Crim Law 2 Digest

Table of Contents
ART 114- TREASON...............................................................................................................................4

1. Laurel v. Misa, 77 Phil. 856 - Agatha Guison..........................................................................4
2. People vs. Mangahas G.R. No L5367 and L5368- Queenie Joy Accad..............................4
3. People vs. Adlawan, G.R. No. L-456, March 29, 1949- Naoimi Leaño...............................5
4. People v. Perez, 83 Phil. 314- Mariam T. Tictic........................................................................6
5. People v. Prieto, 80 Phil, 138 Michaela-Dexter Abrigo Santillan.........................................6
6. People v. Manayao, 78 Phil. 721- Mariam T. Tictic.................................................................7
7. People v. Adriano, 78 Phil. 561 - Michaela Abrigo Santillan................................................8
ARTICLE 117-ESPIONAGE...................................................................................................................9
1.Go Tian Sek Santos v Misa - Naoimi Leaño..............................................................................9
ART. 122-PIRACY IN GENERAL AND MUTINY ON THE HIGH SEAS..........................................9
1.People v. Lol-lo and Saraw, 43 Phil 19- Alisha Ianne Zulueta...............................................9
2. People v. Rodriguez, 135 SCRA 485- Lee Ann Tong-aan Chungalao..............................10
3. People v. Siyoh, 141 SCRA 356- Alisha Ianne Zulueta........................................................11
TITLE TWO.............................................................................................................................................13
ART. 124- ARBITRARY DETENTION................................................................................................13
People v. Santiano- Irish bencio...................................................................................................13
2. Us V. Santos- Mary Faith Lawagan..........................................................................................14
3. People V. Misa- Michelle Domoguen.......................................................................................14
4. Umil v Ramos - Torres, Emiaj Josh..........................................................................................16
5. People v Burgos- Maduli, Eden Faith......................................................................................17
6. Milo v Salanga - Chungalao, Lee Ann T..................................................................................18
ART. 125 DELAY IN DELIVERY OF DETAINED PERSONS TO THE PROPER JUDICIAL
AUTHORITIES........................................................................................................................................18
1. Soria V. Desierto, G.R No. 153524-25, January 31, 2005 – Irish Bencio.........................18
2. Agbay v. Natividad, G.R. No. 134503, July 2, 1999 – Clarence Santonia........................19
3. Alberto V. De la Cruz, SCRA 406- Ron Garcia.......................................................................20
ART. 127 EXPULSION.................................................................................................................................21
1. Villavicencio V. Lukban- Valeros..............................................................................................21
ART 129- SEARCH WARRANTS MALICIOUSLY OBTAINED AND ABUSE IN THE SERVICE
OF THOSE LEGALLY OBTAINED.....................................................................................................22
1. Stonehill v. Diokno- Danah Dominguez..................................................................................22
2. Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff, AFP, 133 SCRA 800, December 26, 1984- Canduyas,
Yvain P................................................................................................................................................23
ARTICLE 133 - OFFENDING RELIGIOUS FEELINGS....................................................................23
1. People vs Mandoriao. 51 OG 4619 - Agatha Guison............................................................23
2. PEOPLE v BAES - Naoimi Leaño..............................................................................................24
3. People v. Tengson- Abes, Medeah Faye V.............................................................................25
4. People v. Nanoy - Chungalao, Lee Ann T...............................................................................26
TITLE 3....................................................................................................................................................26
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ART 134- REBELLION/INSURRECTION...........................................................................................26
1. Lagman V. Medeldea, G.R No. 231658, July 4, 2017 - Abes, Medeah Faye V.................26
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6968...................................................................................................................27
1.Enrile vs. Salazar- Mariam T. Tictic...........................................................................................27
2. Umill Vs. Ramos-Michaella Santillan.......................................................................................29
3. Enrile v. Amin, 189 SCRA 573- Ron Garcia............................................................................29
4. People v. Dasig - Chungalao, Lee Ann....................................................................................30
5. People v. Lovedioro, 250 SCRA 389- Mariam Tictic FACTS :..............................................30
ART 139-SEDITION...............................................................................................................................31
1. People v Cabrera, 43 PHIL. 64 - Torres, Emiaj Josh P.........................................................31
2. People Vs Umali- Alisha Zulueta..............................................................................................32
Art 142-Inciting Sedition.....................................................................................................................33
1. Us Vs. Tolentino- Abes, Medeah Faye V.................................................................................33
2. Espuelas v. People - Queenie Joy Accad...............................................................................33
3. Umil v. Ramos - Queenie Joy Accad.......................................................................................35
CFARA.....................................................................................................................................................35
1.People v. Quijada, 259 SCRA 225- Canduyas, Yvain P........................................................35
2. People v Feloteo - Chungalao, Lee Ann T.............................................................................36
3. People v Narvasa- Dominguez, Danah Dominguez..............................................................36
4. Advincula v CA-Michelle Domoguen.......................................................................................37
5. People v Tac-an-Casserene Fernandez..................................................................................38
6. Misolas v Panga- Guison, Agatha...........................................................................................39
7.Baylosis v Chavez - Lawagan, Mary Faith...............................................................................40
8. People vs. Tiozon- Naoimi Leano.............................................................................................40
9. People v Gracia 1194 - Eden Faith Maduli..............................................................................41
10. People vs Garcia 2002 - Clarence Santonia.........................................................................42
11.People vs Garcia 2000- Valeros, Danielle..............................................................................43
12. People Vs. Nepomuceno - Mariam T. Tictic.........................................................................44
13. People vs Evangelista- Michaela Santillan..........................................................................45
CHAPTER 2 VIOLATION OF PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY........................................................46
1.Martinez Vs. Morfe, 44 SCRA 22-Mariam Tictic......................................................................46
ARTICLE 148-DIRECT ASSAULT......................................................................................................47
1.People v. Recto- Abes, Medeah Faye V...................................................................................47
2.Clarin v. Justice of Peace- Accad..............................................................................................48
3. People v. Beltran- Bencio...........................................................................................................48
4. People v. Dollantes- Canduyas, Yvain P.................................................................................49
ARTICLE 156- DELIVERING PRISONERS FROM JAIL.................................................................50
1. Alberto v Dela Cruz - Chungalao, Lee Ann............................................................................50
ARTICLE 157-EVASION OF SERVICE OF SENTENCE.................................................................51
1. Adelaida Tanega v Hon. Honorato B. Masakayan (19 SCRA 564)- Dominguez, Danah
...............................................................................................................................................................51
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2. People v Abilong - Domoguen, Michelle.....................................................................................51
ARTICLE 159- OTHER CASES OF EVASION OF SENTENCE.....................................................52
Wilfredo Torres v. Hon. Neptali A. Gonzales-FERNANDEZ, Casserene Fernandez.........52
ARTICLE 160 - QUASI-RECIDIVISM..................................................................................................53
1.People v. Quijada - Ron Garcia..................................................................................................53
2. People v Feloteo - Agatha Guison............................................................................................54
3. People v. Narvasa 298 SCRA 637- Mary Faith Lawagan.....................................................54
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 247.....................................................................................................55
Chapter 1- Article 163 : People v. Kong Leon, 48 OG 664 - Eden Faith Maduli................55
CHAPTER 4- ARTICLE 166.................................................................................................................56
1.PEOPLE V VALENCIA- Michaela Santillan.................................................................................56
ARTICLE 169- HOW FORGERY IS COMMITTED............................................................................57
1. Del Rosario v. People- Santonia............................................................................................57
2. People V. Galano, 54 OG 5897-Mariam T. Tictic....................................................................57
Art. 172 - Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents........................58
1, Cabuang Vs. People – EJ Torres..............................................................................................59
2. People V. Romualdez – Daniele Valeros.................................................................................59
3. Beradio v CA- Alisha Zulueta....................................................................................................60
4. Luague v CA - Naoimi Leaño.....................................................................................................61
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TITLE 1
CHAPTER ONE
ART 114- TREASON
1. Laurel v. Misa, 77 Phil. 856 - Agatha Guison
FACTS :
Petitioner Anastacio Laurel, a Filipino Citizen, filed a petition for habeas corpus. He
was charged and RULING for the crime of treason during Japanese occupation. In the
FACTS of his previous case, he was arrested in Camarines Sur by the United States
Army, and was interned, under a commitment order "for his active collaboration with the
Japanese during the Japanese occupation," as an ambassador to Japan; but he was
turned over to the Commonwealth Government, and since then has been under the
custody of the respondent Director of Prisons, Eriberto Misa.
CONTENTION OF THE STATE:
The citizen owes permanent allegiance (consists in the obligation of fidelity and
obedience to his government or sovereign). This permanent allegiance should not be
confused with temporary allegiance (a foreigner owes to the government where he
resides). This permanent allegiance is not severed by enemy occupation because the
sovereignty of the government de jure is not transferred to the occupier.
CONTENTION OF THE DEFENSE:
A Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during
Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason because the
sovereignty of the legitimate government was then suspended and that there was a
change of sovereignty over these Islands.
ISSUE : Whether the petitioner is subject to the crime of Treason penalized under
Article 114 of the RPC?
RULING:
Yes. The permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy
is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation. Laurel is subject to the Article
114 of the Revised Penal Code because he is holding a policy determining position and
the change of form of government does not affect the prosecution of those charged with
the crime of treason because it is an offense to the same government and same
sovereign people. The Court therefore denies the petition.
2. People vs. Mangahas G.R. No L5367 and L5368- Queenie Joy Accad
FACTS :
Makapilis raided Lawang, Norzagaray, and apprehended several guerilla members.

Among them were Cayetano and Mariano Mangahas, with whom they surrounded the
house of Enriqueta de la Merced. They went up, took and brought to the garrison of the
Makapilis near the municipal building foodstuffs intended for the guerillas, consisting of
5 sacks of rice, 2 cans of salted beef, a basketful of camote and another of tomatoes, a
small bag of salt and a half sack of sardines, salmon and corned beef.
On December 29, 1944, a group of armed Makapilis, among whom were Cayetano and
Mariano Mngahas, took and carried away rice, shoes, helmet, clothes and anything they
could get hold in the house of Primo S. Cruz and at the same time apprehended him
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and brought him to the San Jose garrison where Japanese soldiers were stationed and
since then Cruz has not returned and has not been seen. A similar tragedy befell
Artemio Nicolas, who was tied up and brought to the San Jose garrison by the
defendants. Each of their wives testified to the arrests of their respective husbands. On
December 30, 1944, Moises Legaspi was brought to the garrison of the Makapilis by
five persons, among whom were the defendants. His wife and son testified to the
foregoing acts. Cayetano Mangahas and Mariano de los Santos Mangahas were
charged with treason at the Court of First Instance in Bulacan. Both defendants have
appealed the RULING of the lower court.
There is no meri itt in the argument that because there is no evidence to show that the
defendants acted as informers or that they were responsible for the arrest of Moises
Legaspi, the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction for treason. There is no
doubt that the two defendants were present when they arrested Moises Legaspi at his
house on December 30, 1944. A mere denial by Cayetano Mangahas that he was with
those who arrested Moises Legaspi is not sufficient to outweigh the testimony of Purita
Ramos and Matias Legaspi, who pointed to the appellants as among the five Makapilis
who apprehended Moises Legaspi.
Cayetano and Mariano Mangahas claimed that there is no proof of adherence to the
enemy. Cayetano Mangahas testifies that he and his brother Mariano de los Santos
Mangahas were arrested by the Japanese on December 25, 1944, because they were
suspected of being guerrillas, and that they could not have been among the 30
Makapilis who raided Martin de la Merced's house on December 13, 1944.
ISSUE : Whether Cayetano and Mariano Mangahas be RULING guilty of treason
RULING :
Yes. The claim that there is no proof of adherence to the enemy is without merit. The
acts of arresting guerrillas, commandeering foodstuffs, doing sentry work, drilling in the
plaza, going around the town carrying firearms, and the fact that before the outbreak of
the war they were members of the Ganap Party and in the latter period of the Japanese
occupation of the Makapilis organization are more than sufficient proofs of adherence to
the enemy.
3. People vs. Adlawan, G.R. No. L-456, March 29, 1949- Naoimi Leaño
FACTS :
Cucufate Adlawan is a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines and he is charged of
Treason after pleading guilty to all of the acts charged against him but he was convicted
of the complex crime of Treason with murder robbery with rape. He is found to be
adhering to the Japanese Military by giving aid and comfort to them.
He should be given the mitigating circumstances of: a. (1) voluntary surrender; (2) the
FACTS that the accused has been and is being utilized as witness by the CIC in cases
against Japanese soldiers under trial by the military commission; on and (3) the FACTS
that the accused helped and saved the lives of many civilian and from death in the
hands of the Japanese. He also contends the conviction in holding that the crime
committed by then accused is a complex crime of treason with murder, rape and
robbery.
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ISSUE : Whether the accused should have been convicted of the complex crime of
treason with murder, robbery, and rape.
RULING :
Appellant should not have been convicted of the so-called "complex crime of treason
with murder, robbery, and rape." The killings, robbery, and raping mentioned in the
information are therein alleged not as specific offenses but as mere elements of the
crime of treason for which the accused is being prosecuted. Being merged in and
identified with the general charge, they can not be used in combination with treason to
increase the penalty under article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. (People vs. Prieto,1 L-
399, January 29, 1948.) Appellant should, therefore, be RULING guilty of treason only.
4. People v. Perez, 83 Phil. 314- Mariam T. Tictic
FACTS :
Susano Perez alias Kid Perez was convicted of 5 counts of treason by the 5th Division
of the People's Court sitting in Cebu City and sentenced to death by electrocution. He
recruited, apprehended and commandeered numerous girls and women against their
will for the purpose of using them to satisfy the immoral purpose and sexual desire of
Colonel Mini, Commander of the Japanese Armed Forces.
If furnishing women for immoral purposes to the enemies was treason because
women's company kept up their morale, then socializing with them, entertaining them at
parties, selling them food and drinks, and kindred acts, would be treason. Any act of
hospitality without doubt produces treason, yet these acts are not the kind of disloyalty
that are punished as treason.
According to the Solicitor General, "maintaining and preserving the morale of the
soldiers has always been, and will always be, a fundamental concern of army
authorities, because the efficiency of rests not only on its physical attributes, but also,
and most importantly, on the morale of its soldiers."
ISSUE : Whether or not the accused committed the crime of Treason
RULING: No. As a general rule, to be treasonous the extent of the aid and comfort
given to the enemies must be to render assistance to them as enemies and not merely
as individuals and, in addition, be directly in furtherance of the enemies' hostile
designs. His "commandeering" of women to satisfy the lust of Japanese officers or men
or to enliven the entertainments RULING in their honor was not treason.
Sexual and social relations with the Japanese did not directly and materially tend to
improve their war efforts or to weaken the power of the United States. The acts herein
charged were not, by fair implication, calculated to strengthen the Japanese Empire or
its army or to cripple the defense and resistance of the other side. The defendant was
found guilty of four separate crimes of rape.
5. People v. Prieto, 80 Phil, 138 Michaela-Dexter Abrigo Santillan
FACTS :
The appellant was prosecuted in the People’s Court for treason on 7 counts. After
pleading not guilty he entered a plea of guilty to counts 1, 2, 3 and 7, and maintained
the original plea to counts 4, 5, and 6. The special prosecutor introduced evidence only
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on count 4, stating with reference to counts 5 and 6 that he did not have sufficient
evidence to sustain them. The defendant was found guilty on count 4 as well as counts
1, 2, 3, and 7 and was sentenced to death and to pay the fine of P20,000.
The lower court believes that the accused is "guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of treason complexed by murder and physical injuries," with "the aggravating
circumstances mentioned above." Apparently, the court has regarded the murders and
physical injuries charged in the information, not only as crimes distinct from treason but
also as modifying circumstances. The Solicitor General agrees with the RULING except
as to the technical designation of the crime. In his opinion, the offense committed by the
appellant is a "complex crime of treason with homicide."|||
ISSUE : Whether the crime of Treason was sufficiently proven by the prosecutor?
RULING :
In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by some
kind of action. Its very nature partakes of a deed or physical activity as opposed to a
mental operation. This deed or physical activity may be, and often is, in itself a criminal
offense under another penal statute or provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as
an element of treason it becomes identified with the latter crime and can not be the
subject of a separate punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the
penalty as article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides.
This rule would not, of course, preclude the punishment of murder or physical injuries as
such if the government should elect to prosecute the culprit specifically for those crimes
instead of relying on them as an element of treason. It is where murder or physical
injuries are charged as overt acts of treason that they can not be regarded separately
under their general denomination.
6. People v. Manayao, 78 Phil. 721- Mariam T. Tictic
FACTS :
The guerillas raided the Japanese in sitio Pulong Tindahan, municipality of Angat,
Province of Bulacan. In reprisal, Japanese soldiers and a number of Filipinos affiliated
with the Makapili, among them the instant appellant, Pedro Manayao, conceived the
diabolical idea of killing the residents of barrio Banaban in the same municipality
Appellant's counsel contends that appellant was a member of the Armed Forces of
Japan, was subject to military law, and not subject to the jurisdiction of the People's
Court; and in he advances the theory that appellant had lost his Philippine citizenship
and was therefore not amenable to the Philippine law of treason. His counsel cites the
fact that in he subscribed an oath before he was admitted into the Makapili association,
'the aim of which was to help Japan in its fight against the Americans and her allies.'
Although Makapili is organized to render military aid to the Japanese Army in the
Philippines during the late war, it was not a part of the Japanese army. It was an
organization of Filipino traitors, pure and simple. As to loss of Philippine citizenship by
appellant, counsel's theory is absolutely untenable.The members of the Makapili could
have sworn to help Japan in the war without necessarily swearing to support her
constitution and laws.
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ISSUE : Whether or not Manayao should be convicted of treason
RULING: Yes. He should be convicted with treason. Neither is there any showing of
the acceptance by appellant of a commission "in the military, naval, or air service" of
Japan. Much less is there a scintilla of evidence that appellant had ever been declared
a deserter in the Philippine Army, Navy or Air Corps - nor even that he was a member of
said Army, Navy, or Air Corps. Appellant's contention is repugnant to the most
fundamental and elementary principles governing the duties of a citizen toward his
country under our Constitution. Article II, section 2, of said Constitution ordains:
"SEC. 2. The defense of the State is a prime duty of government, in the fulfillment of this
duty all citizens may be required by to render personal, military or civil service."
This constitutional provision covers both time of peace and time of war, but it is brought
more immediately and peremptorily into play when the country is involved in war. During
such a period of stress, under a constitution enshrining such tenets, the citizen cannot
be considered free to cast off his loyalty and obligations toward the Fatherland.
7. People v. Adriano, 78 Phil. 561 - Michaela Abrigo Santillan
FACTS :
The accused Adriano was charged with Treason because of his involvement with the
Military Forces of Japan in 1945. He served as a member of the Makapili and
participated with the Japanese soldiers in certain raids and in confiscation of personal
property.
The court below, however, said these acts had not been established by the testimony of
two witnesses, and so regarded them merely as evidence of adherence to the enemy.
But the court did find established under the two witness rule, so we infer, "that the
accused and other Makapilis had their headquarters in the enemy garrison at Gapan,
Nueva Ecija; that the accused was in Makapili military uniform; that he was armed with
rifle; and that he drilled with other Makapilis under a Japanese instructor; that during the
same period, the accused in Makapili military uniform and with a rifle, performed duties
as sentry at the Japanese garrison and Makapili headquarters in Gapan, Nueva Ecija ;"
"that upon the liberation of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, by the American forces, the accused
and other Makapilis retreated to the mountains with the enemy ;" and that "the accused,
rifle in hand, later surrendered to the Americans."
ISSUE : Whether the two witness rule applies in this case.
RULING: No two of the prosecution witnesses testified to a single one of the various
acts of treason imputed by them to the appellant. Those who gave evidence that the
accused took part in raids and seizure of personal property, and performed sentry
duties and military drills, referred to acts allegedly committed on different dates without
any two witnesses coinciding in any one specific deed. There is only one item on which
the witnesses agree: it is that the defendant was a Makapili and was seen by them in
Makapili uniform carrying arms. Yet, again, on this point it cannot be said that one
witness is corroborated by another if corroboration means that two witnesses have seen
the accused doing at least one particular thing, be it a routine military chore, or just
walking or eating.
Learned Hand, J., in United States vs. Robinson (D. C. S. D., N. Y., 259 Fed., 685),
expressed the same idea: "It is necessary to produce two direct witnesses to the
whole overt act. It may be possible to piece bits together of the overt act; but, if so,
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each bit must have the support of two oaths.” And in the recent case of Cramer vs.
United States (sup. Ct., 918), decided during the recent World War, the Federal
Supreme Court lays down this doctrine: "The very minimum function that an overt act
must perform in a treason prosecution is that it show sufficient action by the accused,
in its setting, to sustain a finding that the accused actually gave aid and comfort to the
enemy. Every act, movement, deed, and word of the defendant charged to constitute
treason must be supported by the testimony of two witnesses."
ARTICLE 117-ESPIONAGE
1.Go Tian Sek Santos v Misa - Naoimi Leaño
FACTS :
He is a Chinese citizen apprehended in February, 1945, by the Counter
Intelligence Corps of the United States Army, turned over last September, to the
Commonwealth Government, and since then detained by the respondent as a political
prisoner.

