From Memoir to Case History: Schreber, Freud and Jung

Author(s): KAREN BRYCE FUNT

Source: Mosaic: An Interdisciplinary Critical Journal , Fall 1987, Vol. 20, No. 4, DATA
and ACTA: Aspects of Life-Writing (Fall 1987), pp. 97-115
Published by: University of Manitoba

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24777651

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 From Memoir to Case History:
Schieber, Freud and Jung

KAREN BRYCEFUNT

In 1903, Daniel Paul Schreber, a presiding appellate court judge who had been an
inmate of a government mental institution for nine years, accomplished the unpre
cedented: he wrote his way out of the asylum. The major evidence he produced i
his defense was his autobiography. Since then, he has had many readers; among the
more illustrious were Freud and Jung, who approached Schreber's Memoirs as if
were a case history and used it to articulate their emerging differences. My purpos
in the following essay is to explore the multiple ramifications of this use of an
autobiographical—i.e., literary—document in the formation of psychological
theory.

* * *

Schreber was born in 1842, the third

book on child-rearing which went in
was nineteen. On both sides of his fa
siderable prominence, both as scholar
five, Gustav, his only brother and the
A year later Schreber married Sabine
In October 1884, Schreber (then age
the Reichstag while serving as the p
Chemnitz, part of Saxony in what is

Mosaic 2014
0027/1276-87/010097-19 $01.50 © Mosaic

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98 Karen Bryce Funî

Schreber consulted the Leipzig psychiatrist Flechsig, who figures prominently in

the subsequent Memoirs. Schreber voluntarily admitted himself for six months
to Flechsig's psychiatric clinic where he made two suicide attempts. Though
reportedly severely depressed, he suffered, by his own account, none of the major
hallucinations he was to report of a decade later.
After his stay in the psychiatric clinic, Schreber returned to the bench: first to his
old position in Chemnitz and then as the presiding judge of the more influential
lower court of Leipzig, a post he retained for almost eight years. In October 1893,
Schreber was promoted to the position of chief justice, or Senatspräsident, of the
appellate court of Dresden where his colleagues, over whom he presided, were all
men considerably older than he was. Schreber later attested that this caused him
considerable strain. He also reported that he was distressed by the six miscarriages
his wife had experienced over the fifteen years of their marriage. Depression
returned and in November 1893 he consulted his former psychiatrist, Flechsig; the
following night he tried to commit suicide. He then voluntarily re-admitted himself
to Flechsig's private clinic for a period of six months, whereupon he was trans
ferred (with a short stop at another private clinic), to the public mental institution at
Sonnenstein (the first of its kind in Germany), where his incarceration became
mandatory.
During this nine-year period, Schreber experienced major hallucinations which
he describes extensively in the Memoirs. Both his imagery, which is pervasively
sexual and religious, and his setting, which is psychiatric and legal, made
the Memoirs an entirely unique document to such readers as Freud and Jung.
According to his English translators Macalpine and Hunter, whose work also
involved biographical research on Schreber, he did not learn that his incarceration
had become mandatory until 1899, whereupon he began his legal battle to regain
control over his institutionalization. His tutelage was rescinded only after he had
taken his appeal to three levels of the court, always under a self-conducted defense
using his Memoirs as his major evidence. Having obtained the legal right to leave
the asylum in September 1902, he nonetheless decided to stay until early 1903.
The Memoirs was published a year later, though members of Schreber's family
purportedly made substantial efforts to buy and destroy most copies (Macalpine
and Hunter 369). One of the unprecedented aspects of the Memoirs was its
Appendix where Schreber published all the relevant court material: legal judg
ments, the psychiatrist's report and the prosecutor's summation. This made the
text amenable to legal study, in which capacity the case still remains a landmark.
While it was claimed by Baumeyer ("Schreber Case" 65-67) and later Niederland
(7) that Schreber suffered a relapse after his wife's death in 1907, and was re
admitted to the asylum until his death in 1911, Macalpine and Hunter assert that
there is no way to confirm this (2).

* * *

Though Schreber was still alive when

Freud nor Jung attempted to investiga

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 Schreber, Freud and Jung 99

