearances, Socrates
and evil, at least for those who regard the order says, tricks us into taking "at one time the
of existence, the nature of things, and the laws things of which we repent at another, both in
of reason as independent of our desires or pref- our actions and in our choice of things great
erences. Thus for Spino2:a the nature of man and small."
and seem to provide an objective
his reason
standard for determining what is good alike for The distinction between the r^^/and the ap-
all men. Nothing, he writes, "can be good ex- parent good is, of course, connected with the
Chapter 30: GOOD AND EVIL 609
problem of the objective and the subjective sire and pleasure conceived as the satisfaction of
good. The apparent good varies from individual desire. 'I'his is discussed in the chapter on
to individual and from time to time. If there Pleasure and Pain. If obtaining a desired
were a real good, it would be free from such gcKKl is satisfying, then there is certainly a sense
relativity and variability. Unless there arc in which the g(xxl and the pleasant (or the
real, as distinct from merely apparent, goods, satisfying) are always associated; but it may
moralists cannot distinguish between what also be true that pleasure is only one kind of
men should desire and what in fact they do good among various objects of desire and that
desire. certain pleasures which men desire appear to be,
Since moral science deals with human be- but are not really good.
havior, its province can be separated from that
of other sciences which treat the same subject The foregoing considerations apply to the
matter — such as psychology and sociologv— good in the sphere of human conduct. But the
only in terms of a different treatment of that human good, the practicable good, the good for
subject matter. Moral science must be norma- man, does not exhaust the meaning of the term
tive or prescriptive rather than descriptive. It good. The idea of the good is, for Plaio, the
must determine what men should s^^k, not what measure of perfection in all things; it is "not
they do seek. The very existence of normative only the author of knowledge to all things
sciences, as well as their validity, would thus known, but of their being and essence, and yet
seem to depend on the establishment of a real, the good is not essence, but far exceeds essence
as opposed to a merely apparent, good. in dignity and power."
This creates no special difficulty for moralists The absolute good is also, as in the Diiine
who think that man knows what is really good Comedy, the final cause or ultimate end of the
for him, both in general and in particular, by motions of the universe. It is "the Alpha and
intuition or rational deduction, through the Omega," Dante says, "of every scripture that
commandments of the divine law, or through Love reads to me the Essence wherein is
. . .
•
the precepts of the law of reason. But for those such supremacy that every good which is found
who insist that the good is always somehow outside of It is naught else than a beam of Its
and always involves pleasure,
relative to desire own radiance the Love which moves the
. . .
the distinction between the real and the ap- sun and the other stars."
parent good raises an extremely difficult prob- So too, in Aristotle's cosmology, the circular
lem. motions of the celestial spheres, and through
To say that an apparent good is not really them all other cycles of natural change, are
good suggests, as we have seen, that what is sustained eternally by the prime mover, which
called "good" may not be in itself desirable. moves all things by the attraction of its perfect
That something which is good may not in
really being. It therefore "moves without being
fact appear to be so, seems to imply that the moved," for it "produces motion through being
word "good" can be significantly applied to loved."
something which is not actually desired— at Though desire and love enter into the con-
least not consciously. How, then, is the good ception of the good as a cosmic final cause, thev
always relative to desire.? The traditional an- are not human desire or love. Though the good-
swer to this question must appeal to the dis- ness which inheres in things according to the
tinction between natural and conscious desire, degree of their perfection may make them
which is discussed in the chapter on Desire. It desirable, it is not dependent on their being
is by reference to natural desire that the good consciously desired by men.
is said to be in itself always desirable— even In Jewish and Christian theology, for ex-
when the really good thing is not consciously ample, the goodness of God is in no way meas-
desired. ured by human desires, purposes, or pleasures;
The relation of good and evil to pleasure and nor is the goodness of created things which, ac-
pain can also be clarified by a basic distinction cording to Genesis, God surveyed and found
between the pleasure which is an object of de- "very good." The order of creation, moreover,
610 THE GREAT IDEAS
involves a hierarchy of inequalities in being and The metaphysical conception of goodness
goodness. Even when each thing is perfect in raises peculiarly difficult problems. Are there
its kind, all things are not equally good, for ac- as many meanings of "good" as there are of
cording to the differences in their natures, "being"? When we say God is good, are we
diverse kinds are capable of greater or less making a moral or a metaphysical judgement.?
perfection. Are we attributing perfection of being or good-
In the metaphysical conception of goodness, ness of will to God ? If goodness is a propertv of
that which has more actuality either in exist- being, then must not all evil become a priva-
ence or power has more perfection. God's in- tion of being? Conceiving evil in this way,
finite goodness is therefore said to follow from Augustine points out that if things "be de-
the fact that he is completely actual — infinite prived of all good, they shall cease to be," so
in being and power. Things "which have life," that there is "nothing whatsoever evil" in it-
Augustine writes, "are ranked above those self; and Aquinas maintains that "no being is
thing." That which is less good in a metaphys- of desire, but in the form of love, for the divine
ical sense may be preferred on moral grounds as perfection is usually thought to preclude desire.
being better for man. "Who," he asks, "would Problems of this sort confront those who,
not rather have bread in his house than mice, conceiving the good both apart from and also
gold than fleas.?" Is it not true that "more is relative to man, are obligated to connect the
often given for a horse than for a slave, for a metaphysical and the moral meanings of good
jewel than for a maid" ? and whether they have a common thread.
to say
According to Augustine, as well as to Aquinas Some however, limit their considera-
writers,
later, metaphysical goodness consists in "the tion to the strictly moral good, and deny, as do
value a thing has in itself in the scale of crea- the Stoics, goodness or evil to anything but
tion," while moral goodness depends upon the man's free acts of will.
relation inwhich a thing stands to human need We should, says Marcus Aurelius, "judge
or desire, and according to the estimation only those things which are in our power, to be
placed upon it by human reason. It is in the good or bad." In this we are entirely free, for
moral, not the metaphysical sense that we "things themselves have no natural power to
speak of a good man, a good will, a good life, form our judgments ... If thou art pained by
and a good society; or of all the things, such as any external thing, it is not this thing which
health, wealth, pleasure, virtue, or knowledge, disturbs thee, but thy own judgment about it.
which it may be good for man to seek and pos- And it is in thy power to wipe out this judg-
sess. Only in the metaphysical sense can things ment now Suppose that men kill thee, cut
. . .
be thought of as good entirely apart from man; thee in pieces, curse thee. What then can these
only then can we find a hierarchy of perfections things do to prevent thy mind from remaining
in the world which accords with a hierarchy of pure, wise, sober, just?"
beings. Thus Spinoza declares that "the per- Though Kant develops what he calls a "meta-
fection of things is to be judged by their nature physic of ethics," he does not seem to have a
and power alone; nor are^they more or less per- metaphysical as opposed to a moral conception
fect because they delight or offend the human of the good; unless in some analogous form it
senses, or because they are beneficial or pre- lies between "value" and
in his distinction
judicial to human nature." "dignity," according to which "whatever has
Chaptf.h 30: GOOD /VND EVIL 611
reference to the general inclinations and wants desirable than any other, or the sum of all
jof mankind has a market value,'' whereas "what- good things which, when possessed, leaves noth-
,
ever ... is above all value, and therefore admits ing to be desired. Aristotle and Mill seem to
of no equivalent, has a dignity"— "not a merely take the latter view in their conception of hap-
[relative worth, but an intrinsic worth." piness as the summum bonum. "Human na-
But since Kant thinks that only men, or ra- ture," Mill says, "is so constituted as to desire
tional beings, can have mtrinsic worth, he finds nothing which is not cither a part of happiness
goodness only in the moral order. He agrees or a means of happiness." Happiness, he in-
with the Stoics that good and evil occur only in sists, is "not an abstract idea, but a concrete
the realm of freedom, not at all in the realm of whole" including all other goods within itself.
existence or nature. "Good or evil," he writes, It is the only good which is desired entirely for
"always implies a reference to the will, as de- its own sake. Aristotle treats virtue and knowl-
termined by the law of reason' which is the law edge as intrinsic goods, but he also regards them
of freedom. According to Kant, "nothing can as means to happiness. In Mill's terms, their
possibly be conceived in the w^orld, or even out goodness remains subject to the criterion of
of it, which can be called good without quali- utility, from which happiness alone is exempt
fication, except a Good Will"; and in another since it measures the utility of all other goods.
place he says, "If anything is to be good or evil If the evaluation of all things by reference to
. absolutely ... it can only be the manner of their contribution to happiness as the ultimate
acting, the maxim of the will." In this sense, the good constitutes utilitarianism in ethics, then
free will complying with or resisting the im- Aristotle no less than Mill is a utilitarian, even
peratives of duty is either the seat or the source though Aristotle does not refer to the principle
of all the goodness or evil that there is. "Men of utility, does not identify the good with pleas-
may laugh," Kant says, "at the Stoic, who in ure, and conceives the virtues as intrinsically
the severest paroxysms of gout cried out: Pain, good, not merely as means. Kant ^vould regard
however thou tormentest me, I will never ad- them as in fundamental agreement despite all
I mit that thou art an evil: he was right ... for their differences— or at least he would regard
pain did not in the least diminish the worth of them as committing the same fundamental
his person, but only that of his condition." error.
To Kant any discussion of human conduct
In the sphere of moral conduct, and especially which involves the calculation of means to ends
for those who make desire or pleasure rather is pragmatic or utilitarian, even when the con-
than duty the principle, there seems to be a trolling end is the summum bonum or happi-
plurality of goods which require classification ness. Kant makes a sharp distinction between
and order. what he calls "pragmatical rules" of conduct
Some things, it would appear, are not de- which consider what should be done by one who
sired for themselves, but for the sake of some- wishes to be happy, and what he regards as the
thing They are good only
else. as means to be strictly "moral or ethical law" which "has no
used. Some things are desired for their own other motive than the worthiness of being
sake, and are good as ends, to be possessed or happy'' Morality, he says in another place, "is
enjoyed. This division of goods into means and not properly the doctrine of how we should
ends — the useful and the enjoyable or pleasant make ourselves happy, but how we should be-
—permits a third type of good which is an end —
come worthy of happiness" through doing our
in one respect, and a means in another. Analysis duty.
of this sort leads to the concept of a summum Kant's criticism of Aristotle's ethics of hap-
bonum — that good which is not a means in any piness is therefore applicable to the utilitarian-
respect, but entirely an end, the supreme or ism of Mill; and Mill's rejoinder to Kant serves
highest good for which all else is sought. as a defense of Aristotle. This basic issue con-
The chief question with respect to the sum- cerning the primacy of happiness or duty — of
mum bonum. iswhether it is a good or the good desire or law — is discussed in the chapters on
— whether it is merely one type of good, more Duty and Happiness, where it is suggested
. —
right and wrong as subordinate terms in the economic goods which may either belong to the
analysis of good and evil, finding their special community as a whole or be divided into parcels
significance in the consideration of the good of of private property.
others or the social good. To do right is to do Another sense of common good is that in
good to others; to do wrong is to injure them. which the welfare of a community is a common
The question which Plato so insistently raises, good participated in by its members. The wel-
whether it is better to do injustice or to suffer fare of the family or the state is a good which
it, can also be stated in terms of good and evil, belongs to a multitude organized for some com-
or right and wrong. Is it better to suffer evil or mon purpose. If the individual members of the
to do it? Is it better to be wronged by others group derive some benefit from their association
or to wrong them? As justice for Aristotle is with one another, then the prosperity of the
that one among the virtues which concerns the community is not only a common good viewed
good of others and the common good, and as it collecti\'ely, but also a common good viewed
is the one virtue which is thought to involve distributively, for it is the good of each mem-
duty or obhgation, so the criteria of right and ber of the group as well as of the whole.
wrong measure the goodness or evil of human With this in mind, perhaps. Mill speaks of
acts by reference to law and society. "an indissoluble association between [the in-
dividual's] happiness and the practice of such
The division of goods into means and ends is mode of conduct, negative and positive, as re-
not the only distinction made by moralists who gard for the universal happiness prescribes; so
recognize the plurality and inequality of goods. that not only he may be unable to conceive the
Goods have been divided into the limited possibility of happiness to himself, consistently
and the unlimited with respect to quantity; with conduct opposed to the general good, but
the pure and the mixed with respect to quality; also that a direct impulse to promote the gen-
sensible and intelligible goods or particular eralgood may be in every individual one of the
goods and the good in general; external goods, habitual modes of action." If this statement by
goods of the body, and goods of the soul; the Mill is used to interpret Bentham's phrase
pleasant, the useful, and the virtuous. More "the greatest good for the greatest number"
specific enumerations of the variety of goods then the greatest number cannot be taken to
list wealth, health, strength, beauty, longevity, mean a majority, for the good of nothing less
pleasure, honor (or fame), virtue, knowledge, than the whole collectively or of all distribu-
friendship. tively can be taken as the common or general
All of the foregoing classifications can be com- good.
bined with one another, but there one distinc-
is Still another conception of the common good
tion which stands by itself, although it affects is possible. A good may common in the sense
be
all the others. That is the distinction between in which a specific nature is common to the
the individual and the common good, or be- members of the species — not as organized social-
tween private and public good, the good for ly in any way, but simply as so many like in-
this one man and the good of all others and of dividuals. If all men seek happiness, for ex-
the whole community. In the language of mod- ample, then happiness is a common good, even
ern utihtarianism, it is the distinction between though each individual seeks his own happi-
individual happiness and what Bentham called ness. In a deeper sense it is a common good if
*'the greatest good for the greatest number." the happiness each seeks is the same for all men
Chaptf.r 30: GOOD AND KVIL 613
ibecause they are all of the same nature; inn, by an invisible hand to promote an cnii u hich
most strictly, it is a common good if the happi- was no part of his intention" (i.e., the general
ness of each individual cannot be separated prosperity of society) does not excuse the in-
from the happiness of all. dividual's failure to aim at the common grxxl.
Aquinas seems to be using this meaning of The several meanings of the common gfxxi
common good when, in defining law as a rule of also complicate the statement of the issue be-
conduct "directed to the common good," he tween those who seem to say that the welfare
refers not merely to the good of the community of the community always takes precedence
or body politic, but beyond that to "the last over individual well-being or happiness— that
end of human life," which is "happiness or the good of the whole is always greater than
beatitude." Law, he says, "must needs concern the good of its parts — and those who seem to
itself properly with the order directed to uni- say that the state is made for man, not man
versal happiness." Mill also seems to conceive for the state, or that the prosperity of the so-
happiness as a common good in this sense. ciety in which men live is good primarily be-
"What the assailants of utilitarianism seldom cause it enables each of them to live well. This
have the acknowledge," he writes, is
justice to issue,which runs through all the great books
"that the happiness which forms the utilitarian of political theory from Plato and Aristotle
standard of what is right in conduct, is not the to Hegel and Mill, is discussed in the chapters
agent's own happiness, but that of all con- on Citizen and State.
cerned." The opposition between collectivism and
The several meanings of the common good individualism in economics and politics does
create a fundamental issue. Some writers use it not exhaust the issue which, stated in its broad-
in one sense only, rejecting the others. Some est moral terms, between self-
is a conflict
not only use the term in all its meanings, but interest and altruism. The primary problem
also develop a hierarchy of common goods. to consider here is whether the issue is itself
They regard universal happiness, for example, genuine, or only an opposition between false
as a common good of a higher order than the extremes which needlessly exclude the half-
welfare of the political community. Yet in truth that each contains.
every order they insist upon the primacy of the The collective aspect of the common good
common over the individual good. In the po- may not need to be emphasized at the expense
litical order, for example, they think the wel- of its distributive aspect. The good of each
fare of the community takes precedence over man and the good of mankind may be insep-
individual happiness. They would regard Adam arable. It may be the same good which, in dif-
Smith's statement of the way in which in- ferent respects, is individual and common. It
dividuals accidentally serve the common good may be that no good can be supreme which is
while seeking their private interests, as a per- not both immanent and transcendent — at once
version of the relationship. To say that an in- the highest perfection of the individual and a
dividual considering only his own gain is "led good greater than his whole being and his life.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
I. The general theory of good and evil 615
lb. Goodness in proportion to being: the grades of perfection and the goodness of
order 616
3. The moral theory of the good: the distinction between the moral and the metaphysical
good 620
3^. Human nature and the determination of the good for man: the real and the
apparent good; particular goods and the good in general 621
^f.
The sources of evil in human life 625
4^. Useful and enjoyable goods: good for an end and good in itself
5^. The judgment of diverse types of good: their subordination to one another 629
5c. The dialectic of means and ends: mere means and ultimate ends 630
<^d. The supremacy of the individual or the common good: the relation of the good
of the individual person to the good of other persons and to the good of the
state 631
6a. Knowledge, wisdom, and virtue: the relation of being good and knowing what
is good
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers
in heavy type, which arc the vokimc and page
numbers of the For example, in 4 Homer: Iliad, bk ii (265-28:^) 12d, the
passages referred to.
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 James :Pi^^\'c/io/o^^',116a-l 19b, the passage
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 Plato: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
Author's Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as part, bk, ch,
sect) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d.
Bible References The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
:
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., Old Testa-
ment: Nehemiah, 7:45 — (D) // Esdras, 7:46.
Symbols: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
18 Augustine: Confessions, bk ii, par 10 lla-b; 7 Plato: Phaedrus, 124c- 126a / Symposium,
BK XIII, par 53 124d-125a,c / City of God, bk 167a-d / Gorgias, 282c-284b / Timaeus, 447a-
XI, ch 22 333d-334c; bk xii, ch i 342b,d- 455c / Philebus, 635b-639a,c
343c; CH 4-5 344b-345b; bk xiv, ch 13 387c- 8 Aristotle: Physics, bk i, ch 9 [192*16-24]
388c; bk xxii, ch 24, 610c-611c 268b-c / Heavens, bk i, ch 2 359d-360d; bk
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 2, a II, CH 12 383b-384c / Generation and Corrup-
3, ANs 12c-14a; qq 5-6 23b-30d esp q 5, a 4 tion, bk II, CH 10 [336^25-34] 438d / Meta-
25d-26c; q 16, a i, ans 94b-95c; a 3, ans physics, BK IX, CH 9 [1051*4-21] 577a-b; bk
96b-d; q 18, a 3, ans 106b-107c; q 19, a i, xii, ch 7 602a-603b; ch 10 [1075*11-24] 605d-
ANS 108d-109c; a 4, ans lllc-112c; q 22, a, 2 606a; bk xiv, ch 4 624a-d
ANS 128d-130d; q 23, a i, ans and rep 1-2 9 Aristotle: Generation of Animals, bk ii,
132c-133b; q 36, a 3, ans 194c-195d; q 44, ch i [731^24-33] 272a-b / Ethics, bk i, ch 6
A 4 241a-d; q 48, a i, rep 4 259b-260c; q 59, [1096*17-^7] 341 b-d
A I, ANS 306c-307b; a 3, ans 308b-309a; q 17 Plotinus: First Ennead, tr vii, ch 1-2 26a-d;
60, A 5, ans 313b-314c; q 63, a 4, ans 328b- TR viii 27b-34a / Second Ennead, tr ix, ch 3
329a; q 65, a i, rep 3 339b-340b; a 2 340b- 67b-c / Third Ennead, tr viii, ch 8-10 132d-
Icio \d Chapter 30: CX)()l) AND EVIL 617
136a Ennead, tr ix, ch 1-2 246c- 247b;
/ Fifth 8 Arisioile: Metaphysics, bk v, ch 1 (1013*20-
CH 10, 250c / Sixth Ennead, tr vii, ch 25 2}] 533b; HK xii, en 7 (io72"2^ 36] 602b c;
334a-c; ch 28-29 335b-336b UK XMi, ch 3 [i078»^:5>6] 609d 610a / Soul,
18 Augustine: Confessions, bk vii, par 16 2^ HK ill, CH 7 (4^i''io 1^1 664b
,
48c-50c / City of God, bk viii, ch 6 268d 12 I'.pictetus: Discourses, bk ii. ch 2, 141a; i;k
269c; BK XI, CH 16 331a-c; ch 22 333d 334c; HI, CH I 175a 177c; bk iv, ch 11 240d 242d
BK XII, CH 1-5 342b,d-345b; bk xiv, ch i^ 12 Aurelius: Meditations, bk ii, sect 256b, d; i
20c-30d passim; q 16, a 3, ans 96b-d; q 18, 333b; CH 31-33 336d 338b
A 3 106b-107c; q 19, a i, ans 108d-109c; a 8, 18 Augustine: Confessions, hk xi, par 6 90c-d;
ANS 116a-d; q 22, a 4, ans 131c-132b; q 2^, bk xiii, par 53 124d-125a,c
A 5, rep 3 135d-137d; q 25, a i, rep 2 143d- 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 5, a 4,
144c; A 6 149a-150a; q 42, a i, rep 1-2 224b- rep I 25d-26c; q 16, a i, ans 94b-95c; a ^,
'
225d; Q 44, A I, ANS 238b-239a; q 47, aa 2-3 ans 96b-d; a 4 97a-c; q 17, a 4, rep 2 103c-
257b-259a; qq 48-49 259b-268a,c passim; q 104b; Q 54, A 2, ans 285d-286c; q 79, a ir,
50, A I, ans and rep i 269b-270a; a 3, ans REP 2 424d-425b; q 82, a 3, rep i 433c-434c;
and REP 2 272a-273b; q 57, a i, ans 295a-d; A 4, rep I 434c-435c; part i-ii, q 3, a 5, rep
Q 65, A 2, ANS and REP 3 340b-341b; q 70, 2 626b-627a; q 9, a i, ans and rep 2-3 657d-
A 3, REP 2 365b-367a; q 73, a i, ans 370a- 658d; Q 19, A 3, rep i 704c-705a; q 22, a 2,
371a; q 75, a 7 384d-385c; q 76, a 3, ans ANS 721c-722c; q 26, a i, rep 3 734a-d; q 27,
391a-393a; a 4, rep 3 393a-394c; q 77, a 2 A I, REP 3 737b-d; a 2, ans 737d-738c; q 29,
401b-d; A 4, REP I 403a-d; q 82, a 3, ans A 5, ANS 747c-748b
433c-434c; q 103 528a-534b passim, esp a 3 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part ii-ii,
530a-c, AA 6-8 532b-534b; q 106, a 4, ans q 180, A 2, REP 3 608c-609c; part hi suppl,
548b-549a; part i-ii, q i, a 4, rep i 612a- Q 94, A I, REP 2 1040d-1041b
613a; a 8 615a-c; q 2, a 5, rep 2 618d-619c; q 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part i, 62a
18 693b,d-703a passim, esp aa 1-4 694a-696d; 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 26c-27a
q 22, A 2, rep i 721c-722c; q 29, a i, rep i 42 Kant: Judgement, 478a-479d; 480a-482b;
745a-c; a 5, ans 747c-748b 488a-489a; 521b-523c esp 522b-c; 546d-548c
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 52, 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, part ii, 266a-
A I, ANS 15d-18a; q 54, a 3, rep 2 24c-25b; q 55, 267a
A 4, rep 1-2 28c-29d; q 85, a 4 181b-d; part 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov^ bk vi,
ii-ii, q 2, A 3, ANS 392d-393c; q 23, a 3, rep 3 153a-d
485a-d; part hi, q 7, a 9, ans 751d-752c;
part hi suppl, q 74, A I, REP 3 925c-926c \d.The origin, nature, and existence of evil
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, paradise, i [103-142] Old Testament: Isaiah, 45:7— (D) Isaias, 45:7
107b-d; II [i 12-148] 109a-b; vii [64-75] ^^d- / Lamentations, 3:38
116a; [121-148] 116b-c; xiii [52-87] 126a-b; Apocrypha: Ecclesiasticus, 33:14-15; 39:25— (D)
XXVIII [i]-xxix [66] 148d-151a esp xxviii OT, Ecclesiasticus, 33:15; 39:30
Symposium, 162d-163a; 167a-d / Republic, 48d-49a; ch 18, 49c-d; tr iv, ch 16, 57c:
bk V, 357d-358a; bk vi, 383d-388a / Philebus, TR IX, CH 13 73d-74b / Third Ennead, tr ii,
637c-638a ch 5-7 85b-86c; ch 10-14 88a-89d; tr hi
618 THE GREAT IDEAS 2
9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk vii, ch i [1145*15-27]
(1. The general theory of good and evil. Id. The 395a; ch 14 [1154^20-31] 406c; bk x, ch 8
origin, nature, and existence oj evil.) [1178^8-23] 433b-c / Politics, bk vii, ch i
CH 5, 95d-96a; ch 7, 96d-97a; tr vi, ch ii, [1323^22-25] 527c
113b-c / Fourth Ennead, tr hi, ch 16 150c-d 12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk ii, ch 8 146a-
/ Fifth Ennead, tr ix, ch 10, 250c / Sixth En- 147c
nead, tr vii, ch 28 335b-d 16 Kepler: Harmonies of the World, 1009a;
18 Augustine: Confessions, bk hi, par 11-12 1049b-1050b
15d-16b; bk iv, par 24 25b-c; bk v, par 20 18 Augustine: Confessions, bk i, par 12 4a; bk
32d-33a; bk vii, par 3-7 44a-45d; par 11-23 II, par 10 lla-b; bk vii, par 1-7 43b-45d; par
47a-50d; bk xiii, par 45 123a / City of God, 16-23 48c-50c; bk x, par 38 81a; bk xi, par 6
bk XI, CH 9, 327c-d; ch 22 333d-334c; bk xii, 90c-d; BK XIII, par 1-5 llOd-llld; par 53
CH 1-9 342b,d-348b; bk xix, ch 13 519a- 124d-125a,c / City of God, bk xi, ch 10 327d-
520a 328d; BK XII, ch 1-3 342b,d-344b; ch 8 346d-
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 5, a 347b / Christian Doctrine, bk i, ch 5-7 625d-
3, REP 2 25a-d; a 5, rep 3-4 26c-27c; qq 48-49 626c; CH 31-32 633b-d
259b-268a,c; q 65, a i, rep 2-3 339b-340b; 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 2, a i,
PART i-ii, Q 18 693b,d-703a passim, esp aa REP 2 lOd-lld; A 3, ANS and rep i 12c-14a; q
1-4 694a-696d; q 29, a i, ans and rep 1,3 3, A I, ANS 14b-15b; a 2, ans 15c-16a; a 7, rep
745a-c; a 5, ans 747c-748b 2 19a-c; q 4 20c-23b; q 6 28b-30d; q 13, a 2,
20 Aquinas Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 79,
: ans 63c-64d; a 11, rep 2 73c-74b; q 18, a 3
AA 1-2 156b-158a; q 80 159d-162d; q8i, aa 1-2 106b-107c; q 19, a i, rep 1-3 108d-109c; q 21,
163a-165c; a 5 167a-d; part hi suppl, q 69, a I, rep 4 124b-125b; q 26 150a-152a,c; q 51,
A 7, REP 9 891d-893c; q 74, a i, rep i 925c- A I, REP 3 275b-276b; q 54, a 2, ans 285d-
926c 286c; Q 60, A 5 313b-314c; q 61, a 3, rep 2
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, paradise, i [103-142] 316a-d; q 62, a 8, ans and rep 1-2 323c-324a;
107b-d; vn [19-148] 115b-116c; xin [52-87] Q 66, A I, CONTRARY 343d-345c; q 84, a 2, ans
126a-b; xix [40-66] 135c-d; xxix [49-66] and REP 3 442b-443c; q 91, a i, ans 484a-
150d-151a 485b; Q 100, A 2, ANS 521c-522b; q 103 528a-
23 HoBBEs: Leviathan, part hi, 191b-d; 195d- 534b passim; q 104, a 3, rep 2 537b-d; a 4,
196a ANS 538a-c; q 105, a 4, ans 541c-542a; a 5,
26 Shakespeare: Romeo and Juliet, act ii, ANS 542a-543b; part i-ii, q 2, a 4, rep i
sc HI [15-30] 296c 618a-d; a 5, rep 2 618d-619c; q 9, a 6, ans
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part i, appendix 369b-372d 662a-d; q 18, a i, ans 694a-d; q 22, a 2, rep i
32 MiL.TOi^ Paradise Lost, bk ix [494-1189] 258a-
: 721c-722c
273a 20 Aquinas Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 49,
:
33 Pascal: Provincial Letters, 116a-b A 4, ANS 5a-6a; q 61, a 5, ans 58b-59d; q 64,
35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, sect 153-154 a 4, ans and rep 3 69b-70a; part ii-ii, q 9,
443d-444b a 4, REP I 425d-426c; q 13, a i, ans 444b-
35 Hume: Human Understanding, sect vih, div 445a; q 17, a i, ans 457a-d; q 23, a 4, ans
76-81 485a-487a 485d-486b; q 34, a i, ans 559a-c; q 39, a 2,
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 81b-c REP 3 575b-576b; q 184, a 2, ans 629d-630d;
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 330a-b PART HI, Q I, A I, ANS 701d-703a; q 23, a i,
42 Kant: Practical Reason, 316a-317d ANS 833a-d
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part ii, par 139 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, purgatory, xv [40-
48d-49b; additions, 90-91 130b-131d / Phi- 81] 75d-76a; xxviii [91-96] 97a; paradise,
losophy of History, intro, 160a; 162a-163a; VII [64-148] 115d-116c esp [64-66] 115d; xiii
168d; part i, 237d-238c [52-87] 126a-b; xix [40-90] 135c-136a
48 Melville: Moby Dic\ esp 30a-36b, 117a- 22 Chaucer: Merchant's Tale [10,160-164] 336a
124b, 131a-145a, 171b, 317a-321a, 411a-419b 25 Montaigne: Essays, 300c-d
52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, bk xi, 31 Descartes: Discourse, part iv, 52a-d; 53d /
344a-d Meditations, i, 77b-c; hi, 86a-88d; iv 89a-
93a passim / Objections and Replies, 123d-
2. The goodness or perfection of God: the 124c; def VIII 130d; 228a-c; 229c-d
plenitude of the divine being
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part i, def 6 355b;
New Testament: Matthew, 5:48 / LuJ^, 18:18- PFOP 8-9 356d-357d; prop 10, schol 358a-b;
\()l l]ohn, 1:5 / Revelation, 15:4— (Z)) Apoc- prop 14 359d-360a; prop 16 362a; prop 33,
alypse, 15:4 SCHOL 2 367d-369a
7 Plato: Republic, bk ii, 321d-323a / Timaeus^ 32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk hi [135-166] 138b-
447a-448b / Theaetetus, 530b-d 139a; bk vii [170-173] 220b-221a
8 Aristotle: Metaphysics, bk xii, ch 7 602a- 33 Pascal: P(?«^<?1?^," 425-426 243b-244b; 430
603b 245a-247b
—
35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk ii, ch 2^ 48c 50c; bk xi, par 6 90c d; bk xm, par
XXIII, SECT 34-35 213a-c; bk hi, ch vi, sect 1-5 llOd Hid / City of God, bk vii, cm ^i
11-12 271b-272b passim 261d 262a; »k xi, ch 21-24 333a 336a; bkxii,
35 Hume: Human Understanding, sect xi, div ch I 342b,d 343c; en q 347b 348b; hk xiv,
106-107, 499c-500a passim; div 113, 502a-b CH n 387c 388c; bk xxii, ch 24 609a 612a /
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 230a-b Christian Doctrine, bk i, ch 31-52 633b-d
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 205a-b; 237d-239a / 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 2,
Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 263a-b; A 3, ANS and REP I 12c 14a; q 3, a i, rep i
278b-d / Practical Reason, 307a-d; 325d- 14b 15b; a 2, ans 15c-16a; q 6 28b-30d;
326a; 342c; 345a-c; 351b-352c / Judgement, o 13, A 2, ANs 63c-64d; q 19, a 2, ans and
592a-c REP 2-4 109c-110b; A 4, ANS and rep i lllc
112c; Q 20 119d-124a; q 21, a 3, ans 126a c;
2a. God's goodness as diflfusive, causing the
Q 25, A 6 149a-150a; q 50, a i, ans 269b-270a;
goodness of things: God's love A 3, ans 272a-273b; q 51, a i, rep 3 275b-
Old Testament: Genesis, i / Exodus, 20:4-6 276b; Q 59, A I, ans 306c-307b; a 2, ans 307c-
esp 20:6; 33:19; 34:5-10 / Deuteronomy, 4:1- 308b; Q 60, A 5 313b-314c; q 91, a i, ans 484a-
40 esp 4:6-8, 4:31, 4:37; 5:7-10 esp 5:10; 7:6- 485b; Q 103 528a-534b; q 104, a 3, rep 2
II / Job, 33:13-33 / Psalms passim, esp 8-10, 537b-d; a 4, ans 538a-c; q 105, a 4, ans 541c-
16-18, 20, 22-23, ^5' 68, 97:10, 114:1-115:18, 542a; q 106, a 4, ans 548b-549a; part i-ii, q
118:1-119:176— (D) Pjfl/m^ passim, esp 8-9, 15- I, A 4, rep i 612a-613a; q 2, a 5, rep 3 618d-
17, 19, 21-22, 24, 67, 96:10, 113:1-18, 117:1- 619c; Q 9, A 6, ans 662a-d; q 19, a 4, ans
118 176 / Proverbs, 3:11-12/ Song ofSolomon
:
— 705b-c; Q 28, A 3, contrary 742a-d
(D) Canticle of Canticles / Isaiah, /[0-66 passim, 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, purgatory, xv [40-
esp 42-44, 46:3-4, 49:1-26, 52:1-15, 56:1-8, 81] 75d-76a; paradise, ii [112-148] 109a-b
63:8-9 (D) Isaias, 40-66 passim, esp 42-44, VII [16-148] 115b-116c esp [64-75] 115d-116a
46:3-4, 49:1-26, 52:1-15, 56:1-8, 6^ -.S-g / Jere- XIII [52-87] 126a-b; xix [40-90] 135c-136a
miah, 31-33 —
(^) Jeremias, 31-33 / Lamenta- XXVI [1-69] 145d-146c; xxviii 148d-150b
tions, 3:22-39 esp 3:25, 3:38 / Ezekjei, 16 esp xxix [13-36] 150b-c; [127-145] 151c-d
16:6-14, 16:59-63 —
(D) Ezechiel, 16 esp 16:6- 23 HoBBEs: Leviathan, part hi, 185d
14, 16:59-63 / Hosea esp 2:14-23, 3:1 3:5, ,
31 Descartes: Objections and Replies, 229c-d
6:1-3, ii*i-4» 13 '16-14 :9—(I>) Osee ts^ 2:14- 32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk hi [135-143] 138b;
23' 3-1' 3-5' 6:1-3, II '1-4' 14:1-10 / Jo^^^ 2 BK V [153-208] 178b-179b; bk vii [170-173]
esp 2:18-32 / Zechariah, g:ij—{D) Zacharias, 220b-221a
9:17 / Malachi, 1:1-3— (D) Malachias, 1:1-3 35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, intro, sect
Apocrypha: Tobit, 13:10— (D) OT, Tobias, 3 405b-c; SECT 154 444a-b
13:12 / Wisdom of Solomon, 11:22-26; 16:20- 37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 186c-d
29— (D) OT, Boo)^ of Wisdom, 11:23-27; 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, intro, 169d-
16:20-29 / Ecclesiasticus, 11:14-17; 16:26- 170a
18:14 esp 16:29-30; 39:16,25-34— (D) OT, 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, bk v,
Ecclesiasticus, 11:14-17; 16:26-18:14 esp 16:30- 127b-137c; bk vi, 167b-168c; bk vii, 189a-
31; 39:21,30-40 191a,c
New Testament: Matthew, 6:25-34; 7:7-11 /
Luke, 11:1-13; 12:6-7,16-33 / John, 1:1-5;
2b. The divine goodness and the problem of
evil
3:16-21; 13:31-35; 14:21; 15:9-16; 17:21-26 /
Romans, 2:4; 8:31-39 / Galatians, 2:20 / Old Testament: Deuteronomy, 30:15-20 esp
Ephesians, 3:14-21; 5:1-2 / I John, 3-4 esp 30:15 / / Samuel, 16:14-23 (D) / Kings,—
3:1, 3:16, 4:7-12 / Revelation, 3:19— (D) 16:14-23 / Job I Psalms, 5 esp 5:4-6; 9-10;
Apocalypse, 3:19 13; 22 esp 22:7-8; 37; 39 esp 39:8-12; 44;
7 Plato: Republic, bk ii, 321d-322d; bk vi-vh, 73; 88 —
(D) Psalms, 5 esp 5:5-7; 9; 12; 21
384a-389c / Timaeus, 447a-448a esp 21:8-9; 36; 38 esp 38:9-13; 43; 72; 87
8 Aristotle: Generation and Corruption, bk ii, / Proverbs, 8:13 / Ecclesiastes, 8:1-9:12 esp
ch 10 [336^25-34] 438d / Metaphysics, bk xii, 8:10-14, 9:1-3 / Js^i^b, 45:7— (D) Isaias,
CH 7 602a-603b; ch 10 [1075^11-24] 605d- 457 / Jeremiah, 12 esp 12:1-2— (D) Jeremias,
606a 12 esp 12:1-2 / Lamentations, 3:38 / Amos,
12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk ii, ch 8 146a-147c 3:6 / Micah, 1:12— (D) Micheas, 1:12
16 Kepler: Harmonies of the World, 1049b- Apocrypha: Wisdom of Solomon, 1:13-16; 2:23-
1050b; 1071b 24; 11:24— (D) OT, Book of Wisdom, 1:13-16;
17 Plotinus: First Ennead, tr vii, ch 1-2 26a-d 2 :23-25 ; II :25 / Ecclesiasticus, 1 1 :i4-i6; 15:11-
156a-159c; part hi suppl, q 74, a i, rep i 12 AuRELius: Meditations 253a-310d esp bk ii,
925c-926c sect I 257d, sect 11-12
256b,d, sect 9
. 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, hell, xxxiv [28-^56] 258a-c, BK sect 10 264c, sect 24 265c-d,
IV,
51c; paradise, i [103-142] 107b-d; vii [19- SECT 32 266b-c, sect 37 266d-267a, sect 39
148] 115b-116c; VIII [91-148] 117d-118c; xiii 267a, BK V, sect 2 269a, sect 6 269b-d, sect
[52-87] 126a-b; xix [40-90] 135c-136a; xxix 10 270c-d, sect 12 271a, sect 15-16 271b-d,
[49-66] 150d-151a BK VI, SECT 2 274a, SECT 51 279b-c, bk vii,
22 Chaucer: Friar's Tale [7056-7085] 281a-b sect 36 282b, SECT 44 282b-c, sect 55 283b-c,
23 HoBbEs: Leviathan, part ii, 160d-161a BK viii, sect I 285a-b, sect 10 286b, sect
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 17d-18a; 19 286d-287a, sect 32 287d-288a, sect 39
80b-81a 288c, SECT 41 288d, sect 51 289d-290a,
31 Descartes: Meditations, iv 89a-93a bk ix, SECT I 291a-c, sect 16 293a, sect 42
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part i, prop 33, schol 2 295c-296a,c
367d-369a; appendix 369b-372d 18 Augustine: City of God, bk xi, ch 16 331a-c
32 Milton: Paradise Lost 93a-333a esp bk i [128- 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, qq
168] 96a-97a, [209-220] 98a, bk hi [56-343] 1-5 609a-643d: qq 18-21 693b,d-720ax
3^ Chapter 30: GOOD AND EVIL 621
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, PirROATOKY, xvi (52- 271b d; bk vi, sect ^ 274d; bk vii, sect 20
i
114) 77b-78a; xvii [82]-xviii [75J 79b-80c 281b; SECT 55 283b c; bk vim, spot 285a-b;
i
30 11\con: Advancement of Learning, 69d-76a; BK IX, SECT 291a-c; sect 42 295c 296a,c
I
58b-60a / City of God, bk xii, ch 1-9 342b,d- 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 114d-115a; 149d-150a;
348b 190c-d; 236d-237a / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 48, Morals, 253d-254d; 256a-b; 260a-261d; 265c-
a 6, ANs 264a-d; q 49, a i, rep i 264d-265d; 266d; 268c-270c; 272a-b; 273d-287d esp277d-
Q 82, AA 1-2 431d-433c; q 83, a i 436d-438a; 279d, 281c-282d / Practical Reason, 297a-
Q 87, A 4, rep 2 468b-d; q 105, a 4, ans 541c- 314d esp 307d-314d; 321b-329a esp 325c;
542a; part i-ii, q 10, aa 2-4 663d-666a,c 330d-331a; 338c-355d / Pref. Metaphysical
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 79, Elements of Ethics, 366d-367a; 368b-369a;
AA 1-2 156b-158a; q 80, aa 1-3 159d-162b 373d / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 383a-
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, purgatory, xvi 390a,c esp 383a-384d, 388b-c, 389a-390a,c;
[58-129] 77c-78a; xviii [19-75] 80a-c; xxi [40- 391a-c; 392b-393a / Science of Right, 397c-
72] 85b-d; paradise, iv [64-114] lllb-d 398a; 416b-417b / Judgement, 571c-572a;
23 Houbes: Leviathan, part i, 87c; 93c 593a-d; 595a-d; 599b-d; 605d-606b [fn 2]
24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, bk i, 43 Mil l: Liberty, 296b-c / Utilitarianism, 446a-d;
65c-66b 453c-d; 458b-459b; 468b-469b; 469d-470b;
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 69d-81c 475a-476a,c
31 Descartes: Discourse, part hi, 50b / Objec- 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part i, par 36
tions and Replies, axiom vii 132a; 228a-c 21b-c; par 79 33a-c; part ii, par 129-135 45d-
32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk hi [80-134] 137a- 47d esp par 133 47a; part hi, par 148-149
;
12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk hi, ch 14, 189c-d; AA 5-7 618d-621c; q ^ a 3 624b 625a; q 31,
CH 24 203c-210a A 5 755c-756c
17 Plotinus: First Ennead, tr ii, ch 3-4 7c-8c 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, purgatory, xvi [85-
18 Augustine: Confessions, bk ii, par 9-18 lOd- 114] 77d-78a; xxx [55]-xxxi (90] 100a lOld
13a / City of God, bk viii, ch 4 266d-267c; 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part i, 62c
CH 8-9 270a-271a; bk xix, ch 1-5 507a-514b; 24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, bk iv,
ch 17-20 522b-524a / Christian Doctrine, bk i, 234a-235a
ch 35 634c-d 25 Montaigne: E^jajyj, 538a-d
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 5, a 6 31 Descartes: Discourse, part i, 41d-42a
27c-28b; q 62, a 9, rep 2 324a-325b; part i-ii, 37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 263c-d
Q 2, A I 615d-616c; q 3, a i, ans 622c-623a; 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 338c-d
Q 7, A 2, REP I 652d-653c; q 8, aa 2-3 656a- 43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 448a-450a; 471a-b
657c 44 Bosw ell: Johnson, 378a-b
23 HoBBEs: Leviathan, part i, 62a 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, bkv, 130b-
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 27c-d; 132b; BK VI, 164b-165a
71a-b 53 James: Psychology, 198b-199b
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part iv, appendix, v 447c
35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk ii, ch xxi, 4d. Intrinsic and external goods: intrinsic
SECT 63 194d-195a worth and extrinsic value
36 Sterne: Tristram Shandv, 538a-539a 7 Plato: Apology, 206a-d
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 236d-237a / Fund. Prin. 9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk i, ch 8 [1098^12-19]
Metaphysic of Morals, 256a-b; 257c-d; 266a- 344a; bk vii, ch 13 [1153^13-24] 405a; bk ix,
267d; 268b; 271c-279d esp 273d-277b / CHI [1163^31-1 164*13] 416b,d;cH 9 423a-424b;
Practical Reason, 314d-315c; 327d-329a / bk X, CH 8 432d-434a esp [1178^33-1179*16]
Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 367c / 433c-d / Politics, bk iv, ch ii [1295*^2-34]
Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 387b-388a / 495c-496a; bk vii, ch i 527a-d; ch 13 [^^2*
Judgement, 477b-c; 478a-479d; 586a-b; 591b- 18-27] 536d-537a / Rhetoric, bk i, ch 5 600d-
592d; 595a-d 602d
43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 446dA'\8a; "^610-464(1 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk ii [1-61]
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 183 15a-d; bk v [1113-1135] 75c-d
64a / Philosophy of History, part ii, 267a-268b 12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk ii, ch 16 156b-
53 ] AMES -.Psychology, 725b-726a 158d; BK CH 20 192d-193d; ch 24 203c-
III,
54 Freud: Civilization and Its Discontents, 779d- 210a; BK IV, ch 4 225a-228a; ch 10 238d-240d
780b 12 AuRELius: Meditations, bk vi, sect 51 279b-c;
BK VII, SECT 3 279d-280a
4r. Goods of the body and goods of the soul 14 Plutarch: Solon, 74c-75c / Pericles, 121a-
7 Plato: 40b-41a / Symposium,
Protagoras, 122b
162d-167d / Meno, 178c-d / Apology, 205d- 18 Augustine: Confessions, bk ii, par 10 lla-b/
206d; 209b-212a,c / Crito, 215a-d / Phaedo, City of God, bk i, ch 10 135b-136c; bk viii,
224a-c / Gorgias, 260a-270c / Republic, bk i, CH 8 270a-d; bk xv, ch 22 416a-c; bk xix, ch
295d-296c; 309b-310b; bk hi, 334b-339a; bk 3,510c; CH 20 523d-524a
IX, 421a-425b / Timaeus, 474b-476b / Sophist, 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 103,
556d-558d / Laws, bk i, 643c-d; bk ii, 656d- A 2, rep 1-2 529a-530a; part i-ii, q 2, aa 1-4
658b 615d-618d esp a 4, ans 618a-d; q 4, aa 5-7
8 Aristotle: Physics, bk vii, ch 3 [246*10- 632c-636a esp a 7, ans 635b-636a
248*6] 329c-330d 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, hell, vii [1-66] 9c-
9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk i, ch 7 [io97*»23-io98* 10b
17] 343a-c / Politics, bk vii, ch i [1323*22-^^21] 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part i, 73b-c; 93b-c
527a-c / Rhetoric, bk i, ch 5 [1360^19-1361*12] 25 Montaigne: Essays, 107a-112d esp 108c-109c;
601a-c; [1361*^3-27] 602a-b 126b-128c;300c-306a
12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk ii [1-61] 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 74b-c; 81d-
15a-d 82a
628 THE GREAT IDEAS 4(f to 5a
43 Mill: Liberty, 297a / Utilitarianism, 461d
human good. 4d. Intrinsic and
(4. Divisions of the
44 Boswell: Johnson, 393a-c
external goods: intrinsic worth and ex-
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part i, par 46
trinsic value. ^
23d-24a; part hi, par 170 60d; par 199 67c;
33 Pascal: Pensees, 462 255a par 249 78c; par 287 97a; additions, 27 121b;
35 Locke: Civil Government, ch v, sect 37 33a-b 127 137b; 145 140b
36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 538a-539a 47 Goethe: Faust, part ii [11,559-572] 281b
37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 263c-d 49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 316c-317a; 592d
42 Kant: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 256b; 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, bk vi,
274d-275b/ /«/ro. Metaphysic of Morals, Z%1 6.- 158b-159a
388a / Judgement, 591b-592a
43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 462c-d 5. The order of human goods
44 BoswEi.1.: Johnson, 349a-c
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part i, par 45 5a. The supreme good or summum bonum: its
23c-d; par 49 24c-25a; par 63-65 28b-29a; par existence and nature
67-69 29c-31a; additions, 29 121c 7 Plato: Symposium, 164c-167d / Gorgias,25^d-
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk v, 194d 255c / Republic, bk vi-vii, 383d-401d esp bk
53 ] AMES -.Psychology, 826a VI, 383d-386c / Philebus, 635b-639a,c
8 Aristotle: Metaphysics, bk v, ch 16 543a-b;
4e, Individual and common goods BK XII, CH 7 [1072^13-29] 602d-603a
7 Plato: Crito 213a-219a,c / Republic, bk iv, 9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk i, ch 1-12 339a-347b
342a-d; bk v, 364c-365d / Critias, 480a / esp CH 7 342c-344a; bk vii, ch 11-1:5 403c-
Statesman, 588a-b 405b passim, esp ch 13 404d-405b; bk x, ch
8 Aristotle: Metaphysics, bk xii, ch 10 [1075* 1-8 426a-434a esp ch 6-8 430d-434a / Politics,
11-24] 605d-606a bk I, ch I [1252*1-6] 445a; bk iii, ch 12 [1282''
9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk vi, ch 8 [1141^28-1142^ 15-18] 480c; bk vii, ch 1-3 527a-530a passim
11] 390d-391a / Politics, bk i, ch i [1252^1-6] 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk ii [1-61]
445a; bk ii, ch 1-5 455b,d-460a; bk hi, ch 6-7 15a-d; bk vi [1-42] 80a-d
475d-477a; bk iv, ch ii [1295*25-^1] 495b-c 12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk i, ch 3 108b-c; bk
12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk i, ch 19 125b-126c II, CH II 150a-151b; ch 19 162c-164b; bk hi,
513c; PART i-ii, Q I, a 5, ans 613a-614a; VIII, ch 2 27c-d / Sixth Enfiead, tr ix 353d-
aa 7-8 614c-615c; q 19, a 10, ans 710b-711d; 360d esp CH 6-1 1 357a-360d
Q 21, AA 3-4 718d-720a,c 18 Augustine: Confessions, bk iv, par 24 25b-c;
20 Aquinas Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 90,
: BK VII, par 7 45a-d; bk x, par 29-34 78d-80c
A 2 206b-207a; a 3, ans and rep 3 207a-c; / City of God, bk viii, ch 8-10 270a-271d; bk
A 4, ANS 207d-208b; q 91, a 5, ans 211c-212c; x, ch 1-3 298b,d-301a; ch 18 310b-d; bk xii,
A 6, rep 3 212c-213c; q 93, a i, rep i 215b, d- ch I 342b,d-343c; bk xix 507a-530a,c
216c; q 94, A 2, ans 221d-223a; a 3, rep i 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 12, a
223a-c; q 95, a 4, ans 229b-230c; q 96, a 3, I, ANS 50c-51c; Q 26 150a-152a,c; q 62, a i,
ans and rep 3 232b-233a; a 4, ans 233a-d; q ans 317d-318c; part i-ii, qq 1-5 609a-643d;
97, A 4 238b-239b; q 100, a 2, ans 252b-253a; Q 34, A 3 770c-771c
A 8, ANS and rep 3 259d-261a; q iii, a 5, rep 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, purgatory, xvii
I 355d-356c; part ii-ii, q 39, a 2, rep 3 575b- [127-139] 79d; PARADISE, I [103-142] 107b-d;
576b; Q 187, A 3, rep 1,3 666a-669b; part hi III [82-90] llOa-b; XXVI [1-69] 145d-146c;
suppL, Q 96, A 6, rep ii 1058a-1061b xxxii [i39]-xxxiii [145] 156a-157d
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, purgatory, xv [40- 22 Chaucer: Troilus and Cressida, bk
iii, stanza
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk v, 194d A 2, REP 3 23d'24c; q 107, a i, ans 325c-327b;
52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, bk vi, Q 114, A 4, REP I 373a-d; part ii-ii, q 27, a 6,
164b-165a ANS 524c-525c
53 James Psychology, 198b-204b esp 199b-203a
: 22 Chaucer: Tale of Melibeus 401a-432a
23 Machiavelli: Prince, ch xviii, 25d-26a
5c. The dialectic of means and ends: mere 23Hobbes: Leviathan, part i, 53a-b; 76c-d;
means and ultimate ends 90a; part hi, 237d
5 Sophocles: Philoctetes 182a-195a,c esp [50- 25 Montaigne: Essays, 28a-d; 52c-53c; 330b-
127] 182d-183c 332a; 368d; 381a-388c passim, esp 381c-d,
6 Thucydides Peloponnesian War, bk v, 504c-
: 388a-c
507c 26 Shakespeare: RichardII, act ii, sc hi [140-
261a; bk iv, sect 4 264a; bk v, sect 6 269b-d; XI 55b-58b passim; ch xiv 62b-64c; ch xv,
sect 16 271c-d; sect 22 272b; bk vi, sect 14 SECT 171 65a-b / Human Understanding, bk i,
274d-275a; sect 45 278c; sect 54 279c; bk CH II, SECT 2 104a-b; sect 6 105b-c
VIII, sect 12 286b-c; sect 23 287b; bk ix, 36 Swift: Gulliver, part i, 29b; part hi, 112a-
sect i 291a-c; sect 23 293c; sect 42 295c- 115b esp 112a-113a
296a,c; bk x, sect 6 297a-b; bk xi, sect 21 37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 291d-292a; 330b-c
305d-306a 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk v, 21a; bk
14 Plutarch: Lycurgus 32a-48d esp 44d-45c / XIII, 96a-b; bk xxiv, 203a; bk xxvi, 221c-
Solon, 71b; 71d / Cato the Younger, 626d-627b; 222a
632b-c; 646b / Demosthenes, 699c-700a 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 323a-328a,c csp 323b-
15 Tacitus ///>/or/<fi-, bk ii, 226d-228a
:
325b; 343d-345c; 363a-366d esp 363b 364a /
18 Augustine: City of God, bk xix, ch 5 513d- Political Economy, 368d-377b f Social Contract,
514b; CH 8 515c-516a; ch 12-14 517b-520d; BK I-II, 391b-400c; bk ii, 405a-c; bk hi, 417c-
CH 16-17 521d-523a; ch 19 523b-d; ch 26 418a; bk iv, 425a-d
528d-529a 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, bk i, 109d-110d;
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 60, bk II, 140b; bk iv, 193a-194b esp 194a-b
A 5 313b-314c; q 65, a 2 340b-341b; Q 92, a i, 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 193c-194a
632 THE GREAT IDEAS 6 to 6a
Apocrypha: Wisdom of Solomon, 1:1-7 ^^P ^-4?
