Puyat v. Puyat, G.R. No.

181614, June 30, 2021

FACTS:
Gil and Ma. Teresa Puyat were married when they were 16 and 17 year-olds, respectively.
However, petitioner Gil obtained a divorce decree in California due to conflicts between him and
his wife brought by their immaturity. He then filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage in the Philippines on the ground of psychological incapacity, which was denied by the
Court of Appeals, ruling that there had been collusion between the parties.

ISSUE:
Was there collusion between the parties to justify the dismissal of the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage?

HELD:
NO. Article 48 of the Family Code and the Rule on declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under Section 9 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
mandates the participation of the public prosecutor in cases involving void marriages through the
submission of an investigation report to determine whether there is collusion exists between the
parties.

In this case, the existence of collusion was not proven. Respondent Ma. Teresa’s alleged failure
to testify when she did not appear during her scheduled presentation of evidence should not be
automatically equated to the presumption of collusion between the parties. Collusion is also
negated by the fact that the animosity between the parties was apparent and persisted based on
their submissions and reliefs prayed for.

While the Supreme Court affirmed the finding of psychological incapacity on petitioner, it also
held that despite being declared as the psychologically incapacitated spouse, petitioner is not
barred from initiating an action to declare his marriage to Ma. Teresa null and void. Section 2 of
the said A.M. Circular does not distinguish who between the spouses may file the petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage. Even the psychologically incapacitated can file
the petition. Ultimately, the petition was granted and the parties’ marriage were declared null and
void.
Villanueva v. CA, G.R. 132955, Oct. 27, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioner Orlando Villanueva was married to private respondent Lilia Villanueva. Eventually,
petitioner filed a petition for annulment of his marriage alleging that threats of violence and
duress forced him into marrying Lilia who was already pregnant, and that he never cohabited
with her after the marriage. However, the lower courts dismissed the petition, causing the
petitioner to elevate the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Can the marriage of the parties in this case be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent?

HELD:
NO. The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the lower court that petitioner freely and
voluntarily married private respondent, and that no threats or intimidation, duress or violence
compelled him to do so based on the following findings:
1. It took petitioner four (4) years and eight (8) months since their marriage to have it
annulled, bolstering private respondent’s allegation that the annulment suit was filed by
petitioner in the mere hope that a favorable judgment thereon would result in his acquittal
for the crime of bigamy then already pending against him;

2. Petitioner’s apprehension of danger to his person was not so overwhelming as to deprive

him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage.

3. Petitioner’s invocation of fraud that he was induced to marry private respondent due to
the latter bearing his child which he alleged was not true must also fail, for it was even
conceded by his counsel that he had a sexual relationship with private respondent; and

4. Lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to annul a marriage. The failure to cohabit
becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the grounds for
annulling the marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or
undue influence. Since the petitioner failed to justify his failure to cohabit with the
private respondent on any of those grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld.
Gandionco v. Peñaranda, G.R. No. 79284, November 27, 1987
FACTS:
Private respondent Teresita Gandionco filed a civil case for legal separation against petitioner
Froilan Grandioco on the ground of concubinage with a petition for support and payment of
damages, as well as a criminal case for concubinage. Petitioner contends that the civil action for
legal separation and the incidents consequent thereto, such as the application for support
pendente lite, should be suspended in view of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him
the private respondent.

ISSUE:
Should the proceedings related to legal separation have to be suspended while awaiting the
conviction or acquittal for concubinage in the criminal case?

HELD:
NO. In view of the amendment under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, a civil action for
legal separation, based on concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a
criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one "to enforce the civil liability
arising from the offense" even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to
the same offense. The action for legal separation in this case is not to recover civil liability but is
merely aimed at the conjugal rights of the spouses and their relations to each other.
Somosa-Ramos v. Vamenta Jr., G.R. No. L-34132, July 29, 1972
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a case of legal separation against her husband in the sala of the respondent Judge
and likewise sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for the return to
her of what she claimed to be her paraphernal and exclusive property, then under the
administration and management of his husband. Respondent Judge granted the motion of the
husband to suspend the hearing of the petition for a writ of mandatory preliminary injunction, to
which petitioner appealed before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Does the requirement under the Family Code prohibiting the hearing of an action for legal
separation before the lapse of six (6) months from the filing of the petition likewise preclude
courts from acting on a motion for preliminary injunction applied for as an ancillary remedy to
such a suit?

HELD:
NO. Said provision is not an absolute bar to the hearing motion for preliminary injunction prior
to the expiration of the six-month period. It provides that, "After the filing of the petition for
legal separation, the spouse shall be entitled to live separately from each other and manage their
respective property. The husband shall continue to manage the conjugal partnership property
but if the court deems it proper, it may appoint another to manage said property, in which case
the administrator shall have the same rights and duties as a guardian and shall not be allowed
to dispose of the income or of the capital except in accordance with the orders of the court."

There appears to be in the law a recognition that the question of management of the spouses’
respective property need not be left unresolved even during such six-month period. There is
justification then for the petitioner's insistence that her motion for preliminary mandatory
injunction should not be ignored by the lower court.
Ong Eng Kiam v. Ong, G.R. No. 153206, October 23, 2006
FACTS:
Private respondent Lucita Ong filed a case for legal separation against her husband, herein
petitioner, on the ground of physical violence, threats, intimidation, and grossly abusive conduct
in the form of beating up his wife and children and raining them with profanities. On the other
hand, petitioner alleges that while it was true that he and his wife quarreled often, he denied the
imputation to him of grossly abusive conduct. Moreover, petitioner argued that since Lucita
abandoned the family, a decree of legal separation should not be granted, following Article 56,
paragraph (4) of the Family Code, which provides that legal separation shall be denied when
both parties have given ground for legal separation.

ISSUE:
Do the facts of the case constitute sufficient ground to grant the petition for legal separation?

HELD:
YES. The Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the lower court wherein petitioner himself
admitted that there was no day that he did not quarrel with his wife, which made his life
miserable, and blamed her for being negligent of her wifely duties and for not reporting to him
the wrongdoings of their children. Private respondent’s sister also gave numerous accounts of the
instances when petitioner displayed violent temper against his wife and their children.

Finally, the abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable
cause for more than one year. As it was established that private respondent left petitioner due to
his abusive conduct, such does not constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision.
Hence, the petition was granted.
Bugayong v. Ginez, G.R. No. L-10033, December 28, 1956
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a case for legal separation against his wife when he alleged that he was informed,
based on testimonies by the latter’s sister-in-law and from anonymous letters, of the infidelities
of his wife. Thereafter, petitioner went to Pangasinan and sought for his wife where she agreed to
come along with him. They both proceeded to the house of petitioner’s cousin where they stayed
and lived for 2 nights and 1 day as husband and wife, then went back to petitioner’s house and
again passed the night therein as husband and wife. When petitioner tried to confirm the
allegations regarding his wife’s infidelity from her, she merely packed up and left, which
petitioner took as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity imputed on her. Despite that belief,
petitioner exerted efforts to locate her and, failing to find her, he then went to Bacarra, Ilocos
Norte, "to soothe his wounded feelings".

The petition was dismissed by the lower courts on the ground that there had been condonation on
the part of petitioner, citing that legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse,
provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage.

ISSUE:
Does the petitioner’s attitude of sleeping with his wife for 2 nights despite his alleged belief that
she was unfaithful to him, amount to a condonation of her previous and supposed adulterous
acts?

HELD:
YES. The act of the latter in persuading her to come along with him, and the fact that she went
with him and consented to be brought to the house of his cousin Pedro Bugayong and together
they slept there as husband and wife for one day and one night, and the further fact that in the
second night they again slept together in their house likewise as husband and wife — all these
facts have no other meaning in the opinion of this court than that a reconciliation between them
was effected and that there was a condonation of the wife by the husband. The reconciliation
occurred almost ten months after he came to know of the acts of infidelity amounting to adultery.

Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation. A
single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties ordinarily is sufficient to
constitute condonation, and where the parties live in the same house, it is presumed that they live
on terms of matrimonial cohabitation.
Busuego v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 196842, October 9, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner Alfredo Busuego and and private respondent Rosa Busuego were married. Eventually,
Rosa found out that love letters from other women were being sent to petitioner which he denied.
When Rosa saw an opportunity to work in the US as a nurse, petitioner vehemently opposed and
even went to a point where he pointed a gun at Rosa’s head. Nonetheless, Rosa pushed through
and stayed in the US. All the while, Alfredo never sent financial support. Instead, it was Rosa
who would remit money to Alfredo from time to time, believing that Alfredo had stopped
womanizing. Rosa also continued to spend her annual vacation in Davao City. However, her
husband’s extra-marital relations with one Sia and de Leon were found out. Consequently, Rosa
filed a criminal case for concubinage against her husband.

Petitioner argues that Rosa had pardoned his concubinage, having admitted to knowing of his
womanizing and yet continuing with their relationship as demonstrated in Rosa’s annual visits to
him in Davao City.

ISSUE:
Was there condonation in this case?

HELD:
NO. Although the foregoing speaks of condonation of concubinage as a ground for legal
separation, the holding therein applies with equal force in a prosecution for concubinage as a
felony. Rosa’s admission was that she believed her husband had stopped womanizing, not that
she had knowledge of Alfredo’s specific acts of concubinage, specifically keeping them in the
conjugal dwelling. This admission set against the specific acts of concubinage listed in Article
334 of the Revised Penal Code does not amount to condonation. Their continued cohabitation as
husband and wife construed from Rosa’s annual visits to Davao City is not acquiescence to
Alfredo’s relations with his concubines. Nowhere does it appear that she has consented to her
husband's immorality or that she has acquiesced in his relations with his concubine.
Sy v. Eufemio, G.R. No. L-30977, January 31, 1972
FACTS:
Petitioner Carmen Sy filed a petition for legal separation against her husband, herein private
respondent, when she discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman named Go
Hiok. Private respondent counter-claimed for the declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage
with petitioner on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Eventually,
petitioner died from a car accident and was substituted in the case by his father. Private
respondent then moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on two (2) grounds, namely:
that the petition for legal separation was filed beyond the one-year period; and that the death of
Carmen abated the action for legal separation.

ISSUE:
Does the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the
action? If it does, will abatement also apply if the action involves property rights?

HELD:
YES. An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board
separation of the spouses is purely personal. The law recognizes this by allowing only the
innocent spouse to claim legal separation; and by providing that the spouses can, by their
reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation
already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action
causes the death of the action itself.

A review of the resulting changes in property relations between spouses shows that they are
solely the effect of the decree of legal separation; hence, they cannot survive the death of the
plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree.

A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if
property rights are involved, is that these rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their
source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that
before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes
during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical
and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily
remain unborn.
Siochi v. Gozon, G.R. No. 169900, 169977, March 18, 2010
FACTS:
Private respondent Elvira Gozon filed a petition for legal separation against her husband, herein
private respondent Alfredo Gozon. While the case was still pending, Alfredo entered into a sale
with petitioner Mario Siochi regarding a parcel of land which was registered in the name
“Alfredo Gozon, married to Elvira Gozon.” Meanwhile, the legal separation case was granted by
the RTC and the spouses’ conjugal properties, including the land herein, were dissolved and
liquidated. Being the offending spouse, Alfredo was deprived of his share in the net profits and
the same was awarded to their child, Winifred Gozon.

Thereafter, Alfredo donated the land to Winifred and subsequently sold the same land to private
respondent Inter-Dimensional Realty. Hence, petitioner filed a case for specific performance,
damages and the annulment of the donation and sale. The Court of Appeals ruled that the one-
half undivided share of Alfredo in the property was already forfeited in favor of his daughter
Winifred, based on the ruling of the Cavite RTC in the legal separation case.

ISSUE:
Did the legal separation of the spouses have the effect of forfeiting the entire share of Alfredo,
the offending spouse, of his entire share in their conjugal property?

HELD:
NO. Among the effects of the decree of legal separation under Article 43 (2) of the Family Code,
in relation to Article 63 thereof, is that the conjugal partnership is dissolved and liquidated and
the offending spouse would have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the conjugal
partnership. It is only Alfredo’s share in the net profits which is forfeited in favor of Winifred.
Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredo’s share in the conjugal partnership
property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal partnership property.