The partial mobilization that began in September allowed Russia to increase their

deployment in Ukraine, while Ukraine’s success in liberating territory has reduced

the length of the Russian frontline. Consequently, the density of Russian forces
has increased in comparison to the area occupied.

Russia is now trying to make full use of the additional capacity to push forward.

“The Ukrainian military said on Tuesday that Russian forces were attacking in five
different directions along the crescent-shaped front line in the east, relying on
masses of troops to try to overrun Ukrainian positions.

The tactic has allowed Russia to make incremental gains in recent weeks and, to
slowly tighten a noose around the key Ukrainian-held city of Bakhmut. But the
strategy has come at a cost of hundreds of dead and wounded soldiers each day”.

Russian Offensive is Imminent

The Washington., D.C based thinktank ISW, one of the highly reliable sources of
information about the Ukraine war firmly believes that Russia will launch a major
offensive.

Yesterday they reported,

“Russian Defense Minister Shoigu claimed that Russian forces are successfully
developing operations near Bakhmut and Vuhledar and claimed that Russian troops
have recently taken control of Soledar, Klishchiivka, Pidhorodne, Krasnopolivka,
Blahodatne, and Mykolaivka in the Bakhmut area and Lobkove in Zaporizhia Oblast.

Shoigu likely held this press conference in order to create the guise of formality
and legitimacy for the Russian MoD as it continues efforts to reform the Russian
military, prepare for a renewed offensive, and set conditions for prolonged
operations in Ukraine.

ISW has previously noted that Russian officials are preparing for an imminent
Russian offensive in Ukraine in the coming months, and that these preparations are
also happening on the strategic level with Russian command structures”.

Where will the Russians Show Up?

There are three or four options available to the Russians. They can either launch
an offensive from Belarus(1), or attack Kherson(2), or push out towards
Zaporizhzhia(3), or expand their attack lines near Bakhmut(4). There are benefits
and drawbacks to each offensive line.

Licensed Image. Sketches added by author

From Belarus: A Supply-Chain Nightmare (1)
In recent weeks, both Ukraine and Russia have talked about a large-scale Russian
offensive launched from Belarus. It seems that the Russians do have some troops
stationed in Belarus, but it looks more like a staging area for training troops
before they are moved into battle.

I don’t think Russia will pour out of Belarus for the simple reason: Where exactly
is this group expected to launch an attack?

Kyiv..or

Kharkhiv… or

On the bridge to nowhere?

Screenshot from Google Maps
Belarus is located north of Kyiv. As soon as Putin orders an attack on Kyiv, we can
order popcorn, sit in front of the TV and watch the Russian army crumble in a
matter of weeks. Ukraine will mount a strong defense around Kyiv. The same supply
problems Russia encountered during the early stages of the war will resurface.

Russia does not have the strength for urban warfare nor does it have the ability to
feed such a long frontline stretching from the Kherson in the south all the way to
Kyiv in the north. Russian formation has to remain contiguous and without any gaps.

Attack Kherson: Don’t Touch the River (2)

Russia wanted to capture Kherson and drive all the way to the eastern border of
Ukraine in order to cut off Ukraine’s access to the Black Sea. It was Putin’s dream
to extend his empire as far as Odesa. Trying to capture Kherson one more time makes
a lot of strategic sense, but logistically it is a nightmare.

Original image by Ukraine War mapper. Author authorized by creator to use the image
The Dnipro river serves as a natural barrier of protection for Russian troops
stationed in the south. The two sides have established themselves on either side of
the river, so whoever attacks the other side must cross the river and expose
themselves. Crossing the river and attacking an enemy settlement is not easy.

Russian army isn’t used to doing easy tasks. Therefore, expecting hard yards from
them won’t work.

Push out of Zaporizhzhia: A Pipe dream (3)

Original image by Ukraine War mapper. Author authorized by creator to use the image
This one is not off the table. It is possible for Russia to advance closer to the
river bank and get closer to Zaphorzizhia.

It is likely that Russia is considering this line of advance because Ukraine will
try to cut through the Russian defensive line in Zaphorizizhia-Melitopol at some
point in the future. If Ukraine takes this route, the Russian occupation chain will
be sliced into two parts, while exposing Crimea in two directions for Ukraine to
launch an attack — one from Kherson in the east and the other one from Melitopol in
the west.

Russia can hinder Ukraine’s ability to mount this audacious plan by attacking
Zaporizhzhia.

Russia lacks the offensive strength to accomplish this task. Putin would love to
get this done, but his army has no strength whatsoever to accomplish this task.
This is where I expect Ukraine’s final hammer to fall. Either here or near Mariupol
(the two black arrows in the image attached above).

Expand around Bakhmut: The End (4)

At a small scale, this is already happening. There are five directions from which
Russia is attacking, according to The Times. Not only do I expect the attacks to
widen, but I also expect Russia to send the majority of its newly trained recruits
here.

For the propagandist regime, this makes a lot of sense. The Russian army will be
able to market it as their biggest victory since defeating Hitler if they can take
even one or two towns in this region. We are finally winning, they will say. The
importance of finding those recruits who can be used as canon fodder cannot be
overstated.
How strong will the offensive be?
For now, Ukraine is still holding Bakhmut. But we do not know how many Russian
lives are going to be funneled into this section over the coming weeks and whether
or not it is worth the defensive effort by Ukraine. What we do know for sure is
Russia cannot sustain this offensive for long.

According to Ukraine, Russia will mobilize hundreds of thousands of soldiers.

Despite Russia’s desire to do the same, the average Russian is simply not ready to
hang himself. There is no doubt that Russia is having difficulty finding those
recruits.

Putin does not have the time and will send as many conscripts as possible into
battle. He doesn’t care if the brand-new recruits are trained or not. It will be a
problem for his commanders. Using a recruitment machine, however weak, he will pour
human lives into the war-torn Bakhmut region like a hose supplying concrete from a
truck.

I think it will be better if Ukraine absorbs the incoming Russian offensive,

conserves their energy by not taking the attack to their enemy, offers a stoic
defense, depletes the additional capacity generated by Russia, and launches a
counter offensive just as Russia starts to exhaust.

When you secretly worship Stalin and Hitler, sending one thousand soldiers every
day to their grave yard doesn’t seem like a big deal. By offering human lives as
sacrifices, Putin is trying to overwhelm Ukraine.

He can force Russians to march to the frontline as long as he is a dictator. Even

dictators need time to find their recruits, train them, arm them, and pack them
into their coffins. The most vulnerable part of Putin’s strategy lies here.

It is called..

Time.

It is in Putin’s best interest to prolong the war as long as possible. Therefore, I

consider this upcoming offensive by Russia to be the second worst decision Putin
and his team of brainless strategists have ever made. Last year’s tank parade was
the best worst decision.

It would have been better if Putin had kept adding capacity. Added more defensive
depth to the flanks.

→In the south, he already has enough coverage. He will be able to hold the south
thanks to the Dnipro river.

→He should have increased Russia’s defensive depth between Zaphorzizhia and
Svatove.

→Used the time to build handheld weapons that can take out Ukraine’s fast moving
heavy weapons.

He only had to copy paste Ukraine’s mobile defense strategy to hold the occupied
territory. He should have created a stalemate and then contacted President Biden.
It might have worked. It might have been the only way to seek armstice.

However, Putin’s inner circle that begins at his forehead and ends before it
reaches his toes had some glorious ideas.
Putin refuses to separate politics from war. A major offensive at this point is not
based on strategy, but rather on Putin playing macho man for domestic audiences.