He claims, is illegal, because he has not been charge before, nor convicted by,
the judge of a competent court, and because he may not be confined under Act. No.
682, as he owes allegiance neither to the United States nor to the Commonwealth of the
Philippines.

The Solicitor-General, for the respondent, admits the detention, for active
collaboration with the Japanese, doubts the allegation of citizenship, and maintains that,
conceding arguendo petitioner's alienage, he may be charged for espionage, a crime
against national security wherein allegiance is immaterial, and may, therefore, be
RULING in custody under Commonwealth Act No. 682.
ISSUE :
Whether Go Tian Sek Santos should be convicted of Espionage regardless of his
citizenship.
RULING:
His foreign status does not exclude him ipso facto from the scope of the above
provisions. As stated by the Solicitor-General, he might be prosecuted for espionage,
(Commonwealth Act No. 616) a crime not conditioned by the citizenship of the offender,
and considered as an offense against national security.
ART. 122-PIRACY IN GENERAL AND MUTINY ON THE HIGH SEAS
1.People v. Lol-lo and Saraw, 43 Phil 19- Alisha Ianne Zulueta
FACTS : On or about June 30, 1920, A boat of Dutch possession after a number of
days of navigation, arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Duth East
Indies. There the boat was surrounded by 6 vintas manned by 24 Moros all armed. The
Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, took for themselves all of the
cargo, attacked some of the men and brutally violated 2 of the women. The Moros
abducted the 2 women and put holes on the Dutch boat with the idea that it would
submerge together with the other persons aboard. During the course of their abduction,
the 2 women were repeatedly violated but later on were able to escape upon their
arrival at Maruro, another Dutch possession. Lol-lo and Saraw, 2 of the Moros, later
returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu. There they were arrested and
were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy.
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CONTENTION OF THE STATE: All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present.
Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and
done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.
Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be
punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or
into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no
territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that
the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those
limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes." (U.S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5
Wheat., 184.)
CONTENTION OF THE DEFENSE: A demurrer was interposed by counsel de oficio for

the Moros, based on the grounds that the offense charged was not within the jurisdiction
of the Court of First Instance, nor of any court of the Philippine Islands, and that the
FACTS did not constitute a public offense, under the laws in force in the Philippine
Islands.
ISSUE : Whether or not the provisions of Article 153 to 156 of the Penal Code dealing
with the crime of piracy are still in force.
RULING: Yes. Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and
154, to be still in force in the Philippineshe crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an
offense against chastity and (2) the abandonment of persons without apparent means of
saving themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary for us to determine as to whether the
penalty of cadena perpetua or death should be imposed.
.The general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the United States relating
to the effect of a transfer of territory from another State to the United States are well-
known, the political law of the former sovereignty is necessarily changed. The municipal
law in so far as it is consistent with the Constitution, the laws of the United States, or the
characteristics of the government, remains in force. Laws subsisting at the time of
transfer, designed to secure good order and peace in the community, where are strictly
of a municipal character, continue until by direct action of the new government they are
altered or repealed.
The articles of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with piracy were meant to
include the Philippine Islands. Article 156 of the Penal Code in relation to article 1 of the
Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, would also make the provisions of the Code
applicable not only to Spaniards but to Filipinos. The framers of the Constitution and the
members of Congress were content to let a definition of piracy rest on its universal
conception under the law of nations. It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code
now in force in the Philippines relating to piracy are not inconsistent with the
corresponding provisions in force in the United States
2. People v. Rodriguez, 135 SCRA 485- Lee Ann Tong-aan Chungalao
FACTS :
The appellants Jaime Rodriguez alias Jimmy alias Wilfred de Lara y Medrano, Rico
Lopez, Davao Reyes alias Dario Dece Raymundo y Elausa, and Peter Ponce y
Bulaybulay alias Peter Power were crew members of the vessel M/V Noria 767, a barter
trade vessel of Philippine Registry.
On August 30, 1981, the accused-appellants armed with bladed weapons and high
calibre firearms, forcibly steal and carried away the properties, equipments and
personal belongings of the passengers and crew members of the vessel M/V Noria 767
in total amount of P3,687,300.00. The said act of piracy of the accused-appellants
caused the death and injuries of the passengers and crew members of the said vessel.
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The accused were charged of the crime of piracy before the then Court of First Instance
of Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. The accused-appellants were all found guilty by the trial court
and were sentenced each "to suffer the extreme penalty of death."
Jaime Rodriguez and Rico Lopez, assisted by their counsel, pleaded guilty to the
charge.
Dario Dece Raymundo, upon arraignment, interposed a plea of not guilty. However, he
withdrew his plea and substituted it with that of guilty.Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay entered
the plea of not guilty. After trial, he was found guilty of the offense charged.
In their brief, appellants Jaime Rodriguez, Rico Lopez, Dario Dece, and Peter Ponce
claim that the trial court erred in not appreciating their plea of guilty as mitigating
circumstance thus imposing upon them the penalty of extreme death penalty.
ISSUE : Whether the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty.
RULING:
No. The court was correct in imposing the death penalty.
Under the Presidential Decree No. 532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy Law,
amending Article 134 of the RPC provides: any person who commits piracy or highway
robbery/brigandage as herein defined, shall, upon conviction by competent court be
punished by:
a) Piracy.—The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods shall
be imposed. If physical injuries or other crimes are committed as a result or on the
occasion thereof, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. If rape, murder or
homicide is committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy, or when the offenders
abandoned the victims without means of saving themselves, or when the seizure is
accomplished by firing upon or boarding a vessel, the mandatory penalty of death shall
be imposed.
Clearly, the penalty imposable upon persons found guilty of the crime of piracy where
rape, murder or homicide is committed is mandatory death penalty. Thus, the lower
court committed no error in not considering the plea of the defendants as a mitigating
circumstance. Also, Article 63 of the RPC states that in all cases in which the law
prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the
deed.
3. People v. Siyoh, 141 SCRA 356- Alisha Ianne Zulueta
FACTS :
On July 11, 1979, the group of Antonio de Guzman, who were merchants, went
to Pilas Island, Province of Basilan to sell the goods they received from Alberto Aurea.
After selling their goods in Pilas, they went to the house of accused Omarkayam Kiraam
at Pilas. The following day, the group together with Kiram and Julaide Siyoh started
selling goods. The next day, they were again accompanied by Kiram and Siyoh.
On July 13, 1979, Kiram suggested the group to go to Baluk-Baluk to sell their
goods. The group then went to Baluk –Baluk. Thereafter, they returned to Pilas Island
for the night but Kiram did not sleep with them.
On July 14, 1979, the group went again to Baluk-Baluk accompanied by Kiram
and Siyoh. They used the pumpboat of Kiram. At that time, Kiram and Siyoh were
armed with “barongs” Upon arrival at Baluk-Baluk, Kiam and Siyoh went to a house
about 15 meters away from the place where the group was selling their goods.KIram
and Siyoh were seen talking with two persons whose faces the group saw but could not
11
recognize. After selling their goods, the group, together with Kiram and Siyoh, prepared
to return to Pilas Island. Kiram was the one who operated the engine of the pumpboat.
On their way to Pilas, Antonio de Guzman saw another pumpboat painted with red and
green about 200 meters away from their pumpboat. Thereafter, two gun shots were
fired from the pumpboat as it moved toward them. There were two persons on the other
pumpboat who were armed with armalites. De Guzman recognized them to be the same
person he saw Kiram conversing with in the house at Baluk-Baluk Island. Whenthe boat
came close to them, Kiram threw a rope to the other boat which towed de Guzmans’
group towards Mataja Island. On their way to Mataja, de Guzman and his companions
were divested of their money and their goods by Kiram. Kiram and his companions
ordered the group to undress.After taking theirmoney and dress, Siyoh hacked Danilo
Hiolen while Kiram hacked Rodolfo de Castro. Antonio de Guzman then jumped into the
water and he was able to survive.
An order of arrest was then ISSUE d against all of the accused but only Jlaide
Siyoh and Omarkayam Kiram were apprehended. After trial, the accused were
convicted of the crime Qualified Piracy with Triple Murder and Frustrated Murde under
P.D.532, and was sentenced each one of them to death, however, a commutation to life
imprisonment was recommended in consideration of the provision of the Sec. 106 Code
of Mindanao and Sulu.
The trial court which had the opportunity of observing the demeanor of the
witnesses and how they testified assigned credibility to the former and an examination
of the record does not reveal any fact or circumstance of weight and influence which
was overlooked or the significance of which was misinterpreted as would justify a
reversal of the trial court's determination.
The Accused argued the credibility of the witness and that there is no evidence
Anastacio de Guzman was killed together with Rodolfo de Castro and Danilo Hiolen
because his remains were never recovered. They also argued that if they were the
culprits they could have easily robbed their victims at the Kiram house or on any of the
occasions when they were travelling together.They also argued that there is no
evidence Anastacio de Guzman was killed together with Rodolfo de Castro and Danilo
Hiolen because his remains were never recovered. There is no reason to suppose that
Anastacio de Guzman is still alive or that he died in a manner different from his
companions. They also argued that it was Indanan and Jamahali who killed them
ISSUE :
Whether or not appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified piracy
with triple murder.
RULING:
The Court finds the accused Omar-kayam Kiram and Julaide Siyoh guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Piracy with Triple Murder and Frustrated
Murder as defined and penalized under the provision of Presidential Decree No. 532.
P.D. No. 532 considers qualified piracy, i.e. rape, murder or homicide is committed as a
result or on the occasion of piracy, as a special complex crime punishable by death
regardless of the number of victims. The number of persons killed on the occasion of
piracy is not material.
In the argument that it was Indanan and Jamahali who killed them. However, the
SC said that this claim is baseless in the face of the proven conspiracy among the
12
accused for as RTC stated: “A) On July 14, 1979, while peddling, the survivor-witness
Tony de Guzman noticed that near the window of a dilapidated house, both accused
were talking to two (2) armed strange-looking men at Baluk-Baluk Island; B) When the
pumpboat was chased and overtaken, the survivor-witness Tony de Guzman
recognized their captors to be the same two (2) armed strangers to whom the two
accused talked in Baluk- Baluk Island near the dilapidated house; C) The two accused,
without order from the two armed strangers transferred the unsold goods to the captors'
banca; D) That Tony de Guzman and companion peddlers were divested of their
jewelries and cash and undressed while the two accused remained unharmed or not
molested. These concerted actions on their part prove conspiracy and make them
equally liable for the same crime”.
TITLE TWO
ART. 124- ARBITRARY DETENTION

People v. Santiano- Irish bencio
FACTS :
Alipio Santiano , Jose Sandigan, Armenia Pillueta and Jose Chanco were indicted for
the kidnapping of Ramon Dy Know Jr who was detained at Naga City Jail for illegal
possession of marijuana, together with him in the cell is Santiano who got mauled.
When Santiano got released from the jail, he went to Naga City Jail, and he pointed out
that Ramon was the mastermind of the mauling incident.
On December 27,1993, Ramon asked a jail trustee to allow him to buy viand outside the
jail. He left the jail wearing a fatigue jacket and short pant. He was then accosted by
Santiano and Sandigan and was brought to the NARCOM office and was mauled.
Ramon was found dead in the canal in Palestina, Pili, Camarines Sur. The autopsy
report showed that the cause of death was due to internal hemorrhage secondary to
gunshot wound. Santiano et al, were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of kidnapping as defined and penalized under Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
Santiano et al, contended that the use of the words abducted and kidnapping in the
information was not in itself indicative of the crime of kidnapping being charged but that,
from the averments of the information, it could be apparent that Ramon was abducted
or kidnapped not for the purpose of detaining but of liquidating him so their conviction
for kidnapping had no legal ground to stand on.
Santino et al, were convicted properly since they had gone through trial without any
objection and the FACTS before the trial court contains no doubt. They were found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping with murder stated in the amended
information punishable under Art 267 and Art 248.
ISSUE : Whether or not they are guilty of kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
RULING:
Yes, the amended information readily reveals that the charge is kidnapping with murder
defined under Art 267 and Art 248.
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who shall
kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death;
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than five days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
13
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, female, or a public officer.
2. Us V. Santos- Mary Faith Lawagan
FACTS :
Dionisio Santos, a policeman of Pateros, Province of Rizal, acting under the orders of
his chief who desired to put a stop to pilfering in a certain locality, patrolled this district.
While conducting patrol at midnight, he saw two person in front of an uninhabited

house and entered an uninhabited camarin. Dionisio arrested them without warrant,
although no crime had been committed, and took them to the municipal presidencia
where they were detained in the jail for six or seven hours.
The powers for peace officers in the Philippines, generally stated, are the same as
those conferred upon constables under the Anglo-American Common Law. The extent
of their authority to make arrests without warrant and the limitations thereon are as
stated in the language of the Legislature in the charter of the city of Manila.
A peace officer can justify an arrest without warrant if there is reasonable ground of
suspicion tending to show that a person has committed or is about to commit any crime
or breach of the peace, and if he acts in good faith. Under such conditions, even if the
suspected person is later found to be innocent, the peace officer is not liable.
ISSUE : Whether or not the accused is guilty of arbitrary detention?
RULING:
No.The accused herein cannot justify the arrest by reason of acting in obedience to
legal process which it was his duty to obey. Under the rule a peace officers may pursue
and arrest without warrant any person found in suspicious places or under suspicious
circumstances reasonably tending to show that such person has committed, or is about
to commit any crime or breach of the peace. Also, the Common Law rule as to the
arrest without warrant of suspicious night-walkers is of particular interest
The reason of the rule is apparent. Good people do not ordinarily lurk about streets and
uninhabited premises at midnight. Citizens must be protected from annoyance and
crime. Prevention of crime is just as commendatory as the capture of criminals. surely
the officer must not be forced to await the commission of robbery or other felony. The
rule is supported by the necessities of life.
3. People V. Misa- Michelle Domoguen
FACTS :
This case stemmed from Informations filed before the RTC charging Misa with the
crimes of Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs. A team composed of
members of the Philippine National Police Cebu Police Station, with coordination from
the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, conducted a buy-bust operation against
Misa,two (2) heat-sealed plastic sachets containing suspected shabu weighing 0.03
gram each were recovered from him. Consequently, a search incidental to his arrest
yielded five (5) more heat-sealed plastic sachets containing suspected shabu weighing
0.03 gram each. . The team, together with Misa, then proceeded to the police station
14
where the seized items were marked, photographed, and inventoried in the presence of
Municipal Councilors Raul Butron and Teodoro Mirasol. The conduct thereof was not
done in the presence of representatives from the Department of Justice (DOJ) and/or
the media The RTC found Misa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged.
CONTENTION OF THE DEFENSE
For his part, Misa denied the charges against him and claimed that on said date, he was
in the public market buying barbeque with his wife when suddenly, a policeman
embraced him from behind and arrested him. Despite resisting the arrest, he and his
wife were brought to the police station where the police officers recovered from him
cash amounting to P120.00 and devices for gapping fighting cocks. Thereafter, they
were placed inside the jail.
CONTENTION OF THE STATE
The conduct thereof was not done in the presence of representatives from the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and/or the media, as police officers claimed that it was
difficult to contact them "as their telephone lines were always busy" and that they
had to beat the 24-hour deadline in submitting the evidence to the crime
laboratory. Thereafter, the seized items were brought to the crime laboratory
where, after examination, they tested positive for the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.
ISSUE
Whether or not all the elements of the of the crimes of Illegal Sale and Illegal
Possession of Dangerous Drugs were present and the chain of custody rule was duly
complied with
RULING
NO, In cases for Illegal Sale and/or Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under RA
9165,it is essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral
certainty, considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus
delicti of the crime. Failing to prove the integrity of the corpus delicti renders the
evidence for the State insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt and hence, warrants an acquittal
To establish the identity of the dangerous drug with moral certainty, the prosecution
must be able to account for each link of the chain of custody from the moment the drugs
are seized up to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime As part of the chain
of custody procedure, the law requires, inter alia, that the marking, physical inventory,
and photography of the seized items be conducted immediately after seizure and
confiscation of the same. The law further requires that the said inventory and
photography be done in the presence of the accused or the person from whom
the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, as well as certain
required witnesses, namely: (a) if prior to the amendment of RA 9165 by RA
10640, "a representative from the media AND the DOJ, and any elected public
official";or (b) if after the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, "[a]n elected
public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service (NPS) OR
the media." The law requires the presence of these witnesses primarily "to ensure the
establishment of the chain of custody and remove any suspicion of switching, planting,
or contamination of evidence."
15
In this case, it is apparent that the inventory of the seized items was not conducted in
the presence of a representative from the NPS (which falls under the DOJ) or the media
contrary to the afore-described procedure provided under Section 21, Article II of RA
9165, as amended by RA 10640
The plain explanation of PO2 Mamale that it was "hard to contact" the required
witnesses at that time is undoubtedly too flimsy of an excuse and hence, would not pass
the foregoing standard to trigger the operation of the saving clause.
4. Umil v Ramos - Torres, Emiaj Josh
FACTS :
On February 1, 1988, military agents were dispatched to St. Agnes Hospital in Quezon
City to verify confidential information about a “sparrow man”, a New People’s Army
member, who had been admitted with a gunshot wound. It is disclosed in a confidential
information that the wounded man is among the five male “sparrows” who murdered two
CAPCOM soldiers on or before January 31, 1988, along Macanining St., Caloocan City.
Furthermore, the wounded man’s name was listed as “Ronnie Javellon”, who was then
identified as Rolando Dural and was transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the
CAPCOM for security reasons.
Rolando Dural denied authorship of the crime charged and interposed the defense of
alibi. Dural alleged that he stayed in his sister's house at Biñan, Laguna from November
29, 1987 to January 31, 1988. He told his sister, Agnes, that his stomach and chest
were in severe pain. Consequently, his sister got in touch with Dr. Jeremias de la Cruz;
who brought him to the latter's clinic in Quezon City where his cyst was removed and
his wound at the left side of his body was sutured. Thereafter, he was brought to St.
Agnes Hospital where he was admitted under the name Ronnie Javelon for the reason
that his sister will be shouldering his hospital bills and expenses.
The trial court rejected the defense of alibi on the ground that the eyewitnesses whose
testimonies were logical, straightforward and probable and whose credibility was not
shaken in any manner by the rigorous examination to which they have been exposed,
positively identified the accused. Moreover, finding Rolando Dural guilty of the crime of
double murder.
ISSUE : Whether the arresting officers be RULING liable for the crime of arbitrary
detention.
RULING:
No, the arresting officers will not be RULING liable for the crime of arbitrary detention.
Under Section 5, Rule 113, explains that an agent of persons in authority can arrest
without a warrant if: a) When, in his presence, the person to he arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; and b) When an offense
has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of FACTS indicating
that the person to be arrest has committed it. The court ruled that the crimes of
insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and
other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance under Presidential Proclamation
No. 2045 are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from the
common offenses. Hence, Dural was not arrested because he is a member of the New
People’s Army. Moreover, it is equally settled that for alibi to prosper, it must not only be
shown that the accused was at some other place at the time of the incident but that it
16
was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of
its commission; and this was not proven by Dural.
5. People v Burgos- Maduli, Eden Faith
FACTS :
Defendant Ruben Burgos was charged with illegal possession of firearms in furtherance
of subversion (tasks such as recruiting members to the NPA and collection of
contributions from its members) and found guilty by the RTC of Digos, Davao del Sur.
An information was given by Masamlok, allegedly a man that defendant Burgos tried to
recruit into the NPA. The police authorities arrested the defendant and had his house
searched. Subsequently, subversive documents and a firearm were confiscated.
Defendant denies being involved in any subversive activities and claims that he has
been tortured in order to accept ownership of subject firearm and that his alleged
extrajudicial statements have been made only under fear, threat and intimidation on his
person and his family. He avers that his arrest is unlawful as it is done without valid
warrant, that the trial court erred in holding the search warrant in his house for the
firearm lawful.
The trial court justified the warrantless arrest under Rule 113 Sec 5 of the Rules of
Court:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense,
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
FACTS indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
The confiscation of the firearm under Rule 126, Sec 12:
A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.
ISSUE : Whether defendant’s arrest, search of his home, and the subsequent
confiscation of a firearm and subversive documents lawful.
RULING:
The arrest was invalid considering that the only information from Masamlok who led the
authorities to suspect that Burgos committed a crime. They were still fishing for
evidence of a crime not yet ascertained.

