1

CHANGING CHARACTER OF WAR

INTRODUCTION
1. Defining the nature of war has been one of the most vexing problems
occupying the minds of scholars and statesmen throughout history. The very ubiquity
of mil conflict as an aspect of human interaction between societies has spawned
questions as wide-ranging as the causes of war, how to prevent war, and
significantly what exactly we understand as war. All of these can be combined into
the overarching meta-historical question of whether and how, war is subject to
change, and if so, what components are specifically subject to change?    
2. Change or not to Change – Nature versus Character. How we
approach change as an aspect of war will depend on how we conceptualize the
concept of change relative to the phenomenon of war, which naturally produces the
corollary question of what exactly war is. For answers to both the preeminent
intellectual auth to have been consulted since the French Revolutionary Wars is Carl
von Clausewitz and his theoretical framework presented in On War. As to the latter
conundrum, Clausewitz provides a succinct definition, that “War is nothing but a duel
on a larger scale. Countless duels go to make up war, but a picture of it as a whole
can be formed by imagining a pair of wrestlers. […] War is thus an act of force to
compel our enemy to do our will” (Clausewitz, 1976, p. 75). From this analogy it is
clear, that located at the centre of war is the dialectical confrontation between two
opposing autonomous actors, utilizing coercion to allow for the attainment of each
actor’s end.
3. Turning to the former question, while Clausewitz does not provide a
comprehensive framework for a causal sequence regarding change, he establishes
a fundamental difference between contingent manifestation and an enduring core:
"War is more than a mere chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the
given case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a
paradoxical trinity – composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity… ; of the
play of chance and probability… ; and of its ele of subordination, as an instrument of
policy, which makes it subject to reason alone."
– Carl von Clausewitz in On War
4. Clausewitz further elaborates that a highly variable interrelationship exists
between these tendencies, not to be subjected to a fixed relationship, thus allowing
for substantial variation in the relative wt ascribed to each across cases (Clausewitz,
1976). Global tech devps and their mil applications have an impact on the changing
character of war. Major tech transformations constitute a source of change in
conventional and unconventional warfare. The changes in the global power structure
in light of recent conflicts begs the question, how rapidly is the nature & character of
warfare going to change, and to what extent; answers to which would be discussed
in the fwg paragraphs.
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AIM
5. To analyse the changing character of war in the strat envt of 21 st century, and
discuss the various factors influencing the nature and conduct of warfare.
SCOPE
6. The fwg themes would be analysed:
(a) Part I: Evolving Character of War
(b) Part II: Trends in Warfare
(c) Part III: Capb Devp
(d) Part IV: Strat for Future Conflict
(e) Part-V: Conclusion

PART – I: EVOLVING CHARACTER OF WAR

Nature of War
7. War has an enduring nature that demonstrates four continuities: a pol
dimension, a human dimension, the existence of uncertainty and that it is a contest
of wills. Clausewitz, provided a description of war's enduring nature in the opening
chapter of On War. He observed that all wars involve passion, often lying with the
hostile feelings of the people, otherwise states would avoid war altogether by simply
comparing their relative strengths in "a kind of war by algebra.” He emphasized wars'
uncertainty, stating that war often "[resembles] a game of cards." Finally, war is
always a matter of policy, as "The political object…will thus determine both the mil
obj…and the amount of effort it requires," which is a rational process of directing
hostile intent normally left to govt. While these continuities are present in all wars,
every war exists within social, political and historical contexts, giving each war much
of its unique character (e.g. levels of intensity, objs, interactions with the en, etc.).
8. Conversely, warfare has a constantly changing character. Although simply
"the means by which war has to be fought," the influence of context is again
paramount. Tech has a significant influence on warfare, but other influences like doc
and mil org are also important. Changes in the character of warfare may occur slowly
over generations or quite rapidly. Additionally, these changes clearly affect the
tactical art of employing units and wpns and, to a lesser extent, the op art of linking
mil obj to achieve strategic ones. Both continuities, in the nature of war and the
changes in the character of warfare influence strat. The greater influence on strat, as
Clausewitz observes, comes from the nature and character of war because the
"most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and cdr have to make is to
establish…the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor
trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature."
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Emerging Character of War

