CASE |1

[A.C. No. 1163. August 29, 1975.] or conceal from the Court his criminal case of slight physical injuries which was
IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias then and until
ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar now is pending in the City Court of Manila; and thereafter repeatedly omitted to
Examinee, respondent. make mention ofthe same in his applications to take the Bar examinations in 1967,
Topic: 1969 and 1971.
Requirements for application to the Bar – 5. That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar
no filed or pending case of moral turpitude examinations of the fact that he had been charged with, or indicted
FACTS: for, an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his license to practice law is well
1. Ramon E. Galang passed the 1971 bar examination but his exam papers — settled.
were subjected to unauthorized re-correction and re-evaluation by 5 6. Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman
examiners. E. Galang, was allowed to take the Bar examinations and the
2. An investigation by the NBI revealed highly irregular manner in which he passed the Bar, WE have no other alternative
 that Ramon (Roman/Romy) was a student of School of Law of MLQU; but to order the surrender of his attorney's certificate and the
 that in Sept 8, 1959, he was charged with the crime of slight physical striking out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
Injuries (SPI) of another student of the same university;
 that in a 1973 hearing, he was confronted with this information but
declared he does not remember being charged with the same.
4. Victim was summoned and narrated the case and identified Galang as the very
same person charged with SPI in that case.
5. An administrative proceeding was filed for his disbarment along with Bar
Confidant Lanuevo.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Galang must be stricken off in the roll of attorneys for concealing
his case of SPI.
DECISION: YES
1. Under Rule 127, Sec 2 every applicant is dutybound d to lay before the Court all
his involvement in any criminal case, pending or otherwise terminated, to enable
the Court to fully ascertain or determine applicant's moral character.
2. As to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to
determine. Hence, the necessity of laying before or informing the Court
of one's personal record — whether he was criminally indicted, acquitted,
convicted or the case dismissed or is still pending — becomes more compelling.
3. In 1963 and 1964, when Galang took the Bar for the second and third time,
respectively, the application form provided by the Court for use
of applicants already required the applicant to declare under oath that "he has not
been accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or
tribunal of any offense involving moral turpitude; and that there is no pending case
of that nature against him."
4. By 1966, when Galang took the Bar examinations for the fourth time, the
application form prepared by the Court for use of applicants
required the applicant to reveal all his criminal cases whether involving moral
turpitude or not. Yet, Galang continued to intentionally withhold
 CASE |2

Diao v Martinez 7 SCRA 745 3.29.63

FACTS: 2 years after passing the Bar exam, a complaint was filed against Diao on
false representation of his application to the Bar examination that he has the
requisite academic qualification. The Solicitor General made an investigation and
recommended to strike the name of Diao off the rolls of attorney because
contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination in this Court, he had not
completed, before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal education
prescribed by the Department of Private Education.

I: WON Diao may continue to practice the law profession.

RULING: The court held that his admission to the bar was under the pretense that
he had acquired a pre-legal education, an academic requirement before one
could take the bar exam. Such admission having been obtained under false
pretenses is thereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is
immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to become an
attorney-at-law, taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular
manner is equally essential. His name thus was stricken out from the Rolls of
Attorneys.
 CASE |3

In Re Charges of Lilian F. Villasanta for existing is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. Thus lacking
the good moral character required by the Rules of Court, the respondent is
Immorality vs. Hilarion M. Peralta disqualified from being admitted to the bar.
April 30, 1957.
Facts:
            On April 16, 1939, Hilarion M. Peralta, the respondent, was married
to Rizalina E. Valdez in Rizal, Nueva Ecija. On or before March 8, 1951, he
courted Lilian F. Villasanta, the complainant, who fell in love with him. To
have carnal knowledge of her, the respondent procured the preparation of a
fake marriage contract which was then a blank document. He made her sign
it on March 8, 1951. A week after, the document was brought back by the
respondent to the complainant, signed by the Justice of the Peace and the
Civil Registrar of San Manuel, Tarlac, and by two witnesses. Since then the
complainant and the respondent lived together as husband and wife.
Sometime later, the complainant insisted on a religious ratification of their
marriage and on July 7, 1951, the corresponding ceremony was performed
in Aparri by the parish priest of said municipality. The priest no longer
required the production of a marriage license because of the civil marriage
contract shown to him. After the ceremony in Aparri, the couple returned to
Manila as husband and wife and lived with some friends. The complainant
then discovered that the respondent was previously married to someone
else; whereupon, she filed the criminal action for a violation of Article 350
of the Revised Penal Code in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan and the
present complaint for immorality in this court.
Issue:
            Whether or not the respondent’s grossly immoral conduct makes
him disqualified to take the bar examination.
Held:
            Yes. The Supreme Court held that committed a grossly immoral
conduct, thus, he is disqualified to take the bar examinations. Hilarion M.
Peralta, the respondent, made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred
institution demanding respect and dignity and his conviction of violation of
Art. 350 of the Revised Penal Code involves moral turpitude. His act in
contracting the second marriage even his act in making love to another
woman while his first wife is still alive and their marriage still valid and

