JOEL JIMENEZ, plaintiff-appellee,

v.
REMEDIOS CAÑIZARES, defendant.
Republic of the Philippines, intervenor-appellant.
Acting Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for appellant.
Climaco, Ascarraga and Silang for appellee.
PADILLA, J.:
G.R. No. L-12790
August 31, 1960
Voidable Marriage: Article 45 of FC

FACTS:
 Filed on 7 June 1955 in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga the plaintiff Joel Jimenez prays
for a decree annulling his marriage to the defendant Remedios Cañizares contracted on 3 August
1950 before a judge, upon the ground that:
o the office of her genitals or vagina was too small to allow the penetration of a male organ
or penis for copulation
o the condition of her genitals as described above existed at the time of marriage and
continues to exist; 
o and that for that reason he left the conjugal home two nights and one day after they had
been married.
 On 14 June 1955 the wife was summoned and served a copy of the complaint. She did not file an
answer. 
 On 29 September 1956, pursuant to the provisions of article 88 of the Civil Code, the Court
directed the city attorney of Zamboanga to inquire whether there was a collusion.
 On 17 December 1956 the Court ordered the defendant to submit to a physical examination to
determine her physical capacity for copulation and to submit, within ten days from receipt of the
order, a medical certificate.
 On 14 March 1957 the defendant was granted additional five days from notice to comply with the
order of 17 December 1956, if not complied would be deemed lack of interest on her part, and
that judgment upon the evidence presented by her husband would be rendered.
 On 11 April 1957 was the hearing - without the defendant; the Court entered a decree annulling
the marriage. 
 On 26 April 1957 the city attorney filed a motion for reconsideration of the decree, upon the
ground:
o that the defendant's impotency has not been satisfactorily established as required by
law; 
o that she had not been physically examined because she had refused to be examined; 
o that instead of annulling the marriage the Court should have punished her for contempt of
court and compelled her to undergo a physical examination and submit a medical
certificate; 
o that the decree sought to be reconsidered would open the door to married couples, who
want to end their marriage to collude or connive with each other by just alleging
impotency of one of them. 
 He prayed that the complaint be dismissed or that the wife be subjected to a physical
examination. Pending resolution of his motion, the city attorney timely appealed the decree. On
13 May 1957 the motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE:
WON the marriage in question may be annulled on the strength only of the lone testimony of the husband
who claimed and testified that his wife was and is impotent. (The latter did not answer the complaint, was
absent during the hearing, and refused to submit to a medical examination).
RULING: 
NO. In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the sole testimony of
the husband who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his
marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been
satisfactorily established, because from the commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the
decree she had abstained from taking part therein. Although her refusal to be examined or failure to
appear in court show indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the presumption arising out of the
suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred because women of this country are by nature coy,
bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical examination unless compelled to by competent
authority. 

This the Court may do without doing violence to and infringing in this case is not self-incrimination. She is
not charged with any offense. She is not being compelled to be a witness against herself.1 The decree
appealed from is set aside and the case remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in
accordance with this decision.
 ORLANDO VILLANUEVA, petitioner,
v.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LILIA CANALITA-VILLANUEVA, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
G.R. No. 132955             
October 27, 2006
Voidable Marriage: Article 45 of FC

FACTS:

 This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the January 26, 1998 Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832, affirming with modification the Decision dated
January 12, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172 in Civil
Case No. 3997-V-92 (a) dismissing petitioner's petition for the annulment of his marriage to
private respondent and (b) ordering him to pay moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees
and costs. Also assailed is the March 5, 1998 Resolution denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
 Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia Canalita-Villanueva got married on
April 13, 1988 in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. On November 17, 1992, or after 4 years and 8
months of their marriage, Orlando filed with the trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage
alleging that threats of violence and duress forced him into marrying Lilia, who was already
pregnant; that he did not get her pregnant prior to the marriage; that he never cohabited with her
after the marriage; and that he later learned that private respondent's child died during delivery on
August 29, 1988.
 In her answer with compulsory counterclaim, Lilia prayed for the dismissal of the petition, arguing
that petitioner freely and voluntarily married her; that petitioner stayed with her in Palawan for
almost a month after their marriage; that petitioner wrote letters to her after he returned to Manila,
during which private respondent visited him personally; and that petitioner knew about the
progress of her pregnancy, which ended in their son being born prematurely. Private respondent
also prayed for the payment of moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs.
 While this trial is in progress, Orlando has a pending bigamy charge in which Lilia alleged that this
petition for the annulment of their marriage is only an avenue sought by Orlando to get a
favorable judgement or even acquittal in his bigamy charge.
 The RTC ruled in dismissing the case and ordered Orlando to pay exemplary damages. This is
also affirmed by the CA and only reduces the amount for exemplary damages against Orlando.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent.

