Legal Ethics Week 11 and 15 Cases (Canons 14-22)

Week 11 Cases (Canon 14 and 15)
a. A.C. No. 6155. March 14, 2006.*

MA. GINA L. FRANCISCO, JOSEPHINE S. TAN and CARLOS M. JOAQUIN, complainants, vs. ATTY. JAIME
JUANITO P. PORTUGAL, respondent.
b. A.C. No. 4401. January 29, 2004.*

BIOMIE SARENAS-OCHAGABIA, complainant, vs. ATTY. BALMES L. OCAMPOS, respondent.
c. Adm. Case No. 378. March 30, 1962.

JOSE G. MEJIA and EMILIA N. ABRERA, complainants, vs. FRANCISCO S. REYES, respondent.
d. Adm. Mat. No. MTJ-95-1063. February 9, 1996.*

ALFONSO C. CHOA, complainant, vs. JUDGE ROBERTO S. CHIONGSON, respondent.

a. A.C. No. 4349. December 22, 1997.*
LOURDES R. BUSIÑOS, complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO RICAFORT, respondent.
b. Adm. Case No. 5831. January 13, 2003.*

CESAR A. ESPIRITU, complainant, vs. ATTY. JUAN CABREDO IV, respondent.
c. A.C. No. 4219. December 8, 2003.*

LOTHAR SCHULZ, complainant, vs. ATTY. MARCELO G. FLORES, respondent.
d. A.C. No. 6656. December 13, 2005.*

(Formerly CBD-98-591.)
BOBIE ROSE V. FRIAS, complainant, vs. ATTY. CARMENCITA BAUTISTA LOZADA, respondent.
e. Adm. Case No. 2736. May 27, 1991.*

LORENZANA FOOD CORPORATION represented by Mr. SOLOMON U. LORENZANA, JR., as its
President and General Manager, and/or Mrs. ELIZABETH L. DIAZ, as its Vice-President, petitioners,
vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO L. DARIA, respondent.

a. A.C. No. 5687. February 3, 2005.*
FELIX E. EDQUIBAL, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROBERTO FERRER, JR., respondent.
b. A.C. No. 6788. August 23, 2007.*

(Formerly, CBD 382)
DIANA RAMOS, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG, respondent.
c. Adm. Case CBD No. 190. January 28, 1998.*

CORAZON T. REONTOY, complainant, vs. ATTY. LIBERATO R. IBADLIT, respondent.
d. Adm. Case No. 4103. September 7, 1995.*

VERONICA S. SANTIAGO, BENJAMIN Q. HONTIVEROS, MR. SOCORRO F. MANAS, and TRINIDAD
NORDISTA, complainants, vs. ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS, respondent.
e. Adm. Case No. 3294. February 17, 1993.*

MARIO S. MARIVELES, complainant, vs. ATTY. ODILON MALLARI, respondent.
1
f. Adm. Case No. 249. November 21, 1978.*
TOMAS ALCORIZA, complainant, vs. ATTY. ALBERTO LUMAKANG and ATTY. PABLO SALAZAR,
respondents.
g. G.R. No. 75856. June 4, 1990.*

FLORECER GONZALES and LEON CAJES, JR., petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE OF
BRANCH I OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BOHOL, THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE OF
THE 5TH MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT OF TRINIDAD-SAN MIGUEL-BIEN UNIDO, BOHOL and
the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
h. A.M. No. 405 May 31, 1971

VALENTIN AVELINO, petitioner, vs.
ATTY. PEDRO K. PALANA, respondent.
i. G.R. No. 90083. October 4, 1990.*

KHALYXTO PEREZ MAGLASANG, accused-petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Presiding
Judge ERNESTO B. TEMPLADO (San Carlos City Court), Negros Occidental, respondents.
j. A.C. No. 3523. January 17, 2005.*

RASMUS G. ANDERSON, JR., petitioner, vs. ATTY. REY-NALDO A. CARDEÑO, respondent.
k. G.R. Nos. 93026-27. December 17, 1996.*

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, vs. CONRADO PAJARO alias "DADI," defendant.

a. G.R. No. 91958. January 24, 1991.*
WILFREDO D. LICUDAN and CRISTINA LICUDAN-CAMPOS, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS and ATTY. TEODORO O. DOMALANTA, respondents.
b. G.R. No. 147010. July 18, 2003.*

PIONEER INSURANCE AND SURETY CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.DE DIOS TRANSPORTATION CO.,
INC. and DE DIOS MARIKINA TRANSIT CORPORATION, respondents.
2
A.C. No. 6155. March 14, 2006.*

MA. GINA L. FRANCISCO, JOSEPHINE S. TAN and CARLOS M. JOAQUIN, complainants, vs. ATTY.
JAIME JUANITO P. PORTUGAL, respondent.
Administrative Law; Attorneys; In a criminal case, the lawyer for the accused has a higher duty to be
circumspect in defending the accused.—In a criminal case like that handled by respondent in behalf
of the accused, respondent has a higher duty to be circumspect in defending the accused for it is not
only the property of the accused which stands to be lost but more importantly, their right to their life
and liberty.
Same; Same; It is the counsel, not his client, who has the duty to file the Notice of Withdrawal.—
Respondent ought to know that he was the one who should have filed the Notice to Withdraw and
not the accused. His tale that he sent a registered letter to the accused and gave them instructions on
how to go about respondent’s withdrawal from the case defies credulity. It should have been
respondent who undertook the appropriate measures for the proper withdrawal of his
representation. He should not have relied on his client to do it for him if such was truly the case.
Without the presentation of the alleged registry receipt (or the return card, which confirms the
receipt of the mail by the recipient) of the letter he allegedly sent to PO3 Joaquin, the Court cannot
lend credence to respondent’s naked claim, especially so that complainants have been resolute in
their stand that they did not hear from respondent after the latter had filed the ad cautelam petition.
He could relieve himself of his responsibility as counsel only first by securing the written conformity
of the accused and filing it with the court pursuant to Rule 138, Section 26 of the Rules of Court.
Same; Same; A client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relation at anytime with
or without cause.—The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the
attorney-client relation at anytime with or without cause. The right of an attorney to withdraw or
terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is, however, considerably restricted. Among the
fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action
impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. He is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable
cause. A lawyer’s right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only from the
client’s written consent or from a good cause.
Same; Same; The zeal and the degree of fervor in handling the case should neither diminish nor cease
just because of his perceived insufficiency of remuneration.—Even if respondent felt under-
compensated in the case he undertook to defend, his obligation embodied in the Lawyer’s
Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility still remains unwavering. The zeal and the
degree of fervor in handling the case should neither diminish nor cease just because of his
perceived insufficiency of remuneration.
Same; Same; Rule 14.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility clearly directs lawyers not
to discriminate clients as to their belief of the guilt of the latter.—The Court does not appreciate
the offensive appellation respondent called the shooting incident that the accused was engaged in. He
described the incident, thus: “the accused police officers who had been convicted of [h]omicide for
the ‘salvage’ of Froilan G. Cabiling and Jose M. Chua and [a]ttempted [h]omicide of Mario C. Macato.”
Rule 14.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility clearly directs lawyers not to discriminate
clients as to their belief of the guilt of the latter. It is ironic that it is the defense counsel that actually
branded his own clients as being the culprits that “salvaged” the victims. Though he might think of
his clients as that, still it is unprofessional to be labeling an event as such when even the
Sandiganbayan had not done so.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Violation of Lawyer’s Oath, Gross Misconduct and
Gross Negligence.
3
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Antoniutti K. Palaña for respondent.
TINGA, J.:
Complainants filed before this Court an affidavit-complaint1 on 15 August 2003 against Atty. Jaime
Juanito P. Portugal (respondent) for violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, gross misconduct, and gross
negligence. Complainants are related to petitioners in G.R. No. 152621-23 entitled SPO1 Ernest C.
Francisco, SPO1 Donato F. Tan and PO3 Rolando M. Joaquin v. People of the Philippines, in whose
behalf respondent filed the Petition for Review on Certiorari (Ad Cau-telam) in the case.
The complaint against respondent originated from his alleged mishandling of the above-mentioned
petition which eventually led to its denial with finality by this Court to the prejudice of petitioners
therein.
The facts are as follows:
On 21 March 1994, SPO1 Ernesto C. Francisco, SPO1 Donato F. Tan and PO3 Rolando M. Joaquin
(eventually petitioners in G.R. No. 152621-23, collectively referred to herein as the accused) were
involved in a shooting incident which resulted in the death of two individuals and the serious injury
of another. As a result, Informations were filed against them before the Sandiganbayan for murder
and frustrated murder. The accused pleaded not guilty and trial ensued. After due trial, the
Sandiganbayan2 found the accused guilty of two counts of homicide and one count of attempted
homicide.
At that juncture, complainants engaged the services of herein respondent for the accused.
Respondent then filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Sandiganbayan but it was denied in a
Resolution dated 21 August 2001. Unfazed by the denial, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for
Leave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration, with the attached Second Motion for
Reconsideration.3 Pending resolution by the Sandiganbayan, respondent also filed with this Court a
Petition for Review on Certiorari (Ad Cautelam) on 3 May 2002.
Thereafter, complainants never heard from respondent again despite the frequent telephone calls
they made to his office. When respondent did not return their phone inquiries, complainants went to
respondent’s last known address only to find out that he had moved out without any forwarding
address.
More than a year after the petition was filed, complainants were constrained to personally verify the
status of the ad cautelam petition as they had neither news from respondent about the case nor
knowledge of his whereabouts. They were shocked to discover that the Court had already issued a
Resolution4 dated 3 July 2002, denying the petition for late filing and non-payment of docket fees.
Complainants also learned that the said Resolution had attained finality and warrants of arrest5 had
already been issued against the accused because respondent, whose whereabouts remained
unknown, did nothing to prevent the reglementary period for seeking reconsideration from lapsing.
In his Comment,6 respondent states that it is of vital significance that the Court notes that he was not
the original counsel of the accused. He only met the accused during the promulgation of the
Sandiganbayan decision convicting the accused of two counts of homicide and one count of
attempted homicide. He was merely requested by the original counsel to be on hand, assist the
accused, and be present at the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision.
4
Respondent claims that there was no formal engagement undertaken by the parties. But only
because of his sincere effort and in true spirit of the Lawyer’s Oath did he file the Motion for
Reconsideration. Though admitting its highly irregular character, respondent also made informal but
urgent and personal representation with the members of the Division of the Sandiganbayan who
promulgated the decision of conviction. He asserts that because of all the efforts he put into the case
of the accused, his other professional obligations were neglected and that all these were done
without proper and adequate remuneration.
As to the ad cautelam petition, respondent maintains that it was filed on time. He stresses that the
last day of filing of the petition was on 3 April 2002 and on that very day, he filed with this Court a
Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review,7 seeking an additional thirty (30) days to
file the petition. Subsequently, on 3 May 2002, he filed the petition by registered mail and paid the
corresponding docket fees. Hence, so he concludes, it was filed within the reglementary period.
Soon thereafter, respondent recounted all the “herculean” efforts he made in assisting the accused
for almost a year after the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision. He considered the fact that it
was a case he had just inherited from the original counsel; the effect of his handling the case on his
other equally important professional obligations; the lack of adequate financial consideration for
handling the case; and his plans to travel to the United States to explore further professional
opportunities. He then decided to formally withdraw as counsel for the accused. He wrote a letter to
PO3 Rolando Joaquin (PO3 Joaquin), who served as the contact person between respondent and
complainants, explaining his decision to withdraw as their counsel, and attaching the Notice to
Withdraw which respondent instructed the accused to sign and file with the Court. He sent the letter
through registered mail but unfortunately, he could not locate the registry receipt issued for the
letter.
Respondent states that he has asked the accused that he be discharged from the case and endorsed
the Notice of Withdrawal to PO3 Joaquin for the latter to file with the Court. Unfortunately, PO3
Joaquin did not do so, as he was keenly aware that it would be difficult to find a new counsel who
would be as equally accommodating as respondent. Respondent suggests this might have been the
reason for the several calls complainants made to his office.
On 9 February 2004, the Court resolved to refer the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The case was assigned to Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. (Commissioner
Villadolid) who sent notices of hearing to the parties but of the three complainants, only complainant
Carlos Joaquin appeared. Thus, in the mandatory conference held, the other two complainants were
declared as having waived their rights to further participate in the IBP proceedings.8
The parties were directed to file their respective position papers and on 27 May 2005, Commissioner
Villadolid submitted his Report and Recommendation finding respondent guilty of violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility9 and recommended the imposition of penalty ranging from
reprimand to suspension of six (6) months.10 On 12 November 2005, the Board of Directors of the
IBP resolved to adopt and approve Commissioner Villadolid’s recommendation to find respondent
guilty and specifically to recommend his suspension for six (6) months as penalty.
The only issue to be resolved in the case at bar is, considering all the facts presented, whether
respondent committed gross negligence or misconduct in handling G.R. No. 152621-23, which
eventually led to the ad cautelam petition’s dismissal with finality.
After careful consideration of the records of the case, the Court finds the suspension recommended
by the IBP proper. In a criminal case like that handled by respondent in behalf of the accused,
respondent has a higher duty to be circumspect in defending the accused for it is not only the
5
property of the accused which stands to be lost but more importantly, their right to their life and
liberty. As held in Regala v. Sandiganbayan:
“Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that
breathe life into it, among those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of very delicate, exacting and
confidential character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good faith, that is required by
reason of necessity and public interest x x x .
It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to his client that distinguishes him from any other
profession in society. x x x”12
At the onset, the Court takes notice that the ad cautelam petition was actually filed out of time.
Though respondent filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Motion for Leave to File Second Motion
for Reconsideration with the attached Second Motion for Reconsideration, he should have known
that a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading13 and it rests on the sound
discretion of the Sandiganbayan to admit it or not. Thus, in effect, the motion did not toll the
reglementary period to appeal. Having failed to do so, the accused had already lost their right to
appeal long before respondent filed his motion for extension. Therefore, respondent cannot now say
he filed the ad cautelam petition on time. Also important to note is the allegation of complainants
that the Sandiganbayan denied the second motion for reconsideration in its Resolution dated 7
February 2002. This respondent does not dispute.
As to respondent’s conduct in dealing with the accused and complainants, he definitely fell short of
the high standard of assiduousness that a counsel must perform to safeguard the rights of his clients.
As aptly observed by Commissioner Vil ladolid, respondent had not been quite candid in his dealings
with the accused or complainants. The Court notes that though respondent represented to the
accused that he had changed his office address, still, from the examination of the pleadings14 he filed,
it can be gleaned that all of the pleadings have the same mailing address as that known to
complainants. Presumably, at some point, respondent’s office would have received the Court’s
Resolution dismissing the petition. Of course, the prudent step to take in that situation was to at least
inform the client of the adverse resolution since they had constantly called respondent’s office to
check the status of the case. Even when he knew that complainants had been calling his office, he
opted not to return their calls.
Respondent professed an inkling that the several phone calls of complainants may have been about
the letter he sent PO3 Joaquin regarding his desire to be discharged as counsel of the case. However,
though aware of such likelihood, respondent still did not return their calls. Had he done so, he and
complainants could have threshed out all unresolved matters between them.
Had respondent truly intended to withdraw his appearance for the accused, he as a lawyer who is
presumably steeped in court procedures and practices, should have filed the notice of withdrawal
himself instead of the accused. At the very least, he should have informed this Court through the
appropriate manifestation that he had already given instructions to his clients on the proper way to
go about the filing of the Notice of Withdrawal, as suggested by Commissioner Villadolid. In not so
doing, he was negligent in handling the case of the accused.
Certainly, respondent ought to know that he was the one who should have filed the Notice to
Withdraw and not the accused. His tale that he sent a registered letter to the accused and gave them
instructions on how to go about respondent’s withdrawal from the case defies credulity. It should
have been respondent who undertook the appropriate measures for the proper withdrawal of his
representation. He should not have relied on his client to do it for him if such was truly the case.
Without the presentation of the alleged registry receipt (or the return card, which confirms the
receipt of the mail by the recipient) of the letter he allegedly sent to PO3 Joaquin, the Court cannot
lend credence to respondent’s naked claim, especially so that complainants have been resolute in
6
their stand that they did not hear from respondent after the latter had filed the ad cautelam petition.
He could relieve himself of his responsibility as counsel only first by securing the written conformity
of the accused and filing it with the court pursuant to Rule 138, Section 26 of the Rules of Court.15
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client
relation at anytime with or without cause. The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the
relation other than for sufficient cause is, however, considerably restricted. Among the fundamental
rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly
stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. He is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause. A
lawyer’s right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only from the client’s
written consent or from a good cause.16
We agree with Commissioner Villadolid that the dismissal of the ad cautelam petition was primarily
due to the gross negligence of respondent. The Court has stressed in Aromin v. Boncavil17 that:
“Once he agrees to take up the cause of the client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with
competence and diligence, and champion the latter’s cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and
devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his client’s rights, and the exertion of the his utmost learning and ability
to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied.
This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that
is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or
defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law
carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the
public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of
his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of
the community to the legal profession.”18
Respondent has time and again stated that he did all the endeavors he enumerated without adequate
or proper remuneration. However, complainants have sufficiently disputed such claim when they
attached in their position paper filed before the IBP a machine validated deposit slip in the amount of
P15,500.00 for the Metro Bank savings account of one Jaime Portugal with account number
7186509273.19 Respondent has neither admitted nor denied having claimed the deposited amount.
The Court also rejects respondent’s claim that there was no formal engagement between the parties
and that he made all his efforts for the case without adequate and proper consideration. In the words
of then Justice Panganiban (presently Chief Justice) in Burbe v. Atty. Magulta:20
“After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client, even if
the client never paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it is a
profession in which duty of public service, not money, is the primary consideration.”21
Also to the point is another case where this Court ruled, thus:
“A written contract is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may be
express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an
attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession. x x x”22
Hence, even if respondent felt under-compensated in the case he undertook to defend, his obligation
embodied in the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility still remains unwavering.
The zeal and the degree of fervor in handling the case should neither diminish nor cease just because
of his perceived insufficiency of remuneration.
7
Lastly, the Court does not appreciate the offensive appellation respondent called the shooting
incident that the accused was engaged in. He described the incident, thus: “the accused police officers
who had been convicted of [h]omicide for the ‘salvage’ of Froilan G. Cabiling and Jose M. Chua and
[a]ttempted [h]omicide of Mario C. Macato.”23 Rule 14.0124 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility clearly directs lawyers not to discriminate clients as to their belief of the guilt of the
latter. It is ironic that it is the defense counsel that actually branded his own clients as being the
culprits that “salvaged” the victims. Though he might think of his clients as that, still it is
unprofessional to be labeling an event as such when even the Sandiganbayan had not done so.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended the suspension of respondent for six (6) months, the
most severe penalty recommended by Commissioner Villadolid, but did not explain why such penalty
was justified. In a fairly recent case where the lawyer failed to file an appeal brief which resulted to
the dismissal of the appeal of his client in the Court of Appeals, the Court imposed upon the erring
lawyer the penalty of three (3) months’ suspension.25 The Court finds it fit to impose the same in the
case at bar.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for three (3) months. Let a copy of the Resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant for appropriate
annotation in the record of respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Notes.—A lawyer’s responsibility to protect and advance the interest of his client does not
warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other
party. (Villaflor vs. Sarita, 308 SCRA 129 [1999])
As a rule, an attorney-client relationship is said to exist when a lawyer voluntarily permits or

acquiesces with the consultation of a person, who in respect to a business or trouble of any
kind, consults a lawyer with a view of obtaining professional advice or assistance. (Uy vs.
Gonzales, 426 SCRA 422 [2004])
An attorney may only retire from the case either by a written consent of his client or by
permission of the court after due notice and hearing, in which event the attorney should see
to it that the name of the new attorney is recorded in the case. (De Juan vs. Baria III, 429 SCRA
187 [2004])
8
A.C. No. 4401. January 29, 2004.*
BIOMIE SARENAS-OCHAGABIA, complainant, vs. ATTY. BALMES L. OCAMPOS, respondent.
Attorneys; Duties; Diligence; A client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense
that is authorized by the law.—Every case a lawyer accepts deserves full attention, diligence,
skill, and competence regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for
free. It bears emphasis that a client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and
defense that is authorized by the law and expects his lawyer to assert every such remedy or
defense.
Same; Same; Same; Until his final release from the professional relationship with a client, a counsel of
record is under obligation to protect the client’s interest.—Until his final release from the
professional relationship with a client, a counsel of record is under obligation to protect the
client’s interest. That is why if a party has a counsel of record, a court does not recognize any
other representation on behalf thereof unless it is in collaboration with such counsel of
record or until a formal substitution of counsel is effected.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Violation of Code of Professional Responsibility.
Godwin Denzil B. Manginsay for complainant.
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
On January 25, 1995, complainant Biomie Sarenas-Ochagabia lodged a complaint1 against her former
counsel, respondent Atty. Balmes L. Ocampos, whose legal services she, together with her aunts
Toribia Garban de Detalla and Rosenda Garban vda. de Denore as co-plaintiffs, engaged in Civil Case
No. 91-39 before Branch 15 of the Regional Trial Court of Ozamis City (for recovery of possession
and ownership of a parcel of land).
An adverse decision2 having been rendered against the plaintiffs in above-mentioned civil case on
September 7. 1992, Atty. Ocampos filed a notice of appeal3 at the behest of the former.4
The Court of Appeals gave the plaintiffs-appellants 45 days from notice to file their brief5 but before
the lapse of the period, their counsel Atty. Ocampos, upon motion,6 was granted a 90-day extension
of time to file the brief. The extended period lapsed, without, however, any appellants’ brief being
filed, prompting the appellate court to dismiss the appeal.7 The dismissal of the appeal was not
challenged.8
Thus spawned the present complaint against Atty. Ocampos.
In his Comment9 filed on August 29, 1995, the then 73-year old respondent claimed that he merely
agreed to handle the case gratis et amore upon the request of a friend who is incidentally the son-in-
law of herein complainant and Clerk of Court of one of the city courts in Ozamis City. And he
explained that he appeared only at the later part of the proceedings when defendants were already
presenting their evidence, he adding that when the decision of the trial court was promulgated, the
plaintiffs’ principal counsel, Atty. Placidtrank Osorio, was out of town, hence, he was requested by the
plaintiffs to appeal the decision before the Court of Appeals.10
Respondent additionally claimed that he was constrained to ask for extension of time within which to
file appellants’ brief due to pressure of work and gastrointestinal illness, and that he had in fact made
arrangements with herein complainant to ask Atty. Osorio to, in his stead, prepare the brief.11
9
Finally, Atty. Ocampos claimed that based on the evidence presented before the trial court, the
possibility that the decision of the trial court would be reversed was remote, hence, no serious or
irreparable damage could have been caused by the dismissal of the appeal.12
The complaint was referred by this Court on September 20, 1995 to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for “investigation and [recommendation].13 Upon motion of complainant, venue of
the investigation was transferred to Ozamis City, all the parties being residents thereof.14
In her Position Paper15 submitted on June 9, 1998,16complainant reiterated her charge in her
complaint, she contending that respondent violated his duty to inform her of his failure to file
appellants’ brief and of the dismissal of the appeal. Worse, complainant went on, respondent denied
such dismissal when she asked him about the status of the appeal.17
Despite the grant of respondent’s motion for extension of time to submit his position paper,18 he
failed to submit one.19
The committee created for the purpose of investigating the case in Ozamis City thereupon
recommended that the case be resolved on the basis of the pleadings and records on file.20
Investigating Commissioner Victoria G. de los Reyes, in her Report and Recommendation21 dated
August 29, 2003, faulted respondent for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
“particularly Rule 18.0122 and Rule 18.03 x x x,” and recommended the imposition of the penalty of
suspension for six months, she observing as follows:
It is worthwhile to mention here that in the case of In re Santiago F. Marcos, 156 SCRA 844 (1987),” a
lawyer’s failure to file brief for his client amounts to inexcusable negligence. x x x
In the instant case, the respondent Atty. Ocampos had no justifiable excuse for not preparing and
filing the needed appellants’ brief. Granting that he was ill during that time, he could have written to
the complainant about it so that the latter will be able to hire another lawyer to handle the case for
her and to prepare and file the appellants’ brief. He also failed to make the necessary Manifestation
and Motion with the Court of Appeals. Sad to state, the respondent failed to do all these in blatant
violation of his duty towards his client and to the Courts.
We therefore maintain that a lawyer’s neglect of duty should not be tolerated and for such inaction
he has to be penalized.
The undersigned Commissioner could have recommended for a stiffer penalty. But considering that
he is now in the twilight years of his life, and for humanitarian reasons, it is recommended that he
just be suspended from the practice of law. (Emphasis in the original)23
By Resolution of September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with the modification that the penalty of
suspension should only be for four months.24
This Court finds the IBP Board Resolution faulting respondent in order. A lawyer engaged to
represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting the latter’s interest with utmost
diligence.25 By failing to file appellants’ brief, respondent was remiss in the discharge of such
responsibility. He thus violated the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
Rule 12.03. A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda
or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his
failure to do so.
10
Rule 18.03. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
That respondent accepted to represent complainant et al. gratis et amore does not justify his failure
to exercise due diligence in the performance of his duty to file appellants’ brief. Every case a law yer
accepts deserves full attention, diligence, skill, and competence regardless of its importance and
whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.26
It bears emphasis that a client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is
authorized by the law and expects his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense.27
Respondent’s claim that he conferred with complainant to request Atty. Osorio to draft and file the
appellants’ brief does not persuade, especially given his filing of a motion of extension of time to file
brief upon the grounds therein stated, without him mentioning that Atty. Osorio was going to be the
one to prepare and file it.
Until his final release from the professional relationship with a client, a counsel of record is under
obligation to protect the client’s interest. That is why if a party has a counsel of record, a court does
not recognize any other representation on behalf thereof unless it is in collaboration with such
counsel of record or until a formal substitution of counsel is effected. Since respondent had not then
withdrawn as counsel as he, it bears repeating, in fact filed a motion for extension of time to file brief,
he was under obligation to discharge his professional responsibility.
As for complainant’s allegation that respondent denied that the appeal was dismissed by the
appellate court, it does not merit consideration, no factual finding thereof being reflected in the IBP
Report and Recommendation.
A word on the penalty to be imposed. In administrative complaints, this Court has exercised its
discretion on what penalty to impose on the basis of the facts thereof. Thus, for a lawyer’s failure to
file a brief or other pleading, this Court imposed penalties ranging from reprimand,28 warning with
fine,29 suspension30 and, in aggravated cases, disbarment.31
In the present case, owing to respondent’s advanced age, this Court imposes upon him the penalty of
suspension for three months.
WHEREFORE, for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent Atty. Balmes L.
Ocampos is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months effective upon the finality
hereof, with WARNING that a repetition thereof will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Note.—A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable. (Cariño vs. De los Reyes, 362 SCRA 374 [2001])
11
Adm. Case No. 378. March 30, 1962.
JOSE G. MEJIA and EMILIA N. ABRERA, complainants, vs. FRANCISCO S. REYES, respondent.
Attorneys-at-law; Lawyers cannot represent conflicting interests in a case.—Lawyers are

prohibited from representing conflicting interests in a case. (Cantorne vs. Ducusin, 57 Phil. 23
and In re: De la Rosa, 27 Phil. 258). So that respondent's act of appearing and acting as counsel for
the complainants in the civil case against the Philippine National Bank that has appointed him bank
attorney and notary public, constitutes malpractice. Considering, however, that it does not appear
satisfactorily proven that during the pendency of their case the complainants did not know of the
respondent's connection with the bank as attorney and notary public; that in spite of the knowledge
of the Philippine National Bank that respondent was appearing as counsel for the complainants, it did
not revoke or cancel his appointment as bank attorney and notary public; and that respondent was
deeply devoted to his duties as counsel for the complainants and collected a very small attorney's fee,
the malpractice committed by the respondent is not so serious. He is, therefore, admonished and
warned not to repeat it.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a disbarment proceedings against attorney Francisco S. Reyes for malpractice.
On 27 September 1947, Francisco S. Reyes, a practicing lawyer, was appointed bank attorney and
notary public for the Baguio Branch of the Philippine National Bank (Exhibit H), as follows:
Atty. Francisco S. Reyes

Baguio C ity, Mt. Province
(Thru: The Manager, Phil. Nat. Bank
Baguio Branch)
Sir:
Please be advised that you are hereby appointed as Bank Attorney and Notary Public of our Baguio
Branch, effective September 19, 1947, and as such you are to perform the following:
1) To ratify documents covering bank transactions;

2) To represent the Bank in cases filed in the local courts when, in the opinion of the Government
Corporate Counsel. there is a necessity for an attorney for the purpose: and
3) To give legal advise on ordinary routinary matters to our Branch Manager thereat and sign
collection letters when so requested by the latter.
It is understood that you shall receive no regular compensation from the Bank but that you will be
allowed to collect fees authorized by the Notarial Law when ratifying documents and 5% of the
amount of judgment in cases where your appearance for the Bank is requested, if and when actually
collected, which fees, however, may be changed as circumstances may warrant. Furthermore, it is
also understood that under this appointment, you are not entitled to any other form of compensation
or privileges accorded to regularly appointed employees of this Bank.
Yours very truly,
(Sgd.) V. CARMONA
12
President
I AGREE
(Sgd.) FRANCISCO S. REYES
In June 1955 while still holding such position his professional services were engaged by Jose G. Mejia
and Emilia N. Abrera, residents of Baguio City, to bring an action in court against the Philippine
National Bank and the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (now the Development Bank of the
Philippines) as successor-in-interest of the defunct Agricultural and Industrial Bank for the
cancellation of a mortgage on a parcel of land situated in Baguio City recorded on their certificate of
title No. 2499 (civil No. 532). On 28 June 1955 a complaint, signed by Attorney Francisco S. Reyes for
the law firm of Reyes and Cabato, was filed in the Court of First Instance of Baguio against the two
banks, praying that the sum in Japanese war notes of P2,693.53 paid on 27 October 1944 by Jose G.
Mejia and Emilia N. Abrera to the Agricultural and Industrial Bank and received by the Philippine
National Bank, Baguio Branch, to pay the balance of a real estate mortgage loan, be credited by the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation as successor-in-interest of the defunct Agricultural and Industrial
Bank and that the mortgage annotated on transfer certificate of title No. 2499 be cancelled (Exhibit
A). After trial, on 4 , Augu 1956 the Court rendered judgment declaring valid the payment in Japanese
war notes of P2,693.53 on 27 October 1944 but crediting only the sum of P67.34, Philippine
currency, the equivalent value of P2,693.53 under the Ballantyne Schedule (Exhibit 8). On 31 August
1956 the Reyes and Cabato law firm filed a motion for reconsideration (Exhibit 9) and the Philippine
National Bank on 4 September 1956 (Exhibit 10), to which on 15 September 1956 the former filed a
written objection (Exhibit 11). On 15 September 1956 the Court denied both motion for
reconsideration (Exhibit 12). No appeal was taken by either party.
In this administrative proceedings, the complainants Jose G. Mejia and Emilia N. Abrera allege that
they had desired to take an appeal from the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of
Baguio but did not, upon the respondent's advice; that thereafter for the first time they learned that
the respondent was counsel and notary public of the Baguio Branch of the Philippine National Bank;
that his representing them against the Philippine National Bank, in whose Baguio Branch he was
bank attorney and notary public, without revealing to them such connection with the Bank,
constitutes malpractice; and pray this Court to disbar him.
In his answer filed on 2 . Mar ch 1 959 respon dent cisco S. Reyes avers that after a conference among
the complainants, attorney Federico L. Cabato and himself, they agreed not to appeal the judgment
rendered by the Court and, instead, to take advantage of the provisions of Republic Act No. 1286 that
condoned interests accruing on debts to the Government provided that the principal was paid on or
before 31 December 1956: that all the time he was handling their case the complainants knew his
professional connection with the Baguio Branch of the Philippine National Bank; that he worked hard
with attorney Cabato on their case, for which he was paid by them a meager sum of P90 as attorney's
fees: that he is not guilty of malpractice, because he was not a retainer lawyer of 'the Philippine
National Bank but represented it only in collection cases where he was paid 5% of any amount
collected; that the malpractice charge is just to harass, embarrass and force him to pay the
complainants' debt to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation; and prays that the complaint be
dismissed.
On 4 March 1959 the Court referred the administrative case to the City Attorney of Baguio for
investigation, report and recommendation. After conducting the investigation during which the
parties presented their evidence, on 23 March 1960, Sixto A. Domondo, City Attorney of Baguio,
rendered a report finding the respondent guilty of malpractice and recommending reprimand.
Lawyers are prohibited from representing conflicting interests in a case (Cantorne vs. Ducusin, 57
Phil. 23 and In re: De la Rosa, 27 Phil. 258). The respondent's act of appearing and acting as counsel
13
for the complainants Jose G. Mejia and Emilia N. Abrera in the civil case against the Philippine
National Bank, that had appointed him bank attorney and notary public, constitutes malpractice.
However, it does not appear satisfactorily proven that during the pendency of their case the
complainants did not know of the respondents connection with the bank as attorney and notary
public. On the other hand, it appears that notwithstanding the letter dated 21 July 1955 written by
Mr. L. D. Herrera, manager of the Baguio Branch, quoting a part of a previous letter sent to him
(Herrera) by attorney Ramon B. de los Reyes, chief legal counsel of the Philippine National Bank,
stating that 9
We note that the complaint is signed by our Bank Attorney and Notary Public, Atty. Francisco S. Reyes,
in behalf of the Law Office of Reyes and Cabato. Needless to say, it is unethical for Atty. Reyes, who is
presently the attorney of the Bank, to represent the plaintiffs here whose interests are diametrically
opposed to those of the Bank. As this is certainly embarrassing both for Atty. Reyes and for the Bank, it is
requested that you please take this matter with Atty. Reyes with the end in view of advising him to desist
from representing the plaintiffs in this case, otherwise, we will be compelled, much to our regret, to
recommend severance of his official connection with this Bank,
which shows that the Philippine National Bank knew that the respondent was appearing as counsel
for the complainants, yet it did not revoke or cancel his appointment as bank attorney and notary
public; that in the civil case the respondent did not appear as counsel for the Bank which was
represented by attorneys Ramon B. de los Reyes and Nemesio P. Libunao; that no appeal was taken
from the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Baguio, because the complainants had
chosen to pay the principal of their loan on or before 31 December 1956 in order that the interests
thereon be condoned as provided for in Republic Act No. 1286 (Exhibits 13 to 17); and that the
respondent was deeply devoted to his duties as counsel for the complainants and collected a very
small attorney's fees of P90, the malpractice committed by the respondent is not so serious. He is just
admonished and warned not- to repeat it.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and De Leon, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L. and Concepcion, JJ ., took no part.
Respondent admonished and warned not to repeat it.
14
Adm. Mat. No. MTJ-95-1063. February 9, 1996.*
ALFONSO C. CHOA, complainant, vs. JUDGE ROBERTO S. CHIONGSON, respondent.
Courts; Judges; Criminal Procedure; Motion to Quash; If the accused and his counsel honestly
believed that the allegations in the Information did not constitute an offense, they should have filed a
motion to quash instead of subsequently filing an administrative complaint against the judge.—
Indeed, as correctly pointed out by the respondent, if the complainant and his counsel honestly
believed that the allegations in the Information in the perjury case did not constitute an offense, they
should have filed a motion to quash. Under Section 3(a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, the accused
may move to quash the complaint or information on this ground. The complainant never did; he was
arraigned and entered into trial. Although his failure to do so did not operate as a waiver of the said
ground pursuant to Section 8 of the same Rule, it showed, nevertheless, his admission of the
weakness of the ground. If he had perceived it to be strong, he would not have wasted an opportunity
to put an early end to the ordeal of a prolonged litigation. Besides, this ground had not at all been
invoked by him, as shown in the order of 31 March 1995 denying the complainant’s motion for the
reconsideration.
Same; Same; Same; Criminal Law; Perjury; The withdrawal of the Petition for Naturalization did not
and cannot amount to a recall of untruthful statements, nor extinguish any offense which may have
been committed by reason of such untruthful statements.—The withdrawal of the Petition for
Naturalization did not and cannot amount to a recall of the questioned untruthful statements.
Neither could it extinguish any offense which may have been committed by reason of such untruthful
statements.
Same; Same; Disqualification of Judges; The fact alone that the judge is a next-door neighbor of the
complainant in a perjury case is not a ground for either a mandatory or voluntary disqualification
under Rule 137 of the Rules of Court.—As to the respondent Judge’s being a next-door neighbor of
the complainant’s wife—the complainant in the perjury case—it must be stressed that that alone is
ot a ground for either a mandatory disqualification under the first paragraph or for a voluntary
disqualification under the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court. In any event,
the complainant has failed to disclose in his complaint that he had raised this matter at any time
before the rendition of the judgment.
Same; Same; Criminal Procedure; The nature and character of the complainant’s grievances relative
to the respondent’s judgment finding the former guilty of perjury may only be properly ventilated in
an appropriate judicial proceeding, such as an appeal from the judgment, and not in an
administrative complaint against the judge.—Finally, the nature and character of the complainant’s
grievances relative to the respondent’s judgment finding the former guilty of perjury may only be
properly ventilated in an appropriate judicial proceeding, such as an appeal from the judgment. This
kind of recourse, whether made in addition to a regular appeal from the judgment, or in lieu thereof,
if none had been made, is clearly without any basis and cannot be tolerated for it robs Judges of
precious time which they could otherwise devote to the cases in their courts or to the unclogging of
their dockets.
Same; Same; Legal Ethics; Attorneys; It is incumbent upon an attorney to give a candid and honest
opinion on the merits and probable results of his client’s case with the end in view of promoting
respect for the law and legal processes.—Atty. Raymundo A. Quiroz, counsel for the complainant,
must have been aware of the utter lack of merit of the charges against the respondent. As a
Member of the Philippine Bar he is bound: (1) by his oath, not to, wittingly or willingly,
promote or sue any groundless, false, or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same;
(2) by Section 20(c), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to counsel or maintain such action or
proceedings only as appear to him to be just; and (3) to uphold the Code of Professional
Responsibility. It was incumbent upon him to give a candid and honest opinion on the merits
and probable results of the complainant’s case (Rule 15.05, Canon 15, Code of Professional
15
Responsibility) with the end in view of promoting respect for the law and legal processes
(Canon 1, Id.). He should, therefore, be required to show cause why no disciplinary action
should be taken against him for his apparent failure to observe the foregoing duties and
responsibilities.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Grave Misconduct, Gross Bias and Partiality and
Knowingly Rendering Unjust Judgment.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
Raymundo A. Quiroz for complainant.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The uncomplicated issues in this administrative complaint have been properly joined with the filing
of the respondent’s comment as required in the 1st Indorsement of 18 August 1995 of Hon. Bernardo
P. Abesamis, Deputy Court Administrator. No further pleadings need be required from the parties.
In the complaint signed by Atty. Raymundo A. Quiroz as counsel for the complainant and verified by
the latter, the respondent is charged with grave misconduct, gross bias and partiality, and having
knowingly rendered an unjust judgment in Criminal Case No. 50322 entitled, “People of the
Philippines vs. Alfonso C. Choa.”
Criminal Case No. 50322 was for Perjury and initiated by the complainant’s wife, Leni L. Ong-Choa,
through the filing of a letter-complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City. This
complaint arose from the alleged untruthful statements or falsehoods in the complainant’s Petition
for Naturalization dated 30 March 1989 which was docketed as Case No. 5395, of Branch 41 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City.
In due course, an Information was filed, in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Bacolod City
by the Office of the Prosecutor, charging the complainant herein with perjury allegedly committed as
follows:
That on or about the 30th day of March, 1989, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and knowingly made untruthful statements of [sic] falsehoods upon material matters
required by the Revised Naturalization Law (C.A. No. 473) in his verified “Petition for Naturalization”
dated April 13, 1989, subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Felomino B. Tan, Jr., who is
authorized to administer oath[s], which petition bears Doc. No. 140; Page No. 29; Book No. XXIII; and
Series of 1989, in the Notarial Register of said Notary Public, by stating therein the following, to wit:
5. I am married to a Filipino. My wife’s name is Leni Ong Choa and now resides at 46 Malaspina
Street, Bacolod City. I have two (2) children, whose names, dates and places of birth, and residences
are as follows:
16
NAME DATE OF PLACE OF RESIDENCE
BIRTH BIRTH
ALBRYAN July 19, Bacolod 46 Malaspina St.,

