Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Jessica Tarr
Jessica Tarr
02/05/2023
Psychopathology
Those of whom are not familiar with diagnostic classifications within the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders [DSM] might be surprised to learn that the term
“psychopathy” has no longer been used to make diagnosis within the official diagnostic criteria
and codes within Section II of the manual. The term “psychopath” has widely been used in
media, and even recently, there have been increased interest within the public population to
absorb themselves with information on infamous figures (e.g., Ted Bundy) via the help of
releases by streaming services. For instance, according to Smith (2022), the Netflix show titled
‘Monster: The Jeffrey Dahmer Story’ occupied the top spot on the Netflix TV Charts in the
month of October, 2022. Even fictional characters, such as James Bond and Sherlock Holmes,
have been described as having prototypic psychopathic characteristics (Lilienfeld et al., 2015, as
cited in Crego & Widiger, 2022). As a term used by average laypersons with no associations to
the psychological field, why has psychopathy dwindled to mere mentions in the current DSM-5-
TR? (American Psychiatrist Association [APA], 2022) That is the topic in question within the
current paper. The answer can largely be contributed to continuous criterion changes and name
changes in the DSM editions over the many decades (Gurley, 2009; Crego & Widiger, 2015). In
an effort to include alterative diagnostic models of personality disorders, the DSM-5 (APA,
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2013) and DSM-5-TR (APA, 2022) added an alternative model for personality disorders
(AMPD) within Section III of the manual. Not only has this exposed the disagreements that have
occurred within the field in regard to how to best diagnose personality disorders, but the AMPD
for antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) has included psychopathic features. Thus, the second
question to the paper is whether Section III tests better than Section II within research in relation
Many individuals have continued to use the term ‘psychopathy,’ ‘sociopathy,’ and
‘antisocial personality disorder’ interchangeably. Much of the overlap and confusion might be
seen as a result of continuous change within criteria and terminology within the DSM editions
over the last seven decades (Gurley, 2009). Indeed, once upon a time (i.e., ~20 years before the
release of the DSM-I) psychopathy referred to all cases of personality disorders (Schneider,
1923, as cited in Crego & Widiger, 2015). Cleckley (1941) was the most influential in his
definition of psychopathy, and the DSM-I (APA, 1952) had significant overlap with his
variation (APA, 1952, p. 38). Within the first edition, it explicitly stated that the term would be a
psychopathic state.’ It also described such individuals to be frequently callous, hedonistic, and
chronically antisocial. The DSM-II (APA, 1968) changed this term to “antisocial personality,”
with even more of Cleckley’s (1941) formulation, which included the features of selfishness,
impulsivity, irresponsibility, inability to feel guilt or to learn from experience, and having
conflict with society. A more significant change occurred within the DSM-III (APA, 1980),
when the term changed to “antisocial personality disorder” (ASPD) and diagnostic guidelines
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were officially provided for the first time due to the lack of reliability with previous editions for
diagnosing. The increased interest in improving reliability resulted in two additional influential
instrumental criteria (Feighner et al., 1972; L. Robins, 1966, as cited in Crego & Widiger, 2015).
The DSM-III was the first with explicit sets of criteria, and a combination of instrumental criteria
were added to DSM-III (e.g., the inclusion of the conduct disorder prerequisite, financial
was the only clinical assessment within personality disorders that remained reliable (Mellsop et
al., 1982, as cited in Crego & Widiger, 2015). This was largely due to Hare’s (1980)
to appear between the traits from instrumental measures and DSM-III diagnostic criterion (e.g.,
PCL did not require the presence of conduct disorder). Additionally, the DSM assessed
behaviors, while the PCL assessed traits. Psychopathy began to slowly drift; instead of the
consideration of traits of psychopathy, the DSM had begun to focus on a series of antisocial acts
(Hare, 1986; as cited in Crego & Widiger, 2015). Most criteria from DSM-I and II were
ultimately removed, and the diagnosis transitioned from a disorder of personality to one of
behavior (Gurley, 2009). Characteristics that reflected psychopathy had all been deleted from the
criteria; however, their inclusion of the term “Sociopathic Personality” in the index, with a note
to “see antisocial personality disorder” kept psychopathy as an association with the disorder.
