Educ Stud Math (2017) 94:275–291

DOI 10.1007/s10649-016-9726-3

Objects, signs, and representations in the semio-cognitive

analysis of the processes involved in teaching and learning
mathematics: A Duvalian perspective

Maura Iori 1

Published online: 29 September 2016

# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Abstract In mathematical activities and in the analysis of mathematics teaching-learning

processes, objects, signs, and representations are often mentioned, where the meaning
assigned to those words is sometimes very broad, sometimes limited, other times intuitive,
allusive, or not completely clear. On the other hand, as international research in mathematics
education has shown, the confusion between objects, signs, and representations is one of the
main reasons of the difficulties in learning mathematics. But what kinds of objects are involved
in teaching-learning mathematics? Why should we distinguish a knowledge object, and in
particular a mathematical object, from one of its representations? What is meant by Bsign^?
Can we equate the term Bsign^ with the term Brepresentation^? In this article we will try to
provide an answer to these questions, taking into account the main contributions to mathe-
matics education made by the semiotic theories that are considered the most relevant in the
analysis of the cognitive processes involved in mathematical activities. In particular, we will
refer to the semiotic representation registers theory, on which Duval’s semio-cognitive ap-
proach is based. In general it will be shown that the choice of a semiotic approach to
mathematics education assumes a fundamental theoretical choice closely tied to the funda-
mental distinction between classifying signs and classifying semiotic systems, which is often
implicit or rather not emphasized enough. The example presented shows how the semio-
cognitive analysis of the processes involved in the solution of a mathematical problem
provides new and effective professional reading keys of students’ difficulties in learning
mathematics.

Keywords Objects . Signs . Representations . Semiotic representation registers .

Semio-cognitive analysis . Learning mathematics

* Maura Iori
maura@iori-maura.191.it

1
NRD (Nucleo di Ricerca in Didattica della Matematica), University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy
276 M. Iori

1 Introduction

Nowadays, in mathematical activities, and in the cognitive processes underlying them, what
appears to be specific is the semiotic component (Duval, 1993, 1995, 2001). Different
approaches are carried out in relation to the type of analysis (semio-cognitive, semiotic-
cultural, onto-semiotic, etc.), and the specific aspects investigated.1 Indeed, it is not possible
to elaborate a single model of knowledge acquisition (or construction), a model that is
independent of the type of knowledge in question (Duval, 1993).
Among the models that can be utilized to analyze the signs and their role in the general
working of scientific activity and communication, the model of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–
1914) and that of Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913) are closely related to the foundation of
Bsemiotics^ as a discipline (Duval, 2006c, 2011). Furthermore, even though not strictly related
to the foundation of semiotics as a discipline, the contribution of the German mathematician,
logician, and philosopher Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege (1848–1925) is highly relevant,
most of all in connection with the semiotic processes as descriptive-producers of new
knowledge in mathematics, which according to Frege are closely related to the processes of
denomination-indication based upon the fundamental distinction between the sense (Sinn) and
meaning (Bedeutung) of a sign.
Said models shall be examined in section 3, however without dwelling too much on the
details. (For other conceptual and historical aspects of the discipline of Bsemiotics^ and for
further research on its relevance in mathematics education, see: D’Amore, Fandiño Pinilla, &
Iori, 2013).
Without claiming to be exhaustive, the terms Bobject,^ Bconcept,^ Bsign,^ Brepresentation^
are introduced and compared in section 2. A full explanation of these terms falls outside the
scope of this short paper.

2 Objects and concepts

The notion of a mathematical object is widely debated, but not shared completely, most of all
because it changes with the point of view adopted in mathematics, philosophy, history, the
epistemology of mathematics, as well as in mathematics education (D’Amore, 2001a; Duval,
1998a, b; Font, Godino, & Gallardo, 2013; Godino & Batanero, 1998; Hossack, 1991; Otte,
2003; Panza, 2010; Radford, 2002b, 2004; Steinbring, 2006; to cite only a few authors that
have addressed the issue).
In mathematics one generally speaks of Bobjects^ when it is desired to emphasize the
particular reality of the entity being studied, created, constructed, or investigated by the
mathematician, or otherwise of Bconcepts^ when it is desired to emphasize the result of the
act of thought, that is to say, as suggested by the etymology of the word Bconcept^ (from the
masculine Latin noun conceptus, which literally means Bfetus,^ Bproduct of conception^ and
the verb concipere, consisting of cum and capere, Btake together,^ Bhold within itself^), the
Bresult of the act of conceiving or creation in the mind during the process of becoming
detached from the immediacy of the sense impressions and specific representations while

1
On the subject of representation and the issues it raises in teaching-learning mathematics, an important
collection of points of view, studies, and research predating the 90’s is that of Janvier (1987), most of all within
the scope of psychology and pedagogy.
Educational Studies in Mathematics 277

reaching a universal signification^ (D’Amore, 1999, p. 195).2 The sense impressions and the
specific representations are the effect produced on the senses by things, the external reality in a
naive sense, in other words, by that which presents the three characteristics presented in the
Metaphysics of Aristotle: three-dimensionality, simultaneous accessibility to several human
senses (sight, hearing, smell, tact, taste), material separability from other Bthings^ (D’Amore,
2000; Duval, 1998a).
Same as the word Bconcept,^ the word Bobject^ also derives from Latin. In Cassin, Apter,
Lezra, and Wood (2014) it can be seen that classic Latin already has the perfect participle of
obicere, Bto throw or put before,^ Bto be opposite,^ Bto set against.^ The concept of Bobject^
arises when the neutral noun obiectum holds two meanings: that of Bobstacle to vision^
adopted by Augustine of Hippo (354–430), and that associated by Aristotle (for example in:
On the Soul, book III; Categories, chapter X; Metaphysics, book V) to the Greek term
αντιkείμενα (antikeímena, which has the etymological meaning of Bthe opposites^) in order
to designate that which is placed face to face with something else or each other, the
counterparts, or more in general the correlates, a reciprocal relation between two entities or
phenomena, such as that between the knowable and knowledge, the ability to know and that
which this ability enables to know; a relation that also Plato (in particular in the Republic, book
IV, trans. 1930) expresses, although by means of paraphrases because of lacking a specific
name to designate it (Cassin et al., 2014). Therefore, from an etymological point of view, the
word Bobject^ designates not only that which is in front, the obstacle interposed, but also what
is recognized as the result of the act of knowing, or in other words the relation between the
person and what the person is focusing their attention on.
But BWhich objects is the teacher referring to and which objects are the students ‘seeing’ and
working with?^ (Sáenz-Ludlow & Presmeg, 2006, p. 5). As mentioned by Sáenz-Ludlow and
Presmeg (2006), the teacher and the students may Bsee^ different objects although they Bsee^
the same marks. The main reason is related to the well known Duval’s cognitive paradox
(D’Amore, Fandiño Pinilla, Iori, & Matteuzzi, 2015; Duval, 1993). For Duval (1993), in order
to understand the processes of learning mathematics, the relevant question that should be
addressed is: How not to confuse a mathematical object with one of its semiotic representations,
if it is not possible to access the mathematical object without producing (implicitly or explicitly)
a semiotic representation? It is not whether the mathematical objects arise before or after the
mathematical activities, or before or after their semiotic representations. As we shall see, the
question results from the fundamental epistemological requirement that characterizes all scien-
tific knowledge, and in particular mathematics; that is: Do not confuse an object of knowledge
(in our case a mathematical object) with one of its representations (Duval, 1993, 1995). It is
worth pointing out that Duval’s semiotic representation registers theory does not rely on an
explicit ontological choice between realism and anti-realism, but rather on the recurrent
difficulties that students face in handling semiotic representations of mathematical objects.

2.1 Types of objects

Lacking ostensive referrals, a mathematical object cannot be identified with a real object, a
thing, i.e., an object from the point of view of naive realism. However, as stated by Duval
(2009), when talking about an Bobject,^ we often tend to confuse four different realities, also
within the context of mathematics education:

2
The translation of all quotes from non-English-language sources has been rendered by the author.
278 M. Iori

& The object as a thing (in Greek: πρᾶγμα [pragma], in Latin: res), that is to say the
concrete, physical object that can be accessed by the senses (in the sense expressed in the
Metaphysics of Aristotle), whether directly or by means of an instrument;
& The intentional object, that is to say that on which attention is focused, that which is being
aimed at, being perceived, that which is immediately and directly noticed (shape, color,
sound, etc.) every time the attention is directed to something; that is to say the object of an
(intentional) act of signification;
& The phenomenological object, that is to say the object as it appears in the conscience and
enables the person to recognize it in its occurrences; a complex object on account of its
character being predefined on one hand, while being open and incomplete on the other
(Lanfredini, 2006);
& The knowledge object, that is to say the invariant, independent from its mode of Bexistence^
(D’Amore, 2001a; Spencer, 2012) in multiple possible representations, and in particular:

– The experimental object, that is to say the causal invariant of a multiplicity of observed
phenomena (non-semiotic representations);
– The mathematical object, that is to say the operational or logical-discursive invariant of a
multiplicity of semiotic representations, which (re)present human practices.

More in general the word Bobject^ contains three separate and specific fundamental
requirements in the analysis of knowledge (Duval, 2009):

& The practical requirement of manipulation (inseparable from the notion of object as a thing
at the center of numerous studies of Jean Piaget, and others; see for example: Dewey,
1920/1957; Piaget, 1936);
& The phenomenological requirement characteristic in any conscious act (intentionality, or
directionality, being always directed at something of which undergoes its attributes, i.e.,
the object as it is understood, as stated by Edmund Husserl, 1900-01/1970);
& The epistemological requirement common to the entire body of knowledge (that which
calls for separating the objects of knowledge from their representations, which is already
found in Plato, Republic, VI, 509d-510b).

Within the scope of teaching-learning mathematics, reference is made to objects of knowl-

edge (mathematical objects) as well as objects understood as things, and also to phenomeno-
logical or intentional objects, which are often confused with each other.
In Duval’s semio-cognitive (semiotic and cognitive) approach, the mathematical object is
precisely the (operational or logical-discursive) invariant of a multiplicity of semiotic repre-
sentations, which are recognized as such by the scientific community. The object of knowledge
hence emerges from the recognition that two or more representations represent the Bsame
object,^ independently of their contents. The assumption of its pre-existence is not necessary,
nor useful. In other words, no philosophical interpretation (of the realist or idealist, construc-
tivist or platonic, … type) can be inferred from Duval’s cognitive characterization of the
mathematical objects and the semiotic activity. Indeed, in the Duvalian perspective the
question of the philosophical approach to the mathematical objects is irrelevant. It is sufficient
to consider mathematical objects as arising from the recognition of the referential equivalence
of semiotic representations, even when not semantically congruent (i.e., not Bsimilar^ in some
respect, or relatively different, from the cognitive point of view) (Duval, 1988). Such as for
Educational Studies in Mathematics 279

example, n2 + 2 and (n + 1)2 − 2n + 1 (see Problem 1). The human practice remains in any
event the essential distinctive characteristic of a mathematical object.
In the onto-semiotic approach (Godino & Batanero, 1994; Godino, Batanero, & Font, 2007)
the notion of a mathematical object is completely different: BWe use object in a wide sense to
mean any entity which is involved in some way in mathematical practice or activity and which
can be separated or individualized^ (Font et al., 2013, §6.1). In particular the authors introduce
the following types of primary objects: linguistic elements, situations/problems, concepts/defi-
nitions, propositions, procedures, arguments. In this approach the mathematical objects selected
or shared by an institution (understood as a community of practice) become institutional objects,
while the objects that emerge from the systems of personal practice become personal objects.3
(For further details, see: D’Amore & Godino, 2006; Font, Godino, & D’Amore, 2007, 2010).
In the semiotic-cultural approach (Radford 1998a, b), mathematical objects are conceived
as social-historical-cultural entities, and specifically, syntheses (Radford, 2010) of ways of
doing, thinking, and relating to others that are not Bfixed^ in nature nor the mind, but in the
social practice, as its potential invariants. Mathematical objects are not revealed by means of
signs or representations, but through forms of action and thought that are historically and
culturally codified: BIn general, concrete materials and artifacts cannot disclose the conceptu-
ality they are supposed to individuate. They need to be embedded in an activity (a particular)
that makes apparent the conceptuality they are bearers of^ (Radford, 2013a, p. 28). The objects
of knowledge are pure possibilities that acquire reality only by means of activity, becoming
indistinguishable from the activity itself.4 In accordance with the theory of objectification
(Radford, 2002a, 2006, 2013a, 2014), learning is both knowing and becoming, more precisely,
the semiotically mediated social process of becoming gradually and critically aware of systems
of ideas, cultural meanings, forms of thinking, etc. (Radford, 2013a).5

3 Signs and representations

In the processes involved in teaching and learning mathematics, it is not possible to speak of
signs and representations without taking into account the possibility of accessing the mathe-
matical objects that are pre-defined, pre-established or recognized as such by an institution. In
all scientific disciplines except mathematics there are two modes of accessing objects of
knowledge: multisensory, whether direct observation or by means of instruments (micro-
scopes, telescopes, sensors, etc.), and semiotic, by means of the intentional use of a system
of signs. Instead in mathematics the access to the objects of knowledge is only semiotic, by
means of semiotic representations; no multisensory access is possible.
However, for the person who suddenly finds them in front of their eyes, the signs and
semiotic representations initially appear as ink blots on a sheet of paper, chalk marks on the
blackboard…, things in the true sense of the word. Their thingness plays a highly relevant role
for who tries to utilize them in some manner, firstly asking BWhat are they?^ and then perhaps