The trial court has erred in its conclusion that said warrantless arrest is under the ambit
of aforementioned Rules of Court. At the time of defendant’s arrest, he wasn’t in actual
17
possession of any firearm or subversive document, and was not committing any
“subversive” act—he was plowing his field. It is not enough that there is reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime in a warrantless
arrest. An essential precondition is that a crime must have been in fact or actually have
been committed first; it isn’t enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed.
The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.
Ruben Burgos was acquitted.
6. Milo v Salanga - Chungalao, Lee Ann T.
FACTS :
On April 21, 1972 in Manaoag, Pangasinan, accused barrio captain Tuvera Sr. with
some private persons allegedly maltreated Armando Valdez through fist blows and by
hitting him with the butts of their guns. Thereafter, accused Tuvera with members of the
police force without legal grounds, detained Valdez inside the municipal jail for about 11
hours. They were charged with Arbitrary Detention under Art. 124 of the RPC.
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Milo argued that the duties and powers of a barangay captain
is to look after the maintenance of public order and enforce laws and ordinances (RA
3590, Revised Barrio Charter). He is a peace officer in the barrio considered under the
law as a person in authority. As such, he may arrest and detain persons within legal
limits.
Judge Salanga concluded that Tuvera is not a public officer.
ISSUE : Whether a barrio captain is a public officer who can be charged with Arbitrary
Detention.
RULING:
Yes. Arbitrary Detention is committed by a public officer who, without legal grounds,
detains a person where the offender is a public officer or employee.
Long before PD 299 was signed into law, barrio lieutenants, later named barrio
captains, now barangay captains, were recognized as persons in authority.
ART. 125 DELAY IN DELIVERY OF DETAINED PERSONS TO THE PROPER

JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES
1. Soria V. Desierto, G.R No. 153524-25, January 31, 2005 – Irish Bencio
FACTS :
Rodolfo Soria and Edimar Bista were both arrested without warrant of arrest and were
brought to Sta. Police Station before the day of the election which is a Sunday. Soria
was arrested for illegal possession of .38 cal. revolver and the penalty is pricion
correccional,he was detained for 22 hrs before release while Bistro was arrested for
illegal possession of sub-machine pistol UZI, 9mm cal. and .22 cal. revolver with
ammunition. Bistro was released after 26 days.
They invoked that Sundays, Holidays and Election days are excluded in the
computation periods as contemplated in Art. 125.
18
Their complaint for violation of Art 125 was dismissed for lack of merit. The
Ombudsman ruled that Sundays, holidays, and election days are excluded in the
computation periods as contemplated in Article 125.
ISSUE : Whether or not Sundays, holidays, and election days are excluded in the
computation periods as contemplated in Article 125.
RULING:
No, an election day or a special holiday, should not be included in the computation of
the period prescribed by law for the filing of complaint/information in courts in cases of
warrantless arrests, it being a “no-office day
2. Agbay v. Natividad, G.R. No. 134503, July 2, 1999 – Clarence Santonia
FACTS :
On September 7, 1997, petitioner, together with acertainSherwinJugalbot, was arrested

and detained at the Liloan PoliceStation, MetroCebu for an alleged violation of R.A.
7610 (Special Protectionof ChildrenAgainst Child abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Act). Thefollowingday(September 8, 1997), a Complaint for violation of R.A. 7610 was
filed against petitioner and Jugalbot with the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)
ofLiloan-Compostela, barely 20 hours after the arrest of here in complainant of
September 7, 1997. On September 10, 1997, counsel for petitioner
wrotetotheChiefofPolice of Liloan demanding the immediate release of petitioner
considering that the latter had "failed to deliver the detained Jasper Agbay to the proper
judicial authority within thirty-six (36) hours fromSeptember 7, 1997. Privaterespondents
did not act on this letter and continued to detain the petitioner. Petitioner filed a
complaint for delay in the delivery of detained persons against herein private
respondents SPO4 NemesioNatividad,Jr.,SPO2 Eleazar M. Salomon and other
unidentified police officers stationed at the Liloan Police Substation, before the Office of
the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas.
CONTENTION OF THE STATE: The filing of the complaint with the MCTC was already
compliant with the very purpose and intent of Art. 125
CONTENTION OF THE DEFENSE: Private respondents failed to deliver the detained

Jasper Agbay to the proper judicial authority within thirty-six(36)hours from September
7, 1997 which makes them guilty of violation of Art.125.
ISSUE : Whether there was a delay in the delivery of the detained person to proper
judicial authorities.
RULING:
The words ``judicial authority" as contemplatedby Art. 125 mean "the courts of justices
or judges of said courts vested with judicial powertoorder the temporary detention or
confinement of a person charged with having committed a public offense, that is, the
SupremeCourt and other such inferior courts as may be established by law.
Furthermore, upon the filing of the complaint with theMunicipal TrialCourt, the intent
behind art. 125 is satisfied considering that bysuchact,thedetained person is informed of
the crime imputed against him and, upon his application with the court, he may be
released on bail. Petitioner himself acknowledged this power of the MCTC to order his
releasewhenheappliedfor and was granted his release upon posting bail. Thus, the very
purpose underlying Article 125 has been duly served with the filingof thecomplaintwith
the MCTC. Therefore, such filing of the complaint withtheMCTCinterrupted the period
prescribed in said Article. Art. 125 of the RPC is intended to prevent any abuse resulting
from confining a person without informing him of his offense and without permitting him
19
to go on bail. More specifically, it punishes public officials or employees who shall detain
any person for some legal groundandshall fail to deliver such person to the proper
judicial authorities within the periods prescribed by law. The continued detention of the
accused becomes illegal upon the expiration of the periods provided for by Art. 125
without such a detainee having been delivered to the corresponding judicial authorities.
3. Alberto V. De la Cruz, SCRA 406- Ron Garcia
Alberto v Dela Cruz - before reciting the digest note that there was no mention of
art. 125.
FACTS :
At on or about the 12th day of September. 1968, in the barrio of Taculod, municipality of
Canaman, province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, being then a member of the Provincial Guard of
Camarines Sur and specially charged with the duty of keeping under custody detention
prisoner Pablo Denaque, leave the latter unguarded while in said barrio, thereby giving
him the opportunity to run away and escape. The detention prisoner Pablo Denaque did
run away and escape from the custody of the said accused.
The respondent Judge, Hon. Rafael Dela Cruz, directed the office of Edmundo Alberto
(Fiscal), within 15 days from date, to cause the further investigation of the case, taking
into consideration the provisions of Article 156 in relation to Articles 223 and 224 of the
Revised Penal Code in order to determine once and for all whether the Governor as
jailer of the province and his assistant have any criminatory participation in the
circumstances of Denaque's escape from judicial custody.
There was no mention of violation of Art. 125
Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code is intended to prevent any abuse resulting from
confining a person without informing him of his offense and without permitting him to go
on bail. More specifically, it punishes public officials or employees who shall detain any
person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial
authorities within the periods prescribed by law. The continued detention of the accused
becomes illegal upon the expiration of the periods provided for by Art. 125 without such
detainee having been delivered to the corresponding judicial authorities.
 Taken from agbay v. natividad
ISSUE : Whether there was a delay in the delivery of the detained person to proper
judicial authorities
RULING:
No. Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code is intended to prevent any abuse resulting from
confining a person without informing him of his offense and without permitting him to go
on bail. More specifically, it punishes public officials or employees who shall detain any
person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial
authorities within the periods prescribed by law. The continued detention of the accused
becomes illegal upon the expiration of the periods provided for by Art. 125 without such
detainee having been delivered to the corresponding judicial authorities.
20
ART. 127 EXPULSION
1. Villavicencio V. Lukban- Valeros
FACTS :
Justo Lukban was then the Mayor of the City of Manila. He ordered the deportation of
170 women dancers and prostitutes to Davao.
The mayor's reason for doing this was to preserve the morals of the people of Manila.
The women were under the assumption that they were being transported to another
police station while Ynigo, the haciendero from Davao, had no idea that the women
being sent to work for him were actually prostitutes.
During the trial, it came out that, indeed, the women were deported without their
consent. Infact there was no law or order authorizing Lukban's deportation of the 170
prostitutes.
Liberty of abode was raised here versus the power of the executive of the Municipality
in deporting the women without their knowledge and consent in his capacity as Mayor.
The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners with the instructions to the respondents
giving them 3 options:
(1) Produce the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ.
(2) Show by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons (170 women
subject of the writ of habeas corpus) could not safely be brought before the court, or
(3) Present affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the
right to be present.
The guy moved for the dismissal of the case stating that those women were already out
of his jurisdiction and that, it should be filed in the city of Davao instead.
RULING:
The Supreme Court said "We are clearly a government of laws".
Lukban committed grave abuse of discretion by deporting the prostitutes to a new

domicile against their will.
There is no law expressly authorizing his action. On the contrary, there is a law
punishing public officials, not expressly authorized by law or regulation, who compels
any person to change his residence.
Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as citizens of the Philippines entitled to the same
rights, as stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as every other citizen. Their choice of
profession should not be a cause for discrimination. It may make some, like Lukban,
quite uncomfortable but it does not authorize anyone to compel said prostitutes to
isolate themselves from the rest of the human race. These women have been deprived
of their liberty by being exiled to Davao without even being given the opportunity to
21
collect their belongings or, worse, without even consenting to being transported to
Mindanao. For this, Lukban et al must be severely punished.
ART 129- SEARCH WARRANTS MALICIOUSLY OBTAINED AND ABUSE IN THE

SERVICE OF THOSE LEGALLY OBTAINED
1. Stonehill v. Diokno- Danah Dominguez
FACTS :
Respondents-Judges herein ISSUE d a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners

herein and the corporations of which they were officers, to search “books of accounts,
financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios,
credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers),” as “the subject of the offense; stolen or
embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense,” or “used or intended to be used as the
means of committing the offense,” which is described in the applications adverted to
above as “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and the Revised Penal Code.”
Respondents-prosecutors alleged, (1) that the contested search warrants are valid and
have been ISSUE d in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any,
were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are
admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of
the aforementioned searches and seizures.
The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as their issuance
violated the Constitution and the Rules of Court for being general warrants.
The documents, papers, and things seized under the aWhether or not the search
warrants are null and void and violated the constitution and the rules of court.
ISSUE :
Whether the search warrants are null and void and violated the constitution and the
rules of court.
RULING:
Yes. Warrants for the search of 3 residences are null and void; searches and seizures
made are illegal. To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out
completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it
would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers. The
warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the
Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein
made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore ISSUE d, in connection
with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein
petitioners is hereby made permanent.
22
2. Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff, AFP, 133 SCRA 800, December 26, 1984-
Canduyas, Yvain P.
FACTS: Two warrants were issued by Judge Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of then Court
of First Instance of Rizal, against petitioners for the search on the premises of
“Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to
have been used in subversive activities (printing equipment, motor vehicles, documents,
books, etc.).
CONTENTION OF THE STATE: Burgos, Jr. alleged that the warrants were issued
without probable cause and that respondent Judge failed to conduct an examination
under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses. Also, the two search
warrants pinpointed only one place where petitioner was allegedly keeping and
concealing the articles listed therein (No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City).
CONTENTION OF THE DEFENSE: AFP Chief of Staff, et al. insinuates that petitioners
are estopped by laches that they only impugned the search warrant six months later.
They further justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the ground that
they have been sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as
amended, which authorizes sequestration of the property of any person engaged in
subversive activities against the government in accordance with implementing rules and
regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of National Defense.
ISSUE: Whether the two search warrants were valid.
HELD: No. The search warrants are null and void as they are in the nature of a general
warrant.
When the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor
in connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the
application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with
particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to publish.
Mere generalization will not suffice.
The broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in possession or
has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and
other documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of
committing the offense of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as
amended ..." is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of
probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of
probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as the basis for the issuance of a search
warrant and it was a grave error for the respondent judge to have done so.
ARTICLE 133 - OFFENDING RELIGIOUS FEELINGS
1. People vs Mandoriao. 51 OG 4619 - Agatha Guison
FACTS :
Iglesia ni Cristo RULING a religious rally at a public place in City Camp, Baguio City.
Around 200 people attended, about 50 of whom were members of the Iglesia ni Cristo.
While the minister, Plutarco Salvio, was expounding on his topic that Jesus Christ is not
God, but only a man, the crowd went unruly and many of them shouted and made
noise. Some people urged the appellant, Jose Mandoriao, to go up the stage and have
a debate with Salvio. His co-defendant, Alipio Rivera, was also among the people who
were shouting. Appellant went up the stage and challenged Salvio to a debate,
however, was not able to speak before the microphone because the wire connecting it
23
was abruptly disconnected. Jose Mandariao was then charged with a violation of Article
133 of the Revised Penal Code in the Court of First Instance of Baguio City.
Mandoraio disturbed the meeting by going up the stage and grabbing he microphone
from the preacher, “which acts the City Attorney alleges were notoriously offensive to
the feelings of the devotees therein. The trial judge concurred this view of the City
Attorney. After due trial, the lower court found Jose Mandoriao guilty of the crime
charged and sentenced to imprisonment of 4 years and 1 day of arresto mayor. While
his co-defendant, Rivera, was acquitted.
Mandoriao contends that the lower court erred in finding that the religious rally was a
religious ceremony within the purview of Article 133. And that the law punishes, “acts
notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful” performed in “a place devoted to
religious worship or during the celebration of any religious ceremony”.
ISSUE : Whether the meeting is a “religious ceremony” in purview of Article 133 of the
RPC.
RULING:
No. The application of the Church of Christ to hold the meeting and the permit expressly
state that the purpose was to hold a religious rally. A religious meeing is an
“assemblage of people meeting for the purpose of performing acts of adoration to the
Supreme Being, or to perform religious services in recognition of God as an object of
worship…” The meeting here was not limited to the members of the Iglesia ni Cristo.
The supposed prayers and singing of hymns were merely incidental because the
principal object of the rally was to persuade new converts to their religion. Assuming
that the rally was a religious ceremony, the appellant cannot be said to have performed
acts or utered words ofensive to the feelings of the faithful. An act is said to be
notoriously offensive to the religious feelings of the faithful when a person ridicules or
makes light of anything constituting a religious dogma; mocks or scoffs at anything
devoted to religious ceremonies. The act complained of must be directed against a
dogma or ritual, or upon an object of veneraion. There was no object of veneration at
the meeting.
There was already a commotion before Mandariao went up the stage after Salvio made
a remark that those who believe that Christ is God is an anti-Christ and that all the
members of the Roman church, from the highest official down to the last “Ember, are
marked by the demon; and that the Pope is the commander-in-chief of satan”. The
Court stated that if there is anyone was to blame for the disturbance, it was the speaker
Salvio. Appellant was also not able to talk before the microphone because the wire was
disconnected. Thus, appellant Mandoriao is acquitted.
2. PEOPLE v BAES - Naoimi Leaño
FACTS :
Parish priest Baes of Lumban, Laguna charged Enrique Villaroca, Alejandro

Lacbay, and Bernardo Del Rosario with an offense against religion.
During the funeral of Antonio Macabigtas, who is a follower of Church of Christ,

the accused caused the funeral to pass through the churchyard fronting the Roman
Catholic church, through force and threats of physical violence in open disregard of the
religious feelings of the Catholics.
24
The fiscal filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the FACTS imputed do
not constitute the offense complained of. Justice Albert, commenting on the article, has
this to say: "An act is said to be notoriously offensive to the religious feelings of the
faithful when a person ridicules or makes light of anything constituting a religious
dogma; works or scoffs at anything devoted to religious ceremonies; plays with or
damages or destroys any object of veneration by the faithful." The mere act of causing
the passage through the churchyard belonging to the Church, of the funeral of one who
in life belonged to the Church of Christ, neither offends nor ridicules the religious
feelings of those who belong to the Roman Catholic Church.
ISSUE : Whether the acts complained of constitute the crime defined and penalized
under Art. 133 of the RPC.
RULING:
Yes. The motion raises a question of law, not one of fact. In the second place,
whether or of the act complained of is offensive to the religious feelings of the Catholics,
is a question of fact which must be judged only according to the feelings of the Catholics
and not those of other faithful ones, for it is possible that certain acts may offend the
feelings of those who profess a certain religion, while not otherwise offensive to the
feelings of those professing another faith. We, therefore, take the view that the FACTS
alleged in the complaint constitute the offense defined and penalized in article 133 of
the Revised Penal Code, and should the fiscal file an information alleging the said
FACTS and a trial be thereafter RULING at which the said FACTS should be
conclusively established, the court may find the accused guilty of the offense
complained of, or that of coercion, or that of trespass under article 281 of the Revised
Penal Code, as may be proper, pursuant to section 29 of General Orders, No. 58.
3. People v. Tengson- Abes, Medeah Faye V.
FACTS :
Alfonso Tengson, a minister of “Christ is the Answer”, together with his assistant
Eduardo Olegario, after receiving a telegram informing him of the death of one Tiburcio
Cepillo’s wife. They are requested by the widower Cepillo to perform a religious service
by singing hymns and reading passages from the bible, answered with the chant of
“Alleluia” by Olegario.
Tengson was guilty of Violation of Article 133 of the RPC. “The penalty of arresto mayor
in its maximum period of prison correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed
upon anyone who, in a place devoted to religious worship or during the celebration of
any religious ceremony, shall perform acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of the
faithful.”
The act of performing burial rites in accordance with the rules of practices of “Christ is
the Answer”, by reading passages from the Bible, chanting the “Alleluia”, singing
religious hymns and praying for the repose of the soul of the dead, is not notoriously
offensive to the feelings of religious persons, provided there was no intent to mock,
scoff at or to desecrate any religious act or object venerated by people of a particular
religion. Here the appellant and his assistant simply performed religious rites in
accordance with the practice of their sect, a Christian sect at that.
ISSUE :
25
Whether Tengson and Olegario performed act notoriously offensive to the
feelings of a Christian or a Roman Catholic faith.
RULING:
No. There are two essential elements of the offense penalized under Article 133
of the Revised Penal Code, to wit: (1) That the acts complained of were performed in a
place devoted to religious worship or during the celebration of any religious ceremony;
and (2) that ‘the act or acts must be notoriously offensive to those who are faithful in
their religion. The first element above-mentioned is present in this case as the acts
complained of took place inside the Roman Catholic cemetery where there is a chapel,
although unfinished, for performing the last rites before burial of the dead in accordance
with the Roman Catholic religion. As to the second element, we believe the acts
complained of do not come within the purview of the law. For an acts to be notoriously
offensive to religious feelings, it must be directed against a religious practice, or dogma,
or ritual for the purpose of ridicule.
4. People v. Nanoy - Chungalao, Lee Ann T.
FACTS :
Nanoy, allegedly drunk, entered into the chapel of the congregation of the Assembly of
God while it was having its afternoon service and attempted to grab the song leader. As
a result, everyone ran out of the church and the religious services were discontinued.
Nanoy was charged with the crime of offending religious feelings. He is guilty of
disturbance or interruption of a religious ceremony penalized under Article 133 of the
RPC.
CONTENTION OF THE DEFENSE: Nanoy argued that the offense, if any, is unjust
vexation.
ISSUE : Whether Nanoy is guilty of the crime of offending religious feelings.
RULING:
No. Nanoy did not perform acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful.
Neither did he cause such serious disturbance as to interrupt or disturb the services of
the said congregation. His acts were not directed to the religious belief itself.
Nanoy is guilty of unjust vexation penalized under paragraph 2 of Article 287.
TITLE 3
ART 134- REBELLION/INSURRECTION
1. Lagman V. Medeldea, G.R No. 231658, July 4, 2017 - Abes, Medeah Faye V.
FACTS :
Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Duterte
ISSUE d Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. After the submission of
the Report and the briefings, the Senate ISSUE d P.S. Resolution No. 390 expressing
full support to the martial law proclamation and finding Proclamation No. 216 "to be
satisfactory, constitutional and in accordance with the law". In the same Resolution, the
Senate declared that it found "no compelling reason to revoke the same".
26
While the government is presently conducting legitimate operations to address the on-
going rebellion, if not the seeds of invasion, public safety necessitates the continued
implementation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the whole of Mindanao until such time that the rebellion is completely quelled.
The OSG sided with the President.
The Lagman Group, the Cullamat Group and the Mohamad Group petitioned the
Supreme Court, questioning the factual basis of President Duterte's Proclamation of
martial law.
ISSUE : Whether the armed hostilities mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 and in the
Report of the President to Congress are sufficient bases for the existence of actual
rebellion.
RULING:
Yes. In his Report, the President noted that the acts of violence perpetrated by the ASG
and the Maute Group were directed not only against government forces or
establishments but likewise against civilians and their properties. In addition and in
relation to the armed hostilities, bomb threats were ISSUE d; road blockades and
checkpoints were set up; schools and churches were burned; civilian hostages were
taken and killed; non-Muslims or Christians were targeted; young male Muslims were
forced to join their group; medical services and delivery of basic services were
hampered; reinforcements of government troops and civilian movement were hindered;
and the security of the entire Mindanao Island was compromised.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6968
1.Enrile vs. Salazar- Mariam T. Tictic
FACTS :
Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested on the strength of a
warrant ISSUE d by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio
Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly
committed during the period of the failed coup attempt against then president Corazon
Aquino. Senator Enrile was taken to and RULING overnight at the NBI headquarter,
without bail.
Enrile invoked the RULING in the landmark case of People vs Hernandez where it was
ruled that rebellion cannot be complexed with common crimes such as murder; as such,
the proper crime that should have been charged against him is simple rebellion – which
is bailable.
Solicitor General urged that the petitioners' case does not fall within the Hernandez
RULING because-and this is putting it very simply-the information in Hernandez
charged murders and other common crimes committed as a necessary means for the
commission of rebellion, whereas the information against Sen. Enrile et al. charged
murder and frustrated murder committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, of
27
rebellion. Stated otherwise, the Solicitor General would distinguish between the
complex crime ("delito complejo") arising from an offense being a necessary means for
committing another, which is referred to in the second clause of Article 48, Revised
Penal Code, and is the subject of the Hernandez RULING, and the compound crime
("delito compuesto") arising from a single act constituting two or more grave or less
grave offenses referred to in the first clause of the same paragraph, with which
Hernandez was not concerned and to which, therefore, it should not apply.
ISSUES: The parties oral and written pleas presented the court with the following
options:
(a) abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view expressed in the main dissent of
Justice Montemayor in said case that rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes, and
that under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code rebellion may properly be complexed
with common offenses, so-called; this option was suggested by the Solicitor General in
oral argument although it is not offered in his written pleadings;
(b) hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in furtherance, or as a

necessary means for the commission, of rebellion, but not to acts committed in the
course of a rebellion which also constitute "common" crimes of grave or less grave
character;
(c) maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb all other offenses
committed in its course, whether or not necessary to its commission or in furtherance
thereof.

RULING :
Eleven (11) Members of the Court voted against abandoning Hernandez. Two (2)
Members felt that the doctrine should be re-examined. In the view of the majority, the
RULING remains good law, its substantive and logical bases have withstood all
subsequent challenges and no new ones are presented here persuasive enough to
warrant a complete reversal. This view is reinforced by the fact that the incumbent
President, exercising her powers under the 1986 Freedom Constitution, saw fit to
repeal, among others, Presidential Decree No. 942 of the former regime which precisely
sought to nullify or neutralize Hernandez by enacting a new provision (Art. 142-A) into
the Revised Penal Code to the effect that "(w)hen by reason, or on the occasion, of any
of the crimes penalized in this Chapter (Chapter I of Title 3, which includes rebellion),
acts which constitute offenses upon which graver penalties are imposed by law are
committed, the penalty for the most serious offense in its maximum period shall be
imposed upon the offender."' 11 In thus acting, the President in effect by legislative flat
reinstated Hernandez as binding doctrine with the effect of law. The Court can do no
less than accord it the same recognition, absent any sufficiently powerful reason against
so doing.

On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to reject the theory that Hernandez
is, or should be, limited in its application to offenses committed as a necessary means
for the commission of rebellion and that the RULING should not be interpreted as
prohibiting the complexing of rebellion with other common crimes committed on the
occasion, but not in furtherance, thereof. While four Members of the Court felt that the
proponents' arguments were not entirely devoid of merit, the consensus was that they
were not sufficient to overcome what appears to be the real thrust of Hernandez to rule
out the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed in its course under
either of the aforecited clauses of Article 48,
Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion

with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary
to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.
28
Thus, in Hernandez, the Court said that the crime charged in the aforementioned
amended information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion
with multiple murder, arsons and robberies; and that, in conformity with the policyof this
court in dealing with accused persons amenable to a similar punishment, said
defendant may be allowed bail.
2. Umill Vs. Ramos-Michaella Santillan
3. Enrile v. Amin, 189 SCRA 573- Ron Garcia
FACTS
Fugitive Col. Gringo Honasan and some 100-rebel soldier attended the mass and
birthday party RULING at the residence of the petitioner in the evening of Dec. 1, 1989.
Col. Gringo Honasan conferred with Juan Ponce Enrile accompanied by about 100 fully
armed rebel soldiers wearing white armed patches.
Based on this the prosecution concluded that Enrile and Honasan were co-conspirator
in the failed coup.
The prosecution in this Makati case alleges that the petitioner entertained and
accommodated Col. Honasan by giving him food and comfort on December 1, 1989 in
his house. Knowing that Colonel Honasan is a fugitive from justice, Sen. Enrile allegedly
did not do anything to have Honasan arrested or apprehended. And because of such
failure the petitioner prevented Col. Honasan's arrest and conviction in violation of
Section 1 (c) of PD No. 1829.
c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has
reasonable ground to believe or suspect has committed any offense under existing
penal laws in order to prevent his arrest, prosecution and conviction.
The alleged harboring or concealing by Sen. Enrile of Col. Honasan in a supposed

meeting on 1 December 1989 is absorbed in, or is a component element of, the
"complexed" rebellion presently charged against Sen. Enrile as alleged co-conspirator
of Col. Honasan on the basis of the same meeting on 1 December 1989.
The orderly administration of Justice requires that there be only one prosecution for all
the component acts of rebellion.
ISSUE : Whether Enrile is liable for "complexed" rebellion.
RULING : No for it will be absorbed by rebellion.
The SC stated that a person cannot be charged with the complex crime of rebellion for
the greater penalty to be applied, neither can he be charged separately by 2 different
offenses where on is constitutive or component element or committed in furtherance of
rebellion.
Citing the case of Hernandez in stating the long-standing proscription against splitting
the component offenses of rebellion and subjecting them to different prosecution.
29
4. People v. Dasig - Chungalao, Lee Ann
FACTS : Rodrigo Dasig and several others who were part of a sparrow unit killed a
police officer, Pfc. Manatad, performing traffic duties. Dasig was convicted of murder
with direct assault.
CONTENTION OF THE STATE: Dasig was convicted of murder with direct assault.
CONTENTION OF THE DEFENSE: Dasig contended that assuming arguendo he

conspired in the killing, he should have been convicted at most of simple rebellion, not
murder with direct assault.
ISSUE : Whether the proper crime charged is rebellion and not murder with direct
assault.
RULING: Yes. The Court favored Dasig. Dasig is found guilty of participating in an act
of rebellion beyond reasonable doubt. Dasig confessed his membership in the sparrow
unit and his participation and that of the group on Pfc. Manatad’s killing. Sparrow unit is
the NPA’s liquidation squad, with the objective of overthrowing the government.
5. People v. Lovedioro, 250 SCRA 389- Mariam Tictic
FACTS :
Elias Lovedioro y Castro was charged with murder after shooting SPO3 Jesus Locilo in
the head. He had other three companions and shot the fallen policeman four times as
he lay on the ground. He and his co-accused were hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
Appellant cites the testimony of the prosecution's principal witness, as supporting his
claim that he should have been charged with the crime of rebellion, not murder. The
witness identified him as a member of the New People's Army. He contends that the
killing was "a means to or in furtherance of subversive ends,” and should have been
deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion under Arts. 134 and 135 of the Revised
Penal Code should therefore have been meted only the penalty of prison mayor by the
lower court.
The Solicitor General avers that the crime committed by appellant may be considered
as rebellion only if the defense itself had conclusively proven that the motive or intent for
the killing of the policeman was for "political and subversive ends.
ISSUE ; Whether or not Lovedorio committed the crime of rebellion
RULING: No. The solicitor general agreed that the crime committed was murder.
Under Art. 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act. No. 6968,
rebellion is committed in the following manner: [B]y rising publicly and taking arms
against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said
Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part
thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief
Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.
The gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising against the
government. By its very nature, rebellion is essentially a crime of masses or multitudes
30
involving crowd action, which cannot be confined a priori within predetermined
bounds.The Solicitor General says that the appellants' contention offer no explanation
as to what contribution the killing would have made towards the achievement of the
NPA's subversive aims.
ART 139-SEDITION
1. People v Cabrera, 43 PHIL. 64 - Torres, Emiaj Josh P.
FACTS :
who was a member of the household of a Constabulary soldier stationed at the Santa
Lucia Barracks. The following day, a policeman named Artemio Mojica, posted on Calle
Real, had an encounter with various Constabulary soldiers which resulted in the
shooting of private Macasinag of the Constabulary. On December 15, at around 7
o’clock in the evening, Private Torio was easily persuaded to permit private Francisco
Garcia of the Second Company to saw out the window bars of the quarters, and to allow
soldiers to escape through the window with rifles and ammunition under the command
of their sergeants and corporals. When outside of the quarters, these soldiers divided
into platoons to attack the police force.
The defendant, Graciano Cabrera testified that he belonged to the first company of the
constabulary and was garrisoned in the afternoon of December 15, 1920. Cabrera left
the barracks at about 7 o’clock in the evening to search the policemen and secret
service men of Manila. Moreover, he had a standing grudge against the police of Manila
since the wife of one of their comrades was first arrested by the policemen and then
abused by the same; and came the shooting of Macasinag. Cabrera’s action was an act
of vengeance on what they did on the night of December 15, 1920.
The court overruled the special defenses and found that the guilt of the accused had
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. All of the defendants were sentenced to serve
the maximum imprisonment of ten years provided by section 6 of Act No. 292.
ISSUE: Whether the defendant is guilty of the crime of sedition in the case at bar.
RULING :
No, The Supreme Court ruled that all persons guilty of sedition are the ones who rise
publicly and tumultuously in order to obtain by force or outside of legal methods any one
of vie objects, including that of inflicting any act of hate or revenge upon the person or
property of any official or agent of the Insular Government or of Provincial or Municipal
Government. The trial court found that the crime of sedition, as defined and punished by
31
the law, had been committed, and believed that such finding is correct. Furthermore,
there is a violation of subdivision 3 of section 5 of Act No. 292 if the offender is a private
citizen and the offended party a public functionary. The law makes no distinction
between the persons to which it applies since in one scene there was a fight between
two armed bodies of the Philippine Government, but it was an unequal fight brought on
by the actions of the accused.
2. People Vs Umali- Alisha Zulueta
FACTS :
Congressman Umali, Pasumbal, and Capino were found guilty by the CFI of Quezon
Province of the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, frustrated murder,
arson and robbery said to have been committed during the raid staged by armed men in
the town of Tiaong Quezon. The said raid resulted in the burning down and complete
destruction of houses, including that of Mayor Punzalan.
Appellants were charged with and convicted of the complex crime of rebellion with
multiple murder, frustrated murder, arson and robbery. However, the Solicitor General in
his brief claims that appellants are guilty of said complex crime and in support of his
stand "asks for leave to incorporate by reference" his previous arguments in opposing
Umali's petition for bail, counsel for appellants considered it unnecessary to discuss the
existence or non-existence of such complex crime, saying that the nature of the crime
committed "is of no moment to herein appellants because they had absolutely no part in
it whatsoever"
CONTENTION OF THE DEFENSE: Umali and Pasumbal claimed that during the raid,
they were in the home of Pasumbal in Taguan, about seven kilometers away from
Tiaong where a consolation party was being RULING.
ISSUE : Whether defendants are guilty of sedition under Art. 139 of the RPC
RULING: The court ruled that the principal and main, though not necessarily the most
serious, crime committed here was not rebellion but rather that of sedition. The purpose
of the raid and the act of the raiders in rising publicly and taking up arms was not
exactly against the Government and for the purpose of doing the things defined in
Article 134 of the Revised Penal code under rebellion.
Under Art 139 of the RPC the elements present here are (1.) That the offenders rise
publicly; and tumultuously;(2.) That they employ force, intimidation, or other means
outside of legal methods; and (3.) That the offenders employ any of those means to
attain any of the following objects: to prevent the national government, or any provincial
or municipal government, or any public officer thereof from freely exercising its or his
functions, or prevent the execution of any administrative order and to inflict any act of
hate or revenge upon the person or property of any public officer or employee;
Here, the object was to attain by means of force, intimidation, etc. one object, to wit, to
inflict an act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of a public official, namely,
Punzalan who was then Mayor of Tiaong. Under Article 139 of the same Code this was
sufficient to constitute sedition.
32
Art 142-Inciting Sedition
1. Us Vs. Tolentino- Abes, Medeah Faye V.
FACTS :
Aurelio Tolentino and others presented a theatrical work written by the former
entitled, “ Kahapon Ngayon at Bukas” in tagalog language at the Teatro Libertad in
Manila. The piece contained seditious words and speeches, and scurrilous libels
against the Government of the US and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands
which were uttered during the presentation as if tending to obstruct the lawful officers in
the execution of their offices, instigate others to cabal and meet together for unlawful
purposes, suggest and incite rebellious conspiracies and riots and disturb the peace,
safety and order of the community.
The publication and presentation of the drama directly and necessarily tend to
instigate others to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes, and to suggest and
incite rebellious conspiracies and riots and to stir up the people against the lawful
authorities and to disturb the peace of the community and the safety and order of the
Government.
Insists that the intent of the accused to commit the crime with which he is
charged does not appear from the evidence of record, and that the drama is, in itself, a
purely literary and artistic production wherein the legendary history of these Islands and
their future, as imagined by the author, are presented merely for the instruction and
entertainment of the public.
ISSUE :
Whether the theatrical performance of Tolentino were acts of inciting to sedition.
RULING:
Yes. The manifest, unmistakable tendency of the play, in view of the time, place,
and manner of its presentation, was to inculcate a spirit of hatred and enmity against the
American people and the Government of the United States in the Philippines, and we
are satisfied that the principal object and intent of its author was to incite the people of
the Philippine Islands to open and armed resistance to the constituted authorities, and
to induce them to conspire together for the secret organization of armed forces, to be
used when the opportunity presented itself, for the purpose of overthrowing the present
Government and setting up another in its stead.
2. Espuelas v. People - Queenie Joy Accad
FACTS : Oscar Espuelas had his picture taken, making it appear as if he were hanging
lifeless at the end of a piece of rope suspended from the limb of a tree, when in truth
and fact, he was merely standing on a barrel. Espuelas sent pictures to
several newspapers and weeklies of general circulation, not only in the Province of
Bohol but also throughout the Philippines and abroad, for their publication with
a suicide note or letter, wherein he made to appear that it was written by a fictitious
suicide, Alberto Reveniera, and addressed to the latter's supposed wife. In said letter,
he wrote the reasons why he committed suicide, mainly because he “was not pleased
with the administration of Roxas because of the situation happened in Central Luzon,
33
Leyte.” Here, he asked his wife to write to President Truman and Churchill that the
Philippines is “infested with many Hitlers and Mussolinis” and to tell their children to
“burn pictures of Roxas when they come across one.” He was apparently
ashamed of the government and had “no power to put under Juez de Cuchillo all the
Roxas people now in power," so he sacrificed himself.
He was then charged with the crime of inciting to sedition under Article 142 of the
Revised Penal Code. Espuelas admitted to the fact that he wrote the letter and caused
its publication in several local periodicals, and he impersonated one Alberto Reveniera.
The trial court found him guilty, and the CA affirmed the RULING.
CONTENTION OF THE STATE: The letter is a scurrilous libel against the government.
It calls the government one of crooks and dishonest persons infested with Nazis and
dictators. And the communication reveals a tendency to produce dissatisfaction or a
feeling incompatible with the disposition to remain loyal to the government.
Writings that tend to overthrow or undermine the security of the government or to

weaken the confidence of the people in the government are against the public peace
and are criminal not only because they tend to incite a breach of the peace but also
because they are conducive to the destruction of the very government itself.
CONTENTION OF THE DEFENSE: Espuelas argued that he should not be charged

with the crime of inciting to sedition because he did not say any words and that it was
only in writing.
ISSUE : Whether Oscar Espuelas is guilty of the crime of inciting to sedition?
RULING: Yes. Espuelas is found guilty of the crime of sedition. Writings which tend to
overthrow or undermine the security of the government or to weaken the confidence of
the people in the government are against the public peace, and are criminal not only
because they tend to incite to a breach of the peace but because they are conducive to
the destruction of the very government itself. Regarded as seditious libels they were the
subject of criminal proceedings since early times in England. Freedom of speech
secured by the Constitution "does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish
without responsibility whatever one may choose." It is not "unbridled license that gives
immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who
abuse this freedom." So, statutes against sedition have guaranty, although
they should not be interpreted so as to agitate for institutional changes. The citizens
have the privilege to criticize his government officials and to submit his criticism, but let
such criticism be specific and therefore constructive, reasoned or tempered, and not a
contemptuous condemnation of the entire government set-up.
Furthermore, if he argued that it is only directed to President Roxas himself, Art. 142
punishes not only libel against the government but also "libel against any of the duly
constituted authorities thereof." The "Roxas’s people" in the government obviously refer
at least to the President, his Cabinet, and the majority of legislators, to whom the
adjectives dirty, Hitlers and Mussolinis were naturally directed. On this score alone, the
conviction could be upRULING. It is clear that the letter suggested the decapitation or
assassination of all Roxas officials (at least members of the Cabinet and a majority of
legislators, including the Chief Executive himself). And such a suggestion clinches the
case against the appellant.
3. Umil v. Ramos - Queenie Joy Accad
FACTS : Espiritu, was arrested without warrant, on the basis of the attestation of certain
witnesses: Espiritu spoke at a gathering of drivers and sympathizers, where he said,
among other things: Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulona.
Espiritu was arrested without warrant, not for subversion or any "continuing offense,"
34
but for uttering the above-quoted language which, in the perception of the arresting
officers, was inciting to sedition.
CONTENTION OF THE DEFENSE: Espiritu argued that he is just excersing his right to
freedom of speech. In the first place, Espiritu mav not be considered as having "just
committed" the crime charged. He allegedly first uttered seditious remarks at the
National Press Club in the afternoon of November 12, 1988. The second allegedly
seditious remark aforequoted was made at around 5:00 o'clock in the same afternoon.
Under these circumstances, the law enforcement agents had time, short though it might
seem, to secure a warrant for his arrest. Espiritu's apprehension may not therefore be
considered as covered by Section 5(b) of Rule 113 which allows warrantless arrests
"when an offense has in fact just been committed."
CONTENTION OF THE STATE: The States contends that such statement was, in the
perception of the arresting officers, inciting to sedition. While not conceding the validity
of such perception, realizing that it is indeed possible that Espiritu was merely
exercising his right to free speech, the resolution nonetheless supports the authority of
peace officers "only for purposes of the arrest."
RULING: The Court has ordered the bail for Espiritu's release to be reduced from
P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. However, Espiritu had before arraignment asked the court
for re-investigation, the peace officers did not appear. Because of this development, the
defense asked the court at the resumption of the hearings to dismiss the case. Case
against Espiritu (Criminal Case No. 88-68385) has been provisionally dismissed and his
bail bond cancelled.
CFARA
1.People v. Quijada, 259 SCRA 225- Canduyas, Yvain P.
FACTS:
On December 25, 1992, a benefit-dance was held in Brgy. Tinago, Dauis,Bohol. Herein
accused Daniel Quijada, armed with an unlicensed .38 cal. revolver, shot one Diosdado
Iroy on the head which resulted to the death of the latter. The appellant was charged in
two informations for murder under Art. 248 of the RPC and illegal possession of firearm
in its aggravated form under PD 1866.
CONTENTION OF THE STATE: Diosdado had no license to possess or carry a firearm.

The firearm then that he used in shooting Diosdado Iroy was unlicensed.
CONTENTION OF THE DEFENSE: Diosdado claimed that he was not at the place at
the time of the commission of the crime and his voluntary surrender implies his
innocence.
ISSUE: Whether murder may be complexed with or absorbed by illegal possession of

unlicensed firearm where said firearm is used in the commission of murder or homicide.
HELD: No. P.D. No. 1866 has no legislative intent to decriminalize homicide or murder if
either crime is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, or to convert the
offense of illegal possession of firearm as a qualifying circumstance if the firearm so
illegally possessed is used in the commission of homicide or murder. The law intends to
preserve the law on homicide and murder and impose a higher penalty for illegal
possession of firearm if such firearm is used in the commission of homicide or murder.
Hence, the killing of a person with the use of an illegally possessed firearm gives rise to
two separate offenses of (a) homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code, and (b)
illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form.
35
2. People v Feloteo - Chungalao, Lee Ann T.
FACTS : Sotto was walking with his friends in a lively mood when Wilfredo Feloteo,
armed with an armalite rifle, appeared from the opposite side of the road.
He aimed the armalite at Sotto and pressed its trigger. Sotto was hit above the left chest
that caused his death.
Feloteo was without any license or permit to possess firearm.
Feloteo was convicted for murder, and under Section 1 of PD No. 1866, for illegal
possession of firearm, the governing laws at the time the crimes were committed.
(1998)
The accused denied that he stole SPO2 Adion's armalite and alleged that the shooting
of Sotto was an accident as he was unaware that it was loaded.
ISSUE : Whether the Feloteo was properly charged with murder and illegal possession
of firearms.
RULING: Feloteo is guilty for murder aggravated with the use of an unlicensed firearm.
Republic Act No. 8294, amended P.D. No. 1866 where it provides that if homicide or
murder is committed with the use of unlicensed firearm, SUCH USE OF AN
UNLICENSED FIREARM SHALL BE CONSIDERED AS AN AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE.'
3. People v Narvasa- Dominguez, Danah Dominguez
FACTS :
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Emiliano Rabina filed three informations against

accused-appellants and their co-accused, Mateo Narvasa, two for aggravated illegal
possession of firearm and one for homicide.
Felicisimo Narvasa was charged with aggravated illegal possession of firearm (M-14
Rifle without license and permit), conspiring with Jimmy Orania also charged with
aggravated illegal possession of firearm (.30 U.S. Carbine without license and permit).
Felicisimo Narvasa, Jimmy Orania, and Mateo Narvasa were charged with homicide for
killing SPO3 Primo Camba.
The trial court in convicting the accused guilty of aggravated illegal possession of
firearm accorded credibility to the prosecution witnesses and RULING that mere denial
could not overcome the prosecution evidence showing that appellants used high-
powered firearms to shoot at the prosecution witnesses, thereby resulting in the death
of SPO3 Primo Camba. Further supporting said testimonies were the results of the
paraffin test conducted on appellants and the recovery of various cartridges and shells
matching the firearms purportedly used in the crime. Though these unlicensed firearms
were not presented as evidence, the trial court, citing People v. Ferrera ruled that
appellants may still be convicted of illegal possession of firearms.
36
Appellants question the credibility of Witnesses Laderas and Nagal because of an
alleged inconsistency in their testimonies. Laderas testified that there was an exchange
of fire between appellants and PO2 Simeon Navora, while Nagal declared that only the
appellants fired. Appellants point out that (conflicting testimonies on a material and
relevant point casts doubt [on] the truthfulness or veracity) 17 of such testimonies.
ISSUE : Whether the evidence presented was sufficient to sustain the appellant’s
conviction.
RULING: The Court ruled (that in crimes involving illegal possession of firearms, the
prosecution has the burden of proving the elements thereof, viz: the existence of the
subject firearm and the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm does
not have the corresponding license or permit to possess the same.) Appellants contend
that the existence of the firearms was not sufficiently proven because the prosecution
had not presented the firearms as evidence. It is necessary, they argue, that said
(firearms allegedly possessed by the accused-appellants and allegedly used in the
killing of Policeman Primo Camba be presented in evidence as those firearms constitute
the corpus delicti of the crime with which they are sentenced.)
Appellants’ argument is not persuasive. In People v. Lualhati, this Court merely stated
that the existence of the firearm must be established; it did not rule that the firearm itself
had to be presented as evidence. Thus, in People v. Orehuela, the Court RULING that
the existence of the firearm can be established by testimony, even without the
presentation of the said firearm. In the said case, Appellant Orehuela was convicted of
qualified illegal possession of a firearm despite the fact that the firearm used was not
presented as evidence. The existence of the weapon was deemed amply established by
the testimony of an eyewitness that Orehuela was in possession of it and had used it to
kill the victim.
4. Advincula v CA-Michelle Domoguen
FACTS :
Private respondent Isagani Ocampo was on his way home when petitioner Noel
Advincula and two (2) of his drinking companions started shouting invectives at him and
challenging him to a fight. Petitioner, armed with a bolo, ran after Isagani who was able
to reach home and elude his attackers. Petitioner kept cursing Isagani who eventually
left. A certain Enrique Rosas told private respondent Amando Ocampo, father of
Isagani, that petitioner had chased his son with a bolo. Amando then got his .22 caliber
gun, which he claimed was licensed, and confronted petitioner who continued drinking
with his friends. But petitioner threatened to attack Amando with his bolo, thus
prompting the latter to aim his gun upwards and fire a warning shot. Cooler heads
intervened and Amando was pacified. He left to check on his son. Later, however, he
saw petitioner’s drinking companions firing at petitioner’s house.
Petitioner however has a different version. According to him, on 1 October 1993 he and
his friends were having a conversation outside his house when Isagani passed by and
shouted at them. This led to a heated argument between him and Isagani Then Isagani
left but returned with his father Amando and brother Jerry. Isagani and Amando were
each armed with a gun and started petitioner who ran home to avoid harm but private
firing at respondents Isagani and Amando continued shooting, hitting petitioner’s
residence in the process. Illegal possession of firearms was filed against Isagani
37
Private respondents filed their opposition ( when the petitioner filed a motion to set
aside the dismissal of the offense ) thereto stating in essence that Amando’s gun was
licensed and that there was no proof other than petitioner’s self-serving statement that
Isagani had carried a firearm.
There is no dispute as to the fact that respondent Amando Ocampo, by his own
admission, was in possession of a firearm. His defense that it was duly licensed,
however, by the records of the Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO). Granting,
however, that said firearm was duly licensed by the Philippine National Police, no
evidence was submitted to prove that he is possessed of the necessary permit to carry
the firearm outside of his residence. In other words, his possession of the firearm, while
valid at first, became illegal the moment he carried it out of his place of abode.
With regard to respondent Isagani Ocampo, his bare denial cannot overcome his
positive identification by complainant and his witnesses. Physical evidence, such as the
bullet marks on the walls of complainant’s residence, indeed strengthen the latter’s
allegation that respondents actually fired at him. The case was nevertheless dismissed
on the ground of lack of evidence. This is erroneous. In cases falling under violations of
PD 1866, it is not indispensable that the firearm used be presented in evidence as long
as the possession and use thereof have been duly established by the testimony of
several witnesses.
ISSUE : Whether the Court of Appeals erred in granting private respondents’ petition
and in setting aside the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice
RULING: Yes. The Secretary of Justice, in his contested Resolution, thus made the
following findings: Even if Amando had the requisite license, there was no proof that he
had the necessary permit to carry it outside his residence; and Isagani’s plain denial
could not overcome his positive identification by petitioner that he carried a firearm in
assaulting him. These are findings of fact supported by evidence which cannot be
disturbed by this Court
Indeed, the rule is well settled that in cases of Illegal Possession of Firearms, two (2)
things must be shown to exist: (a) the existence of the firearm, and (b) the fact that it is
not licensed. 6 However, it should be noted that in People v. Ramos, 7 citing People v.
Gy Gesiong, 8 this Court ruled: ". . . Even if he has the license, he cannot carry the
firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor.
It is enough that the Secretary of Justice found that the FACTS , as presented by both
petitioner and private respondents, would constitute a violation of PD 1866. Hence, the
Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion in directing the filing of
criminal Informations against private respondents, and clearly, it was error for the Court
of Appeals to grant private respondents’ petition for certiorari
The resolution of the the Secretary of Justice granting the petitioner's appeal and
ordered the Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite to file the corresponding charges of Illegal
Possession of Firearms against private respondents is reinstated
5. People v Tac-an-Casserene Fernandez
FACTS : RenatoTac-anmurdered Francis Escano with the useof an unlicensed firearm

(.38 revolver) inside Room 15 of the high school building.
38
The RTC of Tagbiliran City convicted him of qualified illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions qualified by murder and murder under Article 248 of the RPC in relation to
Batas Pambansa Blg. 179 and P.D. 1866 (Codifying The Law On Illegal/Unlawful
Possession, Manufacture, Dealing In, Acquisition Or Disposition, Of Firearms,
Ammunition Or Explosives Or Instruments Used In The Manufacture Of Firearms,
Ammunition Or Explosives, And Imposing Stiffer Penalties For Certain Violations
Thereof And For Relevant Purposes).
Tac-an argued that P.D. 1866 is inapplicable to him since the decree was enforceable
only during the existence of martial law regime. Moreover, Tac-an contended that the
trial court erred in not holding that the defendant was placed twice in jeopardy for having
been prosecuted for violation of P.D. 1866 despite his being prosecuted for murder in
an information which alleges that he used an unlicensed firearm in killing Escano.
ISSUE : W/N Tac-an can be charged with both crimes?
RULING : No, the trial court committed an error. The Supreme Court decided that there
is no law which renders the use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating
circumstance in homicide or murder. Under an information charging homicide or
murder, the fact that the death weapon was an unlicensed firearm cannot be used to
increase the penalty for the second offense of homicide or murder to death. Moreover,
the SC mentioned that P.D. No. 1866 was intended to remain in effect only for the
duration of the martial law imposed upon the country by former President Marcos.
Neither does the statute contain any provision that so prescribes its lapsing into non-
enforceability upon the termination of the state or period of martial law. Thus, the SC
convicted him in the case of murder under Article 248 of the RPC in relation to Batas
Pambansa Blg. 179 and P.D. 1866 (Criminal Case No. 4007) and deleted the special
aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed firearm in Criminal Case No.
4012.
6. Misolas v Panga- Guison, Agatha
FACTS : Petitioner Misolas was alleged to be a member of the NPA after being found in
a suspected underground house in Pili, Camarines Sur. The house was searched and
the Philippine Constabulary officers also found a .20 guage Remington shotgun and
four live rounds of ammunition in a red bag under a pillow. An information charging
petitioner with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under Presidential Decree
No. 1866 was filed by the provincial fiscal. The information alleged that the firearm and
ammunition were used in furtherance of subversion so as to qualify the offense under
the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866.
CONTENTION OF THE DEFENSE: Petitioner based his arguments on the Hernandez

and Geronimo RULINGs on the doctrine of absorption of common in rebellion. Misolas
asserts that the nature of his alleged acts requires that he be charged with subversion
or with rebellion instead of qualified illegal possesion of firearms and ammunition.
CONTENTION OF THE STATE: Respondent judge denied the petition for lack of merit.
Petitioner was charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under
Presidential Decree No. 1866.
ISSUE : Whether the doctrine of absorption is applicable in the case at bar.
RULING. No. The Court clarified that petitioner is being charged specifically for the
qualified offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under PD 1866. He is
NOT being charged with the complex crime of subversion with illegal possession of
firearms. Neither is he being separately charged for subversion and for illegal
39
possession of firearms. Thus, the RULINGs of the Court in Hernandez, Geronimo and
Rodriguez find no application in this case. Rebellion (and also subversion then) does
not absorb illegal possession of firearms (even if committed in furtherance of rebellion
or subversion) as these were treated as separate and distinct offenses. Petition is
dismissed.
7.Baylosis v Chavez - Lawagan, Mary Faith
FACTS : Petitioners Rafael Baylosis and Benjamin de Vera, together with one Marco
Palo, all known high ranking officers of the Communist Party of the Philippines, and its
military arm, the New People’s Army, were charged of Presidential Decree No. 1866
Amended by RA 9516.
The petitioners possess Firearms/Ammunition and explosives without securing the

necessary license or permit from a competent government authority.
CONTENTION OF THE DEFENSE: Baylosis, de Vera, and Palo, filed a motion to