(5. The order of human goods. 5d. The supremacy 6; 8-io-(D) OT, Boo{of Wisdom, 1:1-7 esp
of the individual or the common good: the 1:4; 6; 8-10 / Ecclesiasticus, 19:22-24; 39:1-
relation of the good of the individual person
"5 43-33; 50:28-29— (£)) OT, Ecclesiasticus,
to the good of other persons and to the good
19:19-21; 39:1-15; 43:37; 50-30-31
of the state. ^ New Testament: /o;^«, 3:17-21 / Romans, 7:15-
42 Kant: Vure Reason, 114b-d / Fund. Prin. Meta- 2.^ / James, ^wj
physic of Morals, 272d-273a / Practical Reason, 5 Euripides: Hippolytus [375-430] 228b-d
304b-305c / Pref. Metaphysical Elements of 7 Plato: Charmides, 7b-c; 12a-13c / Laches Ida-
Ethics, 369c-373b; 373d; 375d-376b / Science 37d / Protagoras 38a-64d / Euthydemus, 69a-
of Right, 438d-439b 71a / Cratylus, 86c-d / Meno 174a-190a,c esp
43 Constitution of the U.S.: amendments, 183b-190a,c / Phaedo, 225d-226c; 230d-234c
i-x 17a-d / Republic, bk i, 306c-308a; bk ii, 314d-315a;
43 Federalist: number 45, 147c-148a; number bk III, 333b-334b; 337b-d; bk iv, 354d-355a;
64, 197d; number 85, 256d-257a bk vi-vii, 383d-401d esp bk vii, 389d-
43 Mill: Liberty, 267b,d-274a; 293b-323a,c esp 398c; BK X, 439b-441a,c / Critias, 485b-c /
322d-323a,c / Representative Govern?nent, 392b- Laws, BK I, 643c-d; bk hi, 669a-670c; bk ix,
396d / Utilitarianism, 450b-455a; 455c-456a; 754a-b; bk xii, 788d-789a / Seventh Letter,
460a-461c; 463a-b; 469b-470c; 473c-476a,c 806a-c
passim 8 Aristotle: Topics, bk hi, ch 6 [120*26-31]
44 Boswell: Johnson, 221d-224a; 261c-d; 304c; 168a; bk iv, ch 2 [121^24-122^] 169d-170a;
393a-c CH3 [124*10-14] 172d
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part i, par 46 9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk i, ch 3 339d-340b; bk
23d-24a; part ii, par 125-126 44d-45b; par II, CH 4 350d-351b; bk vi, ch 8 390d-391c;
134 47b; PART III, par 155 57c; par 170 60d; ch 12-13 393b-394d; bk vii, ch 2-3 395c-
par 183 64a; par 192 66b-c; par 199 67c; par 398a; ch 10 [1152*7-24] 403a-b; bk x, ch 5
240 76d; par 249 78c; par 254 79c; par 261 [1176*15-29] 430c-d; CH 8 [1178*16-18] 432d;
83a-d; par 277 92b-c; par 294 98b-d; par CH 9 [1179^4-1180*13] 434b-d / Politics, bk vii,
308 102c-103a; par 323 107a; additions, 27 CH I [1323*^21-36] 527c-d
121b; 47 124a-b; 117 135d-136a; 127 137b; 12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk i, ch 5 llOb-c; ch
141 139c; 145 140b; 148 140c-d; 151 141b-c; 17 122d-124a; ch 26 131b-132b; ch 28 133b-
158 142d / Philosophy of History, intro, 164b; 134d; BK II, CH 22 167d-170a; ch 26 174c-d;
192d-193a; part i, 236a-c; part ii, 271c-d; BK IV, CH I 213a-223d
276a; PART III, 298c-299a; part iv, 320c-321a; 12 AuRELius: Meditations, bk ii, sect i 256b,d;
47 Goethe: Faust, part ii [11,559-572] 281b 26 281c; SECT 62-63 283d-284a; bk vih, sect
49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 310a-319a esp 312a- 14 286c; bk ix, sect 42 295c-296a,c; bk xii,
313a, 314b-315d, 316c-317c; 321b-322d esp SECT 12 308b-c
322c-d; 592d 14 Plutarch: Pericles, 121a-122b / Aristides,
50 Marx: Capital, 237a 265c-d / Agesilaus, 490d-491b / Demetrius,
50 Marx-Engels: Communist Manifesto, 429b-c 726a-d
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk ii, 67d-68c; 72d- 17 Plotinus: First Ennead, tr ii, ch 6-7 9a-10a;
74a; bk v, 214c-216d; bk vi, 260a-262a; bk TR III, CH 6 lld-12b
XI, 475b-476c; 505a-511b passim, esp 509d- 18 Augustine: Confessions, bk vii, par 27 51d-
510a; 514b-515a; bk xii, 537b-538a; bk xiii, 52c; BK VIII, par lo-ii 55c-56b / City of God,
577b-c; bk xv, 634a-635a; epilogue i, 670d- bk VIII, CH 3 266a-d; ch 8 270a-d; bk ix, ch
671c 20 296a-b; bk xi, ch 28 338a-d
52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, bk vi, 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q i, a 6,
158b-159a; 164a-167b; bk xii, 370b-d REP 3 6b-7a; part i-ii, q 2, a i, rep i 615d-
54 Freud: General Introduction, 452c-d; 573b-c / 616c; A 2, rep 3 616d-617b
War and Death, 757b-759d esp 759c-d / Civil- 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 57,
ization and Its Discontents, 780b-781d; 799a- A 4, ANS 38a-39a; a 5, ans 39a-40a; q 58, a 2
800a / New Introductory Lectures, 853a- b 42a-43a; aa 4-5 44a-45d; q 65, a i, rep 3-4
70b-72a; part ii-ii, q 18, a 4, ans 464c-465a;
6. Knowledge and the good q 24, A II, ans 498b-499c
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, paradise, xix [40-
6a. Knowledge, wisdom, and virtue: the rela- 66] 135c-d; xxvi [1-69] 145d-146c; xxviii
tion of being good and knowing what [106-114] 150a
is good
25 Montaigne: Essays, 59c-60a; 69d-75a esp
Old Testament: Genesis, 3 / Proverbs, 1-2; 7-8; 70d-72a; 208a; 478c-480c; 514a-b
9:9; 10:8,31; 11:12; 14:16-18,22,29; 15:21; 26 Shakespeare: Merchant of Venice, act i,
28:7; 29:8 sc ii [13-23] 408b-c
6^ to 6c
27 Shakespeare:
Chapter
Measure for Measure,
30: GOOD AND EVIL m
act
I, sc 1 [33-41] 174d; ACT 11, sc iv 6c.The goodness of knowledge or wisdom: the
(2-17I
184d use of knowledge
30 Bacon: Advancement of learning, 26c-27a Old Testament: / Kings, 3:5 15; 10 -{D) III
31 Descartes: Discourse, part r, 43c; part hi, Kings, 3:5-15; 10 / // Chronicles, 1:7-12; 9:1 ~
49d-50b y —
(D) II Paralipomenon, :7-i2; 9:1-7 / Job,
i
31 Spinoza: Ethics, pari iv, prop 14-17 428a d; 28:12-20 / Proverbs, 1-4; S; 9:10-12; 10:1;
prop 18, scHOL 429a-d; prop 23-24 430c-d 12:8; 14:24; 15:24; 16:16; 17:16; 19:2,8;
32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk vii [=519-510] 228b- 20:15; 23:15-16,23-25; 24:1-14; 27:11; 28:2
229a; bk viii [316-337] 239a-b: bk ix [679- / Ecclesiastes, 1:17-18; 2:12 26; 6:8; 7:11-
779] 262a-264a; bk xi [84-98] 301a / Samson 12,16-19; 9:11,13-18 — (D) 1:17-Ecclesiastes,
Agonistes [38-59] 340b 18; 2:12-26; 6:8; 7:12-13,17-20; 9:11, 13-18
35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk i, cii hi, / Ezcf^tel, 28:2-7-(D) Ezechiel, 28:2-7
SECT 16, 117a; bk ii, ch xxi, sect 35 186b d; Apocrypha: Wisdom of Solomon, 6-10— (D) OT,
sect 64 195a-b Boo\ of Wisdom, 6-10 / Ecclesiasticus, i :i6-i9;
35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, sect 100 4:11-19; 6:18-37; ii:i; 14:20-15:8; 2r:i2-
432b-c 13,21; 24:1-22; 25:10; 34:8; 37:24,26; 40:25;
36 Swift: Gulliver, part i, 28b-29a; part iv, 41:14-15; 51:13-28 —
(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus,
159b-160a 1:20-24; 4:12-22; 6:18-37; ^i-^I 14:22-15:8;
37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 182a-c 21:14-16,24; 24:1-30; 25:13; 34:8; 37:27,29;
38 Rousseau: Inequality, 343b-345c esp 345a-c / 40:25; 41:17-18; 51:18-36
Social Contract, bk iv, 434c New Testament: / Corinthians, i :i7-3i
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 149d / Fund. Prin. Meta- 5 Sophocles: Oedipus the King [300-462] 102a-
physic of Morals, 265b; 282b-283d / Practical 103c / Antigone [632-765] 136c-137d; [1348-
Reason, 326b-327a 1353] 142d
43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 458b-459b 7 Plato: Charmides, 8b / Lysis, 16c- 18b /
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part ii, par 139- Laches, 28a-b / Protagoras, 40a-41a; 61d-62b
140 48d-54a / Philosophy of History, intro, / Euthydemus, 69a-71a; 74b-76b / Meno,
168b-d; part ii, 280b-c 183d-184c / Phaedo, 226a-b / Gorgias, 272b-
53 James: Psychology, 82a-b; 806a-808a 273b; 291c-292b / Republic, bk vii 388a-
54 Freud: General Introduction, 560c-d; 625a-b 401d esp 389d-398c; bk ix, 421a-425b /
Timaeus, 476a-b / Theaetetus, 525c-526a;
€b. The need for experience of evil 528c-531a / Philebus 609a-639a,c esp 635c-
7 Plato: Republic, bk hi, 337b-d / Latvs, bk 639a, c / Laws, bk i, 643c bk hi, 669d-670c;
;
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Other statements of the metaphysical theory of good and evil, see Being ^^h; Cause 6;
Change 14; Desire i ; God 5b; World 6b, 6d; for the relation of the good to the true and
the beautiful, see Beauty la; Truth ic; and for the theological consideration of the
divine goodness and of the problem of God 4f, 5h; Justice iia; Love 5a, 5c;
evil, see
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great BooI{s of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
Augustine. Divine Providence and the Problem of F. Bacon. "Of Goodness, and Goodness of Na-
Evil ture," in Essays
. Concerning the Nature of Good Hobbes. The Whole Art ofRIietoric, bk i, ch 7
636 THE GREAT IDEAS
Hume. An of Morals
Inquiry Concerning the Principles Nietzsche. Beyond Good and Evil
A. Smith. The Theory of Moral Sentiments, part The Genealogy of Morals, i
.
Cicero. De Finibus {On the Supreme Good) Santayana. Reason in Science, ch 8-10
Sextus Empiricus. Against the Ethicists Croce. The Philosophy of the Practical
Outlines of Pyrrhonism, bk hi, ch 21-32
. Scheler. Der Formalismus in der EthiJ^ und die
BoETHius. Quomodo Substantiae {How Substances materiale Wertethi\
Can Be Good in Virtue of Their Existence Without Wassermann. The World's Illusion
Being Absolute Goods) McTaggart. The Nature of Existence, ch 64-67
The Consolation of Philosophy, bk iii-iv
. Moore. Principia Ethica, ch 4, 6
Maimonides. Eight Chapters on Ethics . Ethics, CH 3-4, 7
The Guidefor the Perplexed, part hi, ch 10-12
. .
Philosophical Studies, ch 8, 10
BONAVENTURA. BrCvUoquium, part III (i) GiDE. The Counterfeiters
Duns Scotus. Tractatus de Primo Principio {A N. Hartmann. Ethics
Tract Concerning the First Principle) Dewey. "The Good," "The Ethical W^orld," "The
Al.bo. The Boo\of Principles {Sefer ha-l%arim), vol Formation and Growth of Ideals," "The Moral
IV, CH 12-15 Struggle," in Outlines of a Critical Theory of
SuAREZ. Disputationes Metaphysicae, iii, x-xi, Ethics
xxiii-xxiv "Nature and Its Good, A Conversation,"
.
in
Malebranche. De la recherche de la verite, bk iv, The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy
CH 1-4 . Reconstruction in Philosophy, ch 5, 7
Leibnitz. Theodicy . Human Nature and Conduct, part iii-iv
HuTCHEsoN. An Inquiry into the Original of Our . Experience and Nature, ch 3-4, 10
Ideasof Beauty and Virtue, 11 . The Quest for Certainty, ch 10
Voltaire. Candide J. S. Haldane. The Sciences and Philosophy, lectxv
. "Good —The Sovereign Good —A Chimera," Ross. The Right and the Good, iii-vii
"Good," in A Philosophical Dictionary Bergson. Two Sources of Morality and Religion
.The Ignorant Philosopher, ch 31, 38 Westermarck. Ethical Relativity
T. Reid. Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Malraux. Man's Fate
Mind, III, PART III, ch 1-4; v A. E. Taylor. The Faith of a Moralist, series i
J. G. FicHTE.
The Vocation of Man Laird. An Enquiry into Moral Notions
T. Carlyle. Sartor Resartus B. Russell. Philosophical Essays, ch i
Dickens. Oliver Twist . The Scientific Outlook^, ch 17
Whew ELL. The Elements of Morality, bk i . Religion and Scie?ice, ch 8
Baudelaire. Flowers of Evil Adler. a Dialectic of Morals
H. SiDGwicK. The Methods of Ethics, bk i, ch 9 A, Huxley. The Perennial Philosophy
Clifford. "On the Scientific Basis of Morals," C. I. Lewis. An Analysis of Knowledge and Valu'
"Right and Wrong: The Scientific Ground of ation
Their Distinction," in vol ii, Lectures and Es- Ewing. The Definition of Good
says Maritain, Saint Thomas and the Problem of Evil
T. H. Green. Prolegomena to Ethics, bk iii-iv The Person and the Common Good
.
Chapter IT. GOVERNMENT
INTRODUCTION
THE usual connotation of
political. The word
"government"
often used inter-
is "government" to refer to the way in which it is
is politically organized. Yet the two concepts
changeably with "state." But there is govern- tend to fuse in traditional political theory. The
ment in a university, in an economic corpora- kinds of states, for example, are usually named
tion, in the church, in any organization of men according to their forms of government. The
associated for a common purpose. The theo- great books speak of monarchical and repub-
logian speaks of the divine government of the lican states, as we today speak of the fascist or
universe, and the moralist speaks of reason as the democratic state.
the ruling power in the soul which governs the Nevertheless, we recognize the distinction
appetites or passions. between a state and its government when we
In ail these contexts, the notion of govern- observe that the state can maintain its his-
ment involves the fundamental relations of toric identity while it undergoes fundamental
ruling and being ruled, of command and obe- changes in its form of government. The state
dience. Though the character of these relation- is not dissolved by a revolution which replaces
ships varies somewhat with the terms related, a monarchy by a republic, or conversely.
there is enough common meaning throughout There is a sense in which Rome is the same
^ to permit a general consideration of the nature state under the Tarquins, under the Republic,
of government. But that is not the way in and under the Caesars. In contrast, some rebel-
which government is discussed in the great lions, such as the War of Secession in American
books. For the most part, government is con- history, threaten to dissolve the state itself.
sidered in one or another of its special settings Despite the fact that government involves a
— as it functions in the family or the state, in relation between rulers and ruled, the word is
the soul or the universe. The common thread often used to designate one term in that rela-
of meaning is noted only indirectly, by the way tionship, namely, the rulers. When the citizens
in which comparisons are made or analogies of a republic speak of "the government," they
are drawn between the various modes of gov- usually refer to the officialdom — not the body
ernment. of citizens as a whole, but only those who for a
In view of this, we have found it convenient time hold public But government can-
office.
to restrict this chapter to government in the not consist of governors alone, any more than
political sense, treating domestic and ecclesias- education can consist of teachers alone. The
tical government under Family and Religion, different forms of government can be distin-
economic government under Wealth, divine guished as readily by looking to the condition
government in the chapters on God and of the ruled as to the powers of the rulers. Fur-
World, and government in the soul in the thermore, the same individuals may both "rule
which consider the relation of
several chapters and be ruled by turns," as Aristotle observes
reason to the passions, such as Desire and of constitutional government.
Emotion. Though the notion of government includes
Government and state are often used as if they both rulers and ruled, the word usually appears
•were interchangeable terms. Some writers dif- in political literature with the more restricted
ferentiate theirmeanings by using "state" to meaning. When writers refer to the branches or
signify the political community itself, and departments of government, or when they
637
638 THE GREAT IDEAS
speak of the sovereignty of a government, they ment shall be judged. They compare various
direct attention to the ruUng power, and to the forms of government as more or less desirable,
division of that power into related parts. nearer to the ideal or nearer to the opposite
extreme of corruption. In the course of these
The great books of poHtical theory ask a considerations they answer questions about
number of basic questions about government. the necessity, the legitimacy, and the ends of
What is the origin of government, its nature government in general.
and necessity? What ends does government
serve and how do these ends define its scope There seems to be considerable agreement on
and limits? What is the distinction between one point, namely, that government is necessary
good and bad government, between legitimate for the life of the state. It is generally held by the
and illegitimate, or just and unjust, govern- authors of the great books that no community
ment ? What are the forms of government, of can dispense with government, for without
good government, of bad government ? What government men cannot live together in peace.
are the various departments or branches of None is an anarchist, like Thoreau or Kropot-
government, and how should they function kin, although Kropotkin claims that War and
with respect to one another ? Peace and even Mill's Essay on Liberty contain
These questions are related. The origin, na- "anarchist ideas." Marx and Engels may be the
ture, and necessity of government have a bear- other possible exception to the rule.
ing on its ends and limits. These same consider- If Marx and Engels take the opposite view,
ations enter into the discussion of the legiti- they do so simply on the ground that with the
macy and justice of governments. They also advent of a classless society after the com-
have a bearing on the classification of the forms munist revolution, the class war will come to
of government, and on the evaluation of di- an end and there will no longer be any need
verse forms. The way in which the several for government. The state can quietly wither
branches of government should be related is away. But, according to Aquinas, even if
affected by the way in which the various forms society were free from all injustice and iniquity,
of government differ. even if men lived together in a state of inno-
These questions are not always approached cence and with the moral perfection they would
in the same order. Some of the great political possess if Adam had not sinned, even then gov-
theorists —
for example, Hobbes, Locke, and ernment would be necessary. "A social life," he
—
Rousseau find their fundamental principles in thinks, "cannot exist among a number of
the consideration of the origin of government. people unless government is set up to look after
They start with such questions as, What makes the common good."
it legitimate for one man to govern another? Is The great books do not agree about the
the exercise of political power both justified naturalness of the state. They do not agree
and limited by the end it serves ? In answering about the way in which government originates
these questions, they imply or make a distinc- historically or about the functions it should
tion between good and bad government and and should not perform. They do not all reflect
indicate the abuses or corruptions to which in the same way on the good and evil in govern-
government is subject. Though they enumerate ment. Nor do they all give the same reasons for
the various forms of government in a manner the necessity of government. In consequence
which reflects the traditional classifications, they set different limits to the scope of govern-
they do not seem to regard that problem as of ment and assign it different functions, which
central importance. range from the merely negative function of
Other eminent political thinkers make the preventing violence to the duty to provide pos-
and comparison of diverse forms
classification itively lor human welfare in a variety of ways.
the central problem in the theory of govern- On all these things they differ, but with the
ment. Plato and Aristotle, Montesquieu and exceptions noted they do concur in thinking
Mill, are primarily concerned with the criteria that anarchy — the total absence of government
by which the justice or goodness of a govern- — is unsuitable to the nature of man. Man be-
—
man may obey another either voluntarily or power, but on whether the power which must
involuntarily — either because he recognizes the be employed is or is not legally authorized.
right vested in that other to give him commands
*
or because he fears the consequences which he The notion of sovereignty involves consider-
may he disobeys.
suffer if ations of authority and power. The word itself
These two modes of obedience correspond to is mediaeval and feudal in origin. It signifies the
the authority and power of government. supremacy of an overlord who owes allegiance
Authority elicits voluntary compliance. Power to no one and to whom fealty is due from all
either actually coerces or, by threatening coer- who hold fiefdoms under him. Since the su-
cion, compels involuntary obedience. Author- premacy of the sovereign lord is clothed with
ity and power are the right and might of gov- legal rights, according to the customs of feudal
ernment. Either can exist and may operate tenure, sovereignty seems to imply the union
apart from the other; but, as Rousseau points of power with authority, not the use of naked
out, when right is lacking, government is ille- force.
gitimate; and as Hamilton points out, when The political philosophers of antiquity do
might is lacking, it is ineffective. not use the term sovereignty. But their discus-
In a famous passage, the Federalists explain sion of the distribution of political power is
that rule by authority alone might work in a certainly concerned with the possession of
society of angels. But since men are men, not authority as well as the control of force. Aris-
angels, their obedience must be assured by the totle's question, for example, about "what is to
threat of force. In any society in which some be the supreme power in the state — the multi-
men are good, some bad, and all may be either tude ? or the wealthy ? or the one
? or the good
at one time or another, force is the only expe- best man .?" same problem which
deals with the
dient to get the unwilling to do what they modern writers express by asking where sover-
should do for the common good. Even when eignty resides. As Aristotle sees the conflict
the institutions of government have their between the oligarchical and the democratic
authority from the consent of the governed, constitutions, the issue concerns the legal defi-
they cannot function effectively without the nition of the ruling class: whether the constitu-
640 THE GREAT IDEAS
tion puts all the political power in the hands exempt from the law as to its coercive power,
of the rich or in the hands of the freeborn, rich since, properly speaking, is coerced by no man
and poor alike. It does not seem to be too himself,and law has no coercive power save
violent an interpretation for modern transla- from the authority of the sovereign." But
tors to use the word "sovereignty" here, for Aquinas differs from Hobbes in thinking that
sovereignty can be said to belong to whatever the authority, if not the power, of the prince
person or class holds the supreme power by law. is Umited by the constitutional character of the
Within this meaning of sovereignty the kingly office. In the mediaeval conception of
basic difference between absolute and limited monarchy, the king is bound not to himself
government, or between the despotic and the alone, as Hobbes insists, but to his subjects.
constitutional regime, leads to a distinction Their oath of allegiance to him is reciprocated
between the sovereign man and the sovereign by his coronation oath, in which he assumes
office. the obligation to uphold the customs of the
The ruler who holds sovereignty in his per- realm.
son an absolute sovereign if his power and
is
authority are in no way limited by positive law. Where Aquinas conceives the sovereign
According to some political philosophers, sov- prince as one element — the other being estab-
ereignty must be absolute. In the opinion of lished law —
in a government which is therefore
Hobbes, for example, the notion of a limited both absolute and constitutional, Hobbes con-
sovereignty seems to be as self-contradictory as ceives the sovereign as identical with a govern-
that of a supremacy which is not supreme. ment which is wholly absolute. The distinction
After discussing the absolute rights which here implied — between a mixed regime and one
constitute sovereignty, Hobbes goes on to say that is purely absolute — more fully discussed
is
that "this great authority being indivisible . . . in the chapters on Constitution and Mon-
there is little ground for the opinion of them archy. In contrast to both, a republic, or
that say of sovereign kings, though they be purely constitutional government, substitutes
singulis majores, of greater power than every the sovereign office for the sovereign man. It
one of their subjects, yet they be universis denies the possession of sovereignty to men
minores, of less power than them all together. except in their capacity as office-holders.
For by all together they mean not the collec-
if According to the republican notions of Rous-
tive body as one person, then all together and seau, not even government itself has sover-
every one signify the same, and the speech is eignty except as representing the political
absurd. But if by all together they understand community as a whole, which is the sovereign.
them as one person (which person the sovereign Sovereignty, he whites, is vested in the govern-
bears), then the power of all together is the ment "simply and solely as a commission, an
same as the sovereign's power, and so again the employment in which the rulers, mere officials I
"he that is bound to himself only is not bound" sion into separate departments or branches,
at all. such as the legislative, executive, and judicial.
Aquinas seems to be taking the same view Since in a repubUc the government (in all its
when he admits that "the sovereign is . . . branches or offices) derives its power and
CnAPTLK 31: GOVERNMENT 641
authority fromthe constitution (or what posed to the sovereignty of the monarcii," he
Rousseau "the fundamental law"), and
calls writes, "the sovereignty o( the people is one ol
since it is the people as a whole, not the ollicials the conlused notions based on the wild idea oi
of government, who have the constitutive the 'people.' " If the sovereignty of the people
power, the people are in a sense supreme or means nothing more than the sovereignty of
sovereign. the whole slate, then, he says, the sovereignly
Popular sovereignty may mean that tiie peo- \N hich "is there as the personality of the whole
ple as a whole govern themselves without the . . . is there, in the real existence adequate to its
services of magistrates of any sort; but this concept, as the person of the monarch."
would be passible only in a very small commu- But republican writers would reply that the
nity. questionable whether a people has
It is sense in which they speak of the sovereignty of
ever exercised sovereignty in this way in anv the people cannot be opposed to the sovereign-
state of historic importance. Popular sovereign- ty of government, so long as that government
ty more usually means what is implied by is constitutional, not absolute. When the sover-
Aquinas when he conceives the magistrate or eignty of the people is conceived as the source
ruler as merely the vicegerent of the people. or basis, not as the actual exercise, of the legiti-
"To order anything to the common good," mate powers of government, there is no conflict
he writes, "belongs either to the whole people, between these two locations of sovereignty in
or to someone who is the vicegerent of the the state. Yet the supremacy of the government
whole people. Hence the making of a law be- always remains limited by the fact that all its
longs either to the whole people or to a public powers are delegated and can be withdrawn or
personage who has the care of the whole peo- changed at the people's will.
must derive "their just powers from the con- In the latter, the local or municipal authorities
sent of the governed." form distinct and independent portions of the
Hegel objects to the sense "in which men supremacy, no more subject, within their re-
have recently begun to speak of the 'sovereign- spective spheres, to the general authority than
ty of the people' " as "something opposed to the general authority is subject to them within
the sovereignty existent in the monarch. So op- its own sphere." The federal or general and the
642 THE GREAT IDEAS
state or local governments draw on the same In their relation to one another they are,
reservoir of popular sovereignty, but the sov- writes Kant, like "lawless savages." Following
ereignty which each derives from that source is Rousseau, he thinks it is fitting that the state
limited by the definition of matters reserved to "viewed in relation to other peoples" should
be
the jurisdiction of the other. called"a power." Unlike sovereign govern-
The fundamental difference between the con- ments which unite authority with power in
dition of states in a federation and the condition their domestic jurisdiction, sovereign states in
of colonial dependencies or subject peoples is their external relations can exert force alone up-
that imperial government, unUke federal gov- on each other. When their interests conflict,
ernment, claims an unUmited sovereignty. The each yields only to superior force or to the
issues of imperialism which arise from the exer- threat of it. A fuller discussion of these matters
cise of such power are discussed in the chapters will be found in the chapters on Law, State,
on Tyranny and Slavery. and War and Peace.
The one remaining situation is that of inde-
pendent governments, the governments of sep- As ALREADY INDICATED in scvcral placcs, the
arate states associated with one another only by materials covered in this chapter necessarily de-
treaties or alliances, or at most in the kind of mand a study of many related chapters dealing
loose hegemony or league represented by the with political topics. This is peculiarly true of
Greek confederacies or the American Articles the problems concerning the forms of govern-
of Confederation. In this situation, the word ment. Separate chapters are devoted to each of
*'sovereignty" applied to independent govern- the traditionally recognized forms, m., Aristoc-
ments signifies supremacy, not in the sense of racy, Democracy, Monarchy, Oligarchy,
their having the authority and power to com- Tyranny. Each of these chapters defines a par-
mand, but in the opposite sense of not being ticular form, distinguishes it from others, and
subject to any political superior. compares their merits. In addition, the chapter
This radical difference in meaning is explic- on Constitution deals with what is perhaps
itly formulated in Hegel's distinction between the most fundamental of all distinctions in
internal and external sovereignty. forms of government, that between a republic
After stating the conditions of the sovereign- and a despotism, or between government by
ty of the state in relation to its own people, laws and government by men.
Hegel says, "This is the sovereignty of the state Here, then, it is necessary only to treat gen-
athome. Sovereignty has another side, i.e., sov- erally of the issues raisedby the classification
ereignty vis-a-vis foreign states." The state's in- and comparison of diverse forms of government.
dividuality resides in its awareness of its own They can be summarized in the following ques-
existence "as a unit in sharp distinction from tions.
others"; and in this individuality Hegel finds What are the criteria or marks of good gov-
the state's autonomy, which he thinks is "the ernment.? Is the goodness of government deter-
most fundamental freedom which a people pos- mined by the end it serves, by the way in which
sesses as well as its highest dignity." it is instituted, by its efficiency in promoting
But from the fact that "every state is sover- whatever end it serves? Are such criteria of
eign and autonomous against its neighbors," it good government as justice, legitimacy, and
also follows, according to Hegel, that such sov- efficiency, independent or interchangeable }
ereigns "are in a state of nature in relation to What is the nature of bad government.?
each other." It is this state of nature which Can a distinction be made between the abuses
Hobbes had earlier described as a state of war. or weakness to which good government is sub-
Precisely because independent states have ab- ject in actual operation, and government which
solute sovereignty in relation to one another, is essentially bad because perverse or corrupt in
"they live in the condition of perpetual war, principle as well as practice.?
and upon the confines of battle, with their Are there several forms of good government?
frontiers armed, and cannons planted against Of bad government.? How are they differenti-
their neighbors round about." ated from one another.? Are all good forms
Chapter 31: GOVERNMENT 643
equally gcxxl, all bad forms equally bad ? If not, Most important of all, it is necessary to know
what is the principle in terms of which some "not only what form of government is Ik-si, but
order of desirability or undesirability is estab- also what is possible." Though "j^ohtical writers
lished For example, is one good form of gov-
? have excellent ideas," Aristotle thinks they "arc
ernment better than another, one bad form often impractical." Since "the best is often un-
worse than another, in terms of degrees of jus- attainable," the true legislator "ought to be ac-
tice and injustice, or in terms of efficiency and quainted not only with what is best in the ab-
inefficiency? To put this question in another stract, but also with what is best relative to
way, one form of good government better
is circumstances."
than another because it achieves a better result Both Montesquieu and Mill later apply this
or merely because it achieves the same result basic distinction between the best form of gov-
more completely ? ernment considered absolutely or in the ab-
forms of good
If there are several distinct stract, and the best form relative to particular
government, are there one or more ways in historic circum.stances. Among these are a peo-
which these can be combined to effect a com- ple's economic condition, level of culture, po-
posite or mixed form? If a mixed form is com- litical experience, geography, climate, and ra-
parable with the pure forms it unites, is it su- cial characteristics. Montesquieu, for example,
perior to all, to some, to none of them? On thinks that government by law, absolutely con-
what grounds? In what circumstances? sidered, is better than despotic government, yet
While proposing what they consider to be he also holds that despotic government is bet-
the ideal form of government, some political ter for certain peoples. Mill thinks that the in-
philosophers admit that the ideal may not be stitutions of a representative democracy repre-
realizable under existing circumstances or with sent the ideal form of government, but he ac-
men as they are. Plato, for example, recognizes knowledges that absolute monarchy may be
that the state he outlines in the Republic may better for a rude or uncivilized people who have
not be practicable; and in the Laws he proposes not yet advanced far from barbarism.
government which represent for
institutions of The great question here is whether the cir-
him something less than the ideal but which cumstances themselves can be improved so that
may be more achievable. The/Athenian Stran- a people may become fit or ready for a better
ger says of the state described in the Republic form of government, and ultimately for the
that, "whether it is possible or not, no man, best that is attainable, that is, the form relative
acting upon any other principle, will ever con- to the best possible conditions. Since Montes-
stitute a state which will be truer or better or quieu emphasizes what he considers to be fixed
more exalted in virtue." The state which he is racial characteristics, such as the servility of the
discussing in the Laws "takes the second place." Asiatics, whereas Millstresses conditions which
the best form of government which now actu- to give opposite answers. The issue is more fully
ally exists. discussed in the chapters on Democracy,
Aristotle also sets down the various ways in Monarchy, and Progress.
which forms of government can be judged and Still other questions remain and should be
compared. We may consider, he writes, "of mentioned here. Are the ideal state and the
what sort a government must be to be most in ideal form of government inseparable, or can
accordance with our aspirations, if there were one be conceived apart from the other? How
no external impediment," but we must also shall the ideal government be conceived in —
consider "what kind of government is adapted terms of the best that is practicably attainable,
to particular states." In addition, Aristotle given man as he is or can be; or in terms of a
thinks it is necessary "to know the form of gov- perfection which exceeds human attainment
ernment which is best suited to states in gen- and which men can imitate only remotely or
eral" as well as "to say how a state may be con- imperfectly, if at all? Does divine government,
stituted under any given conditions." for example, set a model which human govern-
644 THE GREAT IDEAS
ment should aim to approximate? Is that hu- which the king is the government, all powers
man government ideal which is most like the are in the hands of one man. Though he mav
divine; or, on the contrary, is the perfection of delegate his powers to others, they act only as
human government measured by standards his deputies or agents, not as independent offi-
drawn from the nature of man and the diffi- cials. This does not obliterate the theoretical
culties involved in the rule of men over men ? distinction between legislation, adjudication,
and execution, but in this situation there can
The traditional enumeration of the functions be no practical separation of the three powers,
of government is threefold: the legislative, the certainly no legal system of checks and balances.
judicial, and the executive. Locke adds what he It is the separation of powers, according to
calls "the federative power," the power of Montesquieu, that is the basis of political lib-
making treaties or alliances, and in general of erty. "Power should be a check to power," he
conducting foreign affairs. It may be questioned writes. In a system of separated powers, "the
whether this function is strictly coordinate body being composed of two parts,
legislative
with the other three, since foreign, like domes- they check one another by the mutual privilege
tic, affairs may fall within the province of the of rejecting. They are both restrained by the
executive or the legislature, or both, as in the executive power, as the executive is by the
case of the Constitution of the United States. legislative."
