G.R. No.

141528             October 31, 2006

OSCAR P. MALLION, petitioner vs. EDITHA ALCANTARA, respondent.

FACTS:
 On October 1995, petitioner Mallion filed a petition with the RTC seeking a declaration of nullity
of his marriage to respondent Alcantara under Article 36 of the Family Code, citing respondent’s
alleged psychological incapacity. RTC denied the petition upon since petitioner failed to adduce
preponderant evidence to warrant the grant of the relief he is seeking. Appeal was filed but was
also dismissed.
 After decision of the previous case, petitioner again filed, on July 1999, another petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC, this time alleging that his marriage with
respondent was null and void due to the fact that it was celebrated without a valid marriage
license.
 Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata and forum shopping. Petition
was dismissed on that ground.
 Petitioner argues that while the relief prayed for in the two cases was the same, that is, the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent, the cause of action in the earlier case was
distinct and separate from the cause of action in the present case because the operative facts upon
which they were based as well as the evidence required to sustain either were different.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a previous final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of
psychological incapacity bar a subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of lack of
marriage license?

RULING:
YES. Rule 39 in the Rules of Court-Civil Procedure, Section 47 (b) pertains to it in its concept as "bar by
prior judgment" or "estoppel by verdict," which is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a
second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. On the other hand, Section 47 (c) pertains
to res judicata in its concept as "conclusiveness of judgment" or otherwise known as the rule of auter
action pendant which ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be
raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action. Res judicata in its
concept as a bar by prior judgment obtains in the present case.

Petitioner is simply invoking different grounds for the same cause of action. By definition, a cause of
action is the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. In both petitions, petitioner has
the same cause - the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent. What differs is the ground upon
which the cause of action is predicated.

In the previous trial, petitioner impliedly conceded that the marriage had been solemnized and celebrated
in accordance with law. Petitioner is now bound by this admission. The issue now could have been raised
in the earlier case. He cannot divide grounds for recovery and process file a case piecemeal.

A party seeking to enforce a claim, legal or equitable, must present to the court, either by the pleadings or
proofs, or both, on the grounds upon which to expect a judgment in his favor. He is not at liberty to split
up his demands, and prosecute it by piecemeal or present only a portion of the grounds upon which a
special relief is sought and leave the rest to the presentment in a second suit if the first fails. There would
be no end to litigation if such piecemeal presentation is allowed.
In sum, litigants are provided with the options on the course of action to take in order to obtain judicial
relief. Once an option has been taken and a case is filed in court, the parties must ventilate all matters and
relevant issues therein.

Therefore, having expressly and impliedly conceded the validity of their marriage celebration, petitioner
is now deemed to have waived any defects therein. The petition was denied.

REPUBLIC VS DAYOT
G.R. No. 175581
March 28, 2008
Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J.

FACTS:
 The records disclose that on November 24, 1986, Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa Tecson-
Dayot (Felisa) were married at the Pasay City Hall. In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and
Felisa executed a sworn affidavit of marital cohabitation attesting that both of them had
attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years.
 However, on July 7, 1993, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna (RTC). He contended
that his marriage with Felisa was a sham claiming that no marriage ceremony was
celebrated between the parties; tha t he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that
he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his consent
to the marriage was secured through fraud. According to Jose, he was introduced to
Felisa in 1986, the same year when the marriage occurred. In her defense, Felisa denied
Jose’s allegations and defended the validity of their marriage.
 The RTC ruled that based from the testimonies and evidence presented by both parties,
the marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa was valid. Likewise, the Court of
Appeals (CA) did not accept Jose’s assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio
for the lack of a marriage license ruling that under Article 76 of the Civil Code, a
marriage may be solemnized with the parties executing an affidavit of marriage
between a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years. Aggrieved, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE:
WON the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by Jose and Felisa does not affect
the validity of their marriage

RULING:
NO. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly
but reasonably construed. For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is necessary thereto that
the man and the woman must have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried,
they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.

It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the
time they executed their sworn affidavit of cohabitation and contracted marriage. Even the
Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five
months before the celebration of their marriage.

The insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties’ affidavit will not
affect the validity of the marriage since all the parties’ affidavit will not affect the validity of
marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were complied with deserves scant
consideration. It cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa were celebrated
without the formal requisite of a marriage license nor did Jose and Felisa meet the legal
requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a marriage license.

Petitioner: Chi Ming Tsoi

Respondents: Court of Appeals and Gina Lao-Tsoi
266 SCRA 324
G.R. No. 119190
January 16, 1997

FACTS:

Petitioner and private respondent were married on May 22, 1988. On the first night of their married life
where they were supposed to make love as newlyweds, petitioner instead  went to bed and slept.
Contrary to the expectations of the wife, no sexual intercourse between them occurred during the first
night. The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights. In an effort to have their
honeymoon in a private place, they went to Baguio City, but they did so together with some of their
relatives who were all invited by the husband to join them. During the period of their stay in Baguio no
sexual intercourse between them took place. They slept together in the same bed since the day of their
marriage until March 15, 198; however during this period, no attempt to consummate the marriage was
made. Private respondent claims that she did not even see her husband’s private parts nor did he see
hers. Not willing to reconcile with him, she sought for the annulment of their marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of her husband.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the husband’s refusal to consummate the marriage constitutes psychological incapacity.

RULING:

Yes.
The Court ruled that “one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to procreate
children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the
basic end of marriage. Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or
wholeness of the marriage.”

In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital
obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Reiterating the trial court’s ruling, the Court stated
that the admission that the husband, who does not appear to be suffering from any physical disability, is
reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife after ten months of cohabitation, is
indicative of a hopeless situation and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological
incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the Family Code.

G.R. No. 183896 : January 30, 2013

SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner, v. GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.
VELASCO, JR., J.:

FACTS:
1. Syed Azhar Abbas, a Pakistani, filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Gloria Goo- Abbas on the ground that their marriage has no existing
marriage license.
2. Syed and Gloria were married in Taiwan on August 9, 1992.
3. Syed arrived on the Philippines and on January 9, 1993, a ceremony was conducted
between him and Gloria, solemnized by Rev. Mario Dauz and witnessed by Atty. Lorenzo
Sanchez and Mary Ann Ceriola. Present also is Felicitas Goo, mother of Gloria.
4. During the ceremony, Syed and Gloria signed a document. Syed claim that he did not
know the nature of the ceremony until Gloria told him that it was a marriage.
5. In July of 2003, Syed went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to
check on their marriage license however, the Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C.
Encarnacion, issued a certification stating that the marriage license number appearing in
the marriage contract submitted by Syed which is Marriage License No. 9969967, was
the number of another marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan.
6. On the other hand, Gloria presented their marriage contract bearing their signatures as
proof. She also presented Rev. Mario Dauz as the solemnizing officer of the wedding;
Atty. Lorenzo and Mary Ann as the witnesses and her mother who was also present
during the ceremony. She also said that certain Qualin got their marriage license for
them and that she has a daughter with Syed.
7. Gloria also filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a certain Maria Corazon
Buenaventura during the existence of their marriage.
 8. The RTC declared their marriage null and void on the ground that that the lack of a valid
marriage license is an absence of a formal requisite, Therefore, the marriage of Gloria
and Syed on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.
9. The CA reversed the ruling of the RTC and held that the evidences presented by Gloria
Abbas showed that appellant and appellee have been validly married and there was
compliance with all the requisites laid down by law and the CA also take serious note
that said that the petition of Syed appears to have been instituted by him only after an
Information for Bigamy was filed against him for contracting a second or subsequent
marriage with one Ma. Corazon Buenaventura. The CA cannot reward him by declaring
the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the process allow him to
profit from his own deceit and perfidy.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the marriage of Syed and Gloria is void (Article 35)
RULINGS:
1. YES. The court gave probative value to the certification issued to Syed by the Municipal
Civil Registrar. It was permitted under Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which
states that a written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an official
record, that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist
in the records of his office, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office
contain no such record or entry.
In this case, the Marriage License No. 9969967 indicated to the marriage contract of
Syed and Gloria was the number of another marriage license issued to another couple,
therefore, as the marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of
Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that
his motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may,
the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a
valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of
a valid marriage license cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to
procure the same. The law must be applied. 

G.R. No. 175367               June 6, 2011

DANILO A. AURELIO vs. VIDA MA. CORAZON P. AURELIO
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio were married on
March 23, 1988. They have two sons, namely: Danilo Miguel and Danilo Gabriel.
2. On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage on the ground that both she and petitioner were psychologically incapacitated
 of performing and complying with their respective essential marital obligations and that
such state of psychological incapacity was present prior and even during the time of the
marriage ceremony.
3. The psychological incapacity was manifested by lack of financial support from the
husband; his lack of drive and incapacity to discern the plight of his working wife. The
husband exhibited consistent jealousy and distrust towards his wife. His moods
alternated between hostile defiance and contrition. He refused to assist in the
maintenance of the family. He refused to foot the household bills and provide for his
family’s needs. He exhibited arrogance. He was completely insensitive to the feelings of
his wife. He liked to humiliate and embarrass his wife even in the presence of their
children.
4. Vida, on the other hand, is effusive and displays her feelings openly and freely. Her
feelings change very quickly – from joy to fury to misery to despair, depending on her
day-to-day experiences. Her tolerance for boredom was very low. She was emotionally
immature; she cannot stand frustration or disappointment. She cannot delay to gratify
her needs. She gets upset when she cannot get what she wants. Self-indulgence lifts her
spirits immensely.
5. The private respondent was evaluated by a psychologist, who found that the
psychological incapacity of both husband and wife to perform their marital obligations is
grave, incorrigible and incurable.
6. Private respondent suffers from a Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic
features; whereas petitioner suffers from passive aggressive (negativistic) personality
disorder that renders him immature and irresponsible to assume the normal obligations
of a marriage.
7. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss and argued that the petition failed to meet the
standards set by the Court for the interpretation and implementation of Article 36 of the
Family Code.
8. RTC denied the petition to dismiss and ruled that respondent’s petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage complied with the requirements of the Molina doctrine. CA
affirmed the ruling of RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the allegations contained in the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
are sufficient for the court to declare the nullity of the marriage between Vida and Danilo
RULINGS:
YES. The allegations contained in the petition for the nullity of marriage filed by the private
respondent is sufficient, on the other hand, the arguments raised by petitioner is not
meritorious.
Specifically, petitioner contends that the petition failed to comply with three of the Molina
guidelines, namely: that the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be alleged in the
complaint; that such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage; and that the non-complied marital obligation
must be stated in the petition.

First, the Court finds that the root cause of psychological incapacity was stated and alleged in
the complaint. The manifestation of respondent that the family backgrounds of both petitioner
and respondent were discussed in the complaint as the root causes of their psychological
incapacity. Moreover, a competent and expert psychologist clinically identified the same as the
root causes.

Second, the psychologist reported that respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorder
with Narcissistic Features. Petitioner, on the other hand, allegedly suffers from Passive
Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality Disorder. The incapacity of both parties to perform their
marital obligations was alleged to be grave, incorrigible and incurable.

Lastly, the essential marital obligations that were not complied with were alleged in the
petition. Respondent’s allegations fall under Article 68 of the Family Code which states that
"the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support."

It bears to stress that whether or not petitioner and respondent are psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill their marital obligations are a matter for the RTC to decide at the first
instance. Each case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged
not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its
own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals. It would thus be more prudent for this Court to remand the case
to the RTC, as it would be in the best position to scrutinize the evidence as well as hear and
weigh the evidentiary value of the testimonies of the ordinary witnesses and expert witnesses
presented by the parties. WHEREFORE, premises considered the petition is DENIED.

In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court created the Molina guidelines to aid the courts in the
disposition of cases involving psychological incapacity, to wit:

(1) Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
 (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of

the Family Code as regards the husband and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.

The court has modified Section 2(d) thereof, stating that the certification of the Solicitor
General required in the Molina case is dispensed with to avoid delay.

G.R. No. 162368             July 17, 2006

MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS vs. BRIX FERRARIS, respondent.
FACTS:
1. On February 20, 2001, the RTC denied the petition for declaration of nullity of
petitioner's marriage with Brix Ferraris. The trial court noted that suffering from
epilepsy does not amount to psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Civil Code
and the evidence on record were insufficient to prove infidelity.
2. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was also denied and the trial court reiterated
that there was no evidence that respondent is mentally or physically ill to such an extent
 that he could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could
not have given valid assumption thereof.

3. Petitioner appealed to the CA however, the latter affirmed the decision of RTC. It held
that the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering
from psychological incapacity or that there is absolutely no showing that the "defects"
of respondent were already present at the inception of the marriage, or that those are
incurable.

4. The CA also said that petitioner's evidence showed that respondent's alleged failure to
perform his so-called marital obligations was not at all a manifestation of some deep-
seated, grave, permanent and incurable psychological malady. The couple's relationship
before the marriage and even during their brief union (for well about a year or so) was
not all bad. During that relatively short period of time, petitioner was happy and
contented with her life in the company of respondent. In fact, by petitioner's own
reckoning, respondent was a responsible and loving husband.

5. Their problems began when petitioner started doubting respondent's fidelity. It was
only when they started fighting about the calls from women that respondent began to
withdraw into his shell and corner, and failed to perform his so-called marital
obligations. Respondent could not understand petitioner's lack of trust in him and her
constant naggings. He thought her suspicions irrational. Respondent could not relate to
her anger, temper and jealousy.

6. The CA also found that Dr. Dayan's testimony failed to establish the substance of
respondent's psychological incapacity; that she failed to explain how she arrived at the
conclusion that the respondent has a mixed personality disorder; that she failed to
clearly demonstrate that there was a natal or supervening disabling factor or an adverse
integral element in respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him from
accepting and complying with the essential marital obligations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of marriage
depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case.
RULINGS:
NO. The court finds respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-the-house"
attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual
infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with
his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but
a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
The Court cited its rulings in Republic vs. CA, that a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations and a mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitute psychological incapacity; it is not
enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married
persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological, not physical, illness. Also, in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, habitual alcoholism,
sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for
declaring a marriage void based on psychological incapacity.

While petitioner's marriage with the respondent failed and appears to be without hope of
reconciliation, the remedy however is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the
ground of psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void
marriage. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED WITH FINALITY.

PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY AS MENTIONED IN THIS CASE:

The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36
of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated
with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. It is for this reason that the Court relies heavily on
psychological experts for its understanding of the human personality. However, the root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully
explained, which petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate.

Title Tongol vs. Tongol Case Digest by

G.R. No. 157610 Subject PFR
Date October 19, 2007 Case No. 7
Ponente Austria-Martinez, J. Topic Article 36 – Psychologically
incapacitated

FACTS:
a) Orlando G. Tongol filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Filipinas M. Tongol on the grounds of psychologically incapacitated to comply with
marital obligations.
 b) Basically, the spouses’ differences and misunderstanding revolve around to their
disagreement regarding the management of their business wherein Orlando led the
business operations.
c) Dr. Villegas claimed that Filipinas is suffering from Inadequate Personality Disorder
with hysterical coloring, and Orlando is suffering from some Depressive features
recently development of marital problems. Both of them is showing irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities thereby causing a persistent fight with each
other, and affected their children.

ISSUE: Whether or not on the grounds of Article 36 of the Family Code a psychological
incapacitated person affects the duties and responsibilities of a marriage?

RULING: No. Because the case does not show that the personality disorder is of the kind
contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code as well as jurisprudence as to render
psychologically incapacitated or incapable with the essential obligations of marriage. Thus,
Doctor Villegas claimed could not satisfactorily explain if the personality disorder or
respondent is grave enough to bring about Filipinas disability to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. Wherefore, the petition
is denied.

Title Santos vs. CA and Bedia- Case Digest by

Santos
G.R. No. 112019 Subject PFR
Date January 4, 1995 Case No. 8
Ponente Vitug, J. Topic Article 36

FACTS:
a) Leouel filed a complaint for “voiding of marriage” under Article 36 of the Family Code
against her wife Julia on the grounds of psychologically incapacitated whereby, the
latter failed to return home and communicate her whereabouts for more than five
years.
b) Leouel and Julia were legally married on September 20, 1986 and gifted with one
son. However, the married couple “quarrel” about their independency from Julia’s
parent or whenever Leouel is spending a few days with his own parents.
c) On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United States of America to work as a nurse
despite Leouel's pleas to dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, Julia
called up Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She promised to
return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When
Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training
program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from April to
 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia
but all his efforts were of no avail.
d) Julia’s claim in her answer through counsel, opposed the complaint and denied its
allegations, claiming, in main, that it was petitioner who had, in fact, been
irresponsible and incompetent.

ISSUE: Whether or not the grounds for psychological incapacity is valid in Article 36 of the
Family Code for voiding of marriage?

RULING: No. Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently
of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage wherein,
marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment under Article 1 of the Family Code.
Though, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his situation, but neither law nor
society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem. The
petition is denied.

RICARDO P. TORING vs.TERESITA M. TORING

G.R. No. 165321
August 3, 2010
BRION, J.

Topic: Void and Voidable Marriages

FACTS:

On February 1, 1999, more than twenty years after Ricardo and Teresita's wedding, Ricardo filed a
petition for annulment before the RTC. He claimed that Teresita was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage prior to, at the time of, and subsequent to the
celebration of their marriage.

At the trial, Ricardo offered in evidence their marriage contract; the psychological evaluation and
signature of his expert witness, psychiatrist Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran, and his and Dr. Albaran’s respective
testimonies.

Ricardo alleged in his petition and in his testimony at the trial that Teresita was an adulteress and a
squanderer who was not adept in managing the funds he sent and their finances, incurring debts and
missing to pay bills and rents.

Ricardo likewise accused Teresita of infidelity and suspected that she was pregnant with another man’s
child. Ricardo alleged that the child could not have been his, as his three instances of sexual contact with
Teresita were characterized by "withdrawals."
Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran testified that a major factor that contributed to the demise of the marriage was
Teresita’s Narcissistic Personality Disorder that rendered her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her
essential marital obligations.

In opposing the petition for annulment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contended that there
was no basis to declare Teresita psychologically incapacitated. It asserted that the psychological
evaluation conducted on Ricardo (and his son Richardson) only revealed a vague and general conclusion
on these parties’ personality traits but not on Teresita’s psychological makeup.

The RTC agreed with Ricardo, and annulled his marriage to Teresita. The CA reversed the RTC decision
and held that the trial court’s findings did not satisfy the rules and guidelines set by this Court in
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina.

The CA found that Ricardo’s allegations on Teresita’s overspending and infidelity do not constitute
adequate grounds for declaring the marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code. These
allegations, even if true, could only effectively serve as grounds for legal separation or a criminal charge
for adultery.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of RTC.

Ruling:

No.This Court finds the petition unmeritorious, as the CA committed no reversible error when it set
aside the RTC’s decision for lack of legal and factual basis.

In the leading case of Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al., the Court held that psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and
(c) incurability, to be sufficient basis to annul a marriage. The psychological incapacity should refer to
"no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."

In the present case and guided by these standards, the Court finds the totality of the petitioner’s
evidence to be insufficient to prove that Teresita was psychologically incapacitated to perform her
duties as a wife.

The Court is in no way convinced that a mere narration of the statements of Ricardo and Richardson,
coupled with the results of the psychological tests administered only on Ricardo, without more, already
constitutes sufficient basis for the conclusion that Teresita suffered from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder.

Ricardo’s testimony merely established that Teresita was irresponsible in managing the family’s finances
by not paying their rent, utility bills and other financial obligations. Teresita’s spendthrift attitude,
according to Ricardo, even resulted in the loss of the house and lot intended to be their family
residence. This kind of irresponsibility, however, does not rise to the level of a psychological incapacity
required under Article 36 of the Family Code. At most, Teresita’s mismanagement of the family’s
finances merely constituted difficulty, refusal or neglect, during the marriage, in the handling of funds
intended for the family’s financial support.

Teresita’s alleged infidelity, even if true, likewise does not constitute psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code. In order for sexual infidelity to constitute as psychological incapacity, the
respondent’s unfaithfulness must be established as a manifestation of a disordered personality,
completely preventing the respondent from discharging the essential obligations of the marital state;
there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor that effectively incapacitated her from
complying with the obligation to be faithful to her spouse.

The petition is DENIED and the decision of the CA AFFIRMED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs. LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, respondent.
G.R. No. 149498 May 20, 2004

FACTS:
1.) Respondent and her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national had a common-law
relationship in Japan and later lived in the Philippines for a month. Toshio went back to Japan
for half a year of 1987 and on the same year respondent gave birth to their child.
2.) Respondent and Toshio were married in MTC of Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio
was psychologically incapacitated to assume marital responsibilities and it only manifested after
marriage.
3.) Toshio went back to Japan. After sending money to respondent for two months, he stopped
giving financial support. Also, after several years, unknown to respondent, Toshio visited the
Philippines but never bothered to see her and their child.
4.) The trial court rendered a decision that the marriage of respondent and Toshio is NULL and
VOID on the ground of Psychological Incapacity.
5.) Office of the Solicitor General, appealed to the CA but was denied. Petitioner Republic
appealed before this Court.
ISSUE:
WON the respondent successfully proved Toshio’s Psychological Incapacity that would warrant
their marriage NULL and VOID.
RULING:
NO. Separation or abandonment alone is not conclusive proof of Psychological Incapacity.
The totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically
incapacitated to assume marital responsibilities. Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly
irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological
illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was
presented showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder.
We cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family
immediately after the celebration of the marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to
prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential
that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical,
illness.

(According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and Santos do not apply here
because the present case involves a "mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese national.
We disagree. In proving psychological incapacity, we find no distinction between an alien
spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely
because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign
national. The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated
on the basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining
psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.)

REPUBLIC VS CA
FACTS:
1. Eduardo and Catalina were married on March 16, 1977 in civil rites solemnized by the
Municipal Mayor of Lingayen, Pangasinan.

2. The couple was not blessed with a child due to Catalina’s hysterectomy following her
second miscarriage.

3. On April 6, 1998, Eduardo filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage,
citing Catalina’s psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital
obligations. Catalina did not interpose any objection to the petition, but prayed to be
given her share in the conjugal house and lot located in Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan.

4. Eduardo testified that Catalina always left their house without his consent; that she
engaged in petty arguments with him; that she constantly refused to give in to his sexual
needs; that she spent most of her time gossiping with neighbors instead of doing the
household chores and caring for their adopted daughter; that she squandered by gambling
all his remittances as an overseas worker in Qatar since 1993; and that she abandoned the
conjugal home in 1997 to live with Bobbie Castro, her paramour.

5. Eduardo presented the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr.

Annabelle L. Reyes, a psychiatrist. Based on the tests she administered on Catalina.

6. Dr. Reyes opined that Catalina exhibited traits of Borderline Personality Disorder that
was no longer treatable. Dr. Reyes found that Catalina’s disorder was mainly
 characterized by her immaturity that rendered her psychologically incapacitated to meet
her marital obligations.

7. Catalina admitted her psychological incapacity, but denied leaving the conjugal home
without Eduardo’s consent and flirting with different men. She insisted that she had only
one live-in partner; and that she would not give up her share in the conjugal residence
because she intended to live there or to receive her share should the residence be sold.

8. The RTC granted the petition on August 9, 2000.

9. On July 30, 2003, the CA promulgated its decision affirming the judgment of the RTC.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTS OF CATALINA CONSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY.
RULING:
No. Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the
difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will. It consists of:
(a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) the inability must refer to
the essential obligations of marriage, that is, the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the
rendering of mutual help, and the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability
must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. Proving that a spouse failed to meet his or
her responsibility and duty as a married person is not enough; it is essential that he or she must
be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals, we decreed that psychological incapacity should refer to a mental
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants such as those
enumerated in Article 68 of the Family Code and must be characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability. In an effort to settle the confusion that may arise in deciding cases
involving nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, we then laid down the
following guidelines in the later ruling in Molina, viz:
 The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity.
 The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical.
  The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the
marriage.
 Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
 Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes.
 The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such noncomplied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a maximum of seven (7) hours of
interview, and unsupported by separate psychological tests, cannot tie the hands of the trial
court and prevent it from making its own factual finding on what happened in this case. The
probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of his theory or
opinion, but rather in the assistance that he can render to the courts in showing the facts that
serve as a basis for his criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of his conclusion is
founded.

It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had

difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these
obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor an adverse integral element in
the respondents personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with
his essential marital obligations must be shown. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from
incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable
differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the
like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as
the same may only be due to a persons refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs. CESAR ENCELAN, Respondent.
G.R. No. 170022 January 9, 2013

FACTS:
1.) Respondent Cesar married Lolita and they were blessed with two children. Cesar went to
Saudi Arabia to support his family and later learned that Lolita was having an illicit affair with an
Alvin Perez.
2.) Lolita and Cesar separated after the former allegedly left the conjugal home with her children
and lived with Alvin.
3.) Cesar filed with the RTC a petition against Lolita for the declaration of the nullity of his
marriage based on her psychological incapacity.
4.) Lolita denied the affair and insisted that she is not psychologically incapacitated and that she
left their home because of irreconcilable differences with her mother-in-law.
5.) At the trial, Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolita’s infidelity and subsequent abandonment
of the family home. And even continued providing financial support for his family even after he
learned of her illicit affair with Alvin.
6.) Cesar presented the psychological evaluation report which found Lolita "not suffering from
any form of major psychiatric illness," but had been "unable to provide the expectations
expected of her for a good and lasting marital relationship"; her "transferring from one job to the
other depicts some interpersonal problems with co-workers as well as her impatience in
attaining her ambitions"; and "her refusal to go with her husband abroad signifies her reluctance
to work out a good marital and family relationship."
7.) RTC ruled that the marriage was void. The CA affirmed the RTCs decision. The OSG then
filed the present petition.
ISSUE:
WON there exists sufficient basis to nullify Cesar’s marriage to Lolita on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
RULING:
NO. There is no sufficient basis exists to annul Cesar’s marriage to Lolita on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
In interpreting Article 36 of the Family Code, it is repeatedly stressed that psychological
incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume
the basic marital obligations"; not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on
the part of the errant spouse.
In this case, Cesar’s testimony failed to prove Lolita’s alleged psychological incapacity. In any
event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not
necessarily constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal separation.
To constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness and
abandonment are manifestations of a disordered personality that completely prevented the
erring spouse from discharging the essential marital obligations. No evidence on record exists to
support Cesar’s allegation that Lolita’s infidelity and abandonment were manifestations of any
psychological illness.
Also, Cesar mistakenly relied on Dr. Flores’ psychological evaluation report on Lolita to prove
her alleged psychological incapacity. The psychological evaluation, in fact, established that
Lolita did not suffer from any major psychiatric illness.
In sum, we find that Cesar failed to prove the existence of Lolita’s psychological incapacity.
G.R. NO. 168796               April 15, 2010SILVINO A. LIGERALDE, Petitioner,
vs. MAY ASCENSION A. PATALINGHUG and the REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

Topic: Psychological Incapacity

Facts:

Silvino and May got married on October 3, 1984. They were blessed with four children.
Silvino claimed that, during their marriage, he observed that May had several
manifestations of a negative marital behavior. He described her as immature,
irresponsible and carefree. Her infidelity, negligence and nocturnal activities, he
claimed, characterized their marital relations.

Sometime in September 1995, May arrived home at 4:00 o’clock in the morning. Her
excuse was that she had watched a video program in a neighboring town, but admitted
later to have slept with her Palestinian boyfriend in a hotel. Silvino tried to persuade
her to be conscientious of her duties as wife and mother. His pleas were ignored. His
persuasions would often lead to altercations or physical violence.

The couple started a new life. A few months after, however, he realized that their
marriage was hopeless. May was back again to her old ways. This was demonstrated
when Silvino arrived home one day and learned that she was nowhere to be found. He
searched for her and found her in a nearby apartment drinking beer with a male lover.

Later, May confessed that she had no more love for him. They then lived separately.

With May’s irresponsible, immature and immoral behavior, Silvino came to believe that
she is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage.

On October 22, 1999, the RTC declared the marriage of Silvino and May null and void

The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision. It ruled that private respondent’s
alleged sexual infidelity, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility do not constitute
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code and that the
psychologist failed to identify and prove the root cause thereof or that the incapacity
was medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner’s evidence established respondent May’s psychological

incapacity.

Ruling:

No.
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family
Code.

Petitioner's testimony did not prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of private
respondent’s condition. Even Dr. Nicdao-Basilio failed to show the root cause of her
psychological incapacity. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
identified as a psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully explained and
established by the totality of the evidence presented during trial.

More importantly, the acts of private respondent do not even rise to the level of the
"psychological incapacity" that the law requires. Private respondent's act of living an
adulterous life cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially
when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at
the inception of marriage.

Doubtless, the private respondent was far from being a perfect wife and a good mother.
She certainly had some character flaws. But these imperfections do not warrant a
conclusion that she had a psychological malady at the time of the marriage that
rendered her incapable of fulfilling her marital and family duties and obligations.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner, 
vs. MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent
G.R. No. 166357

September 19, 2011

FACTS:

1. Petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez (Malyn) met in
1973. They maintained a relationship and eventually married in Hong Kong on November 4,
1976. They had four children, Valerio (Rio), Maria Eva (Ria), Ramon Miguel (Miggy or
Mickey), and Jaime Teodoro (Jay).
2. Shortly after the birth of their youngest son, Tyrone had an extramarital affair with Jocelyn
Quejano (Jocelyn), who gave birth to a son in March 1983.
3. In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home (the house of her Kalaw in-laws) and her four
children with Tyrone.6Meanwhile, Tyrone started living with Jocelyn, who bore him three
more children.
4. In 1990, Tyrone went to the United States (US) with Jocelyn and their children. He left his
four children from his marriage with Malyn in a rented house in Valle Verde with only a
househelp and a driver.8 The househelp would just call Malyn to take care of the children
whenever any of them got sick. Also, in accordance with their custody agreement, the
children stayed with Malyn on weekends.
5. In 1994, the two elder children, Rio and Ria, asked for Malyn’s permission to go to Japan for
a one-week vacation. Malyn acceded only to learn later that Tyrone brought the children to
the US.10 After just one year, Ria returned to the Philippines and chose to live with Malyn.
6. Meanwhile, Tyrone and Jocelyn’s family returned to the Philippines and resumed physical
custody of the two younger children, Miggy and Jay. According to Malyn, from that time on,
 the children refused to go to her house on weekends because of alleged weekend plans with
their father.
7. On July 6, 1994, nine years since the de facto separation from his wife, Tyrone filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. 12 He
alleged that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform and comply with the
essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of their marriage. He further
claimed that her psychological incapacity was manifested by her immaturity and
irresponsibility towards Tyrone and their children during their co-habitation, as shown by
Malyn’s following acts:
 she left the children without proper care and attention as she played mahjong all day
and all night;
  she left the house to party with male friends and returned in the early hours of the
following day; and
 she committed adultery on June 9, 1985, which act Tyrone discovered in flagrante
delicto.
8. Malyn’s version -- Malyn denied being psychologically incapacitated. 27 While she admitted
playing mahjong, she denied playing as frequently as Tyrone alleged. She maintained that
she did so only two to three times a week and always between 1 p.m. to 6 p.m. only. 28 And in
those instances, she always had Tyrone’s permission and would often bring the children and
their respective yayas with her. 29 She maintained that she did not neglect her duties as
mother and wife.
9. CHILDREN’S VERSION -- The children all stated that both their parents took care of them,
provided for their needs, and loved them. Rio testified that they would accompany their
mother to White Plains on days that she played mahjong with her friends. None of them
reported being neglected or feeling abandoned.
10. Ruling of the Regional Trial Court -- After summarizing the evidence presented by both
parties, the trial court concluded that both parties are psychologically incapacitated to
perform the essential marital obligations under the Family Code. The court’s Decision is
encapsulated in this paragraph:

From the evidence, it appears that parties are both suffering from
psychological incapacity to perform their essential marital obligations under Article 36
of the Family Code. The parties entered into a marriage without as much as
understanding what it entails. They failed to commit themselves to its essential
obligations: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual
help, the procreation and education of their children to become responsible
individuals. Parties’ psychological incapacity is grave, and serious such that both are
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. The incapacity has
been clinically established and was found to be pervasive, grave and incurable.
The trial court then declared the parties’ marriage void ab initio pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code.
11. Ruling of the Court of Appeals -- Malyn appealed the trial court’s Decision to the CA.  The1âwphi1

CA reversed the trial court’s ruling because it is not supported by the facts on record. Both
parties’ allegations and incriminations against each other do not support a finding of
psychological incapacity. The parties’ faults tend only to picture their immaturity and
irresponsibility in performing their marital and familial obligations. At most, there may be
sufficient grounds for a legal separation. 57Moreover, the psychological report submitted by
petitioner’s expert witness, Dr. Gates, does not explain how the diagnosis of NPD came to
 be drawn from the sources. It failed to satisfy the legal and jurisprudential requirements for
the declaration of nullity of marriage.

Tyrone filed a motion for reconsideration59 but the same was denied on December 15, 2004.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage was void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

RULING:
NO, The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the trial court’s
Decision for lack of legal and factual basis.
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is governed by Article 36 of the Family Code which
provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization.
Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume
the basic marital obligations. 72 The burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the
plaintiff.73 The plaintiff must prove that the incapacitated party, based on his or her actions or
behavior, suffers a serious psychological disorder that completely disables him or her from
understanding and discharging the essential obligations of the marital state. The psychological
problem must be grave, must have existed at the time of marriage, and must be incurable.
After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual basis for the conclusion of
psychological incapacity. There is no error in the CA’s reversal of the trial court’s ruling that there
was psychological incapacity. The trial court’s Decision merely summarized the allegations,
testimonies, and evidence of the respective parties, but it did not actually assess the veracity of
these allegations, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of the evidence. The trial court did
not make factual findings which can serve as bases for its legal conclusion of psychological
incapacity.
What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have
constrained them from dedicating the best of themselves to each other and to their children. There
may be grounds for legal separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity that voids a marriage.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ May 27, 2004
Decision and its December 15, 2004 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240 are AFFIRMED.

RENNE ENRIQUE BIER, petitioner, 

vs. MA. LOURDES A. BIER and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 173294
February 27, 2008

FACTS:
1. Petitioner Renne Enrique E. Bier met respondent Ma. Lourdes A. Bier through
his sister. Their courtship, which blossomed as a result of the exchange of long
distance calls between them, lasted six months. Back then, petitioner observed
respondent to be a very sweet and thoughtful person. This, he said, made him
fall in love with her.

2. On July 26, 1992, six months after their first meeting, they were married at the
UST Santissimo Rosario Parish Church. Everything went well for the first three
years of their marriage. Respondent was everything petitioner could hope for in a
wife — sweet, loving and caring. She also took good care of the house. As
petitioner was based in Saudi Arabia as an electronics technician at Saudia
Airlines, the parties decided to maintain two residences, one in the Philippines
and another in Saudi Arabia. They took turns shuttling between the two countries
just so they could spend time together.

3. The couple started experiencing marital problems after three years of marriage.
According to petitioner, respondent ceased to be the person he knew and
married. She started becoming aloof towards him and began to spend more time
with her friends than with him, refusing even to have sexual relations with him for
no apparent reason. She became an alcoholic and a chain-smoker. She also
started neglecting her husband's needs and the upkeep of their home, and
became an absentee wife. After being gone from their home for days on end, she
would return without bothering to account for her absence. As a result, they
frequently quarreled. Finally, on April 10, 1997, respondent suddenly left for the
United States. Petitioner has not heard from her since.

4. On April 1, 1998, petitioner instituted in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City, Branch 89, a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground
that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital
obligations to petitioner. It was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-98-33993.

5. Thereafter, the RTC ordered Assistant City Prosecutor Edgardo T. Paragua to

investigate if there was collusion between the parties and to intervene for the
State to see to it that evidence was not fabricated. Assistant City Prosecutor
Paragua manifested that, since both parties failed to appear before him, he was
unable to make a ruling on the issue of collusion and determine if the evidence
was fabricated.

6. After petitioner filed his pre-trial brief, Prosecutor Paragua filed a second
manifestation stating that petitioner had appeared before him and that, after
investigation, he was convinced that there was no collusion between the parties
and that the evidence was not fabricated.

7. At pre-trial, only petitioner appeared. As respondent failed to attend the same,

the RTC declared her to have waived the pre-trial. Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued. Again, respondent did not take part in the proceedings.
 8. After trial, the trial court rendered judgment 5 granting the petition:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as

VOID, based upon the respondent's psychological incapacity, the marriage
contracted on July 26, 1992 between Renne Enrique E. Bier and Ma. Lourdes A.
Bier. As such, their property relations shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership pursuant to Article 147 of the Family Code. Henceforth, their property
relations shall be governed by the regime of complete separation of property.

9. Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, appealed the decision
of the RTC to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 66952. The CA held that
petitioner failed to comply with the guidelines laid down in Molina as the root
cause of respondent's psychological incapacity was not medically or clinically
identified. Worse, the same was not even alleged in the petition filed in the
court a quo. As such, it granted the appeal and reversed the decision of the trial
court. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision 6 read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The

Decision dated 06 March 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 89 in Civil Case No. Q-98-33993, which declared as void the
marriage between appellee and respondent, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The marriage of Renne Enrique E. Bier and respondent Ma.
Lourdes A. Bier remains valid and subsisting. No costs.

10. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the CA decision. The same was denied.
Hence, this recourse.

Petitioner contends that the guidelines enunciated in Molina, specifically

its directive that the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained, and that it must be proven to be existing at the inception of the
marriage, need not be strictly complied with as Molina itself stated the
guidelines were merely "handed down for the guidance of the bench and
bar" and were not meant to be a checklist of requirements in deciding
cases involving psychological incapacity. Furthermore, even
assuming arguendo that the Molina doctrine should be applied, the RTC
erred in ruling that he failed to comply therewith.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the totality of the evidence presented by petitioner was enough to
establish that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential
marital obligations.

RULING:
The Petition is without merit. It was not enough that respondent, the party adverted to
as psychologically incapacitated to comply with her marital obligations, had difficulty or
was unwilling to perform the same. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor, an
adverse integral element in respondent's personality structure that effectively
incapacitated her from complying with her essential marital obligations, had to be
shown. This petitioner failed to do. The decision of CA was affirmed.

G.R. No. 167523             June 27, 2008

NILDA V. NAVALES, petitioner,
vs.REYNALDO NAVALES, respondent.*

Facts:
I.Reynaldo Navales (Reynaldo) and Nilda Navales (Nilda) met in 1986 in a local bar where Nilda worked
as a waitress.
II. Reynaldo feared that Nilda may be wed to an American, Reynaldo, even if knowing that she has an
illegitimate child out of wedlock, proposed to Nilda and got married in 1988.
III. The 1st year of their marriage went well until Nilda began to work when she neglected some of her
duties as a wife.
IV. She later worked as a gym instructor and according to Reynaldo’s allegations; her job makes her flirt
with her male clients.
V. She also drives home with other guys even though Reynaldo would be there to fetch her. She also
projected herself as single. And she refused to have a child with Reynaldo because that would only
destroy her figure.
VI. Reynaldo then filed a petition to have their marriage be annulled.
VII. Reynaldo also presented the findings of a psychologist who concluded that based on Nilda’s acts,
Nilda is a nymphomaniac, who has a borderline personality, a social deviant, an alcoholic, and suffering
from anti-social personality disorder, among others, which illnesses are incurable and are the causes of
Nilda’s psychological incapacity to perform her marital role as wife to Reynaldo.
VIII. Nilda defended that it is actually Reynaldo who is a womanizer and that in fact she has filed a case
of concubinage against him which was still pending. She also said that she only needs the job in order to
support herself because Reynaldo is not supporting her. She also showed proof that she projected herself
as a married woman and that she handles an aerobics class which is exclusive to females only.
IX. The RTC and the CA ruled in favor of Reynaldo. Hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether the marriage between Reynaldo and Nilda is null and void on the ground of Nilda’s
psychological incapacity.

Ruling: No.  It is the policy of our Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution, and marriage as the foundation of the family. Nilda’s alleged actions were
insufficient to establish a psychological or mental defect that is serious, incurable or grave as
contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code.

Psychological incapacity, in order to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of
marriage. It is a malady that is so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As all people may have certain quirks
and idiosyncrasies, or isolated traits associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any
doubt that the intention of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability.

The Court finds that the psychological report presented in this case is insufficient to establish Nilda's
psychological incapacity. It fails to conform to social norms, deceitful, impulsive, irritable and aggresive,
irresponsible and vain. She further defined "nymphomia" as a psychiatric disorder that involves a
disturbance in motor behavior as shown by her sexual relationship with various men other than her
husband.

The remedy is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. A
marriage, no matter how unsatisfactory, is not a null and void marriage. And this Court, even as the
highest one, can only apply the letter and spirit of the law, no matter how harsh it may be.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 76624 promulgated on February 16, 2005 and the Decision dated January 2, 2002 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 59 of Toledo City, in Civil Case No. T-799 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. T-799,
is DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 184063               January 24, 2011

CYNTHIA E. YAMBAO, Petitioner,
vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and PATRICIO E. YAMBAO, Respondents.

Facts:
I.Cynthia E. Yambao and Patricio E. Yambao married on December 21, 1968.
II.After 35 years of marriage and three kids, Yambao, filed a petition to declare their marriage null and
void in the reason of his husband’s psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
III. Yambai claimed that they had been marred by bickering, quarrels, and recrimination due to the latter’s
inability to comply with the essential obligations of married life, in finding stable job, failure in family
business, refusal of changing diaper’s to their baby when she just had caesarean, insecurity and jealousy
towards acquintances and relatives, eating and sleeping all day, gambling and threats to kill her.
IV. She even consulted a psychiatrist that concluded that her husband suffered from dependent
personality disorder.
V. RTC dismissed the case for lack of merit, and CA affirming RTC’s decision.
VI. Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the totality of petitioner’s evidence established respondent’s psychological
incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage

Ruling: No. There is no showing that respondent was suffering from a psychological condition so severe
that he was unaware of his obligations to his wife and family. On the contrary, respondent’s efforts,
though few and far between they may be, showed an understanding of his duty to provide for his family,
albeit he did not meet with much success.
For a marriage to be annulled under Article 36 of the Family Code, the psychologically incapacitated
spouse must be shown to suffer no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes him or her to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive
one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.

Article 36 incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of
marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the
conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education
of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. It is not enough to
prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he
must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 16,
2008 and the Resolution dated August 4, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89262 are
AFFIRMED.

Subject: Persons and Family Relations

Topic: Void and voidable Marriages (Art 36)
Jose Reynaldo B. Ochosa, petitioner vs Bona J. Alano, respondent
G.R. No. 167459
January 26, 2011
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J

The case is about Jose Ochosa on a petition against Bona J Alano for the declaration
of nullity of marriage on the grounds of psychological incapacity.

FACTS:

1.) Jose Ochosa is an officer in the AFP and was married to a seventeen-year-old
Bona Alona on October 27 1973. Jose was often assigned to various parts of the
Philippine archipelago where his wife did not cohabit with him in his posts neither
do visit him in his areas of assignment.

2.) In 1987, Jose was incarcerated in Camp Crame due to the alleged participation
in the failed coup d’etat.

3.) The respondent has an illicit relation with other men and in one occasion was
caught by a security aide, having sex with Jose’s driver, Corporal Gagarin.

4. Due to the rumors of Bona’s sexual infidelity, the petitioner got a military pass
from his jail warden and confronted Bona to which she later admitted.

5. Jose filed a petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage seeking to nullify his
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential obligations
of marriage.

ISSUES :
WON Bona should be deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations.

RULING:

No. The court ruled that the respondent’s sexual infidelity can be convincingly
traced to the period of time after her marriage and not to the inception of the said
marriage.

Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts
marital bond at the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage.

Republic vs. Galang

G.R. No. 168335. June 6, 2011
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. NESTOR GALANG, respondent
BRION, J.:
Subject: Persons and Family Relations
Topic: Psychological Incapacity
FACTS
Nestor Galang, an artist-illustrator filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of
his marriage with Juvy, a housewife, under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended.

JUVY ACCUSED AS A KLEPTOMANIAC AND SWINDLER

Galang alleged that Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations
of marriage, as she was a kleptomaniac and a swindler.

STOLE ATM CARD AND PARENT’S MONEY

He claimed that Juvy stole his ATM card and his parents’ money, and often asked money from
their friends and relatives on the pretext that Christopher was confined in a hospital.

JUVY’S INCAPACITY EXTREMELY SERIOUS, INCURABLE

Juvy suffers from “mental deficiency, innate immaturity, distorted discernment and total lack of
care, love and affection [towards him and their] child.” He posited that Juvy’s incapacity was
“extremely serious” and “appears to be incurable.”

The respondent further stated that Juvy squandered the P15,000.00 he entrusted to her. He
added that Juvy stole his ATM card and falsified his signature to encash the check representing
his (the respondent’s) father’s pension. He, likewise, stated that he caught Juvy playing
“mahjong” and “kuwaho” three (3) times.

Finally, he testified that Juvy borrowed money from their relatives on the pretense that their
son was confined in a hospital.
PERSONALITY AND BEHAVIORAL DISORDERS
Psychological findings confirm that the Juvy suffers from personality and behavioral disorders.
These disorders are manifested through her grave dependency on gambling and stealing
money.

RTC RULING
The RTC nullified the parties’ marriage in its decision of January 22, 2001. The CA, in its decision
dated November 25, 2004, affirmed the RTC decision in toto.

The petitioner (Republic) claims in the present petition that the totality of the evidence
presented by the respondent was insufficient to establish Juvy’s psychological incapacity to
perform her essential marital obligations.

ISSUE
Whether or not there is basis to nullify the respondent’s marriage to Juvy on the ground that at
the time of the celebration of the marriage, Juvy suffered from psychological incapacity.

RULING
No, psychological incapacity refers only to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage.

Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties, or one of them,
could not have validly entered into a marriage by reason of a grave and serious psychological
illness existing at the time it was celebrated, the Court is compelled to uphold the indissolubility
of the marital tie.

Declaration of Nullity; Psychological Incapacity

In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al., 240 SCRA 20 (1995), the Court first declared that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by:

(a) gravity;
(b) juridical antecedence; and
(c) incurability.

The defect should refer to “no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage.”
NGO TE SUGGESTED RELAXATION OF STRINGENT REQUIREMENTS
Our 2009 ruling in Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te, 579 SCRA 193
(2009), placed some cloud in the continued applicability of the time-tested Molina guidelines.

We stated in this case that instead of serving as a guideline, Molina unintentionally became a
straightjacket; it forced all cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by
it.

This is contrary to the intention of the law, since no psychological incapacity case can be
considered as completely on “all fours” with another. Benjamin G. Ting v. Carmen M. Velez-Ting
and Jocelyn M. Suazo v. Angelito Suazo, 582 SCRA 694 (2009), however, laid to rest any
question regarding the continued applicability of Molina.

In these cases, we clarified that Ngo Te did not abandon Molina. Far from abandoning Molina,
Ngo Te simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements.

GALANG’S TESTIMONY ABOUT JUVY

The respondent’s testimony merely showed that Juvy:
(a) refused to wake up early to prepare breakfast;
(b) left their child to the care of their neighbors when she went out of the house;
(c) squandered a huge amount of the P15,000.00 that the respondent entrusted to her;
(d) stole the respondent’s ATM card and attempted to withdraw the money deposited in his
account;
(e) falsified the respondent’s signature in order to encash a check;
(f) made up false stories in order to borrow money from their relatives; and
(g) indulged in gambling.

ACTS DO NOT RISE TO THE LEVEL TO PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

These acts, to our mind, do not per se rise to the level of psychological incapacity that the law
requires. We stress that psychological incapacity must be more than just a “difficulty,”
“refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations.

It is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so because of some

psychological, not physical, illness.

In other words, proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person—an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage—had to be
shown. A cause has to be shown and linked with the manifestations of the psychological
incapacity.
PSYCHOLOGICAL FINDINGS
In the end, the psychologist opined without stating the psychological basis for her conclusion
that “there is sufficient reason to believe that the defendant wife is psychologically
incapacitated to perform her marital duties as a wife and mother to their only son.”

We find this kind of conclusion and report grossly inadequate. First, we note that the
psychologist did not even identify the types of psychological tests which she administered on
the respondent and the root cause of Juvy’s psychological condition.

THERE WAS NO SHOWING OF ANY MENTAL DISORDER

We also stress that the acts alleged to have been committed by Juvy all occurred during the
marriage; there was no showing that any mental disorder existed at the inception of the
marriage. Second, the report failed to prove the gravity or severity of Juvy’s alleged condition,
specifically, why and to what extent the disorder is serious, and how it incapacitated her to
comply with her marital duties. Significantly, the report did not even categorically state the
particular type of personality disorder found.

The psychologist’s court testimony fared no better in proving the juridical antecedence, gravity
or incurability of Juvy’s alleged psychological defect as she merely reiterated what she wrote in
her report—i.e., that Juvy was lazy and irresponsible; played mahjong and kuhawo for money;
stole money from the respondent; deceived people to borrow cash; and neglected her child—
without linking these to an underlying psychological cause.

Simply put, the psychologist failed to trace the history of Juvy’s psychological condition and to
relate it to an existing incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage. She, likewise,
failed to successfully prove the elements of gravity and incurability. In these respects, she
merely stated that despite the respondent’s efforts to show love and affection, Juvy was
hesitant to change.

The Court GRANTED the petition of the Republic. SET ASIDE the Decision and the resolution of
the Court of Appeals.

Castillo vs. Republic

G.R. No. 214064. February 6, 2017.
MIRASOL CASTILLO, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and FELIPE IMPAS,
respondents.
PERALTA, J.:
Subject: Persons and Family Relations
Topic: Psychological Incapacity
A petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner (Mirasol) challenging the Decision of the
Court of Appeals (CA), which ruled against the dissolution and nullity of her marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code.

FACTS
Mirasol and Felipe got married in Bani, Pangasinan on April 22, 1984 and were blessed with two
children.

FELIPE RESUMES PHILANDERING

At the beginning, their union was harmonious prompting her to believe that the same was
made in heaven. However, after thirteen (13) years of marriage, Felipe resumed philandering.

Their relatives and friends saw him with different women. One time, she has just arrived from a
trip and returned home to surprise her family. But to her consternation, she caught him in a
compromising act with another woman.

MIRASOL LEAVES FELIPE

Mirasol left the conjugal dwelling and stopped any communication with him. Felipe’s
irresponsible acts like cohabiting with another woman, not communicating with her, and not
supporting their children for a period of not less than ten (10) years without any reason,
constitute a severe psychological disorder.

PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
Mirasol presented clinical psychologist Sheila Marie Montefalcon (Montefalcon) who, in her
Psychological Evaluation Report, concluded that Felipe is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill
the essential marital obligations.

DECLARATION OF NULLITY
June 6, 2011, Mirasol filed a Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional
Trial Court.

RTC in Civil Case No. 4853-11 declared the marriage between Mirasol and Felipe null and void.

PROCEDURES
ACCORDINGLY, pursuant to the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11- 10-SC, the Clerk of Court is
directed to enter this judgment upon its finality in the Book of Entry of Judgment and to issue
the corresponding Entry of Judgment.

Thereupon, the Office of the Civil Registrars in Bani, Pangasinan and Imus, Cavite, are also
mandated to cause the registration of the said ENTRY OF JUDGMENT in their respective Book of
Marriages.
Likewise, furnish the petitioner and the counsel of the petitioner, the respondent, the Solicitor
General, 3rd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Oscar R. Jarlos and the Civil Registrar General with
copies hereof. Upon compliance, the Court shall forthwith issue the DECREE OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE.

COURT OF APPEALS REVERSED RULING

CA in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 99686 reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, ruling that Mirasol
failed to present sufficient evidence.

Upon the denial of her motion for reconsideration, Mirasol elevated the case before the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE
Whether or not Mirasol was able to establish that respondent is suffering from grave
psychological condition that rendered him incognitive of his marital covenants under Article 36
of the Family Code.

RULING
The Court ruled in the negative and that the totality of the evidence presented failed to
establish Felipe’s psychological incapacity.

PSYCHOLOGIST BASED ON MIRASOL’S INFORMATION

Montefalcon, the psychologist evaluated psychological condition indirectly from the
information gathered from Mirasol and her witness.

NO INDEPENDENT WITNESSES
Felipe’s dysfunctional family portrait which brought about his personality disorder as painted in
the evaluation was based solely on the assumed truthful knowledge of petitioner.

COMMON FRIEND DID NOT TESTIFY

Angelica Mabayad, the couple’s common friend, agreed with petitioner’s claims in the interview
with the psychologist, confirmed the information given by petitioner, and alleged that she knew
Felipe as “chick boy” or “playboy.” She did not testify before the court

There was no independent witness knowledgeable of respondent’s upbringing interviewed by

the psychologist or presented before the trial court.

PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
Time and again, it was held that “psychological incapacity” has been intended by law to be
confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by:

(a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying
out the ordinary duties required in a marriage,

(b)juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage, and

(c) incurability, i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved.

The existence or absence of the psychological incapacity shall be based strictly on the facts of
each case and not on a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations.

TING V. VELEZ-TING RULING

As held in Ting v. Velez-Ting,: By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36,
it is logical and understandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by
psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the
root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity.

However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in granting
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage.

At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in
determining the merits of a given case.

EVIDENCE ENOUGH, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS NO LONGER REQUIRED

In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of the person concerned need not
be resorted to.

The presentation of any form of medical or psychological evidence to show the psychological
incapacity, however, did not mean that the same would have automatically ensured the
granting of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try, must always base their
judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties but on the totality of
evidence adduced in the course of their proceedings.

SEXUAL INFIDELITY TO CONSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

The finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a
person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

In order for sexual infidelity to constitute as psychological incapacity, the respondent’s

unfaithfulness must be established as a manifestation of a disordered personality, completely
preventing the respondent from discharging the essential obligations of the marital state;
there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor that effectively incapacitated him
from complying with the obligation to be faithful to his spouse.

It is indispensable that the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts
that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.

DISSENTING OPINION:
(J. Leonen)

I cannot join the majority’s reading of the law as it condemns loveless married couples to a life
of pain and suffering.

The law should not be read as too callous or cruel that it forever condemns those who may
have made very human errors in choosing those with whom they should be intimate.

For the State to enforce this cruelty is the very antithesis of the freedoms embodied in many
provisions of our Constitution.

Marriage is a struggle. In some cases, fortunate couples discover that they become better
together. They learn that their compromises make them grow further.

However, there are others who discover that marriage creates a bond that magnifies their
differences. Irreconcilable differences make every moment of eternal bondage excruciating.

The State, through the courts, do not add any new factor in a couple’s intimate relationship
when it denies petitions for declarations of nullity in failed marriages. The State leaves its
citizens in a perpetual state of misery and places multiple hardships on a couple and their
children.
Felipe’s continuous philandering, albeit having his own family, manifests an incurable
psychological disorder of utmost gravity.

If Felipe’s sexual infidelity were merely caused by his “refusal or unwillingness” to assume his
marital obligations, then he would not have been indifferent about being seen publicly with the
other women with whom he had other affairs.

What Felipe has done apparently caused much pain to his family and should be put to an end.
It is cruel for this Court to rule that Mirasol should remain married to Felipe.

Republic vs. Cabantug-Baguio

G.R. No. 171042. June 30, 2008
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. LYNNETTE CABANTUG-BAGUIO, respondent.
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
Subject: Persons and Family Relations
Topic: Psychological Incapacity

FACTS
Lynnette and Martini, a seaman working overseas, became pen pals in 1995. In 1996, the two
met in person during Martini’s vacation.

August 12, 1997, Martini, then 32, and Lynnette, then 34, contracted marriage, following which
they moved to the house of Lynnette’s parents.

Martini, however, stayed there only on weekends, and during weekdays he stayed with his
parents.

MARITINI REFERRED TO AS “MAMA’S BOY”

While Lynnette suggested that the two of them stay in the house of Martini’s parents, Martini
disagreed, claiming that there were many already living with his parents. Lynnette noticed that
every time she conversed with Martini, he always mentioned his mother and his family, and she
soon realized that he was a “mama’s boy.”

STAYING WITH PARENTS, ALLOTMENT SHARED BY MOTHER AND WIFE

In 1998, after Martini again returned following an almost 10-month contract overseas,8 he
stayed with Lynnette. in 1999 Martini again disembarked, he stayed with his parents. On the
insistence of his mother, Martini’s monetary allotment was shared equally between her and
Lynnette.

ALLOTMENT STOPPED, PARTED WAYS

Lynnette had since January 1999 not heard from Martini. And since April 1999, Lynnette
stopped receiving her share of the allotment, drawing her to inquire from Martini’s employer
who informed her that he had already disembarked on even month.

She soon found out that Martini was in Alabang, Muntinlupa. When Lynnette and Martini finally
met in Cebu City, he told her that they are not compatible and should just part ways.

APPEARED “SINGLE” IN EMPLOYMENT RECORDS

Lynnette learned that Martini declared in his employment records that he was “single” and
named his mother as principal allottee. Hence, Lynnette’s filing of the complaint for declaration
of nullification of marriage.

DR. GERONG’S PSYCHOLOGICAL REPORT

Psychological Evaluation Report, Dr. Gerong concluded that “Defendant shows immature
personality disorder, dependency patterns, and self-centered motives. These are the core
personality dysfunctions noted and have been exaggeratedly expressed which are
detrimental to the familial well-being.

The situation is serious, grave, existing already during the adolescent period, and incurable
because personality and character are stable whether or not it is normal and adaptive. The
defendant is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations in
marriage and family.”

ISSUE
Whether or not Martini and Lynette’s marriage could be declared void ab initio on the ground
of psychological incapacity on the part of the former.

RULING
No. Lynnette’s marriage with Martini may have failed then, but it cannot be declared void ab
initio on the ground of psychological incapacity in light of the insufficient evidence presented.

TOTALITY OF EVIDENCE
Even when the rules have been relaxed and the personal examination of the defendant by a
psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code, the totality of evidence presented during trial by private
respondent must still prove the gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability of the alleged
psychological incapacity (Marcos v. Marcos,Santos v. Court of Appeals).

ARTICLE 36 GROUND TO RENDER MARRIAGE VOID AB INITIO

Article 36 must be read in conjunction with the other articles in the Family Code, specifically
Articles 35, 37, 38, and 41 which provide different grounds to render a marriage void ab initio,
as well as Article 45 which dwell on voidable marriages, and Article 55 on legal separation.

Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not to be applied
indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.

And Article 36 should not be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the
time the causes therefor manifest themselves, nor with legal separation in which the grounds
need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral
corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment, and the like

UTTER INSENSITIVITY OR INABILITY

As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated
with certain personality disorders, there is hardly a doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.

NOT PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY: IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES AND FAILURE TO MEET

RESPOSIBILITIES
The mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” does not
constitute psychological incapacity. Nor does failure of the parties to meet their responsibilities
and duties as married persons.

INSENSITIVE OR INCAPABLE
It is essential that the parties to a marriage must be shown to be insensitive to or incapable of
meeting their duties and responsibilities due to some psychological (not physical) illness, which
insensitivity or incapacity should have been existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage even if it becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

The doctor’s findings and conclusion were derived from his interview of Lynnette and her sister
and Lynnette’s deposition.

DOWNRIGHT INCAPACITY
From Lynnette’s deposition, however, it is gathered that Martini’s failure to establish a common
life with her stems from his refusal, not incapacity, to do so. It is downright incapacity, not
refusal or neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, which renders a marriage void on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
ROOT CAUSE NOT IDENTIFIED IN THIS CASE
While the examination by a physician of a person in order to declare him/her psychological
incapacitated is not required, the root cause thereof must be “medically or clinically
identified.” There must thus be evidence to adequately establish the same. There is none such
in the case at bar, however.

INVIOLABLE SOCIAL INSTITUTION

Marriage, an inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of
the parties. In petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show
the nullity of marriage lies on the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.

G.R. No. 173138               December 1, 2010

NOEL B. BACCAY, Petitioner,
vs. MARIBEL C. BACCAY and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

Facts:
 Noel and Maribel were sweethearts. He found Maribel’s snobbish and hard-to get traits
attractive.
 Noel’s family was aware of their relationship for he used to bring Maribel to their house
to get closer to his family however Noel observed that Maribel was invariably aloof or
snobbish. Noel would talk to Maribel about her attitude towards his family and she
would promise to change, but she never did.
 Around 1997, he decided to break up with Maribel because he was already involved
with another woman. They agreed to see each other on a friendly basis but the two had
several romantic episodes.
 In November 1998, Maribel informed Noel that she was pregnant with his child. Upon
advice of his mother, Noel grudgingly married Maribel. The two lived on Noel’s family.
 Maribel remained aloof and didn't contribute to his family's coffer. She refused to have
sex with him.
 Surprisingly, despite Maribel’s claim of being pregnant, Noel never observed any
symptoms of pregnancy in her. He asked Maribel’s office mates whether she manifested
any signs of pregnancy and they confirmed that she showed no such signs. Then,
sometime in January 1999, Maribel did not go home for a day, and when she came
home, she announced to Noel and his family that she had a miscarriage.
 Sometime in 1999, Noel confronted Maribel and the two had an intense quarrel about
Maribel's alleged miscarriage causing the latter to leave the house and never came back.
  On September 11, 2000 or after less than two years of marriage, Noel filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC. Despite summons, Maribel did not
participate in the proceedings.
 On February 5, 2002, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Noel. The RTC found that
Maribel failed to perform the essential marital obligations of marriage, and such failure
was due to a personality disorder called Narcissistic Personality Disorder characterized
by juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability as determined by a clinical
psychologist.
 On appeal by the OSG, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
 Whether or not the marriage between the parties is null and void under Article 36 of
the Family Code.
Ruling:
 No. Noel failed to provide sufficient evidence to sustain a finding that Maribel was
psychologically incapacitated. Noel's evidence merely established that Maribel refused
to have sexual intercourse with him after their marriage, and that she left him after their
quarrel when he confronted her about her alleged miscarriage. The psychologist failed
to establish that Maribel’s alleged Narcissistic Personality Disorder incapacitated her
from validly assuming the essential obligations of the marriage. The same psychologist
even testified that Maribel was capable of entering into marriage except that it would
be difficult for her to sustain one. Mere difficulty, it must be stressed, is not the
incapacity contemplated under the Article 36 of the Family Code.
 Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," a "refusal," or a "neglect"
in the performance of some marital obligations. An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null
and void marriage.
 Petition is denied.

G.R. No. 178741               January 17, 2011

ROSALINO L. MARABLE, Petitioner,
vs. MYRNA F. MARABLE, Respondent.

Facts:
 In 1967 petitioner Rosalino Marable and respondent Myrna Marable were students in
Arellano University who became lovers after they met in a bus.
 On December 19, 1970, petitioner and respondent eloped and were married and their
marriage was blessed with five children.
   But several years after the marriage their relationship got soured with frequent quarrels
as a consequence, their daughter rebelled and unexpectedly she got pregnant at her
young age.
 Longing for peace, love and affection, petitioner developed a relationship with another
woman. Respondent promptly terminated it and the quarrels aggravated.
 When he could not bear his lot any longer, petitioner left the family home and stayed
with his sister. He gave up all the properties which he and respondent had accumulated
during their marriage in favor of respondent and their children. Later, he converted to
Islam after dating several women.
 On October 8, 2001, petitioner decided to sever his marital bonds. On said date, he filed
a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent on the ground of his
psychological incapacity to perform the essential responsibilities of marital life.
 In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical psychologist,
who reported that petitioner is suffering from "Antisocial Personality Disorder,"
characterized by a pervasive pattern of social deviancy, rebelliousness, impulsivity, self-
centeredness, deceitfulness and lack of remorse which rooted in deep feelings of
rejection starting from the family to peers, and that his experiences have made him so
self-absorbed for needed attention. 
 The RTC granted the petition; on the other hand, the Court of Appeals reversed and set
aside the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
 Whether or not the marriage between the parties is null and void under Article 36 of
the Family Code.
Ruling:
 No, the petitioner completely relied on the psychological examination conducted by Dr.
Tayag on him to establish his psychological incapacity. The result of the examination and
the findings of Dr. Tayag however, are insufficient to establish petitioner's psychological
incapacity. In cases of annulment of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code, as
amended, the psychological illness and its root cause must be proven to exist from the
inception of the marriage. Here, the appellate court correctly ruled that the report of Dr.
Tayag failed to explain the root cause of petitioner’s alleged psychological incapacity.
The evaluation of Dr. Tayag merely made a general conclusion that petitioner is
suffering from an Anti-social Personality Disorder but there was no factual basis stated
for the finding that petitioner is a socially deviant person, rebellious, impulsive, self-
centered and deceitful.
 The totality of the evidence presented is insufficient to establish petitioner’s
psychological incapacity to fulfill his essential marital obligations. Petition is denied.

RODOLFO A. ASPILLAGA, Petitioner, v. AURORA A. ASPILLAGA, Respondent.

G.R. NO. 170925: October 26, 2009
QUISUMBING, J.:
RCAbaigar

Facts:

Rodolfo Aspillaga met Aurora Apon sometime in 1977 while they were students at the Philippine
Merchant Marine Academy and Lyceum of the Philippines, respectively. Rodolfo courted her and five
months later, they became sweethearts. Thereafter, Aurora left for Japan to study Japanese culture,
literature and language. Despite the distance, Rodolfo and Aurora maintained communication.

In 1980, after Aurora returned to the Philippines, she and Rodolfo got married. They begot two children,
but Rodolfo claimed their marriage was "tumultuous." He described Aurora as domineering and
frequently humiliated him even in front of his friends. He complained that Aurora was a spendthrift as
she overspent the family budget and made crucial family decisions without consulting him. Rodolfo
added that Aurora was tactless, suspicious, given to nagging and jealousy as evidenced by the latter's
filing against him a criminal case (concubinage) and an administrative case. He left the conjugal home,
and filed on March 7, 1995, a petition for annulment of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity on the part of Aurora. He averred that Aurora failed to comply with the essential obligations
of marriage.

Aurora, for her part, alleged that sometime in 1991, Rodolfo gave her a plane ticket to Japan to enable
her to assume her teaching position in a university for a period of three months. In August 1991, upon
her return to Manila, she discovered that while she was in Japan, Rodolfo brought into their conjugal
home her cousin, Lecita Rose A. Besina, as his concubine. Aurora alleged that Rodolfo's cohabitation
with her cousin led to the disintegration of their marriage and their eventual separation. In May 1992,
Rodolfo abandoned their conjugal home to live with Besina. Aurora claimed custody of the children.

During trial, expert witness Dr. Eduardo Maaba explained that both parties are psychologically
incapacitated. The RTC found the parties psychologically incapacitated to enter into marriage.

The CA reversed the RTC decision and declared the marriage of Rodolfo and Aurora Aspillaga valid.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was also denied. Hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of the parties’ psychological incapacity

Held:

No. As early as 1995, in Santos v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995), it has been
categorically ruled that:
Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the
party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage;
and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.

In the instant case, Dr. Maaba failed to reveal that the psychological conditions were grave or serious
enough to bring about an incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, Dr. Maaba
was able to establish the parties’ personality disorder; however, he failed to link the parties’
psychological disorders to his conclusion that they are psychologically incapacitated to perform their
obligations as husband and wife. The fact that these psychological conditions will hamper their
performance of their marital obligations does not mean that they suffer from psychological incapacity as
contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code. Mere difficulty is not synonymous to incapacity.

It must be stressed that psychological incapacity must be more than just a “difficulty,” “refusal” or
“neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations (Republic v. CA). The intention of the law is to
confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage (Tongol v. Tongol, G.R. No. 157610, October 19, 2007).

Psychological disorders do not manifest that both parties are truly incapacitated to perform the basic
marital covenants. Moreover, there is nothing that shows incurability of these disorders. Incompatibility
and irreconcilable differences cannot be equated with psychological incapacity as understood
juristically.

As to Rodolfo’s allegation that Aurora was a spendthrift, the same likewise fails to convince. While
disagreements on money matters would, no doubt, affect the other aspects of one’s marriage as to
make the wedlock unsatisfactory, this is not a ground to declare a marriage null and void. In fact, the
Court takes judicial notice of the fact that disagreements regarding money matters are a common, and
even normal, occurrence between husbands and wives.

EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, Petitioner,

vs. ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE, Respondent,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor.
G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009
NACHURA, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse of respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in a
gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Edward was then initially
attracted to Rowena’s close friend; but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to
court Rowena. That was in January 1996, when petitioner was a sophomore student and respondent, a
freshman.
On April 23, 1996, Rowena’s uncle brought the two to a court to get married. He was then 25 years old,
and she, 20. The two then continued to stay at her uncle’s place where Edward was treated like a
prisoner—he was not allowed to go out unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed Edward his guns and
warned the latter not to leave Rowena.

The two then continued to stay at her uncle’s place where Edward was not allowed to go out
unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed Edward his guns and warned him not to leave Rowena. Rowena
suggested that Edward should get his inheritance so that they could live on their own.

Edward escaped from the house of Rowena’s uncle and stayed with his parents. His family then hid him
from Rowena and her family.

In June 1996, they parted ways. After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition
for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latter’s psychological incapacity.

The trial court declared the marriage of the parties null and void on the ground that both parties were
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.

The CA reversed and set aside the trial court’s ruling.

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the instant petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the parties is null and
void.

RULING: YES

Article 36 of the Family Code provides:

Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

As held in Santos, the phrase psychological incapacity is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of
psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly non-
cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity; and render help and support. The
intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most serious of cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated.
Petitioners behavioural pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and
respondents, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.

By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making,
must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.

In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party’s psychological incapacity, the Court is not
demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it
refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the
essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond.

In the case at bench, the psychological assessment, which we consider as adequate, produced the
findings that both parties are afflicted with personality disorders, dependent personality disorder for the
petitioner, and narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder for respondent.

The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders considered, the Court, in this case, finds
as decisive the psychological evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus, rules that the marriage
of the parties is null and void on the ground of both parties psychological incapacity.

Halili v. Halili
G.R. No. 165424
June 9, 2009
Ponente: Corona, J.

FACTS:
 Petitioner Lester Halili filed a petition to declare his marriage to respondent
Chona Santos-Halili null and void based on his psychological incapacity to
perform the essential obligations of marriage. He alleged that he wed
respondent in civil rites thinking that it was a “joke”.
 After the ceremony, they never lived together as husband and wife. However,
they started fighting constantly.
 A year later, at which point petitioner decided to stop seeing respondent and
started dating other women. It was only upon making an inquiry that he found
out that the marriage was not fake.
 RTC found petitioner to be suffering from a mixed personality disorder,
particularly dependent and self-defeating personality disorder. It was serious
and incurable and directly affected his capacity to comply with his essential
marital obligations to respondent.
 On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court on the
ground that the totality of the evidence presented failed to establish petitioner’s
psychological incapacity.
  Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied.

ISSUE:                                                                               
 WON petitioner’s marriage to respondent should be declared null and void
based on his psychological incapacity.

RULING:                                                                
Yes. The Court ruled that the marriage of Lester Halli and Chona Santos-Halili be null
and void. The Court reiterated that courts should interpret the provision on
psychological incapacity on a case-to-case basis - guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines and by decisions of church
tribunals. 
In Te vs Te, the Court defined dependent personality disorder as a personality disorder
characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior. Such individuals
usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and
are easily hurt by others' comments. 

In her psychological report, Dr. Dayan stated that petitioner’s dependent personality
disorder was evident in the fact that petitioner was very much attached to his parents
and depended on them for decisions. Petitioner’s mother even had to be the one to tell
him to seek legal help when he felt confused on what action to take upon learning that
his marriage to respondent was for real. Ultimately, Dr. Dayan concluded that
petitioner’s personality disorder was grave and incurable and already existent at the
time of the celebration of his marriage to respondent.

From the foregoing, it has been shown that petitioner is indeed suffering from
psychological incapacity that effectively renders him unable to perform the essential
obligations of marriage. Accordingly, the marriage between petitioner and respondent is
declared null and void.

DEPENDENT PERSONALITY DISORDER DEFINED

DEPENDENT PERSONALITY DISORDER usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who
have this disorder may be unable to make everyday decisions without advice or
reassurance from others, may allow others to make most of their important decisions
(such as where to live), tend to agree with people even when they believe they are
wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing things on their own, volunteer to do
things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feel
uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often preoccupied with fears of being
abandoned.
G.R. No. 217993
MANUEL R. BAKUNAWA III,, Petitioner,
vs. NORA REYES BAKUNAWA,, Respondent.
Topic: Psychological Incapacity

Facts:
Manuel and Nora met in 1974 at the University of the Philippines where they were
students and became sweethearts. When Nora became pregnant, she and Manuel got
married on July 26, 1975 at St. Ignatius Church, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City.

Because Manuel and Nora were both college undergraduates at that time, they lived
with Manuel's parents.

In 1976, Manuel and Nora lived separately from Manuel's parents. It was during this
period th.at Manuel first observed Nora's passiveness and laziness; she was moody and
mercurial. Their house was often dirty and disorderly. Thus, Manuel became more
irritated with Nora and their verbal quarrels escalated to physical violence.

On May 9, 1977, Nora gave birth to their second child. However, nothing changed in
their relationship. Manuel spent most of his time with friends and engaged in drinking
sprees. In 1979, he had an extramarital affair and seldom came home. He eventually
left Nora and their children in 1980 to cohabit with his girlfriend. They considered
themselves separated.

In 1985, Manuel, upon Nora's request, bought a house for her and their children. Nora
became pregnant again and thereafter gave birth to their third child.

Manuel presented a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas (Dr. Villegas), who testified that
Manuel has Intermittent Explosive Disorder, characterized by irritability and aggressive
behavior that is not proportionate to the cause. Dr. Villegas diagnosed Nora with
Passive Aggressive Personality Disorder, marked by a display of negative attitude and
passive resistance in her relationship with Manuel.

On June 19, 2008, Manuel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, on the ground that he and Nora are
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.

The RTC granted the petition in its Decision.

The CA, granted Nora's appeal and reversed the RTC decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the totality of evidence presented by Manuel is insufficient to prove that
he and Nora are psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of
marriage.

Ruling:

Yes, it is insufficient.

Dr. Villegas' conclusion that Manuel is afflicted with Intermittent Explosive Disorder and
that Nora has Passive Aggressive Personality Disorder which render them
psychologically incapacitated under Article 36 of the Family Code, is solely based on her
interviews with Manuel and the parties' eldest child, Moncho. Consequently, the CA did
not err in not according probative value to her psychological evaluation report and
testimony.

In this case, the only person interviewed by Dr. Villegas aside from Manuel for the
spouses' psychological evaluation was Moncho, who could not be considered as a
reliable witness to establish the psychological incapacity of his parents in relation to
Article 36 of the Family Code, since he could not have been there at the time his
parents were married.

The Court also notes that Dr. Villegas did not administer any psychological tests
on Manuel despite having had the opportunity to do so. While the Court has
declared that there is no requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician,
much less be subjected to psychological tests, this rule finds application only if
the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity. In this case, the supposed personality disorder of Manuel
could have been established by means of psychometric and neurological tests which are
objective means designed to measure specific aspects of people's intelligence, thinking,
or personality.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED.

BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent.

G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000
PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent Wilson G. Marcos was established to

have been married twice. They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were
assigned at the Malacañang Palace and served the Marcoses.

After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then
engaged in different business ventures that did not however prosper. Due to his failure to
engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he
would hit and beat her. He would even force her to have sex with him despite her
weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was
so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times during their cohabitation,
he would leave their house. In 1992, they were already living separately.
 The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994, when they
had a bitter quarrel. As they were already living separately, she did not want him to stay in
their house anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was so angry that
she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her
mother who came to her aid. The following day, she and their children left the house and
sought refuge in her sister's house.

On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the
Mandaluyong Medical Center where her injuries were diagnosed as contusions. The appellee
submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological evaluation
while the appellant on the other hand, did not.

The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform

his marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family and
his violent attitude towards appellee and their children. Marriage between petitioner Brenda
B. Marcos and respondent Wilson G. Marcos was declared null and declared null and void ab
initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.

But the Court of Appeals Reversed the ruling of the RTC and held that psychological
incapacity had not been established by the totality of the evidence presented.

Hence, the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the findings by the
Regional Trial Court of psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage simply because the respondent did not subject himself to psychological
evaluation and whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all
the witnesses should be the basis of the determination of the merits of the Petition.

RULING:

The Court ruled that the personal medical or psychological examination of

respondent is not a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless,
the totality of the evidence she presented does not show such incapacity.

There are three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court
of Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician
examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause
may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence
that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality
of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.

Further, although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to

provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological
incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already
present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. The behavior of
respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully
employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became
intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family
home.

Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the
inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition
is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.

Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that
cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It
is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations
are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.

Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need
not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral
corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment and the like. At best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to
grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.

In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of
petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity,
juridical antecedence and incurability.

MARIA VICTORIA SOCORRO LONTOC-CRUZ, Petitioner vs. NILO SANTOS CRUZ,

Respondent
G.R. No. 201988, October 11, 2017
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS:

Twenty-two-year-old Marivi met 28-year old Nilo sometime in March 1986. After
months of getting steady, they married each other.

On July 5, 2005, Marivi filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa City a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage7 based on psychological incapacity. She averred that it had
been medically ascertained that Nilo was suffering from "inadequate personality disorder
related to masculine strivings associated with unresolved oedipal complex,"8 while she
herself was found to be suffering from a "personality disorder of the mixed type,
[h]istrionic, [n]arcissistic with immaturity.

To show that Nilo failed to provide her with the necessary emotional, psychological, and
physical support, Marivi cited the following:

1. His infidelity and his non-commitment to the marriage as he continued to act like a
bachelor;

2. The lack of 'oneness' in the marriage as Nilo would make decisions (on financial
matters) without consulting or considering her suggestions; treating her as a
 housemate or a "mayordoma;" keeping from her his whereabouts, when he would
come home or how much his income was;

3. The lack of sexual contact for more than a decade as Nilo made excuses;

4. Putting up a facade that he is a caring, concerned, and loving husband, especially to

his bosses; and

5. Preference towards the company of his peers/friends.

In his Answer, Nilo claimed that he was madly in love with Marivi; that at the start of
their relationship, both he and Mari vi would exhibit negative personality traits which they
overlooked; that he believed that both he and Marivi were suffering from psychological
incapacity; and that he was not singularly responsible for the breakdown of their marriage.
He stressed that Marivi also contributed to the deterioration of their union, to wit:

1. Marivi would demand that he behave in ways he was not accustomed to or

inconsistent with his career position;

2. Marivi was jealous of his friends; and would often make hasty conclusions that he
was having an affair with other women;

3. Marivi would exhibit volatile temperament if things did not go her way; would not
admit mistakes, and blame others instead;

4. Marivi would make decisions impulsively, such as changing an item she gets tired of,
or demanding that Nilo change a motor vehicle simply because she did not like it;
and

5. She lacked respect for Nilo, and would speak to him degradingly, and even accuse
him of being gay or a homosexual.

Dr. Encarnacion and Dr. Villegas diagnosis were in sync with each other. On the basis
of Nilo's five-to-six sessions and Marivi's eight bi-weekly psychotherapy sessions with him,
Dr. Encarnacion concluded that there was no chance of a successful marriage in a
dysfunctional union when there is double psychological incapacity. 

In its October 13, 2008 Decision, the RTC denied the Petition. The RTC took a dim
view of the expert witnesses' attribution of a double psychological incapacity to Marivi's
nature of being a "father figure woman," and to Nilo's "oedipal complex." As for Nilo, the
RTC found no concrete evidence of "oedipal complex;" the RTC held that prioritizing his
work over the emotional needs of his family was not reflective of his psychological
incapacity because what he did was still for his family's benefit. 

Then, the CA united with the RTC in rejecting the alleged existence of psychological
incapacity pointed out by Dr. Villegas and by Dr. Encarnacion.

Hence, the petition.

ISSUE:
 At issue before us is whether the psychological conditions of the parties fall under
Article 36 of the Family Code to warrant the declaration of nullity of marriage.

RULING:

The court sustains the findings of both the RTC and the CA.

Article 36 of the Family Code states:

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization.

Court laid down guidelines in interpreting and applying this provision. In Republic v.
De Gracia, they reiterated the doctrine in Santos v. Court of Appeals, "that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it must be grave and serious such
that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a
marriage); (b) juridical antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage); and (c) incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved).

Even granting that both parties did suffer from personality disorders as evaluated by
the expert witnesses, Court finds that the conclusions reached by these expert witnesses do
not irresistibly point to the fact that the personality disorders which plague the spouses
antedated the marriage; that these personality disorders are indeed grave or serious; or
that these personality disorders are incurable or permanent as to render the parties
psychologically incapacitated to carry out and carry on their marital duties.

More than that, too, the evidence on record do not square with the existence of
psychological incapacity as contemplated by law and jurisprudence. In the case of Nilo, what
brought about the breakdown of his relationship with Marivi was not necessarily attributable
to his so-called "psychological disorder" but can be imputed to his work and marital stress,
and his ordinary human failings.

With regard to his failure to sexually perform "adequately," the same appeared to be
a case of "selective impotency," as he was turned off by Marivi's disclosure of their bed
secrets to her family. Nor can it be said that Nilo's failure to provide quality time for the
family was caused by his "inadequate personality disorder" or "unresolved oedipal
complex.", While he was able to provide his family with an adequate standard of living, the
lack of quality time for his wife became attenuated and resulted in severing his bond with
Mari vi, who failed to understand the nature of his job.

The petition is denied.

LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner,
vs. MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 155800            
March 10, 2006
FACTS:

1. Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and
respondent was 36 years of age.

2. After their first meeting, they got married before a minister of the Gospel at the Manila
City Hall, and through a subsequent church wedding at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish,
Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990.

3. A child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.

4. On 8 March 1993, petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage declared null and void.

5. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. He asserted that respondent’s incapacity existed at the time their marriage was
celebrated and still subsists up to the present.

6. Respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent

persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational
attainment and other events or things, to wit:

 She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son, and instead
introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family.

 She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill
her when in fact, no such incident occurred.

 She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist.

 She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold

Recording Company.

 She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez.

 She represented herself as a person of greater means.

 She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his
officemates to monitor his whereabouts.

7. In support of his petition, he presented a psychiatrist and a clinical psychologist. They

observe that Reyes’ persistent and constant lying to petitioner was abnormal or
pathological.
 8. Before the trial court rendered its decision, Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of
Manila annulled the Catholic Marriage of the parties (such decision was affirmed by
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal and later by Roman Rota of the Vatican).

9. According to the trial court, her fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and
personalities enabled her to live in a world of make believe.

10. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving
meaning and significance to her marriage.

11. RTC reversed judgement holding that the totality of the evidence presented was
insufficient to establish respondent’s psychological incapacity.

12. Hence, this petition for review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:
 WON the requirement in Molina that the psychological incapacity of Reyes was shown to
be medically permanent or incurable.

RULING:
 YES, the petitioner’s expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court
rendered its decision on 10 August 1995. These events transpired well before Molina was
promulgated in 1997 and made explicit the requirement that the psychological incapacity
must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such requirement
was not expressly stated in Article 36 or any other provision of the Family Code.
 We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article 36
relies heavily on a case-to-case perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in
this case an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since the parties would
have had no impelling cause to present evidence to that effect at the time this case was
tried by the RTC more than ten (10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are
sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondent’s psychological incapacity has
been established by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts are further dispelled by the fact
that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider incurability as an integral
requisite of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that respondent was so
incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree that annulment was warranted.
 The petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August 1995, declaring the
marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the
Family Code, is REINSTATED

BENJAMIN G. TING, Petitioner, vs. CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING, Respondent.

G.R. No. 166562, March 31, 2009
FACTS:

Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen Velez-Ting (Carmen) were wed in
Cebu City when respondent was already pregnant with their first child. They have been married for
more than 18 years and have a total of 6 children. After being married for more than 18 years,
Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration of nullity of
their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from
psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which, however, only
came to manifest thereafter. 
Carmen was already aware that Benjamin used to drink and gamble occasionally with his friends.
But after they were married, petitioner continued to drink regularly and would go home at about
midnight or sometimes in the wee hours of the morning drunk and violent. He would confront and
insult respondent, physically assault her and force her to have sex with him. There were also
instances when Benjamin used his gun and shot the gate of their house. He refused to give financial
support to their family and would even get angry at Carmen whenever she asked for money for their
children. Instead of providing support, Benjamin would spend his money on drinking and gambling
and would even buy expensive equipment for his hobby. He rarely stayed home and even neglected
his obligation to his children.
Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. Carmen presented Dr. Pureza Trinidad-Oñate
as witness, a psychiatrist. Dr. Oñate concluded that Benjamin’s compulsive drinking, compulsive
gambling and physical abuse of respondent are clear indications that petitioner suffers from a
personality disorder. To refute Dr. Oñate’s opinion, petitioner presented Dr. Renato D. Obra. Dr.
Obra observed that there is nothing wrong with petitioner’s personality, considering the latter’s good
relationship with his fellow doctors and his good track record as anesthesiologist.
The lower court rendered its Decision  declaring the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void. The RTC gave credence to Dr. Oñate’s findings and the admissions
made by Benjamin in the course of his deposition, and found him to be psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Specifically, the trial court found Benjamin an
excessive drinker, a compulsive gambler, someone who prefers his extra-curricular activities to his
family, and a person with violent tendencies, which character traits find root in a personality defect
existing even before his marriage to Carmen.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. The CA rendered a Decision reversing the trial court’s
ruling. It faulted the trial court’s finding, stating that no proof was adduced to support the
conclusion that Benjamin was psychologically incapacitated at the time he married Carmen
since Dr. Oñate’s conclusion was based only on theories and not on established fact.
Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied for having been filed beyond the
prescribed period. Undaunted, respondent filed a petition for certiorari with this Court. this Court
granted the petition and directed the CA to resolve Carmen’s motion for reconsideration. The CA
decided to reconsider its previous ruling. Reversing its first ruling and sustaining the trial court’s
decision. A motion for reconsideration was filed, this time by Benjamin, but the same was denied by
the CA. Thus, the petition is elevated to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Benjamin and Carmen can be declared null and void based
on Article 36 of the Family Code.

RULING: No, the Court ruled that the marriage of Benjamin and Carmen cannot be declared null and
void based on Article 36 of the Family Code.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. The psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the
inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.
In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioner’s "defects" were present at the time of
the celebration of their marriage. She merely cited that prior to their marriage, she already knew
that petitioner would occasionally drink and gamble with his friends; but such statement, by itself, is
insufficient to prove any pre-existing psychological defect on the part of her husband. Neither did
the evidence adduced prove such "defects" to be incurable.
The two experts provided diametrically contradicting psychological evaluations: Dr. Oñate
testified that petitioner’s behavior is a positive indication of a personality disorder, while Dr.
Obra maintained that there is nothing wrong with petitioner’s personality. Moreover, there
appears to be greater weight in Dr. Obra’s opinion because, aside from analyzing the transcript of
Benjamin’s deposition similar to what Dr. Oñate did, Dr. Obra also took into consideration the
psychological evaluation report furnished by another psychiatrist in South Africa who personally
examined Benjamin, as well as his (Dr. Obra’s) personal interview with Benjamin’s brothers.
Logically, therefore, the balance tilts in favor of Dr. Obra’s findings.
Thus, the Court find that the totality of evidence adduced by respondent insufficient to prove
that petitioner is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband,
and more particularly, that he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the
marriage eighteen (18) years ago.
The Court expressed that they are not condoning petitioner’s drinking and gambling problems, or his
violent outbursts against his wife. There is no valid excuse to justify such a behavior. Petitioner must
remember that he owes love, respect, and fidelity to his spouse as much as the latter owes the same
to him. Unfortunately, the Court finds respondent’s testimony, as well as the totality of
evidence presented by the respondent, to be too inadequate to declare him psychologically
unfit pursuant to Article 36.
It should be remembered that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of
marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. In this case, the presumption has not been amply
rebutted and must, perforce, prevail.
Accordingly, the Court REVERSED the trial court’s and the appellate court’s rulings.
The Court declared that the marriage between Benjamin and Carmen is still valid.

RENATO REYES SO, Petitioner, vs. LORNA VALERA, Respondent.

G.R. No. 150677, June 5, 2009

FACTS:
Renato Reyes So and Lorna Valera met in 1973. They had a 19-year common-law relationship,
and culminated their exchange of marital vows at the Caloocan City Hall on December 10, 1991.
During their relationship, they were able to procreate 3 children.
Renato filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage with Lorna. He
claimed that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations
of marriage, as she failed and refused to cohabit and make love with him; did not love and respect
him; did not remain faithful to him; did not give him emotional, spiritual, physical, and psychological
help and support; failed and refused to have a family domicile; and failed and refused to enter into a
permanent union and establish conjugal and family life with him.

The petitioner further alleged that the respondent did not want to practice her profession after
passing the dental board exam; and that she sold the dental equipment he bought for her.  He also
claimed that when he started his own communication company, the respondent disagreed with many
of his business decisions; her interference eventually led to many failed transactions with
prospective clients.

He also narrated that he often slept in the car because the respondent locked him out of the house
when he came home late. He also claimed that Lorna did not take care of their children, and was
very strict with clients. Moreover, the respondent went out with his employees to gamble whenever
there were no clients. Summons was served on the respondent, but Lorna failed to file an answer.

Aside from his testimony, the petitioner also presented certified true copies of the birth certificate of
their three children; certified true copy of their marriage contract; and the testimony, original
curriculum vitae, and psychological report of clinical psychologist Dr. Cristina Rosello-Gates (Dr.
Gates).

An examination of the parties’ respective family background and upbringing, as well as the events
prior to their marriage point to psychological impairment on the part of Respondent Lorna Valera.

Based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM IV), the international standards of
psychological disorders, Respondent Lorna Valera is plagued with an Adjustment Disorder as
manifested in her impulsiveness, lack of restraint, lack of civility and a sense of decency in the
conduct of her life. Compulsive Behavior Patterns are also evident in her marijuana habit, gambling
and habitual squandering of Petitioner’s money. Lorna Valera’s Adjustment Disorder and
Compulsive Behavior Patterns were already existing prior to her marriage to Petitioner Renato So.
Continuing up to the present, the same appears to be irreversible.

The RTC nullified the marriage of petitioner and respondent. the RTC decision wholly dwelt on the
question of the respondent’s psychological incapacity based on the testimony of the petitioner and
Dr. Gates, his expert witness.

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed the
RTC decision to the CA. The CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed the
petition for lack of merit. The CA ruled that the petitioner failed to prove the respondent’s
psychological incapacity. The respondent’s character, faults, and defects did not constitute
psychological incapacity warranting the nullity of the parties’ marriage.
"while respondent appears to be a less than ideal mother to her children, and loving wife to her
husband," these flaws were not physical manifestations of psychological illness. Finally, the CA
concluded that the declaration of nullity of a marriage was not proper when the psychological
disorder does not meet the guidelines set forth in the case of Molina. The petitioner moved to
reconsider the decision, but the CA denied his motion. Thus, the case is elevated to the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not there exists sufficient ground to declare the marriage of petitioner and
respondent null and void based on Article 36 of the Family Code

RULING: NO. The Court ruled that there is no sufficient basis to annul the marriage pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code.
The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which
provides that "a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."

In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by: (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability.

It should refer to "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage." It must be confined to "the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage."

In this case, the petitioner failed to establish respondent’s psychological incapacity. Ideally, the best
results in the determination of psychological incapacity are achieved if the respondent herself is
actually examined. This opportunity, however, did not arise in the present case because the
respondent simply failed to respond to the court summons and to cooperate in the proceedings.
Thus, only an indirect psychological examination took place through the transcript of stenographic
notes of the hearings and clinical interviews of the petitioner which lasted for about three (3) hours.

The Court conclude that they are not sufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the
conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that prevented the respondent from complying
with the essential marital obligations of marriage. In the first place, the facts on which the
psychologist based her conclusions were all derived from statements by the petitioner whose bias in
favor of his cause cannot be doubted.

Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic
marital obligations. Mere "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of marital obligations or
"ill will" on the part of the spouse is different from "incapacity" rooted on some debilitating
psychological condition or illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or
perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a
person's refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and not due to
some psychological illness that is contemplated by said rule.

The Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. The
marriage of Renato and Lorna is still valid for petitioner failed to establish respondent’s psychological
incapacity.
RATIONALE

More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family
Code of the Philippines were handed down by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals 40 (the
Molina case) as follows:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. x x x

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
 must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts…

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

Camacho-Reyes vs. Reyes

G.R. No. 185286
August 18, 2010
Nachura, J.:
Topic: Psychological Incapacity

Petitioner filed for a declaration of nullity of her marriage with respondent on the ground of
psychological incapacity; that respondent was remiss in performing his obligation to their marriage and
their family, and that even after attempts of petitioner to salvage their relationship, respondent was
uncooperative.

Facts:

1. Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at UP where they were
students there. Their acquaintanceship developed into a boyfriend-girlfriend relationship. As
Ramon had habits of cutting classes and was taking marijuana, it was not a surprise that Maria
was the only one who finished her studies. Ramon, on the other hand, dropped out of school in
his third year and continued working in their family business, the Aristocrat restaurant.
2. On December 1976 the two got married following Maria’s graduation and her father’s death.
She was 5 months pregnant then and was working at the Population Center Foundation. They
lived with Ramon’s family where all living expenses were shouldered by his parents and the
couple’s wages were spent solely for their personal needs.
3. They started having financial difficulties when their first child was born. The P1,500 monthly
allowance usually given by Ramon to Maria stopped because of the slow advancement of their
family business. He made business attempts but it eventually failed. Ramon attempted a
fishpond business in Mindoro, but it also became unsuccessful. His business efforts in Mindoro
took him away from his family for but it did not even bother him.
4. When Maria gave birth to their third child while Ramon was in Mindoro, the latter did not even
bother to inquire about her health and the baby’s. When he went back to Manila, he acted
 nonchalantly while playing with the baby and did not attempt to find out how they paid the
hospital bills.
5. Maria later found that Ramon was having an extra-marital affair with a former secretary when
she heard them talking over the phone. Not only was he unable to provide financially for their
family but he was also remiss in his obligation to remain faithful to her. Moreover, when Maria
underwent an operation to remove a cyst, Ramon seemed unconcerned.
6. When Maria asked the siblings of Ramon to intervene, the older brother of Ramon who was a
member of a marriage encounter group, together with his wife, introduced Ramon to Dra.
Dayan for a psychological assessment to “determine benchmarks of current psychological
functioning”, but he resisted and did not continue to undergo psychotherapy. The couple was
also invited to counseling but Ramon was uncooperative.
7. Finally, in 2001, petitioner filed before the RTC a declaration of nullity of her marriage with
Ramon on the grounds of psychological incapacity. Such allegations of Maria was contended by
Ramon because according to him he was not remiss in performing his obligations to his family.
8. The RTC granted the petition and declared their marriage as null and void on the ground
psychological incapacity. The Appellate Court reversed the decision on appeal of Ramon.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential

obligations of marriage.

Ruling:

Yes. The Court relied heavily on the assessment and diagnosis of Dra. Dayan, Dra. Mango, and
Dra. Villegas on the psychological condition of Ramon. The Court finds that the marriage between the
parties from its inception has a congenital infirmity termed "psychological incapacity" which pertains to
the inability of the parties to effectively function emotionally, intellectually and socially towards each
other in relation to their essential duties to mutually observe love, fidelity and respect as well as to
mutually render help and support, (Art. 68 Family Code).

The three doctors were unanimous in finding that the respondent is suffering from personality
disorder which psychologically incapacitated him to fulfill his basic duties to the marriage. However, Dra.
Villegas was also firm that Maria is also afflicted with psychological incapacity as her personality cannot
be harmonized with the personality of the respondent. But such claim was not merited by the Court
because such attributes do not amount to psychological incapacity and it did not incapacitate her from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage. It is even contrary to the fact that Maria
stayed in their marriage and looked for ways to salvage their relationship.

The respondent’s antisocial personality disorder is rooted from his childhood or originated from
unhealthy events in his growing years. It existed before marriage, but became manifest only after the
celebration, due to marital demands and stresses. It is considered as permanent in nature because it
started early in his psychological development, and therefore became so engrained into his personality
structures. It is considered as severe in degree, because it hampered, interrupted and interfered with his
normal functioning related to heterosexual adjustments.

In sum, the three doctors found that the (1) respondent does have problems; and (2) these
problems include chronic irresponsibility; inability to recognize and work towards providing the needs of
his family; several failed business attempts; substance abuse; and a trail of unpaid money obligations.

Article 36 of the Family Code reads:

"A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after solemnization."

and Art. 68 of the same Code provides:

"The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support."

G.R. No. 222541

RACHEL A. DEL ROSARIO, Petitioner
vs. JOSE O. DEL ROSARIO and COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents

Facts
1. Rachel met Jose in Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya and soon had a romantic relationship. They
got married in civil rites. Years later they renewed their vows in a church ceremony, their
married life ran smoothly in its early years.
2. Rachel then worked as an OFW in Hongkong and they were blessed with their son, Wesley.
Rachel has been working as domestic worker ever since, only returning to the Philippines
every year for a vacation.
3. Rachel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, alleging that Jose was
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his essential marital obligations. Rachel claimed that
during their marriage Jose conspicuously tried to avoid his duties as husband and father.
Furthermore she mentioned that Jose was hot tempered, violent and was engage with extra
marital affairs.
4. Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag) prepared the Psychological Report which was primarily based
on her interview with Rachel and Wesley. She stated in the report that Jose suffered from
Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD) characterized by: (a) his lack of empathy and concern
for Rachel; (b) his irresponsibility and his pleasure-seeking attitude that catered only to his
own fancies and comfort; (c) his selfishness marked by his lack of depth when it comes to his
marital commitments; and (d) his lack of remorse for his shortcomings.

Issue
WON the Rachel and Jose’s marriage can be annulled under Article 36 of the Family code?
Ruling
No, Article 36 of the Family Code stated that evidence showing that psychological incapacity, should
establish its gravity, antecedence and incurability. In Dr. Tayag’s report, she did not explain in detail
how Jose's APD could be characterized as grave and incurable. Furthermore, Dr.Tayag’s findings
were based only on the narration of Rachel and his Son Wesley. The court reiterated that
psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of the marital obligations; it is not enough that a party prove that the other failed to
meet the responsibility and duty of a married person. There must be proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person - an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage. This was strengthened, when Rachel attested that their marriage ran smoothly
during the early years of their marriage. Thus, there’s no sufficient evidence establishing the
respondent’s psychological incapacity, thus denying the petition.

G.R. No. 188400

MARIA TERESA B. TANI-DE LA FUENTE, Petitioner
vs RODOLFO DE LA FUENTE, JR., Respondent

Facts

1. Petitioner Maria Teresa and respondent Rodolfo De La Fuente, Jr. met in the University of Sto.
Tomas. They eventually got married in Mandaluyong City. They had two children: Maria
Katharyn, Maria Kimberly.
2. Prior to the celebration of their marriage, Petitioner already noticed that Rodolfo was an introvert
and was prone to jealousy, his attitude worsened as they went on with their marital life. Rodolfo
would even skip work to stalk her. Petitioner even narrated the incident, where respondent poked
a gun on her because of jealousy.
3. Petitioner also attested that Rodolfo treated her like a sex slave. They would have sex four (4) or
five (5) times a day. At times, Rodolfo would fetch Maria Teresa from her office during her lunch
break, just so they could have sex. During sexual intercourse, Rodolfo would either tie her to the
bed or poke her with things
4. On the hopes of saving their marriage, Maria Teresa sought the advice of a doctor, a lawyer, and
a priest, as well as any person she thought could help her and Rodolfo. Maria Teresa also
suggested that she and Rodolfo undergo marriage counseling, but Rodolfo refused and deemed
it as mere "kalokohan"
5. .Dr. Lopez conducted an in-depth interview with Maria Teresa to gather information on her family
background and her marital life with Rodolfo. Doctor Lopez diagnosed Rodolfo with "paranoid
personality disorder manifested by damaging behavior like reckless driving and extreme jealousy;
his being distrustful and suspicious; his severe doubts and distrust of friends and relatives of his
being irresponsible and lack of remorse; his resistance to treatment; and his emotional coldness
and severe immaturity. The doctor stated that Respondent’s disorder was one of the severe
forms of personality disorder, even more severe than the other personality disorders like
borderline and narcissistic personality disorders.

Issue

WON marriage can be considered null and void under Article 36 of family code?

Ruling
Yes, Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. In the case present, Rodolfo's
family background showed that his father was a psychiatric patient, and Rodolfo might have developed
psychic contamination called double insanity, a symptom similar to his father's. Dr, Lopez further testified
that this disorder is very severe, serious and incurable because of the severe paranoia of the patient; that
patients with this kind of personality disorder could never accept that there is something wrong with them
and if ever forced to seek treatment, they would rather engage in an intellectual battle with the therapist
rather than cooperate with them.

The court ruled that, Respondent's repeated behavior of psychological abuse by intimidating, stalking,
and isolating his wife from her family and friends, as well as his increasing acts of physical violence, are
proof of his depravity, and utter lack of comprehension of what marriage and partnership entail. It would
be of utmost cruelty for this Court to decree that petitioner should remain married to respondent. After she
had exerted efforts to save their marriage and their family, respondent simply refused to believe that there
was anything wrong in their marriage. This shows that respondent truly could not comprehend and
perform his marital obligations.

The Court took note of Ngo Te v. Gutierrez Yu Te's observation, wherein "it has taken its toll on people
who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like
termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions.” Which
ironically, the ultimate effect of such stringent application of the Molina(another case) guidelines is the
perversion of the family unit, the very institution that our laws are meant to protect. This fact is persuasive
enough for this Court to believe that respondent's mental illness is incurable thus granting that the
marriage be declared NULL and VOID.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. LIBERATO P. MOLA CRUZ, Respondent.

G.R. No. 236629
July 23, 2018

Facts:
1. Liberato and Liezel were married on August 30, 2002 in Bacolod City. In the course
of their relationship Liezel left for Japan to work as an entertainer. The couple got
married after Liezel returned home.
2. They moved to Japan when Liezel secured a contract as an entertainer, and Liberto
found work as a construction worker. While living in Japan, he noticed changes in
Liezel such as a sudden change in mood.
3. When they returned to the Philippines because of overstaying, Liezel admitted that
she was having a romantic affair with a Japanese man. This stressed out Liberto
especially when Liezel did not end the ilicit relationship. Liezel eventually walked
away from the marriage.
4. They reconciled after being wooed back, however one day respondent found her
Japanese lover inside their house and Liezel introduced Liberto as her older brother.
Liezl and her lover even shared a bed together with Liberto’s consent fearing that
she might leave home again.
5. Liezel left their marriage a second time, and even when petitioner was working
abroad he still wooed her but by then Liezel was cohabiting with her lover already.
6. Liberto then decided to file a declaration of nullity of marriage.
7. A clinical psychologist diagnosed Liezel’s disorder as histrionic characterized by
excessive emotionality and attention seeking behavior. Her incapacity was also found
incurable because it was deeply ingrained in her personality. 
 8.  Liezel questioned Dr. Tudla's report as it lacked details regarding Liezl's condition
and how Liezl was unable to comply with her marital obligations. Petitioner
contended that the change in Liezl's behavior was only caused by her illicit
relationship and not because of psychological incapacity.

Issues:
Whether Liezl's psychological incapacity to comply with her marital obligations was
sufficiently established by the totality of evidence presented by respondent.

Ruling:
The Court affirms the declaration as void ab initio, and holds that both the CA and the
RTC did not err in finding that the totality of evidence presented by respondent in
support of his petition, sufficiently established the link between Liezl's actions showing
her psychological incapacity to understand and perform her marital obligations and her
histrionic personality disorder.

The fact that Liezl's disorder manifested itself through actions that occurred after the
marriage was celebrated does not mean, as ,petitioner argues, that there is no
psychological incapacity to speak of. As held in Republic v. Pangasinan,25 psychological
incapacity may manifest itself after the celebration of the marriage even if it already
exists at the time of the marriage. More importantly, Art. 36 of the Family Code is
explicit - a marriage contracted by a psychologically incapacitated party is also treated
as void even if the incapacity becomes manifest only after the marriage was
celebrated.26

Nice to know:
Petitioner also relies on the premise that Liezl's sexual infidelity and abandonment are only
grounds for legal separation and cannot be used as basis to hold a marriage void ab initio.
According to petitioner, Liezl cheated on and abandoned her husband because of her illicit
affair and not because she is psychologically incapacitated.

It is true that sexual infidelity and abandonment are grounds for legal separation. It may be
noted, however, that the courts a quo duly connected such aberrant acts of Liezl as actual
manifestations of her histrionic personality disorder. A person with such a disorder was
characterized as selfish and egotistical, and demands immediate gratification.30 These traits
were especially reflected in Liezl's highly unusual acts of allowing her Japanese boyfriend to
stay in the marital abode, sharing the marital bed with his Japanese boyfriend and
introducing her husband as her elder brother, all done under the threat of desertion. Such
blatant insensitivity and lack of regard for the sanctity of the marital bond and home cannot
be expected from a married person who reasonably understand the principle and
responsibilities of marriage.

Republic v. CA and Molina

G.R. No. 108763
February 13, 1997
PANGANIBAN, J.
Topic: Void Marriage - Psychological Incapacity
Respondent Roridel Molina filed a petition for declaration of her marriage with Reynaldo Molina as void
on the ground of psychological incapacity, for being immature and irresponsible of the latter.

Facts:

1. Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 and begot a son.

2. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and
a father since 1) he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered
his money; 2) he depended on his parents for aid and assistance; and 3) he was never honest with his
wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them.

3. Few weeks after March 1987, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned
them.

4. Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife, but
contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange
behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal
to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the
household and handle their finances.

5. On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo
Molina before the RTC.

6. RTC and CA grant the petition of Roridel and declared the marriage void on the ground of
psychological incapacity.

7. The OSG filed a petition before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the marriage will be declared as void on the ground of psychological incapacity of
Reynaldo?

Ruling:

No. The Court held that the marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What
constitutes psychological incapacity is not mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personalities. It is indispensable that the parties must exhibit inclinations which would not meet the
essential marital responsibilities and duties due to some psychological illness. Reynaldo’s action at the
time of the marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would comprise grounds for
psychological incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she and her husband
cannot get along with each other and had not shown gravity of the problem neither its juridical
antecedence nor its incurability. In addition, the expert testimony by Dr. Sison showed no incurable
psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility which is not considered as psychological incapacity.

MINORU FUJIKI VS. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY

G.R. No. 196049
June 26, 2013

FACTS:
●Petitioner Minoru Fujiki is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela
Marinay in the Philippines.
●The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to
Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
●Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara. Without the first marriage being dissolved,
Marinay and Maekara were married in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to
Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and
started to contact Fujiki.
●Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. Fujiki
helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.
●Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: “Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment or Decree
of Absolute Nullity of Marriage.”
●RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage” based on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner,
Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.

●Fujiki filed a motion for reconsideration which the RTC denied upon consideration that Fujiki
as a "third person” in the proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce
issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized.
●The OSG agreed with the petitioner that the RTC’s decision be set aside.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Fujiki which is the husband of Marinay in the prior marriage
can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent
marriage between Maekara and Mahinay on the ground of bigamy?
RULING:
YES. The prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining
the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising
from it. Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese
Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil
status as married to Marinay. It is the error for the lower court to dismiss
the case. The Philippine court can recognize the effectivity of a foreign
judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided
under foreign law. Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign
judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. However, the
Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying
a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for
bigamy.
Additional Note:
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to
substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law.
They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the status,
condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the
foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of
whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a
foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to
the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of
the Civil Code.

Republic v. Tampus
G.R. No. 214243
March 16, 2016
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Topic: Declaration of Presumptive Death of the Absent Spouse

Respondent Tampus filed a declaration of presumptive death of her absent spouse who is an army
assigned in combat in Jolo, Sulu and was missing for 33 years already.

Facts:

1. Respondent Tampus was married to Del Mundo on November 29, 1975 in Cordova, Cebu.

2. On December 2, 1975, being an army, Del Mundo left his spouse for Jolo, Sulu where he was assigned.

3. Since then, Tampus heard no news from Del Mundo.

4. Being the case, as Tampus wants to move on with her life and intended to remarry, she filed before
the RTC a declaration of presumptive death of Del Mundo, believing that the latter was already dead.
5. She alleged that within that 33 years of no communication with her spouse, she exerted efforts to find
the latter by inquiring their families, relatives and neighbors to his whereabouts. Unfortunately, they
also don't have news from her spouse.

6. The RTC and CA granted the petition of Tampus and declared Del Mundo as presumptively dead for all
legal purposes, without prejudice to the effect of his reappearance.

7. The OSG, dissatisfied with the ruling of the lower courts, filed a motion for reconsideration before the
Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether Del Mundo can be declared as presumptively dead?

Ruling:

No. The Court ruled that Del Mundo cannot be declared as presumptively dead. Article 41 of the Family
Code provides that the present spouse must have a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead. The "well-founded belief" requires diligent and reasonable efforts in locating the absent
spouse, and through the exertion of these efforts, the present spouse tend to believe that his/her
absent spouse was already dead. However, in this case, the present spouse, Tampus, failed in proving
that she exercised all the diligent and reasonable efforts that leads to her belief of the death of her
husband. The Court emphasized that mere inquiry to their families, relatives and neighbors to her
spouse whereabouts does not suffice as diligent and reasonable efforts. She should have inquire further
to the Armed Forces of the Philippines about the mission in Jolo, Sulu and to her spouse whereabouts,
being the latter a member of the AFP.

Failure of Tampus, present spouse, to prove the same, the Court denied her petition of declaration of
presumptive death of her spouse.

G.R. No. 210580

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Vs LUDYSON C. CATUBAG

FACTS:

Prior to their marriage in 2003, Ludyson Catubag and Shanaviv had been cohabiting with each
other as husband and wife. Their union begot two children. To meet the needs of the family, Ludyson
took work overseas while Shanaviv stayed in the Philippines to tend to the children. On 2003, Ludyson
and Shanaviv got married. Ludyson returned overseas to continue his work.

On 2006, while working abroad, Ludyson was informed by his relatives that Shanaviv left their
house and never returned. The relatives took care of the children. Ludyson came back to the country to
look for his wife. He proceeded to inquire about Shanaviv's whereabouts from their close friends and
relatives, but they too could offer no help. He travelled as far as Bicol, where Shanaviv was born and
raised, but he still could not locate her. Ludsyon subsequently sought the help of BomboRadyo
Philippines, one of the more well-known radio networks in the Philippines, to broadcast the fact of his
wife's disappearance. After almost 7 years of waiting and with the desire to marry again, Ludsyon filed a
petition to have his wife declared presumptively dead.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ludyson had a “well-founded” belief that his spouse was presumptively dead.

Held: No.

Rationale:

Prevailing jurisprudence has time and again pointed out four (4) requisites under Article 41 of
the Family Code that must be complied with for the declaration of presumptive death to prosper:

1. The absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if
the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down
in Article 391 of the Civil Code;
2. The present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. The present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead;
4. The present spouse files for a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death
of the absentee.

Notably, the records reveal that Ludyson has complied with the first, second, and fourth requisites.
Thus, what remains to be resolved is whether or not private respondent successfully discharged the
burden of establishing a well-founded belief that his wife, Shanaviv, is dead.

Ludyson first took a leave of absence from his work in the United Arab Emirates and returned to
the Philippines to search for Shanaviv. He then proceeded to inquire about his wife's whereabouts from
their friends and relatives in Cagayan and Bicol. Next, he aired over BomboRadyo Philippines, a known
radio station, regarding the fact of disappearance of his wife. Finally, he claims to have visited various
hospitals and funeral parlors in Tuguegarao City and nearby municipalities. The Court finds that
Ludyson's efforts fall short of the degree of diligence required by jurisprudence for the following
reasons:

First, he failed to present any of these alleged friends or relatives to corroborate these "inquiries."
Moreover, no explanation for such omission was given. As held in jurisprudence, failure to present any
of the persons from whom inquiries were allegedly made tends to belie a claim of a diligent search.

Second, he did not seek the help of other concerned government agencies, namely, the local police
authorities and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). In Cantor, the Court reasoned that while a
finding of well-founded belief varies with the nature of the situation, it would still be prudent for the
present spouse to seek the aid of the authorities in searching for the missing spouse. Absent such efforts
to employ the help of local authorities, the present spouse cannot be said to have actively and diligently
searched for the absentee spouse.

Finally, aside from the certification of BomboRadyo's manager, Ludyson bases his "well-founded belief”
on bare assertions that he exercised earnest efforts in looking for his wife. Again, the present spouse's
bare assertions, uncorroborated by any kind of evidence, falls short of the diligence required to
engender a well-founded belief that the absentee spouse is dead.
SANTOS vs SANTOS

Background of the Case: The RTC of Tarlac City declared Celerina Santos presumptively dead
following the filing of Ricardo Santos of a petition for declaration of presumptive death of his
wife, Celerina.
Thesis Statement: This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Celerina J. Santos
where she assailed the CA’s resolution dismissing the petition for the annulment of the RTC’s
judgement declaring her presumptively dead, and prayed for the following: (1) the
nullification of the effects of the declaration of her presumptive death and (2) the termination
of the subsequent marriage.
FACTS:
1. July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City issued a judgement declaring
petitioner Celerina J. Santos (Celerina) presumptively dead after her husband, respondent
Ricardo T. Santos (Ricardo), had filed a petition on  June 15, 2007 for declaration of absence or
presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage.
2. In his petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death, Ricardo alleged that he and
Celerina lived in Metro Manila after they had gotten married on June 18, 1980. After a year, they
allegedly moved to Tarlac City then she applied in an employment agency in Ermita, Manila, in
February 1995. She left Tarlac two months after and was never heard from again. Ricardo
further alleged that he exerted efforts to locate Celerina. He went to Celerina's parents but they,
too, did not know their daughter's whereabouts. He also inquired about her from other relatives
and friends, but no one gave him any information. Ricardo claimed that it was almost 12 years
from the date of his Regional Trial Court petition since Celerina left.  He believed that she
had passed away so Ricardo remarried on September 17, 2008.
3. Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only sometime in October 2008
when she could no longer avail the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other
appropriate remedies. According to Celerina, her true residence was in Quezon City, and that
Ricardo, despite his knowledge of her true residence, misrepresented to the court that she was a
resident of Tarlac City. As a result of Ricardo's misrepresentation, she was deprived of any
notice of and opportunity to oppose the petition declaring her presumptively dead. She
further claimed that Quezon City had been her and Ricardo's conjugal dwelling since 1989 until
Ricardo left in May 2008, that she never resided in Tarlac and that she also never left and
worked as a domestic helper abroad. She also claimed that it was not true that she had been
absent for 12 years and that Ricardo was aware that she never left their conjugal dwelling in
Quezon City. She alleged that it was he who left the conjugal dwelling in May 2008 to cohabit
with another woman. Celerina argued that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over Ricardo's
petition because it had never been published in a newspaper. She added that the Office of the
Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not furnished copies of Ricardo's
petition.
4. On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the
Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. T he Court of
Appeals dismissed Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for being a wrong mode
of remedy. According to the Court of Appeals, the proper remedy was to file a sworn statement
before the civil registry, declaring her reappearance in accordance with Article 42 of the Family
Code.
5. Celerina filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' resolution dated
November 28, 2008 but the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration in the
resolution dated March 5, 2009.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in dismissing Celerina’s petition for annulment of judgement
for being a wrong remedy for a fraudulently obtained judgement declaring presumptive
death
RULING: Yes. The CA erred and Court accepted Celerina Santos’ petition to be
meritorious. The provision on reappearance in the Family Code as a remedy to effect the
termination of the subsequent marriage does not preclude the spouse who was declared
presumptively dead from availing other remedies existing in law. 
It held that Annulment of Judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's judgment,
order, or resolution has become final, and the "remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
(or other appropriate remedies) are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner."
The grounds for Annulment of Judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
This court defined extrinsic fraud in Stilianopulos v. City of Legaspi: For fraud to become a
basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual. It is intrinsic when the
fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action or where the acts constituting
the fraud were or could have been litigated, It is extrinsic or collateral when a litigant commits
acts outside of the trial which prevents a party from having a real contest, or from presenting
all of his case, such that there is no fair submission of the controversy.
Celerina’s allegations as stated above (in No.3 of the facts) in her petition for annulment of
judgment are allegations of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction,
According to Article 42 of the Family Code, “the subsequent marriage referred to in the
preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of
reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous
marriage or declaring it void ab initio.” In other words, the Family Code provides the
presumptively dead spouse with the remedy of terminating the subsequent marriage by mere
reappearance.
A close reading of the entire Article 42 reveals that the termination of the subsequent marriage
by reappearance is subject to several conditions:
(1) the non-existence of a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab
initio;
(2) recording in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage of the
sworn statement of fact and circumstances of reappearance;
(3) due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage of the fact of reappearance; and
(4) the fact of reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially determined.
 
The existence of these conditions means that the reappearance of the absent or presumptively
dead spouse will cause the termination of the subsequent marriage ONLY when all the
conditions enumerated in the Family Code are present.

Celerina contends that reappearance is not a sufficient remedy because it will only terminate
the subsequent marriage but not nullify the effects of the declaration of her presumptive death
and the subsequent marriage.
 
Celerina is correct. Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage under Article 42 of the Family
Code is valid until terminated, the "children of such marriage shall be considered legitimate, and
the property relations of the spouse[s] in such marriage will be the same as in valid
marriages." If it is terminated by mere reappearance, the children of the subsequent marriage
conceived before the termination shall still be considered legitimate. Moreover, a judgment
declaring presumptive death is a defense against prosecution for bigamy.
Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage but also of
nullifying the effects of the declaration of presumptive death and the subsequent marriage,
mere filing of an affidavit of reappearance would not suffice. Celerina's choice to file an
action for annulment of judgment will, therefore, lie.
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for determination of the
existence of extrinsic fraud, grounds for nullity/annulment of the first marriage, and the merits of
the petition.

REPUBLIC VS OLAYBAR

Thesis Statement: The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeking the reversal of the
RTC’s Decision and Order which granted Merlina Olaybar’s petition for the cancellation of
entries in her marriage contract due to forgery.

FACTS:

1. Merlinda Olaybar requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate
of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her
boyfriend of five years. She discovered that, based on the records, she was already
married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24, 2002. She claimed
that she did not know the alleged husband and the signature appearing in the
marriage certificate is not hers. She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries
in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion thereof.
2. Giving credit to the testimony and witnesses of Olaybar and finding that the
signature on the marriage certificate was forged, the RTC granted the petition and
ordered the cancellation of the entry in the “wife” portion of the marriage
certificate.
3. The Republic, thru the OSG, filed a motion for reconsideration (MR) on the
grounds that:
 (1) there was no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in
the marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court;
and

(2) granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the marriage
contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio.

4. In denying the MR, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases
for correction of entries even on substantial errors under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court being the appropriate adversary proceeding required. Considering that
Olaybar’s identity was used by an unknown person to contract marriage with a
Korean national, it would not be feasible for her to institute an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage since it is not one of the void marriages under
Articles 35 and 36 of the Family Code.
5. Hence, the OSG filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.

ISSUE: WON the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract may be undertaken in a
Rule 108 Proceeding

RULING: Yes.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry.

The proceedings may either be summary or adversary:

(1) If the correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary.

(2) If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is
deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. An appropriate
adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where
all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have
been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case, and where the evidence has
been thoroughly weighed and considered.

Since the promulgation of Republic v. Leonor Valencia in 1986, the Court has repeatedly
ruled that “even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed
under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing
themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding.”

However, the Court explained that Rule 108 is NOT a substitute action for nullity of
marriage A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is necessary to
prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts
Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369).
On the other hand, a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry
may be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry is located.

In the present case, aside from the certificate of marriage which turned out to be a forgery,
no other evidence was presented to show the existence of marriage. Rather, Olaybar
showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into and that she was not
even aware of such existence. Thus, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of
marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not declare the marriage
void as there was no marriage to speak of.

In the end, the Republic’s petition was denied by the Court for lack of merit.