3
A practice is any action carried out by someone to solve a mathematical problem, communicate the solution to
other persons, validate and generalize the solution in other contests and problems (Godino & Batanero, 1998).
4
On the contemporary cultural-historical theories that include the category of activity see: Roth & Radford
(2011).
5
The word Bobjectification,^ from Bobjectify,^ derives from Latin obiectum (Bthat which is placed in front^ or
Bthat which is thrown against^) and facere (Bto make^). It therefore means etymologically Bto place something in
front of someone in order to make it apparent, i.e., present to the senses.^
280 M. Iori

BWhat do they represent?^ or BWhat is their purpose?^ The naive realism, which is altogether
not naive for who starts to manage signs and semiotic representations of mathematical objects,
therefore has its raison d’être that is often overlooked by adults and teachers because it is in
any event considered to be a temporary phase, which can be overcome sooner or later in the
process of learning or conceptualization. However sometimes this is not the case.
The lack of a double access to the mathematical objects leads almost always to confusing a
certain representation of a particular mathematical object with the object itself (Duval, 1993),
creating in the process many obstacles in the understanding for many students, and others.
How come?
Knowledge, and hence the process of understanding, starts with becoming aware of a
fundamental epistemological (non semiotic) difference; that between:

& Representation (non-semiotic) and object

as well as between:

& Sign and object

where (non-semiotic) representation is understood as that which (with respect to something

else) a given physical, natural, or biological (non-semiotic) system produces automatically,
unintentionally, and not in order to satisfy a communication function (such as for example the
image produced by the visual system, a mirror, or the mind); while the sign is understood as an
entity (word, drawing, gesture, etc.) that is produced intentionally inside a given semiotic
system in order to satisfy a communication function.
It is however most of all in mathematics where the tendency is to confuse a sign (or
representation) with the object/s the sign may refer to (in algebra or in formal languages, for
example). But not just in mathematics, also in mathematics education, in some cases.
For example, in the onto-semiotic approach (§2.1) the distinction between object and sign is
relative, and based on a temporal relation, since that which is a sign at a given time may become
an object at a later time, or vice-versa (Font et al., 2013). A person may therefore identify a sign
with an object or distinguish between them depending on the case, or what is most appropriate or
convenient in a given situation. However, according to Font et al. (2013), the possibility of
differentiating a sign from an object enables the person to establish the correspondence (semiotic
function) between two sets where one of them (the source set) constitutes the expression plane,
while the other (the target set) the content plane. All of this on the basis of the idea of Hjelmslev
(1943/1961) of a sign-function (limited to linguistic productions), that Eco (1976) also describes
in terms of a semiotic function. In particular for Eco (1976) a sign is considered to be constituted
by one or more elements in the expression plane (antecedent) correlated to one or more elements
in the content plane (consequent). In line with this position, D’Amore and Godino (2006) defined
a semiotic function as a representational or instrumental dependence relation between mathemat-
ical (ostensive or non-ostensive) objects, which enables to substitute or utilize one of them in
place of the other. The relation is established by a person or institution in accordance with a given
criterion or code (D’Amore & Godino, 2006).
In the semiotic-cultural approach (§2.1), the term Brepresentation^ is used Bto some extent
(…) as a synonym for sign^ (Radford, 1998b, p. 288). It is the result of a complex interrelation
of a culturally-situated activity that includes all the senses: BThe representation, like the sign, is
a conceptual tool used to interact with our culture^ (Radford, 1998b, p. 289). More precisely,
Educational Studies in Mathematics 281

the representations (or signs) operate as semiotic means of objectification (Radford, 2002a), by
including spoken and written languages, formulas, diagrams, as well as gestures. They are the
result of semiotic contractions of actions (concrete or intellectual) previously carried out on the
social plane (Radford, 1999).
But, from our perspective, what distinguishes a representation from a sign?

3.1 Ways to understand signs and representations

Most of the theories utilized in educational research are based on the idea of sign or representation
that emphasizes the cognitive function of evocation or substitution of a given element with respect
to another element that does not have the same epistemological status as the first one (Duval,
2006c). Some of the most important definitions are those of Augustine (De doctrina christiana, II,
1.1), Leibniz (A, VI, ii, 500),6 Peirce (CP 2.228, ca. 1897), and Piaget (1936). In accordance with
these definitions, the main function of the sign or representation is to evoke something else in the
mind of the interpreter. Particularly, for Peirce a sign (representamen) is always related or linked to
an object; it cannot be conceived in an absolute way, independently of an object.
Of great interest, and especially for understanding the semiotic and cognitive processes that
are intimately connected with mathematical activities, is the distinction described by Frege
(1892) between the content (sense or Sinn) of a sign and the object (meaning or Bedeutung) the
sign refers to. This distinction explains the multiplicity of designations, that is to say signs that
can refer to the same object by means of different contents. Underlying all this, more than the
nature of the signs there is the interest of Frege in the characteristics of the semiotic production
that guarantee acquiring new knowledge in mathematics, that is to say the cognitive possibility
of replacing signs with other signs in an expression (mathematical or linguistic) salva veritate.7
Nevertheless, Frege assumes the symbolic writings of algebra and analysis as the model of all
the representations that can be utilized in mathematics, not recognizing the importance of other
semiotic systems in mathematics (Duval, 2011).
The above definitions assume implicitly the epistemological requirement of distinguishing
the representation from what it represents, or a sign from what it refers to, which is not trivial in
the case of mathematical objects. Furthermore, they do not specify how the cognitive function
of Bevocation^ or Bsubstituting something^ can be satisfied from a structural point of view
(Duval, 2006c). The theories that assume these definitions tend to focus on only some of the
fundamental relations (similarity, causality, reference) between the element that performs the
function of evocation (sign or representation) and what is being evoked (object), without any
structural analysis of their working.
In mathematics, on the other hand, the semiotic representations often play a primary role
with respect to the mathematical objects. But this is not all.
As asserted by Duval (2006c), there are situations where the signs do not inherently evoke
any object but simply substitute other signs, such as in algebra when letters are utilized to
substitute a given set of possible numerical values, or in codes that correlate two lists of
elements term by term (Eco, 1976). Indeed, signs such as the letters in algebra, mathematical

6
A = Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, herausgegeben von der Preussischen
(Deutschen) Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Reihe 6. Darmstadt 1923, Leipzig 1938, Berlin 1950 -
(followed by volume, part, page).
7
In Über Sinn und Bedeutung, when referring to the principle of substitution, Frege cites Leibniz: BEadem sunt,
quae sibi mutuo substitui possunt, salva veritate^ (Frege, 1892, p. 35). (For further details, see: Bagni, 2006;
D’Amore, Fandiño Pinilla, Iori, & Matteuzzi, 2015).
282 M. Iori

notations, words and their combinations in expressions, statements or formulas, refer to a

mathematical object only by means of an intentional discursive operation of designation.
By discarding any relation between signs and objects, De Saussure’s definition is signifi-
cantly different from the classical definitions. It assigns the primary role not to the sign as such,
but to the system of signs: A sign operates as a sign only inside a system; and more precisely a
sign can be recognized as a sign only as a result of the relations of opposition it has with other
signs in a given system (De Saussure, 1916/1959). In other words, the sense of a sign is
closely-permanently tied to the system in which it operates as a sign.

3.2 Two different approaches for analyzing mathematical productions

Two completely different ways of understanding the signs, and hence the processes involved in
teaching and learning mathematics, emerge from the foregoing analysis:

1. The epistemological and representational approach

It emerges before de Saussure when the approach to the signs is mainly epistemological and
representational: The signs are considered to be isolated (in the absence of semiotic systems)
and related to the object they refer to on the basis of relations of:

& Similarity (iconic relation)

& Causality (indexical relation)
& Reference, by means of an intentional discursive operation of designation (which cannot
be reduced to the relation of similarity or causality).

The signs are not completely distinct from the representations, since their main function is
reduced to being representations: taking the place of other objects or evoking objects which are
not present.

2. The structural approach

It emerges after de Saussure when the approach to the signs is mostly structural: What plays
a major role are not the signs as such, but the semiotic systems. A sign is only a sign inside a
semiotic system, that is to say only as a result of the opposition to other signs. The use of signs
is not subject to the objects the signs may designate but is tied to the semiotic system that
produced them, that is to say the internal structures of opposition chosen, or which are
considered the most suitable or effective in a particular context, also from the point of view
of the signs themselves. This structure creates the possibilities of transforming the signs inside
the system, that is to say the cognitive function of treatment in order to produce new
knowledge. The reference of the sign to an object is the result of an explicit designation
operation, rather than a relation of causality.
In the first approach the signs are always in relation to an object, and hence confused with
representations. On the other hand, as mentioned above, in mathematics there are signs that do
not refer to any specific object, or which refer to different objects from a phenomenological
point of view. In other words, in mathematics the relation between the signs and the objects
they refer to is not a relation of causality but a reference relation that is the result of an
intentional discursive operation of designation (Duval, 2011).
Educational Studies in Mathematics 283

The approach of de Saussure, when extended to all semiotic systems utilized in mathemat-
ics and integrated with Frege’s approach, may therefore be valuable for the analysis of the
mathematical productions from a semiotic and cognitive point of view.

4 Semiotic systems and representation registers

On the basis of the approach of de Saussure and that of Frege, Duval (2006a) defines a
semiotic system as a set of elements (signs) that assume a value of sense only in opposition of
choice to other elements, together with the organizing rules that enable to carry out intentional
designation operations and combine or group the elements in significant units (expressions or
figural units). The network of oppositions, differences, values, and the set of organizing rules
constitute the structure of the system. On the base of this structure: BSigns present the
possibility of being replaced by other signs, independently of the objects they may evoke^
(Duval, 2011, p. 27, the italics and small caps are the author’s). The possibility of replacing the
signs with other signs does not depend on the knowledge of the possible objects being
represented, but on the production system. In any event, the signs are not identified with the
representations since their use is not subject to just the designation of objects.
In addition, a semiotic system does not have the internal coherence always advocated in
mathematics. It has nothing in common with an axiomatic system, and hence with the
representation systems considered by Peirce in relation to diagrams: BA Diagram is a
representamen which is predominantly an icon of relations and is aided to be so by conven-
tions. Indices are also more or less used. It should be carried out upon a perfectly consistent
system of representation^ (Peirce, CP 4.418, ca. 1903).
Every semiotic system has its specific representation capabilities, which must often be
complemented or extended with other semiotic systems. For example, number systems are not
provided with the capability of designating all real numbers. In this case it is necessary to
pffiffiffi
utilize pure designations (for example: π, e, 2), or descriptions by means of hypotheses (such
as in the construction of geometric figures), specific sequences, series, continuous fractions,
ellipses, B…^, etc. In any event, the Ball^ is excluded.

4.1 Classification of the representation registers

The representation registers, as characterized by Duval (1996), are semiotic systems that fulfill
the functions of

& communication
& objectification (for only oneself, not for communication) and
& treatment (transformation of a representation into another representation inside the same
semiotic system, in accordance with the specific transformation possibilities enabled by the
semiotic system, in order to obtain new information).

Regarding the word Bobjectification^ (§2.1), the sense attributed by Duval (1995) is
completely different from that attributed by Radford (2002a, 2006, 2013a, 2014). For Duval
Bobjectification^ means becoming aware of something for oneself and only for oneself (not for
communication). It is not identified with knowledge, but is a necessary (not sufficient)
284 M. Iori

condition for knowledge: Something is produced only in order to become aware of that which
was not apparent beforehand, without any intention of communication. On the other hand, in
the theory of Radford (§2.1) the word Bobjectification^ is utilized to indicate a social learning
process, which enables to develop a progressive and critical awareness of encoded forms of
thought and action by means of artifacts, languages, gestures, and more generally signs
(semiotic means of objectification).
Duval (2006a, b, 2011) distinguishes four types of representation registers:

Discursive

& multifunctional

[natural language (written or spoken) for designating objects, reasoning, or enunciation];

& monofunctional

(symbolic writings: number systems, algebraic writing, formal languages);

Non discursive

& multifunctional

[of the iconic type: drawings that preserve the Brelations of closeness^ between the parts of
the object; of the non-iconic type: geometric configurations (construction, division, and re-
configuration, dimensional deconstruction of shapes)];

& monofunctional

(2D configurations of 1D or 0D shapes according to rules, Cartesian diagrams).

In the monofunctional registers the treatments can take the form of an algorithm, while in the
multifunctional registers the treatments cannot be converted into an algorithm. The conversion
of semiotic representations from one register to another may require the use of auxiliary
transition representations, that is to say representations that mix the characteristics of two or
more registers in order to facilitate the transition from one register to another (see Problem 1).

5 Semio-cognitive analysis of mathematical activities and the underlying

understanding processes

Mathematical activity cannot be separated from the production or choice of the semiotic
representations and their involvement (implicit or explicit) in the transformations by treatment
(transformation of a semiotic representation into another one of the same register, of the same
object) and conversion (transformation of a semiotic representation into another one of another
register, of the same object).
Partially utilizing the notations of D’Amore (2001b):

rm m-th semiotic register (m = 1, 2, 3, …)

Educational Studies in Mathematics 285

Rmi i-th semiotic representation (i = 1, 2, 3, …) of a (mathematical) object O (not

necessarily unique) in the rm semiotic register
contentmi content of the Rmi representation
the transition from Rmi = [contentmi, rm] to Rnh = [contentnh, rn] (n, h = 1, 2, 3, …; where
potentially m = n, but contentmi ≠ contentnh syntactically or semantically) is cognitively rele-
vant if the same object O can be recognized in [contentmi, rm] and in [contentnh, rn]; that is to
say if it is possible to coordinate the registers rm and rn in the treatment and conversion
transformations. The difficulty in this recognition arises from the fact that the content of the
starting representation has nothing (semantically or syntactically) in common with the content
of the target representation. The two representations may hence be Bnaively^ associated (that is
to say from the point of view of the naive realism described previously) with two completely
different mathematical objects.
The transition from a representation to another is spontaneous when the representations are
congruent with each other, that is to say when there is a direct and immediate semantic
correspondence between the units of content in the two representations (Duval, 1995).
Otherwise, the degree of congruence, or cognitive distance, between the representations may
vary, depending also on the direction of the transformation: Two representations may be
congruent when the transformation of one into the other occurs in one direction, and not
congruent when the transformation is carried out in the opposite direction (see Problem 1). In
any event, the conversion and treatment difficulties reflect the cognitive distance between the
representations of the same object in two different registers (Duval, 1995), and in the same
register (D’Amore, 2006; Rojas Garzón, 2014; Santi, 2010), respectively.
The example of semio-cognitive analysis provided below relates to the solution of a
problem (Fig. 1) that has the same structure as the exploration problems (Duval, 2013), or
generalization tasks (Radford, 2000).
Figure 1 reports the production rule of dot configurations, which may evoke numbers or
geometric shapes. They are semiotic representations that must be compared with each other in
order to become aware of their production rule and thus obtain new representations. The
representations produced can be seen in different ways: It is possible to recognize 2D figural
units (triangles and squares identified by the small circles), 1D figural units (rows of the small
circles) and 0D figural units (the small circles themselves). However the recognition of the 2D
units tends to hinder the recognition of the units of a lower dimension (Duval, 1995). In
particular, starting from the second configuration, it is possible to recognize the superimposi-
tion of a triangle and a square, or the juxtaposition of a square and two 0D figural units, as well
as other types of superimposition or juxtaposition. In any event, each configuration does not
refer to only one mathematical object, since it may represent different objects.
The conversion of these semiotic representations into a monofunctional discursive register
enables to obtain a numerical description (sequence of numbers) or a literal description (by

Fig. 1 Problem 1: How many dots

are there in Fig. 50?

Fig. 1 Fig. 2 Fig. 3 …

286 M. Iori

condensation of the sequence of numbers) of the sequence of configurations, which leads to

the requested number with very few calculations.
The semio-cognitive analysis of the problem makes explicit the required conversions and
treatments (Fig. 2), the registers involved and their articulation (Fig. 3) in order to solve the
problem.
Three types of referentially equivalent representations are obtained: geometric configura-
tions, numbers, and literal expressions (Fig. 2). The arrows in Fig. 3 highlight how the direct
conversion (indicated by black straight arrows with solid line) and its inverse (indicated by
black straight arrows with dotted line) constitute two completely different cognitive tasks.
In the Duvalian interpretation, the simple use of a letter (n) to designate any number (in this
case a natural number greater than zero) does not constitute a mathematical generalization but
a condensation, and more precisely the condensation of a sequence of numbers. It is an
inherently semiotic process. Similarly, the use of a condensation (a letter) in order to designate
a second condensation (in this case the number of the small circles in each configuration of the
sequence) is not a mathematical generalization but a functional designation (Duval, 2003). On
the other hand, the extension of a relation to all the elements of the sequence constitutes a
mathematical generalization, by involving synthesis and construction (Otte, 2003, p. 188). It
requires the transition from verbal, figural, or numerical data to a literal description that
synthetizes the relation between the data, thus explaining the generality of their relation. In

RULE OF PRODUCTION

Recognition of all the relevant

figural units:
2D figural units (square and
triangular shapes), 1D figural units
(rows of the small circles) and 0D
figural units (in particular the two
small circles highlighted in all the
representations)

Conversion: Numerical 3 6 11
description of the sequence of
configurations
Treatment: Numerical 1+2 4+2 9+2
description of the production rule or:
4–2+1 9–4+1 16 – 6 + 1
or: …

POSITION OF THE CONFIGURATION 1 2 3

IN THE SEQUENCE OF
CONFIGURATIONS
Conversion: Literal description of
the sequence of configurations
The sequence of the numbers that identify the position of the configurations is
condensed into the letter n.
n2 2
(n + 1)2 – 2 n + 1
The congruence between the number that identifies the position of a configuration in
the sequence and the number of the small circles in the configuration is more or less
high depending on the treatments of the configurations.

Fig. 2 Semio-cognitive analysis of the exploration activity in the solution of problem 1. Adapted from Duval
(2013, p. 35)
Educational Studies in Mathematics 287

REPRESENTATIONS IN REPRESENTATIONS IN
DISCURSIVE REGISTERS NON DISCURSIVE REGISTERS

REPRESENTATIONS The second configuration is

IN
obtained from the first by adding
MULTIFUNCTIONAL two small circles to the square
REGISTERS:
configuration with side 2; the
Representations third configuration is obtained
whose from the second by adding two
transformations are small circles to the configuration
not determined by with side 3, and so forth.
an algorithm
AUXILIARY Fig. 1 2 3 …
TRANSITION
REPRESENTATIONS Total 3 6 11 …

REPRESENTATIONS 1 2 3 … 50 …
IN
3 6 11 …
MONOFUNCTIONAL
REGISTERS: 1+2 4+2 9+2 …
Representations 4–2+1 9–4+1 16–6+1 …
whose
transformations are
n
determined by an
algorithm n2 2
(n + 1)2 – 2 n + 1

Fig. 3 Types of register involved and their articulation in the solution of problem 1. Adapted from Duval (2011,
p. 118)

any event, the mathematical generalization is independent of the choice of the literal descrip-
tion, or other semiotic representations (Duval, 2003).
In the semiotic-cultural approach, mathematical generalization is a cultural-historical
dialectical concept (Radford, 2015). It is Bseeing^ the particular as something general in a
cultural sense, that is to say in specific and culturally accepted ways of symbolization
(Radford, 2005). Generalization involves three mutually interrelated fundamental components:
phenomenological, epistemological, and semiotic (Radford, 2013b, 2015). The phenomeno-
logical component is involved in the ways of seeing the configurations of the sequence, their
appearance, or that which attention is focused on, such as form, color, and arrangement. The
epistemological component is involved in the extrapolation of a relation between the config-
urations that produces a new object (the general term of the sequence), while the semiotic
component is involved in the use of signs in order to Bdenote^ the new object. Specifically, the
literal description results inseparable from the underlying practical-intellectual activities.

6 Conclusions

The semio-cognitive analysis of the processes involved in teaching and learning mathematics
requires first of all becoming aware of the epistemological, semiotic and cognitive character-
istics of learning mathematics. In teaching-learning mathematics we refer both to mathematical
objects and to objects understood as things, and also to phenomenological and intentional
objects, which are often confused with each other. But mathematical objects should not be
confused with the semiotic representations utilized to designate them: This is the fundamental
epistemological requirement that characterizes the scientific knowledge.
288 M. Iori

Duval’s theory of registers, which stems from the sign theory of de Saussure and Frege’s
theory of sense (Sinn) and meaning (Bedeutung), enables us to clarify the roles of the signs and
representations in the processes involved in teaching and learning mathematics. In particular, it
enables us to clarify that we are capable of distinguishing a mathematical object from any of its
possible semiotic representations when we are capable of recognizing the correspondences
between the units of content mathematically relevant of different representations of the object
in question, in different registers (by means of conversions) and in the same register (by means
of treatments). From the analysis of the mathematics learning processes, it became apparent
that the cognitive and semiotic complexity of the production, selection, treatment, and
conversion of the semiotic representations, in a given situation, is largely determined by the
phenomena of congruence or non-congruence of the semiotic representations that are involved.
Duval’s semio-cognitive analysis is not specifically designed to focus on the affective,
pedagogical, psychological, and social aspects of the processes involved in teaching and learning
mathematics. That is not its purpose. Nevertheless, it may help us to clarify the roles of the signs
and representations in the cognitive processes involved in teaching and learning mathematics, as
well as the deepest difficulties that most students have to face in mathematical activities.
More broadly, in order to underline other semiotic dimensions of the processes involved in
mathematics teaching and learning, such as the embodied and multimodal aspects of cognition
(Arzarello, 2006), other semiotic approaches could be compared, coordinated or locally
integrated (Prediger, Bikner-Ahsbahs, & Arzarello, 2008) with the semio-cognitive approach.
Clearly, this is an important issue for future research.

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