In our own day,
the multiplication of admin- Whether or not Montesquieu is right in at-
and the development of plan-
istrative agencies tributing this aspect of constitutionalism to the
ning boards have been thought to add a new limited monarchy of England in his own day,
dimension to the activities of government, but his argument can be examined apart from his-
again it may be questioned whether these are tory, for it raises the general question whether
not merely supplemental to the functions of government by law can be preserved from, de-
making law, applying law to particular cases, generating into despotic government except by
and regulating by administrative decree those the separation of powers.
matters which fall outside the domain of en- For the American Federalists, the system of
forceable law. The executive branch of gov- checks and balances, written into the Constitu-
ernment seems the most difficult to define, be- tion, so contrives "the interior structure of the
cause it involves both law enforcement and the government that its several constituent parts
administration of matters not covered by legis- may, by their mutual relations, be the means
lative enactment or judicial decision. of keeping each other in their proper places."
If the threefold division of the functions of This they consider the prime advantage to be
government is exhaustive, the question re- gained from Montesquieu's principle of the
mains how these distinct activities shall be re- separation of powers. The principle itself they
lated to one another, and by whom they shall hold to be "the sacred maxim of free govern-
be performed. In an absolute monarchy, in ment."
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
I. The general theory of government 646
ir. The ends and limits of government: the criteria of legitimacy and justice 648
id. The elements of government: authority and power, or coercive force; the dis-
(2) The sovereign office: the partition of sovereignty among the offices created
by a constitution C)<yi
4. The support and the expenditures of government: taxation and budget 659
5^. Foreign policy: the making of treaties; the conduct of war and peace 660
5<^. Confederation and federal union: the division of jurisdiction between state and
federal governments
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Homer: Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 James Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 Plato: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
Author's Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as part, bk, ch,
sect) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e^., Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d.
Bible References: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., Old Testa-
—
ment: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) // Esdras, 7:46.
Symbols: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
XV, SECT 171 65a-b, ch xix, sect 211 73d- 74a 438b
la to \b Chapter 31 : GOVERNMENT 647
7 Plato: Protagoras, 44c d / Crito, 216b 217d /
- 43 Dkclaration of Indrpendencf: [7-25] lab
Gorgias, 271b- 272b / Republic, bk ii, 316c- 43 (constitution of the U.S.: preamble lla.c
319a / Laws, bk hi, 663d-667b 43 I'^oeralist: number 2, 31a-b; number 4,
9 Aristotle: History of Animals, bk i, en i 36a; number 15, 63a-d; 65b-c; number 16
[487^^2-488«i5] 8d-9a / Ethics, bk viii, cm 12 66c 68d passim; number iS 20 71a 78b pas-
[1162*16-25] 414c; BK IX, CH 9 (1169^18-22] sim; number ^8, I2Ib 122a; number 51,
423b / Politics, bk i, ch 2 445b-446d csp 163b c; 164c d; numbir 85, 258d 259a.c
[125^*29-39] 446d; BK III, CH 6 [i278''i5-29] 43 Mh.l: Liberty, 267d 268a; 269c; 302d 303a /
475d-476a Utilitarianism, 472b-c
12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk v [ioii- 44 Bns\\\.iA.: Johnson, 172d 173a
1027] 74b-c; [1136-1160] 76a-b 46 HEfiEL: Philosophy of Right, additions, 47
12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk i, ch 23 128c-d 124a-b / Philosophy of History, intro, 173a-
,
12 AuRELius: Meditations, bk iv, sect 4 264a 175c; part ii, 262a-c; part iv, 342c-d
14 Plutarch: Cato the Younger, 638b-d 49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 310a-c; 321b c
15 Tacitus: Annals, bk hi, 51b-c / Histories, 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, epilogue ii, 680b-
BKi, 211c-212d 684a
18 Augustine: City of God, bk iv, ch 4 190d; 54 Freud: Civilization and Its Discontents, 780b-d
BK XII, CH 27 359c-360a,c; bk xix, ch 14-17
520a-523a; ch 21 524a-525a; ch 23-24, 528a-c lb. Comparison of political or civil govern-
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 96, ment with ecclesiastical government and
A 4 512d-513c with paternal or despotic rule
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 95, 5 Sophocles: Antigone [631-680] 136c-137a
A I 226c-227c 5 Euripides: Andromache [464-492] 319b-c
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, purgatory, vi [76- 6 Herodotus: History, bk hi, 107c-108d; bk v,
151] 61c-62c;xvi [85-105] 77d; paradise, viii 178a- 180a
[115-117] 118a 7 Plato: Crito, 217a-c / Statesman, 581a-c /
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part i, 58c-d; 77a; 77c Laws, BK HI 663d-677a
84c-87b; 91a-b; 96a-b; part ii, 99a-102a 9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk viii, ch 10 [1160^
104b-d; 109b; 112b-d; 113c; 124c-125a 23-1161*9] 413a-b / Politics, bk i, ch 1-2
131a-c; 159d 445a-446d; ch 3 [1253^15-22] 447a; ch 5
25 Montaigne: Essays, 462c-465c 447d-448c; ch 7 [1255^16-22] 449b-c; ch
26 Shakespeare: Henry V, act i, sc ii [183-220] 12-13 453d-455a,c; bk hi, ch 4 [1277*33-
535d-536b ^24] 474c-d; ch 6 [1278*^30-1279*221 476a-c;
27 Shakespeare: Troilus and Cressida, act i, BK VII, CH 2 [1324^23-41] 528d-529a; ch 3
scfiii [78-134] 109a-c [i325»i8-''i3] 529b-d; ch 14 537b-538d
28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 454a 15 Tacitus: Annals, bk i, la-2a; 3a-b; bk hi,
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 20c-d 51b-c; 61c-62a
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part iv, prop 37, schol 2 18 Augustine: City of God, bk xix, ch 13-17
435b-436a 519a-523a
. 32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk vi [169-188] 200a 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 92, a
33 Pascal: Pensees, 304 227b-228a; 306 228a; I, rep 2 488d-489d; q 96, a 4 512d-513c
91a-b; part i-ii, 96c-105c esp part ii, 99a-b; BK VIII, CH lo-ii 412c-413d / Politics, bk ii,
109b-c; 112b-d; 117d; 122b-124b; 131d-132a; ch 2 [1261*23-^6] 456a-b; ch 9 [1269*29-33)
145a-b; 148d-149b; 159d; part hi, 191b; 465b-c; bk hi, ch 6 [i279*i7]-ch 7 [1279^10)
225c-d; part iv, 273a-c 476c-477a; bk vi, ch 4 [1318^21-1319*3)
26 Shakespeare: //<?7?r>' V, act i, sc ii [183-220] 522b-c; bk vii, ch 2 [1324*24-25) 528b;
535d-536b ch 14 [1332^12-41] 537b-d
27 Shakespeare: Troilus and Cressida, act i, 12 Aurelius: Meditations, bk i, sect 14 254b-c
sc III [78-134] 109a-c / Measurefor Measure, 18 Augustine: City of God, bk ii, ch 21 161b-
ACT I, sc II [120-127] 176b-c 162d; bk IV, ch 3-4 190a-d; bk xix, ch 24
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part iv, prop 37, schol 2 528b-c
435b-436a; prop 51, schol 439d 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 95,
33 Pascal: Pensees, 294-308 225b-228b; 311 A 4, ANS 229b-230c; q 105, a i, ans 307d-
228b; 878 345a-b 309d
35 Locke: Toleration, 3a-4a; 16a-c / Civil Gov- 23 Machiavelli: Prince, ch xii, 18a
ernment, CH I, SECT 2-3 25c-d; ch ii 25d-28c 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part ii, 101a-104d;
passim; ch iv, sect 21 29d; ch vi, sect 69-71 112b-d; 153a-159c
40a-c; ch vii, sect 87-89 44a-d; ch viii, sect 29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, part i, 193a; part
95-99 46c-47c; ch ix 53c-54d; ch xii, sect II, 331a-336a; 352d-353a
143-CH XIII, sect 149 58c-59d; ch xiv 62b- 35 Locke: Civil Government, ch ix, sect 131
64c passim; ch xv, sect 171 65a-b; ch xvi- 54d; CH XI, sect 134-CH xii, sect 143 55b-
XIX 65d-81d passim, esp ch xix, sect 219 58d; CH XIII, SECT 158-cH xiv, sect 168 61d-
75b-c / Human Understanding, bk ii, ch 64c; ch xviii, sect 205 72a-c
xxviii, sect 4-17 229b-232d passim, esp sect 36 Swift: Gulliver, part ii, 74a-76b; 78a-b
6 229d, SECT 9 230b 36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 216b
36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 261b-262a 37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 268c-269b
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk xii, 84b 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk i, 3b-d; bk
38 Rousseau: Political Eco7iomy, 367b; 370b- VI, 39b; bk xi, 69a-75a; bk xii, 84b,d-85c;
5 Sophocles: Antigone [631-765] 136c- 137d 54a-d; en xi, sect 134 55b-d; ch xiii 59b-
5 Euripides: Suppliants [429 456] 262a b / 62b passim; ch xiv, sect 163-166 63a 64a
Andromache [464-492] 319b-c 36 Swii r: Gulliver, part ii, 71a-76b
6 Herodotus: History, bk i, 23b 24b; bk hi, 38 NfoNTESQUiEu: Spirit of Imws, bk xi, 69d-
107c-108c 75a
7 Plato: Laws, bk iv, 679c-681a 38 Rousseau: Social Contract, bk ii, 395a-d; hk
9 Aristotle: Politics, bk hi, ch 10 [1281*29-38] III, 419b
479a; ch 14 [i285^29]-ch 17 [1288*34] 484a- 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, lab; 25a-28a pas-
487a; bk iv, ch 10 495a-b sim, csp 28a
15 Tacitus: Annals, bk i, la-2a; 3a-b 41 (iiBBON: Decline and Fall, 564a-
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 96, 42 Kant: Science of Right, 436b-c; 444c 445a
A 4 512d-513c; q 103, a 3 530a-c 43 Constitution of the U.S.: article i-hi
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 90, lla-16a
A I, REP 3 205b-206b; a 3 207a-c; q 96, a 5, 43 Federalist: number 22, 84c-d; number ^9,
ANS and REP 3 233d-234d; q 105, a i 307d- 125c-d; NUMBER 47-51 153c-165a; number
309d 53, 167d-168b; number 64, 197a-b
23Hobbes: Leviathan, part i, 71d-73a; 74b-c; 43 Mill: Representative Government, 355b-356b;
97c-d; part ii, 100c-106d; 113d-114b; 130b-d; 362c-363a; 401d-402b
131d-132a; 149d-150a; 153a-158a 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 269
30 Bacon Netv Atlantis, 208a-c
: 84d; par 271 89c; additions, 161 143a b /
32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk i [587-612] 106a-b; Philosophy of History, part iv, 342b-d; 368c-d
BK II [1-42] llla-112a; bk vi [169-188] 200a 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk vi, 238c-243d
35 Locke: Toleration, 14b-d / Civil Government,
ch I, sect I 25a-c; ch ii 25d-28c; ch vi, sect 1^(3) The sovereign people: the community as
the source of governmental sovereignty
53 36b-c; ch vii, sect 90-94 44d-46c; ch xix,
SECT 232-239 78c-81b Old Testament: /«%<?5, 8 :22-23 / / Samuel, 8—
37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 268c-269b (D) / Kings, S/ II Samuel, 2:4 -(D) // Kings,
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laivs, bk i, 3b; bk 2:4 / / Kings, 12:1-20— (D) /// Kings, 12:1-20
II, 4a; 7c-d; 8d-9a,c; bk hi, 12b-13c; bk v, Apocrypha: / Maccabees, 14:25-47 —
(D) OT,
26d-27b; 30a-c; bk vi, 36a-b; bk xh, 94c I Machabees, 14:25-47
38 Rousseau: Inequality, 323d / Social Contract 5 Euripides: Suppliants [429-456] 262a-b
bk hi, 406b,d-407a 5 Aristophanes: A!'m^/r/j470a-487a,cesp [1316-
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 24b,d-28b passim, 1408] 486a-487a,c
esp 26b-27d; 51a-d 6 Herodotus: History, bk hi, 107c-108c
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 74c-d; 320d-321a 9 Aristotle: Politics, bk ii, ch 9 [1270^20-22]
42 Kant: Science of Right, 437c-d; 439a-441d; 466d; BK HI, CH i [1275*22-^21] 472a-c; ch 3
445a-c; 450a-b; 450d-452a [1276*40-^^1] 473b; CH 7 476c-477a; ch ii
43 Mill: Liberty, 267d-268a / Representative 479b-480c; ch 17 486c-487a; bk iv, ch 4
Government, 341d-344a [1291^30-1292*37] 491a-d; ch 9 [1294^34-39]
44 Boswell: Johnson, 120a-c 494d; CH 12 496d-497b; ch 14 498b-499c
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 275 14 Plutarch: Tiberius Gracchus, 678b-d
92a-b; par 279 93a'94d; par 320 106c; addi- 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 90,
tions, 167 145c / Philosophy of History, part A 3 207a-c
HI, 300a-301c; part iv, 325a-b; 342a-343a; 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part ii, 100c-102c; part
355c-d; 365c-366b HI, 200a-b
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, epilogue ii, 680b- 35 Locke: Civil Government, ch iv, sect 21 29d;
684a CH VII, SECT 87-94 44a-46c; ch vih 46c-53c
passim; ch ix, sect 127-cH x, sect 132 54a-
1^(2) The sovereign ofl&ce: the partition of 55b; cH XI, SECT 141 58a-b; ch xiii, sect 149
sovereignty among the offices created by 59b-d; ch xiv, sect 163-168 63a-64c; ch xv,
a constitution sect 171 65a-b; ch xvi, sect 179-184 66d-
7 Plato: Laws, bk vi, 697a-705c 68d; SECT 190-192 69b-d; ch xvh, sect 198
9 Aristotle: Politics, bk ii, ch 2 [1261*23-^6] 70d-71a; ch xix 73d-81d passim, esp sect
456a-b; bk hi, ch i [i275*22-''2i 472a-c; ch 240-243 81b-d
II[1282*25-^14] 480a'C; ch 16 [i287'»ii-b7] 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk ii, 4a-6b;
485c-486a; bk iv, ch 3 [1290*3-13] 489a; ch 4 bk XV, 109c
[1292*30-37] 491d; CH 15 499c-501c; bk vi, ch 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 323d / Social Contract,
8 525b'526d BK I, 391b-393b; bk ii, 395b-c; 396d-398a;
14 Plutarch: Lycurgus, 34d-35d / Tiberius 400a; 401a-c; bk hi, 406b,d-410a; 420a-421c;
Gracchus, 678b-d 423a-424b
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part ii, 153a-159c 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, lOOd; 241b
652 THE GREAT IDEAS \h to la
43 Federalist: number 39, 125a-b; number
(1^. The sovereignty of government: the Ufiity a^id
49-50 159b-162c; number 51, 164d-165a;
disposition of sovereignty.1^(3) The sov- number 52-61 165a-188d passim; number 68
ereign people: the community as the source
205b-207a; number 84, 252b-c
of governmental sovereignty.) 43 Mill: Liberty, 268d-269a / Representative
42 Kant: Science of Right, 436c; 437c-d; 439a- Government, 370a-406a
441d; 450a-b; 450d-452a esp 451c-452a 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 308-
43 Declaration OF Independence: [1-25] lab; 311 102c-104a / Philosophy of History, intro,
[43-47I 2a 172d-173a
43 Constitution of the U.S.: preamble na,c;
AMENDMENTS, IX-X 17d 2. The forms of government: their evaluation
43 Federalist: number 22, 84d-85a; number and order
33, 108b-c; NUMBER 39 125a-128b; number
46, 150b-c; NUMBER 49, 159c; number 2a. The distinction and comparison of good
53,
167d-168b; number 84, 252b-c and bad forms of government
43 Mill: Liberty, 267d'269c / Representative Gov- 5 Euripides: Suppliants [399-456] 261d-262b
ernment, 341d-350a passim, esp 344d; 355b- 6 Herodotus: History, bk hi, 107c-108c
356b; 380c-382c; 386d-393a esp 387c-d 6 Thucydides Peloponnesian War, bk ii, 396c-d;
:
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 279 BK III, 432b-c; bk vi, 520b-c; bk viii,
93a-94d; par 308 102c-103a / Philosophy of 587a-b
History, part ii, 272b-273a; part hi, 300a- 7 Plato: Republic, bk i, 301c-d; bk viii-ix,
301c; PART IV, 365c-366b 401d-421a / Statesman, 598b-604b / Laws, bk
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, epilogue ii, 680b- III 663d-677a esp 669d-672a, 672c; bk iv,
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk ii, 7c-8c; omy, 371c / Social Contract, bk h, 405c-d; bk
BK III, llc-12b; 13c; bk vi, 36a-b; bk ix, 415b-417c
HI, 407c; 409a; 410c;
58b,d-60a; bk xi 68b,d-84d; bk xix, 142a- 40 Gibbon: Decline and 32b-34a,c csp 33c;
Fall,
146a,c 68b,d-69a; 90d-91d; 513b-c
38 Rousseau: Inequality, 357b-c / Social Con- 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 222d-224a; 320d-
tract, bk III, 410c; 414d-415b; bk iv, 427a- 321b
428a 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 114b-d / Science of Right,
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 24b; 26d-28b; 438d-439a; 450b-d
622d-623a; 630b,d-631a 43 Declaration of Independence: [7-23] lab
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 71 d; 81c-d; 218c- 43 Federalist: number 6, 40a-41a; number 10,
219a; 403b-d esp 403c; 404c-d; 428a 51c-52d; number 15, 65b-66b; number 55,
42 Kant: Science of Right, 439c-440a; 441 b-c; 174c-d; NUMBER 85, 257a-c
450a-452a 43 Mill: 272a / Representative Govern-
Liberty,
43 Federalist: number 39, 125c; number 43, ment, 327b,d-355b passim; 366a-369b; 436b-
141a-d; number 47, 154a-c; number 69 207a- 437a
210c passim; number 70, 213b-c; number 71, 44 Bosw ELI.: Johnson, 195c-d
216a-b; number 84, 252b-c 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 273-
. 43 Mill: 267d-268c / Representative
Liberty, 274 90c-92a; additions, 165-166 145a-c /
Government, 343c-344a; 351a-c; 353d-354b; Philosophy of History, intro, 173c- 175c; 203 b-
355b-356b; 401d-402b 206a,c; part i, 207d-209a; 243b-c; part ii,
44 BoswBhh: Johnson, 178a-b; 255a-d; 390a-b 271c-d; 273d-274a; part hi, 285b-d; 300a-
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 273 301c; part IV, 344a-c
90c-92a; par 275-286 92a-97a; additions, 48 Melville: Moby Dic{, 107a-b
170-172 145d-146d / Philosophy of History, 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, BKV,127b-
part IV, 368c-d 137c passim
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk vi, 238c-243d 54 Freud: New Introductory Lectures, 883d-884c
654 THE GREAT IDEAS Id to I
(2. Theforms of government: their evaluation and 14 Plutarch: L^<:«r^«^ 32a-48d
order.) 18 Augustine: City of God, bk xix, ch 21 524a-
525a; ch 23-24, 528a-c
2d, The influence of diflferent forms of govern- 23 Machiavelli: Prince, ch xv, 22b
ment on the formation of human charac- 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part ii, 112b-d; 164a,c
ter 25 Montaigne: Essays, 318c-319b; 462c-465c
6 Herodotus: History, bk v, 175b; bk vii, 27 Shakespeare: Tempest, act ii, sc i [143-168]
232d-233d 532d-533a
6 Thucydides Peloponnesian
: War, bk ii, 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 94d-95a /
396c-d; bk viii, 564a-c New Atlantis 199a-214d
7 Plato: Republic, bk viii 401d-416a / Laws, 32 Milton: Areopagitica, 393a-b
bk viii, 733b-734a 36 Swift: Gulliver, part i, 28a-31a; part ii, 76b-
9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk viii, ch io-ii 412c- 80b; PART III, 112a-115b; part iv 135a-184a
413d; bk X, ch 9 434a-436a,c / Politics, bk 36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 216b
III, CH 4-5 473c-475d; bk iv, ch 7 [i293''5-6] 37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 268c-269b
493a-b; bk v, ch 9 [1310*12-35] 512b-c; bk 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk xi, 68b,d-
VII, ch 2 [1324*5-^23] 528a'd; ch 14 [1333*11- 75a
15] 537d-538a 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 323a-328a,c / Social
10 Hippocrates: Airs, Waters, Places, par 16 Contract, bk ii, 400c-403a; 405a-c; bk hi,
15d-16a; par 23 18a-c 410d-411c; 417c-418a; bk iv, 427d
14 Plutarch: Lycurgus 32a-48d esp 34b-37c / 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 68b,d-69a
Numa Pompilius, 59c-60b / Lycurgus-Numa 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 114b-d / Science of Rights
61b,d-64a,c / Cleomenes, 659d-660a 438d-439a; 450b-452a /Judgement, 586a-587a
25 Montaigne: Essays, 60c-61d 43 Federalist: number 6, 40a-41a; number 16,
32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk ii [246-257] 116b / 68d; number 38, 122b-124a; number 41,
Samson Agonistes [241-276] 344b-345b / Are- 132b-c; NUMBER 43, 141d-142d; number 49,
opagitica, 384b-385b 159d-160a; number 65, 200b-c; number 68,
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk ii-v, 8d- 206b-c; number 85, 257a-c; 258d-259a
19d; BK V, 26c-27a; bk xix, 138c-140d; 142a- 43 Mill: Representative Government, 327b,d-355b
146a,c esp 341c-d; 368c-370a; 380c-381a; 387c-d
38 Rousseau: Economy 372a-b / Social
Political , 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, pref, 6c-d; part
Contract, bk
400d-401a
ii, III, par 185 64b-d; par 273 90c-92a / Philoso-
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 23c-24a,c; 79c-d; phy of History, intro, 173c-175c; part i,
91c-92b; 523d-524a 243b-c; 251b; part ii, 279c-d; part hi,
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 161c-162b; 202b-c 300c-d; PART IV, 365c-d
42 Y^a^t: Judgement, 586b-c 50 Marx-Engels: Communist Manifesto, 428d-
43 Mill: Liberty, 298d / Representative Govern- 429c; 432d-433c
ment, 341d-350a passim 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk vi, 245a-c
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 273 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, bk v,
90c-92a / Philosophy of History, intro, 174a- 131c-d
175c; PART III, 285b-d 54 Freud: New Introductory Lectures, 883d-884c
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, epilogue i, 668a-
669d . The powers, branches, or departments of
government: enumerations, definitions,
2e. The ideal form of government: the distinc- and orderings of these several powers
tion between practicable and Utopian 7 Plato: Laws, bk hi, 665d-666c
ideals 9 Aristotle: Politics, bk iv, ch 14-16 498b-
5 Aristophanes: Birds 542a-563d / Ecclesiazu- 502a,c / Rhetoric, bk i, ch i [1354*13-1355*3]
sae 615a-628d esp [553-729] 621b-623c 593b-594a
6 Herodotus: History, bk hi, 107c-108c 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part ii, 122b-124b
7 Plato: Republic 295a-441a,c esp bk ii-vii 35 Locke: Civil Government, ch vii, sect 88-89
310c-401d / Timaeus, 442b-443b / Statesman, 44c-d; CH IX 53c-54d; ch xi-xiv 55b-64c
598b-604b / Laws, bk iv, 681b-d; bk v, 692c- 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk xi, 69d-
693a; 696a-b; bk vii, 722d-723c; bk ix, 75a
754a-b / Seventh Letter, 806b-807b 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, bk v, 301a-357c
9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk v, ch 7 [1135*2-4] 382d passim
/ Politics, bk ii, ch i [i26o'^28]-ch 9 [1269*37] 42 Kant: Science of Right, 436b-439a
455b,d-465c; bk iv, ch i 487a-488b; ch 2 43 Constitution of the U.S.: article i-iii
[1289*30-35] 488b; ch 7 [1293^1-21] 493a-b; lla-16a passim
CH II 495b-496d; bk v, ch 12 [1316*1-20] 43 Federalist: number 37, 119b-d; number
518d-519a; bk vii, ch 4-15 530a-539d 47-82 153c-244a esp number 48, 157c-d,
12 Aurelius: Meditations, bk ix, sect 29 294a-b NUMBER 64, 197a-b; number 78, 230b-d
3« to 3>b Chapter 31 : GOVERNMENT 655
43 Mill: Representative Government, 355b 424c 43 .Mill: Liberty, 322a d Govern-
/ Representative
passim meru, 350d 351a; 353b d; 355b 363a; 365b-
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 366a; 401d 402b
272-273 89d-92a; additions, 164 144c-145a / 44 \U^s\\iA.\.: Johnson, 178b c; 255d; 41Ia b
Philosophy of History, part iv, 364d-365a; 46 Heghl: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 272-
365c-d 27^ 89d 92a; par 297 99b; par 300 100b; par
^02 lOla-c; par 312-313 104a-b; additions,
^a. The separation and coordination of the
i()f 164 144c-145a; 174 146d-147b; 178-179
several powers: usurpations and infringe-
147d-148a / Philosophy of History, part iv,
ments by one branch of gOYernment
365c-d
upon another
7 Plato: Laws, bk hi, 671a-672a; bk ix, 754c-d 3A. The relation of the civil to the military
9 Aristotle: Politics, bk iv, oh 14-16 498b- power
502a,c / Athenian Constitution, ch 45, par i 6 Herodotus: History, bk ii, 79a-c
573d 6Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, bk vii,
14 Plutarch: Solon, 70d-71c / Poplicola-Solon, 551b-d; bk viii, 582a-583c; 585d-586b; 587a-
86d-87a / Agesilaus, 482a-c / Agis, 650b-656d 589a; 590a-c passim
Cleomenes, 660b-661a
/ 7 Plato: Republic, bk iii-v, 340b-368d
15 Tacitus: Annals, bk i, la-2a; 3a-b; bk iv, 9 Aristotle: Politics, bk hi, ch 7 (1279*37-^3]
65a-c; bk xi, 101c; bk xiii, 126c-d 476d; BK IV, ch 13 [1297' 10-28] 497d-498a;
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 95, BK VI, CH
8 [i322*29-''6] 526a-b BK VII, CH 9
A I, rep 2-3 226c-227c 11329*2-17] 533b-c
23 HoBBEs: Leviathan, part ii, 103d-104a; 150b; 15 Tacitus: Annals, bk i, 6b-15a; bk iv, 64a-b
151c-152a / Histories, bk i, 190b-c; 194a-c; 195c-197d esp
35 Locke: Government, ch ii-iii 25d-29d
Civil 197c-d; 210d-212d; bk ii, 239c-240a
passim; chsect 90-94 44d-46c; ch viii,
vii, 23 Machiavelli: Prince, ch xii, 18a; ch xiv
SECT 107 49b-d; ch xii-xiv 58c-64c; ch xvii- 21b-22a
xviii 70c-73c; ch xix, sect 212-219 7^^' 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part ii, 103b; 159a-c
75c 35 Locke: Civil Government, ch xii, sect 145-
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk ii, 6b-8c; 148 58d-59b; ch xvi 65d-70c
bk v, 29a; bk vi, 36a-37b; bk xi 68b,d-84d 36 Swift: Gulliver, part ii, 80a-b
esp 69d-75a; bk xix, 142b-143a; bk xxviii, 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk v, 30b;
259b 31c-32b; bk xi, 74b-d; bk xix, 143c
38 Rousseau: Social Contract, bk ii, 397b-c; bk 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 361a-b / Social Con-
hi, 406d-407a; 410d-411a; 415a-b; 422b-c; tract, bk III, 424b
423a; 423d; bk iv, 432b-433a 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, bk v, 301a-309a,c
39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, bk v, 311c-315a,c esp 307d-308c
esp 314d-315a,c 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 25d-26d; 30a-b;
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 24b,d-28b esp 25a- 42b,d-43b; 50b-51a; 63a-64d; 68c; 76b-77b;
26a, 27a-b; 154a-b; 343c 245d-246d esp 246c
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 74b-75a; 75d-78b 43 Declaration of Independence: [60-61] 2a;
esp 76a; 586c-587a [65-67] 2b; [80-94] 2b-3a
42 Kant: Science of Right, 436b; 437d-439a; 43 Articles of Confederation: vi [107-123]
440a-441b; 450d-452a esp 451d-452a 6b-c; VII 6d; ix [290-298] 8a; [318-365] 8b-d
43 Declaration of Independence: [7-79] la- passim
2 b passim 43 Constitution of the U.S.: article i, sect
43 Articles of Confederation: ix [192-197] 8 [226-242] 13b-c; ARTICLE II, sect 2 [409-
7b 413] 15a; AMENDMENTS, III 17b
43 Constitution of the U.S.: article i, sect 43 Federalist: number 8, 45b-c; 46a-47a; num-
2 [45-47] lid; sect 3 [81-95] 12a-b; sect 7 ber 24-29 87b-101a passim; number 46,
[156-191] 12d-13a; article ii, sect i [335- 152b-153a; number 74, 221c-d
374] 14b-d; [383-393] 14d-15a; sect 2 [421]- 43 Mill: Representative Government, 409 d; 425c-d
SECT 4 [458] 15b-c 44 Bosw ell: Johnson, 281d-282a
43 Federalist: number 16, 68b-c; number 22, 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 326
83d-84b; number 27, 96a-b; number 47-49 107d-108a; par 329 108c; additions, 163 144c
153c-161b; number 51 162d-165a; number / Philosophy of History, part iv, 325a-b
52, 165c-167b; number 62, 189d-191c passim; 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk hi, 138d; 144c;
number 64-67 195b-205b esp number 65-66 146d; 153d-155a; bk v, 209a-c; bk ix, 346a-
198a-203a; number 71, 215a-216b; number 365c passim, esp 353a, 355b, 361b-d; bk x,
73 218d-221c; number 75-77 222d-229d; 404c-405a; bk xii, 533a-537b esp 535d-53 7b;
number 78, 230a-232a; number 81, 237d- BK XIII, 565c-566d; bk xiv, 610d-611a; bk xv,
239c; NUMBER 82, 242d-243a 627d-630a
656 THE GREAT IDEAS 3>c to 3c(2)
(3. The powers, branches, or departments of gov- 9 Aristotle: Politics, bk iv, ch 14 [i298*4-''ii]
ernment: enumerations, definitions, and 498b-499a
orderings oj these several powers.) 35 Locke: Toleration, 16a-c / Civil Governmenty
ch IV, SECT 21 29d; ch xi, sect 134-CH xii,
3c. The legislative department of government: sect 143 55b-58d; ch xiii sect 150-153 59d-
the making of law 60c; CH XIX, sect 212-217 74a-75a; sect 221-
7 Plato: Republic, bk iv, 344a-346a / Theaete- 222 75d-76c
tus, 531a-b / Statesman, 599c'600d / Laws^ 36 Swift: Gulliver, part iv, 167a-b
BK 666b-c; bk iv, 679c-680d; 684b-686c;
III, 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk ii, 6b; bk
BK 705d-706c; bk ix, 745c-746a; 754a-d;
VI, v, 21d-22c; bk xi, 69d-75a
bk
XI, 782a-b / Seventh Letter, 807a-b 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 25d; 27d-28a;
9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk x, ch 9 434a-436a,c / 130c-131a
Politics, bk IV, CH 14 498b-499c 42 Kant: Science of Right, 451c-452a
15 Tacitus: Annals, bk iii, 51b 43 Declaration of Independence: [29-47] Ib-
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 90 2a
205a- 208b; Q 91, a 3 209d-210c; q 92 213c- 43 Articles of Confederation: ix 7a-9a pas-
215a,c; qq 95-97 226b-239b sim
23 HoBBEs: Leviathan, part ii, 103a; 130d-131a; 43 Constitution of the U.S.: article i, sect
131d-132a; 133d-134a; 151c-152a; part iv, 1-9 lla-14a; article ii, sect 2 [421-435] 15b;
273d article III, sect 3 [507]-ARTICLE IV, SECT I
29 Cervantes: Do;; Quixote, part ii, 363d-364a [518] 16a; ARTICLE IV, SECT 3-ARTICLE V
30 Bacon: Advancement ofLear?iing, 94d-95b 16b-c; ARTICLE VI [591-599] 16d; amend-
33 Pascal: Pensees, 294 225b-226b ments, I 17a; xii-xx 18a-20d passim
35 Locke: Toleration, lib; 16a-c / Civil Govern- 43 Federalist: xNumber 23-36 85a-117d passim;
inent, ch vii, sect 88-89 44c-d; ch ix, sect number 41-46 132a-153b passim; number 52-
127-CH X, sect 132 54a-55b; ch xi, sect 134- 66 165a-203a passim, esp number 53, 167d-
CH xii, SECT 143 55b-58d; ch xiii, sect 150 168b; NUMBER 75, 223a-224a; number 77,
59d; ch XIX, sect 212-217 74a-75a 227b-229b; number 78, 230d-231c; number
36 Svvtft: Gulliver, part ii, 73a-74b; 78b 81, 237d-240b; number 82 242b-244a passim;
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk ii, 6b; bk number 83, 244c-245c
XI, 69d; 71a-72b passim; bk xxix 262a-269a,c 43 Mill: Representative Government, 355b-363a;
38 Rousseau: Inequality, 324c-d / Political Econ- 365c-366a; 401a-409c passim; 417c-424c;
omy, 368c-369a; 372a-b / Social Contract, bk 431a-c
II, 399b-402a; bk iii, 419d-420a 44 B0SV/E1.1.: Johnson, 255d; 364c-365a; 370a
40 Gibbon: Decline and Pall, 151b-156a; 616d- 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 298
617b; 624b-c 99c; par 309-311 103b-104a
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 79d-80b; 96a-d;
108a-c 3c(2) Legislative institutions and procedures
42 Kant: hitro. Metaphysic of Morals, 393c / 9 Aristotle: Politics, bk iv, ch 14 [1298^12-
Science of Right, 397a-b; 436b-c; 438b-c; 1299*2] 499a-c / Athenian Constitution, ch 43-
450d-452a esp 451c-452a 44 572d-573d
43 Declaration of Independence: [29-47] ^^' 14 Plutarch: Lycurgus, 34d-35c; 45c-46a /
2a; [62-64] [72-79] 2b Solon, 71b-c
43 Constitution of the U.S.: article i, sect 15 Tacitus: Histories, bk iv, 267d-268c
1-9 lla-14a 35 Locke: Civil Government, ch xi, sect 138
43 Federalist: number 10, 50d-51b; number 57b-c; CH xii, sect 147 59a-b; ch xiii, sect
15, 64b; NUMBER 33, 107d-109b; number 44, 153-158 60b-62b; ch xiv, sect 167-168 64a-c;
145c-146d; number 51, 163c-d; number 52- CH XIX, sect 215 74d
66 165a-203a esp number 53, 167d-168b, 36 Swift: Gulliver, part ii, 73a- 74b; part iv,
number 64, 197a-b; number 70, 212b; num- 167a-b
ber 75, 223a-c; number 81, 239a-b 36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 435b-436a
43 Mill: Representative Government, 355b-409c 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk ii, 4a-6b;
passim BK V, 22a-c; bk xi, 71a-d; 72b-d
44 BoswELh: Johnson, 255d 38 Rousseau: Social Contract, bk hi, 423d
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 211 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 27d-28a
70a-c; par 298-314 99c-104b / Philosophy of 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 7 Id- 74b passim,
History, part ii, 271d-272a; part iv, 364d- esp 71d-72a, 73a-b; 587a
365a; 365c-d 43 Declaration of Independence: [29-47] ^^'
2a; [62-64] [72-79] 2b
3c(l) The powers and duties of the legislature 43 Constitution of the U.S.: article i, sect
7 Plato: Republic, bk iv, 344a-346a / Theaete- 1-9 lla-14a; article iv, sect i 16a; article
tus, 531 a-b V 16c; article vi [591-599] 16d; amend-
d
36 Swift: Gulliver^ part i, 37a-b; part ii, 73b- ^' ?(1) The powers and duties of the executive
75a; part iv, 152b-154a 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part ii, 101a-104d; 122b-
36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 266a-b 124b; 130d; 153a-159c
37 F1E1.BING :Tom Jones, 8c-10c; 65c-66a; 135c-d; 29 Cervantes: Do?i Quixote, part i, 193a; part
176d'177d; 217a-c; 267d-268b II, 331a-336a
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk ii, 8b-c; 35 Locke: Civil Government, ch ii, sect io-ii
BK VI, 33a-37d; bk xi, 70c-71a; 73b-d 27b-d; ch xii, sect 144-148 58d-59b; ch xih,
39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, bk v, 311c-315a,c SECT 154-CH XIV, SECT i68 60c-64c; ch xix,
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 243a-245d passim, SECT 218-219 75a-c; sect 221-222 75d-76c
esp 244d-245b; 251b-d; 617a-618d 36 Swift: Gulliver, part iv, 157b-158a
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 73d-74b; 94c-95c; 38 Montesquieu: Spirit ofLaws, bk vi, 36a-37a;
403c-404d; 458c-d; 586c-d 43c-d; BK XI, 72b-73b; 73d-74c
43 Declaration of Independence: [52-55] 2a; 38 Rousseau: Social Contract, bk iv, 433a-434b
[70-71] 2b 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, bk v, 319b-320a
43 Articles of Confederation: ix [198-274] 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 25d-26a; 26d-27c;
7b-8a 243b
43 Constitution of the U.S.: article hi, 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 586d
sect 1 15c; SECT 2 [485-499] 15d; article hi, 42 Kant: Science of Right, 448a-
sect 3 [507]-ARTicLE IV, SECT I [518] 16a; 43 Declaration of Independence: [28-61] Ib-
article IV, SECT 2 [522-528] 16a-b; amend- 2a
ments, iv-viii 17b-d 43 Articles of Confederation: ix [299-310]
43 Federalist: number 22, 83d-84b; number 8b; X 9a
51, 162d-163a; number 65, 199a-c; number 43 Constitution of the U.S.: article i, sect
78-83 229d-251a passim 7 [156-191] 12d-13a; article ii 14b-15c
43 Mill: Representative Government, 336c-d; 43 Federalist: number 8, 45b-c; number 48,
337b-c; 413d-414d; 421d-422c 157c; number 51, 163d; number 66, 201a-
44 B0SWEI.1.: Johnson, 255a-b 203a; number 67-77 203b-229d passim
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 223 43 Mill: Liberty, 319d-323a,c / Representative
73c-d / Philosophy of History, part iv, 326b-c Government, 356b-359a; 409d-417c; 421c-422c
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk xh, 547b-d 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 290-
52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, bk ix 296 97d-99b / Philosophy of History, part iv,
235b,d-271d passim; bk xii 348b,d-401d 365c-d
3^. The executive department of government: 3^(2) Administrative institutions and proce-
the enforcement of law; administrative dures
decrees 7 Plato: Laws, bk vi, 700d-704c
9 Aristotle: Politics, bk iv, ch 15 499c-501c 9 Aristotle: Politics, bk iv, ch 15 [1299*31-
35 Locke: Toleration, "iai / Civil Government, cu 11, 1300^4] 500a-501b; bk vi, ch 8 525b-526d /
SECT 7-13 26c-28b; ch vii, sect 88-89 44c-d; Athenian Constitution, ch 43-52 572d-576d;
CH IX, sect 126-131 54a-d; ch xii, sect CH 54-61 577c-581b
144-CH XIV, SECT 168 58d-64c; ch xviii, sect 15 Tacitus: Annals, bk i, 22b; bk vi, 88d-89a
203-210 72a-73c; ch xix, sect 218-219 75a-c 23 Machiavelli Prince, ch xxii-xxih 33a-34b
:
36 Swift: Gulliver, part iv, 157b-158a 23 HoBBEs: Leviathan, part ii, 122b-123a; 123d
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk xi, 69d- 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk v, 31b-
70a; 72b; 80a-c 33a,c; bk xxvi, 224d-225a
38 Rousseau: Social Contract, bk hi, 414d-415a; 38 Rousseau: Social Contract, bk ii, 403a-404a
423a; 424a-b 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 25d-27c passim;
42 Kant: Science of Right, 438a- 240b-246d; 248d-251a
43 Constitution of the U.S. article ii 14b-
: 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 317d-318b; 563d-
15c 564b; 586c-587a
43 Federalist: number 15, 64b-66b; number 43 Articles of Confederation: iv [37-44] 5d;
16 66c-68d passim; number 21, 78b-d; num- IX [299-310] 8b; IX [368]-x [395] 8d-9a
ber 27-29, 94d-99b; number 48, 157c; num- 43 Constitution of the U.S. article ii 14b-
:
bk IV, CH 14-15 196b-197a; bk v, ch 12 216d- 33d-35a; number 14, 61b-d; number 17 69a-
219b; CH 17 221b-222a; bk xix, ch 21, 524c-d 70d; number 28 96c-98b passim; number 31,
2i Machiavelli: Prince, ch iii-viii 3c-14c; ch 105b-c; NUMBER 32 105c-107b passim; num-
XX 30a-31c ber 34 109b-llld passim; nuviber 36 I14c-
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part ii, 106d-107c; 108d- 117d passim; number 39, 126b-128b; number
109c; llOb-llla; 119a-c; 126d-127a; 131c; 43, 141a-d; number 44, 144a-145c passim;
conclusion, 280b-281a NUMBER 45, 148b-150b; number 46 150b-
24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, bk hi, 153b passim; number 84, 253d-254b
131b,d-133b 43 Mill: Liberty, 322a-d / Representuthe Govern-
29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, part i, 40d ment, 417c-424c
32 Milton: Samson Agonistes [241-276] 344b- 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 290
345b 97d; additions, 174 146d-147b
35 Locke: Toleration, 13c-d; 14c-15a / Civil Gov- 50 Marx-Engels: Communist Manifesto, 421c-d
ernment, CH IV, sect 22-23 30a-b; ch vii,
5d. Confederation and federal union: the di-
sect 85 43c-d; ch xv, sect 172 65b-c; ch xvi
vision of jurisdiction between state and
65d-70c passim; ch xix, sect 211 73d-74a
federal governments
36 Swift: Gulliver, part i, 24b-25a; part iv,
182b-183a 6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, dk i, 365a-
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk x 61b,d- 371b
68d; BK XI, 83c-84c; bk xv, 109b-c; llOa-d; 7 Plato: Laws, bk hi, 667c-670a
BK XXI, 170c-171d 9 Aristotle: Politics, bk hi, ch 9 [1280*34-^32]
38 Rousseau: Political Economy, 380a-b 478a-c
39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, bk iv, 239a-279b 14 Plutarch: Philopoemen, 296a-b / Aratus,
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 14d-15c; 18a; 834c-d
26a-c;134a-b; 245d-246d; 420b-d; 518b- 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk ix, 58b, d-
519a; 522c-523a,c; 550b-551b; 608b,d; 60a
624b-c; 632d-633a; 638a-639a 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, bk v, 420b-d
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 65a-c; 216c-d; 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 103c-d
285a-c; 505b-c 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 218c-219a: 577b-c
42 Kant Science ofRight, 413d 454a-455a 456c-
: ; ; 43 Articles of Confederation: 5a-9d
457a 43 Constitution of the U.S.: lla-20d esp
43 Declaration of Independence: la-3b pas- article VI [583-599] 16d
sim 43 Federalist: number 1-30 29a-103c passim,
43 Constitution of the U.S.: article iv, sect espnumber 10, 52b-c, number 14, 61b-c,
3 [544-550] 16b
number 15, 65c-d; number 31-34, 104c-llld;
43 Federalist: number 43, 140d-141a number 36, 115a-117b; number 37, 119b-
662 THE GREAT IDEAS
162d; BK V, ch 12 216d-219b; ch 21-26 226a-
(5. The relation of governments to one another: 230a,c
sovereign princes or states as in a condition 20 Aquinas Summa Theologica, part i-ii,
:
\CROSS-REFERENCES
For: The basic context of the problems discussed in this chapter, see State; for the discussion of
domestic government, see Family 2b, 5a; for the discussion of ecclesiastical government,
see Religion 3c(2); for the discussion of divine government, see God 7c; World ic; and
for the discussion of government in relation to economic affairs, Wealth 9d.
see
Other considerations of the issues concerning anarchy, see Liberty ib; Tyranny 3;
War and Peace i.
Other discussions of the notion of sovereignty in its various forms or meanings, see Democ-
racy 4b; Lav^ 6b; Liberty ib, 6c; State 2c, gd; Tyranny 5c; and for the problems of
foreign policy as between sovereign states, see Justice g(; State gc(i)-gc(2); War and
Peace iic.
Sovereignty in relation to federal government, and for the idea of world government, see
State loe-iof; War and Peace iid.
Justice, liberty, and property in relation to government, see Justice la, 6-6e, g~gc, lo-ioe;
Liberty id, if, ih; Wealth 7a.
The relation of the ideal form of government to the ideal state, see State 2e, 6-6b.
The abuses or corruption of government, see Law 7d; Monarchy 4e(3)-4e(4); Tyranny
i-ic.
The issues of Imperialism in the government of colonies or subject peoples, see Democracy
7b; Liberty 6c; Monarchy 5-5b; Revolution 7; Slavery 6d; State lob; Tyranny 6.
The analysis of particular forms of government, see Aristocracy i-2e; Constitution i-3b,
5-5b; Democracy 1-4C; Monarchy i-ia(2), 4-4e(i), 4e(3)-4e(4); Oligarchy 1-2, 4-5;
Tyranny i-5d; and for the discussion of mixed forms of government, see Constitu-
tion 3a-3b; Monarchy ib-ib(2).
The condition of the ruled under diverse forms of government, see Citizen 2b; Liberty if;
Slavery 6a-6b.
The institutions of self-government, such as representation, elections, voting, see Aristoc-
racy 6; Constitution g-gh; Democracy 5a-5b(4).
The problem of the relativity of the forms of government to the character and circumstances
of particular peoples, see Democracy 4d; Monarchy 4e(2); Tyranny 4b.
The general discussion of political revolution and progress, see Liberty 6b; Progress
4a-4c; Revolution 2a-2c, 3a, 3c-3c(3); and for the consideration of revolution with
respect to particular forms of government, see Aristocracy 3; Constitution 8-8b;
Democracy 7a; Oligarchy 3-3b; Tyranny 8.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Boo\s of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the BibUography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
and Ohgarchy," in Moralia Burke. An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs
Aquinas. On the Governance of Rulers W. Humboldt. The Sphere and Duties of Government
Dante. Convivio {The Banquet), fourth treatise, Paine. Rights of Man
CH 4-5 The Age of Reason
.
On World-Government or De Monarchia
. Dissertation on First Principles of Government
.
iMiLTON. Defence of the People of England Whewell. The Elements of Morality, bk iv, ch 6;
Hobbes. Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Govern- BK V, CH 7-9
ment and Society, ch 6-7, 10- 11 Calhoun. A Disquisition on Government
The Elements ofLaw, Natural and Politic, part
. . A Discourse on the Constitution and Govern-
I, ch 19; PART II, ch I ment of the United States
A Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a Stu-
. Dickens. Little Dorritt
dent of the Common Laws of England LoTZE. Microcosmos, bk viii, ch 5
Spinoza. Tractatus Theologico-Politicus {Theological- J. H. Newman. A Letter to the Dul^e ofNorfol\
Political Treatise), ch 16-19 TuRGENEV. Fathers and Sons
. Tractatus Politicus {Political Treatise), ch 3-5 . Virgin Soil
Hume. A Treatise of Human Nature, bk hi, part ii, T. H. Huxley. Methods and Results, ix
SECT Vll-X T. H. Green. The Principles of Political Obligationy
A. Smith. Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue and (a,f,g)
Arms Spencer. The Man Versus the State
Marx. A Criticism of the Hegelian Philosophy of Maine. Popular Government
Right Maitland. Justice and Police
Dostoevsky. The Possessed W. Wilson. Congressional Government
Kropotkin. Anarchism
II.
Bosanquet. The Philosophical Theory of the State
PoLYBius. Histories, vol i, bk vi Bryce. "The Nature of Sovereignty," in Studies in
Cicero. De Republica {The Republic) History and Jurisprudence
John of Salisbury. The Statesman' s Boo\ S ANT AY an A. Rcasoit in Society, ch 3
Marsilius of Padua. Defensor Pads Chesterton. The Napoleon ofNotting Hill
FoRTESCUE. Governance of England The Man Who Was Thursday
.
Burlamaqui. Principles of Natural and Politic Law Maritain. Scholasticism and Politics, ch iii-iv
Vattel. The Law of Nations, bk i, ch 1-13 Simon. Nature and Functions of Authority
Voltaire. Letters on the English, viii-ix A. J. Carlyle. Political Liberty
"Government," in A Philosophical Dictionary
. Barker. Refectiofis on Government
J. Wilson. Wor\s, part i, ch ii, v, x Ferrero. The Principles of Power
Bentham. A Fragment on Government, ch 2, 4-5 MacIver. The Web of Government
Chapter ^1.: HABIT
INTRODUCTION
THE familiar word "habit" has a tremendous
range of meaning. Some of its meanings in
ing to one view, the acquisition of habits de-
pends on activity. According to another, habits
technical discourse are so divergent from one are modifications, passively, not acti\ely, ac-
another— as well as from the popular under- quired.
standing of the term — that fmd
it is difficult to The word "habit" is also used in a sense dia-
a common thread of derivation whereby to metrically opposite to the meanings so far con-
pass from one meaning to another. sidered. It is the sense in which Aristotle, in the
We can eliminate at once the use of the word History of Animals, discusses the habits of ani-
to designate apparel, as when we speak of a mals, and differentiates species according to the
"riding habit." Yet even this sense contains a differences in their habits. Here the word "habit"
root of meaning which cannot be dismissed. is used to signify not an acquired pattern of
Augustine points out that "the term 'habit' is behavior, but an innate predisposition to act or
derived from the verb *to have' " and Aris- react in a certain way. The difference between
totle, considering the meanings of 'to have,' in- acquired habits and "the habits to which there
cludes the sense in which a man may be said "to is an innate tendency," James tells us, is marked
have a coat or tunic" along with the sense in by the fact that the latter generally "arc called
which a man may be said to have a habit "a
— instincts."
^ piece of knowledge or a virtue." Just as clothes The opposition between these two meanings
are something a person has or possesses in a man- of "habit" is clear. On the one hand, habits rep-
ner more or less fitting to the body, so habits in resent what, in the case of living things at least,
the psychological sense are qualities which a is added by nurture to nature— the results of
person has or possesses, and they too can be experience, training, or activity. On the other
judged for their fitness. hand, habits which are identical with instincts
This understanding of habit is conveyed in belong to original nature itself — part of the na-
the ancient remark which has become a com- tive endowment of the animal. Is there any com-
mon expression — that "habit is second nature." mon thread of meaning in the notions of ac-
Habit is not original nature, but something quired and innate habit which may explain the
added thereto as clothes are added to the body. use of the word in such opposite senses.?
But unlike clothes, which are added externally The familiar statement that a person does
and merely by contact, habits as second nature what he is in the habit of doing indicates that a
are nature itself transformed or developed. In habit is a tendency to a particular sort of be-
the words of an ancient poet, whom Aristotle havior. Knowledge of a person's habits enables
quotes with approval, "habit's but long prac- us to predict what he is likely to do in any situa-
. tice, and this becomes men's nature in the end." tion which elicits habitual conduct on his part.
j
Not all, as we shall see, would grant that prac- So, too, an animal's behavior in a particular sit-
tice is essential to habit. Nevertheless the word uation may be predicted from a knowledge of
"practice" suggests one notion that is common its instincts. Instinct and habit— or innate and
to all theories of acquired habit, namely, that acquired habits — seem to have this common
habit is a retained effect— xht result of something character, that they are tendencies to behavior
done or experienced. Within this common un- of a specific or determinate sort. They are defi-
derstanding, there are opposite views. Accord- nitely not random behavior. In the one case, the
665
666 THE GREAT IDEAS
tendency is preformed, a part of the inherited are either relatively inflexible at one extreme or
nature of the organism. In the other, the tend- easily modifiable at the other has been thought
ency is somehow a product of experience and to indicate that animal's rank in the scale of in-
learning. In neither case does "habit" refer to telligence. The higher animals seem to have a
mere capacity for action, unformed and inde- greater capacity to form habits and to be capa-
terminate, nor does it refer to the action, but ble, therefore, of modifying their instinctive
rather to the tendency to act. patterns of behavior as the result of experience.
In consequence, their behavior is both more
The modifiability of instincts by experience adaptive and more variable than that of animals
indicates another and more dynamic connection which always follow the lines of action laid
between innate and acquired habits. WilHam down by instinct.
James conceives innately determined behavior Species whose instincts are largely unmodifi-
as if it were a plastic material out of which new able are at a disadvantage in a changing environ-
patterns of conduct can be formed. The process ment or in one to which they are not innately
of animal learning he thinks can be generally de- adapted. In the struggle for existence, Darwin
scribed as the replacement of instincts by hab- observes, it is the organism that "varies ever so
its. "Most instincts," he writes, "are implanted little, either in habits or structure" which "gains
for the sake of giving rise to habits, and this an advantage over some other inhabitant of the
purpose once accomplished, the instincts them- same country." Though for the most part in-
selves, as such, have no raison tfeire in the psy- stinctsseem to be directed toward the animal's
chical economy, and consequently fade away." survival, inteUigence, or the power of modify-
Some years before the Russian physiologists ing instincts by learning, may sometimes be
Bechterev and Pavlov experimentally studied needed to save the animal from his own instincts.
the conditioning of reflexes, James described ani- If the lower animals are most dependent on
mal learning in terms of the substitution of new their instincts and least able to modify them,
for old responses to stimuli which had previously that would seem to indicate a kind of opposi-
called forth an instinctive reaction, or in terms tion between instinct and intelligence. Darwin
of the attachment of instinctive responses to quotes Cuvier to the effect that "instinct and
new stimuli. "The actions we call instinctive," intelhgence stand in an inverse ratio to each
James writes, "all conform to the general reflex other," but he himself does not wholly accept
type" and "are called forth by determinate sen- this view. He thinks that the behavior of bea-
sory stimuli." For example, a predatory animal, vers, for example, or of certain classes of insects,
instinctively responsive to various perceptible shows that "a high degree of intelUgence is cer-
signs of the whereabouts of its prey, may learn tainly compatible with complex instincts." Yet
to hunt for its food in a particular locality, at a he admits that "it is not improbable that there
particular time, and in a particular way. Or, to is a certain amount of interference between the
take the example James gives, "if a child, in his development of free inteUigence and of in-
will excite in him the impulse to fondle again." equivocal position. According to him, "man pos-
Similarly, an animal which has no instinctive sesses all the impulses that [animals] have, and a
fear of man may
acquire an habitual tendency great many more besides." After enumerating
to flee at man's approach, as the result of expe- what he considers to be the instinctive tenden-
riences in which the appearance of man is asso- cies of the human species, he concludes by say-
ciated with instinctively recognized signs of ing that "no other mammal, not even the mon-
danger. key, shows so large an array." But since James
In the classification of animals, from Aristotle also thinks that man has the keenest intelligence
on, the instincts peculiar to each species have and may even be the only reasoning animal, he
been used in their differentiation. In addition, cannot believe that there is any "material an-
the degree to which the instincts of an animal tagonism between instinct and reason." On the
Chaptir 32: HABIT 667
contrary, a high development of the faculties ol nunt ol something earlier." Indeed, he claims
memory, of associating ideas, and of making in- lliat tlie insimcls of living tilings revcri back
ferences implies not the absence of instinct, but beyond ancestral history to the inorganic. They
the modifiability of instinct by experience and go back to "an ancient starting point, which the
learning. "Though the animal richest in reason living being left long ago." They arc an "im-
might be also the animal richest in instinctive print" left upon the development of the organ-
impulses too," James writes, "he would never ism by "the evolution of our earth and its
seem the fatal automaton which a merely in- relation to the sun."
stinctive animal would be." James, on the other hand, claims that there is
The opposite position is taken by those who, "perhaps not one single unequivocal item of
like Cuvier, hold that the more adequate an ani- positive proof" in favor of the view thai "adap-
mal's instinctive equipment is for its survival, tive changes are inherited." He thinks the vari-
the less it needs free intelligence for adaptive from generation to genera-
ability of instincts
purposes, and the less important is the role of tion must be accounted for by some other means
learning and habit formation. Some writers, like than the inheritance of acquired characteristics,
Aquinas, go further than this and maintain that according to which the habits acquired by earlier
in the case of man, the power of reason as an in- generations gradually become, through heredi-
strument of learning and of solving life's prob- tary transmission, the innate habits of later gen-
lems supplants instinct almost entirely, or needs erations.
to be supplemented by instinctive impulses of The question of their origin aside, what is the
an extremely rudimentary sort hardly more — structure of instincts? In the chapter on Emo-
complex than simple reflexes. tion, where this matter is considered, instinc-
What other animals do by instinct man does tive behavior is described as having three com-
by reason. "Brute animals," Aquinas writes, "do ponents. It involves, first, an innate ability to
not act at the command of reason," but "if they recognize certain objects; second, an emotional
are left to themselves, such animals act from reaction to them which includes an impulse to
natural instinct." Since in his opinion habits act in a certain way; and, third, the ability to
can be formed only by acts which involve reason execute that impulse without benefit of learning.
as a factor, he does not think that, strictly speak- James covers two of these three points when
ing, habits are to be found in brutes. But, he he defines an instinct as "the faculty of acting
adds, to the extent that man's reason may influ- in such a way as to produce certain ends, with-
ence brutes "by a sort of conditioning to do out foresight of the ends, and without previous
things in this or that way, so in this sense to a education in the performance"; and he touches
certain extent we can admit the existence of on the remaining one when he declares that "in-
habits in brute animals." stinctive reactions and emotional expressions
shade imperceptibly into each other. Every ob-
The modification of instincts in the course of ject that excites an instinct," he goes on to say,
individual Ufe raises a question about their modi- "excites an emotion as well," but emotions "fall
fiability from generation to generation. The short of instincts in that the emotional reaction
question has obvious significance for the theory usually terminates in the subject's own body,
of evolution. whilst the instinctive reaction is apt to go fur-
It is thought by some that an animal's in- ther and enter into practical relations with the
stincts represent the past experience ot the race. exciting object."
In a passage quoted by James, Herbert Spencer, In the discussion of instincts from Aristotle to
for example, maintains that "reflex actions and Freud, the emphasis on one or another of these
instincts .... result from the registration of ex- components has varied from time to time. Me-
perience continued for numberless generations." diaeval psychologists, if we take Aquinas as an
Freud appears to hold much the same opinion. example, seem to stress the cognitive aspect. He
"All organic instincts are conservative," he speaks of the sheep running away "when it sees
They are "historically acquired, and are
writes. the wolf, not because of its color or shape, but
directed towards regressions, towards reinstate- as a natural enemy." The point which he thinks
668 THE GREAT IDEAS
notable here is not the fact that the sheep runs of matter, which consists in "the possession of a
away, but rather the fact that without any pre- structure weak enough to yield to an influence,
vious experience of wolves, the sheep recognizes but strong enough not to yield all at once. Each
the wolf as dangerous. "The sheep, seeing the relatively stable phase of equilibrium in such a
wolf, judges it a thing to be shunned not . . . structure is marked by what we may call a new
from deliberation, but from natural instinct." set of habits." He
examples of habit for-
cites as
This instinctive power of recognizing what is to mation in inorganic matter such things as the
the animal's advantage or peril Aquinas calls magnetizing of an iron bar, the setting of plaster,
"the estimative power" and assigns it, along scratches on a polished surface or creases in a
with memory and imagination, to the sensitive piece of cloth. The matter in each of these cases
faculty. isnot only plastic and yielding, but retentive
Later writers stress the emotional and cona- through its inertia. "When the structure has
tive aspects of instinct — feeling and impulse. yielded," he writes, "the same inertia becomes
James, for example, indicates this emphasis when the condition of its comparative permanence in
he says that "every instinct is an impulse"; and the new form, and of the new habits the body
Freud makes desire central rather than percep- then manifests."
tion or action. An instinct, he says, may be de- The habits of living things or of the human
scribed as a stimulus, but it would be more exact mind are to be regarded only as special cases of
to speak of "a stimulus of instinctual origin" as nature's general plasticity and retentiveness.
a "need." The instincts are the basic cravings James does not fail to observe the difference be-
or needs, and these instinctual needs are the pri- tween the magnetized bar, the scratched surface,
mary unconscious determinants of behavior and or the creased cloth, and the habits of a trained
thought. animal or a skilled workman. The latter are ac-
What Freud calls "instinctual needs" seem to —
quired by activity by practicing the same act
be the counterpart of what, in an earlier phase repeatedly. Furthermore, they are not merely
of the tradition, are called "natural desires." passive relics of a past impression, but are them-
These two notions are far from being strictly in- selves tendencies to action. They erupt into ac-
terchangeable, but they do have a certain simi- tion almost spontaneously when the occasion for
larity in their reference to desires which are not performance arises.
conscious or acquired through experience. This may be questioned whether the word "hab-
It
matter is further discussed in the chapter on it" should be used so broadly. Unhke James, most
Desire. writers restrict its apphcation to living things,
and even there they limit habit formation to the
If we turn now to the consideration of habit sphere of learning. If the capacity to learn from
assomething acquired by the individual, we find experience is not a property of plant life, then
two major issues. The first of these has already plants cannot form habits. The same may be said
been mentioned in connection with the concep- of certain species of animals whose activity is en-
tion of habit as a retained effect. tirely and inflexibly instinctive. Habits are pos-
According to William James, the capacity for by those organisms — animals or men
sessed only
habit formation is a general property of nature, — whose future conduct can be determined by
found in inanimate matter as well as in living their own past behavior. Aquinas, as we have
things. "The moment one tries to define what seen, goes further than this, and limits habit for-
habit is," he writes, "one is led to the funda- mation in a strict sense to man alone.
mental properties of matter." He regards the This leads at once to the second issue. For
laws of nature, for example, as "nothing but the those who believe that man is not specifi-
immutable habits which the different elemen- cally different from all other animals, man's
tary sorts of matter follow in their actions and habits and his habit formation require no spe-
reactionsupon each other. In the organic world, cial distinction or analysis. They hold that hu-
however, the habits are more variable than this." man intelligence differs from animal intelli-
James attributes this universal capacity for gence only in degree, not in kind. No other
habit formation to what he calls the "plasticity" factors, they think, are present in human learn-
Chapter 32: HABIT 669
ing than those which operate when animals of faculties, and especially by their analysis of
somehow profit from experience or acquire new the powers and activities which they think be-
modes of behavior. In the great books there is long peculiarly to man. This in turn gives a
I to be found, however, a very special theory of metaphysical meaning to habit, for they treat
habit which is part of the doctrine that man is human powers and human acts as special cases
specifically differentfrom all other animals in of potentiality and actualization.
that he alone is rational and has free will. Aquinas bases much of his discussion of habii
The issue about man's nature is discussed in on Aristotle's definition of it as "a disposition
other chapters (Animal, Evolution, Man, whereby that which is disposed is disposed well
Mind). Here we must examine the consequen- or ill, and this, either in regard to itself or in
ces for the theory of habit of these opposing regard to another." In calling a habit a dis[)osi-
views. Do men form habits in the
animals and tion, Aristotle goes on to say that all "disposi-
same sense of that term P The use of the word is tions are not necessarily habits," for while dis-
not at stake, for "habit" may be used in a dif- positions are unstable or ephemeral, habits "are
ferent sense for the acquired dispositions of ani- permanent" or at least "difficult to alter."
mals.Those who hold that brute animals and For a disposition to be a habit, certain other
men do not have habits in the same sense ac- conditions must be present, according to Aqui-
knowledge that men may have, in addition to nas. "That which is disposed should be distinct
their specifically human habits, the sort of mod- from that to which it is disposed," he writes,
ified instincts or conditioned reflexes which are and hence "should be related to it as poten-
typical of animal habit formation. Further- tiality is to act." If there is a being which lacks
more, it is recognized that human and animal all potentiality, he points out, "we can find no
habits are alike in certain respects. Both are ac- room in such a thing for habit ... as is clearly
quired by activity and both are tendencies to the case in God."
activity of a determinate sort. It is also necessary that "that which is in a
The question, therefore, is simply Does
this: state of potentiality in regard to something else
one conception of habit apply to men and ani- be capable of determination in several ways and
mals, or does human nature require a special to various things." If there were a potentiality
conception applicable to man alone ? To clarify which could be actualized in one way and one
this issue, it is necessary to summarize the way only, then such a power of operation could
analysis of human habits which Aristotle and not be determined by habits. Some of man's
Aquinas develop more fully than other writers, powers seem to be of this sort. His faculty of
even than those who share their view of the sensation, for example, functions perfectly
rationahty and freedom of man. when the sense organs have normally matured.
A man does not learn to see colors or to hear
That Aristotle and Aquinas should be the tones, and
so the simple use of his senses— apart
authors of an elaborate theory of human habits from aesthetic perceptions and trained dis-
becomes intelligible in terms of two facts. criminations — does not lead to sensory habits.
In the first place, they consider habit in the "The exterior apprehensive powers, as sight,
context of moral theory. For them the virtues, hearing, and the like," Aquinas maintains, "are
moral or intellectual, are habits, and so neces- not susceptive of habits but are ordained to
sarily are the opposite vices. Virtues are good their fixed acts, according to the disposition
for knowing grammar or geometry, but after not in operation. It may even develop during
he has learned these subjects he has the habit periods of inactivity. As William James re-
of such knowledge. This, according to Aristotle marks, there is a sense in which "we learn to
and Aquinas, means that his original capacity swim during the winter and to skate during the
has been rendered more determinate in its summer" when we are not actually engaging in
activity. It would be so even if he had learned these sports. This would seem to be inconsistent
errors, that is, even if the intellectual habits he with the general insight, common to all ob-
had formed disposed his mind in a manner by exercise
servers, that habits are strengthened
which would be called "ill" rather than "well." and weakened or broken by disuse or by the
The difference between a man who has performance of contrary acts. But James ex-
learned grammar and one who has not is a dif- plains that his point, stated less paradoxically,
ference in their capacity for a certain intellec- means only that during periods of rest the
tual performance, a difference resultingfrom effects of prior activity seem to consolidate and
grammatical skill, the fact that he has formed sents an actualization or development of capac-
this particular habit means that he will be able, ity, even as a particular operation is an actual-
whenever the occasion arises, to do correctly ization of the power to act. That is why habit
with speed and facility what the man who does is sometimes called a second grade of poten-
not have the habit cannot do readily or easily tiality (compared to natural capacity as first po-
It may be helpful to illustrate the same points (compared to operation as complete act).
by reference to a bodily habit, such as a gym-
nastic or athletic skill which, being an art, is According to the theory of specifically hu-
a habit not of body alone, but of mind as well. man habits, habits are situated only in man's
If two men are born with normal bodies equally powers of reason and will. Habits are formed
capable of certain muscular coordinations, they in the other powers only to the extent that they
stand in the same relation to performing on the are subject to direction by his reason and will.
tennis court. Both are equally able to learn the Specifically human habits can be formed only
game. But when one of them has learned to in that area of activity in which men are free
play, his acquired skill consists in the trained to act or not to act; and, when they act, free to
capacity for the required acts or motions. The act this way or that. Habit, the product of
other man may be able to perform all these acts freedom, is not thought of as abolishing free-
or go through all these motions, but not with dom. However difficult it may be to exert a free
the same facility and grace, or as pleasantly, as choice against a strong habit, even the strongest
Chapter 32: HABIT 671
habit not conceived as unbreakable; and if it
is a whole and what is a part, should at once per-
is breakable, it must permit action contrary to ceive that every whole is larger than its part."
itself. Habitual behavior only seems to lack The sense in which Aquinas says that "M^-
freedom because a man does habitually, without understanding offirst principles is called a natural
conscious attention to details, what he would be habit" applies to the first principles of the
forced to do by conscious choice at every step practical reason as well as to the axioms of
if he lacked the habit. theoretic knowledge.no man who Just as
In the theory under consideration habits arc makes theoretic judgments about the true and
classified according to the faculty which they the false can be, in his opinion, without habit-
determine or perfect, on the ground that "every ual knowledge of the principle of contradic-
power which may be variously directed to act tion, .so he thinks no man who makes practical
needs a habit whereby it is well disposed to its judgments about good and evil can be without
act." Consequently there are intellectual hab- habitual knowledge of the natural moral law,
its, or habits of thinking and knowing; and ap- the first principle of which is that the good is to
petitive habits, or habits of desire which involve be sought and evil avoided. "Since the precepts
the emotions and the will, and usually entail of the natural law are sometimes considered by
specific types of conduct. Within a single fac- reason actually," Aquinas writes, "while some-
ulty, such as the intellect, habits are further times they are in the reason only habitually,
differentiated by reference to their objects or in this way the natural law may be called a hab-
to the end to which their characteristic oper- it."
ation is directed. For example, the habit of In a different phase of the tradition Hume
knowing which consists in a science like geom- regards it as an inevitable tendency of the hu-
etry and the habit of artistic performance such man mind to interpret any repeated sequence
as skill in grammar both belong to the intellect, of events in terms of cause and effect. If one
but they are distinct habits according to their thing has preceded another a certain number of
objects or ends. times in our experience, we are likely to infer
All of these distinctions have moral as well as that if the first occurs, the second will follow.
psychological significance. They are used in The principle which determines us "to form
formulating the criteria o{ good Sind ^a^ habits such a conclusion" is, Hume says, "Custom or
which are more appropriately discussed in the Habit." All our inferences from experience are
chapter on Virtue and Vice. But here one "effects of custom, not of reasoning" and since ;
further psychological distinction deserves com- the habit of inferring a future connection be-
ment. Some of man's acquired habits are re- tween things which have been customarily con-
gardedas natural in a special sense not in the — joined in the past is, in his opinion, universally
sense in which instincts are called "natural" or present in human nature, Hume refers to it as
"innate" habits. The distinction is drawn from "a species of natural instinct which no reason-
the supposition that certain habits develop in all ing or process of thought and understanding is
men because, since human nature is the same able either to produce or prevent."
for all, men will inevitably form these habits if Even Kant's synthetic judgments a priori
they act at all. This word "natural" here ap- have a certain similarity to the thing called
plied to a habit simply means that it is common "natural habit." They comprise judgments the
to all having the same nature. mind will make because of its own nature or,
For example, the understanding of the law in Kant's terms, its transcendental structure.
of contradiction— that the same thing cannot be Though a priori, the judgment itself is not in-
affirmed and denied at the same time — and other nate, for it arises only when actual experience
simple axioms of theoretic knowledge are said provides its subject matter. So, too, the natural
to be possessed by the human mind as a matter habit of first principles, of which Aquinas
of natural habit. If a man thinks at all he will speaks, is not innate, but a result of experience.
come to know these truths. "It is owing to the
very nature of the intellectual soul," Aquinas There is still one other traditional meaning
writes, "that man, having once grasped what is of the phrase "natural habit." It occurs in
672 THE GREAT IDEAS
Christian theology. Habits are there distin- difference between habit and custom. But we
guished according as they are acquired by man's usually think of customs in terms of the group
own efforts or are a gift of God's grace, which or community rather than the individual. As
adds to or elevates human nature.The former indicated in the chapter on Custom and Con-
are natural, the latter supernatural. vention, the prevailing modes of behavior in
In the sphere of supernatural habits the theo- a societyand its widely shared beUefs repre-
logian makes a distinction between grace it- sent common habits of thoughtand action
self and the special habits which accompany on the part of members. Apart from the
its
grace. Aquinas, for example, writes that "just habits of individuals social customs have no ex-
as the natural light of reason is something dif- istence whatsoever. But social customs and in-
ferent from the acquired virtues, which are dividual habits cannot be equated because, with
ordained to this natural light, so also the light respect to any customary practice or opinion,
of grace, which is a participation of the divine there may be non-conforming individuals
nature, something different from the infused
is — men of divergent habit. The prevalent or
virtues which are derived from and are ordained predominant customs are the habits of the
to this light."These "infused virtues," like the majority.
natural virtues, are good habits principles of — No society endures for long or functions
operation, determining acts of thought or de- peacefully unless common habits generate the
sire. They are either the specifically theological ties of custom. To perpetuate itself, the state
virtues of faith, hope, and charity, or the super- necessarily attempts to mould the habits of
natural counterparts of the acquired intellec- each growing generation — by every means of
tual and moral virtues — the habits which are education, by tradition, by law. So important
called "the infused virtues" and "the moral is the stability of custom in the life of society,
and intellectual gifts." according to Montaigne, that it is "very un-
Grace, taken in itself rather than in its con- just ... to subject pubhc and established cus-
sequences, is not an operative habit, that is, it toms and institutions to the weakness and in-
is not a habit of performing certain Never- acts. stabihty of a private and particular fancy."
theless, regarded as something added to and He doubts "whether any so manifest benefit
perfecting nature, it is considered under the can accrue from the alteration of a law re-
aspect of habit. But rather than "a habit where- ceived, let it be what it will, as there is danger
by power is inclined to an act," Aquinas in- and inconvenience in altering it." His extreme
cludes it among those habits by which "the caution with regard to changing the law comes
nature is well or ill disposed to something, and from a preference for the stability of settled
chiefly when such a disposition has become a customs and from the recognition that "govern-
sort of nature." Through the habit of grace, ment is a structure composed of diverse parts
man's nature is elevated by becoming "a par- and members joined and united together, with
taker ... of the divine nature." so strict connection, that it is impossible to stir
To distinguish this kind of habit from those so much as one brick or stone, but the whole
in the operative order, it is sometimes called an body will be sensible of it."
"entitative habit" —a habit of the very being Without habits of action, at least, neither
of man's personality. On the purely natural the individual nor society can avoid chaos.
plane, health may be thought of in the same Habits bind day to day in a continuity which
way as a habit which is entitative rather than would be lost if the recurring problems of con-
operative. It is a habit not of thought, desire, duct or thought had to be solved anew each
or conduct, but of man's physical being. time they arose. Without habits Ufe would
become unbearably burdensome; it would bog
The word "custom" is sometimes a synonym down under the weight of making decisions.
for "habit" and sometimes a variant with spe- Without habits men could not live with them-
cial connotations. What a man does habitually selves, much less with one another. Habits are,
is customary for him to do. So far as the single as William James remarks, "the fly-wheel of
individual is concerned, there seems to be no society."
OiAi'TiiR 32: HABIT 673
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
1. Diverse conceptions of habit :
as second nature, perieclion of jx)uer, retained modiPca-
tion ol matter
074
la. Habit in relation to potency and act
lb. Habit in relation to the plasticity of matter ^>75
2. The kinds of habit: the distinction of habit from disposition and other qualities
2a, Differentiation of habits according to origin and function: innate and acquired,
entitativc and operative habits
3^. The innate sense of the beneficial and harmful: the estimative power 676
3r. Instinct in relation to reason
3^. The instinctive basis of habit -formation: the modification of instincts and re-
flexes through experience or learning 677
3^. The genesis, transmission, and modification of instincts in the course of genera-
tions
4. Habit formation
4^. The causes of habit: practice, repetition, teaching, and the law
4^. The growth and decay of habits: ways of strengthening and breaking habits
5^. Habits of appetite and will: the moral virtues as good habits
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred For example, in 4 Homer: Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d, the
to.
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 James Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 Plato: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
Author's Divisions One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as part, bk, ch,
:
sect) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d.
Bible References The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
:
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., Old Testa-
—
ment: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) // Esdras, 7:46.
Symbols: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
53 ] AMES .Psychology, 68a-71a; 423a-424a passim; 8 Akimoti.i: Categories, cm 8 [(;»r^ 28] 14b /
:
652c [487*1
488b2(>]
1 7d 9d; bk viii, cm 114b.d- r
6a-12a; q 54, aa 1-2 22d-24c; a 3, rep 1,3 10 Galen: Natural Faculties, bk i, ch 12, 173a-c
24c-25b; a 4, ans 25b-d; part ii-ii, q 24, 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk iv [1037-
A 5, ans 492b-493d 1057] 57d
28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 333a-b 12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk i, ch 23 128c-d
^1^ THE GREAT IDEAS 33 to 3c
22 Chaucer: Nun's Priest's Tale [15,279-287]
(3. The instincts or innate habits of animals and
457b
men. 3a. Instinctual needs or drives.) 25 Montaigne: Essays, 286d-287b
19 Aquinas Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 12,
: 28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 456d-457a
A ANs and REP 3 672a-c; q 13, a 2, rep 2-3
5, 31 Descartes: Meditations, vi, 100a
673c-674c; q 16, a 2, rep 2 684d-685b; q 17, 35 Locke: Civil Government, ch vii, sect 79-80
A 2, rep 3 687d-688b; q 41, a i, rep 3 798b-d 42c-43a / Hu7nan Understanding, bk i, ch ii,
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, purgatory, xviii SECT 3 104b-d; bk ii, ch x, sect 3 141c-d; ch
[19-75] 80a-c XI, SECT 5 144d-145a; sect ii 145d-146a
22 Chaucer: Manciple' sTale [17,104-144] 490a-b 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 337d-338a
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part i, 61a-d; 84c-86b; 48 Melville: Moby Dic\, 144a-b; 146b-148a
PART II, 141a-b 49 Darwin: Origin of Species, 121a; 122c / De-
25 Montaigne: Essays, 184a-b; 424d-425c; scent of Man, 287d-288a; 290c-291a; 292b-c
512a-b 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk hi, llla-c; 129a-c
28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 339b; 346a- 53 James: Psychology, 8a; 13a; 708a-709a; 720b-
347d; 349a-350a; 361c-362a; 402a-d; 460d- 725a passim; 729b
461a; 476b-477b 54 Freud: General Introduction, 607d-609c; 612c-
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 72c-73a 614a esp 613d-614a; 623b-c / Beyond the
31 Descartes: Meditations, vi, 99d-103a Pleasure Principle, 640d-641a / Inhibitions,
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part hi, prop 4-9 398d-399c Symptoms, and Anxiety, 720a-721c esp 721a;
35 Locke: Civil Government, ch vii, sect 78-80 737b-738a; 751a-752b / New Introductory
42b-43a / Human Understa?iding, bk i, ch ii, lectures, 845a-846a
sect 3 104b-d
35 Hume: Human Understanding, sect v, div 38, 3c. Instinct in relation to reason
466b; DIV 45 469c; sect ix, div 85 488c; sect 8 Aristotle: Physics, bk ii, ch 8 [199*20-33]
XII, div 118 504c-d 276c
38 Rousseau: Inequality, 342c-346d passim 9 Aristotle: History of Animals, bk ix, ch 7
43 Mill: Utilitaria?iism, 469b-470c [6i2''i8-6i3^i6] 138b-d / Politics, bk vii, ch
46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, intro, 164b-c 13 [1332^39-^10] 537a-b; ch 15 [1334^7-28]
48 Melville: Moby Dic\, 286b-288a 539b-d
49 Darwin: Origin of Species, 122d-131b / De- 12 AuRELius: Meditations, bk hi, sect 16 262d-
scent of Man, 298a'C; 304a-314b esp 304b- 263a,c
305a, 308a-310a, 311a-312d; 371c-372c; 17 Plotinus: Fourth Ennead, tr iv, ch 20-21
456b-457c; 583a 167d-168c
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, epilogue i, 665a-d 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 18, a
53 James: Psychology, 198b-199a; 700a-704a; 3, ANS 106b-107c; q 59, a 3, ans 308b-309a;
712b-737a esp 736b- 737a [fn i] Q 76, A 5, REP 4 394c-396a; q 78, a 4, ans and
54 Freud: Narcissism, 400c-402c esp 401a-c / REP 4-5 411d-413d; q 83, a i, ans 436d-438a;
General Introduction, 569c-593b esp 574a-d, q 96, A I, REP 4 510b-511b; part i-ii, q 12, a
590a-593b; 615b-616c; 618d-619a / Beyond 5, ans and rep 3 672a-c; q 17, a 2, rep 3 687d-
the Pleasure Principle 639a-663d esp 651d-663c 688b
/ Group Psychology, 669a-b; 673b-c; 684d- 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 50,
686c esp 685a-b / Ego and Id, 708c-712c esp A 3 8b-9a
708d-709b, 711c-712a; 714c-717a,c esp 717c / 25 Montaigne: Essays, 216b-219b
Civilization and Its Discontents, 787a-788d esp 28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 428a-c
787a-c; 789b-791d / New Introductory Lec- 30 Bacon: Novum Organum, bk i, aph 108 128d
tures, 837b-d; 846b-852c esp 851a-d; 883b-c 31 Descartes: Discourse, part v, 59d-60b /
Objections and Replies, 156a-d
3^. The innate sense of the beneficial and 31 Spinoza: Ethics, part hi, prop 9, schol 399c
harmful: the estimative power 3i Pascal: Pensees, 339-344 233a-b / Vacuum,
6 Herodotus: History, bk ii, 63b-c 357a-b
9 Aristotle: History of Animals, bk viii, ch 12 35 Hume: Human Understanding, sect v, div 38,
[596^20-28] 122d; BK IX, CH 5-6 136d-138b 466b; DIV 45 469c; sect ix, div 85 488c; sect
17 Plotinus: Fourth Ennead, tr iv, ch 20 167d- XII, DIV 118-119 504c-505b
168b 38 Rousseau: Social Contract, bk i, 393b-c
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 19, a 40 Gibbon: Decline a7id Fall, 409d-410a
10, ANS 117d-118b; q 59, a 3, ans 308b-309a; 42 Kant: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 256d-
Q 76, A 5, rep 4 394c-396a; q 78, a 4, ans and 257a / Practical Reason, 316c-317a / Judge-
rep 4-5 411d-413d; q 81, a 2, rep 2 429c- ment, 602b,d [fn i]
430c; a 3, ANS and rep 2 430c-431d; q 83, a 43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 465a- b
I, ANS 436d-438a; q 96, a i, ans and rep 4 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, intro, 164b-c;
510b 511b 171b-c; part iv, 361c-d
b J
247*19] 330a-b
5. The analysis of specifically human habits 9 Aristotle: History of Animals, bk vii, ch i
8 Aristotle: Physics, bk vii, ch 3 [246^10-248* [581^11-22] 107b / Ethics, bk ii, ch 1-6
6] 329c-330d 348b,d-352d; bk vii, ch 5 [1148^15-1149*4]
9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk h, ch 1-6 348b,d-352d 399a-c;ch 10 [1152*28-33] 403b / Politics,
passim bk vii, ch 15 [1334*^8-28] 539b-d
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, qq 12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk hi, ch 3 178d-
49-54 la-25d 180a; CH 8 184b-c; bk iv, ch i 213a-223d
31 Descartes: Rules, i la-2a 14 Plutarch: Cato the Younger, 637b-c
53 James Psychology, 73b-83b
: 18 Augustine: Confessions, bk vih, par 10 55c-d;
par 20-21 58c-59a
5a. Habits of body: manual arts and the skills
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 49,
of play A I, REP 3 lb-2b; A 2, REP 3 2b-4a; q 50, a 3
7 Plato: Protagoras, 46c / Republic, bk hi, 8b-9a; a 5 lOb-d; q 56, a 4 32b-33c; a 6 34b-
334d-335b; bk vii, 391d / Theaetetus, 518a-b 35a; qq 58-61 41a-59d; q 94, a i, rep i 221a-d
/ Laws, BK VII, 717b-d 27 Shakespeare: Hamlet, act hi, sc iv [160-
8 Aristotle: Physics, bk vii, ch 3 [246^10-^19] 170] 56b
329c-330a / Heavens, bk h, ch 12 [292^14-^18] 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 69d-70a;
383d-384b / Metaphysics, bk v, ch 20 [1022'' 78d-81c esp 79a
10-13] ^^^ 35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk ii, ch xxi,
9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk ii, ch i [1103^33-35] SECT 71 197b-198a
348d; [1103^6-13] 349a / Politics, bk iv, ch i 42 Kant: Practical Reason, 357c-360d / Pref.