quash the information on the following grounds: (I) the FACTS charged do not
constitute an offense because they are founded on an unconstitutional/repealed statute,
(2) for the same reason, this Honorable Court is devoid of jurisdiction to try this case.
CONTENTION OF THE STATE: The provision punishes with the penalty of reclusion
perpetua,any person who unlawfully manufactures, deals in, acquires,disposes of, or
possesses any firearm,in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crimes
of rebellion, insurrection or subversion.
ISSUE : Wether or not PD No. 1866 is unconstitutional for being violative of due
process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution
RULING: No. The petitioners' invocation of the doctrine of double jeopardy as an

argument against the constitutionality of PD 1866 is equally futile. Moreover, even if
such a subsequent or second jeopardy does arise, P.D. No. 1866 will not be rendered
unconstitutional because such is not a ground to nullify that law. Double jeopardy is
merely a defense that an accused may raise to defeat a subsequent prosecution or
conviction for the same offense.
8. People vs. Tiozon- Naoimi Leano
FACTS :
This is a case of homicide involving Tiozon as the accused and Leonardo Bolima as the
victim. These two men were friends but one night, while they were out to get some
drinks, Tiozon decided to shoot the victim from the back causing his death. According to
the victim’s wife, after the two went out she heard gunshots and that is when Tiozon
hurriedly came to their home with blood splutters on him and said the words “mare mare
nabaril ko si pare”. They tried to rush the victim to the hospital and Tiozon even helped
at first but decided that the victim wouldn't make it so he just dropped the body of the
victim.
The accused is guilty of murder and violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866. The
circumstantial evidence is enough to convict the accused.
40
There is no eyewitness as to the illegal possession of the accused of the fatal gun
involved in the case.
ISSUE : The Trial Court Gravely Erred In Convicting The Accused-Appellant Of The
Crime Of Illegal Possession With Murder As Defined Under Section 1 Of P.D. 1866. The
Circumstantial Evidences Relied Upon By The Trial Court In Its Judgment Of Conviction
Are Insufficient To Prove Beyond Reasonable Doubt The Guilt Of Accused-Appellant.
RULING: There being no proof that accused-appellant had no license to possess the
firearm in question, he could not be convicted for illegal possession of a firearm. The
trial court then committed an error in holding the accused-appellant guilty thereof.
However, as above-stated, the accused-appellant did not touch this ISSUE in his Brief.
Be that as it may, the rule is well-settled that an appeal in a criminal case opens the
whole case for review and this includes the review of the penalty, indemnity and the
damages involved.
9. People v Gracia 1194 - Eden Faith Maduli
FACTS : (Crime charged) Accused-appellant Rolando de Gracia was charged in two

separate informations for illegal possessions of ammunition and explosives in
furtherance of rebellion, and for attempted homicide. Appellant was convicted for illegal
possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion, but was acquitted of attempted
homicide.
(How was the crime committed) The searching team saw appellant de Gracia inside the
office where they confiscated the explosives and ammunition.
Appellant principally contends that he cannot be RULING guilty of illegal possession of

firearms for the reason that he did not have either physical or constructive possession
thereof considering that he had no intent to possess the same; he is neither the owner
nor a tenant of the building where the ammunition and explosives were found; he was
merely employed by Col. Matillano as an errand boy; he was guarding the explosives
for and in behalf of Col. Matillano; and he did not have actual possession of the
explosives. He claims that intent to possess, which is necessary before one can be
convicted under Presidential Decree No. 1866, was not present in the case at bar.
The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms
and ammunition. What the law requires is merely possession which includes not only
actual physical possession but also constructive possession or the subjection of the
thing to one's control and management.
The trial contends that accused is guilty of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance
of rebellion pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code which
states that "any person merely participating or executing the command of others in a
rebellion shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period." The trial court
said that appellant De Gracia, who had been servicing the personal needs of Col.
Matillano (whose active armed opposition against the Government, particularly at the
Camelot Hotel, was well known), is guilty of the act of guarding the explosives and
"molotov" bombs for and in behalf of the latter.
41
ISSUE : Whether or not appellant's possession of the firearms, explosives and
ammunition was for the purpose and in furtherance of rebellion.
RULING:
The Court are duly convinced that the firearms, explosives and ammunition confiscated
from appellant De Gracia were illegally possessed by him in furtherance of the rebellion
then admittedly existing at that time.
The nature and quantity of the items in de Gracia’s possession are clearly not for ones
personal defense but they are for offensive operations.
His manifestation of innocence of those items and what he has been guarding in that
office is not credible for:
(a) he was a former military personnel; (b) at the birthday party of Col. Matillano on
November 30, 1989 many soldiers and ex-soldiers were present which self-evidently
discloses that De Gracia, in the company of his boss, was still very much at home and
constantly in touch with soldiers and the armed rebellion of November 30, 1989 to
December 8 or 9, 1989 was a military coup d' etat;
(c) it appears that he is the only person tasked with caretaking (sic) there in the
Matillano office, which shows that he is a highly trusted right-hand man of Col.
Matillano; and
(d) as heretofore discussed, De Gracia was earlier seen with some men who fired upon
a car of the AFP intelligence agents.
The court affirmed the lower court’s RULING but the recommendation for executive
clemency and supposed basis thereof are deleted.
10. People vs Garcia 2002 - Clarence Santonia
FACTS :
Atty. Romualdo Tioleco was jogging alone at Gilmore Avenue, New Manila, Quezon
City, at about 5:30 o'clock in the morning of 5 October 1996. When he was kidnapped
by four people, two of the kidnappers were identified as Gerry Valler and Ronald Garcia
while the other two remained at large. Atty. Tioleco was led to a house and then into a
room. He remained blindfolded and handcuffed throughout his ordeal. The kidnappers
contacted her sister Floriana Toleco and they demanded an initial ransom of 2 million
pesos which Floriana bargained down to 71,000 pesos as it is what they can afford.
During the scheduled pay-off the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC)
operatives surveyed the area and noticed a blue Toyota corona near Floriana and her
two companions who waited for two hours but no pay-off occurred. Floriana and
company left and the Toyota corona also left. The PACC tailed the Toyota corona to a
bungalow in Fairview Quezon City. The kidnappers suspected Floriana’s companion to
be police officers so they then set another pay-off using the code word Romy to identify
themselves as the kidnapper. The same Toyota corona appeared and the pay-off was
made. The occupants were arrested where they revealed that Atty Tioleco is in the
bungalow in Fairview Quezon City. P/Chief Insps. Winnie Quidato and Paul Tucay are
posted near the bungalow and were instructed to rescue the victim. Rodante Rogel and
Rotchel Lariba are in the sala when the rescue was made. As one of the PACC teams
was about to arrest the two (2) men, the latter ran towards a room in the house where
they were about to grab a .38 cal. revolver without serial number loaded with six (6)
rounds of ammunition and a .357 cal. revolver with six (6) live ammunition. The other
PACC team searched the house for Atty. Tioleco found him in the other room.
42
Rogel and Lariba further assert that they could not be RULING guilty of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition since neither was in complete control of the
firearms and ammunition that were recovered when they were arrested and no evidence
was offered to prove responsibility for the presence of firearms and ammunition inside
the room.
RULING:
No. In people vs Ladjaalam we ruled that if another crime was committed by the
accused he could not be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms under RA
8294 amending PD 1866.
Sec. 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms

or Ammunition Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms
or Ammunition. - The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of
not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who
shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered
firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part
of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in
the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other.
A simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission
of any crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms.
Hence, if the "other crime" is murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms
becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate offense. Since direct
assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant can no
longer be RULING liable for illegal possession of firearms. The law is clear: the accused
can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that "no other crime
was committed by the person arrested." If the intention of the law in the second
paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so,
as it did in the third paragraph. Verily, where the law does not distinguish, neither should
we. Indeed, an accused may evade conviction for illegal possession of firearms by
using such weapons in committing an even lighter offense, like alarm and scandal or
slight physical injuries, both of which are punishable by arresto menor.
We conclude that they were merely guarding the house for the purpose of either helping
the other accused appellants in facilitating the successful denouement to the crime or
repelling any attempt to rescue the victim, as shown by the availability of arms and
ammunition to them. They thus cooperated in the execution of the offense by previous
or simultaneous acts by means of which they aided or facilitated the execution of the
crime but without any indispensable act for its accomplishment. We affirm the conviction
of Gerry Valler and Ronald "Roland" Garcia as principals and Rotchel Lariba and
Rodante Rogel as accomplices for the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious
illegal detention. This Court is compelled to impose the supreme penalty of death on
Valler and Garcia as mandated by Art. 267 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by
RA 7659.
11.People vs Garcia 2000- Valeros, Danielle
FACTS:
That on or about the 12th day of October 1987, in the municipality of llagan, Province of
Isabela, the herein accused, not being authorized or allowed by the law to keep,
possess and carry firearms, did feloniously had in their possession and under their
control and custody, firearms without first having obtained the necessary permit and/or
license to possess the same, and that on the occasion of such possession, the herein
accused with treachery did suddenly and unexpectedly and without giving them chance
43
to defend themselves; inflicted upon them gunshot wounds which directly caused their
deaths and further inflicting on the same occasion gunshot wounds upon Jerry Palomo,
Romeo Pacho, Nolasco Estrada, Mario Palomo and Simeon Pacano, which injuries
would ordinarily cause their death, but nevertheless, the timely and able medical
assistance rendered to them prevented their deaths.
Lumilan and Garcia interposed the defense of alibi. Appellant Garcia testified that he
was in the company of Atty. Beniamin Olalia who stood as sponsor in the wedding of
the daughter of a certain Hilario Lagua in Gayong-Gayong Sur, Ilagan, Isabela. They
had late lunch at the house of Hilario Lagua and stayed there until 4:00 oclock in the
afternoon. Thereafter, Garcia and Atty. Olalia returned to the latters house in Osmenia,
Ilagan, Isabela, together with Martin Lagua, Juan Lorenzo, Felix Aguda, Romeo Callo,
Rodrigo Junio, a driver, and two other individuals.
They spent the rest of the day at the house of Atty. Olalia who corroborated Garcias
testimony. On the other hand, appellant Lumilan testified that he was in Alibagu, lIlagan,
Isabela the whole day of October 12. 1987.
ISSUE : Whether or not appellants may be properly convicted of murder, frustrated

murder and attempted murder under an information that charges them with qualified
illegal possession of firearms used in murder in violation of Section 1 of Presidential
Decree (P D.) No. 1866, as amended
RULING:
The SC said where an accused uses an unlicensed firearm in committing homicide or

murder, he may no longer be charged with what used to be the two separate offenses of
homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code and qualified illegal possession of
firearms used in homicide or murder under P. D. No. 1866. As amended by R.A. No.
8294, P.D. No. 1866 now mandates that the accused will be prosecuted only for the
crime of homicide or murder with the fact of illegal possession of firearms being
relegated to a mere special aggravating circumstance.
Thus, illegal possession of firearms may now be said to have taken a dual personality:
in its simple form, it is an offense in itself, but when any killing attends it, illegal
possession of firearms is reduced to a mere aggravating circumstance that must be
alleged in the information in order to be appreciated in the determination of the criminal
liability of the accused.
If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the
crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attemptedcoup detat, such violation shall
be absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion, or insurrection, sedition or
attempted coup detat.
Thus, court is constrained to acquit the appellants on the ground of reasonable doubt.
The constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the appellants was not over-
turned by the evidence adduced by the prosecution.
12. People Vs. Nepomuceno - Mariam T. Tictic
FACTS :
Accused-appellant Guillermo Nepomuceno, Jr., (hereafter NEPOMUCENO) was

charged before the Regional Trial Court of Manila with parricide in Criminal Case No.
94-136491 and with qualified illegal possession of firearm in Criminal Case No. 94-
139839. The crime of parricide was alleged to have been committed with the use of an
unlicensed firearm. The two cases were consolidated
44
CONTENTION OF THE DEFENSE : In the crime of illegal possession of firearm that
was committed on 2 May 1994, i.e., before the approval of R.A. No. 8294 on 6 June
1997. Section 1 thereof radically amended Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 by, among others
things, revising the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 from the following:
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of
death shall be imposed to If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an
unlicensed firearm, such use shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
CONTENTION OF THE STATE : Our RULING in People v. Quijada should be applied

that the killing of a person with the use of an illegally possessed firearm gives rise to two
separate offenses, namely, (1) homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code and
(2) illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form.
ISSUE : Whether or not Nepomuceno should be separately charged in the illegal

possession of firearms
RULING: No. P.D. No. 1866 was recently amended by Republic Act. No. 8294,
otherwise known as An Act Amending the Provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1866,
as Amended. The third paragraph of Section 1 of said Act provides that if homicide or
murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed
firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. In short, only one offense
should be punished, viz., either homicide or murder, and the use of the unlicensed
firearm should only be considered as an aggravating circumstance. Thereby
Nepomuceno is acquitted with the separate criminal case of illegal possession of
firearms but shall remain in jail to serve his sentence for parricide
13. People vs Evangelista- Michaela Santillan
FACTS : The accused-appellant Reynaldo Evangelista was charged of murder for

killing Efren Arceo and another complaint for violation of illegal possession of firearms
for the piece homemade paltik.
ISSUE : Whether illegal possession of firearms will aggregate the penalty of

Evangelista
CONTENTION OF THE STATE: The contention of the Solicitor General that since a
paltik is a homemade gun, is illegally manufactured as recognized in People vs.
Fajardo, [17 SCRA 494 (1966)] and cannot be ISSUE d a license or permit.
The Regional Trial Court found the accused guilty of illegal possession of firearms to
suffer the supreme penalty of death.
CONTENTION OF THE DEFENSE: It must be specifically alleged in the information,

otherwise the accused cannot be sentenced to death for illegal possession of firearm in
its aggravated form without violating his right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him.
RULING:
No. It will not aggregate the penalty of the accused.
In G.R. No. 84333, however, we hold that accused-appellant cannot be found guilty of
illegal possession of firearm, much less of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated
form.
The information charged accused-appellant with simple illegal possession of firearm but
the trial court found him guilty of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form
under P.D. No. 1866, §1, par. 2, after finding that accused- appellant had used an
unlicensed firearm in killing Efren Arceo. This cannot be done
45
Indeed accused-appellant cannot be convicted even of simple illegal possession of
firearm because of lack of evidence that the firearm is unlicensed. The trial court based
its RULING simply on the fact that the firearm used in this case is a homemade gun
known in the dialect as paltik, apparently being of the opinion that a paltik cannot be
licensed.
We do not agree with the contention of the Solicitor General that since a paltik is a
homemade gun, is illegally manufactured as recognized in People vs. Fajardo, [17
SCRA 494 (1966)] and cannot be ISSUE d a license or permit, it is no longer necessary
to prove that it is unlicensed. This appears to be, at first blush, a very logical
proposition. We cannot, however, yield to it because Fajardo did not say that paltiks can
in no case be ISSUE d a license or a permit, and that proof that a firearm is a paltik
dispenses with proof that it is unlicensed.
Accused-appellant is ACQUITTED of the charge of illegal possession of firearm under

P.D. No. 1866.
CHAPTER 2 VIOLATION OF PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY
1.Martinez Vs. Morfe, 44 SCRA 22-Mariam Tictic
FACTS :
Petitioner Martinez y Festin 8 alleged that an information against him for falsification of
a public document was filed. Its basis was his stating under oath in his certificate of
candidacy for delegate to the Constitutional Convention that he was born on June 20,
1945, when in truth and in fact he knew that he was born on June 20, 1946. Petitioner
Fernando Bautista, Sr., it was alleged that he is a duly elected and proclaimed delegate
to the 1971 Constitutional Convention and it is alleged that he violated Section 51 of
the Revised Penal Code in that they gave and distributed free of charge food, drinks
and cigarettes at two public meetings. The two were arrested while the Constitutional
Convention was still in session.
What is sought by petitioners Martinez y Festin and Bautista, Sr. is that the respective
warrants of arrest ISSUE d against them be quashed on the claim that by virtue of the
parliamentary immunity they enjoy as delegates, ultimately traceable to Section 15 of
Article VI of the Constitution as construed together with Article 145 of the Revised Penal
Code, they are immune from arrest. In the case of petitioner Martinez y Festin, he is
proceeded against for falsification of a public document punishable by prision mayor.
As for petitioner Bautista, Sr., the penalty that could be imposed for each of the Revised
Election Code offense, of which he is charged, is not higher than prision mayor
Their reliance on the constitutional provision which for them should be supplemented by
what was provided for in the Revised Penal Code is futile. There is no justification then
for granting their respective pleas.
ISSUE : Whether or not Martinez and Bautista are immune from arrest in accordance
with Article 145 of the RPC.
RULING:
Petitioners cannot justify their claim to immunity. As is made clear in Section 15 of

Article VI, the immunity from arrest does not cover any prosecution for treason, felony
and breach of the peace. Breach of the peace covers any offense whether defined by
46
the Revised Penal Code or any special statute. It is a well-settled principle in public law
that the public peace must be maintained and any breach thereof renders one
susceptible to prosecution. The crimes for which Martinez and Bautista were arrested
fall under the category of “breach of peace.
Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code cannot either come to their rescue. Such a
provision that took effect in 1932 could not survive after the Constitution became
operative on November 15, 1935. As will be shown, the repugnancy between such an
expansion of the congressional immunity and the plain command of the Constitution is
too great to be overcome, even on the assumption that the penalty to which a public
officer will be subjected in the event that he did arrest one entitled thereto for an offense
punishable by less than reclusion temporal suffices to widen its scope
ARTICLE 148-DIRECT ASSAULT

