ANAYA VS.

PALAROAN
36 SCRA 97
REYES, J.B.L., J.

NATURE: Appeal from an order of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court

FACTS:
Plaintiff Aurora and defendant Fernando were married in December 1953; that defendant
Fernando filed an action for annulment of the marriage in January 1954 on the ground that his consent
was "(1) obtained through force and intimidation; that judgment was rendered therein in September
1959 dismissing the complaint of Fernando, upholding the validity of the marriage and granting Aurora's
counterclaim; that (per paragraph IV) while the amount of the counterclaim was being negotiated "to
settle the judgment," Fernando had divulged to Aurora that several months prior to their marriage he
had pre-marital relationship with a close relative of his; and that "the nondivulgement to her of the
aforementioned pre-marital secret on the part of defendant that definitely wrecked their marriage,
which apparently doomed to fail even before it had hardly commenced… frank disclosure of which,
certitude precisely precluded her, the Plaintiff herein from going thru the marriage that was solemnized
between them constituted 'FRAUD', in obtaining her consent. She prayed for the annulment of the
marriage and for moral damages.

Defendant Fernando, denied the allegations; he averred that under no circumstance would he
live with Aurora, as he had escaped from her and from her relatives the day following their marriage;
that he denied having committed any fraud against her. Defendant Fernando did not pray for the
dismissal of the complaint but for its dismissal "with respect to the alleged moral damages.

Plaintiff Aurora filed a reply with answer to the counterclaim, wherein she alleged:
1. Prior to their marriage, paid court to her, and pretended to shower her with love and
affection felt so but because she merely happened to be the first girl available to marry so he
could evade marrying the close relative of his whose immediate members of her family were
threatening him to force him to marry her;

2. that since he contracted the marriage for the reason intimated by him, and not because he
loved her, he secretly intended from the very beginning not to perform the marital duties and
obligations appurtenant thereto, and furthermore, he covertly made up his mind not to live with
her;

3. Carried on a courtship with a third girl with whom, after gaining the latters love cohabited and
had several children during the whole range of nine years.

While reviewing the expediente, the court realized that Aurora's allegation of the fraud was
legally insufficient to invalidate her marriage

ISSUE:
Whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with
another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage.

RULING:
We must agree with the lower court that it is not. For fraud as a vice of consent in marriage,
which may be a cause for its annulment, comes under Article 85, No. 4, of the Civil Code, which
provides:
"ART. 85. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the
time of the marriage: xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx "(4) That the consent of either party was
obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts
 constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as her husband or his wife, as the
case may be";

This fraud, as vice of consent, is limited exclusively by law to those kinds or species of
fraud enumerated in Article 86, as follows:
"ART. 86. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in
number 4 of the preceding article:

1. Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting parties;

2. Non-disclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of a crime involving
moral turpitude, and the penalty imposed was imprisonment for two years or more;
3. Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant by a man other than her husband.

"No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall

constitute Such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage."

The intention of Congress to confine the circumstances that can constitute fraud as
ground for annulment of marriage to the foregoing three cases may be deduced from the fact
that, of all the causes of nullity enumerated in Article 85, fraud is the only one given special
treatment in a subsequent article within the chapter on void and voidable marriages. If its
intention were otherwise, Congress would have stopped at Article 85, for, anyway, fraud in
general is already mentioned therein as a cause for annulment. But Article 86 was also enacted,
expressly and specifically dealing with "fraud referred to in number 4 of the preceding article,"
and proceeds by enumerating the specific frauds, making it clear that Congress intended to
exclude all other frauds or deceits. To stress further such intention, the enumeration of the
specific frauds was followed by the interdiction: "No other misrepresentation or deceit as to
character, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for
the annulment of marriage."

NOTES:
But plaintiff-appellant Anaya emphasizes that not only has she alleged "non-
divulgement" (the word chosen by her) of the pre-marital relationship of her husband with
another woman as her cause of action, but that she has, likewise, alleged in her reply that
defendant Fernando paid court to her without any intention of complying with his marital duties
and obligations and covertly made up his mind not to live with her.

On the merits of this second fraud charge, it is enough to point out that any secret
intention on the husband's part not to perform his marital duties must have been discovered by
the wife soon after the marriage: hence her action for annulment based on that fraud should
have been brought within four years after the marriage.
JIMENEZ VS. REPUBLIC
NO. L-12790
PADILLA, J.

NATURE: Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Zamboanga City

FACTS:
Plaintiff Joel Jimenez prays for a decree annulling his marriage to the defendant
Remedios Cañizares contracted in August 1950, upon the ground that the orifice of her genitals
or vagina was too small to allow the penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation; that
the condition of her genitals as described above existed at the time of marriage and continues to
exist; and that for that reason he left the conjugal home two nights and one day after they had
been married.

After hearing, at which the defendant was not present, in April 1957 the Court entered a
decree annulling the marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant. In the same month, the
city attorney filed a motion for reconsideration of the decree, upon the ground, among others,
that the defendant's impotency has not been satisfactorily established as required by law; that
she had not been physically examined because she had refused to be so examined; that instead
of annulling the marriage the Court should have punished her for contempt of court and
compelled her to undergo a physical examination and submit a medical certificate; and that the
decree sought to be reconsidered would open the door to married couples, who want to end
their marriage to collude or connive with each other by just alleging impotency of one of them.

ISSUE:
Whether the marriage in question may be annulled on the strength only of the lone
testimony of the husband who claimed and testified that his wife was and is impotent.

RULING:
No. A physical examination in this case is not self-incrimination. She is not charged with
any offense. She is not being -compelled to be a witness against herself. 1 "Impotency being an
abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency." 2 The
lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is
insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife.
JONES VS. HORTIGUELA
NO. 43701
CONCEPCION, J.

NATURE: Appeal from an order of the CFI of Cebu

FACTS:
As Marciana Escaño had died intestate, her widower Felix Hortigüela was appointed
judicial administrator of her entire estate, and in an order issued on May 9, 1932, Angelita Jones,
her daughter by her first marriage, and Felix Hortigüela, her widower by her second marriage,
were declared her only heirs. The project of partition and final account were approved in an
order of June 26, 1933, and the properties were turned over to the respective grantees by virtue
thereof.

In May 1934, the heiress Angelita Jones, filed a motion alleging that she was the only
heir of her mother, the deceased Marciana Escaño; that there never was a valid marriage
between her mother and Felix Hortigüela or that had such marriage been celebrated, it was null
and void; and even granting that it were valid, Felix Hortigüela was not entitled to a share in
usufruct of one-third of the inheritance; that the petitioner was a minor and that during the
hearing of the intestate proceedings she had not been assisted by counsel but was represented
by the same attorney of Felix Hortigüela; that during said proceedings there had been
committed many errors and inaccuracies which impaired her rights and that the fees of P10,000
charged by the administrator were highly unreasonable and unconscionable.

She prayed:
(a) for the reopening of the proceedings;
(b) that her husband be appointed special administrator without bond;
(c) that her mother's alleged marriage to Felix Hortigüela be declared null and void;
(d) that the partition of the properties made by administrator Hortigüela be declared
null and void and that the petitioner be declared the only universal heir of her deceased mother;
and
(e) that in case there was a valid marriage between Felix Hortigüela and Marciana
Escaño, Hortigüela be declared not entitled to the widower's usufruct; the errors in the
administrator's account be corrected; the latter be granted a remuneration of only P4 a day, and
a new partition of the properties be made.

It is a fact that in December, 1914, Marciana Escaño married Arthur W. Jones, in January
1918, Jones secured a passport to go abroad and thereafter nothing was ever heard of him. In
October 1919, proceedings were instituted, to have her husband judicially declared an absentee.
On the 25th of said month, the court issued an order declaring Arthur W. Jones an absentee
from the Philippine Islands pursuant to the provisions of article 186 of the Civil Code, with the
proviso that said judicial declaration of absence would not take effect until six months after its
publication in the official newspapers. In April 1921, the court issued another order for the
taking effect of the declaration of absence. In May 1927, Felix Hortigüela and Marciana Escaño
were married.

Angelita Jones contends that the declaration of absence must be understood to have
been made not in the order of October 25, 1919, but in that of April 23, 1921, and that from the
latter date to May 6, 1927, the date of the celebration of the marriage, only 6 years and 14 days
elapsed. Felix Hortigüela and Marciana Escaño is null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Felix Hortigüela's alleged marriage to Marciana Escaño was celebrated.

RULING:
This court does not believe so. For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not
necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence
made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the
taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the
celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has been
absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present
does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally
reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the
marriage (section III, paragraph 2, General Orders, No. 68).

In accordance with the foregoing legal provision, the absence of Marciana Escaño's
former husband should be counted from January 10, 1918, the date on which the last news
concerning Arthur W. Jones was received, and from said date to May 6, 1927, more than nine
years elapsed. Said marriage is, therefore, valid and lawful.

Inasmuch as Felix Hortigüela was lawfully married to Marciana Escaño and was not
divorced from her at the time of her death, there is' no doubt that he is entitled to inherit in
usuf ruct, not only in testate but also in intestate succession, as in the present case.

Therefore, there is no reason to annul the order of May 9, 1932, declaring that the heirs
of the deceased were her widower and her daughter Angelita Jones. Neither is there any reason
to annul the order of June 28, 1933, approving the partition of the properties of the intestate
estate.

The inaccuracies and errors attributed to the administrator Felix Hortigüela in Angelita
Jones' motion and alleged therein as one of the grounds for asking for the reopening of the
proceedings, have not been the subject matter of any assignment of error. It should, therefore,
be the considered that the petitioner has desisted from her in tention relative to this alleged
ground for the nullity of the proceedings.

As to the administrator's fees, the evidence shows that of the P10,000 granted by the
court to Hortigüela as his own f ees as such administrator, he paid to Attorney Faelnar the sum
of P8,000 for the latter's professional services in this as well as in other cases affecting the estate
of his deceased wife. As to the remainder of P2,000, said administrator is entitled to collect the
sum of P4 for every day employed by him as such, and considering the importance of the
inheritance in question and the time elapsed since the inception of the administration
proceedings this court is of the opinion that the sum of P2,000 is an adequate compensation for
said administrator's services.
SSS VS. JARQUE
G.R. NO. 165545
CARPIO-MORALES, J.

NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari

FACTS:
In April 1955, Clemente G. Bailon (Bailon) and Alice P. Diaz (Alice) contracted marriage.
More than 15 years later or on October 9, 1970, Bailon filed before the then Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Sorsogon a petition to declare Alice presumptively dead. The CFI granted the
petition.

Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared presumptively dead or on August 8,
1983, Bailon contracted marriage with Teresita Jarque (respondent).

In January 1998, Bailon, who was a member of the Social Security System (SSS) since and
a retiree pensioner thereof, died.

Respondent filed on March 11, 1998 an additional claim for death benefits which was
also granted by the SSS.

Cecilia Bailon-Yap (Cecilia), who claimed to be a daughter of Bailon and one Elisa Jayona
(Elisa) contested before the SSS the release to respondent of the death and funeral benefits. She
claimed that Bailon contracted three marriages in his lifetime, the first with Alice, the second
with her mother Elisa, and the third with respondent, all of whom are still alive; she, together
with her siblings, paid for Bailon’s medical and funeral expenses; and all the documents
submitted by respondent to the SSS in support of her claims are spurious.

Cecilia and her sister Norma Bailon Chavez (Norma) claimed that they personally know
that Alice is “still very much alive.”

In April 1999, a certain Hermes P. Diaz, claiming to be the brother and guardian of “Aliz
P. Diaz,” filed before the SSS a claim for death benefits accruing from Bailon’s death,

Atty. Marites C. de la Torre of the Legal Unit of the SSS recommended the cancellation
of payment of death pension benefits to respondent and the issuance of an order for the refund
of the amount paid to her; the denial of the claim of Alice on the ground that she was not
dependent upon Bailon for support during his lifetime; and the payment of the balance of the
five-year guaranteed pension to Bailon’s beneficiaries according to the order of preference
provided under the law, after the amount erroneously paid to respondent has been collected.

Respodent protested the cancellation of her monthly pension for death benefits, and
asserted that her marriage with Bailon was not declared before any court of justice as bigamous
or unlawful, hence, it remained valid and subsisting for all legal intents and purposes as in fact
Bailon designated her as his beneficiary.

SSS maintained the denial of her claim and discontinuance of payment of monthly
pension.
 One Alicia P. Diaz filed an Affidavit, attesting that she is the widow of Bailon; she had
only recently come to know of the petition filed by Bailon to declare her presumptively dead; it
is not true that she disappeared as Bailon could have easily located her, she having stayed at her
parents’ residence in Barcelona, Sorsogon after she found out that Bailon was having an
extramarital affair; and Bailon used to visit her even after their separation.

Ratiocinated:
“The first wife never disappeared as the deceased member represented in bad faith.
This Commission accords credence to the findings of the SSS contained in its Memorandum
dated August 9, 1999, 32 revealing that Alice (a.k.a. Aliz) Diaz never left Barcelona, Sorsogon,
after her separation from Clemente Bailon x x x.

SSC RULING: The SSC found that the marriage of respondent to Bailon was void and, therefore,
she was “just a common-law-wife.”

CA RULING: CA reversed and set aside the order of the SSC and thus ordered the SSS to pay
respondent all the pension benefits due her.

It is only the competent court that can nullify the second marriage pursuant to Article 87
of the Civil Code and upon the reappearance of the missing spouse, which action for annulment
may be filed.

Nowhere does the law contemplates [sic] the possibility that respondent SSS may validly
declare the second marriage null and void on the basis alone of its own investigation and declare
that the decision of the RTC declaring one to be presumptively dead is without basis.

Respondent SSS cannot arrogate upon itself the authority to review the decision of the
regular courts under the pretext of determining the actual and lawful beneficiaries of its
members.

SSC and SSS filed motion for reconsideration but both denied for lack of merit.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the decision of the CA is contrary to law.
2. Whether or not the marriage of Bailon and respondent is void.

RULING:
1. Yes. In interfering with and passing upon the CFI Order, the SSC virtually acted as an
appellate court. The law does not give the SSC unfettered discretion to trifle with orders of
regular courts in the exercise of its authority to determine the beneficiaries of the SSS.

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity on
August 3, 1988 of theFamily Code, the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code
which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration.

(Refer to Art. 83 of the Civil Code)

In the case at bar, as found by the CFI, Alice had been absent for 15 consecutive years 45
when Bailon sought the declaration of her presumptive death, which judicial declaration was not
even a requirement then for purposes of remarriage.

Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable, 48 it is terminated by final
judgment of annulment in a case instituted by the absent spouse who reappears or by either of
the spouses in the subsequent marriage.
 Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is
necessary.

If the subsequent marriage is not terminated by registration of an affidavit of

reappearance or by judicial declaration but by death of either spouse as in the case at bar,
Tolentino submits:

“x x x [G]enerally if a subsequent marriage is dissolved by the death of either spouse,

the effects of dissolution of valid marriages shall arise. The good or bad faith of either spouse
can no longer be raised, because, as in annullable or voidable marriages, the marriage cannot be
questioned except in a direct action for annulment.”

NOTES:
It bears reiterating that a voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a
direct proceeding. Consequently, such marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the
parties and not after the death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left
as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. Upon the death of either, the marriage cannot be
impeached, and is made good ab initio.
VALDEZ VS. REPUBLIC
G.R. NO. 180863
NACHURA, J.

NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45

FACTS:
Petitioner married Sofio in January 1971. In March 1972, Sofio left their conjugal
dwelling, petitioner waited for him to return but in May 1972, petitioner decided to go back to
her parent’s home. Sofio showed up after 3 years, and they agreed to separated. They executed
a document to that effect. That was the last time petitioner saw him, no news of his whereabout
or even if he was alive or not.

Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes on June 20,
1985. Subsequently, however, Virgilio's application for naturalization n filed with the United
States Department of Homeland Security was denied because petitioner's marriage to Sofio was
subsisting. Hence, petitioner filed a Petition before the RTC seeking the declaration of
presumptive death of Sofio.

RTC RULING: Dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The RTC held that Angelita "was not able
to prove the well-grounded belief that her husband Sofio Polborosa was already dead." It said
that under Article 41 of the Family Code, the present spouse is burdened to prove that her
spouse has been absent and that she has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already
dead before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, she argued that it is the Civil Code that applies in
this case and not the Family Code since petitioner's marriage to Sofio was celebrated on January
11, 1971. Petitioner further argued that she had acquired a vested right under the provisions of
the Civil Code and the stricter provisions of the Family Code should not be applied against her.
To apply the stricter provisions of the Family Code will impair the rights petitioner had acquired
under the Civil Code.

RTC denied the motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subsequent marriage of petitioner is valid.

RULING:
Yes. The RTC Decision, insofar as it dismissed the Petition, is affirmed. However, we
must state that we are denying the Petition on grounds different from those cited in the RTC
Decision.

The RTC erred in applying the provisions of the Family Code and holding that petitioner
needed to prove a "well-founded belief" that Sofio was already dead.

It is readily apparent, however, that the marriages of petitioner to Sofio and Virgilio on
January 11, 1971 and June 20, 1985, respectively, were both celebrated under the auspices of
the Civil Code.
 For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse
judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary
precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee.

In re Szatraw: A judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he had

been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary
proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final.

In both cases (Lukban v. Republic & Gue v. Republic), the Court reiterated its ruling in
Szatraw. It held that a petition for judicial declaration that petitioner's husband is presumed to
be dead cannot be entertained because it is not authorized by law.

Under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is established by law[19] and no court
declaration is needed for the presumption to arise. Since death is presumed to have taken place
by the seventh year of absence,[20] Sofio is to be presumed dead starting October 1982.

Consequently, at the time of petitioner's marriage to Virgilio, there existed no

impediment to petitioner's capacity to marry, and the marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of
Article 83 of the Civil Code.

We declare that petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio at the time their marriage
was celebrated in 1985 and, therefore, the said marriage is legal and valid.