[1288^10-20] 487a-b; bk vii, ch 15 [1334^7- Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 368d; 378a-b
28] 539b-d; ch 17 [1336*3-22] 541a-b; bk /Judgement, 521b-523c; 604d-606d esp 606a-d
VIII, ch 4 544a-c 43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 445d-446a; 463d-465b
10 Hippocrates Articulations, par 52 109b-
: 44 Boswell: Johnson, 386a
110a; par 55, 111c; par 58 112b-113a / Apho- 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, intro, 171b-c
risms, SECT II, par 49-50 133d 49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 304a-305c esp
12 EricTETUs: Discourses, bk hi, ch 15, 190a-c 304b,d [fn5]; 310c-319a esp 311c-d, 318a-
13 Virgil: Aeneid, bk ix [590-620] 295a-b 319a; 321b-322d; 593a-b
14 Plutarch: Lycurgus, 40d-42a / Coriolanus, 53 James: Psychology, 80a-83b; 798b-808a pas-
175b / Philopoemen, 293d-294a / Demos- sim, esp 799a-b
thenes, 693c; 695b 54 Freud: War and Death, 757c-759d
17 Plotinus: Third Ennead, tr ii, ch 8, 87a-b
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part
q 49, i-ii,
5c. The natural habits of reason: innate pre-
a rep 1,3 2b-4a; a 3, rep 3 4b-5a; a 4, ans dispositions of the mind
2,
5a-6a; q 50, a i 6a-7b; a 3, rep 2 8b-9a; q 52, 8 Aristotle: Metaphysics, bk i, ch i [980*22-
A I, ans 15d-18a; a 2, ans 18a-19a; q 54, a i, 28] 499a; bk iv, ch 3 [1005^15-34] 524d-525a;
ans 22d-23d BK XI, ch 5 [1061^34-1062*5] 590a-b
^
612a-613a; a 5, ans 613a-614a 31 Spinoza: EthicSi part iv, prop 25-28 430d-
20 Aquinas: Sumrna Theologica, part i-ii, q 51, 431c; PART V, PROP 10, scHOL 455a 456a
A I, ANS and rep 1-2 12b-13c; q 53, a i, ans 35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk ii, ch ix,
19d-21a; q 94, a i 221a-d; part hi, q 9, a i, sect 8-10 139b-140b; ch xxxiii, sect 5-18
ANS 763b-764c 248d-251c passim; bk iv, ch i, sect 8-9 308b-
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, purgatory, xvi [73- 309b
81] 77c-d; XVIII [19-21] 80a; [49-66] 80b-c 35 Hume: Human Understanding, sect v, div 35-
23 Hobbes: Let'iathan, part i, 54a; 60a-b; 86b-d 38 464c-466c; div 40, 467c; div 44 468d-469c;
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 59c-d; 60c- SECT VII, DIV 59-61 476b-478a passim; sect
61c / Novum Organum, bk i, aph 48 llOd-llla IX, DIV 83-84 487c-488b
31 Descartes: Rules, i, lab; iv, 5c-d; viii, 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 347a-b
13c-d / Discourse, part i, 41b; part v, 54c / 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 223a-d
Objections and Replies, 224b,d 44 B0SWEL.L: Johnson, 135c-136a
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part iv, prop 19 429d 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, additions, 97
33 Pascal: Pensees, i, 171a; 81 186h / Geometrical 132c-133a
Demonstration, 440b 49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 320b-321a passim;
35 Locke: Civil Government, ch ii, sect 5-8 26a- 593a
27a / Human Understanding, bk i 95b,d-121a,c 53 James: Psychology, 83b; 295b-298a esp 296b;
passim 331b-336a; 361a-380a passim; 427b-430a;
35 Hume: Human Understanding, sect v, div 38, 433a-434a esp 434a; 502a-507a esp 504a;
466b; DIV 45 469c; sect xii, div 118 504c-d 520a-526b esp 520b, 524a-525a; 555a-557b
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 20a; 48a-c; 58c-59b; 66d- passim; 852b-853a; 860b-862a
72c esp 67c-69c; 109b-c; 157d; 229b-c; 234c /
Judgement, 562a-564c; 604d-606d esp 606a-d 5e. Supernatural habits
43 Federalist: number 31, lOSc-d
43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 445d-446a; 465a-b; 5^(1) Grace as an entitative habit of the person
469b-470c 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 50,
53 James: Psychology, 851a-890a esp 851a-852a, A 2, ANS 7c-8a; q 51, a 4 15a-d; q 82, a i
879b-882a, 889a-b 168a-d; g no 347d-351d
5d. The acquired habits of mind: the intellec- 5^(2) The infused virtues and the supernatural
tual virtues gifts
7 Plato: Theaetetus, 518b; 542a-c Old Testament: I Kings, 3:5-15; 4:29-34— (Z))
8 Aristotle: Physics, bk vii, ch 3 [247^1-248* /// Kings, 3:5-15; 4:29-34 / / Chronicles, 22:12
9] 330b-d; bk viii, ch 4 [255^3o-''23] 340a-c / — (D) / Paralipomenon, 22:12 / // Chronicles,
Metaphysics, bk ix, ch
5 [1047^31-34] 573a; 1:7-12— (D) // Paralipomenon, 1:7-12 / Job,
CH 8 [1049^32-1050^3] 575c-d / Soul, bk ii, 32:8 / Psalms, 119:34-40,73,125,130,144,169—
CH 5 [417^1-418*6] 647d-648d / Memory and (D) Psalms, 118:34-40,73,125,130,144,169 /
Reminiscence, ch 2 [45i^io-452''6] 693a-694b Proverbs, 2 esp 2:6 / Ecclesiastes, 2:26 / Isaiah,
9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk vi 387a-394d / Politics^ II :2-5 — (D) Isaias, 11 :2-5 / Daniel, i esp 1:17;
BK VII, CH 15 [1334^8-28] 539b-d 2:20-23
12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk hi, ch 3 178d- Apocrypha: Wisdom of Solomon, 3:9; 7:7,22;
180a; CH 8 184b-c; bk iv, ch i, 216c-223d 8:7,21; 9—{D) OT, Boo{ of Wisdom, 3:9;
12 AuRELius: Meditations, bk hi, sect 4 260b- 7:7,22; 8:7,21; 9 / Ecclesiasticus, 1:1,5,10;
261a; bk v, sect 16 271c-d 11:15; 15:5; 24:24-28; 43:33; 50:29; 51:17-
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 14, (D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 1:1,5,10; 11:15; 15:5;
A I, REP 1-2 75d-76c; q 79, aa 6-7 419b-421c; 24:34-38; 43:37; 50:31; 51:22-23
A 10, ANS 423d-424d; q 86, a 2, ans 462a- New Testament: Matthetv, 6:33 / Acts, 2:1-21
463a; q 87, a 2, rep 2-3 466c-467b / / Corinthians, 1:30; 2; 12:4-11 / Ephesians,
20 Aquinas Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 49,
: 1:16-18; 4:17-5:21 / Philippians, 3:9 / James
A I, rep 3 lb-2b; a 2, rep 3 2b-4a; g 50, a 3, i:5-7'i7J 3:13-18 / // Peter, 1:1-10
d
19:21 —(D) Matthew, 9:20-22,27-30; 15:22- 244a-b; bk viii, 303a-305b; bk xi, 486a; bk
28; 17:14-20 esp 17:18-20; 19:16-23 esp 19:21 XII, 556d-557a; bk xiv, 609d; bk xv, 639c
/ Mar}{, ^'.i']-:2.'j esp 9:23-24— (D) MarJ^, 53 James Psychology, 73b-83b
:
9:16-26 esp 9:22-23 / Luke, 17:5-6 / John, 54 Freud: Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 643d-
14:21; 20:26-29/ Romans, 1:5,16-17; 3:20-5:9; 646a esp 645b-646a
8 :24-25 10 / / Corinthians, 13 / Galatians, 5 :5-6
;
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Terms of fundamental relevance to the conception of habit, see Being yc-yc(^); Matter 2a;
Mind 2b; Nature 2c.
The psychological analysis of the faculties or powers in which habits are situated, see Animal
ia-ia(3); Life 3; Man ^-^d; Soul 2c-2c(3); Virtue and Vice 2a.
Other discussions of instinct, see Animal id; Desire 3a; Emotion ic; Evolution 3b;
Sense 3d(3).
Consideration of the factors involved in the formation or breaking of habits, see Education
3-6; Law 6d; Virtue and Vice 4-4d(4).
The Virtue and Vice le; for other discussions of the
role of habit in the theory of virtue, ^^^
intellectual virtues,Art I Mind 4c, 4e-4f Prudence i-2c; Science ia(i); Virtue and
i<?^ ; ;
Vice 2a, 2a(2); Wisdom 2a; for other discussions of the moral virtues, see Courage i, 4;
Justice ic-id; Temperance i-ib; Virtue and Vice 2a-2a(i), 3b; for other discussions
of the theological virtues, ^f<? Knowledge 6c(5); Love 5b-5b(2); Mind 5c; Religion la;
Virtue and Vice 2b, 8d-8d(3); and for other discussions of the infused virtues and the
supernatural gifts, see Mind 4f, 5c; Virtue and Vice 8e.
Matters relevant to grace as an entitative habit, see God yd; Man 9b(2); Nature 6b; Sin
3c, 4d, 7; Virtue and Vice 8b; Will ye (2).
Other considerations of the natural habits of the mind, see Judgment 8a; Knowledge 6c(2)-
6c(4); Law 4a; Mind 4df2)-4d(3); Principle 2b(2), 3a(i), 4; Virtue and Vice 4a.
The relation of habit to freedom, see Will 3a (2).
The relation of habit to custom and law, see Custom and Convention 2, 6b; Law 5f, 6d.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Boo\s of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the BibHography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
INTRODUCTION
THE great questions about happiness are
concerned with its definition and its attain-
pirical, "for it is
"that I
only by experience," he says,
can learn either what inclinations exist
abihty. In what does happiness consist ? Is it the which desire satisfaction, or what are the natu-
same for all men, or do different men seek dif- ral means of satisfying them." Such empirical
ferent things in the name of happiness? Can knov. ledge "is available for each individual in
happiness be achieved on earth, or only here- his own way." Hence there can be no universal
after? And if the pursuit of happiness is not a solution in terms of desire of the problem of
futile quest, by what means or steps should it how to be happy. To reduce moral philosophy
be undertaken? to "a theory of happiness" must result, there-
On all these questions, the great books set fore, in giving up the search for ethical prin-
forth the fundamental inquiries and specula- ciples which are both universal and a priori.
tions, as well as the controversies to which they In sharp opposition to the pragmatic rule,
have given rise, in the tradition of western Kant sets the "moral or ethical law," the mo-
thought. There seems to be no question that tive of which is not simply to be happy, but
men want happiness. "Man wishes to be happy," rather to be worthy of happiness. In addition to
Pascal writes, *'and only wishes to be happy, being a categorical imperative which imposes
and cannot wish not to be so." To the ques- an absolute obligation upon us, this law, he savs,
tion, what moves desire? Locke thinks only "takes no account of our desires or the means of
one answer is possible: "happiness, and that satisfying them." Rather it "dictates how we
alone." ought to act in order to deserve happiness." It
But even if it goes undisputed, does
this fact, is drawn from pure reason, not from experience,
684
Chapter 33: HAPPINESS
worth docs constitute the supreme good, Kant whether all who seek happiness l(K)k for it or
still refuses to admit that happiness, as a prac- find il in the same things.
tical objective, can function as a moral prin- HoKling that a definite conception of happi-
ciple. Though a man can hope to he happv only ness cannot be formulated, Kant thinks that
ifunder the monil law he does his duty, he happiness fails even as a pragmatic principle of
should not do his duty with the hope of thereby conduct. "The notion of happiness is so in-
becoming happy. "A disposition," he writes, definite," he writes, "that although every man
"which should require the prospect of happi- wishes to attain it, yet he never can say defi-
ness as its necessary condition, would not be nitelyand consistently what it is that he really
moral, and hence also would not be worthy of wishes." He cannot "determine with certainty
complete happiness." The moral law commands what would make him truly happv; Ix-causc to
the performance of duty unconditionally. Hap- do so he would v\Qf:(\ to be omniscient." If this
piness should be a consequence, but it cannot is true of the individual, how various must be
be a condition, of moral action. the notions of happiness which prevail among
In other words, happiness fails for Kant to men in general.
impose any moral obligation or to provide a Locke plainly asserts what is here implied,
standard of right and wrong in human conduct. namely, the fact that "everyone does not place
No more than pleasure can happiness be used his happiness in the same thing, or choose the
as a first principle in ethics, if morality must same way to But admitting this fact does
it."
avoid all calculations of utiHty or expediency not prevent Locke from inquiring how "in
whereby things are done or left undone for the matters of happiness and misery men come . . .
sake of happiness, or any other end to be often to prefer the worse to the better; and to
enjoyed. choose that which, by their own confession, has
made them miserable." Even though he de-
This issue between an ethics of duty and an clares that "the same thing is not good to every
ethics of happiness, as well as the conflict it man alike," Locke thinks it is possible to ac-
involves between law and desire as sources of count "for the misery that men often bring on
morality, are considered, from other points of themselves" by explaining how the individual
view, in the chapters on Desire and Di'Ty, and may make errors in judgment— "how things
again in Good and Evil where the problem of come to be represented to our desires under
the summiim bonum is raised. In this chapter, by the judgment pro-
deceitful appearances ...
we shall be concerned with happiness as an nouncing wrongly concerning them."
ethical principle, and therefore with the prob- But this applies to the individual only. Locke
lems to be faced by those who, in one way or does not think it is possible to show that when
another, accept happiness as the supreme good two men differ in their notions of happiness,
and the end of life. They may see no reason to one is right and the other wrong. "Though all
reject moral principles which work through men's desires tend to happiness, yet they are
desire rather than duty. They may find nothing not moved by the same object. Men may choose
repugnant in appealing to happiness as the ul- different things, and yet all choose right." He
timate end which justifies the means and de- does not quarrel with the theologians who, on
termines the order of all other goods. But they the basis of divine revelation, describe the eter-
cannot make happiness the first principle of nal happiness in the life hereafter which is to l:)e
ethics without having to face many questions enjoyed ali}{e by all who are saved. But revela-
concerning the nature of happiness and its tion one thing, and reason another.
is
they have asserted that fact, once they have vation. Hence Locke quarrels with '*the philos-
made happiness the most fundamental of all ophers of old" who, in his opinion, vainly sought
ethical terms, writers Uke Aristotle or Locke, to define the siimmiim bonum or happiness in
Aquinas or Mill, cannot escape the question such a way that all men would agree on what
686 THE GREAT IDEAS
happiness is; or, if they failed to, some would be should seek must be something appropriate to
in error and misled in their pursuit of happiness. the humanity which is common to them all,
It may be wondered, therefore, what Locke rather than something determined by their
means by saying that there is a science of what individually differing needs or temperaments.
man ought to do "as a rational and voluntary If it were the latter, then Aristotle and Aquinas
agent for the attainment of . . . happiness." Ke would admit that questions about what men
and
describes ethics as the science of the "rules should do to achieve happiness would be an-
measures of human
which lead to hap-
actions, swerable only by individual opinion or personal
piness" and he places "morality amongst the preference, not by scientific analysis or demon-
sciences capable of demonstration, wherein . . . stration.
from self-evident propositions, by necessary With the exception of Locke and perhaps to
consequences, as incontestable as those in mathe- a less extent Mill, those who think that a science
matics, the measures of right and wrong might of ethics can be founded on happiness as the
be made out, to any one that will apply him- first principle tend to maintain that there can
self with the same indifferency and attention be only one right conception of human happi-
to the one, as he does to the other of these ness. They regard other notions as misconcep-
sciences. tionswhich may appear to be, but are not really
the summum bonum. The various definitions of
The ancient philosophers with whom Locke happiness which men have given thus present
disagrees insist that a science of ethics depends the problem of the real and the apparent good,
on a first principle which is self-evident in the the significance of which is considered in the
same way to all men. Happiness is not that chapter on Good and Evil.
principle if the content of happiness is what
each man thinks it to be; for if no universally In the everyday discourse of men there seems
applicable definition of happiness can be given to be a core of agreement about the meaning of
— if when men differ in their conception of the words "happy" and "happiness." This com-
what constitutes happiness, one man may be as mon understanding has been used by philoso-
right as another— then the fact that all men phers like Aristotle and Mill to test the ade-
agree upon giving the name "happiness" to quacy of any definition of happiness.
what they ultimately want amounts to no When a man says "I feel happy" he is saying
more than a nominal agreement. Such nominal that he feels pleased or satisfied — that he has
agreement, in the opinion of Aristotle and what he wants. When men contrast tragedy
Aquinas, does not suffice to establish a science and happiness, they have in mind the quality a
of ethics, with rules for the pursuit of happiness life takes from its end. A tragedy on the stage,
in their specific nature." It is in terms of their whole despite difficulties and vicissitudes along
specific or common nature that happiness can the way. Only ultimate defeat or frustration
be objectively defined. Happiness so conceived is tragic.
isa common end for all, "since nature tends to There appears to be some conflict here be-
one thing only." tween feeling happy at a given moment and
It may be granted that there are in fact many being happy for a lifetime, that is, living hap-
different opinions about what constitutes hap- pily. It may be necessary to choose between
piness, but it cannot be admitted that all are having a good time and leading a good fife.
equally sound without admitting a complete Nevertheless, in both uses of the word "happy"
relativism in moral matters. That men do in fact there is the connotation of satisfaction. When
seek different things under the name of happi- men say what they want is happiness, they
that
ness does not, according to Aristotle and Aqui- imply that, having it, they would ask for noth-
nas, alter the truth that the happiness they ing more. If they are asked why they want to be
CiiAPTLR 33; HAPPINESS 687
happy, they find it difficult to give any reason "The utilitarian doctrine," he writes, "is that
except "for its own sake." They can think of happiness is desirable, and the only thing de-
nothing beyond happiness for which happiness sirable as an end; all otiicr things being only
serves as a means or a preparation. This aspect desirable as means." No reason can or need [)e
of ultimacy or finahty appears without quali- given why this is so, "except that each person,
fication in the sense of happiness as belonging so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires
to a whole life. There is quiescence, too, in the his own happiness." This is enough to prove
momentary feeUng of happiness, but precisely that happiness is a good. To show that it is the
because it does not last, it leaves another and good, it is "necessary to show, not only that
another such moment to be desired. people desire happiness, but that they never
Observing these facts, Aristotle takes the desire anything else."
word "happiness" from popular discourse and Here Mill's answer, like Aristotle's, pre-
gives it the technical significance of ultimate supposes the rightness of the prevailing sense
good, last end, or summum bonum. "The chief that when aman is happy, he has everything
good," he writes, "is evidently something fi- he desires. Many things. Mill admits, may be
nal. . . . Now we call that which is in itself desired for their own sake, but if the possession
worthy of pursuit more final than that which is of any one of these leaves something else to be
worthy of pursuit for the sake of something desired, then it is desired only as a part of hap-
else, and that which is never desirable for the piness. Happiness is "a concrete whole, and
sake of something else more final than the things these are some of its parts. . . . Whatever is
that are desirable both in themselves and for desired otherwise than as a means to some end
the sake of that other thing. Therefore, we call beyond itself, and ultimately to happiness, is
final wdthout qualification that which is always desired as itself a part of happiness, and is not
desirable in itself and never for the sake of desired for itself until it has become so."
something else. Such a thing happiness, above
all else, is held to be; for this we choose always There are other conceptions of happiness.
\ for itself and never for the sake of something It is not always approached in terms of means
else." and ends, utility and enjoyment or satisfaction.
The ultimacy of happiness can also be ex- Plato, for example, identifies happiness with
pressed in terms of its completeness or suffi- spiritual well-being —a harmony in the soul,
ciency. It would not be true that happiness is an inner peace which results from the proper
desired for its own sake and everything else for order of all the soul's parts.
the sake of happiness, if the happy man wanted Early in the Republic, Socrates is challenged
something more. The most obvious mark of the to show that the just man will be happier than
happy man, according to Aristotle, is that he the unjust man, even if in all externals he seems
wants for nothing. The happy life leaves noth- to be at a disadvantage. He cannot answer this
ing to be desired. It is this insight which Boe- question until he prepares Glaucon for the in-
thius later expresses in an oft-repeated char- is "concerned not with the
sight that justice
acterization of happiness as "a fife made perfect outward man, but with the inward." He can
by the possession in aggregate of all good things." then explain that "the just man does not permit
So conceived, happiness is not a particular good the several elements within him to interfere
but the sum of goods. "If happiness were
itself, with one another. ... He sets in order his own
to be counted as one good among others," inner life, and is his own master and his own
Aristotle argues, "it would clearly be made law, and is at peace with himself."
more by the addition of even the
desirable In the same spirit Plotinus asks us to think
least of goods." But then there would be some- of "two wise men, one of them possessing all
thing left for the happy man to desire, and that is supposed to be naturally welcome, while
happiness would not be "something final and the other meets only with the very reverse."
self-sufficient and the end of action." He wants to know whether we would "assert
Like Aristotle, Mill appeals to the common that they have an equal happiness." His own
sense of mankind for the ultimacy of happiness. answer is that we should, "if they are equally
— —
According to Plotinus, "Plato rightly taught striving comes to rest because all desires are
that he who is to be wise and to possess happi- fulfilled or quieted. The suggestion of this point
ness draws his good from the Supreme, fixing is found in the fact that the theologians con-
his gaze on That, becoming like to That, living ceive beatitude, or supernatural happiness, in
by That All else he will attend to only as
. . . both ways. For them it is both an ultimate end
he might change his residence, not in expecta- which satisfies all desires and also a state of
tion of any increase in his settled felicity, but peace or heavenly rest.
simply in a reasonable attention to the differing "The ultimate good," Augustine writes, "is
conditions surrounding him as he lives here or that for the sake of which other things are to
there." If he "meets some turn of fortune that be desired, while it is to be desired for its own
he would not have chosen, there is not the sake"; and, he adds, it is that by which the good
slightest lessening of his happiness for that." "is finished, so that it becomes complete" — all-
Like Plato, Plotinus holds that nothing ex- But what is this "final blessedness,
satisfying.
ternal can separate a virtuous man from happi- the ultimate consummation, the unending
ness — that no one can injure a man except end"? It is peace. "Indeed," Augustine says,
himself. "we are said to be blessed when we have such
The opposite view is more frequently held. peace as can be enjoyed in this life; but such
In his argument with Callicles in the Gorgias, blessedness is mere misery compared to that
Socrates meets with the proposition that it is final felicity," which can be described as "either
better to injure others than to be injured by peace in eternal life or eternal life in peace."
them. This can be refuted, he thinks, only if
CaUicles can be made to understand that the There may be differences of another kind
unjust or vicious man is miserable in himself, among those who regard happiness as their ul-
regardless of his external gains. The funda- timate end. Some men identify happiness with
mental principle, he says, is that "the happy the possession of one particular type of good
are made happy by the possession of justice and wealth or health, pleasure or power, knowledge
temperance and the miserable miserable by the or virtue, honor or friendship — or, if they do
possessionof vice." Happiness is one with not make one or another of these things the
justice because justice or virtue in general is only component of happiness, they make it
"the health and beauty and well-being of the supreme. The question of which is chief among
soul." the various goods that constitute the happy life
This association of happiness with health is the problem of the order of goods, to which
the one a harmony in the soul as the other is a we shall return presently. But the identification
harmony —
body appears also in Freud's
in the of happiness with some one good, to the exclu-
consideration of human well-being. For Freud, sion or neglect of the others, seems to violate
the ideal of health, not merely bodily health the meaning of happiness on which there is such
but the health of the whole man, seems to iden- general agreement. Happiness cannot be that
tify happiness with peace of mind. "Anyone which leives nothing to be desired if any good
who born with a specially unfavorable in-
is — anything which is in any way desirable is —
stinctual constitution," he writes, "and whose overlooked.
libido- components do not go through the trans- But it may be said that the miser desires
formation and modification necessary for suc- nothing but gold, and considers himself happy
Chapter 33: HAPPINESS 689
when he That he may con-
possesses a hoard. is happy; since nothing man's natural
satisfies
sider himself happy cannot be denied. Yet this desire, except the perfect good which is Happi-
does not prevent the moralist from considering ness. But if wc untlcrsiand it of those llnngs
him deluded and in reality among the unhappi- that man desires according to the apprehension
cst of men. The difference between such illusory of reason," Aquinas continues, then "it docs
happiness and the reality seems to depend on not belong to I lappiness to have certain things
the distinction between conscious and natural that man desires; rather does it belong to un-
desire. According to that distinction, considered happiness, in so far as the possession of such
in the chapter on Desire, the miser may have things hinders a man from having all that he
all that he consciously desires, but lack many desires naturally." For this reason, Aquinas
of the things toward which his nature tends and points out, when Augustine approved the state-
which are therefore objects of natural desire. ment that ''happy is he who has all he desires''
Me may be the unhappiest of men if, with all he added the words "provided he desires nothing
the wealth in the world, yet self-deprived of amiss r
friends or knowledge, virtue or even health, As men have the same complex nature, so
his excliLsive interest in one type of good leads they have the same set of natural desires. As
to the frustration of many other desires. He they have the same natural desires, so the real
may not consciously recognize these, but they goods which can fulfill their needs comprise the
nevertheless represent needs of his nature same variety for all. As different natural de-
demanding fulfillment. sires represent different parts of human nature
As suggested in the chapter on Desire, the — lower and higher — so the several kinds of
relation of natural law to natural desire may good are not equally good. And, according to
. provide the beginning, at least, of an answer to Aquinas, if the natural object of the human
. Kant's objection to the ethics of happiness on will "is the universal good," it follows that
; the ground that its principles lack universality "naught can satisfy man's will save the univer-
I or the element of obligation. The natural moral sal good." This, he holds, "is to be found, not
*
law may command obedience at the same time in any created thing, but in God alone."
: that it directs men to happiness as the satisfac- We shall return later to the theologian's con-
tion of all desires which represent the innate ception of perfect happiness as consisting in the
tendencies of man's nature. The theory of natu- vision of God in the life hereafter. The happi-
ral desire thus also has a bearing on the issue ness of this earthly life (which the philosopher
whether the content of happiness must really considers) may be imperfect by comparison,
be the same for all men, regardless of how it but such temporal feficity as men can attain is
good which must be included or the order in flects natural desire, must be the same for all
which these several goods should be sought? men. In such terms Aristotle seems to think it
A negative answer seems to be required by the possible to argue that the reafity of happiness
view that real as opposed to apparent goods can be defined by reference to human nature
are the objects of natural desire. and that the rules for achieving happiness can
Aquinas, for example, admits that ''happy is have a certain universality despite the fact—
the man who has all he desires, or whose every that the rules must be applied by individuals
wish is fulfilled y is a good and adequate defi- differently to the circumstances of their own
nition" only "if it be understood in a certain lives. No particular good should be sought ex-
way." It is "an inadequate definition if under- cessively or out of proportion to others, for the
stood in another. For if we understand it simply penalty of having too much of one good thing
of all that man desires by his natural appetite, is deprivation or disorder with respect to other
then it is true that he who has all that he desires goods.
690 THE GREAT IDEAS
The relation of happiness to particular goods nition of happiness as "activity in accordance
raises a whole series of questions, each pecuUar with virtue."
to the type of good under consideration. Of This definition raises difficulties of still an- 1
these, the most insistent problems concern pleas- other order. As the chapter on Virtue and
ure, knowledge, virtue, and the goods of Vice indicates, there are for Aristotle two kinds
fortune. of virtue, moral and intellectual, the one con-
With regard to pleasure, the difficulty seems cerned with desire and social conduct, the other
to arise from two meanings of the term which with thought and knowledge. There are also
are more fully discussed in the chapter on two modes of life, sometimes called the active
Pleasure and Pain. In one of these meanings and the contemplative, differing as a life de-
pleasure is an object of desire, and in the other voted to political activity or practical tasks
it is the feeling of satisfaction which accom- differsfrom a life occupied largely with theo-
panies the possession of objects desired. It is in reticproblems in the pursuit of truth or in the
the latter meaning that pleasure can be identi- consideration of what is known. Are there two
fied with happiness or, at least, be regarded as kinds of happiness then, belonging respectively
its correlate, for if happiness consists in the pos- to the political and the speculative life ? Is one
session of all good things it is also thesum total a better kind of happiness than another? Does
of attainable satisfactions or pleasures. Where the practical sort of happiness require intellec-
pleasure means satisfaction, pain means frus- tual as well as moral virtue? Does the specu-
tration, not the sensed pain of injured flesh. lative sort require both also?
Happiness, Locke can therefore say, "is the In trying to answer these questions, and gen-
utmost pleasure we are capable of"; and Mill erally in shaping his definition of happiness,
can define it as "an existence exempt as far Aristotle considers the role of the goods of for-
as possible from pain, and as rich as possible tune, such things as health, wealth, auspicious
in enjoyments." Nor does Aristotle object birth, native endowments of body or mind, and
to saying that the happy life "is also in itself length of life. These gifts condition virtuous
pleasant." activity or may present problems which virtue
But unlike Locke and Mill, Aristotle raises is needed to solve. But to the extent that hav-
the question whether all pleasures are good, and ing or not having them is a matter of fortune,
all pains evil. Sensuous pleasure as an object they are not within a man's control — to get,
often conflicts with other objects of desire. And keep, or give up. If they are indispensable,
if "pleasure" means satisfaction, there can be happiness is precarious, or even unattainable
conflict among pleasures, for the satisfaction of by those who are unfortunate. In addition, if
one desire may lead to the frustration of another. the goods of fortune are indispensable, the defi-
At this point Aristotle finds it necessary to in- nition of happiness must itself be qualified.
troduce the principle of virtue. The virtuous More is required for happiness than activity in
man is one who finds pleasure "in the things accordance with virtue.
that are by nature pleasant." The virtuous man "Should we not say," Aristotle asks, "that he
takes pleasure 07ily in the right things, and is ishappy who is active in accordance with com-
willing to suffer pain for the right end. If pleas- plete virtue and is sufficiently equipped with
ures, or desires and their satisfaction, can be external goods, not for some chance period but
better or worse, there must be a choice among throughout a complete life? Or must we add
them makes this
for the sake of happiness. Mill 'and who is destined to live thus and die as
choice depend on a discrimination between befits his fife' ? . . . If so, we shall call happy
lower and higher pleasures, not on virtue. He those among living men in whom these condi-
regards virtue merely as one of the parts of tions are, and are to be, fulfiUed— but happy
happiness, in no way different from the others. men.''
But Aristotle seems to think that virtue is the
principal means to happiness because it regu- The consideration of the goods of fortune has
which must be rightly made in
lates the choices led to diverse views about the attainability of
order to obtain all good things; hence his defv- happiness in this life. For one thing, they may
—
Solon has in mind when, as reported by Herod- those gifted with very special talents, depends
otus, he tells Croesus, the king of Lydia, that for its answer in part on the conception of
he will not call him happy "until I hear that happiness itself. Like Aristotle, Spinoza places
thou has closed thy life happily ... for often- happiness in intellectual activity of so high an
times God men
gleam of happiness, and
gives a order that the happy man is almost godlike;
then plunges them into ruin." For this reason, and, at the very end of his Ethics, he finds it
in judging of happiness, as "in every matter, necessary to say that the way to happiness
it behoves us to mark well the end." "must indeed be difficult since it is so seldom
Even if it is possible to call a man happy while discovered." Nevertheless, "true peace of soul"
he is alive — on the ground that virtue, which can be found by the rare individual. "All noble
is within his power, may be able to withstand things are as difficult as they are rare." In con-
anything but the most outrageous fortune — it trast, a statement like Tawney's — that "if a
is still necessary to define happiness by refer- man has important work
and enough to do,
ence to a complete life. Children cannot be leisure and income to enable him to do it prop-
called happy, Aristotle holds, because their erly, he is in possession of as much happiness as
characters have not yet matured and their lives is good for any of the children of Adam"
are still too far from completion. To call them seems to make happiness available to more than
happy, or to call happy men of any age who the gifted few.
still may merely to
suffer great misfortune, is Whether happiness is attainable by allmen,
voice the hopes we have for them. "The most even on Tawney's definition, may also depend
prosperous," Aristotle writes, "may fall into on the economic system and the political con-
great misfortunes in old age, as is told of Priam stitution, to the extent that they determine
in theTrojan cycle; and one who has experi- whether all men will be granted the opportunity
enced such chances and has ended wretchedly and the leisure to use whatever talents they
no one calls happy." have for leading a decent human life. There
Among the goods of fortune which seem to seems to be a profound connection between
have a bearing on the attainment of happiness, conceiving happiness in such a way that all
those which constitute the individual nature of normal men are capable of it and insisting that
a human being at birth— physical traits, tem- all normal men deserve political status and eco-
perament, degree of intelligence — may be un- nomic liberty. Mill, for example, differs from
alterable in the course of life. If certain in- Aristotle on both scores.
herited conditions either limit the capacity for
happiness or make it completely unattainable, Differing from the position of both Aristotle
then happiness, which is defined as the end of and Mill is the view that happiness is an illusory
man, is not the summum bonum for all, or not goal — that the besetting ills of human life as
for all in the same way. well as the frailty of men lead inevitably to
In the Aristotelian view, for example, women tragedy. The great tragic poems and the great
cannot be happy to the same degree or in the tragedies of history may, of course, be read as if
same manner as men; and natural slaves, like they dealt with the exceptional case, but an-
beasts, have no capacity for happiness at all, other interpretation Here writ large
is possible.
through serving him, the slave gives the master lot of all men.
—
strange to his lot, what suffering is not therein ? As ALREADY INTIMATED, the problem of human
— envy, factions, strife, battles, and slaughters; happiness takes on another dimension when it
and, last of all, age claims him for her own is by the Christian theologians. Any
treated
age, dispraised, infirm, unsociable, unfriended, happiness which men can have on earth and in
with whom all woe of woe abides." time is, according to Augustine, "rather the
Death sometimes regarded as the symbol
is solace of our misery than the positive enjoy-
of tragic frustration. Sometimes it is not death, ment of felicity.
but the fear of death which overshadows life, "Our very righteousness," he goes on to say,
so that for Montaigne, learning how to face "though true in so far as it has respect to the
death well seems indispensable to living well. true good, is yet in this life of such a kind that
"The very fehcity of life itself," he writes, it consists rather in the remission of sins than
"which depends upon the tranquihty and con- in the perfecting of virtues. For as reason, . . .
tentment of a well-descended spirit, and the though subjected to God, is yet 'pressed down
resolution and assurance of a well-ordered soul, by the corruptible body,' so long as it is in this
ought never to be attributed to any man till he mortal condition, it has not perfect authority
has first been seen to play the last, and, doubt- over vice. For though it exercises authority,
. . .
less, the hardest act of his part. There may be the vices do not submit withouta struggle. For
disguise and dissimulation in all the rest ... however well one maintains the conflict, and
but, in this scene of death, there is no more however thoroughly he has subdued these ene-
counterfeiting: we must speak out plain and mies, there steals in some evil thing, which, if
discover what there is of good and clean in the it do not find ready expression in act, sUps out
bottom of the pot." by the lips, or insinuates itself into the thought;
So, too, for Lucretius, what happiness men and therefore his peace is not full so long as he
can have depends on their being rid of the fear is at war with his vices."
of death through knowing the causes of things. Accepting the definition of happiness as the
But neither death nor the fear of death may be possession of all good things and the satisfaction
the crucial flaw. It may be the temporal char- of all desires, the theologians compare the suc-
acter of life itself. cessive accumulation of finite goods with the
It is said that happiness consists in the pos- unchanging enjoyment of an infinite good. An
session of all good things. It is said that happi- endless prolongation of the days of our mortal
ness is the quaUty of a whole life, not the feeling life would not increase the chances of becoming
of satisfaction for a moment. If this is so, then perfectly happy, because time and change per-
Solon's remark to Croesus can be given another mit no rest, no finality. Earthly happiness is
ment of his life. Man can come to possess all of the immortal soul, completely at rest in the
good things only in the succession of his days, beatific vision, for in the vision of God the soul
not simultaneously; and so happiness is never is united to the infinite good by knowledge and
actually achieved but is always in the process love. In the divine presence and glory all the
of being achieved. When that process is com- natural desires of the human spirit are simul-
pleted, the man is dead, his Ufe is done. taneously satisfied — the intellect's search for
It may still be true that to live well or vir- truth and the will's yearning for the good.
tuously — with the help of fortune — is to live "That final peace to which all our righteousness
happily, but so long as life goes on, happiness is has reference, and for the sake of which it is
CiiAi'Tr.R 33: FIAPiMNESS 693
maintained," Augustine descrilKs as "the feli- happiness according to the strict tenets of
city of a life which is done with bondage" — to Christian doctrine.
vice or conflict, to lime and change. In contrast, Aquinas employs the conception of eternal
the best human hfe on earth is miserable with beatitude not only to measure the imptrlection
frustrations and an ennui that human nature of earthly life, but also to insist that temporal
cannot escape. happiness is happiness at all only to the extent
The doctrine of immortaUty is obviously pre- that it is a remote participation of true and
supposed in the theological consideration of perfect happiness. It cannot be said of temporal
happiness. For Kant immortality is a necessary happiness that it "excludes every evil and ful-
condition of the soul's infinite progress toward fills every desire. In this life every evil cannot
the moral perfection, the holiness, which alone be excluded. For this present life is subject to
deserves perfect happiness. But for theologians many unavoidable evils: to ignorance on the
like Augustine and Aquinas, neither change nor part of the intellect; to inordinate affection on
progress play any part in immortal life. On the the part of the appetite; and to many penalties
contrary, the immortal soul finds its salvation on the part of the body. . . . Likewise," Aquinas
in eternal rest. The difference between motion continues, "neither can the desire for good be
and rest, between time and eternity, belongs to satiated in this life. For man naturally desires
the very essence of the theologian's distinction the good which he has to be abiding. Now the
between imperfect happiness on earth and goods of the present life pass away, since life
His fall'n condition is, and to me owe which is busied with one thing, i.e., the con-
All his deliv'rance, and to none but me.
templation of truth."
God's grace is needed for men to lead a good When the theologians consider the modes of
life on earth as well as for eternal blessedness. lifeon earth in terms of the fundamental dis-
On earth, man's efforts to be virtuous require tinction between the secular and the religious,
the reinforcement of supernatural gift-s— faith, or the active and the contemplative, they seem
hope, and charity, and the infused moral vir- to admit the p^ossibility of imperfect happiness
tues. The beatific vision in Heaven totally ex- in either mode. In either, a devout Christian
ceeds the natural powers of the soul and comes dedicates every act to the glory of God, and
with the gift of added supernatural light. It through such dedication embraces the divine in
seems, in short, that there is no purely natural the passing moments of his earthly pilgrimage.
694 THE GREAT IDEAS
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. The desire for happiness: its naturalness and universality 695
2B. The content of a happy life: the parts or constituents of happiness 697
(i) The contribution of the goods of fortune to happiness: wealth, health,
longevity
(7) The function of knowledge and wisdom in the happy life: the place of
speculative activity and contemplation
/\a. Man's capacity for happiness: differences in human nature with respect to
happiness 703
4^. The attainability of happiness: the fear of death and the tragic view of human life
5. The social aspects of happiness: the doctrine of the common good 704
5 J. The happiness of the individual in relation to the happiness or good of other men 705
5^. The happiness of the individual in relation to the welfare of the state: happiness
in relation to government and diverse forms of government
ya. The effects of original sin: the indispensability of divine grace for the attainment
of natural happiness 707
yb. The imperfection of temporal happiness: its failure to satisfy natural desire
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which arc the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, m 4 Homf.r: Iliad, bk ii (265 2H^\ 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d mdicaies that the pas
sage is in section d of page 12.
Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 Jam Es P>v<rAo/o^>', 1 16a-l 19b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. Forexample,in 7 Plato: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
Author's Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as part, bk, ch,
sect) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, bk ii [265-283I 12d.
Bible References: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a {D), follows; e.g.. Old Testa-
—
ment: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) // Esdras, 7:46.
Symbols: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
Ennead, tr ix, ch 9, 70d-71a; ch 15 74d-75b 2^(1) The contribution of the goods of for-
18 Augustine: Confessions, bk vi, par 9-10 37c- tune to happiness: wealth, health, lon-
38b; par 18-20 40d-41c; bk x, par 33-34 79d- gevity
80c / City of God, bk iv, ch 21 198d-199d; bk Old Testament: Exodus, 20:17 / Deuteronomy^
VIII, CH 8 270a-d; bk xix, ch 1-4 507a-513c; 11:13-17 / Psalms, 34:9-10; 91; 112:1-3; 128;
bk XXII, CH 24 609a-612a 144:11-15— (D) Psalms, 33:10-11; 90; 111:1-3;
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 18, 127; 143:11-15 / Proverbs, 10:27; 15:16-17;
-c A 2, REP 2 105c-106b; q 26, a 4 151c-152a,c; 16:8 / Ecclesiastes, 2:4-11; 4:5-8; 5-6 esp 5:9-
; PART i-ii, Q I, A 5, REP I 613a-614a; a 7 614c- 17— (D) Ecclesiastes, 2:4-11; 4:5-8; 5-6 esp
615a; q 2 615c-622b; q 4 629c-636c 5:8-16
22 Chaucer: Knight's Tale [1251-1267] 180b / Apocrypha: Ecclesiasticus, 30:14-17 — (D) OT,
Wife of Bath's Prologue [5583-6410] 256a-269b Ecclesiasticus, 30 :
1
4-1
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part i, 76c-d New Testament: Matthew, 19:16-30 / Philip-
24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, bk i, pians, 4:10-23 / / Timothy, 6 / Hebrews, 13:5
60c-66b esp 65c-66b; bk hi, 133b-140b 5 Aeschylus: Persians [155-172] 16d-17a
25 Montaigne: Essays, 70d-72a; 107a-112d; 5 Sophocles: Oedipus at Colonus [1211-1248]
126b-131a; 231d-238d; 279d-281a; 312c-314b; 125b-c
459c-462a; 471a-472a; 478c-479c; 486b-497b 5 Euripides: Suppliants [1080-1113] 267d-268a
29 Cervantes: Do« Quixote, part ii, 379d-380a / Trojan Women [466-510] 274a-b / Electra
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 71d-72c [420-431] 331a / Phoenician Maidens [552-558]
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part iv, prop 18, schol- 382d / Cyclops [316-346] 443b
prop 28 429a-431c; appendix, iv 447b-c 5 Aristophanes Birds [592-610] 550a-c / Plutus
:
33 V\scAi.\ Pensees, 164-172 202b-203b; 174 204a 629a-642d esp [415-618] 633d-636d
35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk ii, ch xxi, 6 Herodotus: History, bk i, 7b-8a; bk vii,
SECT 55-56 192c-193b 224d-225a
37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 311b-312a; 403a-405d 7 Plato: Euthydemus, 69a-71a; 74b-76b / Re-
esp 403c-d, 404b public, BK I, 295d-297b; bk hi, 325b-c; bk
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laivs, bk xiv, 104c- iii-iv, 341c-343b; bk v, 364c-365d / Critias,
105a 485b-c / Laws, bk v, 690a-c: 694a-d; bk ix,
39 Smith: Wealth ofNations, bk v, 336c-d; 343b-c 751c / Seventh Letter, 805d-806a
698 THE GREAT IDEAS 2^(1) to 2b{2)
52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, bk vi.