1.People v. Recto- Abes, Medeah Faye V.
FACTS : The RTC of Romblon found the accused Julio Recto guilty of 4 crimes.
1. Criminal Case No. 1970- the said accused, with intent to kill, did then and there, by
means of treachery, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot with a
shotgun locally called 'pugakang' one MELCHOR RECTO, knowing that the latter is a
duly appointed barangay chief tanod of Ambulong, Magdiwang, Romblon, while he was
engaged in the performance of his official duties, inflicting upon the latter gunshot
wounds in different parts of his body, thus performing all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony of murder as a consequence, but nevertheless, did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused and that is by the
timely and able medical assistance rendered to the victim which prevented his death.
This Court finds accused JULIO RECTO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
complex crime of qualified direct assault with frustrated homicide.
2. In Criminal Case No. 1971, this Court finds accused JULIO RECTO GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the complex crime of qualified direct assault with frustrated
homicide.
3. In Criminal Case No. 1972- the said accused with intent to kill, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping each other, did then and there, by means of
treachery, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with a shotgun
locally called 'pugakang' and strike with a long bolo, one ANTONIO MACALIPAY,
knowing that the latter is a duly elected barangay kagawad of Ambulong, Magdiwang,
Romblon, while he was engaged in the performance of his official duties, inflicting upon
the latter mortal wounds in different parts of his body which were the cause of his
untimely death.
This Court finds co-accused JULIO RECTO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
complex crime of qualified direct assault with murder.
4. In Criminal Case No. 1973, this Court finds co-accused JULIO RECTO GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.
CONTENTION OF THE STATE: The trial court found that appellant had fired at a
barangay tanod, Melchor Recto, who was at the crime scene "on the occasion of the
performance of his official duties." It added that appellant had shot a barangay captain,
Percival Orbe, also "on the occasion of the performance of his official duties. The lower
court ruled out treachery in the killing of Emiliano Santos, because there had been a
gun duel between him and appellant. However, it convicted and sentenced appellant to
death for the murder of Antonio Macalipay
47
CONTENTION OF THE DEFENSE: Appellant contends that he committed the crimes
attributed to him in self-defense and in defense of his uncle, Cornelio Regis Jr.
ISSUE : Whether the lower court erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of direct
assault in Criminal Case Nos. 1970 and 1972 which accordingly resulted in his being
convicted of complex crimes in those cases.
RULING: Yes. First, in Criminal Case No. 1970. Direct assault, a crime against public
order, may be committed in two ways. One of which is by any person or persons who,
without a public uprising, "shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any
person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official
duties, or on occasion of such performance.” One way to aggravate this mode is when
the offender lays a hand upon a person in authority. In this case, Melchor Recto was
clearly an agent of a person in authority. Unquestionably, he was a barangay chief
tanod; however, at the crime scene he was a mere bystander. Apparently, he was not
acting and had no occasion to act in the performance of his official duties that afternoon.
Thus, the attack on him did not amount to direct assault. Thus, appellant's liability
amounted only to attempted, not frustrated, homicide. Appellant shall be convicted of
attempted homicide.
Second, in Criminal Case No. 1972. The court erred in finding the presence of the
qualifying circumstance of treachery. Evidently, the victim had all the opportunity to
escape or defend himself from the aggression that was to ensue, yet chose not to grab
the opportunity and instead placed himself in a position more open to attack. Equally
important, his vulnerable position had not been deliberately sought by appellant. It was
thrust on the latter by the former himself. In short, appellant did not deliberately choose
the mode of attack to kill the victim with impunity and without risk to himself. Absent
treachery, the killing is homicide, not murder. Appellant shall be convicted of qualified
direct assault with homicide aggravated by the use of a weapon.
2.Clarin v. Justice of Peace- Accad
Facts: This case is an appeal from an order of the CFI of Ilocos Sur dismissing a
petition to prohibit the Justice of the Peace of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, from taking
cognizance of two criminal complaints filed with the said Justice of the Peace by the
Chief of Police of the town against several persons, among them the petitioners.
Contention of the defense :
Contention of the State:
Issue: Whether or not the petition for prohibition is proper in the case at bar.
Ruling: No. The petition for prohibition being clearly premature, the appealed order of
dismissal is affirmed. According to the Supreme Court, if the offender prevented by
force the holding of a popular election in certain precincts, without public uprising, he
may be held liable for direct assault of the first form.
3. People v. Beltran- Bencio
FACTS : Delfino Beltran and others were indicted for murder and double attempted
murder with direct assault due to the death of Vicente Quirolgico. in the evening of
January 11, 1972, in Ballesteros, Cagayan, Ernesto Alvarado was bringing Calixto Urbi
home in a jeep. Passing by the Puzon Compound, Delfino Beltran alias Minong,
shouted at them, "Oki ni inayo" (Vulva of your mother). They proceeded on their way
and ignored Delfino. After Alvarado had brought Urbi to his house he went to the house
of Mayor Bienvenido Quirolgico and reported the matter. The newly elected Mayor told
the Chief of Police that something should be done about it. Delfino was working with
48
Congressman David Puzon at the time, so they went to talk to them to surrender but
there were sudden simultaneous gunshots discharged and Vicente was hit causing his
death while Mayor Quirolgico and Patrolman Tolentino suffered injuries.
Delfin Beltran claimed self-defense, explaining that he was assaulted by Mayor’s group
while he was patrolling the Rural Bank whereas the rest of the accused claimed that
they do not have anything to do with the incident.
The claim of Delfino Beltran that he had just acted in self-defense, suffice it to say, that
the one invoking this justifying circumstance must prove beyond reasonable doubt that
all the necessary requisites of self-defense are present, namely: (1) Unlawful
aggression on the part of the offended party; (2) Reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it; and, (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself. Delfino Beltran had not proved any one of these. Thus, his
claim of self-defense was properly dismissed by the trial court.
ISSUE : Whether or not Beltran and others are guilty of attempted murder with direct
assault.
RULING: Yes. considering that Mayor Quirolgico is a person in authority and Pat.
Rolando Tolentino is a policeman who at the time was in his uniform, and both were
performing their official duties to maintain peace and order in the community, the finding
of the trial court that appellants are guilty. For the double attempted murder with direct
assault, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposed on the
aforesaid appellants is reduced to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum.
4. People v. Dollantes- Canduyas, Yvain P.
FACTS:
Gabutero was delivering a speech before the start of the dance for the barangay fiesta.
Pedro Dollantes suddenly performed a “nagkorantsa” (Visayan dance move) while
carrying a knife and challenging the audience. Gabutero told him to keep quiet but
instead of doing so, Pedro stabbed him on his left arm. All of the accused, except for
Grengia, Esteban, and Villaester (they were holding stones which they threw at the
store of the victim’s wife), took turns stabbing Gabutero. This led to Gabutero’s death.
The accused then kicked Gabutero and danced around his body.
The accused were found guilty of the complex crime of assault upon a person in
authority resulting in murder. All of the accused appealed except for Grengia who filed a
separate brief alleging that the lower court erred in holding that he was guilty of the said
crime.
CONTENTION OF THE STATE: The crime was committed in conspiracy as shown by

the dancing and kicking as corroborated by prosecution witnesses.
CONTENTION OF THE DEFENSE: Accused-appellant Hugo Grengia claims that the

trial court erred in not giving weight to the admission of accused Hamlet Dollantes that
he was the lone perpetrator while the others did not participate in the stabbing incident.
49
ISSUE: Whether the accused was correctly charged with assault upon a person in
authority resulting in murder.
HELD: Yes. Records show that the Barangay Captain was in the act of trying to pacify
Pedro Dollantes who was making trouble in the dance hall when he was stabbed to
death. He was therefore killed while in the performance of his duties. In the case of
People v. Hecto (135 SCRA 113), this Court ruled that “As the barangay captain, it was
his duty to enforce the laws and ordinances within the barangay. If in the enforcement
thereof, he incurs, the enmity of his people who thereafter treacherously slew him the
crime committed is murder with assault upon a person in authority.”
ARTICLE 156- DELIVERING PRISONERS FROM JAIL

1. Alberto v Dela Cruz - Chungalao, Lee Ann
FACTS :
Eligio Orbita, a provincial guard, is prosecuted for the crime of Infedility in the Custody
of Prisoner for the escape of prisoner Denaque. It was alleged that Governor Cledera
and Assistant Provincial Jail Warden Esmeralda should also be included to the charge
because of the note of the Governor asking 5 men to work on his guesthouse being
used by the province.
Judge Dela Cruz ordered the amendment of the information to include Cledera, being
the author of the note, and Esmeralda, who carried out the orders of Cledera.
Fiscal Alberto said that Cledera and Esmeralda cannot be charged for the escape of
Denaque because after reinvestigation and thorough and intelligent analysis of the
FACTS and law, no prima facie case against Governor Cledera and Jose Esmeralda
exist.
ISSUE : Whether Cledera and Esmeral be charged for the escape of Denaque.
RULING:
Since Gov. Cledera as governor, is the jailer of the province, and Jose Esmeralda is the
assistant provincial warden, they cannot be prosecuted for the escape Of Pablo
Denaque under Article 156 of the RPC.There is likewise no sufficient evidence to
warrant their prosecution under Article 223 because it is necessary that the public
officer had consented to, or connived in, the escape of the prisoner under his custody or
charge. Connivance in the escape of a prisoner on the part of the person in charge is an
essential condition in the commission of the crime of faithlessness in the custody of the
prisoner. If the public officer charged with the duty of guarding him does not connive
with the fugitive, then he has not violated the law and is not guilty of the crime.
There was no connivance in the escape of Denaque from the custody of the accused
Orbita that can be deduced from the note of Gov. Cledera to Jose Esmeralda asking for
five men to work in the guest house, because the notes does not mention the names of
the prisoners to be brought to the guest house; and that it was the accused Orbita who
picked the men to compose the work party.
50
ARTICLE 157-EVASION OF SERVICE OF SENTENCE
1. Adelaida Tanega v Hon. Honorato B. Masakayan (19 SCRA 564)- Dominguez,

Danah
FACTS :
Adelaida Tanega appealed her conviction of the crime of slander to the City Court of
Quezon City. Found guilty once again by the CFI, she was sentenced to suffer 20 days
of arresto menor. The Court of Appeals affirmed her conviction. The City Court of
Quezon City directed that the execution of the sentence be set for January 27 1965. On
petitioner’s motion, execution was deferred to February 12 1965 at 8:30 AM. At the
appointed day and hour, petitioner failed to appear prompting respondent Judge
Masakayan to ISSUE warrants for her arrest but the former was never arrested.
More than a year later, the counsel of petitioner Tanega moved to quash the warrants of
arrest on the ground that the penalty has already been prescribed.
The respondent Judge rejected the plea of prescription of penalty and, instead, directed
the issuance of another alias warrant of arrest. It is ruled that "the penalty imposed upon
the accused has to be served".
ISSUE : Whether the penalty has been prescribed.
RULING:
No. The penalty has not been prescribed. According to Article 92 of the RPC, penalties
“imposed by final sentence” are prescribed in one year. The period of prescription of
penalties, so the succeeding Article 93 provides “shall commence to run from the date
when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence.”
Under Art. 157 of the RPC, the elements of evasion of service of sentence are: (1) the
offender is a convict by final judgment; (2) he is serving his sentence which consists in
deprivation of liberty; and (3) he evades service of sentence by escaping during the
term of his sentence. For, by the express terms of the statute, a convict evades service
of his sentence, by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final
judgment. Indeed, evasion of sentence is but another expression of the term
jailbreaking. The court ruled that for the prescription of the penalty of imprisonment
imposed by the final sentence to commence to run, the culprit should escape during the
term of such imprisonment. Regarding the FACTS , we have here the case of a convict
who – sentenced to imprisonment by final judgment, was thereafter never placed in
confinement. Prescription of the penalty, then, does not run in her favor.
2. People v Abilong - Domoguen, Michelle
FACTS
Florentino Abilong was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with evasion of
service, the said accused, being then a convict sentenced and ordered to serve two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of destierro during which he should not enter any
place within the radius of 100 kilometers from the City of Manila, by virtue of final
judgment rendered by the municipal court for attempted robbery, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously evade the service of said sentence by going beyond
the limits made against him and commit vagrancy.
51
Counsel for the appellant contends that a person like the accused evading a sentence
of destierro is not criminally liable under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code,
particularly article 157 of the said Code for the reason that said article 157 refers only to
persons who are imprisoned in a penal institution and completely deprived of their
liberty. He bases his contention on the word "imprisonment" used in the English text of
said article which in part reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Evasion of service of sentence. — The penalty of prision correccional in its medium

and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his
sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment.
The Solicitor General in his brief says that had the original text of the Revised Penal
Code been in the English language, then the theory of the appellant could be
upRULING. However, it is the Spanish text that is controlling in case of doubt.
ISSUE : Whether or not the lower court erred in imposing a penalty on the accused
under article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, which does not cover evasion of service of
"destierro”
RULING:
No, We agree with the Solicitor General that inasmuch as the Revised Penal Code was
originally approved and enacted in Spanish, the Spanish text governs (People v.
Manaba, 58 Phil., 665, 668). It is clear that the word "imprisonment" used in the English
text is a wrong or erroneous translation of the phrase "sufriendo privacion de libertad"
used in the Spanish text. It is equally clear that although the Solicitor General impliedly
admits destierro as not constituting imprisonment, it is a deprivation of liberty, though
partial, in the sense that as in the present case, the appellant by his sentence of
destierro was deprived of the liberty to enter the City of Manila. This view has been
adopted in the case of People v. Samonte, No. 36559 (July 26, 1932; 57 Phil, 968)
wherein this Court RULING, as quoted in the brief of the Solicitor General that "it is clear
that a person under sentence of destierro is suffering deprivation of his liberty and
escapes from the restrictions of the penalty when he enters the prohibited area." Said
RULING in that case was ratified by this Court, though, indirectly in the case of People
v. Jose de Jesus, (45 Off. Gaz. Supp. to No. 9, p. 370) 1 , where it was RULING that
one evades the service of his sentence of destierro when he enters the prohibited area
specified in the judgment of conviction, and he cannot invoke the provisions of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law which provides that its provisions do not apply to those
who shall have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence.
In conclusion we find and hold that the appellant is guilty of evasion of service of
sentence under article 157 of the Revised Penal Code (Spanish text), in that during the
period of his sentence of destierro by virtue of final judgment wherein he was prohibited
from entering the City of Manila, he entered said City
ARTICLE 159- OTHER CASES OF EVASION OF SENTENCE
Wilfredo Torres v. Hon. Neptali A. Gonzales-FERNANDEZ, Casserene Fernandez
FACTS :
52
Before 1979, Wilfredo Torres was convicted of two counts of estafa. In 1979, he was
pardoned by the president with the condition that he shall not violate any penal laws
again, thus, he was released from confinement. In 1982, Torres was charged with 20
crimes of estafa and in 1985, with a crime sedition. The NBI also showed a list if Torres’
charges such as swindling, grave threats, grave coercion, illegal possession of firearms,
ammunition, and explosives among others. In 1986, then Chairman of the Board of
Paroles Neptali Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of Torres’ pardon. Hence, the
president cancelled the pardon and released an order of arrest and recommitment
against Torres, thus he was arrested and confined in Muntinlupa.
Recommend to the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to the
Torres given the number of charges against him in court.
DEFENSE:
Torres appealed the ISSUE before the Supreme Court averring that the Executive
Department erred in convicting him for violating the conditions of his pardon because
the estafa charges and crime of sedition against him were not yet final and executory as
they were still on appeal. He also contends that he was not given an opportunity to be
heard before he was arrested and recommitted to prison.
ISSUE :
Whether conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before Torres
can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional
pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.
RULING:
No, in proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is
alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has
two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the RPC which
imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who
“having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the
conditions of such pardon.” Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the
petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an
exercise of the President’s executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.
Note: Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of

guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final
judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his
conditional pardon.
ARTICLE 160 - QUASI-RECIDIVISM
1.People v. Quijada - Ron Garcia
FACTS :
That on or about the 30th day of December, 1992, in the municipality of Dauis, province
of Bohol, Philippines, Quijada, with intent to kill, shoot Diosdado Iroy y Nesnea.
Quijada have in his possession a firearm (hand gun) with ammunition, without first
obtaining the necessary permit or license to possess the said firearm from competent
authorities. The firearm was later used by him in committing the crime of Murder of
Diosdado Iroy y Nesnea.
53
That the accused committed another crime during the service of penalty imposed for
another previous offense by possessing unlicensed firearm.
He contended that the law punishing illegal possession of firearm is a special law while
Article 160 commission of another crime during the service of the penalty imposed for
another previous offense (quasi-recidivism) is punishable by the RPC.
ISSUE : Whether the accused violated Art. 160 of the RPC.
RULING:
No. Note the use of the word “felony” in this article. The second crime must be a felony.
Thus, if a prisoner serving sentence for one crime is found in possession of a firearm
without a license, this article does not seem to apply, because the law punishing illegal
possession of firearm is a special law. Must article 10 be made to apply I this case? No.
Article 160 speaks of “the maximum period” of the penalty prescribed by law for the new
felony. The penalty prescribed by special law has no periods like the three periods
divisible penalty prescribed by the R.P.C. – RPC book 2
2. People v Feloteo - Agatha Guison
FACTS : Accused Wilfredo Feleteo was charged with and convicted of the crimes of
Murder and Illegal Possession of Firearm. One evening, the victim, Sonny Sotto, and
his friends were walking along the highway when the accused Feleteo appeared, and
fired an armalite at Sotto causing his death. The firearm used in the incident was stolen
from SP02 Adion.
CONTENTION OF THE DEFENSE: Feloteo denied that he stole the firearm and
alleged that the shooting was an accident.
CONTENTION OF THE STATE: Feloteo have in his possession and control an armalite
rifle without any license or permit to posess, which he used in shooting to death Sonny
Sotto. Feloteo was convicted of Murder under Article 249 of the RPC an Illegal
Possession of Firearm under Sec. 1 of PD 1866.
ISSUE : What is the proper charge against Feloteo?
RULING: PD 1866 provides that if homicide or murder is committed with the use of
unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance. Thus, the proper charge against Feloteo is the crime of
Murder aggravated with the use of unlicensed firearm.
In relation to the topic of Quasi-recidivism: Feloteo is not a quasi-recidivist. Quasi-

recidivism is a special aggravating circumstance where a person, after been convicted
by final judgment, shall commit a new felony before beginning to serve such sentence
or while serving the same. In terms of who can be pardoned, a quasi-recidivist may be
pardoned at age 70, if he has already served out his original sentence, and not a
habitual criminal. Feloteo does not meet any of the elements stated herein.
3. People v. Narvasa 298 SCRA 637- Mary Faith Lawagan
FACTS : Accused-appellants Felicisimo Narvasa, Jimmy Orania, and Mateo Narvasa

were charged for aggravated illegal possession of firearm and one for homicide. On
February 6, 1992, SPO3 Primo Camba and PO2 Simeon Navora who were on patrol
54
met two councilmen and reported that there were missing animals at Sitio Bugtong,
Bani and Sitio Patar of the adjoining town of Agno, Pangasinan suggested to should
track down the armed goons. While investigating there was an exchange of gunfire
causing the death of SPO3 Primo Camba. The unlicensed firearms used in the incident
were M-16, M-14 and caliber .30 U.S.
CONTENTION OF THE DEFENSE: Appellants deny the charges against them.

