ANTONIO M. CARANDANG, Petitioner v. HONORABLE
ANIANO A. DESIERTO, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
Respondent.
ANTONIO M. CARANDANG, Petitioner v.
SANDIGANBAYAN (FIFTH DIVISION), Respondent
G.R. No. 148076; G.R. No. 153161 January 12, 2011
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Petitioner Antonio M. Carandang (Carandang) challenges
the jurisdiction over him of the Ombudsman and of the
Sandiganbayan on the ground that he was being held to
account for acts committed while he was serving as general
manager and chief operating officer of Radio Philippines
Network, Inc. (RPN), which was not a government-owned
or -controlled corporation; hence, he was not a public
official or employee.
In G.R. No. 148076, Carandang seeks the reversal of the
decision and resolution promulgated by the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirming the decision of the Ombudsman
dismissing him from the service for grave misconduct.
In G.R. No. 153161, Carandang assails on certiorari the
resolutions dated October 17, 2001 and March 14, 2002 of
the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) that sustained the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over the criminal complaint
charging him with violation of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
Antecedents
Roberto S. Benedicto (Benedicto) was a stockholder of RPN,
a private corporation duly registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). In March 1986, the
Government ordered the sequestration of RPN’s properties,
assets, and business. On November 3, 1990, the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)
entered into a compromise agreement with Benedicto,
whereby he ceded to the Government, through the PCGG,
all his shares of stock in RPN. Consequently, upon motion
of the PCGG, the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) directed
the president and corporate secretary of RPN to transfer to
the PCGG Benedicto’s shares representing 72.4% of the Carandang moved for reconsideration on two grounds: (a)
total issued and outstanding capital stock of RPN.
However, Benedicto moved for a reconsideration,
contending that his RPN shares ceded to the Government,
through the PCGG, represented only 32.4% of RPN’s
outstanding capital stock, not 72.4%. Benedicto’s motion
for reconsideration has remained unresolved to this date.
Administrative Complaint for Grave Misconduct
On July 28, 1998, Carandang assumed office as general
manager and chief operating officer of RPN.
On April 19, 1999, Carandang and other RPN officials were
charged with grave misconduct before the Ombudsman.
The charge alleged that Carandang, in his capacity as the
general manager of RPN, had entered into a contract with
AF Broadcasting Incorporated despite his being an
incorporator, director, and stockholder of that corporation;
that he had thus held financial and material interest in a
contract that had required the approval of his office; and
that the transaction was p rohibited under Section 7 (a) and
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees),
thereby rendering him administratively liable for grave
misconduct.
Carandang sought the dismissal of the administrative
charge on the ground that t he Ombudsman had no
 jurisdiction over him because RPN was not a government-
owned or -controlled corporation.
On May 7, 1999, the Ombudsman suspended Carandang
from his positions in RPN.
On September 8, 1999, Carandang manifested that he was
no longer interested and had no further claim to his
positions in RPN. He was subsequently replaced by Edgar
San Luis.In its decision dated January 26, 2000, the
Ombudsman found Carandang guilty of grave misconduct
and ordered his dismissal from the service.
that the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction over him because
RPN was not a government-owned or -controlled
corporation; and (b) that he had no financial and material
interest in the contract that required the approval of his
office.
The Ombudsman denied Carandang’s motion for
reconsideration on March 15, 2000.
On appeal (CA G.R. SP No. 58204), the CA affirmed the
decision of the Ombudsman on February 12, 2001, stating:
The threshold question to be resolved in t he present case is
whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has
 jurisdiction over the herein petitioner.
It is therefore of paramount importance to consider the
definitions of the following basic terms, to wit: A public
office “is the right, authority and duty, created and
conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed
by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power,
an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the state to be exercised by him for the benefit
of the public.” (San Andres, Catanduanes vs. Court of
Appeals, 284 SCRA 276: Chapter I, Section 1, Mechem, A
Treatise on Law of Public Offices and Officers). The
individual so invested is called the public officer which
 “includes elective and appointive officials and employees,
permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or
unclassified or exemption service receiving compensation,
even nominal, from the government as defined in xxx [Sec.
2 (a) of Republic Act No. 3019 as amended].” (Sec. 2 (b) of
Republic Act No. 3019 as amended. U nless the powers
conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a public
officer.
With these time-honored definitions and the substantial
findings of the Ombudsman, We are constrained to
conclude that, indeed, the herein petitioner (Antonio M.
Carandang) is a public officer. Precisely, since he (Antonio
M. Carandang) was appointed by then President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada as general manager and chief operating
officer of RPN-9 (page 127 of the Rollo). As a presidential

appointee, the petitioner derives his authority from the
Philippine Government. It is luce clarius that the function of
the herein petitioner (as a presidential appointee), relates
to public duty, i.e., to represent the interest of the
Philippine Government in RPN-9 and not purely personal
matter, thus, the matter transcends the petitioner’s
personal pique or pride.
xxx
Having declared earlier that the herein petitioner is a public
officer, it follows therefore that, t hat jurisdiction over him is
lodged in the Office of the Ombudsman.
It is worth remembering that as p rotector of the people, the
Ombudsman has the power, function and duty to act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against
officers or employees of the Government, or of any,
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, and enforce
their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case
where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient
service by the Government to the people. (Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 6770).
xxx
Accordingly, the Office of the Ombudsman is, therefore,
clothed with the proper armor when it assumed jurisdiction
over the case filed against the herein petitioner. x x x
xxx
It appears that RPN-9 is a private corporation established
to install, operate and manage radio broadcasting and/or
television stations in the Philippines (pages 59-79 of the
Rollo). On March 2, 1986, when RPN-9 was sequestered by
the Government on ground that the same was considered
as an illegally obtained property (page 3 of the Petition for
Review; page 2 of the Respondent’s Comment; pages 10
and 302 of the Rollo), RPN-9 has shed-off its private status.
In other words, there can be no gainsaying that as of the
date of its sequestration by the Government, RPN-9, while
retaining its own corporate existence, became a
government-owned or c ontrolled corporation within the
Constitutional precept.
Be it noted that a government-owned or controlled
corporation “refers to any agency organized as a stock or
non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating to
public needs whether government or proprietary in nature,
and owned by the Government directly or through its
instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in
the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least
fifty-one (51) percent of its c apital stock; Provided, That
government-owned or c ontrolled corporations may be
further categorized by the department of Budget, the Civil
Service, and the Commission on Audit for purposes of the
exercise and discharge of their respective powers, functions
and responsibilities with respect to such corporations.”
(Section 2 , Executive Order No. 292).
Contrary to the claim of the petitioner, this Court is of the
view and so holds that RPN-9 perfectly falls under the
foregoing definition. For one, “the government’s interest to
RPN- 9 amounts to 72.4% of RPN’s capit al stock with an
uncontested portion of 32.4% and a contested or litigated
portion of 40%.” (page 3 of the Petition for Review; pages
8-9 of the Respondent’s Comment). On this score, it ought
to be pointed out that while the forty percent (40%) of the
seventy two point four percent (72.4%) is still contested
and litigated, until the matter becomes formally settled, the
government, for all interests and purposes still has the right
over said portion, for the law is on its side. Hence, We can
safely say that for the moment, RPN-9 is a government
owned and controlled corporation. Another thing, RPN 9,
though predominantly tackles proprietary functions—those
intended for private advantage and benefit, still, it is
irrefutable that RPN-9 also performs governmental roles in
the interest of health, safety and for the advancement of
public good and welfare, affecting the public in general.
xxx
Coming now to the last assignment of error- While it may
be considered in substance that the “latest GIS clearly
shows that petitioner was no longer a stockholder of record
of AF Broadcasting Corporation at the time of his
assumption of Office in RPN 9 x x x” (Petitioner’s Reply [to
Comment]; page 317 of the Rollo), still severing ties from
AF Broadcasting Corporation does not convince this Court
fully well to reverse the finding of the Ombudsman that
Antonio Carandang “appears to be liable for Grave
Misconduct” (page 10 of the Assailed Decision; page 36 of
the Rollo). Note that, as a former stockholder of AF
Broadcasting Corporation, it is improbable that the herein
petitioner was completely oblivious of the developments
therein and unaware of the contracts it (AF Broadcasting
Corporation) entered into. By reason of his past (Antonio
Carandang) association with the officers of the AF
Broadcasting Corporation, it is unbelievable that herein
petitioner could simply have ignored the contract entered
into between RPN-9 and AF Broadcasting Corporation and
not at all felt to reap the benefits thereof. Technically, it is
true that herein petitioner did not directly act on behalf of
AF Broadcasting Corporation, however, We doubt that he
(herein petitioner) had no financial and/or material interest
in that particular transaction requiring the approval of his
office—a fact that could not have eluded Our attention.
xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered and pursuant to
applicable laws and jurisprudence on the matter, the
present Petition for Review is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit. The assailed decision (dated January 26, 2000) of
the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-ADM-0-99-0349 is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
After the denial of his motion for
reconsideration, Carandang commenced G.R. No. 148076.
Violation of Section 3 (g), Republic Act No. 3019
On January 17, 2000, the Ombudsman formally charged
Carandang in the Sandiganbayan with a violation of Section
3 (g) of RA 3019 by alleging in the following
information, viz:

That sometime on September 8, 1998 or thereabouts, in
Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused ANTONIO M. CARANDANG, a high
ranking officer (HRO) being then the General Manager of
Radio Philippines Network, Inc. (RPN-9), then a
government owned and controlled corporation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted
benefits to On Target Media Concept, Inc. (OTMCI) through
manifest partiality and gross inexcusable negligence and
caused the government undue injury, by pre-terminating
the existing block time contract between RPN 9 and OTMCI
for the telecast of “Isumbong Mo Kay Tulfo” which assured
the government an income of Sixty Four Thousand and
Nine Pesos (P 64,009.00) per telecast and substituting the
same with a more onerous co-production agreement
without any prior study as to the profitability thereof, by
which agreement RPN-9 assumed the additional obligation
of taking part in the promotions, sales and proper
marketing of the program, with the end result in that in a
period of five (5) months RPN-9 was able to realize an
income of only Seventy One Thousand One Hundred Eighty
Five Pesos (P 71,185.00), and further, by waiving RPN-9’s
collectible from OTMCI for August 1-30, 1998 in t he amount
of Three Hundred Twenty Thousand and Forty Five Pesos (P
320,045.00).
Carandang moved to quash the information, arguing that
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction because he was not a
public official due to RPN not being a government-owned or
-controlled corporation.
The Sandiganbayan denied Carandang’s motion to quash
on October 17, 2001.
After the denial by the Sandiganbayan of his motion for
reconsideration, Carandang initiated G.R. No. 153161.
On May 27, 2002, Carandang moved to defer his
arraignment and pre-trial, citing the pendency of G.R. No.
153161.
On July 29, 2002, the Court directed the parties in G.R. No.
153161 to maintain the status q uo until further orders.
On November 20, 2006, G.R. No. 148076 was consolidated
with G.R. No. 153161.
Issue
Carandang insists that he was not a public official
considering that RPN was not a g overnment-owned or -
controlled corporation; and that, consequently, the
Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction
over him. He prays that the administrative and criminal
complaints filed against him should be dismissed.
Accordingly, decisive is whether or not RPN was a
government-owned or -controlled corporation.
Ruling
We find the petitions to be meritorious.
It is not d isputed that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over
administrative cases involving grave misconduct committed
by the officials a nd employees of government-owned or -
controlled corporations; and that the Sandiganbayan has
 jurisdiction to try and decide criminal actions involving
violations of R.A. 3019 committed by public officials and
employees, including presidents, directors and managers of
government-owned or -controlled corporations. The
respective jurisdictions of the respondents are expressly
defined and delineated by the law.
Similarly, the law defines what are government-owned or -
controlled corporations. For one, Section 2 of Presidential
Decree No. 2029 (Defining Government Owned or
Controlled Corporations and Identifying Their Role in
National Development) states:
Section 2. A government-owned or c ontrolled corporation is
a stock or a non-stock corporation, whether performing
governmental or proprietary functions, which is directly
chartered by a special law or if organized under the general
corporation law is owned or controlled by the g overnment
directly, or indirectly through a parent corporation or
subsidiary corporation, to the extent of at least a majority
of its outstanding capital stock or of its outstanding voting
capital stock.
Section 2 (13) of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative
Code of 1987) renders a similar definition of government-
owned or -controlled corporations:
Section 2. General Terms Defined. – Unless the specific
words of the text or the context as a whole or a particular
statute, shall require a different meaning:
xxx
(13) government-owned or controlled corporations refer to
any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation
vested with functions relating to public needs whether
governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the
government directly or indirectly through its
instrumentalities either wholly, or where applicable as in
the case of stock corporations to the extent of at least 51%
of its capital stock.
It is clear, therefore, that a corporation is considered a
government-owned or -controlled corporation only when
the Government directly or indirectly owns or controls at
least a majority or 51% share of the capital stock. Applying
this statutory criterion, the Court ruled in Leyson, Jr. v.
Office of the Ombudsman:
But these jurisprudential rules invoked by petitioner in
support of his claim that the CIIF companies are
government owned and/or controlled corporations are
incomplete without resorting to the definition of
 “government owned or controlled corporation” contained in
par. (13), Sec.2, Introductory Provisions of the
Administrative Code of 1987, i.e., any agency organized a s
a stock or non-stock corporation vested with functions
relating to public needs whether governmental or
proprietary in nature, and owned by the government
directly or indirectly through its instrumentalities either
wholly, or where applicable as in the case of stock
corporations to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent
of its capital s tock. The definition mentions three (3)
requisites, namely, first, any agency organized as a stock
or non-stock corporation; second, vested with f unctions
relating to public needs whether governmental or
proprietary in nature; and, third, owned by the Government

directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or,
where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the
extent of at least fifty-one (51) of its capital s tock.
In the present case, all three (3) corporations comprising
the CIIF companies were organized as stock
corporations. The UCPB-CIIF owns 44.10% of the shares of
LEGASPI OIL, xxx. Obviously, the below 51% shares of
stock in LEGASPI OIL removes this firm from the definition
of a government owned or controlled corporation. x x x The
Court thus concludes that the CIIF are, as found by public
respondent, private corporations not within the scope of its
 jurisdiction.
Consequently, RPN was neither a government-owned nor a
controlled corporation because of the Government’s total
share in RPN’s capital stock being only 32.4%.   xxx
Parenthetically, although it is true that the Sandiganbayan
(Second Division) ordered the transfer to the PCGG of
Benedicto’s shares that represented 72.4% of the total
issued and outstanding capital stock of RPN, such
quantification of Benedicto’s shareholding cannot be
controlling in view of Benedicto’s timely filing of a motion
for reconsideration whereby he clarified and insisted that
the shares ceded to the PCGG had accounted for only
32.4%, not 72.4%, of RPN’s outstanding capital stock. With
the extent of Benedicto’s holdings in RPN remaining
unresolved with finality, concluding that the Government
held the majority of RPN’s capital stock as to make RPN a
government-owned or -controlled corporation would be
bereft of any factual and legal basis.
Even the PCGG and the Office of the President (OP) have
recognized RPN’s status as being neither a government -
owned nor -controlled corporation.
In its Opinion/Clarification dated August 18, 1999, the
PCGG communicated to San Luis as the president a nd
general manager of RPN regarding a c ase involving RPN
and Carandang
MR. EDGAR S. SAN LUIS
President & General Manager
Radio Philippines Network, Inc.
Broadcast City, Capitol Hills
Diliman, Quezon City
Sir:
This refers to your letter dated August 4, 1999, seeking
 “PCGG’s position on the following: 
 “1. Whether RPN-9 is a GOCC x x x or a private corporation
outside the scope of OGCC and COA’s control given 32%
Government ownership x x x.
It appears that under the RP-Benedicto Compromise
Agreement dated November 3, 1990 – validity of which has
been sustained by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 96087,
March 31, 1992, (Guingona, Jr. vs. PCGG, 207 SCRA 659) –  performing governmental or proprietary functions which is
Benedicto ceded all his rights, interest and/or participation,
if he has a ny, in RPN-9, among others, to the government
which rights, interest and/or participation per PCGG’s
understanding, include 9,494,327.50 shares of stock, i.e,
about 72.4% of the total issued and outstanding capital
stock of RPN-9.
Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan (Second Division), on
motion of the government through PCGG, ordered the
president and corporate secretary of the RPN-9 to “effect
the immediate cancellation and transfer of the
9,494,327.50 shares corresponding to Benedicto’s
proprietary interest in RPN-9 to the Republic of the
Philippines c/o PCGG” (Sandiganbayan’s Resolution of
February 3, 1998 in Civil Case No. 0034, RP vs. Roberto
Benedicto, et. al.) Benedicto, however, filed a motion for
reconsideration of said Resolution, contending that the
number of RPN-9 shares ceded by him embraces only his
personal holdings and those of his immediate family and
nominees totaling 4,161,207.5 shares but excluding the
RPN-9 shares in the name of Far East Managers and
Investors, Inc. (“FEMIE”), which is about 40%, as they are
corporate properties/assets of FEMIE and not his personal
holdings. Said motion for reconsideration is still pending
resolution by the Sandiganbayan.
xxx
We agree with your x x x view that RPN-9 is not a
government owned or controlled corporation within the
contemplation of the Administrative Code of 1987, for
admittedly, RPN-9 was organized for private needs a nd
profits, and not for pub lic needs and was not specifically
vested with functions relating to public needs.
Neither could RPN-9 be considered a “government -owned
or controlled corporation” under Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 2029 dated February 4, 1986, which defines said terms
as follows:
 “Sec.2. Definition. – Agovernment owned- or controlled
corporation is a stock or non-stock corporation, whether
directly chartered by special law or organized under the
general corporation law is owned or controlled by the
government directly, or indirectly through a parent
corporation or subsidiary corporation, to the extent of at
least a majority of its outstanding capital stock or of its
outstanding voting capital stock;
Provided, that a corporation organized under the general
corporation law under private ownership at least a majority
of the shares of stock of which were conveyed to a
government corporation in satisfaction of debts incurred
with a government financial institution, whether by
foreclosure or otherwise, or a subsidiary corporation of a
government corporation organized exclusively to own and
manage, or lease, or operate specific physical a ssets
acquired by a government financial institution in
satisfaction of debts incurred therewith, and which in any
case by enunciated policy of the government is required to
be disposed of to private ownership within a specified
period of time, shall not b e considered a government-
owned or controlled corporation before such disposition and
even if the ownership or control thereof is subsequently

transferred to another government-owned or controlled
corporation.”  ownership over RPNI is only 32.4% of its capital stock,
A government-owned or controlled corporation is either
 “parent” corporation, i.e., one “created by special law”
(Sec. 3 (a), PD 2029) or a “subsidiary” corporation,  i.e,
one
created pursuant to law where at least a majority of the
outstanding voting capital stock of which is owned by
parent government corporation and/or other government-
owned subsidiaries. (Sec. 3 (b), PD 2029).
RPN- 9 may not likewise be considered as an “acquired
asset corporation” which is one organized under the general
corporation law (1) under private ownership at least a
majority of the shares of stock of which were conveyed to a
government corporation in satisfaction of debts incurred
with a government financial institution, whether by
foreclosure or otherwise, or (2) as a subsidiary corporation
of a government corporation organized exclusively to own
and manage, or lease, or operate specific physical assets
acquired by a g overnment financial institution in
satisfaction of debts incurred therewith, and which in a ny
case by enunciated policy of the government is required to
be disposed of to private ownership within a specified
period of time” (Sec 3 c, PD 2029), for the following
reasons:
1. as noted above, the uncontested (not litigated) RPN-9
shares of the government is only 32.4% (not a majority) of
its capital stock;
2. said 32.4% shares of stock, together with the
contested/litigated 40%, were not conveyed to a
government corporation or the government “in satisfaction
of debts incurred with government financial institution,
whether by foreclosure or otherwise;
3. RPN-9 was not organized as a subsidiary corporation of
a government corporation organized exclusively to own and
manage, or lease, or operate specific p hysical assets
acquired by a g overnment financial institution in
satisfaction of debts incurred therewith.
It should be parenthetically noted that the 32.4% or 72.4%
shares of stocks were turned over to the government by
virtue of a compromise agreement between the
government and Benedicto in Civil Case No. 0034 which is
 “a civil action against Defendants Roberto S. Benedicto,
Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos” and others, to
recover from them ill-gotten wealth” (Amended Complaint,
Aug. 12, 1987, Civil Case No. 0034, p. 2.) As the case
between the government and Benedicto, his family and
nominees was compromised, no judicial pronouncement
was made as to the character or nature of the assets and
properties turned over by Benedicto to the g overnment –  This is not to mention the fact that the other respondents,
whether they are ill-gotten wealth or not.
The PCGG’s Opinion/Clarification was affirmed by the OP
itself on February 10, 2000:
February 10, 2000
Mr. Edgar S. San Luis
President and General Manager
Radio Philippines Network Inc.
Broadcasting City, Capitol Hills, Diliman
Quezon City
Dear President San Luis,
xxx
Relative thereto, please be informed that we affirm the
PCGG’s opinion that RPNI is not a government -owned
and/or controlled corporation (GOCC). Section 2 (13),
Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of
1987 defines a GOCC as an agency organized as a stock or
non-stock corporation vested with functions relating to
public needs whether governmental or proprietary in
nature, and owned by the government directly or indirectly
through its instrumentalities either wholly, or where
applicable as in the case of stock corporations to the extent
of at least 51% of its capital stock. As government
pending the final judicial determination of the true and legal
ownership of RPNI, the corporation is deemed private.
Even earlier, a similar construction impelled the
Ombudsman to dismiss a criminal complaint for violation of
R.A. 3019 filed against certain
RPN officials, as the Ombudsman’s resolution
dated December 15, 1997 indicates, a pertinent portion of
which is quoted thus:
the RPN officials, are outside the jurisdiction of this Office
(Office of the Ombudsman); they are employed by a private
corporation registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the RPN, which is not a government owned or
controlled corporation x x x
Considering that the construction of a statute g iven by
administrative agencies deserves respect, the uniform
administrative constructions of the relevant aforequoted
laws defining what are g overnment-owned or -controlled
corporations as applied to RPN is highly persuasive.
Lastly, the conclusion that Carandang was a p ublic official
by virtue of his having been appointed as general manager
and chief operating officer of RPN by President Estrada
deserves no consideration. President Estrada’s intervention
was merely to recommend Carandang’s designation  as
general manager and chief operating officer of RPN to the
PCGG, which then cast the vote in his favor vis-à-vis said
positions. Under the circumstances, it was RPN’s Board of
Directors that appointed Carandang to his positions
pursuant to RPN’s By -Laws.
In fine, Carandang was correct in insisting that being a
private individual he was not subject to the administrative
authority of the Ombudsman and to the criminal jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, we grant the petitions in G.R. No. 148076
and G.R. No. 153161.

 
We reverse and set aside the decision promulgated
on February 12, 2001 by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R.
SP No. 58204, and dismiss the administrative charge for
grave misconduct against the petitioner.
We annul and set aside the resolutions dated October 17,
2001 and March 14, 2002, as well as the order dated March
15, 2002, all issued by the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division)
in Criminal Case No. 25802, and dismiss Criminal Case No.
25802 as against the pet itioner.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 102342, July 03, 1992]
LUZ M. ZALDIVIA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ANDRES B.
REYES, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS ACTING PRESIDING
JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, FOURTH
JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH 76, SAN MATEO, RIZAL,
AND PEOPLE OF THE P HILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
The Court is asked to determine the applicable law
specifying the prescriptive period for violations of municipal
ordinances.
The petitioner is charged with q uarrying for commercial
purposes without a mayor's permit in violation of Ordinance
No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in
the Province of Rizal.
The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990. The
referral-complaint of the police was received by t he Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990.  The
corresponding information was filed with the Municipal Trial
Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990. 
The petitioner moved to quash the information on the
ground that the crime had p rescribed, but the motion was
denied. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, the
denial was sustained by the respondent judge.  Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run," reading as
In the present petition for review on certiorari, the
petitioner first argues that the charge against her is
governed by the following provisions of the Rule on
Summary Procedure:
Section 1. Scope. -- This rule sha ll govern the procedure in
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts,
and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases:
xxx
B. Criminal Cases:
1. Violations of traffic laws, rules and
regulations;
2. Violations of rental law;
3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
4. All other criminal cases where the penalty
prescribed by law for the offense charged does not exceed
six months imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos
(P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of other imposable
penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability
arising therefrom. x x x" (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx
Section 9. How commenced. – The prosecution of criminal
cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be either by
complaint or by information filed directly in court without
need of a p rior preliminary examination or preliminary
investigation: Provided, however, That in Me tropolitan
Manila and chartered cities, such cases shall b e commenced
only by information; Provided, further, That when the
offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the corresponding
complaint shall be signed and sworn to before the fiscal by
the offended party.
She then invokes Act No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An
Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations
Penalized by Special Acts and M unicipal Ordinances and to
follows:
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless
otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance
with the following rules: x x x Violations penalized by
municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months.
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from t he day of
the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same
be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and
the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation
and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run
again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.
Section 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be
acts defining and penalizing violations of law not included in
the Penal Code." (Emphasis supplied)
Her conclusion is that as the information was filed way
beyond the two-month statutory period from the date of
the alleged commission of the offense, the charge against
her should have been dismissed on the ground of
prescription.
For its part, the prosecution contends that the prescriptive
period was suspended upon the filing of the complaint
against her with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.
Agreeing with the respondent judge, the Solicitor General
also invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, providing as follows:
Section 1. How Instituted - For offenses not subject to the
rule on summary procedure in special cases, the institution
of criminal action shall be a s follows:
a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court, by filing the complaint with the