DSM-III-R (1987) and DSM-IV (1994) consisted of little change, with the exception of obvious
shortened criteria and adjusted diagnosis closer to the new PCL-R conceptualization (Widigen &
Corbitt, 1993, as cited in Crego & Widiger, 2015), and DSM-IV-TR (2000) also had little to no
change for the diagnosis of ASPD. Despite the separation of ASPD and psychopathy by the
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release of DSM-IV (1994) and DSM-5 (2013), as well as the confusion on whether they were
one in the same or different, it was found that there was significantly more research conducted
on psychopathy than on ASPD (Crego & Widiger, 2015). The Work Group for DSM-5 proposed
Crego & Widiger, 2015). The proposal was ultimately dropped before the official release due to
lack of empirical support for validity or reliability (Widiger, 2011, as cited in Crego & Widiger,
2015). Instead, the proposal was replaced with the alternative hybrid model, which was a
combination of deficits of interpersonal relatedness and sense of self with seven maladaptive
personality traits obtained from a five-domain dimensional trait model (Krueger et al., 2011, as
cited in Crego & Widiger, 2015). The four deficits included impairment to intimacy, self-
direction, identity, and empathy. The seven traits from Krueger et al.’s (2011) model were risk
taking, impulsivity, and responsibility from the disinhibition domain, and callousness, hostility,
manipulativeness, and deceitfulness from the antagonism domain. Among those in the field,
some attention was drawn to DSM-5 with its exclusion of Hare and Cleckley’s conceptualization
of psychopathy and instead its inclusion of a brand-new model of psychopathy with three
constructs (meanness, disinhibition, and boldness), which they had identified as essential to
understand psychopathy (Triarchic Psychopathy Measure [TriPM]; Patrick et al., 2009). More
concerns were raised in respect to further revisions made on the DSM-5 website with the
proposed alternative model criterion set, as it added new components for a psychopathy specifier
(i.e., low anxiousness, low social withdrawal, and high attention-seeking) (APA, 2013). Not only
were those components separate from Cleckley (1941, 1976) and Hare’s (2003) PCL-R, but they
“[were] largely components of normal, adaptive functioning” (Marcus et al., 2012, as cited in
2015).
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In addition to the changes made throughout the years to DSM editions, some of the
confusion around ASPD and psychopathy might be attributed to continued criticisms made by
researchers and individuals within the field of psychology. ASPD has long been criticized as
being a diagnosis that has steadily differentiated itself from Cleckley’s (1941) teachings (Hare et
al., 2012, as cited in Crego & Widiger, 2015). However, Crego & Widiger (2015) argued that “it
psychopathy be consistent with one developed by a particular clinician from the 1940s” (p. 671).
They also indicated that much of what the field has based psychopathy on (i.e., Cleckey’s
description of the prototypic psychopath) included participants who do not fit the current mold of
what a true prototypic psychopath is. They described Cleckley’s cases as having been
“essentially drifting ne’er-do-wells who were not particularly aggressive, cruel, or viscous”
(Crego & Widiger, 2022, pp. 680-681)… and that not one of Cleckley’s psychopath cases “had
committed murder or rape, let alone serial rape or serial murder” (p. 681). Even so, some
additional arguments continued, with some having stated that “boldness” should not be
considered a feature of psychopathy, while others complained that “meanness” was not included
in prototypical psychopathy (Miller & Lynam, 2012; Lilienfeld et al., 2015, as cited in Crego &
Witiger, 2022). Even the PCL-R, which was once referred to as “the gold standard in
psychopathy research” (Western & Weinberger, 2004, as cited in Crego & Witiger, 2022) had
been replaced by newer models and measures that severely differed from PCL-R. All of the
different discrepancies seemed to also trickle down to the general public’s confusion on
psychopathy, as some of the figures they attributed as being psychopathic had bits and pieces of
various traits and behaviors that were at one point considered to have been representative of the
prototypic psychopath. That confusion was reflected perfectly in Crego & Widiger’s (2022)
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study, which obtained ratings of psychopathic traits of six specific public figures. They used the
five-factor model, Cleckley’s (1941, 1976) criteria, as well as the newer traits from newer
models (e.g., fearlessness and boldness). In their results, the traits that were evident for all six
However, while three individuals clearly presented as an obvious psychopath (i.e., Clyde
Barrow, Ted Bundy, and Bernie Madoff), the other three were figures who would not have been
said to be psychopathic (i.e., Chuck Yeager, Sherlock Holmes, and James Bond). While the
addition of a psychopathic specifier in the AMPD seemed exciting, they explained why its added
traits of boldness and fearlessness were worrisome, stating, “perhaps then it is precisely these
traits of fearlessness and boldness that contributes to an inaccurate perception that these persons
are psychopathic” (p. 680). While understanding how a human being could be so “evil” is a valid
definition or description of the disorder (Widiger & Crego, 2021). In the end, they suggested that
The second focus of the paper pertains to the DSM-5 alternative model for personality
disorders (AMPD) and its operationalization on ASPD and its relation to the psychopathic
functioning (Criterion A) and pathological traits (Criterion B)” (Anderson & Kelley, 2022, pp.
397-398). In addition to the categorical classification and ASPD trait operationalization, it also
included a psychopathy specifier. Few et al. (2015) stressed the importance of that inclusion, as
psychopathy has not been recognized in any official capacity within the last four editions of the
DSM as its own entity. The inclusion assumes that psychopathy is an aspect or variant of ASPD.