Freud and Jung functioned as readers, not psychoanalysts. The Memoirs are in
narrative form; Schreber as author tells his story, yet Freud and Jung accepted the
Memoirs as "history" and proceeded to psychoanalyze.
Unlike a psychiatric case history where a reader encounters the patient through
the sole mediation of the analyst, with Schreber's Memoirs as with most auto
biographies, the narrator, author and major character are conflated.2 Like any
author, Schreber mediates and controls all elements of the narrative, including his
relations with psychiatrists, his transference objects. When one focuses not on
Schreber as an author but as a character in an ongoing narrative written by Freud
and Jung, however, there is no psychoanalytic relation. Schreber's transferences
obviously cannot extend to Freud or Jung, yet that is exactly what a reader would
reasonably expect from a case history.
What is lost in large part by this particular shift from autobiography to case
history is precisely a consciousness on the part of the psychoanalyst of the trans
ference relation. For when Freud writes a "case history" of Schreber, two basic
structural positions are changed from the standard psychiatric case history: the
narrator, i.e. Freud, is not the attending psychiatrist (who could comment on the
transferences and counter-transferences thus involved) and the major subject of
the text, i.e., Schreber, is depended upon for all "historical evidence." Yet here,
despite surface disclaimers, Freud' s implication is that he can function as a psycho
analyst in reference to Schreber. His role, however, is structurally more akin to a
biographer, whose sole sources of reference are the written documentation of
his subject.
As was suggested, autobiographies conflate author, narrator and primary char
acter. In a case history that conflation also occurs, and therefore one would think
that case history would qualify as a form of autobiography, but there is one
important proviso: namely, the psychiatrist, who functions as author and narrator,
is only a secondary character. He or she is never the explicit primary subject. So in
a generic sense, a standard case history can be seen as a specific variant of auto
biography, with the narrator assuming the role of secondary character. Freud's text
is essentially a form of biography, where the author is distanced from the primary
subject of the text. As with all biographies, however, the biographer's distance can
always be challenged, since biographies are notoriously prone to projections on the
part of the author. In the case of Freud's and Jung's treatments of Schreber, this
situation is no exception.
Clearly, from Schreber's authorial position, Freud and Jung were merely two
anonymous readers. Nonetheless, from the perspective of the readers themselves,
projections, transferences, counter-transferences and identifications with Schreber
and the characters of his text were not only possible but all too often insufficiently
conscious. In other words, it was both the standard literary relation between author
and readers, and between biographers and their subjects. However, and this is part
of my current interest in the Freud/Jung correspondence, in the informal setting of
the letters, Freud in particular allowed himself a degree of self-analysis which he
censored from his published version of the Schreber case.
The question in part is one of categorizing both Schreber's Memoirs and Freud's

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100 Karen Bryce Funt

case history, for they both bridge several genres. Each genre—autobiography,
biography and case history—is marked by an internal tension between its histor
icity and its fictionality. James Hillman makes a useful distinction, following E.M.
Forster (86), between "story" and "plot," in which latter category Hillman places
Freud's case histories. Hillman cites Forster's Aspects of the Novel.

"The king died and then the queen died," is a story. "The king died and then the
queen died of grief," is a plot.... If it is in a story we say "and then?" If it is in a
plot we ask "why?" (130)

Schreber wrote his Memoirs in what

As an autobiography, nevertheless, it w
ology. When Freud and Jung tried to
"story" became a "plot." Hillman argue
plots in this sense and can never be the
ically are portrayed to be.
Recent autobiographical theorists Pa
and Paul Jay have emphasized how the
parent genre many of its practitione
theory, prefers not even to call autobio
whose purpose prov is in large part to
coherence that was lacking prior to c
that coherence would be as necessary f
the courts and his family.
DeMan, Jay and Lang all carry the i
step further than Bruss, arguing that
ing a sense of a unified Subject is a goal
and it is a Lacanian hypothesis, is that t
and does not in any sense exist prior t

Are we so certain the autobiography d

depends on its subject or a (realistic) pic
produces the autobiography as an act pro
suggest, with equal justice, that the auto
and determine the life and that whatever t
technical demands of self-portraiture and
resources of his medium The autobiog
ment between the two subjects involved
determine each other by mutual

This of course complicates the issue o

the first instance Freud and Jung, can
and not a "case." Freud's case history
patients, had caused him some embarr
withheld the Dora case from publicatio
her identity and also realize his failu
choosing to write about Schreber, Fr

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 Schreber, Freud and Jung 101

possible accusation of failure or indiscretion, and further, that by examining an

autobiography as a pretext for the formulation of theory, he was able publicly to
mask his own transferences and projections in regard to Fliess, while at the same
time and by his own account, he was able to work through those unresolved issues.
In 1911, Freud's study of Schreber became the first published discussion of the
Memoirs while Jung's discussion of the case was dispersed through his later writ
ings. Freud titled his analysis "Psycho-Analytic Notes on an Autobiographical
Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides)." The use of the word
"Notes" emphasizes the speculative nature of his analysis, just as he draws atten
tion to his role as critic at a distance from the subject in his use of "on an Auto
biographical Account."3 In other words, here as in so many other places in his
writing, Freud was self-conscious of his gestures as a writer.
The title also highlights a new term, "paranoia." This paper was Freud's first
attempt to articulate a theory of paranoia; it was a term not in common usage, even
within the small psychiatric community. The word itself comes from the Greek
"para," meaning beside, and "nous," meaning mind—implying beside the mind,
beside oneself, madness (Partridge 441). It was a rather general term for madness,
so by using Schreber as a prototype, Freud was beginning the more specialized
usage of paranoia assumed today, articulated as follows by Laplanche and Pontalis:
"Chronic psychosis characterized by more or less systematized delusion, with a
predominance of ideas of reference but with no weakening of the intellect and,
generally speaking, no tendency towards deteriorization. As well as delusions of
persecution, Freud places erotomania, delusional jealousy and delusions of gran
deur under the heading of paranoia" (296).
By specifically characterizing his "diagnosis" of Schreber as "paranoia," Freud
initiated discussion on several topics still prominent in psychoanalytic theory
including the nature of psychosis, delusion, and what has come to be known as
"systematized delusion," issues both quite distinct from those associated with
neurosis and, one would assume, quite distinct from such literary issues as the
degree to which a reader is asked by an author to enter into his or her "delusional
system." If one accepts the Laplanche/Pontalis definition of paranoia, then one
must ask if Schreber can be approached substantially differently from the way in
which one would approach any other author. In other words, it is possible to make a
simultaneous and double gesture to Schreber: as reader to author and as psycho
analyst to case history. Freud and Jung did precisely that, however not with the
sense of self-interrogation one might expect.
It was Jung who sent Schreber's Memoirs to Freud. At least on a rhetorical level,
Freud and Jung expressed a spontaneous enthusiasm for Schreber which is not
evident in their public writings on him.

April 22,1910, Freud to Jung: [Freud speaks of] the wonderful Schreber, who
ought to have been made a professor of psychiatry and director of a mental
hospital. (187 F)4
September 29, 1910, Jung to F
much you appreciate the greatn
of the "basic language." (213 J)

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102 Karen Bryce Funt

October 1, 1910, Freud to Jung: I share your enthusiasm for Schreber; it is a kind
of revelation. (214 F)

October31, 1910, Freud to Jung: First an analysis of our dear and ingenious
friend Schreber. (218 F)

December 3, 1910, Freud to Jung: I am all Schreber. (223 F)

March 19, 1911, Jung to Freud: Only now that I have the galleys can I enjoy your
Schreber. It is not only uproariously funny, but brilliantly written as well If I
were an altruist I would now be saying how glad I am that you have taken Schreber
under your wing and shown psychiatry what treasures are heaped up there. (243 J)

As one looks at the letters in further detail, it becomes clear that perhaps the
major interest for both of them, at least initially, was Schreber's use of language.
They were impressed with his "delusional utterances." Freud included an extended
discussion of Schreber's definitional structure in his case history (2Iff.) and he
devoted considerable space to what Schreber may have meant by such crucial terms
as "the state of bliss," "the order of things," "the rays of God," "basic (root)
language," "nerves of voluptuousness," "soul-murder" and "miracle" (as a verb).
Freud argued that by analysis of Schreber's language one could construct the mean
ing and mechanisms of his illness. This was quite an innovative posture at a time
when schizophrenic language was generally ignored. He used the analogy to dream
interpretation: that in the details of fantasy formation lie the elements of psychical
construction in condensed form (38).

October 1, 1910, Freud to Jung: I plan to introduce "basic language" as a serious

technical term—meaning the original wording of a delusional idea which the
patient's consciousness (as in the case of the Rat Man) experiences only in
distorted form. (214 F)

October 31, 1910, Freud to Jung:

friend Schreber. Because one can g
father complex: Obviously Flechsig
Flechsig points to a brother who lik
at the time of the illness. The "fore

(breasts!) are the women of the fam

are the father and his sublimation, God.... (218 F)

It is interesting to note that Freud did not include this interpretation of t

God in his formal case-history. Later psychoanalytic theorists, notab
White (66), have wondered how Freud could have overlooked this
Schreber's imagery.

October31, 1910 [continued]: There is no mention of any "soul-murde

Manfred but there is of incest with a sister.... (218 F)

Manfred is Byron's dramatic poem that Schreber mentions in his Memoirs. None
of the analyses of the case, including Freud's, directly implies that Schreber may
have had an incestuous relationship, even on a fantasy level, with his sister. How
ever, the later biographical research done by both Morton Schatzman (12-13) and

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 Sehr eher, Freud and Jung 103

Robert White (59) indicate that he was particularly close to a younger sister, per
haps closer to her than to other members of his family or to his wife.

October 31, 1910 [continued]: The castration complex is only too evident. Don't
forget that Schreber's father was a doctor. As such, he performed miracles, he
miracled. In other words, the delightful characterization of God—that he knows
how to deal only with corpses and has no idea of living people—and the absurd
miracles that are performed on him (Schreber) are a bitter satire on his father's
medical art. In other words the same use of absurdity as in dreams. The enormous
significance of homosexuality for paranoia is confirmed by the central emascu
lation fantasy. (218 F)

The letters reveal Freud's awar

indicated in reference to his choice
truth for his interpretation, but h
his letter to Jung, "guesses from
these guesses as corroboration of
counter-transferences to the case.
In his case history Freud made c
pretation and theory: "I. Case His
(35-58); "III. On the Mechanism of
each section was fairly even and
level. Many of the re-interpreters
of the other two. For example, Ju
Freud's description, although he to
Lacan accepted both description an
assumptions, while Schatzman, W
questioned the case back to the lev
description as a relatively complet
biographical information on Schre
tieth-century Vienna.
The methodological issue here,
approaches and "reads" Schreber's
and Jung were, and not interroga
seek to account for Schreber's tex
biographical circumstances. Both
with a text. Freud makes some qu
concerning the Schreber case:

October 1,1910, Freud to Jung: I see

as I do; [he had just discussed the Sch
that leads straight ahead, you keep yo
This is the best way, I think; afterwa
these digressions. Consequently, I w
ology. (214 F)
December 18, 1910, F
formally imperfect, fl

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104 Karen Bryce Funt

good things in it, and it contains the boldest thrust at psychiatry since your
Dementia Praecox. 1 am unable to judge its objective worth as was possible with
earlier papers, because in working on it 1 have had to fight off complexes within
myself (Fliess). (225 F; emphasis mine)

Here Freud has given some insight into what he thought m

the case. He alludes to his analytic style, where method
spectively. He candidly admits the possibility that in the
dealing with his own projections vis-à-vis Fliess.
This is an extremely important and previously neglected
rated by three other letters written by Freud at exactly th
letters were written to Sandor Ferenczi. The previous yea
and Jung had traveled together to the United States. For sev
analyzed each other's dreams and Freud had consolidated h
Jung and Ferenczi. It is by combining the two sets of corre
regarding Fliess that it is possible to observe Freud's awar
was an important connection between his relation to Flies
Schreber case history.

October 6, 1910, Freud to Ferenczi: You not only noticed, bu

that I no longer have any need to uncover my personality co
correctly traced this back to the traumatic reason for it. Sin
the overcoming of which you recently saw me occupied,
extinguished. A part of my homosexual cathexsis has been w
use of to enlarge my own ego. I have succeeded where the pa
emphasis mine)5 (Letters to Fliess 2-3)
October 17, 1910, Freud to Ferenczi: You probably imagine that I h
quite other than those I have reserved for myself, or you believe that my
connected with a special sorrow, whereas I feel capable of handling e
and am pleased with the greater independence that results from havin
my homosexuality. (Letters to Fliess 4)
December 16, 1910, Freud to Ferenczi: I have now overcome Flie
you were so curious. (Letters to Fliess 4)

Freud and Jung's first reference to Schreber is dated 22 April 1

1910, in other words, exactly at the time of the first letter to Fe
Freud was saying to Jung, "I share your enthusiasm for Schreb
revelation." It is my hypothesis that the "revelation" was how
Schreber related to his own failed friendship with Fliess. On Oct
days later, Freud wrote to Ferenczi, "Since Fliess's case, with th
which you recently saw me occupied part of my homosexual c
withdrawn and made use of to enlarge my own ego. I have succ
paranoic fails." Freud called Schreber a paranoic and interp
hallucinations as homosexual; in his letters to Ferenczi he explici
own relation to Fliess as homosexual. The "success" that Freud claims is to have
"overcome" his homosexuality. By Freud's account, Schreber was a paranoic
suffering from hallucinations, precisely because Schreber was unable to "over
come his homosexuality."

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 Schreber, Freud and Jung 105

On 3 December 1910, Freud had said to Jung, "I am all Schreber." On

December 16th, he reported to Ferenczi that, "I have now overcome Fliess." And
just two days later, on 18 December 1910, Freud writes to Jung, referring to his
completion of the Schreber case, "I am unable to judge its objective worth as was
possible in earlier papers because in working on it I have had to fight off complexes
within myself (Fliess)." The implication is that his conclusions regarding the
recently completed case (i.e., the interpretation that all of Schreber's fantasies
were homosexually based, the interpretation of Schreber's transference to Flechsig
as homosexual, and then the further interpretation of Schreber's sexual fantasies
regarding God as a continuous line of transference from Flechsig) may stem from
his own projections and counter-transferences. Which is not to say that Freud did
not stand firmly behind his analysis of Schreber's text, but rather that he felt justi
fied in generalizing subjective experience into psychoanalytic theory.
Up to this point I have been dealing mainly with Freud's reactions to the
Schreber Memoirs. It was only after publication of Freud's case history in 1911,
that conflict over the case emerged between Jung and Freud, though clearly from
the following early indications, one can notice a divergence of approach:

March 19,1911, Jung to Freud: [continuation of the letter cited above, where
Jung gives his first reactions to Freud's galleys of the case]—For more than a year
now, amid unspeakable difficulties, I have been analysing a Dementia praecox
case, which has yielded very strange fruits; I am trying to make them compre
hensible to myself by a parallel investigation of incestuous fantasy in relation to
"creative fantasy." (243 J)
June 12, 1911, Jung to Freud: It seems th
costs to bring to light the inner world produ
in paranoics appears in distorted form as

Partly through thinking about Schreber

Jung is tentatively beginning to forge
ness and "creative fantasy" by examini
grounded in psychoanalytic assumption
word-association experiments and tries
"delusional utterances" themselves, a me
Freud compliments Jung on this meth
describes it as one of two basic method
Freud used this same basic method in h
that are quite language based, with a
alternative Freud proposes in the Schre
of the illness" (35)—an etiological meth
In the interpretive section (35-58), Freu
method, concluding: "The exciting cause
homosexual libido; the object of this lib
physician, Flechsig; and his struggles ag
conflict which gave rise to the patholog
Nevertheless, Schreber's language

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106 Karen Bryce Funt

extended discussion of his use of terms with religious associations (descriptive

section, 2 Iff.). It would seem that regarding the conscious logic of the case, Freud
basically used an etiological method while simultaneously keeping patient
centered language analysis as an important secondary methodology.
In the theoretical section of the case history (59-79), Freud joined mechanisms
of symptom-formation with mechanisms of repression: "The mechanism of
symptom-formation in paranoia requires that internal perceptions—feelings—
shall be replaced by external perceptions. Consequently, the proposition 'I hate
him' becomes transformed by projection into another one: 'He hates (persecutes)
me, which will justify me in hating him' (63)."
The details of the imagery in Schreber's hallucinations become submerged by the
way Freud focused on the analytic speculation that the image equals a repressed
paranoic projection. Freud immediately shifted attention away from the symptom to
his hypothesis of the cause. The cause, in turn, Freud assumed to be repressed desire
for an unacceptable object-choice. Regarding symptom-formation he concluded:
"Having thus been made aware that more general psychological problems are involved
in the question of the nature of projection, let us make up our minds to postpone the
investigation of it (and with it that of the mechanism of paranoic symptom-formation
in general) until some other occasion [editor James Strachey notes that there is 'no
trace of any such later discussion']; and let us now turn to consider what ideas we
can collect on the subject of the mechanism of repression in paranoia" (66).
Freud's discussion of symptom-formation is very brief—both in the Schreber
case and in his other writings—while his discussion of repression is extended. The
shift from symptom (imagery) to cause (the mechanics of repression) was swift,
and as always with Freud, seemingly natural and logical. Yet one is left with the
lingering feeling that Schreber's delusional language with its vivid imagery is
being partially eluded.
Clearly the two methods—amplification centering on imagery and language
versus delineation of the causes of the illness—are intimately linked and it is inter
esting to note that in Freud's exposition of the two methods, he seemed to be
pointing implicitly to the central element of difference that emerged between him
self and Jung. As Paul Ricoeur has amply discussed, Freud's method was inher
ently archeological (459-93). Analysis was a search for arche, a reverse teleology
digging backwards. One might have thought that Jung's emerging theories of
archetypal complexes would not have caused conflict with Freud's archeology.
But the differences became more profound as Freud increasingly looked for par
ticular traumatic incidents paralleling a circumscribed set of myths and Jung
sought to distance his interpretations from their bodily implications.
The rift between Jung and Freud became increasingly evident after Freud
published his Schreber. Jung responded to Freud's galleys in March 1911. By
November 1911, the case was published and Jung's tone became even more
markedly concerned:

November 14, 1911, Jung to Freud: That passage in your Schreber analysis where
you ran into the libido problem (loss of libido = loss of reality) is one of the points
where our mental paths cross. (282 J; emphasis mine)

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 Schreber, Freud and Jung 107

December 11, 1911, Jung to Freud: As for the libido problem, I must confess your
remark in the Schreber analysis.. .has set up booming reverberations. This
remark, or rather the doubt expressed therein, has resuscitated all the difficulties
that have beset me throughout the years in my attempt to apply the libido theory to
Dementia praecox. The loss of the reality function in Dementia praecox cannot be
reduced to repression of libido (defined as sexual hunger). Not by me at any rate.
Your doubt shows me that in your eyes as well the problem cannot be solved in this
way. I have now put together all the thoughts on the libido concept that have come
to me over the years, and devoted a chapter to them in my second part [Collected
Works V, part II, chapt. 2].... You must let my interpretation work on you as a
whole to feel its full impact. Mere fragments are barely intelligible.
(287 J; emphases mine)

The passage Jung is questioning in Freud's case history concludes: "It therefore
appears to me far more probable that the paranoic's altered relation to the world is
to be explained entirely or in the main by the loss of his libidinal interest" (75).
This is a return in a theoretical setting of Freud's conclusion that the "exciting
cause" of Schreber's illness was an "outburst of homosexual libido" directed
toward his psychiatrist, Flechsig. Freud assumed that Schreber experienced a basic
frustration of libido in this regard and that it was Schreber's literal homosexual
impulse and its frustration that "produced the conflict which gave rise to the patho
logical phenomena" (43). Jung was asking whether loss of libidinal interest in the
real world (and this could mean reference to the assumed object-choice of
Schreber's psychiatrist, Flechsig, or possible alternative object-choices such as his
wife, mother, father, sister or others) necessarily results in the loss of reality and
the construction of a paranoid fantasy system. Freud's equation was "Loss of libido
= loss of reality" (282 J), whereas Jung's resolution was a broadening of the
concept of libido. Freud ultimately rejected Jung's theoretical solution—or as
Freud would have it, compromise—as a basic undermining of Freud's sexual
assumptions. His formal response was published in 1914, in the essay "On
Narcissism: An Introduction." Personally, however, Freud insisted to Jung that the
question need not imply conflict:

June 13,1912, Freud to Jung: Dear friend: About the libido question, we shall
see. The nature of the change you have made is not quite clear to me and I know
nothing of its motivation. Once I am better informed, I shall surely be able to
switch to objectivity, precisely because I am well aware of my bias. Even if we
cannot come to terms immediately, there is no reason to suppose that this scien
tific difference will detract from our personal relations. I can recall profounder
differences between us at the beginning of our relationship. (319 F)

Though Freud expressed seeming eagerness to continue the friendship as before,

Jung, nonetheless, did take offense. As James Yandell has shown, on a number of
different occasions Jung was much quicker to take exception to Freud than vice
versa (54-76).
In a theoretical sense, the difference over libido did come to take on significant
dimensions, particularly when one examines the consequences to a theory of psy
chosis and language. As Jung said in his letter of 11 December 1911, that specific

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108 Karen Bryce Funt

difference "set up booming reverberations." Laplanche and Pontalis define libido

and conclude their definition of psychosis as follows:

[Libido:] Energy postulated by Freud as underlying the transformation of the

sexual instinct with respect to its object (displacement of cathexes), with respect
to its aim (e.g., sublimation), and with respect to the source of sexual excita
tion (diversity of erotogenic zones). For Jung the notion of libido extends to
embrace "psychical energy" in general, present in every "tendency towards" or
appetitus. (239)
[Psychosis: conclusion:
denominator of the psyc
relation to reality ; the m
construction, are accordin
objects. (370; emphasis mine)

The Latin word libido means wish or desir

if, as they both assume, Schreber did eviden
the libidinal relation to reality"—was whethe
reality as necessarily linked to a sexual basi
can libido ever be separable from its sexual
As I have discussed, Freud felt that the na
ally, was toward the world and that frustratio
range of mental phenomena causing disturb
of excitation. Jung, after the Schreber case,
Types" the alternative view that different p
propensities in regard to the direction of li
being pathological. The theoretical conseque
question continued to manifest itself in Ju
("On Psychological Understanding"), Jung
verted" and "extraverted" personality types:
chiefly to his own personality: he finds th
verted type directs his libido outwards: he f
The introvert sees everything in terms of
extravert is dependent on the value of the
ceive the necessity that forces the introver
system" (190-91; emphasis mine).
Jung felt that Schreber was an introvert, th
or pathological variety, was a way by which
to the world. Jung said explicitly in the s
"championed the extravert" and that he was
Freud's disposition. (190-91).
By 1930, Jung had extended his deve
termed the "Stages of Life" (387-403). F
relevance is his theory that in the "secon
reversal from what was previously im
scious. If in the "first half of life" one d
outer professional and economic goals,

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 Schreber, Freud and Jung 109

life" would be a reversal of the direction of libido inward to questions, for instance,
of religion, esthetics or music. With the occurrence of a crisis, the transition from
the first to the second stage can cause major psychological difficulties. This, of
course, was evident with Schreber, who at fifty-one and at the onset of his first
major illness, had just been promoted to presiding appellate court judge. It was a
job which he felt incapable of handling and in addition he was facing the reality that
he was unlikely to have children (White 59-60).
Freud's interpretation of Schreber's developmental crisis was that it caused a
primary regression to infantile narcissism with its inherent homosexuality and that
Schreber's narcissism was the causal factor in the creation of his delusional struc
ture. White (55-73), Macalpine and Hunter (328-71) hypothesized that the
regression was to a pre-Oedipal situation and involved birth fantasies on Schreber's
part. Freud located the regression, as did Jacques Lacan, in the Oedipal situation.
Jung, on the other hand, sought to explain Schreber's change without the concept
of regression at all.
Jung did retain, nonetheless, Freud's concept of bisexuality in his later theories,
with its distinct applicability to Schreber. Bisexuality is defined as follows by
Laplanche and Pontalis: "Notion introduced into psychoanalysis by Freud, under
the influence of Wilhelm Fliess, according to which every human being is endowed
constitutionally with both masculine and feminine dispositions; these can be
identified in the conflicts which the subject experiences in assuming his own
sex" (52).
Again, there is an inexplicit entry of Freud's relation to Fliess in the details of the
Schreber case, that is the notion of bisexuality. Much of the difficulty that emerged
between Freud and Fliess was over the origin, or if you will, ownership, of the
notion of bisexuality. The recently released complete correspondence between
Freud and Fliess shows how important the concept was in their relationship:

December 6, 1896, Freud to Fliess:...I avail myself of the bisexuality of all

human beings Occasionally there is a metamorphosis within the same indi
vidual: perverse during the age of vigor and then, after a period of anxiety, hysteri
cal. Accordingly, hysteria is not repudiated sexuality but rather repudiated per
version . [Note the relation to Schreber]

January 4, 1898, Freud to Fliess: I literally embraced your

and consider this idea of yours to be the most significant one
that of "defense."

August 1, 1899, Freud to Fliess: But bisexuality! You are cert

am accustoming myself to regarding every sexual act as a p
individuals are involved.

August 7, 1901, Freud to Fliess: And now, the main thing! A

next work will be called "Human Bisexuality." It will go to the
and say the last word it may be granted me to say—the las
found The idea itself is yours. You remember my telling y
you were still a nose specialist and surgeon, that the soluti
Several years later you corrected me, saying that it lay in b
that you are right. So perhaps I must borrow even more fr
sense of honesty will force me to ask you to coauthor the wor

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110 Karen Bryce Funt

Such a co-authorship, however, was not to occur. Both Ernest Jones (204-06)
and Freud's recent biographer Paul Roazen (93-94) have documented the convo
luted history of the notion of bisexuality. Freud had apparently discussed the con
cept of bisexuality with a patient, Herman Swoboda, who in turn talked about it
with another friend, Otto Weininger. Weininger proceeded, in 1903, to write a
successful book on the subject. That same year, Weininger committed suicide.
Fliess accused Freud of squandering and stealing his important concept. The
matter was taken to court by Swoboda who sued Fliess for the accusation. In short,
bisexuality became for Freud a concept that he might well have desired to repress.
It had been a shared enthusiasm with Fliess and now it had become central to their
estrangement. In writing the Schreber case, Freud's omission of bisexuality was
complete; he gave absolutely no credence to Schreber's evident bisexuality. Ironic
ally, it was Jung who in his later writings took up the idea once more.
Jung hypothesized that part of the developmental change that occurs between the
"first and second halves of life" is the attempt by the psyche to integrate its contra
sexual tendencies—the repressed feminine in the man and the repressed masculine
in the woman, the anima and animus. When one applies Fliess and Freud's concept
of bisexuality with Jung's derivative theory of contrasexual integration in the
second half of life to a central element of Schreber's fantasy system—his desire to
be transformed into a woman and have children—one can interpret the fantasy as
a psychological attempt to bring to consciousness what had previously been
repressed, his unconscious femininity.
Several details of Schreber's fantasies and Freud's private interpretations to Jung
are important in this connection. Schreber, according to Freud (23-24), divided
God into the "anterior" (representing the female and breasts) and the "posterior"
(representing the male and buttocks). Freud, in other words, had indicated to Jung
in detail how God, for Schreber, was inherently both male and female. Schreber's
hallucination, in other words, was of a bisexual God, despite the fact that Freud did
not explicitly use that adjective. Both masculine and feminine aspects of God were
represented by Schreber as having destructive and benevolent dispositions. In the
later stages of his fantasy, Schreber desired sexual union with God, when God was
at the time in his masculine aspect. Schreber hallucinated emasculation in order to
achieve that union with the masculine God.
Another associated detail of the hallucination was Schreber's belief that he had
"nerves of voluptuousness" all over his body. The contemporary incarnation of this
notion is Norman O. Brown's concept of "polymorphous perversity": "The aboli
tion of repression would abolish the unnatural concentrations of libido in certain
particular bodily organs—concentrations engineered by the negativity of the mor
bid death instinct, and constituting the bodily base of the neurotic character dis
orders in the human ego The human body would become polymorphously
perverse, delighting in that full life of all the body which it now fears" (308).
Schreber, according to Freud, "calls for a medical examination, in order to
establish the fact that his whole body has nerves of voluptuousness dispersed over it
from head to foot, a state of things which is only to be found, in his opinion, in the
female body, whereas, in the male, to the best of hi s knowledge, nerves ofvoluptu
ousness exist only in the sexual organs and their immediate vicinity" (33).

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 Schreber, Freud and Jung 111

What seems to be indicated is Schreber's desire to be more sexually complete.

Freud took this on a literal level, interpreted it as an "emasculation fantasy" related
to his "passive homosexual desires" for his former psychiatrist, Flechsig. The
imagery described by Schreber in his Memoirs, however, expressed the desire
to be both male and female and to experience sexual union with a similarly
bisexual God.

Again, Freud avoided any hint that Schreber might be bisexual and this came
from someone who less than ten years before had stressed the concept's uni
versality. It might appear that this was not in fact inconsistent with his private
revelations to Ferenczi and Jung regarding how writing the Schreber case had
helped him to "overcome Fliess" and that with the Schreber case he had reversed
what he now thought was a mistaken direction away from sexuality to bisexuality.
Freud did not, however, subsequently repudiate his allegiance to the notion of
bisexuality, despite his estrangement from Fliess and the complications regarding
the manner in which the idea reached the public through his patient Swoboda and
Swoboda's friend, Weininger.
Freud had written to Jung: "First the father complex: Obviously Flechsig-father
God-sun form a series" (218 F), implying an Oedipal transference. Jung inter
preted Schreber's transformation fantasy on a symbolic level as his desire to
experience his female tendencies. Schreber, in his position as judge, had lived
in an imbalanced masculine perspective which ultimately overcame him to the
extent that he then exaggerated his repressed tendencies in his delusional fantasy
structure.

Both Freud and Jung placed the imagery in Schreber's hallucinatory system
within their respective theoretical structures. The difference between them centers
on the function of metaphor in psychological constructions. Metaphor can be con
cretized as Freud did when he interpreted Schreber as literally desiring emascu
lation. Or it can be shifted to a purely symbolic level as Jung did, severing
Schreber's imagery from its bodily implications. Yet a third alternative is to situate
the discussion on a metalevel and say that the defining quality of what may be
termed illness or psychosis is precisely the inability to distinguish between literal
ized and symbolic metaphor.
The question of metaphor is implicit to contemporary discussions of Schreber.
Following R.D. Laing and Gregory Bateson, Morton Schatzman literalizes
Schreber's metaphorical system. Schatzman proposes an internal logic to
Schreber's fantasies within his family situation. As I mentioned, Schreber's father,
Daniel Gottlieb Moritz Schreber (1808-61) was one of Germany's leading writers
on child-rearing in the mid-nineteenth century. He advocated excessively repress
ive treatment of children, which included explicit threats of castration to prevent
masturbation and the use of torturous devices to prevent it. Schatzman also pre
sents evidence that Schreber's psychiatrist, Flechsig, literally advocated castration
as a "cure." In 1884 Flechsig wrote, "I think there are justifiable grounds to use
castration as a successful treatment against neurosis and psychosis" (qtd. in
Schatzman 101). Flechsig purportedly had at least three patients castrated at the
clinic where Schreber spent the initial part of his illness.

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112 Karen Bryce Funt

In addition to the biographical research on Schreber's father's writings,

Schatzman also provides a comparative linguistic analysis of Schreber's father's
metaphors with the actual language Schreber used in his fantasy system. Schreber's
father used overtly sexual language in his discussion of child-rearing. Schatzman
argues that Schreber's father set up a language which his child adopted and
changed. His implication is that if a mental illness is more like a language than a
disease, the problem of interpretation is more one of learning how to understand
the meaning of the language than of finding the etiology of the illness.
Jacques Lacan's 1958 reading of Schreber, "On a Question Preliminary to Any
Possible Treatment of Psychosis," begins, like Schatzman's, by treating Schreber's
fantasy system as a language. At no point, however, does Lacan consider it relevant
to associate Schreber's language with the external world. Schreber's language, for
Lacan, is purely symbolic and self-referential. Nonetheless, it is Schreber's failure
to continue to maintain himself as a Subject within language which makes him
psychotic. Lacan goes further than Freud in his pervasively linguistic interpretation
of Schreber's illness. Lacan proposes that psychoses originate when there is a gap
in the logical formation of a chain of symbolic signifiers. This gap precludes
the establishment of the Subject per se. He does not examine, however, why
Schreber's particular delusional system surfaced at age fifty-one and not at any
prior point, including that of his suicidal depression of a decade earlier. For Lacan,
the Unconscious is a basic manifestation of the Other. This Other is initially dis
placed onto the Oedipal triangulation, and subsequently through language, onto
the abstract symbolic signification, which he calls the "Name of the Father." Lacan
was sarcastically critical of any interpretations which attempt to make biographical
connections to Schreber's literal family (220).
To Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Schreber becomes a pi vot for their critique
of Freud's omnipresent Oedipalization. This Oedipalization applies both to the
development of consciousness in the Subject and to the imagery the Subject mani
fests. They are openly disdainful of Lacan and others who do not question Freud's
assumption that Schreber's fantasies were a transference of the Oedipal problem
atic. To Deleuze and Guattari, even Schatzman's interpretation would be an
extended Oedipalization of Schreber, in the sense that Schatzman examines
Schreber's actual father, thereby giving him literal and rational grounds for his
psychosis. They insist that Schreber's imagery be kept on a level of multiple signi
fication. Deleuze and Guattari argue that Freud's equation, for example, of God =
Flechsig = father represents what they describe as the analytic practice of "pro
moting the conversion of the Unconscious to Oedipus, form and content" (74).
"Judge Schreber feels something, produces something, and is capable of explain
ing the process theoretically. Something is produced A schizophrenic out for a
walk is a better model than a neurotic lying on the analyst's couch. A breath of
fresh air, a relationship with the outside world" (2).
I have briefly described the work of several of the more influential and recent
re-interpreters of the case—Lacan, Deleuze, Guattari and Schatzman—in order to
indicate the trail of displacement that has occurred since Freud and Jung began
communicating on Schreber's Memoirs. Schreber's Memoirs are not read in them

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 Schreber, Freud and Jung 113

selves; they are now only one component in the series which provides a means of
articulating theoretical difference. Claiming to follow Freud, Lacan questions the
linguistic consequences of a Subject experiencing gaps in his or her mode of sig
nification. Claiming opposition to Freud, Deleuze and Guattari attack the appro
priateness of interpretations which assume Oedipal repetitions. Challenging the
very notion of internal referentiality, Schatzman denies any purely self-referential
Subject.
The issue finally becomes not whether Schreber was psychotic in the sense I
have discussed—as evidencing a "primal disturbance in his libidinal relation to
reality"—but rather given the disturbance or the lack of adjustment to reality, how
is one to interpret it? The issue is one of reading, of interpretation. The interpretive
question becomes whether the delusional system and its accompanying illness
were necessary for Schreber. Freud's answer was categorically affirmative: "The
delusional formation, which we take to be the pathological product, is in reality an
attempt at recovery, a process of reconstruction" (71). Jung concurred; the
Memoirs described a necessary adaptive strategy: "Closer study of Schreber's or
any similar case will show that these patients are consumed by a desire to create a
new world-system, or what we call a Weltanschauung, often of the most bizarre
kind. Their aim is obviously to create a system that will enable them to assimilate
unknown psychic phenomena and so adapt themselves to their own world. This is
purely subjective at first, but it is a necessary transition stage on the way to adapt
ing the personality to the world in general" ("On Psychological Understand
ing" 189).
As I have shown, Freud interrogated the apparent causes of Schreber's psycho
sis, while Jung sought to explain the nature of the libido empowering Schreber's
construction of an internal linguistic system. Freud and Jung formed an interpretive
community of two and, in the interest of friendship, they attempted not to
acknowledge the differences in their interpretations of the Memoirs. Eventually,
those differences became severe. Schreber's text occasioned a remarkable series of
transformations. What began as an autobiography for Schreber and a judicial
means to free himself from the asylum, became for Freud and Jung a pivotal psy
choanalytic case history and a major setting of a tumultuous, and in turn historic
ally critical, ending to a deep friendship.

NOTES

1/ Aside from Schreber's own Memoirs and the commentary by Macalpine and Hunter, biographical
material may be found in Niederland and Schatzman.

2/ Both Bruss and Lang emphasize the autobiographical conflation of author, narrator and protagonist.
Lang argues that such prominent autobiographical theorists as Spengemann and Olney (Metaphors),
as well as most of the authors included by Olney in Autobiography, do not sufficiently take into
account the distinguishing feature of autobiography as involving that conflation.

3/ Freud made a similar gesture in 1905, when he titled the Dora case, "Fragment of an Analysis of a
Case of Hysteria." Rose details the numerous ways in which the case was a "fragment." See also
Marcus 56-91.

4/ Identification of letters follows the format used in The Freud!Jung Letters.

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114 Karen Bryce Funt

51 This letter to Ferenczi was originally published by Ernest Jones and subsequently by Max Schur,
the first two people given full access to Freud's correspondence. Schur briefly notes the link between
Schreber, Fliess and Jung within the context of the ongoing and acknowledged intertwining of
Freud's self-analysis and his written theoretical work. The current citation is to Masson's edition of
Freud's correspondence with Fliess. Masson, however, does not refer to the correlation between the
Schreber case, Freud, and Fliess which I am discussing here.

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