l\epublic of tbe flbtltpptnes

~upreme QCourt TIME: \I :l I 't.

~anila

EN BANC

IN RE: SPECIAL REPORT ON A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC

THE ARREST OF ROGELIO M.
SALAZAR, JR., SHERIFF IV,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT-
OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF
COURT, BOAC, MARINDUQUE,
FOR VIOLATION OF REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 9165,

x-----------------------------------------x
OFFICE OF THE COURT A.M. No. P-16-3450
ADMINISTRATOR, (Formerly A.M. No. 15-12-379-RTC)
Complainant,
Present:

BERSAMIN, C.J.,
CARPIO, J.,
PERALTA,
DEL CASTILLO,
- versus - PERLAS-BERNABE,
LEONEN,
JARDELEZA,
CAGUIOA,
TIJAM,
A. REYES, JR.,
GESMUNDO,
J. REYES, JR.,
ROGELIO M. SALAZAR, JR., HERNANDO, and
SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL CARANDANG,* JJ.
COURT- OFFICE OF THE
CLERK OF COURT, BOAC, Promulgated:
MARINDUQUE, December 4, 2018'
Respondent.

x---------------------------------------------------

'on leave.
Decision 2 A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC
andA.M. No. P-16-3450

DECISION

Per Curiam:

No less than the Constitution mandates that a public office is a

public trust and public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.

The image of the court of justice is mirrored in the conduct,

official and otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat. The
conduct of a person serving the Judiciary must, at all times, be
characterized by propriety and decorum and above all else, be above
suspicion so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the
Judiciary. The Court would never countenance any conduct, act or
omission on the part of all those in the administration of justice, which
will violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or even just
tend to diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary. 1 (Emphasis ours)

No other office in the government service exacts a greater

demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an employee
than the Judiciary. The Court is mindful that any act of impropriety on
the part of judicial officers and personnel, be they the highest or the lowest
members of the work force, can greatly erode the people's confidence in
our justice system. Hence, it is the sacred duty of every worker in the
Judiciary to maintain the good name and standing of the courts.
Every employee of the court should be an exemplar of integrity,
uprightness, and honesty. The Court will not hesitate to impose the
ultimate penalty on those who have fallen short of their
accountabilities. 2 (Emphasis ours)

Before this Court are two consolidated administrative matters against ; I

Rogelio M. Salazar, Jr. (respondent), Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court (RTC), ,
Office of the Clerk of Court, Boac, Marinduque, for grave misconduct and :
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

Factual Antecedents

These administrative matters stemmed from criminal cases filed

against respondent for violation of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165, otherwise
known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002". Specifically, ,
Criminal Case No. 63-15 was filed for violation of Section 11 (Illegal ,
Possession) in relation to Section 28 of RA 9165; while Criminal Case No.! 1

tive Charge of Misconduct Relative to the Alleged Use of Prohibited Drug

("Shabu'~ of Reynard B. Castor, Electrician II, Maintenance Division, Office of Administrative Services,
719 Phil. 96, 101-102 (2017).
2
Security and Sheriff Division, Sandiganbayan v. Ronald Allan Gole R. Cruz, A.M. No. SB-17-24-
P, July 11, 2017.
Decision .3 A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC
and A.M. No. P-16-3450

62-15 was filed for violation of Section 15 (Prohibited Use) in relation to

Section 28 of the same Act. 3 Also, LS. No. XV-05-INV-15C-087 was filed
against respondent for violation of Sections 5 (Illegal Sale) and 15 of the
said Act but was, however, dismissed by the Provincial Prosecutor and now
the subject of an automatic review before the Department of Justice (DOJ). 4

The factual backdrop of the said cases are as follows:

On March 7, 2015, pursuant to Search Warrant No. 5043, the

Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) and Philippine National
Police (PNP) searched respondent's property, which resulted in the
confiscation of seven plastic sachets, later on found to be containing a total
of 9.4993 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as
"shabu". Consequently, respondent was arrested and detained. The
confirmatory test conducted on respondent's urine sample likewise yielded
positive of shabu. The Provincial Prosecutor also noted that respondent
admitted the use of dangerous drugs. 5