Felicisimo Narvasa claims that his son Arnel was shot by Ernesto Nagal, Villamor
Laderas and PO2 Simeon Navora. Also, Felicisimo Narvasa testified that he was
sleeping at his house on the afternoon of February 6, 1992 when Glicerio Narvasa woke
him up and informed him that his son Arnel was shot. Jimmy Orania further averred that
he knew nothing and denied participation in the killing of Primo Camba.
CONTENTION OF THE STATE: The trial court accorded credibility to the prosecution
witnesses and RULING that mere denial could not overcome the prosecution evidence
showing that appellants used high-powered firearms to shoot at the prosecution
witnesses, though these unlicensed firearms were not presented as evidence, the trial
court, citing People v. Ferrera, ruled that appellants may still be convicted of illegal
possession of firearms.
ISSUE : What is the proper charge against the Accused-appellants?
RULING: Appellants Felicisimo Narvasa and Jimmy Orania were charged and
convicted for the crime of homicide, with the special aggravating circumstance of the
use of illegally possessed firearms. Under the law if homicide or murder is committed
with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance.
In relation to the topic of Quasi-recidivism, Quasi- recidivism is commission of another

crime during the service of a penalty imposed for another previous offense. In this case
quasi-recidivism was not committed.
TITLE FOUR
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 247
Chapter 1- Article 163 : People v. Kong Leon, 48 OG 664 - Eden Faith Maduli
FACTS :
Appellant Kong Leon alias Kim Huy is a gold smith and was charged and convicted for
violation od Article 163, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code by counterfeiting of
foreign coin.One Moro Arais Mansu informed the police that appellant was selling
illegally fabricated U.S. gold dollar coin, that led the police headed by Lt. Versoza to
search appellant’s shop and person. They found gold smith paraphernalia and
counterfeited coins in appellant’s room. According to Lt. Verzosa, he also searched the
person of the appellant and found in the latter's pocket eight (8) pieces of twenty-dollar
U.S. gold coins wrapped in paper.
Appellant contends that he may not be considered guilty of a violation of Article 163,
paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code because the gold coins have ceased to be a
currency of the United States by the operation of the provisions of the U.S. Gold
Reserve Act of 1934.
55
The learned judge of the trial court RULING that the provisions of the said Act of the
Congress of the United States, known as the Gold Reserve Act of 1934(G. R. 6976,
Public, No. 87), only withdraw gold coins from circulation temporarily, but did not
declare them as illegal or valueless, or no longer currency or legal tender. also, the
Solicitor General, in support of the judgment of conviction, argues that only the
circulation of gold coins was suspended, as may be seen from the title of the Act.
ISSUE : Whether counterfeiting of foreign coin still punishable although the said coin is
withdrawn from circulation.
RULING:
Yes.
In the case at bar collectors were to be defrauded, as it was apparent by the imitation of
the U. S. gold dollars fabricated by appellant that they were to be passed to Moros who
value them even as relics or rare objects. Be that as it may, the reason for applying the
law to coins even if withdrawn from circulation, as given by Viada,i. e., the possibility
and probability that the counterfeiter will use his trade for the fabrication of coins in
circulation, has not been shown to have ceased to exist. As the reason and policy of the
law from which the provision in question (article 163, paragraph 3, Revised Penal Code)
was derived still obtains, there being no legal provision to the contrary or reason for
implying the contrary.
The Court hereby hold, that the making of a false coin of a foreign country is punishable
under article 163, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code, even if said country has
withdrawn the coin from circulation therein.
CHAPTER 4- ARTICLE 166
1.PEOPLE V VALENCIA- Michaela Santillan
FACTS :
Defendants Marcelino Valencia, Melchor Quijano and Socorro Quijano conspiring

among themselves, by mutual agreement, helping each other and in colluding with the
manufacturers of counterfeit banknotes, who until now have not been identified,
voluntarily, illegally, and criminally, dispensed and passed on a counterfeit banknote
knowing that it was counterfeit.
ISSUE : Whether Marcelino is guilty of violation of Article 166 of the Revised Penal
Code.
That article 168 of the Revised Penal Code should be applied, instead of article 166,
alleging that no evidence was presented that appellant Marcelino was in connivance
with the counterfeiters or forgers when he passed the counterfeit bills.
This contention is groundless, since, by his plea of guilty, Marcelino admitted all the
material allegations of the information, including that of connivance with the authors of
the forgery, which characterizes the crime defined by article 166 of the Revised Penal
Code.
RULING: Yes, Marcelino is guilty of violation of Article 166 of the Revised Penal Code.
56
By his plea of guilty, Marcelino admitted all the material allegations of the information,
including that of connivance with the authors of the forgery, which characterizes the
crime defined by article 166 of the Revised Penal Code. His testimony at the trial of, and
as witness for, his co-appellant, could not affect the legal consequences of his plea.
The crime committed by Marcelino Valencia falls within the purview of article 166, case
2, of the Revised Penal Code.
ARTICLE 169- HOW FORGERY IS COMMITTED
1. Del Rosario v. People- Santonia
FACTS:
Accused of counterfeiting Philippine treasury notes, Sergio del Rosario, Alfonso Araneta
and Benedicto del Pilar were convicted by the Court of First Instance of Davao of illegal
possession of said forged treasury notes
On appeal, the judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals
The case is before us on appeal by certiorari taken by Sergio del Rosario.
It appears that, after showing to complainant Apolinario del Rosario the Philippine one-
peso bills Exhibits C, E and G and the Philippine two-peso bill. Exhibit H, and inducing
him to believe that the same were counterfeit paper money manufactured by them,
although in fact... they were genuine treasury notes of the Philippine Government one of
the digits of each of which had been altered and changed, the aforementioned
defendants had succeeded in obtaining P1,700.00 from said complainant, in the City of
Davao, on June 23, 1955, for the avowed purpose... of financing the manufacture of
more counterfeit treasury notes of the Philippines.
Appellant maintains that, being genuine treasury notes of our government, the
possession thereof cannot be illegal.
It is not disputed that a portion of the last digit 9 of Serial No. F-79692619 of Exhibit C,
had been erased and changed so as to read 0 and that similar erasures and changes
had been made in the penultimate digit 9 in Serial No. F-79692691 of Exhibit E, in the
last digit 6... in Serial No. D-716326 of Exhibit G, and in the last digit 9 of Serial No. D-
716329 of Exhibit H.
ISSUE: whether the possession of said Exhibits C, E, G and H constitutes a violation of

Article 168.
RULING:
the possession of genuine treasury notes of the Philippines any of the figures, letters,
words or signs contained" in which had been erased and/or altered, with knowledge of
such erasure and alteration, and with the intent to use such... notes, as they were used
by petitioner herein and his co-defendants in the manner adverted to above, is
punishable under said Article 168, in relation to Article 166, subdivision (1), of the
Revised Penal Code... the decision appealed from is, accordingly, affirmed, with costs
against petitioner Sergio del Rosario.
2. People V. Galano, 54 OG 5897-Mariam T. Tictic
FACTS :
57
Patrolman Villanueva was informed by one Lilia Cruz, a balut vendor, that Galano
bought from her four balut eggs and paid her a false pre-war one-peso bill of the
Treasure Certificate series which she then gave to the said patrolman. That upon
receiving the one peso bill from Galano, she discovered that the word "Victory" at the
back thereof was only written in ink. Hence, Galano was charged with a violation of
Article 166 of the Revised Penal Code
The forgery referred to in Article 166 of the Revised Penal Code may be committed by
any of the following means: 1. By giving to treasury or bank note or any instrument
payable to bearer or to order mentioned therin, the appearance of a true and genuine
document; and 2. By erasing, substituting, counterfeiting or altering by any means the
figures, letters, or signs contained therein. (Article 169, supra.)
ISSUE :
Whether the appellant has correctly been accused of and convicted under Article 166, in
relation to Article 169, of the Revised Penal Code
RULING:
The forgery here committed is under the first paragraph of Article 169 of the Code.
The alteration or even destruction of demonetized paper bill would harm no one but the
holder and would not constitute a crime but for the utterance of the bill so altered. Its
utterance by giving it to the similitude of a true and genuine legal tender of the Victory
series shows the intention to deceive and defraud the Government in its avowed duty to
protect not only the public but also the paper bills legally ISSUE d or authorized for
circulation.
Under the first paragraph of Article 169 of the Code (By giving to a treasure or bank
note or any instrument payable to bearer or to order mentioned therein, the appearance
of a true and genuine document). We believe that this provision does not only
contemplate situations where a spurious, false of fake document or instrument is given
the appearance of a true and genuine document, but also to situations involving
originally true and genuine documents which have been withdrawn or demonetized, or
have outlived their usefulness. The case under consideration could not come within the
second paragraph of the aforesaid article (By erasing, substituting, counterfeiting or
altering by any means the figures, letters, words or signs contained therein), because
no figure, letter, word, or sign contained or has been erased, substituted, counterfeited
or altered. The forgery consists in the addition of a word in an effort to give to the
present document the appearance of a true and genuine certificate that it used to have
before it was withdrawn or has outlived its usefulness.
Section 4
Art. 172 - Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents
58
1, Cabuang Vs. People – EJ Torres
FACTS: While Evelyn de Vera and Maria Victoria Parana were walking home through
an uninhabited place at about 11 o'clock at night on 14 October 1988, accused
Cabuang and Matabang suddenly appeared from the surrounding rice fields. Cabuang
grabbed Maria Victoria and covered her mouth. Evelyn ran away because she became
terribly frightened and Matabang followed in pursuit. Matabang lost sight of Evelyn
along the road. From her hiding place in the front yard of a house along the road,
Evelyn saw Maria Victoria pass by in a tricycle with the accused Cabuang, Matabang
and two (2) other men and heard Maria Victoria crying and pleading for help. Evelyn
clearly recognized Cabuang and Matabang, but not the other two. Early the next
morning, on 15 October 1988, the body of Mario Victoria was found in the barangay
traversed by the road on which Maria Victoria was walking the night before.
CONTENTION OF THE DEFENSE: The claims of alibi by Cabuang and Matabang were
not successfully established. Cabuang acknowledged that he was in the same barangay
where Maria Victoria had been assaulted and killed, while Matabang asserted that he
was in his house in Dagupan City which was no more than an hour or so by bus from
the scene of the crime. Neither Cabuang nor Matabang offered and presented
independent and reliable corroboration of their presence far away from the scene of the
crime at the time of occurrence of the crime.
CONTENTION OF THE STATE: The trial court found the circumstances, considered
together, as adequate to prove appellants' guilt beyond reasonable doubt of robbery
with rape and homicide and sentencing the accused to reclusion perpetua. ISSUE:
Whether the entries made in the police blotter are conclusive proof of the truth of such
entries.
HELD: No, the Court ruled that entries in a police blotter, though regularly done in the
course of performance of official duty, are not conclusive proof of the truth of such
entries; entries in official records like a police blotter are only prima facie evidence of the
facts therein set out, since the entries in the police blotter could well be incomplete or
inaccurate. Testimony given in open court during the trial is commonly much more
lengthy and detailed than the brief entries made in the police blotter and the trial court
cannot base its findings on a police report merely, but must necessarily consider all
other evidence gathered in the course of the police investigation and presented in court.
In the present case, the Court conclude that prosecution witness Evelyn de Vera did
positively and clearly identify Modesto Cabuang and Nardo Matabang as among those
who had raped and killed and robbed the hapless Maria Victoria Parana.
2. People V. Romualdez – Daniele Valeros
FACTS: The accused Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabuhay were charged with the
crime of falsification of public and official documents. The accused Estela Romualdez
was the secretary of Honorable Norberto Romualdez, one of the Justices of the
Supreme court. The latter was then the Head of the Bar Examination Committee.
Because of such functions, she had under her care the computations and other papers
and documents for the admission of the candidate to the Bar held in the month of
August and September 1926. At that time, aside from the Committee of Bar Examiners,
a Committee of Correctors was also appointed. The work of the Committee of Bar
59
Examiners was to prepare the test questions on their respective subjects and a
memorandum of authorities and legal provisions as well as jurisprudence as sources of
the questions. The work of reviewing and grading the test booklets were entrusted to
the Committee of Correctors who were furnished the notes and set of rules.
ISSUE: Whether or not Estela Romualdez is guilty of falsification of public documents.
RULING: Yes. Justice Romualdez was designated by the Chief Justice to conduct the
examination in accordance with the law and the Rules of Court. He himself had no such
authority as he is alleged to have given his secretary. The accused made the alterations
in a way as to make it appear that the correctors had participated therein, because she
blotted out the grades of the correctors and wrote the new grades opposite their initials.
She in that way attributed to the correctors' statements other than those in fact made by
them.
3. Beradio v CA- Alisha Zulueta
FACTS:
Salud Beradio is a lady lawyer appointed as an election registrar of the COMELEC in

Rosales Pangasinan. While holding the said position, the COMELEC granted her
request for permission to appear as counsel for her cousins and cousins-in-law in the
case before the Court of Agrarian Relations. However, criminal charges were filed
against her of the grounds of falsification of public or official documents for making false
entries in her daily time records. Beradio made it appear that she was in her office and
performed her work on specific dates while in fact she was attending court sessions.
The Court of Appeals ruled that her various appearances in court were not on official
business, and the permission granted her by the COMELEC was to appear in behalf of
her relatives, and she was still obligated to reflect in her daily time records only the
hours when she was actually in the office.
Beradio contended that she only stayed in court for 5, 30, 40, or 45 minutes a day for
her appearances therein, where, at no instance exceeding 1 hour which can be
absorbed within the allowed coffee breaks of 30 minutes in the morning and in the
afternoon. Besides, the court was only 2 meters away from her office in COMELEC
Issue: Whether or not Beradio committed falsification of documents
RULING:
No, she did not commit falsification of documents. While it is true that a time record is
an official document, it is not criminally falsified if it does not pervert its avowed purpose
as when it does not cause damage or loss to the government as would result in
instances where it pays an employee for no work done.
In this case, the time records have already served their purpose. They have not caused
any damage to the government or third person because under the facts duly proven,
petitioner may be said to have rendered service in the interest of the public, with proper
60
permission from her superiors. They may now even be condemned as having no more
use to require their continued safe- keeping. Public interest has not been harmed by
their contents, and continuing faith in their verity is not affected.
4. Luague v CA - Naoimi Leaño
FACTS :
Iluminado Luague, a teacher clerk, died on January 24, 1972 after he was
confined in a hospital. After his death, Pilar Luague, Iluminado’s wife, received three (3)
treasury warrants from Florencio Guillermo, on February 7, 17, and 25, 1972 as
payment for Iluminado’s salaries. Florencio Guillermo instructed Pilar to sign the name
of her husband on the payroll warrant register and counter-sign with her initials.
Upon discovering his mistake, Guillermo asked Pilar to return the treasury
warrants ISSUE d in the name of her husband. However, he discovered that the
treasury warrants had already been encashed with different local stores.
CONTENTION OF THE STATE :
She was charged with Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Documents for
signing the name of her husband as payee on the three treasury warrants for purposes
of endorsement.
CONTENTION OF THE DEFENSE :
Pilar puts up the defense of good faith in signing the name of her deceased
husband in the treasury warrants in question. She also said that she had already
encashed the warrants to different stores to settle their financial obligations incurred in
the hospitalization and death of her husband.
ISSUE : Whether Pilar is guilty of falsification of documents.
RULING :
NO. She acted in good faith.
The petitioner has signed her husband’s name to the checks because they were
delivered to her by no less than her husband’s district supervisor long after her
husband’s death. It was also known to the supervisor that the checks were used to pay
for the expenses of her husband’s illness and his burial. Also, she is a poor widow who
was obviously in the state of bewilderment due to the recent death of her husband when
she cashed the pay checks. She was also in dire need of money to settle the expenses
for her husband’s last illness and burial.
It was also brought to the hearing that the government did not sustain any
financial loss due to the encashment of the checks because the petitioner’s husband
had accumulated vacation and sick leaves the money value of which exceeded the
value of the three pay checks. While we do not mean that if there is no damage, there
can be no falsification, we do say that the absence of damage is an element to be
considered to determine whether or not there is criminal intent.
61

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Table of Contents

ART 114- TREASON...............................................................................................................................4

ART 114- TREASON

1. Laurel v. Misa, 77 Phil. 856 - Agatha Guison

CONTENTION OF THE STATE:

Makapilis raided Lawang, Norzagaray, and apprehended several guerilla members.

CONTENTION OF THE STATE:

CONTENTION OF THE DEFENSE:

ISSUE : Whether Cayetano and Mariano Mangahas be RULING guilty of treason

CONTENTION OF THE DEFENSE:

4. People v. Perez, 83 Phil. 314- Mariam T. Tictic

CONTENTION OF THE DEFENSE:

CONTENTION OF THE STATE:

ISSUE : Whether or not the accused committed the crime of Treason

5. People v. Prieto, 80 Phil, 138 Michaela-Dexter Abrigo Santillan

CONTENTION OF THE STATE:

6. People v. Manayao, 78 Phil. 721- Mariam T. Tictic

CONTENTION OF THE DEFENSE:

CONTENTION OF THE STATE:

7. People v. Adriano, 78 Phil. 561 - Michaela Abrigo Santillan

CONTENTION OF THE STATE:

ISSUE : Whether the two witness rule applies in this case.

1.Go Tian Sek Santos v Misa - Naoimi Leaño

CONTENTION OF THE DEFENSE:

CONTENTION OF THE STATE:

ART. 122-PIRACY IN GENERAL AND MUTINY ON THE HIGH SEAS

1.People v. Lol-lo and Saraw, 43 Phil 19- Alisha Ianne Zulueta

CONTENTION OF THE DEFENSE: A demurrer was interposed by counsel de oficio for

2. People v. Rodriguez, 135 SCRA 485- Lee Ann Tong-aan Chungalao

CONTENTION OF THE DEFENSE:

3. People v. Siyoh, 141 SCRA 356- Alisha Ianne Zulueta

CONTENTION OF THE STATE:

CONTENTION OF THE DEFENSE:

ART. 124- ARBITRARY DETENTION

CONTENTION OF THE DEFENSE:

CONTENTION OF THE STATE:

2. Us V. Santos- Mary Faith Lawagan

While conducting patrol at midnight, he saw two person in front of an uninhabited

CONTENTION OF THE STATE:

CONTENTION OF THE DEFENSE:

ISSUE : Whether or not the accused is guilty of arbitrary detention?

3. People V. Misa- Michelle Domoguen

CONTENTION OF THE DEFENSE

CONTENTION OF THE STATE

4. Umil v Ramos - Torres, Emiaj Josh

CONTENTION OF THE DEFENSE:

CONTENTION OF THE STATE:

5. People v Burgos- Maduli, Eden Faith

CONTENTION OF THE DEFENSE:

CONTENTION OF THE STATE:

The confiscation of the firearm under Rule 126, Sec 12:

6. Milo v Salanga - Chungalao, Lee Ann T.

CONTENTION OF THE STATE:

CONTENTION OF THE DEFENSE:

Judge Salanga concluded that Tuvera is not a public officer.

ART. 125 DELAY IN DELIVERY OF DETAINED PERSONS TO THE PROPER

CONTENTION OF THE DEFENSE:

CONTENTION OF THE STATE:

2. Agbay v. Natividad, G.R. No. 134503, July 2, 1999 – Clarence Santonia

On September 7, 1997, petitioner, together with acertainSherwinJugalbot, was arrested

CONTENTION OF THE DEFENSE: Private respondents failed to deliver the detained

3. Alberto V. De la Cruz, SCRA 406- Ron Garcia

CONTENTION OF THE STATE: