[G.R. No. L-12790. August 31, 1960.]
:
JOEL JIMENEZ, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. REMEDIOS CAÑIZARES, Defendant.
Republic of the Philippines, Intervenor-Appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. MARRIAGE; ITS NATURE AND SANCTITY; SECURITY AND STABILITY OF
STATE. — Marriage in this country is an institution in which the community is
deeply interested. The state has surrounded it with safeguards to maintain its
purity, continuity and permanence. The security and stability of the state are
largely dependent upon it. It is in the interest and duty of each and every member
of the community to prevent the bringing about of a condition that would shake its
foundation and ultimately lead to its destruction. The incidents of the status are
governed by law, not by will of the parties.
2. ID.; ANNULMENT; IMPOTENCY; LONE TESTIMONY OF HUSBAND; CASE
AT BAR. — The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds that must be proved
to exist by indubitable evidence, to annul a marriage. In the case at bar, the
annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the sole testimony of the
husband who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the
annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the wife is really
impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily established because from
the commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the decree she had
abstained from taking part therein.
3. ID.; WOMAN’S REFUSAL FOR PHYSICAL EXAMINATION; NOT
SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE. — Although the wife’s refusal to be examined or
failure to appear in court show indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the
presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or be
inferred, because woman of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and
would not submit to a physical examination unless compelled to by competent
authority. This the court may do without doing violence to and infringing upon her
constitutional right. A physical examination in this case is not self-incrimination.
She is not charged with any offense. She is not being compelled to be a witness
against herself. Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed.
4. ID.; ANNULMENT; PRESUMPTION OF POTENCY; HUSBAND’S LONE
TESTIMONY INSUFFICIENT. — The presumption is in favor of potency. The lone
testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse
is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband
and wife.
DECISION
1
PADILLA, J.
In a complaint filed on 7 June 1955 in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga
the plaintiff Joel Jimenez prays for a decree annulling his marriage to the
defendant Remedios Cañizares contracted on 3 August 1950 before a judge of the
municipal court of Zamboanga City, upon the ground that the orifice of her genitals
or vagina was too small to allow the penetration of a male organ or penis for
copulation; that the condition of her genitals as described above existed at the time
of marriage and continues to exist; and that for that reason he left the conjugal
home two nights and one day after they had been married. On 14 June 1955 the
wife was summoned and served with a copy of the complaint. She did not file an
answer. On 29 September 1956, pursuant to the provisions of article 88 of the Civil
Code, the Court directed the city attorney of Zamboanga to inquire whether there
was collusion between the parties and, if there was no collusion, to intervene for
the State to see that the evidence for the plaintiff is not a frame-up, concocted or
fabricated. On 17 December 1956 the Court entered an order requiring the
defendant to submit to a physical examination by a competent lady physician to
determine her physical capacity for copulation and to submit, within ten days from
receipt of the order, a medical certificate on the result thereof. On 14 March 1957
the defendant was granted additional five days from notice to comply with the
order of 17 December 1956 with warning that her failure to undergo medical
examination and submit the required doctor’s certificate would be deemed lack of
interest on her part in the case and that judgment upon the evidence presented by
her husband would be rendered.
After hearing, at which the defendant was not present, on 11 April 1957 the Court
entered a decree annulling the marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant.
On 26 April 1957 the city attorney filed a motion for reconsideration of the decree
thus entered, upon the ground, among others, that the defendant’s impotency has
not been satisfactorily established as required by law; that she had not been
physically examined because she had refused to be so examined; that instead of
annulling the marriage the Court should have punished her for contempt of court
and compelled her to undergo a physical examination and submit a medical
certificate; and that the decree sought to be reconsidered would open the door to
married couples, who want to end their marriage to collude or connive with each
other by just alleging impotency of one of them. He prayed that the complaint be
dismissed or that the wife be subjected to a physical examination. Pending
resolution of his motion, the city attorney timely appealed from the decree. On 13
May 1957 the motion for reconsideration was denied.
The question to determine is whether the marriage in question may be annulled on
the strength only of the lone testimony of the husband who claimed and testified
that his wife was and is impotent. The latter did not answer the complaint, was
absent during the hearing, and refused to submit to a medical examination.

Marriage in this country is an institution in which the community is deeply

interested. The state has surrounded it with safeguards to maintain its purity,
continuity and permanence. The security and stability of the state are largely
dependent upon it. It is the interest and duty of each and every member of the
community to prevent the bringing about of a condition that would shake its
foundation and ultimately lead to its destruction. The incidents of the status are
governed by law, not by will of the parties. The law specifically enumerates the
legal grounds, that must be proved to exist by indubitable evidence, to annul a
marriage. In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was
decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was expected to give
testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage he sought
and seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been
satisfactorily established, because from the commencement of the proceedings
until the entry of the decree she had abstained from taking part therein. Although
her refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show indifference on her
part, yet from such attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of
evidence could not arise or be inferred, because women of this country are by
nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical examination unless
compelled to by competent authority. This the Court may do without doing violence
to and infringing upon her constitutional right. A physical examination in this case
is not self-incrimination. She is not charged with any offense. She is not being
compelled to be a witness against herself. 1 "Impotency being an abnormal
condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency." 2 The
lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual
intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as
husband and wife.

The decree appealed from is set aside and the case remanded to the lower court
for further proceedings in accordance with this decision, without pronouncement as
to costs.