{2b. The content of a happy life: the parts or con- 164b-d
stituents of happiness. 2^(1) The contri- 53 James Psychology, 189a-b
:
bution of the goods of fortune to happiness: 54 Freud: Civilization and Its Discontents, 777a-
wealth, health, longevity^
779a
9 Aristotle: Ethics^ bk i, ch 4 [1095*13-27]
340b; CH 5 [1096*5-10] 341a-b; ch 7 [1098*18- 2^(2) Pleasure and happiness
19] 343c; CH 8 [1099*31-^8] 344d-345a; ch 10- Old Testament: Proverbs, 13:19; 21:17; 23:20-
II 345c-347a; bk vii, ch 13 [1153^14-24] 405a; 21,29-35 / Ecclesiastes, 2:1-2; 3:12-13,22;
BK X, CH 8 [1178^33-1179*16] 433c-d / Politics, 5:18-20; 8:15— (Z)) Ecclesiastes, 2:1-2; 3:12-
BK VII, CH I 527a-d esp [1323^22-29] 527c-d; 13,22; 5:18-19; 8:15 / Isaiah, 22:12-13—
CH 13 [1331^39-1332*27] 536c-537a / Rhetoric, (D) Isaias, 22:12-13
BK I, CH 5 [1360^14-30] 601a-b; [1361^27-35] Apocrypha: Wisdom of Solomon, 2:1-9— (D)
602 b-c OT, Boo\ of Wisdom, 2 :i-9
12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk ii [1-61] New Testament: Luke, 12:16-21 / // Peter,
15a-d; bk hi [59-78] 30d-31a; [1076-1094] 2:12-14
44a,c; bk v [1113-1135] 75c-d 5 Sophocles: Antigone [11 55-1 171] 140d-141a
12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk iv, ch 6 230b-232c 5 Euripides: Alcestis [773-802] 243d- 244a /
14 Plutarch: Solon, 74c-75c / Aemilius Paulus, Cyclops [163-174] 441 d
224d-225c; 229a-c / Marcus Cato, 285c-d / 7 Plato: Protagoras, 57d-62d / Gorgias, 275b-
Pyrrhus, 320c-321a / Caius Marius, 353d- 284d / Republic, bk ix, 421a-427b / Philebus
354a,c / Demosthenes, 691b,d 609a-639a,c esp 635c-639a,c / Laws, bk i,
15 Tacitus: Annals, bk vi, 91c; bk xiv, 154a-c 646a; bk v, 689c-690c; bk vii, 715c-716a /
17 Plotinus: First Ennead, tr v 19b-21a Seventh Letter, 801 b-c
18 Augustine: City of God, bk viii, ch 8, 8 Aristotle: Metaphysics, bk xii, ch 7 [1072^
270a-b; bk xix, CH3, 510a-c; ch 13-14 519a- 14-24] 602d-603a
520d 9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk i, ch 5 [1095^13-22]
19 Aquinas Summa Theologica, part i, q 26,
: 340d; CH 8 [1099*7-30] 344c-d; bk vii, ch ii-
A 4, ANS and rep 2 151c-152a,c; part i-ii, q 14 403c-406a,c esp ch 13 [1153^8-1154*6] 404d-
I, a 7, ANS 614c-615a; q 2, aa 1-5 615d-619c 405b; BK IX, CH 9 423a-424b; bk x, ch 1-5
esp A 4, ANS 618a-d; q 4, aa 5-7 632c-636a; 426a-430d passim; ch 6 [ii76^8]-ch 7 [1178*8]
Q 5, A 4, ANS 639a-640b; q 12, a 3, rep i 670d- 431a-432c esp ch 7 [1177*24-28] 431d-432a /
671b Politics,BK VIII, ch 3 [1337^27-1338*9] 543a-b;
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, hell, vii [25-96] 9d- CH 5 [1339^32-40] 545b-c / Rhetoric, bk i, ch
10c; purgatory, xv [40-81] 75d-76a 5 [1360^14-18] 601a
22 Chaucer: Prologue of Man of Law's Tale 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk II [1-36]
[4519-4546] 235b-236a / Tale ofMelibeus, par 15a-c; BK HI [1003-1010] 43a; bk V [1412-
49-50 422a-423a / Parson's Tale, par 28, 515a 1435] 79b-d
24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, bk hi, 14 Plutarch: Demetrius, 747b
133b-140b; bk iv, 234a-235a 17 Plotinus: First Ennead, tr iv, ch 1-2 12 b-
25 Montaigne: Essays, 33b-36a; lOSc-llOc; 13c; ch 6-7 15a-16a; ch 12 17d; tr v, ch 4
122a-124d; 126b-129d; 368d 19c; ch 8-9 20c-d / Second Ennead, tr ix, ch
26 Shakespeare: As You Li^e It, act ii, sc i 15 74d-75b
[1-20] 603c-d 18 Augustine: City of God, bk viii, ch 8
27 Shakespeare: Hamlet, act hi, sc ii [68-79] 270a-d
49c-d / Othello, act i, sc hi [199-220] 211a-b 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 26, a
/ Sonnets, cxlvi 608c 4, ANS and REP 2 151c-152a,c; part i-ii, q i,
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 86b-c A 6, REP I 614a-c; a 7, ans 614c-615a; q 2, a
31 Descartes: Discourse, part vi, 61a-d 6 619d-620d; q 3, a 4, ans 625a-626b; q 4, aa
36 Swift: Gulliver, part hi, 124a-129a 1-2 629d-631a; Q 5, a 8 642d-643d; q 34, a 3
37 Fielding: Tom ]ones, 2b; 263c-d; 283a-b 770c-771c; Q 35, a 5 775d-777a
38 Rousseau: Inequality, 350c; 363a-366d 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 84,
42 Kant: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, A 4, ANS 176d-178a; part ii-h, q 28 527b-
256a-b / Practical Reason, 330d-331a / Pref 530a; q 180, a 7 614d-616a; part hi suppl,
Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 370b-d q 81, A 4, rep 4 966d-967d; q 90, a 3 1014d-
43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 451d-452b; 462c-463b 1016a; Q 95, A 5, ANS 1048a-1049d
44 Boswell: Johnson, 102d-103a; 124d-125d; 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, purgatory, xvh
349a-c; 403a; 491b; 492b-c; 494b; 498d- [127-139] 79d; XIX [1-69] 81c-82a; xxx-xxxi
499a 99b-102b
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk v, 194c-d; bk x, 22 Chaucer: Prologue [331-360] 165a
430a-b; bk xi, 514b-d; bk xih, 577a-578b; 24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, bk i,
bk xiv, 605b-d; bk xv, 630c-631a 60c-66b esp 65c-66b
d b
1094] 44a,c
3. The argument concerning happiness as a 12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk hi, ch 24 203c-
principle of morality: the conflicting
first
210a
claims of duty and happiness 14 Plutarch: Solon, 66b-d; 74c-75b / Caius
9 Aristotle: bk Ethics, i 339a'348d passim, Marius, 353d-354a,c
esp ch 4 340b-d, ch 7 342c-344a, ch 12 17 Plotinus First Ennead, tr iv 12b-19b / Third
:
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, paradise, xi [1-12] VII, 294b-296a; bk viii, 303a-305b; bk ix,
122a 357d-358b; 373b-374d; bk xh, 560a-562a;
22 Chaucer: Troilus and Cressida, bk i, stanza bk XIII, 577a-578b; bk xiv, 605b-d; bk xv,
31-35 5a-b; bk hi, stanza i 17-120 69b-70a; 630c-631c; epilogue i, 659c-d; 671c-672a
BK IV, stanza 72-74 98a; bk v, stanza 262- 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, bk ii, 25d-
263 154b / Knight's Tale [i 303-1 324] 181b; 27d; bk hi, 53b-54b; bk v, 121d-127b; 127b-
[2837-2852] 206b-207a / Merchant's Tale 137c passim; bk xi, 345a-c
[9927-9954] 332a-b / Mon](s Tale 434a-448b 54 Freud: Civilization and Its Discontents, 771a-
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part i, 65a-b; 76c-d; 802a,c esp 772b-c, 776b-777c, 778d-779a,
79b-d; part ii, 163d-164a 788d-789b, 793d-794a, 796b-c, 799c-800a
25 Montaigne: Essays, 6d'10a; 26d'36b; 70d-
72a; 115b-119d; 124c-125a; 149b-d; 231d- 5. The social aspects of happiness: the doctrine
233c; 312c-314b; 326b-327b; 339a-d; 402c- of the common good
403c; 478c-479c; 509b-512a; 528c-529b; 7 Plato: Euthydemus, 75c-76b / Republic, bk
541b-c IV, 342a-d; bk v, 365c; bk vii, 390b-391b /
26 Shakespeare: Richard II, act hi, sc ii [144- Statesman, 599c-603d
185] 337a-b; act iv, sc i [162-318] 343b-344d; 9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk i, ch 1-2 339a-d; bk v,
act V, sc V [1-41] 349d-350a CH I [ii29''i 1-1130^13] 377a-c / Politics, bk hi,
27 Shakespeare: Hamlet, act i, sc ii [129-137] CH 9 [1280^31-34] 477d-478a; bk i\, ch ii
32d-33a; sc iv [13-38] 36a-b; act ii, sc ii [1295*25-^1] 495b-c; bk vii, ch 1-3 527a-
[303-322] 43d; ACT HI, sc i [56-157] 47c-48c 530a; ch 13-15 536b-539d
/ Measure for Measure, act hi, sc i [1-43] 12 Epictetus: D/>(rowr^<?/, bk i, ch 19 125b-126c;
186d-187a / Timon of Athens, act iv, sc i BK II, CH 10 148c-150a
409c-d; ACT iv, sc hi-act v, sc i 410c-419b / 12 AuRELius: Meditations, bk h, sect 3 257a-b;
Henry VIII, act hi, sc ii [350-372] 572c-d BK HI, SECT 4 260b-261a; bk iv, sect 4 264a;
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 26a-c; bk V, SECT I 268b, d; sect 6 269b-d; sect 16
70b-d; 73d-74a 271c-d; sect 22 272b; bk vi, sect 14 274d-
31 Spinoza: Ethics, part iv, prop 67 444d-445a; 275a; sect 45 278c; sect 54 279c; bk vii,
part V, PROP 42 463b-d SECT 44-46 282b-c; bk viii, sect 12 286b-c;
32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk ii [496-505] 122a; sect 23 287b; bk ix, sect i 291a-c; sect 23
bk X [782-844] 291b-292b 293c; sect 42 295c-296a,c: bk x, sect 6-7
33 Pascal: Pensees, 109-110 193b-194a; 126-147 297a-c; sect 20 299b
195b-201a; 156-157 201b-202a; 164-18^ 202b- 18 Augustine: City of God, bk xix, ch 1-8
204b; 199 210b; 386 239a 507a-516a; ch 12-17 517b-523a; ch 26 528d-
35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk ii, ch vii, 529a
SECT 5 132c; CH XXI, sect 45 189b-d 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 21, a
36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 383a-384a; 388a- I,ANS and rep 1,3 124b-125b; q 60, a 5, ans
399b; 459a-460a 313b-314c; q 92, a i, rep 3 488d-489d; q 96,
37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 283a-b A 4 512d-513c; part i-h, q i, a 5, ans 613a-
38 Rousseau: Inequality, 338b-c; 363a-366d pas- 614a; a 7 614c-615a; q 19, a 10, ans 710b-
sim, esp 363a-b, 366b-d 711d; Q 21, A 3 718d-719c: a 4, rep 3 719d-
42 Kant: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 720a,c
256d-257d; 258b; 267b-d / Practical Reason, 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 59,
345a-347a / Judgement, 584d-586a aa 4~5 48c-49d; q 60, a 2 50d-51b; q 90, a 2
43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 450c-453a 206b-207a; a 3, ans and rep 3 207a-c; a 4,
44 Boswell: Johnson, 95c-d; 102d-103b; 104b; ANS 207d-208b; q 91, a 6, rep 3 212c-213c;
254b-c; 312b; 350d-351b; 362c-363a; 376c- q 92, A I, ANS and rep 1,3-4 213c-214c; q 93,
377a; 540b-542a A I, REP I 215b,d-216c; q 94, a 2, ans 221d-
46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, intro, 162a- 223a; a 3, rep i 223a-c; q 95, a 4, ans 229b-
170b; PART I, 245b-d; part hi, 285a-b 230c; Q 96, A 3, ans and rep 3 232b-233a; a 4,
47 Goethe: Faust esp part i [354-517] 11a- ans 233a-d; a 6, ans 235a-d; q 97, a i, ans
14b, [614-736] 17a-19b. [1064-1125] 26b-28a, and rep 3 236a-d; a 2, ans and rep 2 236d-
[1544-1571] 37b-38a, [1583-1638] 38b-39b, 237b; A 4 238b-239b; q 98, a i. ans 239b-
5a to 5b Chapter 33: HAPPINESS 705
240c; Q 99, a 3, ans 247a-248a: y 100, a 2, 21 Dam Diiine Comedy, PURf;ATORY, \v (40-
I.:
ANs 252b 253a: a 8, ans and kkp ^ 259d 261a: Sij 75d 76a: xvi (91 i^l 77d 78b
A II, ri:p 263c-264d; q 105, a i, Rh:i» ^ 307d-
}, 35 L<k:kf.: Toleration, I5d 16a
309d; A 2, ANS and km- 1,4 309d 316a: a ^, 37 Fiii.DiNt;: Tom Jones, 291 d 292a; 305d;
ANS and REi' 5 316a-318b: i'art ii-ii, g ^9, a 330bc
2, REP 3 575b-576b: y 1S7. a ^, rkp i,^ 666a- 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of l^ws, bk xxiv,
669b: PART III SL PPL, q 9O, a 6, rep 1058ai i 203a
1061b; a 7, REP 3 1061b-1062a 38 Rousseau: Inetfuaiity, 343d-345c; 363a 366d
23 HoBBEs: Letiathan, i'ari i, 84c 86b esp 363b 364a
30 Bacon: Adianceryient of Learning, 69d 76a esp 42 K\ST. Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 272d-
71bc 72b c 273a / Practical Reason, 304b 305c / Pref.
31 Spinoz.\: Ethics, part iv, prop 18, scmol Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 369c 373 b esp
429a-d 372a b; 373d; 375d 376b
35 Locke: Human Understanding, uk i, ch ii, 43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 450b; 452b 454a; ^60a
SECT 6 105b-c 461c; 461d; 463a b; 469b 470c
36 Swift: Gidliver, part i\ 180b 184a
, 44 lins\K lll: Johnson, 221d-224a
38 Rousseau: Ineijualitw 323a 328a,c: 333b-c; 46 He(;el: Philosophy of Right, part ii, p)ar 125-
342c-343b; 351c-352a; 363a-366d / Political 126 44d-45b; par 134 47b; part hi, par 155
Economy, 372b-377b / Social Contract, bk ii, 57c; par 182-18^ 64a; par 189 65d-66a; par 192
400c-40ia: 401 d 66b c; par 249 78c; additions, 116 135c d;
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 114b-d / Pref. Metaphysi- 127 137b
cal Elements of Ethics, 369c -3 73b / Science of 47 Goethe: Faust, part ii [11,559-572] 281b
Right, 438d-439a 49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 310a-319a esp 312a-
43 Federalist: number 45, 147c-148a 313a, 314b-315d, 316c 317c; 592d
43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 453a-454a: 460a-461c; 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk hi, 116c-117a;
461d; 475a-476a 127d-128d; bk v, 197b-c; 214c-216d: bk x
44 Bosvi ELI.: Johnson, 211b-c 430a-b; epilogue i, 670d-671c
49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 316a-317a: 592d 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, bk ii, 25d-
52 Doi>TOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, bkv, 127b- 27d; 37c-38a; bk v, 121d-127b; bk vi. 154d-
137c passim 159a; 165b-167b
54 Freud: Civilization and Its Discontents. 799a-
802a,c esp 799c-800a 5b. The happiness of the individual in relation
to the welfare of the state: happiness in
5a. The happiness of the individual in relation relation to government and diverse forms
to the happiness or good of other men of government
5 Sophocles: Ajax [263-281] 145c Old Testament: Proverbs, 11:10-11
6 Herodotus: History, bk hi, 99a 5 Aeschylus: Seven Against Thebes 27a-39a,c
7 Plato: Gorgias, 262a-270c; 284a-285a esp [1011-1084] 38b-39a,c
9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk ix, ch 6 [ii67*'5-i5] 5 Sophocles: Antigone 131a-142d esp [162-210]
420d-421a: ch 8 [ii68''28-i 169*11] 422b-d; 132c-d / Philoctetes 182a-lS5a,c
CH 9 423a-424b; ch ii 425a-d 5 Euripides: Phoenician Maidens [8^4-1018]
12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk ii [i-i^] 385c-387b; [1582-1684] 391d-392d / Iphige-
15a nia at Aulis 425a-439d esp [125 5 -1275] 436c,
12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk i, ch 19 125b-126c; [1368-1401] 437c-d
bk II, CH 5 142c-144a; ch 10 148c-150a 6 Herodotus: History, bk i, 6c- 7a
12 AuRELius: Meditations, bk hi, sect 4 260b- 6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, bk ii, 397d-
261a; bk v, sect 6 269b-d; bk vi, sect 14 398c: 402b-c: bk vi, 511c-d
274d-275a; bk viii, sect 12 286b-c; sect 56 7 Plato: Crito 213a-219a,c esp 216d-219a,c /
290c; BK IX, SECT I 291a-c; sect 23 293c; Republic, bk i, 302c-306a; bk ii, 311b-c; bk
sect 42 295c-296a.c; bk x, sect 6 297a-b IV, 342a-d; bk v, 364c-365d; bk vi, 379d-
18 Augustine: Confessions, bk iv, par 7-14 20d- 380b; BK VII, 390b-391b; 401a-b; bk ix, 416a-
23a / Ciiy of God, bk xix, ch 8 515c-516a; ch 421a esp 418d-421a / Laws, bk v, 692c-693a:
12-14 517b-520d BK VI, 707c-708a: bk ix, 754a-b / Seventh
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q i, Letter, 814b-c
18 Augustine: Confessions, bk x, par 33-34 79d- 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk v, 216d 218b;
80c / City of God, bk ix, ch 14-17 293a-295c; HK VI, 273c-274a,c; bk xi, 525c-526b; bk xii,
BK X, ch 2-3 299d-301a; ch 22-32 312a- 560a-562a; epilogue i, 650b; 659c-d; 671c-
322a,c; bk xiv, ch i 376b,d-377a; bk xxi, 672a
ch 15-16 572c-574a; bk xxii, ch 22-24 606d- 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, bk v, 127b-
612a / Christian Doctrine, bk i, ch 15 628b-c 137c passim; bk vi, 153d-167b
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 85
178b-184a; q 91, a 6 212c-213c; g 109, a 2 7c. Eternal beatitude: the perfection of human
339c-340b; aa 7-8 344a-346a happiness
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, purgatory, xxviii 18 Augustine: Confessions, bk i, par 31 8d-9a;
[9i]-xxix [36] 97a-98a; paradise, vii 115a- BK IX, par 23-26 68a-d; bk xiii, par 50-52
116c 124c-d/ City of God, bk vii, ch 31 261d-262a;
22 Chaucer: Second Nun's Tale [15,788-822] BK IX, CH 15 293a-294a; bk x, ch 1-3 298b,d-
467a-b / Parson's Tale, par 1-15 495a-506b 301a; CH 18 310b-d; ch 22 312a-b; ch 32
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part hi, 195d-196a 319d-322a,c; bk xi, ch 12 329b-c; bk xii, ch i
32 Milton: Paradise Lost, bk hi [56-415] 136b- 342b,d-343c; bk xiii, ch 20 370c-371a; bk
144b esp [130-134] 138a, [227-238] 140b; bk XIX, ch ch io-ii 516c-517b; ch
4 511a-513c;
XI [1-44] 299a-300a; bk xi [334J-BK xii [649] 13 519a-520a;ch 20 523d-524a; ch 27 529a-d;
306b-333a BK XXI, CH 15 572c-573b; bk xxii 586b,d-
33 Pascal: Pensees, 425-430 243b-247b; 447 253a 618d esp CH I 586b,d-587b, ch 3 588a-b, ch
37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 38d 29-30 614b-618d / Christian Doctrine, bk i,
52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, BKv,121d- ch 4 625b-c; ch 15 628b-c; ch 32-33 633c-
127b esp 125d-126b; bk vi, 168a-c 634b
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 12, a
lb. The imperfection of temporal happiness: its
I,ans 50c-51c; q 18, a 2, rep 2 105c-106b; q
failure to satisfy natural desire 26 150a-152a,c; q 62 317c-325b; q 66, a 3,
18 Augustine: Confessions, bk iv, par 7-19 20d- ans 347b-348d; q 73, a 2, rep 3 371b-d; q 75,
24b; bk viii, par 17 57d; bk ix, par 23-26 A 7, rep I 384d-385c; q 82, a 2, ans 432d-
68a-d / City of God, bk viii, ch 8 270a-d; bk 433c; part i-ii, q 2, a 8 621c-622b; q 3, a 8
IX, CH 14-15 293a-294a; bk xii, ch i 342b,d- 628d-629c; qq 4-5 629c-643d; q 19, a 10, rep
343c; BK XIX, ch 4-10 511a-516d; ch 20 523d- I 710b-711d
524a; ch 27 529a-d / Christian Doctrine^ bk i, 20 Aquinas: Sumfna Theologica, part i-ii, q 55,
ch 4 625b-c; ch 38 635c-d A 2, REP 3 27a-d; q 62 59d-63a; q 63, a 3, ans
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 2, and REP 2 65a-d; q 67 81b-87c; q 68, aa 2-6
A I, rep 3 615d-616c; a 3 617b-618a; a 8 621c- 89c-94c; q 69 96c-101c; q 109 338a-347d;
622b; Q 3, A 2, rep 4 623a-624b; aa 6-8 627b- PART ii-ii, Q 2, AA 3-8 392d-398b; q 17, aa
629c; Q 5, a I, rep 2 636d-637c; a 3 638b- 2-3 457d-459a; q 26, a 13 519d-520d; part
639a; a 4, ans 639a-640b; a 5 esp rep 3 640b- III suppL, Q 75, a I 935b-937a; qq 82-85
50; i8:6-<); 25:41-46 / Mar){, 9:42-48 — (D) Old Testament: Exodus, 33 18-20 / [Chronicles,
:
[100-130] lOc-d, XI 15a-16b, xiv [16-72] 19c- 106a; XXXIII [46-145] 156d-157d
20b, XXVII [55-136] 40a-41b, xxxiii [91-148] 31 Spinoza: Ethics, part v, prop 17 456c-d;
50c-51a; paradise, vii [64-93] n5d-116a; xv PROP 35-36 460d-461c
[ia-12] 128c 32 Milton: Upon the Circumcision 12b- 13a /
22 Chaucer: Friar's Tale [7216-7234] 283b-284a Paradise Lost, bk hi [56-415] 136b-144b
/ Surmnoner's Prologue 284b-285a / Parson's 42 Kant: Practical Reason, 347d-348b / Judge
Tale, par 10 498b- 502a ment, 594d [fn i]
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Matters most relevant to the general theory of happiness, see Good and Evil 3a, 5a; Pleas-
ure AND Pain 6-6b, 6d.
Particular goods or virtues which are related to happiness, see Courage 5; Honor 2b;
Knowledge 8b(4); Love 3a; Prudence 2a; Temperance 3; Virtue and Vice id;
Wealth loa; Wisdom 2c; and for the discussion of means and ends in the order of goods,
see Good and Evil 4b, 5b-5c.
Other treatments of the conflict between an ethics of happiness and an ethics of duty, see
Basic notions involved in the Christian doctrine of supernatural happiness or eternal beati-
tude, see Eternity 4d; God Immortality 5e-5g; Love 5a(2); Punish-
6c(4), yd, 7g;
ment 5d, 5e(i); Sin 3c-3d, 4d, 6d, 7; Virtue and Vice 8b, 8e; Will 7e-7e(2).
Another discussion of the beatitude of God, see God 4h.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Boo\s of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
INTRODUCTION
our language the term History,'* Hegel ob- Francis Bacon makes this distinction when he
IXserves, "unites the objective with the sub- divides history into "natural, civil, ecclesiasti-
jective side. ... It comprehends not less what cal, and literary." Whereas the last three deal
happened than the narration of what has hap-
h:is with human things, the first is concerned with
pened. This union of the two meanings we must the non-human part of the natural world. At
regard as of a higher order than mere outward the same time, this natural history is not, in
accident; we must suppose historical narrations Bacon's judgment, the same thing as "natural
to have appeared contemporaneously with his- philosophy," or what we would now call "na-
torical deeds and events." tural science."
Our daily speech confirms Hegel's observa- In this set of great books, natural history,
tion that "history" refers to that which has hap- even cosmic history, makes its appearance in
pened as well as to the record of it. We speak of works which we ordinarily classify as science or
the history of a people or a nation, or of the philosophy; for example, Darwin's Origin of
great events and epochs of history; and we also Species, Lucretius' On the Nature of Things, or
call a history the book which gives a narrative Plato's Timaeus. The great books of history
account of these matters. deal with man and society, not nature or the
It is as if we used the word "physics" to name universe. For the most part this is true also of
both the object of study and the science of that the great philosophies of history. They, too, are
object; whereas normally we tend to use primarily concerned with human civiUzation,
"physics" for the science and refer to its sub- not the physical world.
ject matter as the physical world. We do not
say that matter in motion is physics, but that In its original Greek root, the word "history"
it is the object of physics, one of the things a means research, and implies the act of judging
physicist studies. We might similarly have the evidences in order to separate fact from fic-
adopted the convention of using "history" in a tion. The opening line of Herodotus is some-
restricted sense to signify a kind of knowledge times translated not "these are the histories of
or a kind of writing, and then called the phe- Herodotus of Halicarnassus," but "these are
nomena written about or studied "historical" the researches ..."
but not "history." The word "research" can, of course, mean
That, however, is not the prevailing usage. any sort of inquiry — into what is the case as
The word "history" seems to have at least four well as into what has happened. The title of one
distinct meanings. It refers to a kind of knowl- of Aristotle's biological works, the History of
edge. It refers to a type of literature. It means Animals, suggests that it is concerned with re-
an actual sequence of events in time, which searches about animals. The book does not deal
constitutes a process of irreversible change. with natural history; it is not a history of ani-
This can be either change in the structure of the mals in the sense of giving the stages of their
world or any part of nature, or change in human development in the course of time. The redun-
I
affairs, in society or civiUzation. dancy of "historical research" can therefore be
Historical knowledge and historical writing excused on the ground that it is necessary to
can be about natural history or human history. distinguish between two kinds of inquiry or re-
711
712 THE GREAT IDEAS
Originally, research set the historian apart cerning the arrival of Helen at the court of Pro-
from the poet and the maker of myths or leg- teus. It seems to me that Homer was acquainted
ends. They told stories, too; but only the his- with this story, and while discarding it, be-
torian restricted himself to telling a story based cause he thought it less adapted for epic poetry
on the facts ascertained by inquiry or research. than the version which he followed, showed
Herodotus deserves the title "father of history" that it was not unknown to him."
for having originated a style of writing which Herodotus cites passages in the Iliad and the
differs from poetry in this extraordinary re- Odyssey to corroborate this point. He is willing
spect. He tries to win the reader's belief not by to use the Homeric poems
one source of in-
as
the plausibihty of his narrative, but rather by formation, but not without checking them
giving the reader some indication of the sources against conflicting accounts. "I made inquiry,"
of information and the reliability of the evi- he writes, "whether the story which the Greeks
dence on which the narrative is based. tell about Troy is a fable or not." When he
The poet tries to tell a likely story, but the comes to the conclusion that Helen was never
historian tries to make credible statements within the walls of the city to which the Greeks
about particular past events. He makes an ex- laid siege for ten years, he tells the reader his
plicit effort to weigh the evidence himself or, as reasons for thinking so. Homer, however, when
Herodotus so frequently does, to submit con- he narrates Helen's actions during the siege,
flicting testimony to the reader's own judg- does not bother to estabhsh the facts of the
ment. "Such is the account which the Persians matter or to give the reader contrary versions
give of these matters," he writes, "but the of what took place. That is not the poet's task,
Phoenicians vary from the Persian statements"; as Herodotus recognizes. It belongs to the his-
or "this much I know from information given torian, not the poet. The story which may have
me by the Delphians; the remainder of the greater probability in fact may not be the bet-
story the Milesians add"; or "that these were ter story for the poet.
the real facts I learnt at Memphis from the
priests of Vulcan"; or "such is the truth of this Since he is both an investigator and a story-
matter; I have also heard another account teller, the historian stands comparison with the
which I do not at all believe"; or again, "thus scientist in one respect and with the poet in
far I have spoken of Egypt from my own obser- another. The special character of history as a
vation, relating what I myself saw, the ideas kind of knowledge distinct from science or
that I formed, and the results of my own re- philosophy seems clear from its object — the
searches. What follows rests on accounts given singular or unique events of the past. The scien-
me by the Egyptians, which I shall now repeat, tist or philosopher is not concerned with what
adding thereto some particulars which fell un- has happened, but with the nature of things.
der my own notice." Particular events may serve as evidences for
Herodotus seems quite conscious of the dif- him, but his conclusions go beyond statements
ference between himself and Homer, especially of particular fact to generalizations about the
on those matters treated by the poet which fall way things are or happen at any time and place.
within his purview as an historian. The Trojan In contrast, the historian's research begins and
War lies in the background of the conflict with ends with particulars. He uses particulars di-
which Herodotus is directly concerned the — rectly observed by himself or testified to by
—
Persian invasion of Greece for the Persians others as the basis for circumstantial inference
"trace to the attack upon Troy their ancient to matters which cannot be estabUshed by di-
enmity towards the Greeks." rect evidence. The method of investigation de-
Herodotus does not doubt that the siege of veloped by the early historians may be the pre-
Troy took place as Homer relates, but he learns cursor of scientific method, but the kind of
from the Egyptians a legend about the landing evidence and the mode of argument which we
of Paris and Helen on Egyptian soil and the de- find in Hippocrates or Plato indicate the diver-
tention of Helen by Proteus, king of Memphis. gence of the scientist and philosopher from the
"Such is the tale told me by the priests con- procedure of the historian.
Chapter 34: HISTORY 713
The contrast between history and science— I Icrcxlotus writes, he tells us, *'in the hope of
or what for the purpose of comparison may be preserving from decay the remembrance of
the same, philosophy— is formiHatcd in Aris- what men have done, and of preventing the
totle's statement concerning poetry, that it is great and wonderful actions of the Greeks and
**more philosophical than history, because the barbarians from losing their due meed of
poetry tends to express the universal, history glory." Thucydides proceeds in the belief that
the particular." History deals with what has the war between the Peloponnesians and the
actually happened, whereas poetry, like philos- Athenians **was the greatest movement yet
ophy, may be concerned with whatever is or known in history, not only of the I lellenes, but
can be. of a large part of the barbarian world — I had
One comparison leads to another. Unlike almost said of mankind." Not very different is
poetry, history and science are alike in that the declaration of Tacitus: "My purpose is not
they both attempt to prove what they say. But to relate at length every motion, but only such
in distinction from science or philosophy, his- as were conspicuous for excellence or notorious
tory resembles poetry, especially the great epic for infamy. This I regard as history's highest
and dramatic poems, in being narrative litera- function, to let no worthy action be uncom-
ture. The historian and the poet both tell stories. memorated, and to hold out the reprobation of
If the poet and the historian— including, of posterity as a terror to evil words and deeds."
course, a biographer like Plutarch — are also But though there seems to be a striking simi-
moralists, they are moralists in the same way. larity in the purpose of these historians, Tacitus
Their works do not contain expositions of eth- alone of the three avows a moral purpose. Fur-
ical or political doctrine, but rather concrete thermore, each of the three is conscious of the
exemplifications of theories concerning the con- individual way which he has put his inten-
in
duct of human life and social practices. That tion into effect. Thucydides, for example, seems
fact explains why much of the content of the to have Herodotus in mind when he fears that
great historical books is cited in other chapters "the absence of romance in my history will
dealing with moral and political, even psycho- detract somewhat from its interest; but if it be
logical, topics. But in this chapter we are con- judged useful by those inquirers who desire an
cerned with history itself rather than with the exact knowledge of the past. ... I shall be con-
particulars of history. We are concerned with tent." Like Thucydides, Tacitus is an historian
the methods and aims of history as a kind of of contemporary events and he fears comparison
knowledge and literature; and we are concerned with the historian of antiquity who can "en-
with the historical process as a whole, the con- chain and refresh a reader's mind" with "de-
sideration of which belongs to the philosophy scriptions of countries, the various incidents of
of history. battle, glorious deaths of great generals." His
own work may be instructive, he thinks, but
The aims and methods of writing history are it may also give very little pleasure because he
discussed by the historian himself, as well as by has "to present in succession the merciless bid-
the philosopher. Philosophers Uke Hobbes, Ba- dings of a tyrant, incessant prosecutions, faith-
con, or Descartes consider history largely from less friendships, the ruin of innocence, the same
the point of view of the kind of knowledge it is causes issuing in the same results, and [he is]
standards of reliability or authenticity by which flicting accounts. Only occasionally does he in-
they determine what is and the principles
fact, dicate which is more likely in his own judgment.
of interpretation by which they select the most Thucydides claims that he has made a greater
important facts, ordering them according to effort to determine the facts. "I did not even
some hypothesis concerning the meaning of the trust my own impressions," he writes; the nar-
events reported. rative "rests partly on what I saw myself, partly
—
historian may applaud the importance and not only not 'without God' but is essentially
variety of his subject; but, while he is con- His Work."
scious of his own imperfections, he must often The difference is rather to be found in the
accuse the deficiency of his materials." Because ultimate source of insight concerning human
of the scarcity of authentic memorials, he tells development and destiny. Augustine sees
us in another place, the historian finds it hard everything in the light of God's revelation of
"to preserve a clear and unbroken thread of His plan in Holy Writ; Hegel and other phi-
narration. Surrounded with imperfect frag- losophers of history from Vico to Toynbee seek
ments, always concise, often obscure, and some- and sometimes claim to find in the records of
times contradictory, he is reduced to collect, history itself the laws which govern and the
to compare, and to conjecture; and though he pattern which inheres in the procession of
ought never to place his conjectures in the rank events from the beginning to the end of human
of facts, yet the knowledge of human nature, time.
and of the sure operation of its fierce and un- For Augustine, the great epochs of history
restrained passions, might, on some occasions, are defined reUgiously. They are stages in the
supply the want of historical materials." development of the city of God on earth, not
Clearly, the historians have different criteria the city of man. Man is viewed as dwelling on
of relevance in determining the selection and earth under four distinct dispensations from
rejection of materials and different principles God: (i) in Paradise before the Fall; (2) in the
of interpretation in assigning the causes which world after expulsion from Eden and before
explain what happened. These differences are the Promise and the Law were given to the
reflected in the way each historian constructs Jews; (3) under the Law and before the coming
from the facts a grand story, conceives the line of Christ; (4) between the first and second
of its plot and the characterization of its chief coming under the dispensation of grace.
actors. Herodotus, for example, has been com- Augustine sometimes makes other divisions
pared with Homer as writing in an epic man- of history, but they are always primarily reli-
ner; Thucydides, with the dramatic writers of gious. For example, he divides all of time into
f
—
captivity to the birth of Christ in the flesh. State: "European history is the exhibition of
There are thus five ages in all. The sixth is now the growth of each of these principles severally
passing, and cannot be measured by any num- . then of an antithesis on the part of both
. . . . .
ber of generations. . . . After this period God lastly, of the harmonizing of the antithesis."
shall rest as on the seventh day, when He shall In the German-Christian world, the secular
give us (who shall be the seventh day) rest in and the religious modes of life are ultimately
Himself. . . . The seventh shall be our Sabbath, harmonized, fused in a single order of "rational
which shall be brought to a close, not by an Freedom."
evening, but by the Lord's day, as an eighth
and eternal day, consecrated by the resurrec- Apart from the opposition between the phil-
tion of Christ, and prefiguring the eternal re- osophical and theological approaches, here rep-
pose not only of the spirit, but also of the body resented by Hegel and Augustine, there seem
. This is what shall be in the end without
. . to be two main issues in the general theory of
end." human history. The first concerns the pattern
This same projection of history— in all es- of change; the second, the character of the
sentials, at least — is laid before Adam by causes at work.
the archangel Micfiael m Milton s Paradise The pattern most familiar because of its
Lost, just before Adam leaves the Garden of prevalence in modern speculations is that of
Eden. progress or evolution. The progress may be
Unlike the four major dispensations of which conceived as a dialectical motion in the realm
Augustine and Milton speak, Hegel's four of Spirit, contrasted by Hegel with the realm
stages of the world are epochs in the develop- of Matter or Nature, according as "the essence
ment of Spirit as manifested in the State. They of Matter is Gravity . . . and the essence of
are secularly defined as the Oriental, the Greek, Spirit is Freedom." But it mayalso be thought
the Roman, and the German world and are to occur, as in the dialectical materialism of
seen as a "progress of the consciousness of Free- Marx and Engels, through the resolution of
dom." The "various grades in the consciousness conflicting material or economic forces.
of Freedom," Hegel writes, "supply us with "The whole mankind," Engels
history of
the natural division of universal History. . . . writes in his preface to the Communist Mani-
The Orientals have not attained the knowledge festo, "since the dissolution of primitive tribal
that Spirit — Man as such — is free; and because society, holding land in common ownership,
they do not know this, they are not free. They has been a history of class struggles, contests
''
only know that one is free . . . that one is there- between exploiting and exploited, ruling and
fore only a Despot; not 2. free man. The con- oppressed classes; the history of these class
sciousness of Freedom first arose among the struggles forms a series of evolutions in which,
Greeks, and therefore they were free; but they, now-a-days, a stage has been reached where the
\
and the Romans likewise, knew only that some exploited and oppressed class, the proletariat,
are free — not man as such. The Greeks,
. . . cannot attain its emancipation from the sway
therefore, had slaves and their whole hfe and of the exploiting and ruling class, the bour-
ihe maintenance of their splendid liberty, was geoisie, without, at thesame time, and once for
implicated with the institution of slavery. . . . all, emancipating society at large from all
. The German nations, under the influence of exploitation, oppression, class-distinction and
716 THE GREAT IDEAS
class-struggle." The four great economic sys- come insignificant; and such as are at present
tems — the systems of slave labor, feudal serf- powerful were weak in olden time. I shall,
dom, industrial capitalism, and the communis- therefore, discourse equally of both, convinced
tic or classless society — are thus seen as the that prosperity never continues long in one
stages of progress toward an ultimate perfection stay." Lucretius finds the cyclical pattern both
in which history comes to rest because it has in the succession of worlds and in the succession
at last fully reaUzed its controlling tendency. of civilizations. The myth of the golden age of
The pattern of progress may be conceived Kronos and the earth-bound age of Zeus, which
not as a dialectical motion involving conflict Plato in the Statesman, also applies both
tells
cause to attribute to nature in respect of the author and creator, turns about and by an in-
human race." The progressive realization of herent necessity revolves in the opposite di-
culture consists in "the liberation of the will rection." Thus the history of the world runs
from the despotism of desires whereby, in our through "infinite cycles of years," and one age
attachment to certain natural things, we are succeeds another in an endless round.
rendered incapable of exercising a choice of There is still a third view which sees history
our own." In these terms history moves toward as neither cyclical nor simply progressive. Vir-
a perfection vv^hich can never be fully achieved gil reverses the order of the Platonic myth by
on earth, for man's "own nature is not so con- placing the golden age in the future. It dawns
any posses-
stituted as to rest or be satisfied in with Rome, where, in the words of the 4th
sion or enjoyment whatever." Eclogue, "the majestic roll of circling centuries
As conceived by the evolutionist, progress begins anew: Justice returns, returns old Sat-
may or may not attain its limit, but in either urn's reign, with a new breed of men sent down
case its manifestation in human history appears from heaven . . . and the iron shall cease, the
change in nature, the same pattern of birth, lapse of cycles." The perpetuity of Rome seems
growth, decay, and death repeating itself gen- to leave little room for any further essential
eration after generation. That history too re- progress and no chance for another cycle of
peats itself with the rise and decline of cities decay and regeneration.
and civiUzations, seems to be the ancient view. The Christian dogma of the fall of man from
It reappears in our day with Spengler and, grace and his return through divine mediation
somewhat qualified by the possibility of prog- to grace and salvation seems to give history a
part of it will stem from choices freely made, or Truth for their age, for their world; the species
according as all of it is inexorably determined next in order, so to speak, and which was al-
below by the operation of material forces, and of slight impulses tending in many directions.
irom above by what Hegel calls "God's pur- But however slight the impulse each man gives,
pose with the world." The vast "arras-web of his contribution to history is a free act, con-
Only against the large scene history reveals of history belong with treatises on morals and
and amidst the variety of human nature it politics and in the company of philosophical
exhibits can a man truly know himself and his and theological speculations concerning the
own time. In a similar vein, Gibbon declares nature and destiny of man. Liberal education
that "the experience of history exalts and en- needs the particular as well as the universal,
larges the horizon of our intellectual view." and these are combined in the great historical
Hegel, on the other hand, "what ex-
insists that narratives. Apart from their utiUty, they have
perience and history teach is that peoples and the originality of conception, the poetic qual-
governments never have learned anything from ity,the imaginative scope which rank them
history, or acted on principles deduced from it. with the great creations of the human mind.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGB
1. History as knowledge and as literature: its kinds and divisions; its distinction from
poetry, myth, philosophy, and science 719
2. The light and lesson of history : its role in the education of the mind and in the guidance
of human conduct 720
(2) Material forces in history: economic, physical, and geographic factors 723
(3) World history as the development of Spirit: the stages of the dialectic of
history
(4) The role of the individual in history: the great man, hero, or leader
/\b. The laws and patterns of historical change: cycles, progress, evolution
4c. The spirit of the time as conditioning the politics and culture of a period 724
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers
in heavy type, which arc the volume and page
numbers For example, in 4 Homhr: IliacJ, bk ii [265 28^] 12d, the
ot the passages referred to.
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d ot page 12.
Page Sections: When printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
the text is
upperand lower halvesof the page. For example, in53 James :Pi;v<r/io/o^V,
116a- 11 9b, the passage
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 Plato: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
Author's Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as part, bk, ch,
sect) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d.