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The DSM-5 described the specifier by “a lack of anxiety or fear and by a bold interpersonal style
that may mask maladaptive behaviors” (APA, 2022, p. 885) and characterized by low
Withdrawal, low Anxiousness, and high Attention-Seeking. Indeed, as stated previously, the
debate on the inclusion of ‘boldness’ have made the specifier questionable to many (Lilienfeld et
al., 2016, as cited in Anderson & Kelley, 2022). Crego & Widiger (2015) debated that there was
a missed opportunity for the AMPD to reunite psychopathy and ASPD, as well as having stated
that the specifier ultimately failed to reflect models established of psychopathy and that the new
added traits were too adaptive. Nonetheless, previous studies have concluded that AMPD traits
in Section III successfully reflected the personality disorders listed in Section II (Anderson et al.,
2014, as cited in Anderson & Kelley, 2022). Their current study aimed to decipher whether
AMPD trait conceptualization of ASPD exceeded its Section II counterpart in the measurement
of psychopathy. This had already been proven consistently within past studies (Wygant et al.,
2016, 2020, as cited in Anderson & Kelley, 2022) and psychopathy seemed to be well-
represented in the AMPD for ASPD. Despite the fact of contention in regard to the “boldness”
centrality of the specifier, previous studies suggested that the specifier successfully captured the
boldness construct (Wygant, 2020, as cited in Anderson & Kelley, 2022). They, however,
described the decision to make the construct the differentiating feature of psychopathy as “lighter
fluid in the psychopathy forest fire” (p. 399). Though imperfect, they suggested that the AMPD
gave way to rejoin psychopathy into the field of psychopathology. Similarly, Few et al. (2015)
found that the diagnostic approach for ASPD in the AMPD converged more successfully with
the psychopathy construct, from which ASPD was originally born. The results of their study
suggested that the approach used in Section III to diagnose ASPD accounted for significantly
higher variance in scores of psychopathy than the approach in Section II…and that the trait of
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callousness was the most consistent contributor to the scores of psychopathy. However, they
found little added variance in regard to the traits included in the psychopathy specifier. Like
Anderson & Kelley, they also believed that the more trait-based approach featured in the AMPD
might bring ASPD and psychopathy closer together. For those who argued too much similarity in
the two approaches, they contended that while nominal content was similar, the assessment
approach was significantly different… that the new approach relieed less on explicit markers of
behavior and more on open construct. Clark & Watson (2022) indicated their slight criticism
with the AMPD, stating that in the current state of literature, the vast majority were based on one
self-report measure, the Personality Inventory for DSM-5 (PID-5; Krueger et al., 2012). They
believed this constituted the measure to be the model, and their recommendations for future
research was for more focus on additional existing measures of the AMPD and/or the
development of more measure formats so that the model itself was measured, rather than a
specific operationalization if it. Wygant et al., (2016) argued that psychopathy is very important
within the criminal justice system, as research clearly established the effectiveness of it being a
predictor of violent behavior, sexual aggression, recidivism, and criminal behavior. While DSM-
5 operationalized psychopathy as being ASPD, the ability to test psychopathy in criminal settings
was difficult due to ASPDs lack of capability to “capture the full psychopathy construct” (p.
229). They felt the choice made by the APA Board of Trustees to place the AMPD into Section
III was unfortunate because it had better promise than its Section II counterpart to cover the
psychopathic personality. In their own study, their goal was to determine whether the
operationalization of ASPD in Section III had moved closer to the more traditional construct of
psychopathy in comparison to its Section II variant. Their findings affirmed this, as Section III
outperformed Section II in the prediction of psychopathic traits. Additionally, they found that
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personality impairment (Criterion A) increased the prediction of psychopathy and ASPD far
larger than personality traits (Criterion B). Thus, in Wygant et al.’s (2016) study, in addition to
others listed, results suggested that Section III’s ASPD was more aligned with psychopathy than
Section II’s behaviorally oriented model. They recommended further avoidance on overlap
between the different personality disorder profiles, with the indication that it might help
discontinue the use of the personality disorder model used in Section II of DSM-IV and DSM-5.
In conclusion, historical changes within diagnostic criteria manual editions have skewed
individuals within the psychological field and public population alike. The continuous changes
of traits and behaviors have created differentiating opinions on which truly represent the
prototypic psychopathic profile. This might explain why specific public figures are often
associated with psychopathy, like Lykken (1982), who suggested that Chuck Yeager, a highly
successful pilot, and the typical psychopath “are twigs from the same branch,” due to both
having shared the fearlessness trait (as cited in Crego & Widiger, 2022). The inclusion of the
AMPD in Section III of DSM-5 has provided guidance to bring both terms back together and
potentially weed out unhelpful traits within Section II. As studies proved the AMPD for ASPD to
be a better indication of psychopathy variants, it had some help from the psychopathic specifier.
Although the specifier essentially began to bring psychopathy back together with ASPD in a way
that has not been seen since before the release of DSM-IV, its associated adaptive characterized
traits have not consistently supported the specifier to positively predict psychopathic traits.
Further research on this specifier will indicate whether those traits should be changed, as its
current continued failure to augment AMPD ASPD traits in the prediction of psychopathy has
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