2
G.R. No. L-7487 December 29, 1913
CONSTANZA YAÑEZ DE BARNUEVO, plaintiff and appellant, vs. GABRIEL
FUSTER, defendant and appellant.
JOHNSON, J.:
On the 7th of February, 1875, Gabriel Fuster and Constanza Yañez were joined in
a Catholic or canonical marriage in the city of Malaga, Spain. In February of 1892,
Gabriel Fuster came to the Philippine Islands, settled, and acquired real and
personal property. Toward the middle of 1896, Constanza Yañez came to Manila,
where her husband was residing, and here lived with him in conjugal relations until
the month of April, 1899. On the 4th day of that month and year they made an
agreement, in a public document, by which they "resolved to separate and live
apart, both consenting to such separation, and by virtue thereof the husband
authorized the wife to move to Spain, there to reside in such place as the said lady
pleases." (B. of E., p. 13.) In the same document, the husband undertook to send
his wife the sum of 300 pesetas monthly for her support, payable in Madrid, Spain,
from the month of June of the said year 1899. The husband complied with this
obligation until August, 1899, after which time he ceased to make further
payments.
In the beginning of March, 1909, the wife returned to the Philippines, but the
husband had absented himself therefrom in the early days of February of the same
year. On the 11th of March, 1909, the wife commenced divorce proceedings
against her husband, alleging as cause of action the adultery committed by him in
or about the year 1899 with a certain woman that she named in the complaint and
with whom he had lived and cohabited and by whom he had had two children. She
prayed that she be granted a decree of divorce; that the court order the separation
of the properties of the plaintiff and the defendant, to date from the date of the said
decree; that the conjugal society be therefore liquidated, and after the amount of
the conjugal property had been determined, that one-half thereof be adjudicated to
her; furthermore, as to the amount of pension owing for her support but not paid to
her, that the defendant be ordered to pay her the sum of 36,000 Spanish pesetas,
that is, 7,220 Spanish dollars, which, reduced to Philippine currency at the rate of
exchange on the date of the complaint, amounted to P12,959.90.
The defendant denied that either he or his wife was a resident of the city of Manila,
as they had their domicile in Barcelona, Spain, and he alleged that both of them
were natives and subjects of Spain. He admitted that he was married to Constanza
Yañez; he also admitted having executed the document of the 4th of April, 1899, in
which he had undertaken to make an allowance for the support of his wife in
Madrid, but he denied the other paragraphs of the complaint. As a special defense
with regard to the allowance, he alleged: "That in or about the month of May, 1900,
3
he wrote to his wife, the plaintiff, instructing her to return to Manila, with a view of
joining her husband and being maintained by him in his own house; that the
communication was ignored by the plaintiff, who against the will of the defendant,
continued to live separately from him that from the year 1901, the defendant did
not know her address; that since 1900, the plaintiff has lived in comfort and has
known where her husband resided; that the plaintiff, during all of the time referred
to, in addition to dispossing of valuable property belonging to her husband,
possessed and still possesses property of her own, acquired by her, in greater
amount than that owned by her husband; and that in any case the action has
prescribed by operation of law."(B. of E., pp. 7 and 8.) As to the divorce, he admits
that he had by the plaintiff two children that have died. He expressly denied the
contents of paragraph 5 of the complaint, relating to the charge of adultery and
also those of paragraphs 6, 7, and 8, concerning the possession of real and
personal property of the conjugal partnership, the statement of their amount, and
their qualification as being all conjugal property. As a special defense, he alleged
that prior to the year 1899 he conferred powers of attorney upon the plaintiff to
administer and collect property and credits pertaining to him to the value of about
200,000 pesos; that the plaintiff accepted and exercised the said power of
attorney, attached the property and collected the credits without ever having
rendered any account of them. As a special preferred defense, he alleged that
neither the trial court nor any other court in the Philippine Islands has jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the complaint, because, as to the allowance for support,
since neither the plaintiff nor the defendant are residents of Manila, or of any other
place in the Philippine Islands, the agreement upon the subject was neither
celebrated, nor was it to be fulfilled, in the Philippine Islands; and as to the divorce,
because the action therefore ought to be tried by the ecclesiastical courts. In
conclusion, he prayed that the court find: That the court was without jurisdiction
over the two causes of action; that even if it had jurisdiction, it could not order the
payment of the sum claimed as arrears of alimony; that, after all, the action with
regard to this cause of action has prescribed; and as to the prayer for a decree of
divorce, the defendant should be acquitted, while on the other hand the plaintiff
should be required to render to the defendant an accounting, supported by proofs,
of her operations as his attorney and administratrix of his property in Spain.
In deciding the case, the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila held itself to
have jurisdiction, decreed the suspension of life in common between the plaintiff
and defendant, ordered the latter to pay the former P5,010.17, directed that the
communal property be divided between the parties, with costs against the
defendant, and in event that the parties could not agree to the division, it was to be
effected by commissioners according to law.
Both parties appealed from this judgment, but notwithstanding the appeal, the
partition of the property, by means of commissioners, was proceeded with. These
latter, after various vicissitudes, rendered their report and account of the partition
to the court, who then rendered final judgment, from which, also, both parties
appealed.
I. DEFENDANT'S APPEAL.
The first error assigned is the utter lack of jurisdiction of the trial court and of all
other courts of the Islands to try the case, either with regard to the fulfillment of the
contract to furnish alimony, or to decree a divorce or suspension of life in common
between the spouses: lack of jurisdiction over the persons and over the subject
matter of the litigation; and over the persons of the contending parties, because
neither of the spouses was a resident of the Philippines on the date of the
complaint.
The lower court did not commit this error attributed to him. The defendant had not
proved that he had elsewhere a legal domicile other than that which he manifestly
had in the Philippines during the seventeen years preceding the date of the
complaint. On the contrary, it plainly appears, without proof to the contrary, that
during this not inconsiderable period, extending from the year 1892 until a month
prior to the arrival of his wife in the Philippines in March, 1909, he had constantly
resided in the said Islands, had kept open house, and had acquired in the city of
Manila quite a little real property which is now the object of the division of the
conjugal society. It is also plainly shown, without proof to the contrary, that his wife
resided in this city of Manila from the middle of 1896 until April, 1899, at which time
she was permitted by him to change her residence. It is affirmed by the defendant
in point five of his answer to the complaint, that in May, 1900, he sent a letter
instructing the plaintiff to return to Manila to live with her husband and to be
supported by him in his house, but that the plaintiff, against the will of the
defendant, continued to live part from him. (B. of E., p. 7.) It is also affirmed in the
said answer, that during all of the time referred to in the complaint, and especially
since 1900, the plaintiff knew where her husband resided. (B. of E., p. 7.) It is also
very evident that the contract, by virtue of which he authorized his wife to move to
Spain and reside there in such place as was agreeable to her, was executed in
these Islands, "in the city of Manila on the 4th of April, 1889," as is to be seen in
the heading of the document. (B. of E., p. 12.) Finally, at page 11 of his brief, he
says that the record shows him to be a Spanish subject, inscribed in the consulate
of his nation, and cities article 26 of the Civil Code, the Treaty of Paris and the
Philippine Bill.
Granting these facts, there can be no doubt that the defendant, although a Spanish
subject, was a resident of these Islands. Article 26 of the Civil Code that he cites
itself provides that "Spaniards who change their domicile to a foreign country,
where they may be considered as natives without other conditions than that of
4
residents therein, shall be required, in order to preserve the Spanish nationality, to
state that such is their wish before the Spanish diplomatic or consular agent, who
must record them in the registry of Spanish residents, as well as their spouses,
should they be married, and any children they may have." From this provision,
which is the exclusive and irrefutable law governing the defendant, we are to
conclude that the domicile of the defendant and the plaintiff is fully proven,
irrespective of the Treaty of Paris. Without this supposition of having acquired his
domicile and residence in these Islands, he could not have required his wife to
return to live with him therein because this requirement could only be based on
articles 58 of the Civil Code of Spain, according to which the wife is obliged to
follow her husband wherever he wishes to establish his residence, or on article 48
of chapter 5 of the Marriage Law in force in the Philippines, which imposes upon
the wife the duty of obeying her husband, living in his company, or of following him
to wherever he transfers his domicile or residence. And just because he was
absent for a month before his wife returned to the Philippines, he cannot be
understood to have surrendered his habitual domicile of more than seventeen
years, without having established any other afterwards, and without making any
declaration in legal form, before he absented himself, of it being his intention to
change his domicile, while at the same time he retains here his house, real
property and all manner of means of subsistence. Section 377 of the Code of Civil
Procedure leaves to the election of the plaintiff the bringing of a personal action
like the one at bar either in the place where the defendant may reside or be found,
or in that where the plaintiff resides.
The litigating spouses have gained not only domicile (domicilio) but also residence
(vecindad) in Manila. In this litigation the defendant claims that, born as he says in
Mallorca, in the Balearic Islands, he is not subject, in his marriage, to the rules
governing conjugal property, that are in force in the territories of Spain that are
governed by the common law of Castillo (as the Philippines in their day), because
they are opposed to the Foral Law in force in the said Islands and which is
respected by the Civil Code. Even if this defense could be sustained herein,
paragraph 2 of article 15 of the said Civil Code would be applicable. It provides:
"For the purposes of this article, residence (vecindad) will be acquired: By
residence of ten years in common law provinces or territories, unless before the
termination of that time he manifests his will to the contrary; or by a residence of
two years, if the interested person declares this to be his will . . . In any case, the
wife will follow the condition of her husband. . . ." On no occasion had the
defendant manifested his will to the contrary, not even as he was leaving, after a
residence of seventeen years, a month before the return of his wife to these
Islands. On the contrary, when he inscribed himself in the Spanish consulate, he
declared his intention of continuing to reside in the Islands as a Spaniard and not
as a Mallorquin, subject as such to the common law of Spain.
In an endeavor to demonstrate the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of these Islands
over the subject matter of the complaint that is to try an action for divorce between
two Catholic Spaniards, he alleges in his appeal: That both litigants are Spanish
subjects and that they contracted a Catholic marriage; that in accordance with
article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain (the same as that of these Islands) the laws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons, govern Spaniards although they reside in a foreign country; that, in
consequence, "all questions of a civil nature, such as those dealing with the
validity or nullity of the matrimonial bond, the domicile of the husband and wife,
their support, as between them, the separation of their properties, the rules
governing property, marital authority, division of conjugal property, the
classification of their property, legal causes for divorce, the extent of the latter, the
AUTHORITY to decree it, and, in general, the civil effects of marriage and divorce
upon the person and properties of the spouses, are questions that are governed
exclusively by the national law of the husband and wife, and, in our case, by the
Spanish law by virtue of article 9 as above set out." (Brief, p. 12.) The appellant
and defendant continues his argument, saying: That by the express provision of
article 80 of the Civil Code of Spain, "jurisdiction in actions for divorce and
nullification of canonical marriages lies with ecclesiastical courts," while that of civil
tribunals is limited to civil marriages; that this being so, the action for divorce
brought by the plaintiff in the cause does not fall within the jurisdiction of the civil
courts, according to his own law of persons, because these courts ought to apply
the Spanish law in accordance with the said article 9 of the Civil Cod of Spain, and
this Spanish law grants the jurisdiction over the present cause to the ecclesiastical
courts, in the place of which no tribunal of these Islands con subrogate itself. Says
this appellant: "If a law of a foreign country were of rigorous application in a given
case, a North American tribunal would have no jurisdiction upon an ecclesiastical
court and therefore the North American tribunal in applying it would have to
exercise a faculty which that law reserved to the ecclesiastical court." (Brief, pp.
13, 14, and 15.)
Unless we take the question itself for granted, the foregoing reasoning cannot be
upheld. The question is precisely whether the courts of the Philippines are
competent or have jurisdiction to decree the divorce now on appeal, and it is taken
for granted that the power to decree it is one of the rights included in the personal
statute, but appellant does not prove by any law or legal doctrine whatever that the
personal statute of a foreigner carries with it, to whether he transfers his domicile,
the authority established by the law of his nation to decree his divorce, which was
what he had to demonstrate.
The authority of jurisdictional power of courts to decree a divorce is not comprised
within the personal status of the husband and wife, simply because the whole
theory of the statutes and of the rights which belong to everyone does not go
5
beyond the sphere of private law, and the authority and jurisdiction of the courts
are not a matter of the private law of persons, but of the public or political law of
the nation. "The jurisdiction of courts and other questions relating to procedure are
considered to be of a public nature and consequently are generally submitted to
the territorial principle. . . . All persons that have to demand justice in a case in
which foreigners intervene, since they can gain nothing by a simple declaration,
should endeavor to apply to the tribunales of the state which have coercive means
(property situated in the territory) to enforce any decision they may render.
Otherwise, one would expose himself in the suit to making useless expenditures
which, although he won his case, would not contribute to secure his rights because
of the court's lack of means to enforce them." (Torres Campos, "Elementos de
Derecho International Privado," p. 108.) "Justice," says the same professor, "is a
principle superior to that of nations, and it should therefore be administered without
taking into any account whatsoever the state to which the litigants belong. . . . In
order to foster their relations and develop their commerce, all civilized nations are
interested in doing justice, not alone to their own people, but to those foreigners
who contract within the country or outside of it juridical ties which in some manner
effect their sovereignty. (Ibid, p. 107.) Might its courts, in some cases, in suits
between foreigners residing in its territory, apply the personal law of the parties,
but abdicate their jurisdiction, refrain from administering justice because the
personal law of the foreigner gave the jurisdiction of the given case to some court
that is not the territorial one of the nation? This has never yet been claimed in any
of the theories regarding the conflict of laws arising out of questions of nationality
and domicile; it would be equivalent to recognizing extraterritorial law in favor of
private persons. The provisions of article 80 of the Civil Law of Spain is only
binding within the dominions of Spain. It does not accompany the persons of the
Spanish subject wherever he may go. He could not successfully invoke it if he
resided in Japan, in China, in Hongkong or in any other territory not subject to the
dominion of Spain. Foreign Catholics domiciled in Spain, subject to the
ecclesiastical courts in actions for divorce according to the said article 80 of the
Civil Code, could not allege lack of jurisdiction by invoking, as the law of their
personal statute, a law of their nation which gives jurisdiction in such a case to
territorial courts, or to a certain court within or without the territory of their
nation.1awphi1.net
It is a question that has already been settled in two decisions of the Supreme
Court (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil. Rep., 34, and Ibañez vs. Ortiz, 5 Phil.
Rep., 325).
In the present action for divorce the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila did
not lack jurisdiction over the persons of the litigants, for, although Spanish Catholic
subjects, they were residents of this city and had their domicile herein.
The Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands have the power and
jurisdiction to try actions for divorce. That of the city of Manila did not lack
jurisdiction by reason of the subject matter of the litigation.
The second assignment of error is directed against the finding of the court that the
defendant had committed adultery with a certain woman in this city from the year
1899 until 1909; the third was against the finding that the adultery was
accompanied by public scandal and injured the dignity of his wife; and the fourth
for having decreed the divorce, suspension of the married life, and the separation
of the properties of the parties.
The evidence relating to the foregoing not being sent up on appeal, we are unable
to review it, so we accept the findings of the trial court.
There is a point of law regarding the claim that the adultery, even though it were
proven would not be a cause for divorce, because no public scandal resulted
therefrom nor was there contempt displayed for the wife. (Appellant's brief, p. 26.)
The facts must be accepted by this tribunal as they were found by the trial court,
since the evidence cannot be reviewed; moreover, the appellee affirms the
contrary and maintains that it is a proven fact, public and notorious, an assertion
that the trial court must have found to be proven. (Appellee's brief, p. 5.) In law, it is
not necessary that adultery, to be a cause for divorce, should be accompanied by
public scandal and contempt for the wife. There is no law that requires this. Law 2,
title 9, of the Fourth Partida does not require it.
The fifth and sixth assignments of error are directed against the finding of the trial
court that there exists conjugal property, a finding that the appellant maintains is
without foundation, and that which holds that the property in the hands of the
receiver (that sought to be divided) is conjugal property, a conclusion which the
appellant claims to be contrary to the law which should be applied to the case and
according to which, as alleged in the tenth assignment of error, the whole of the
property should be adjudicated to the defendant as being exclusively his.
Facts: The appellant affirms that he is a native of Mallorca in the Balearic Islands
and that is also the condition of his wife, the plaintiff. Law: That although the rule of
the Civil Code is that which legally governs conjugal property, yet at the same time
it admits, as an exception, the laws, usages, and customs of the Foral Law,
according to which, as applied in the Balearic Islands, the law of the family is that
of the division of property and that of conjugal property is not known; so that the
property pertains exclusively to the spouse who, by whatever title, has acquired it.
In support of the facts, appellant cites pages 27 to 37 and 39 to 41 in the bill of
exceptions; and of the law, the doctrinal authority of Manresa, Gutierrez, and
Alcubilla.
6
The citation from pages 39 to 41 of the bill of exceptions, the only pertinent one, is
but an affidavit filed by the defendant in which, under oath, he himself testifies as
to the Foral Law in the Balearic Islands. The adverse party says with regard to this:
"This affidavit was never presented in proof, was never received by the trial judge,
and cannot seriously be considered as an effort to establish the law of a foreign
jurisdiction. Sections 300, 301 and 302 of the Code of Civil Procedure, now in
force in these islands, indicate the method by which the law of a foreign country
may be proved. We maintain that the affidavit of a person not versed in the law,
which was never submitted as proof, never received by the trial court, and which
has never been subjected to any cross-examination, is not a means of proving a
foreign law on which the defendant relies." (Brief, pp. 6 and 7.)
Furthermore, on the supposition that the defendant could invoke the Foral Law as
the law of his personal status in the matter of the regimen of his marriage, and that
to allege this he be considered as authorized by article 15 of the Civil Code, we
have said before, in dealing with his law of domicile, that paragraph 2 of this article
15 of the Civil Code would be entirely adverse to his claim, and if it be advanced
that there is a similar Foral Law in the Philippines by virtue of paragraph 1 of the
said article 15, it might be said, though there is not at present any need to say it,
that it is not in force. The two findings attacked are in perfect accord with the law.
All the property of the marriage, says article 1407 of the Civil Code, shall be
considered as conjugal property until it is proven that it belongs exclusively to the
husband or to the wife. No proof has been submitted to this effect.
As seventh assignment of error it is alleged that the court below erred in holding in
the judgment that the plaintiff had brought to the marriage a dowry of 30,000
Spanish dollars. But the defendant himself adds that the court made no order or
decree regarding the alleged dowry. On the other hand, the plaintiff, in her fourth
assignment of errors, claimed that the court erred in not confirming the report of
the commissioners which gave to the said plaintiff the sum of 30,000 Spanish
dollars. It is unnecessary to say anything further.
The eighth error consists in that the court below ordered the defendant to pay to
the plaintiff P56,010.17 Philippine currency, whereas the plaintiff had made no
demand in her complaint with respect to this sum; that no arrears of payment are
owing for alimony, even though payments had been stipulated in the contract,
unless they are claimed by the person who had furnished the actual support, and
that alimony is due only when it is necessary; so that, as the plaintiff has had no
need of it for ten years, nor has she stated who has furnished it, there is no reason
for awaring her the amount of the arrears for all that time; that as she has allowed
ten years to elapse before claiming it, her action prescribed in 1904, that is to say,
after five years.
The plaintiff acknowledges that there is no petition or prayer in her complaint as to
this cause of action, but she considers that in equity such an omission can be
supplied.
Paragraph 3 of section 89 (90) of the Code of Civil Procedure determines one of
the requisites of the complaint: "A demand for the relief which the plaintiff claims."
The section goes on to say: "If the recovery of money or damages is demanded,
the amount demanded must be stated. If special relief, such as an order for the
special restitution of property, etc., the ground of demanding such relief must be
stated and the special relief prayed for. But there may be added to the statement
of the specific relief demanded a general prayer for such further or other relief as
shall be deemed equitable."
In the complaint of the case at bar the provisions of paragraph 2 of the said section
89 [90] are complied with by setting forth in its paragraphs 4 and 5 the relation of
the cause of action, that is, the contract of the 4th of April, 1899, by which the
defendant obligated himself to send to the plaintiff in Spain a certain amount of
money monthly, for her support, and the failure to comply with this obligation after
the month of August, 1899. Paragraph 6, as a consequence of the promise
established in 4 and 5, says as follows: "That the defendant Gabriel Fuster y
Fuster actually owes the plaintiff the sum of 36,100 Spanish pesetas, that is, 7,220
dollars, which, reduced at the present rate of exchange, amounts to the sum of
P12,959.90, Philippine currency." (B. of E., p. 2.) In the case of default on the part
of the defendant "the court shall proceed to hear the plaintiff and his witnesses and
assess the damages or determine the other relief to which the plaintiff may be
entitled, including the costs of the action, and render final judgment for the plaintiff
to recover such sum or to receive such other relief as the pleadings and the facts
warrant." The pleadings, not the prayer of the complaint.
This court has recently decided that the pleadings, not the prayer, exactly, are the
essential part of a complaint.
It is not a question of alimony for the present, nor for the future, which constitutes
the first cause of action, but of certain sums stipulated in a contract. This contract
is a law for the contracting parties, a law which rises superior to those general laws
which regulate the nature of the subject matter of the contract (in the present case
an entirely voluntary one) and which govern judicial action.
An action arising out of a contract of this nature does not prescribe like all personal
ones, but, by the provisions of article 1964 of the Civil Code, after fifteen years. But
even though the provisions of article 1966 were applicable, by which an action to
compel the fulfillment of an agreement to pay alimony prescribes in five years, yet
by section 50 of the Code of Civil Procedure, "when payment has been made upon
any demand founded upon contract . . . an action may be brought . . . after such
7
payment. . . ." And the parties admit that on the 18th of August, 1908, the plaintiff
secured the payment of 6,365.68 pesetas by virtue of the contract of April 4, 1899.
So that from August, 1908, until March, 1909, the date of the complaint, the said
period of five years had not elapsed.
The ninth assignment of error consists in that the court below erred in empowering
the receiver to proceed to the separation of the property and in appointing
commissioners to make the partition and distribution between the spouses, since
the principal question in this action hinges upon the classification of the property;
that it was erroneously classified as conjugal property, whereas all of it pertained
to the husband alone and should be adjudicated to him for the reason that, as it
reiterated in the tenth assignment of error, the conjugal partnership was not
subject to the provisions of the law governing conjugal property, because such
provision are totally foreign to the Foral Law of the Balearic Islands.
The action of the trial court, by the terms of section 184 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, was in accordance with law. The only question before this court is the
partition of real property. All that referred to in the second decision appealed from,
dated September 9, 1911, is urban real estate. Its classification as conjugal
property is in accordance with law, as is shown in the foregoing reasoning, and
that no consideration of the Foral Law enters into the question has also been
demonstrated.
II. PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL.
As the trial court rendered judgment ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff
only P5,010.17, the petitioner here prays that the judgment be reversed and that in
its place this court order the defendant to pay to the plaintiff her claim of
P12,959.90, plus the additional sum which the alimony amounts to at the rate of
P107.70 per month, dating from the 1st of August, 1909, until the date of payment,
with legal interest upon the said P12,959.90 from the date of the filing of the
complaint until the date of payment, and, furthermore, legal interest upon each of
the monthly payments due after the filing of the complaint, and which will continue
to become due until the close of this litigation.
The trial court made the following findings: First, that the total amount of the
alimony owing to the plaintiff amounted to 34,200 pesetas; second, that of this sum
the plaintiff had collected in Madrid 6,365.68; third, that the remainder, that is,
27,834.32, was equivalent to $5,566.86 Mexican currency; fourth, that the Mexican
peso was worth 90 centavos Philippine currency; fifth, that therefore the sum of
$5,566.86 Mexican currency was equivalent to P5,010 Philippine currency; and
finally, as there was no evidence as to the kind of pesetas agreed upon, it was to
be presumed that it was that current at the time and place where the agreement
was made, which was Mexican pesetas.
In her appeal, the plaintiff contends that these findings are erroneous in that, firstly,
the parties had admitted that the pesetas referred to in the contract of the 4th of
April, 1899, were Spanish, and in view of this admission the court was not
empowered to define them as being different from the kind admitted by the parties;
secondly, if he were so empowered, his interpretation should be governed by the
terms of the law.
With regard to the first error, the plaintiff says that the statement is made in her
complaint that the defendant had obligated himself to pay her a "monthly pension
for her support of 300 Spanish pesetas, that is, 60 Spanish dollars, which, reduced
to Philippine currency, amounts to P107.70;" that the defendant had admitted this
in hi answer to the complaint, and that by his finding in a sense other than that
accepted and not refuted in the answer of the defendant, the court violated the
provisions of section 94 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The court has not incurred this error, because it does not appear that the
defendant in his answer accepted the fact in the manner alleged in the complaint.
The defendant said that he admitted having made the agreement referred to in
paragraph 4 of the complaint, and that he stood upon its contents. The contents of
the document to which he refers is of the following tenor: "Mr. Fuster binds and
obligates himself to pay to his said wife the sum of 300 pesetas, monthly, payable
de su cuenta in the city and capital of Madrid, for her support. . . ." He did not
therefore admit the matter of the Spanish pesetas; that does not appear in the
contents of the document — the only thing he admitted in his answer.
As to the second error, the court did not commit it in applying the rule contained in
article 1287 of the Civil Code. "The usages or customs of the country shall be
taken into consideration in interpreting ambiguity in contracts. . . ." If in the contract
the word " pesetas," not being specific, was ambiguous, then it was in harmony
with this precept to interpret it as being the peseta then in use or current when and
where the agreement was made, Mexican being then the usual and current money
in the Philippines. Furthermore, the phrase de su cuenta clearly means that it was
not "Spanish pesetas" that the contracting parties had in mind, because if the
agreement had been a specific one to pay 300 Spanish pesetas in Madrid,
everyone would of course understand that the expense of following the fluctuations
of change and of the differences in value between the money current in the
country, and the Spanish pesetas, would have to be defrayed by the obligated
party; whereas, if nothing more than pesetas was mentioned, it was necessary to
decide which party should pay for the difference in value so that the 300 pesetas
stipulated here should be 300 Spanish pesetas paid in Madrid. Against the
8
reasons of the court below for his decision this court can offer no legal grounds.
The rule of interpretation cited is the one applicable and it supports the reasoning
of the decision appealed from.
The appellant also alleges as error that the court did not adjudicate to her the
30,000 Spanish dollars which the commissioners proposed in their report. First she
characterizes this sum of 30,000 dollars as the dowry of the wife delivered to the
husband, then, later, as paraphernal property brought to the marriage.
According to the last instructions of the court to the commissioners, this amount of
30,000 dollars could not enter into the partition, and with reason. If, as was
claimed, it was inherited by the plaintiff from her uncle, it really constitutes
paraphernal property under article 1381. "Paraphernal property is that which the
wife brings to the marriage without being included in the dowry and that she may
acquire after the creation of the same without being added thereto." But it is a
provision of article 1384 that "The wife shall have the management of the
paraphernal property unless she has delivered the same to her husband, before a
notary, in order that he may administer said property. In such case the husband is
obliged to create a mortgage for the value of the personal property he may receive,
or to secure said property, in the manner established for the dowry property." Not
even was there offered in evidence the public deed of delivery, nor the equally
public mortgage deed that is required by law. So that, therefore, the necessary
proof of the obligation to return paraphernal property as here demanded does not
exist.lawphil.net
The partition of property decreed in the judgment appealed from of the 9th of
September, 1911, should be and is hereby confirmed.
The two judgments appealed from are hereby affirmed, without special
pronouncement of costs in this instance.
G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998
FE D. QUITA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN, *
respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines
on 18 May 1941. They were not however blessed with children. Somewhere along
the way their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A. She submitted in the divorce proceedings a private
writing dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their agreement to live separately from each
other and a settlement of their conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a
final judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix
Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the
U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier
Inciong filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of
letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine
Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred to as Blandina
Padlan), claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis,
Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the
children of Arturo Padlan opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment
instead of Atty. Leonardo Casaba, which was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon
motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by Higino
Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the oppositors (Blandina and Padlan children)
submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing and the final
judgment of divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan,
claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo, intervened.
On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the
decedent and the distribution of his estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23
October 1987, private respondent as well as the six (6) Padlan children and
Ruperto failed to appear despite due notice. On the same day, the trial court
required the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten
(10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the
issue on the declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for resolution. The
prescribed period lapsed without the required documents being submitted.
The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escaño 1 which held that "a foreign divorce
between Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present
Civil Code (Rep. Act 386) was not entitled to recognition as valid in this
jurisdiction," 2 disregarded the divorce between petitioner and Arturo.
9
Consecuently, it expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until the death of
Arturo in 1972. Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicial settlement of conjugal
properties due to lack of judicial approval. 3 On the other hand, it opined that there
was no showing that marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo,
much less was it shown that the alleged Padlan children had been acknowledged
by the deceased as his children with her. As regards Ruperto, it found that he was
a brother of Arturo. On 27 November 1987 4 only petitioner and Ruperto were
declared the intestate heirs of Arturo. Accordingly, equal adjudication of the net
hereditary estate was ordered in favor of the two intestate heirs. 5
On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to
present proofs that the recognition of the children by the deceased as his
legitimate children, except Alexis who was recognized as his illegitimate child, had
been made in their respective records of birth. Thus on 15 February 1988 6 partial
reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of
Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and
petitioner to the other half. 7 Private respondent was not declared an heir.
Although it was stated in the aforementioned records of birth that she and Arturo
were married on 22 April 1947, their marriage was clearly void since it was
celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as one
of the errors allegedly committed by the trial court the circumstance that the case
was decided without a hearing, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules of
Court, which provides that if there is a controversy before the court as to who are
the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which
each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided
as in ordinary cases.
Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the
appeal; hence, on 11 September 1995 it declared null and void the 27 November
1987 decision and 15 February 1988 order of the trial court, and directed the
remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings. 8 On 18 April 1996 it
denied reconsideration. 9
Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings?
Petitioner insists that there is no need because, first, no legal or factual issue
obtains for resolution either as to the heirship of the Padlan children or as to the
decedent; and, second, the issue as to who between petitioner and private
respondent is the proper heir of the decedent is one of law which can be resolved
in the present petition based on establish facts and admissions of the parties.
We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is
clear: If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the
deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled
under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6)
Padlan children to inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that they
have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even recognizes them
as heirs of Arturo Padlan; 10 nor as to their respective hereditary shares. But
controversy remains as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo. The
trial court, after the parties other than petitioner failed to appear during the
scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987 of the motion for immediate declaration of
heirs and distribution of estate, simply issued an order requiring the submission of
the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof,
after which, with or without the documents, the issue on declaration of heirs would
be deemed submitted for resolution.
We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised,
among others, the issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the
decedent considering that she had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact had
twice remarried. She also invoked the above quoted procedural rule. 11 To this,
petitioner replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally married to
her in spite of the divorce they obtained. 12 Reading between the lines, the
implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her
divorce from Arturo. This should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing
to establish her citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the
matters in issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as
the arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead,
the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely applying the
ruling in Tenchavez v. Escaño.
Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower
court's decision she stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the
light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. 13 that aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. She prayed therefore that the case be set for
hearing. 14 Petitioner opposed the motion but failed to squarely address the issue
on her citizenship. 15 The trial court did not grant private respondent's prayer for a
hearing but proceeded to resolve her motion with the finding that both petitioner
and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and were married in the Philippines." 16 It
maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.,
was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding on their
citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court was not
10
supplied with a basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of their
divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when
their divorce was decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of
this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of
their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well
lose her right to inherit from Arturo.
Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner's citizenship; 17 it
did not merit enlightenment however from petitioner. 18 In the present proceeding,
petitioner's citizenship is brought anew to the fore by private respondent. She even
furnishes the Court with the transcript of stenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995
during the hearing for the reconstitution of the original of a certain transfer
certificate title as well as the issuance of new owner's duplicate copy thereof
before another trial court. When asked whether she was an American citizen
petitioner answered that she was since 1954. 19 Significantly, the decree of
divorce of petitioner and Arturo was obtained in the same year. Petitioner however
did not bother to file a reply memorandum to erase the uncertainty about her
citizenship at the time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings to be
conducted by the trial court. Consequently, respondent appellate court did not err
in ordering the case returned to the trial court for further proceedings.
We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court
should be limited only to the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving
spouse. Private respondent's claim to heirship was already resolved by the trial
court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of
petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage
considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code.
Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status
presupposes a legitimate relationship. 20
As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and a her counsel to be
declared in contempt of court and that the present petition be dismissed for forum
shopping, 21 the same lacks merit. For forum shopping to exist the actions must
involve the same transactions and same essential facts and circumstances. There
must also be identical causes of action, subject matter and issue. 22 The present
petition deals with declaration of heirship while the subsequent petitions filed
before the three (3) trial courts concern the issuance of new owner's duplicate
copies of titles of certain properties belonging to the estate of Arturo. Obviously,
there is no reason to declare the existence of forum shopping.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of
Appeals ordering the remand of the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings and declaring null and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita
and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate
court modifying its previous decision by granting one-half (1/2) of the net hereditary
estate to the Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and
Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's
brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court however emphasizes
that the reception of evidence by the trial court should he limited to the hereditary
rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.