Symbols: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
7 Plato: Cratylus, 112b / Republic, bk ii, 323d- 33 Pascal: Pensees, 628 287a / Vacuum, 355a-
324a / Timaeus, 447a / Critias, 479d / Laws, 356a
bk hi 663d-677a 35 Locke: Human Understanding, bk iv, ch xvi,
9 Aristotle: Poetics, ch 9 [1451*36-^32] 686a-c; SECT 7-11 368d-370a
CH 23 695a-c 35 Hume: Human Understanding, sect viii, div
14 Plutarch: Theseus, la-c / Romulus 15a-30a,c 65, 479b-c; sect xii, div 132, 509c
passim, esp 15a-18d / Themistocles, 102a, 37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 19a-20a; 49b-50c
/ Pericles, 128d-129a / Timoleon, 195a-b / 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 88a-d; 97c-98d
Cimon, 390b-d / Alexander, 540b,d-541a / passim; 211a; 398b; 471c-d
Dion, 794c- 795a 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 337c
15 Tacitus: Annals, bk hi, 60d; bk iv, 71d-72b; 44 BoswELL:7oA«Jo/?,203a-b;258d-259a:353b-c
BK XI, 107c; BK xiii, 133b / Histories, bk ii, 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, intro, par 3, 10a-
228a-b 11c; PART III, par 355, 112d / Philosophy of
18 Augustine: Christian Doctrine, bk ii, ch 27- History, intro, 153a-158a; 182d-183d; 193d-
28 650a-d 194a; part i, 230c-231b; 248c; part hi, 285d-
23 HoBBEs: Leviathan, part i, 67b-c; 71c-d 286a
25 Montaigne: Essays, 24a-c; 41c-42a; 199a- 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk x, 430d-431a;
200d; 305d-306a; 347c-350d; 457a-b bk XI, 469a-470c; bk xiii, 563a-b; epilogue
26 Shakespeare: Richard HI, act hi, sc i [72- II 675a-696d passim
15 Tacitus: Annals, hk i, lab; iik ii, 44d -ISa; 495a b; bk xxii, en ^o, 618c d
BK 111, 48c; 49c-d; 60d-61a; hk i\ 66b-d; 71d-
, 23 HoBBi-s: Ijcviathan, pari i, 67b-c
72b; BK XII, llSd; bk xvi, 179d / Histories, 25 M()ntai(;ne: F.ssays, 41b 42a; 68b 69a; 81a c;
BK I, 189a-b; 190a; bk hi, 255b-c 199a c; 305b 306a; 347c 350d; 457a b
23 HoBBEs: Leviathan, part i, 67b c 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 13d-14b;
25 Montaigne: Essays, 24a-c; 41b 42a; 68b- 32d 39c csp 32d-33d
69a; 198c-200d; 347c-350d; 455d-457b 31 Descartes: Discourse, part vi, 64a
29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, part i, 23c-d 33 Pascal: Pensees, dii) 286b; 628 287a; 786-7S7
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 32d-38c csp 325b
34b-35a / Novum Organum, bk i, aph 97-98 36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 209b- 2 10b
126c 127b; aph 101-103 127c-128a 37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 19a-20a; 49b 50c
33 Pascal: Pensees, 622-628 286a-287a 38 Rousseau: Social Contract, bk iv, 428a
36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 209b 210b 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 88a-d; 96b,d; 97c-
37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 19a-20a; 49a-50c 98d passim; 103c; 201b-204d passim, esp
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, lb; 87a; 96c-d; 203a-b; 212b-214b esp 729b-c [n 31], 213a d;
213a-214b; 234b; 240b-c; 648d-649c 232b 234a,c csp 232c, 736d [n 1S2]; 295c-
41 Gibbon: Decline atid Fall, 112a-b; 161a-163d; 296c; 354c d; 413b d; 428b-c; 471c-d; 648d-
186a-b; 255b-c; 598a,c; 635d [n 57]; 639a-d 649b
[n i]; 755d-756a [n 41]; 756d-757a [n 61]; 790d- 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 311a-312b; 337c;
791a,c [n 98] 501c-503a; 639a-d [n i]; 660d [n 149]; 710a-b
44 Boswell: Johnson, xia-xiiia; la-4c; 5c-d; [n i]; 756d [n 60]
99a; 120c; 217a-b 44 Boswell: Johnson, Ib-c; 2d-4b; 5c-d; 27c-d;
46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, intro, 153a- 119a; 139a; 177d-178a;2I0d; 254b; 286b; 311d-
158a; 181b-182c; part i, 230c-231b; part hi, 312a; 347c-d; 359d-360a; 425a; 458d; 575b
285d-286a 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, intro, 153a
48 Melville: Moby Dicl{, 195a-201a 154c; 155b; 186c-i82c; 196d-199d esp 199d;
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk hi, 134a-c; bk 203b-206a,c; part i, 209b-210c; 230c-231b;
IX, 366d-367b; bk x, 405a-406c 247d-248a; p^u^t iv, 319a-b
50 Marx: 86d Capital, [fn 4]
3<». The determination and choice of fact: the 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk xih, 582 b-d;
classification of historical data 584a-
6 Herodotus: History, bk i, 2b; 17c; 23a-b; bk 54 Freud: General Introduction, 450d-451a
II, 49a-56b passim; 59a; 60a; 60c-61b; 69b-d;
355a; 373c; bk ii, 391c-d; 399c; bk hi, 439b; 6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, bk i, 349a-
442c-443a; bk v, 487d; 500d-501a; bk vi, 355c; 371b-c; 384b-386d passim; bk v,
523c-524d passim 489a-b; bk vhi, 586b-d
14 Plutarch: Theseus la-15a,c passim, esp la-c 14 Plutarch: Romulus, 17b-18d / Camillus,
/ Romulus 15a-30a,c passim, esp 15a-18d / 107b-d; 109c-110a / Coriolamis, 191d-192b /
Lyctirgus, 32a-b / Numa Pompilius, 49a-b / Timoleon, 201c-d / Flamininus, 307d-308a /
Themistocles, 102a,c / Caniillus, llla-b; 116a- Cimon, 390b-d / Demosthenes, 698a-699a /
117a passim / Pericles, 128d-129a / Coriolamis, Dion, 794d-795a / Marcus Brutus, 815b-c;
191d-192b 262b,d-263c / Cimon,
/ Aristidcs, 822a-b
390b-d / Nicias, 423a-c / Pompey, 502d / 15 Tacitus: Annals, bk hi, 58b-d; bk vi, 91 b-d;
Alexander, 540b,d-541a / Cato the Younger, BK XVI, 179d / Histories, bk i, 189b-190b
634a-c / Demosthenes, 691b,d-692b: 698b- 18 Augustine: City of God, bk i, pref 129a-d;
699a / Galba, 859d cH 36 149c-d; BK V, ch i 207d-208c; ch 11-26
15 Tacitus: Annals, bk hi, 48c; 49c; 60d-61a; 216c-230a,c
BK IV, 66b-d; 71d-72b; bk vi, 87d; bk xi, 25 Montaigne: Essays, 200b
107c; BK xiH, 133b; bk xiv, 157c; bk xm, 30 Racon: Advance?nent of Learning, 34c; 37a
179d / Histories, bk i, 189a-b; 190a- b; bk 11, 35 Locke: Civil Government, ch vhi, sect 100-
228a-b; bk hi, 255b-c 112 47c-51b
722 THE GREAT IDEAS 4 to 4^(1)
49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 323a-328d '
(3. The writing of history: research and narra- 50 Marx: Capital, 6d-7d; 8a-lld passim; 35b-c;
tion, 'ih. The explanation or interpreta-
36c-d [fn 2]; 181d [fn 3]; 377c-378d
tion of historic fact: the historian's treat-
50 Marx-Engels: Communist Manifesto, 416c-
ment of causes.^ 417a,c; 419b,d-425b passim; 428b-d
38 Rousseau: Social Contract, bk iv, 428a 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk ix, 342a-344b;
39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, bk ii, 148d-149a; bk XI, 469a-472b; bk xin, 563a-575a; bk xiv,
BK V, 305b-309a,c 588a-590c; 609d-613d; bk xv, 618b-621b;
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 179a-d; 190a-d; EPILOGUE I, 645a-650c; epilogue ii 675a-
200a-201b; 207b; 211a'C; 232b-233c; 294a- 696d
296d; 409b-410a; 456c-457a,c; 630b,d-634a,c 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, bk xi,
esp 631a-632a 345a-c
41 GiBBoys Decline and Fall, 244b-245a; 386a-b;
: 53 James: Psychology, 361b
451c-453a,c 54 Freud: Civilization and Its Discontents, 781a-
44 Bos-wEi.!.: Johnson, 166c 789b esp 787a-788d; 791b-d; 799a-802a,c /
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, intro, par 3, 10a- New Introductory Lectures, 834b-c; 882b-
11b; PART II, par 124 44b- d / Philosophy of 884c
History, intro, 154c-158a; 165a-166d; 182d-
184b; part iv, 368d-369a,c 4a{\) The alternatives of fate or freedom, ne-
50 Marx-Engels: Cofnmunist Manifesto, 430b- cessity or chance
433 d passim 6 Herodotus: History, bk i, 21d-22a; bk ix,
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk ix, 342a-344b; 291b-c
BK X, 389d-390a; 405a-b; 430b-432c; 447c- 6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BKiv,462a-b
448c; bk xi, 469a-470c; bk xiii, 563a-564a; 7 Plato: Laws, bk iv, 679a-c
582b-d; bk xiv, 588a-589a; 610d-611c; bk 12 Aurelius: Meditations, bk v, sect 8 269d-
XV, 619c-620a; epilogue ii 675a-696d 270b
13 Virgil: Aeneid, bk i [254-296] llOa-llla
4. The philosophy of history 14 Plutarch: Romulus, 18d; 20b-c / Camillus,
109c-110a / Coriolanus, 188d-192b / Timoleon
4a. Theories of causation in the historical 195a-213d esp 201a-203b / Philopoemen,
process 300b-c / Demosthenes, 698b-699a / Marcus
9 Aristotle: Politics, bk v 502a-519d passim Brutus, 814d-815c; 822a-b
12 Lucretius Nature of Things, bk i [449-482]
: 15 Tacitus: Annals, bk hi, 49c; bkiv, 69a-b;
6c-7a; bk ii [1105-1174] 29a-30a,c; bk v [65- bk 91b-d /
VI, Histories, bk i, 194b; bk ii,
109] 62a-c; [170-194] 63b-c; [772-1457] 71a- 232d-233a
80a,c 18 Augustine: City of God, bk v, ch i 207d-
12 AuRELius: Meditations, bk v, sect 8 269d- 208c; CH 11-26 216c-230a,c
270b; BK IX, SECT 28 293d-294a 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, hell, vii [61-96]
18 Augustine: City of God, bk i, pref 129a-d; lOb-c; purgatory, xvi [52-129] 77b-78a
CH 36 149c-d; BK II, CH 2-3 150c-151c; bk iv, 23 Machiavelli: Prince, ch vi, 8d-9b; ch xxv
CH 33 206c-d; bk v, ch i 207d-208c; ch 11-26 35a-36b
216c-230a,c; bk xi, ch 18 331d-332a; bk xii, 26 Shakespeare: Juliits Caesar, act iv, sc hi
ch 21 357a-b; bk xiv, ch 28-BK xv, ch i [215-224] 590d
397a-398c; bk xv, ch 21-22 415b-416c; bk 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 609b-c; 630b
xviii, ch 1-2 472b,d-473d 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 590a-b
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, hell, vii [61-96] 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 340
lOb-c; PURGATORY, XVI [52-114] 77b- 78a llOb-c; par 342-345 llOc-lllb; par 348 Hid /
23 Machiavelli: Prince, ch xiv, 21b Philosophy of History, intro, 153a-190b esp
38 Rousseau: Inequality, 348a,c 156d-158a, 158c-160b, 161d-162a, 166b-168b,
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 456d-457a,c; 170d-172b, 178a-179c; 203a-206a,c; part i,
63Gb,d-634a,c 258b-d; part ii, 283d-284a,c; part hi,
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 451c-453a,c 285a-b; 300a-301c
43 Federalist: number 3, 33c 47 Goethe: Faust, part ii [10,849-872] 264a-b
43 Mill: Representative Government, 327b,d-332d 50 Marx: Capital, 6d; 7b-c; lOb-llb; 174a-c;
pas>sim 378b-d
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part ii, par 115 50 Marx-Engels: Communist Manifesto, 421d-
42b-c; PART III, par 340-360 110b-114a,c esp 42 2c passim
par 342 llOc-d, par 347 lllb-c; additions, 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk hi, 143a-c; bk
153 141d / Philosophy of History, intro, 156d- IX, 342a-344b; bk x, 389a-391c; bk xiii,
170b; 190b-201a,c esp 190b-d, 194b-196a; 563a-b; bk xv, 618b-621b; 626d-630a; epi-
part I, 258b-d; part ii,262c-263d; 274a- logue I, 645a-650c; epilogue ii 675a-
275a 696d
b
434d esp 416c-d, 419b,d, 421d-422a, 427a-b, 645a-650c, epilogue ii 675a-696d passim
428b-d 54 Freud: Civilization and Its Discontents, 800a-
54 Freud: New Introductory Lectures, 834c; 882c- / New Introductory Lectures, 834 b-c
883 b; 884c
4b. The laws and patterns of historical change:
4a{'5) World history as the development of cycles, progress, evolution
Spirit: the stages of the dialectic of his- 6 Herodotus: History, bk i, 2b
tory 6 Thucydides: Peloponncsian War, bk i, 349a-
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 279, 352a
94b-d; par 340-360 110b-114a,c; additions, 7 Plato: Republic, bk vih, 403a-d / Timaeus,
153 141d / Philosophy of History, intro, 156c- 444d-445b / Statesman, 587b-589c / Laws,
162a; 163a-165b; 166b-c; 169d-171b; 176b-c; BK HI, 663d-666d
177d-190b; 203a-206a,c; part iv, 368d-369a,c 8 Aristotle: Physics, bk iv, ch 14 [223*'24-3o]
303c-d/ Metaphysics, bk xh, ch 8 [1074^11-13]
4a{4) The role of the individual in history: the 605a
great man, hero, or leader 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk ii [1105-
9 Aristotle: Politics, bk i, ch 2 [1253^29-31] 1174] 29a-30a,c; bk v [65-109] 62a-c; [170-
446d 194] 63b-c; [772-1457] 71a-80a,c
13 Virgil: Aeneid, bk vi [756-892] 231a-235a; 12 AuRELius: Meditations, bk ii, sect 14 258d;
bk VIII [608-731] 275a-278b BK VI, SECT 46 278c-d; bk vii, sect i 279b;
14 Plutarch: Theseus la-15a,c esp 9a-d / Romu- SECT 49 282d; bk ix, sect 28 293d-294a; bk
lus 15a-30a,c / Lycurgus 32a-48d esp 47a-48c x, SECT 27 299d
/ Numa Pompilius 49a-61d esp 59c-60b / 13 Virgil: Eclogues, iv 14a-15b / Aeneid, bk vih
Solon 64b,d-77a,c / Pericles 121a-141a,c esp [306-336] 267b-268a
129c-130b, 140c-141a,c / Timoleon 195a-213d 14 Plutarch: Sulla, 372a-c
724 THE GREAT IDEAS 4c to 5a
(4. The philosophy of history. 4b. The laws and 5. The theology of history
patterns of historical change: cycles, prog-
ress, evolution^ 5a. The relation of the gods or God to
15 Tacitus: Annals, bk hi, 51b-52b; 58b-d human history: the dispensations of
18 Augustine: City of God, bk x, ch 14 providence
307c-308a; bk xi, ch 18 331d-332a; bk Old Testament: Genesis, 3; 6-9 passim; 16-17;
xv-xviii 397b,d-507a,c; bk xxii, ch 30, 21:1-24; 22:1-18 esp 22:15-18; 28:11-16;
618c-d 35:9-13; 45:1-13; 46:1-4 / Exodus, 3-20
20 Aquinas Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 97,
: passim; 23:20-33 / Deuteronomy, 4:1-40;
A I, ANS 236a-d 7-1 1 passim; 29 / Joshua, 6:1-20; 10;
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, hell, vii [67-96] 24:1-25 —
(D) Josue, 6:1-20; 10; 24:1-25 /
lOb-c; XIV [94-120] 20c-d / Samuel, 12:6-2^— (D) I Kings, 12:6-25 /
25 Montaigne: Essays, 439c-440b; 443a-b; Nehemiah, 9:1-10:29— (D) II Esdras, 9:1-
465a-c 10:29 / Psalms, 44:1-3; 78; 81; 105-106; 136
26 Shakespeare: 2nd Henry IV, act hi, sc i esp 136:10-24 —(D) Psalms, 4^:1-4; 77;
[45-91] 483b-c / Julius Caesar, act iv, sc hi 80; 104-105; 135 esp 135:10-24 / Jeremiah,
[218-224] 590d 43:8-13; 44:30; 46— (D) Jeremias, 43:8-13;
36 Swift: Gulliver, part ii, 79a-80a; part hi, 44:30; 46
121a-b Apocrypha: Judith passim, esp 5-6, 8-16— (D)
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 544d 545d; 632a- OT, Judith passim, esp 5-6, 8-16
634a,c New Testament: Romans, i-ii / / Corinthians,
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 62c-d; 349a 15:19-55 / Galaiians, 3-4 / // Thessalonians,
42 Y^ym: Judgement, 584d-587a 1:7-2:14 / Hebrews passim / // Peter, 3:3-13 /
43 Mill: Liberty, 300d-301c Revelation— {D) Apocalypse
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 5 Aeschylus: Persians 15a-26d esp [737-908]
340 llOb-c; par 344 Ilia; par 347 lllb-c; par 23a-24d / Prometheus Bound 40a-51d esp [436-
354-360 112c-114a,c / Philosophy of History, 502] 44c-45a
INTRO, 161a-c; 174d-175c; 178a-179c; 187a-c; 6 Herodotus: History, bk i, 21d-22a; bk vi,
203b-206a,c; part i, 235d'236a; 258b-d; 204b-c; bk vii, 214d-220b esp 218b-220b;
part II, 259c-d; 282d-284a,c; part hi, 237a-b; 238d-239a; 250b-d; bk viii, 273b-c;
286c-287a; 308a-b; part iv, 315b-317d; 342d- BK IX, 309d-310a
343a 7 Plato: Protagoras, 44a-45a / Symposium,
49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 323a; 327a-330a,c 157b-159b / Republic, bk vi, 378a-b / Critias
esp 327b 478a-485d / Statesman, 587a-589c / Laws,
50 Marx: Capital, lOb-lld; 377c-378d BK IV, 679a-b; 682d-683d; bk x, 765d-
50 Marx-Engels: Communist Manifesto, 416c-d 768d
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk xi, 469a-472b; 12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk hi, ch 22 195a-
EPILOGUE I, 645a-650c; epilogue ii 675a- 201a; BK IV, ch i 213a-223d; ch 3 224b-d; ch
696d 7 232c-235a
54 Freud: Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 65 Id- 12 Aurelius: Meditations, bk ii, sect ii 258a-b;
652 d / Civilization and Its Discontents, 781a- BK III, SECT II 262a-b; bk vi, sect 44
789b esp 785c; 799a-802a,c / Neiu Introductory 278b-c
Lectures, 834c; 882c-883a; 883c 13 Virgil: Aeneid 103a-379a
14 Plutarch: Romulus, 18d; 28b-29c / Numa
4c. The spirit of the time as conditioning the Pompilius, 50d-5ic / Camillus, 107b-d /
politics and culture of a period Coriolanus, 188d-192b / Sulla 372a-c /
33 Pascal: Pensees, 354 234b Demosthenes, 698a-699a / Marcus Brutus,
38 Rousseau: Inequality, 362a-d 822a-b
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, pref, 6c-7a; 15 Tacitus: Histories, bk i, 189b-190a
INTRO, par 3 10a-12c; part hi, par 218 72c-d 18 Augustine: Confessions, bk xiii, par 49-51
/ Philosophy of History, intro, 173a-175c; 124a-d / City of God, bk i, pref 129a-d; ch
177c-178a; 182d-183a; 185a-185d; 187d-189a; 36 149c-d; BK II, CH 2-3 150c-151c; bk iv, ch
PART I, 211a-219d esp 219c-d; 219d-235c esp 33-34 206c-207a,c; bk v, ch 11-26 216c-
22Gb-221a, 222a-223a, 233b-235c; 247b-257c; 230a,c; bk x, ch 14 307c-308a; bk xi, ch i
PART II, 259d-260c; 263d-281b; part hi, 286c- 322b,d-323a; ch 18 331d'332a; bk xii, ch 21
29Sa 357a-b; bk xv, ch i 397b,d-398c; ch 21-22
47 Goethe: Faust, part i [570-580] 16a 415b-416c; bk xvii, ch 1-3 449a-451c; bk
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, epilogue i, 645a- xviii, CH 1-2 472b,d-473d; bk xxii, ch 30,
64dc 618c-d
52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karainazov, bk xi, 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i, q 73,
345a-c A I, rep I 370a-371a
5h Chapter 34: HISTORY 725
20 Aquinas: Summa T/ieologica, part i-ii, q 98, Ai'ocryimia: Wisdom of Solomon, 6:2-4 — (D)
A 6 244c 245b; (^ 106, a a ^ ^ 323a 325c; part C )'I\ Boo/( of II isdom, 6:^5
ii-ii, Q I, A 7 385c-387a; part hi, q i, aa 5-6 New Testament: Matthew, 6:^y. 17:24-27;
707a-709c 22:15 22- i^^) Matthew, d:^^', i7:25-26;22:i5-
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, hell, ii [1^-27) 2d; 22 / Murf(, 12:13-17 / I.ul^e, 12:31; 20:21-26 /
VII [61-96] lOb-C; PURGATORY, XVI (52 I29J John, 18:^ ^-^7 / Acts, 5:29 / Romans, 13:1 8
77b-78a; xxix 97d 99b; xxxii [^7) xxxiii / / Corinthians, 15:24-25 / Ephcsiuns, 2:19 /
[78] 102d 105a; paradise, vi [i-iii| 113c- Colossians, 1:12 13 / / Timothy, 2:1-3 / Titus,
114d; viii [9I-M81 117d 118c: xi [28 ;59l 122b; VI / / Peter, 2:1^-17
XII [37-45] 124a; xviii [52]-xx [148] 134a- 12 Im'ictktus: Discourses, hk n. f:ii 5. 143d
138b passim; xxx [i24]-xxxii li^8] 153a 156a 144a; en 14, 155a b
23 Machiavelli: Prince, ch xxvi, 36b 37a 12 Ai REi.ius: Meditations, bk hi, sect 11 262a b;
25 Montaigne: Essays, 306a d BK IV, sect 23 265c
26 Shakespeare: Richard III 105a 148a,c csp 18 Augi'stine: City of God, bk i, pkki 129a d;
ACT V, so III 143b-147d CH 35 149b-c; BK IV, en \t, 206c 207a,c;
i,j\
368d-369a,c 278d
48 Melville: Moby Dicl{, 85a 32 WiLTOs: Paradise Lost, bk xh [485-551] 329b-
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk ix, 343 b-c; 331a
epilogue II, 675a-677b; 680b-c; 684b-d 38 Rousseau: Social Contract, bk iv, 435a-439c
esp 437c-438c
5b. The city of God and the city of man; church 42 Kant: Science of Right, 442c- d; 444a-c /
and state Judgement, 509d-510a
Old Testament: Psalms, 2; 46:4; 48:1,8; 72:8- 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, intr(^, 175c-
11 87:3; 101:8; 127:1
; —
(D) Psalms, 2; 45:5; 177d; 205d-206a,c; part i, 245d-247b; part
III, 308b-c; 311b-d; part iv, 315d: 316a-d;
47:1,9; 71:8-11; 86:3; 100:8; 126:1 / Isaiah,
60:14— (D) Isaias, 60:14 / Daniel, 2:44; 331b-342a; 348a 369a,c
4:3,34; 7:14 — (D) Daniel, 2:44; 3:100; 4:31; 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazoi, hk ii, 28d-
V 7:14 32c
726 THE GREAT IDEAS
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: The general consideration of history as a kind of knowledge, see Knowledge 5a(5); Memory
AND Imagination 3d; Time 6e; and for other comparisons of history with poetry, science,
and philosophy, see Nature 4c; Philosophy id; Poetry 5b; Science 2b.
The educational significance of history or of historical examples, see Education 4d; Virtue
and Vice 4d (4).
Other discussions of the logic or method of historical research, see Logic 4c; Reasoning 6d.
The theory of historical causation, see Cause 8; and for the factors of chance and fate, free-
dom and necessity, see Chance 6b; Fate 6; Liberty 6a; Necessity and Contingency
5f; Progress la; Will 7b.
The idea of progress in the philosophy of history, see Evolution 7c; Progress i-ic; and for
a cyclical theory of history, see Labor la; Man 9a; Progress ic.
Other discussions of a materialist philosophy of history, see Dialectic 2d; Labor 7c-7c(3);
Matter 6; Opposition 5b; Progress la; War and Peace 2c; Wealth ii.
Other considerations of history as a dialectical process in the development of Spirit, see
Dialectic 2d-2d(2); Liberty 6a; Mind iof-iof(2); Progress 4b.
The role of the great man or hero in history, see Honor 5d.
The historian or philosopher of history as a prophet, see Fate 6.
Other expressions of historical relativism, see Custom and Convention g-gh; Relation
6-6c; Universal and Particular 7-7C.
Divine providence in relation to the events of history and to the issue of necessity and free-
dom in history, see Fate 4;God 7b; Liberty 5a-5b; Will 7b.
Other discussions of the city of God and the city of man, or of the issue of church and state,
see Religion 4; State 2g.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Boo\s of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
INTRODUCTION
THE notions of honor and fame are some-
times used as meanings were in-
if their
at a low rate,
low, in this case,
is But high and
to dishonor him.
is by com-
to be understood
terchangeable, and sometimes as if each had a parison to the rate that each man setteth on
distinct connotation. In the tradition of the himself." Does Hobbes mean that the value a
great books, both usages will be found. It is man sets on himself is the true standard of his
seldom just a matter of words. The authors who worth } Apparently not. Let men, he says, "rate
see no difference between a man's honor and themselves at the highest value they can; yet
his fame are opposed on fundamental issues of their true value is no more than it is esteemed
morality to those who think the standards of by others." What, then, is the measure of such
honor are independent of the causes of fame. esteem.? "The value, or worth of a man," an-
This opposition will usually extend to psy- swers Hobbes, "is as of all other things, his price;
chological issues concerning human motivation that is to say, so much as would be given for the
and to political issues concerning power and use of his power; and therefore, is not absolute
justice. It entails contrary views of the role of but a thing dependent on the need and judg-
rewards and punishments in the life of the indi- ment of another."
vidual and of society. Here, then, honor is not what a man has in
Praise and blame seem to be common ele- himself, but what he receives from others.
ments in the significance of fame and honor. Honor is paid him. He may think him.self dis-
The meaning of honor seems to involve in honored if others do not pay him the respect
addition the notion of worth or dignity. But which accords with his self-respect, but their
whether a man is virtuous or not, whether he evaluation of him is somehow independent of
deserves the good opinion of his fellow men, does the standard by which he measures him-self. It
not seem to be the indispensable condition on depends on the relation in which he stands to
which his fame or infamy rests. Nor does his them, in terms of his power and their need.
good or ill repute in the community necessarily Virtue and duty — considerations of good and
signif)' that he is a man of honor or an honor- evil, right and wrong — do not enter into this
problem of this chapter. Any solution of the the political utility rather than the moral worth
problem must consider the relation of the in- of a man.
dividual to the community, and the standards
by which the individual is appraised by him- — There is axother conception of honor which
self and his fellow men. Honor and fame both it from fame, but also makes
not only separates
seem to imply public approval, but the ques- itindependent of public approbation. This is
tion is whether both presuppose the same not an unfamihar meaning of the term. The
causes or the same occasions for social esteem. man who says "on my honor" or "my word of
"The manifestation of the value we set on honor" may not be an honest man, but if he
one another," writes Hobbes, "is that which is is, he pledges himself by these expressions to
commionly called Honoring and Dishonoring. fulfill a promise or to live up to certain ex-
To value a man at a high rate, is to honor him; pectations. He is saying that he needs no ex-
728
CHAPTIR 35 : HONOR 729
ternalcheck or sanction. A man who had to be The sense of honor and llir sense of dutv dif-
compelled by threat or force to honor his fer in still another res|-K*ct. Duly [)rcsup{XKCS
obHgations would noi be acting from a sense law. The essence of law is its universality. A
of honor. sense of duty, therefore, leads a man to do what
"It is not for outward show that the soul is is expected of him, but not of him alone, for
to play its Montaigne writes, "but for
part," he is no diflerent from others in relation to
ourselves within, where no eyes can pierce but what the law commands. In contrast, a sense
our own; there she defends us from the fear of of honor presupposes self-consciousness o{ \\xi\i^
death, of pain, of shame itself; there she arms in the individual. It binds him in conscience
us against the loss of our children, friends, and to live up to the image of his own character,
fortunes; and when opportunity presents itself, insofar as it has lineaments which seem ad-
she leads us on to the hazards of war: 'Not for mirable to him.
any profit, but for the honor of honesty it- Without some self-respect, a man can have
self.'" no sense of honor. In the great tragic poems,
A sense of honor thus seems to function like the hero who dishonors himself in his own eyes
a sense of duty. Both Hght of con-
reflect the dies spiritually with the loss of his self-respect.
science. Both operate through an inner de- To live on in the flesh thereafter would be
termination of the will to do what reason judges almost a worse fate than the physical demise
to be right in the particular case. If there is a which usually symbolizes the tragic ending.
difference between them, it is not so much in
their effects as in their causes. The sense in which a man can honor or dis-
Duty usually involves obligations to others, honor himself is closely akin to the sense in
but a man's sense of honor may lead him to act which he can be honored or dishonored by
in a certain way though the good of no other others. Both involve a recognition of virtue or
is involved. To maintain his self-respect he its violation. But they differ in this: that a
must respect a standard of conduct which he man's personal honor is an internal consequence
t
has set for himself. Accordingly, a man can be of virtue and inseparable from it, whereas pub-
ashamed of himself for doing or thinking what lichonor bestowed upon a man is an external
neither injures anyone else nor ever comes to reward of virtue. It is not always won by those
the notice of others. A sense of shame— the who deserve it. When it is, "it is given to a
reflex of his sense of honor — torments him for man," as Aquinas points out, "on account of
having fallen short of his own ideal, for some excellence in him, and is a sign and testi-
being disloyal to his own conceptions of what mony of the excellence that is in the person
is good or right; and his shame may be even honored."
more intense in proportion as the standard he There can be no separation between what a
has violated is not one shared by others, but community considers honorable and what it
is his own measure of what a man should be considers virtuous or excellent in mind or char-
or do. acter. But it does not necessarily follow that
Dmitri Karamazov exhibits these mixed the man who is actually virtuous will always
feelings ofhonor and shame when he declares receive the honorwhich is due him. Public
at the preUminary legal investigation: "You honor can be misplaced either undeserv-
have to deal with a man of honor, a man of the edly given or unjustly withheld. The virtuous
highest honor; above ail don't lose sight of — should be prepared for this, in the judgment of
it — a man who's done a lot of nasty things, but Aquinas, since honor is not "the reward for
has always been, and still is, honorable at bot- which the virtuous work, but they receive
tom, in his inner being. . . . That's just what's honor from men by way of reward, as from
made me wretched all my life, that I yearned those who have nothing greater to offer.'' Happi-
to be honorable, that I was, so to say, a martyr ness, he goes on to say, is the "true reward . . .
to a sense of honor, seeking for it with a lantern, for which the virtuous work; for if they worked
with the lantern of Diogenes, and yet all my for honor, it would no longer be virtue, but
life I've been doing filthy things." ambition."
730 THE GREAT IDEAS
Tolstoy, however, deplores the injustice of tarnish, as honor does, when it is unmerited.
the honor given Napoleon and the dishonor But for the same reason, fame is often lost as
in which Kutuzov was held. "Napoleon," he fortuitously as it is acquired. "Fame has no
writes, "that most insignificant tool of history stability," Aquinas observes; "it is easily ruined
who never anywhere, even in exile, showed by false report. And if it sometimes endures, •
—
human dignity Napoleon is the object of this is by accident."
adulation and enthusiasm; he is grand. But
—
Kutuzov the man who from the beginning The distinction between honor and fame Is
to the end of his activity in 1812, never once not acknowledged by those who ignore merit
swerving by word or deed from Borodino to as a condition of praise. Machiavelli, for ex-
Vilna, presented an example exceptional in ample, places fame — or, as he sometimes calls
history of self-sacrifice and a present conscious- it, glory — in that triad of worldly goods which
ness of the future importance of what was hap- men want without limit and without relation
—
pening Kutuzov seems to them something to justice. If the aim of life is to get ahead in
indefinite and pitiful, and when speaking of the world, money, fame, and power are the
him and of the year 18 12 they always seem a chief marks of success. A man is deemed no less
little ashamed." successful if he acquires power by usurping it,
Kutuzov later received some measure of or gains it by foul means rather than fair; so,
honor when he was presented with the rarely too, if he becomes famous through chicanery or
awarded Order of St. George. But what is per- deception and counterfeits whatever form of
haps a much higher honor came to him after greatnessmen arc prone to praise.
his death when Tolstoy enshrined him as one Along with riches, fame, says Machiavelli, is
of the heroes of War and Peace. Sometimes the "the end which every man has before him."
virtuous or truly honorable man, living in a This men seek to obtain by various methods:
bad society, goes without honor in his own time "one with caution, another with haste; one
to be honored only by posterity. He may even by force, another by skill; one by patience,
be dishonored by a society which has contempt another by its opposite; and each one succeeds
for virtue. Sometimes a man of indifferent char- in reaching the goal by a different method."
acter and achievement, or even one who is Some methods, he admits in another place,
actually base and ignoble, wins honor through "may gain empire, but not glory," such as "to
cleverly simulating the possession of admirable slay fellow-citizens, to deceive friends, to be
traits. without faith, without mercy, without reli-
It seems appropriate to consider the propor- gion." Nevertheless, he declares: "Let a prince
tion between a man's intrinsic worth and the have the credit of conquering and holding a
honor he receives. The distribution of honors means will always be considered hon-
state, the
raises questions of justice —
in fact, it is thought est, and he will be praised by everybody."
to be one of the chief problems of distributive Because fame seems to be morally neutral,
justice. For those who hold that honor and it replaces honor in the discussions of those who
fame are utterly distinct in principle, this is measure men in terms of success instead of vir-
the clear mark of their difference. Justice does tue, duty, or happiness. Because it is morally
not require that fame be proportionate to vir- neutral, it is the term used by those who wish
tue. Though there is a sense in which fame may to judge, not men, but the impression they
not be deserved, the qualities in a person which make. What counts is the magnitude of that
fame are of a different order from those
justify impression, not its correspondence with reality.
which honor should reward. Fame belongs to To be famous is to be widely, not necessarily
the great, the outstanding, the exceptional, well, spoken of by one's fellow men, now or
without regard to virtue or vice. Infamy is hereafter. The man who stands above the herd,
fame no less than good repute. The great scoun- whose outlines are clear and whose deeds are
drel can be as famous as the great hero. Existing memorable, takes his place among the famous
in the reputation a man has regardless of his of his time or of all times. Plutarch the moralist
character or accomplishments, fame does not certainly does not regard the men whose lives
CuAPTiK 35: HONOR 731
he writes as paragons of virtue. On ilic con- desire to hold the approbation of those wlio
he plainly indicates tliat nianv ot them
itrary, share a common life. With this in mind ap-
are examples of extraordinary depravity. But parently, William James descriJK-s fame and
Plutarch the biographer treats them all as honor as a man's "image in the eyes of his own
famous. He takes that as a matter of historic which exalts or condemns him as he con-
'set,'
fact, not of moral judgment. Good or bad, they forms or not to certain requirements that may
were acknowledged to be great men, leaders, not be made of one in another walk of life."
figuresof eminent proportions, engaged in ThoughPascal regards "the pursuit of glory"
momentous exploits. They were not all vic- as"the greatest baseness of man," he must ad-
torious. Few if any were successful in all that mit that "it is also the greatest mark of his ex-
they attempted or were able to preserve what cellence; for whatever possessions he may have
successes they achieved. But each ventured be- on earth, whatever health and essential com-
yond the pale of ordinary men; and each suc- fort, he is not satisfied if he has not the esteem
ceeded at least in becoming a symbol of great of men. He
human reason so highly that,
values
deeds, a monument in human memory. whatever advantages he may have on earth, he
The opposite of fame is anonymity. In Dan- is not content if he is not also ranked highly
te's moral universe, only the Trimmers on the in the judgment of man. Those who most . . .
rim of Hell are totally anonymous; neither good despise men, and put them on a level with
nor bad, they lack name and fame. Because brutes, yet wish to be admired and believed
they "lived without infamy and without by men, and contradict themselves by their
praise," Hell will not receive them, "for the own feelings."
damned would have some boast of them." To But is this universal wish for the esteem of
them alone no fame can be allowed. Honor and others a desire for honor or a desire for fame?
glory belong only to the blessed, but the Does it make any difference to our conception
damned in the pits of Hell, by the record they of happiness whether we say that men cannot
I
left for men to revile, are as well remembered, be happy without honor or that they cannot be
and hence as famous, as the saints in Heaven. happy unless they are famous.?*
Even those who do not distinguish be-
That men normally desire the esteem of their tween honor and fame are led by these ques-
fellow men seems to be undisputed. "He must tions to discriminate between fame and in-
be of a strange and unusual constitution," famy. As we have already noted, fame and
Locke writes, "who can content himself to live infamy are alike, since both involve the noto-
in constant disgrace and disrepute with his own riety enjoyed by the outstanding, the excep-
particular society. Solitude many men have tional, the great, whether good or bad. If what
sought, and been reconciled to; but nobody men desire is simply to be known by others,
that has the least thought or sense of a man and to have a kind of immortality through
about him, can live in society under the con- living on in the memory of later generations,
stant disUke and ill opinion of his familiars, then evil will serve as well as good repute.
and those he converses with. This is a burden All that matters is the size of the reputation,
too heavy for human sufferance." and its vitality. But if the desire is for appro-
A society of misanthropes, despising each bation or praise, good opinion alone will satisfy,
other, is as unthinkable as an economy of and then the question becomes whether the
misers. The social nature of man requires sym- object is fame or honor. Which does lago have
pathy and fellow feeling, love and friendship, in mind when he says, "Good name in man and
and all of these involve some measure of ap- woman, dear my Lord, is the immediate jewel
proval based on knowledge or understanding. of their souls" .'^
According to one theory, the highest type of Opposite answers seem to be determined by
friendship springs from mutual admiration, the opposite views of human nature and human
respect which men have for one another. The happiness. Those who, like Plato, think that
old saying that "there is honor among thieves" virtue is an indispensable ingredient of happi-
suggests that even among bad men there is a ness, include honor among the "good things"
—
seem to mean that the virtuous man will not on trifling grounds, he will utterly despise,
seek praise for the wrong reasons — either for since it is not this that he deserves."
that which is not praiseworthy in himself or Humility and vanity are, according to Aris-
from others whose lack of virtue disqualifies totle, the vices of defect and excess which occur
them from giving praise with honesty. The when a man fails to be proud. The unduly
virtuous man will not seek fam.e or be unhappy humble man, underestimating his worth, does
lacking it, for fam.e, like pleasure or wealth, not seek the honor he deserves. The vain man,
can be enjoyed by bad men as well as good and at the other extreme, overestimates himself and
be sought for wrong as well as right reasons or Vv'antshonor out of proportion to his quafities.
in the wrong as well as the right way. Virtue, Honor, like any other external good, "may be
according to the moralists, protects a man from desired more than is right, or less, or from the
the seductions of money, fame, and power right sources and in the right way. We blame
the things for which men undisciplined by vir- both the over-ambitious man as aiming at honor
tue seem to have an inordinate desire. more than is right and from the wrong sources,
In the theory of virtue, honor, unhke fame, and the unambitious man as not wilUng to be
belongs only to the good and is always a good honored even for noble reasons."
object, worthy of pursuit. Honor is, in fact, However words are used, the point seems to
the object of two virtues which Aristotle de- be clear. It is possible for men to desire honor
fines in the Ethics. One of these virtues he calls more than they should and less. It is also pos-
"ambition," and the Greek nam.e for the other, sible for honor to be rightly desired. Honor de-
which is literally rendered by "high-minded- sired to excess or in the wrong way may be
ness," is sometimes translated by the Enghsh called "fame," even as the excessive desire for
word "magnanimity" and sometimes by honor is sometimes regarded as the vice of
"pride." The Christian connotation of "pride" ambition or an aspect of the sin of pride. The
makes it a difficult word to use as the name for word "pride" seems to have both a good and
a virtue, but it can nevertheless be so used a bad connotation. But the point remains that
when it is understood to mean a justifiable de- the difference between these two meanings of
gree of self-respect — not conceit but a middle- "pride," like the difference between honor and
ground between undue self-esteem and in- fame, is understood by m.oralists in terms of vir-
ordinate self-deprecation. When the Aristo- tue, and it is discounted by those who reject the
telian names for these two vices are translated relevance of virtue.
in EngHsh by "vanity" and "humility," it is
again necessary to point out that "humihty" Though honor may be regarded as inseparable
must be understood, not in its Christian sig- from virtue in moral theory, certain pofitical
nificance as meaning the virtue of the truly re- philosophers make its separation from virtue
ligious man, but rather as signifying an exag- the principle of a type of government.
gerated meekness or pusillanimity. In Plato's Republic, monarchy and aristoc-
The difference between pride and ambition racy are defined in terms of the virtue of the
lies magnitude of the other virtues they
in the rulers — either of the one wise man or of the
accompany and the scale of honor with which excellent few. Government by the few is oli-
they are concerned. Both are concerned with garchy rather than aristocracy when wealth
honor, which Aristotle calls "the greatest of rather than virtue is the principle of their se-
external goods." In both cases, "honor is the lection. Plato sees the possibility of an inter-
prize of virtue, and it is to the good that it is mediate between these two which occurs as
rendered." The proud man is one "who, being a kind of transitional form when aristocracy
Chai»ti:k 35: HONOR 733
tends to degenerate into oligarchy. He calls his fellowmen, the symbol of human greatness
that intermediate "timocracy" and describes and the object of human admiration.
it as "a mixture of good and evil" in which the Honor, fame, and glory combine in various
ruler is "a lover of power and a lover of honor, proportions to constitute the heroic figures of
claiming to be a ruler, not because he is elo- classical antiquity: honor, to llic extent that
quent, or on any ground of that sort, but be- none is without some virtue and each possesses
cause he is a soldier and has performed feats of certain virtues at least to a remarkable degree;
arms." In such a state, heclaims,"one thing, and fame, because they arc the great among men,
one thing only, predominantly seen the
is — outstanding and well-known, godlike in their
spirit of contention and ambition; and these are pre-eminence; and glory, almost in the theo-
due to the prevalence of the passionate or spir- inasmuch as the heroes celebrated
logical sense,
ited element." In a timocracy, in other words, by Homer and Virgil are beloved by the gods.
honor is divorced from virtue and wisdom and It is not accidental that the central figure in
becomes the only qualification for public of- the Greek tragedies is called a "hero," since in
fice. the ancient view the tragic character must nec-
With Montesquieu, the situation is quite re- essarily belong to a great man, a man of noble
versed. For him, virtue is absolutely requisite proportions, one who is "better than the ordi-
in popular government or democracy, and to a nary man," says Aristotle. If he also has some
less extent in that other form of republic which fault or flaw, it is a consequence of strength
he calls "aristocracy." As virtue is necessary in misused, not a mark of individual weakness.
a republic, so is honor in a monarchy. "Honor Such weakness as he has is the common frailty
— that is, the prejudice of every person and of man.
rank — supplies the place of political virtue. A In the modern world heroism and the heroic
monarchical government supposes pre-eminen- are more difficult to identify or define. We tend
ces and ranks, as likewise a noble descent. Since to substitute the notion of genius in considering
it is the nature of honor to aspire to preferments the exceptionally gifted among men. Glory is
and titles, it properly placed in this govern- dimly recognized and honor takes second place
ment." to fame. That portion of modern poetry which
Though Montesquieu and Plato differ in deals in heroes — as, for example, the tragedies
government,
their classification of the forms of and historical plays of Shakespeare — borrows
they seem to agree that honor divorced from them from, or models them on, legendary fig-
virtue is a counterfeit. Honor identified with ures. The great modern novels, counterparts of
their own interests, Montesquieu admits is a to heroic stature. One of these novels, Tolstoy's
false honor, "but even this false honor is as use- War and Peace, seeks to deflate the fame of
ful to the public as true honor could possibly be great men. They do not deserve even their
to private persons." Considering the laws of reputation for great deeds, much less the honor
as shining; not as just, but as great; not as rea- But in Tolstoy's opinion "the words chance and
sonable, but extraordinary." genius do not denote any really existing thing
and therefore cannot be defined." We can dis-
Heroism is discussed in the chapter on Cour- pense with these meaningless words, he thinks,
age, and the role of the hero— the leader or if we are willing to renounce "our claim to dis-
great man— in the chapter on History. Here cern a purpose immediately intelligible to us"
we are concerned with the hero in the esteem of and admit "the ultimate purpose to be beyond
"
power and fame will be used for liberty. The to pious faith," he writes, "if the love of glory
great man has the historic mission of a pioneer, be greater in the heart than the fear or love of
not the role of a pup|H-t. Clod, that the Lord said, 'How can ye believe,
Even in the Renaissance, however, Machia- who look from one another, antl do not
lor glory
"
velli is answered by Montaigne, who prizes seek the glory which is from CJod alone?'
mcxJcration too much to praise heroism more The Christian hero, consequently, seeks not
than a little. (Comparing vSocrates and Alex- his own glory, but the glory of (icxl, and in
ander, Montaigne places all of the latter's ac- contrast lo the pagan hero, he is great, not in
tions under the maxim, "Subdue the world," pride, but in humility. His model is seen in the
whereas Socrates, he says, acts on the principle Apostles, who, according to Augustine, "amidst
that it is wise "to carry on human life conform- maletiiclionsand ie[)roaches, and most grievous
ably with its natural coiulition." To Montaigne, persecutions and cruel (Punishments, were not
"the virtue of the soul does not consist in flying tie t erred from the preaching of human salva-
high, but in walking orderly; its grandeur dcxrs tion. And when . . . great glory followed them
not exercise itself in giaiuleur, but in medi- in the church of Christ, they did not rest in
confessors, doctors—are regarded as having, your works shine before men, that they may see
with (ichTs giace, superhuman strength. \\\c your giKxl deeds, and glorify your Father who
saints not onlyperform acts of exemplary jxt- is in heaven.'
fcction; they are godlike n\en in their exemp- The word "glory" in its theological connota-
tioi\ from the frailties of human flesh. tion thus has a meaning distinct from, antl even
The heroes of antiquity also wear an aspect oppt)sed to, the sense in which it is sometimes
i
Chapter 3S: HONOR 735
A a:^ .1 synonym for **Umc.* In ihc liiurjjy fullness \i\ Himself and the height of all jxr-
hc church, the ps.Ums and hymns (esjx-cially feciion"; nevertheless, Nfontaigne writes, '*His
sc ot the doxoloijv which sing the glon'j nan\c mav Ix- augmenleil and mcrraseti hv the
-•: and ihr gloru tn rvrrisis /)<-r>) rrndcr vuilo Mcssmj; .\\\d praise we atlnhuic lo His exicnor
|Gtxl the homage due His inliniie gixxi-
whicli is works."
ttcss, the rctlexive splendor of which is the di- According to Danle. "the glorv ol \{\n\ who
vine glor\\ As in the strict moral sense honor on moves evervthing jx-nelrates through the uni-
the human plane is due to virtue alone, so in a verse, aiui is resplenilenl in one pail more and
strict theological sense glorv l^elongs onlv to in another less." In his lournev thrxnigh Para-
CkxI. dise, he Ix-holds the Sirints whom Citxl loves c$-
Stricily. Gixl's glory cannot Iv iiu u.i>cd by [xxially, each with a distinct degree of glory
human recognition. Yet every act of religious according to the proximity with which he ap-
devotion is s,ud to rtdouiui lo ihc greater glorv pnuches the presence of C»<xl. Their halos antl
ofGixi and to dilhise His glory among creatures aureoles, m the mwgerv of Christian art, are
through the divinity they acquire when they the symbols of the glory in which they are
love CiOti and arc Ix-loved bv I lim. Cuxl is "all Ixilhed as in rellecltxl light.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
rxGB
1. The relation of honor and fame: praise and reputation 736
2f. Honor as the pledge of friendship: ihc cckIcs ot honor among social equals 740
4/'. The scale o( honor in the organi/aiion of the stale: ihe jusi distribution of
honors 743
4r. Honor as a [x>liiical leclinique: the uses of praise, prestige, public opinion
6. The idea of glory: its distinction from honor Ai\d fame 746
6j. The glory of Gcxi: the signs and the praise of the divine glory
REFERENCES
To numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
find the passages cited, use the
numbers of the passages For example, in 4 Homer: Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d, the
referred to.