appropriate officer for the purpose of conducting the
requisite preliminary investigation t herein;
b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, by
filing the complaint directly with the said courts, or a
complaint with the fiscals office. However, in Metropolitan
Manila and other chartered cities, the complaint may be
filed only with the office of the fiscal.
In all cases such institution interrupts the pe riod of
prescription of the offense charged. (Emphasis supplied.)
Emphasis is laid on the last paragraph. The respondent
maintains that the filing of the complaint with the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor comes under the phrase "such
institution" and that the phrase "in all cases" applies to all
cases, without distinction, including those falling under the
Rule on Summary Procedure.
The said paragraph, according to the respondent, was an
adoption of the following dictum in Francisco v. Court of
Appeals:  shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted
In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to
provide guidance for Bench and Bar, this Court has re-
examined the question and, after mature consideration, has
arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine is, and
should be, the one established b y the decisions holding that
the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it
be merely for purposes of p reliminary examination or
investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of
prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court
where the complaint or information is filed can not try the
case on its merits. Several reasons buttress t his conclusion:
first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, in
declaring that the period of prescription "shall be
interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information"
without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the
court for preliminary examination or investigation merely,
or for action on the merits. Second, even if the court where
the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to
investigate the case, its actuations already represent the
initial step of the proceedings against the offender. Third, it
is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain
vindication on account of delays that a re not under his
control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part
to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.
It is important to note that this decision was promulgated
on May 30, 1983, two months before the promulgation of
the Rule on Summary Procedure on August 1, 1983. On the
other hand, Section 1 of Rule 110 is new, having been
incorporated therein with the revision of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure on January 1, 1985, except for the last
paragraph, which was added on October 1, 1988.
That section meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for
offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in
special cases," which plainly signifies that t he section does
not apply to offenses which are subject to summary
procedure. The phrase "in all cases" appearing in the last
paragraph obviously refers to the cases covered b y the
Section, that is, those offenses not governed b y the Rule on
Summary Procedure. This interpretation conforms to the
canon that words in a statute should be read in relation to
and not isolation from the rest of the measure, to discover
the true legislative intent.
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure
that among the offenses it covers are violations of
municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the
charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a
municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule
and not Section 1 of Rule 110.
Where paragraph (b) of the section d oes speak of "offenses
falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference is
to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses
punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years
and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand
pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of
other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the
civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated
thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount
thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses involving
damage to property through criminal negligence they shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine
does not exceed twenty thousand pesos.
These offenses are not covered by the Rule on Summary
Procedure.
Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the
complaint or information shall be filed directly in court
without need of a p rior preliminary examination or
preliminary investigation."  Both parties agree that this
provision does not prevent t he prosecutor from conducting
a preliminary investigation if he wants t o. However, the
case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in
court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a
preliminary investigation. This means that the running of
the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case
is actually filed in court and not on any date before that.
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted
Act No. 3326 which says that the period of prescription
against the guilty party." The proceedings referred to in
Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the
submission of the Solicitor General that they include
administrative proceedings. His contention is that we must
not distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter
of fact, it does.
At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict
between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of
Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former
should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict
between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this
Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not
allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights"
under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution.
Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right. 
Going back to the Francisco case, we find it not irrelevant
to observe that the decision would have been conformable
to Section 1, Rule 110, as the offense involved was grave

oral defamation punishable under the Revised Penal Code
with arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period. By contrast, the
prosecution in the instant case is for violation of a municipal
ordinance, for which the penalty cannot exceed six
months,  and is thus covered by t he Rule on Summary
Procedure.
The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a
crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed
seasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or
not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial
proceedings until its too late. However, that p ossibility
should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules
beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from
their plain language. The remedy is not a distortion of the
meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the
problem here sought to be corrected.
Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for t he crime
imputed to the petitioner commenced from its a lleged
commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months
thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in a ccordance with Section 1
of Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted by the filing of the
complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on
May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The
 judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period
was the filing of the information with the Municipal Trial
Court of Rodriguez, but this was d one only on October 2,
1990, after the crime had already prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the challenged
Order dated October 2, 1991 is SET ASIDE. Criminal Case
No. 90-089 in the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, Rizal,
is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of prescription. It is so
ordered.
G.R. No. L-53373 June 30, 1987
MARIO FL. CRESPO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, Presiding Judge,
CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT OF LUCENA CITY, 9th
Judicial Dist., THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by the SOLICITOR GENERAL, RICARDO
BAUTISTA, ET AL., respondents.  and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of
GANCAYCO, J.:
The issue raised in this e ase is whether the trial court
acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the
Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of
Justice to whom the case was e levated for review, may
refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment
and trial on the merits.
On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with
the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for
estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court
of Lucena City which was docketed as Criminal Case No.
CCCIX-52 (Quezon) '77. When the case was set for
arraigment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment
on the ground that there was a pending petition for review
filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the
information. In an order of August 1, 1977, the presiding
 judge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the
motion. A motion for reconsideration of the order was
denied in the order of August 5, 1977 but the arraignment
was deferred to August 18, 1977 to afford nine for
petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate court.
A petition for certiorari and p rohibition with prayer for a
preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the accused in
the Court of Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
06978. In an order of August 17, 1977 the Court of Appeals
restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the
arraignment of the accused until further orders of the
Court. In a comment that was filed by the Solicitor General
he recommended that the petition be given due course. On
May 15, 1978 a decision was rendered by the Court of
Appeals granting the writ and perpetually restraining the
 judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment
of the accused in the case until the Department of Justice
shall have finally resolved the petition for review.
On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice,
Hon.Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the petition for review
reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal
the information filed against the accused. A motion to
dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the
Provincial Fiscal dated April 10, 1978 with the trial
court, attaching thereto a copy of the letter of
Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an order of August 2, 1978
the private prosecutor was given time to file an opposition
thereto. On November 24, 1978 the Judge denied the
motion and set the arraignment stating:
ORDER
For resolution is a motion to dismiss this rase filed by the
procuting fiscal premised on insufficiency of evidence, as
suggested by the Undersecretary of Justice, evident from
Annex "A" of the motion wherein, among other things, the
Fiscal is urged to move for dismissal for the reason that the
check involved having been issued for the p ayment of a
pre-existing obligation the Hability of the d rawer can only
be civil and not criminal.
The motion's thrust being to induce this Court to resolve
the innocence of the accused on evidence not before it but
on that adduced before t he Undersecretary of Justice, a
matter that not only disregards the requirements of due
process but also erodes the Court's independence and
integrity, the motion is considered as without merit and
therefore hereby DENIED.
WHEREFORE, let the arraignment be, as it is hereby set for
December 18, 1978 at 9:00 o'clock in t he morning.
SO ORDERED.
The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with petition for the issuance of preliminary
writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the
Court of Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-
08777. On January 23, 1979 a restraining order was issued
by the Court of Appeals against the threatened act of
arraignment of the accused until further orders from the
Court. In a decision of October 25, 1979 the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining

order of January 23, 1979. A motion for reconsideration of
said decision filed by the accused was denied in a resolution
of February 19, 1980.
Hence this petition for review of said decision was filed by
accused whereby petitioner prays that said decision be
reversed and set aside, respondent judge be perpetually
enjoined from enforcing his threat to proceed with the
arraignment and trial of petitioner in said criminal case,
declaring the information filed not valid and of no legal
force and effect, ordering respondent Judge to dismiss the
said case, and declaring the obligation of petitioner as
purely civil.
In a resolution of May 19, 1980, the Second Division of this
Court without giving due course to the petition required the
respondents to comment to the petition, not to file a motion
to dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice. In the
comment filed by the Solicitor General he recommends that
the petition be g iven due course, it being meritorious.
Private respondent through counsel filed his reply to the
comment and a separate comment to the petition asking
that the petition be dismissed. In the resolution of February
5, 1981, the Second Division of this C ourt resolved to
transfer this case to the Court En Banc. In the resolution of
February 26, 1981, the Court En Banc resolved to give due
course to the petition.
Petitioner and private respondent filed their respective
briefs while the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation in lieu
of brief reiterating that the decision of the respondent Court
of Appeals be reversed and that respondent Judge be
ordered to dismiss t he information.
It is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions either
commenced by complaint or by information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The
institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound
discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file the
complaint or information, follow or not follow that
presented by the offended pa rty, according to whether the
evidence in his opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the
guilt of the a ccused beyond reasonable doubt. The reason
for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and
control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded
prosecution by private persons. It cannot be controlled by
the complainant. Prosecuting officers under the power
vested in them by law, not only have the authority but also
the duty of p rosecuting persons who, according to the
evidence received from the complainant, are shown to be
guilty of a c rime committed within the jurisdiction of their
office. They have equally the legal duty not to prosecute
when after an investigation they become convinced that the
evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish a prima
facie case.
It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation that
the fiscal determines the existence of a puma facie case
that would warrant the p rosecution of a case. The Courts
cannot interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of
the criminal prosecution. It is not prudent or e ven
permissible for a Court to compel the fiscal to prosecute a
proceeding originally initiated by him on a n information, if
he finds that the evidence relied upon by him is insufficient
for conviction. Neither has the Court any power to order the
fiscal to prosecute or file an information within a certain
period of time, since this would interfere with the fiscal's
discretion and control of criminal prosecutions. Thus, a
fiscal who asks for the d ismissal of the case for insufficiency
of evidence has authority to do so, and Courts that grant
the same commit no error. The fiscal may re-investigate a
case and subsequently move for the dismissal should the
re-investigation show either that the defendant is innocent
or that his guilt may not be established beyond reasonable
doubt. In a clash of views between the judge who did not
investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and
the offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal's
should normally prevail. On the other hand, neither an
injunction, preliminary or final nor a writ of prohibition may
be issued by the courts to restrain a criminal
prosecution except in the extreme case where it is
necessary for the Courts to do so for the orderly
administration of justice or to prevent the use of the strong
arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner.
However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not
without any limitation or control. The same is subject to the
approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state
prosecutor as the case maybe and it may be elevated for
review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to
affirm, modify or reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal.
Consequently the Secretary of Justice may direct that a
motion to dismiss the case be filed in Court or otherwise,
that an information be filed in Court.
The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a
criminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over
the case, which is the a uthority to hear and determine the
case. When after the filing of the complaint or information a
warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial
court and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself
to the Court or was duly arrested, the Court thereby
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the
purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists
warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated
upon the filing of the information in the proper court. In
turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in
motion the criminal action against the accused in Court.
Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation
of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must
be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and
recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the
Court for appropriate action. While it is true that the fiscal
has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or
not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the
case had already been brought to Court whatever
disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case
thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the
Court, The only qualification is that the action of the Court
must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the
right of the People to due process of law.
Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and
whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a
review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to
dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the

exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it
and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the
proper determination of the case.
However, one may ask, if the trial court refuses to grant
the motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal upon the directive
of the Secretary of Justice will there not be a vacuum in the
prosecution? A state prosecutor to handle the case cannot
possibly be designated by the Secretary of Justice who does
not believe that there is a basis for prosecution nor can the
fiscal be expected to handle the prosecution of the case
thereby defying the superior order of the Secretary of
Justice.
The answer is simple. The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as
We all know is to see that justice is done and not
necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused
before the Courts. Thus, in spite of his opinion to the
contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the
presentation of evidence of the prosecution to the Court to
enable the Court to arrive at its own independent judgment
as to whether the a ccused should be convicted or acquitted.
The fiscal should not shirk from the responsibility of
appearing for the People of the Philippines even under such
circumstances much less should he abandon the
prosecution of the case leaving it to the hands of a private
prosecutor for then the entire proceedings will be null and
void. The least that the fiscal should do is to continue to
appear for the p rosecution although he may turn over the
presentation of the evidence to the private prosecutor but
still under his direction and control.
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a
complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of
the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the
accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although
the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already
in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court.
The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the
case before it. The determination of the case is within its
exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss
the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court
who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not
matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the
accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation
or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the records of the investigation.
In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the
opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action
of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the
Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain
from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the
action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has
already been filed in Court. The matter should be left
entirely for the determination of the Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit
without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
STATE PROSECUTOR RINGCAR B. PINOTE,
Petitioner v. JUDGE ROBERTO L. AYCO, Respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-05-1944
[Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 05-2189-RTJ]
December 13, 2005
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On August 13 and 20, 2004, Judge Roberto L. Ayco
of Branch 26, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of South Cotabato
allowed the defense in Criminal Case No. 1771 TB, “People
v. Vice Mayor Salvador Ramos, et al.,” for violation of
Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, to present
evidence consisting of the testimony of two witnesses, even
in the absence of St ate Prosecutor Ringcar B. Pinote who
was prosecuting the case.
State Prosecutor Pinote was on August 13 a nd 20,
2004 undergoing medical treatment at the Philippine Heart
Center in Quezon City, hence, his absence during the
proceedings on the said dates.
On the subsequent scheduled hearings of t he
criminal case on August 27, October 1, 15 and 29, 2004,
State Prosecutor Pinote refused to cross-examine the two
defense witnesses, despite being ordered by Judge Ayco, he
maintaining that the proceedings conducted on August 13
and 20, 2004 in his absence were void.
State Prosecutor Pinote subsequently filed a
Manifestation on November 12, 2004 before the trial court,
he restating why he was not present on August 13 and 20,
2004, and reiterating his position that Judge Ayco’s act of
allowing the defense to present evidence in his absence was
erroneous and highly irregular. He thus prayed that he
should not be “coerced” to cross-examine those two
defense witnesses and that their testimonies be stricken off
the record.
By Order issued also on November 12, 2004, Judge
Ayco, glossing over the Manifestation, considered the
prosecution to have waived its right t o cross-examine the
two defense witnesses.
Hence, arose the present administrative complaint
lodged by State Prosecutor Pinote (complainant) against
Judge Ayco (respondent), for “Gross Ignorance of the Law,
Grave Abuse of Authority and Serious Misconduct.”  
By Comment dated March 18, 2005, respondent
proffers that complainant filed the complaint “to save his
face and cover up for his incompetence and lackadaisical
handling of the prosecution” of the criminal case as in fact
complainant was, on the request of the Provincial Governor
of South Cotabato, relieved as prosecutor in the case by the
Secretary of Justice.
And respondent informs that even after complainant
was already relieved as the prosecutor in the case, he filed
a motion for his inhibition without setting it for hearing.
On the above-said Manifestation filed by complainant
before the trial court on November 12, 2004, respondent
brands the same as “misleading” and “highly questionable,”
complainant’s having undergone medical treatment at the
Philippine Heart Center on August 13 and 20, 2004 having
been relayed to the trial court only on said date.

  On his Order considering the prosecution to have
waived presenting evidence, respondent justifies the same
on complainant’s failure to formally offer the evi dence for
the prosecution despite several extensions of time granted
for the purpose.
Finally, respondent proffers that no substantial
prejudice was suffered by the prosecution for complainant
was permitted to cross examine the two defense witnesses
but he refused to do so.
By way of counter-complaint, respondent charges
complainant with “Contempt of Court” and “Grave
Misconduct” and/or “Conduct Unbecoming of a Member of
the Bar and as an Officer of the Court.”  of the Philippines as a whole and not merely to the person
On evaluation of the case, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), citing Section 5, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rule on Criminal Procedure, finds respondent to
have breached said rule and accordingly recommends that
he be reprimanded therefor, with warning that a repetition
of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
Rule 110, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure reads:
Sec. 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. - All
criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information
shall be prosecuted under the d irection and control of the
prosecutor. In case of heavy work schedule or in the event
of lack of p ublic prosecutors, the private prosecutor may be
authorized in writing by the C hief of the Prosecution Office
or the Regional State Prosecution Office to prosecute the
case subject to the approval of the Court. Once so
authorized to prosecute the criminal action, the private
prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case up to the
end of the trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor,
unless the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn.
x x x (Underscoring supplied)
Thus, as a general rule, all criminal actions shall be
prosecuted under the control and direction of the public
prosecutor.
If the schedule of the public prosecutor does not
permit, however, or in case there are no public prosecutors,
a private prosecutor may be a uthorized in writing by the
Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State
Prosecution Office to prosecute the case, subject to the
approval of the court. Once so authorized, the private
prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case until the
termination of the trial even in the absence of a public
prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise
withdrawn.
Violation of criminal laws is an affront to the People
directly prejudiced, he being merely the complaining
witness.  It is on this account that the presence of a public
prosecutor in the trial of c riminal cases is necessary to
protect vital state interests, foremost of which is its interest
to vindicate the rule of law, the bedrock of peace of the
people.  DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Respondent’s act of allowing the presentation of the
defense witnesses in the absence of complainant public
prosecutor or a private prosecutor designated for the
purpose is thus a clear transgression of the Rules which
could not be rectified b y subsequently giving the
prosecution a chance to cross-examine the witnesses.
Respondent’s intention to uphold the righ t of the
accused to a speedy disposition of the case, no matter how
noble it may be, cannot justify a breach of the Rules. If the
accused is entitled to due process, so is the State.
Respondent’s lament about complainant’s failure to
inform the court of his inability to attend the August 13 and
20, 2004 hearings or to file a motion for postponement
thereof or to subsequently file a motion for reconsideration
of his Orders allowing the defense to present its two
witnesses on said dates may be mitigating. It does not
absolve respondent of his utter disregard of the Rules.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Roberto L. Ayco is
hereby ordered to pay a fine FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P5,000.00) with warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Respecting the counter-complaint against
complainant State Prosecutor Ringcar B. Pinote, respondent
is advised that the same should be lodged before the
Secretary of Justice.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179497
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee v.
RENANDANG MAMARUNCAS, Piagapo, Lanao del Sur;
PENDATUM AMPUAN, Piagapo, Lanao del Sur;
Appellants
and BAGINDA PALAO (at large), Alias “Abdul Wahid
Sultan”, Accused.
01/25/12
DECISION
The assessment of the credibility of witnesses by the trial
court is the center of this controversy. The well-known rule,
though subject to certain recognized exceptions, is that
findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses
are matters best left to the trial court. Hence, “[u]nless
certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which,
if considered, might affect the result of the case, the trial
court’s assessment must be respected.”  
Assailed in the present appeal is the June 30, 2006 Decision
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00196
which affirmed with modification the July 19, 1999
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iligan City,
Branch 06 in Criminal Case No. 06-6150 convicting
Renandang Mamaruncas (Mamaruncas) and Pendatum
Ampuan (Ampuan) (appellants) of the crime of murder.
On February 9, 1996, the following Information for murder
was filed against Mamaruncas, Baginda Palao (Palao) alias
Abdul Wahid Sultan and Ampuan.

That on or about February 1, 1996, in the City of Iligan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, except for others whose cases are
still under preliminary investigation, conspiring with and
confederating together and mutually helping each other,
armed with deadly weapon, to wit: a caliber .45 pistol, by
means of treachery and evident premeditation, and with
intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, shoot and wound one Baudelio R.
Batoon, thereby inflicting upon him the following physical
injuries, to wit:
Cardio respiratory arrest
Hypovolemic shock
Multiple gunshot wound
which caused his death.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code with the aggravating circumstances of treachery
and evident premeditation.
Only Mamaruncas and Ampuan appeared at the scheduled
arraignment on May 20, 1996. Their co-accused, Palao alias
Abdul Wahid Sultan (Abdul), remains at large. Appellants
pleaded not guilty and trial proceeded against them.
Factual Antecedents
The facts of the case, as summarized by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) in its brief and substantiated by the
transcripts of stenographic notes of the proceedings, are as
follows:
Around noontime on February 1, 1996, Baudelio Batoon,
Richard Batoon, Juanito Gepayo and a certain “Nito” were
working on vehicles inside Baudelio Batoon’s auto repair
shop situated along the highway in Tubod, Baraas, Iligan
City.
Baginda Palao then entered the shop accompanied by
appellants Renandang Mamaruncas and Pendatum Ampuan.
Baginda Palao wore desert camouflage fatigues; while his
two (2) companions wore Philippine Army tropical green
fatigues. Baginda Palao showed Baudelio Batoon an arrest
warrant and told the latter he was serving it against
Batoon.
The arrival of Baginda Palao’s group prompted Juanito
Gepayo and Richard Batoon to stop t heir work and observe
what was happening.
Baudelio Batoon told Baginda Palao to just wait awhile, as
they would settle the matter after he [Batoon] [finishes]
tuning-up an engine he had been working on.
Baginda Palao reacted by slapping the victim’s stomach and
pointing a .45 caliber p istol at him. Baudelio Batoon then
tried to grab Palao’s gun, causing the two of them to
grapple for the same. As these two wrestled for control of
the gun, Renandang Mamaruncas, who was behind Baudelio
Batoon, shot from behind Batoon’s right thigh with a .38
cal. homemade gun. Pendatum Ampuan, who was also
standing behind Baudelio Batoon, followed up by shooting
Batoon’s left arm pit with a .45 cal. [homemade] pistol.
Baudelio Batoon fell to the ground and Baginda Palao
finished [him off] with a single .45 cal. shot to the back.
Juanito Gepayo and Richard Batoon saw the entire scene,
stunned and unable to do anything. From their vantage
points three (3) to four (4) meters away, these witnesses
had a clear and unobstructed view of the entire incident.
Meanwhile, Police Inspector Graciano Mijares, then
Commanding Officer of the Iligan City PNP Mobile Force
Company, was riding a civilian car a long the highway,
heading towards Iligan City proper. He was accompanied by
his driver, SPO3 William Yee, and SPO3 George Alejo. They
heard the gunshots emanating from the auto repair shop at
Baraas, prompting Inspector Mijares to order his driver to
stop the car. They alighted and proceeded to the source of
the gunshots. At the repair shop, they saw three (3) men in
camouflage gear with guns drawn and pointed at a person
already lying on the ground. Inspector Mijares’ group
shouted at the camouflaged gunmen to stop what they
were doing and to drop their firearms, at the same time
announcing that they (Mijares’ group) were policemen.  Baraas. They stopped at a crossing and Abdul Wahid and
The camouflaged gunmen reacted by firing at the
policemen. The latter fired back. During the e xchange of
gunfire, Baginda Palao ran behind the Batoon house, while
Renandang Mamaruncas and Pendatum Ampuan ran
towards the road and a nearby car. Inspector Mijares was
able to hit Mamaruncas and Ampuan, while SPO3 Yee
likewise hit Ampuan. Mamaruncas, who managed to get
inside the car, and Ampuan were then captured by the
policemen. The lawmen also gave chase to Baginda Palao;
but he escaped.
Other responding policemen brought Mamaruncas and
Ampuan to the hospital for treatment and they were
eventually placed under detention. Baudelio Batoon was
brought to the hospital by his wife; but he was pronounced
dead on arrival.
Based on the necropsy examination of the victim’s body,
Dr. Leonardo Labanen established that the three (3)
gunshot wounds found on the body of B audelio Batoon (i.e.,
at the right thigh, left armpit and back) were inflicted at
close range due to the presence, or at least traces, of
gunpowder burns.
Only appellants testified for their defense. Their
testimonies, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows:
Accused Renandang Mamaruncas testified that he is 34
years old, married, carpenter and a resident of Piagapo,
Lanao del Sur. On the morning of February 1, 1996, he was
in Marawi City. He decided to come down to Iligan City to
see a movie. He left Marawi at 7:00 a.m. and upon arrival
at the Tambacan terminal in Iligan City, he went to the
house of his cousin. Later, he changed his mind about going
to a movie and returned to the Tambacan terminal in order
to go back to Marawi City. At about 11:30 a.m., Abdul
Wahid Sultan arrived with Pendatum Ampuan on board a
car driven by Aminola. Abdul Wahid invited him to go with
them because he will collect some money and afterwards
they will have some enjoyment. He agreed and sat at the
rear seat behind the driver. Abdul Wahid was at the front
seat with Pendatum behind at the back seat. They drove to