QUINGWA VS. PUNO (19 SCRA 439)
FACTS: Flora Quingwa filed a verified complaint
charging Armando Puno, a member of the Bar, with gross immorality
and misconduct. Complainant is an educated woman, having been a
public school teacher for a number of years. The respondent took her to
the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing the hotel register as "Mr.
and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her
on the promise of marriage. Complainant submitted to respondent's
plea for sexual intercourse because of respondent's promise of marriage
and not because of a desire for sexual gratification or of voluntariness
and mutual passion. Complainant gave birth to a baby boy supported by
a certified true copy of a birth certificate and to show how intimate the
relationship between the respondent and the complainant was, the
latter testified that she gave money to the respondent whenever he
asked from her.
The respondent denied all the material allegations of the complaint, and
as a special defense averred that the allegations therein do not
constitute grounds for disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule
127 of the former Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Puno should be disbarred/suspended.
HELD: YES. One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to
the Bar is that the applicant must produce before the Supreme Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character (Section 2, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court). It is essential during the continuance of the practice
and the exercise of the privilege to maintain good moral character.
When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he
denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome
the evidence for the relator and show proofs that he still maintains the
highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected
of him. With respect to the special defense raised by the respondent in
his answer to the charges of the complainant that the allegations in the
complaint do not fall under any of the grounds for disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar as enumerated in section 25 of Rule
127 of the (old) Rules of Court, it is already a settled rule that the
statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or suspension is
not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to
CASE |4
suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent powers of the court over its
officers cannot be restricted. Times without number, our Supreme Court
held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and
dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct, which shows
him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which
his license and the law confer upon him. Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of court states that:
A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from
his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice,
or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to
a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The respondent has committed a grossly immoral act and has, thus
disregarded and violated the fundamental ethics of his profession.
Indeed, it is important that members of this ancient and learned
profession of law must conform themselves in accordance with the
highest standards of morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons
of Judicial Ethics:
The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the
profession of candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in either
moral character or education. He should strive at all times to uphold the
honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and to improve not
only the law but the administration of justice.
Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and, as a
consequence, his name is ordered stricken off from the Roll
of Attorneys.

LEGAL PROFESSION CASE 23
ROYONG VS. OBLENA
AC No. 376 April 30, 1963
En Banc, Barrera
FACTS:
• Complainant Josefina Royong charge the respondent Ariston Oblena, a
member of the bar and bench, with rape. The Solicitor General immediately
conducted an investigation and found out that there was no rape, the
carnal knowledge between complainant and respondent seems to be
consensual sex.
• In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if
respondent did not commit the alleged rape, nevertheless, he was guilty of
other misconduct. The Solicitor General made another complaint charging
the respondent of falsely and deliberately alleging in his application for
admission to the bar that he is a person of good moral character, of living
adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the same time maintaining illicit
relations with the 18 year old Josefina Royong. Thus rendering him unfit to
practice law, praying that this Court render judgment ordering the
permanent removal of the respondent as lawyer and judge.
CASE |5
as have proven in this case, as to shock common sense of decency,
certainly may justify positive action by the Court in protecting the prestige
of the noble profession of the law.
As former Chief Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license to
practice law is required to show good moral character, or what he really is,
as distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally
entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the
place where he is known.
Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time
he applied for admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia
Angeles, and the fact that people who knew him sqemed to have
acuuiesced to his utatus, did noq render him a person of good moral
character. It is of no moment that his immoral state was discovered then or
now as he is clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the illicit relation of the respondent with Josefina Royong
and the adulterous cohabitation of respondent with Briccia Angeles
warrants disbarment.

HELD:
Ariston Oblena was disbarred.

RATIO:
The continued possession of a fair private and professional character or a
good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in
the practice of law for one who has been admitted, and its loss requires
suspension or disbarment even though the statutes do not specify that as
ground for disbarment.
Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly
bearing on his profession, has nevertheless rendered him unfit and
unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer.
Fornication, if committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances
 CASE |6
Melendrez v Decena 176 SCRA 662