On April 21, 2015, Criminal Case Nos. 63-15 and 62-15 were filed.
No bail was recommended for the respondent's release. 6 Meanwhile, as a
result of an alleged buy-bust operation, LS. No. XV-05-INV-15C-087 was
also filed. 7

Documents relative to Criminal Case No. 63-15 were then forwarded

to the Office of Administrative Services (OAS), Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA). Pursuant to the Court En Banc Reso.lution dated
March 12, 1981, which authorized the OCA to initiate motu proprio the
filing of administrative proceedings against judges and/or employees of the
inferior courts who have been convicted and/or charged before the
Sandiganbayan or the courts, the OCA charged respondent with grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, which
case was then docketed as A.M. No. 15-12-379-RTC. 8

In a Report9 dated November 6, 2015 in the said administrative matter,

the OCA found respondent's acts to constitute grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Hence, it recommended that
the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter; that respondent be
ordered suspended from service pending the outcome of the criminal case or
until further order from the Court; and, that respondent be ordered to /
3
Rollo (A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC), p. 67. (
4
Id. at 69.
5
Id. at 68-69.
6
Id. at 69.
7
Id.
8
Rollo (A.M. No. P-16-3450), p. 148.
9
Id. at 1-2.
Decision 4 A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC
andA.M. No. P-16-3450

comment on the administrative charge. The Court, in its April 11, 2016
Resolution, 10 adopted and approved the OCA's findings and
recommendation. Pursuant to the said April 11, 2016 Resolution, the case
was re-docketed as A.M. No. P-16-3450.

Meanwhile, P/Supt. Lorenzo Junia Holanday, Jr., Provincial Director,

Marinduque Police Provincial Office, informed the Court, through a letter 11
dated March 25, 2015, of the Special Report on respondent's arrest and the
criminal cases filed against the latter for violations of RA 9615. This brought
aboutA.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC.

In a Report 12 dated January 28, 2016 in A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC, the ,

OCA likewise found respondent's acts to be constitutive of grave misconduct
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

In the main, respondent's separate Comments 13 in the instant

administrative matters constitute denial of the charges against him in the ,
criminal cases and allegations of evidence-planting and frame-up.

Upon recommendation of the OCA, the Court, in its April 11, 2016
Resolution, 14 suspended respondent from service pending the final outcome
of the criminal case filed against him or until further order of this Court
considering that the evidence of guilt is prima facie strong.

In a letter15 dated August 11, 2016, respondent requested that the

instant administrative cases be consolidated and that the cases be submitted
for resolution based on the pleadings filed.

On April 7, 2017, the OCA issued a Memorandum 16 regarding A.M.

No. 15-05-136-RTC, with the following recommendations:

1. A.M. No. P-16-3450 xxx andA.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC be

CONSOLIDATED;

2. Respondent Rogelio M. Salazar, Jr., Sheriff IV, Office of

the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Boac, Marinduque be found
GUILTY in both A.M. No. P-16-3450 and A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC of
grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
pursuant to Sections 46(A)(3) and (B)(8), respectively, under Rule 10 of
the Revised Rules for Administrative Cases in the Civil Service; and !
10
Id. at 8-9. ·
11
Rollo (A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC), pp. 2-3.
12
Id. at 54-57.
13
Rollo (A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC), pp. 7-9 and rollo (A.M. No. P-16-3450), pp. 10-32.
14
Rollo (A.M. No. P-16-3450), p. 8.
15
Rollo (A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC), pp. 61-63.
16
Id. at 67-75.
 Decision 5 A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC
and A.M. No. P-16-3450

3. Respondent Salazar, Jr. be meted out the penalty of

DISMISSAL from the service with forfeiture of all benefits, except
accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to re-employment in any
branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned
or controlled corporations.