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 James Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 Plato: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
Author's Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as part, bk, ch,
sect) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, bk ii [265-283] 12d.
Bible References: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., Old Testa-
—
ment: Nehefniah, 7:45 (D) // Esdras, 7:46.
Symbols: The abbreviation "esp" the reader's attention to one or more especially
calls
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic
is discussed intermit-
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
12 AuREhixjs: Meditations, bk vi, sect 16 275b-d; 223d / Cymbeline, act hi, sc iv 466d-468d /
SECT 51 279b-c; bk ix, sect 30 294b-c Henry VIII, act hi, sc ii [350-458] 572c-573d
13 Virgil: Aeneid, bk i [441-493] 115a-116b / Sonnets, lxix-lxx 596d-597a; cxxi 604d
14 Plutarch: Marcellus-Pelopidas, 262d / Aris- 29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, part ii, 203a-b;
tides, 265c-d / Marcus Cato, 282a / Agis, 222b-c; 227d-228d
648b,d-649a / Demetrius, 737b-d 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 91d-92b
15 Tacitus: Annals, bk iv, 73b-d 31 Spinoza: Ethics, part hi, prop 29 405b;
18 Augustine: Confessions, bk iv, par 21-23 24c- prop 53, coROL 413a; part iv, prop 58, schol
25a / City of God, bk v, ch 12-20 216d-226a 441d-442a
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 2, 32 Milton: Samson Agonistes [960-996] 360b-
aa 2-3 616d-618a 361a
i
2/0 23 Chapter 35: HONOR 737
33 Pascal: Pensees, 147-159 200b 202a: ^3 stanza 162-163 42b 43a; bk hi, stanza 22-
232b; 400-401 240b-241a; 404 241a 25 57b; STANZA 36 50 59a 6Ia / Prolnguf
36 Swift: Gulliver, part hi, 119a 121b (4? 78) 159b 160a / Knight's Tale [S59 i'>'>4l
37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 223d-224b 174a 176b; (vMi ^056] 210a / Franklins Tale
38 MosTESQmT.v Spirit of Laws, dk 111. lie 12a;
:
[ri. 667 928 361b 366a / Physicians Tale
J
BK VI, 241c-242b; 247a-c; 250c; bk mii, 304c; sc viii [77I 560a 561b
BK XV, 619c-621b 27 Shakespeare: Hamlet, act iv, sc iv [5^^^'!
52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, bk x, 59b-c / Troilus and Cressida, act ii, sc ii
273a-d 113c-115d / Measure for Measure, act ii,
53 James: Psychology, 189b-191a sc iv [87-187] 185c-186c; act hi, sc i [133-176]
188b-c / Antony and Cleopatra, act ii, sc vii,
2. Honor and fame in the life of the individual
[61-90] 326a-c / Cymbeline, act i, sc [55- i
4 Homer: Iliad, bk i [1-510] 3a-8b; bk hi 19a- 57d-58a; 81b-84c; l23a-b; 147b-d; part ii,
23d; BK IV [326-418] 27b-28a; bk v [520-532] 203a b; 222c: 227d 228d; 254d-255a; 290a-d
35c; BK VI [312-358] 43b-d; [440-465] 44c-d; 31 Spinoza: Ethics, part iv, prop 58, schol
BK IX 57a-64a,c esp [96-114] 58a-b, [307-429] 441d-442a
60b-61c, [606-619] 63b; bk xii [290-328J 33 Pascal: Pen sees, 630 287 b
85b-c; BK xxii [99-130] 156b-c; [289-305] 37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 36a-38b esp 38a b;
158b 146b-147a
5 Sophocles: Ajax [430-480] 146d-147b / Phil- 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part i, par 69,
octetes 182a-195a,c esp [50-122] 182d-183b 30c-d; part hi, par 207 69b-c; par 244 77c;
5 Euripides: Hippolytus [373-430] 228b-d / par 253 79a-c; additions, 130 137c-d; 149
Heracleidae [i-ii] 248a; [484-596] 252c-253b 140d-14Ia / Philosophy of History, part i, '
/ Suppliants [857-917] 266a-b / Helen [838- 214d-215a; part iv, 320c; 334b-c
854] 306b-c / Hecuba [342-383] 355d-356a / 49 Darwis Descent of Man, 310d-314besp310d,
:
321d-322a / Hecuba [299-331] 355b-c / Hera- A 5, ANS 53a-54d; part ii-ii, q 25, a i, rep 2
cles Mad [275-311] 367c-d 501b-502a; q 185, a i, ans and rep 1-2 639c-
6 Herodotus: Historyy bk i, 6c-7b; bk hi, 641c; part hi suppl, q 96, a 7, rep 3 1061b-
118a-c; 122a-d; 123c-d; bk vi, 205a-b; bk 1062a
VII, 215c-216b; 243d-245a; 255c-d; bk viii, 21 Dante Divine Comedy, hell, hi [22-69] 4b-d
:
264c; 282c-283a; bk ix, 304a IV 5c-7a; vi [76-93] 9a-b; xiii [31-78] 18b-c;
6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian PF^r, BKi,370a-c; XVI [1-90] 22c-23b; xxiv [43-60] 35a-b; xxxii
BK II, 397d-398d; bk v, 486a-d [i]-xxxiii 47c-49c; purgatory, xi [73-
[9]
7 Plato: Euthydetnus, 69a-b / Symposium^ 117] 69c-70a; paradise,
i [13-36] 106a-b; vi
BK II, 310c-315c; bk v, 370b-c; bk viii, 404d- 22 Chaucer: Troilus and Cressida, bk ii, stanza
405a; bk ix, 421a-422b / Laws, bk i, 651a- 53-55 28b; stanza 100-115 34b-36b; stanza
652a; bk v, 686d-688a; bk xii, 788d-789a / 162-163 42b-43a; bk hi, stanza 22-25 ^^b;
Seventh Letter, 805c-806a; 807d-808a; 810d- STANZA 36-50 59a-61a
811a; 814b-c 24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, bk i,
8 Aristotle: Topics, bk vi, ch 8 [146^20-24] 65c-d
200c 25 Montaigne: Essays, llOd-llla; 112a-d;
9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk i, ch 5 [1095^22-30] 125a-c; 300c-307a; 462b-c; 495d-496d
340d-341a; ch 10 [1100*10-31] 345c-d; bk ii, 26 Shakespeare: Titus Andronicus, act v, sc hi
CH 7 [1107^22-1108^1] 353b-c; bk hi, ch 10 [35-64] 196d-197a / Love's Labour's Lost, act
[1117^24-36] 364b-c; bk iv, ch 3-4 370b- IV, sc I [1-40] 264b-d / Richard U, act i, sc i
372d; CH 7 [1127^9-22] 374d-375a; bk vii, ch [165-185] 322b-c; act iv, sc i [162-334] 343b-
4 398a-399a; bk viii, ch 8 [1159^13-26] 411b; 345a / 1st Henry IV, act i, sc i [78-90] 435b;
BK IX, ch 8 [1168*28-34] 421d-422a; bk x, sc hi [160-208] 439b-d; act hi, sc ii [129-
ch 9 [1179^4-1180*11] 434b-d / Politics, bk 161] 454b-c; act v, sc i [127-144] 462a-b; sc
VII, ch 13 [1332*9-29] 536d-537a; ch 14 IV [59-101] 464d-465b / Henry V, act iv, sc i
[1333*30-^10] 538a-b / Rhetoric, bk i, ch 5 [261-301] 554a-c; sc hi [18-67] 555d-556b;
[1360^1361^2] 600d-602a esp [1361*25-^2] sc V 558a-b / Julius Caesar, act i, sc ii [84-
601d-602a; ch 6 603b-c esp
[1362^10-28] 96] 570b
[1362^20-23] 603c; CH 614c
II [1371^7-17] 27 Shakespeare: Troilus and Cressida, act ii,
30d-31b; bk v [1105-1135] 75c-d Othello, ACT II, sc HI [262-270] 219d; act hi,
12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk i, ch 21 127b-c; sc hi [154-161] 223d / Coriolanus, act i, sc
BK IV, CH 6, 230b-c HI [1-50] 355b-d / Sonnets, xxv 590a
12 Aurelius: Meditations, bk ii, sect 11-12 29 Cervantes Don Quixote esp part i, 32c-33a,
:
258a-c; bk iv, sect 33 266c-d; bk vi, sect 57d-58a, 147b-d, part ii, 222b-c, 227c-228d
51 279b-c; bk viii, sect i 285a-b 31 Descartes: Discourse, part vi, 65c-d; 66d-
13 Virgil: Aeneid, bk i [441-493] 115a-116b; bk 67a,c
VI [886-892] 234b-235a; bk viii [608-731] 31 Spinoza: Ethics, part hi, prop 53 413a; prop
275a-278b; bk x [276-286] 309b-310a; [656- 55, scHOL 413b-d; part iv, prop 52 439d-440a
688] 320a-321a; bk xi [376-444] 338b-340a 32 Milton: Lycidas [64-84] 29a-b
14 Plutarch: Theseus, 2c-3b / Themistocles, 33 Pascal: Pensees, 100 191a-192b; 158-164
89a-90b; 95d-96a / Alcibiades 155b,d-174d / 202a-b; 400-401 240b-241a; 404 241a
AlcibiadeS'Coriolanus, 194b-195a,c / Aristides, 35 Locke: Human Understanding, 90c-d; bk ii,
264a-b; 265c-d / Marcus Cato, 282a / Fla- CH XXVIII, SECT 10-12 230b-231c
mininus 302b,d-313a,c / Lysander, 354b, d / 37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 146c-147a; 223d-224b;
Sulla, 369a-d / Lysander -Sulla, 387d-388a / 273b; 313d-314d
Pompey 499a-538a,c / Alexander 540b,d- 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 360a-362d esp 360c-
576d esp 542a-d / Caesar, 599b-d / Agis, 361a, 362b-d
648b,d-649b / Cicero 704a-723d esp 706b-c, 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, bk i, 44d-45c; bk
717a-b IV, 269d-271a
15 Tacitus: Annals, bk iv, 73b-d; bk vi, 92c-d; 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 3a
bk XI, 101c-102a; bk xiv, 154a-b; bk xv, 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 176c; 194c; 494b,d-
162c-163a / Histories, bk i, 195a-b; bk ii, 495a
226d-228a; bk iv, 267b-d 42 Kant: Fund} Prin. Metaphysic of Morals,
18 Augustine: Confessions, bk ii, par 13, lid; 256a-b; 258b-c
2c to 2d CiiAPTKR 35: HONOR 739
43 Federalist: number 57, 177b-c; number 72, 43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 448d 449c
217a-c 44 H()s\vi.LL:/«/j«jo«,xiid-xiiia; 16d 17a;73a b
43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 448d 449c 116b 117c; 383c d
44 BoswELLiJo/wson, I28b; 163d [In .}]; 479a-d; 46 Hi:c;i:l: Philosophy of History, part ii, 267c
498c-499a 268b
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part ii, par 124 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk ir, 72d 74a
44b-d; part hi, par 207 69b-c; par 25^ 79a-c 102b d; BK III, 133b-c; hk iv, 173d 179a cs{
48 Melville: Moby Dic/(, 45b-46a 177d 178a; bk vii, 291a 292b; 301b 302d
49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 310c-d; 312a 317b bk viii, 321d-322d; 335b 337d; 338b 339c
esp 312c-313b; 322a-c; 592d esp 339b-c; bk ix, 365d 366a; hk x, 442c
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk i, 15d-16a; bk 443b; bk xi, 498b d; 527b 528b; bk xm
III, 146d-147c; bk iv, 177d-178a: bk v, 214c- 569d-570a
215a; bk ix, 365d-366a; 370c-372a; bk xiv, 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, bk iv
590d-604b 104b 109a,c; bk v, 110c 111c
53 James: Psychology, 189b-191a; 198b-199b; 53 James: Psychology, 211a-212a
203a-204b; 207a-b; 208b 54 Freud: Narcissism, 407b 409c passim / Ego
and Id, 707c
2c. Honor as due self-esteem: magnanimity or
proper pride 2d.Honor or fame as a mode of immortality
4 Homer: Iliad, bk xii [290-328] 85b-c Old Testament: Psalms, 72:17— (D) Psalms,
5 Aeschylus: Agamemnon [914-957] 61d-62b 71:17 / Proverbs, 10:7 / Ecclesiastes, 2:16
6Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, bk vi, Apocrypha: Wisdom of Solomon, 4:1-2; 8:9-1^
513a-d -(D) OT, Boof^ of Wisdom, 4:1-2; 8:9-13 /
7 Plato: Apology, 208c-209b / Laws, bk v, Ecclesiasticus, 37:26; 39:9-11; 44:8-15; 46:11-
686d-689c 12 —
(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 37:29; 39:12-15;
9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk ii, ch 7 [1107^22- 44:8-15; 46:13-15 / / Maccabees, 3:1-7 (D) —
iio8«i] 353b-c; bk iv, ch 2-4 368d-372d esp OT, / Machabees, y.i-'j I II Maccabees, 6:21-
CH2 [1122*^19-24] 369c; CH7 [i 127^9-33] 374d- 31 -(D) OT, // Machabees, 6\:l\-m
375a 4 Homer: bk ix [307-429] 60b-6ic; bk
Iliad,
12 Epictetus: Discourses, bk i, ch 19, 125c-d XII [290-328] 85b-c; bk xxii [289-305J 158b /
12 Aurelius: Meditations, bk vi, sect 16 275b-d Odyssey, bk xxiv [191-202] 319a
14 Plutarch: Marcus Cato, 283b-d / Cicero, 5 Aeschylus: Seven Against Thebes [683-684]
706b-c; 713 b-c / Demosthenes -Cicero, 724c-d 34c
15 Tacitus: Annals, bk iv, 73c-d 5 Sophocles: Philoctetes [1408-1444] 194d-
18 Augustine: Confessions, bi^x, par 59-65 86b- 195a,c
88b / City of God, bk xiv, ch 13 387c-388c 6 Thucydides Peloponnesian War, bk ii, 398a-c
:
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 348 / Politics,BK V, ch id [1312*23-39] 5I4d /
llld / Philosophy of History, intro, 167a- Rhetoric, bk i, ch 5 [i36i"27-34] 601d; ch 9
168a; part ii, 262a-c; 272c-273a; 280b-281a 608c-611c; bk ii, ch ii [i388'»28-^28] 635b-
47 Goethe: Faust, part i [1011-1021] 25b-26a 636a
48 Melville: Moby Dic{, 79a-82b; 84b-85a 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, bk v [1105-
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk iv, 171c-173d; 1135] 75c-d
bk VIII, 338c-d; bk xiii, 578b; 582a-584b; bk 12 Aurelius: Meditations, bk iv, sect 3, 263d;
XV, 619c-621b; 629b-c BK VII, SECT 34 282a ^:
742 THE GREAT IDEAS lb to 4a
33 Pascal: Pensees, 319-324 229b-230b; 337
(3. The social realization of honor andfame, 3 A. 232b-233a
The conditions of honor or fame atid the 36 Swift: Gulliver, part i, 15b-16b; part hi,
causes of dishonor or infamy.) 119a-121b
13 Virgil: Aeneid, bk i [441-493] 115a-116b; 37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 9a-d; 38b; 146c-147a;
[561-568] 118b; BK IX [590-620] 295a-b 223d-224b; 308a-310a; 313d-314d
14 Plutarch: Camillus, 117a-c / Fabius 141a- 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 360a-362d esp 362b-d
154a,c esp 149b-c / Alcibiades 155b,d-174d / Political Economy, 372d; 374d-375b / Social
esp 172b / Akibiades-Coriolanus, 194a-195a,c Contract, bk iv, 434b-435a
/ Aemilius Paulus, 224d-229c / Pelopidas, 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, bk v, 354c-d
243c-244b / Marceilus-Pelopidas, 262d / Aris- 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 2a; 3a; 92a; 435a-
264a-d; 265c-d / Cimon, 392d-393b /
tides, 436b
Nicias, 425c-d / Agesilaus, 497a-b / Pompey, 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 27c-29a; 31b,d-
509d-510a / Caesar, 598d-601a / Phocion, 32c; 68a-b; 71b,d; 176c-d; 209d; 494b,d-
604b,d-605d / Cato the Younger, 637a-c / Agis, 495d; 504C-5O5C
648b,d-649b / Cleomenes, 659d-660a / Cicero, 43 Federalist: number 68, 206b-c
712d-713b / Demetrius, 737b-d / Dion, 784a-b 43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 452c-453a
15 Tacitus: Annals, bk i, 16d-17a; bk ii, 33c; 44 Boswell: Johnson, 62b-c; 124d-125d; 140b-
41c-d; BK III, 60d-61a; bk iv, 72d-73d; bk xi, 141a; 160b; 189d-190b: 194c-195a; 197c;
101c-102a; bk xv, 169a / Histories, bk ii, 226d- 198b-d; 250d-251a; 256d; 299a-b; 412b-d;
228a; bk hi, 248b-c; 259c-260a; bk iv, 289d- 479a-d; 498c-499a
290a 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 244
18 Augustine City of God, bk v, ch 12-20 216d-
: 77c
226a passim 47 Goethe: Faust, part i [3734-3763] 91a-b
19 Aquixas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 2, 48 Melville: Moby Dic{, 79a-82b; 84b-85a
AA 2-3 616d-618a 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk iv, 170d-171c
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, part i-ii, q 173d-179a esp 177d-178a; bk v, 204a-205b
73, A 10, ANS 128a-d; part ii-ii, q 25, a i, 228b-234a; bk vi, 247a-c; 250c; bk viii, 304c
rep 2 501b-502a; q 43 585a-592d 338c-d; bk xiii, 582a-584b; bk xiv, 610c-
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, hell, hi [22-69] 611c; BK XV, 619c-621b
4b-d; VI [76-93] 9a-b; vii [1-66] 9c-10b; xiii 54 Freud: Civilization and Its Discontents, 767a
[31-78] 18b-c; xvi [1-90] 22c-23b; xxiv [43-
60] 35a-b; xxxii [i]-xxxiii [9] 47c-49c; pur-
4. Honor in the political community and in
gatory, VIII [121-139] 65c-d; XI [73-117] 69c- government
70a; par.\dise, xvi [16-154] 130a-132a; xvii
[46-142] 132c-133c
4a. Honor as a principle in the orgaaization of
22 Chaucer: Parson s Tale, par 10, 500a the state: timocracy and monarchy
23 Machiavelli: Prince, ch viii 12d-14c esp 4 Homer: Iliad, bk xii [290-328] 85b-c
13b-c; CH xiv-xix 21b-30a; ch xx, 30d; ch 7 Plato: Symposium, 152b-d / Republic, bk
xxi 31d-33a 402b-405c
viii,
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part i, 74c-75b; part ii, 9 Aristotle: Politics, bk v, ch 10 [1310^40-
146d; part iv, 261c 1311*7] 513b; bk vii, ch 2 [i324''2-i325*7]
25 Montaigne: Essays, 7a-d; 103c-104d; 112d- 528c-529a
113d; 126b-127c; 130b-d; 302b-306a; 314c- 14 Plutarch: Themistocles, 99b-c / Lysander-
316a; 390c-391c; 445a-446a; 450c-453c; 495d- Sulla, 387d-388a
496d 18 Augustine: City of God, bk v, ch 12, 218d-
26 Shakespeare: 2nd Henry VI, act i, sc ii 36b- 219b
37c / Richard II, act v, sc ii [1-40] 346b-d / 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, part i, 74b-c
Henry V, act iv, sc i [247-301] 554a-c 25 Montaigne: Essays, 181d-182c
27 Shakespeare: Hamlet, act iv, sc iv [46-66] 26 Shakespeare: Richard II, act iv, sc i [162-
59b-c / Troilus and Cressida, act ii, sc ii 334] 343b-345a; act v. sc n [1-40] 346b-d
113c-115d; ACT III, sc hi [74-233] 123b-125a / 27 Shakespeare: Coriolanus, act hi, sc i [142-
Coriolanus, act ii, sc i [220-275] 363b-364a; 161] 370d-371a
ACT III, sc ii-iii 373c-377a; act iv, sc vii [27- 36 Swift: Gulliver, part hi, 120a
57] 384c-d / Henry VIII, act hi, sc ii [350- 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk hi, 11c-
458] 572c-573d / Sonnets, xxv 590a 12b; bk IV, 13b,d-15a; bk v, 32d; bk viii,
29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, part ii, 227a- 53b-c
228d; 303a-c 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 326b-327a; 360a-362d
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 83c; 92a-b passim, esp 360a-361a / Political Economy,
32 Milton Lycidas [64-84] 29a-b / Paradise Lost,
: 375a-b
BK II [430-456] 120b-121a / Samson Agonistes 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 630b
[960-996J 360b-361a 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 81c-d; 317b-318b
4* to 4r Chapter 35: HONOR 743
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, part hi, par 27^, 43 Articles of Confederation: vi [8793! 6b
91c-d / Philosophy of History, part ii, 262a-c; 43 ("onstitution of the U.S.: article i, sect
PART IV, 334b-c 9 [2S9 295I 14a
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk vi, 241c -242b 43 Im-oeralist: number 84, 252a
44 Roswi-ll: Johnwn, 141a; 197c
4b, The scale of honor in the organization of
46 Hkc.el: Philosophy of Right, pari hi, par 206
the state: the just distribution of honors
68d 69b; par 319, 106b c / Philosophy of
New Testament: Romans, ly.-j History, part i, 222a 224a
4 Homer: Iliad, bk [1-510] 3a 8b; bk ix 57a-
i 47(J<)iTHi;: Faust, part ii [10,849-976] 264a-
64a,c; bk xii [290-328) 85b-c 267a
5 Aeschylus: Seven Against Thebes [1011-1084] 48 Melville: Moby Dtcl{, 108a 112a
38b-39a,c 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, »k hi, 131c-135c;
5 Sophocles: Antigone [162-210] 132c-d / Ajax BK v, 206b c; 228b 234a; bk vi, 241c-242b;
143a-155a,c esp [430-480] 146d-147b, [1047- 250c
1421] 152a-155a,c
5 Euripides: Hecuba [299-^5^1] 355b-c 4c. Honor as a political technique: the uses of
6 Herodotus: History, bk 11, 85a; bk vi, 194d- praise, prestige, public opinion
195b 4 Homer: Iliad,bk x [60-71] 65d
6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, bk ii, 395d- 5 I'ajripides: Hecuba [251-257J 355a; [299-331J
399a; bk hi, 427a-c; bk vhi, 587a b 355bc
7 Plato: Republic, bk i, 305d-306b; bk v, 366d- 6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, bk ii, 395d-
367a / Laws, bk hi, 673d-674b; bk iv, 399a; bk hi, 427a-c
683b-c; bk v, 686d-688a; bk vi, 699d-700b 7 Plato: Republic, bk i, 305d 306b; bk vi,
9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk v, ch 2 [1130^:^0-34] 377a-379c / I^ws, bk vh, 730d-731d
378b; CH 3 [1131*24-29] 378d; ch 6 [ii34''i-7] 9 Aristotle: Politics, bk i, ch 12 [i259*'5-8]
382b; bk vhi, ch 14 [1163^5-13] 416a,c / 454a; bk ii, ch ii [1273*32-^7] 469d-470a; bk
Politics, BK I, ch 12 [1259^5-8] 454a; bk ii, ch HI, CH 5 [1278*35-39] 475c; BK v, ch 8
7 [i266^36-i267*2]462c; [1267*37-41] 463b; ch [i3o8''io-2o] 510d; ch ii [1315*4-24] 517d-
9 [1270^18-25] 466d-467a; ch 11 [1273*32-^7] bk vh, ch 2 [i324''io-23] 528c-d /
518a;
469d-470a; bk hi, ch 5 [1278*35-39] 475c; bk 1, ch 9 608c-611c
Rhetoric,
ch 10 [1281*29-34] 479a; ch 13 481b-483a; 13 Virgil: Aeneid, bk i [142-156] 107a; [450-
bk V, ch 2 [i302*i6]-ch 3 [i302''2o] 503b- 465] 115b
504a; ch 4 [1304*17-38] 505d-506a; ch 8 14 Plutarch: Lycurgus, 45c-46b / Alcibiades,
[1308*8-11] 510a; [1308^10-17] 510d; [1309*13- 165c-d / Caesar, 598d-599b / Cleomenes, 659d-
15] 511b; ch 12 [1316^21-24] 519d; bk vh, ch 660a
14 [1332^42-1333*16] 537d-538a / Athenian 15 Tacitus: Histories, bki, 209d-210b
44c-d; bk viii [130-156] 52c; bk ix 57a-64a,c; 147c; 150a-164a,c; bk ix, 366d-367b; 369a-
BK XII [290-328] 85b-c; BK XXII [99-130] 372a; bk xi, 527b-528b; bk xiii, 569d-570a;
156b-c; [289-305] 158b bk XIV, 590d-604b passim, esp 603a-604b; bk
5 Sophocles: Ajax [430-480] 146d-147b XV, 618b-619d; epilogue i, 673d-674a,c
5 Euripides: Heracleidae [i-ii] 248a; [484-596] 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, bk x,
252c-253b / Suppliants [857-917] 266a-b / 273a-d; epilogue, 408a-c
Hecuba [343-383] 355d-356a; [482-603] 357a- 54 Freud: War and Death, 765a-b
358a / Heracles Mad [275-311] 367c-d / Phoe-
nician Maidens [991-1030] 387a-b 5b. Hero-worship: the exaltation of leaders
5 Aristophanes: Knights [565-598] 477a-c 4 Homer: Iliad, bk xii [290-328] 85b-c
6 Herodotus: History, bk vii, 226b-c; 234a-b; 5 Aristophanes: Frogs [1008-1098] 576b-577c
255c-d; bk ix, 291c-292a 6 Herodotus: History, bk v, 168d-169a; 183d-
6 Thucydides Peloponnesian War, bk ii, 395d-
: 184a; bk vi, 192c; bk vii, 235b-c
399a esp 397d-398c; 402c-404a; bk v, 484a-c; 6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, bk ii, 395d-
bk vii, 556b-d 398a; bk v, 485b-c
7 Plato: Syinposium, 152b-d; 166b-167a / 7 Plato: Republic, bk hi, 340a-b; bk v, 366c-
Apology, 205d-206a / Republic, bk v, 366c- 367b; BK VII, 401b
367b / Laws, bk i, 651a-652a 9 Aristotle: Politics, bk vii, ch 14 [1332^17-
9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk hi, ch 6-9 361a-364b; 27] 537b-c
BK IV, CH 3 370b-372b passim, esp [1123^31- 13 Virgil: Aeneid, bk i [267-290] llOa-llla;
33] 370d, [1124^7-9] 371b-c / Politics, bk v, BK VI [756-892] 231a-235a; bk viii [608-
CH 10 [1312^24-39] 514d 731] 275a-278b
13 Virgil: Aeneid, bk i [441-493] 115a-116b; bk 14 Plutarch: Theseus, 14c-15a,c/ Romulus, 28a-
X [276-286] 309b-310a; bk xi [376-444] 338b- 30a,c / Themistocles, 99b-c / Pericles, 140c-
340a; bk xii [650-696] 371b-372b 141a,c / Aemilius Paulus, 226c-230d / Lysan-
14 Plutarch: Theseus, 2c-9a esp 3a-b, 3d / der, 361d-362a / Demetrius, 729d-731a; 734b-
Romulus-Theseus, 30a-b / Poplicola, 83b-84a 735a
/ Coriolanus, 175d-176b / Pelopidas, 238b- 15 Tacitus: Annals, bk iv, 73b-d / Histories,
239c / Flamininus, 302b / Alexander 540b,d- BK I, 198c-d
576d esp 542a-d, 553b-c / Caesar, 583b-585d; 24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, bk iv
599b- d / Cato the Younger 620a-648a,c 267c-270b
5c to 5d Chapter 35; HONOR 745
25 Montaigne: Essays, 103c 104d; 126b 128d; 20 AguiNAs: Summa Theologica, part in st ppl,
145d-146d; 362a 365a; 390c-391c; 452d 453b g 96, AA 5-7 1055c 1062a; aa ii 12 1063d
26 Shakespkark: Richard II, act v, sc ii [i 40! 106Sb
346b-d / King John, act i 376a 379c / Julius 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, hell, xxvi 38a 39c
Caesar, act i, sc i [37-65] 568d-569a; sc 11 22 C^hauckr: Truilus and Cressida, bk ii, stanza
[90-161] 570b-571a; act V, sc v [68-75] 596a,c 25 29 24b 25b; stanza 88-92 33a b; uk v,
27 Shakespeare: Antony and Cleopatra, act v, STANZA 258 154a / Prologue [4^ 78] 159b 160a
sc II [82-100] 347a-b / Knight's Tale 174a-211a esp [859-1004] 174a-
29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, part i, la-8c; 32c- 176b
33a; 41a-c; 82c-d; part ii, 254d-255a 23 Machiavelli: Prince, en xxvi 36b-37d
32 Milton: Lord Gen. Fairfax 68b-69a / Lord 23 HoBBEs: Leviathan, part i, 73b 76b
Gen. Cromwell 69a-b 24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagrucl, uk i,
38 Rousseau: Political Economy, 373c-d 32c-35a; 42a-44a; 50c-52d
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 12b-c; 28b-d; 92a; 25 Montaigne: Essays, 302b-303a; 340a 343b
263a; 298b; 471c-d; 627a-d passim; 362a 365a; 390c-391c
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 131b; 209d; 415d- 26 Shakespeare: Henry V, act hi, sc i 543d-
416c; 536c-d 544b; act iv, sc hi [16-67] 555d-556b
43 Mill: Liberty, 298d-299a 27 Shakespeare: Troilus and Cressida, act ii,
48 Melville: Moby Dicl(, 107a-b sc II 113c-115d / Coriolanus, act i, sc i [256-
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk i, 9c-10d; bk ii, 280] 354b-c; act ii, sc i [130-178] 362b-c;
97c-101c; BK III, 135c-137c; 140c-142d; 159b- sc HI [86-128] 366d-367b / timon of Athens,
161b; 162b-164a,c; bk iv, 170d-173d; bk v, act hi, sc V 406d-408a
230b 234a; bk vi, 238c-243d esp 242c-243c 29 Cervantes: Don Quixote esp part i, 147b-d,
260a-262a; bk ix, 344b-346a; 354a 355c PART II, 203a-b, 280b-c
366d-367b; 382a-388a,c; bk x, 405a-406c 32 Milton: Lord Gen. Fairfax 68b-69a
444a-445d; bk xi, 518c-d; bk xiii, 578b; 582a- 38 Rousseau: Social Contract, bk iv, 437d-438c
584b; BK XIV, 600d; 610c-611c; bk xv, 619c- 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 217d-220d esp
621b; epilogue i, 647b-649d; 673d-674a,c 219c-220d; 240b-247a passim; 369d-376c esp
53 James: Psychology, 826b-827a 370a-c, 375b-c: 644d-645c
54 Freud: Group Psychology, 669a-c; 674b- 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 19d-20a; 357c-
675b; 676b-c; 683c-684a; 686b-689d; 691d- 359c; 415d-416c; 534b-536d passim; 549c-
693a / War and Death, 762c 550c
46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, part i, 241 d-
5c. The occasions of heroism in war and peace 242b; 247a; part ii, 262c-363a; 274a-275a;
4 Homer: Iliad3a'179d esp bk iv [220-418] 26b- 281d-282d; part hi, 298a-b
28a, bk V [520-532] 35c, bk x [203-253] 67a-c, 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, bk ii, 77c-81b;
bk XII [290-328J 85b-c / Odyssey, bk i [267- 89b-d; 97c-106d; bk hi, 146d-147c; 150a-
305] 185d-186a 164a,c; bk vi, 25Gc; bk ix, 366d-367b; 369a-
5 Euripides: Rhesus [149-263] 204c-205c / 372a; bk xiv, 590d-604b
Heracles Mad [140-205] 366b-d / Phoenician
Maidens [991-1018] 387a-b 5d. The estimation of the role of the hero in
history
6 Herodotus: History, bk 69a-b; bk hi,
ii,
lOlc-d; 122a-i23d; bk iv, 134d-135b; bk vi, 13 Virgil: Aeneid, bk vi [756-892] 231a- 235a;
187b-188d; bk vii, 233d-234b; 238a-c; 248d; BK VIII [608-731] 275a-278b
255a-257d; bk ix, 291c-292a; 303c-304a 14 Plutarch: Theseus la-15a,c esp 9a-d / Romu-
6 Thucydides: Pelopomjesian War, bk ii, 395d- lus 15a-30a,c / Lycurgus 32a-48d csp 47a-48c
399a; bk iv, 457b-c; bk v, 484c-485c; 502b-c / Numa Pompilius 49a-61d esp 59c-60b / Peri-
7 Plato: Apology, 205d-206a cles 121a-141a,c esp 129c-130b, 140c-141a,c /
9 Aristotle: Ethics, bk hi, ch 6-9 361a-364b; Timoleon 195a-213d csp 212c-213d / Fla-
bk iv, ch 3 370b-372b passim / Politics, bk miiiinus, 307d-308a / Poinpey 499a-538a,c /
vii, ch 2 [1324^10-23] 528c-d Caesar 577a-604d / Antony 748a- 779d esp
13 Virgil: Aefieid, bk ix [168-449] 283b-291a 750a-b / Marcus Brutus 802b,d-S24a,c
14 Plutarch: Theseus la-15a,c / Poplicola, 83b- 23 Machiavelli: Prince, ch vi, 9a-b; ch xx,
84a / Coriolanus, 1 74b, d- 179c / Aemilius 30d; ch xxv-xxvi, 35a-37a
Paulus, 219d-229c / Marcellus 246b,d-261a,c 24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, bk iv,
Alexander 540b,d-576d / Cato the Younger
/ 267c-268a
620a-648a,c / Demosthenes, 695d-703b / 25 Montaigne: Essays, 362a-365a
Cicero, 712d-713b 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, bk x, 65d-68a
15 Tacitus: Annals, bk i, lla-b; bk hi, 49d; 38 Rousseau Inequality, 362a-b; 364a-b / Politi-
:
bk VI, 92c; BK XVI, 180d-183a; 183d-184a / cal Economy, 373c-374a / Social Contract, bk
Histories, bk i, 200b-c; bk ii, 226d-228a; II, 400c-402a
BK hi, 246b-c; 248b-c; 249b; 256a-c 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 633d-634a,c
— b —
I :j-io / II Peter, 1:17/ Revelation, 21-22 (D) — 106a; vii (i (;I ll.Sa b; x xiv 120b 128b csp
Apocalypse, 21-22 XIV (i 6()| 126d 127c; xviii (52I-XIX (18) I34a-
18 Augustine: City of God, bk v, ch r6-i8 221a- 135b; xxiii 141b 142c; xxvin (i 129) 148d-
224b passim; bk xviii, ch 48 501b-d: bk xix, 150a; XXIX [ I ^6 1
45) 151c d; xxx xxxiil5Id-
CH 13 519a-520a; bk xx, ch 17 544d-545c; bk 156a csp xxx [97 1^2) 152d 153a
XXII, ch 29-30 614b-618d 29 (Cervantes: Don Quixote, part ii, 228b d
19 Aquinas: Stimma Theologica, part i, q 62 31 Spinoza: Ethics, part v, prop ^6, schol
317c-325b; part i-ii, q 2, a 3, ans and rep i 461bc
617b-618a; q 4, a 8, rep i 636a-c 32 Mil. ion On Time 12a b / At a Solemn Sfusic{
:
20 Aquinas: Surnma Theologica, part hi, q 19, 13a-b / Paradise Lost, bk v [809-845) I93a-b
A 3, rep 3-4 819c-820c; part hi suppl, q csp [83^ 8^5] 193b
69, A 2, rep 3-4 886c-887d; qq 82-85 968a- 33 Pascal: Pensees, 643 290b-291a; 793, 326b
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Honor or fame in relation to virtue, duty, and happiness, see Duty 4-4b; Happiness 2b(4);
Virtue and Vice 4d(2), 6d.
The sense in which pride is a vice and humility a virtue, see Sin 4c; Virtue and Vice 8f.
Fame as a mode of immortality, see Immortality 6b.
Mutual respect or honor as a condition of friendship, see Love 2b(3); Virtue and Vice 6e.
The poHtical significance of honor, see Government 2a; Justice ge; State 9c.
The rhetorical uses of praise or honor, see Rhetoric 4a.
Other discussions of heroism and the heroic, j^d- Courage 5; Temperance 6a; and for the con-
ception of the tragic or epic hero, see Poetry 7b.
Various estimations of the role of heroes, leaders, and great men in history, see History 4a (4).
The theological significance of glory, see God 4h; Happiness 7c(2), 7d; Immortality 5f.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Books of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
Brooke. An Inquisition upon Fame and Honour ViGNY. Military Servitude and Grandeur
Beaumont and Fletcher. The Maid's Tragedy Ware. The Law of Honor
Calderon. The Physician of His Own Honour Stendhal. The Red and the Blac/^
Carew. a Rapture . The Charterhouse of Parma
CORNEILLE. Le Cid T. Carlyle. On Heroes, Hero- Worship and the Heroic
Horace
. in History
Racine. Andromaque Emerson. Representative Men
MoLiERE. he bourgeois gentilhomme {The Cit Turned Galton. Hereditary Genius
Gentleman) Meredith. The Egoist
Dryden. All for Love HowELLs. The Rise of Silas Lapham
Shaftesbury. Characteristics ofMen, Manners, Opin- Nietzsche. Beyond Good and Evil, ch ix
ions, Times Frazer. The Golden Bough, part vii, ch 3
Mandeville. An Enquiry into the Origin of Honor, T. Veblen. The Theory of the Leisure Class
and the Usefulness of Christianity in War Rostand. UAiglon
Saint-Simon. Memoirs T. Hardy. The Dynasts
HuRD. Letters on Chivalry and Romance Farnell. GreeJ{ Hero Cults and Ideas of Immor-
Voltaire. "Honor," in A Philosophical Dictionary tality
Millar. Observations Concerning the Distinction of T. S. Eliot. Murder in the Cathedral
Ran^s in Society Raglan. The Hero
Sheridan. The Rivals, act 4, sc i Cassirer. The Myth of the State, part hi (15-17)
Chapteri^G: HYPOTHESIS
INTRODUCTION
COMPARISON of their Greek and
A roots shows that the EngHsh words "hy-
pothesis" and "supposition" are synonymous.
Latin There is one use of the word "hypothesis" in
to make one thing the basis of another in the given, not as the basis from which the conclu-
process of thought. sion is drawn or proved, but as a condition of
The word "hypothesis" is today often popu- solving the geometric problem under consider-
larly misappHed to mean a guess or hunch. The ation. Let us take Proposition 6 of Book I. It
sleuth in a detective story speaks of having an reads: "//"in a triangletwo angles be equal to
hypothesis about who committed the crime. one another, then the sides which subtend the
The popular notion of what it means to suppose equal angles will aJso be equal to one another."
something, or to entertain a supposition, more In the demonstration of this theorem, a tri-
accurately reflects the meaning of hypothesis in angle having two equal angles is regarded as
logic, mathematics, and scientific or philosoph- given or granted. That figure or geometrical con-
ical method. dition is a fact obtained by hypothesis. It is the
A supposition is generally understood to be fact stated in the hypothesis, or the if-clause, of
something taken for granted, something as- the theorem.
sumed for the purpose of drawing implications If the geometrical reality of that fact itself is
or making inferences. What is supposed is not questioned, the answer would have to be ob-
known to be true; it may be true or false. When tained by a prior proof that such a figure, con-
we make a supposition, our first concern is to forming to the definition of an isosceles tri-
see what follows from it, and only then to angle, can be constructed by the use of no other
consider its truth in the light of its conse- instruments than a straight edge and a compass.
quences. We cannot reverse this order, when The construction is not made, however, as part
we employ suppositions, and ask first about of the proof of Theorem 6, any more than is the
their truth. demonstration of an antecedent theorem, which
The word "if" expresses the essence of sup- may have to be used in the proof of Theorem
posing. The word "then" or the phrase "it fol- 6. In the proof of Theorem 6, the first line, be-
lows that" introduces the consequences for the ginning with the word "let," declares that the
consideration of which we make the supposi- construe tibility of the figure is to be taken for
tion. W^e are not interested in the "if" for its granted as a matter of hypothesis.
own sake, but for the sake of what it may lead The whole problem of Theorem 6 is to prove
then ." that the then-clause follows from the if-clause.
to. In any statement of the "if . . . . .
sort, it is the if-clause which formulates the sup- Euclid appears to accomplish this by introduc-
position or the hypothesis; the other part of the ing other propositions — drawn from his axioms,
statement, the then-clause, formulates the con- definitions, postulates, or theorems previously
sequences or implications. The whole complex demonstrated — which establish this connection
statement, which makes an //the logical basis and so certify the conclusion as following from
for a then, is not an hypothesis. Rather it is the hypothesis. Two points about this proce-
what is traditionally called in logic a hypothet- dure should be noted.
ical proposition. First, the conclusion does not follow from
749
—
angles in an isosceles triangle are necessarily Socrates immediately inquires about the conse-
equal does not need any demonstration of the quences. "If virtue is knowledge," he asks,
connection between equal angles and equal "will it be taught V
Since Meno