RULING:

No. The subject marriage cannot be annulled on the grounds of alleged vitiated consent. Under Article 45
of FC, “A marriage may be annulled for any of these causes: that the consent of either party was obtained
by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife; that the consent of either party was obtained by force,
intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter
freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife.”

In this case, Orlando alleged that he did not freely consent to be married to Lilia by citing several incidents
that created in his mind a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger to his life
and safety. He also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to believe by appellee that the
latter was pregnant with his child when they were married, excusing that he could not have impregnated
Lila because he did not have an erection during their tryst is flimsy. However, Orlando fails to substantiate
his claims and just focuses on undermining the credibility of Lilia’s testimony. In addition to this, the court
believes that if there were ever truth on the allegations of Orlando, he wouldn’t have waited after more
than 4 years of their marriage before filing this petition for annulment. Hence, the marriage remains valid
while the award of moral and exemplary damages to Lilia is deleted.
 MANUEL G. ALMELOR, petitioner,
v.
THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LAS PIÑAS CITY, BRANCH 254, and LEONIDA T.
ALMELOR, respondents.
G.R. No. 179620            
August 26, 2008
Voidable Marriage: Article 46 of FC

FACTS:
 Manuel and Leonida were married in 1989. They were blessed with three children. Both were
medical practitioners- anesthesiologist and pediatrician respectively. After 11 years of marriage,
however, Leonida filed before the RTC of Las Pinas City a petition to annul their marriage on the
grounds of Manuel’s Psychological Incapacity.

Leonida’s Allegations 
1. Manuel’s tendency to be a harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous, easily angered - a
contrast to his public persona.
2. Manue’s deep attachment to his mother and over dependence on her decisions is
INCOMPREHENSIBLE to Leonida. 
3. Manuel was concealing his Homosexuality and Leonida found some homosexual pornographic
materials belonging to Manuel.
4. Manuel’s closeness to male acquaintances is PECULIAR.
5. Manuel was caught kissing another man.

 Manuel naturally denied and belied all allegations. His brother, Jesus, testifying and belying all
allegations. 
 After which, Leonida left their conjugal abode with their children. 
 RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage of the parties null and void ab initio. Manuel
was also ordered to support their children. THE RTC NULLIFIED THE MARRIAGE NOT BASED
ON ARTICLE 36 BUT ON ARTICLE 45 OF THE FAMILY CODE. 
Manuel filed a petition for annulment of Judgment before the CA.
 CA pheld the ruling of the RTC and ruled that Manuel filed the wrong remedy. Hence, this petition
for review on certiorari. 

ISSUE:
Whether or NOT the RTC  have erred in its decision to annul Almelor’s marriage on the grounds of
psychological incapacity and in this case at bar, HOMOSEXUALITY. 

RULING:
Yes. Under Article 46 of the Family Code, paragraph 4, “Concealment of….HOMOSEXUALITY OR
LESBIANISM at the time of marriage.” is a ground for annulment of Marriage. Mere Homosexuality is a
ground only for legal separation under Article 55 (6) of the Family Code. The Supreme Court emphasized
that mere allegations of conflicting personalities, irreconcilable differences, incessant quarrels and/or
beatings, unpredictable mood swings, infidelities, vices, abandonment, and difficulty, neglect, or failure in
the performance of some marital obligations do not suffice to establish psychological incapacity.

In the case at bar, there is no doubt that even though, petitioner Manuel denied the allegations, there are
preponderant evidences to show that he was really a homosexual. However, notwithstanding the
allegations of Leonida against Manuel, there is really no sufficient proof presented before the Courts to
show that Manuel was really a Homosexual and that he tried to conceal it to his wife at the time of their
marriage. The Court emphasized that IT IS THE CONCEALMENT (DELIBERATE) OF HOMESEXUALITY
THAT BECOMES GROUND FOR ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE, NOT HOMOSEXUALITY.
Homsexuality is a ground for LEGAL SEPARATION. The Supreme Court ruled that the lower court
committed grace abuse of discretion by ruling the marriage of petitioner and private defendant null and
void ab initio on the basis of petitioner’s alleged homosexuality not on its deliberate concealment. 
 ISIDRO ABLAZA, Petitioner,
v.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 158298               
August 11, 2010
BERSAMIN, J.:
Voidable Marriages

FACTS: 
 Petitioner, Isidro, filed  a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage
contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila
Honato before the Regional Trial Court of Cataingan, Masbate on October 17, 2000. 
 He alleged that the marriage contracted by his late brother and Leonila was contracted without a
marriage license and should be declared null and void ab initio. He also claimed to be the brother
of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties
acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest. He
contends that he can challenge the validity of his late brother’s marriage with Leonila even after
the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio. 
 RTC dismissed the petition on the grounds that the petition was filed out of time and petitioner is
not a party to the marriage. The marriage was celebrated between Cresenciano and Leonila. 
 CA dismissed the petition  stating that a surviving brother of the deceased spouse is not the
proper party to file the subject petition and the surviving spouse, who stands to be prejudiced,
was not impleaded in this petition.Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. 
ISSUE:
Whether or not a person not being a party to an assailed marriage, may bring an action for the declaration
of the absolute nullity of that marriage--In this case, the marriage of a deceased brother. 

RULING:
Yes. Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC Section 2, paragraph (a), (Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which took effect on March 15,
2003 provides that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or wife. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, however, extends only to marriages covered by the Family
Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, and, being a procedural rule that is prospective in application,
is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003 as ruled in the Carlos v. Sandoval
case.

In the case at bar, the marriage of Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on December 26, 1949,
before the effect of the Civil Code. The rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the
right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had
absolutely no application to the petitioner, therefore. A judicial declaration of nullity marriage is usually not
necessary for the establishment of its nullity. But for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of
mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared
by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction. Article 40 of the Family Code provides that for the
purpose of heirship, a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is necessary. 

As ruled in Carlos v.Sandoval case, the plaintiff must still be the party who stands to be benefited by the
suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural law that every action must be
prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest. Carlos alleged himself to be the brother
and surviving heir of the deceased. That means that he has a material interest in the estate of the
deceased. He has the right to succeed according to Articles 1001 and 1003 of the Civil Code. The RTC
and CA had erred in their decision to dismiss the petition of Isidro. The Supreme Court reversed those
decisions made by the RTC and CA for further proceedings (to determine whether he was the surviving
brother and heir of Cresenciano and entitled to succeed) so that his substantial rights may not be
prejudiced. 

MARIETTA B. ANCHETA, petitioner, 

v..
RODOLFO S. ANCHETA, respondent.
G.R. No. 145370 
March 4, 2004
Voidable Marriage: Article 48 of FC

FACTS:
 Petitioner and respondent were married on March 5, 1959, and resided in Muntinlupa, Metro
Manila. They had 8 children. 
 In 1992, the husband left the conjugal home and abandoned his wife and children. 
 In 1994, the parties executed a Compromise Agreement where some of the conjugal properties
were adjudicated to the petitioner and her 8 children – including a parcel of land (island/resort
called Munting Paraiso) in Carmona, Cavite.
 When the husband intended to remarry, he filed a petition with the RTC of Cavite for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. 
 Although the husband knew that his wife was already residing at the resort Munting Paraiso in
Cavite, he nevertheless alleged in his petition that the wife was residing in Las Piñas, metro
Manila, “where she may be served with summons.” The clerk issued summons to the petition at
the address stated in the petition, but the petitioner failed to file an answer. 
  In 1995, the respondent filed an “Ex-Parte Motion to Declare Defendant as in Default” since she
had no appearance during the hearing. On July 7 of the same year, the petition was granted -
their marriage was declared void ab initio.
 In 1998, the husband and Teresita H. Rodil was married in civil rights to the municipal mayor of
Indang, Cavite.
 In 2000, the petitioner filed a verified petition against the respondent with the Court of Appeals for
the annulment of the order of the RTC of Cavite. She alleged that the respondent committed
gross misrepresentation by making it appear in his petition that she was residing in Las Piñas,
Metro Manila. Hence, a petition for review on certiorari was filed before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: 
Whether or not the declaration of nullity of marriage was valid.

RULING:
No. A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of collusion.
According to Article  48 of the Family Code, “in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage
and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the State for the
purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed.” If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare
him or her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists
between the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal separation or
annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious
and fabricated.

Our constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our
family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the
State is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families.
The break-up of families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their preservation is not the concern
of the family members alone. Whether or not a marriage should continue to exist or a family should stay
together must not depend on the whims and caprices of only one party, who claims that the other suffers
psychological imbalance, incapacitating such party to fulfill his or her marital duties and obligations.

Wherefore, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the CA are SET ASIDE and REVERSED.

DAVID A. NOVERAS, Petitioner, 

v.
LETICIA T. NOVERAS, Respondent.
PEREZ, J.
G.R. No. 188289
 August 20, 2014
Voidable Marriage:  Article 135 of FC, Article 26 of FC, Article 99 of FC

FACTS:
 David and Leticia, both Filipinos, were married on 3 December 1988 in QC. They resided in
California, USA where they eventually acquired American citizenship. They then begot two
children, Jerome and Jena. Accordingly, they have properties in PH and USA. 
 On Dec 2002, their Sampaloc property (their house in Sampaloc, Manila used to be owned by
David’s parents) were sold for 2.2 Million, 120k were incurred in going to and from the USA (Net
= 2.08M). 410k of this is still unpaid.
 David left USA due to business reverses (2001) but later on abandoned his family to live with his
mistress in Aurora province (Sep 2003). 
 In December 2003, David and Leticia executed a joint affidavit before David’s father, Atty Isaias.
  Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce with the
Superior Court of California, which granted the same on 24 June 2005.  The California court
granted to Leticia the custody of her two children, as well as all the couple’s properties in the
USA.
 In August 2005 - Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property before the
RTC of Baler, Aurora. She relied on the Dec 2003 Joint Affidavit and David’s failure to comply
with his obligation under the same. David, on the other hand, demanded that the conjugal
partnership properties, which also include the USA properties, be liquidated since a divorce
decree was already entered.
 The RTC regarded that since the parties are US citizens, their marriage is hereby declared
DISSOLVED pursuant to the divorce decree. Thus, the trial court considered the petition filed by
Leticia as one for liquidation of the absolute community of property instead of an action for judicial
separation of conjugal property. Their property was classified as absolute community because
they did not execute any marriage settlement before the solemnization of their marriage pursuant
to Article 75 of the Family Code. Then, the trial court ruled that in accordance with the doctrine of
processual presumption, Philippine law should apply because the court cannot take judicial notice
of the US law since the parties did not submit any proof of their national law. The court
adjudicated the Philippine properties to David subject to the payment of the children’s legitimes.
 On appeal, the CA modified the RTC decision and directed the equal division of the Philippine
properties between the spouses and both should pay their children the amount of P520,000.00
(from the sale of Sampaloc property – 2.08M /2 (half of the sale belongs to the children) /2
children.)
 Hence this petition, where David insists that CA should have recognized the California Judgment
of divorce and that allowing Leticia to share in the Philippine properties is tantamount to unjust
enrichment considering that she was already granted all US properties by the California court.

ISSUES: 
1. Whether or not the marriage between David and Leticia has been dissolved pursuant to the divorce
decree issued in California;

2. Whether or not the filing of the judicial separation of property is proper in accordance with the Family
Code

RULING: 
1. No. The trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree which severed the bond of marriage
between the parties. Foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on
evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien
himself or herself. 

Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The required certificates to
prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on divorce were not presented. Even if we
apply the doctrine of processual presumption, divorce is not recognized between Filipino citizens in the
Philippines. Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still legally
married in the Philippines.

The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to liquidation.

2. Yes. Art 135 of the Family Code provides that “Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause
for judicial separation of property:

(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least
one year and reconciliation is highly improbable.”
  The records of this case are complete with evidence that both parties had indeed separated for
more than a year and that reconciliation is highly improbable. 
a. The spouses had been living separately since 2003. 
b. Leticia heard from her friends that David has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who
represented herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who worked in the hospital where
David was once confined, testified that she saw the name of Estrellita listed as the wife of David
in the Consent for Operation form. 
c. They had filed for divorce and it was granted by the California court in June 2005.

Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year, the petition for
judicial separation of the absolute community of property should be granted. The grant of the judicial
separation automatically dissolves the absolute community regime, as stated in the 4th paragraph of
Article 99 of the Family Code, thus: “Art. 99. The absolute community terminates: (4) In case of judicial
separation of property during the marriage under Articles 134 to 138.” Accordingly, the procedure
provided in Art 102 shall apply.

Thus, the decision of the CA is affirmed. This court agrees with the appellate court that the Philippine
courts did not acquire jurisdiction over the California properties of David and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of
the Civil Code clearly states that real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated. Thus, liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine properties. The
principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen
who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage.