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10: Oligopoly
#1 a) Industry A consists of two firms, each of which has an equal share of the market. Compute
the Herfindahl index for the industry.
b) Industry B consists of three firms, each of which has an equal share of the market. Compare
the Herfindahl indices for industries A and B.
c) Now suppose that there are 100 firms in the industry, each with equal shares. What is the
Herfindahl index for this industry?
d) State the general relationship between the competitiveness of an industry and its Herfindahl
index.
#2 True or False?
In a Cournot duopoly market, the two firms agree to produce half of the monopoly output level
for that market and split the resulting profit. Given that the monopoly profit is the highest profit
that can be obtained, the two firms will stick to that agreement.
#3 True or False?
An industry that can be described by the Cournot model will produce total output that is the
same as that produced by a perfectly competitive industry, however they will charge a higher
price.
#4 The profits of the leader in a Stackelberg duopoly:
a) are greater than those of the follower;
b) are equal to those of the follower;
c) are less than those of the follower;
d) are greater than those of a Cournot duopolist;
e) answers a) and d) above.
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#5 Two firms dominate the market for leisurely space travel: Nerd Voyages and Geek Tours.
Each firm can offer one or two flights per month. Each flight costs one million dollars, and there
are no fixed costs. Total market demand is given in the following table:
Price (in M$/flight) 6 4 3
Total quantity demanded
2 3 4
(in flights per month)
A) Fill out the payoff matrix below by computing the profits for each firm in each of the four
possible situations. The profits for Nerd Voyages and Geek Tours are denoted as πN and πG,
respectively.
Geek Tours
1 flight 2 flights
B) Identify the Nash equilibrium outcome of this interaction. Explain why it is a Nash
equilibrium and comment on its efficiency.
C) If Nerd Voyages and Geek Tours could form a cartel and coordinate their actions, what
would be the outcome of their interaction? According to you, will Nerd Voyages and Geek
Tours be able to maintain a cartel?
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#6 Consider the market for aluminium. The demand for aluminium is given by P = 200 ‐ 3Q.
There are two firms producing aluminium. Their marginal cost is constant and equal to 20.
a) If firm 1 anticipates that firm 2 will produce q2 = 10 units what is the quantity that
maximizes its profits? Same question when firm 1 anticipates q2 = 20 units, 30 units.
b) Draw the reaction curve for firm 1 and do the same for firm 2, on the same graph.
c) What is the Nash equilibrium of the game? What is the total production of aluminium?
What is the equilibrium price of aluminium? What are the profits of the firms?
#7 Consider again the market for aluminium studied in exercise #6. Suppose you are the CEO of
firm 1. You have the opportunity to modernize you factory. You can invest 200 to lower your
marginal cost to MC = 8. Is it a good investment?
a) Compute the best response of firm 1 to any anticipated output q2 of firm 2 when it has
invested to modernize its factory.
b) Given that the best response function of firm 2 has not changed, find the Nash
equilibrium of the game? What is the profit of firm 1?
c) Compare the profits with and without the cost reduction investment? Conclude
regarding the profitability of the investment.
#8 Market power and market structure
Reconsider the industry analyzed in class with demand P = 13 –Q and a marginal cost equal to
one. Compare the market power of a monopolist in this market with the market power of a
duopolist. To do so, you need to compute the Lerner index associated with both scenarios.
#9 Comparisons between market structures
Consider a market where demand is given by P = 27 – Q. Firms have the same technology with a
constant marginal cost of MC = 3 and no fixed cost.
a) If the market were competitive, what would be the market price? How many units
would be produced? What would be the total surplus?
b) Suppose now that there is only one firm present on the market (monopoly). How many
units are produced? At what price are they sold? What is the total surplus?
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c) Suppose now there are two firms on the market (a duopoly) that choose their output
simultaneously (Cournot model). What is the output of each firm? What is the
equilibrium price and the total surplus?
d) Suppose now that there are two firms but that one firm is the leader and chooses its
production first (Stackelberg model). Compute the equilibrium quantities, price and
surplus?
#10 To what extent collusion between firms can be understood as prisoner’s dilemma?
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