9. “War’s nature is violent, interactive between opposing wills, and driven by
politics. War’s character, its conduct, constantly evolves under the influence of tech,
moral forces (law or ethics), culture, and mil culture, which also change across time
and place.” Commentators, analysts, and even mil professionals frequently conflate
the lasting nature of war with the ever-changing character of war. While this might
seem a trivial distinction, it is not. The fundamental nature of war—as defined by Carl
von Clausewitz in On War—is the clash of actively opposed wills comprised of
violence, chance, and rational thought. By comparison, war’s character is rapidly and
continuously evolving. Tech, societal expectations and culture, geostrategic
dynamics, doc, economics, trade, and even history all combine to shape war in each
era.
10. Failure to distinguish between war’s nature and character encourages viewing
it as something it is not. Such failures have significant and negative impacts on
militaries—both in the preparation and the conduct of war. For example, failing to
account for the human ele (and the derivative eles of chance, friction, fear, and
uncertainty) may lead militaries to believe that chaos and confusion can be designed
out of war, or that the next tech devp will ensure victory, or that forces can be
employed with perfect efficiency, controlled by all-knowing but distant cdrs. War’s
intrinsic human ele and all the uncertainty it introduces lay bare the fallacy of such
beliefs. Today, accelerating change is making itself felt across all aspects of war’s
character—and not just in each ele, but also in the interactions between those eles.
The re-emergence of great power competition is rapidly altering the geostrategic
landscape; the possibility of war between powers at the top of the global pecking
order brings with it many new factors that have been ignored for the past 30 yrs: tech
equivalence, the return of mass, the end of air and sea sanctuary, and the reality of
WMDs.
Evolution of Warfare
11. The first wave of recognizable change in warfare in the past few centuries
was during the first industrial revolution; the invention of the stream engine
revolutionized the strat mobility and lgs of armies. A new revolutionary wave of
industrial tech started in 1880 and affected the mil fd. It was dominated by
chemicals, electric power, and the IC engine. The internal combustion engine made
the mechanized air flight possible and brought the radio comn. The third
revolutionized wave began when electro-optic, television and laser guidance for msls
revolutionized the air-land battle. The newer tech have 'both polarized and
democratized the balance between the more advanced and less advanced sides in
war'. The wpns with pinpoint accuracy and means of massive damage which was
state monopoly are becoming avbl to non-state actors as well.
12. However, it is not new that the non-state actors conduct their tac using tech.
Some tactics are old as war itself but has been conducted by modern tech since the
nineteenth century. For instance, the assassination of leaders is very old tac which
can be conducted via modern tech. Armed non-state actors use motor vehs, high
expl, and auto wpns. Yet, the adv sides, particularly, the most devp states still
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monopolize the high tech which is used in mil. Besides the nuc wpns that are still
states’ monopoly, there is no balance between advanced sides and less advanced
sides in war at the level of air warfare, elec and cyber capb. High mil tech is central
in counterterrorist ops as well.
Grey Z W
13. The grey z describes a set of activities that occur between peace (or coop)
and war (or armed conflict). A multitude of activities fall into this murky in-between—
from nefarious economic activities, influence ops, and cyberattacks to mercenary
ops, assassinations, and disinformation campaigns. Generally, grey z activities are
considered gradualist campaigns by state and non-state actors that combine non-mil
and quasi-mil tools and fall below the threshold of armed conflict. They aim to thwart,
destabilize, weaken, or attk an adversary, and they are often tailored toward the vuln
of the tgt state. While grey-zone activities are nothing new, the onset of new tech has
provided states with more tools to op and avoid clear categorization, attribution, and
detection—all of which complicates a country and its allies’ ability to respond.
14. The activities in the grey z have always been a feature of great-power
competition. Proxy wars, destabilizing insurgencies, legal w (lawfare), and info w—by
adversaries and allies alike—have been a feature of conflict for millennia. But the
cost of conventional conflict in the nuc era has grown too steep, and the risk of
escalation too profound. As a result, nations seek to promote their national objs
through aggression conducted covertly, or with obfuscated attribution or justification,
in order to achieve their goals.
15. Autocracies tend to have an advantage in the grey z in two ways. First, the
nature of their centralized systems allows them to marshal whole-of-state (and
whole-of-society) resources to execute ops. Second, the openness of democracies
and the often-diffuse nature of power can leave them more vuln to grey z activities
and less effective at cobbling together effective national responses. While the United
States and other democracies are faring better in some areas, such as cyberspace,
they lag behind in others, such as the info domain. Because Russia, China, and
other actors have ingrained grey z tac into their docs, whereas many democracies
have failed to even build consensus around those concepts—let alone embed them
into their security strats, despite having most of the tools to do so.
PART-II TRENDS IN WARFARE
16. National Security Trends. The peace war paradigm has ceased to
exist betn India & Pak & now China & India. It is now a paradigm of war & the
contours of conflict are suggestive of the fact that India will always remain in
competition / confrontation, & it is just the intensity & the nature of that competition
that will determine the type & nature of contest. Most strat analysts agree that non-
contact & non-kinetic wars make good economic sense because they do not impose
a high economic burden unlike conventional wars & achieve their goals w/o much
bloodshed. Indeed, ‘successful wars’ of the future may be those that conclude w/o
firing a shot. The internal security sit needs to be stabilised, with emerging threats of
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our adversaries employing non-kinetic means to attk us; instance, “Bleeding with a
thousand cuts.”

Emerging Domains
17. The three traditional domains of warfare have been land, sea & air. Rapid
tech adv have led to the creation of three new domains viz cyber, space & cognitive.
The advent of these three new domains has changed the character of warfare.
Therefore, to achieve success in any future war, any jt force will aim at closely integ
all the six domains to expl the str of each & gain kinetic as well as non-kinetic
advantages over the en, thus making it a multi-domain battle space. Tech today are
increasingly impacting both i.e. battle-thought & battle spaces in profound ways. At
present, the three domains, namely land, sea & air have merged with space & cyber
domains, which are fast emerging as addl points of impact & fusion. Therefore, any
future Indo-Pak conflict will no longer be confined to just the physical domain – but
will be exec simultaneously in all the domains.
18. Cognitive domain can be defined as ‘A domain consisting of perception &
reasoning in which mvre is achieved by expl the info envt to influence interconnected
beliefs, values & culture of indls, gps &/ or populations’. Therefore, cognitive W can
be defined as mvres in the cognitive domain to est a pre-determined perception
among a tgt audience in order to gain advantage over another party. Though
cognitive W perpetuated since ages to influence decisions of mil cdrs but its
significance has enhanced manifolds now & will continue to enhance in future as
well. From Indian perspective, we face unique, substantial & multi-domain
challenges from Western & Northern adversary, with threat of collusivity if not coop.
Disputed bdrs with nuc neighbours, coupled with State sponsored ‘Proxy War’ poses
a challenge for India to devp capb for dealing with multiple scenarios of Peace &
Conventional threat in Multi-Domain W envt.
19. Future wars would be fought in multiple domains, possibly by a jt force on
their own in an indep theatre. The jt force must, therefore, understand land, sea, air,
cyber, space & cognitive domains & be capb of op eff in all when called upon to do
so. The multi domain battle concept is not just about better integ of the ops of the
services; multi domain also requires each indl service to expand its AsOR. Moreover,
cross-domain synergy will be an imperative. Cross domain implies that a force
should be capb of op eff in any domain be it land, sea, air, space or cyber, & in doing
so, it would enhance the op eff of the other domain specialist. The US DoD, Jt Op
Access Concept elaborates that cross-domain synergy creates & expl asymmetrical
advantages inherent in a jt force – air power to defeat maritime power, maritime
power to neutr conventional air power, grnd forces to neutr land-based threats to air
& maritime assets, cyber ops to defeat space sys & so on. It is amply clear that the
window of conventional conflict is narrowing with advent of various disruptive
technologies while the window of Grey Z W is expanding & dominating the battle
space across all domains.
PART- III: CAPB DEVP
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Doctrinal Evolution in the Indian Context

20. India’s force structuring and disposn, till recently, was poised for a punitive
strike capb against Pakistan, in the conventional spectrum. It was articulated by a
matured ‘proactive strat’ and was the foundation for ‘integ theatre ops’ on the
western front. The LoC due to active, face to face deployment, in hilly to
mountainous trn astride the bdrs with Pakistan, is more tailored for positional/
attrition w. The Chinese front had def dply, with combat forces located appropriately,
to a plan in the various sub sectors. These were progressively and selectively
postured fwd, in tandem with devp of road infra. Fortunately, the pace of infra devp,
including rd connectivity in the remote corners along the northern bdrs, has seen a
renewed time bound impetus, in the last few yrs.
21. Hostilities against China were premised on avbl of a protracted ‘warning pd’,
allowing for move of appropriate accretional/dual tasked fmns to the desired area of
ops. Op expediencies and rd accessibility have resulted in deployment of Mech
combat eles and FMs along the northern bdrs. Also, recent yrs has seen a review of
the land forces op logistic plans, resulting in placement of amn and lgs loads for
speedier distribution, from a ‘western front biased’ profile. There has been
redistribution of combat resources in their tasking and dplys, to address the state of
contestation with China astride the northern bdrs. India’s growing stature will require
it to have a correspondingly potent mil with expeditionary capbs, for executing ‘out of
area ops’. This would require agile combat eles with adequate strategic lift capb or a
tailor-made Airborne Force. In the changing dispensation the role and task of Special
Forces will need to be revisited. China’s advanced Info War capb and Info
Dominance Ops will continue to be a threat, in both war and peace. Therefore, India
will have to devp capacities to not only wage Info Warfare, but have capacities to
defeat Pakistan and China’s initiatives targeting the mind space, in its future mil doc.
22. China’s rapid devp and militarisation has been incentivised by its aspiration to
compete with USA and be a Super Power by 2049. It has outstripped India
economically and technologically, as also in harnessing the capb of cyber and
space. It has honed advanced skills and tools to undertake Cyber and Info Warfare.
It has also penetrated the public mind space in India and other target countries
innovatively, giving it the opportunity to exploit these at the opportune time. China’s
capb for Info Warfare have also become more efficient, as PLAs strat of INEW (Integ
Network Elec Warfare) is now reflected in its jt org structures. Dply of smart wpns,
long range precision msls, wpn systems exploiting disruptive tech, robotics,
autonomous systems, swarm drones and space-based mil assets have given China
a distinct advantage in waging ‘non-contact’ and standoff strike capb. It is increasing
its presence in the Indian Ocean, seeking naval bases in the island countries, South
Asia and African continent, CPEC in Pakistan is its flagship project under the BRI
and being the upper riparian State for South Asia, it has control on the water
systems sourced from the Tibetan plateau. It retains linkages with the Indian
Insurgent groups in the NE of India and remains the source of illegal wpns for them.
It would be a fair assessment that China has developed capb to not only confront
India on land frontiers but across the complete spectrum of engagement. Also, the
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complexities of conflict in South Asia are further aggravated as all three protagonists
are recognized nuc wpn states.

Capb Devp & Character of War in Indian Context

23. Though the threat profile indicates increased probability of non-kinetic
engagements, there still exists a real possibility of a short and intense conventional
conflict, even under the nuc umbrella. Thus, while ‘capb devp’ and ‘force
modernisation’ for ‘non-contact’ warfare will have to be made, attention will need to
be accorded for retaining the edge and modernising the conventional mil strength. It
has to be appreciated that the confrontation betn adversarial States in the future will
be a combination of a few or all of the following – non-contact, nonattributable cyber
engagements on both mil and critical infra, including ISR assets in space, creating
disharmony in public by targeted messaging/ false propaganda over a pd of time,
instigating riots and uprisings with irregulars/ non state actors in the tgt country on
sensitive issues, engagements by standoff wpns to cause extensive damage to
combat resources and a kinetic engagement.
24. Apropos, the changing ‘character of war’ and the speed and pace of change
in an integ and networked battlespace, have made it incumbent for the Land Forces,
to relook at the current docs and strategies for conducting conflict on the land
frontiers and maritime domain, with air assets and at the challenges of exploiting the
new dimensions of space and cyber, duly synergized with related orgs of the nation,
to devp capacities to fight in these disruptive domains. The ongoing ‘proxy war’,
remnants of insurgency in the NE States, and continued vuln to presence of nonstate
actors within the nation, with or without adversarial State support, will continue to be
an active threat for the nation. India therefore will have to be prepared for CI/CT ops
for the foreseeable future.
25. India’s growing stature will require it to have a correspondingly potent mil with
expeditionary capb, for executing ‘out of area ops’. This would require agile combat
eles with adequate strategic lift capb or a tailor-made Airborne Force. In the
changing dispensation the role and task of Special Forces will need to be revisited.
China’s advanced Info War capb and Info Dominance Ops will continue to be a
threat, in both war and peace. Therefore, India will have to develop capacities to not
only wage Info Warfare, but have capacities to defeat Pakistan and China’s
initiatives targeting the mind space, in its future mil doc.
26. The Land Forces will have to display ’strategic adaptability’ by being prepared
for Multi Domain ops as the era of a ‘single service ops’ is over and individual
Services will have to be part of a Jt Doc. Land Forces Mil doc will have to be a
subset of the overall Jt Forces Strat. It needs to be reiterated that successful Multi
Domain Ops are premised on jtness, technology and the human resource. The
reskilling of the human ele will have to be a priority and will require appropriate
‘professional mil education’, for the changed opal landscape. It needs to be
highlighted that empowerment of the Armed Forces and the Land Forces in
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particular, with niche technologies and path breaking innovations, is only possible
indigenously. To harness the capb of these emerging tech it will require the Land
Forces to be an equal partner in the R & D and devp of tailormade innovative
solutions. It will also have to hand hold pvt and public enterprises, in their design,
devp and manufacturing. Thus, ensuring that the civ-mil synergy empowers the
nation and the Armed Forces.
PART-IV: STRATEGIES FOR FUTURE CONFLICT
Purpose, Triggers & Desired End State
27. India’s priorities are maintaining the status quo (as well as both its contested
borders) and preventing power implosion, while power projection remains a distant
possibility. In India’s context, “power implosion” does not solely mean internal
disturbances or non-state actors: it also includes loss of territorial and/or functional
control due to climate change, food insecurity, or any other factor that may not yet
have been conceived as a threat. Taking this “power imperative” model as the basis,
some contours of a future-ready force can be drawn out.
28. The international envt that India currently operates in is fluid, dynamic, and
subject to constant stresses. The era of a certain type of stability, with the US as the
sole superpower, is over—to be replaced by constant friction with the nearest
contender, China. Certain other powers have risen, if not to the posn of a “pole,” at
least near it. The European Union (EU) is at odds with itself, with many diverging
issues—refugees, climate crisis, nationalism, significance of the Euro, and now the
Russia-Ukraine crisis—threatening to put the brakes on this unique experiment in
pooling sovereignties. Russian actions in Ukraine, and growing convergence with
China, seem to stretch US Indo-Pacific strat, by dividing focus on to the Eastern
European theatre.
29. The era of interests-based coalitions is on the rise, as a result of the failure of
regional and intl institutions to devp a consensus on critical security, economic, pol,
tech, and ecological issues. For its part, India now plays a huge role in a significant
number of functional groupings, such as the Quad, SCO, BRICS, BIMSTEC and
G20. The future of such groupings remains to be seen, as they present a geopolitical
self-contradiction. Further, allocating sovereignties based on specific issues will be
difficult betn countries with Westphalian disputes: for instance, India and China’s
mutual interests in climate change and trade negotiations may be marred by
territorial issues.
30. New realignments (not yet alliances but more than abstract ideas) have
started being etched out. While Russia, China, Iran and Pakistan are generally
aligning their aims with each other, the US ‘camp’ is mostly running on empty. The
US’s vigour in countering China has not been received enthusiastically by Germany,
whose economic stewardship of the EU is dependent on Chinese markets and
financing. Similarly, Germany has hesitatingly taken actions against Russia including
holding off on Nord Stream II and supplying the Ukrainians with arms and amn. The
Australia-UK-US trilateral security partnership, announced on 15 September 2021,
has securitised an Australia-Chinese relationship that was previously devoid of any
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mil eles. It also put a spanner betn an ongoing French-Australia trade deal over
diesel-electric submarines, exacerbating the distrust betn the US and Europe. The
US is now torn betn the def of Europe and the forfeiture of the Indo-Pacific to
Chinese hegemony.
31. The intl order is in flux, and nothing is more reflective of this than the creation
of a host of ad-hoc coalitions. Within this flux, India has a key role to play. On the
strength of its three ‘Ds’ —Demography, Democracy, and Demand —India stands
both as a beacon of multicultural democracy and as a rock against adventurous
nation-states and terror groups. The country’s size, economic heft, professional mil
forces, huge markets, and resilient institutions make it a critical player in shaping the
new world order, when it emerges. Until then, with unipolarity melting away but are
yet to be replaced with a more stable order, India must play the role of a balancer, a
facilitator amongst various groupings—those already in place as well as others that
could emerge soon.
Contours of Escalatory Continuum
32. The escalatory matrix covering the complete spectrum of ops highlights the
need to be ready for all out conventional war under nucl umbrella. The long-standing
Sino-Pak collusive relns, recent Pakistani overtures to Russia & easy avbl of low
cost niche tech based wpn platforms have meant that any future Indo-Pak conflict
would be fought under an overhang of disruptive tech based wpn sys and more
importantly nucl wpns, which would be the last resort to terminate such a conflict.
This highlights the need for capb bldg in line with present policy of indigenisation,
need based procurement of niche tech from foreign sources & contd engagement
with friendly mil for capb enhancement.
33. Pak, with its robust sub conventional capb & a comparatively weaker
conventional capb has continuously strived to keep conflict into the sub conventional
domain forcing the conventional window to be optimally constricted with a threat of a
spill over into the nucl domain. The erstwhile ‘Strat Restraint’ & ‘Zero Response’
policy had played into the Pak strat narr that sought to keep the threshold of conflict
at the sub conventional spectrum with aberrations in 1965 & 1971 where
conventional domain was breached with obvious outcomes. It is thus imperative for
India to expand the conventional spectrum to create space for ops below full-scale
conventional war, where it enjoys a comparative superiority, & minimize the
possibility of playing out of conflict in sub conventional & nuc domains. Simplistic
extrapolation of the same on the above-mentioned scenario legislates that with the
induction of emerging tech in PA, its existing capb in Grey Z W in virtual & cognitive
domain will rise exponentially. While PA has mastered the art & science of exploiting
Grey Z W against India, has IA devp adequate capbs to counter the same?
Therefore, a reorientation of Indian strat will be reqd to achieve start advantage in
future.
34. In any future war, India would attempt to leverage all eles of national power on
the multi-domain battle fd i.e. “Diplomacy, Info, Mil & Econs (DIME)” Extrapolating
the same on India – Pak confrontation, diplomacy is in a deadlock, W in info domain
is consistently being persecuted against each other causing trust deficit, mil eles of
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both the nations are continuously engaged in Grey Z W & econ ele is non-existent
due to above mentioned factors. Therefore, all these leverages are reqd to be devp
& structured so that these leverages can be used during any conflict by India along
WF. The ‘Means’ of achieving ‘Ends’ are changing with the incr in complexities in the
future battle fd, leading to the shifting in spectrum of W towards NCW.

(a) Cost & Risk. The costs & risks of a conventional war are going
to be so huge that nations will avoid it. Even rogue nation such as Pak which
is otherwise aggressive, weak & irrational, will avoid risking a conventional
war. In our context, the threat of a large war may have been reduced but the
constant threat scenario does remain relevant since India is encircled by
inimical state & non-state actors who are capb of threatening the sovereignty
of this nation. The ‘Notion of Victory’ can be achieved by an inferior state/
non-state actor at lesser cost by appl of NCW & controling the escalation
ladder to avoid/ minimize the contact ph involving the classical conventional
means to achieve ends of war.

(b) Invisible Collusivity. The full collusivity in NCW, especially in

non-kinetic realm can be achieved betn our Western & Northern adversary,
w/o being involved dir & w/o any threat to Human Resource. The PLA has the
requisite org, structures & capbs under PLA SSF, to wage a potent NCW in
both non-kinetic & kinetic realm. The same capb can be extended in collusive
threat to aid our western adversary with complete deniability in place, thus
making the appl of high-end tech of NCW a reality w/o raising the alarm of
Two Front Confrontation.

Strat for Defeat mechanism

35. Some attributes that the Indian Armed Forces need to develop in the next
eight to 10 years, to make them future-ready, are given in the following points.
(a) Lean and Agile. The age of “Corps and Divs” must be reimagined.
While such large bodies of tps have some merit from the perspective of
coercive diplomacy, they must also be economically justifiable. From a mil
perspective, wars are no longer attrition or mvre based; indeed
informationisation. is increasingly becoming the tool of modern w. Thus, a
future-ready force needs to be small, modular, networked and capable of
Potent Force Quick Time (PFQT) ops, i.e. based on the symbiosis betn the
three services, but also manned-unmanned teaming (MUMT), where
complementary teams of human operators and unmanned vehs and drones
carry out heavy and time-compressed strikes against adversary positions,
preferably from stand-off distances.
(b) Enhanced Theatre Comds (ETCs). The current model of
geographical theatre comds, though a step in the right dirn, still considers phy
geography as the core imperative. However, in an era where cyber and space
technologies, and related capb, are set to increase, it makes sense to
inculcate them as part of these theatre comds. The concept of ETCs
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recognises that some war-fighting will happen outside the confines of

geographic loc, and for that, organic cyber and info war (IW) capb must be
integ into each theatre command. Currently, the Def Cyber Agency (DCA) is a
tri-services organisation that reviews in a centralised manner the Indian
Armed Forces’ offn and def capb in the cyber domain. A disaggregation, at
least starting at the level of Theatre Comd HQ, will be necessary to
incorporate these capb into the Theatre Cdrs’ respective mil plans. ETCs can
leverage capb in cyber and IW domains for future war-fighting, both in the
short and long term.
(c) Specialised Cadres. With the increasing fragmentation of
subjects and domains into super and hyper-specialisations, it is imperative
that the Indian Armed Forces include specialists in domains such as cyber, AI,
linguistics, public relns, unmanned platform oprs, robotics, space, and EM
spectrum. By 2030, these subjects are likely to form a crucial part of non-
contact w.
(d) Proliferation of Unmanned Vehs. The future of warfare is
unmanned. Despite being a societal interaction that is singly human, war-
fighting will be dominated by unmanned platforms in all three domains of land,
air, and water. Unmanned aerial vehs (UAVs), armed and unarmed, will
dominate the skies in the near to long term, with a heavy emphasis on
autonomy, bio-inspiration, miniaturisation, and swarms. UAVs will also bridge
the gap betn the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force’s aerial reqmts. As
long-range vectors, armed UAVs will slowly and steadily diminish the reqmts
of arty guns, and close-air sp ac. Different variants of UAVs will act as comn
relays for networked tps, jammers, and ISR, amongst others. On the naval
side, UUVs will be used in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
(HADR) ops, decoys and armed “smart” torpedoes against bigger ships of the
adversary. On land, unmanned drones will be used as load-carrying
transports for grnd tps in difficult trn, minefd traversing, IED detecting and
defusing, amongst other tasks.
(e) Counter Disinformation Offns (CDOs). The Indian
Armed Forces should be prepared to undertake not only kinetic ops but also
CDOs in the social media domain, to prevent a “cognitive blowout” of mil pers
as well as Indian citizens. Since the non-contact nature of warfare will not be
ltd to the kinetic domain, and will encompass cognitive and info aspects,
specialised branches of the armed forces will need to conduct pre-emptive
ops, utilising social media networks and harnessing the Web. As mentioned
earlier, the securitisation of civil domains such as trade, economics, protests,
and debates will lead to a greater interaction and interfacing of the mil with
civilians, where cognitive battles will play a dominant role vis-a-vis kinetic
ones. With the impending move of social media towards a metaverse, Virtual
Reality and Augmented Reality training will take priority.
(f) Fully Digitised Force. The future force will ideally be completely
digitised, as the only way to utilise and exploit niche and emerging tech is
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through the computerisation and generation of data, followed by the

standardisation of data labels, collection, collation and analysis of data. Such
a process will allow the three services to be “plugged” into a common system
with adequate built-in safeguards. Combined with the Indian Armed Forces’
cloud system, BADAL (Bulk Accumulation of Data for Automation and
Learning), this setup will provide theatre cdrs and the subordinate
cyber/space departments to undertake informed and integ offn.

PART-V: CONCLUSION
36. The current transformation of the Indian Armed Forces is only structural, and
not capb-based. Therefore, there remain gaps on how to create a credible theory of
victory for India, especially in the age of non-contact w. Furthermore, the armed
forces, despite some accretions in emerging tech, are constrained by antiquated
procurement procedures and an attrition war mindset. This must be discarded in
favour of a decentralised, networked, flexible, and directive style—one that prioritises
disruptive thinking rather than well-rehearsed battle drills. The recommendations
made in this brief, if applied well in time, can prepare the armed forces to prevail
over their adversaries in the next two to three decades, giving pol imperatives the
space to play out and lead to pol settlements.
37. Radical transformations need to be implemented within the Indian Armed
Forces to make them battle-ready for the future. These must be pursued with vigour
and persistence, to ensure that the armed forces can deliver results, despite budget
cuts. Versatility, speed and tempo, indl initiative, and decentralization, along with a
comprehensive understanding of what war is and how to integrate the myriad eles of
national power to a given purpose, are the keys to prevailing in these challenging
times. In short, we must adapt to the new realities of war. Doing so will require a
deep understanding of both its fundamental nature and its changing character in the
coming era.