The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to
dismiss the present petition for forum shopping is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

11
G.R. No. 124371 November 23, 2000
PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F.
LLORENTE, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case raises a conflict of laws issue.
What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals1
modifying that of the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur, Branch 35, Iriga City2
declaring respondent Alicia F. Llorente (herinafter referred to as "Alicia"), as co-
owners of whatever property she and the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente
(hereinafter referred to as "Lorenzo") may have acquired during the twenty-five
(25) years that they lived together as husband and wife.
The Facts
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United
States Navy from March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957.3
On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred
to as "Paula") were married before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in
Nabua, Camarines Sur.4
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and
Paula stayed in the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur.5
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and
Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United
States District Court, Southern District of New York.6
Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo
was granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the
Philippines.7 He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was "living in"
and having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente.8
On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the
Registrar of Nabua as "Crisologo Llorente," with the certificate stating that the child
was not legitimate and the line for the father’s name was left blank.9
12
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February 2, 1946,
the couple drew a written agreement to the effect that (1) all the family allowances
allotted by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzo’s salary and all other
obligations for Paula’s daily maintenance and support would be suspended; (2)
they would dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings; (3)
they would make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal property acquired
during their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her
adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate from
Lorenzo peacefully. The agreement was signed by both Lorenzo and Paula and
was witnessed by Paula’s father and stepmother. The agreement was notarized by
Notary Public Pedro Osabel.10
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce
with the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San
Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in
the proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of
California, for the County of San Diego found all factual allegations to be true and
issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce.11
On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final.12
In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila.13 Apparently,
Alicia had no knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided in the same town
as Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation.14
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife.15
Their twenty-five (25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly,
all surnamed Llorente.16
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was
notarized by Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with
attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the
will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children, to wit:
"(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my
residential house and lot, located at San Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur,
Philippines, including ALL the personal properties and other movables or
belongings that may be found or existing therein;
"(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my
children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares,
all my real properties whatsoever and wheresoever located, specifically my real
properties located at Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay
Paloyon, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Baras, Sitio Puga, Nabua, Camarines
Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong, Nabua, Camarines Sur;
"(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and
unto my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in
equal shares, my real properties located in Quezon City Philippines, and covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188652; and my lands in Antipolo, Rizal,
Philippines, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 124196 and 165188, both
of the Registry of Deeds of the province of Rizal, Philippines;
"(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether real
or personal properties, shall not be disposed of, ceded, sold and conveyed to any
other persons, but could only be sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed of by and
among themselves;
"(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this my
Last Will and Testament, and in her default or incapacity of the latter to act, any of
my children in the order of age, if of age;
"(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute should
served (sic) without bond;
"(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary
dispositions heretofore executed, signed, or published, by me;
"(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any degree in
the Llorente’s Side should ever bother and disturb in any manner whatsoever my
wife Alicia R. Fortunato and my children with respect to any real or personal
properties I gave and bequeathed respectively to each one of them by virtue of this
Last Will and Testament."17
On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga,
Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and allowance of his last will and
testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix
of his estate.18
On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason that the
testator Lorenzo was still alive.19
On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court
admitted the will to probate.20
On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died.21
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition22 for letters of
administration over Lorenzo’s estate in her favor. Paula contended (1) that she
was Lorenzo’s surviving spouse, (2) that the various property were acquired during
13
their marriage, (3) that Lorenzo’s will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia
and her children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal
property.23
On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-
755), a petition for the issuance of letters testamentary.24
On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court
gave due course to Paula’s petition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888.25
On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the newspaper
"Bicol Star".26
On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus:
"Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree
granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines,
therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at
Manila is likewise void. This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the
issuance of letters testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled to receive
any share from the estate even if the will especially said so her relationship with
Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).
"On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente,
meritorious, and so declares the intrinsic disposition of the will of Lorenzo Llorente
dated March 13, 1981 as void and declares her entitled as conjugal partner and
entitled to one-half of their conjugal properties, and as primary compulsory heir,
Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to one-third of the estate and then one-third
should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surname (sic)
Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and also entitled to the remaining
free portion in equal shares.
"Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the
deceased, Lorenzo Llorente. As such let the corresponding letters of
administration issue in her favor upon her filing a bond in the amount (sic) of
P100,000.00 conditioned for her to make a return to the court within three (3)
months a true and complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, and credits,
and estate which shall at any time come to her possession or to the possession of
any other person for her, and from the proceeds to pay and discharge all debts,
legacies and charges on the same, or such dividends thereon as shall be decreed
or required by this court; to render a true and just account of her administration to
the court within one (1) year, and at any other time when required by the court and
to perform all orders of this court by her to be performed.
"On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence could
not be granted.
"SO ORDERED."
In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the
aforequoted decision.
On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicia’s motion for reconsideration
but modified its earlier decision, stating that Raul and Luz Llorente are not children
"legitimate or otherwise" of Lorenzo since they were not legally adopted by him.29
Amending its decision of May 18, 1987, the trial court declared Beverly Llorente as
the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the estate
and one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the estate.
On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming with
modification the decision of the trial court in this wise:
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that Alicia is declared as co-owner of whatever properties she
and the deceased may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years of
cohabitation.
"SO ORDERED."
On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for
reconsideration of the decision.
On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals, denied the motion for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
The Issue
Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various arguments
raised,36 the issue is simple. Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N.
Llorente?
We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We remand the case to
the trial court for ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.
The Applicable Law
14
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before
and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution
of his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by
foreign law.
The Civil Code clearly provides:
"Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad.
"Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.
"However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found."
(emphasis ours)
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are
not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be
alleged and proved.37
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not
admit the foreign law. The Court of Appeals and the trial court called to the fore the
renvoi doctrine, where the case was "referred back" to the law of the decedent’s
domicile, in this case, Philippine law.
We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not
sufficiently proven, in the same breath it made the categorical, albeit equally
unproven statement that "American law follows the ‘domiciliary theory’ hence,
Philippine law applies when determining the validity of Lorenzo’s will.38
First, there is no such thing as one American law.1ªwph!1 The "national law"
indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general American
law. There is no such law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the
United States. Each State of the union has its own law applicable to its citizens
and in force only within the State. It can therefore refer to no other than the law of
the State of which the decedent was a resident.39 Second, there is no showing
that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New York
State law.
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained
dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the trial court’s opinion was a mere paramour.
The trial court threw the will out, leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz,
with nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half
(1/2) of whatever property she and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation,
applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will,
already probated as duly executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine
law, is fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal circumstances here
obtaining.
Validity of the Foreign Divorce
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.40 we held that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by
the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals, that once
proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the
divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and
petitioner could "very well lose her right to inherit" from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in
his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and
its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is
concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of
persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be
reversed. We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first
wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now,
the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are
matters best left to the determination of the trial court.
Validity of the Will
The Civil Code provides:
15
"Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments
shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
"When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials
of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established
by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution." (underscoring ours)
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and
children by her is glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to
frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on "family
rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity."
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues
best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will
was executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring
to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.
As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good
customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to
extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. Congress specifically left
the amount of successional rights to the decedent's national law.
Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G. R. SP No. 17446 promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.
In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and
RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased
Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the
County of San Diego, made final on December 4, 1952.
Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of
the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’
successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court
shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within
the framework of the Rules of Court.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 11263 November 2, 1916
ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. JOSE CAMPOS
RUEDA, defendant-appellee.
TRENT, J.:
This is an action by the wife against her husband for support outside of the
conjugal domicile. From a judgment sustaining the defendant's demurrer upon the
ground that the facts alleged in the complaint do not state a cause of action,
followed by an order dismissing the case after the plaintiff declined to amend, the
latter appealed.
It was urged in the first instance, and the court so held, that the defendant cannot
be compelled to support the plaintiff, except in his own house, unless it be by virtue
of a judicial decree granting her a divorce or separation from the defendant.
The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on January 7, 1915, and
immediately thereafter established their residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino,
where they lived together for about a month, when the plaintiff returned to the
home of her parents. The pertinent allegations of the complaint are as follows:
That the defendant, one month after he had contracted marriage with the plaintiff,
demanded of her that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital
organs; that the plaintiff spurned the obscene demands of the defendant and
refused to perform any act other than legal and valid cohabitation; that the
defendant, since that date had continually on other successive dates, made similar
lewd and indecorous demands on his wife, the plaintiff, who always spurned them ,
which just refusals of the plaintiff exasperated the defendant and induce him to
maltreat her by word and deed and inflict injuries upon her lips, her face and
different parts of her body; and that, as the plaintiff was unable by any means to
induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and cease from
maltreating her, she was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in
the home of her parents.
Marriage in this jurisdiction is a contract entered into in the manner and with the
solemnities established by General Orders No. 68, in so far as its civil effects are
concerned requiring the consent of the parties. (Garcia vs. Montague, 12 Phil.
Rep., 480, citing article 1261 of Civil Code.) Upon the termination of the marriage
ceremony, a conjugal partnership is formed between the parties. (Sy Joc Lieng vs.
Encarnacion, 16 Phil. Rep., 137.) To this extent a marriage partakes of the nature
of an ordinary contract. But it is something more than a mere contract. It is a new
relation, the rights, duties, and obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of
the parties but upon the general law which defines and prescribes those rights,
16
duties, and obligations .Marriage is an institution, in the maintenance of which in its
purity the public is deeply interested. It is a relation for life and the parties cannot
terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any contract they may make .The
reciprocal rights arising from this relation, so long as it continues, are such as the
law determines from time to time, and none other. When the legal existence of the
parties is merged into one by marriage, the new relation is regulated and controlled
by the state or government upon principles of public policy for the benefit of society
as well as the parties. And when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering
its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good
to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. With these principles to
guide us, we will inquire into the status of the law touching and governing the
question under consideration.
Articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code are not in force in the Philippine Islands
(Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil .Rep., 34). Articles 44 to 78 of the Law of Civil
Marriage of 1870, in force in the Peninsula, were extended to the Philippine
Islands by royal decree on April 13, 1883 (Ebreo vs. Sichon, 4 Phil. Rep., 705).
Articles 44, 45, and 48 of this law read:
ART. 44. The spouses are obliged to be faithful to each other and to mutually
assist each other.
ART. 45. The husband must live with and protect his wife. (The second paragraph
deals with the management of the wife's property.)
ART. 48. The wife must obey her husband, live with him, and follow him when he
charges his domicile or residence.
Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing paragraph, the court may for just
cause relieve her from this duty when the husband removes his residence to a
foreign country.
And articles 143 and 149 of the Civil Code are as follows:
ART. 143. The following are obliged to support each other reciprocally to the whole
extent specified in the preceding article.
1. The consorts.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. (149) 49. The person obliged to give support may, at his option, satisfy it,
either by paying the pension that may be fixed or by receiving and maintaining in
his own home the person having the right to the same.
Article 152 of the Civil Code gives the instances when the obligation to give
support shall cease. The failure of the wife to live with her husband is not one of
them.
The above quoted provisions of the Law of Civil Marriage and the Civil Code fix the
duties and obligations of the spouses. The spouses must be faithful to, assist, and
support each other. The husband must live with and protect his wife. The wife must
obey and live with her husband and follow him when he changes his domicile or
residence, except when he removes to a foreign country. But the husband who is
obliged to support his wife may, at his option, do so by paying her a fixed pension
or by receiving and maintaining her in his own home. May the husband, on
account of his conduct toward his wife, lose this option and be compelled to pay
the pension? Is the rule established by article 149 of the Civil Code absolute? The
supreme court of Spain in its decision of December 5, 1903, held:.
That in accordance with the ruling of the supreme court of Spain in its decisions
dated May 11, 1897, November 25, 1899, and July 5, 1901, the option which
article 149 grants the person, obliged to furnish subsistence, between paying the
pension fixed or receiving and keeping in his own house the party who is entitled to
the same, is not so absolute as to prevent cases being considered wherein, either
because this right would be opposed to the exercise of a preferential right or
because of the existence of some justifiable cause morally opposed to the removal
of the party enjoying the maintenance, the right of selection must be understood as
being thereby restricted.
Whereas the only question discussed in the case which gave rise to this appeal
was whether there was any reason to prevent the exercise of the option granted by
article 149 of the Civil Code to the person obliged to furnish subsistence, to receive
and maintain in his own house the one who is entitled to receive it; and inasmuch
as nothing has been alleged or discussed with regard to the parental authority of
Pedro Alcantara Calvo, which he ha not exercised, and it having been set forth that
the natural father simply claims his child for the purpose of thus better attending to
her maintenance, no action having been taken by him toward providing the support
until, owing to such negligence, the mother was obliged to demand it; it is seen
that these circumstances, together with the fact of the marriage of Pedro
Alcantara, and that it would be difficult for the mother to maintain relations with her
daughter, all constitute an impediment of such a nature as to prevent the exercise
of the option in the present case, without prejudice to such decision as may be
deemed proper with regard to the other questions previously cited in respect to
which no opinion should be expressed at this time.
The above was quoted with approval in United States and De Jesus vs. Alvir (9
Phil. Rep., 576), wherein the court held that the rule laid down in article 149 of the
17
Civil Code "is not absolute." but it is insisted that there existed a preexisting or
preferential right in each of these cases which was opposed to the removal of the
one entitled to support. It is true that in the first the person claiming the option was
the natural father of the child and had married a woman other than the child's
mother, and in the second the right to support had already been established by a
final judgment in a criminal case. Notwithstanding these facts the two cases clearly
established the proposition that the option given by article 149 of the Civil Code
may not be exercised in any and all cases.
Counsel for the defendant cite, in support of their contention, the decision of the
supreme court of Spain, dated November 3, 1905. In this case Don Berno Comas,
as a result of certain business reverses and in order no to prejudice his wife,
conferred upon her powers to administer and dispose of her property. When she
left him he gave her all the muniments of title, mortgage credits, notes, P10,000 in
accounts receivable, and the key to the safe in which he kept a large amount of
jewels, thus depriving himself of all his possessions and being reduced in
consequence to want. Subsequently he instituted this civil action against his wife,
who was then living in opulence, for support and the revocation of the powers
heretofore granted in reference to the administration and disposal of her property.
In her answer the wife claimed that the plaintiff (her husband) was not legally in a
situation to claim support and that the powers voluntarily conferred and accepted
by her were bilateral and could not be canceled by the plaintiff. From a judgment in
favor of the plaintiff the defendant wife appealed to the Audencia Territorial
wherein, after due trial, judgment was rendered in her favor dismissing the action
upon the merits. The plaintiff appealed to the supreme court and that high tribunal,
in affirming the judgment of the Audencia Territorial, said:
Considering that article 143, No. 1, of the Civil Code, providing that the spouses
are mutually obliged to provide each other with support, cannot but be subordinate
to the other provisions of said Code which regulates the family organization and
the duties of spouses not legally separated, among which duties are those of their
living together and mutually helping each other, as provided in article 56 of the
aforementioned code; and taking this for granted, the obligation of the spouse who
has property to furnish support to the one who has no property and is in need of it
for subsistence, is to be understood as limited to the case where, in accordance
with law, their separation has been decreed, either temporarily or finally and this
case, with respect to the husband, cannot occur until a judgment of divorce is
rendered, since, until then, if he is culpable, he is not deprived of the management
of his wife's property and of the product of the other property belonging to the
conjugal partnership; and
Considering that, should the doctrine maintained in the appeal prevail, it would
allow married persons to disregard the marriage bond and separate from each
other of their own free will, thus establishing, contrary to the legal provision
contained in said article 56 of the Civil Code, a legal status entirely incompatible
with the nature and effects of marriage in disregard of the duties inherent therein
and disturbing the unity of the family, in opposition to what the law, in conformity
with good morals, has established; and.
Considering that, as the spouses D. Ramon Benso and Doña Adela Galindo are
not legally separated, it is their duty to live together and afford each other help and
support; and for this reason, it cannot be held that the former has need of support
from his wife so that he may live apart from her without the conjugal abode where
it is his place to be, nor of her conferring power upon him to dispose even of the
fruits of her property in order therewith to pay the matrimonial expenses and,
consequently, those of his own support without need of going to his wife;
wherefore the judgment appealed from, denying the petition of D. Ramon Benso
for support, has not violated the articles of the Civil Code and the doctrine invoked
in the assignments of error 1 and 5 of the appeal.
From a careful reading of the case just cited and quoted from it appears quite
clearly that the spouses separated voluntarily in accordance with an agreement
previously made. At least there are strong indications to this effect, for the court
says, "should the doctrine maintained in the appeal prevail, it would allow married
persons to disregard the marriage bond and separate from each other of their own
free will." If this be the true basis upon which the supreme court of Spain rested its
decision, then the doctrine therein enunciated would not be controlling in cases
where one of the spouses was compelled to leave the conjugal abode by the other
or where the husband voluntarily abandons such abode and the wife seeks to
force him to furnish support. That this is true appears from the decision of the
same high tribunal, dated October 16, 1903. In this case the wife brought an action
for support against her husband who had willfully and voluntarily abandoned the
conjugal abode without any cause whatever. The supreme court, reversing the
judgment absolving the defendant upon the ground that no action for divorce, etc.,
had been instituted, said:
In the case at bar, it has been proven that it was Don Teodoro Exposito who left
the conjugal abode, although he claims, without however proving his contention,
that the person responsible for this situation was his wife, as she turned him out of
the house. From this state of affairs it results that it is the wife who is party
abandoned, the husband not having prosecuted any action to keep her in his
company and he therefore finds himself, as long as he consents to the situation,
under the ineluctable obligation to support his wife in fulfillment of the natural duty
sanctioned in article 56 of the Code in relation with paragraph 1 of article 143. In
not so holding, the trial court, on the mistaken ground that for the fulfillment of this
duty the situation or relation of the spouses should be regulated in the manner it
18
indicates, has made the errors of law assigned in the first three grounds alleged,
because the nature of the duty of affording mutual support is compatible and
enforcible in all situations, so long as the needy spouse does not create any illicit
situation of the court above described.lawphil.net
If we are in error as to the doctrine enunciated by the supreme court of Spain in its
decision of November 3, 1905, and if the court did hold, as contended by counsel
for the defendant in the case under consideration, that neither spouse can be
compelled to support the other outside of the conjugal abode, unless it be by virtue
of a final judgment granting the injured one a divorce or separation from the other,
still such doctrine or holding would not necessarily control in this jurisdiction for the
reason that the substantive law is not in every particular the same here as it is in
Spain. As we have already stated, articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code in force in
the Peninsula are not in force in the Philippine Islands. The law governing the
duties and obligations of husband and wife in this country are articles 44 to 78 of
the Law of Civil Marriage of 1870 .In Spain the complaining spouse has, under
article 105 of the Civil Code, various causes for divorce, such as adultery on the
part of the wife in every case and on the part of the husband when public scandal
or disgrace of the wife results therefrom; personal violence actually inflicted or
grave insults: violence exercised by the husband toward the wife in order to force
her to change her religion; the proposal of the husband to prostitute his wife; the
attempts of the husband or wife to corrupt their sons or to prostitute their
daughters; the connivance in their corruption or prostitution; and the condemnation
of a spouse to perpetual chains or hard labor, while in this jurisdiction the only
ground for a divorce is adultery. (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil .Rep., 34, 45.)
This positive and absolute doctrine was announced by this court in the case just
cited after an exhaustive examination of the entire subject. Although the case was
appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States and the judgment rendered by
this court was there reversed, the reversal did not affect in any way or weaken the
doctrine in reference to adultery being the only ground for a divorce. And since the
decision was promulgated by this court in that case in December, 1903, no change
or modification of the rule has been announced. It is, therefore, the well settled and
accepted doctrine in this jurisdiction.
But it is argued that to grant support in an independent suit is equivalent to
granting divorce or separation, as it necessitates a determination of the question
whether the wife has a good and sufficient cause for living separate from her
husband; and, consequently, if a court lacks power to decree a divorce, as in the
instant case, power to grant a separate maintenance must also be lacking. The
weakness of this argument lies in the assumption that the power to grant support
in a separate action is dependent upon a power to grant a divorce. That the one is
not dependent upon the other is apparent from the very nature of the marital
obligations of the spouses. The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the
part of the husband to support his wife. This obligation is founded not so much on
the express or implied terms of the contract of marriage as on the natural and legal
duty of the husband; an obligation, the enforcement of which is of such vital
concern to the state itself that the laws will not permit him to terminate it by his own
wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek protection in the parental home. A
judgment for separate maintenance is not due and payable either as damages or
as a penalty; nor is it a debt in the strict legal sense of the term, but rather a
judgment calling for the performance of a duty made specific by the mandate of the
sovereign. This is done from necessity and with a view to preserve the public
peace and the purity of the wife; as where the husband makes so base demands
upon his wife and indulges in the habit of assaulting her. The pro tanto separation
resulting from a decree for separate support is not an impeachment of that public
policy by which marriage is regarded as so sacred and inviolable in its nature; it is
merely a stronger policy overruling a weaker one; and except in so far only as such
separation is tolerated as a means of preserving the public peace and morals may
be considered, it does not in any respect whatever impair the marriage contract or
for any purpose place the wife in the situation of a feme sole.

The foregoing are the grounds upon which our short opinion and order for
judgment, heretofore filed in this case, rest.

19
G.R. No. L-21076 March 31, 1965
WONG WOO YIU alias NG YAO, petitioner-appellee, vs. HON. MARTINIANO
P. VIVO, ETC., ET AL., respondents-appellants.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
On June 28, 1961, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 rendered a decision finding
petitioner to be legally married to Perfecto Blas and admitting her into the country
as a non-quota immigrant. This decision was affirmed by the Board of
Commissioners on July 12, 1961 of which petitioner was duly informed in a letter
sent on the same date by the Secretary of the Board. However, on June 28, 1962,
the same Board of Commissioners, but composed entirely of a new set of
members, rendered a new decision reversing that of the Board of Special Inquiry
No. 3 and ordering petitioner to be excluded from the country. On August 9, 1962,
petitioner filed a motion for new trial requesting an opportunity to clarify certain
points taken in the decision, but the same was denied for lack of merit.
Whereupon, on September 14, 1962, petitioner initiated the instant petition for
mandamus with preliminary injunction before the Court of First Instance of Manila
which incidentally was considered by it as a petition for certiorari.
In due time, respondents filed their answer, and, after the parties had submitted a
written stipulation of facts, attaching thereto some documentary evidence, the
court a quo rendered a decision granting in, toto the relief prayed for. Thus, the
court declared valid the decision rendered by the Board of Special Inquiry No. 3
while it restrained respondents from excluding petitioner from the country.
Respondents interposed the present appeal.
It appears that in the proceedings held before the Board of Special Inquiry
sometime in June, 1961, petitioner declared that she came to the Philippines in
1961 for the first time to join her husband Perfecto Blas to whom she was married
in Chingkang, China on January 15, 1929; that they had several children all of
whom are not in the Philippines; that their marriage was celebrated by one Chua
Tio, a village leader; that on June 28, 1961 the Board of Special Inquiry No. 3
rendered a decision finding, among others, that petitioner is legally married to
Perfecto Blas, a Filipino Citizen, and admitted her into the country as a non-quota
immigrant; that this decision was affirmed by the Board of Commissioners of which
petitioner was duly notified by the Secretary of said Board in a letter dated July 12,
1961; that in a motu proprio decision rendered by the Board of Commissioners
composed of a new set of members dated June 28, 1962 the latter found that
petitioner's claim that she is the lawful wife of Perfecto Blas was without basis in
evidence as it was "bereft of substantial proof of husband-wife relationship"; that
said Board further held that, it appearing that in the entry proceedings of Perfecto
Blas had on January 23, 1947 he declared that he first visited China in 1935 and
20
married petitioner in 1936, it could not possibly sustain her claim that she married
Perfecto Blas in 1929; that in an affidavit dated August 9, 1962 Perfecto Blas
claimed that he went to China in 1929, 1935 and 1941, although in his re-entry
declaration he admitted that he first went to China in 1935, then in 1937, then in
1939, and lastly in 1941; and that Perfecto Blas in the same affidavit likewise
claimed that he first went to China when he was merely four years old so that
computed from his date of birth in 1908 it must have been in 1912.1äwphï1.ñët
In view of the discrepancies found in the statements made by petitioner and her
alleged husband Perfecto Blas in the several investigations conducted by the
immigration authorities concerning their alleged marriage before a village leader in
China in 1929, coupled with the fact that the only basis in support of petitioner's
claim that she is the lawful wife of Perfecto Blas is "a mass of oral and
documentary evidence bereft of substantial proof of husband-wife relationship," the
Board of Commissioners motu proprio reviewed the record concerning the
admission of petitioner into the country resulting in its finding that she was
improperly admitted. Thus, said Board made the following comment:
The only basis in support of the claim that she is the wife of Perfecto Blas is a
mass of oral and documentary evidence bereft of substantial proof of husband-wife
relationship. She relies on the records of Perfecto Blas in connection with his
cancellation case and the testimony of the supposed children in the previous
admission proceeding. But this claim is belied by the admission of Perfecto Blas
himself, in the hearing conducted by a Board of special inquiry in connection with
his entry on January 23, 1947, that he was married to one Ng Yo in Ki Say,
Chingkang, China in 1936, his first visit there being in 1935; he could not therefore
have been married to herein applicant in 1929.
The above comment cannot be disputed, it finding support in the record. Indeed,
not only is there no documentary evidence to support the alleged marriage of
petitioner to Perfecto Blas but the record is punctured with so many
inconsistencies which cannot but lead one to doubt their veracity concerning the
pretended marriage in China in 1929. This claim cannot also be entertained under
our law on family relations. Thus, Article 15 of our new Civil Code provides that
laws relating to family rights or to the status of persons are binding upon citizens of
the Philippines, even though living abroad, and it is well-known that in 1929 in
order that a marriage celebrated in the Philippines may be valid it must be
solemnized either by a judge of any court inferior to the Supreme Court, a justice
of the peace, or a priest or minister of the gospel of any denomination duly
registered in the Philippine Library and Museum (Public Act 3412, Section 2). Even
if we assume, therefore, that the marriage of petitioner to Perfecto Blas before a
village leader is valid in China, the same is not one of those authorized in our
country.
But it may be contended that under Section 4 of General orders No. 68, as
reproduced in Section 19 of Act No. 3613, which is now Article 71 of our new Civil
Code, a marriage contracted outside of the Philippines which is valid under the law
of the country in which it was celebrated is also valid in the Philippines. But no
validity can be given to this contention because no proof was presented relative to
the law of marriage in China. Such being the case, we should apply the general
rule that in the absence of proof of the law of a foreign country it should be
presumed that it is the same as our own.

The statutes of other countries or states must be pleaded and proved the same as
any other fact. Courts cannot take judicial notice of what such laws are. In the
absence of pleading and proof the laws of a foreign country or state will be
presumed to be the same as our own. (Yam Ka Lim v. Collector of Customs, 30
Phil. 46).

In the absence of anything to the contrary as to the character of a foreign law, it

will be presumed to be the same as the domestic law on the same subject. (Lim
and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil. 472).

In the absence of evidence to the contrary foreign laws on a particular subject are
presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. (Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil.
867).

Since our law only recognizes a marriage celebrated before any of the officers
mentioned therein, and a village leader is not one of them, it is clear that
petitioner's marriage, even if true, cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. As a corollary, the petition

for mandamus filed before the court a quo is hereby dismissed. No costs.

21
G.R. No. 18081 March 3, 1922
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF CHEONG BOO, deceased. MORA
ADONG, petitioner-appellant, vs. CHEONG SENG GEE, opponent-appellant.
MALCOLM, J.:
The two question presented for determination by these appeals may be framed as
follows: Is a marriage contracted in China and proven mainly by an alleged
matrimonial letter, valid in the Philippines? Are the marriage performed in the
Philippines according to the rites of the Mohammedan religion valid? As the
decision of the Supreme Court on the last point will affect marriages consummated
by not less than one hundred and fifty thousand Moros who profess the
Mohammedan faith, the transcendental importance of the cause can be realized.
We proposed to give to the subject the serious consideration which it deserves.
Cheong Boo, a native of China, died intestate in Zamboanga, Philippine Islands,
on August 5, 1919. He left property worth nearly P100,000. The estate of the
deceased was claimed, on the one hand, by Cheong Seng Gee, who alleged that
he was a legitimate child by a marriage contracted by Cheong Boo with Tan Dit in
China in 1895. The estate was claimed, on the other hand, by the Mora Adong
who alleged that she had been lawfully married to Cheong Boo in 1896 in Basilan,
Philippine Islands, and her daughters, Payang, married to Cheng Bian Chay, and
Rosalia Cheong Boo, unmarried.
The conflicting claims to the estate of Cheong Boo were ventilated in the Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga. The trial judge, the Honorable Quirico Abeto, after
hearing the evidence presented by both sides, reached the conclusion, with
reference to the allegations of Cheong Seng Gee, that the proof did not sufficiently
establish the Chinese marriage, but that because Cheong Seng Gee had been
admitted to the Philippine Islands as the son of the deceased, he should share in
the estate as a natural child. With reference to the allegations of the Mora Adong
and her daughters Payang and Rosalia, the trial judge reached the conclusion that
the marriage between the Mora Adong and the deceased had been adequately
proved but that under the laws of the Philippine Islands it could not be held to be a
lawful marriage; accordingly, the daughters Payang and Rosalia would inherit as
natural children. The order of the trial judge, following these conclusions, was that
there should be a partition of the property of the deceased Cheong Boo between
the natural children, Cheong Seng Gee, Payang, and Rosalia.
From the judgment of the Judge of First Instance both parties perfected appeals.
As to the facts, we can say that we agree in substance with the findings of the trial
court. As to the legal issues submitted for decision by the numerous assignments
22
of error, these can best be resolved under two heads, namely: (1) The validity of
the Chinese marriage; and (2) the validity of the Mohammedan marriage.
1. Validity of the Chinese Marriage
The theory advanced on behalf of the claimant Cheong Seng Gee was that
Cheong Boo was married in the city of Amoy, China, during the second moon of
the twenty-first year of the Emperor Quang Su, or, according to the modern count,
on February 16, 1985, to a young lady named Tan Dit. Witnesses were presented
who testified to having been present at the marriage ceremony. There was also
introduced in evidence a document in Chinese which in translation reads as
follows:
One hundred years of life and health for both.
Your nephew, Tan Chao, respecfully answers the venerable Chiong Ing, father of
the bridegroom, accepting his offer of marriage, and let this document serve as
proof of the acceptance of said marriage which is to be celebrated during the
merry season of the flowers.
I take advantage of this occasion to wish for your and the spouses much
happiness, a long life, and prolific issue, as noble and great as that which you
brought forth. I consider the marriage of your son Boo with my sister Lit Chia as a
mandate of God and I hope that they treat each other with great love and mutual
courtesy and that both they and their parents be very happy.
Given during the second moon of the twenty-first year of the reign of the Emperor
Quang Su.
Cheong Boo is said to have remained in China for one year and four months after
his marriage during which time there was born to him and his wife a child named
Cheong Seng Gee. Cheong Boo then left China for the Philippine Islands and
sometime thereafter took to himself a concubine Mora by whom he had two
children. In 1910, Cheong Boo was followed to the Philippines by Cheong Seng
Gee who, as appears from documents presented in evidence, was permitted to
land in the Philippine Islands as the son of Cheong Boo. The deceased, however,
never returned to his native hearth and seems never to have corresponded with
his Chinese wife or to have had any further relations with her except once when he
sent her P10.
The trial judge found, as we have said, that the proof did not sustain the allegation
of the claimant Cheong Seng Gee, that Cheong Boo had married in China. His
Honor noted a strong inclination on the part of the Chinese witnesses, especially
the brother of Cheong Boo, to protect the interests of the alleged son, Cheong
Seng Gee, by overstepping the limits of truthfulness. His Honor also noted that
reliable witnesses stated that in the year 1895, when Cheong Boo was supposed
to have been in China, he was in reality in Jolo, in the Philippine Islands. We are
not disposed to disturb this appreciation of fact by the trial court. The immigration
documents only go to show the relation of parent and child existing between the
deceased Cheong Boo and his son Cheong Seng Gee and do not establish the
marriage between the deceased and the mother of Cheong Seng Gee.
Section IV of the Marriage Law (General Order No. 68) provides that "All marriages
contracted without these Islands, which would be valid by the laws of the country in
which the same were contracted, are valid in these Islands." To establish a valid
foreign marriage pursuant to this comity provision, it is first necessary to prove
before the courts of the Islands the existence of the foreign law as a question of
fact, and it is then necessary to prove the alleged foreign marriage by convincing
evidence.
As a case directly in point is the leading one of Sy Joc Lieng vs. Encarnacion
([1910]), 16 Phil., 137; [1913], 228 U.S., 335). Here, the courts of the Philippines
and the Supreme Court of the United States were called upon to decide, as to the
conflicting claims to the estate of a Chinese merchant, between the descendants
of an alleged Chinese marriage and the descendants of an alleged Philippine
marriage. The Supreme Courts of the Philippine Islands and the United States
united in holding that the Chinese marriage was not adequately proved. The legal
rule was stated by the United States Supreme Court to be this: A Philippine
marriage, followed by forty years of uninterrupted marital life, should not be
impugned and discredited, after the death of the husband and administration of his
estate, though an alleged prior Chinese marriage, "save upon proof so clear,
strong, and unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the existence of such
impediment." Another case in the same category is that of Son Cui vs. Guepangco
([1912], 22 Phil., 216).
In the case at bar there is no competent testimony as to what the laws of China in
the Province of Amoy concerning marriage were in 1895. As in the Encarnacion
case, there is lacking proof so clear, strong, and unequivocal as to produce a
moral conviction of the existence of the alleged prior Chinese marriage. Substitute
twenty-three years for forty years and the two cases are the same.
The lower court allowed the claimant, Cheong Seng Gee, the testamentary rights
of an acknowledged natural child. This finding finds some support in Exhibit 3, the
affidavit of Cheong Boo before the American Vice-Consul at Sandakan, British
North Borneo. But we are not called upon to make a pronouncement on the
question, because the oppositor-appellant indicates silent acquiescence by
assigning no error.
23
2. Validity of the Mohammedan Marriage
The biographical data relating to the Philippine odyssey of the Chinaman Cheong
Boo is fairly complete. He appears to have first landed on Philippine soil sometime
prior to the year 1896. At least, in the year las mentioned, we find him in Basilan,
Philippine Islands. There he was married to the Mora Adong according to the
ceremonies prescribed by the book on marriage of the Koran, by the
Mohammedan Iman (priest) Habubakar. That a marriage ceremony took place is
established by one of the parties to the marriage, the Mora Adong, by the Iman
who solemnized the marriage, and by other eyewitnesses, one of whom was the
father of the bride, and another, the chief of the rancheria, now a municipal
councilor. The groom complied with Quranic law by giving to the bride a dowry of
P250 in money and P250 in goods.
The religious rites began with the bride and groom seating themselves in the
house of the father of the bride, Marahadja Sahibil. The Iman read from the Koran.
Then the Iman asked the parents if they had any objection to the marriage. The
marital act was consummated by the groom entering the woman's mosquito net.
From the marriage day until the death of Cheong Boo, twenty-three years later, the
Chinaman and the Mora Adong cohabited as husband and wife. To them were
born five children, two of whom, Payang and Rosalia, are living. Both in his
relations with Mora Adong and with third persons during his lifetime, Cheong Boo
treated Adong as his lawful wife. He admitted this relationship in several private
and public documents. Thus, when different legal documents were executed,
including decrees of registration, Cheong Boo stated that he was married to the
Mora Adong while as late as 1918, he gave written consent to the marriage of his
minor daughter, Payang.
Notwithstanding the insinuation of counsel for the Chinese appellant that the
custom is prevalent among the Moros to favor in their testimony, a relative or
friend, especially when they do not swear on the Koran to tell the truth, it seems to
us that proof could not be more convincing of the fact that a marriage was
contracted by the Chinaman Cheong Boo and the Mora Adong, according to the
ceremonies of the Mohammedan religion.
It is next incumbent upon us to approach the principal question which we
announced in the very beginning of this decision, namely, Are the marriages
performed in the Philippines according to the rites of the Mohammedan religion
valid? Three sections of the Marriage Law (General Order No. 68) must be taken
into consideration.
Section V of the Marriage Law provides that "Marriage may be solemnized by
either a judge of any court inferior to the Supreme Court, justice of the peace, or
priest or minister of the Gospel of any denomination . . ." Counsel, failing to take
account of the word "priest," and only considering the phrase "minister of the
Gospel of any denomination" would limit the meaning of this clause to ministers of
the Christian religion. We believe this is a strained interpretation. "Priest,"
according to the lexicographers, means one especially consecrated to the service
of a divinity and considered as the medium through whom worship, prayer,
sacrifice, or other service is to be offered to the being worshipped, and pardon,
blessing, deliverance, etc., obtained by the worshipper, as a priest of Baal or of
Jehovah; a Buddhist priest. "Minister of the Gospel" means all clergymen of every
denomination and faith. A "denomination" is a religious sect having a particular
name. (Haggin vs. Haggin [1892], 35 Neb., 375; In re Reinhart, 9 O. Dec., 441;
Hale vs. Everett [1868], 53 N. H. 9.) A Mohammedan Iman is a "priest or minister
of the Gospel," and Mohammedanism is a "denomination," within the meaning of
the Marriage Law.
The following section of the Marriage Law, No. VI, provides that "No particular form
for the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties must declare, in the
presence of the person solemnizing the marriage, that they take each other as
husband and wife." The law is quite correct in affirming that no precise ceremonial
is indispensable requisite for the creation of the marriage contract. The two
essentials of a valid marriage are capacity and consent. The latter element may be
inferred from the ceremony performed, the acts of the parties, and habit or repute.
In this instance, there is no question of capacity. Nor do we think there can exist
any doubt as to consent. While it is true that during the Mohammedan ceremony,
the remarks of the priest were addressed more to the elders than to the
participants, it is likewise true that the Chinaman and the Mora woman did in fact
take each other to be husband and wife and did thereafter live together as
husband and wife. (Travers vs. Reinhardt [1907], 205 U.S., 423.
It would be possible to leave out of view altogether the two sections of the
Marriage Law which have just been quoted and discussed. The particular portion
of the law which, in our opinion, is controlling, is section IX, reading as follows: "No
marriage heretofore solemnized before any person professing to have authority
therefor shall be invalid for want of such authority or on account of any informality,
irregularity, or omission, if it was celebrated with the belief of the parties, or either
of them, that he had authority and that they have been lawfully married."
The trial judge in construing this provision of law said that he did not believe that
the legislative intention in promulgating it was to validate marriages celebrated
between Mohammedans. To quote the judge:
24
This provisions relates to marriages contracted by virtue of the provisions of the
Spanish law before revolutionary authorized to solemnized marriages, and it is not
to be presumed that the legislator intended by this law to validate void marriages
celebrated during the Spanish sovereignty contrary to the laws which then
governed.
What authority there is for this statement, we cannot conceive. To our mind,
nothing could be clearer than the language used in section IX. Note for a moment
the all-embracing words found in this section:
"No marriage" — Could more inclusive words be found? "Heretofore solemnized"
— Could any other construction than that of retrospective force be given to this
phrase? "Before any person professing to have authority therefor shall be invalid
for want of such authority" — Could stronger language than this be invoked to
announce legislative intention? "Or on account of any informality, irregularity, or
omission" — Could the legislative mind frame an idea which would more effectively
guard the marriage relation against technicality? "If it was celebrated with the belief
of the parties, or either of them, that he had authority and that they have been
lawfully married" — What was the purpose of the legislator here, if it was not to
legalize the marriage, if it was celebrated by any person who thought that he had
authority to perform the same, and if either of the parties thought that they had
been married? Is there any word or hint of any word which would restrict the
curative provisions of section IX of the Marriage Law to Christian marriages? By
what system of mental gymnastics would it be possible to evolve from such precise
language the curious idea that it was restricted to marriages performed under the
Spanish law before the revolutionary authorities?
In view of the importance of the question, we do not desire to stop here but would
ascertain from other sources the meaning and scope of Section IX of General
Order No. 68.
The purpose of the government toward the Mohammedan population of the
Philippines has, time and again, been announced by treaty, organic law, statutory
law, and executive proclamation. The Treaty of Paris in its article X, provided that
"The inhabitants of the territories over which Spain relinquishes or cedes her
sovereignty shall be secured Instructions to the Philippine Commission imposed on
every branch of the Government of the Philippine Islands the inviolable rule "that
no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof, and that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed ... That
no form of religion and no minister of religion shall be forced upon any community
or upon any citizen of the Islands; that, upon the other hand, no minister of religion
shall be interfered with or molested in following his calling, and that the separation
between state and church shall be real, entire, and absolute." The notable state
paper of President McKinley also enjoined the Commission, "to bear in mind that
the Government which they are establishing is designed . . . for the happiness,
peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands" and that, therefore,
"the measures adopted should be made to conform to their customs, their habits,
and even their prejudices. . . . The Philippine Bill and the Jones Law reproduced
the main constitutional provisions establishing religious toleration and equality.
Executive and legislative policy both under Spain and the United States followed in
the same path. For instance, in the Treaty of April 30, 1851, entered into by the
Captain General of the Philippines and the Sultan of Sulu, the Spanish
Government guaranteed "with all solemnity to the Sultan and other inhabitants of
Sulu the free exercise of their religion, with which it will not interfere in the slightest
way, and it will also respect their customs." (See further Decree of the Governor-
General of January 14, 1881.) For instance, Act No. 2520 of the Philippine
Commission, section 3, provided that "Judges of the Court of First Instance and
justices of the peace deciding civil cases in which the parties are Mohammedans
or pagans, when such action is deemed wise, may modify the application of the
law of the Philippine Islands, except laws of the United States applicable to the
Philippine Islands, taking into account local laws and customs. . . ." (See further
Act No. 787, sec. 13 [ j]; Act No. 1283, sec. 6 [b]; Act No. 114 of the Legislative
Council amended and approved by the Philippine Commission; Cacho vs.
Government of the United States [1914], 28 Phil., 616.) Various responsible
officials have so oft announced the purpose of the Government not to interfere with
the customs of the Moros, especially their religious customs, as to make quotation
of the same superfluous.
The retrospective provisions of the Philippine Marriage Law undoubtedly were
inspired by the governmental policy in the United States, with regard to the
marriages of the Indians, the Quakers, and the Mormons. The rule as to Indians
marriages is, that a marriage between two Indians entered into according to the
customs and laws of the people at a place where such customs and laws are in
force, must be recognized as a valid marriage. The rule as to the Society of
Quakers is, that they will be left to their own customs and that their marriages will
be recognized although they use no solemnization. The rule as to Mormon
marriages is that the sealing ceremony entered into before a proper official by
members of that Church competent to contract marriage constitutes a valid
marriage.
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage.
Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but, it is a new relation, an
institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony.
25
Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of
any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.
The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not
what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant
violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil
Procedure is "that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.:" (Sec. 334, No. 28.) Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage. (U. S. vs. Villafuerte and
Rabano [1905], 4 Phil., 476; Son Cui vs. Guepangco, supra; U.S. vs. Memoracion
and Uri [1916], 34 Phil., 633; Teter vs. Teter [1884], 101 Ind., 129.)
Section IX of the Marriage Law is in the nature of a curative provision intended to
safeguard society by legalizing prior marriages. We can see no substantial reason
for denying to the legislative power the right to remove impediments to an effectual
marriage. If the legislative power can declare what shall be valid marriages, it can
render valid, marriages which, when they took place, were against the law. Public
policy should aid acts intended to validate marriages and should retard acts
intended to invalidate marriages. (Coghsen vs. Stonington [1822], 4 Conn, 209;
Baity vs. Cranfill [1884], 91 N. C., 273.)
The courts can properly incline the scales of their decisions in favors of that
solution which will mot effectively promote the public policy. That is the true
construction which will best carry legislative intention into effect. And here the
consequences, entailed in holding that the marriage of the Mora Adong and the
deceased Cheong Boo, in conformity with the Mohammedan religion and Moro
customs, was void, would be far reaching in disastrous result. The last census
shows that there are at least one hundred fifty thousand Moros who have been
married according to local custom. We then have it within our power either to
nullify or to validate all of these marriages; either to make all of the children born of
these unions bastards or to make them legitimate; either to proclaim immorality or
to sanction morality; either to block or to advance settled governmental policy. Our
duty is a obvious as the law is plain.
In moving toward our conclusion, we have not lost sight of the decisions of this
court in the cases of United States vs. Tubban ([1915]), 29 Phil., 434) and United
States vs. Verzola ([1916, 33 Phil., 285). We do not, however, believe these
decisions to be controlling. In the first place, these were criminal actions and two
Justice dissented.. In the second place, in the Tubban case, the marriage in
question was a tribal marriage of the Kalingas, while in the Verzola case, the
marriage had been performed during the Spanish regime by a lieutenant of the
Guardia Civil. In neither case, in deciding as to whether or not the accused should
be given the benefit of the so-called unwritten law, was any consideration given to
the provisions of section IX of General Order No. 68. We are free to admit that, if
necessary, we would unhesitatingly revoke the doctrine announced in the two
cases above mentioned.

We regard the evidence as producing a moral conviction of the existence of the

Mohammedan marriage. We regard the provisions of section IX of the Marriage
law as validating marriages performed according to the rites of the Mohammedan
religion.

There are other questions presented in the various assignments of error which it is
unnecessary to decide. In resume, we find the Chinese marriage not to be proved
and that the Chinaman Cheong Seng Gee has only the rights of a natural child,
and we find the Mohammedan marriage to be proved and to be valid, thus giving
to the widow and the legitimate children of this union the rights accruing to them
under the law.
 
Judgment is reversed in part, and the case shall be returned to the lower court for
a partition of the property in accordance with this decision, and for further
proceedings in accordance with law. Without special findings as to costs in this
instance, it is so ordered.

26
G.R. No. L-1211 January 30, 1947
CHING HUAT, petitioner, vs. CO HEONG (alias CO HONG, CO YONG),
respondent.
HILADO, J.:
Petitioner prays for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus directing any lawful
officer to take from respondent and produce before this Court the person of Maria
Ching alias Avelina Ching, allegedly aged 15 years, and requiring the respondent
to justify his right to the custody of said minor, and, after hearing, to award said
custody to petitioner.
It is alleged in the petition, verified by petitioner's oath, among other things, that
the said minor is his legitimate daughter; that up to June 21, 1946, said minor had
been living with and had under the custody of petitioner; that respondent, taking
advantage of his confidential and spiritual relation with Maria Ching as her
godfather, persuaded and induced her by means of trick, promises and cajolery, to
leave the parental home and to elope with him in the night of June 21, 1946, to
Plaridel, Bulacan, where they were married on the following day before the Justice
of the Peace of said municipality, said Maria Ching being at the time 15 years old;
and that ever since respondent has had the minor Maria Ching under his custody
in Malolos, Bulacan, and has restrained her at her liberty.
It is further alleged that respondent had been previously married in China to Gue
Min, said marriage being said to be subsisting at the time respondent married
Maria Ching. Petitioner further avers that Gue Min has never been declared an
absentee nor generally considered as dead and believed to be so by respondent at
the time he married Maria Ching.
Respondent, in his answer, among other things, asserts that on June 21, 1946, he
and Maria Ching alias Avelina Ching were legally married before the Justice of the
Peace of Plaridel, Bulacan. He has attached to his answer a certificate (Appendix
1) of the Local Civil Registrar of Plaridel, Bulacan, dated July 9, 1946, attesting the
celebration of the marriage above mentioned between the parties above named on
June 21, 1946, and alleges that the essential requisites for such were marriage
complied with.
The question to be decided is whether petitioner still retains his right to the custody
of his minor daughter Maria Ching alias Avelina Ching.
The fact of the civil marriage between respondent and Maria Ching having been
solemnized by the Justice of the Peace of Plaridel, Bulacan, on June 21, 1946, is
not disputed. Petitioner himself alleges in his petition that respondent is of legal
27
age, meaning 21 years or more old upon the date of the petition, November 28,
1946. June 21, 1946, date of the marriage, was only 5 months and one week
earlier. Both man and woman were, therefore, of marriageable age under section 2
of Act No. 3613.
The alleged marriage of respondent to Gue Min in China has not been proven.
There is no allegation in the petition, much less is there evidence, to show that the
said supposed marriage was performed in accordance with the laws were of China
inforce at the time of its supposed performance, nor even what those laws were
(Act No. 3613, section 19). The cited section of the existing Marriage Law
provides:
SEC. 19. Marriages performed abroad. — All marriages performed outside of the
Philippine Islands in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were performed and valid there as such, shall also be valid in these Islands.
This provision is substantially the same as that contained upon the same subject in
the former Philippine Marriage Law, General Orders No. 68, which is as follows:
SEC. IV. All marriages contracted without these Islands, which would be valid by
the laws of the country in which the same were contracted, are valid in these
Islands.
In the case of Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee (43 Phil., 43, 49), this Court held, after
quoting the aforesaid provision of the former Marriage Law:
. . . To establish a valid foreign marriage pursuant to this comity provision, it is first
necessary to prove before the courts of the Islands the existence of the foreign law
as a question of fact, and it is then necessary to prove the alleged foreign marriage
by convincing evidence.
In the same case of Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, this Court said (p. 50):
In the case at bar there is no competent testimony as to what the laws of China in
the Province of Amoy concerning marriage were in 1895. As in the Encarnacion
case (Sy Joc Lieng vs. Encarnacion, 16 Phil., 137; 228 U.S., 335), there is lacking
proof so clear, strong and unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the
existence of the alleged prior Chinese marriage. . . .
Again in that case the United States Supreme Court (228 U.S., 335, 338-339) held:
In these circumstances every presumption was in favor of the validity and good
faith of the Philippine marriage, and sound reason required that it be not impugned
and discredited through the alleged prior marriage save upon proof so clear, strong
and unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the existence of that
impediment. . . .

On the other hand, the Philippine marriage between said respondent and Maria
Ching before the Justice of the Peace of Plaridel, Bulacan, is undisputed. It is also
beyond question that marriage was contracted by a man much over 16 years old
with a girl 15 years old (Act No. 3613, section 2), neither of whom was included in
any of the exceptions mentioned in section 28 of the same Act; nor in those stated
in section 29 thereof for the reason that the alleged prior Chinese marriage has not
been established.

If the supposed prior Chinese marriage had been sufficiently proven, then in order
that the subsequent Philippine marriage could be valid, it would have been
necessary either (a) that the Chinese marriage should have been previously
annulled or dissolved: or (b) that the first wife of respondent should have been
absent for 7 consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the
respondent having news of the absentee being alive; or (c) that the absentee
should have been generally considered as dead and believed to be so by
respondent at the time of contracting the subsequent marriage, in either of which
last two cases the subsequent marriage will be valid until declared null and void by
a competent court, while in the first it will be valid without this limitation. (Act No.
3613, section 29 [a] and [b]; section 30 [b].) But as already adverted to, the
complete absence of proof of the supposed former Chinese marriage makes
sections 29 and 30 of the Marriage Law inapplicable.

Maria Ching having been validly married on June 21, 1946, she became
emancipated on that same date (arts. 314 [1] and 315, Civil Code). This
emancipation brought about the loss by the father of the parental authority that he
claims. On the other hand, by article 48 of Chapter V of the Spanish Marriage Law
of 1870, whose articles 44 to 78 were, and are now partly, in force in the
Philippines (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil., 34), the wife has the duty, among
others, of living in her husband's company and of following him to wherever he
transfer his domicile or residence. (Yañez de Barbuevo vs. Fuster, 29 Phil., 606,
612.)

For all the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion that the petition should be,
as it is hereby, dismissed, with costs to petitioner. So ordered.

28
G.R. No. L-42581 October 2, 1935
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MORA
DUMPO, defendant-appellant.
RECTO, J.:
Moro Hassan and Mora Dupo have been legally married according to the rites and
practice of the Mohammedan religion. Without this marriage being dissolved, it is
alleged that Dumpo contracted another marriage with Moro Sabdapal after which
the two lived together as husband and wife. Dumpo was prosecuted for and
convicted of the crime of bigamy in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty with a maximum of eight years, and one
day of prision mayor and minimum of two years, four months and twenty one days
of prision correccional, with costs. From this judgment the accused interposed an
appeal. The records of the case disclose that it has been established by the
defense, without the prosecution having presented any objection nor evidence to
the contrary, that the alleged second marriage of the accused is null and void
according to Mohammedan rites on the ground that her father had not given his
consent thereto.
We formulate no general statement regarding the requisites necessary for the
validity of a marriage between Moros according to Mohammedan rites. This is a
fact of which no judicial notice may be taken and must be subject to proof in every
particular case. In the case at bar we have the uncontradicted testimony of Tahari,
an Iman or Mohammedan priest authorized to solemnize marriages between
Mohammedans, to the effect that the consent of the bride's father or. in the
absence thereof, that of the chief of the tribe to which she belongs in an
indipensable requisite for the validity of such contracts. If the absence of this
requisite did not make the marriage contract between Mohammedans void, it was
easy for the prosecution to show it by refuting Iman Tahari's testimony inasmuch
as for lack of one there were two other Imans among the State witnesses in this
case. It failed to do so, however, and from such failure we infer that the Iman's
testimony for the defense is in accordance with truth. It is contended that, granting
the absolute necessity of the requisite in question, tacit compliance therewith may
be presumed because it does not appear that Dumpo's father has signified his
opposition to this alleged marriage after he had been informed of its celebration.
But this presumption should not be established over the categorical affirmation of
Moro Jalmani, Dumpo's father, that he did not give his consent to his daughter's
alleged second marriage for the reason that he was not informed thereof and that,
at all events, he would not have given it, knowing that Dumpo's first marriage was
not dissolved.
29
It is an essential element of the crime of bigamy that the alleged second marriage,
having all the essential requisites, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of
the first marriage. It appearing that the marriage alleged to first been contracted by
the accused with Sabdapal, her former marriage with Hassan being undissolved,
cannot be considered as such, there is no justification to hold her guilty of the
crime charged in the information.
Wherefore, reversing the appealed judgment, the accused is acquitted of the
charges and if she should be in detention her immediate release is ordered, with
the costs of both instances de oficio. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, and Imperial, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
HULL, J., dissenting:
Under section 25 of the Marriage Law Act No. 3613, "marriages between
Mohammedans may be performed in accordance with the rites or practices of their
religion . . .," and as stated in the majority opinion we cannot take judicial notice of
such matters but that they are subject to proof, as is any foreign law. The person
"learned in the law" who was presented as an expert witness for the defense, did
not know his age, but it was estimated by the judgment as fifty-four years. He gave
his occupation as that of a fisherman and stated he had performed two marriages.
He does not know how to read. He was not asked any questions as to whether
there was a difference between the marriage of a young woman living with her
parents or a woman who had been emancipated.
In the evidence of the prosecution, it was shown that the second marriage was
solemnized by an Iman, a Mohammedan religious official, seventy years old, who
was living in the vicinity of the contracting parties.lawphil.net
There was no quotation from the Koran regarding the essentials of a marriage
ceremony according to the Mohammedan religion, and I agree with the trial court
that the evidence relied upon by the majority opinion, is not worthy of serious
consideration. If consent were in fact necessary, it can well be presumed from the
subsequent actions of the father of the girl. She left his house and after the second
ceremony lived openly with her second husband, this with her father's full
knowledge and at least tacit consent, for many months.
I therefore believe that the sentence appealed from should be affirmed. 
G.R. No. L-21017 February 25, 1924
In re estate of JOSE YAP SIONG, deceased. MARIA LAO and JOSE LAO,
petitioners-appellees, vs. DEE TIM, YAP KIM TING, YAP KIM SENG, and YAP
HU CHO, respondents-appellants.
JOHNSON, J.:
It appears from the record that on the 5th day of September, 1922, Yap Siong died
in the municipality of Angeles, Province of Pampanga, Philippine Islands, leaving a
considerable amount of property to be distributed among his heirs. An
administrator was appointed to administer his estate. During the course of the
administration and distribution of the estate there appeared the petitioners and the
respondents, each claiming to be the legitimate heirs of Yap Siong and entitled to
his estate. The petitioner Maria Lao claims to be the legitimate widow of Yap
Siong, having been legally joined to him in holy wedlock on the 24th day of June,
1903, in the Philippine Islands (Exhibit 1) and that Jose Lao is a legitimate child
born of that marriage, and that they are therefore entitled, as heirs, to the estate of
Yap Siong, deceased.
Upon the other hand Dee Tim claims to be the legitimate widow of Yap Siong; that
she and Yap Siong were joined in the holy wedlock on the 14th day of September,
1893, in accordance with the laws of China (Exhibits A and A-1), and that the said
Yap Kim Ting, Yap Kim Seng, and Yap Hu Cho were her legitimate children born
of that wedlock.
In support of the contention of the petitioners, Maria Lao and her son Jose Lao, a
great deal of proof was presented. Exhibits 1 and 1-A, certificates of marriage,
were presented to show that she had been legally married to Yap Siong. A number
of other documents (Exhibits 9 to 13) were presented to show that Yap Siong had
admitted that he was a married man. Exhibits 14 to 17 were presented for the
purpose of proving that Yap Siong had admitted in a public document that Maria
Lao was his wife.
The respondent Dee Tim presented a great deal of proof to show that she was the
legitimate wife of Yap Siong, lawfully joined to him in holy wedlock in China on the
14th day of September, 1893. To support that contention she presented what she
contended was a certificate of marriage, marked Exhibit A — Exhibit A-1. She
contended that Exhibit A was positive proof of her marriage and that it complied
with the custom and practice in China with reference to marriage ceremonies. To
support her contention she presented a number of witnesses. Jan Peng, a
Chinaman of 52 years of age, swore that he knew the forms of ceremonies of
marriage in China, and that Exhibit A was the ordinary and customary document
issued to prove that the ceremony of marriage had taken place. He described in
30
detail the ceremony of marriage performed in accordance with the customs and
practice in China.
Dee Tim also presented a witness, Ty Cong Ting, a Chinaman, 32 years of age
and a lawyer, who testified concerning the laws and customs in China with
reference to the forms of marriage ceremony. He testified that he knew and was
well acquainted with the customs and practices of Chinamen in China with
reference to marriages and the manner and form in which they were celebrated,
and the form of proof issued for the purpose of proving that a marriage ceremony
had been performed. He further testified that Exhibit A was the usual proof or
certificate issued for the purpose of proving that a marriage ceremony had taken
place. He further testified that Exhibit A was the usual and ordinary proof, or
certificate, if it may be called a certificate, issued to show that a marriage
ceremony had been performed between the persons mentioned therein. Mr. Ty
Cong Ting was, at the time he declared as a witness, the legal attorney of the
Chinese Consul General in the City of Manila.
The respondent Dee Tim presented several witnesses who confirmed her
contention that she was the legitimate wife of Yap Siong and that her three
children Yap Kim Ting, Yap Kim Seng, and Yap Hu Cho were her legitimate
children, born of her marriage with Yap Siong. To further sustain her contention
she presented Exhibits B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, and J, documents in which Yap Siong
had expressly recognized his marriage to her.
To overcome the proof adduced by Dee Tim in support of her marriage to Yap
Siong, the petitioner presented Exhibits 2,3,4,5,6,7, and 8. Said exhibits are
alleged letters supposed to have been written by an uncle in China of Yap Siong
during the years 1900 to 1906, urging him to return to China for the purpose of
marrying, thus attempting to establish the fact that Yap Siong during that period
was not a married man. When we first studied the record in this case we were
inclined to give said letters great credit, but upon a further examination of the
record and a further argument by the respective parties, we are now inclined to
believe that said letters were fabricated for the very purpose of defeating the
contention of Dee Tim. They were not identified properly by persons who had
reason to know that they were genuine in character and were actually prepared in
China and sent to Yap Siong in the Philippine Islands. We are of the opinion, and
we believe that was the real opinion of the trial court, that said exhibits should not
be admitted as proof to sustain the fact for which they were presented. We are
now persuaded that said letters are pure fabrications.
The petitioner further presents two or three witnesses for the purpose of showing
that the marriage between Dee Tim and Yap Siong never took place for the reason
that Yap Siong was in the Philippine Islands on the 14th day of September, 1893,
and that at that time he was living in the municipality of Bacolor, of the Province of
Pampanga, and that he never left that municipality. A careful reading of their
testimony, however, does not convince us that it is altogether reliable. The
testimony which they gave was given in the month of January, 1923, and they
testified positively as to exact dates, times, and places in the year 1897. Their
testimony contains no facts, or data, or peculiar circumstances or conditions which
caused them to remember the particular facts concerning which they testified.
They gave no reason why they were able to remember the exact whereabouts of
Yap Siong during the period to which their testimony referred. Upon the contrary
there is much proof in the record that Yap Siong returned to China a number of
times after his first arrival here. The petitioner further presents some proof to show
that Yap Siong had admitted on several occasions that Dee Tim was his querida
and not his wife.
The respondents further attempted to show that Maria Lao and Jose Lao, her son,
were not the legitimate wife and son of Yap Siong, by presenting Exhibits L and
LL. Exhibit L is the baptismal certificate issued by the parish priest of the
municipality of Angeles, in which it is made to appear that on the 5th day of
January, 1904, he baptized a child named Jose Martin, a natural son of Maria Lao,
and whose father was unknown. Exhibit LL is a certificate of birth issued by the
secretary of the municipality of Angeles, in which it appears that Jose Martin Lao, a
child, was born on the first day of January, 1904, a natural son of Maria Lao. There
is nothing, however, in Exhibits L or LL, which shows that Maria Lao was
responsible for the facts which they contain. Exhibit LL contains the statement that
the facts therein were not obtained from Maria Lao but from one Isabelo Lao.
There is a notable conflict between Exhibits L and LL. Exhibit LL certifies that Jose
Martin Lao was born on the first day of January, 1904, while Exhibit L certifies that
the baptism took place on the 5th day of January, 1904, and that the child was
then 34 days old. It is apparent therefore that the facts stated in one or the other of
said exhibits are untrue. And, moreover, when we consider the customs of the
Filipino people in their relation with the Holy Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, it is
easily understood, in view of the alleged fact that Maria Lao and Yap Siong had
been joined in holy matrimony under the forms of the Protestant Church, why the
parish priest of the municipality of Angeles stated in his certificate that the father of
the child, then Jose Martin, was unknown.
The respondents further attempted to show that Yap Siong and Maria Lao had
never been joined legally in holy wedlock, by the testimony of a number of
witnesses to the fact that Yap Siong had on numerous occassions asserted that
Maria Lao was his querida only. It is perhaps true that Yap Siong did on various
occasions, depending upon his interest and convenience at the particular time,
state that Maria Lao was his querida and not his wife. It is also perhaps true, for
31
the same reason, that he stated that Dee Tim was not his wife but his querida.
Evidently he was attempting to keep the information, that he was quite able to do,
until he had passed to that bourn from which none returns, and until a distribution
of his large accumulated earnings among his heirs became necessary.
From all of the foregoing conflicting facts, and considering all of the facts of the
record, we are forced to the conclusion that a preponderance of the evidence
shows the following:
(1) That Dee Tim and Yap Siong were legally married in China in accordance with
the laws and customs in China on the 14th day of September, 1893; that Yap Kim
Ting, Yap Kim Seng, and Yap Hu Cho were the legitimate children born of that
wedlock; that Dee Tim and her said children were ignorant of the fact that Yap
Siong had legally married Maria Lao, and that Jose Lao was born of that wedlock;
and that they had no reason to believe, until after the death of Yap Siong, that he
was legally married to the petitioner herein.
(2) That Maria Lao was legally married to Yap Siong on the 24th day of June,
1903, in good faith believing that Yap Siong was not then a married man, without
any knowledge or information or suspicion to the contrary; and that Jose Lao is the
legitimate child born of that marriage of Yap Siong and Maria Lao.
In other words, we are fully convinced that a preponderance of the evidence shows
that both Dee Tim and Maria Lao were legally married to Yap Siong in good faith,
believing that each was his sole and separate wife, living in absolute ignorance of
the fact of his double marriage. They were each married in good faith and in
ignorance of the existence of the other marriage. Yap Siong up to the time of his
death seems to have been successful in keeping each of his two wives ignorant of
the fact that he was married to the other.
Under the foregoing facts, how must the property of Yap Siong be divided between
the two families? Under the Leyes de Partidas (Law 1, title 13, partida 4), where
two women innocently and in good faith are legally united in holy matrimony to the
same man, their children born will be regarded as legitimate children and each
family will be entitled to one-half of the estate of the husband upon distribution of
his estate. That provision of the Leyes de Partidas is a very humane and wise law.
It justly protects those who innocently have entered into the solemn relation of
marriage and their descendants. The good faith of all the parties will be presumed
until the contrary is positively proved. (Article 69, Civil Code; Las Leyes de
Matrimonio, section 96; Gaines vs. Hennen, 65 U.S., 553.)
A woman who is deceived by a man who represents himself as single and who
marries him, she and her children born while the deception lasted, under the
Spanish Law, are entitled to all the rights of a legitimate wife and children. The
common law allowing none of the incidents of a true marriage to follow another
marriage entered into during the continuance of a first, was early found to work a
great injustice upon the innocent parties to the second marriage, and specially
upon the offspring of such second marriage. To remedy that hardship under the
common law and following the wise jurisprudence of Spain, both England and
many of the states of the United States adopted statutes. (Glass vs. Glass, 114
Mass., 563; Spicer vs. Spicer, 16 Abbot's Practice [N. S.], 114; Dyer vs. Brannock,
66 Mo., 391; Graham vs. Bennet, 2 Cal., 503; Smith vs. Smith, 1 Tex., 621 [46 Am.
Dec., 121]; Clendenning vs. Clendenning, 7 Martin [La.], 587; Patton vs. Cities of
Philadelphia and New Orleans, 1 La. Ann., 98; Abston vs. Abston, 15 La. Ann.,
137; Gaines vs. Hennen, 65 U.S., 553; Ex parte Myra Clarke Whitney, 38 U.S.,
404; Estate of Navarro, 24 La. Ann., 298; In re Taylor, 39 La. Ann., 823.)

The foregoing conclusions in no way conflict with the decision of this court in the
case of Sy Joc Lieng vs. Encarnacion (16 Phil., 137) nor with the decision of
Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee (43 Phil., 43), for the reason that in each of said
cases a preponderance of the evidence showed that no legal marriage had been
performed in China, that is, that the alleged Chines wife and the deceased in each
of those cases had never been legally married.

Therefore the conclusion reached in the decision heretofore announced by this

court in the present case is hereby set aside and it is hereby ordered and decreed
that the judgment of the lower court be revoked and that the estate of Yap Siong
be divided equally, one-half going to Maria Lao and her son, Jose Lao, and the
other one-half to Dee Tim and her three children. And without any finding as to
costs, it so ordered.

32
G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988
YAO KEE, SZE SOOK WAH, SZE LAI CHO, and SY CHUN YEN, petitioners,
vs. AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE, RODOLFO
SY, and HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
CORTES, J.:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national. died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City where he
was then residing, leaving behind real and personal properties here in the
Philippines worth P300,000.00 more or less.
Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy
filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration docketed as Special
Proceedings Case No. C-699 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch
XXXIII, Caloocan City. In said petition they alleged among others that (a) they are
the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego; (b) to their knowledge Sy Mat
died intestate; (c) they do not recognize Sy Kiat's marriage to Yao Kee nor the
filiation of her children to him; and, (d) they nominate Aida Sy-Gonzales for
appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased [Record on
Appeal, pp. 4-9; Rollo, p. 107.]
The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun
Chen who alleged that: (a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married
on January 19, 1931 in China; (b) the other oppositors are the legitimate children
of the deceased with Yao Kee; and, (c) Sze Sook Wah is the eldest among them
and is competent, willing and desirous to become the administratrix of the estate of
Sy Kiat [Record on Appeal, pp. 12-13; Rollo, p. 107.] After hearing, the probate
court, finding among others that:
(1) Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee [CFI decision, pp. 12-27; Rollo, pp. 49-
64;]
(2) Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sze Chun Yen are the legitimate children of
Yao Kee with Sy Mat [CFI decision, pp. 28-31; Rollo. pp. 65-68;] and,
(3) Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy are the
acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego [CFI
decision, pp. 27-28; Rollo, pp. 64- 65.]
held if favor of the oppositors (petitioners herein) and appointed Sze Sook Wah as
the administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased [CFI decision, pp. 68-69;
Rollo, pp. 105-106.]
On appeal the Court of Appeals rendered a decision modifying that of the probate
court, the dispositive portion of which reads:
33
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the lower Court is hereby
MODIFIED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment rendered as follows:
(1) Declaring petitioners Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy- Bernabe and
Rodolfo Sy acknowledged natural children of the deceased Sy Kiat with Asuncion
Gillego, an unmarried woman with whom he lived as husband and wife without
benefit of marriage for many years:
(2) Declaring oppositors Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu and Sze Chun Yen, the
acknowledged natural children of the deceased Sy Kiat with his Chinese wife Yao
Kee, also known as Yui Yip, since the legality of the alleged marriage of Sy Mat to
Yao Kee in China had not been proven to be valid to the laws of the Chinese
People's Republic of China (sic);
(3) Declaring the deed of sale executed by Sy Kiat on December 7, 1976 in favor
of Tomas Sy (Exhibit "G-1", English translation of Exhibit "G") of the Avenue
Tractor and Diesel Parts Supply to be valid and accordingly, said property should
be excluded from the estate of the deceased Sy Kiat; and
(4) Affirming the appointment by the lower court of Sze Sook Wah as judicial
administratrix of the estate of the deceased. [CA decision, pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 36-
37.]
From said decision both parties moved for partial reconsideration, which was
however denied by respondent court. They thus interposed their respective
appeals to this Court.
Private respondents filed a petition with this Court docketed as G.R. No. 56045
entitled "Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy v.
Court of Appeals, Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen"
questioning paragraphs (3) and (4) of the dispositive portion of the Court of
Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court however resolved to deny the petition and
the motion for reconsideration. Thus on March 8, 1982 entry of judgment was
made in G.R. No. 56045. **
The instant petition, on the other hand, questions paragraphs (1) and (2) of the
dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals. This petition was initially
denied by the Supreme Court on June 22, 1981. Upon motion of the petitioners the
Court in a resolution dated September 16, 1981 reconsidered the denial and
decided to give due course to this petition. Herein petitioners assign the following
as errors:
I. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECLARING
THE MARRIAGE OF SY KIAT TO YAO YEE AS NOT HAVE (sic) BEEN PROVEN
VALID IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA.

II. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING
AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE AND RODOLFO
SY AS NATURAL CHILDREN OF SY KIAT WITH ASUNCION GILLEGO. [Petition,
p. 2; Rollo, p. 6.]
I. Petitioners argue that the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in accordance with
Chinese law and custom was conclusively proven. To buttress this argument they
rely on the following testimonial and documentary evidence.
First, the testimony of Yao Kee summarized by the trial court as follows:
Yao Kee testified that she was married to Sy Kiat on January 19, 1931 in Fookien,
China; that she does not have a marriage certificate because the practice during
that time was for elders to agree upon the betrothal of their children, and in her
case, her elder brother was the one who contracted or entered into [an] agreement
with the parents of her husband; that the agreement was that she and Sy Mat
would be married, the wedding date was set, and invitations were sent out; that the
said agreement was complied with; that she has five children with Sy Kiat, but two
of them died; that those who are alive are Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho, and Sze
Chun Yen, the eldest being Sze Sook Wah who is already 38 years old; that Sze
Sook Wah was born on November 7, 1939; that she and her husband, Sy Mat,
have been living in FooKien, China before he went to the Philippines on several
occasions; that the practice during the time of her marriage was a written
document [is exchanged] just between the parents of the bride and the parents of
the groom, or any elder for that matter; that in China, the custom is that there is a
go- between, a sort of marriage broker who is known to both parties who would
talk to the parents of the bride-to-be; that if the parents of the bride-to-be agree to
have the groom-to-be their son in-law, then they agree on a date as an
engagement day; that on engagement day, the parents of the groom would bring
some pieces of jewelry to the parents of the bride-to-be, and then one month after
that, a date would be set for the wedding, which in her case, the wedding date to
Sy Kiat was set on January 19, 1931; that during the wedding the bridegroom
brings with him a couch (sic) where the bride would ride and on that same day, the
parents of the bride would give the dowry for her daughter and then the document
would be signed by the parties but there is no solemnizing officer as is known in
the Philippines; that during the wedding day, the document is signed only by the
parents of the bridegroom as well as by the parents of the bride; that the parties
themselves do not sign the document; that the bride would then be placed in a
carriage where she would be brought to the town of the bridegroom and before
departure the bride would be covered with a sort of a veil; that upon reaching the
town of the bridegroom, the bridegroom takes away the veil; that during her
wedding to Sy Kiat (according to said Chinese custom), there were many persons
34
present; that after Sy Kiat opened the door of the carriage, two old ladies helped
her go down the carriage and brought her inside the house of Sy Mat; that during
her wedding, Sy Chick, the eldest brother of Sy Kiat, signed the document with her
mother; that as to the whereabouts of that document, she and Sy Mat were
married for 46 years already and the document was left in China and she doubt if
that document can still be found now; that it was left in the possession of Sy Kiat's
family; that right now, she does not know the whereabouts of that document
because of the lapse of many years and because they left it in a certain place and
it was already eaten by the termites; that after her wedding with Sy Kiat, they lived
immediately together as husband and wife, and from then on, they lived together;
that Sy Kiat went to the Philippines sometime in March or April in the same year
they were married; that she went to the Philippines in 1970, and then came back to
China; that again she went back to the Philippines and lived with Sy Mat as
husband and wife; that she begot her children with Sy Kiat during the several trips
by Sy Kiat made back to China. [CFI decision, pp. 13-15; Rollo, pp. 50-52.]
Second, the testimony of Gan Ching, a younger brother of Yao Kee who stated
that he was among the many people who attended the wedding of his sister with
Sy Kiat and that no marriage certificate is issued by the Chinese government, a
document signed by the parents or elders of the parties being sufficient [CFI
decision, pp. 15-16; Rollo, pp.
52-53.]
Third, the statements made by Asuncion Gillego when she testified before the trial
court to the effect that (a) Sy Mat was married to Yao Kee according to Chinese
custom; and, (b) Sy Kiat's admission to her that he has a Chinese wife whom he
married according to Chinese custom [CFI decision, p. 17; Rollo, p. 54.]
Fourth, Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien issued in Caloocan City on
October 3, 1972 where the following entries are found: "Marital status—Married";
"If married give name of spouses—Yao Kee"; "Address-China; "Date of marriage—
1931"; and "Place of marriage—China" [Exhibit "SS-1".]
Fifth, Sy Kiat's Alien Certificate of Registration issued in Manila on January 12,
1968 where the following entries are likewise found: "Civil status—Married"; and, 'If
married, state name and address of spouse—Yao Kee Chingkang, China" [Exhibit
"4".]
And lastly, the certification issued in Manila on October 28, 1977 by the Embassy
of the People's Republic of China to the effect that "according to the information
available at the Embassy Mr. Sy Kiat a Chinese national and Mrs. Yao Kee alias
Yui Yip also Chinese were married on January 19, 1931 in Fukien, the People's
Republic of China" [Exhibit "5".]
These evidence may very well prove the fact of marriage between Yao Kee and Sy
Kiat. However, the same do not suffice to establish the validity of said marriage in
accordance with Chinese law or custom.
Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly
observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory" [In the Matter
of the Petition for Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name "Ozaeta, Romulo,
de Leon, Mabanta and Reyes", July 30, 1979, SCRA 3, 12 citing JBL Reyes & RC
Puno, Outline of Phil. Civil Law, Fourth Ed., Vol. 1, p. 7.] The law requires that "a
custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence" [Article 12,
Civil Code.] On this score the Court had occasion to state that "a local custom as a
source of right can not be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is
properly established by competent evidence like any other fact" [Patriarca v. Orate,
7 Phil. 390, 395 (1907).] The same evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should
be required of a foreign custom.
The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article 71 of the Civil Code which
states that:
Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were performed and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except bigamous, Polygamous, or incestuous
marriages, as determined by Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied.) ***
Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to establish a valid foreign
marriage two things must be proven, namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law
as a question of fact; and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence
[Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 49 (1922).]
In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided in the Rules of Court. With
respect to an unwritten foreign law, Rule 130 section 45 states that:
SEC. 45. Unwritten law.—The oral testimony of witnesses, skilled therein, is
admissible as evidence of the unwritten law of a foreign country, as are also
printed and published books of reports of decisions of the courts of the foreign
country, if proved to be commonly admitted in such courts.
Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand, is provided for under Rule 132
section 25, thus:
SEC. 25. Proof of public or official record.—An official record or an entry therein,
when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record,
35
or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with
a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is
kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of embassy
or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer
in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and authenticated by the seal of his office.
The Court has interpreted section 25 to include competent evidence like the
testimony of a witness to prove the existence of a written foreign law [Collector of
Internal Revenue v. Fisher 110 Phil. 686, 700-701 (1961) citing Willamette Iron
and Steel Works v. Muzzal, 61 Phil. 471 (1935).]
In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to
the law and custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching
cannot be considered as proof of China's law or custom on marriage not only
because they are
self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are
competent to testify on the subject matter. For failure to prove the foreign law or
custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance with said law
or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in
this jurisdiction.
Petitioners contend that contrary to the Court of Appeals' ruling they are not duty
bound to prove the Chinese law on marriage as judicial notice thereof had been
taken by this Court in the case of Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia [16 Phil. 137 (1910).]
This contention is erroneous. Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle
that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be
alleged and proved as any other fact [Yam Ka Lim v. Collector of Customs, 30 Phil.
46, 48 (1915); Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 (1930).]
Moreover a reading of said case would show that the party alleging the foreign
marriage presented a witness, one Li Ung Bieng, to prove that matrimonial letters
mutually exchanged by the contracting parties constitute the essential requisite for
a marriage to be considered duly solemnized in China. Based on his testimony,
which as found by the Court is uniformly corroborated by authors on the subject of
Chinese marriage, what was left to be decided was the issue of whether or not the
fact of marriage in accordance with Chinese law was duly proven [Sy Joc Lieng v.
Sy Quia, supra., at p. 160.]
Further, even assuming for the sake of argument that the Court has indeed taken
judicial notice of the law of China on marriage in the aforecited case, petitioners
however have not shown any proof that the Chinese law or custom obtaining at the
time the Sy Joc Lieng marriage was celebrated in 1847 was still the law when the
alleged marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee took place in 1931 or eighty-four (84) years
later.
Petitioners moreover cite the case of U.S. v. Memoracion [34 Phil. 633 (1916)] as
being applicable to the instant case. They aver that the judicial pronouncement in
the Memoracion case, that the testimony of one of the contracting parties is
competent evidence to show the fact of marriage, holds true in this case.
The Memoracion case however is not applicable to the case at bar as said case
did not concern a foreign marriage and the issue posed was whether or not the
oral testimony of a spouse is competent evidence to prove the fact of marriage in a
complaint for adultery.
Accordingly, in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be
presumed that it is the same as ours *** [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-
21076, March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 552, 555.] Since Yao Kee admitted in her
testimony that there was no solemnizing officer as is known here in the Philippines
[See Article 56, Civil Code] when her alleged marriage to Sy Mat was celebrated
[CFI decision, p. 14; Rollo, p. 51], it therefore follows that her marriage to Sy Kiat,
even if true, cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo,
supra., pp. 555-556.]
II. The second issue raised by petitioners concerns the status of private
respondents.
Respondent court found the following evidence of petitioners' filiation:
(1) Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien where the following are entered:
"Children if any: give number of children—Four"; and, "Name—All living in China"
[Exhibit "SS-1";]
(2) the testimony of their mother Yao Kee who stated that she had five children
with Sy Kiat, only three of whom are alive namely, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu
and Sze Chin Yan [TSN, December 12, 1977, pp. 9-11;] and,
(3) an affidavit executed on March 22,1961 by Sy Kiat for presentation to the Local
Civil Registrar of Manila to support Sze Sook Wah's application for a marriage
license, wherein Sy Kiat expressly stated that she is his daughter [Exhibit "3".]
Likewise on the record is the testimony of Asuncion Gillego that Sy Kiat told her he
has three daughters with his Chinese wife, two of whom—Sook Wah and Sze Kai
Cho—she knows, and one adopted son [TSN, December 6,1977, pp. 87-88.]
However, as petitioners failed to establish the marriage of Yao Kee with Sy Mat
according to the laws of China, they cannot be accorded the status of legitimate
36
children but only that of acknowledged natural children. Petitioners are natural
children, it appearing that at the time of their conception Yao Kee and Sy Kiat were
not disqualified by any impediment to marry one another [See Art. 269, Civil Code.]
And they are acknowledged children of the deceased because of Sy Kiat's
recognition of Sze Sook Wah [Exhibit "3"] and its extension to Sze Lai Cho and Sy
Chun Yen who are her sisters of the full blood [See Art. 271, Civil Code.]
Private respondents on the other hand are also the deceased's acknowledged
natural children with Asuncion Gillego, a Filipina with whom he lived for twenty-five
(25) years without the benefit of marriage. They have in their favor their father's
acknowledgment, evidenced by a compromise agreement entered into by and
between their parents and approved by the Court of First Instance on February 12,
1974 wherein Sy Kiat not only acknowleged them as his children by Asuncion
Gillego but likewise made provisions for their support and future inheritance, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
2. The parties also acknowledge that they are common-law husband and wife and
that out of such relationship, which they have likewise decided to definitely and
finally terminate effective immediately, they begot five children, namely: Aida Sy,
born on May 30, 1950; Manuel Sy, born on July 1, 1953; Teresita Sy, born on
January 28, 1955; Ricardo Sy now deceased, born on December 14, 1956; and
Rodolfo Sy, born on May 7, 1958.
3. With respect to the AVENUE TRACTOR AND DIESEL PARTS SUPPLY ... , the
parties mutually agree and covenant that—
(a) The stocks and merchandize and the furniture and equipments ..., shall be
divided into two equal shares between, and distributed to, Sy Kiat who shall own
one-half of the total and the other half to Asuncion Gillego who shall transfer the
same to their children, namely, Aida Sy, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy, and Rodolfo Sy.
(b) the business name and premises ... shall be retained by Sy Kiat. However, it
shall be his obligation to give to the aforenamed children an amount of One
Thousand Pesos ( Pl,000.00 ) monthly out of the rental of the two doors of the
same building now occupied by Everett Construction.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) With respect to the acquisition, during the existence of the
common-law husband-and-wife relationship between the parties, of the real
estates and properties registered and/or appearing in the name of Asuncion
Gillego ... , the parties mutually agree and covenant that the said real estates and
properties shall be transferred in equal shares to their children, namely, Aida Sy,
Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy, and Rodolfo Sy, but to be administered by Asuncion
Gillego during her lifetime ... [Exhibit "D".] (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx If any question involving any of the above matters should arise as an incident in
This compromise agreement constitutes a statement before a court of record by any case pending in the ordinary court, said incident shall be determined in the
which a child may be voluntarily acknowledged [See Art. 278, Civil Code.] main case.

Petitioners further argue that the questions on the validity of Sy Mat's marriage to xxx xxx xxx
Yao Kee and the paternity and filiation of the parties should have been ventilated As held in the case of Divinagracia v. Rovira [G.R. No. L42615. August 10, 1976,
in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. 72 SCRA 307]:

Specifically, petitioners rely on the following provision of Republic Act No. 5502,
entitled "An Act Revising Rep. Act No. 3278, otherwise known as the Charter of
the City of Caloocan', with regard to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court:
SEC. 91-A. Creation and Jurisdiction of the Court.—
xxx xxx xxx
The provisions of the Judiciary Act to the contrary notwithstanding, the court shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Cases involving custody, guardianship, adoption, revocation of adoption,
paternity and acknowledgment;
(3) Annulment of marriages, relief from marital obligations, legal separation of
spouses, and actions for support;
(4) Proceedings brought under the provisions of title six and title seven, chapters
one to three of the civil code;
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that under the aforequoted section 1 of Republic Act No. 4834 **** a case
involving paternity and acknowledgment may be ventilated as an incident in the
intestate or testate proceeding (See Baluyot vs. Ines Luciano, L-42215, July 13,
1976). But that legal provision presupposes that such an administration proceeding
is pending or existing and has not been terminated. [at pp. 313-314.] (Emphasis
supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
The reason for ths rule is not only "to obviate the rendition of conflicting rulings on
the same issue by the Court of First Instance and the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court" [Vda. de Baluyut v. Luciano, G.R. No. L-42215, July 13, 1976, 72
SCRA 52, 63] but more importantly to prevent multiplicity of suits. Accordingly, this
Court finds no reversible error committed by respondent court.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

and the ruling in the case of Bartolome v. Bartolome [G.R. No. L-23661, 21 SCRA
1324] reiterated in Divinagracia v. Rovira [G.R. No. L-42615, 72 SCRA 307.]

With the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts
were abolished. Their functions and jurisdiction are now vested with the Regional
Trial Courts [See Section 19 (7), B.P. Blg. 129 and Divinagracia v. Belosillo, G.R.
No. L-47407, August 12, 1986, 143 SCRA 356, 360] hence it is no longer
necessary to pass upon the issue of jurisdiction raised by petitioners.

Moreover, even without the exactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 we find in
Rep. Act No. 5502 sec. 91-A last paragraph that:

xxx xxx xxx

37
G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,
Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him
or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite
ruling on this apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision1 dated May 15,
2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and
its Resolution2 dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The
court a quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is
capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the
Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his
American wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine
Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage
was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady
Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer.
A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an
American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a
divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her
child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel,
California.
38
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry
invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed.
Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein
petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought
reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF
THE FAMILY CODE
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not
applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage;
that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper
remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal
separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs
respondent’s situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of
judicial determination.
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case
but insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which
capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant
to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.7
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial
court actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section
1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute,
executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation may,
before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial
Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a
declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are
adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy;
and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.8
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage
between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a
divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are
also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the
institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration
of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the
controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as
when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of
his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this
provision had come about in the first place, and what was the intent of the
legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order
No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3,
1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive
Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of
the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it
now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4),
(5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation
presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time
of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
39
The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the
parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an
American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to
remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9 on the Family Code, the
Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following
objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are
Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be
able to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad
can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino
citizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be
considered to be validly divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be
deleted and made into law only after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the
intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a
member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining
a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly
obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the
Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a
foreign citizenship by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of
Appeals.11 In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they
got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained
a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that
a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under
Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of
reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include
cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen
and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where
the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be
construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the
letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal
meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.12
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining
a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be
deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there
was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As
fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce
capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the
"divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper remedy of the
Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal
separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular
case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to
have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a
sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally
40
separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien
spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly
submitted by respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of
respondent’s wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.13
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation
that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign
divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must
prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it.14 Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and
proved.15 Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows
his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there
would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into
another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be
interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had
acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering
that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record,
we are unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that his wife,
who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and
had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such
declaration could only be made properly upon respondent’s submission of the
aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The
assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET
ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-11622 January 28, 1961
THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. DOUGLAS
FISHER AND BETTINA FISHER, and the COURT OF TAX APPEALS,
respondents.
BARRERA, J.:
This case relates to the determination and settlement of the hereditary estate left
by the deceased Walter G. Stevenson, and the laws applicable thereto. Walter G.
Stevenson (born in the Philippines on August 9, 1874 of British parents and
married in the City of Manila on January 23, 1909 to Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson
another British subject) died on February 22, 1951 in San Francisco, California,
U.S.A. whereto he and his wife moved and established their permanent residence
since May 10, 1945. In his will executed in San Francisco on May 22, 1947, and
which was duly probated in the Superior Court of California on April 11, 1951,
Stevenson instituted his wife Beatrice as his sole heiress to the following real and
personal properties acquired by the spouses while residing in the Philippines,
described and preliminary assessed as follows:
Gross Estate
Real Property — 2 parcels of land in Baguio, covered by T.C.T. Nos. 378 and 379
= P43,500.00
Personal Property
(1) 177 shares of stock of Canacao Estate at P10.00 each = 1,770.00
(2) 210,000 shares of stock of Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. at P0.38 per
share = 79,800.00
(3) Cash credit with Canacao Estate Inc. =4,870.88
(4) Cash, with the Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China = 851.97
Total Gross Assets = P130,792.85
On May 22, 1951, ancillary administration proceedings were instituted in the Court
of First Instance of Manila for the settlement of the estate in the Philippines. In due
time Stevenson's will was duly admitted to probate by our court and Ian Murray
Statt was appointed ancillary administrator of the estate, who on July 11, 1951,
filed a preliminary estate and inheritance tax return with the reservation of having
the properties declared therein finally appraised at their values six months after the
death of Stevenson. Preliminary return was made by the ancillary administrator in
order to secure the waiver of the Collector of Internal Revenue on the inheritance
tax due on the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines Inc.
which the estate then desired to dispose in the United States. Acting upon said
return, the Collector of Internal Revenue accepted the valuation of the personal
41
properties declared therein, but increased the appraisal of the two parcels of land
located in Baguio City by fixing their fair market value in the amount of P52.200.00,
instead of P43,500.00. After allowing the deductions claimed by the ancillary
administrator for funeral expenses in the amount of P2,000.00 and for judicial and
administration expenses in the sum of P5,500.00, the Collector assessed the state
the amount of P5,147.98 for estate tax and P10,875,26 or inheritance tax, or a
total of P16,023.23. Both of these assessments were paid by the estate on June 6,
1952.
On September 27, 1952, the ancillary administrator filed in amended estate and
inheritance tax return in pursuance f his reservation made at the time of filing of the
preliminary return and for the purpose of availing of the right granted by section 91
of the National Internal Revenue Code.
In this amended return the valuation of the 210,000 shares of stock in the
Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. was reduced from 0.38 per share, as originally
declared, to P0.20 per share, or from a total valuation of P79,800.00 to
P42,000.00. This change in price per share of stock was based by the ancillary
administrator on the market notation of the stock obtaining at the San Francisco
California) Stock Exchange six months from the death of Stevenson, that is, As of
August 22, 1931. In addition, the ancillary administrator made claim for the
following deductions:
Funeral expenses ($1,04326) = P2,086.52
Judicial Expenses:
(a) Administrator's Fee = P1,204.34
(b) Attorney's Fee = 6.000.00
(c) Judicial and Administration expenses as of August 9, 1952 = 1,400.05
= 8,604.39
Real Estate Tax for 1951 on Baguio real properties (O.R. No. B-1 686836) =
652.50
Claims against the estate:
($5,000.00) P10,000.00 = P10,000.00
Plus: 4% int. p.a. from Feb. 2 to 22, 1951
22.47
10,022.47
Sub-Total
P21,365.88
In the meantime, on December 1, 1952, Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson assigned all
her rights and interests in the estate to the spouses, Douglas and Bettina Fisher,
respondents herein.
On September 7, 1953, the ancillary administrator filed a second amended estate
and inheritance tax return (Exh. "M-N"). This return declared the same assets of
the estate stated in the amended return of September 22, 1952, except that it
contained new claims for additional exemption and deduction to wit: (1) deduction
in the amount of P4,000.00 from the gross estate of the decedent as provided for
in Section 861 (4) of the U.S. Federal Internal Revenue Code which the ancillary
administrator averred was allowable by way of the reciprocity granted by Section
122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as then held by the Board of Tax
Appeals in case No. 71 entitled "Housman vs. Collector," August 14, 1952; and (2)
exemption from the imposition of estate and inheritance taxes on the 210,000
shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. also pursuant to the
reciprocity proviso of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. In this
last return, the estate claimed that it was liable only for the amount of P525.34 for
estate tax and P238.06 for inheritance tax and that, as a consequence, it had
overpaid the government. The refund of the amount of P15,259.83, allegedly
overpaid, was accordingly requested by the estate. The Collector denied the claim.
For this reason, action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by
respondents, as assignees of Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson, for the recovery of
said amount. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 1125, the case was forwarded to the
Court of Tax Appeals which court, after hearing, rendered decision the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
In fine, we are of the opinion and so hold that: (a) the one-half (½) share of the
surviving spouse in the conjugal partnership property as diminished by the
obligations properly chargeable to such property should be deducted from the net
estate of the deceased Walter G. Stevenson, pursuant to Section 89-C of the
National Internal Revenue Code; (b) the intangible personal property belonging to
the estate of said Stevenson is exempt from inheritance tax, pursuant to the
provision of section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code in relation to the
California Inheritance Tax Law but decedent's estate is not entitled to an
exemption of P4,000.00 in the computation of the estate tax; (c) for purposes of
estate and inheritance taxation the Baguio real estate of the spouses should be
valued at P52,200.00, and 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode
Mines, Inc. should be appraised at P0.38 per share; and (d) the estate shall be
entitled to a deduction of P2,000.00 for funeral expenses and judicial expenses of
P8,604.39.
From this decision, both parties appealed.
The Collector of Internal Revenue, hereinafter called petitioner assigned four
errors allegedly committed by the trial court, while the assignees, Douglas and
Bettina Fisher hereinafter called respondents, made six assignments of error.
42
Together, the assigned errors raise the following main issues for resolution by this
Court:
(1) Whether or not, in determining the taxable net estate of the decedent, one-half
(½) of the net estate should be deducted therefrom as the share of tile surviving
spouse in accordance with our law on conjugal partnership and in relation to
section 89 (c) of the National Internal revenue Code;
(2) Whether or not the estate can avail itself of the reciprocity proviso embodied in
Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code granting exemption from the
payment of estate and inheritance taxes on the 210,000 shares of stock in the
Mindanao Mother Lode Mines Inc.;
(3) Whether or not the estate is entitled to the deduction of P4,000.00 allowed by
Section 861, U.S. Internal Revenue Code in relation to section 122 of the National
Internal Revenue Code;
(4) Whether or not the real estate properties of the decedent located in Baguio City
and the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc., were
correctly appraised by the lower court;
(5) Whether or not the estate is entitled to the following deductions: P8,604.39 for
judicial and administration expenses; P2,086.52 for funeral expenses; P652.50 for
real estate taxes; and P10,0,22.47 representing the amount of indebtedness
allegedly incurred by the decedent during his lifetime; and
(6) Whether or not the estate is entitled to the payment of interest on the amount it
claims to have overpaid the government and to be refundable to it.
In deciding the first issue, the lower court applied a well-known doctrine in our civil
law that in the absence of any ante-nuptial agreement, the contracting parties are
presumed to have adopted the system of conjugal partnership as to the properties
acquired during their marriage. The application of this doctrine to the instant case
is being disputed, however, by petitioner Collector of Internal Revenue, who
contends that pursuant to Article 124 of the New Civil Code, the property relation
of the spouses Stevensons ought not to be determined by the Philippine law, but
by the national law of the decedent husband, in this case, the law of England. It is
alleged by petitioner that English laws do not recognize legal partnership between
spouses, and that what obtains in that jurisdiction is another regime of property
relation, wherein all properties acquired during the marriage pertain and belong
Exclusively to the husband. In further support of his stand, petitioner cites Article
16 of the New Civil Code (Art. 10 of the old) to the effect that in testate and
intestate proceedings, the amount of successional rights, among others, is to be
determined by the national law of the decedent.
In this connection, let it be noted that since the mariage of the Stevensons in the
Philippines took place in 1909, the applicable law is Article 1325 of the old Civil
Code and not Article 124 of the New Civil Code which became effective only in
1950. It is true that both articles adhere to the so-called nationality theory of
determining the property relation of spouses where one of them is a foreigner and
they have made no prior agreement as to the administration disposition, and
ownership of their conjugal properties. In such a case, the national law of the
husband becomes the dominant law in determining the property relation of the
spouses. There is, however, a difference between the two articles in that Article
1241 of the new Civil Code expressly provides that it shall be applicable regardless
of whether the marriage was celebrated in the Philippines or abroad while Article
13252 of the old Civil Code is limited to marriages contracted in a foreign land.
It must be noted, however, that what has just been said refers to mixed marriages
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. In the instant case, both spouses are
foreigners who married in the Philippines. Manresa,3 in his Commentaries, has
this to say on this point:
La regla establecida en el art. 1.315, se refiere a las capitulaciones otorgadas en
Espana y entre espanoles. El 1.325, a las celebradas en el extranjero cuando
alguno de los conyuges es espanol. En cuanto a la regla procedente cuando dos
extranjeros se casan en Espana, o dos espanoles en el extranjero hay que
atender en el primer caso a la legislacion de pais a que aquellos pertenezean, y
en el segundo, a las reglas generales consignadas en los articulos 9 y 10 de
nuestro Codigo. (Emphasis supplied.)
If we adopt the view of Manresa, the law determinative of the property relation of
the Stevensons, married in 1909, would be the English law even if the marriage
was celebrated in the Philippines, both of them being foreigners. But, as correctly
observed by the Tax Court, the pertinent English law that allegedly vests in the
decedent husband full ownership of the properties acquired during the marriage
has not been proven by petitioner. Except for a mere allegation in his answer,
which is not sufficient, the record is bereft of any evidence as to what English law
says on the matter. In the absence of proof, the Court is justified, therefore, in
indulging in what Wharton calls "processual presumption," in presuming that the
law of England on this matter is the same as our law.4
Nor do we believe petitioner can make use of Article 16 of the New Civil Code (art.
10, old Civil Code) to bolster his stand. A reading of Article 10 of the old Civil
Code, which incidentally is the one applicable, shows that it does not encompass
or contemplate to govern the question of property relation between spouses. Said
article distinctly speaks of amount of successional rights and this term, in speaks in
our opinion, properly refers to the extent or amount of property that each heir is
legally entitled to inherit from the estate available for distribution. It needs to be
pointed out that the property relation of spouses, as distinguished from their
successional rights, is governed differently by the specific and express provisions
43
of Title VI, Chapter I of our new Civil Code (Title III, Chapter I of the old Civil
Code.) We, therefore, find that the lower court correctly deducted the half of the
conjugal property in determining the hereditary estate left by the deceased
Stevenson.
On the second issue, petitioner disputes the action of the Tax Court in the
exempting the respondents from paying inheritance tax on the 210,000 shares of
stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. in virtue of the reciprocity proviso
of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, in relation to Section 13851
of the California Revenue and Taxation Code, on the ground that: (1) the said
proviso of the California Revenue and Taxation Code has not been duly proven by
the respondents; (2) the reciprocity exemptions granted by section 122 of the
National Internal Revenue Code can only be availed of by residents of foreign
countries and not of residents of a state in the United States; and (3) there is no
"total" reciprocity between the Philippines and the state of California in that while
the former exempts payment of both estate and inheritance taxes on intangible
personal properties, the latter only exempts the payment of inheritance tax..
To prove the pertinent California law, Attorney Allison Gibbs, counsel for herein
respondents, testified that as an active member of the California Bar since 1931,
he is familiar with the revenue and taxation laws of the State of California. When
asked by the lower court to state the pertinent California law as regards exemption
of intangible personal properties, the witness cited article 4, section 13851 (a) and
(b) of the California Internal and Revenue Code as published in Derring's
California Code, a publication of the Bancroft-Whitney Company inc. And as part of
his testimony, a full quotation of the cited section was offered in evidence as
Exhibits "V-2" by the respondents.
It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and
our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them.5 Like any other fact,
they must be alleged and proved.6
Section 41, Rule 123 of our Rules of Court prescribes the manner of proving
foreign laws before our tribunals. However, although we believe it desirable that
these laws be proved in accordance with said rule, we held in the case of
Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, 61 Phil. 471, that "a reading of sections
300 and 301 of our Code of Civil Procedure (now section 41, Rule 123) will
convince one that these sections do not exclude the presentation of other
competent evidence to prove the existence of a foreign law." In that case, we
considered the testimony of an attorney-at-law of San Francisco, California who
quoted verbatim a section of California Civil Code and who stated that the same
was in force at the time the obligations were contracted, as sufficient evidence to
establish the existence of said law. In line with this view, we find no error,
therefore, on the part of the Tax Court in considering the pertinent California law as
proved by respondents' witness.
We now take up the question of reciprocity in exemption from transfer or death
taxes, between the State of California and the Philippines.F
Section 122 of our National Internal Revenue Code, in pertinent part, provides:
... And, provided, further, That no tax shall be collected under this Title in respect
of intangible personal property (a) if the decedent at the time of his death was a
resident of a foreign country which at the time of his death did not impose a
transfer of tax or death tax of any character in respect of intangible personal
property of citizens of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country, or (b) if
the laws of the foreign country of which the decedent was a resident at the time of
his death allow a similar exemption from transfer taxes or death taxes of every
character in respect of intangible personal property owned by citizens of the
Philippines not residing in that foreign country." (Emphasis supplied).
On the other hand, Section 13851 of the California Inheritance Tax Law, insofar as
pertinent, reads:.
"SEC. 13851, Intangibles of nonresident: Conditions. Intangible personal property
is exempt from the tax imposed by this part if the decedent at the time of his death
was a resident of a territory or another State of the United States or of a foreign
state or country which then imposed a legacy, succession, or death tax in respect
to intangible personal property of its own residents, but either:.
(a) Did not impose a legacy, succession, or death tax of any character in respect to
intangible personal property of residents of this State, or
(b) Had in its laws a reciprocal provision under which intangible personal property
of a non-resident was exempt from legacy, succession, or death taxes of every
character if the Territory or other State of the United States or foreign state or
country in which the nonresident resided allowed a similar exemption in respect to
intangible personal property of residents of the Territory or State of the United
States or foreign state or country of residence of the decedent." (Id.)
It is clear from both these quoted provisions that the reciprocity must be total, that
is, with respect to transfer or death taxes of any and every character, in the case of
the Philippine law, and to legacy, succession, or death taxes of any and every
character, in the case of the California law. Therefore, if any of the two states
collects or imposes and does not exempt any transfer, death, legacy, or
44
succession tax of any character, the reciprocity does not work. This is the
underlying principle of the reciprocity clauses in both laws.
In the Philippines, upon the death of any citizen or resident, or non-resident with
properties therein, there are imposed upon his estate and its settlement, both an
estate and an inheritance tax. Under the laws of California, only inheritance tax is
imposed. On the other hand, the Federal Internal Revenue Code imposes an
estate tax on non-residents not citizens of the United States,7 but does not provide
for any exemption on the basis of reciprocity. Applying these laws in the manner
the Court of Tax Appeals did in the instant case, we will have a situation where a
Californian, who is non-resident in the Philippines but has intangible personal
properties here, will the subject to the payment of an estate tax, although exempt
from the payment of the inheritance tax. This being the case, will a Filipino, non-
resident of California, but with intangible personal properties there, be entitled to
the exemption clause of the California law, since the Californian has not been
exempted from every character of legacy, succession, or death tax because he is,
under our law, under obligation to pay an estate tax? Upon the other hand, if we
exempt the Californian from paying the estate tax, we do not thereby entitle a
Filipino to be exempt from a similar estate tax in California because under the
Federal Law, which is equally enforceable in California he is bound to pay the
same, there being no reciprocity recognized in respect thereto. In both instances,
the Filipino citizen is always at a disadvantage. We do not believe that our
legislature has intended such an unfair situation to the detriment of our own
government and people. We, therefore, find and declare that the lower court erred
in exempting the estate in question from payment of the inheritance tax.
We are not unaware of our ruling in the case of Collector of Internal Revenue vs.
Lara (G.R. Nos. L-9456 & L-9481, prom. January 6, 1958, 54 O.G. 2881)
exempting the estate of the deceased Hugo H. Miller from payment of the
inheritance tax imposed by the Collector of Internal Revenue. It will be noted,
however, that the issue of reciprocity between the pertinent provisions of our tax
law and that of the State of California was not there squarely raised, and the ruling
therein cannot control the determination of the case at bar. Be that as it may, we
now declare that in view of the express provisions of both the Philippine and
California laws that the exemption would apply only if the law of the other grants an
exemption from legacy, succession, or death taxes of every character, there could
not be partial reciprocity. It would have to be total or none at all.
With respect to the question of deduction or reduction in the amount of P4,000.00
based on the U.S. Federal Estate Tax Law which is also being claimed by
respondents, we uphold and adhere to our ruling in the Lara case (supra) that the
amount of $2,000.00 allowed under the Federal Estate Tax Law is in the nature of
a deduction and not of an exemption regarding which reciprocity cannot be
claimed under the provision of Section 122 of our National Internal Revenue Code.
Nor is reciprocity authorized under the Federal Law. .
On the issue of the correctness of the appraisal of the two parcels of land situated
in Baguio City, it is contended that their assessed values, as appearing in the tax
rolls 6 months after the death of Stevenson, ought to have been considered by
petitioner as their fair market value, pursuant to section 91 of the National Internal
Revenue Code. It should be pointed out, however, that in accordance with said
proviso the properties are required to be appraised at their fair market value and
the assessed value thereof shall be considered as the fair market value only when
evidence to the contrary has not been shown. After all review of the record, we are
satisfied that such evidence exists to justify the valuation made by petitioner which
was sustained by the tax court, for as the tax court aptly observed:
"The two parcels of land containing 36,264 square meters were valued by the
administrator of the estate in the Estate and Inheritance tax returns filed by him at
P43,500.00 which is the assessed value of said properties. On the other hand,
defendant appraised the same at P52,200.00. It is of common knowledge, and this
Court can take judicial notice of it, that assessments for real estate taxation
purposes are very much lower than the true and fair market value of the properties
at a given time and place. In fact one year after decedent's death or in 1952 the
said properties were sold for a price of P72,000.00 and there is no showing that
special or extraordinary circumstances caused the sudden increase from the price
of P43,500.00, if we were to accept this value as a fair and reasonable one as of
1951. Even more, the counsel for plaintiffs himself admitted in open court that he
was willing to purchase the said properties at P2.00 per square meter. In the light
of these facts we believe and therefore hold that the valuation of P52,200.00 of the
real estate in Baguio made by defendant is fair, reasonable and justified in the
premises." (Decision, p. 19).
In respect to the valuation of the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother
Lode Mines, Inc., (a domestic corporation), respondents contend that their value
should be fixed on the basis of the market quotation obtaining at the San Francisco
(California) Stock Exchange, on the theory that the certificates of stocks were then
held in that place and registered with the said stock exchange. We cannot agree
with respondents' argument. The situs of the shares of stock, for purposes of
taxation, being located here in the Philippines, as respondents themselves
concede and considering that they are sought to be taxed in this jurisdiction,
consistent with the exercise of our government's taxing authority, their fair market
value should be taxed on the basis of the price prevailing in our country.
Upon the other hand, we find merit in respondents' other contention that the said
shares of stock commanded a lesser value at the Manila Stock Exchange six
45
months after the death of Stevenson. Through Atty. Allison Gibbs, respondents
have shown that at that time a share of said stock was bid for at only P.325 (p.
103, t.s.n.). Significantly, the testimony of Atty. Gibbs in this respect has never
been questioned nor refuted by petitioner either before this court or in the court
below. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we are, therefore, constrained
to reverse the Tax Court on this point and to hold that the value of a share in the
said mining company on August 22, 1951 in the Philippine market was P.325 as
claimed by respondents..
It should be noted that the petitioner and the Tax Court valued each share of stock
of P.38 on the basis of the declaration made by the estate in its preliminary return.
Patently, this should not have been the case, in view of the fact that the ancillary
administrator had reserved and availed of his legal right to have the properties of
the estate declared at their fair market value as of six months from the time the
decedent died..
On the fifth issue, we shall consider the various deductions, from the allowance or
disallowance of which by the Tax Court, both petitioner and respondents have
appealed..
Petitioner, in this regard, contends that no evidence of record exists to support the
allowance of the sum of P8,604.39 for the following expenses:.
1) Administrator's fee
P1,204.34
2) Attorney's fee
6,000.00
3) Judicial and Administrative expenses
2,052.55
Total Deductions
P8,604.39
An examination of the record discloses, however, that the foregoing items were
considered deductible by the Tax Court on the basis of their approval by the
probate court to which said expenses, we may presume, had also been presented
for consideration. It is to be supposed that the probate court would not have
approved said items were they not supported by evidence presented by the estate.
In allowing the items in question, the Tax Court had before it the pertinent order of
the probate court which was submitted in evidence by respondents. (Exh. "AA-2",
p. 100, record). As the Tax Court said, it found no basis for departing from the
findings of the probate court, as it must have been satisfied that those expenses
were actually incurred. Under the circumstances, we see no ground to reverse this
finding of fact which, under Republic Act of California National Association, which it
would appear, that while still living, Walter G. Stevenson obtained we are not
inclined to pass upon the claim of respondents in respect to the additional amount
of P86.52 for funeral expenses which was disapproved by the court a quo for lack
of evidence.
In connection with the deduction of P652.50 representing the amount of realty
taxes paid in 1951 on the decedent's two parcels of land in Baguio City, which
respondents claim was disallowed by the Tax Court, we find that this claim has in
fact been allowed. What happened here, which a careful review of the record will
reveal, was that the Tax Court, in itemizing the liabilities of the estate, viz:
1) Administrator's fee
P1,204.34
2) Attorney's fee
6,000.00
3) Judicial and Administration expenses as of August 9, 1952
2,052.55
Total
P9,256.89
added the P652.50 for realty taxes as a liability of the estate, to the P1,400.05 for
judicial and administration expenses approved by the court, making a total of
P2,052.55, exactly the same figure which was arrived at by the Tax Court for
judicial and administration expenses. Hence, the difference between the total of
P9,256.98 allowed by the Tax Court as deductions, and the P8,604.39 as found by
the probate court, which is P652.50, the same amount allowed for realty taxes. An
evident oversight has involuntarily been made in omitting the P2,000.00 for funeral
expenses in the final computation. This amount has been expressly allowed by the
lower court and there is no reason why it should not be. .
We come now to the other claim of respondents that pursuant to section 89(b) (1)
in relation to section 89(a) (1) (E) and section 89(d), National Internal Revenue
Code, the amount of P10,022.47 should have been allowed the estate as a
deduction, because it represented an indebtedness of the decedent incurred
during his lifetime. In support thereof, they offered in evidence a duly certified
claim, presented to the probate court in California by the Bank of California
National Association, which it would appear, that while still living, Walter G.
Stevenson obtained a loan of $5,000.00 secured by pledge on 140,000 of his
46
shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. (Exhs. "Q-Q4", pp. 53-
59, record). The Tax Court disallowed this item on the ground that the local
probate court had not approved the same as a valid claim against the estate and
because it constituted an indebtedness in respect to intangible personal property
which the Tax Court held to be exempt from inheritance tax.
For two reasons, we uphold the action of the lower court in disallowing the
deduction.
Firstly, we believe that the approval of the Philippine probate court of this particular
indebtedness of the decedent is necessary. This is so although the same, it is
averred has been already admitted and approved by the corresponding probate
court in California, situs of the principal or domiciliary administration. It is true that
we have here in the Philippines only an ancillary administration in this case, but, it
has been held, the distinction between domiciliary or principal administration and
ancillary administration serves only to distinguish one administration from the
other, for the two proceedings are separate and independent.8 The reason for the
ancillary administration is that, a grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore,
have any effect beyond the limits of the country in which it was granted. Hence, we
have the requirement that before a will duly probated outside of the Philippines can
have effect here, it must first be proved and allowed before our courts, in much the
same manner as wills originally presented for allowance therein.9 And the estate
shall be administered under letters testamentary, or letters of administration
granted by the court, and disposed of according to the will as probated, after
payment of just debts and expenses of administration.10 In other words, there is a
regular administration under the control of the court, where claims must be
presented and approved, and expenses of administration allowed before
deductions from the estate can be authorized. Otherwise, we would have the
actuations of our own probate court, in the settlement and distribution of the estate
situated here, subject to the proceedings before the foreign court over which our
courts have no control. We do not believe such a procedure is countenanced or
contemplated in the Rules of Court.
Another reason for the disallowance of this indebtedness as a deduction, springs
from the provisions of Section 89, letter (d), number (1), of the National Internal
Revenue Code which reads:
(d) Miscellaneous provisions — (1) No deductions shall be allowed in the case of a
non-resident not a citizen of the Philippines unless the executor, administrator or
anyone of the heirs, as the case may be, includes in the return required to be filed
under section ninety-three the value at the time of his death of that part of the
gross estate of the non-resident not situated in the Philippines."
In the case at bar, no such statement of the gross estate of the non-resident
Stevenson not situated in the Philippines appears in the three returns submitted to
the court or to the office of the petitioner Collector of Internal Revenue. The
purpose of this requirement is to enable the revenue officer to determine how
much of the indebtedness may be allowed to be deducted, pursuant to (b), number
(1) of the same section 89 of the Internal Revenue Code which provides:
(b) Deductions allowed to non-resident estates. — In the case of a non-resident
not a citizen of the Philippines, by deducting from the value of that part of his gross
estate which at the time of his death is situated in the Philippines —
(1) Expenses, losses, indebtedness, and taxes. — That proportion of the
deductions specified in paragraph (1) of subjection (a) of this section11 which the
value of such part bears the value of his entire gross estate wherever situated;"
Respondent's claim for interest on the amount allegedly overpaid, if any actually
results after a recomputation on the basis of this decision is hereby denied in line
with our recent decision in Collector of Internal Revenue v. St. Paul's Hospital
(G.R. No. L-12127, May 29, 1959) wherein we held that, "in the absence of a
statutory provision clearly or expressly directing or authorizing such payment, and
none has been cited by respondents, the National Government cannot be required
to pay interest."
WHEREFORE, as modified in the manner heretofore indicated, the judgment of
the lower court is hereby affirmed in all other respects not inconsistent herewith.
No costs. So ordered.

In other words, the allowable deduction is only to the extent of the portion of the
indebtedness which is equivalent to the proportion that the estate in the Philippines
bears to the total estate wherever situated. Stated differently, if the properties in
the Philippines constitute but 1/5 of the entire assets wherever situated, then only
1/5 of the indebtedness may be deducted. But since, as heretofore adverted to,
there is no statement of the value of the estate situated outside the Philippines, no
part of the indebtedness can be allowed to be deducted, pursuant to Section 89,
letter (d), number (1) of the Internal Revenue Code.

For the reasons thus stated, we affirm the ruling of the lower court disallowing the
deduction of the alleged indebtedness in the sum of P10,022.47.

In recapitulation, we hold and declare that:

(a) only the one-half (1/2) share of the decedent Stevenson in the conjugal
partnership property constitutes his hereditary estate subject to the estate and
inheritance taxes;
(b) the intangible personal property is not exempt from inheritance tax, there
existing no complete total reciprocity as required in section 122 of the National
Internal Revenue Code, nor is the decedent's estate entitled to an exemption of
P4,000.00 in the computation of the estate tax;
(c) for the purpose of the estate and inheritance taxes, the 210,000 shares of stock
in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. are to be appraised at P0.325 per share;
and
(d) the P2,000.00 for funeral expenses should be deducted in the determination of
the net asset of the deceased Stevenson.

In all other respects, the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals is affirmed.

47