ONG CHOA 1981 City Bacolod City
CHERYL LYNNE May 5, Bacolod 46 Malaspina St.,

ONG CHOA 1983 City Bacolod City
xxx
10. I am of good moral character, I believe in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution. I
have conducted myself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of my
residence in the Philippines in my relations with the constituted government as well as with the
community in which I am living.
xxx
When in truth and in fact said accused knew that his wife Leni Ong Choa and their two (2) children
were not then residing at the said address at No. 46 Malaspina Street, Villamonte, Bacolod City,
having left the aforesaid residence in 1984, or about five (5) years earlier and were then residing at
Hervias Subdivision, Bacolod City, that contrary to his aforesaid allegations in his verified Petition for
Naturalization, accused while residing at 211, 106 Street, Greenplains Subdivision, Bacolod City, has
been carrying on an immoral and illicit relationship with one Stella Flores Saludar, a woman not his
wife since 1984, and begotting [sic] two (2) children with her as a consequence, as he and his wife,
the private offended party herein, have long been separated from bed and boards [sic] since 1984;
which falsehoods and/or immoral and improper conduct are grounds for disqualifications [sic] of
[sic] becoming a citizen of the Philippines.
Act contrary to law.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 50322 and was assigned to Branch III thereof where the
respondent is the presiding Judge.
After trial, the respondent Judge rendered judgment on 21 February 1995 and found the complainant
herein guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of perjury. The respondent Judge accordingly
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of six months and one day of prision correccional and to pay the
costs.
The complainant moved for a reconsideration of the judgment alleging that: (1) there is no basis for
the conviction since his petition for naturalization had been withdrawn and therefore had become
functus oficio; (2) the petition for naturalization is a pleading, hence its allegations are privileged;
and (3) his prosecution violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The last ground is
founded on an admission made by a representative of the Office of the Solicitor General of her lack of
knowledge of any perjury case filed based on a withdrawn or dismissed petition for naturalization.
The respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit in an order dated 31
March 1995.
The complainant filed the instant complaint on 14 July 1995 and prayed for the removal of the
respondent Judge from office. As grounds therefor, he alleges that:
(1) The respondent Judge is guilty of Grave Misconduct, Gross Bias and Partiality, and Knowingly
Rendering An Unjust Judgment when he intentionally failed to divulge the next-door-neighbor
17
relationship between him and the family of Leni Ong Choa and to disqualify himself from sitting in
the criminal case on such ground as part of the grand design and preconceived intention to unjustly
convict the complainant of the crime charged without due process.
(2) The allegations in the Information do not constitute the offense of perjury.
(3) The petition having been withdrawn with finality, it has become functus oficio and it is as if the
Petition was not filed at all so that whatever false statements were contained therein were no longer
required by law and had ceased to be on a material matter.
(4) The respondent Judge admitted for prosecution Exhibit “P” (handwritten list of properties)
even if this was self-serving as it was undated and unsigned; and Exhibit “Q” (letter of Leni Ong
Choa’s counsel to the complainant) even if it was also self-serving as there was no showing that he
received the letter.
(5) The respondent Judge has sentenced the complainant to suffer a penalty higher than that
provided by law, without applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
The respondent Judge refutes the charge in his Comment dated 12 September 1995, thus:
He denies being the next-door-neighbor of Leni Ong Choa there being a house, belonging to the Sia
family, separating his house and that of Leni Choa; he and the rest of the members of his family are
not acquainted with Leni Choa or any member of her family and had not exchanged greetings nor is
he even a nodding acquaintance of Leni Choa or any member of her family.
He asserts that if the allegations in the Information do not constitute an offense, the complainant
should have filed a Motion to Quash but he did not. Just the same, when the complainant stated in the
Petition that he together with his wife and children lived at 46 Malaspina St., Bacolod City, he
committed a falsehood under oath because the truth is two (2) years before the filing of the Petition,
his wife and two (2) children were not living with him anymore, making him liable for perjury.
Respondent also avers that the complainant is not of good moral character contrary to what he
stated in the Petition for Naturalization since he is conducting and extra-marital relationship with
Stella Flores Saludar, his former employee, with whom he has begotten two (2) children. As a matter
of fact, a case for concubinage against complainant was filed and is now pending in Court.
According to the respondent, a reading of the Order granting the Motion to Withdraw the Petition
will show that the Prosecutor representing the Office of the Solicitor General opposed the Motion to
Withdraw the Petition for the reason that the complainant had abandoned his wife and two (2)
children, is not giving them support and is now living with his paramour.
On the claim of the complainant that his petition for naturalization has became functus oficio in view
of its withdrawal, hence no longer existent, the respondent Judge maintains that the withdrawal
reduced the petition to functus oficio only for the purpose of the Special Proceedings but not when it
is used as evidence in other cases.
On the issue of the admissibility of the Exhibits P, Q and R, the respondent Judge contends that
Exhibits P, Q and R were duly identified by Leni Ong Choa and her testimonies on these were found
to be credible by the Court.
Finally, respondent Judge asserts that the Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable in the
perjury case as the penalty imposed by the court did not exceed one (1) year.
The respondent Judge then prays for the dismissal of the complaint for being patently without merit
and for the censure and reprimand of the complainant’s counsel with a warning to refrain from filing
similar harassment suits.
18
In the Evaluation contained in a Memorandum dated 17 November 1995 and duly approved by the
Court Administrator, Hon. Zenaida N. Elepaño, Deputy Court Administrator, makes the following
findings and conclusions:
EVALUATION: A careful study of the records shows that the allegations of the complainant are devoid
of any merit.
The charge that respondent Judge and Leni Choa are nieghbors [sic] appears to be petty under the
circumstances. Granting that they are indeed next-door neighbors does not necessarily mean that
respondent Judge has violated Rule 137 of the Rules of Court for Disqualification of Judges. Nowhere
in said Rule is it ordained that being the neighbor of a party litigant is reason enough for the Judge to
disqualify himself from hearing the former’s case.
With respect to the complainant’s claim that the allegations in the Information do not constitute the
offense of perjury, an administrative proceeding is not the forum to decide whether the judge has
erred or not, especially as complainant has appealed his conviction.
Even if the matter can be examined, we do not find any error in the Court’s decision.
The elements of perjury as enumerated in the case of People of the Philippines vs. Bautista (C.A., 40
O.G. 2491) are as follows:
(a) Statement in the affidavit upon material matter made under oath;
(b) The affiant swears to the truthfulness of the statements in his affidavit before a competent
officer authorized to administer oath;
(c) There is a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood; and
(d) Sworn statement containing the falsity is required by law.
It cannot be denied that the petition for naturalization filed by Alfonso C. Choa was made under oath
and before a competent officer authorized to administer oath as shown by the records (p. 4
APPENDIX “A”). This petition for naturalization is required by law as a condition precedent for the
grant of Philippine citizenship (Section 7, Com. Act No. 473).
The question now boils down to whether there is a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood.
As shown by the records (p. 1 APPENDIX “A”), Alfonso C. Choa declared in his petition dated 30
March 1989 that his wife Leni Ong Choa resides at 46 Malaspina St., Bacolod City while in the
administrative complaint he filed against respondent Judge, he stated that his wife Leni Ong Choa left
their family residence (46 Malaspina St., Bacolod City) in the latter part of 1984 (p. 6, par. 2 of Adm.
Complaint). This simply means that when he filed his petition for naturalization, Leni Ong Choa was
not residing at the abovementioned address anymore.
It was also proven that Alfonso C. Choa had a child with a woman not his wife and he himself signed
the birth certificate as the father of that child (p. 4 APPENDIX “E”). This is contrary to what he
declared in his petition that he is of good moral character which is required under the Naturalization
Law (par. 3, Sec. 2, Com. Act No. 473).
There was therefore a deliberate assertion of falsehood by Alfonso C. Choa to warrant conviction for
perjury as found by Judge Chiongson.
As to the complainant’s claim that the withdrawal of the petition makes it functus oficio, we sustain
the respondent Judge’s view that the Petition can be used as evidence in another case. In the case of
People of the Philippines vs. Cainglet (16 SCRA 748) the Court held that “every interest of public
policy demands that perjury be not shielded by artificial refinements and narrow technicalities. For
19
perjury strikes at the very administration of the laws (Jay vs. State, [1916] 15 Ala. App. 255, 43 So.
137). It is the policy of the law that judicial proceedings and judgment shall be fair and free from
fraud, and that litigants and parties be encouraged to tell the truth and that they be punished if they
do not (People vs. Niles, 300 Ill., 458, 133 N.E. 252, 37 A.R.L. 1284, 1289).”
On whether the judge erred in not applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law to the case, we cite
Section 2 of R.A. No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law) which provides in part that “This Act shall
not apply to x x x those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year, x x x.”
Since the penalty for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code is arresto mayor in its
maximum period which is one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months to prision correccional in
its minimum period which is six (6) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months,
the respondent Judge was correct in not applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
As earlier stated, the foregoing discussion is in no way the final appreciation of the Court’s decision
which is on appeal, but is made only to illustrate the utter lack of merit of this charge. Counsel for the
complainant must be reprimanded for assisting in the filing of this complaint.
Deputy Court Administrator Elepaño then recommends:
Premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that this complaint against Judge Roberto S.
Chiongson be DISMISSED for lack of merit. It is further recommended that Atty. Raymundo A. Quiroz
be REPRIMANDED for assisting in the filing of a patently unmeritorious complaint.
We fully agree with Deputy Court Administrator Elepaño that the allegations in the complaint are
utterly devoid of merit. Good faith and good motive did not seem to have inspired the filing of the
complaint.
Indeed, as correctly pointed out by the respondent, if the complainant and his counsel honestly
believed that the allegations in the Information in the perjury case did not constitute an offense, they
should have filed a motion to quash. Un der Section 3(a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, the accused
may move to quash the complaint or information on this ground. The complainant never did; he was
arraigned and entered into trial. Although his failure to do so did not operate as a waiver of the said
ground pursuant to Section 8 of the same Rule, it showed, nevertheless, his admission of the
weakness of the ground. If he had perceived it to be strong, he would not have wasted an opportunity
to put an early end to the ordeal of a prolonged litigation. Besides, this ground had not at all been
invoked by him, as shown in the order of 31 March 1995 denying the complainant’s motion for the
reconsideration.
The withdrawal of the Petition for Naturalization did not and cannot amount to a recall of the
questioned untruthful statements. Neither could it extinguish any offense which may have been
committed by reason of such untruthful statements.
As to the respondent Judge’s being a next-door neighbor of the complainant’s wife—the complainant
in the perjury case—it must be stressed that that alone is not a ground for either a mandatory
disqualification under the first paragraph or for a voluntary disqualification under the second
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court. In any event, the complainant has failed to
disclose in his complaint that he had raised this matter at any time before the rendition of the
judgment. In fact, the summary of the grounds of his motion for reconsideration in the respondent’s
order denying the said motion does not include this matter. If indeed the complainant honestly
believed in the justness of this grievance, he would have raised it in an appropriate pleading before
the trial court.
20
Finally, the nature and character of the complainant’s grievances relative to the respondent’s
judgment finding the former guilty of perjury may only be properly ventilated in an appropriate
judicial proceeding, such as an appeal from the judgment.
This kind of recourse, whether made in addition to a regular appeal from the judgment, or in lieu
thereof, if none had been made, is clearly without any basis and cannot be tolerated for it robs
Judges of precious time which they could otherwise devote to the cases in their courts or to the
unclogging of their dockets.
Atty. Raymundo A. Quiroz, counsel for the complainant, must have been aware of the utter lack of
merit of the charges against the respondent. As a Member of the Philippine Bar he is bound: (1) by
his oath, not to, wittingly or willingly, promote or sue any groundless, false, or unlawful suit nor give
aid nor consent to the same; (2) by Section 20(c), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to counsel or
maintain such action or proceedings only as appear to him to be just; and (3) to uphold the Code of
Professional Responsibility. It was incumbent upon him to give a candid and honest opinion on the
merits and probable results of the complainant’s case (Rule 15.05, Canon 15, Code of Professional
Responsibility) with the end in view of promoting respect for the law and legal processes (Canon 1,
Id.). He should, therefore, be required to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken
against him for his apparent failure to observe the foregoing duties and responsibilities.
WHEREFORE, for want of merit, the instant complaint is DISMISSED.
For the reasons above stated, Atty. Raymundo A. Quiroz is hereby directed to SHOW CAUSE, within
fifteen (15) days from notice hereof, why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for his
apparent failure to comply with his duties and responsibilities stated above.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Complaint dismissed.
Notes.—An objection to the competency of a judge to hear a case should be filed with him in
writing, not by means of an unverified letter to the Supreme Court. (Constante vs. Pimentel,
85 SCRA 41 [1978])
A judgment is not necessarily unjust because the judge who rendered it should have inhibited
herself. (Ubarro vs. Mapalad, 220 SCRA 224 [1993])
21
A.C. No. 4349. December 22, 1997.*

LOURDES R. BUSIÑOS, complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO RICAFORT, respondent.
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Dishonesty; It cannot be denied that the respect of litigants for the
profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays their trust and
confidence.— Respondent’s transgressions manifested dishonesty and amounted to grave
misconduct and grossly unethical behavior which caused dishonor, not merely to respondent,
but to the noble profession to which he belongs, for it cannot be denied that the respect of
litigants for the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays
their trust and confidence.
Same; Same; Same; By swearing the lawyer’s oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of truth and
the rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of
justice—a vital function of democracy a failure of which is disastrous to society.—This Court
has been nothing short of exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character from
members of the Bar. In Marcelo v. Javier (A.C. No. 3248, 18 September 1992, 214 SCRA 1, 12-13),
reiterated in Fernandez v. Grecia, (A.C. No. 3694, 17 June 1993, 223 SCRA 425, 434), this Court
declared: A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients require in the attorney a high
standard and appreciation of his duty to his clients, his profession, the courts and the public.
The bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair
dealing. Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully
performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end,
nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in
any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the profession.
Here, respondent chose to forget that by swearing the lawyer’s oath, he became a guardian of
truth and the rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial
administration of justice—a vital function of democracy a failure of which is disastrous to
society.
Same; Same; Same; Disbarment; Lawyer disbarred for dishonesty, grave misconduct, grossly
unethical behavior in palpable disregard of Section 25 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
aggravated by a violation of Canon 11 thereof.—WHEREFORE, for dishonesty, grave misconduct,
grossly unethical behavior in palpable disregard of Section 25 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, aggravated by a violation of Canon 11 thereof, and consistent
with the urgent need to maintain the esteemed traditions and high standards of the legal
profession and to preserve undiminished public faith in the members of the Philippine Bar,
the Court Resolves to DISBAR respondent ATTY. FRANCISCO RICAFORT from the practice of
law. His name is hereby stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Grossly
Unethical Behavior.
Rodolfo R. Paulino for complainant.

RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
22
In a sworn complaint for disbarment dated 31 October 1994 but received by us on 21 November
1994, complainant Lourdes R. Busiños charged respondent Atty. Francisco Ricafort, a practicing
lawyer in Oas, Albay, with having committed the crime of estafa under Article 315(1)(b) of the
Revised Penal Code by misappropriating the sum of P32,000.00. Of this amount, P30,000.00 was
entrusted to respondent for deposit in the bank account of complainant’s husband, while P2,000.00
represented the amount respondent demanded from complainant supposedly for a bond in Civil Case
No. 5814, when no such bond was required.
In the resolution of 18 January 1995, we required respondent to comment on the complaint. Despite
his receipt of a copy of the resolution, respondent did not comply, compelling us in the resolution of
17 July 1995 to require him to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in
contempt for such failure.
Again respondent failed to comply. Hence in the resolution of 25 September 1996, we ordered him
once more to file his comment within ten (10) days from notice, and within the same period, to pay a
fine of P1,000.00 or suffer imprisonment of ten (10) days should he fail to so pay. In a Compliance
and Motion dated 24 October 1996, respondent transmitted the fine of P1,000.00 by way of postal
money order, but asked for five (5) days from date to file his comment. As respondent still failed to so
file, we then declared, in the resolution of 2 December 1996, that respondent was deemed to have
waived his right to file his comment, and referred the complaint to the Office of the Bar Confidant for
reception of complainant’s evidence and submission of a report and recommendation thereon.
On 16 October 1997, the Bar Confidant, Atty. Erlinda C. Verzosa, submitted her Report and
Recommendation, material portions of which read as follows:
Respondent Atty. Francisco Ricafort stands charged with having misappropriated the sum of
P30,000.00 intended for his clients as well as having deceived his clients into giving him the sum of
P2,000.00 purportedly to be deposited as a bond in the case he was handling.
Complainant Lourdes R. Busiños is one of the heirs of Pedro Rodrigo who are the defendants in Civil
Case No. 1584, apparently a case involving the properties of the late Pedro Rodrigo, father of herein
complainant. Respondent was the counsel of record for the defendants in the said case. On July 10,
1994, complainant, representing her co-heirs, executed a special power of attorney, appointing and
constituting respondent and/or Pedro Rodrigo, Jr. to be her true and lawful attorney-in-fact with the
following powers:
“1. To attend to and represent me, testify, or otherwise enter into compromise during the pre-trial
stage or other proceedings in Civil Case No. 1584, entitled “Heirs of Rosario Rodrigo-Reantaso vs.
Heirs of Pedro Rodrigo, Sr., et al.” now pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Ligao,
Albay;
“2. To demand, collect and receipt for any and all sums of money that may now be deposited in said
court by the defendant Oas Standard High School or hereafter be deposited by said defendant, due
and owing to me or said Heirs of Pedro Rodrigo, Sr., representing the rentals of said defendant for the
lease of the property involved in said case; and
“3. To sign, authenticate, issue and deliver any and all deeds, instruments, papers and other
records necessary and pertinent to the above stated transactions.”
On August 10, 1994, the Regional Trial Court of Ligao, Albay, Br. 12 issued an order, directing the
Clerk of Court “to release any and all deposits of rentals made in connection with this case (Civil Case
No. 1584) to the defendants Heirs of Pedro Rodrigo through Lourdes Rodrigo Busiños who were
receiving the rentals from Oas Standard High School prior to the institution of this case.”
In a letter dated August 10, 1994, the Clerk of Court of RTC, Ligao informed herein complainant that
respondent had already received the rental deposit of P25,000.00 on even date (see Annex “C” to the
23
complaint). Respondent also received from Oas Standard High School on August 17, 1994 the sum of
P5,000.00 as payment for rental of school site for the month of July 1994 (See Annex “D” to the
complaint). The said sum was entrusted to respondent with an obligation on his part to deposit the
same in the account of complainant’s husband at PNB, Ligao Branch. Instead, however, of depositing
the money, respondent converted the money to his own personal use, and despite several demands,
he failed to return the same to complainant. She was thus constrained to file a criminal case for estafa
and an administrative case for disbarment against him. Thus, on November 21, 1994, complainant
filed the instant administrative case against respondent.
Complainant further accuses respondent for demanding and receiving P2,000.00 from her which he
said will be used for the bond in Civil Case No. 1584, but said amount was never used as intended
since no bond was required in the said case. Thus, respondent merely pocketed the said amount.
xxx xxx xxx
Complainant, upon questioning by the undersigned, testified that: She authorized respondent to
withdraw the money amounting to P35,000.00 representing the rental fee paid by Oas Standard High
School from the Clerk of Court, with the instruction to deposit the same in her savings account at the
PNB. After she was informed by the court that respondent had already withdrawn the money, she
expected in vain to receive the money a week later in Tarlac as respondent failed to effect the deposit
of the said sum in her account. She demanded from him to give her the money, but he informed her
that he had already spent the same. He promised, though, to pay her the said amount. (pp. 7-8, TSN,
Reception of Evidence, April 18, 1997). She clarified that respondent withdrew only the sum of
P30,000.00 from the Clerk of Court, while the P5,000.00 was withdrawn by respondent from Oas
Standard High School (TSN, p. 8). Despite several demands, both from her and her lawyer,
respondent failed to make good his promise to give her the money he withdrew from the Clerk of
Court and Oas Standard High School (TSN, pp. 11-13). She was then constrained to file a criminal
case for estafa and an administrative case against respondent sometime in November of 1994 to
recover the money in question (TSN, pp. 14-16). On their third hearing of the estafa case sometime in
1995, respondent came with the money and paid complainant inside the courtroom (TSN, pp. 15, 19-
20). Because of this development, she did not anymore pursue the estafa case against respondent
(TSN, p. 17). She has no intention, however, of withdrawing the instant complaint (TSN, p. 18).
She further testified that respondent demanded from her the sum of P2,000.00 for the bond required
in the civil case. (TSN, p. 18). Respondent did not give her a receipt for the said amount. (TSN, p. 19).
Respondent gave back the P2,000.00 to complainant. He paid complainant a total of P60,000.00
representing the money he withdrew from the Clerk of Court and Oas Standard High School, the
P2,000.00 he got from complainant and attorney’s fees, which he undertook to foot as a way of
settlement. (TSN, p. 19).
Although complainant failed to submit the original or certified true copies of the documents in
support of her complaint against respondent, respondent’s repeated failure to comply with several
resolutions of the Court requiring him to comment on the complaint lends credence to the allegations
of the complainant. It manifests his tacit admission thereto. We have no other alternative, therefore,
but to accept the said documents at their [sic] face value.
There is no doubt that respondent is guilty of having used the money of his clients without their
consent. As the evidentiary value of the documents should be given more weight than the oral
testimony of complainant, we place the amount illegally used by respondent at P30,000.00 and not
P35,000.00 as claimed by complainant. Respondent’s illegal use of his client’s money is made more
manifest [by] his letters to complainant, all promising the latter to make good his promise to pay the
money he withdrew from the Clerk of Court and Oas Standard High School (See Annex “E” to the
complaint).
24
It bears emphasis that a lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not to delay any man for money or
malice and is bound to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his clients. He is obligated to report
promptly the money of his clients that has come into his possession. He should not commingle it with
his private property or use it for his personal purposes without his client’s [sic] consent. He should
maintain a reputation for honesty and fidelity to private trust (Daroy vs. Legaspi, 65 SCRA 304).
Money collected by a lawyer in pursuance of a judgment in favor of his clients is held in trust and
must be immediately turned over to them (Aya vs. Bigornia, 57 Phil. 8).
Respondent, by converting the money of his clients to his own personal use without their consent,
and by deceiving the complainant into giving him the amount of P2,000.00 purportedly to be used as
a bond which was not required, is, undoubtedly, guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct.
By so doing, he betrays the confidence reposed in him by his clients. Not only has he degraded
himself but as an unfaithful lawyer he has besmirched the fair name of an honorable profession.
His belated payment of the amount he illegally used and fraudulently obtained do not relieve him
from any liability if only to impress upon him that the relation between an attorney and his client is
highly fiduciary in its nature and of a very delicate, exacting and confidential character, requiring
high degree of fidelity and good faith. In view of that special relationship, lawyers are bound to
promptly account for money or property received by them on behalf of their clients and failure to do
so constitutes professional misconduct (Daroy vs. Legaspi, supra.)
Moreover, his repeated failure to comply with the resolutions of the Court, requiring him to comment
on the complaint indicate the high degree of irresponsibility of respondent.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Atty. Francisco Ricafort be

SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR.
While the findings are in order, the penalty recommended is not commensurate to respondent’s
infractions.
Plainly, respondent breached Section 25 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and
Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which read:
SEC. 25. Unlawful retention of client’s funds; contempt.—When an attorney unjustly retains in his
hands money of his client after it has been demanded he may be punished for contempt as an officer
of the Court who has misbehaved in his official transactions; but proceedings under this section shall
not be a bar to a criminal prosecution.
CANON 1—A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01.—A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 16—A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT
THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01.—A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or
from the client.
Rule 16.02.—A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and
those of others kept by him.
25
Rule 16.03.—A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may
be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to
his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has
secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Respondent’s transgressions manifested dishonesty and amounted to grave misconduct and grossly
unethical behavior which caused dishonor, not merely to respondent, but to the noble profession to
which he belongs, for it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably
diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence.
This Court has been nothing short of exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character
from members of the Bar. In Marcelo v. Javier ( A.C. No. 3248, 18 September 1992, 214 SCRA 1, 12-
13), reiterated in Fernandez v. Grecia, (A.C. No. 3694, 17 June 1993, 223 SCRA 425, 434), this Court
declared:
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The trust and
confidence necessarily reposed by clients require in the attorney a high standard and appreciation of
his duty to his clients, his profession, the courts and the public. The bar should maintain a high
standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. Generally speaking, a lawyer can
do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts
and to his clients. To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which
might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of
the profession.
Here, respondent chose to forget that by swearing the lawyer’s oath, he became a guardian of truth
and the rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of
justice—a vital function of democracy a failure of which is disastrous to society.
Any departure from the path which a lawyer must follow as demanded by the virtues of his
profession shall not be tolerated by this Court as the disciplining authority. This is specially so, as
here, where respondent even deliberately defied the lawful orders of the Court for him to file his
comment on the complaint, thereby transgressing Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which requires a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due the courts.
WHEREFORE, for dishonesty, grave misconduct, grossly unethical behavior in palpable disregard of
Section 25 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, aggravated by a violation of Canon 11 thereof,
and consistent with the urgent need to maintain the esteemed traditions and high standards of the
legal profession and to preserve undiminished public faith in the members of the Philippine Bar, the
Court Resolves to DISBAR respondent ATTY. FRANCISCO RICAFORT from the practice of law.
His name is hereby stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
This resolution shall take effect immediately and copies thereof furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, to be appended to respondent’s personal record; the National Office and the Albay Chapter
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; the Philippine Judges Association; and all courts of the land
for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.), Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Francisco, Panganiban and Martinez, JJ., concur.
Respondent disbarred.
26
Notes.—A lawyer convicted of falsification of a public document may be disbarred. (Paras vs.
Vailoces, 1 SCRA 954 [1961])
The administrative complaint for disbarment is premature where the subject matter of
complaint is still pending investigation in the Department of Foreign Affairs. (Ramos vs.
Miculob, 3 SCRA 470 [1961])
27
Adm. Case No. 5831. January 13, 2003.*
CESAR A. ESPIRITU, complainant, vs. ATTY. JUAN CABREDO IV, respondent.
Administrative Law; Attorneys; Relationship between a lawyer and a client is highly fiduciary, it
requires a high degree of fidelity and good faith.—The relationship between a lawyer and a
client is highly fiduciary; it requires a high degree of fidelity and good faith. Hence, in dealing
with trust property, a lawyer should be very scrupulous. Money or other trust property of the
client coming into the possession of the lawyer should be reported by the latter and
accounted for promptly and should not, under any circumstances, be commingled with his
own or be used by him.
Same; Same; Like judges, lawyers must not only be proper but they must also appear to be
so.—Indeed, it is improbable that respondent’s secretary failed to inform complainant about the
receipt of such a substantial sum of money. In failing to account for the money of his client,
respondent violated not only the Code of Professional Responsibility but also his oath to conduct
himself with all good fidelity to his clients. Like judges, lawyers must not only be proper but they
must also appear to be so. This way, the people’s faith in the justice system would remain unshaken.
Same; Same; The breach of trust committed by respondent amounted to deceit as well as a violation
of his oath for which he should be penalized with either disbarment or suspension.—From the
evidence presented by complainant, which respondent failed to rebut, it is clear that the breach of
trust committed by respondent amounted to deceit, as well as a violation of his oath, for which he
should be penalized with either disbarment or suspension. While we agree with the findings of the
investigating commissioner, we find the recommended penalty of suspension for three months to be
too light. In Reyes P. Maglaya a lawyer was suspended for one year for failing to return P1,500.00
belonging to his client despite numerous demands. In Castillo v. Taguines, a lawyer failed to deliver
to his client P500.00, representing the monetary settlement of a civil suit despite demands. To make
matters worse, he fooled the client by issuing a bouncing check. He was suspended for one year.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Failure to Fulfill Fiduciary Obligation.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an administrative complaint filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on May 8,
2001 by complainant Cesar A. Espiritu against Atty. Juan Cabredo IV for failure to fulfill a fiduciary
obligation to a client.
The complaint alleges the following facts:
On November 5, 1999, the BPI Family Savings Bank Inc. (BPI-FSB) filed two complaints for replevin
and damages against Esphar Medical Center, (Esphar) Inc. and its president Cesar Espiritu and a
certain John Doe. In the first complaint, the BPI-FSB alleged that, on July 14, 1997, Esphar, Cesar
Espiritu, and a certain John Doe executed in favor of Gencars, Inc. (Gencars) a promissory note in
which they obligated themselves jointly and severally to pay the latter P511,956.00 in monthly
installments pursuant to a schedule they had agreed upon. It was provided that failure on the part of
the makers to pay any installment when due shall make subsequent installments and the balance of
the obligation immediately due and demandable. The promissory note was secured by a chattel
mortgage on an Isuzu “Close Van” (1997 model) and registered with the Register of Deeds and the
Land Transportation Commission. On July 14, 1997, Gencars executed a deed of assignment in favor
of the BPI-FSB, assigning to the latter all of its rights, title and interest in the promissory note secured
by the chattel mortgage. In 1999, Esphar, Espiritu and John Doe failed to pay installments for three
consecutive months, for which reason demands were made on the three to pay the entire balance of
28
P186,806.28, with accrued interest at the rate of 36% per annum or to give to BPI-FSB the
possession of the Isuzu van in order to foreclose the mortgage. As the three failed to comply with the
demands, the BPI-FSB brought suit for replevin and damages against them.1
The second complaint alleged similar facts involving Citimotors, Inc. as the payee of another
promissory note in which Esphar, Espiritu and John Doe, as makers, obligated themselves solidarily
to pay the former P674,640.00 in monthly installments. The promissory note was secured by a
chattel mortgage on a Mitsubishi L-300 “Exceed Montone Van” (1997 model), which BPI-FSB, as
holder of the said promissory note, sought to foreclose due to the makers’ failure to comply with its
terms and conditions.2
On December 10, 1999, Espiritu engaged the services of Atty. Juan Cabredo IV, herein respondent, to
represent him in the two civil cases. On same day, Cabredo’s secretary, Rose Tria, picked up copies of
the complaints from Espiritu’s office and, on December 14, 1999, his representative Reynaldo Nuñez
received from Esphar P16,000.00 for use as filing and acceptance fees. While the cases were pending
in court, Atty. Cabredo advised Esphar to remit money and update payments to BPI-FSB through the
trial court. Accordingly, on December 28, 1999 and again January 28, 2000, Esphar’s representative,
Maritess Alejandrino, delivered a total of P51,161.00 to Atty. Cabredo’s office. Later on, when Atty.
Cabredo failed to appear at a hearing of the civil cases, the management of Esphar found out that he
did not deliver the sum of P51,161.00 to the court or BPI-FSB. The management of Esphar then
agreed to settle the cases amicably. For this reason, a joint motion to dismiss was filed by the parties,
and the cases were dismissed on May 15, 2000. Thereafter, on May 8, 2001, Espiritu filed a complaint
against Atty. Cabredo for fraud.3
In his answer dated June 6, 2001, respondent Cabredo admitted that his secretary, Rose Tria, had
indeed received P51,161.00 from Esphar, but claimed that Tria failed to inform him about it. It was
only when he read Esphar’s first demand letter dated March 21, 2000 that he learned for the first
time about the receipt of the money. Respondent claimed that he failed to get complainant’s demand
letters of March 24, 2000 and January 5, 2001 because of lapses on the part of his staff. He thus
shifted the blame on his staff.
7. It is quite unfortunate that this incident happened all thru the fault of the law firm personnel. In
spite of respondent’s candid, honest and sincere desire to faithfully and religiously serve good
clients, [his efforts have been] rendered inutile by lapses of his staff;
8. Respondent believes that complainant Cesar A. Espiritu would not have resorted to this present
action had the firm personnel been vigilant enough to inform respondent of this matter.
Respondent said he was willing to reimburse complainant to show his good faith and “to erase the
suspicion that respondent intentionally spent the amount for his own use and benefit.”4
Acting on the complaint, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline
scheduled a hearing on September 24, 2001. However, the hearing had to be rescheduled three
times—on November 14, 2001, December 14, 2001, and January 18, 2002—because of respondent’s
failure to appear despite due notice to him. In orders dated November 14, 20015 and December 14,
2001,6 respondent was warned that the investigator would proceed with the case if he failed to
appear again in subsequent hearings. Finally, in the order dated January 18, 2002, Investigating
Commissioner Wilfredo Reyes ordered:
Considering that this is the fifth (5th) time that the respondent has failed to appear despite notice,
the undersigned Commissioner has no option but to decide the case on the basis of the pleadings
submitted. It must be noted that despite receipt of the Orders of the Commission, the respondent
Atty. Juan Cabredo IV has failed to appear before the Commission on Bar Discipline.
This case is deemed submitted for resolution based on the pleadings submitted by the parties.7
29
On February 13, 2002, Commissioner Reyes submitted his report and recommendation. He found
respondent guilty of violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended that the
latter be suspended from the practice of law for three months and ordered to return the amount of
P51,161.00 to Esphar.8 In a resolution dated August 3, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved the recommendation of the investigating commissioner.9
Except for the penalty, we find the recommendation is well taken.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON 16—A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT
THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01—A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or
from the client.
Rule 16.02—A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and
those of others kept by him.
Rule 16.03—A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may
be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to
his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has
secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
The relationship between a lawyer and a client is highly fiduciary; it requires a high degree of fidelity
and good faith.10 Hence, in dealing with trust property, a lawyer should be very scrupulous. Money
or other trust property of the client coming into the possession of the lawyer should be reported by
the latter and accounted for promptly and should not, under any circumstances, be commingled with
his own or be used by him.11
In this case, respondent claims that he did not know about the receipt by his secretary on the amount
of P51,161.00 received from Esphar until he read the first demand letter of the company, which
stated:
March 21, 2000
JUDGE JUAN CABREDO

Cubao, Quezon City
Dear Judge Cabredo:
Due to your failure to make an interbank deposit as what we have agreed upon yesterday, March 20,
2000, we are sending bearer, MRS. MARITESS ALEJANDRINO, to collect the amount of P51,161.00
representing payment intended for BPI FAMILY BANK which was coursed through your office per
your instruction.
We are hoping that you will not fail to return the money through bearer hereof. Her specimen
signature is shown below for identification purposes. Thank you.
Very truly yours,
ESPHAR MEDICAL CENTER, INC.
30
(signed)
AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE
Specimen Signature of:

(signed)
MARITESS ALEJANDRINO
However; even after receiving this notice and two other demand letters, respondent never returned
the money of complainant nor paid it to the bank. Indeed, it is improbable that respondent’s
secretary failed to inform complainant about the receipt of such a substantial sum of money. In
failing to account for the money of his client, respondent violated not only the Code of Professional
Responsibility but also his oath to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his clients.12 Like judges,
lawyers must not only be proper but they must also appear to be so. This way, the people’s faith in
the justice system would remain unshaken.13
It appears that respondent, while now a practicing lawyer, was a former judge.14 Thus, he should
have known the ethical precepts guiding lawyers who handle money given to them in trust by their
clients and the necessary consequences for violation thereof. Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides,
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefore.—A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or
for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice. [emphasis supplied]
From the evidence presented by complainant, which respondent failed to rebut, it is clear that the
breach of trust committed by respondent amounted to deceit, as well as a violation of his oath, for
which he should be penalized with either disbarment or suspension. While we agree with the
findings of the investigating commissioner, we find the recommended penalty of suspension for
three months to be too light. In Reyes v. Maglaya15 a lawyer was suspended for one year for failing to
return P1,500.00 belonging to his client despite numerous demands. In Castillo v. Taguines,16 a
lawyer failed to deliver to his client P500.00, representing the monetary settlement of a civil suit
despite demands. To make matters worse, he fooled the client by issuing a bouncing check. He was
suspended for one year.
For his failure to account for P51,161.00 received from his client and to restitute it without any
reason, respondent should be suspended for one year.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Juan Cabredo IV is hereby SUSPENDED for one (1) year and ORDERED to
immediately return to Esphar Medical Center, Inc. the sum of P51,161.00, with WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Let copies of the Decision be
entered in his record as an attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and
all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Respondent suspended for one (1) year and ordered to return to Esphar Medical Center, Inc.
the sum of P51,161, with warning against repetition of similar act.
31
Note.—A lawyer can be deprived of his license for misconduct ascertained and declared by
judgment of the court after giving him the opportunity to be heard. (Sebastian vs. Calis, 314
SCRA 1 [1999])
32
A.C. No. 4219. December 8, 2003.*
LOTHAR SCHULZ, complainant, vs. ATTY. MARCELO G. FLORES, respondent.
Attorneys; Duties; Morality; The nature of the office of a lawyer requires that he shall be of good
moral character.—Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A high
sense of morality, honesty and fair dealing is expected and required of a member of the bar.
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “a lawyer shall not engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” The nature of the office of a lawyer
requires that he shall be of good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition
precedent to the admission to the legal profession, but its continued possession is essential to
maintain one’s good standing in the profession. Furthermore, implicit in a vocation
characterized by professionalism is a certain level of competence and dedication. Far from
measuring up to the norms of conduct set in the Code, the respondent charged in this case, in
fact, breached his avowed duty as a lawyer and the ethical standards he was strictly bound to
observe.
Same; Same; Any member of the legal fraternity worth his title cannot afford to practice the
profession in a lackadaisical manner.—The Court has time and again emphatically stated that the
trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients requires in the lawyer a high standard and an
appreciation of his duty to his clients, his profession, the courts and the public. Every case an
attorney accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its
importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. To be sure, any member of the legal
fraternity worth his title cannot afford to practice the profession in a lackadaisical manner.
Same; Same; Attorney’s Fees; Neither is a lawyer entitled to unilaterally appropriate his client’s
money for himself by the mere fact alone that the client owes him attorney’s fees.—Where a
client gives money to his lawyer for a specific purpose, such as to file an action, appeal an adverse
judgment, consummate a settlement, or pay the purchase price of a parcel of land, the lawyer should,
upon failure to take such step and spend the money for it, immediately return the money to his client.
The fact that a lawyer has a lien for his attorney’s fees on the money in his hands collected for his
client does not relieve him from the obligation to make a prompt accounting. Neither is a lawyer
entitled to unilaterally appropriate his client’s money for himself by the mere fact alone that the
client owes him attorney’s fees.
Same; Same; Misappropriation; The unjustified withholding of money belonging to his client, as
in this case, warrants the imposition of disciplinary action.—The failure of an attorney to return
the client’s money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his
own use to the prejudice and violation of the trust reposed in him by the client. It is not only a gross
violation of the general morality as well as of professional ethics; it also impairs public confidence in
the legal profession and deserves punishment. In short, it is settled that the unjustified withholding
of money belonging to his client, as in this case, warrants the imposition of disciplinary action.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.

RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Only recently, we stressed that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A high
sense of morality, honesty and fair dealing is expected and required of a member of the bar. Rule 1.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” The nature of the office of a lawyer requires that he shall be
of good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to the admission to the
33
legal profession, but its continued possession is essential to maintain one’s good standing in the
profession.1 Furthermore, implicit in a vocation characterized by professionalism is a certain level of
competence and dedication.2 Far from measuring up to the norms of conduct set in the Code, the
respondent charged in this case, in fact, breached his avowed duty as a lawyer and the ethical
standards he was strictly bound to observe.
On March 22, 1994, Lothar Schulz, a German national filed a verified complaint for disbarment
against Atty. Marcelo G. Flores of Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental.3 He alleged that sometime in
December 1992, he engaged the services of respondent for the purposes of filing a complaint against
Wilson Ong for revocation of contract and damages for the latter’s failure to deliver the jeep he sold
to complainant within the stipulated period. Respondent advised him that there was no need to refer
the complaint for barangay conciliation. Three months later, respondent instructed him to file his
complaint with the Lupon Tagapayapa of Tabuc-tubig, Dumaguete City. Wilson Ong refused to appear
at the conciliation hearings, arguing that the Lupon of Tabuc-tubig had no jurisdiction over his
person because he was a resident of Barangay Banilad. Complainant thus brought the complaint
before the Barangay Captain of Banilad. By that time, however, complainant learned that Wilson Ong
had already filed a case for Specific Performance against him before the Regional Trial Court of
Negros Oriental, Branch 31, entitled “Rachel Lisa B. Ong, et al. v. Lothar Schulz,” docketed as Civil
Case No. 10527. Complainant argued that respondent’s inordinate delay in acting on his case resulted
in his being defendant rather than a complainant against Wilson Ong.
Complainant also charged respondent with collecting excessive and unreasonable fees and of
unjustifiably refusing to return his files. He undertook to pay respondent attorney’s fees of P5,000.00
if the case does not reach the court, and P10,000.00 attorney’s fees and P500.00 appearance fees if it
reaches the court. This notwithstanding, respondent alleged in the Answer with Counterclaim which
he prepared on behalf of complainant in Civil Case No. 10527 that his attorney’s fees was P50,000.00
and appearance fee was P1,000.00 per hearing. When complainant questioned him about this,
respondent explained that it was Wilson Ong who will be made to pay for the said fees. This,
complainant claimed, showed respondent’s deceit and lack of candor in his dealings with the parties
in court.
Further, complainant alleged that since he suspected respondent of not protecting his interest in Civil
Case No. 10527, he instructed respondent to withdraw his appearance as his counsel after the filing
of the answer. Thereafter, he asked respondent to return the amount of P12,000.00 out of the total of
P17,000.00 that he has paid to the latter, inasmuch as the amount of P5,000.00 should be sufficient
compensation for the minimal services rendered by him. Respondent, however, refused to return the
amount to complainant and, instead, demanded additional fees. Complainant’s new counsel wrote a
formal demand letter to respondent which, however, was ignored. This prompted complainant to file
a complaint with the Lupon Tagapayapa of Barangay Bantayan where respondent resided. After the
parties failed to reach a settlement, complainant instituted an action for sum of money against
respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 10645.
Complainant alleged that respondent offered to return his files provided that he signs a statement
acknowledging that respondent does not owe him anything. Complainant refused, for fear that it
would prejudice the collection suit he filed against respondent. Thus, respondent continued to
unreasonably retain his files.
In support of his charges against respondent, complainant pointed out that respondent was formerly
a Municipal Judge of Siaton, Negros Oriental who was dismissed from the service after the end of the
Marcos regime. He submitted a copy of an Order4 of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental,
Branch 34, in Civil Case No. 9142 entitled “Bishop of Dumaguete v. Fausta Pajunar, et al.” In that case,
respondent sought the inhibition of the Presiding Judge, Rosendo Bandal, Jr. The latter inhibited
himself but cited in the said Order nine instances of anomalous, illegal and unethical practices
committed by respondent.
34
In his Comment,5 respondent alleged that upon accepting the case of complainant, he immediately
sent a letter to Wilson Ong demanding that he deliver the jeep to complainant for road test.6 Ong
complied with the demand and allowed complainant to roadtest the vehicle, during which he
discovered that the jeep was defective.7 Respondent thereafter requested Ong to cause the repairs
on the jeep. It was only after the negotiations with Ong failed that he advised complainant to proceed
with the filing of his complaint before the Barangay Captain of Tabuc-tubig. At the time, he believed
Tabuc-tubig was the proper venue considering that the South Pacific Metal Works owned by Wilson
Ong was located there.
Respondent claims that complainant was to blame for the fact that Wilson Ong filed his complaint in
court first. He alleged that complainant failed to follow up his case because he was involved in a
traffic accident. Complainant’s inability to attend to his complaint with the Barangay Lupon in Tabuc-
tubic caused the delay thereof.
Anent the attorney’s fees, respondent alleges that complainant agreed to pay him P50,000 as
attorney’s fees, one-half of which is payable upon the filing of the Answer with Counterclaim8 in Civil
Case No. 10527 less the amount of P17,000.00 given as payment for past services. Complainant also
agreed to pay him P1,000.00 per appearance. Hence, respondent avers that complainant still owed
him P8,000.00 to complete the required one-half of the P50,000.00 attorney’s fees, and P1,000.00
appearance fee for the hearing on April 15, 1993. Respondent further explained that he was willing
to return complainant’s files provided that he sign a receipt acknowledging the turn-over, but
complainant refused to sign.
Respondent admitted that he was once a Municipal Judge of Siaton, Negros Oriental but he decided to
go on optional retirement. During his 17-year stint in the judiciary, he was held in high esteem by his
colleagues and was elected President of the Municipal Judges League of Negros Oriental for 14
consecutive terms. Out of the 15 RTC Judges in Negros Oriental, it is only Judge Bandal who had
shown animosity, hostility and hatred towards him. However, he added that he and Judge Bandal
have reconciled and are now on good terms.
On August 29, 1994, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.9
On August 9, 2002, respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion alleging that complainant had long
left the country, for which reason the case may be resolved on the basis of the pleadings.10
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline submitted a Report dated June 28, 2003 recommending that:
(1) respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months with a warning that a repetition
of the same or similar acts will merit a more severe penalty; (2) he be ordered to return to
complainant the amount of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00) with legal interest; and (3) he
return the papers of complainant which came under his custody during the period of his engagement
as counsel.
In justifying the recommended penalty, the IBP-CBD made the following observations:
[Respondent] was presumed to be knowledgeable on the laws, but in this case, it turned out that
Atty. Flores knew too little of the provisions and application of PD No. 1508 which mandates that all
disputes, except those specifically cited (the dispute between Lothar Schulz and Wilson Ong not
included), between and among residents of the same city or municipality should be brought first
under the system of barangay conciliation before recourse to the court can be allowed.
35
He was not all certain if the complaint of Lothar Schulz falls under PD No. 1508 or not. As Lothar
Schulz narrated, Atty. Flores told him at first that there was no need for his complaint to be coursed
through the barangay authorities.
Not realizing the need and urgency to avail of PD No. 1508, Atty. Flores found it more important to
spend more than two months to dialogue and confer with Wilson and hope that he could get the
parties to come to an amicable settlement of their differences, an undertaking that only involves a
waste of time and effort as he later realized it because it turned out that Wilson Ong did not appear to
have any genuine intent to make good his obligation to put the jeep in good running condition and
free from defects because Lothar Schulz and his mechanics found out from the result of the last road
test on the jeep that aside from several defects discovered during previous road tests and which had
remained uncorrected/unrepaired, there are twenty-six more new defects.
It was already March 8, 1992, more than two months after becoming Lothar Schulz’s lawyer that
Atty. Flores reversed position and suddenly prepared a written complaint for the client which he
asked the latter to file with the Barangay Captain of Tabuc-tubig. However, that belated move did not
benefit the cause of his client at all. On the contrary, Atty. Flores even made the problem of delay
worse. Upon the misconception that the proper venue was Tabuc-tubig which was the place where
the assembly/motor shop of Wilson Ong is located, he directed Lothar Schulz to file his complaint
there. That was a wrong advice. Section 3 of PD No. 1508 states that the dispute should be lodged for
conciliation with the barangay where the respondent actually resides. Because PD No. 1508 applies
only to parties who are natural persons, the location of the assembly should of Wilson Ong is of no
consequence to the law. The respondent who could be made a party under PD No. 1508 in this case is
Wilson Ong and the complaint against him must be filed where he resides which is Barangay Banilad
in Dumaguete City. Thus, the complaint of Lothar Schulz was not able to move at all for the entire
duration that it was in Barangay Tabuc-tubig which had no authority over it. Such was the situation
until that barangay was impelled to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. It is true that the
complaint was eventually brought to the proper barangay (Banilad), but the Lupon in that place was
no longer in a position to assert its jurisdiction because at that time there was already a case that
Wilson Ong had succeeded to file against Lothar Schulz on the subject of their failed contract.
xxx xxx x x x.
Between the conflicting versions given by the parties as to the reason why the papers of Lothar
Schulz had continued to be possessed by Atty. Flores, the version of the complainant appears more
deserving of credence. If the paper which was presented for the signature of Lothar Schulz is really
an acknowledgment to evidence the return of the papers of the case to Lothar Schulz, as the
respondent would have it appear, there is no reason why Lothar Schulz [should] hesitate or refuse to
sign the paper[s] as there is nothing prejudicial to his interest. But certainly if the contents of the
paper presented by Atty. Flores to Lothar Schulz for the purpose of signature involve[s] an admission
on the part of Lothar Schulz that the lawyer is clear on the matter of money accountability, it is
understandable that Lothar Schulz will not sign that paper because his signature will have the effect
of a desistance in his pending civil case for the recovery of the P12,000.00 which he alleged to be an
overcharge on attorney’s fee[s] by Atty. Flores. The continuing possession by Atty. Flores of the
papers of Lothar Schulz can only be compatible with the version that Lothar Schulz presented. Atty.
Flores would not release the papers for they serve as means to harass and/or pressure Lothar Schulz
until the latter is impelled to agree to give up his efforts to pursue Civil Case No. 10645 which will
provide Atty. Flores the assurance that a day may come when he will be made to reimburse the
amount of P12,000.00 previously collected from the former client.11
The findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD were thereafter approved and adopted by the IBP
Board of Governors in Resolution No. XVI-2003-109 dated August 30, 2003.
36
We agree with the findings and conclusions of the Committee on Bar Discipline, as approved by the
IBP Board of Governors. The breach of respondent’s sworn duty as a lawyer and of the ethical
standards he was strictly to honor and observe has been sufficiently established.
Respondent has fallen short of the competence and diligence required of every member of the Bar.
The pertinent Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility state:
CANON 17.—A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE
MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18.—A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 18.03—A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
It is dismaying to note that respondent patently violated his duty as a lawyer in this case. He
committed a serious transgression when he failed to exert his utmost learning and ability to give
entire devotion to his client’s cause. His client had relied upon him to file the complaint with dispatch
so that he would not be preempted by the adverse party. But he failed him. As a consequence of
respondent’s indolence, his client was haled to court as a party-defendant. It therefore behooves this
Court to wield its corrective hand on this inexcusable infraction which caused undeserved and
needless prejudice to his client’s interest, adversely affected the confidence of the community in the
legal profession and eroded the public’s trust in the judicial system. As an attorney, respondent is
sworn to do his level best and to observe full fidelity to the court and his clients.12
The Court has time and again emphatically stated that the trust and confidence necessarily reposed
by clients requires in the lawyer a high standard and an appreciation of his duty to his clients, his
profession, the courts and the public.13 Every case an attorney accepts deserves his full attention,
diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for
free.14 To be sure, any member of the legal fraternity worth his title cannot afford to practice the
profession in a lackadaisical manner.
Likewise, respondent erred in not returning complainant’s money despite demands after his failure
to file the case and his devious act of compelling complainant to sign a document stating that he has
no financial obligation to complainant in exchange of the return of complainant’s papers. This
conduct violated the following Canon:
CANON 15.—A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS, AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS
AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT.
Rule 16.03.—A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of client when due or upon demand. x x x.
Where a client gives money to his lawyer for a specific purpose, such as to file an action, appeal an
adverse judgment, consummate a settlement, or pay the purchase price of a parcel of land, the lawyer
should, upon failure to take such step and spend the money for it, immediately return the money to
his client.15 The fact that a lawyer has a lien for his attorney’s fees on the money in his hands
collected for his client does not relieve him from the obligation to make a prompt accounting.16
Neither is a lawyer entitled to unilaterally appropriate his client’s money for himself by the mere fact
alone that the client owes him attorney’s fees.17
The failure of an attorney to return the client’s money upon demand gives rise to the presumption
that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice and violation of the trust reposed in
37
him by the client.18 It is not only a gross violation of the general morality as well as of professional
ethics; it also impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.19 In short,
it is settled that the unjustified withholding of money belonging to his client, as in this case, warrants
the imposition of disciplinary action.20
A lawyer must conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients, with integrity in a manner
that is beyond reproach. His relationship with his clients should be characterized by the highest
degree of good faith and fairness.21
Therefore, we agree with the evaluation of the IBP-CBD and find that respondent’s acts warrant the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions against him. The recommended penalty of six months
suspension from the practice of law is well-taken.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent Atty. MARCELO G. FLORES is found guilty of
negligence and incompetence, and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months effective immediately. He is ordered to RETURN to complainant Lothar Schulz the amount of
Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00) with legal interest from the date of promulgation of this
Resolution, and all papers which came into his custody as a result of having served as counsel for said
complainant. Respondent is further STERNLY WARNED that a commission of the same or similar act
in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the record of respondent and served on the IBP, as well as
on the Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Panganiban, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Respondent suspended from practice of law for six (6) months for negligence and
incompetence, with stern warning against commission of similar act.
Note.—The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients requires in the attorney a high
standard and appreciation of his duty to his clients, his profession, the courts and the public.
(SipinNabor vs. Baterina, 360 SCRA 6 [2001])
38
A.C. No. 6656. December 13, 2005.*
(Formerly CBD-98-591.)
BOBIE ROSE V. FRIAS, complainant, vs. ATTY. CARMENCITA BAUTISTA LOZADA, respondent.
Attorneys; Duties; Misconduct; A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional
misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or
former client.—A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel
for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. He may not also
undertake to discharge conflicting duties any more than he may represent antagonistic interests.
This stern rule is founded on the principles of public policy and good taste. It springs from the
relation of attorney and client which is one of trust and confidence.
Same; Same; Same; Conflict of Interest; The test of conflict of interest is whether the acceptance
of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided
fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness.—The test of conflict of
interest is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge
of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or
double-dealing in its performance. The conflict exists if the acceptance of the new retainer will
require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in
which he represented him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against
the first client any knowledge acquired through their connection.
Same; Same; Same; A lawyer’s act of asking a client for a loan, as what respondent did, is very
unethical.—Her act of borrowing money from a client was a violation of Canon 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility: A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s
interests are fully protected by the nature of the case and by independent advice. A lawyer’s act of
asking a client for a loan, as what respondent did, is very unethical. It comes within those acts
considered as abuse of client’s confidence. The canon presumes that the client is disadvantaged by
the lawyer’s ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on her obligation.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
Pineda, Soriano & Associates for complainant.

RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
In this disbarment case, we are faced with conflicting versions of the incidents surrounding the filing
of the verified complaint1 for deception and malpractice allegedly committed by Atty. Carmencita
Bautista Lozada.
For her part, complainant Bobie Rose Frias alleged that respondent became her retained counsel and
legal adviser in the early part of 1990. She entrusted to respondent documents and titles of
properties in November of that year. Sometime in December 1990, respondent persuaded
complainant to sell her house located at 589 Batangas East, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa City.
Respondent allegedly acted as broker as she was in need of money.
On December 7, 1990 respondent hastily arranged a meeting with her and a prospective buyer, Dra.
Flora San Diego, in Valenzuela, Manila. She was allegedly made to sign a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA)2 without her having read it because “they had to reach the bank before it closed at 3:00 p.m.”
39
When they arrived at the Security Bank branch in Valenzuela, San Diego handed respondent P2M in
cash and P1M in check, instead of P3M in cash as the down payment3 indicated in the MOA.
Out of the P2M in cash, respondent took P1M as her commission without complainant’s consent.
When complainant protested, respondent promised to sign a promissory note later. The P1M check
was later on dishonored by the bank because it was a stale check.
San Diego eventually backed out from the sale. However, she converted the aborted sale into a
mortgage loan at 36% p.a. interest, as provided for in the MOA.
Since the transaction between her and San Diego did not materialize, complainant allegedly tried to
recover from respondent the title4 to the property and other documents.5 Respondent, however,
started avoiding her. Complainant recovered the documents placed inside an envelope only on May
6, 1991. On the same day, however, the envelope was allegedly stolen from her Pajero. She reported
the incident to the police.6 She also informed respondent about the incident, and the latter prepared
an affidavit of loss.7 Complainant later offered this affidavit as evidence in a petition for issuance of a
duplicate copy of the title she filed in the RTC of Makati, Branch 142.8
A perjury case9 was then filed by San Diego against complainant on the ground that the title to the
property was never really lost (as alleged by complainant in the affidavit of loss) but was with San
Diego all along. San Diego maintained that complainant handed it to her on the day they signed the
MOA. Complainant denied these allegations. She instead claimed that the perjury case was filed by
San Diego, with respondent as counsel, to coerce her (complainant) to assign the property to San
Diego and to abandon her claim of P1M from respondent.
San Diego also filed a case10 for the return of the P3M she paid complainant, at 36% p.a. interest.
Complainant claimed that her failure to return the money to San Diego was by reason of respondent’s
refusal to give back the P1M she took as commission. Complainant was thus constrained to file a civil
case against respondent. Despite the favorable decision11 of the trial court, which was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals12, respondent refused to return the money.
In her answer13 to the disbarment complaint, respondent claimed that, although complainant was
engaged in the buy-build-and-sell of real property, she represented her only in labor cases relative to
the latter’s overseas recruitment business. Respondent denied that she persuaded complainant to
sell the property in Ayala Alabang. Rather, it was complainant who offered to sell or mortgage the
property to respondent. Since respondent did not have enough money, complainant requested her to
sell or mortgage the property and offered her a loan, commission and attorney’s fees on the basis of
the selling price.
According to respondent, complainant confided that on October 29, 1990 she offered the Alabang
property to a certain Nelia Sta. Cruz. Complainant received P400,000 as earnest money in this
transaction on the condition that she would return the said amount to Sta. Cruz in two weeks in case
the latter decided not to proceed with the sale.14 The said amount would in turn be used to buy
another property.
Respondent also claimed that on December 4, 1990, she introduced complainant to another client,
Dra. San Diego, as a prospective buyer. They visited the Alabang property to check on the house. It
was there that complainant offered the house to San Diego for either sale or mortgage. They then
discussed the terms and conditions to be contained in the MOA.15 The agreement was thereafter
signed in respondent’s office in Valenzuela, Metro Ma-nila on December 7, 1990, duly notarized by
Atty. Manuel Agui-naldo.16 They then proceeded to Prudential Bank (not Security Bank as alleged in
the complaint) to withdraw P2M in cash. Upon receipt of P2M in cash and P1M check down payment,
complainant gave San Diego the TCT.
40
Complainant then handed to respondent P900,000 as commission and loan, duly receipted in a
promissory note.17 Complainant further entrusted P100,000 to respondent to be given to Nelia Sta.
Cruz as partial reimbursement of the P400,000 earnest money.18
Respondent maintained that when San Diego backed out from the transaction, the latter demanded
the return of only P2M, not P3M, as clearly stated in San Diego’s letter19 to the complainant dated
March 20, 1991.
Respondent denied that complainant previously demanded the return of the P1M until the civil case
against her was instituted. She expressed her willingness to pay the P900,000 plus the agreed
interest, but not the P1M plus interest baselessly demanded from her by complainant. In an attempt
to settle the controversy, respondent offered to pay the P900,000 to complainant in the presence of
San Diego, so complainant could in turn pay San Diego the P2M.
Respondent also denied that she prepared the affidavit of loss which was offered as evidence by
complainant in the petition for issuance of lost title.
Respondent further denied that she represented San Diego in the criminal cases of perjury and false
testimony which the latter filed against complainant.
In a report and recommendation dated July 25, 2000, the IBP Investigating Commissioner20 found
respondent guilty of dishonesty and malpractice for concealing the identity of the person in actual
possession of complainant’s documents and for preparing an affidavit of loss even if she knew that
the documents were in San Diego’s custody. A suspension for six months from the practice of law was
accordingly recommended.
A careful study of the records reveals that the IBP recommendation relied solely on complainant’s
self-serving and unsupported claims. A re-examination of the differing claims of the parties, however,
discloses that, instead of the grounds relied on by the IBP, respondent should be held accountable for
certain serious violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Canon 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
“A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts.”
A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose
interest conflicts with that of his present21 or former client.22 He may not also undertake to
discharge conflicting duties any more than he may represent antagonistic interests. This stern rule is
founded on the principles of public policy and good taste.23 It springs from the relation of attorney
and client which is one of trust and confidence.
The test of conflict of interest is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney
from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double-dealing in its performance.24 The conflict exists if the acceptance of the
new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in
any matter in which he represented him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation
to use against the first client any knowledge acquired through their connection.25
In this case, respondent not only admitted that she represented both complainant and San Diego in
unrelated actions but also counseled both of them in the sale of the Alabang property.
As their lawyer, she was duty-bound to protect both of their interests. She should have therefore
refrained from jumbling their affairs. Yet she introduced complainant to another client of hers as a
41
buyer of the property. She even had the temerity to broker the transaction. At that early stage, she
should have realized that her role as their lawyer had been seriously compromised. Since buyer and
seller had evident antagonistic interests, she could not give both of them sound legal advice. On top
of this, respondent’s obvious tendency then was to help complainant get a high selling price since the
amount of her commission was dependent on it.
After several suits were filed as an offshoot of the transaction between her two clients, respondent
found herself in a very tight situation. Although she denied that she represented any of them, her
active participation in the transaction was obvious and it clearly displayed an utter disregard of the
rule against discharging inconsistent duties to her clients. The great likelihood was that she would be
called upon to use against either the complainant or San Diego information acquired through her
professional connection with them.
Furthermore, her role as their counsel in the other unrelated cases was also compromised. Both
parties had, at this point, become wary of her since she had by then taken—for her own conven-
ience—San Diego’s side by refusing to return the P900,000 to com-plainant until San Diego was paid.
It was not surprising therefore that complainant filed this administrative case because of the
suspicion that respondent had double-crossed her.
The records further establish that respondent collected her full commission even before the
transaction between complainant and San Diego was completed. This unmasked respondent’s greed
which she now wants us so badly to ignore. Her integrity was placed in serious doubt the moment
her promised commission started motivating her every move. Her behavior was, sad to say, simply
distasteful.
Likewise, her act of borrowing money from a client was a violation of Canon 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
“A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by
the nature of the case and by independent advice.”
A lawyer’s act of asking a client for a loan, as what respondent did, is very unethical. It comes within
those acts considered as abuse of client’s confidence. The canon presumes that the client is
disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on her obligation.
Finally, respondent should be reminded that a lawyer should, at all times, comply with what the
court lawfully requires.26 Here, respondent continues to disregard the final order of the Court of
Appeals finding her liable for the P900,000 she received from complainant. We see no justification
for her continued delay in complying with an order that has long become final. Respondent
adamantly insists that she and complainant should simultaneously settle their obligations. As a
lawyer, she should have known that her obligation to complainant was independent of and separate
from complainant’s obligation to the buyer. Her refusal to comply with the appellate court’s order is,
therefore, a willful disobedience to its lawful orders and must not be left unpunished.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Carmencita Bautista Lozada is hereby found guilty of violating
Rule 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and of willfully disobeying a
final and executory decision of the Court of Appeals. She is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years from notice, with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant for their information and guidance, and let it be entered in
respondent’s personal records.
42
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,

Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Atty. Carmencita Bautista Lozada suspended from practice of law for two (2) years for
violating Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of Code of Professional Responsibility and for willfully
disobeying final and executory decision of Court of Appeals, with stern warning against
repetition of similar acts.
Note.—Relationship between a lawyer and a client is highly fiduciary, it requires a high

degree of fidelity and good faith. (Espiritu vs. Cabredo IV, 395 SCRA 19 [2003])
43
Adm. Case No. 2736. May 27, 1991.*
LORENZANA FOOD CORPORATION represented by Mr. SOLOMON U. LORENZANA, JR., as its
President and General Manager, and/or Mrs. ELIZABETH L. DIAZ, as its Vice-President,
petitioners, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO L. DARIA, respondent.
Attorneys; Code of Professional Responsibility; Respondent-attorney is guilty of negligence in failing

to appear in the 2 scheduled hearings of his case, and to file the required position paper, which
prejudiced his client’s cause.—In an effort to extricate himself from this charge, the respondent
submits that since he was able to persuade the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on
appeal to set aside the Decision of the Labor Arbiter and to remand the case for further proceedings,
then the charge of negligence should be considered moot and academic already. We find this
submission not meritorious. Instead, we agree with the position of the Solicitor General:
Respondent’s plea is untenable. The setting aside of the adverse Decision of the Labor Arbiter cannot
obliterate the effects of respondent’s negligence. Indeed, had respondent attended the two scheduled
hearings and filed the required position paper, then at least, there would have been no delay in the
resolution of the case, which, perhaps, would have been in favor of complainant. The delay, by itself,
was prejudicial to complainant because it deprived successor-counsel Atty. Loy of time which he
should be devoting to other cases of complainant. In fact he had to prepare complainant’s position
paper which respondent should have done earlier (Exh. 7). From the foregoing, it is manifest that the
respondent is indeed guilty of negligence, a clear violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Same; Same; An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has
represented him but also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated.—The
Solicitor General further found that the respondent assisted Roberto San Juan in the preparation of
the counter-affidavit, submitted in defense of the latter in the accusation of estafa filed against San
Juan by LFC. As a matter of fact, the respondent signed the jurat of the San Juan counter-affidavit he
(respondent) helped prepare. It is also a fact that the respondent investigated this same charge of
estafa while he was still the lawyer of the complainant and San Juan still likewise an employee of LFC.
Again, we concur with the findings and evaluation of the Office of the Solicitor General: x x x
Respondent, however, tried to extricate himself from his predicament by testifying that the counter-
affidavit was prepared by a lawyer-friend, Atty. Joselito R. Enriquez, who had his (respondent’s)
name typed on it; that after reading it, he called up Atty. Enriquez so that he will delete his name and
signature thereon; that he instructed San Juan to bring the counter-affidavit to Atty. Enriquez so that
he will delete his name and signature, but San Juan did not obey him; and that San Juan filed the
counter-affidavit with the office of the Provincial Fiscal with his name and signature still on it (tsn.
pp. 47-51, Dec. 9, 1985). It is submitted that, apart from being a mere afterthought, respondent’s
explanation is incredible. His foregoing testimony is not reflected in his comment on the complaint. x
x x We are convinced that the respondent had betrayed the confidences of the complainant, his
former client. x x x An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has
represented him but also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated, and it is not a good
practice to permit him afterwards to defend in another case other persons against his former client
under the pretext that the case is distinct from and independent of the former case.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court.
Jose Feliciano Loy, Jr. for petitioners.

RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
The respondent lawyer, Atty. Francisco L. Daria, is administratively charged1 on two counts, to wit:
44
1. Negligence and
2. Betrayal of his former client’s confidences.
A verified complaint dated February 22, 1985 was filed by Lorenzana Food Corporation (LFC,
hereinafter), and received by the Court on February 25, 1985.2
The Court, on June 10, 1985, resolved to refer this case to the Office of the Solicitor General for
investigation, report, and recommendation.
After proper proceedings, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its “Report and
Recommendation,” dated February 21, 1990 and received by the Court on February 26, 1990.
From the findings made by the Solicitor General, the pertinent facts may be summarized as follows:
Respondent Francisco L. Daria is charged with negligence and betrayal of his former client’s
confidences. The following facts are in connection with the charge of negligence: Respondent was
hired by complainant Lorenzana Food Corporation (LFC) on January 8, 1981 as its legal counsel and
was designated as its personnel manager six months later (tsn. pp. 6-7, Dec. 9, 1985). On May 23,
1983, LFC employee, Violeta Hanopol, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and other monetary
claims against complainant before the Ministry (now Department) of Labor and Employment
(MOLE). On May 30, 1983, summons was served on the parties with the requirement that position
papers be submitted (Exh. G).
During the initial hearing on June 13, 1973** (sic) Hanopol and respondent tried to explore the
possibility of an amicable settlement.
Since no agreement was reached the hearing was reset to June 17, 1983. On the pretext that Hanopol
was supposed to go to his office on that date respondent failed to appear for the second setting (tsn.
pp. 14-15, Dec. 9, 1985). So, the Labor Arbiter was constrained to further reset the hearing to June
28, 1983. Respondent received on June 23, 1983 the Order for the resetting to June 1983 (Exh. J).
In the meantime, on June 20, 1983, respondent received an Order in another labor case, setting the
hearing therein also on June 28, 1983 (Exh. H-6). Faced with a conflicting schedule, respondent
decided to move to postpone the hearing in the Hanopol case. However, instead of filing a written
motion for postponement, he opted to call, through his secretary, the Office of the Labor Arbiter to
move for postponement (Exh. H-5; tsn. p. 16, Dec. 9, 1985). Respondent’s telephone message
apparently failed to reach the Labor Arbiter, because at the hearing on June 28, 1983, he considered
the case submitted for decision on the basis of Hanopol’s complaint and affidavit (Exh. G-1).
Respondent had not submitted a position paper.
After a month, on July 29, 1983, the Labor Arbiter issued a Decision directing LFC to pay Hanopol the
total sum of P6,469.60 in labor benefits, on the basis of Hanopol’s evidence alone.
Respondent Daria appealed the Decision to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on
August 23, 1983 (Exh. 4). The case was remanded to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings. The
case was set for hearing on June 25, 1984 and July 12, 1984 wherein attempts for an amicable
settlement still proved futile. The Labor Arbiter set two more dates for hearing: July 27, 1984 and
August 8, 1984 (tsn. pp. 21-22, Dec. 9, 1985).
In the meantime, the middle of June 1984, respondent signified to management his intention to
resign. In the light of this development, management hired Atty. Rogelio Udarbe to take his place on
July 16, 1984, the effective date of his resignation (Exh. 2). Respondent endorsed the cases of
complainant to Atty. Udarbe (tsn. pp. 23-25, Dec. 9, 1985).
45
During the hearings in the Hanopol case on July 27, 1984 and August 8, 1984, no one appeared for
complainant. So, on August 15, 1984, Hanopol filed a “Manifestation and Motion” praying that the
earlier Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated July 29, 1983 be revived. (Exh. 5).
On September 1, 1984, Atty. Jose Loy, Jr. was hired by complainant LFC vice Atty. Udarbe and he
immediately came across the above-mentioned “Manifestation and Motion”. On September 5, 1984,
he filed an Opposition (Exh. 6) thereto, and on September 19, 1984, he followed this up with a
position paper for LFC (Exh. 7). However, the Labor Arbiter had already revived his earlier Decision
dated July 29, 1983 in another Decision dated September 4, 1984, thereby prompting Atty. Loy to
appeal the latter Decision (Exh. 3). In a resolution dated May 9, 1985, the NLRC ordered anew the
remand of the case for further proceedings (Exh. 8).
In connection with the other charge of betrayal by respondent of his former client’s confidences, the
following facts appear on record:
While respondent was still connected with complainant, its general manager, Sebastian Cortes,
issued a memorandum dated February 28, 1984 (Exh. C) to its employee, Roberto San Juan, requiring
him to submit a written explanation for his alleged double liquidation and unliquidated cash
advances. Another memorandum dated March 15, 1984 (Exh. D) was issued this time by
complainant’s internal auditor, Rosario L. Bernardo, addressed to complainant’s president, summing
up San Juan’s unliquidated advances amounting to P9,351.15. Respondent was furnished a copy of
this memorandum (Exh. D-3). The executive committee, to which respondent belongs, investigated
San Juan on his unliquidated advances. On account of the gravity of the charge, respondent placed
San Juan under preventive suspension, per his letter to him dated April 25, 1984 (Exh. E).
On September 20, 1984, when respondent had already resigned, complainant sent a demand letter to
San Juan requiring him to restitute the amount of P9,351.15 (Exh. N-2). Since he failed to pay the
amount demanded, a complaint for estafa was lodged against him before the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal. San Juan thereafter resigned and sought the assistance of respondent in the preparation of his
counteraffidavit in January 1985 (tsn. p. 35, Nov. 5, 1985). Respondent prepared San Juan’s
counteraffidavit and signed it (Exh. F). San Juan then submitted his counteraffidavit to the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal (tsn. p. 42, Nov. 5, 1985).3
xxx xxx xxx
For failure to appear in two consecutive hearings and to submit a position paper in the Hanopol case
which resulted in complainant LFC’s default and judgment against it by the Labor Arbiter, the
respondent is faulted for negligence. The respondent avers that Hanopol should have seen him in his
office to work out a compromise agreement, on the scheduled day of the second hearing, June 17,
1983, but did not.4
It is the finding of the Solicitor General that this excuse by the respondent is not borne by the
Constancia5 setting the case for hearing. The Constancia clearly states: “By agreement of the parties,
case reset to June 17, 1983 at 2:00 p.m. as previously scheduled.”6 Since it was signed by both
Hanopol and the respondent, the Solicitor General argues that the respondent’s explanation is
manifestly unsatisfactory.
With regard to his second non-appearance for the hearing on June 2, 1983, the respondent justified
his absence by claiming that he had another hearing on the same date and that he told his secretary
to call up the Office of the Labor Arbiter to have the hearing of the Hanopol case postponed.7 The
Solicitor General avers:
46
x x x It is submitted that respondent’s actuation was not warranted by the circumstances. As it
turned out, the telephone request apparently did not reach the Labor Arbiter, thereby constraining
him to declare complainant in default and render judgment against it.8
In an effort to extricate himself from this charge, the respondent submits that since he was able to
persuade the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on appeal to set aside the Decision of the
Labor Arbiter and to remand the case for further proceedings, then the charge of negligence should
be considered moot and academic already.9 We find this submission not meritorious. Instead, we
agree with the position of the Solicitor General:
Respondent’s plea is untenable. The setting aside of the adverse Decision of the Labor Arbiter cannot
obliterate the effects of respondent’s negligence. Indeed, had respondent attended the two scheduled
hearings and filed the required position paper, then at least, there would have been no delay in the
resolution of the case, which, perhaps, would have been in favor of complainant. The delay, by itself,
was prejudicial to complainant because it deprived successor-counsel Atty. Loy of time which he
should be devoting to other cases of complainant. In fact he had to prepare complainant’s position
paper which respondent should have done earlier (Exh. 7).10
From the foregoing, it is manifest that the respondent is indeed guilty of negligence, a clear violation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility:11
CANON 18—A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE
Rule 18.03—A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
The other accusation against the respondent by the Solicitor General was that he had betrayed
complainant LFC’s confidences in violation of the then Canon 37 of the old Canons of Professional
Ethics, to wit:
It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client’s confidences. This duty outlasts the lawyer’s
employment, and extends as well to his employee’s and neither of them should accept employment
which involves or may involve the disclosure or use of these confidences, either for the private
advantages of the client, without his knowledge and consent, and even though there are other
available sources of such information. A lawyer should not continue employment when he discovers
that this obligation prevents the performance of his full duty to his former or to his new client.
xxx xxx xxx
Superseded by the Code of Professional Responsibility, the appropriate Canon now is:
CANON 17—A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE
MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
The Solicitor General further found that the respondent assisted Roberto San Juan in the preparation
of the counteraffidavit,12 submitted in defense of the latter in the accusation of estafa filed against
San Juan by LFC. As a matter of fact, the respondent signed the jurat of the San Juan counter-affidavit
he (respondent) helped prepare. It is also a fact that the respondent investigated this same charge of
estafa while he was still the lawyer of the complainant and San Juan still likewise an employee of LFC.
Again, we concur with the findings and evaluation of the Office of the Solicitor General:
x x x Respondent, however, tried to extricate himself from his predicament by testifying that the
counteraffivadit was prepared by a lawyer-friend, Atty. Joselito R. Enriquez, who had his
47
(respondent’s) name typed on it; that after reading it, he called up Atty. Enriquez so that he will
delete his name and signature thereon; that he instructed San Juan to bring the counteraffidavit to
Atty. Enriquez so that he will delete his name and signature, but San Juan did not obey him; and that
San Juan filed the counteraffidavit with the office of the Provincial Fiscal with his name and signature
still on it (tsn. pp. 47-51, Dec. 9, 1985).
It is submitted that, apart from being a mere afterthought, respondent’s explanation is incredible. His
foregoing testimony is not reflected in his comment on the complaint. x x x13
We are convinced that the respondent had betrayed the confidences of the complainant, his former
client.
x x x An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but
also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated, and it is not a good practice to permit
him afterwards to defend in another case other persons against his former client under the pretext
that the case is distinct from and independent of the former case.14
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondent is found guilty of both the charge of
negligence, a transgression of Rule 18.03, Canon 18, and the charge of betrayal of his former
client’s confidences, in violation of Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.
Let this Decision be entered in the personal records of the respondent and copies thereof furnished
to all courts and IBP chapters.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Respondent suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.
Note.—One (1) month suspension from practice, proper penalty imposed on lawyer for his
negligence resulting in the dismissal of appeals which has decidedly prejudiced complainants
who lost all recourses against the judgment against them. (Morales vs. Maneja, Jr., 133 SCRA
579.)
48
A.C. No. 5687. February 3, 2005.*

FELIX E. EDQUIBAL, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROBERTO FERRER, JR., respondent.
Administrative Law; Attorneys; The lawyer-client relationship is one of trust and confidence; There
is a need for the client to be adequately and fully informed about the developments in his
case.— It bears stressing that the lawyer-client relationship is one of trust and confidence. Thus,
there is a need for the client to be adequately and fully informed about the developments in his case.
A client should never be left groping in the dark, for to do so would be to destroy the trust, faith, and
confidence reposed in the lawyer so retained in particular and the legal profession in general.
Same; Same; Diligence is the attention and care required of a person in a given situation and is the
opposite of negligence; It is axiomatic in the practice of law that the price of success is eternal
diligence to the cause of the client.—Diligence is “the attention and care required of a person in a
given situation and is the opposite of negligence.” A lawyer serves his client with diligence by
adopting that norm of practice expected of men of good intentions. He thus owes entire devotion to
the interest of his client, warm zeal in the defense and maintenance of his rights, and the exertion of
his utmost learning, skill, and ability to ensure that nothing shall be taken or withheld from him, save
by the rules of law legally applied. It is axiomatic in the practice of law that the price of success is
eternal diligence to the cause of the client.
Same; Same; Practice of law does not require extraordinary diligence (exactissima diligentia)
or that extreme measure of care and caution which persons of unusual prudence and
circumspection use for securing and preserving their rights; All that is required is ordinary
diligence (diligentia) or that degree of vigilance expected of a bonus pater familias.—The practice of
law does not require extraordinary diligence (exactissima diligentia) or that “extreme measure of
care and caution which persons of unusual prudence and circumspection use for securing and
preserving their rights.” All that is required is ordinary diligence (diligentia) or that degree of
vigilance expected of a bonus pater familias. Yet, even by this lesser standard, respondent’s failure to
attend to his client’s appeal is clearly wanting.
Same; Same; An attorney’s failure to file brief for his client constitutes inexcusable
negligence.—In People v. Cawili, we held that the failure of counsel to submit the brief within the
reglementary period is an offense that entails disciplinary action. People v. Villar, Jr. characterized a
lawyer’s failure to file a brief for his client as inexcusable neglect. In Blaza v. Court of Appeals, we
held that the filing of a brief within the period set by law is a duty not only to the client, but also to
the court. Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. v. Saquilaban reiterated Ford v. Daitol and In re: Santiago
F. Marcos in holding that an attorney’s failure to file brief for his client constitutes inexcusable
negligence.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Professional Misconduct and Neglect of Duty.
RESOLUTION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
In a letter-complaint1 under oath dated January 8, 2002, Felix E. Edquibal, complainant, charged
Atty. Roberto Ferrer, Jr., respondent, with professional misconduct and neglect of duty.
49
Complainant alleged that he engaged the services of respondent to assist his mother Ursula Edquibal
in cases she filed against his sister Delia Edquibal-Garcia involving a certain real property in
Masinloc, Zambales. His mother obtained favorable judgments in four (4) out of the five (5) cases
handled by respondent. However, in Civil Case No. RTC-1495-I (filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 70, Iba, Zambales), the trial judge rendered a decision adverse to his mother. Respondent
then advised complainant to appeal to the Court of Appeals and that the cost involved is P4,000.00.
When complainant informed respondent that he does not have enough money, the latter said
P2,000.00 would be sufficient for the moment. After receiving the money from complainant,
respondent told him just to wait for the result. The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 65019.
When complainant failed to hear from respondent in January 2001, he went to the Court of Appeals
to follow-up the appealed case. He then learned that the appeal was dismissed for failure of the
appellant to file the required appellant’s brief.
In his comment2 dated June 2, 2003, respondent denied that he filed an appeal, on behalf of
complainant’s mother, with the Court of Appeals or received P2,000.00. What happened was that
complainant told him that there is someone in the Court of Appeals who can help him regarding his
appeal.
Respondent claimed that he “did his best” for complainant’s mother and did not even ask for
attorney’s fees.
On July 30, 2003, we referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report, and recommendation.
In his Report and Recommendation dated March 19, 2004, Atty. Leland R. Villadolid, IBP
Commissioner, made the following findings:
“It is clear from the records of this case that per the records of CA G-R. CV No. 65019, Respondent is
the counsel of record of defendants-appellants therein (including Complainant’s mother). In the
Resolution dated 31 August 000, it was explicitly noted that ‘(N)otice sent to counsel for defendants-
appellants requiring him to file appellant’s brief within forty-five (45) days from receipt thereof was
received by him on March 16, 2000.’ If it is true that Respondent never agreed to handle the appeal,
upon receipt of said notice, Respondent should have immediately manifested to the Court of Appeals
that he is not handling the appeal on behalf of said defendants-appellants. Thus, Section 2, Rule 44 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure clearly states that ‘[T]he counsel and guardians ad litem of the parties in
the court of origin shall be respectively considered as their counsel and guardians ad litem in the
Court of Appeals.’ By failing to do so, the Court of Appeals had every reason to assume that he was
likewise representing defendants-appellants in the appeal. Accordingly, his failure to timely file the
required appellants’ brief resulted in the dismissal of the appeal.
The facts of this case clearly show that Respondent violated Canon 17 and 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (‘CPR’).
Undoubtedly, Respondent’s failure to exercise due diligence in protecting and attending to the
interest of Complainant (Complainant’s mother) caused the latter material prejudice. It should be
remembered that the moment a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will exert all effort
for its prosecution until its final conclusion. A lawyer who fails to exercise due diligence or abandons
his client’s cause makes him unworthy of the trust reposed in him by the latter. x x x”
Atty. Villadolid recommended to the IBP Board of Governors that respondent be reprimanded “for
failure to act with reasonable diligence in representing the cause of complainant;” and that
respondent be directed to “return the amount of P2,000.00 as and by way of restitution to
complainant.”
50
In its Resolution No. XVI-2004-383 dated July 30, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the Report and Recommendation of Atty. Villadolid, thus:
“RESOLVED TO ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of
the Resolution as Annex “A”; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering the respondent’s failure to act with
reasonable diligence in representing the cause of complainant, Atty. Roberto Ferrer, Jr., is hereby
REPRIMANDED and Ordered to Return the amount of P2,000,00 by way of Restitution to
complainant.”3
We sustain the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors except as to the penalty recommended.
Records show that respondent was the counsel of record for the appellants, complainant’s mother
and other relatives in CA-G.R. CV No. 65019. The Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated August 31,
2000 clearly states that the “notice sent to counsel for defendants-appellants requiring him to file
appellant’s brief within forty-five (45) days from receipt thereof, was received by him on March 16,
2000.”4 However, respondent failed to file the appellants’ brief despite receipt of such notice.
Section 2, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:
SEC. 2. Counsel and guardians.—The counsel and guardians ad litem of the parties in the court of
origin shall be respectively considered as their counsel and guardians ad litem in the Court of
Appeals. When others appear or are appointed, notice thereof shall be served immediately on the
adverse party and filed with the court.
If it were true that respondent did not agree to represent the appellants in CA-G.R. CV No. 65019,
why did he not file with the Court of Appeals a motion to withdraw as their counsel? Obviously, his
negligence, which resulted in the dismissal of the appeal, caused prejudice to his clients. Likewise,
respondent’s failure to inform complainant of the status of his mother’s appeal is inexcusable.
It bears stressing that the lawyer-client relationship is one of trust and confidence. Thus, there is a
need for the client to be adequately and fully informed about the developments in his case.5 A client
should never be left groping in the dark, for to do so would be to destroy the trust, faith, and
confidence reposed in the lawyer so retained in particular and the legal profession in general.
Respondent violated Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which

provide:
“Canon 17—A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him.
Canon 18—A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03—A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
Rule 18.04—A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to his client’s request for information.”
Diligence is “the attention and care required of a person in a given situation and is the opposite of
negligence.”6 A lawyer serves his client with diligence by adopting that norm of practice expected of
men of good intentions. He thus owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the
51
defense and maintenance of his rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning, skill, and ability to
ensure that nothing shall be taken or withheld from him, save by the rules of law legally applied.7 It
is axiomatic in the practice of law that the price of success is eternal diligence to the cause of the
client.
The practice of law does not require extraordinary diligence (exactissima diligentia) or that “extreme
measure of care and caution which persons of unusual prudence and circumspection use for securing
and preserving their rights.”8 All that is required is ordinary diligence (diligentia) or that degree of
vigilance expected of a bonus pater familias. Yet, even by this lesser standard, respondent’s failure to
attend to his client’s appeal is clearly wanting.
In People v. Cawili,9 we held that the failure of counsel to submit the brief within the reglementary
period is an offense that entails disciplinary action. People v. Villar, Jr.10 characterized a lawyer’s
failure to file a brief for his client as inexcusable neglect. In Blaza v. Court of Appeals,11 we held that
the filing of a brief within the period set by law is a duty not only to the client, but also to the court.
Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. v. Saquilaban12 reiterated Ford v. Daitol13 and In re: Santiago F.
Marcos14 in holding that an attorney’s failure to file brief for his client constitutes inexcusable
negligence.
In cases involving a lawyer’s failure to file a brief or other pleading before an appellate court, we did
not hesitate to suspend the erring member of the Bar from the practice of law for three months,15 six
months,16 or even disbarment in severely aggravated cases.17
Accordingly and considering the circumstances of this case, we find a need to scale the recommended
penalty upward. Here, we are convinced that respondent deserves the penalty of suspension for
three (3) months.
WHEREFORE, ATTY. ROBERTO FERRER, JR. is hereby found guilty of professional misconduct
and neglect of duty. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months with a
WARNING that a repetition of the same or a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
He is further DIRECTED to return immediately to the complainant the amount of P2,000.00.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban (Chairman), Corona, Carpio-Morales and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Atty. Roberto Ferrer, Jr. suspended for three (3) months from the practice of law for professional
misconduct and neglect of duty, with warning against repetition of similar offense.
Note.—The trust and confidence clients repose in lawyers require a high standard and
appreciation of the latter’s duty to the former, the legal profession, the courts and the public.
(Abragan vs. Rodriguez, 380 SCRA 93 [2002])
52
A.C. No. 6788. August 23, 2007.*
(Formerly, CBD 382)
DIANA RAMOS, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG, respondent.
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Government Lawyers; Lawyers in government service are expected to be
more conscientious of their actuations as they are subject to public scrutiny.—Lawyers are
expected to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity. More specifically, lawyers in government
service are expected to be more conscientious of their actuations as they are subject to public
scrutiny. They are not only members of the bar but also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to
public service.
Same; Same; Same; Lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they are
expected to devote themselves fulltime to the work of their respective offices.—Government
employees are expected to devote themselves completely to public service. For this reason, the
private practice of profession is prohibited. Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees provides: Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions.—In addition to
acts and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing
laws, the following constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee
and are hereby declared unlawful: x x x x x x x x x (b) Outside employment and other activities
related thereto, public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not: x x x x x x x x x (1)
Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided
that such practice will not conflict with their official function. Thus, lawyers in government service
cannot handle private cases for they are expected to devote themselves full-time to the work of their
respective offices.
Same; Same; Same; Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client

relationship.—In this instance, respondent received P5,000 from the complainant and issued a
receipt on July 15, 1992 while he was still connected with the PAO. Acceptance of money from a
client establishes an attorney-client relationship. Respondent’s admission that he accepted money
from the complainant and the receipt confirmed the presence of an attorney-client relationship
between him and the complainant. Moreover, the receipt showed that he accepted the complainant’s
case while he was still a government lawyer. Respondent clearly violated the prohibition on private
practice of profession.
Same; Same; Same; Public Attorney’s Office (PAO); The Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) was created
for the purpose of providing free legal assistance to indigent litigants; A Public Attorney’s
Office (PAO) lawyer should not accept attorney’s fees from a party as this is inconsistent with
the office’s mission.—Aggravating respondent’s wrongdoing was his receipt of attorney’s fees. The
PAO was created for the purpose of providing free legal assistance to indigent litigants. Section 14(3),
Chapter 5, Title III, Book V of the Revised Administrative Code provides: Sec. 14. x x x The PAO shall
be the principal law office of the Government in extending free legal assistance to indigent persons in
criminal, civil, labor, administrative and other quasijudicial cases. As a PAO lawyer, respondent
should not have accepted attorney’s fees from the complainant as this was inconsistent with the
office’s mission. Respondent violated the prohibition against accepting legal fees other than his
salary.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The undertaking to uphold the law includes the observance of the
prohibitions blatantly violated by respondent when he accepted the complainant’s cases and
received attorney’s fees in consideration of his legal services.—Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides: CANON 1.—A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE
LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. Every
lawyer is obligated to uphold the law. This undertaking includes the observance of the above-
mentioned prohibitions blatantly violated by respondent when he accepted the complainant’s cases
53
and received attorney’s fees in consideration of his legal services. Consequently, respondent’s
acceptance of the cases was also a breach of Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
because the prohibition on the private practice of profession disqualified him from acting as the
complainant’s counsel.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A government lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is burdened with
a high degree of social responsibility, higher than his brethren in private practice.—
Respondent’s conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral character required of all
lawyers, specially one occupying a public office. Lawyers in public office are expected not only to
refrain from any act or omission which tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in
government but also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high
standard of honesty and fair dealing. A government lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is burdened
with a high degree of social responsibility, higher than his brethren in private practice.
Same; Same; A lawyer could not be held guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility where he did not hold the money for the benefit of the client but
accepted it as his attorney’s fees.—There is, however, insufficient basis to find respondent guilty of
violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent did not hold the money
for the benefit of the complainant but accepted it as his attorney’s fees. He neither held the amount in
trust for the complainant (such as an amount delivered by the sheriff in satisfaction of a judgment
obligation in favor of the client) nor was it given to him for a specific purpose (such as amounts given
for filing fees and bail bond). Nevertheless, respondent should return the P5,000 as he, a government
lawyer, was not entitled to attorney’s fees and not allowed to accept them.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Disbarment and Suspension.
Geronga, Cimafranca and Associates for complainant.

RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint for disbarment or suspension1 against Atty. Jose R. Imbang for multiple violations
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Complaint
In 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the assistance of respondent Atty. Jose R. Imbang in
filing civil and criminal actions against the spouses Roque and Elenita Jovellanos.2 She gave
respondent P8,500 as attorney’s fees but the latter issued a receipt for P5,000 only.3
The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases against the Jovellanoses. Oddly,
respondent never allowed her to enter the courtroom and always told her to wait outside. He would
then come out after several hours to inform her that the hearing had been cancelled and
rescheduled.4 This happened six times and for each “appearance” in court, respondent charged her
P350.
After six consecutive postponements, the complainant became suspicious. She personally inquired
about the status of her cases in the trial courts of Biñan and San Pedro, Laguna. She was shocked to
learn that respondent never filed any case against the Jovellanoses and that he was in fact employed
in the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO).5
54
Respondent’s Defense
According to respondent, the complainant knew that he was in the government service from the very
start. In fact, he first met the complainant when he was still a district attorney in the Citizen’s Legal
Assistance Office (predecessor of PAO) of Biñan, Laguna and was assigned as counsel for the
complainant’s daughter.6
In 1992, the complainant requested him to help her file an action for damages against the
Jovellanoses.7 Because he was with the PAO and aware that the complainant was not an indigent, he
declined.8 Nevertheless, he advised the complainant to consult Atty. Tim Ungson, a relative who was
a private practitioner.9 Atty. Ungson, however, did not accept the complainant’s case as she was
unable to come up with the acceptance fee agreed upon.10 Notwithstanding Atty. Ungson’s refusal,
the complainant allegedly remained adamant. She insisted on suing the Jovellanoses. Afraid that she
“might spend” the cash on hand, the complainant asked respondent to keep the P5,000 while she
raised the balance of Atty. Ungson’s acceptance fee.11
A year later, the complainant requested respondent to issue an antedated receipt because one of her
daughters asked her to account for the P5,000 she had previously given the respondent for
safekeeping.12 Because the complainant was a friend, he agreed and issued a receipt dated July 15,
1992.13
On April 15, 1994, respondent resigned from the PAO.14 A few months later or in September 1994,
the complainant again asked respondent to assist her in suing the Jovellanoses. Inasmuch as he was
now a private practitioner, respondent agreed to prepare the complaint. However, he was unable to
finalize it as he lost contact with the complainant.15
Recommendation of the IBP
Acting on the complaint, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) where the complaint was filed, received evidence from the parties. On November
22, 2004, the CBD submitted its report and recommendation to the IBP Board of Governors.16
The CBD noted that the receipt17 was issued on July 15, 1992 when respondent was still with the
PAO.18 It also noted that respondent described the complainant as a shrewd businesswoman and
that respondent was a seasoned trial lawyer. For these reasons, the complainant would not have
accepted a spurious receipt nor would respondent have issued one. The CBD rejected respondent’s
claim that he issued the receipt to accommodate a friend’s request.19 It found respondent guilty of
violating the prohibitions on government lawyers from accepting private cases and receiving
lawyer’s fees other than their salaries.20 The CBD concluded that respondent violated the
following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from
a client.
Rule 18.01. A lawyer should not undertake a legal service which he knows or should know
that he is not qualified to render. However, he may render such service if, with the consent of
his client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter.
Thus, it recommended respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for three years and ordered
him to immediately return to the complainant the amount of P5,000 which was substantiated by the
receipt.21
55
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the findings of the CBD that respondent violated
Rules 1.01, 16.01 and 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It, however, modified the
CBD’s recommendation with regard to the restitution of P5,000 by imposing interest at the legal rate,
reckoned from 1995 or, in case of respondent’s failure to return the total amount, an additional
suspension of six months.22
The Court’s Ruling
We adopt the findings of the IBP with modifications.
Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity.23 More specifically, lawyers
in government service are expected to be more conscientious of their actuations as they are subject
to public scrutiny. They are not only mem bers of the bar but also public servants who owe utmost
fidelity to public service.24
Government employees are expected to devote themselves completely to public service. For this
reason, the private practice of profession is prohibited. Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides:
“Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions.—In addition to acts and omissions of public officials
and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following constitute
prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared
unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto, public officials and employees during
their incumbency shall not:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided that such practice will not conflict with their official function.”25
Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they are expected to devote
themselves full-time to the work of their respective offices.
In this instance, respondent received P5,000 from the complainant and issued a receipt on July 15,
1992 while he was still connected with the PAO. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an
attorney-client relationship.26 Respondent’s admission that he accepted money from the
complainant and the receipt confirmed the presence of an attorneyclient relationship between him
and the complainant. Moreover, the receipt showed that he accepted the complainant’s case while he
was still a government lawyer. Respondent clearly violated the prohibition on private practice of
profession.
Aggravating respondent’s wrongdoing was his receipt of attorney’s fees. The PAO was created for the
purpose of providing free legal assistance to indigent litigants.27 Section 14(3), Chapter 5, Title III,
Book V of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
“Sec. 14. x x x
The PAO shall be the principal law office of the Government in extending free legal assistance to
indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor, administrative and other quasi-judicial cases.”28
56
As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted attorney’s fees from the complainant as this
was inconsistent with the office’s mission.29 Respondent violated the prohibition against accepting
legal fees other than his salary.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON 1.—A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law.30 This undertaking includes the observance of the
above-mentioned prohibitions blatantly violated by respondent when he accepted the complainant’s
cases and received attorney’s fees in consideration of his legal services. Consequently, respondent’s
acceptance of the cases was also a breach of Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
because the prohibition on the private practice of profession disqualified him from acting as the
complainant’s counsel.
Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against handling private cases and accepting attorney’s
fees, respondent also surreptitiously deceived the complainant. Not only did he fail to file a complaint
against the Jovellanoses (which in the first place he should not have done), respondent also led the
complainant to believe that he really filed an action against the Jovellanoses. He even made it appear
that the cases were being tried and asked the complainant to pay his “appearance fees” for hearings
that never took place. These acts constituted dishonesty, a violation of the lawyer’s oath not to do any
falsehood.31
Respondent’s conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral character required of all
lawyers, specially one occupying a public office. Lawyers in public office are expected not only to
refrain from any act or omission which tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in
government but also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high
standard of honesty and fair dealing. A government lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is burdened
with a high degree of social responsibility, higher than his brethren in private practice.32
There is, however, insufficient basis to find respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Respondent did not hold the money for the benefit of the complainant
but accepted it as his attorney’s fees. He neither held the amount in trust for the complainant (such
as an amount delivered by the sheriff in satisfaction of a judgment obligation in favor of the client)33
nor was it given to him for a specific purpose (such as amounts given for filing fees and bail bond).34
Nevertheless, respondent should return the P5,000 as he, a government lawyer, was not entitled to
attorney’s fees and not allowed to accept them.35
WHEREFORE, Atty. Jose R. Imbang is found guilty of violating the lawyer’s oath, Canon 1, Rule
1.01 and Canon 18, Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the
Roll of Attorneys. He is also ordered to return to complainant the amount of P5,000 with
interest at the legal rate, reckoned from 1995, within 10 days from receipt of this resolution.
Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office
of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (C.J.), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, SandovalGutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,

Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Garcia, Velasco, Jr., Nachura and Reyes, JJ., concur.
57
Chico-Nazario, J., No part.
Atty. Jose R. Imbang disbarred.
Notes.—The trust and confidence clients repose in lawyers require a high standard and
appreciation of the latter’s duty to the former, the legal profession, the courts and the public.
(Abragan vs. Rodriguez, 380 SCRA 93 [2002])
Disbarment should never be imposed unless it is evidently clear that the lawyer, by his
serious misconduct, should no longer remain a member of the bar. (Vda. de Rosales vs. Ramos,
383 SCRA 498 [2002])
58
Adm. Case CBD No. 190. January 28, 1998.*
CORAZON T. REONTOY, complainant, vs. ATTY. LIBERATO R. IBADLIT, respondent.
Administrative Law; Attorneys; It was respondent’s fault in not appealing within the
reglementary period in the belief that appeal would be useless.—We hold respondent
administratively liable. Indeed it was his fault in not appealing within the reglementary period in the
belief that appeal would be useless. It was highly improper for him to adopt such opinion without
any clear instruction from his client not to appeal the adverse verdict.
Same; Same; A lawyer owes entire devotion in protecting the interest of his client, warmth and
zeal in the defense of his rights.—A lawyer owes entire devotion in protecting the interest of his
client, warmth and zeal in the defense of his rights. He must use all his learning and ability to the end
that nothing can be taken or withheld from his client except in accordance with the law. He must
present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law in support of his client’s cause,
regardless of his own personal views. In the full discharge of his duties to his client, the lawyer
should not be afraid of the possibility that he may displease the judge or the general public.
Same; Same; A lawyer has no authority to waive his client’s right to appeal.—A lawyer has no
authority to waive his client’s right to appeal. His failure to perfect an appeal within the prescribed
period constitutes negligence and malpractice proscribed by Rule 18.03, Canon 18, of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that “a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted
to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.”
Same; Same; Respondent utterly failed to perform his duties and responsibilities faithfully and
well as to protect the rights and interests of his client.—In sum, respondent utterly failed to
perform his duties and responsibilities faithfully and well as to protect the rights and interests of his
client. The record shows that complainant lost the case and suffered the corresponding loss of her
real property in Kalibo, Aklan, consisting of her undivided share or interest in five (5) valuable
parcels of land. Certainly, complainant paid dearly for respondent’s ignorance, laxity, if not
incompetence, by failing to appeal on time.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Negligence.
Geminiano G. Galicia, Jr. for complainant.
Reloj Law Office for respondent.

RESOLUTION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a complaint filed by Corazon T. Reontoy for the disbarment of her counsel, Atty. Liberato R.
Ibadlit, for having been negligent in handling her case for partition, accounting and reconveyance
then pending with the RTC-Br. 4, Kalibo, Aklan.1
Respondent lawyer admits that he was the lawyer of complainant Corazon T. Reontoy in Civil Case
No. 2805 which was decided by the RTC against his client. He likewise admits that he received copy
of the adverse decision on 19 June 1989 and filed his notice of appeal only on 17 July 1989 when the
expiry date to appeal was 4 July 1989.2
Respondent alleges in his defense that after he received the adverse decision he immediately
contacted complainant’s brother Proculo Tomazar and requested the latter to inform complainant
that they lost the case and that after going over the decision he (respondent) was convinced that
59
appeal was futile. He also requested Proculo to tell complainant to communicate immediately with
respondent if complainant disagreed with him on his position not to appeal the RTC decision
anymore. Confident that Proculo had conveyed the message to complainant and having failed to
receive any advice from her respondent intentionally did not file the corresponding notice of appeal.
But after Proculo informed him later in his office that complainant wished to appeal the decision, he
forthwith filed a notice of appeal, in the interest of justice, on 17 July 1989.
The notice of appeal having been filed beyond the reglementary period, the trial court on 16 August
1989 denied the appeal and granted the Motion for Execution of Judgment of the prevailing parties.
In the investigation conducted by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, complainant presented her
brother Proculo Tomazar to deny, as he did, that he was authorized by her to communicate with
respondent regarding the case, claiming in fact that he had no knowledge whatsoever of subject civil
case.3
The testimony of Proculo Tomazar corroborated complainant’s testimony that she had never
authorized him to be her representative either to the court or to communicate with her counsel for
the reason that Proculo was unlettered. Complainant further testified that when she went to see
respondent in September 1989 to check on the status of her case the latter merely told her that the
period to appeal had already elapsed and then returned the case records to her.
We hold respondent administratively liable. Indeed it was his fault in not appealing within the
reglementary period in the belief that appeal would be useless. It was highly improper for him to
adopt such opinion without any clear instruction from his client not to appeal the adverse verdict.
A lawyer owes entire devotion in protecting the interest of his client, warmth and zeal in the defense
of his rights. He must use all his learning and ability to the end that nothing can be taken or withheld
from his client except in accordance with the law. He must present every remedy or defense within
the authority of the law in support of his client’s cause, regardless of his own personal views. In the
full discharge of his duties to his client, the lawyer should not be afraid of the possibility that he may
displease the judge or the general public.4
A lawyer has no authority to waive his client’s right to appeal. His failure to perfect an appeal
within the prescribed period constitutes negligence and malpractice proscribed by Rule
18.03, Canon 18, of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that “a lawyer shall
not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.”5
Had respondent filed the appeal on time he could have easily withdrawn the case later so that he
could have the time to confer meticulously with his client and then decide whether to pursue the case
to the appellate court; or, he could have withdrawn his services and advised complainant to look for
another lawyer before the period to appeal lapsed to give his client a chance to ventilate her case on
appeal.
Respondent claims that he nonetheless filed a notice of appeal in the interest of justice. Notably,
respondent filed the notice of appeal on 17 July 1989, or only after the period to appeal had already
expired. The belated filing of the appeal cannot in any way mitigate respondent’s liability; on the
contrary, it would show ignorance on his part. As a lawyer, he ought to know that his notice of
appeal, having been filed beyond the reglementary period, would surely be struck down for late
filing.
In sum, respondent utterly failed to perform his duties and responsibilities faithfully and well as to
protect the rights and interests of his client. The record shows that complainant lost the case and
suffered the corresponding loss of her real property in Kalibo, Aklan, consisting of her undivided
60
share or interest in five (5) valuable parcels of land. Certainly, complainant paid dearly for
respondent’s ignorance, laxity, if not incompetence, by failing to appeal on time.
WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Liberato R. Ibadlit, is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one
(1) year effective upon finality hereof.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (Chairman), Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Atty. Liberato R. Ibadlit suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year.
Note.—It is incumbent upon an attorney to give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and
probable results of his client’s case with the end in view of promoting respect for the law and
legal processes. (Choa vs. Chiongson, 253 SCRA 371 [1996])
61
Adm. Case No. 4103. September 7, 1995.*
VERONICA S. SANTIAGO, BENJAMIN Q. HONTIVEROS, MR. SOCORRO F. MANAS, and TRINIDAD
NORDISTA, complainants, vs. ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS, respondent.
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or
advocate for every person who may wish to become his client but once he agrees to take up
the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him.—It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as
adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline
employment, subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Once he
agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and
diligence, and champion the latter’s cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise
stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his client’s rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that
nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply
means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized
by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense.
Same; Same; If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice
law carries with it the correlative duties not only to practice law but also to the court, to the bar, and
to the public.—If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to
practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the
bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects
the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain
the respect of the community to the legal profession.
Same; Same; Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill, and
competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.—
Pressure and large volume of legal work provide no excuse for the respondent’s inability to exercise
due diligence in the performance of his duty to file an answer. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves
his full attention, diligence, skill, and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he
accepts it for a fee or for free.
Same; Same; A lawyer’s negligence in not filing an answer on time is not excused by his claim
that the case was in fact a “losing cause,” for if indeed he was so convinced of the futility of any
defense therein, he should have seasonably informed his clients thereof.—The respondent’s
negligence is not excused by his claim that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was in fact a “losing cause” for
the complainants since the claims therein for damages were based on the final decision of the Med-
Arbiter declaring the complainants’ act of expelling Salvador from the union to be illegal. This claim
is a mere afterthought which hardly persuades us. If indeed the respondent was so convinced of the
futility of any defense therein, he should have seasonably informed the complainants thereof. Rule
15.05, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly provides: A lawyer, when
advising his client, shall give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of the
client’s case, neither overstating nor understating the prospects of the case.
Same; Same; For the inexcusable negligence of a lawyer in failing to file an answer for his clients, he
is reprimanded.—We do not therefore hesitate to rule that the respondent is not free from any blame
for the sad fate of the complainants. He is liable for inexcusable negligence. WHEREFORE, ATTY.
AMADO R. FOJAS is hereby REPRIMANDED and ADMONISHED to be, henceforth, more careful in the
performance of his duty to his clients.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
62
Amado R. Fojas for and in his own behalf.
DAVIDE, JR., J. :
In their letter of 8 September 1993, the complainants, former clients of the respondent, pray that the
latter be disbarred for “malpractice, neglect and other offenses which may be discovered during the
actual investigation of this complaint.” They attached thereto an Affidavit of Merit wherein they
specifically allege:
1. That we are Defendants-Appellates [sic] in the Court of Appeals Case No. CA-G.N. CV No. 38153
of which to our surprise lost unnecessarily the aforesaid Petition [sic]. A close perusal of the case
reveals the serious misconduct of our attorney on record, Atty. Amado Fojas tantamount to
malpractice and negligence in the performance of his duty obligation to us, to defend us in the
aforesaid case. That the said attorney without informing us the reason why and riding high on the
trust and confidence we repose on him either abandoned, failed to act accordingly, or seriously
neglected to answer the civil complaint against us in the sala of Judge Teresita Capulong Case No.
3526-V-91 Val. Metro Manila so that we were deduced [sic] in default.
2. That under false pretenses Atty. Fojas assured us that everything was in order. That he had
already answered the complaint so that in spite of the incessant demand for him to give us a copy he
continued to deny same to us. Only to disclose later that he never answered it after all because
according to him he was a very busy man. Please refer to Court of Appeals decision dated August 17,
1993.
3. That because of Atty. Amado Fojas’ neglect and malpractice of law we lost the Judge Capulong
case and our appeal to the Court of Appeals. So that it is only proper that Atty. Fojas be disciplined
and disbarred in the practice of his profession.
In his Comment, the respondent admits his “mistake” in failing to file the complainants’ answer in
Civil Case No. 3526-V-91, but he alleges that it was cured by his filing of a motion for reconsideration,
which was unfortunately denied by the court. He asserts that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was a “losing
cause” for the complainants because it was based on the expulsion of the plaintiff therein from the
Far Eastern University Faculty Association (FEUFA) which was declared unlawful in the final
decision in NCR-OD-M-90-10-050. Thus, “[t]he unfavorable judgment in the Regional Trial Court is
not imputable to [his] mistake but rather imputable to the merits of the case, i.e. , the decision in the
Expulsion case wherein defendants (complainants herein) illegally removed from the union (FEUFA)
membership Mr. Paulino Salvador. . . .” He further claims that the complainants filed this case to
harass him because he refused to share his attorney’s fees in the main labor case he had handled for
them. The respondent then prays for the dismissal of this complaint for utter lack of merit, since his
failure to file the answer was cured and, even granting for the sake of argument that such failure
amounted to negligence, it cannot warrant his disbarment or suspension from the practice of the law
profession.
The complainants filed a Reply to the respondent’s Comment.
Issues having been joined, we required the parties to inform us whether they were willing to submit
this case for decision on the basis of the pleadings they have filed. In their separate compliance, both
manifested in the affirmative.
The facts in this case are not disputed.
63
Complainants Veronica Santiago, Benjamin Hontiveros, Ma. Socorro Manas, and Trinidad Nordista
were the President, Vice-President, Treasurer, and Auditor, respectively, of the FEUFA. They
allegedly expelled from the union Paulino Salvador. The latter then commenced with the Department
of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a complaint (NCR-OD-M-90-10-050) to declare illegal his
expulsion from the union.
In his resolution of 22 November 1990, Med-Arbiter Tomas Falconitin declared illegal Salvador’s
expulsion and directed the union and all its officers to reinstate Salvador’s name in the roll of union
members with all the rights and privileges appurtenant thereto. This resolution was affirmed in toto
by the Secretary of Labor and Employment.
Subsequently, Paulino Salvador filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
Branch 172, a complaint against the complainants herein for actual, moral, and exemplary damages
and attorney’s fees, under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 3526-V-91.
As the complainant’s counsel, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the said case on grounds of
(1) res judicata by virtue of the final decision of the Med-Arbiter in NCR-OD-M-90-10-050 and (2)
lack of jurisdiction, since what was involved was an intra-union issue cognizable by the DOLE. Later,
he filed a supplemental motion to dismiss.
The trial court, per Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, granted the motion and ordered the dismissal of
the case. Upon Salvador’s motion for reconsideration, however, it reconsidered the order of
dismissal, reinstated the case, and required the complainants herein to file their answer within a
nonextendible period of fifteen days from notice.
Instead of filing an answer, the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and dismissal of the
case. This motion having been denied, the respondent filed with this Court a petition for certiorari,
which was later referred to the Court of Appeals and docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 25834.
Although that petition and his subsequent motion for reconsideration were both denied, the
respondent still did not file the complainants’ answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. Hence, upon
plaintiff Salvador’s motion, the complainants were declared in default, and Salvador was authorized
to present his evidence ex-parte.
The respondent then filed a motion to set aside the order of default and to stop the ex-parte
reception of evidence before the Clerk of Court, but to no avail.
Thereafter, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the complainants herein to pay, jointly and
severally, plaintiff Salva dor the amounts of P200,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as
exemplary damages or corrective damages; and P65,000.00 as attorney’s fees; plus cost of suit.
The complainants, still assisted by the respondent, elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which,
however, affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
The respondent asserts that he was about to appeal the said decision to this Court, but his services as
counsel for the complainants and for the union were illegally and unilaterally terminated by
complainant Veronica Santiago.
The core issue that presents itself is whether the respondent committed culpable negligence, as
would warrant disciplinary action, in failing to file for the complainants an answer in Civil Case No.
3526-V-91 for which reason the latter were declared in default and judgment was rendered against
them on the basis of the plaintiff’s evidence, which was received ex-parte.
64
It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who
may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline employment,1 subject, however, to Canon
14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the
lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him.2 He must serve the client with competence and diligence,3 and champion the latter’s cause with
wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion.4 Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of
the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client’s rights, and the exertion of his
utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the
rules of law, legally applied.5 This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and
every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to
assert every such remedy or defense.6 If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the
entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also
to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor
not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar,
and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.7
The respondent admits that it was his duty to file an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. He justifies
his failure to do so in this wise:
[I]n his overzealousness to question the Denial Order of the trial court,8 [he] instead, thru honest
mistake and excusable neglect, filed a PETITION FOR CERTIORARI with the Honorable Court,
docketed as G.R. No. 100983. . . .
And, when the Court of Appeals, to which G.R. No. 100983 was referred, dismissed the petition, he
again “inadvertently” failed to file an answer “[d]ue to honest mistake and because of his
overzealousness as stated earlier. . . .”
In their Reply, the complainants allege that his failure to file an answer was not an honest mistake
but was “deliberate, malicious and calculated to place them on the legal disadvantage, to their
damage and prejudice” for, as admitted by him in his motion to set aside the order of default, his
failure to do so was “due to volume and pressure of legal work.”9 In short, the complainants want to
impress upon this Court that the respondent has given inconsistent reasons to justify his failure to
file an answer.
We agree with the complainants. In his motion for reconsideration of the default order, the
respondent explained his non- filing of the required answer by impliedly invoking forgetfulness
occasioned by a large volume and pressure of legal work, while in his Comment in this case he
attributes it to honest mistake and excusable neglect due to his overzealousness to question the
denial order of the trial court.
Certainly, “overzealousness” on the one hand and “volume and pressure of legal work” on the other
are two distinct and separate causes or grounds. The first presupposes the respondent’s full and
continuing awareness of his duty to file an answer which, nevertheless, he subordinated to his
conviction that the trial court had committed a reversible error or grave abuse of discretion in
issuing an order reconsidering its previous order of dismissal of Salvador’s complaint and in denying
the motion to reconsider the said order. The second ground is purely based on forgetfulness because
of his other commitments.
Whether it be the first or the second ground, the fact remains that the respondent did not comply
with his duty to file an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. His lack of diligence was compounded by
his erroneous belief that the trial court committed such error or grave abuse of discretion and by his
continued refusal to file an answer even after he received the Court of Appeals’ decision in the
certiorari case. There is no showing whatsoever that he further assailed the said decision before this
Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to prove his claim of
65
overzealousness to challenge the trial court’s order. Neither was it shown that he alleged in his
motion to lift the order of default that the complainants had a meritorious defense.10 And, in his
appeal from the judgment by default, he did not even raise as one of the errors of the trial court
either the impropriety of the order of default or the court’s grave abuse of discretion in denying his
motion to lift that order.
Pressure and large volume of legal work provide no excuse for the respondent’s inability to exercise
due diligence in the performance of his duty to file an answer. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves
his full attention, diligence, skill, and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he
accepts it for a fee or for free.
All told, the respondent committed a breach of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which requires him to serve his clients, the complainants herein, with diligence
and, more specifically, Rule 18.03 thereof which provides: “A lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.”
The respondent’s negligence is not excused by his claim that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was in fact a
“losing cause” for the complainants since the claims therein for damages were based on the final
decision of the Med-Arbiter declaring the complainants’ act of expelling Salvador from the union to
be illegal. This claim is a mere afterthought which hardly persuades us. If indeed the respondent was
so convinced of the futility of any defense therein, he should have seasonably informed the
complainants thereof. Rule 15.05, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly
provides:
A lawyer, when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and
probable results of the client’s case, neither overstating nor understating the prospects of the
case.
Then too, if he were unconvinced of any defense, we are unable to understand why he took all the
trouble of filing a motion to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and lack of jurisdiction and of
questioning the adverse ruling thereon initially with this Court and then with the Court of Appeals,
unless, of course, he meant all of these to simply delay the disposition of the civil case. Finally, the
complainants were not entirely without any valid or justifiable defense. They could prove that the
plaintiff was not entitled to all the damages sought by him or that if he were so, they could ask for a
reduction of the amounts thereof.
We do not therefore hesitate to rule that the respondent is not free from any blame for the sad fate of
the complainants. He is liable for inexcusable negligence.
WHEREFORE, ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS is hereby REPRIMANDED and ADMONISHED to be,

henceforth, more careful in the performance of his duty to his clients.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla (Chairman), Bellosillo, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Respondent reprimanded and admonished.
Notes.—The practice of lawyers of sending messengers to ask for postponement should not be
tolerated. (People vs. Tibayan, 85 SCRA 378 [1978])
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins every lawyer to “conduct himself
with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel.” (Yu vs. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 594 [1994])
66
Adm. Case No. 3294. February 17, 1993.*
MARIO S. MARIVELES, complainant, vs. ATTY. ODILON MALLARI, respondent.
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Code of Professional Responsibility; Failure to file appellant's brief
despite numerous extensions.—The IBP's Committee on Bar Discipline investigated the complaint
and held hearings. On March 3, 1992, it submitted to this Court a report/ resolution finding: "In sum,
what was committed by the respondent is a blatant violation of our Code of Professional
Responsibility. "xxx xxx xxx " 'Rule 12.03—A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to
file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an
explanation for his failure to do so. 'Rule 18.03—A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted
to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.' xxx xxx The Court concurs
with the above observations. The respondent demonstrated not only appalling indifference and lack
of responsibility to the courts and his client but also a shameless disregard for his duties as a lawyer.
He is unfit for membership in this noble profession.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Abandonment and dereliction of duty.
The facts are stated in the opinion 'of the Court.
Rodolfo B. Ta-asan for complainant.
PER CURIAM:
On January 11,1989, Mario S. Mariveles of Davao City filed an administrative complaint against his
former counsel, Attorney Odilon C. Mallari, whose legal services he had engaged in 1984 to handle his
defense in Criminal Case No. 6608 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City where he was charged
with violation of B.P. Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.
After an adverse decision was rendered on December 26, 1986, Mariveles instructed Attorney
Mallari to appeal the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeals, which the respondent did.
However, in the Court of Appeals, despite numerous extensions of time, totalling 245 days, which he
obtained from the Court, Attorney Mallari failed to file the appellant's brief, resulting in the dismissal
of the appeal.
Complainant discovered his lawyer's desertion only when he was subpoenaed by the trial court to
appear before it for the execution of the decision which had become final.
Through new counsel, complainant filed a Petition for Reinstatement of Appeal, Cancellation of Entry
of Judgment and Admission of Appellant's Brief in CA-G.R. CR No. 04482, but it was denied by the
appellate court.
He sought relief in this Court (G.R. No. 85964, "Mario S. Mariveles vs. Court of Appeals, et al.") which,
on March 13, 1989, granted his petition, ordered the Court of Appeals to cancel the entry of judgment
in CA-G.R. CR No. 04482, reinstate the appeal, and admit the appellant's brief filed by his new
counsel. The Court said:
"It is true that the failure of counsel to file brief for the appellant which led to the dismissal of the
appeal does not necessarily warrant the reinstatement thereof. However, where the negligence of
counsel is so great that the rights of the accused are prejudiced and he is prevented from presenting
his defense, especially where the appellant raises issues which place in serious doubt the correctness
of the trial court's judgment of conviction, the aforesaid rule must not be rigidly applied to avoid a
miscarriage of justice. These teachings of jurisprudence are present in the case at bar.
67
"On the first aspect, the failure of petitioner's former counsel to file the brief, for reasons unknown
and without any cause imputable to petitioner, amounted to deliberate abandonment of his client's
interest and justifies reinstatement with consequent due consideration of petitioner's appeal through
a new counsel." (pp. 106-107, Rollo.)
On February 15, 1989, the administrative complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBP's Committee on Bar Discipline investigated the complaint and held hearings. On March 3,
1992, it submitted to this Court a report/resolution finding:
"In sum, what was committed by the respondent is a blatant violation of our Code of Professional
Responsibility.
"xxx xxx xxx
" 'Rule 12.03—A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an
explanation for his failure to do so.
" 'Rule 18.03—A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.'
"Suffice it to state that a lawyer has no business practicing his profession if in the course of that
practice, he will eventually wreck and destroy the future and reputation of his client and thus
disgrace the law profession. The last thing that his peers in the law profession and the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines would do is to disrobe a member of the profession, for he has worked for the
attainment of his career burning the midnight oil throughout school and passing the bar. The
undersigned, however, could not find any mitigating circumstances to recommend a lighter penalty.
Disbarment is the only recourse to remove a rotten apple if only to instill and maintain the respect
and confidence of all and sundry to the noble profession." (pp. 249-250, Rollo.)
The Court concurs with the above observations. The respondent demonstrated not only appalling
indifference and lack of responsibility to the courts and his client but also a shameless disregard for
his duties as a lawyer. He is unfit for membership in this noble profession.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Attorney Odilon C. Mallari guilty of abandonment and
dereliction of duty toward his client and hereby orders him DISBARRED from the legal
profession and to immediately cease and desist from the practice of law. Let the Office of the Court
Administrator and the Executive Judges of the Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh and Twelfth Judicial Regions, be
furnished with copies of this resolution for dissemination to all the courts in those regions.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.), Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon,
Bellosillo, Melo and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., On terminal leave.

Quiason, J., No part.
Respondent disbarred.
Note.—Attorney's failure to exercise due diligence or abandonment of client's cause renders

him unworthy of the trust of his client (Cantiller vs. Potenciano, 180 SCRA 246).
68
Adm. Case No. 249. November 21, 1978.*
TOMAS ALCORIZA, complainant, vs. ATTY. ALBERTO LUMAKANG and ATTY. PABLO SALAZAR,
respondents.
Attorneys; A lawyer should be more careful in attending to his clients’ cases, as in appearing in
court on the day of trial.—WHEREFORE, the instant administrative case is dismissed insofar as
Atty. Pablo Salazar is concerned, and Atty. Alberto Lumakang is hereby reprimanded and
admonished to be more careful in attending to the cases of his clients so as to avoid any similar
incident as that complained of. Let this decision he entered in the respective records of each of the
respondents.
BARREDO, J.:
Administrative complaint for disciplinary action against Attys. Pablo Salazar and Alberto Lumakang.
Respondents were required to answer and after they filed their answers, the case was referred to the
Solicitor General for investigation and recommendation. The Solicitor General has submitted the
following report:
“REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This case was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General, for investigation, report and
recommendation. Since the respondents were residents of Davao City, the case was, therefore,
referred in turn by this Office to the City Attorney of Davao City, for investigation and report. In a
letter dated March 14, 1957, City Attorneys A.L. Noel submitted the report of then special counsel,
now Fiscal Leo D. Medialdea, which he approved and adopted as his own, the original of which,
together with the original records of the case, is missing in our files due to the retirement of the
Solicitor then assigned to the case (Sol. Adolfo Brillantes), hence only a duplicate original of said
letter, together with a true copy of the original records of this case, is hereto attached. For
convenience, the said report is quoted as follows:
‘x x x
‘After going over the records of the case together with the transcript of stenographic notes marked as
Annex ‘A’, it appears that the whole case emanated from the decision of the Municipal Court of Davao
City in Civil Case No. 1845 for sum of money, between one Juana V. Antonio, et al., plaintiffs, vs.
Tomas Alcoriza, defendant, ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P251.50, plus the
legal rate of interest beginning the date of the filing of the complaint until the date of complete
payment. The defendant is also ordered to pay an amount equivalent to 25% of the amount due, in
the concept of attorney’s fees, and the legal cost of the suit. It also appears in the decision that the
trial was conducted in the absence of the defendant and/or his counsels despite the fact that they
have been duly notified.
Atty. Alberto Lumakang, one of the respondents in Administrative Case No. 249, explains his failure
to appear in the trial of Civil Case No. 1845, wherein he appears as one of the attorneys on record as
follows:
‘Early in the morning as usual as I used to, I reported to the office at 7:30 believing that Tomas
Alcoriza would come to the office. I waited for him until 9:00. I know that the hearing of Judge
Hofileña will be 9:00 and that as I said if he will not appear in my office I will not appear for him as I
would be going there without any preparation, so that on that day though I was jittery I did not go to
the court. I stayed in the office waiting for Alcoriza.’ (Transcript of the stenographic notes. T.S.N. p.
28, Annex ‘A’.)
69
‘It appears that the reason of Atty. Lumakang for his failure to appear in representation of his client,
Tomas Alcoriza, in the trial of his case on October 27, 1955, is not wholly laudable. The undersigned
believes that although Atty. Lumakang was not prepared to enter into trial on that day, still he could
do things to protect the interest of his client by appearing for him in court. However, it is not
considered that this inaction of Atty. Lumakang would constitute so serious a ground as to warrant
disciplinary action in view of the lack of interest which his client has shown in the premises. Instead,
Atty. Lumakang for his failure to appear should be reprimanded for his inaction as it would tend to
diminish trust and confidence which the public is supposed to repose in the office of a lawyer. In
order to be free from, any complaint from his client he should have appeared on October 27, 1955
primarily to protect the interest of his client and secondarily to explain to the court the predicament
he was in.
‘Respondent Pablo Salazar should be exonerated of charges preferred against him by Tomas Alcoriza,
because the records of Civil Case No. 1845 show that Atty. Alberto Lumakang took over from him the
active handling of the case since August 20, 1955 until October 27, 1955, date of rendition of
judgment giving rise to this Administrative Case No. 249.’
“The undersigned concur in toto with the foregoing report and recommendation, the same being
justified by the evidence adduced at the hearing.
RECOMENDATION
“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Atty. Alberto
Lumakang be reprimanded as above-indicated and Atty. Pablo Salazar be exonerated of the charges
filed against him.” (Pp. 59-61, Record.)
Required to comment on the foregoing report by Our resolution of September 2, 1964, Atty.
Lumakang explained that:
“x x x. The respondent asked Tomas Alcoriza why he did not go to the office or to the Court to attend
to the trial of his case, Tomas Alcoriza merely answered that he is busy. The respondent told Tomas
Alcoriza that the Judge has become impatient because of the many postponement so that an order
was issued giving you last postponement and that if you will be absent again on the day of the trial
the Court will proceed to try the case ex parte. Tomas Alcoriza assured the respondent that he will go
to the office and he and the respondent will go to Court together on the day of the trial, and in parting
the respondent told Tomas Alcoriza that if you will not come to the office on the date of the trial then
the respondent will not appear in Court as his appearance would only be useless.
“The respondent began to suspect that the defendant Tomas Alcoriza has already lost his interest in
the case aforesaid because of his refusal to attend to the trial every time the case is called for hearing.
This suspicion came true because on the date set for hearing of his case in accordance with the
provision of the order of last postponement, Tomas Alcoriza did not appear at the office of the
respondent neither to the Court, Such being the case, it is the honest belief of the respondent that a
lawyer cannot be more interested in his client’s case than the client himself. So, on the day of the
hearing the respondent did not go to the Court any more because there was nothing or no interest at
all to be protected. The defendant, now complainant, having lost interest or have shown lack of
interest in his case in the Municipal Court, therefore, the respondent has every reason not to go to the
Court because the respondent could not be expected to be more interested in the case than Tomas
Alcoriza himself. The lack of interest or loss of interest of Tomas Alcoriza in his case was shown in
the findings of the City Fiscal of Davao which findings was also adopted by the Solicitor General in his
report and recommendation, quote:
70
‘However, it is not considered that this inaction of Atty. Lumakang would constitute so serious a
ground as to warrant disciplinary action in view of the lack of interest which his client has shown in
the premises.’ (italics supplied).” (Pp. 64-65, Record.)
When the case was set for hearing, Atty. Lumakang waived oral argument, hence the case was
deemed submitted for decision.
We have reviewed the record and We find the report and recommendation of the Solicitor General to
be in order and amply justified by the circumstances on record.
WHEREFORE, the instant administrative case is dismissed insofar as Atty. Pablo Salazar is
concerned, and Atty. Alberto Lumakang is hereby reprimanded and admonished to be more
careful in attending to the cases of his client’s so as to avoid any similar incident as that
complained of. Let this decision be entered in the respective records of each of the respondents.
Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur.
Case dismissed insofar as Atty. Salazar is concerned, and Atty. Lumakang is hereby
reprimanded and admonished.
Notes.—While lawyers may be disbarred or suspended from practice, the disability may not
be permanent. On proper petition a disbarred lawyer may be reinstated. (In re: Adriatico, 7
Phil. 173).
A complaint against a lawyer may be dismissed for lack of interest of the complaining party to
prosecute. (Washington vs. Fernandez, 71 SCRA 229).
The serious consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow only where there is a
clear preponderance of evidence against the respondent. (Agbayani vs. Agtang, 73 SCRA 283).
An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but
also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated and it is not good practice to
permit him afterwards to defend in another case other person against his former client under
the pretext, that the case is dismissed from, and independent of the former case. (Nombrado
vs. Hernandez, 26 SCRA 13.)
The client is bound by his counsel’s conduct, negligence and mistakes in handling the case
during the trial. (Fernandez vs. Tan Tick, 1 SCRA 1138; Gordulan vs. Gordulan, 3 SCRA 205;
Valerio vs. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 7 SCRA 719; Mina vs. Pacson, 8
SCRA 774; Ramos vs. Potenciano, 9 SCRA 589; Cabalag vs. Roxas y Cia, 18 SCRA 1099; Ocampo
vs. Caluag, 19 SCRA 971; Manila. Pest Control, Inc. vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission,
25 SCRA 700; Rivera Vda. de Cruz, 26 SCRA 58.)
It is the duty of attorney to advise client on merit or lack of merit of his case. (Castañeda vs.
Ago, 65 SCRA 505.)
It is the duty of counsel for private respondent interested in sustaining proceedings in court
to appear and defend in behalf of court or judge affected by cause. (Toroma vs. Sayo, 67 SCRA
508.)
71
G.R. No. 75856. June 4, 1990.*
FLORECER GONZALES and LEON CAJES, JR., petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE
OF BRANCH I OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BOHOL, THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE OF
THE 5TH MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT OF TRINIDAD-SAN MIGUEL-BIEN UNIDO, BOHOL and
the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Summary Procedure; Judgment; Valid promulgation of judgment in the presence of the Judge and the
defendant.—The Court similarly finds unmeritorious the contention of petitioners that the
promulgation of the judgment on December 27, 1985 was invalid because they were not assisted by
their counsel. It has been categorically held that the absence of defendant’s counsel during the
reading of the judgment does not affect the validity of the promulgation. There is a valid
promulgation of judgment if the decision is read in the presence of the presiding judge and the
defendant, or the latter’s attorney or representative if the conviction is for a light offense.
Same; Same; Appeal; Review of evidence belongs to the Court of Appeals.—Anent petitioners’ final
contention that they are entitled to acquittal because their co-accused Jesus Acuna was acquitted by
the same evidence against them, the Court can only state that such reasoning is plainly non sequitur.
It does not necessarily follow under our rules of criminal procedure that once a co-accused is
acquitted the other accused should also be exculpated because precisely the purpose of trial is to
determine the liability of each of the accused. More fundamentally, the task of reviewing the
sufficiency of evidence of conviction of the petitioners in cases of this nature properly belongs to the
Court of Appeals in an ordinary appeal, not to this Court in the instant special civil action for
certiorari.
Same; Same; Same; Lawyer’s duty to his client; Due to his own neglect and omission, lawyer
wasted chances to present evidence which caused prejudice to client.—Finally, the Court notes
with disapproval the lackadaisical handling by Atty. Lord Marapao of his clients’ defense in the case
at bar. He was lukewarm and less than vigilant in the performance of his duties as defense counsel.
He took too much for granted, in the process forfeiting his clients’ opportunities to present evidence
in their own behalf. Having wasted several chances to present evidence for the defense due to his
own neglect and omission, he vainly tried to shift to the trial court the blame for the prejudice caused
thereby to his clients. For this deplorable conduct and attitude towards his clients’ welfare and the
dignity of the court, Atty. Lord Marapao is hereby ADMONISHED and WARNED that a repetition of
the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City, Bohol,
Br. I.
Lord M. Marapao for petitioners.
FERNAN, C.J.:
Petitioners Florecer Gonzales and Leon Cajes, Jr. seek: [1] to annul the decision dated 16 May 1986 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch I, of Tagbilaran City, Bohol, affirming en toto the judgment of
the 5th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Trinidad-San Miguel-Bien Unido, Bohol, in Criminal
Case No. 1090 which convicted them of the crime of Less Serious Physical Injuries on the sole basis of
the prosecution’s evidence in view of their failure to submit counter-affidavits as required under the
Rule on Summary Procedure, and [2] to remand the case to the trial court for reception of evidence
for the defense and re-promulgation of judgment. Alternatively, petitioners pray for their acquittal.
72
It appears that on June 5, 1985, petitioners Gonzales and Cajes, together with one Jesus Acuna, were
charged with the crime of less serious physical injuries by Juanito A. Yana before the MCTC of
Trinidad, Bohol.1 On July 15, 1985, they were served with copies of the complaint as well as the
order of respondent Presiding Judge Abundio T. Payot, notifying them that the case falls and would
be tried under the Rule on Summary Procedure.2 They were directed to appear and submit their
counter-affidavits and those of their witnesses on or before July 24, 1985, in accordance with Section
10 of said Rule.3 Petitioners failed to comply with the directive.
On July 24, 1985, trial proceeded for the reception of the prosecution’s evidence. Counsel for
accused-petitioners participated by cross-examining the prosecution witnesses.4 On November 12,
1985, the prosecution rested its case and moved that the case be deemed submitted for decision
without evidence for the defense, as the latter failed to comply with paragraph 2 of Section 14 of the
Rule on Summary Procedure which requires the submission of the affidavits of witnesses before they
may be allowed to testify at the hearing.
Counsel for accused-petitioners opposed the motion and asked that they be allowed to present their
evidence. The trial court acceded by setting the case for the reception of evidence for the defense on
November 18, 1985. On said date, however, defense counsel Atty. Lord Marapao did not appear,
allegedly because his father died four (4) days earlier. Petitioner likewise failed to submit their
affidavits or those of their witness, prompting the prosecution to reiterate its motion to consider the
case submitted for resolution without evidence for the defense. This motion was granted on
November 22, 1985.
The promulgation of the decision was scheduled by the trial court on December 27, 1985 and notice
to the parties was sent by registered mail. Notice to the defense counsel was mailed as early as
December 13, 1985.5 On December 27, 1985, only accused-petitioner Gonzales and his co-accused
Acuna were present. Co-accused-petitioner Cajes and defense counsel Atty. Marapao were absent.
The latter allegedly did not receive notice of the promulgation date.
To safeguard the rights of the accused, the trial court appointed Atty. Severino Estonia as counsel for
the defense. He was, however, unable to enter his appearance due to the objection of accused-
petitioner Gonzales. Nevertheless, the MCTC promulgated its decision as scheduled, acquitting Jesus
Acuna, but convicting accused-petitioners Gonzales and Cajes, Jr., who were sentenced to suffer two
(2) months and one (1) day imprisonment, to pay jointly the offended party Juanito Yana the amount
of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) as damages and to pay proportionately the cost of the
proceedings.6 On the same day, accused-petitioner Gonzales filed a notice of appeal which was
favorably acted upon by the court.
On the following day, the defense counsel filed an omnibus motion asking for, among others, the
reopening of the case to allow the accused to present evidence.7 The motion was denied by the
respondent judge, it being one of the prohibited motions under Section 15(c) of the Rule on Summary
Procedure.
On January 3, 1986, the trial court read again the decision in the presence of accused-petitioner Cajes
who appeared before the court. The trial court denied the subsequent motion of the defense counsel
to re-promulgate the judgment.
On May 16, 1985, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment on accused-petitioner Gonzales’
appeal, affirming the decision of the trial court en toto. Accused-petitioner Gonzales’ motion for
reconsideration was denied; hence, this petition for certiorari, where Florecer Gonzales is joined by
Leon Cajes, Jr. Petitioner contends that they were denied the opportunity to present their evidence;
that the promulgation of judgment against them was null and void because the same was made in the
absence of their counsel and co-defendant Leon Cajes; and that they are entitled to acquittal since
their co-defendant Jesus Acuna was acquitted.8
73
Considering the foregoing factual and procedural antecedents, the Court does not find any
jurisdictional error or abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent courts. On the contrary, they
acted and proceeded in accordance with the rules of procedure, at times even exercising liberality to
accommodate petitioners. Counsel for petitioners should be the last to claim denial of opportunity to
present evidence after squandering several opportunities to do so.
In the first place, petitioners through their counsel failed to comply with the July 10, 1985 order of
the trial court to submit their counter-affidavits and those of their witnesses, apparently failing to
appreciate the implication of such failure despite notice that the case would be tried under the Rule
on Summary Procedure, Section 14 of which expressly prohibits any witness from testifying during
trial without previously submitting his affidavit. They continued to fail to submit the required
affidavits even as their counsel actively cross-examined the witnesses of the prosecution from the
initial hearing on July 24, 1985 until the prosecution rested its case on November 16, 1985, or for a
period close to five (5) months.
To the credit of the trial court, it gave the defense another chance to present evidence when it set the
reception of evidence for the defense on November 18, 1985 even if accused-petitioners failed to
submit their affidavits as ordered earlier. On the scheduled date, however, counsel for the defense at
whose instance the hearing was set, did not even appear or inform the court of his inability to do so
as scheduled. While defense counsel may have had a valid reason to ask for a resetting of the hearing,
the court was never formally notified thereof, and it would be too much to charge the court of judicial
notice of counsel’s personal circumstance.
The case having dragged on for several months, the trial court cannot be faulted in considering the
case submitted for decision on November 22, 1985, because Section 17 of the Rule requires that
hearing in summary cases, when still ordered, must be finished on the same date set therefor.
Furthermore, petitioners had another chance to present their arguments when the trial court
required the parties to submit their respective memoranda; but again the defense failed to comply.
It would not be amiss to say that the chronicled reluctance of petitioners’ counsel to present simple
affidavits and other defensive evidence betrays absence of real and substantial defense if not a
deliberate attempt to prolong and delay the otherwise expeditious and summary procedure
mandated by the Rule in simple cases of this nature.
The Court similarly finds unmeritorious the contention of petitioners that the promulgation of the
judgment on December 27, 1985 was invalid because they were not assisted by their counsel. It has
been categorically held that the absence of defendant’s counsel during the reading of the judgment
does not affect the validity of the promulgation.9 There is a valid promulgation of judgment if the
decision is read in the presence of the presiding judge and the defendant, or the latter’s attorney or
representative if the conviction is for a light offense.10
In the instant case, two of the defendants were present during the December 27, 1985 promulgation
of judgment. The trial court read again the decision on January 3, 1986 to accused-petitioner Leon
Cajes, Jr. when the latter appeared before the court. While the presence of counsel for the accused is
desirable, the proceedings need not be delayed to suit the whim of counsel who did not show up
despite due notice. Besides, the trial court took steps to secure the rights of the accused when it
provided petitioners with a counsel whose services they refused.
As far as petitioner Gonzales is concerned, he has effectively waived any objection to the validity of
the promulgation when he appealed the decision to the regional trial court. With regard to Leon
Cajes, the record shows that the court read the judgment to him on January 3, 1986 which is
sufficient compliance with the rules. At any rate, as correctly noted by the Solicitor General, there is
74
no point in remanding the case to the trial court just for the purpose of reading again the judgment
which is already known to the petitioners.
Anent petitioners’ final contention that they are entitled to acquittal because their co-accused Jesus
Acuna was acquitted by the same evidence against them, the Court can only state that such reasoning
is plainly non sequitur. It does not necessarily follow under our rules of criminal procedure that once
a co-accused is acquitted the other accused should also be exculpated because precisely the purpose
of trial is to determine the liability of each of the accused. More fundamentally, the task of reviewing
the sufficiency of evidence of conviction of the petitioners in cases of this nature properly belongs to
the Court of Appeals in an ordinary appeal, not to this Court in the instant special civil action for
certiorari.
Finally, the Court notes with disapproval the lackadaisical handling by Atty. Lord Marapao of his
clients’ defense in the case at bar. He was lukewarm and less than vigilant in the performance of his
duties as defense counsel. He took too much for granted, in the process forfeiting his clients’
opportunities to present evidence in their own behalf. Having wasted several chances to present
evidence for the defense due to his own neglect and omission, he vainly tried to shift to the trial court
the blame for the prejudice caused thereby to his clients. For this deplorable conduct and attitude
towards his clients’ welfare and the dignity of the court, Atty. Lord Marapao is hereby ADMONISHED
and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
WHEREFORE, finding the questioned decision to be in accordance with law, the Rules and
jurisprudence, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr. and Bidin, JJ., concur.
Feliciano and Cortés, JJ., on leave.
Petition dismissed.
Note.—Rationale for resolution of Supreme Court directing the Municipal Trial Court in
Olongapo City that whenever a criminal case covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure is
initiated by complaint, to refer the same to City Fiscal for the filing of the corresponding
information. Uniform procedure to be followed in all courts of the same level, beneficial.
(Salcedo vs. Bans, 136 SCRA 291.)
75
A.M. No. 405 May 31, 1971
VALENTIN AVELINO, petitioner, vs.
ATTY. PEDRO K. PALANA, respondent.
DIZON, J.:
In a verified complaint filed by Valentin Avelino against Atty. Pedro K. Palaña the latter was charged
with malpractice in connection with his professional conduct as the complainant's counsel in Civil
Case No. 2250 of the Court of First Instance of Leyte such malpractice having given rise to the
rendition of judgment against said complainant and his wife ordering them:
... to restore the ownership and possession of the property described under paragraph 2 of the
complaint to the plaintiffs herein; to demolish or transfer the house they built in the land within a
period of three months counted from the receipt of this decision at the expiration of which, if they
shall fail to remove the house from the land in question, the plaintiffs shall be authorized to remove it
at the expense of the defendants; to pay the plaintiffs in the amount of (P300.00) three hundred
pesos for attorneys' fees; for damages, to pay the plaintiffs the amount of P1,800.00 which is the
estimated value of the produce of the land in question from 1951 up to the present year which the
plaintiffs failed to take advantage of due to their being dispossessed of the aforementioned land; and,
to pay the costs there being no adequate evidence to support the claim for moral damages, no such
damages are adjudged.
Answering the complaint, the respondent admitted some of the allegations thereof and denied the
others, and, by way of affirmative defenses, alleged the following:
xxx xxx xxx
2. That the respondent was admitted a member of the Philippine Bar in 1939 which is now a fifth of a
century since his taking his oath as attorney and counselor-at-law; was appointed to the Judiciary as
Justice of the Peace Court of Palo, Province of Leyte, in 1949, remaining as such until 1954 — the date
when he resigned to continue his practice of law; in 1957, he (respondent) was again appointed as
Justice of the Peace Court, this time in his home town at Tolosa, Leyte; remaining as such until he
resigned in 1958 to accept the position as Assistant Administrative Officer in the Office of the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, Congress of the Philippines. During all the years that he was
actively practicing his noble profession, he has never been nor will he in the future, be a renegade to
this noble profession. In his actuations as a Justice of the Peace Courts: first at Palo, Leyte then at
Tolosa, Leyte, his records are his eloquent proof of his being a missionary of justice;
3. That it is true that the respondent was engaged by the petitioner to be their counsel in the case
entitled "FERMIN NATIVIDAD, ET AL., versus VALENTIN AVELINO, ET AL.," docketed as Civil Case
No. 2250 of the Court of First Instance of Leyte where the petitioner is one of the defendants;
4. That the respondent verbally advised the petitioner of the hearing of the aforestated case on
November 15, 1957, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning at least three days before the scheduled hearing
when the petitioners called on the respondent at the latter's residence which the former were used
to do as admitted by him in paragraph 4 of the complaint as that is their understanding to enable
them to confer;
5. That when the scheduled hearing of the aforecited case on November 15, 1957, at 8:30 o'clock in
the morning arrived, the respondent failed to be present in court or appear thereat because: "at
about 3:00 o'clock in the morning of that day, I had a severe stomach ache followed by constant
moving of bowel and vomiting. As a consequence I became very weak and I felt that I was about to
76
die," as shown by a medical certificate which is attached to the "motion for new trial" filed by the
respondent, hereto attached as an integral part hereof and marked as Annex "A";
6. That when the respondent received a copy of the decision in the Court of First Instance of Leyte
entitled "Fermin Natividad, et al., versus Valentin Avelino, et al., he filed a "motion for new trial"
already marked as Annex "A" hereof, wherein the respondent explained his failure to appear on the
date of the hearing of said case on November 15, 1957, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning;
7. That on January 18, 1958, the herein respondent filed an "amended motion for new trial" where, in
addition to the reasons recited by him in his motion for new trial he stated that:
... the evidence of the defendants in this case at bar consisting of their adverse, continuous and
peaceful possession of the property in question for almost twenty years, payment of land taxes, fraud
committed in the part of the plaintiffs herein and estoppel in the part of the plaintiffs are very strong;
and that if the defendants are given their day in court to present their evidence, the findings and
conclusions of the Honorable Court might be made in favor of the herein defendants and adverse to
the plaintiffs;
or another way of alleging that the defendants have a good and valid defense; said "amended motion
for new trial is hereto attached as Annex "B" and made an integral part hereof;
8. That the failure of the defendants to appear in court when their case was set for hearing on
November 15, 1957, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning despite the verbal notice to them by the herein
respondent is not until the present known to herein respondent;
9. That when the herein respondent was appointed Administrative Officer in the Office of the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, Congress of the Philippines, sometime in March 1958, he already
advised the petitioner to look for another lawyer to represent him.
The issues having been thus joined, the case was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for
investigation report and recommendation.
Upon the evidence presented by the parties the Solicitor General submitted his report, the portion of
which under the title "ANALYSIS" reads as follows:
From the foregoing facts, this Office finds the respondent guilty of negligence on the following
counts:
1. Atty. Palaña did not duly inform his client of the date of the trial scheduled for November 15, 1957
when the evidence shows that he received notice of such hearing on October 11, 1957.
2. The filing of the motion for new trial on January 7, 1958 was made out of time, exactly 40 days
after the decision was received on November 28, 1957. The delay in the filing of the said motion
remains unexplained in the record.
3. Atty. Palaña's 2nd motion for new trial, after the Court had afforded him all the opportunity to
plead his motion successfully, was denied by the lower court on the ground that he failed to comply
with an order of the court dated February 1, 1958. While the said motion was duly filed on time, a
previous order of the Court directed the movant (Atty. Palaña to serve a copy of his amended motion
to the other party through counsel, but compliance therewith does not appear on the said motion)
(Exh. 4).
The testimony of petitioner is not clear as to whether respondent was responsible in hiring Atty.
Aristedes de la Paz to take over the case after the decision had become final. However, we allow such
77
a doubt to be resolved in favor of the respondent's claim that he suggested to his client that he
contract Atty. De la Paz.
This Office believes that although petitioner had verified the petition for relief from judgment dated
March 18, 1958 filed by Atty. De la Paz, petitioner herein did not exactly comprehend, due to his
patent illiteracy, what he was signing in alleging excusable negligence on the part of Atty. Palaña for
failing to notify him and his co-respondents in Civil Case No. 2250 of the date of the hearing.
Furthermore, we are fully aware of the practice that practicing attorneys usually prepare such
petitions for their clients to sign.
This Office however believes that the non-appearance of Atty. Palaña at the bearing of November 15,
1957 has been satisfactorily explained by the verified medical certificate. But we do not share the
same view insofar as his negligence in failing to notify his clients of the date of hearing is concerned."
On the basis of the findings contained in the above-quoted portion of his report, the Solicitor General
found the respondent "guilty of negligence in the performance of his duties as a member of the Bar"
and consequently recommended "that he be suspended from the practice of law for at least six
months."
Thereafter following the procedure provided by the Rules of Court in cases of the same nature, the
Office of the Solicitor General filed with this Court the corresponding complaint based on the findings
of fact contained in his report. In respondent's answer thereto he reproduced the defenses set forth
in his answer to the verified complaint, filed by the complainant.
Thereafter, We set the case for hearing but, instead of arguing the case orally, the respondent
submitted a written memorandum while the Office of the Solicitor General did not.
Upon consideration of the whole record, We find no sufficient justification to reverse the finding
made by the Office of the Solicitor General to the effect that respondent "did not duly inform his
client of the date of the trial scheduled for November 15, 1957" in spite of the fact that, according to
the evidence, he had received notice of such hearing four days before.
As regards respondent's failure to appear in court on the day set for the trial, We are inclined to
accept his claim that it was due to the fact that early in the morning of that date he had "a severe
stomach ache, followed by constant moving of bowel and vomiting and that as a consequence he
became very weak." But while this might be, to a certain extent, a good excuse for his non-
appearance in court, it is obviously not sufficient to explain his failure to notify his clients in due time
of the date of the trial. Had he done so, his clients would probably have tried to contact him in due
time, and upon discovering that he was sick they would have either gone to court to ask for the
postponement of the trial, or they would have looked for another lawyer to represent them in court.
Then again We find no sufficient exculpatory evidence for respondent filing a motion for new trial
"out of time," exactly forty days after notice of the decision rendered by the court. Moreover,
although he was given an opportunity to file a second motion for new trial, it appears that the same
was denied by the court "on the ground that he had failed to comply with its previous order dated
February 1, 1958. In this connection, We reproduce hereunder the pertinent portion of the report
submitted by the Solicitor General:
xxx xxx xxx
The said decision was received by Atty. Palaña on November 28, 1957. This is admitted by him in his
second motion for new trial (Exh. 1) Atty. Palaña filed his motion for new trial dated December 26,
1957 on January 7, 1958, 40 days after receipt of judgment (Exh. C). The motion for new trial was
opposed by the attorney for the plaintiffs on the grounds: (1) that the motion for new trial is not the
78
proper remedy; (2) that the motion was not accompanied by affidavits or affidavits of merits (Exh.
E). An amended motion for new trial was subsequently filed dated January 18, 1958, attaching
thereto an affidavit executed by Atty. Palaña (Exh. F). On the same date, January 18, 1958, the Court
of First Instance of Tacloban City ordered the movant "to serve a copy of his amended motion, if he so
desires to amend his motion, to the other party through counsel, Atty. Fernando Suddrio not later
than the 25th of January so that the latter may file a reply if he so desires." On February 1, 1958,
another order was issued by the Court giving Atty. Palaña one week's time within which to present
another amended motion for new trial (Exh. H). A subsequent amended motion for new trial was
filed on February 8, 1958 (Exh. H). The said motion for new trial was however denied on the same
date for "not having complied with the order of this court dated February 1, 1938" (Exh. J).
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the respondent, as hereby found guilty as charged in the report
and complaint filed by the Solicitor General, and considering all the circumstances of the case,
he is hereby suspended from the practice of law for a period of three months from notice
hereof.
Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ.,
concur.
Castro, Barredo, JJ., took no part.
79
G.R. No. 90083. October 4, 1990.*
KHALYXTO PEREZ MAGLASANG, accused-petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Presiding
Judge ERNESTO B. TEMPLADO (San Carlos City Court), Negros Occidental, respondents.
Lawyers; Legal Ethics; A lawyer's duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to
that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always
be scrupulously observant of law and ethics.—It is clear that the case was lost not by the alleged
injustices Atty. Castellano irresponsibly ascribed to the members of the Court's Second Division, but
simply because of his inexcusable negligence and incompetence. Atty. Castellano, however, seeks to
pass on the blame for his deficiencies to the Court, in the hope of salvaging his reputation before his
client. Unfortunately, the means by which Atty. Castellano hoped to pass the buck so to speak, are
grossly improper. As an officer of the Court, he should have known better than to smear the honor
and integrity of the Court just to keep the confidence of his client. Time and again we have
emphasized that a "lawyer's duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to that end,
his client's success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously
observant of law and ethics." Thus, "while a lawyer must advocate his client's cause in utmost
earnest and with the maximum skill he can marshal, he is not at liberty to resort to arrogance,
intimidation, and innuendo."
Same; Same; Same; Courts; Contempt of Court; Criticisms towards the Court should be bona fide,
and should not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.—To be sure, the Court does not
pretend to be immune from criticisms. After all, it is through the criticism of its actions that the Court,
composed of fallible mortals, hopes to correct whatever mistake it may have unwittingly committed.
But then again, "[i]t is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall
not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the
one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and
unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts."
Same; Same; Same; Same; Supreme Court; The Supreme Court is supreme—no other department or
agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them "unjust", not even the President of the
Philippines.—We further note that in filing the "complaint" against the justices of the Court's Second
Division, even the most basic tenet of our government system—the separation of powers between
the judiciary, the executive, and the legislative branches—has been lost on Atty. Castellano. We
therefore take this occasion to once again remind all and sundry that "the Supreme Court is
supreme—the third great department of government entrusted exclusively with the judicial power
to adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, public and private. No other department or agency
may pass upon its judgments or declare them 'unjust.'" Consequently, and owing to the foregoing, not
even the President of the Philippines as Chief Executive may pass judgment on any of the Court's
acts.
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the San Carlos City Court. Templado, J.
Marceliano L. Castellano for petitioner.

RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On June 22,1989, a petition for certiorari1 entitled "Khalyxto Perez Maglasang vs. People of the
Philippines, Presiding Judge, Ernesto B. Templado (San Carlos City Court) Negros Occidental," was
filed by registered mail with the Court. Due to noncompliance with the requirements of Circular No.
1-88 of the Court, specifically the non-payment of P316.50 for the legal fees and the non-attachment
80
of the duplicate originals or duly certified true copies of the questioned decision and orders of the
respondent judge denying the motion for reconsideration, the Court dismissed the petition on July
26,1989.2
On September 9, 1989, Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano, as counsel of the petitioner, moved for a
reconsideration of the resolution dismissing the petition.3 This time, the amount of P316.50 was
remitted and the Court was furnished with a duplicate copy of the respondent judge's decision, and
also the IBP O.R. No. and the date of the payment of his membership dues. The motion for
reconsideration did not contain the duplicate original or certified true copies of the assailed orders.
Thus, in a Resolution dated October 18,1989, the motion for reconsideration was denied "with
FINALITY."4
Three months later, or on January 22,1990 to be exact, the Court received from Atty. Castellano a
copy of a complaint dated December 19,1989, filed with the Office of the President of the Philippines
whereby Khalyxto Perez Maglasang, through his lawyer, Atty. Castellano, as complainant, accused all
the five Justices of the Court's Second Division with "biases and/or ignorance of the law or knowingly
rendering unjust judgments or resolution."5 The complaint was signed by Atty. Castellano "for the
complainant" with the conformity of one Calixto B. Maglasang, allegedly the father of accused-
complainant Khalyxto.6 By reason of the strong and intemperate language of the complaint and its
improper filing with the Office of the President, which, as he should know as a lawyer, has no
jurisdiction to discipline, much more, remove, Justices of the Supreme Court, on February 7, 1990,
Atty. Castellano was required to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt or
administratively dealt with for improper conduct.7 On March 21, 1990, Atty. Castellano filed by
registered mail his "Opposition To Cite For Contempt Or Administratively Dealt With For An
Improper Conduct (sic)."8
In his "Opposition", Atty. Castellano claimed that the complaint "was a constructive criticism
intended to correct in good faith the erroneous and very strict practices of the Justices concerned, as
Respondents (sic)."9 Atty. Castellano farther disputed the authority and jurisdiction of the Court in
issuing the Resolution requiring him to show cause inasmuch as "they are Respondents in this
particular case and no longer as Justices and as such they have no more jurisdiction to give such
order."10 Thus, according to him, "the most they (Justices) can do by the mandate of the law and
procedure (sic) is to answer the complaint satisfactorily so that they will not be punished in
accordance with the law just like a common tao."11
Notwithstanding his claim that the complaint was a "constructive criticism," the Court finds the
various statements made by Atty. Castellano in the complaint he lodged with the Office of the
President of the Philippines and in his "Opposition" filed with the Court portions of which read as
follows:
VI
That with all these injustices of the 2nd Division, as assigned to that most Honorable Supreme Court,
the complainant was legally constrained to file this Administrative Complaint to our Motherly
President who is firm and determined to phase-out all the scalawags (Marcos Appointees and
Loyalists) still in your administration without bloodshed but by honest and just investigations, which
the accusedcomplainant concurs to such procedure and principle, or otherwise, he could have by
now a rebel with the undersigned with a cause for being maliciously deprived or unjustly denied of
Equal Justice to be heard by our Justices designated to the Highest and most Honorable Court of the
Land (Supreme Court);12 (Emphasis ours.)
VII
81
That the Honorable Supreme Court as a Court has no fault at all for being Constitutionally created,
but the Justices assigned therein are fallables (sic), being bias (sic), playing ignorance of the law and
knowingly rendering unjust Resolutions the reason observed by the undersigned and believed by
him in good faith, is that they are may be Marcos-appointees, whose common intention is to sabotage
the Aquino Administration and to rob from innocent Filipino people the genuine Justice and
Democracy, so that they will be left in confusion and turmoil to their advantage and to the prejudice
of our beloved President's honest, firm and determined Decision to bring back the real Justice in all
our Courts, for the happiness, contentment and progress of your people and the only country which
God has given us—PHILIPPINES.13 (Emphasis ours.)
VIII
That all respondents know the law and the pure and simple meaning of Justice, yet they refused to
grant to the poor and innocent accused-complainant, so to save their brethren in rank and office
(Judiciary) Judge Ernesto B. Templado, x x x.14
IX
xxx If such circulars were not known to the undersigned, it's the fault of the Justices of the Honorable
Supreme Court, the dismissal of the petition was based more of money reasons. x x x This is so for
said Equal Justice is our very Breath of Life to every Filipino, who is brave to face the malicious acts
of the Justices of the Second Division, Supreme Court. By reason of fear for the truth Respondents
ignore the equal right of the poor and innocent-accused (complainant) to be heard against the rich
and high-ranking person in our Judiciary to be heard in equal justice in our Honorable Court, for the
respondents is too expensive and can't be reached by an ordinary man for the Justices therein are
inconsiderate, extremely strict and meticulous to the common tao and hereby grossly violate their
Oath of Office and our Constitution "to give all possible help and means to give equal Justice to any
man, regardless of ranks and status in life."15 (Emphasis ours.)
xxx xxx xxx
5. That the undersigned had instantly without delay filed a Motion for Reconsideration to the
Resolution which carries with it a final denial of his appeal by complying (sic) all the requirements
needed for a valid appeal yet the respondents denied just the same which legally hurt the
undersigned in the name of Justice, for the RespondentsJustices, were so strict or inhumane and so
inconsiderate that there despensation (sic) of genuine justice was too far and beyond the reach of the
Accused-Appellant, as a common tao, as proved by records of both cases mentioned above.16
xxx xxx xxx
D. That by nature a contempt order is a one sided weapon commonly abused by Judges and Justices,
against practicing lawyers, party-litigants and all Filipino people in general for no Judges or Justices
since the beginning of our Court Records were cited for contempt by any presiding Judge. That this
weapon if maliciously applied is a cruel means to silence a righteous and innocent complainant and
to favor any person with close relation.17
scurrilous and contumacious. His allegations that the Court in dismissing his petition did so "to save
their brethren in rank and office (Judiciary) Judge Ernesto B. Templado," and that the dismissal was
"based more for (sic) money reasons;" and his insinuation that the Court maintains a double
standard in dispensing justice—one set for the rich and another for the poor—went beyond the
bounds of "constructive criticism." They are not relevant to the cause of his client. On the contrary,
they cast aspersion on the Court's integrity as a neutral and final arbiter of all justiciable
controversies brought before it. Atty. Castellano should know that the Court in resolving complaints
yields only to the records before it and not to any extraneous influence as he disparagingly intimates.
82
It bears stress that the petition was dismissed initially by the Court for the counsel's failure to fully
comply with the requirements laid down in Circular No. 1-88, a circular on expeditious disposition of
cases, adopted by the Court on November 8,1988, but effective January 1, 1989, after due publication.
It is true that Atty. Castellano later filed on behalf of his client a motion for reconsideration and
remitted the necessary legal fees,18 furnished the Court with a duplicate original copy of the assailed
trial court's decision,19 and indicated his IBP O.R. No. and the date he paid his dues.20 But he still fell
short in complying fully with the requirements of Circular No. 1-88. He failed to furnish the Court
with duplicate original or duty certified true copies of the other questioned orders issued by the
respondent trial court judge. At any rate, the explanation given by Atty. Castellano did not render his
earlier negligence excusable. Thus, as indicated in our Resolution dated October 18, 1989 which
denied with finality his motion for reconsideration, "no valid or compelling reason (having been)
adduced to warrant the reconsideration sought." Precisely, under paragraph 5 of Circular No. 1-88 it
is provided that "(S)ubsequent compliance with the above requirements will not warrant
reconsideration of the order of dismissal unless it be shown that such noncompliance was due to
compelling reasons."
It is clear that the case was lost not by the alleged injustices Atty. Castellano irresponsibly ascribed to
the members of the Court's Second Division, but simply because of his inexcusable negligence and
incompetence. Atty. Castellano, however, seeks to pass on the blame for his deficiencies to the Court,
in the hope of salvaging his reputation before his client. Unfortunately, the means by which Atty.
Castellano hoped to pass the buck so to speak, are grossly improper. As an officer of the Court, he
should have known better than to smear the honor and integrity of the Court just to keep the
confidence of his client. Time and again we have emphasized that a "lawyer's duty is not to his client
but to the administration of justice; to that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate; and his
conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics."21 Thus, "while a
lawyer must advocate his client's cause in utmost earnest and with the maximum skill he can
marshal, he is not at liberty to resort to arrogance, intimidation, and innuendo."22
To be sure, the Court does not pretend to be immune from criticisms. After all, it is through the
criticism of its actions that the Court, composed of fallible mortals, hopes to correct whatever
mistake it may have unwittingly committed. But then again, "[i]t is the cardinal condition of all such
criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide
chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges
thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to
courts."23 In this regard, it is precisely provided under Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility that:
CANON 11—A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS
AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
xxx xxx xxx
RULE 11.03—A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the courts.
RULE 11.04—A lawyer should not attribute to a judge motives not supported by the record or
have materiality to the case.
xxx xxx xxx
We further note that in filing the "complaint" against the justices of the Court's Second Division, even
the most basic tenet of our government system—the separation of powers between the judiciary, the
executive, and the legislative branches—has been lost on Atty. Castellano. We therefore take this
83
occasion to once again remind all and sundry that "the Supreme Court is supreme—the third great
department of government entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality
all justiciable disputes, public and private. No other department or agency may pass upon its
judgments or declare them 'unjust.' "24 Consequently, and owing to the foregoing, not even the
President of the Philippines as Chief Executive may pass judgment on any of the Court's acts.
Finally, Atty. Castellano's assertion that the complaint "was a constructive criticism intended to
correct in good faith the erroneous and very strict practices of the Justices, concerned as
Respondents (sic)" is but a last minute effort to sanitize his clearly unfounded and irresponsible
accusation. The arrogance displayed by counsel in insisting that the Court has no jurisdiction to
question his act of having complained before the Office of the President, and in claiming that a
contempt order is used as a weapon by judges and justices against practicing lawyers, however,
reveals all too plainly that he was not honestly motivated in his criticism. Rather, Atty. Castellano's
complaint is a vilification of the honor and integrity of the Justices of the Second Division of the Court
and an impeachment of their capacity to render justice according to law.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano is found guilty of CONTEMPT OF COURT and

IMPROPER CONDUCT as a member of the Bar and an officer of the Court, and is hereby
ordered to PAY within fifteen (15) days from and after the finality of this Resolution a fine of
One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos, or SUFFER ten (10) days imprisonment in the municipal jail
of Calatrava, Negros Occidental in case he fails to pay the fine seasonably, and SUSPENDED
from the practice of law throughout the Philippines for six (6) months as soon as this
Resolution becomes final, with a WARNING that a repetition of any misconduct on his part will
be dealt with more severely. Let notice of this Resolution be entered in Atty. Castellano's record,
and be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Court of Appeals, and the Executive Judges
of the Regional Trial Courts and other Courts of the country, for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez Jr., Cruz, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortés, Griño-
Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan (C.J.), Paras and Feliciano, JJ., On leave.
Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano is fined One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) and suspended from
the practice of law for a period of six (6) months as soon as this resolution becomes final.
Note.—The first duty of a lawyer is not to his client but to the administration of justice. To that
end, his client's success is wholly subordinate. (Sangalang vs. Gaston, 177 SCRA 87.)
84
A.C. No. 3523. January 17, 2005.*
RASMUS G. ANDERSON, JR., petitioner, vs. ATTY. REY-NALDO A. CARDEÑO, respondent.
Administrative Law; Attorneys; By accepting the case, respondent should have known the
attendant responsibilities that came with the lawyer-client relationship.—It is undisputed that
Atty. Cardeño was engaged by the complainant as counsel. By accepting the case, respondent should
have known the attendant responsibilities that came with the lawyer-client relationship.
Same; Same; A lawyer has the duty to prepare for trial with diligence and deliberate speed and
he should not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, for his negligence shall render him
liable.—The Court therein declared that a lawyer’s failure to do so violates Canon 18 of the Code. It
added that the said rule is clear in its mandate that a lawyer should not undertake a legal service that
he is not qualified to render, nor should a lawyer handle any legal matter without adequate
preparation. A lawyer has the duty to prepare for trial with diligence and deliberate speed and he
should not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, for his negligence shall render him liable.
Same; Same; The practice of law is a special privilege bestowed only upon those who are
competent intellectually, academically and morally.—From the records it is evident that Atty.
Cardeño has fallen short of the professional standards this Court has set for members of the Bar. A
lawyer should never neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, otherwise his negligence in fulfilling his
duty subjects him to disciplinary action. Respondent is reminded that the practice of law is a special
privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually, academically and morally. This
Court has been exacting in its expectations for the members of the Bar always to uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust
and confidence of the public.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Malpractice and Neglect of Duty.
Benjamin E. Ilagan for complainant.
RESOLUTION
AZCUNA, J.:
For resolution is an administrative case against Atty. Reynaldo A. Cardeño for malpractice and
neglect of duty, stemming from his alleged neglect or deliberate mishandling of a case involving
herein petitioner, resulting to the latter’s prejudice.
After receipt of the complaint and the corresponding comment thereto, this Court, on October 17,
1990, referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
On April 6, 1998, this Court received a Manifestation from the IBP Investigating Commissioner
Victoria Gonzales de los Reyes stating that when the case was referred to the IBP, the same was
initially handled by Commissioner George Briones. In view of the fact that the case had only been
recently re-assigned to her, she needed time within which to investigate as well as prepare the
required report and recommendation.
Thereafter, on March 13, 2001, Commissioner de los Reyes submitted her Report and
Recommendation to the IBP Board of Governors. In turn, the IBP Board of Governors passed
Resolution No. XIV-2001-187, dated April 29, 2001, remanding the Report and Recommendation to
85
the Investigating Commissioner, requiring the latter “to make the recommendation clearer and
review the report.”
Upon review of the records, the Investigating Commissioner affirmed her findings and maintained
her recommendation. In turn, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the said report, with a
modification of the recommended penalty of three months suspension, to a penalty of six months
suspension, from the practice of law.
The records show the following antecedent facts:
Complainant Rasmus G. Anderson, Jr., an American citizen from Kodiak, Alaska, USA, filed an action
before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), to recover title and possession of a parcel of
land against the spouses Juanito Maybituin and Rosario Cerrado, and Fernando Ramos. The case was
dismissed by the trial court, which declared the defendants the true and lawful owners of their
respective portions of the land in question.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA), 3rd Civil Cases Division, in AC-G.R. CV No. 68459, modified1 the
decision of the trial court, stating:
“WHEREFORE, the decision is hereby modified by ruling that the respective Torrens Titles in the
names of the defendants spouses Maybituin and Fernando Ramos are maintained at this stage but
without prejudice on the part of the plaintiff to institute an action for reconveyance thereof after
determining his rightful share from the estate of his late father.
Costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.”2
The CA judgment was not appealed and, thereafter, it was duly entered.
On February 16, 1985, Anderson, Jr., through his counsel Atty. Cesar S. de Guzman, filed an Amended
Complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 67, docketed as Civil
Case No. 0110-B, entitled “Rasmus Anderson, Jr., Plaintiff v. Spouses Juanito Maybituin and Rosario
Cerrado, et al., Defendants.”3
It was at this stage of the proceedings when Atty. Cesar S. de Guzman died. Anderson, Jr. was now
without a counsel to represent him. Upon referral by a friend, Anderson, Jr. engaged the services of
herein respondent Atty. Reynaldo A. Cardeño.
On July 19, 1990, Rasmus G. Anderson, Jr., filed an administrative complaint4 before this Court
wherein he alleged that respondent Atty. Reynaldo A. Cardeño caused “the loss” or the adverse ruling
against him in the aforementioned case before the RTC, Civil Case No. 0110-B. Specifically,
complainant alleged the following:
1.) That when the respondents in the civil case filed a Demurrer to Evidence, Atty. Cardeño did not
file an opposition thereto and did not appear at the formal hearing set for the purpose of considering
the merits of the demurrer. Thus, in addition to finding merit in the demurrer, the trial court, noting
the non-appearance of Atty. Cardeño, assumed that even he, the plaintiff ’s counsel, appeared
convinced that there was merit, validity and reasonableness in the demurrer filed;
2.) That after the trial court issued an Order finding the respondents’ demurrer to evidence
meritorious, Atty. Cardeño did not even file a Motion for Reconsideration thereof, which in turn
caused the same order to become final and executory;
86
3.) That even prior to the above events and in view of what the complainant perceived to be
respondent lawyer’s loss of interest in the case, complainant verbally told Atty. Cardeño to withdraw
as his counsel. However, Atty. Cardeño allegedly insisted on continuing to represent the complainant
as the case was already in its closing stage.
Complainant concludes that Atty. Cardeño abused his client’s trust and confidence and violated his
oath as a lawyer in failing to defend his client’s cause to the very end. Complainant prays that Atty.
Cardeño be disbarred.
When asked to comment, Atty. Cardeño replied:
1.) That complainant was being ungrateful to him. In the first place, he was only asked by a good
friend of the complainant Anderson, Jr., to step into the shoes of the latter’s deceased counsel. He
accommodated the request and took the case, even without personally meeting the complainant, as
the latter was residing in the United States;
2.) That as a client, complainant Anderson, Jr., did not give him full cooperation. Although
voluminous records were turned over to him, they were “in disarray.” Atty. Cardeño alleges that
when he began representing the complainant in court, he had to “proceed and appear with only half
the information[ ] and background[ ] of the case, and not knowing the person he was representing.”
He allegedly did his best to familiarize himself with the case, although there were several questions
left unanswered by the complainant’s good friend;
3.) That their first meeting happened at the time he was about to present their last witness. At that
time, Anderson, Jr.’s deposition had already been taken by his former counsel, now deceased. Atty.
Cardeño then asked Anderson, Jr., about the regularity of the taking of said deposition, and the latter
assured him that his former counsel had exhaustively examined him and that said deposition had
been regularly taken;
4.) That the same was the first and only occasion when he personally met complainant. At no time
during said meeting did complainant ask him to withdraw from the case;
5.) That from the records he had on hand, and based on the reputation of complainant’s deceased
counsel, Atty. Cardeño saw no need to present complainant again to testify in court. This was also in
view of the fact that complainant was then in a hurry to leave the country, and also because of
complainant’s assurances that the deposition previously made would suffice;
6.) That it was a “big surprise” for him later to discover that the taking of the deposition was
irregular as it was done without the presence of counsels and parties, and without the proper
notices. This led the other party to file a demurrer to evidence;
7.) That the “biggest blow and surprise” to him was when he was approached by “good friends” of
the complainant and these friends told him that “they have good access and have made arrangements
with the Presiding Judge.” He was asked by these friends to prepare the motion for reconsideration,
which he “obligingly did” and thereafter he gave said motion to these friends, for them to file.
However, these friends did not furnish or return a copy of said motion for his files and reference;
8.) That true to his oath as a lawyer, Atty. Cardeño considers the representations of the
complainant’s good friends to be in bad taste; that he “could not join complainant’s good friends in
their plans to corrupt” the judge; that he considers this course of action of these friends of the
complainant to imply that “he is no longer needed as a lawyer and that they have made their own
ways”;
87
9.) That because of these actions of the friends of the complainant which respondent considers
contrary to his duty as an officer of the court, and also against the respect due to the courts,
respondent asked to be relieved of his duties as counsel but said request was refused.
Thus, respondent Atty. Cardeño concluded that complainant cannot accuse him of deliberately
causing their defeat in the case when he, Atty. Cardeño, did his best with such little information,
support and cooperation given by the complainant and the latter’s friends. It was in fact complainant
and his friends who chose to take “another path” to deal with the case. Complainant, he claims,
erroneously thinks that a lawyer must do everything, even crooked or illegal acts, in order to win a
case. Atty. Cardeño then asserted that he has to uphold his oath as a lawyer and so he refused when
complainant’s friends proposed to employ acts to corrupt the judge or proceed with the case in
dubious ways.
In the aforesaid Report and Recommendation of IBP Commissioner Victoria G. de los Reyes, it was
found:
After having considered the position taken by each party in the instant case, this Commission has
arrived at a conclusion that there is apparent lack of interest on the part of the Complainant to
further pursue his case. The complainant could have appeared personally and present his evidence
or could have his deposition taken to support the allegations contained in his complaint. What he did
was just to send a representative by the name of Bienvenido Maregmen. Clearly, this is not sufficient
to show the needed enthusiasm and interest to support his accusations against the respondent.
We sustain the respondent in his position that he should be given the opportunity to confront the
complainant and cross-examine him. Here, the complainant failed to appear despite the several
settings of hearings in this case. Based on this alone, this Commission could have recommended the
dismissal of the instant complaint for failure of the complainant to substantiate his charges against
the respondent.
However, the respondent has indubitably failed to perform an obligation which he owed to his client,
the herein complainant. The respondent himself categorically stated in his Comment filed with the
Honorable Supreme Court on October 2, 1990 that he prepared a Motion for Reconsideration in the
case entitled “Rasmus Anderson v. Juanito Maybituin, et al.”, Civil Case No. 0110-B, then pending in
the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 67-Binangonan. But that certain “good friends” of the
complainant made representations to him that they already made arrangements with the presiding
judge who they claimed had already been “bought”. Respondent allowed these persons to take over
in the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration and did not even bother to check with the Court if the
same has been filed or not.
Clearly, the respondent was guilty of neglect of duty and this is a violation of Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Ethics, which provides that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence; particularly, Rule 18.03 thereof which states that “a lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable”.
He likewise breached his duty to the Honorable Supreme Court to report “corrupt” judges for
appropriate disciplinary action with the aim of improving the quality of justice and in helping
restore the people’s faith in our judicial system.5
As aforestated, the IBP Board of Governors thereafter issued Resolution XVI-2004-68 dated February
27, 2004, which “x x x ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner x x x, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification, and considering respondent’s violation
of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility x x x” recommended that Atty.
Reynaldo Cardeño be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months and that he be warned
that a graver penalty would be imposed should he commit the same offense in the future.
88
This Court sustains the findings and recommendations of the IBP Board of Governors.
It is undisputed that Atty. Cardeño was engaged by the complainant as counsel. By accepting the case,
respondent should have known the attendant responsibilities that came with the lawyer-client
relationship.
These imperatives were pointedly explained in Pariñas v. Atty. Oscar P. Paguinto:6
Paguinto should know that as a lawyer, he owes fidelity to the cause of his client. When a lawyer
accepts a case, his acceptance is an implied representation that he possesses the requisite academic
learning, skill and ability to handle the case. The lawyer has the duty to exert his best judgment in the
prosecution or defense of the case entrusted to him and to exercise reasonable and ordinary care and
diligence in the pursuit or defense of the case.
A lawyer should give adequate attention, care and time to his case. Once he agrees to handle a case,
he should undertake the task with dedication and care. If he fails in this duty, he is not true to his
oath as a lawyer. Hence, a lawyer must accept only as much cases as he can efficiently handle,
otherwise his clients’ interests will suffer. It is not enough that a lawyer possesses the qualification to
handle the legal matter. He must also give adequate attention to his legal work.
The lawyer owes it to his client to exercise his utmost learning and ability in handling his cases. A
license to practice law is a guarantee by the courts to the public that the licensee possesses sufficient
skill, knowledge and diligence to manage [his] cases. The legal profession demands from a lawyer the
vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family.7
Thus, respondent’s defenses that the complainant was “uncooperative” as a client, that the
voluminous records turned over to him were in disarray, and that the complainant did not disclose to
him certain particulars of the case, are all unavailing.
First, it was incumbent upon Atty. Cardeño to insist on his client’s participation in the proceedings in
the case. While the complainant shares the responsibility for the lack of communication between
lawyer and client, Atty. Cardeño should not have depended entirely on the information his client gave
or the time his client wished to give them. As a lawyer representing the cause of his client, he should
have taken more control over the handling of the case. Knowing that his client was based in the
United States should, with more reason, have moved him to secure all the legal means available to
him either to continue representing his client effectively or to make the necessary manifestation in
court, with the client’s conformity, that he was withdrawing as counsel of record. That his client did
not agree to terminate his services is a mere allegation that has not been substantiated.
Thus, in view of the fact that he remained counsel of record for the complainant, it was highly
irregular for him to entrust the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration to other people who did not
lawfully appear interested in the subject litigation.
In the same case of Paguinto, citing Gamalinda v. Alcantara,8 this Court stated:
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and must be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him. He shall serve his client with competence and diligence, and his duty of entire
devotion to his client’s cause not only requires, but entitles him to employ every honorable means to
secure for the client what is justly due him or to present every defense provided by law to enable the
latter’s cause to succeed. An attorney’s duty to safeguard the client’s interests commences from his
retainer until his effective release from the case or the final disposition of the whole subject matter of
the litigation. During that period, he is expected to take such reasonable steps and such ordinary care
as his client’s interests may require.9
89
The Court therein declared that a lawyer’s failure to do so violates Canon 18 of the Code. It added
that the said rule is clear in its mandate that a lawyer should not undertake a legal service that he is
not qualified to render, nor should a lawyer handle any legal matter without adequate preparation. A
lawyer has the duty to prepare for trial with diligence and deliberate speed and he should not neglect
a legal matter entrusted to him, for his negligence shall render him liable.10
From the records it is evident that Atty. Cardeño has fallen short of the professional standards this
Court has set for members of the Bar. A lawyer should never neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
otherwise his negligence in fulfilling his duty subjects him to disciplinary action. Respondent is
reminded that the practice of law is a special privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent
intellectually, academically and morally. This Court has been exacting in its expectations for the
members of the Bar always to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain
from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence of the public.11
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Reynaldo A. Cardeño is hereby found guilty of violating Canon 18
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his lawyer’s oath. He is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for six (6) months effective from notice and is WARNED that any similar
infraction in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in the record of respondent as a member of the Bar.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Atty. Reynaldo A. Cardeño suspended from practice of law for six (6) months for violating Canon 18
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his lawyer’s oath, with warning against repetition of
similar infraction.
90
G.R. Nos. 93026-27. December 17, 1996.*
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, vs. CONRADO PAJARO alias "DADI," defendant.
Criminal Law; Rape; Evidence; Accused positively identified as the rapist.—Agnes Gorrion positively
identified her rapist as the accused-appellant Conrado "Dadi" Pajaro. Although it was already dark,
the first time she was defiled, Agnes nevertheless, recognized the voice of accused-appellant and his
quaint smell (like a dog). There was a smell of dog in his fingernails. The second time Agnes was
raped, accused-appellant identified himself to Agnes.
Same; Same; Same; Proof of injury or damage not an essential element of the crime.—The fact that
the dress and panty of Agnes were not torn cannot disprove that she was raped. The force or violence
necessary in rape is a relative term, depending on the size, age and strength of the parties and their
relation to each other. Agnes was only thirteen years old at the time she was raped by the accused-
appellant who was then already in his late thirties. Her resistance was inadequate to repulse the
assaults of the accusedappellant. There is rape when force or intimidation was exerted on a woman
and there was carnal knowledge against her-will. Even the absence of external injuries does not
negate her accusation of rape. Proof of injury or damage is not an essential element of the crime.
Same; Same; Same; Witnesses; It is settled that in the absence of evidence to show why the
prosecution witness would have testified falsely, the logical conclusion is that no such improper
motive exacted and that therefore the testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.—There was no
evidence showing improper motive on the part of Agnes and the other prosecution witnesses to
impute the crime against the accused-appellant. It is settled that in the absence of evidence to show
why the prosecution witness would have testified falsely, the logical conclusion is that no such
improper motive existed and that, therefore, the testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Findings of fact of a trial court are not to be disturbed on appeal unless the
trial court has overlooked, ignored or disregarded some fact or circumstance of weight or
significance which if considered would have altered the case.—In synthesis, accused-appellant posits
issues the bottom-line of which is one of credibility. We have, however, adhered to the time-honored
postulate that "the findings of fact of a trial court are not to be disturbed on appeal unless the trial
court has overlooked, ignored, or disregarded some fact or circumstance of weight or significance
which if considered would have altered the case (People vs. Martinez, 205 SCRA 666), for verily, the
trial court is in a better position to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying (Collado
vs. IAC, 206 SCRA 206). Thus, we find no fact or circumstance which would otherwise justify the
reversal of the assailed decision.
Same; Same; Same; Flight; Court has time and again sustained the rule that flight indicates a
consciousness of guilt on the part of the accused.—It should be noted that accused-appellant escaped
from jail during the pendency of the trial. His action was not that of an innocent man but one who
wanted to evade punishment. Necessarily, his defense of innocence is not worthy of belief. Over the
years, this Court has time and again sustained the rule that "flight indicates a consciousness of guilt
on the part of the accused."
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Br. 42.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
TORRES, JR., J.:
91
Accused-appellant Conrado Pajaro alias "Dadi," was found guilty for raping thirteen (13) year old
Agnes Gorrion y Dojeno, and he now comes to this Court alleging inter alia that the prosecution failed
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
It appears on record that on July 10, 1981, two informations both for the crime of rape was filed
against Conrado Pajaro alias "Dadi," The aforesaid informations read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 4542
"That on or about the 7th day of February, 1981, in the Municipality of Hinigaran, Province of Negros
Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused,
armed with knife, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of one AGNES GORRION x" DOJENO, against the will of the latter.
CONTRARY TO LAW."1
Criminal Case No. 4556
That on or about the 11th day of February, 1981, in the Municipality of Hinigaran, Province of Negros
Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused,
armed with knife, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of one AGNES GORRION x" DOJENO, against the will of the latter.
ACT. CONTRARY TO LAW."2
The cases were assigned to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, Bacolod City. At arraignment,
accused Pajaro pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Joint trial on the merits ensued and
thereafter, the trial court rendered its decision dated November 14, 1989, as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Court finds the accused CONRADO PAJARO
alias "Dadi," guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having committed the crime of rape defined and
penalized by Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code on two (2) separate occasions charged in the
above-entitled Informations, and hereby sentences said accused—
(1) in Criminal Case No. 4542, to suffer a penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to indemnify the
offended party AGNES D. GORRION the sum of P20,000; and likewise,
(2) in Criminal Case No. 4556, to suffer a penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to indemnify the
same offended party AGNES D. GORRION the sum of P20,000.
The Court finds it unnecessary to make pronouncement with respect to the acknowledgment of a
possible offspring taking into account that no evidence was adduced by the prosecution to show that
pregnancy occurred to Agnes D. Gorrion between the time she was sexually abused on February 7
and 11, 1981, and the trial of these cases.
With costs in both cases.
SO ORDERED."3
The antecedent facts:
On February 7, 1981, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening in Barrio Patiqui, Hinigaran, Negros
Occidental, thirteen (13) year old Agnes Gorrion left their house to fetch her mother in the barangay
market. On her way to the market, she met the accused Conrado Pajaro (naked) at the passage along
the sugarcane plantation. Pajaro grabbed Agnes and dragged her into the sugarcane field owned by
92
Linda Carrachico. Agnes struggled to free herself from the clutches of Pajaro but the latter pointed a
knife at her. He pushed the girl and forced her to lie down. Pajaro succeeded in undressing Agnes
while still pointing a knife at the latter's neck. Agnes cried and cried to fight but her efforts remained
futile. Pajaro was able to place himself on top of Agnes and forced himself into her, thereby satisfying
his lust. Agnes described her horrifying experience as follows:
Q.
How about the accused, what did he do?
A.
He placed himself on top of me and held my two hands and pointed the knife against my neck.
Q.
After the accused did this, what did he do?
A.
He warned me not to inform my parents about the incident.
Q.
While the accused was on top of you, did he do something else?
A.
He held my both hands and pointed a knife against me.
Q.
And then?
A.
He placed his palm on my mouth and he did not want me to utter a word.
Q.
Then what else?
A.
I was crying because I was in pain.
Q.
Why were you in pain?
A.
Because he placed himself on top of me.
Q.
What else did the accused do besides placing himself on top of you?
A.
He held both of my hands.
Q.
What else?
A.
He pointed a knife against my neck.
93
Q.
Now, you testified that you felt pain. In what part of the body did you feel pain?
A.
In my private parts.
Q.
Why?
A.
Because he inserted something on my private parts.
Q.
What is it that he placed in your private parts?
A.
His penis.
Q.
Was the accused able to penetrate your vagina?
A.
He was able to penetrate his penis inside my vagina.
Q.
While his penis was inside your vagina, what did you do?
A.
I was crying.
Q.
What else did you do?
A.
I wanted to free myself but I was unable to.
Q.
Why?
A.
Because he was holding both my hands.
Q.
And what else?
A.
The same thing, he was pointing his knife against my neck.
Q.
After the accused had sexual intercourse with you, what did you do?
A.
He left and went away."4
94
After the incident, Agnes proceeded to the market. She did not reveal to her mother or to anyone in
her family what happened to her that night.
Then on February 11, 1981, at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening, Agnes was on her way to buy
bananas for their supper when she was accosted again by the accused Pajaro. He pointed a knife at
her and then dragged her to the sugarcane field owned by Carlos Parcon. He covered her mouth, held
her hands and pressed a knife at her. Agnes resisted and fought back but accused Pajaro
overpowered her. Then he pushed her to the ground and forcibly undressed her. Pajaro then laid on
top of Agnes and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. After the bestial act, the accused
ran away. Agnes, because of her fear, did not report the matter to anybody.
Two weeks after the incident, Agnes' sister, Fe, and her mother Bienvenida, noticed that Agnes was
looking pale and haggard and was often seen staring blankly at the wall. She likewise refused to eat
and her mother had to spoonfeed her. She complained of stomach pains and physical discomfort.
Consequently, her sister Fe confronted her and coerced her to tell what was wrong with her. It took
sometime before Agnes finally confessed and narrated what happened to her.
Fe Gorrion brought Agnes to the Hinigaran Municipal Clinic where she was examined by the rural
health physician. Later, she was brought to Bacolod City where she was examined by Dr. Anthony
Hinolan at the Corazon Locsin Montelibano Memorial Hospital. The medical examination revealed
the following:
"Internal Examination:
Hymen—old laceration at 6 o'clock.
Introitus—admits 2 fingers easily.
Adnexa—negative
Cervix—small-close.
Uterus—small (normal size)."5
The medical report showed that there was possibly sexual intercourse or something had been
inserted into the girl's vagina which caused laceration. At the time Agnes was examined, the
laceration had already healed. There was also no spermatozoa seen.
On March 25, 1981, accused Pajaro was arrested. He was ordered to be detained and on July 6, 1981,
he was transferred to the provincial jail of Bacolod City. On February 21, 1983, during the pendency
of the trial, accused Pajaro escaped from jail. He was recaptured only on January 29,1988.
Accused Conrado Pajaro alias "Dadi," single and jobless, was about 37 years old at the time of the
incident. The accused did not deny having had sexual intercourse with Agnes and alleged that it was
by mutual consent. For his defense, accused testified that Agnes used to ask money from him. On
February 7, 1981, he was at a market stall vulcanizing bicycle tire when Agnes approached him and
ask for money. He refused to give her, telling her that he would be going to Bacolod City to have a
good time and be with a woman. Agnes asked him how much he usually pays the woman and he said,
"P5.00." Agnes volunteered herself for only P4.00 and told him that she would meet him that
afternoon at the sugarcane field near her house. So later that day, they met at the plantation and had
sexual intercourse there. Thereafter, Agnes asked him to buy her a bicycle. He told her that he would
have to save money but in the meantime, they would continue their tryst.
95
On February 11, 1981, Agnes told her mother that she was going to play. She, however, met the
accused and again they had sexual intercourse in the fields that afternoon. Their last contact was on
March 20,1981.
The accused-appellant seemingly strange version of the incident is in the opinion of the court a quo,
"utterly unbelievable," viz:
"It is utterly unbelievable that a young barrio girl of 13 like Agnes Gorrion, who, at that time, was still
in her elementary grades and possessed with a traditional and proverbial modesty of a Filipino
would, lure a much older man of 38 years to have sex with her not even for the sake of love, but for a
fee, when there is no iota of proof that Agnes Gorrion was already a harlot at such a tender age. Such
a claim exposes the accused' mental perversity.
Such kind of a story proposed by the accused to gain absolution must be totally rejected because it is
a well-defined doctrine in law, that "evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth
of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation
of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances." (People vs. Dayag, L-3619, March 29,
1974; People vs. Valdez, L-51034, May 29, 1987)
Accused Pajaro also denied escaping from jail. He alleged that he was assigned in the janitorial
services when he got drunk and slept at the plaza that evening. When he woke up the following
morning, he was in doubt whether to go back to jail or to go home; he decided to go home. He later
went to Taclaron Bago and helped in harvesting palay. He went back to Patiqui, Hinigaran three days
after. He was only recaptured in January 1988 after the mother of Agnes Gorrion reported to the
police that she was threatened with a knife by him on the eve of the wedding of the sister of one
Norbing.
The trial court found the testimony of Agnes Gorrion credible and gave weight to the evidence of the
prosecution. Accused Pajaro was sentenced to the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua both in Criminal
Case Nos. 4542 and 4556.
Hence, this appeal with this sole assignment of error:
The trial court erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape on
two (2) counts.
Accused-appellant Conrado Pajaro contends that there was no rape because: (1) neither the dress
nor the panty of Agnes was torn so there was no struggle; (2) Agnes did not report the incidents
immediately after they happened; 3) although the medical report showed that there was sexual
intercourse, the doctor was not certain whether there was rape; 4) when accused-appellant escaped
from jail, the complainant, for almost five years, did not exert effort to have him recaptured.
The appeal must fail.
Agnes Gorrion positively identified her rapist as the accused-appellant Conrado "Dadi" Pajaro.
Although it was already dark, the first time she was defiled, Agnes nevertheless, recognized the voice
of accused-appellant and his quaint smell (like a dog). There was a smell of dog in his fingernails. The
second time Agnes was raped, accused-appellant identified himself to Agnes.6
The fact that the dress and panty of Agnes were not torn cannot disprove that she was raped. The
force or violence necessary in rape is a relative term, depending on the size, age and strength of the
parties and their relation to each other.7 Agnes was only thirteen years old at the time she was raped
by the accused-appellant who was then already in his late thirties. Her resistance was inadequate to
repulse the assaults of the accused-appellant. There is rape when force or intimidation was exerted
96
on a woman and there was carnal knowledge against her will. Even the absence of external injuries
does not negate her accusation of rape. Proof of injury or damage is not an essential element of the
crime.
Agnes was threatened by the accused-appellant with a knife sticking at her neck. Seized by fear and
helpless, Pajaro achieved his lewd desires. It was also because of fear that she did not immediately
report the incident to her mother or to the authorities. It should be observed that Agnes was a young
girl who grew up in the barrio. It was understandable that she did not disclose the incident because it
was shameful and terrifying. At her young age, she did not possibly know what to do after the tragic
incident and how to cope up with it. This was manifested by the sudden deterioration of her health
and attitude.
This is a good time as any to stress the fact that—
"x x x Behavioral psychology teaches us that different people react to similar situations dissimilarly.
Most women would resist a sexual assault with a wild struggle. Others become virtually catatonic
because of the mental shock they experience. Yet, it can never be successfully argued that the latter
are any less sexual victims than the former. As we held in an earlier case:
"x x x A young girl, unlike a mature woman, cannot be expected to have the courage and intelligence
to immediately report a sexual assault committed against her especially when a death threat hangs
over her head. To her simple, unsophisticated mind, appellant's threat was not an idle one x x x."
(People vs. Ibay, 233 SCRA 15)
The testimony of the victim was credible and convincing.
There was no evidence showing improper motive on the part of Agnes and the other prosecution
witnesses to impute the crime against the accused-appellant. It is settled that in the absence of
evidence to show why the prosecution witness would have testified falsely, the logical conclusion is
that no such improper motive existed and that, therefore, the testimony is worthy of full faith and
credit.8
It should be noted that accused-appellant escaped from jail during the pendency of the trial. His
action was not that of an innocent man but one who wanted to evade punishment. Necessarily, his
defense of innocence is not worthy of belief. Over the years, this Court has time and again sustained
the rule that "flight indicates a consciousness of guilt on the part of the accused."9
In synthesis, accused-appellant posits issues the bottomline of which is one of credibility. We have,
however, adhered to the time-honored postulate that "the findings of fact of a trial court are not to be
disturbed on appeal unless the trial court has overlooked, ignored, or disregarded some fact or
circumstance of weight or significance which if considered would have altered the case (People vs.
Martinez, 205 SCRA 666), for verily, the trial court is in a better position to observe the demeanor of
the witnesses while testifying (Collado vs. IAC, 206 SCRA 206). Thus, we find no fact or circumstance
which would otherwise justify the reversal of the assailed decision. Considering, however, that the
"crime committed against the innocent 13-year old lass, the damages awarded for the two cases are
separately increased to thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) pursuant to prevailing case law.10
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the decision appealed from dated November 14, 1989, is
hereby AFFIRMED with the modification as to the indemnity for damages as abovestated.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
97
Judgment affirmed with modification.
Note.—The absence of physical injuries does not negate the commission of rape. (People vs.
Gapasan, 243 SCRA 53 [1995])
98
G.R. No. 91958. January 24, 1991.*

WILFREDO D. LICUDAN and CRISTINA LICUDAN-CAMPOS, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS and ATTY. TEODORO O. DOMALANTA, respondents.
Attorneys; Attorney’s Fees; When attorney’s fees may be claimed.—It is a well-entrenched rule
that attorney’s fees may be claimed in the very action in which the services in question have been
rendered or as an incident of the main action. The fees may be properly adjudged after such litigation
is terminated and the subject of recovery is at the disposition of the court. (see Camacho v. Court of
Appeals, 179 SCRA 604 [1989]; Quirante v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 169 SCRA 769 [1989]).
Same; Same; Contingent fees are not per se prohibited by law.—It is an equally deeply-rooted
rule that contingent fees are not per se prohibited by law. They are sanctioned by Canon 13 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics and Canon 20, Rule 20.01 of the recently promulgated Code of
Professional Responsibility. However, as we have held in the case of Tanhueco v. De Dumo (172 SCRA
760 [1989]): “x x x When it is shown that a contract for a contingent fee was obtained by undue
influence exercised by the attorney upon his client or by any fraud or imposition, or that the
compensation is clearly excessive, the Court must and will protect the aggrieved party. (Ulanday v.
Manila Railroad Co., 45 Phil. 540 [1923]; Grey v. Insular Lumber Co., 97 Phil. 833 [1955]).
Same; Same; Contingent fees are subject to the supervision of the Supreme Court.—On the
contrary, we rule that the questioned Orders dated September 19, 1979 and October 21, 1985 cannot
become final as they pertain to a contract for a contingent fee which is always subject to the
supervision of the Court with regard to its reasonableness as unequivocally provided in Section 13 of
the Canons of Professional Ethics which reads: “13 Contingent Fees.—A contract for a contingent fee,
where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case including the
risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision of a court,
as to its reasonableness.”
Same; Same; Contract; Contract for Professional Services becomes the law of the parties when
stipulations therein are not contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy or
public order.—Although the Contract for Professional Services dated August 30, 1979 was
apparently voluntarily signed by the late Aurelio Licudan for himself and on behalf of his daughter,
petitioner Cristina Licudan-Campos and by the petitioner Wilfredo Licudan who both manifested in
open court that they gave their free and willing consent to the said contract, we cannot allow the said
contract to stand as the law between the parties involved considering that the rule that in the
presence of a contract for professional services duly executed by the parties thereto, the same
becomes the law between the said parties is not absolute but admits an exception—that the
stipulations therein are not contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy or public order
(see Philippine American Life Insurance Company v. Pineda, 175 SCRA 416 [1989]; Syjuco v. Court of
Appeals, 172 SCRA 111 [1989]).
PETITION for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Arnold V. Guerrero & Associates for petitioners.
Teodoro O. Domalanta for and on his behalf as private respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
99
The practice of law is a profession rather than trade. Courts must guard against the charging of
unconscionable and excessive fees by lawyers for their services when engaged as counsel. Whether
or not the award of attorney’s fees in this case is reasonable, being in the nature of contingent fees, is
the principal issue.
This petition for review on certiorari assails:
1) The Decision of the public respondent dated September 12, 1989 which dismissed the
petitioners’ appeal thereby upholding the reasonableness of the respondent lawyer’s lien as
attorney’s fees over the properties of his clients; and
2) The Resolution of the public respondent dated January 30, 1990 which denied the petitioners’
motion for reconsideration.
The grounds relied upon by the petitioners are as follows:
“The respondent Court, in upholding the entitlement of private respondent-attorney on the

attorney’s fees he claimed, decided the question in a manner not in accord with law or with the
applicable decisions of this Honorable Tribunal.
“The respondent Court, in refusing to review and determine the propriety, reasonableness and
validity of the attorney’s fees claimed by the private respondent-attorney, departed from the usual
course of judicial proceedings.
“The respondent Court, in failing to declare the attorney’s fees claimed by the private respondent-
attorney as unconscionable, excessive, unreasonable, immoral and unethical, decided the question in
a way not in accord with law and with applicable decisions of this Honorable Tribunal.” (Petition, pp.
12-13; Rollo, pp. 16-17)
The following are the antecedent facts pertinent to the case at bar:
The respondent lawyer was retained as counsel by his brother-in-law and sister, the now deceased
petitioners’ parents, spouses Aurelio and Felicidad Licudan. His services as counsel pertained to two
related civil cases docketed as Civil Case No. Q-12254 for partition and Civil Case No. Q-28655 for a
sum of money in connection with the redemption of the property subject matter of the two cases
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 818 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. In both cases,
the respondent lawyer obtained a judgment in favor of his clients.
On August 13, 1979, the respondent lawyer filed a Petition for Attorney’s Lien with Notification to his
Clients which substantially alleged that his clients executed two written contracts for professional
services in his favor which provided that:
“a) The undersigned counsel is entitled to own 97.5 square meters of the plaintiff’s share of the lot
in question.
b) The undersigned counsel shall have a usufructuary right for a period of ten (10) years of
plaintiffs’ share of the lot in question.
c) And that all damages accruing to plaintiffs to be paid by the defendant is for the undersigned
counsel.” (Annex “H” of the Petition, Rollo, p. 54)
On September 19, 1979, the trial court handling Civil Case No. Q-12254 ordered the annotation at the
back of TCT No. 818 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City of the respondent lawyer’s Contract for
Professional Services dated August 30, 1979 signed by petitioner Wifredo Licudan and Aurelio
Licudan on his own behalf and on behalf of his daughter, petitioner Cristina Licudan-Campos. The
said trial court’s Order, being one of two Orders being essentially challenged in this petition, is
reproduced below:
100
“Before the court for consideration is a ‘Petition for Attorney’s Lien filed by Atty. Teodoro D.
Domalanta, counsel for the plaintiff, praying that his attorney’s fees be annotated as a lien at the back
of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 818 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, subject matter of this
case.
For the protection of the plaintiffs, the court required the plaintiff Aurelio Licudan as well as his son
to appear this morning. Plaintiff Aurelio Licudan together with his son Wilfredo Licudan, who
appears to be intelligent and in fact he speaks (the) English language well, appeared. Both Aurelio
and Wilfredo Licudan manifested that they have freely and voluntarily signed the Contract for
Professional Services, dated August 30, 1979 and notarized before Notary Public Amado Garrovillas
as Doc. No. 32, Page 8, Book No. XIX, Series of 1979.
Considering the manifestation of plaintiff, Aurelio Licudan and Alfredo (sic) Licudan that they have
entered freely and voluntarily in the said contract of professional services, let the same be annotated
at the back of TCT 818 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, upon payment of the required legal
fees.” (CA Decision, pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp. 36-37)
The Contract for Professional Services dated August 30, 1979 differs from the earlier contractual
provisions in that it entitled the respondent lawyer to one-third (1/3) of the subject property or 90.5
square meters and provided for usufructuary rights over the entire lot in question in favor of the
respondent lawyer’s son, Teodoro M. Domalanta, Jr. for an agreed consideration. (Annex “J” of the
Petition; Rollo, p. 59)
On July 25, 1985, the respondent lawyer filed a motion ex parte to amend the Order dated September
19, 1979 so as to conform with an additional professional fee covering 31 square meters more of the
lot for services rendered in Civil Case No. Q-28655 as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated
May 1, 1983 executed by Aurelio Licudan in favor of the respondent lawyer.
On September 6, 1985, the trial court ordered the respondent lawyer to submit a subdivision plan in
conformity with his attorney’s fees contract under which one-third (1/3) of the property or 90.5
square meters was alloted to him.
On September 23, 1985, the respondent lawyer filed a motion for reconsideration praying for the
amendment of the Order dated September 19, 1979 to conform with the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
May 1, 1983 which was executed after the annotation of the original attorney’s lien of 90.5 square
meters.
On September 30, 1985, the trial court denied the motion on the ground that the respondent lawyer
cannot collect atttorney’s fees for other cases in the action for partition.
On October 4, 1985, the respondent lawyer filed a second motion for reconsideration of the Order
dated September 6, 1985 explaining that what he sought to be included in the Order dated
September 19, 1979 is the additional attorney’s fees for handling the redemption case which was but
a mere offshoot of the partition case and further manifesting that the additional 31 square meters as
compensation for the redemption case must be merged with the 90.5 square meters for the partition
case to enable the said respondent lawyer to comply with the Order dated September 6, 1985 which
directed him to submit a subdivision plan as required.
On October 21, 1985, the trial court issued the second Order being assailed in this petition. The said
Order reads:
“Acting on the ‘Second Motion for Reconsideration’ filed by Atty. Teodoro Domalanta and finding the
same to be justified, let an attorney’s lien be annotated in the title of the property for 31 square
101
meters as attorney’s fees of said Atty. Teodoro Domalanta in addition to the original 90.5 square
meters.” (CA Decision, p. 8; Rollo, p. 37)
On August 22, 1986, more than ten (10) months after the Orders of September 6, 1985 and October
21, 1985 had become final and executory, the petitioners as substituted heirs of the respondent
lawyers’ deceased clients filed a motion to set aside orders on the ground that the award of
professional fees covering 121.5 square meters of the 271.5 square meter lot is unconscionable and
excessive.
After the respondent lawyer filed his Opposition to the above petitioners’ motion, the lower court, on
August 29, 1986, finding that the petitioners as substituted plaintiffs are not in full agreement with
the respondent lawyer’s claim for attorney’s fees, set aside its Orders dated September 6, 1985 and
October 21, 1985.
On September 16, 1986, the respondent lawyer filed a motion for reconsideration stressing the fact
that the payment of the professional services was pursuant to a contract which could no longer be
disturbed or set aside because it has already been implemented and had since then become final.
This motion was denied on October 3, 1986.
On November 15, 1986, the respondent lawyer filed a motion to set aside the orders dated August 29,
1986 and October 3, 1986 reiterating his position that the Orders of September 6, 1985 and October
21, 1985 have become final and are already implemented. The respondent lawyer further asked for
the modification of the October 21, 1985 Order to reflect 60.32 square meters instead of 31 square
meters only since the stipulation in the Additional Contract for Professional Services entitled him to
60.32 square meters.
After the petitioners’ Opposition to the said motion was filed, the trial court, on February 26, 1987,
rendered an Order with the following dispositive portion:
“WHEREFORE, this Court has no alternative but to set aside its orders of 29 August 1986 and 3
October 1986 and declare its Orders of 19 September 1979 and 21 October 1985 irrevocably final
and executory.” (CA Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 34)
On Appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondent lawyer by dismissing the appeal and
the prayed for writ of preliminary injuncton. Their subsequent motion for reconsideration having
been denied, the petitioners filed the instant petition.
The petitioners fault the respondent Court for its failure to exercise its inherent power to review and
determine the propriety of the stipulated attorney’s fees in favor of the respondent lawyer and
accuse the respondent lawyer of having committed an unfair advantage or legal fraud by virtue of the
Contract for Professional Services devised by him after the trial court awarded him attorney’s fees
for P1,000.00 only instead of respecting the trust and confidence of the highest level reposed on him
considering the close blood and affinal relationship between him and his clients.
The petitioners contend that under the award for professional services, they may have won the case
but would lose the entire property won in litigation to their uncle-lawyer. They would be totally
deprived of their house and lot and the recovered damages considering that of the 271.5 square
meters of the subject lot, the respondent lawyer is claiming 121.5 square meters and the remaining
portion of 150 square meters would also go to attorney’s fees since the said portion pertains to the
lawyer’s son by way of usufruct for ten (10) years.
The aforesaid submissions by the petitioners merit our consideration.
102
It is a well-entrenched rule that attorney’s fees may be claimed in the very action in which the
services in question have been rendered or as an incident of the main action. The fees may be
properly adjudged after such litigation is terminated and the subject of recovery is at the disposition
of the court. (see Camacho v. Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 604 [1989]; Quirante v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 169 SCRA 769 [1989]).
It is an equally deeply-rooted rule that contingent fees are not per se prohibited by law. They are
sanctioned by Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics and Canon 20, Rule 20.01 of the recently
promulgated Code of Professional Responsibility. How-ever, as we have held in the case of Tanhueco
v. De Dumo (172 SCRA 760 [1989]):
“x x x When it is shown that a contract for a contingent fee was obtained by undue influence
exercised by the attorney upon his client or by any fraud or imposition, or that the compensation is
clearly excessive, the Court must and will protect the aggrieved party. (Ulanday v. Manila Railroad
Co., 45 Phil. 540 [1923]; Grey v. Insular Lumber Co., 97 Phil. 833 [1955]).
In the case at bar, the respondent lawyer caused the annotation of his attorney’s fees lien in the main
action for partition docketed as Civil Case No. Q-12254 on the basis of a Contract for Professional
Services dated August 30, 1979. We find reversible error in the Court of Appeals’ holding that:
“When the reasonableness of the appellee’s lien as attorney’s fees over the properties of his clients
awarded to him by the trial court had not been questioned by the client, and the said orders had
already become final and executory, the same could no longer be disturbed, not even by the court
which rendered them (Tañada v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 419).” (CA Decision p. 7; Rollo, p. 36)
On the contrary, we rule that the questioned Orders dated September 19, 1979 and October 21, 1985
cannot become final as they pertain to a contract for a contingent fee which is always subject to the
supervision of the Court with regard to its reasonableness as unequivocally provided in Section 13 of
the Canons of Professional Ethics which reads:
“13. Contingent Fees.—
A contract for a contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the
circumstances of the case including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always
be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness.” (Italics supplied).
There is no dispute in the instant case that the attorney’s fees claimed by the respondent lawyer are
in the nature of a contingent fee. There is nothing irregular about the execution of a written contract
for professional services even after the termination of a case as long as it is based on a previous
agreement on contingent fees by the parties concerned and as long as the said contract does not
contain stipulations which are contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy or public
order.
Although the Contract for Professional Services dated August 30, 1979 was apparently voluntarily
signed by the late Aurelio Licudan for himself and on behalf of his daughter, petitioner Cristina
Licudan-Campos and by the petitioner Wilfredo Licudan who both manifested in open court that they
gave their free and willing consent to the said contract, we cannot allow the said contract to stand as
the law between the parties involved considering that the rule that in the presence of a contract for
professional services duly executed by the parties thereto, the same becomes the law between the
said parties is not absolute but admits an exception—that the stipulations therein are not contrary to
law, good morals, good customs, public policy or public order (see Philippine American Life
Insurance Company v. Pineda, 175 SCRA 416 [1989]; Syjuco v. Court of Appeals, 172 SCRA 111
[1989]).
103
Under Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall charge only fair and
reasonable fees. In determining whether or not the lawyer’s fees are fair and reasonable, Rule 20-01
of the same Code enumerates the factors to be considered in resolving the said issue. They are as
follows:
a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;
b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
c) The importance of the subject matter;
d) The skill demanded;
e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proferred case;
f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP Chapter to which
he belongs;
g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service;
h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
j) The professional standing of the lawyer.”
A similar provision is contained under Section 24, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which
partly states that:
“SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees.—An attorney shall be entitled to have and
recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the
importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the
professional standing of the attorney. x x x A written contract for services shall control the amount to
be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreason-able.”
All that the respondent lawyer handled for his deceased sister and brother-in-law was a simple case
of partition which necessitated no special skill nor any unusual effort in its preparation. The
subsequent case for redemption was admittedly but an offshot of the partition case. Considering the
close blood and affinal relationship between the respondent lawyer and his clients, there is no doubt
that Atty. Domalanta took advantage of the situation to promote his own personal interests instead of
protecting the legal interests of his clients. A careful perusal of the provisions of the contract for
professional services in question readily shows that what the petitioners won was a pyrrhic victory
on account of the fact that despite the successful turnout of the partition case, they are now
practically left with nothing of the whole subject lot won in the litigation. This is because aside from
the 121.5 square meters awarded to Atty. Domalanta as attorney’s fees, the said contract for
professional services provides that the remaining portion shall pertain to the respondent lawyer’s
son by way of usufruct for ten (10) years. There should never be an instance where a lawyer gets as
attorney’s fees the entire property involved in the litigation. It is unconscionable for the victor in
litigation to lose everything he won to the fees of his own lawyer.
The respondent lawyer’s argument that it is not he but his son Teodoro M. Domalanta, Jr. who is
claiming the usufructuary right over the remaining portion of the subject lot is inaccurate. The
records show that the matter of usufruct is tied up with this case since the basis for the said
usufructuary right is the contract for professional services the reasonableness of which is being
questioned in this petition. We find the ten-year usufruct over the subject lot part and parcel of the
attorney’s fees being claimed by the respondent lawyer.
In resolving the issue of reasonableness of the attorney’s fees, we uphold the time-honoured legal
maxim that a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession so that
his basic ideal becomes one of rendering service and securing justice, not money-making. For the
worst scenario that can ever happen to a client is to lose the litigated property to his lawyer in whom
all trust and confidence were bestowed at the very inception of the legal controversy. We find the
Contract for Professional Services dated August 30, 1979, unconscion-able and unreasonable. The
104
amount of P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees, in lieu of the 121.5 square meters awarded to the
respondent lawyer and the ten-year usufructuary right over the remaining portion of 150 square
meters by the respondent lawyer’s son, is, in the opinion of this Court, commensurate to the services
rendered by Atty. Domalanta.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Court of
Appeals’ decision of September 12, 1989 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Atty. Domalanta
is awarded reasonable attorney’s fees in the amount of P20,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J., Chairman), Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.
Decision reversed and set aside.
105
G.R. No. 147010. July 18, 2003.*
PIONEER INSURANCE AND SURETY CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.DE DIOS TRANSPORTATION
CO., INC. and DE DIOS MARIKINA TRANSIT CORPORATION, respondents.
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Substitution of Counsel; Requisites.—The notice of withdrawal of appeal

filed by the Luis Q.U. Uranza, Jr. & Associates on September 14, 1999 with the CA was a mere scrap of
paper, absent a valid substitution of counsel. The counsel of record as of September 14, 1999 was the
Padilla Reyes & De la Torre Law Office. On the said date, the law office filed a motion with the CA to
withdraw as counsel for the appellants, while the Luis Q.U. Uranza, Jr. & Associates filed the notice of
withdrawal of appeal for the appellants. In the case of Santana-Cruz v. Court of Appeals,this Court
enumerated the essential requisites of a valid substitution of counsel: ... No substitution of counsel of
record is allowed unless the following essential requisites of a valid substitution of counsel concur:
(1) there must be a written request for substitution; (2) it must be filed with the written consent of
the client; (3) it must be with the written consent of the attorney to be substituted; and (4) in case
the consent of the attorney to be substituted cannot be obtained, there must be at least a proof of
notice that the motion for substitution was served on him in the manner prescribed by the Rules of
Court . . . .
Same; Same; Same; Special Power of Attorney; Absent a special power of attorney expressly
authorizing counsel to withdraw an appeal, or in lieu thereof, the written conformity of the
client to the withdrawal of his appeal, the notice of withdrawal of appeal by a new counsel is a
mere scrap of paper.—We agree with the respondents that the notice of withdrawal of appeal of the
appellants in CA-G.R. CV No. 61310 filed on September 14, 1999 was not self-executory, and did not
render the trial court’s December 4, 1998 Decision final and executory. While we agree with the
petitioner that under Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, an appeal may be withdrawn by the
appellants as a matter of right at any time before the filing of the appellees’ brief; however, the rule
does not apply in this case because the notice of withdrawal of appeal filed in CA-G.R. CV No. 61310
by the Luis Q.U. Uranza, Jr. & Associates did not bear the appellants’ conformity thereto. It bears
stressing that the counsel of the appellants was a mere agent holding a special power of attorney to
act for and in behalf of the principal respecting the ordinary course of the appealed case. There was a
need for the appellants, as the principals, to execute a special power of attorney specifically
authorizing the withdrawal of a perfected appeal. Absent a special power of attorney expressly
authorizing their counsel to withdraw their appeal, or in lieu thereof, the written conformity of the
appellants to the withdrawal of their appeal, the notice of withdrawal of appeal by the new counsel of
the appellants was a mere scrap of paper.
Same; Same; Same; Pleadings and practice; A party should not be benefited by the deleterious
manipulation of the rules of procedure.—The submission by the appellants on September 28, 1999 of
the requisite conformity to the withdrawal of their appeal should not be given retroactive effect so as
to foreclose the right of the respondents to file with the CA their motion to execute against the
injunction bond, thus enabling the petitioner to escape liability on the same. As ratiocinated by the
CA: . . . Having successfully enjoined the encashment of the checks they issued through the surety
bond issued by the private respondent (pp. 55-58, ibid.), Willy Choa Coyukiat and Goldfinger
Transport Corporation were able to use and dispose of the petitioners’ buses (p. 134, ibid.)and to
evade the satisfaction of the decision rendered in Civil Case No. Q-95-24462 pending appeal (pp. 76-
77, ibid.). Far from acknowledging the judgment debt, therefore, it appears that the withdrawal of the
appeal was merely calculated to further frustrate the satisfaction of the same. The notice of
withdrawal of appeal was deemed filed only on September 28, 1999 upon compliance with the
September 16, 1999 Resolution of the CA. The appeal of the appellants was effectively withdrawn
and dismissed before October 8, 1999 when the CA issued its resolution therein. The petitioner
should not be benefited by the deleterious manipulation of the rules of procedure.
106
Suretyships; Due Process; Damages; A surety should be given an opportunity to be heard as to the
reality or reasonableness of the damages resulting from the wrongful issuance of the writ of
execution, and in the absence of due notice to the surety, no judgment for damages may be entered
and executed against it.—In International Container Terminal Services, Inc. v.Court of Appeals,this
Court ruled that due notice to the adverse party and its surety setting forth the facts supporting the
applicant’s right to damages and the amount thereof under the bond is indispensable.
The surety should be given an opportunity to be heard as to the reality or reasonableness of the
damages resulting from the wrongful issuance of the writ. In the absence of due notice to the surety,
therefore, no judgment for damages may be entered and executed against it. In this case, the
petitioner was not served with a copy of the motion to execute on the bond filed by the respondents
with the CA in CA-G.R. CV 61310. But the records show that the CA directed the petitioner to file its
comment on the said motion. On November 4, 1999, the petitioner filed its comment on the
respondents’ motion, and on December 9, 1999, the respondents filed their motion to resolve with
the trial court, serving a copy thereof to the petitioner. It cannot, thus, be gainsaid that the petitioner
was deprived of its right to be heard on the respondents’ motion to execute on the bond.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
De Borja, Medialdea, Bello, Guevarra & Gerodias for petitioner.
Salomon, Gonong, Dela Cruz Law Offices for respondents.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the October 31, 2000 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 58519 2 and its January 30, 2001 Resolution denying the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration of the said decision.
The petition at bar arose from the following factual milieu:
Herein respondents De Dios Transportation Co. (DDTC) and De Dios Marikina Transport Corporation
(DMTC) were the franchise holders and owners of fifty-eight buses plying the Buendia-Ayala-UP and
Monumento-Ayala routes. On February 23, 1995, the respondents, as vendors, executed a Deed of
Conditional Sale covering the said buses and their franchise in favor of Willy Choa Coyukiat
(Coyukiat) and/or Goldfinger Transport Corporation (Goldfinger) as vendees. In the said contract,
the respondents bound and obliged themselves to sell to Coyukiat and Goldfinger the fifty-eight
buses and their corresponding franchise, and to deliver and turn over possession of the said buses to
the vendees for the price of P12,000,000, payable as follows:
(a)A downpayment of ONE MILLION (P1,000,000.00) PESOS in personal check shall be paid upon
the execution of this Contract;
(b) The balance of ELEVEN MILLION (P11,000,000.00) to be paid by eleven (11) postdated checks
at the rate of ONE MILLION (P1,000,000.00) a month all of which shall likewise be delivered to the
VENDORS upon the execution of this Contract; provided, however, that the date of the first postdated
check shall be thirty days from the full and actual delivery of the units as provided in paragraph 3
hereof and the subsequent dates of the other postdated checks shall be reckoned from the date of the
first postdated check;3
The parties further agreed that in case of default by the vendors:
107
8. CONSEQUENCES OF DEFAULT. It is agreed and understood that the representations and
warranties made by the VENDORS in this Contract are the primary motivations/reasons that
induced, convinced and moved the VENDEE to enter into this contract and the Deed of Sale. In the
event of default by the VENDORS, the VENDEE shall at its option either consider the obligations of
the VENDORS under the Contract immediately due and demandable and the VENDORS shall
immediately execute the Deed of Sale of the buses and their corresponding lines/franchises without
need of any further payments or reimburse all the amounts paid by the VENDEE to the VENDORS. In
either case, the VENDORS shall, likewise, be liable to the VENDEE for liquidated damages in the
amount of Twelve Million (P12,000,000.00) pesos.
In the event of default by the VENDEE, the VENDORS shall at their option, declare the entire
obligation due and demandable, and demand for the payment of the entire balance of the purchase
price or declare the contract as without any further force and effect and that all payments previously
paid are forfeited. In either case, the VENDEE shall, likewise, be liable for liquidated damages in the
amount of Twelve Million (P12,000,000.00) Pesos in favor of the VENDORS.4
The respondents, as vendors, guaranteed that the franchise and routes to Buendia-Ayala-UP and vice
versa and Monumento-Ayala via EDSA were valid, fully and completely utilizable, and merely
required registration with the Land Transportation Office (LTO) for the vendees to be able to operate
the same.5 The vendees delivered the downpayment and postdated checks drawn upon the account
of Goldfinger with the Philbanking Corporation for the balance of the purchase price.
On March 23, 1995, the respondents delivered the buses to the vendees. The respondents were able
to encash the check for the downpayment of the purchase price. However, before the respondents
could deposit the first check for the remaining balance, the vendees stopped all payments, on their
claim that, contrary to the representations of the respondents, some of the buses were not in good
running condition. The color of the buses had been changed without the proper permits or
clearances from the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB), the LTO and
the Philippine National Police (PNP). Consequently, the vendees failed to operate the buses. The
vendees were, likewise, unable to operate the buses along the Buendia-Ayala-UP route,
notwithstanding the representation of the respondents that only registration with the LTO was
required.
On July 20, 1995, the vendees, through its counsel, the Padilla Reyes & De la Torre Law Office, filed a
complaint against the respondents and Philbanking Corporation as defendants with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City for rescission of contract with a plea for a temporary restraining
order or writ of preliminary injunction.6
Therein plaintiffs Coyukiat and Goldfinger alleged that defendants (the respondents herein) reneged
on their obligation to deliver the buses in good running condition. By reason of the defen-dants’
misrepresentation regarding the registration of the buses, they failed to secure certificates of
registration under their names, preventing them from operating the buses, thus causing tremendous
losses to their business which impelled them to stop the payments of the eleven remaining postdated
checks. The complaint contained the following prayer:
ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
1. Declaring the Deed of Conditional Sale entered into between the plaintiffs Willy Choa Coyukiat
and Goldfinger Transport Corporation and the defendants De Dios Transportation Co., Inc. and the De
Dios Marikina Transit Corporation as RESCINDED.
2. Ordering the defendants De Dios Transportation Co., Inc. and the De Dios Marikina Transit
Corporation to return the One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) down payment and all other amounts
given by the plaintiffs to them under the Deed of Conditional Sale.
108
3. Requiring the defendants De Dios Transportation Co, Inc. and the De Dios Marikina Transit
Corporation to accept the return from the plaintiffs of the fifty-eight (58) passenger buses;
4. Ordering the defendant De Dios Transportation Co., Inc. and the De Dios Marikina Transit
Corporation to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs the amount of Twelve Million Pesos
(P12,000,000.00) as liquidated damages.
ON THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
5. On the second cause of action, ordering the defendant De Dios Transportation Co., Inc. and the
De Dios Marikina Transit Corporation to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs the amount of One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral damages.
ON THE THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
6. On the third cause of action, ordering the defendants De Dios Transportation Co., Inc. and the De
Dios Marikina Transit Corporation to pay jointly and severally the amount of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) as exemplary damages.
ON THE FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
7. On the fourth cause of action, ordering the defendants De Dios Transportation Co., Inc. and the
De Dios Marikina Transit Corporation to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs the amounts of Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as attorney’s fees and at least One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00) as litigation expenses.7
The plaintiffs therein prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, and after due notice
and hearing, to issue a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining the therein defendants DDTC and
DMTC, their agents, representatives and all persons acting in their behalf from encashing, depositing,
discounting or transacting the postdated checks issued by plaintiff Goldfinger as listed in Annex “B”
of the complaint, and enjoining the defendant Philbanking Corporation (Del Monte branch), its
agents, representatives and all persons acting in its behalf from encashing, accepting, clearing, or
transacting in any other manner, the postdated checks listed in Annex “A” of the complaint.
On July 21, 1995, the RTC issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the defendants and their
agents from encashing, accepting, clearing, or transacting twelve postdated checks issued by therein
plaintiff Coyukiat.8 On August 11, 1995, the RTC granted the plaintiffs’ plea for a writ of preliminary
injunction on a bond of P11,000,000. The plaintiffs posted Bond No. 71336 issued by herein
petitioner Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corporation for the amount of P11,000,000.9
On August 17, 1995, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint dropping Philbanking Corporation as
party-defendant.
The defendants, in their answer with counterclaim, denied the material allegations of the complaint
and prayed for the dismissal thereof. The defendants interposed counterclaims for damages and
attorney’s fees, thus: (a) P11,000,000 representing the plaintiffs’ unpaid balance; (b) P12,000,000
representing liquidating damages; (c) P1,000,000 for moral damages; (d) P1,000,000 for exemplary
damages; and (e) twenty percent of the claim representing attorneys fees and P1,000 for each court
appearance.10
On September 21, 1998, the trial court issued an order dismissing the case on motion of the
defendants for failure of the plaintiffs to prosecute the same. As directed by the trial court on motion
of the defendants, the latter adduced evidence ex parte to prove their counterclaim.
109
On December 14, 1998, the RTC rendered a decision dismissing the complaint and granting the
counterclaims of the defendants, the dispositive portion of which is herein quoted:
“WHEREFORE, as prayed for, defendants’ counterclaim is hereby GRANTED, and judgment is hereby
rendered ordering plaintiff to pay the defendants the following:
(1) ELEVEN MILLION ([P11,000,000.00) PESOS representing the plaintiff’s unpaid balance on the
consideration of the Deed of Conditional Sale;
(2) TWELVE MILLION (P12,000,000.00) PESOS as liquidated damages;
(3) FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) as moral damages and FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) as exemplary damages; and
(4) TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS as attorney’s fees and P113,783.50 as litigation expenses;
(5) Costs of suit.”11
Aggrieved, the plaintiffs Coyukiat and Goldfinger interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA)
which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 61310.
On August 20, 1999, the appellants, through Atty. Ronaldo Reyes, filed their brief with the CA. Before
the appellees (the respondents herein) could file their brief, the Padilla Reyes & De la Torre Law
Office filed on September 14, 1999 its withdrawal of appearance as counsel for the appellants. On the
same day, the Luis Q.U. Uranza, Jr. & Associates filed its appearance as counsel for the appellants and
filed a notice of withdrawal of appeal. However, the withdrawal of appearance of the Padilla Reyes &
De la Torre Law Office, the appearance of the Luis Q.U. Uranza, Jr. & Associates and the notice of
withdrawal of appeal filed by Luis Q.U. Uranza, Jr. & Associates did not bear the conformity of the
appellants. The appellees (herein respondents) were served with copies thereof thru their counsel by
registered mail.12
On September 15, 1999, the respondents filed with the CA a Motion to Execute Against the Injunction
Bond posted by herein petitioner Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation, serving a copy thereof
on Atty. Ronaldo Reyes.13
The respondents alleged inter alia in their motion that the appellants Coyukiat and Goldfinger were
not entitled to a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction. They contend that
were it not for the said temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction, the
appellants would not have been able to hide and dispose of their assets and sell the buses, thus
frustrating the collection of the amount of P11,000,000 representing the respondents’
counterclaim.14 The CA issued a resolution requiring the petitioner to file its comment on the
motion.
On September 16, 1999, the CA issued a resolution granting the withdrawal of the Padilla Reyes & De
la Torre Law Office as counsel for the appellants and noting the entry of the Luis Q.U. Uranza, Jr. &
Associates as new counsel. However, with respect to the withdrawal of their appeal, the CA directed
the appellants to submit their written conformity thereto, and held in abeyance the resolution of the
said incident pending compliance by the appellants to its resolution.15
On September 28, 1999, the appellants submitted to the CA their conformity to the withdrawal of
their appeal. On October 8, 1999, the CA issued a resolution (a) declaring that the appeal of the
appellants was considered withdrawn and dismissed; and (b) directing the appellees to address their
motion to execute the bond with the trial court after the remand thereto of the records. On the same
day, an entry of judgment was issued by the CA.16
On November 4, 1999, the petitioner filed with the CA its comment on the opposition to the motion
to execute filed by the respondents with the CA on the following grounds:
110
I
There is no basis for defendants-appellees to execute against the injunction bond.17
II
The Decision of the lower court has become final and, therefore, defendants-appellees’ Motion can no
longer be entertained.18
III
Even assuming, for the sake of argument that an application for damages can still be made,
defendants-appellees suffered no damage by reason of the issuance of the injunction.19
In accordance with the directive of the Court of Appeals, the respondents filed on December 9, 1999
with the RTC Quezon City, Br. 223, a Motion to Resolve their Motion to Execute Against the Injunction
Bond. The respondents alleged inter alia that (a) the trial court had ruled that the plaintiffs Coyukiat
and Goldfinger were not entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction; (b) were it not for the writ, the
respondents would have been able to negotiate and collect on the remaining postdated checks of the
plaintiffs which had become stale in the meantime; (c) the plaintiffs were able to hide and dispose of
their assets because of a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction issued by
the court; (d) by reason of the failure of the plaintiffs to pay the amount due and demandable under
the decision of the court, the respondents sustained damages; (e) in accordance with the provisions
of the Revised Rules of Court, before the decision of the court a quo became final and executory, the
respondents filed their motion to execute against the injunction bond on September 15, 1999 before
the CA; (f) the CA directed the respondents to address their motion to the trial court for
consideration and resolution thereof.20
On February 2, 2000, the court a quo issued an order denying the motion of the respondents on the
following grounds: (a) its Decision dated December 4, 1998 had already attained finality in view of
the withdrawal of the appeal by the plaintiffs; and (b) the resolution of the respondents’ motion to
execute against the injunction bond would necessitate the reception of evidence which could no
longer be done as its decision had become final and executory. The respondents’ motion for
reconsideration of the order was denied by the court on March 13, 2000.21
On April 21, 2000, the respondents, consequently, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure before the CA seeking the annulment of the February 2, 2000 and
March 13, 2000 Orders of the court a quo. The respondents in this case alleged inter alia that the
court a quo acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
denied their motion to resolve (the motion to execute against the injunction bond) on the ground
that the judgment in the main case had become final and executory, and that the case could no longer
be re-opened for the parties to adduce evidence in support of the motion.22
On June 23, 2000, herein petitioner filed its comment. The petitioner averred that the decision of the
trial court had become final and executory on September 14, 1999, upon the withdrawal of the
appeal. Further, when the CA issued its October 8, 1999 Resolution directing the respondents in this
case to address their motion to the trial court, it had already lost its jurisdiction over the appeal. Even
assuming that the motion of the respondents was timely filed, nevertheless, they did not suffer any
damages arising from the preliminary injunction issued by the trial court. The injunction bond
answers only for the damages caused to the adverse party by reason of the wrongful issuance of the
injunction and not for the damages awarded by the trial court on the respondents’ counter-claims.
On October 31, 2000, the CA rendered a decision annulling the assailed orders of the trial court and
granting the motion to execute on the injunction bond issued by the petitioner therein, thus:
111
“WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders dated February 2, 2000 and March 13, 2000 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and, in lieu thereof, another is rendered granting the petitioners’ Motion to Execute
Against the Injunction Bond. No costs.”23
The Court of Appeals cited the ruling of this Court in International Container Terminal Services, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals,24 which declared that Section 20, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court regarding the
application against the surety bond in support of the writ of preliminary attachment shall apply by
analogy to a preliminary injunction. The CA likewise cited the ruling of this Court in Rivera
v.Talavera,25and Ponce Enrile v. Capulong,26that the application or claim for damages against the
injunction bond must be filed before the trial court either during the trial with due notice to the
surety or sureties, or even after trial when judgment is rendered, but before entry thereof.
In its petition at bar, the petitioner contends that the decision and resolution of the CA should be
reversed and set aside based on the following grounds:
1. With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals decided the case in a way not in accord
with law and the applicable decisions of the Honorable Supreme Court. The Honorable Court of
Appeals erred when it ruled that it still had jurisdiction over the case even after Coyukiat and
Goldfinger had filed their Notice of Withdrawal of Appeal as a matter of right.
2. Respondents are not entitled to execute on the injunction bond for failing to file an application
for damages against the injunction bond at the trial of the main case, Civil Case No. Q-95-24462, and
for filing the same only after the decision in said case had become final and executory.
3. The judgment of the Quezon City RTC-Branch 223 in the main case, Civil Case No. Q-95-24462,
did not include any award for damages in favor of respondents by reason of the issuance of the writ
of preliminary injunction, and the fact that the decision therein was in favor of respondents did not
automatically entitle them to such award for damages.
4. The damages allegedly sustained by respondents were not by reason of the issuance of the writ
of preliminary injunction.27
The petition is bereft of merit.
On the first ground, the petitioner argues that the withdrawal of the appeal on September 14, 1999
rendered the decision of the trial court ipso facto final and executory. Since the appellants filed their
notice of withdrawal of appeal before the filing of the appellees’ brief, under Section 3, Rule 50 of the
Rules of Court, the appeal could be withdrawn without the need for the trial court’s post factum
approval. Further, under Section 1(c) of Rule 15 of the 1996 Internal Rules of the CA, when an appeal
is withdrawn, entry of judgment shall be made immediately.
For their part, the respondents contend that the filing of the withdrawal of appeal through new
counsel, but without the appellants’ written conformity to the substitution and to such withdrawal of
appeal, was not self-executory. The appeal was deemed withdrawn and dismissed only upon the
submission by the appellants of their written conformity to the substitution of their new counsel and
to the withdrawal of their appeal, and the CA’s approval of the same. It was only then that the appeal
of the appellants was deemed withdrawn and dismissed, and the decision of the trial court rendered
final and executory. Thus:
The Court of Appeals still had ju

risdiction over the case when the
Motion to Execute Against the
Injunction Bond was filed.
Petitioner argues in its Petition that Coyukiat filed a Withdrawal of Appeal on September 14, 1999 or
one day before respondents filed their Motion to Execute Against Injunction Bond on September 15,
112
1999. Since no appellee’s brief had been filed at that time, petitioner argues that the withdrawal of
the appeal was a matter of right. Thus, Pioneer triumphantly concludes, on September 14, 1999 the
appeal was already effectively withdrawn and the Decision of the trial court had already become final
and executory.
What Pioneer conveniently does not discloseis that the Withdrawal of Appeal was not filed by
counsel of record for Coyukiat but a different counselpurporting to be the newly substituted counsel
for Coyukiat. This different counsel from the counsel of record had entered her appearance as such
only for the purpose of withdrawing the appeal.
More importantly, Pioneer also conveniently fails to disclosethat neither the Entry of Appearance of
new counsel for Coyukiat nor the Withdrawal of the Appeal bore the conformity of Willy Choa
Coyukiat and Gold-finger Transport Corporation—the appellants.
It is well-established that substitution of counsel is not effective without the conformity of client.
Moreover, well-entrenched is the rule that pleadings which have the effect of withdrawing the appeal
should bear the conformity of the appellant.
Clearly therefore, the Withdrawal of Appeal filed on September 14, 1999 was not effectual because it
did not bear the conformity of Coyukiat. The new counsel of Coyukiat (who entered her appearance
without Coyukiat’s conformity in substitution of the counsel of record) cannot reasonably expect that
she will be allowed by the Court of Appeals to withdraw the appeal on her own. This is especially so
when even her substitution of the counsel of record does not bear the conformity of the appellants.
In a long line of cases, the court has ruled that the attorney of record is regarded as the counsel who
should be held responsible for the conduct of the case (Fojas vs. Navarro, 32 SCRA 476, 485 [1970]).
For a substitution of attorneys to be effectual, the procedure to be followed strictlyis as follows:
“In order that there may be substitution of attorneys in a given case, there must be (1) a written
application for substitution; (2) the written consent of the client; (3) the written consent of the
attorney substituted; and (4) in case such written consent cannot be secured, there must be filed
with the application proof of service of notice of such motion upon the attorney to be substituted, in
the manner prescribed by the rules. Unless the foregoing formalities are complied with, substitution
will not be permitted, and the attorney who properly appeared last in the case, before such
application for substitution, will be regarded as the attorney of record and will be held responsible
for the proper conduct of the case.” (Adarne vs. Aldaba, A.C. No. 801, June 27, 1978; Cortez, et al. vs.
CA, et al., L-32547, May 9, 1978; Ramos vs. Potenciano, 118 Phil. 1435; and U.S. vs. Borromeo, 20 Phil.
189).
In this case, therefore, the Withdrawal of Appeal filed by a new counsel who substituted the counsel
of record—Atty. Ronaldo Reyes, without bearing the conformity of Coyukiat was a mere scrap of
paper.
This is precisely the reason why the Court of Appeals issued a resolution requiring the appellant to
submit his conformity to the withdrawal.
As mentioned above, the appellants only manifested their desire to withdraw the appeal, by way of
the signature of Coyukiat in his behalf and in behalf of Goldfinger Transport Corporation, on
September 29, 1999.
This conformity was taken note of by the Court of Appeals on October 8, 1999when it dismissed the
appeal.
113
Clearly, therefore, even if we were to follow petitioner’s argument that a withdrawal of appeal is a
matter of right and needs no further action from the court, in this case the intention of withdrawing
the appeal was only properly made known to the court by Coyukiat and Goldfinger Transport Corp.
on September 29, 1999.
By that time, respondents had already filed their Motion to Execute Against the Injunction Bond.
It is, therefore, not factually and legally accurate for petitioner Pioneer to claim that the Court of
Appeals had already lost jurisdiction over the case when the Motion to Execute Against the
Injunction Bond was filed.28
In its reply to the comment of the respondents, the petitioner avers that the compliance to the CA
Resolution of September 16, 1999, to submit the appellants’ conformity to the substitution of new
counsel and the withdrawal of the appeal was a ratification of the withdrawal of the appeal by the
new counsel which should be deemed effective as of the date of the filing of the notice of withdrawal
of appeal, or on September 14, 1999.
For its part, the CA ruled that it still retained jurisdiction over the appeal when the respondents filed
their motion for execution of the bond with the said court, the supervening finality of the RTC
decision notwithstanding:
The record shows that the withdrawal of their appeal by appellants Willy Choa Coyukiat and
Goldfinger Transport Corporation from the decision rendered in Civil Case No. Q-95-24462 was
approved by the Thirteenth Division of this Court only on October 8, 1999. Having preceded the
resolution to the effect issued in CA-G.R. CV No. 61310 (p. 92, Rollo)by twenty-three (23) days, there
is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioners’ filing of their application for damages against the
injunction bond on September 15, 1999 (pp. 72-75, ibid.)was still well within the time frame the law
prescribes therefor. That this Court still had jurisdiction over the case when the petitioners’ Motion
for Execution Against the Injunction Bond was filed is evident from the referral thereof to the court a
quo in the same order which granted the appellants’ withdrawal of their appeal (p. 92,ibid.). The
supervening finality of the decision in Civil Case No. Q-95-24462 notwithstanding, the respondent
court clearly committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioners’ motion to resolve their
application for damages solely on the ground that the withdrawal of the appeal rendered its Decision
dated December 4, 1998 final and executory (p. 28, ibid.).29
The contention of the petitioner does not persuade.
First. The notice of withdrawal of appeal filed by the Luis Q.U. Uranza, Jr. & Associates on September
14, 1999 with the CA was a mere scrap of paper, absent a valid substitution of counsel. The counsel of
record as of September 14, 1999 was the Padilla Reyes & De la Torre Law Office. On the said date, the
law office filed a motion with the CA to withdraw as counsel for the appellants, while the Luis Q.U.
Uranza, Jr. & Associates filed the notice of withdrawal of appeal for the appellants. In the case of
Santana- Cruz v.Court of Appeals,30this Court enumerated the essential requisites of a valid
substitution of counsel:
. . . No substitution of counsel of record is allowed unless the following essential requisites of a valid
substitution of counsel concur: (1) there must be a written request for substitution; (2) it must be
filed with the written consent of the client; (3) it must be with the written consent of the attorney to
be substituted; and (4) in case the consent of the attorney to be substituted cannot be obtained, there
must be at least a proof of notice that the motion for substitution was served on him in the manner
prescribed by the Rules of Court. . . .31
There was clearly no compliance to these essential requisites. It was only on September 16, 1999
when the CA granted the motion of the Padilla Reyes & De la Torre Law Office to withdraw as counsel
114
for the appellants that the withdrawal of the said counsel and its substitution by the Luis Q.U. Uranza,
Jr. & Associates became effective.
Second. Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, as amended, reads:
Section 3. Withdrawal of appeal.—An appeal may be withdrawn as a matter of right at any time
before the filing of the appellee’s brief. Thereafter, the withdrawal may be allowed in the discretion
of the court.
We agree with the respondents that the notice of withdrawal of appeal of the appellants in CA-G.R.
CV No. 61310 filed on September 14, 1999 was not self-executory, and did not render the trial court’s
December 4, 1998 Decision final and executory. While we agree with the petitioner that under
Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, an appeal may be withdrawn by the appellants as a matter of
right at any time before the filing of the appellees’ brief; however, the rule does not apply in this case
because the notice of withdrawal of appeal filed in CA-G.R. CV No. 61310 by the Luis Q.U. Uranza, Jr. &
Associates did not bear the appellants’ conformity thereto. It bears stressing that the counsel of the
appellants was a mere agent holding a special power of attorney to act for and in behalf of the
principal respecting the ordinary course of the appealed case. There was a need for the appellants, as
the principals, to execute a special power of attorney specifically authorizing the withdrawal of a
perfected appeal.32 Absent a special power of attorney expressly authorizing their counsel to
withdraw their appeal, or in lieu thereof, the written conformity of the appellants to the withdrawal
of their appeal, the notice of withdrawal of appeal by the new counsel of the appellants was a mere
scrap of paper.
Third. The submission by the appellants on September 28, 1999 of the requisite conformity to the
withdrawal of their appeal should not be given retroactive effect so as to foreclose the right of the
respondents to file with the CA their motion to execute against the injunction bond, thus enabling the
petitioner to escape liability on the same. As ratiocinated by the CA:
. . . Having successfully enjoined the encashment of the checks they issued through the surety bond
issued by the private respondent (pp. 55-58,ibid.), Willy Choa Coyukiat and Goldfinger Transport
Corporation were able to use and dispose of the petitioners’ buses (p. 134, ibid.)and to evade the
satisfaction of the decision rendered in Civil Case No. Q-95-24462 pending appeal (pp. 76-77, ibid.).
Far from acknowledging the judgment debt, therefore, it appears that the withdrawal of the appeal
was merely calculated to further frustrate the satisfaction of the same.33
The notice of withdrawal of appeal was deemed filed only on September 28, 1999 upon compliance
with the September 16, 1999 Resolution of the CA. The appeal of the appellants was effectively
withdrawn and dismissed before October 8, 1999 when the CA issued its resolution therein. The
petitioner should not be benefited by the deleterious manipulation of the rules of procedure.
On the second ground, the petitioner avers that the respondents failed to serve a copy of their
(respondents’) motion to execute on the bond as mandated by Section 20, Rule 51 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, which reads:
1. The application for damages must be filed in the same case where the bond was issued;
2. Such application for damages must be filed before the entry of judgment; and
3. After hearing with notice to the surety.34
In International Container Terminal Services, Inc. v.Court of Appeals,35this Court ruled that due
notice to the adverse party and its surety setting forth the facts supporting the applicant’s right to
damages and the amount thereof under the bond is indispensable. The surety should be given an
opportunity to be heard as to the reality or reasonableness of the damages resulting from the
115
wrongful issuance of the writ.36 In the absence of due notice to the surety, therefore, no judgment
for damages may be entered and executed against it.
In this case, the petitioner was not served with a copy of the motion to execute on the bond filed by
the respondents with the CA in CA-G.R. CV 61310. But the records show that the CA directed the
petitioner to file its comment on the said motion.37 On November 4, 1999, the petitioner filed its
comment on the respondents’ motion, and on December 9, 1999, the respondents filed their motion
to resolve with the trial court, serving a copy thereof to the petitioner. It cannot, thus, be gainsaid
that the petitioner was deprived of its right to be heard on the respondents’ motion to execute on the
bond.
We also agree that the Court of Appeals had the authority to remand to the court of origin the
resolution of the motion to execute against the injunction bond after the parties adduced their
respective evidence on the motion. To repeat, the respondents’ motion to execute was filed earlier
than the motion to withdraw the appeal, and more importantly, before the December 4, 1998
Decision of the court of origin became final and executory.38
On the third and fourth grounds, the same should be addressed to and resolved by the trial court
after due hearing and presentation of evidence. As it was, the trial court denied the motion of the
respondents on its finding that it had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the motion, without
affording the parties the right to adduce evidence thereon.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is DENIED DUE COURSE. The decision of the Court
of Appeals is AFFIRMED. The RTC Quezon City, Branch 223, is directed to resolve on the merits
the Motion to Execute Against Injunction Bond filed by the respondents after the parties shall
have adduced their respective evidence in Civil Case No. Q-95-24462 with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Austria-Martinez and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., On official leave.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
Notes.—Courts may not presume that the counsel of record has been substituted by a second
counsel merely from the filing of a formal appearance by the latter. (Bernardo vs. Court of
Appeals, 275 SCRA 413 [1997])
In the absence of a notice of withdrawal or substitution of counsel, the court will rightly
assume that the counsel of record continues to represent his client and receipt of the notice
by the former is the reckoning point of the reglementary period. (Ram’s Studio and
Photographic Equipment, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 346 SCRA 691 [2000])
116

Legal Ethics Week 11 and 15 Cases (Canons 14-22)

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Legal Ethics Week 11 and 15 Cases (Canons 14-22)

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Week 11 Cases (Canon 14 and 15)

a. A.C. No. 6155. March 14, 2006.*

b. A.C. No. 4401. January 29, 2004.*

c. Adm. Case No. 378. March 30, 1962.

d. Adm. Mat. No. MTJ-95-1063. February 9, 1996.*

Week 13 Cases (Canon 16 and 17)

b. Adm. Case No. 5831. January 13, 2003.*

c. A.C. No. 4219. December 8, 2003.*

d. A.C. No. 6656. December 13, 2005.*

e. Adm. Case No. 2736. May 27, 1991.*

Week 14 Cases (Canon 18 and 19)

b. A.C. No. 6788. August 23, 2007.*

c. Adm. Case CBD No. 190. January 28, 1998.*

d. Adm. Case No. 4103. September 7, 1995.*

e. Adm. Case No. 3294. February 17, 1993.*

g. G.R. No. 75856. June 4, 1990.*

h. A.M. No. 405 May 31, 1971

i. G.R. No. 90083. October 4, 1990.*

j. A.C. No. 3523. January 17, 2005.*

k. G.R. Nos. 93026-27. December 17, 1996.*

Week 15 Cases (Canon 20 and 22)

b. G.R. No. 147010. July 18, 2003.*

A.C. No. 6155. March 14, 2006.*

Antoniutti K. Palaña for respondent.

The facts are as follows:

[a]ttempted [h]omicide of Mario C. Macato.”23 Rule 14.0124 of the Code of Professional

As a rule, an attorney-client relationship is said to exist when a lawyer voluntarily permits or

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Violation of Code of Professional Responsibility.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Godwin Denzil B. Manginsay for complainant.

Thus spawned the present complaint against Atty. Ocampos.

Attorneys-at-law; Lawyers cannot represent conflicting interests in a case.—Lawyers are

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

This is a disbarment proceedings against attorney Francisco S. Reyes for malpractice.

Atty. Francisco S. Reyes

1) To ratify documents covering bank transactions;

Yours very truly,

(Sgd.) FRANCISCO S. REYES

Reyes, J.B.L. and Concepcion, JJ ., took no part.

Respondent admonished and warned not to repeat it.

The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.

Raymundo A. Quiroz for complainant.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

ALBRYAN July 19, Bacolod 46 Malaspina St.,

CHERYL LYNNE May 5, Bacolod 46 Malaspina St.,

Act contrary to law.

Deputy Court Administrator Elepaño then recommends:

WHEREFORE, for want of merit, the instant complaint is DISMISSED.

Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

A.C. No. 4349. December 22, 1997.*

The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.

Rodolfo R. Paulino for complainant.

xxx xxx xxx

PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Atty. Francisco Ricafort be

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Failure to Fulfill Fiduciary Obligation.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The complaint alleges the following facts:

Except for the penalty, we find the recommendation is well taken.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

March 21, 2000

JUDGE JUAN CABREDO

Dear Judge Cabredo: