CIRCULAR NO.

3-89 February 6, 1989 (1) The IBP (Board of Governor and Commission on Bar Discipline) shall forward to the
SUPREME COURT CIRCULARS AND ORDERS
TO: COURT OF APPEALS, SANDIGANBAYAN, COURT OF TAX APPEALS, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS,
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT AND SHARI'A
CIRCUIT COURTS, ALL MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT PROSECUTION SERVICE,
AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT PROSECUTION SERVICE, AND ALL
MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
SUBJECT: COMPLAINTS FILED WITH THE IBP AGAINST JUSTICES AND JUDGES OF
THE LOWER COURTS.
For the information and guidance of all concerned, quoted hereunder is the Resolution of
the EN BANC, dated January 31, 1989 clarifying Resolution dated November 29, 1988 in
"RE: Letter of(Acting) Presiding Justice Rodolfo A. Nocon and Associate Justice Reynato S.
Puno and Alfredo Marigomen of the Court of Appeals:
The Court NOTED the letter dated December 19, 1988 by Dr. Leon M. Garcia, Jr.,
President, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) to the Supreme Court seeking a resolution
"reconsidering/clarifying" the Resolution of this Court dated November 29, 1988 relating to
complaints filed with the IBP against justices and judges of the lower courts.
After careful consideration of Hon. Garcia's letter, the Court Resolved to REITERATE its
Resolution dated November 29, 1988 directing that "all complaints against justices and
judges of the lower courts filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline should promptly be
REFERRED to the Supreme Court for appropriate action." This Resolution is properly
regarded as an interpretation of Section 1, second paragraph of Rule 139-B of the Revised
Rules of Court, such that "attorney's in the government service" should be understood as
not including members of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax
Appeals and Judges of the lower courts. In general, the court is here referring to those who
perform judicial functions and before whose courts the member of the IBP appear in the
exercise of their profession.
Supreme Court for appropriate action all cases involving justices and judges of lower courts,
whether or not such complaints deal with acts apparently unrelated to the discharge of their
official functions, such as acts of immorality, estafa, crimes against persons and property,
etc.
(2) As noted above, his Resolution as well as our Resolution dated November 29, 1988
constitute an interpretation of Section 1, Rule 139-B.
(3) In principle, the Supreme Court would not assign complaints filed with it against justices
and judges of the lower courts to the IBP for investigation after the Supreme Court shall
have found a probable cause in such charges. As a matter of long standing practice, the
Court has assigned complaints against Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Judges to an
Executive Judge, against Regional Trial Courts judges to a Justice of the Court of Appeals
for investigation, report and recommendation, while a complaint against a member of the
Court of Appeals would probably be assigned to a member of the Supreme Court for
investigation, report and recommendation.
(4) The IBP shall refer to the Supreme Court all cases filed against judges, including
complaints charging judges jointly with practicing lawyers, whether filed directly with the IBP
or transmitted to the IBP by the Office of the Solicitor General. The Supreme Court will
examine these complaints individually and on a case by case basis. The court may refer
such a case for joint investigation to an Executive Judge of a Regional Trial Court or to a
justice of the Court of Appeals. There may, however, be instances when the case against
the practicing lawyer may be separable and conveniently referred to the IBP for
investigation.
(5) The Court will scrutinize very carefully any claim by other lawyers in the government
service that complaints against them be referred to this Court rather than to the IBP. The
Court looks forward to comments thereon by the IBP should such claims be made.
(6) It appears to the Court that the IBP has been quite busy with the number of cases
already referred to it involving private petitioners. the Court continues to follow the work of
the IBP in this area with great interest and high expectations.

February 6, 1989.
The Court still has under consideration the case of fiscals and other government
prosecuting attorneys, as well as government lawyers whose office duties do not consist of
the adjudication of cases or disputes. The Court will inform the IBP when it shall have (Sgd.) MARCELO B. FERNAN
reached a conclusion in respect of fiscals and prosecuting attorneys.
Chief Justice
The Court addresses below the "matters which need clarification" set out in Hon. Garcia's
letter:
 Suarez v. Platon mandamus. This is especially true in a matter involving the
G.R. No. 46371; 7 February 1940 examination of evidence and the decision of questions of law
and fact, since such a duty is not ministerial.
Facts:
In May 1935, respondent Lieutenant Vivencio Orais of the
Philippine Constabulary filed a complaint charging petitioner
Fortunato N. Suarez, and one Tomas Ruedas, with sedition for
vocally despising the abuses made by government officers.
The case was subsequently dismissed after Lieutenant Orais
moved for its temporary dismissal in obedience to an order of
the Provincial Commander of Tayabas.  In turn, Suarez
charged Orais and Damian Jimenez with the crime of arbitrary
detention for unlawfully arresting and detaining him while
riding a train going to Calauag. During the course of the
proceedings, respondent Judge Serviliano Platon was
appointed to preside over the case. Judge Planton thereafter
dismissed the case after due consideration of all the facts and
proofs submitted. Thus, the petition for writ of mandamus,
compelling Judge Platon to reinstate the criminal case.

Issue:
Should the writ of mandamus prayed for be issued?

Held:
No. The Court held that Judge Servillano Platon, in granting
the motion for the dismissal of the case for arbitrary detention,
did not abuse his discretion so flagrantly as to justify, in the
interest of justice, a departure from the well settled rule that an
inferior tribunal in the performance of a judicial act within the
scope of its jurisdiction and discretion cannot be controlled by
ROMULO G. DINSAY VS. ATTY. LEOPOLDO CIOCO
A.C. No. 2995 NOVEMBER 27, 1996
 
TOPIC: Res adjudicata applies only to judicial or quasi-
judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of the Court’s
administrative powers.
 
FACTS:
Planters Machinery Corporation (PLAMACO) mortgaged to
Traders Royal Bank (the Bank) certain properties as security
for the payment of its loan.  PLAMACO defaulted in the
payment of the loan so the Bank extrajudicially foreclosed
the mortgage.  At a foreclosure sale conducted by the sheriff,
the property was sold to the bank, who was the sole
bidder.  A certificate of Sheriff’s sale was executed by Atty.
Cioco, then clerk of Court and Ex-officio Sheriff.   duties as a government official.  The exception is, if that
 
Records disclose that page four of the said Certificate was
surreptitiously substituted.  The new page lowered the bid
price from the original amount of P3, 263, 182.67 to only
P730,000.  Cioco and the sheriff who conducted the sale had
previously been administratively charged and dismissed from
service.
Now, Atty.Cioco is sought to be disbarred.  He argues that
there was res adjudicata due to the administrative case, and
that disbarment was deemed adjudicated therein, thus he
may no longer be charged.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cioco may be charged with
disbarment 
HELD:
Cioco’s contention has no merit.  Res adjudicata applies only
to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the
exercise of the Court’s administrative powers, as in this case.
Disbarment has not been adjudicated in the previous case.
Therein, Cioco was administratively proceeded against as an
erring Court personnel under the supervisory authority of the
court.  Herein, Cioco is sought to be disciplined as a lawyer
under the court’s plenary authority over members of the legal
profession.
 
While Cioco is in effect being indicted twice for the same
misconduct, there is no double jeopardy as both proceedings
are administrative in nature. The general rule is that a lawyer
who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a
member of the bar for misconduct in the discharge of his
misconduct affects his qualification as a lawyer or shows
moral delinquency.  
 
Cioco’s participation in changing the bid price in the
Certificate of Sheriff’s Sale affects his fitness as a member of
the bar.  He knows it is patently illegal to alter its contents
after notarization, since it is already a public
document.   Cioco is disbarred.

ENRIQUEZ V. GIMENEZ
Enriquez v. Gimenez
G.R. No. L-12817. April 29, 1960
Padilla, J.
FACTS:
On 2 June 1956 the municipal mayor of
Bauan, Batangas wrote a letter to Julio
Enriquez, Sr. (petitioner) engaging his
services as counsel for the municipality in
its contemplated action against the
National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority.
This is after the fact that the provincial
fiscal of the municipality declined to
represent such in an action to be brought
againt NWSA to test the validity and
constitutionality of the Act creating it.
On 28 June 1956 the petitioner accepted the
offer and filed the necessary complaint in
the Court of First Instance of Batangas.
Petitioner requested a reimbursement of
P40.00 for docket fee and P500.00 as
initial attorney’s fee. On 24 June 1957 the
Auditor General, herein respondent,
disallowed in audit the petitioner’s claim
for initial attorney’s fee but offered no
objection to the refund of docket fee.
ISSUE:
WON the Auditor General erred in
disallowing the reimbursement of the
initial attorney’s fee.
RULING:
No. Bias or prejudice and animosity or
hostility on the part of a fiscal not based
on any of the conditions enumerated in the
law and the Rules of Court do not
constitute a legal and valid excuse for
inhibition or disqualification. And unlike
a practising lawyer who has the right to
decline employment, a fiscal cannot refuse
the performance of his action and functions
on grounds not provided for by law without
violating his oath of office, where he
swore, among other, “that he will well and
faithfully discharge to the best of his
ability the duties of the office or
position upon which he is about to enter….”