In its Memorandum, the OCA emphasized that only substantial

evidence is needed in administrative proceedings; that administrative
liability is separate and distinct from criminal liability; and that in
administrative proceedings, the Court is not bound by technical rules of
procedure and evidence. The OCA also noted that the instant administrative
cases are not intended to preempt the DOJ's review of the dismissal of LS.
No. XV-05-INV-15C-087 nor to determine respondent's guilt in Criminal
Case Nos. 62-15 and 63-15. 17

The OCA found that the evidence on record, which include, the
undisputed fact that respondent was found to be positive for shabu in the
drug test following his arrest, and that the finding of probable cause in the .
criminal charges against him constitute more than substantial evidence to
hold respondent administratively liable for grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of service. The OCA grounded its conclusion
on Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 13, series of 2010, which
provides that any official or employee found positive for use of dangerous
drugs shall be subjected to disciplinary/administrative proceedings with a
penalty of dismissal from the service for the first offense pursuant to Section
46(19) of Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Section 22( c) of its
Omnibus Rules. 18

On even date, the OCA also issued a Memorandum 19 as regards A.M.

No. P-16-3450, with the same findings and recommendation as in A.M. No.
15-05-136-RTC above-stated.

In a letter2° dated August 25, 2017, respondent manifested to this

Court that on May 4, 2017, Judge-Designate Dennis R. Pastrana (Judge
Pastrana) of the RTC of Boac, Marinduque, granted his Motion to Quash
Search Warrant with Motion to Suppress Evidence for lack of probable
cause and non-conformity with established constitutional rules and statutory
guidelines in the implementation of such search warrant. 21 In the said May 4,
2017 Order, Judge Pastrana found that the officers who applied for the
search warrant committed deliberate falsehoods to obtain the same. Thus[
17
Id. at 69-71.
18
Id. at 73.
19
Rollo (A.M. No. P-16-3450), pp. 148-154.
20
Id. at 163-164.
21
Id. at 168-177.
Decision 6 A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC
and A.M. No. P-16-3450

Judge Pastrana ruled that due to the nullity of the search warrant, the search
conducted on its authority is likewise null and void and with the
inadmissibility of the drugs seized from respondent's home, there is no more
evidence to support his conviction.

Respondent further manifested that his motion to dismiss the criminal

cases against him was also granted by the RTC on August 18, 2017. In the
said August 18, 2017 Order, 22 Judge Pastrana added that even the urine test
conducted on the respondent, having been done as a result of an arrest
occasioned by the search is also inadmissible like the seized drugs for being
fruits of the poisonous tree.

Thus, in his August 25, 201 7 letter, 23 respondent requested for the
dismissal of the instant administrative cases against him in view of the
dismissal of the criminal cases, revocation of his suspension order, and
payment of his back salaries and other benefits withheld during his
suspension and detention.

The Issue

The pivotal issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not

respondent should be held administratively liable despite dismissal of the
related criminal cases against him.

This Court's Ruling

Respondent was charged with illegal sale, possession, and use of ,

illegal drugs. Respondent, however, pounds on the fact that the criminal
cases against him from which these administrative cases rooted, had already
been dismissed by virtue of the quashal of the search warrant and the
suppression of the evidence taken by virtue of the said warrant. It is the
respondent's position that since the evidence obtained through such search
warrant were declared illegal and inadmissible by the RTC, the same cannot 1

likewise be used in the instant administrative cases. Hence, respondent 1

argued that the administrative cases against him has no leg to stand on and
must be dismissed.

We do not agree.

At the outset, We find it necessary to first place the instant case in its f
proper context. /

22
Id. at 178-179.
23
Id. at 163-164.
Decision 7 A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC
and A.M. No. P-16-3450

This is an administrative case against a Sheriff of the court charged

with the administrative offenses of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service as an offshoot of a prior arrest and criminal
charges for violations of RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002 against said officer.

Owing to the administrative nature of the instant case, several

important considerations must be taken into serious account: first, the
finding of administrative guilt is independent of the results of the criminal
charges against the Sheriff; second, the Sheriff stands scrutiny and treated
not as an accused in a criminal case, but as a respondent court officer; third,
the Supreme Court, in taking cognizance of this administrative case, acts not
as a prosecutor, but as the administrative superior specifically tasked to
discipline its Members and personnel; fourth, the quantum of proof required
for a finding of administrative guilt remains to be substantial evidence; and
fifth, the paramount interest sought to be protected in an administrative case
is the preservation of the Constitutional mandate that a public office is a
public trust.

Well settled is the rule that an absolution from a criminal charge is not
a bar to an administrative prosecution or vice-versa. 24 Evidence to support a
conviction in a criminal case is not necessary, and the dismissal of the
criminal case against the respondent is not a ground for the dismissal of the
administrative case. It bears stressing that a criminal case is different from
an administrative case and each must be disposed of according to the facts
and the law applicable to each case. 25 Thus, the dismissal of Criminal Case
Nos. 62-15 and 63-15 does not automatically entail the dismissal of the
instant administrative actions.

The fact that the pieces of evidence obtained from the voided search
were declared inadmissible for being fruits of the poisonous tree will not
result to the outright dismissal of the administrative cases at bar.

It is necessary to emphasize that to sustain a finding of administrative

culpability, only substantial evidence is required, that is, more than a mere
scintilla of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion, 26 even if other minds equally reasonable might
conceivably opine otherwise. 27 In the case of Ombudsman Marcelo v.
Bungubung and CA, 28 this Court explained: /

24
Office of the Court Administrator v. Enriquez, 291-A Phil. 1 (1993).
25
Office of the Court Administrator v. Lopez, 654 Phil. 602, 607 (2011).
26
Hon. Ombudsman Marcelo v. Bungubung, et al., 575 Phil. 538, 557 (2008).
27
Dadulo v. Court ofAppeals, 549 Phil. 872, 877 (2007).
28
Hon. Ombudsman Marcelo v. Bungubung, et al., supra note 26, id. at 557-558.
Decision 8 A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC
and A.M. No. P-16-3450

xxx The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is

reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the
misconduct complained of, even if such evidence might not be
overwhelming or even preponderant. While substantial evidence does not
necessarily import preponderance of evidence as is required in an ordinary
civil case, or evidence beyond reasonable doubt as is required in criminal
cases, it should be enough for a reasonable mind to support a
conclusion. xxx(citations omitted and emphasis ours)

The question now is, taking into consideration the inadmissibility in

the criminal cases of the drugs obtained by virtue of the search warrant and
the positive result of the confirmatory test conducted on the respondent upon
arrest, is there substantial evidence to hold the respondent administratively
liable in this case?

We answer in the affirmative.

Respondent's admission of drug use, albeit with an allegation that he

had stopped doing it as a promise to his mother on her deathbed in
December 2014, 29 coupled with the confirmatory test that yielded a positive
result, are more than substantial evidence to support the conclusion that '
respondent is a drug-user, which would warrant this Court's exercise of its
disciplinary power over court personnel.

First. Respondent's admission of drugs use during the inquest cannot

be considered as a fruit of the poisonous tree and as such, may legally and
validly be admitted as evidence in the instant administrative case.

It is noteworthy that nowhere in the trial court's order quashing the

search warrant and dismissing the criminal cases did the trial court exclude
the respondent's admission of drug use. This must necessarily be so for two
reasons:

( 1) The admission partakes of a testimonial evidence, and

not a "personal property" that can be the subject of a search and
seizure.

Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court enumerates the personal

property that may be seized for which a search warrant may be issued: (a)
the subject of the offense; (b) stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or
fruits of the offense; or (c) used or intended to be used as the means of
committing an offense. In Retired SP04 Bienvenido Laud v. People 30 , We
explained that "personal property" as used under the Rules pertain to the
thing's mobility. Referencing Article 416 of the Civil Code, We expounded!
29
Rollo (A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC), p. 49.
30
747 Phil. 503, 524 (2014).
 Decision 9 A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC
andA.M. No. P-16-3450

that in general, all things which can be transported from place to place are
deemed to be personal property. Testimonial evidence, therefore, cannot be
treated as a "fruit" of the quashed search warrant. People v. Uy 31 was
emphatic in saying that the "inadmissible evidence termed as the fruit of the
poisonous tree" refers to "object, not testimonial, evidence" and even more
constricting when it held that "it refers to an object seized in the course of an
illegal search and seizure."

(2) The admission was already far removed from the

illegal search warrant that it cannot be regarded as a fruit of the
poisonous tree.

The lapse of time from the illegal search and the admission itself
sufficiently "attenuate[s] the link." 32 It should be stressed that the adjudged
irregularity in the application and implementation of the search warrant does
not have any clear causal relation between the evidence which was illegally
obtained by virtue of such quashed warrant and respondent's admission
before a separate and distinct proceeding and authority. Stating it in a
different manner, the admission cannot be considered as a logical
consequence of the latter. As eloquently put by one Justice's opinion, "[t]he
admission was a voluntary act of respondent; it was not as if he was put into
such an inescapable situation wherein he would be forced to admit to his
guilt, since nothing precluded him from contesting the admissibility - as he
did, in fact, contest the admissibility - of the evidence illegally obtained
from him. Thus, as respondent had valid claims and defenses, it would be a
stretch to conclude that the admission made during the preliminary
investigation was a direct result of the evidence illegally seized from him.
That being said, the admission is a distinct and separate piece of evidence
that should not be tarnished by the illegal search conducted and hence,
cannot be deemed as a fruit of poisonous tree."

In the same vein, it would also be not logical nor legal to find nexus
between the arrest which resulted from the illegal search and seizure and the
admission during the preliminary investigation. The admission was made by
respondent during the preliminary investigation stage which is a source
independent from the illegal search, seizure, and arrest, and is presumed to
have been regularly performed. While the search, seizure, arrest and
preliminary investigation may be sequential, the admission made during the
preliminary investigation was not a necessary, logical, and automatic
consequence of the search, seizure and resulting arrest. We must consider
that respondent may, or may not have made such admission despite the
search and the arrest. Notably, respondent never questioned the voluntariness
of such admission as well as the regularity of the preliminary investigation./
31
508 Phil. 637, 655 (2005).
32
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 US 586, 592 (2006).
Decision 10 A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC
and A.M. No. P-16-3450

In Wong Sun v. United States, 33 the U.S. Supreme Court, under the
"independent source exception" - admits evidence that was discovered
through an independent source sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of
the primary taint. If the evidence is not obtained directly from the violation,
it is freed from the initial taint of the violation. 34

In addition, the admission was made before the Prosecutor (and not
before the erring police agents) who, concededly, had no participation in the
illegal search and arrest. The Prosecutor, during the preliminary
investigation, was regularly performing his duty, relying upon the validity of '
the search warrant and respondent's arrest. Hence, respondent's drug use was ,
discovered by the Prosecutor independently and in good faith.

Verily, the admissibility of respondent's admission in the instant

administrative case cannot be questioned. Said admission is a separate and
distinct piece of evidence that should not be tarnished by the illegal search
and thus, cannot be regarded as a fruit of the poisonous tree. Further, it must
be stressed that there is no allegation, much less proof, that any of
respondent's basic rights in giving such admission were violated. Lastly,
respondent's admission of his drug use is relevant for purposes of the present
administrative case and as such, it may properly be considered by this Court
in this administrative proceeding as substantial evidence.

Second. The legal basis of the admissibility of the result of the

confirmatory drug test cannot, likewise, be denied.

The procedure for laboratory examination or test is outlined in Section

35
3 8 of RA 9165. Section 3 8 provides that when there is reasonable ground
to believe that an apprehended or arrested offender is under the influence of
dangerous drugs, such offender shall be subjected to a screening laboratory
examination or test. The positive results of a screening test shall be!
33
371U.S.471 (1963).
34
The Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology, Arizona v. Evans: Expanding Exclusionary Rule
Exceptions and Contracting Fourth Amendment Protection by Heather A. Jackson.
35
Section 38. Laboratory Examination or Test on Apprehended/Arrested Offenders. - Subject to
Section 15 of this Act, any person apprehended or arrested for violating the provisions of this Act shall be
subjected to screening laboratory examination or test within twenty-four (24) hours, if the apprehending or
arresting officer has reasonable ground to believe that the person apprehended or arrested, on account of
physical signs or symptoms or other visible or outward manifestation, is under the influence of dangerous
drugs. If found to be positive, the results of the screening laboratory examination or test shall be challenged
within fifteen (15) days after receipt of the result through a confirmatory test conducted in any accredited
analytical laboratory equipment with a gas chromatograph/mass spectrometry equipment or some such
modem and accepted method, if confirmed, the same shall be prima facie evidence that such person has
used dangerous drugs, which is without prejudice for the prosecution for other violations of the provisions
of this Act: Provided, That a positive screening laboratory test must be confirmed for it to be valid in a
court of law.
 Decision 11 A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC
and A.M. No. P-16-3450

challenged within fifteen ( 15) days from the receipt of the results. The
positive screening test result is not valid in a court of law unless confirmed.

Following the prescribed procedure, the confirmatory urine test is

therefore not the direct or indirect result of the illegal search; rather, it comes
into play not only upon the apprehension or arrest of the offender, but also,
( 1) when the apprehending or arresting officer has reasonable ground to
believe that the offender is under the influence of dangerous drugs; and (2)
only after a screening laboratory test yields a positive result. The basis for
the confirmatory drug test was, in fact, a reasonable belief of drug use and a
positive screening test, both of which are neither a necessary nor automatic
consequence of an illegal search.

Parenthetically, Section 36, Article III of RA 9165 provides for the

mandatory drug testing of:

xxxx

(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. -

Officers and employees of public and private offices, whether domestic or
overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in
the company's work rules and regulations, which shall be borne by the
employer, for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer
or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with
administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination,
subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent
provisions of the Civil Service Law;

xx xx

(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a

criminal offense having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less
than six (6) years and one ( 1) day shall have to undergo a mandatory drug
test; and

xxxx

In addition to the above-stated penalties in this Section, those

found to be positive for dangerous drugs use shall be subject to the?
provisions of Section 15 36 of this Act.

36
Section 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs. -A person apprehended or arrested, who is found to be
positive for use of any dangerous drug, after a confirmatory test, shall be imposed a penalty of a minimum
of six (6) months rehabilitation in a government center for the first offense, subject to the provisions of
Article VIII of this Act. If apprehended using any dangerous drug for the second time, he/she shall suffer
the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine
ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (PS0,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00): Provided,
That this Section shall not be applicable where the person tested is also found to have in his/her possession
such quantity of any dangerous drug provided for under Section 11 of this Act, in which case the provisions
stated therein shall apply.
Decision 12 A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC
and A.M. No. P-16-3450

Further, in A.M. No. 06-1-01-SC dated January 17, 2006, the Court
has adopted guidelines for a program to prevent drug use and eliminate the
hazards of drug abuse in the Judiciary, specifically in the first and second
level courts. Its objectives are as follows:

1. To detect the use of dangerous drugs among lower court

employees, impose disciplinary sanctions, and provide administrative
remedies in cases where an employee is found positive for dangerous drug
use.
2. To discourage the use and abuse of dangerous drugs among
first and second level court employees and enhance awareness of their
adverse effects by information dissemination and periodic random drug
testing.

3. To institute other measures that address the menace of drug

abuse within the personnel of the Judiciary.

There is thus no reason to tum a blind eye, for purposes of this

administrative proceeding, on the results of the confirmatory urine test when
RA 9165 itself, as well as this Court's guidelines, sanction the conduct of a
mandatory random drug testing of officers and employees of public and
private offices. 37 The character of the drug test being made at random
actually dispenses with the usual requirement of probable cause. In the case
of Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board, et al., 38 We
upheld the validity and constitutionality of the mandatory but random drug
testing of officers and employees of both public and private offices. This is
allowed "for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace." This legitimate ,
intrusion of privacy in the workplace is upheld because an employee's
privacy interest is "circumscribed by the company's work policies, the
collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management and the
bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline
and efficiency in the workplace." 39 Specifically, as regards public officers, '
this Court pronounced in SJS that:

Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials

and employees also labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions
imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all f
37
Section 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - xxx
The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:
xx xx
(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. - Officers and employees of public
and private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as
contained in the company's work rules and regulations, which shall be borne by the employer, for purposes
of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs
shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the
provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;
xxxx
38
591 Phil. 393 (2008).
39
Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board, et al., supra note 38 at 414.
 Decision 13 A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC
and A.M. No. P-16-3450

enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. And if

RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the
more reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by
constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all times to the
people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency. 40

Thus, despite the absence of probable cause, and the basis being only
a positive drug test result, an employer is allowed by law to pursue an
administrative case against the public or private officer or employee and
thereafter, to suspend or terminate them.

Notably, in the instant administrative matter, respondent never

questioned the authenticity, validity, and regularity of Chemistry Report No.
CRIMDT-005-15 41 of the Marinduque Provincial Crime Laboratory Office.
No objection or question was raised as to the regularity of the conduct of the
confirmatory test. The finding of respondent's positive use of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu remains unrebutted. Certainly,
such compelling evidence cannot merely be ignored.

The foregoing pieces of evidence thus constitute more than substantial

evidence that respondent was found positive for illegal drugs use. The
confirmatory drug test which yielded a positive result confirms respondent's
admission of drug use and also, reflects respondent's propensity to lie as it
negates his statement in his admission that he already stopped using illegal
drugs.

With the admissibility, relevance, and probative value of the subject

evidence being established, We now proceed to rule on respondent's
infraction and the proper sanction therefor.

Misconduct has been defined as:

xxx a transgression of some established and definite rule of action,

a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in
character, improper or wrong behavior. The misconduct is grave if it
involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to
violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be
established by substantial evidence. As distinguished from simple
misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or
flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a charge of/
grave misconduct. 42

40
Id. at 417.
41
Rollo(A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC), p. 51.
42
Re: Administrative Charge of Misconduct Relative to the Alleged Use of Prohibited Drug of
Castor, supra note 1, id at 100-101..
Decision 14 A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC
and A.M. No. P-16-3450

There is no doubt that the use of prohibited drugs constitute grave

misconduct. It is a flagrant violation of the law, in fact a crime in itself, thus
considered as grave misconduct. In Re: Administrative Charge of
Misconduct Relative to the Alleged Use of Prohibited Drug ("Shabu '') of
Reynard B. Castor, Electrician II, Maintenance Division, Office of
Administrative Services, 43 the Court ruled that under Section 46(A)(3), Rule
10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(RRACCS), grave misconduct is a grave offense punishable by dismissal
even for the first offense. Also, under Civil Service Memorandum Circular ,
No. 13, series of 2010, 44 any official or employee found positive for use of
dangerous drugs shall be subjected to disciplinary/administrative ,
proceedings with a penalty of dismissal from the service at first offense
pursuant to Section 46(19) of Book V of Executive Order (E.O.) 292 and
Section 22(c) of its Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292
and other pertinent civil service laws. 45

Further, undeniably, respondent's conduct tarnished the very image

and integrity of the Judiciary, 46 constitutive of a conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service. Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service is classified as a grave offense under Section 22( c) of the Omnibus
Rules, with a corresponding penalty of suspension for six (6) months and
one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense, and the penalty of dismissal
for the second offense.

Section 50 of the RRACCS provides:

Section 50. Penalty for the Most Serious Offense. - If the

respondent is found guilty of two (2) or more charges or counts, the
penalty to be imposed should be that corresponding to the most serious
charge and the rest shall be considered as aggravating circumstances.
I

Finding respondent guilty of both grave misconduct and conduct ,

prejudicial to the best interest of the service, We find the penalty of dismissal
for grave misconduct, the most serious offense in this case, proper, pursuant :
to the aforecited provision. 47 Besides, respondent's propensity to lie as
above-mentioned, which bolsters a finding of moral turpitude, thus ,
aggravating the offense, cannot go unnoticed.

In all, the absurd consequences of excluding the seized evidence in

this administrative case, constrain Us to hold respondent Sheriff/
43
Id at I 01.
44 Guidelines for a Drug-Free Workplace in the Bw·eaucracy.
45
Re: Administrative Charge of Misconduct Relative to the Alleged Use of Prohibited Drug
("Shabu'~ of Reynard B. Castor, Electrician II, Maintenance Division, Office of Administrative Services,
supra note 1.
46
Id at l 01.
47
Laspiilas, et al. v. Judge Banzon, A.M. No. RTJ-17-2488, February 21, 2017.
 Decision 15 A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC
and A.M. No. P-16-3450

administratively liable. Here is an officer of the court and an agent of law

who is an admitted drug-user as evidenced by his admission during the
preliminary investigation and the positive result of his confinnatory drug
test, who will walk scot-free and whose claimed right to hold his public
office will be sustained by this Court if We will heed to the dissent and
dismiss these administrative cases merely because the related criminal cases
were dismissed due to the quashal of the search warrant. We have, in the
past, meted severe penalties against erring Court employees on the basis of
mere affidavits or on mere allegations spelled in the pleadings filed. There
is no reason for the Court to treat the instant administrative case differently,
when the evidence is far more compelling.

We always have to keep in mind the primordial consideration in

resolving disciplinary actions. The paramount interest sought to be protected
in an administrative case is the preservation of the Constitutional mandate
that a public office is a public trust. It must be remembered that no person
has a vested right to a public office, the same not being property within the
contemplation of the constitutional guarantee. In the case of Office of the
Court Administrator v. Reyes, et al., 48 where We dismissed an RTC clerk
mainly for yielding a positive result in a drug test, We ruled:

This Court is a temple of justice. Its basic duty and responsibility is

the dispensation of justice. As dispensers of justice, all members and
employees of the Judiciary ar~ expected to adhere strictly to the laws of
the land, one of which is Republic Act No. 9165 which prohibits the use of
dangerous drugs.

The Court has adhered to the policy of safeguarding the welfare,

efficiency, and well-being not only of all the court personnel, but also that
of the general public whom it serves. The Court will not allow its front-
line representatives xxx to put at risk the integrity of the whole judiciary.
xxx.49

This Court's mandate to preserve and maintain the public's faith in the
Judiciary, as well as its honor, dignity, integrity, can only be achieved by
imposing strict and rigid standards of decency and propriety governing the
conduct of Justices, judges, and court employees. Thus, it is only by
weeding out the likes of respondent from the ranks that We would be able to
achieve such objective.

WHEREFORE, finding Rogelio M. Salazar, Jr., Sheriff IV, Regional

Trial Court - Office of the Clerk of Court, Boac, Marinduque, liable for
grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
due to his drug use, the Court orders his DISMISSAL from service with!
48
635 Phil. 490 (20 I 0).
49
Id. at 498-499.
 Decision l6 A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC
and A.M. No. P-16-3450

FORFEITIJRE of all benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with

prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government including government-owned or controlled corporations. This
decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO .PERALTA

Associate Justice

L?f~~; u.fl1UN(/
'i~~ANO C. DEL CASTILLO ESTELA M!vEERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice Associate Justice

~~···
-~
-... Associate Justice

v. / I

NOEL G~\ TUAM

Ass~~ate Justice

ANDREf:;J~YES, .JR.
Ass~clte Justice
Decision 17 A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC
and A.M. No. P-16-3450

/·~/

Associate Justice
L~
RAMOkQ HERNANDO
Associate Justice

(on leave)
ROSMARI D. CARANDANG
Associate Justice