Pendatum Ampuan alighted. Before walking away, Abdul
Wahid handed to Renandang a . 38 cal[.] revolver with
instructions to remain in the car a nd [keep] watch. At first
he refused but Abdul Wahid insisted so he accepted the
gun. Abdul Wahid and Pendatum walked to the shop leaving
the rear right door open. About ten minutes later, he heard
three gunshots. He moved to the rear seat where the door
was open and saw p olicemen, who arrived and surrounded
the car. He placed the gun on the seat and raised his hands
as a sign of surrender. Then with his right hand, he closed
the car door. Just as the door closed, the policemen shot
him on the forearm and chest below the right nipple. He
lost consciousness and regained it only at the hospital.
He further testified that Abdul Wahid Sultan is an old friend.
He is also known as Baginda Palao. Pendatum Ampuan is
not known as Abdul Wahid Sultan.
He also declared that the statement of Juanito Gepayo that
only Abdul Wahid Sultan and Pendatum Ampuan entered
the shop and shot Baudelio Batoon is true and that the
testimony of P/Insp. Mijares that he also shot the victim is
not true. He denied any part in the shooting to death of
Baudelio Batoon.
Accused Pendatum Ampuan testified that he is 20 years
old, single, student and a resident of Piagapo, Lanao del
Sur. On January 31, 1996 at about 6:00 a.m., he left
Marawi City for Iligan City on board a passenger Armak
 jeepney. He alighted at the terminal behind the Gaisano
Superstore and at exactly 7:00 a.m., he entered the store
and went to t he upper storey to shop. When he came out,
he met a friend name[d] Bessah. Together they walked to
the Maharlika Theater but then Bessah expressed the
intention to go home to Marawi City. He accompanied
Bessah to the Tambacan terminal. Then he proceeded to
the house of his Uncle Ali in Cabaro. (This is a place North
of the city and at the opposite side from Tambacan which is
South of the city). He arrived there at noon. He stayed
overnight at his Uncle Ali’s house. At about 9:00 a.m., the
following day, February 1, 1996, he left the house of his
uncle. Outside, he met Baginda Palao, who was looking for
a certain Baser, a policeman. He wanted the latter to help
him collect a debt. They went to the terminal at the back of
Gaisano store but did not find Baser. Baginda told him to
wait while he will look for Baser inside the Gaisano store.
Baginda returned without having found Baser and once
again he told him to wait while Baginda will look for a car. A
little later, Baginda returned on board a car driven by one
Aminola Basar. They went to the Tambacan terminal but
again did not find Baser. Instead, they saw Renandang
Mamaruncas. Baginda invited the latter to go with them to
Baraas to collect a debt. Renandang entered the car and
they proceeded to Baraas. The car stopped at a place near
a shop. Baginda instructed him and Renandang to remain in
the car because he was going out to collect the debt.
Baginda left the car and entered the shop. About ten
minutes later, he heard shouting followed by gunfire. He
stepped out of the car to verify and saw Baginda Palao
[shoot] the victim. He retreated to the car as the police led
by Capt. Mijares arrived. They confiscated the car key and
arrested them except Baginda Palao who escaped. They
were taken to the hospital due to injuries. In his case, the
sustained wounds when mauled by the children of t he
victim but in another breath he admitted that his injury was
a gunshot wound when he was caught in the cross fire as
the police shot Renandang Mamaruncas. He was inside the
car when he was hit. He further admitted that Baginda
Palao is known as Abdul Wahid Sultan. He denied shooting
Baudelio Batoon.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC debunked appellants’ defense of denial and held
them guilty as principals by direct participation in the killing
of Baudelio Batoon (Baudelio). It gave full faith and
credence to the evidence of t he prosecution especially on
the presence of conspiracy among the malefactors and
rendered a verdict of conviction, thus:
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Renandang
Mamaruncas and Pendatum Ampuan GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of murder
qualified by treachery defined and penalized in Art. 248 of
the Revised Penal Code as amended, without the presence
of any other aggravating circumstances and hereby
sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA with the corresponding accessory penalties
attached thereto by law and to indemnify the Heirs of
Baudelio Batoon the sums of:
P10,200,000.00 for and as loss of support;
P66,904.00 for and as actual damages;
P50,000.00 as death indemnity and
P100,000.00 for and as moral damages
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Cost against the accused.
Having been under preventive detention since February 1,
1996, the period of such detention shall b e credited in full
in favor of said accused in the service of their respective
sentences.
SO ORDERED.
In view of the Notice of Appeal filed by the appellants, the
RTC forwarded the records of the case to this Court. By
Resolution dated January 31, 2000, the Court resolved to
accept the appeal. In view thereof, appellants were
required to file their brief. Appellants thus filed their brief
on November 20, 2000 while the OSG submitted t he Brief
for the Plaintiff-Appellee on May 2, 2001. Later, however,
consonant with this Court’s pronouncement in People v.
Mateo the case was transferred to the CA for appropriate
action and disposition.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
By Decision promulgated on June 30, 2006, the appeals
court affirmed with modification the RTC Decision. Said
court ruled that the inconsistencies in the p rosecution
witnesses’ testimonies pointed out by the appellants pertain
only to minor and collateral matters which do not dilute the
probative weight of said test imonies. Regarding the
erroneous designation of appellant Ampuan’s name in the
Information, the court went on to hold that such error was

only a formal defect and the proper correction of which was
duly made without any objection on the part of the defense.
The CA likewise held that treachery attended the
commission of the crime.
The decretal portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby
DISMISSED and the questioned Judgment dated July 19,
1999 of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Appellants Renandang Mamaruncas and
Pendatum Ampuan are found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of murder as defined in Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 and are
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The appellants are to pay, jointly and severally,
the heirs of Baudelio Batoon the amount of P50,000.00 by
way of civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages and P66,904.00 as
actual damages.
SO ORDERED.
Disgruntled, appellants are now again before t his Court in
view of their Notice of Appeal from the Decision of the CA.
By Resolution dated November 19, 2007, this Court notified
the parties that they may file their respective supplemental
briefs within 30 days from notice. In their respective
manifestations, the parties opted to adopt the briefs they
earlier filed as their supplemental briefs.
In their brief, appellants assign the following errors:
That the trial court e rred in convicting [them] when they
should have been acquitted for fa ilure of the prosecution to
prove its case beyond reasonable doubt; and
The information filed before the t rial court was substantially
defective.
The basic thrust of appellants’ first assignment of error is
the credibility of the p rosecution witnesses. Appellants
contend that the trial court anchored its finding and
conclusion on the testimonies of witnesses Juanito Gepayo
(Gepayo), Richard Batoon (Batoon) and P/Sr. Insp.
Graciano Mijares (Mijares), who appear to be inconsistent in
their stand and whose credibility is the refore assailable.
They question the prosecution witnesses’ identification of
Abdul and Ampuan as one and the same person and aver
that the same only leads to the logical conclusion that said
witnesses were perjured witnesses. They argue that
Ampuan failed to grasp the information read to him as he
was arraigned as “Abdul Wahid Sultan alias Pendatum
Ampuan”.   details, they do not impair their credibility where there is
On the other hand, the OSG in praying for the affirmance of
the appealed Decision, opines that inconsistencies on minor
and collateral matters in the testimony of a prosecution
eyewitness do not affect his credibility. It also contends
that whatever defect the information subject of appellant
Ampuan’s arraignment has had been cured with the latter’s
consent during the trial.
Our Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
In support of their quest for acquittal, appellants tried to
cast doubt on the credibility of witness Gepayo anchored on
the following grounds: (1) there was serious inconsistency
in his testimony on whether he knew Ampuan before the
incident; (2) his actuation of just watching the incident
without giving any assistance to his fallen employer as well
as his immediate return to work t hereafter is contrary to
human nature and experience; (3) while he testified that
appellant Mamaruncas was one of the wounded suspects
during the encounter, he failed to identify him in court;
and, (4) in his affidavit, he identified Abdul and Ampuan as
one and the same person but later on testified to the
contrary.
Credibility of witnesses not affected b y minor
inconsistencies.
The perceived inconsistency on whether Gepayo knows
Ampuan even before the incident is inconsequential as to
discredit the credibility of Gepayo’s testimony. The
inconsistency pointed out by appellants pertains only to
collateral or trivial matters and has no substantial effect on
the nature of the offense. In fact, it even signifies that the
witness was neither coached nor was lying on the witness
stand. What matters is that there is no inconsistency in
Gepayo’s complete and vivid narration as far as the
principal occurrence and the positive identification of
Ampuan as one of the principal assailants are
concerned. “The Court has held that although there may be
inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses on minor
consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive
identification of the assailant.”  
It could be true that Gepayo did not retreat to a safer place
during the shooting incident and did not render assistance
to his wounded employer. To appellants, this reaction is
contrary to human nature. We believe otherwise. This
imputed omission, to our mind, does not necessarily
diminish the plausibility of Gepayo’s story let alone destroy
his credibility. To us, his reaction is within the bounds of
expected human behavior. Surely, he was afraid that they
might kill him because the malefactors were then armed
with guns. Thus, he would not dare attempt to stop them
and stake his life in the process. At any rate, it is settled
 “that different people react differently to a given situation
or type of situation, and there is no standard form of
human behavioral response when one is confronted with a
strange or startling or frightful experience. Witnessing a
crime is an unusual experience which elicits different
reactions from the witnesses and for which no clear -cut
standard form of behavior can be drawn.”  
The failure of Gepayo to identify Mamaruncas in court does
not bolster appellants’ cause. As the CA correctly pointed
out:
x x x We agree with the prosecution’s observation that
although he did not positively identify appellant
Mamaruncas as one of the shooters, he was however, able
to point out that there was a third person who accompanied
assailants Palao and Ampuan in approaching the victim
during the incident. This is also bolstered by Insp. Mijares

testimony that he saw three a ssailants pointing their guns
at the victim who was already lying prostrate on the
ground.
In any event, even without Gepayo’s identification of
Mamaruncas, the unrebutted testimony of another
prosecution eyewitness, Batoon, clearly points to
Mamaruncas as one of the assailants. Thus:
Q: After these three persons rather Abdul Wahid together
with two companions, presented the warrant of arrest to
your father, what happened thereafter?
A: They pulled their guns and pointed [them at] my father.
Q: Who pulled out .45 caliber gun [and pointed it at] your
father?
A: Abdul Wahid, Sir
Q: And what happened after the .45 pistol [was] pointed
[at] your father?
A: My father tried to [grab] the .45 caliber from Abdul
Wahid, Sir.
Q: What happened after?
A: My father was shot by one of his companion[s], Sir.
Q: Who [first shot] your father?
A: (Witness pointing to a person. [W]hen he was asked x x
x his name[,] he answered that he is Renandang
Mamaruncas)
xxxx
Q: After this Renandang Mamaruncas shot your father,
what happened thereafter?
A: The other companion fired the next shot (witness
pointing to a person sitting at the bench inside the
Courtroom and when he was asked x x x his name, he
answered that he is Pendatum [Ampuan].)
Undoubtedly, the testimonies of eyewitnesses Gepayo and
Batoon on material details are straightforward and
consistent with each other. They personally saw appellants
at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed.
Their combined declarations established beyond reasonable
doubt the identities of both appellants, along with their co-
accused Abdul, as the perpetrators of the crime.
As to the contention that Gepayo referred to Abdul Wahid
Sultan and Pendatum Ampuan as one and the same person
in his affidavit and yet later on testified to the contrary, this
Court finds the same inconsequential and will not outrightly
 justify the acquittal of an accused. In a very recent
case, this Court reiterated that as between an affidavit
executed outside the court and a testimony given in open
court, the latter almost always prevails. It emphasized
therein that:
Discrepancies between a sworn statement and testimony in
court do not outrightly justify the acquittal of an accused.
Such discrepancies do not necessarily discredit the witness
since ex parte affidavits are often incomplete. They do not
purport to contain a complete compendium of the details of
the event narrated by the affiant. Thus, our rulings
generally consider sworn statements taken out of court to
be inferior to in court testimony (citation omitted).
The evidence at hand, moreover, clearly points out that it
was the police officers who supplied the names of the
suspects in Gepayo’s affidavit.  
Any alleged defect in the Information deemed waived.
Anent the second assigned error, appellants aver that the
Information filed before the trial court was substantially
defective considering that it accuses Abdul a nd Ampuan as
one and the same person when in fact they were identified
as different persons. As such, Ampuan was not able to
comprehend the Information read to him.
The Court cannot accord merit to this a rgument. It is well
to note that appellants failed to raise the issue of the
defective Information before the trial court through a
motion for bill of particulars or a motion to quash the
information. Their failure to object to the a lleged defect
before entering their pleas of not guilty amounted to a
waiver of the defect in the Information. “Objections as to
matters of form or substance in the [I]nformation cannot
be made for the first time on appeal.”  Records even show
that the Information was accordingly amended during trial
to rectify this alleged defect but appellants did not
comment thereon, viz:
FISCAL ROBERTO ALBULARIO:
Per manifestation and admission of this witness, the
Information be amended from [Renandang] Mamaruncas
and the word and, it should be Bagindo [sic] Palao alias
Abdul Wahid Sultan and the alias Pendatum Ampuan be
erased as corrected.
COURT:
Any comment from the accused.
ATTY. FIDEL MACAUYAG:
No comment, Your Honor.
Treachery correctly appreciated.
From the evidence and as found by the trial court and
affirmed by the appellate court, the facts sufficiently prove
that treachery was employed by appe llants. The attack on
Baudelio was so swift and unexpected, affording the
hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no opportunity
to resist or defend himself. As ruled by the trial court:
In the above situation, treachery was considered to exist.
More so in this case when the victim was completely
without any weapon from the inception of the assault. At
the moment when Pendatum Ampuan a nd Renandang
Mamaruncas shot him, Baudelio Batoon was not in any
position to defend himself. And when Abdul Wahid shot him
while lying wounded on the ground, he was utterly
defenseless.
Hence, both lower courts correctly found appellants guilty
of murder in view of the presence of treachery.

Conspiracy was duly proven.
We also sustain the finding of conspiracy. Conspiracy exists
 “when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a
crime is not necessary x x x [as it] may be shown through
circumstantial evidence, deduced from the mode and
manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred
from the acts of the accused themselves when such lead to
a joint purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interest.”   enumerated circumstances under the aforesaid Article is
In this case, conspiracy was clearly established. All three
accused entered the shop of Baudelio at the same time.
Ampuan shot Baudelio from behind, hitting the latter at his
left armpit while Mamaruncas shot Baudelio on the thigh.
When Baudelio fell to the ground face down, Abdul shot him
at the back. These consecutive acts undoubtedly showed
appellants’ unanimity in design, intent and execution. They
performed specific acts with such closeness and
coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose
and design in the commission of the crime.
The Court thus sees no cogent reason to disturb the
findings of the RTC and the CA considering that they are
based on existing evidence and reasonable
conclusions drawn therefrom. It has been held time and
again that factual findings of the trial court, its assessment
of the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of
their testimonies and the conclusions based on these
factual findings are to be given the highest respect. As a
rule, the Court will not weigh anew the evidence already
passed on by the trial court and affirmed by the CA. Though
the rule is subject to exceptions, no such exceptional
grounds obtain in this case.
Against the damning evidence adduced by the prosecution,
appellants could only muster mere denial. As ruled in
various cases by the Court, denial, if unsubstantiated by
clear and convincing evidence is inherently a weak defense
as it is negative and self-serving. “As between the
categorical testimony that rings of truth on one hand, and a
bare denial on the other, the former is generally held to
prevail.”   official receipts. To be entitled to an award of actual
The Penalty
Undoubtedly, the crime committed is murder in view of the
attending aggravating circumstance of treachery. Murder,
as defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended, is the unlawful killing of a person which is not
parricide or infanticide, provided that treachery, inter alia,
attended the killing. The presence of any one of the
enough to qualify a killing as murder punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death. Since only the qualifying
circumstance of treachery is found to be p resent, both the
RTC and the CA p roperly imposed the penalty
of reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code. Moreover, Section 3 of Republic Act No.
934 provides:
Section 3. Persons convicted of offenses punishable
with reclusion perpetua or whose sentences will be reduced
to reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act, shall not be
eligible for parole under Act No. 4103 otherwise known as
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
Pursuant to the above provision, appellants are therefore
not eligible for parole.
Awards of Damages
The Court modifies the award of civil indemnity in the
amount of P50,000.00. In line with prevailing
 jurisprudence, said award is increased to P75,000.00.
Anent the award of moral d amages, the CA correctly
imposed the amount of P50,000.00. These “awards are
mandatory without need of allegation and p roof other than
the death of the victim, owing to the fact of the commission
of murder or homicide.”  
Anent the award of actual damages, the victim’s widow
testified that the family spent a total of P66,904.00 relative
to the wake and burial of the victim. However, the claim for
said amount is supported merely by a list of
expenses personally prepared by the widow instead of
damages, “it is necessary to prove the actual amount of
loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon
competent proof and on the best e vidence obtainable x x
x.”   “A list of expenses cannot replace receipts when the
latter should have been issued as a matter of course in
business transactions.”  Thus the Court deletes the lower
courts’ award of actual damages. Nonetheless, since
entitlement of the same is shown under the facts of the
case, temperate damages in the amount
of P25,000.00 should be awarded in lieu of actual damages
to the heirs of the victim pursuant to Article 2224 of the
Civil Code which provides that temperate damages “may be
recovered when the court finds that pecuniary loss has
been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the
case, be proved with certainty.”  
The CA correctly deleted the indemnity for loss of earning
capacity awarded by the t rial court. Such indemnity cannot
be awarded in t he absence of documentary evidence except
where the victim was either self-employed or a daily wage
worker earning less than the minimum wage under current
labor laws.
As testified to by the widow, Florenda Batoon, the victim
was earning a monthly income of P20,000.00
and P90,000.00 as an auto repair shop and a six-wheeler
truck operator, respectively. The trial court made a
conservative estimate of P500.00 a day as the net income
from the truck alone after making reasonable deductions
from its operation. Thus, ranged against the d aily minimum
wage then prevailing in Region X which is P137.00 per day
pursuant to Wage Order No. RX-03, this case undoubtedly
does not fall under the exceptions where indemnity for loss
of earning capacity can be given despite the lack of
documentary evidence.
The Court sustains the award of exemplary damages in
view of the proven qualifying circumstance of treachery.
The CA however awarded exemplary damages to the heirs
of the victim in the amount of P25,000.00. To conform with

prevailing jurisprudence, the Court increases this amount
to P30,000.00.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the June 30, 2006
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
00196 which found appellants Renandang Mamaruncas and
Pendatum Ampuan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder is AFFIRMED with further MODIFICATIONS as
follows:
1. Appellants are sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole;
2. The award of civil indemnity is increased to P75,000.00;
3. The award of P66,904.00 as actual damages is deleted;
4. P25,000.00 as temperate damages is awarded in lieu of
actual damages;
5. The award of exemplary damages is increased
to P30,000.00; and
6. Appellants are further ordered to pay the heirs of the
victim interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of
6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G. R. No. 195002, January 25, 2012]
HECTOR TREÑAS, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISIO N
SERENO, J.:
Where life or liberty is affected by its proceedings, courts
must keep strictly within the limits of the law authorizing
them to take jurisdiction and to try the case and render
 judgment thereon.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to a nnul
and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision dated 9
July 2010 and Resolution dated 4 January 2011.
Statement of the Facts and of the Case
The pertinent facts, as found by the CA, are as follows:
Sometime in December 1999, Margarita Alocilja (Margarita)
wanted to buy a house-and-lot in Iloilo City covered by TCT
No. 109266. It was then mortgaged with Ma ybank. The
bank manager Joselito Palma recommended the appellant
Hector Treñas (Hector) to private complainant Elizabeth,
who was an employee and niece of Margarita, for advice
regarding the transfer of the title in the latter's name.
Hector informed Elizabeth that for the titling of the property
in the name of her aunt Margarita, the following expenses
would be incurred:
P20,000.00- Attorney's fees,
P90,000.00- Capital Gains Tax,
P24,000.00- Documentary Stamp,
P10,000.00- Miscellaneous Expenses.
Thereafter, Elizabeth gave P150,000.00 to Hector who
issued a corresponding receipt dated December 22, 1999
and prepared [a] Deed of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage. Subsequently, Hector gave Elizabeth Revenue
Official Receipt Nos. 00084370 for P96,000.00 and
00084369 for P24,000.00. However, when she consulted
with the BIR, she was informed that the receipts were fake.
When confronted, Hector admitted to her that the receipts
were fake and that he used the P120,000.00 for his other
transactions. Elizabeth demanded the return of the money.
To settle his accounts, appellant Hector issued in favor of
Elizabeth a Bank of C ommerce check No. 0042856 dated
November 10, 2000 in the amount of P120,000.00,
deducting from P150,000.00 the P30,000.00 as attorney's
fees. When the check was deposited with the PCIBank,
Makati Branch, the same was dishonored for t he reason
that the account was closed. Notwithstanding repeated
formal and verbal demands, appellant failed to pay. Thus,
the instant case of Estafa was filed against him.
On 29 October 2001, an Information was filed by the Office
of the City Prosecutor before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
both of Makati City. The Information reads as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1999, in the
City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
 jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, received in trust from ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the
amount of P150,000.00 which money was given to her by
her aunt Margarita Alocilja, with the express obligation on
the part of the accused to use the said amount for
expenses and fees in connection with the p urchase of a
parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-109266, but the said
accused, once in possession of the said amount, with the
intent to gain and abuse of confidence, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate,
misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit
the amount of P130,000.00 less attorney's fees and the
said accused failed and refused and still fails and refuses to
do so, to the damage and prejudice of complainant
Elizabeth Luciaja and Margarita Alocilja in t he
aforementioned amount of P130,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
During arraignment on 26 April 2002, petitioner, acting as
his own counsel, entered a plea of "Not Guilty." Allegedly
due to old age and poor health, and the fact that he lives in
Iloilo City, petitioner was unable to attend the pre-trial and
trial of the case.
On 8 January 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision finding
petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa under section 1,
paragraph (b), of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), with the dispositive portion as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is
rendered finding accused Hector Trenas guilty of the crime
of Estafa with abuse of confidence as penalized under
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, and which offense
was committed in the manner described in t he
aforementioned information. As a consequence of this

 judgment, accused Hector Trenas is sentenced to suffer a
penalty of Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day of Prision
Mayor to Seventeen (17) Years and F our (4) Months
of Reclusion Temporal. Moreover, he is ordered to
indemnify private complainant Elizabeth Luciaja the amount
of P130,000.00 with interest at the legal rate of 12% per
annum, reckoned from the date this case was filed until the
amount is fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
We note at this point that petitioner has been variably
called Treñas and Trenas in the pleadings and court
issuances, but for consistency, we use the name "Treñas",
under which he was accused in t he Information.
On 24 August 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which was denied by the RTC in a
Resolution dated 2 July 2008.
On 25 September 2008, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal
before the RTC. The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CR
No. 32177. On 9 July 2010, the CA rendered a
Decision affirming that of the RTC. On 4 August 2010,
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was
denied by the CA in a Resolution dated 4 January 2011.
On 25 January 2011, petitioner filed a Motion for Extension
of Time to F ile Petition for Review on Certiorari before this
Court. He asked for a period of 15 days within which to file
a petition for review, and the Court granted his motion in a
Resolution dated 9 February 2011.
On 3 February 2011, petitioner filed his Petition for Review
on Certiorari before this Court, with the following
assignment of errors:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT AN
ACCUSED HAS TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE
DEFENSE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION EVEN IF SUCH LACK
OF JURISDICTION APPEARS IN THE EVIDENCE OF THE
PROSECUTION;
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT
DEMAND MADE BY A PERSON OTHER THAN THE
AGGRIEVED PARTY SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENT OF
DEMAND TO CONSTITUTE THE OFFENSE OF ESTAFA;
On the first issue, petitioner a sserts that nowhere in the
evidence presented by the prosecution does it show that
P150,000 was given to and received b y petitioner in Makati
City. Instead, the evidence shows that the Receipt issued
by petitioner for the money was dated 22 December 1999,
without any indication of the place where it was issued.
Meanwhile, the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage
prepared by petitioner was signed a nd notarized in Iloilo
City, also on 22 December 1999. Petitioner claims that t he
only logical conclusion is that the money was actually
delivered to him in Iloilo City, e specially since his residence
and office were situated there as well. Absent any direct
proof as to the place of delivery, one must rely on the
disputable presumption that things happened according to
the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.
The only time Makati City was mentioned was with respect
to the time when the check provided by petitioner was
dishonored by Equitable-PCI Bank in its De la Rosa-Rada
Branch in Makati. Petitioner asserts that the prosecution
witness failed to allege that any of the acts material to the
crime of estafahad occurred in Makati City. Thus, the trial
court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioner thus argues that an accused is not required to
present evidence to prove lack of jurisdiction, when such
lack is already indicated in the prosecution evidence.
As to the second issue, petitioner claims that the amount of
P150,000 actually belongs to Ma rgarita. Assuming there
was misappropriation, it was actually she - not Elizabeth -
who was the offended pa rty. Thus, the latter's demand
does not satisfy the requirement of prior demand by the
offended party in the offense of estafa. Even assuming that
the demand could have been properly made by Elizabeth,
the demand referred to the amount of P120,000, instead of
P150,000. Finally, there is no showing that the d emand was
actually received by petitioner. The signature on t he
Registry Return Receipt was not proven to be that of
petitioner's.
On 30 May 2011, this Court issued a Resolution directing
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file the latter's
Comment on the Petition. On 27 July 2011, the OSG filed a
Motion for Extension, praying for an additional period of 60
days within which to submit its Comment. This motion was
granted in a Resolution dated 12 September 2011. On 23
September 2011, the OSG filed a Motion for Special
Extension, requesting an additional period of five days. On
29 September 2011, it filed its Comment on the Petition.
In its Comment, the OSG asserts that the RTC did not err in
convicting petitioner as charged. The OSG notes that
petitioner does not dispute the factual findings of the trial
court with respect to the delivery of P150,000 to him, and
that there was a relationship of trust and confidence
between him and Elizabeth. With respect to his claim that
the Complaint should have been filed in Iloilo City, his claim
was not supported by any piece of evidence, as he did not
present any. Further, petitioner is, in effect, asking the
Court to weigh the credibility of the prosecution witness,
Elizabeth. However, the trial court's assessment of the
credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight, unless
tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
circumstance, which is not the case here.
With respect to the second issue, the OSG stresses that the
defense of "no valid demand" was not raised in the lower
court. Nevertheless, the demand letter sent to Elizabeth
suffices, as she is also one of the complainants alleged in
the Information, as an agent of Margarita. Moreover, no
proof was adduced as to the genuineness of petitioner's
signature in the Registry Return Receipt of t he demand
letter.
The OSG, however, submits that the Court may recommend
petitioner for executive clemency, in view of his a dvanced
age and failing health.
The Court's Ruling