TOLOSA vs. CARGO
A.M. No. 2385 | March 8, 1989
By: Karen P. Lustica
Facts:
 Complainant Jose Tolosa filed with the Court an Affidavit- Complaint seeking the
disbarment of respondent District Citizens’ Attorney Alfredo Cargo for immorality.
Complainant claimed that respondent had been seeing his (complainant’s) wife
Priscilla M. Tolosa in his house and elsewhere. Complainant further alleged that
his wife left his conjugal home and went to live with respondent.
Complying with an order of this Court, respondent filed a “Comment and/or
Answer” denying the allegations of complainant. Respondent acknowledged that
complainant’s wife had been seeing him but that she had done so in the course of
seeking advice from respondent (in view of the continuous cruelty and
unwarranted marital accusations of affiant [complainant] against her), much as
complainant’s mother-in-law had also frequently sought the advice of respondent
and of his wife and mother as to what to do about the” continuous quarrels
between affiant and his wife and the beatings and physical injuries (sometimes
less serious) that the latter sustained from the former.
Complainant filed a Reply to respondent’s “Comment and/or Answer” and made
a number of further allegations, to wit:
(a) That complainant’s wife was not the only mistress that respondent had taken;
(b) That respondent had paid for the hospital and medical bills of complainant’s
wife last May 1981, and visited her at the hospital every day;
(c) That he had several times pressed his wife to stop seeing respondent but that
she had refused to do so;
(d) That she had acquired new household and electrical appliances where she was
living although she had no means of livelihood; and
(e) That respondent was paying for his wife’s house rent.
Respondent filed a Rejoinder denying the further allegations of complainant, and
stating that he (respondent) had merely given complainant’s wife the amount of
P35.00 by way of financial assistance during her confinement in the hospital.
The Solicitor General found that complainant’s charges of immorality had not
been sustained by sufficient evidence. At the same time, however, the Solicitor
CASE |7
General found that the respondent had not been able to explain satisfactorily the
following:
Respondent’s failure to avoid seeing Priscilla, in spite of complainant’s suspicion
and/or jealousy that he was having an affair with his wife.
Priscilla’s being able to rent an apartment in Malabon whose owner is admittedly
a friend and former client of respondent.
Respondent’s failure to avoid going to Malabon to visit his friend, in spite of his
differences with complainant.
Respondent’s failure to avoid getting involved invarious incidents involving
complainant and Priscilla’s brothers
Respondent’s interest in seeing Priscilla in the evening when she was confined in
the FEU Hospital, in spite again of his differences with complainant.
 
Issue: WON the respondent should be suspended
Held: NO.
Ratio: The record does not contain sufficient evidence to show that respondent
had indeed been cohabiting with complainant’s wife or was otherwise guilty of
acts of immorality. For this very reason, we do not believe that the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law may be properly imposed upon respondent.
At the same time, the Court agrees that respondent should be reprimanded for
failure to comply with the rigorous standards of conduct appropriately required
from the members of the Bar and officers of the court. As officers of the court,
lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to
be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral
standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of
the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the
keeping of mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the
public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards.
 
Dispositive: The Court Resolved to REPRIMAND respondent attorney for conduct
unbecoming a member of the Bar and an officer of the court, and to WARN him
that continuation of the same or similar conduct will be dealt with more severely
in the future.

SURIGAO MINERAL VS. CLORIBEL
(31 SCRA 1 01/09/1970)
FACTS:  First Contempt Case. Yes.
First Contempt Case. The Supreme Court rendered a decision
against MacArthur International Minerals Corp and in their third
Motion for Reconsideration, Attys. Vicente Santiago and John
Beltran Sotto made use of language that are disrespectful and
contemptuous to the Court like "it seems many of
our judicial authorities believe they are chosen messengers of
God", "corrupt in its face" and insinuating favoritism and
partisanship of the members of the Court, notable Chief Justice
Concepcion and Justice Castro due to alleged interest in the case
(Castro's brother works for one of the parties). Santiago and
Castro wanted for the two justices to inhibit themselves in the
MR. The Court demanded for Santiago and Sotto to "show cause"
why they shouldn't be cited in contempt for the said
statements. Santiago insisted that the statements he made were
inadvertently included in the copy sent to the Court, and was just
intended to be in the MR's rough draft.
Second Contempt Case. Counsel for MacArthur drafted a fourth
motion for reconsideration, this time with Atty. Juanito M. Caling
as counsel, and again contained language which the Court found
disrespectful. The MR assailed the decision penned by CJ
Concepcion since he was out of town when the decision was
written and included seeming threats of elevating the issue to
the World Court and allegations of rise of graft and corruption in
the judiciary. The Court demanded Caling to also "show cause"
and he said that it the motion was already prepared
by Santiago when he took the case as was verified by Morton
Meads, an employee from MacArthur.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lawyers should be cited in contempt?
CASE |8
HELD: 
The language employed by Santiago and Sotto degrades the
administration of justice which trangresses Section 3 (d) of Rule
71 of the Rules of Court as well as Sec. 20 (f) of Rule 138 of the
RoC which states that "a lawyer's language should be dignified in
keeping with the dignity of the legal profession". They are also
expected to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts
of justice and judicial officers but their acts resulted in the
contrary and are intended to create and atmosphere of distrust.
The inadvertence of Santiago's use of words can't be used as a
shield to absolve him of any misdeeds.
Second Contempt Case. Yes. Even if the idea of
the language used in the 4th MR came from Meads, both
Santiago and Caling should've adhered to Canon 16 of
the Code of Legal Ethics wherein "a lawyer should use his best
efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients from doing those
things which a lawyer himself ought not to do, particularly with
reference to their conduct towards courts, judicial officers, jurors,
witnesses and suitors. If a client persists in such wrongdoing, the
lawyer should terminated their relation". Santiago is also liable
here since Caling's represent didn't divest him of his capacity as
counsel for MacArthur.

12. People vs. Taneo GR No.117683
Date:January 16, 1998
Ponente: Per curiam
FACTS:
On May 23, 1994, Mencina Taneo, a barrio lass, with physical virginity, was with
her parents and three (3) younger sisters in their house Cebu.
Father: Teofilo Taneo sent his wife to a 1kilometer distance store to get the corn
grits with the other daughter, Ginda
Mencina was sexually abused by Teofilo. She did not reveal to her mother but
instead went to her aunt Paciencia Taneo the next day and confided to her about
the abuse. Paciencia reported to the policeman Expedito Urot.
Meanwhile, at Taneo’s house, Teofilo was threatening to kill Mencina. He was
later apprehended by Borbon policemen and was detained.
Later, she went home in Bihang, Borbon, Cebu, because her father was then
already detained, and there, her mother pleaded to her to pardon her father
because the medical certificate issued after her examination did not show that
she was raped. That her father will be freed because the doctor in Danao General
Hospital was paid by EngracioUrot, brothe r-in-law of her father
She stood pat in not forgiving her father, who also pleaded for forgiveness. She
would rather choose to die than to pardon her father who ravished his own
daughter. Teofilo was convicted of the crime of rape. Appellant insists that
private complainant's allegations are "highly improbable", "implausible", and
"utterly ridiculous", hence unworthy of belief.
ISSUE: Whether or not counsel for appellant acted ethically
RATIO:
Appellant stresses in his second assignment of error that Dra. Macachor, the
attending physician who examined private complainant a day after the sexual
assault, found no "fresh hymenal lacerations, contusions or trauma on the
other parts of [the victim's] organ. At best the crime to which he should have been
held liable, appellant suggests, is "for certain acts of lasciviousness” While the
findings show the absence of hymenal lacerations and private complainant's
vaginal orifice admitting barely the forefinger, these do not militate against the
charge of rape.
It is unfortunate that counsel for appellant has made a hasty accusation
against the trial court for the above
CASE |9
pronouncement as "taking a partial and biased position"and having adopted
"its own biased interpretation of the physical evidence."We do not find any
cogent and valid ground in the records of this case which could
justify such a grave imputation upon a member of the bench who merely
performed his function and expressed his observation on the conduct of the
examination. Counsel should be reminded of his duty to observe and maintain
the respect due the courts of justice and judicial officers. Arguments, written
or oral, should be gracious to both the court and opposing counsel and be of
such words as may be properly addressed by one gentleman to another.
With the trial court's formidable observation and the victim's unrebutted testimony,
appellant's reliance with the medical certificate, as well as the testimony of the
doctor, assumes no significance. In any event, appellant's argument proceeds from
a misconception that a medical certificate is an indispensable element in the
prosecution for rape and runs roughshod over the well-settled rule that the absence
of medical findings by a medico-legal officer does not disprove the occurrence of
rape. The fact that the medical certificate shows no external signs of physical
injuries and spermatozoa on the victim does not negate the commission of rape
for the slightest penetration of the labia consummates the offense. The medical
examination of the victim, as well as the medical certificate, is merely
corroborative in character. What is important is that the testimony of private
complainant about the incident is clear, unequivocal and credible. When a woman
testifies that she has been raped, she says all that is needed to signify that the crime
has been committed.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
Two Justices voted to impose upon the appellant the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.In accordance with Section 25 of
Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon
finality of this decision, let the
records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for
possible exercise of the pardoning
power.
 C A S E | 10

Rheem of the Philippines v Ferrer (In re: Proceedings Against

In the case, the Court felt that Atty. Armonio’s language makes a sweeping charge
Enrile...)
that the decisions of the SC blindly adhere to earlier rulings without making “any
SANCHEZ, J.:
reference and analysis” of the pertinent statutes of the CIR. The statements made
Facts:
by counsel detract much from the dignity and respect of the SC.
The proceeding for certiorari and contempt is an offshoot of the Court of
Industrial Relations’ (CIR) denial of motion to dismiss the respondent’s complaint.
Atty. Armonio was admonished by the SC.
The following was filed by the counsel (Atty. Jose S. Armonio) for the petitioner:
One pitfall into which this Honorable Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the
question as to whether or not a particular subject matter is within the jurisdiction
of the Court of Industrial Relations is the tendency of this Honorable Court to rely
upon its own pronouncement without due regard to the statutes which delineate
the jurisdiction of the industrial court. Quite often, it is overlooked that no court,
not even this Honorable Court, is empowered to expand or contract through its
decision the scope of its jurisdictional authority as conferred by law. This error is
manifested by the decisions of this Honorable Court citing earlier rulings but
without making any reference to and analysis of the pertinent statute governing
the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations. This manifestation appears in
this Honorable Court's decision in the instant case. As a result, the errors
committed in earlier cases dealing with the jurisdiction of the industrial court are
perpetuated in subsequent cases involving the same issue . . . .

The Court ordered counsel to show cause why he should not be held in contempt.

Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Armonio’s statements violated the duty of respect to courts.

Held:
YES. Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that, “it is the duty
of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the
sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office but for the maintenance of
its supreme importance.” Worth remembering is the attorney’s duty to the courts
“can only be maintained by rendering no service involving disrespect to the
judicial office which he is bound to uphold”.

Atty. Manuel Fernandez
vs Judge Eloy Bello
GR No. L-14277 – 107 Phil. 1140 – Legal Ethics – Duty to the
Court – Strong Language by a Lawyer against a Judge
LABRADOR, J.:
Atty. Manuel Fernandez won a civil case for his client
Florentino Perreyras however, Florentino died without
paying Fernandez. Fernandez then assisted the eldest
child of Perreyras in a guardianship proceeding so that
the eldest may properly dispose of their property in order
to pay their father’s indebtedness. Eventually, Florentino’s
nipa land was sold for P1,000.00. Thereafter, P200.00 was
paid to Atty. Fernandez for his legal services both for
Florentino and his heirs. Judge Eloy Bello found out about
said payment and so directed Fernandez to explain
(because under the guardianship,  proceeds of any sale
must first be accounted for and no payment to creditors
shall be made without prior authorization from the court).
In the course of the proceeding however, Judge Bello
stated that Fernandez does not deserve the P200.00
attorney’s fees because Fernandez is a “below average
standard of a lawyer.” Fernandez then responded with
strong language (which were not specified).
C A S E | 11
ISSUE: Whether or not the strong language used by
Fernandez against the judge is proper.
HELD: The Supreme Court seem to say yes. The Supreme
Court stated that the strong language used by Fernandez
must have been impelled by the same language used by
Bello in characterizing the act of Fernandez as “anomalous
and unbecoming” and in charging him of obtaining his fee
“through maneuvers of documents from the guardian-
petitioner.” If anyone is to blame for the language used by
Fernandez, it is Bello himself who has made insulting
remarks in his orders, which must have provoked
Fernandez. If a judge desires not to be insulted he should
start using temperate language himself; he who sows the
wind will reap a storm.
On the issue of attorney’s fees, the opinion of a judge as
to the capacity of a lawyer is not the basis of the right to a
lawyer’s fee. It is the contract between the lawyer and
client and the nature of the services rendered.
 C A S E | 12
TITLE : [001] Laput vs. Remotigue1, 6 SCRA 45
(A.M. No. 219, 29 September 1962) LABRADOR, J. (En ISSUE : Whether or not Atty. Remotigue and Atty Patalinghug are guilty
Banc) of unprofessional and unethical conduct in soliciting cases.

HELD : No. The SC found no irregularity in the appearance of Atty.

FACTS: Petitioner ATTY. CASIANO U. LAPUT charge respondents
ATTY. FRANCISCO E.F. REMOTIGUE and ATTY. FORTUNATO P.
PATALINGHUG with unprofessional and unethical conduct in soliciting
cases and intriguing against a brother lawyer. In May 1952, Nieves
Rillas Vda. de Barrera retained petitioner Atty. Laput to handle her
"Testate Estate of Macario Barrera" case in CFI-Cebu. By Jan. 1955,
petitioner had prepared two pleadings: (1) closing of administration
proceedings, and (2) rendering of final accounting and partition of said
estate. Mrs. Barrera did not countersign both pleadings. Petitioner found
out later that respondent Atty. Patalinghug had filed on 11 Jan. 1955 a
written appearance as the new counsel for Mrs. Barrera. On 5 Feb.
1955, petitioner voluntarily asked the court to be relieved as Mrs.
Barrera’s counsel.
Patalinghug as counsel for Mrs. Barrera; and there was no actual
grabbing of a case from petitioner because Atty. Patalinghug's
professional services were contracted by the widow. Besides, the
petitioner's voluntary withdrawal on 5 Feb. 1955, and his filing almost
simultaneously of a motion for the payment of his attorney's fees,
amounted to consent to the appearance of Atty. Patalinghug as counsel
for the widow.
The SC also held that respondent Atty. Remotigue was also not guilty of
unprofessional conduct inasmuch as he entered his appearance, dated 5
Feb. 1955, only on 7 February 1955, after Mrs. Barrera had dispensed
with petitioner's professional services, and after petitioner had
voluntarily withdrawn his appearance.

Petitioner alleged that: (1) respondents’ appearances were unethical
and improper; (2) they made Mrs. Barrera sign documents revoking the
petitioner’s “Power of Attorney" purportedly to disauthorize him from
further collecting and receiving dividends of the estate from Mr. Macario
Barrera’s corporations, and make him appear as a dishonest lawyer and
no longer trusted by his client; and (3) Atty. Patalinghug entered his
appearance without notice to petitioner.
As to Atty. Patalinghug’s preparation of documents revoking the
petitioner’s power of attorney, the SolGen found that the same does not
appear to be prompted by malice or intended to hurt petitioner's
feelings, but purely to safeguard the interest of the administratrix.
Case dismissed and closed for no sufficient evidence submitted to
sustain the charges.

Respondent Atty. Patalinghug answered that when he entered his

appearance on 11 Jan. 1955 Mrs. Barrera had already lost confidence in
her lawyer, and had already filed a pleading discharging his services.
The other respondent Atty. Remotigue answered that when he filed his
appearance on 7 Feb. 1955, the petitioner had already withdrawn as
counsel.