 
The Petition is impressed with merit.
Review of Factual Findings
While the Petition raises questions of law, the resolution of
the Petition requires a review of the factual findings of the
lower courts and the evidence upon which they are based.
As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition
for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In many
instances, however, this Court has laid down exceptions to
this general rule, as follows:
(1) When the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and
the trial court are contradictory;
(2) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or c onjectures;
(3) When the inference made by the Court of Appeals from
its findings of fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible;
(4) When there is grave abuse of discretion in the
appreciation of facts;
(5) When the appellate court, in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case, and such findings are
contrary to the admissions of both appellant a nd
appellee;
(6) When the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised
on misapprehension of facts;
(7) When the Court of Appeals failed to notice certain
relevant facts which, if p roperly considered, would
ustify a different conclusion;
(8) When the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;
(9) When the findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of the specific e vidence on which they are
based; and
(10)When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
premised on the absence of e vidence but such findings
are contradicted by the evidence on record.
In this case, the findings of fact of the trial court and the
CA on the issue of the place of commission of the offense
are conclusions without any citation of the specific e vidence
on which they are based; they are grounded on conclusions
and conjectures.
The trial court, in its Decision, ruled on the commission of
the offense without any finding as to where it was
committed:
Based on the evidence presented by the prosecution
through private complainant Elizabeth Luciaja, the Court is
convinced that accused Trenas had committed the offense
of Estafa by taking advantage of her trust so that he could
misappropriate for his own personal benefit the amount
entrusted to him for payment of the capital gains tax and
documentary stamp tax.
As clearly narrated by private complainant Luciaja, after
accused Trenas had obtained the amount of P150,000.00
from her, he gave her two receipts purportedly issued by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, for the fraudulent purpose
of fooling her and making her believe that he had complied
with his duty to pay the aforementioned taxes. Eventually,
private complainant Luciaja discovered that said receipts
were fabricated documents.
In his Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, petitioner
raised the argument that it had no jurisdiction over the
offense charged. The trial court denied the motion, without
citing any specific evidence upon which its findings were
based, and by relying on conjecture, thus:
That the said amount was given to [Treñas] in Makati City
was incontrovertibly established by the prosecution.
Accused Treñas, on the other hand, never appeared in
Court to present countervailing evidence. It is only now that
he is suggesting another possible scenario, not based on
the evidence, but on mere "what ifs". x x x
Besides, if this Court were to seriously assay his assertions,
the same would still not warrant a reversal of the assailed
 judgment. Even if the Deed of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage was executed on 22 December 999 in Iloilo City,
it cannot preclude the fact that the P150,000.00 was
delivered to him by private complainant Luciaja in Makati
City the following day. His reasoning the money must have
been delivered to him in Iloilo City because it was to be
used for paying the taxes with the BIR office in that city
does not inspire concurrence. The records show that he did
not even pay the taxes because the BIR receipts he gave to
private complainant were fake documents. Thus, his
argumentation in this regard is too specious to consider
favorably.
For its part, the CA ruled on the issue of the trial court's
 jurisdiction in this wise:
It is a settled jurisprudence that the court will not entertain
evidence unless it is offered in evidence. It bears emphasis
that Hector did not comment on t he formal offer of
prosecution's evidence nor present any evidence on his
behalf. He failed to substantiate his allegations that he had
received the amount of P150,000.00 in Iloilo City. Hence,
Hector's allegations cannot be given evidentiary weight.
Absent any showing of a fact or circumstance of weight and
influence which would appear to have been overlooked and,
if considered, could affect the outcome of the case, the
factual findings and assessment on the credibility of a
witness made by the trial court remain binding on appellate
tribunal. They are entitled to great weight and respect and
will not be disturbed on review.
The instant case is thus a n exception allowing a review of
the factual findings of the lower courts.
Jurisdiction of the Trial Court

 
The overarching consideration in this case is the p rinciple
that, in criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. A court
cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person charged with an
offense committed outside its limited territory. In Isip v.
People, this Court explained:
The place where the crime was committed determines not
only the venue of the action but is an essential element of
 jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to
be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should
have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients
should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of
the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the
territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance
or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the
accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person
charged with an offense a llegedly committed outside of that
limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court
over the criminal case is dete rmined by the allegations in
the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the
court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if
the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the
offense was committed somewhere else, the court should
dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In a criminal case, the prosecution must not only prove that
the offense was committed, it must also prove the identity
of the accused and the fact that the offense was committed
within the jurisdiction of the court.
In Fukuzume v. People, this Court dismissed a Complaint
for estafa, wherein the prosecution failed to prove that the
essential elements of the offense took p lace within the trial
court's jurisdiction. The Court ruled:
More importantly, we find nothing in the direct or cross-
examination of Yu to establish that he gave any money to
Fukuzume or transacted business with him with respect to
the subject aluminum scrap wires inside or within t he
premises of the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati, or
anywhere in Makati for that matter. Venue in criminal cases
is an essential element of jurisdiction. x x x
In the present case, the criminal information against
Fukuzume was filed with and tried by the RTC of Makati. He
was charged with estafa a s defined under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of
which are as follows: x x x
The crime was alleged in the Information as having been
committed in Makati. However, aside from the sworn
statementexecuted by Yu on April 19, 1994, the
prosecution presented no other evidence, testimonial or
documentary, to corroborate Yu's sworn statement or to
prove that any of the above-enumerated elements of the
offense charged was committed in Makati. Indeed, the
prosecution failed to establish that any of the subsequent
payments made by Yu in the amounts of P50,000.00 on
July 12, 1991, P20,000.00 on July 22, 1991, P50,000.00 on
October 14, 1991 and P170,000.00 on October 18, 1991
was given in Makati. Neither was there proof to show that
the certifications purporting to prove that NAPOCOR has in
its custody the subject aluminum scrap wires and that
Fukuzume is authorized by Furukawa to sell the same were
given by Fukuzume to Yu in Makati. On the contrary, the
testimony of Yu established that all the elements of the
offense charged had been committed in Parañaque, to wit:
that on July 12, 1991, Yu went to the house of Fukuzume in
Parañaque; that with the intention of se lling the subject
aluminum scrap wires, the latter pretended that he is a
representative of Furukawa who is authorized to sell the
said scrap wires; that based on the false pretense of
Fukuzume, Yu agreed to buy the subject aluminum scrap
wires; that Yu paid Fukuzume the initial amount of
P50,000.00; that as a result, Yu suffered damage. Stated
differently, the crime of estafa, as defined and penalized
under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal
Code, was consummated when Yu and Fukuzume met at
the latter's house in Parañaque and, by falsely pretending
to sell aluminum scrap wires, Fukuzume was able to induce
Yu to part with his money.
xxx
From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution failed
to prove that Fukuzume committed the crime of e stafa in
Makati or that any of the essential ingredients of the
offense took place in the said city. Hence, the judgment of
the trial court convicting Fukuzume of the crime of estafa
should be set aside for want of jurisdiction, without
prejudice, however, to the filing of a ppropriate charges with
the court of competent jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the prosecution failed t o show that the offense
of estafa under Section 1, paragraph (b) of Article 315 of
the RPC was committed within the jurisdiction of the RTC of
Makati City.
That the offense was committed in Makati City was alleged
in the information as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1999, in the
City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
 jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, received in trust from ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the
amount of P150,000.00 x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
Ordinarily, this statement would have been sufficient to
vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Makati. However, the
Affidavit of Complaint executed by Elizabeth does not
contain any allegation as to where the offense was
committed. It provides in part:
THAT on 23 December 1999, [Elizabeth] personally
entrusted to ATTY. HECTOR TREÑAS the sum of
P150,000.00 to be expended as agreed and ATTY. HECTOR
TREÑAS issued to me a receipt, a photo copy of which is
hereto attached as Annex "B",
THAT despite my several follow-ups with ATTY. HECTOR
TREÑAS, the latter failed to transfer the title of aforesaid
property to MRS. MARGARITA ALOCILJA. He also failed to
pay the capital g ains tax, documentary stamps and BIR-
related expenses. What ATTY. HECTOR TREÑAS
accomplished was only the preparation of the Deed of Sale

covering aforesaid property. A copy of said Deed of Sale is
hereto attached as Annex "C",
THAT in view of my persistent follow-ups, ATTY. HECTOR
TREÑAS issued to me a check for refund of the sum given
to him less the attorney's fee of P20,000.00 and the sum of
P10,000.00 allegedly paid to BIR or in the net sum of
P120,000.00. x x x
THAT when said check was deposited at EQUITABLE PCI
BANK dela Rosa-Rada Branch at Makati City, the same was
dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason: ACCOUNT
CLOSED. x x x
Aside from the lone allegation in the Information, no other
evidence was presented by the p rosecution to prove that
the offense or any of its elements was committed in Makati
City.
Under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC, the elements
of estafa are as follows: (1) that money, goods or other
personal property is received by the offender in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make d elivery of or to
return the same; (2) that there be misappropriation or
conversion of such money or property by the offender, or
denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice
of another; and (4) there is demand by the offended party
to the offender.
There is nothing in the documentary evidence offered by
the prosecution that points to where the offense, or any of
its elements, was committed. A review of the testimony of
Elizabeth also shows that there was no mention of the place
where the offense was allegedly committed:
Q After the manager of Maybank referred Atty. Treñas
to you, what happened next?
A We have met and he explained to the expenses and
what we will have to... and she will work for the Deed
of Sale.
Q And did he quote any amount when you got to the
expenses?
A Yes. I gave him ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND.
Q What was the amount quoted to you?
A ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND.
Q Did he give a breakdown of this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what is the breakdown of this ONE HUNDRED
FIFTY THOUSAND?
A TWENTY THOUSAND is for his Attorney's fee, NINETY
THOUSAND is for the capital gain tax TWENTY FOUR
THOUSAND is intended for documentary sum (sic)
and TEN THOUSAND PESOS is for other expenses for
BIR.
Q And did you give him this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did he issue a receipt?
A Yes, sir.
Q If shown to you a receipt issued by Atty. Treñas for
this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND, will you be
able to identify it?
A Yes, sir.
Q I am showing to you a document, madam witness,
already identified during the pre-trial as exhibit "B".
This appears to be a receipt dated December 22,
1999. Will you please go over t his document and
inform this court what relation has this t o the receipt
which you said Atty. Treñas issued to you?
A This is the receipt issued by Atty. Hector Treñas.
Q Now, after the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND was given to Atty. Treñas by you, what
happened next?
A We made several follow-ups but he failed to do his
ob.
Although the prosecution alleged that the check issued b y
petitioner was dishonored in a bank in Makati, such
dishonor is not an element of the offense of estafa under
Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC.
Indeed, other than the lone allegation in the information,
there is nothing in the p rosecution evidence which even
mentions that any of the elements of the offense were
committed in Makati. The rule is settled that an objection
may be raised based on the ground that the court lacks
 jurisdiction over the offense charged, or it may be
considered motu proprio by the court at any stage of the
proceedings or on appeal. Moreover, jurisdiction over the
subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred upon
the court by the a ccused, by express waiver or otherwise.
That jurisdiction is conferred
by the sovereign authority that organized the court and is
given only by law in the manner and form prescribed by
law.
It has been consistently held by this Court that it is unfair
to require a defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal
and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter or offense or it is not the court of proper
venue. Section 15 (a) of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure of 2000 provides that "[s]ubject to
existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and
tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the
offense was committed or where any of its essential
ingredients occurred." This fundamental principle is to
ensure that the defendant is not compelled to move to, and
appear in, a different court from that of the province where

the crime was committed as it would cause him great
inconvenience in looking for his witnesses and other
evidence in another place.This principle echoes more
strongly in this case, where, due to distance constraints,
coupled with his advanced age and failing health, petitioner
was unable to present his defense in the charges against
him.
There being no showing that the offense was committed
within Makati, the RTC of that city has no jurisdiction over
the case.
As such, there is no more need to discuss the other issue
raised by petitioner.
At this juncture, this Court sees it fit to note that the Code
of Professional Responsibility strongly militates against the
petitioner's conduct in handling the funds of his client.
Rules 16.01 and 16.02 of the Code provides:
Rule 16.01 -- A lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.02 -- A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client
separate and apart from his own and those others kept by
him.
When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client
for a particular purpose (such as for filing fees, registration
fees, transportation and office expenses), he should
promptly account to the client how the money was spent. If
he does not use the money for its intended purpose, he
must immediately return it to the client. His failure either to
render an accounting or to return the money (if the
intended purpose of the money does not materialize)
constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to deliver his client's funds
or properties as they fall due or upon demand. His failure to
return the client's money upon demand gives rise to the
presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use
to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed in
him by the client. It is a g ross violation of general morality
as well as of professional ethics; it impairs public
confidence in the legal p rofession and deserves
punishment.
In Cuizon v. Macalino, this Court ruled that the issuance of
checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn
against a closed account indicates a lawyer's unfitness for
the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows lack of
personal honesty and good moral character as to render
him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a
ground for disciplinary action.
This case is thus referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for the initiation of disciplinary
proceedings against petitioner. In any case, should there be
a finding that petitioner has failed to account for the funds
received by him in t rust, the recommendation should
include an order to immediately return the amount of
?130,000 to his client, with the appropriate rate of interest
from the time of demand until full payment.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
9 July 2010 and the Resolution dated 4 January
2011 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
32177 are SET ASIDE on the g round of lack of jurisdiction
on the part of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 137, Makati
City. Criminal Case No. 01-2409 is DISMISSED without
prejudice. This case is REFERRED to the IBP Boa rd of
Governors for investigation and recommendation pursuant
to Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 176819 January 26, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
ROBERT P. BALAO, JOSEPHINE C. A NGSICO,
VIRGILIO V. DACALOS, and SANDIGANBAYAN, First
Division, Respondents.  capacity and committing the offense in relation to office and
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. The petition challenges the 2 March 2007
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.
26583.
The Facts
On 1 May 2001, Ombudsman Prosecutor II Raul V. Cristoria
filed with the Sandiganbayan an information dated 5 March
2001 against respondents Robert P. Balao (Balao),
Josephine C. Angsico (Angsico), Virgilio V. Dacalos
(Dacalos), Felicisimo F. Lazarte, Jr. (Lazarte, Jr.), Josephine
T. Espinosa, Noel A. Lobrido, and Arceo C. Cruz for violation
of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019), as
amended. The information stated:
The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor II of the Office of
the Ombudsman-Visayas, accuses ROBERT P. BALAO,
FELICISIMO F. LAZARTE, JR., VIRGILIO V. DACALOS,
JOSEPHINE C. ANGSICO, JOSEPHINE T. ESPINOSA, NOEL
A. LOBRIDO AND ARCEO C. CRUZ for VIOLATION OF
SECTION 3(e) of REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019, AS AMENDED
(THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT),
committed as follows:
That in or about the month of March, 1992, at Bacolod City,
Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the
 jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused,
ROBERT P. BALAO, JOSEPHINE C. ANGSICO, VIRGILIO V.
DACALOS, FELICISIMO LAZARTE, JR., JOSEPHINE T.
ESPINOSA, and NOEL H. LOBRIDO, Public Officers, being
the General Manager, Team Head, Visayas Mgt. Office,
Division Manager (Visayas), Manager, RPD, Project Mgt.
Officer A and Supervising Engineer, respectively, of the
National Housing Authority, Diliman, Quezon City, in such
while in the performance of their official functions,
conniving, confederating and mutually helping with each

other and with accused ARCEO C. CRUZ, a p rivate
individual and General Manager of A.C. Cruz Construction,
with address at 7486 Bagtikan Street, Makati City, with
deliberate intent, with manifest partiality and evident bad
faith, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
cause to be paid to A.C. Construction public funds in the
amount of TWO HUNDRED THIRTY TWO THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT PESOS and THIRTY FIVE
CENTAVOS (P232,628.35) PHILIPPINE CURRENCY,
supposedly for the excavation and roadfilling works on the
Pahanocoy Sites and Services Project in Bacolod City
despite the fact that no such works were undertaken by
A.C. Construction as revealed by the Special Audit
conducted by the Commission on Audit, thus accused public
officials in the performance of their official functions had
given unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference to
accused Arceo C. Cruz and A.C. Construction and
themselves, to the damage and prejudice of the
government.
In its 22 May 2001 Order, the Sandiganbayan found the 5
March 2001 information inadequate. The Sandiganbayan
stated that:
This morning the Court expressed its anxiety over the
inadequacy of the Information in that the participation of
each of the accused did not appear clear in the resolution,
much less in the Information.
In view hereof, Pros. Raymundo Julio A. Olaguer will be
given ten (10) days to review the records and to inform this
Court as to the course of action he proposes to take in
order to enlighten the Court and, if necessary, himself so
that a proper Information and a proper prosecution may be
had before this Court.
On 4 August 2004, Assistant Special Prosecutor II Julieta
Zinnia A. Niduaza (Assistant Special Prosecutor Niduaza)
filed with the Sandiganbayan a memorandum dated 27 July
2004. In the memorandum, Assistant Special Prosecutor
Niduaza recommended that the 5 March 2001 information
be maintained.
In their 17 September 2004 motion, Balao, Lazarte, Jr.,
Angsico, and Dacalos prayed for a reinvestigation of the
case. In its 27 March 2005 Resolution, the Sandiganbayan
granted the motion. The Sandiganbayan held that:
The Court notes that the issue as to the pa rticipation of
accused-movants in the acts complained of in the
Information, as raised by the former First Division, appears
not to have been addressed by the prosecution in the
Memorandum dated July 27, 2004 of the Office of the
Ombudsman, Office of the Special Prosecutor. In the said
Memorandum, the prosecution found no reason to disturb
the findings of probable ca use and recommended that the
Information be maintained.
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The former Chairman and Members of the First Division
expressed anxiety over the inadequacy of the x x x
Information "in that the participation of each of the accused
did not appear clear in the resolution, much less in the
Information". Considering that the memorandum of the
Ombudsman "recommended that the Information filed in
Criminal Case No. 26583 be maintained and the
prosecution of this case must proceed accordingly", without
complying with the directive quoted above to clarify the
participation of each of the accused, the Court finds merit in
the accused-movants’ prayer for reinvestigation.   Memorandum dated May 30, 2006 still failed to specify the
On 1 June 2006, Assistant Special Prosecutor Niduaza filed
with the Sandiganbayan a memorandum dated 30 May
2006. In the memorandum, Assistant Special Prosecutor
Niduaza recommended that the 5 March 2001 information
be maintained.
In his motion dated 2 October 2006, Lazarte, Jr. prayed
that the information be quashed. In t heir 4 October 2006
motion, Balao, Angsico, and Dacalos prayed that their
motion to quash the information be admitted. In another
motion, also dated 4 October 2006, Balao, Angsico, and
Dacalos prayed that the information be q uashed.
The Sandiganbayan’s Ruling  
In its 2 March 2007 Resolution, the Sandiganbayan denied
Lazarte’s 2 October 2006 motion and granted Balao,
Angsico, and Dacalos’ 4 October 2006 motions. The
Sandiganbayan held that:
The Court finds that the above Information and subsequent
memoranda submitted by the prosecution in support of the
said information, with respect to the accused-movants
Balao, Angsico and Dacalos, fail to satisfy the requirements
of Section 6, Rule 110. The Information and the supporting
memoranda, still fail to state the acts or omissions of
accused-movants Balao, Angsico and Dacalos with sufficient
particularity so as to enable t hem to make a carefully
considered plea to the charges against them.
It may be recalled that a reinvestigation of the case was
ordered by this Court because the p rosecution failed to
satisfactorily comply with an earlier directive of the former
Chairperson and Members of the first Division, after noting
the inadequacy of the information, to clarify the
participation of each of the accused. In ordering the
reinvestigation, this Court noted the the prosecution’s July
27, 2004 Memorandum did not address the app rehensions
of the former Chairperson and Members of the First Division
as to the inadequacy of the allegations in the information.
This time, despite a reinvestigation, the prosecution’s
participation of accused-movants Balao, Angsico and
Dacalos. The most recent findings of the prosecution still do
not address the deficiency found by the Court in the
information. The prosecution avers that pursuant to Section
3, Rule 117 of t he rules of Court, in determining the
viability of a motion to quash based on the ground of "facts
charged in the information do not constitute an offense,"
the test must be whether or not the facts asseverated, if
hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential
elements of the crime as defined by law. The p rosecution
contends that matters aliunde should not be considered.
However, in the instant case, the Court has found the
information itself to be inadequate, as it does not satisfy
the requirements of particularly alleging the acts or
omissions of the said accused-movants, which served as

the basis of the allegation of conspiracy between the
aforementioned accused-movants and the other accused, in
the commission of the offense charged in the information.
It appears from the prosecution’s May 30, 2006
Memorandum that at the time material in this case,
accused Roberto P. Balao was the General Ma nager of the
NHA; accused Josephine C. Angsico, was the Team Head of
the Visayas Management Office of t he NHA; accused Virgilio
V. Dacalos, was the Division Manager of the NHA’s Visayas
Management Office and accused Felicisimo F. Lazarte, Jr.,
was the Manager of the NHA’s Regional Project
Department. All four accused contend that they cannot be
held accountable as they are high-ranking officials based in
Metro Manila and that they relied solely on the
recommendation of their subordinates in affixing their
signatures. The prosecution concedes that high-ranking
officials are not expected to personally examine every
single detail of a transaction. But in this particular case, the
general averment or conclusion of the prosecution in its
memorandum that the accused allegedly had
foreknowledge of the supposed anomalies and yet t he
accused did nothing to verify t his, does not sufficiently
show the basis of t he charge of conspiracy insofar as
accused Balao, Angsico and Dacalos are concerned.
The prosecution’s May 30, 2006 Memorandum does not
describe how accused Balao, Angsingco [sic] and Dacalos
may have known or when they became aware of the
alleged anomalies, before they allegedly caused p ayment to
the alleged errant contractor. The said Memorandum states
only that they failed to enforce the contract against the
alleged errant private contractor, which is not even the act
imputed against them in the information.
The prosecution contends that the allegation of conspiracy
is sufficient, since there is no need to allege the individual
acts of the conspirators because the act of one is imputable
to all. The allegation of conspiracy in the information may
be adequate if there is no uncertainty in the acts or
omissions imputed against some of the accused and the
findings of the prosecution, such as in the case at bar. To
allow accused Balao, Angsico and Lazarte [sic] to be
arraigned despite the seeming inadequacy of t he instant
information as to their actual involvement in the offense
charged, which is not addressed by the mere allegation of
conspiracy, infringes on the constitutional right of the
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against them.
Among the accused-movants, the public officer whose
participation in the alleged offense is specifically mentioned
in the May 30, 2006 Memorandum is accused Felicisimo
Lazarte, Jr., the Chairman of the Inventory and Acceptance
Committee (IAC), which undertook the inventory and final
quantification of the accomplishment of A.C. Cruz
Construction. The allegations of Lazarte that the IAC, due
to certain constraints, allegedly had to rely on the reports
of the field e ngineers and/or the Project Office as to which
materials were actually installed; and that he supposedly
affixed his signature to t he IAC Physical Inventory Report
and Memorandum dated August 12, 1991 despite his not
being able to attend the actual inspection because he
allegedly saw that all the members of the Committee had
already signed are matters of defense which he can address
in the course of the trial. Hence, the quashal of the
information with respect to accused Lazarte is denied for
lack of merit.
Hence, the present petition. The People of the Philippines,
represented by the Office of the Ombudsman, raises as
issue that the "Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
dismissing the information in Criminal Case No. 26583
which sufficiently charged repondents Balao, Angsico and
Dacalos of violating Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019, as amended."
The Court’s Ruling  SEC. 8. Designation of the offense. — The complaint or
The petition is meritorious.
In Lazarte, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, a case involving the same
information, the Court held that the 5 March 2001
information is valid. The Court held that:
The Court finds that the Information in this case alleges the
essential elements of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019. The Information specifically alleges that petitioner,
Espinosa and Lobrido are public officers being then the
Department Manager, Project Management Officer A and
Supervising Engineer of the NHA respectively; in such
capacity and committing the offense in rela tion to the office
and while in the performance of their official functions
connived, confederated and mutually helped each other and
with accused Arceo C. Cruz, with deliberate intent through
manifest partiality and evident bad faith gave unwarranted
benefits to the latter, A.C. Cruz Construction and to
themselves, to the damage and prejudice of the
government. The felonious act consisted of causing to be
paid to A.C. Cruz Construction public funds in the amount
of P232,628.35 supposedly for excavation and road filling
works on the Pahanocoy Sites and Services Project in
Bacolod City despite the fact that no such works were
undertaken by said construction company as revealed by
the Special Audit conducted by COA. (Emphasis supplied)
Sections 6 and 8, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court state,
respectively:
SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A
complaint or information is sufficient if it st ates the name of
the accused; the designation of the offense given by the
statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate date of the commission of the offe nse; and the
place where the offense was committed.
When the offense is committed by more than one person,
all of them shall be included in the complaint or
information.
information shall state the designation of the offense given
by the statute, a ver the acts or omissions constitutiing the
offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances. If there is no designation of the offe nse,
reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the
statute punishing it.
In quashing the 5 March 2001 information, the
Sandiganbayan held that the information "fail to satisfy the

requirements of Section 6, Rule 110. The Information x x x
still fail to sta te the acts or omissions of accused-movants
Balao, Angsico and Dacalos with sufficient particularity so
as to enable them to make a carefully considered plea to
the charges against them."
The Court disagrees. In Cabrera v. Sandiganbayan, the
Court held that the fundamental test in determining the
adequacy of the averments in an information is whether the
facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the
essential elements of the crime. Matters extrinsic or
evidence aliunde should not be considered.
Section 3(e) of RA 3019, as amended, states:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to
acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices
of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:
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(e) Causing any undue injury to a ny party, including the
Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged
with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
In Dela Chica v. Sandiganbayan, the Court enumerated the
essential elements of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, as amended.
The Court held that:
In a number of cases, the elements of this offense have
been broken down as follows:
1. That the accused a re public officers or private persons
charged in conspiracy with them;
2. That said public officers committed the prohibited acts
during the performance of their official d uties or in relation
to their public positions;
3. That they caused undue injury to any party, whether the
Government or a private party;
4. That such injury was caused b y giving unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference to such part ies; and
5. That the public officers acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexusable negligence.
Clearly, the allegations in the 5 March 2001 information, if
hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential
elements of the crime. The information stated that (1)
Balao, Lazarte, Jr., Angsico, and Dacalos were the g eneral
manager, team head of the Visayas Management Office,
and Visayas division manager, respectively, of the National
Housing Authority; (2) they committed the prohibited acts
"in or about the month of March, 1992," "while in the
performance of their official functions"; (3) they caused
undue injury to the Government in the a mount of
P232,628.35, "supposedly for the excavation and roadfilling
works on the Pahanocoy Sites and Services Project in
Bacolod City despite the fact that no such works were
undertaken"; (4) they gave "unwarranted benefits,
advantage and preference to accused Arceo C. Cruz and
A.C. Construction and themselves"; and (5) they acted
"with deliberate intent, with manifest p artiality and evident
bad faith."
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition. The
Court SETS ASIDE the 2 March 2007 Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 26583 and orders that
(1) respondents Robert P. Balao, Josephine C. Angsico, and
Virgilio V. Dacalos be reinstated as accused in Criminal
Case No. 26583; (2) the hold departure order against them
be reinstated; and (3) they be arrested or they post a cash
bond in sufficient amount.
SO ORDERED.