The SC referred the case to the SolGen for investigation, report and
recommendation. The latter recommended the complete exoneration of
respondents.
1
This case has a sequel under A.M. No. 434, 29 Sept. 1962 wherein complainant-
petitioner Atty. LAPUT charged respondent Atty. REMOTIGUE with malice, bad faith,
and misrepresentation when the latter allegedly committed unfair and unethical
practices bordering on dishonesty. The SC approved the Solicitor General’s
recommendation for respondent's complete exoneration.
 C A S E | 13

CONCEPCION, J.:
 C A S E | 14

PAFLU VS BINALBAGAN court or Hearing Officer to examine and cross examine witnesses on behalf of the
REYES, J.B.L., J.: parties and to assist in the orderly presentation of evidence. Representation
should be exclusively entrusted to duly qualified members of the bar. The
A decision of the Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo entitled , “PAFLU et al vs. Binalbagan permission for a non-lawyer to represent or appear in the said court does not
Isabela Sugar Co., et al.” awas rendered on March 29, 1961. Reinstatement with entitle him for compensation. The ethics or the legal profession should not be
back wages was ordered to the complainants Entila and Tenazas. The violated. Therefore, no one is entitled to recover compensation for services as an
complainants’ counsel was Cipriano Cid & Associates through Atty. Atanacio Pacis. attorney at law unless he has been duly admitted to practice.. and is an attorney
The decision became final. On October 18, 1963, the Cipriano Cid & Associates, in good standing.
counsel of record filed a notice of attorney’s lien equivalent to 30% of the total Respondent Mining is not a lawyer; cannot establish an attorney-client
backwages. On November 1963, Atty. Pacis also filed a similar notice for a relationship. Wherefore, cannot recover attorney’s fees.
reasonable amount. The complainants then subsequently filed their
manifestation indicating their non-objection to the award of an attorney’s fees for
25% of their backwages. Thereafter, Quentin Muning filed a “ Petition for the
Award of Services Rendered” equivalent to 20% of the backwages, but it was
opposed by Cipriano Cid on the ground that he is not a lawyer.
It was found out the the charge was filed by Cipriano Cid & Associates through
Atty. Pacis. All hearungs were held in Bacolod City and appearance made in behalf
of the complaiants were at first by Atty. Pacis and subsequently by the
Respondent Muning.
On May 12, 1964 the Court of Industrial Relations awareded a total of 25% of the
backwages as compensation for the professional services rendred in the case:
10% for the Attys. Cipriano Cid, 10% for the respondent, and 5% for Atty. Pacis.
Muning’s award who is not a lawyer held in question.

Issue: WON a non-lawyer may recover Atty’s fees for legal services rendered.

Held:
No. A non-lawyer may not recover Atty’s fees for legal services rendered.
According to Amalgamated Laborer’s Ass. Vs. CIR, an agreement providing for the
division of atty’s fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president is allowed to share
in said fees with lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is
immoral and cannot be justified. Moreover, according to Section 5 b of RA 875,
representation of legal counsel shall not be required in the proceedings before
the Court of Hearing Examiners. Thus , it shall be the duty and obligation of the

BELTRAN JR. VS. ABAD (132 SCRA
453 10/11/1984)
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
FACTS: Court held respondent Elmo S. Abad a successful bar examinee but has
not been admitted to the Philippine Bar in contempt of Court for unauthorized
practice of law and he was fined P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case
he failed to pay the fine. (121 SCRA 217). He paid the fine. Atty. Procopio S.
Beltran, Jr., the complainant, filed a MOTION TO CIRCULARIZE TO ALL METRO
MANILA COURTS THE FACT THAT ELMO S. ABAD IS NOT AUTHORIZED TO
PRACTICE LAW. The Report has found as a fact, over the denials of the
respondent under oath, that he signed Exhibits B, C, and D, and that he made
appearances in Metro Manila courts. This aspect opens the respondent to a
charge for perjury.  The Report also reveals that Atty. Ruben A. Jacobe
collaborated with the respondent as counsels for Antonio S. Maravilla one of the
accused in Criminal Case Nos. 26084, 26085 and 26086 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City. (Exhibit D.) Atty. Jacobe should be called to account for
his association with the respondent.
Respondent, when asked about the aforesaid motions, Exhibits "B" and "D", and
the signatures therein, denied that he filed the same and that the signatures
therein are his. He also denied that he appeared in the hearing in the afternoon
of December 8, 1983 in the said trial court. According to him, he was in
Batangas at the time. He also testified that the only explanation he could give
regarding the signatures in the aforesaid exhibits is that the same could have
been effected by Atty. Beltran to show the Supreme Court that he (respondent)
was still illegally practicing law. As to the motion for examination and analysis of
respondent's signature, the Investigator, to afford respondent full opportunity to
prove his defense, sought the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation
to compare respondent's signature in the aforesaid exhibits with the signatures
appearing in the pleadings that he filed in the Supreme Court, which latter
signature he admits as genuine and as his own. The aforesaid documentary and
testimonial evidence, as well as the above report of the NBI, have clearly proved
that respondent Abad is still practicing law despite the decision of this Court of
March 28, 1983.
ISSUES: Whether or not Abad can engage in practice of law.
Whether or not Atty. Jacobe liable in his collaboration with the respondent.
HELD: No. Only those licensed by the Supreme Court may practice law in this
country. The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a
C A S E | 15
privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special
qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege
presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment
and even public trust, since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate
does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar
examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from
one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had
practiced law without license. Respondent Abad should know that the
circumstances which he has narrated do not constitute his admission to the
Philippine Bar and the right to practice law thereafter. He should know that
two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed,
namely: his lawyer's oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in
the Roll of Attorneys. (Rule 138, Secs. 17 and 19, Rules of Court.) The
regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. Under Section 3 (e) of
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized
practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court. Mr. Elmo S. Abad is
hereby fined Five Hundred (P500.00) pesos payable to this Court within ten (10)
days from notice failing which he shall serve twenty-five (25) days
imprisonment.
Yes. He violated Canon 9 Rule 9.01 – A lawyer shall not delegate to any
unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only be
performed by a member of the Bar. in good standing. A lawyer shall
not assist anyone who is not a member of the Bar to practice law in this
country. Thus, he must not take as partner or associate in his law firm a person
who is not a lawyer, a lawyer who has been disbarred and a lawyer who has
been suspended from practice of law. The lawyer who assists in an unauthorized
practice of law whether directly or indirectly is subject
to disciplinary action. Finally, Atty. Ruben A. Jacobe is required to explain within
ten (10) days from notice why he should not be disciplined for collaborating and
associating in the practice of the law with the respondent who is not a member
of the bar. 
 C A S E | 16
JOHNSON, J.:
 C A S E | 17
REGALADO, J.: canon 9 Five J taxi v. Nlrc, 235 scra 556
 C A S E | 18
what happened in the petition for certiorari prepared by Sutton did
misrepresent what is set forth in the CA decision and was reprehensible. He
was humble enough to make the necessary expression of regret.
7. Delia Sutton and Atty. Ordoñez filed a ”Joint Apology to the Supreme
Court,” seeking to make amends.

Issue:
Whether or not Sutton must be held accountable in connect to a duty she
owes to the Tribunal as a counsel.
VICENTE MUÑOZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents, DELIA T. SUTTON , Decision: YES, she must be held accountable.
respondent. 1. While expressing regret and offering apology, there was lacking that
Topic: frank admission that what was done by her should not be characterized
Rule 10.02 – A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the merely as "errors" consisting as they do of "inaccurate statements." If there
contents of a paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or were a greater sincerity on her part, the offense should have been
the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision acknowledged as the submission of deliberate misstatements.
already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that 2. As set forth in the applicable Canon of Legal Ethics: "Nothing operates
which has not been proved. more certainly to create or to foster popular prejudice against lawyers as a
class, and to deprive the profession of that full measure of public esteem
Facts: and confidence which belongs to the proper discharge of its duties than does
1. Delia Sutton, a member of the Philippine bar, was the defense lawyer in the false claim, often set up by the unscrupulous in defense of questionable
the case Vicente Muñoz vs PP and CA. She was also connected to Salonga, transactions, that it is the duty of the lawyer to do whatever may enable him
Ordoñez, Yap, Parlade, and Associates law firm. to succeed in winning his client's cause." What is more, the obligation to the
2. Supreme Court found out that the defense submitted an unbelievable bench, especially to this Court, for candor and honesty takes precedence. It
version of the case, attributing to the CA that its decision was made upon is by virtue of such considerations that punishment that must fit the offense
facts different from what actually transpired. has to be meted out to respondent Delia T. Sutton.
Defense Theory: Muñoz’s boat was rammed out by the complainant. 3. WHEREFORE, respondent Delia T. Sutton is severely censured.
Truth: Muñoz’s boat hit the left frontal outrigger of the complainant’s boat
where the complainant was seated, thereby hitting him on the back and
causing his death.
Muñoz’s motorboat had suffered very little damage which would have been
considerable had it been rammed by the offended party’s boat.
3. The Court resolved to deny the petition upon the ground that it is mainly
factual and for lack of merit. Where the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals [are conflicting], the same [are not binding] on the Supreme Court.
(Cesica v. Villaseca, G.R. No. L-9590, April 30, 1957)
4. SC set a hearing requiring all lawyers-partners in the firm to be present.
Sutton appeared. While her demeanor was respectful, it was obvious that
she was far from contrite.
5. Sutton was subjected to intensive questioning by several members of the
Court, yet she was not budged from such an untenable position. It was as if
she was unconcerned, oblivious of the unfavorable reaction to which her
evasive answers gave rise.
6. Atty Sedfrey Ordoñez (law firm partner) expressly acknowledged that

AGUIDO LACSON, JR., ET AL. v. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, ET AL.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
FACTS:
The contempt aspect of this case arose from the motion for reconsideration
of 6 June 1994 which Atty. Fortes filed. He sought therein the reconsideration of
the resolution of 11 May 1994 which the court denied the instant petition. He
contends that "the petition was denied wholly on the basis of technicality"; that the
"denial did not consider the fraud sought to be stopped"; and that in peremptorily
denying the petition, this Court disregarded the purpose of judicial proceedings,
i.e., "to seek the truth," even as it is "unusual that the Resolution failed on this
aspect," and upheld" the fake and falsified OCT No. 730 of the Tuazons." He
further stated therein that:
“it pained the petitioners and their counsel to surmise that nobody cared to
read the Petition. If they did they refused to understand the arguments in order not
to blur the preconceived resolution of this case.”
In the resolution the Court (a) denied with finality the motion to reconsider
the resolution of 11 May 1994 which denied the instant petition for the failure of
the petitioners to sufficiently show that the respondent court committed any
reversible error in rendering the challenged decision, and (b) directed the counsel
for the petitioners, Atty. Mario G. Fortes, to show cause why he should not be held
in contempt of court and declared liable for misconduct for his "apparently
malicious and unfounded accusation that this Court did not read the petition and
for craftily suppressing from the body of the petition the final decision in CA-G.R.
CR No. 11465.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Fortes should be held in contempt of court and
declared liable for misconduct?
HELD:
C A S E | 19
Yes. Ordered to pay a fine of Two Thousand Pesos (P2, 000.00) and
warned that the commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt
with more severely.
Indisputably then, Atty. Fortes' sole purpose was to show and prove his
clients that he was all the time correct and this Court dismally wrong not only for
veering away from the true purpose of judicial proceedings and suppressing the
truth and upholding and illegal title, but, worse, for not even reading the petition or
if it did, for not understanding it in order to hide its prejudgment of the case. In so
doing upon a matrix of false and unfounded premises, Atty. Fortes did an
immeasurable disservice to this Court by putting it into dishonor, disrespect, and
public contempt, diminishing public confidence or promoting distrust in the Court,
and assailing the integrity of its Members and even charging them without
violating their duty to render justice.
Thus, Atty. Fortes deliberately disregarded or ignored his solemn oath to
conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion
with all good fidelity to the courts and his duties to observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers (Section 20, Rule 138,
Rules of Court; Canon 11, Code of Professional Responsibility), observe candor,
fairness and good faith to the courts (Canon 10, Code of Professional
Responsibility), and to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the
sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of
its supreme importance (Canon 1, Canons of Professional Ethics). A client's cause
does not permit an attorney to cross the line between liberty and license. lawyers
must always keep in perspective the thought that since lawyers are administrators
of justice, oath-bound servants of society, their first duty is not to their clients as
many suppose, but to the administration of justice; to this, their client's success is
wholly subordinate; and their conduct ought to and must be scrupulously observant
of law and ethics.
 C A S E | 20

ROMERO, J.:

PERFECTO, J.:
C A S E | 21
 C A S E | 22

PARAS, J.:Heirs of Guballa Vs CA
I. In G.R. No. 78223—Writ of Possession Case
The late Francisco Guballa, Sr. (Guballa Sr. for short) was the registered owner of a parcel of land,
located at 1002-1004 R. Hidalgo St., Quiapo, Manila under TCT No. 15638 of the Register of Deeds of
Manila, together with improvements existing thereon, consisting of a building known as the
Bulaklak Building (Exh. “3”, Folder of Exhibits, p. 27, G.R. No. 78223).

Guballa Sr. used to own and operate Bulaklak Publications Heirs of Francisco Guballa, Sr. vs. Court of
Appeals, 168 SCRA 518, No. L-78223, No. L-79403 December 19, 1988
 C A S E | 23
CASTRO, J.:
The Insular Life Assurance Co. Employees Asso v Insular Life Assurance Co.
37 SCRA 244
 C A S E | 24
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
 C A S E | 25
FERNANDO, J.:
 C A S E | 26
Adez Realty, Inc v CA G.R. No. 100643 Oct 30 1992
BELLOSILLO, J.:
C A S E | 27
 C A S E | 28

FERNANDO, J.:
 C A S E | 29
Canlas vs. CA, 164 SCRA 160 (1988)
G.R. No. L-77691        August 8,1988

SARMIENTO, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Herrera own several parcels of land. He secured loans from L
and R corporations and executed deeds of mortgage over the parcels of
land. Upon the maturity of said loans, the firm initiated an extrajudicial
foreclosure of the properties failure to pay until maturity. Compromise
agreement was made to insure for another year including attorney’s fees of
100k to Atty. Canlas

Still unable to pay, Canlas moved for execution insofar as his fees were
concerned even without collection. Canlas who offered to advance the
money was able to redeem the parcels of land and to register the same in
his name but Herrera alleged that it was falsified but the latter was
acquitted of falsification.

ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Client’s actions violates his duties to his client.

HELD:
Yes. The attorney’s fees are unreasonable. Lawyering is not a moneymaking
venture and lawyers are not merchants, a fundamental standard that has, as a
matter of judicial notice, eluded not a few law advocates.
A lawyer’s efforts partaking of a shakedown of his own client are not becoming of
a lawyer and certainly, do not speak well of his fealty to his oath to "delay no man
for money. However, there is no violation of Art. 1491 of CC because the property
is no longer in litigation.
 C A S E | 30

MARTINEZ, A.M., J.: