2b Civpro Case Digests Ay 2021 2022

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y.
2020-2021
PROFESSOR:
DEAN MA. SOLEDAD DERIQUITO-MAWIS
SUBMITTED BY:
AGUSTIN, NATHAN RAPHAEL D.L.
CRUZ, JOHN DWIGHT V.
ISIDRO, CHANELLE MIKAELLA T.
LEDESMA, DARREN NATHAN S.
MACALINAO, SHARA MAE D.
MARTIN, DOMINIC A.
MATUTINA, MONICO JOSEPH L.
ORCULLO, MA. DANICA
PIGAR, KYRA FRENEL
CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y. 2020-2021

I-G ENER AL P RINC IP LES REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the
NATIONAL CENTENNIAL COMMISSION, petitioner, vs.
SUBSTANTIVE vis-à-vis PROCEDURAL LAW COURT OF APPEALS, respondent
G.R. No. 140500 January 21, 2002
Petition for Review on Certiorari Rule 45

ERNESTINA BERNABE, Petitioner, v. CAROLINA ALEJO as To carry out the Tejeros Convention Project, the government,
guardian ad litem for the minor ADRIAN BERNABE,
through the National Centennial Commission (NCC), filed on
Respondent. December 4, 1997 a complaint for expropriation against
respondents Fe Manuel and Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company (Metrobank). The land was mortgaged by Fe Manuel
Petition for Review on Certiorari to Metrobank and was extrajudicially foreclosed by the latter
Facts: on November 20, 1997.Respondent Fe Manuel interposed no
objection to the expropriation as long as just compensation
Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe fathered a son with his secretary, was paid.
plaintiff Carolina Alejo. The son was born on September 18,
1981 and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on RTC – Dismissed the complaint for expropriation for lack of
August 13, 1993, while his wife Rosalina died on December 3 cause of action. The Court ruled that there was no prior
of the same year, leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir. determination as to necessity to exercise the power of
eminent domain. MR was denied, a copy of which was received
Respondent filed a complaint praying that Adrian be declared by petitioner on Oct 12, 1998.
as an illegitimate child of the late Bernabe and be given his
share in the estate held by petitioner. CA – Dismissed the petition for having been filed out of time,
almost 2 months later or 14 days late under Rule 65 of ROC
RTC – Dismissed the complaint on the ground that it is already after the receipt of the order denying the MR from the trial
barred because complaint should have been filed during the court.
lifetime of the alleged father to give him time to deny the
filiation Issue:
CA –Ruled otherwise that since he was born in 1981, his rights WON the CA erred in dismissing the appeal (YES)
are governed by Art 285 of the CC which allows the action be Ruling:
filed within 4 years after the child attained majority.
Strictly speaking, the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing
Issue: the petition for having been filed out of time because the
WON the action will prosper. (YES) prevailing rule at that time provided that the 60-day period for
filing a petition for certiorari shall be reckoned from receipt of
Ruling: the assailed decision or order. The period is interrupted when
a motion for reconsideration is filed but it starts to run again
The right to seek recognition granted by the Civil Code to
from receipt of the denial of the said motion for
illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the
reconsideration. However, Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
Family Code took effect cannot be impaired or taken away. The
of Civil Procedure as amended by Bar Matter No. 803 effective
minors have up to four years from attaining majority age
September 1, 1998, was recently amended by A.M. No. 00-2-
within which to file an action for recognition. Under the new
03-SC effective September 1, 2000. The recent rule no longer
law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must
provides that the 60-day period shall be reckoned from receipt
be brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent. The
of the assailed decision, order or resolution. Instead, it
Family Code makes no distinction on whether the former was
provides that the 60-day period shall be reckoned from receipt
still a minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is
of the order denying the motion for reconsideration.
given by the new Code a chance to dispute the claim,
considering that illegitimate children are usually begotten and It is settled that procedural laws do not come within the legal
raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against
of their existence. Nonetheless, the Family Code provides the retroactive operation of statutes. They may be given
caveat that rights that have already vested prior to its retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the
enactment should not be prejudiced or impaired. A vested time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a
right is defined as one which is absolute, complete and person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch
unconditional, to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and as there is no vested rights in rules of procedure.
which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent
upon a contingency

OBJECTIVE OF PROCEDURAL LAW In a long line of cases, this Court has held that the CA’s
authority to dismiss an appeal for failure to file the appellant’s
SPOUSES DAVID BERGONIA and LUZVIMINDA CASTILLO, brief is a matter of judicial discretion. Thus, a dismissal based
Petitioners, on this ground is neither mandatory nor ministerial; the
vs. COURT OF APPEALS (4th DIVISION) and AMADO fundamentals of justice and fairness must be observed,
BRAVO, JR., Respondents. bearing in mind the background and web of circumstances
surrounding the case. The petitioners ought to be reminded
that the bare invocation of “the interest of substantial justice”
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is not a magic wand that will automatically compel this Court
to suspend procedural rules. Procedural rules are not to be
Facts: belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance
may have resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantive rights.
The petitioners were the plaintiffs in Civil Case entitled
Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for
"Spouses David Bergonia and Luzviminda Castillo v. Amado
the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to
Bravo, Jr." in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Roxas,
relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the
Isabela. On January 21, 2008, the RTC rendered a decision
degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
adverse to the petitioners. The petitioners consequently
procedure prescribed
sought a reconsideration of the said decision but the same was
denied by the RTC in an Order dated April 25, 2008 which was PHILIPPINE NUMISMATIC AND ANTIQUARIAN SOCIETY,
received on May 6, 2008. On May 7, 2008, the petitioners filed petitioner, VS. AQUINO, respondent, G.R. NO. 206617
a Notice of Appeal.
In 2009, a new law firm entered its appearance for the
petitioner before the CA. Thereafter, the CA issued a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
Resolution on January 30, 2009 requiring the filing of the Facts:
Appellant’s Brief within 45 days from receipt.
Petitioner filed a complaint with the docketed as praying for
Citing Rule 50 respondent subsequently filed a Motion to the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against
Dismiss stating that petitioners failed to file their Appellant’s respondent Angelo Bernardo, Jr. The complaint was verified by
Brief within the 45-day period given by the CA. respondents Eduardo M. Chua, Catalino M. Silangil and
In defense, petitioner alleged that their counsel did not receive Percival M. Manuel who claimed to be the attorneys-in-fact of
the order requiring them to file their Appellant’s Brief in 45 petitioner as per Secretary's Certificate attached to the
days. complaint. Petitioner was represented by Atty. Faustino S.
Tugade as counsel.
CA – petition considered as abandoned thereby dismissed,
records show that the order was received by the petitioners. Two months later, petitioner filed another complaint against
MR denied respondents. It appears however, that two counsels were
trying to represent the petitioner, hence RTC ordered to
Issue: submit within fifteen (15) days from notice the appropriate
pleadings as to who are the true officers of PNAS and to submit
WON the dismissal was proper (YES)
all the documentary exhibits in support of their respective
Ruling: positions.
It bears stressing that the extraordinary remedy of certiorari Only some of the petitioners were able to comply with said
can be availed of only if there is no appeal or any other plain, order, hence, RTC dismissed the complaint as nuisance suit, it
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. appearing that the petitioners had no authority to file a
On the other hand, Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court complaint
states that an appeal may be taken from a judgment or final
CA – Affirmed
order that completely disposes of the case or a particular
matter therein. A judgment or order is considered final if the Issue:
order disposes of the action or proceeding completely, or
terminates a particular stage of the same action; in such case, WON the CA erred in affirming RTC’s dismissal (NO)
the remedy available to an aggrieved party is appeal. If the Ruling:
order or resolution, however, merely resolves incidental
matters and leaves something more to be done to resolve the The Rules of Court, specifically Section 2 of Rule 3 thereof,
merits of the case, the order is interlocutory and the aggrieved requires that unless otherwise authorized by law or the Rules
party’s remedy is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. of Court, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party-in-interest. This provision has two

requirements: (1) to institute an action, the plaintiff must be BPI filed Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, arguing that the
the real party-in-interest; and (2) the action must be RTC order was interlocutory in nature
prosecuted in the name of the real party-in-interest. Interest
CA – found that BPI failed to comply with the procedural
within the meaning of the Rules of Court means material
requirements on non-forum shopping – dismissed
interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or
judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity Issue:
about the question involved. One having no material interest
to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as the WON the dismissal was proper (YES)
plaintiff in an action. The rule on real party-in-interest ensures, Ruling:
therefore, that the party with the legal right to sue brings the
action, and this interest ends when a judgment involving the This Court has repeatedly emphasized the need to abide by the
nominal plaintiff will protect the defendant from a subsequent Rules of Court and the procedural requirements it imposes.
identical action. Such a rule is intended to bring before the The verification of a complaint and the attachment of a
court the party rightfully interested in the litigation so that only certificate of non-forum shopping are requirements that – as
real controversies will be presented and the judgment, when pointed out by the Court, time and again – are basic, necessary
entered, will be binding and conclusive and the defendant will and mandatory for procedural orderliness. The Court is not
be saved from further harassment and vexation at the hands impervious to the frustration that litigants and lawyers alike
of other claimants to the same demand. would at times encounter in procedural bureaucracy but
imperative justice requires correct observance of
APPLICATION OF PROCEDURAL LAW indispensable technicalities precisely designed to ensure its
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Petitioner, vs. proper dispensation. It has long been recognized that strict
compliance with the Rules of Court is indispensable for the
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROMEO BARZA prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and
expeditious dispatch of judicial business. Rules of procedure
are intended to ensure the orderly administration of justice
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 and the protection of substantive rights in judicial and
extrajudicial proceedings. It is a mistake to propose that
Facts: substantive law and adjective law are contradictory to each
First Union Bank borrowed from BPI PhP5 Million pesos, other or, as often suggested, that enforcement of procedural
evidenced by promissory note. As partial security for the loan rules should never be permitted if it will result in prejudice to
obligations of First Union, defendant Linda and her spouse the substantive rights of the litigants.
(Eddy Tien) executed a Real Estate Mortgage Agreement
covering 2 condominium units. Linda executed a
Comprehensive Surety Agreement where she agreed to be CMTC INTERNATIONAL MARKETING CORPORATION,
solidarily liable with First Union for its obligations to BPI. First Petitioner,
Union failed to settle its obligations.
vs. BHAGIS INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION,
BPI initiated an extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings against Respondents.
the 2 condominium. BPI was the highest bidder. After applying
the costs, First Union still owes BPI PhP4 Million including
interests and penalty charges. Hence, BPI filed a Complaint for Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
Collection of Money.
Facts:
Respondents moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground that BPI violated Rule 7 of Civil Procedure when it failed Petitioner instituted a Complaint for Unfair Competition
to attach the necessary board resolution authorizing Asis and and/or Copyright Infringement and Claim for Damages with
Ong to institute an action against respondents. Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction against respondent.
BPI in its Opposition argued that the verification suffices to
prove the authority of Asis and Ong. Further, BPI alleged that RTC – Dismissed
a complaint "can only be dismissed under Section 5, Rule 7 of Petitioner seasonably filed its Notice of Appeal. CA issued a
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure if there was no certification Notice to File the Appellants Brief on May 20, 2005, received
against forum shopping." The provision, according to BPI, 10 days later by the law office representing the petitioner.
"does not even require that the person certifying should show
proof of his authority to do so. CA – Abandoned for failing to file the Appellant’s Brief, hence,
Dismissed. MR dismissed
RTC – granted the Motion to Dismiss by respondents
Issue:
WON the dismissal was proper (NO) years from the execution of the Deeds of Sale, that
respondents seek to enforce said Deeds; thus, the present
Ruling: action is already barred by prescription and/or Laches.
Time and again, this Court has emphasized that procedural RTC – Dismissed on the grounds that the Deeds of Sale in
rules should be treated with utmost respect and due regard, respondents’ favor could not as yet be considered title to the
since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases subject lands, noting the failure of respondents to perfect their
to remedy the worsening problem of delay in the resolution of title or assert ownership and possession thereof for the past
rival claims and in the administration of justice. From time to 27 years; and © the filing of the instant case is barred by res
time, however, we have recognized exceptions to the Rules,
judicata considering the final and executory Decision
but only for the most compelling reasons where stubborn dismissing the earlier filed Civil Case No. 3934-R where
obedience to the Rules would defeat rather than serve the respondents similarly sought to be declared the owners of the
ends of justice. t bears stressing at this point then that the rule, subject lands
which states that the mistakes of counsel binds the client, may
not be strictly followed where observance of it would result in CA – set aside the above ruling. It held that Civil Case No. 3934-
outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property, or R was an action for Injunction where respondents sought to
where the interest of justice so requires. In rendering justice, enjoin petitioners’ alleged entry into the subject lands and
procedural infirmities take a backseat against substantive their introduction of improvements thereat; whereas Civil
rights of litigants. Corollarily, if the strict application of the Case No. 5881-R is an action to quiet title where respondents
rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, this specifically prayed, inter alia, for the removal of the cloud upon
Court is not without power to exercise its judicial discretion in their ownership and possession of the subject lands.
relaxing the rules of procedure
Issue:
JURISDICTION
1. WON the case is within RTC’s jurisdiction (NO); and
BERNADETTE S. BILAG, ERLINDA BILAGSANTILLAN, DIXON
BILAG, REYNALDO B. SUELLO, HEIRS OF LOURDES S. BILAG, 2. WON the prior injunction case bars an action to quiet
title (YES)
HEIRS OF LETICIA BILAG-HANAOKA, and HEIRS OF NELLIE
BILAG vs. ESTELA AY-AY Ruling:
1. Since the subject lands are untitled and unregistered
public lands, then petitioners correctly argued that it is the
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
Director of Lands who has the authority to award their
Facts: ownership.[30] Thus, the RTC Br. 61 correctly recognized its
lack of power or authority to hear and resolve respondents’
Respondents filed an action for Quieting of Title with Prayer action for quieting of title. Having established that the
for Preliminary Injunction against petitioners. Respondents disputed property is public land, the trial court was therefore
alleged that petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest, sold to them correct in dismissing the complaint to quiet title for lack of
separately various portions of a 159,496-square meter parcel jurisdiction. The trial court had no jurisdiction to determine
of land designated by the Bureau of Lands as Approved Plan
who among the parties have better right over the disputed
No. 544367, Psu 189147 situated at Sitio Benin, Baguio City. property which is admittedly still part of the public domain.
Respondents further alleged that they have been in continuous 2. In an action for quieting of title, the complainant is
possession of the said lands since 1976 when they were
seeking for “an adjudication that a claim of title or interest in
delivered to them and that they have already introduced property adverse to the claimant is invalid, to free him from
various improvements thereon. Despite the foregoing, the danger of hostile claim, and to remove a cloud upon or
petitioners refused to honor the foregoing sales by asserting quiet title to land where stale or unenforceable claims or
their adverse rights on the subject lands. Worse, they demands exist.” Under Articles 476 and 477 of the Civil Code,
continued to harass respondents, and even threatened to the two indispensable requisites in an action to quiet title are:
demolish their improvements and dispossess them thereof. (1) that the plaintiff has a legal or equitable title to or interest
Petitioners averred that the subject lands are untitled, in the real property subject of the action; and (2) that there is
unregistered, and form part of the Baguio Townsite a cloud on his title by reason of any instrument, record, deed,
Reservation which were long classified as lands of the public claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which must be shown to
domain. As such, the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case as it be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie
is the Land Management Bureau (formerly the Bureau of appearance of validity. In this case, petitioners, claiming to be
Lands) which is vested with the authority to determine issues owners of the disputed property, allege that respondents are
of ownership over unregistered public lands. As to the second unlawfully claiming the disputed property by using void
ground, petitioners argued that it is only now, or more than 27 documents, namely the “Catulagan” and the Deed of Waiver

of Rights. However, the records reveal that petitioners do not by-laws, the NLRC erred in taking cognizance of the case, and
have legal or equitable title over the disputed property, which in concluding that Maglaya was a mere employee and
forms part of Lot 43, a public land within the Baguio Townsite subordinate official because of the manner of his appointment,
Reservation. It is clear from the facts of the case that his duties and responsibilities, salaries and allowances, and
petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest, the heirs of Pocdo Pool, considering the Identification Card, the Administration and
were not even granted a Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim Personnel Policy Manual which specified the retirement of the
over Lot 43, which remains public land. Thus, the trial court university president, and the check disbursement as pieces of
had no other recourse but to dismiss the case. evidence supporting such finding.
A corporate officer’s dismissal is always a corporate act, or an
intra¬-corporate controversy which arises between a
WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. stockholder and a corporation, and the nature is not altered by
GUILLERMO T. MAGLAYA, SR., Respondent the reason or wisdom with which the Board of Directors may
have in taking such action.

Facts: AAA vs. BBB, G.R. No. 212448
Respondent was appointed as a corporate member and was Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
elected as Board of Trustee for a 5 years of petitioner. He was FACTS:
re-elected as a Board of Trustee in 2007. In a Memorandum,
the incumbent Bishops of the United Methodist Church The assailed decision granted the Motion to Quash
apprised the corporate members of the expiration of their Information which charged BBB violation of RA 9262 Sec 5 (i)
terms. Maglaya learned in 2009 that the Bishops created an Ad for having an illicit relationship. BBB started working Singapore
Hoc committee to plan the effective turn over for proper in 2005 where he acquired permanent resident status. BBB
administration of the WUP. The new chairman informed sent financial support sporadically to AAA and their child, CCC.
Maglaya of the termination of his services. There were also allegations of virtual abandonment,
mistreatment of her and their son CCC, and physical and sexual
Maglaya filed a complaint for Injunction and Damages. violence. To make matters worse, BBB supposedly started
RTC – Dismissed for being a nuisance or harassment suit. The having an affair with a Singaporean woman.
RTC observed that it is clear from the by-laws of WUP that The Information having been filed, a warrant of arrest was
insofar as membership in the corporation is concerned, which issued against BBB. AAA was also able to secure a Hold-
can only be given by the College of Bishops of the United Departure Order against BBB who continued to evade the
Methodist Church, it is a precondition to a seat in the WUP warrant of arrest. Consequently, the case was archived.
Board.
RTC – granted the Motion to Quash info on the ground of lack
LA – Ruled that the action between employers and employees of jurisdiction
where the employer-employee relationship is merely
incidental is within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Issue:
regular courts.
WON RTC has jurisdiction over the case
NLRC – Reversed, Maglaya was illegally dismissed
Ruling:
CA – Affirmed and Dismissed the Certiorari
Acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant
Issue: WON RTC has jurisdiction over the case is acquitted because the evidence does not show that
defendant's guilt is beyond a reasonable doubt; but dismissal
Ruling: Settled is the rule that while the decision of the NLRC does not decide the case on the merits or that the defendant
becomes final and executory after the lapse of ten calendar is not guilty. Dismissal terminates the proceeding, either
days from receipt thereof by the parties under Article 22342 because the court is not a court of competent jurisdiction, or
(now Article 229) of the Labor Code, the adverse party is not the evidence does not show that the offense was committed
precluded from assailing it via Petition for Certiorari under Rule within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint
65 before the CA and then to this Court via a Petition for or information is not valid or sufficient in form and substance,
Review under Rule 45.
etc.
The alleged “appointment” of Maglaya instead of “election” as As jurisdiction of a court over the criminal ease is determined
provided by the by-laws neither convert the president of by the allegations in the complaint or information, threshing
university as a mere employee, nor amend its nature as a out the essential elements of psychological abuse under R.A.
corporate officer. With the office specifically mentioned in the No. 9262 is crucial. In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional.
In Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262, venue undoubtedly pertains to TUMAODOS VS. SAN MIGUEL YAMAMURA PACKAGING
jurisdiction. As correctly pointed out by AAA, Section 7
provides that the case may be filed where the crime or any of
its elements was committed at the option of the complainant. FACTS:
While the psychological violence as the means employed by
the perpetrator is certainly an indispensable element of the Petitioner is an employee of the respondent. Due to
offense, equally essential also is the element of mental or reorganization, respondent implemented Involuntary
emotional anguish which is personal to the complainant. Separation Program effective on No. 15. 2014. Petitioner
availed the program. His separation package amounted to
It is necessary, for Philippine courts to have jurisdiction when PhP3 Million pesos but respondent withheld the remaining
the abusive conduct or act of violence under Section 5(i) of R.A. PhP1.4 Million on behalf of the Cooperative which petitioner
No. 9262 in relation to Section 3(a), Paragraph (C) was allegedly had an outstanding balance.
committed outside Philippine territory, that the victim be a
resident of the place where the complaint is filed in view of the Petitioner later learned that he had no outstanding balance
anguish suffered being a material element of the offense. In anymore to the Cooperative, hence, he demanded the release
the present scenario, the offended wife and children of of the remaining balance. However, respondent received a
respondent husband are residents of Pasig City since March of letter from Cooperative that it is entitled to the remaining
2010. Hence, the RTC of Pasig City may exercise jurisdiction balance of the petitioner’s claim because he was still indebted.
over the case. Respondent filed a complaint for Interpleader with
Consignation before RTC. Petitioner filed a complaint against
respondent for non-payment of separation pay and damages.
SUSAN GALANG and BERNADETH ALBINO, et al. v
VERONICA WALLIS, NELSON INAGCONG SUMERWE et al. LA – in favor of petitioner
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 NLRC – Affirmed
FACTS: On appeal: Respondent contends that NLRC had no jurisdiction

over the case
Petitioners filed Accion Reinvindicatoria Annulment of Tax
Declaration, Injunction with Prayer for Temporary Restraining CA – Granted the petition and held that NLRC had no
Order (TRO) and Damages, claiming to be the lawful owners of jurisdiction over the case. CA found that petitioner was not
parcels of land located at Ampucao, Itogon, Benguet. seeking to enforce his rights under the Labor Code but money
claim and contractual obligations with the Cooperative
Respondents alleged that RTC has not jurisdiction over the
case because he land subject of the controversy is an ancestral Issue:
land and that said controversy is among members of WON LA/NLRC had jurisdiction over the case (NO)
indigenous peoples' groups. As such, the case falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Hearing Officer of the National Ruling:
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP).
Not all controversies or money claims by an employee against
RTC – Dismissed the complaint/ MR denied the employer or vice versa fall within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the LA. With regard to money claims and damages, Article
Issue: 224 of the Labor Code bestows upon LA the original and
WON RTC has jurisdiction over the case (YES) exclusive jurisdiction over cases filed by works involving wages,
among others. In the case at bar, CA correctly ruled that
Ruling: although employment relations existed between the parties,
the subject of the complaint before the LA was petitioner’s
Court unequivocally declared that pursuant to Section 6613 of
money claims against respondent, such money claims did not
the IPRA, the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and
involve and did not arise out of employment relationship. In
disputes involving rights of ICC/IP only when they arise
sum, the determination of petitioner’s case is beyond the
between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP group.
competence of labor tribunals for the following reasons: 1)
When such claims and disputes arise between or among
petitioner’s claim has no reasonable causal connection with his
parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP group, the case
employment relationship with the respondent; 2) Cooperative
shall fall under the jurisdiction of the regular courts, instead of
is not a party to the labor complaint; and 3) the Interpleader
the NCIP. Thus, even if the real issue involves a dispute over a
complaint before RTC was the proper forum to settle the claim
land which appears to be located within the ancestral domain
over the disputed amount.
of the ICC/IP, it is not the NCIP, but the RTC, which has the
power to hear, try and decide the case. MICHAEL SEBASTIAN, Petitioner,

vs. ANNABEL LAGMAY NG, represented by her Attorney- of Court. Indisputably, Angelita chose to enforce the
in-fact, ANGELITA LAGMAY, Respondent kasunduan under the second mode and filed a motion for
execution. Angelita’s motion could therefore be treated as an
original action, and not merely as a motion/special proceeding.
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 For this reason, Annabel has filed the proper remedy
prescribed under Section 417 of the Local Government Code.
FACTS:
2. Under Section 416 of the Local Government Code, the
Respondent, acting as representative and attorney-in-fact of amicable settlement and arbitration award shall have the force
her daµghter Annabel Lagmay Ng (Annabel), filed a complaint and effect of a final judgment of a court upon the expiration of
before the Barangay Justice of Siclong, Laur, Nueva Ecija. She ten (10) days from the date of its execution, unless the
sought to collect from Michael the sum of ₱350,000.00 that settlement or award has been repudiated or a petition to
Annabel sent to Michael. She claimed that Annabel and nullify the award has been filed before the proper city or
Michael were once sweethearts, and that they agreed to municipal court.
jointly invest their financial resources to buy a truck. She
alleged that while Annabel was working in Hongkong, Annabel GONZALES VS. GJH LAND, INC. G.R. NO. 202664
sent Michael the amount of ₱350,000.00 to purchase the
truck. However, after Annabel and Michael’s relationship has
ended, Michael allegedly refused to return the money to Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
Annabel, prompting the latter to bring the matter before the
Barangay Justice. Facts:
Parties entered into an amicable settlement evidenced by a Petitioners filed a complaint of Injunction with prayer for
document denominated as Kasunduan. Respondent alleged Issuance of Status Quo Order and 20-day Temporary
Restraining Order against respondent to enjoin the sale of S.J.
that the same was no repudiated within a period of 10days
Land, Inc.'s shares which they purportedly bought from S.J.
pursuant to Katarungang Pambaranggay under LGC. Punong
Global, Inc. on February 1, 2010. Essentially, petitioners
Baranggay issued a Certification to File Action.
alleged that the subscriptions for the said shares were already
One and ½ year from the execution of the Kasunduan, paid by them in full in the books of S.J. Land, Inc.,7 but were
respondent filed a case against petitioner before MCTC Nueva nonetheless offered for sale on July 29, 2011 to the
Ecija. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the Motion. corporation's stockholders,8 hence, their plea for injunction.
MCTC – ruled in favor of respondent. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction
RTC – Petitioner questioned the discretion of MCTC for not RTC – Granted the Motion filed by the respondents. It should
conducting trial to determin the genuineness of the Kasuduan have filed before specialized commercial courts
/ Upheld the ruling of MCTC
MR Ground - As the raffle was beyond their control, they
MR grounds – MCTC had no jurisdiction since the amount is should not be made to suffer the consequences of the wrong
PhP250,000.00 assignment of the case, especially after paying the filing fees in
the amount of P235,825.00 that would be for naught if the
RTC Ruling – MR granted – Dismissed respondent’s motion dismissal is upheld. Denied
CA – initially dismissed/ upon MR granted the petition for Issue:
failure of petitioner to repudiate the Kasunduan in question
WON the denial was proper (NO)
Issue:
Ruling:
1. WON MCTC has jurisdiction over the case (YES)
As a basic premise, let it be emphasized that a court's
2. WON the Kasunduan could be given the force of a acquisition of jurisdiction over a particular case's subject
final judgment (YES) matter is different from incidents pertaining to the exercise of
Ruling: its jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
conferred by law, whereas a court's exercise of jurisdiction,
1. A simple reading of Section 417 of the Local unless provided by the law itself, is governed by the Rules of
Government Code readily discloses the two-tiered mode of Court or by the orders issued from time to time by the Court.In
enforcement of an amicable settlement. The second mode of Lozada v. Bracewell, it was recently held that the matter of
enforcement, on the other hand, is judicial in nature and could whether the RTC resolves an issue in the exercise of its general
only be resortedto through the institution of an action in a jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court is only
regular form before the proper City/Municipal Trial Court. The a matter of procedure and has nothing to do with the question
proceedings shall be governed by the provisions of the Rules of jurisdiction. Pertinent to this case is RA 8799 which took
effect on August 8, 2000. By virtue of said law, jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the
cases enumerated in Section 528 of Presidential Decree No. complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the
902-A29 was transferred from the Securities and Exchange plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
Commission (SEC) to the RTCs, being courts of general asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the
jurisdiction. The objective behind the designation of such character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.
specialized courts is to promote expediency and efficiency in Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction
the exercise of the RTCs' jurisdiction over the cases also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff
enumerated under Section 5 of PD 902-A. Such designation has is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted
nothing to do with the statutory conferment of jurisdiction to therein. However, jurisdiction of the SEC over intra-corporate
all RTCs under RA 8799 since in the first place, the Court cannot cases was transferred to Courts of general jurisdiction or the
enlarge, diminish, or dictate when jurisdiction shall be appropriate Regional Trial Court. The Court stressed that
removed, given that the power to define, prescribe, and Special Commercial Courts are still considered courts of
apportion jurisdiction is, as a general rule, a matter of general jurisdiction which have the power to hear and decide
legislative prerogative. cases of all nature, whether civil, criminal or special
proceedings.
CONCORDE CONDOMINIUM, INC. VS. BACULIO, G.R. No.
202664 A.L. ANG NETWORK, INC. V. MONDEJAR
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 Facts:
Facts: Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money under the Rule
of Procedure for Small Claims Casesbefore the MTCC, seeking
Petitioner Concorde Condominium, Inc., by itself and
to collect from respondent the amount of ₱23,111.71 which
comprising the Unit Owners of Concorde Condominium represented her unpaid water bills.
Building, {petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati City a Petition for Injunction [with Damages with Respondent denied the allegations and contends that
prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order notwithstanding their agreement that the same would be
(TRO), Writ of Preliminary (Prohibitory) Injunction, and Writ of adjusted only upon prior notice to the homeowners, petitioner
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction] against respondents. unilaterally charged her unreasonable and excessive
Petitioner seeks (1) to enjoin respondents Baculio and New PPI adjustments (at the average of 40 cu. m. of water per month
Corporation from misrepresenting to the public, as well as to or 1.3 cu. m. of water a day) far above the average daily water
private and government offices/agencies, that they are the consumption for a household of only 3 persons. She also
owners of the disputed lots and Concorde Condominium questioned the propriety and/or basis of the aforesaid
Building, and from pushing for the demolition of the building ₱23,111.71 claim.
which they do not even own; (2) to prevent respondent Asian
Security and Investigation Agency from deploying its security Petitioner disconnected the respondent’s water line for not
guards within the perimeter of the said building paying the adjusted balance for almost 2 years.
MTCC – Denied, since petitioner was issued a Certification of
Respondents Baculio and New PPI Corporation filed an Urgent
Public Convenience, it cannot charge the respondent the
Motion to Re-Raffle dated April 25, 2012, claiming that it is a
disputed amount.
regular court, not a Special Commercial Court, which has
jurisdiction over the case. RTC – dismissed finding that the said petition was only filed to
circumvent the non-appealable nature of small claims cases as
RTC - ordered an ocular inspection of the condominium amidst
provided under Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure on Small
the trial/ Denied the motion/ After another motion has been
Claims Cases.
filed, dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction
Issue:
Issue:
WON small claims cannot be appealed by way of Certiorari
WON RTC has jurisdiction over the case (YES)
(NO)
Ruling:
Ruling:
In explaining the jurisdiction of RTC, the Court is guided by the
Considering the final nature of a small claims case decision
rule "that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
under the above-stated rule, the remedy of appeal is not
conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the
allowed, and the prevailing party may, thus, immediately move
complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate
for its execution. Nevertheless, the proscription on appeals in
facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. The nature of
small claims cases, similar to other proceedings where appeal
an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over
is not an available remedy, does not preclude the aggrieved VIVENCIO B. VILLAGRACIA, Petitioner,
party from filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
vs. FIFTH (5th) SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT and ROLDAN E.
Rules of Court. Verily, a petition for certiorari, unlike an appeal,
MALA, represented by his father Hadji Kalam T. Mala,
is an original action designed to correct only errors of
Respondents.
jurisdiction and not of judgment. Owing to its nature, it is
therefore incumbent upon petitioner to establish that
jurisdictional errors tainted the MTCC Decision. The RTC, in
turn, could either grant or dismiss the petition based on an Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
evaluation of whether or not the MTCC gravely abused its Facts:
discretion by capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily
disregarding evidence that is material to the controversy. Roldan E. Mala purchased a 300-square-meter parcel of land
located in Poblacion, Parang, Maguindanao, now Shariff
ERNESTO Z. ORBE, Complainant, Kabunsuan, from one Ceres Cañete. At the time of the
vs. JUDGE MANOLITO Y. GUMARANG, Respondent purchase, Vivencio B. Villagracia occupied the parcel of land.
Petitioner secured a Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo over the
Administrative Complaint land. Roldan had the parcel of land surveyed, and learned the
petitioner was occupying the land.
Facts:
He initiated a barangay conciliation proceeding to no avail.
Orbe is the plaintiff of a small claims filed before the MTC of
Hence, he filed an action to recover the possession of the
Imus, Cavite, presided by Judge Emily A. Geluz. During the
parcel of land with respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court. He
hearing, the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. On
the same day, the case was assigned to respondent Judge alleged that he is a Filipino Muslim and the registered owner
Manolito Y. Gumarang, Assisting Judge of the MTC of Imus, of the land.
Cavite, for the continuation of the trial. Petitioner - In his petition for relief from judgment, Vivencio
cited Article 155, paragraph (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal
Complainant alleged that the case was reset by respondent
Laws of the Philippines and argued that Shari’a District Courts
numerous times for various reasons. Complainant argued that
may only hear civil actions and proceedings if both parties are
Judge Gumarang violated the Rule of Procedure for Small
Muslims
Claims Cases for failure to decide the civil case within five (5)
days from receipt of the order of reassignment. Shari’a Court – ruled in favor Roldan/ Ruled that petitioner
already waived his right to defend himself.
Respondent – argued that the 5 days must be construed as 5
calendar or trial days Issue:
OCA – found respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law WON the Shari’a court has jurisdiction when one of the parties
is not a Muslim (NO)
Issue:
Ruling:
WON the findings of OCA was correct (YES)
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is "the power to hear and
Ruling:
determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings
The intent of the law in providing the period to hear and decide in question belong." This power is conferred by law, which
cases falling under the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims may either be the Constitution or a statute. Since subject
Cases, which is within five (5) days from the receipt of the matter jurisdiction is a matter of law, parties cannot choose,
order of assignment, is very clear. The exigency of prompt consent to, or agree as to what court or tribunal should decide
rendition of judgment in small claims cases is a matter of public their disputes. If a court hears, tries, and decides an action in
policy. There is no room for further interpretation; it does not which it has no jurisdiction, all its proceedings, including the
require respondent’s exercise of discretion. He is duty-bound judgment rendered, are void.
to adhere to the rules and decide small claims cases without
When it became apparent that Vivencio is not a Muslim,
undue delay. Time and again, we have ruled that when the
respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court should have motu
rules of procedure are clear and unambiguous, leaving no
proprio dismissed the case. Under Rule 9, Section 1 of the
room for interpretation, all that is needed to do is to simply
Rules of Court, if it appears that the court has no jurisdiction
apply it. Failure to apply elementary rules of procedure
over the subject matter of the action based on the pleadings
constitutes gross ignorance of the law and procedure. In the
or the evidence on record, the court shall dismiss the claim.
instant case, neither good faith nor lack of malice will
However, as discussed, this concurrent jurisdiction arises only
exonerate respondent, as the rules violated were basic
if the parties involved are Muslims. Considering that Vivencio
procedural rules.
is not a Muslim, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no
SHARI’A COURTS jurisdiction over Roldan’s action for recovery of possession of
real property. The proceedings before it are void, regardless of DETERMINED BY THE LAW IN FORCE AT THE TIME OF
the fact that it applied the provisions of the Civil Code of the COMMENCEMENT
Philippines in resolving the action.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs. The HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, 12 DIVISION,
JURISDICTION CONFERRED BY LAW NOT BY AGREEMENT OF RICO LIPAO, and RICKSON LIPAO, respondents.
THE PARTIES
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. BANTIGUE
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
POINT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent
Facts:
Respondents were indicted for and pleaded not guilty to
violation of Sec. 68 of PD 705 or illegally possessed without
Bantigue Point Development Corporation filed with the license eight (8) pieces of round timbers and 160 bundles of
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Rosario, Batangas an application firewood. This is punishable by Prision Correccional in its
for original registration of title over a parcel of land. Petitioner medium period is imprisonment from 2 years, 4 months and 1
Republic opposed the registration. day to 4 years and 2 months while prisiόn correccional in its
maximum period is imprisonment from 4 years, 2 months and
RTC Clerk of Court transmitted motu proprio the records of the 1 day to 6 years.
case to the MTC of San Juan, because the assessed value of the
property was allegedly less than ₱100,000. Before RTC rendered its judgment, RA 7691 took effect which
expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of MTC in criminal
MTC entered an Order of General Default. After presentation cases covering all offenses punishable of imprisonment not
of evidence, the Court ruled in favor of respondent. exceeding 6 years irrespective of the amount of fine and
CA - estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the lower regardless of other accessory penalties.
court on appeal because of its active participation during the RTC – found respondents guilty
trial
Ground for appeal – subjected to an illegal seizure hence
Issue: evidence cannot be used against him
WON the petitioner is already estopped (NO) CA – Dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction
Ruling: Issue: WON the case was properly dismissed for RTC’s lack of
Republic is not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of jurisdiction (NO)
the lower court, even if the former raised the jurisdictional
Ruling:
question only on appeal. The rule is settled that lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage The passage of RA 7691 did not ipso facto relieve the RTC of
of the proceedings. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the jurisdiction to hear and decide the criminal case against
conferred only by the Constitution or the law. t cannot be private respondents. It has been consistently held as a general
acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the rule that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal action is to
parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court. be determined by the law in force at the time of the institution
Consequently, questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable of the action. Where a court has already obtained and is
even if raised for the first time on appeal. Notwithstanding, exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to
MTC has delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and land proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected
registration cases in two instances: first, where there is no by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in
controversy or opposition; or, second, over contested lots, the another tribunal. The exception to the rule is where the statute
value of which does not exceed ₱100,000. Contrary to expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is
petitioner’s contention, the value of the land should not be intended to operate as to actions pending before its
determined with reference to its selling price. Rather, Section enactment. Where a statute changing the jurisdiction of a
34 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act provides that the value court has no retroactive effect, it cannot be applied to a case
of the property sought to be registered may be ascertained in that was pending prior to the enactment of a statute.
three ways: first, by the affidavit of the claimant; second, by
agreement of the respective claimants, if there are more than A perusal of R.A. 7691 will show that its retroactive provisions
apply only to civil cases that have not yet reached the pre-trial
one; or, third, from the corresponding tax declaration of the
stage. Neither from an express proviso nor by implication can
real property
it be understood as having retroactive application to criminal

cases pending or decided by the Regional Trial Courts prior to R.A. No. 6657, which created, among others, the SACs. Section
its effectivity 57 of R.A. No. 6657 expressly provides that the SACs shall
exercise original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for
SPOUSES JOSE M. ESTACION, JR. and ANGELINA T. the determination of just compensation to landowners, and
ESTACION, Petitioners, v. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY the prosecution of all criminal offenses under said Act. More
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM importantly, Section 57 further provides that “[t]he Rules of
Court shall apply to all proceedings before the [SACs], unless
modified by this Act.”
Petition for Review
The Rules of Court, herefore, was the rule of procedure
Facts: applicable to the cases filed before it. Under Rule 16 of the
Petitioners filed a petition for just compensation with the Rules of Court, and even under the present 1997 Rules of Civil
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, acting Procedure, as amended, a motion to dismiss is not a prohibited
as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC). In their petition, they alleged pleading. Consequently, the SAC had every right to admit and
that they are the owners of two parcels of adjacent land in resolve the motions to dismiss filed by respondents LBP and
Guihulngan, Negros Oriental. According to the petitioners, PNB.
sometime in February 1974, they were informed that their The determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial
properties were placed under the coverage of the Operation function, which is vested in the RTC acting as SAC. It cannot be
Land Transfer program of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27.2 lodged with administrative agencies such as the DAR. The
They contested the coverage, claiming that it was untenanted Court has already settled the rule that the SAC is not an
and primarily devoted to crops other than rice and corn. appellate reviewer of the DAR decision in administrative cases
Despite their protest, their properties were forcibly covered involving compensation.
for agrarian purposes, and that the tenants to whom the
properties were awarded were enjoying the benefits thereof, Furthermore, the SAC’s jurisdiction, while original and
without the petitioners having been duly compensated for the exclusive, is limited. Although the SAC has powers inherent in
value of said properties. to the RTC under RA 6657, it should not be construed to refer
to the power to exercise general jurisdiction which is vested in
Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss contending that (1) the the RTC.
RTC has no jurisdiction over the case; (2) the petitioners have
no legal personality to sue the public respondents; (3) the DETERMINED BY ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT OR
petitioners have no cause of action against the public OTHER INITIATORY PLEADING
respondents; and (4) the case is barred by the statute of JOSE MENDOZA,* Petitioner, vs. NARCISO GERMINO and
limitations, among others. The petitioners filed a Comment on BENIGNO GERMINO, Respondents
the Motion to Dismiss.
Petitioners subsequently included PNB when it extrajudicially
foreclosed the land. Petitioners alleged that its foreclosure of Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
the mortgaged properties was done in violation of P.D. No. 27
FACTS:
and subsequently, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, which
prohibits the foreclosure of properties covered by the agrarian Petitioner filed a complaint with MTC against respondent for
laws. forcible entry on the ground that he is the registered owner of
the parcel in land in question. He alleged that sometime in
PNB filed a Motion to Dismiss for prescription of the action.
1988, respondent unlawfully entered the subject property by
SAC – Case dismissed for lack or jurisdiction means of strategy and stealth, without his knowledge and
despite his repeated demands, refused to vacate the property.
CA – Affirmed
Respondents allege that Benigno is petitioner’s agricultural
Issue: lessee and Narciso merely helped to cultivate the land.
WON SAC has jurisdiction over the case. (NO) MTC – without hearing issued an order remanding the case to
Ruling: DARAB
It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter is PARAD – respondents were mere usurpers of the subject
determined by the law in force at the time of the property, noting that they failed to prove that respondent
commencement of the action. At the time the petitioners filed Benigno was the plaintiffs’ bona fide agricultural lessee.
their case for just compensation in 1995, P.D. No. 946, which DARAB – affirmed because it has jurisdiction because the case
reorganized the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) and is an agrarian dispute
streamlined its procedure, has already been superseded by
CA – ruled that MTC erred in transferring the case to the Issue: WON CA erred in ruling that RTC has jurisdiction (NO)
DARAB because the case is forcible entry/ Remanded case to
Ruling: The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind"
MTC
in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8)
Issue: and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No.
7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely
WON MTC has jurisdiction over the case (YES) incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action.
Ruling: However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main
cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of
It is a basic rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction
determined by the allegations in the complaint. It is of the court. he complaint principally sought an award of moral
determined exclusively by the Constitution and the law. It and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees and
cannot be conferred by the voluntary act or agreement of the litigation expenses, for the alleged shame and injury suffered
parties, or acquired through or waived, enlarged or diminished by respondent by reason of petitioners’ utterance while they
by their act or omission, nor conferred by the acquiescence of were at a police station in Pangasinan. It is settled that
the court. Well to emphasize, it is neither for the court nor the jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in
parties to violate or disregard the rule, this matter being the complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement
legislative in character. Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s causes of
amended by R.A. No. 7691, the MTC shall have exclusive action. It is clear, based on the allegations of the complaint,
original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful that respondent’s main action is for damages. Hence, the other
detainer. forms of damages being claimed by respondent, e.g.,
IRENE SANTE AND REYNALDO SANTE, Petitioners, vs. exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses,
HON. EDILBERTO T. CLARAVALL, in his capacity as Presiding are not merely incidental to or consequences of the main
Judge of Branch 60, Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, and action but constitute the primary relief prayed for in the
VITA N. KALASHIAN, Respondents complaint.
INDOPHIL TEXTILE MILLS, INC., Petitioner, vs. ENGR.
SALVADOR ADVIENTO, Respondents
Petitioner for Certiorari under Rule 65
FACTS:
Respondent filed a complaint before RTC against petitioners
for damages. She alleged that while in the Police Station of Petitioner hired respondent as a Civil Engineer to maintain its
Pangasinan, in the presence of other persons and police facilities in Lambakin, Marilao, Bulacan. Respondent consulted
officers, petitioner uttered towards her "How many rounds of a physician due to recurring weakness and dizziness. He was
sex did you have last night with your boss, Bert? You fuckin’ later on diagnosed with Chronic Poly Sinustis and persistent
bitch!" Bert refers to Albert Gacusan, respondent’s friend and Allergic Rhinitis. He was advised by his doctor to totally avoid
one (1) of her hired personal security guards detained at the house dust mite and textile dust as it will transmute health
said station and who is a suspect in the killing of petitioners’ problems.
close relative. Respondent filed a case for illegal dismissal against petitioner.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. He likewise filed a complaint before RTC alleging that he
The amount claimed was not more than ₱300,000.00, because contracted occupational disease by reason of the gross
the claim for exemplary damages should be excluded in negligence of petitioner to provide him with a safe, healthy,
computing the total claim. and workable environment.
Respondent filed an amened complaint raising the claim for Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that RTC has
damages to ₱1,000,000.00. Petitioner again filed an MD no jurisdiction over the case and the same case is pending
before NLRC
RTC – motion denied/ motion denied
RTC – sustained its jurisdiction/ MR Dismissed
CA – MTC has jurisdiction over the case, The Court of Appeals
added that the totality of claim rule used for determining CA - Petition dismissed for lack of merit
which court had jurisdiction could not be applied to the instant Issue: WON CA erred in dismissing the petition
case because plaintiff’s claim for exemplary damages was not
a separate and distinct cause of action from her claim of moral Ruling: The delineation between the jurisdiction of regular
damages, but merely incidental to it. / Issued another decision courts and labor courts over cases involving workers and their
ruling that RTC has jurisdiction employers has always been a matter of dispute. While we have
upheld the present trend to refer worker-employer
controversies to labor courts in light of the aforequoted of action. n this case, for the RTC to exercise jurisdiction, the
provision, we have also recognized that not all claims involving assessed value of the subject property must exceed
employees can be resolved solely by our labor courts, ₱20,000.00. Since petitioners failed to allege in their Complaint
specifically when the law provides otherwise. For this reason, the assessed value of the subject property, the CA correctly
we have formulated the "reasonable causal connection rule," dismissed the Complaint as petitioners failed to establish that
wherein if there is a reasonable causal connection between the the RTC had jurisdiction over it. In fact, since the assessed value
claim asserted and the employer-employee relations, then the of the property was not alleged, it cannot be determined which
case is within the jurisdiction of the labor courts; and in the trial court had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
absence thereof, it is the regular courts that have jurisdiction.
ESPERANZA TUMPAG, substituted by her son, PABLITO
Such distinction is apt since it cannot be presumed that money
TUMPAG BELNAS, JR., Petitioner, vs. SAMUEL TUMPAG,
claims of workers which do not arise out of or in connection
Respondent.
with their employer-employee relationship, and which would
therefore fall within the general jurisdiction of the regular Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
courts of justice, were intended by the legislative authority to
be taken away from the jurisdiction of the courts and lodged Petitioner filed a complaint for the recovery of possession with
with Labor Arbiters on an exclusive basis. damages against respondent before RTC. Petitioner alleged
that she is the absolute owner of a parcel of land. Respondent
HEIRS OF TELESFORO JULAO, namely, ANITA VDA. DE has been occupying a portion despite the repeated demands
ENRIQUEZ, SONIA J. TOLENTINO and RODERICK JULAO, of petitioner to vacate.
Petitioners, vs. SPOUSES ALEJANDRO and MORENITA DE
JESUS, Respondents. Respondent filed Motion to dismiss on the ground that
petitioner failed to state cause of action and rtc has no
jurisdiction
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 RTC – Motion denied / Ruled in favor of the petitioner
Telesforo filed before the DENR Baguio applications to transfer CA – Reversed. It held that the petitioner’s failure to allege in
his Townsite Sales Application (TSA) upon his death to his heirs. her complaint the assessed value of the disputed property
Solito executed a Deed of Transfer of Rights transferring his warranted the complaint’s dismissal, although without
hereditary share in the property to respondent spouses. prejudice, because the court’s jurisdiction over the case should
Respondent then constructed a house on the property they be "determined by the material allegations of the complaint"
acquired from Solito.
Issue: WON RTC has jurisdiction over the case
DENR issued an order granting the transfer of rights. A TCT was
issued in favor of petitioners. Petitioners filed a complaint Ruling: It is well-settled that jurisdiction over a subject matter
before RTC for the recovery of possession of real property is conferred by law, not by the parties’ action or conduct, and
against respondent spouses. Petitioners alleged that they are is, likewise, determined from the allegations in the complaint.
the true and lawful owners of the parcel of land. Petitioners Record shows that the complaint was filed with the Regional
alleged that they already sent a demand letter to the Trial Court on December 13, 1995. There is no allegation
respondents to return the 70 sqm that they encroached. whatsoever in the complaint for accion publiciana concerning
the assessed value of the property involved. Lack of jurisdiction
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of over the subject matter of the case can always be raised
prescription. anytime, even for the first time on appeal, since jurisdictional
issues, as a rule, cannot be acquired through a waiver or
RTC – denied for lack of merit/ After petitioners rested their
enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by the
case, respondent spouses filed a Motion for Leave of Court to
acquiescence of the court.
File a Demurrer to Evidence – Motion denied.
SPOUSES ROMEO PAJARES and IDA T. PAJARES, Petitioners
RTC – ruled in favor of the petitioners
vs. REMARKABLE LAUNDRY AND DRY CLEANING,
CA – Reversed RTC ruling. CA found the complaint dismissible represented by ARCHEMEDES G. SOLIS, Respondent
on the ground that petitioners failed to identify the property
sought to recover and for lack of jurisdiction.
Issue: WON CA correctly dismissed petitioner’s complaint
Respondent filed a complaint for breach of contract and
Ruling: The assessed value must be alleged in the complaint to
damages against petitioners before RTC. Respondent alleged
determine which court has jurisdiction over the action.
that it entered into a Remarkable Dealer Outlet Contract with
Jurisdiction as we have said is conferred by law and is
petitioners whereby the latter, acting as a dealer outlet, shall
determined by the allegations in the complaint, which contains
accept and receive items or materials for laundry which are
the concise statement of the ultimate facts of a plaintiffs cause
then picked up and processed by the former in its main plant respondents confronted Ciriaco, Ciriaco agreed to pay Peter
or laundry outlet. However, petitioners failed to produce the the difference between the amount paid by the Spouses Po as
said laundry items each week thus the operations ceased on consideration for the entire property and the value of the land
account of lack of personnel. Respondent made written the Spouses Po were left with after the quitclaim.
demands upon petitioners for the payment of penalties
However, in 1990, the same lots were sold to petitioners. The
imposed and provided for in the contract, but the latter failed
heirs, including Ciriaco executed a separate deeds of absolute
to pay; and, that petitioners' violation constitutes breach of
sale in favor of petitioners. Petitioners immediately developed
contract.
a lot as part of a subdivision. He filed a petition to have the
Petitioners raised the issue of jurisdiction. lands registered under his name. A TCT was subsequently
granted in favor of him.
RTC – Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction/ MR denied
Sps. Po filed a complaint to recover the land and nullify the
CA – remanded the case to RTC title.
Issue: WON RTC has jurisdiction over the case RTC – ruled in favor of the respondents
Ruling: The RTC was correct in categorizing Civil Case No. CEB- CA – Partially affirmed/ discussed the inapplicability of the
39025 as an action for damages seeking to recover an amount
rules on double sale and the doctrine of buyer in good faith
below its jurisdictional limit. Specific performance is ''[t]he since the land was not yet registered when it was sold to the
remedy of requiring exact performance of a contract in the Spouses Po.
specific form in which it was made, or according to the precise
terms agreed upon. [It is t]he actual accomplishment of a Petitioners argue that RTC has no power to nullify the final and
contract by a party bound to fulfill it."Rescission of contract executory decision of another RTC branch (YES)
under Article 1191 of the Civil Code, on the other hand, is a
Issue: WON RTC may nullify a decision of another RTC branch
remedy available to the obligee when the obligor cannot
comply with what is incumbent upon him.26 It is predicated on Ruling: The complaint of the Spouses Po is clearly an action for
a breach of faith by the other party who violates the reciprocity reconveyance and annulment of title. Thus, the Regional Trial
between them. Court has jurisdiction to hear the case. The Spouses Aboitiz
claim that it is the Court of Appeals that has jurisdiction over
There is no such thing as an "action for breach of contract."
the annulment of Regional Trial Court judgments.
Rather, "[b]reach of contract is a cause of action, but not the
action or relief itself". Breach of contract may be the cause of As stated, a complaint for reconveyance is a remedy where the
action in a complaint for specific performance or rescission of plaintiff argues for an order for the defendant to transfer its
contract, both of which are incapable of pecuniary estimation title issued in a proceeding not otherwise invalid. The relief
and, therefore, cognizable by the RTC. However, as will be prayed for may be granted on the basis of intrinsic rather than
discussed below, breach of contract may also be the cause of extrinsic fraud; that is, fraud committed on the real owner
action in a complaint for damages. A complaint primarily rather than fraud committed on the procedure amounting to
seeking to lack of jurisdiction.
enforce the accessory obligation contained in the penal clause An action for annulment of title, on the other hand, questions
is actually an action for damages capable of pecuniary the validity of the grant of title on grounds which amount to
estimation. lack of due process of law. The remedy is premised in the
nullity of the procedure and thus the invalidity of the title that
SPS. ROBERTO ABOITIZ AND MARIA CRISTINA CABARRUS,
is issued. Title that is invalidated as a result of a successful
Petitioners
action for annulment against the decision of a Regional Trial
vs. SPS. PETER L. PO AND VICTORIA L. PO, Respondents Court acting as a land registration court may still however be
granted on the merits in another proceeding not infected by
lack of jurisdiction or extrinsic fraud if its legal basis on the
merits is properly alleged and proven.
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 Considering the Spouses Aboitiz's fraudulent registration
without the Spouses Po's knowledge and the latter's assertion
The parcels of land in question originally belonged to the late of their ownership of the land, their right to recover the
Mariano Seno. He executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of property and to cancel the Spouses Aboitiz' s88 title, the action
his son Ciriaco covering a portion of the 2 parcels of land. is for reconveyance and annulment of title and not for
Ciriaco sold the lots to respondents. Mariano died and was annulment of judgment.
survived by his 5 children. The other siblings found out that
Ciriaco executed a quitclaim renouncing his interest over the Thus, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear this case.
land; he stated that he was declared owner of the lots. When
The Heirs of the Late Spouses ALEJANDRO RAMIRO and any of the other reliefs respondents prayed for in their
FELICISIMA LLAMADA, namely; HENRY L. RAMIRO; complaint can be granted, the issue of who between them and
MERLYN R. TAGUBA; MARLON L. RAMIRO; MARIDEL R. petitioners has the valid title to the lot must first be
SANTELLA, WILMA L. RAMIRO; VILMA R. CIELO and determined.
CAROLYN R. CORDERO, Petitioners
JOAQUIN BERBANO, TRINIDAD BERBANO, and MELCHOR
vs. Spouses ELEODORO and VERNA BA CARON, BERBANO, Petitioners vs.
Respondents
HEIRS OF ROMAN TAPULAO, namely: ALBERT D.
TAPULAO,* DANILO D. TAPULAO,** MARIETA TAPULAO-
REYES, LINDA TAPULAORAMIREZ, and JOSEFINA TAPULAO-
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 DACANAY, represented by Attorney-infact JOSEFINA
Respondents filed a complaint against petitioners before RTC TAPULAO-DACANAY, Respondents
alleging that the parcel of land in question was sold to them.
Spouses Bacaron took possession of the land but they found
out that the land was earlier mortgaged by sposes Ramiro to Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
the DBP. Respondents paid the sum for the redemption of the
Respondents filed a complaint for recovery of possession and
property and, petitioners forcibly dispossessed spouses
Bacaron of the property. damages against petitioners. Respondents avers that their
father Roman Tapulao was the registered owner. They paid the
Petitioners denied the allegations them. They averred that RTC realty taxes thereon. After the death of Roman, respondents
has no jurisdiction over the case considering that it involves caused the relocation survey of the lot. It revealed that
recovery of the property and , that the instrument was actually petitioners occupied portions of the lot. Despite several
an equitable mortgage and not Deed of Sale, and that the demands, however, petitioners refused to vacate and return
respondents are barred by laches. Petitioners insist that the lot to respondents.
respondent failed to alleged the value of the property
Petitioners argued that they Felipe Sena was the original
RTC – ruled in favor of the respondents owner of the land. He ceded his possession over half hectare
of the the lot in favor of Berbano. From that time on, Joaquin
CA – Petition denied had been in open and exclusive possession of the lot.
Issue: WON RTC has jurisdiction of the case (NO) Subsequently, Felipe Peña sold the adjacent lot to Roman
Ruling: Settled is the rule that the nature of the action and Tapulao. When Roman Tapulao caused its registration, the
which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the survey mistakenly included therein the adjacent lot belonging
same is determined by the material allegations of the to Joaquin. As a result, OCT No. P-9331 (in the name of Roman
complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff and the Tapulao) also covered Joaquin's lot. Roman and Catalina
law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether Tapulao acknowledged this error through their Affidavit dated
the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims asserted April 2, 1976. They promised to respect Joaquin's ownership of
therein. that specific portion
It is clear from the foregoing that while respondents claim that RTC – ruled in favor of the respondents/ MR raised issue of
their amended complaint before the RTC is denominated as jurisdiction since the value was less than PhP20K, the case fell
one for the declaration of validity of the Deed of Sale and for within the jurisdiction of the first level courts, which was
specific performance, the averments in their amended denied
complaint and the character of the reliefs sought therein
CA – Affirmed
reveal that the action primarily involves title to or possession
of real property. An action "involving title to real property" Issue: WON RTC has jurisdiction over the case (YES)
means that the plaintiffs cause of action is based on a claim
Ruling: Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a
that he owns such property or that he has the legal rights to
court to hear, try, and decide a case. In order for the court or
have exclusive control, possession, enjoyment, or disposition
an adjudicative body to have authority to dispose of the case
of the same. Title is the "legal link between (1) a person who
on the merits, it must acquire, among others, jurisdiction over
owns property and (2) the property itself.
the subject matter. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the
The ultimate relief sought by respondents is for the recovery power to hear and determine the general class to which the
of the property through the enforcement of its sale in their proceedings in question belong; it is conferred by law and not
favor by the late spouses Ramiro. Their other causes of action by the consent or acquiescence of any or all of the parties or
for the cancellation of the original title and the issuance of a by erroneous belief of the court that it exists. Indeed, the
new one in their name, as well as' for injunction and damages, Complaint clearly alleged that the assessed value of the lot
are merely incidental to the recovery of the property. Before subject of the case is P22,070.00. In accordance with BP 129,
as amended by RA 7691, since the value of the subject matter that petitioner made any demand hence she cannot be held in
exceeds P20,000.00, the same falls within the jurisdiction of default.
the RTCs. Hence, the RTC-Branch 1, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan
RTC – denied motion and ordered her in default/ MR was
had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
denied/ Ruled ultimately in favor of PDB
HEIRS OF ROMULO BALUCANAG, JR. ET AL v DOLE
CA – Nullified the RTC decision due to invalid and ineffective
PHILIPPINES
substituted service of summons.
Issue: WON RTC properly acquired jurisdiction over the
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 respondent (YES)
A complaint for ejectment was filed by respondent DOLE Ruling: The fundamental rule is that jurisdiction over a
against petitioners before MTC Cotobato. DOLE averred that it defendant in a civil case is acquired either through service of
has been in continuous possession of the land in question summons or through voluntary appearance in court and
covered by TCT as lessee since 1996. It merely tolerated the submission to its authority. If a defendant has not been
petitioner’s possession thereof. However, when demands to properly summoned, the court acquires no jurisdiction over its
vacate went unheeded, respondent was constrained a person, and a judgment rendered against it is null and void.
complaint for ejectment.
Despite that there was no valid substituted service of
Petitioners countered that he has notoriously occupied the summons, the Court, nevertheless, finds that Chandumal
property since 1974 for commercial and residential purposes. voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court.
Given Chandumal’s voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of
MTC – ruled in favor of DOLE the trial court, the RTC, Las Piñas City, Branch 255, had all
Appeal ground – Jurisdiction of MTC questioned by petitioner authority to render its Decision dated May 31, 2004.
since DOLE did not make it out as a case for unlawful detainer Nonetheless, no valid recsission was made. In this case, it is an
RTC – Appeal denied admitted fact that PDB failed to give Chandumal the full
payment of the cash surrender value. In its complaint. The
CA – Appeal dismissed for lack of merit allegation that Chandumal made herself unavailable for
Issue: WON MTC has jurisdiction over the case payment is not an excuse as the twin requirements for a valid
and effective cancellation under the law, i.e., notice of
Ruling: The complaint filed by DOLE sufficiently alleged the cancellation or demand for rescission by a notarial act and the
cause for an unlawful detainer case. It states the: 1)possession full payment of the cash surrender value, is mandatory.35
of the petitioner was by its mere tolerance; 2) such possession Consequently, there was no valid rescission of the contract to
has been illegal since the notice made by the former; 3) the sell by notarial act undertaken by PDB and the RTC should not
petitioner remained in possession of the property; and 4) the have given judicial confirmation over the same.
case was filed within one year from the date of demand. All of
these allegations were admitted in fact by the petitioners. BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES, INC., Petitioner, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS AND LOLITA G. TOLEDO, Respondents.
JURISDICTION OVER THE PARTIES
PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, Petitioner, vs. JULIE
CHANDUMAL, Respondent. Petitioner filed a complaint for the sum of money on Dec. 24,
1997 with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 attachment against the spouses Manuel and Lolita Toledo.
Respondent filed an Answer dated March 19, 1998 but on May
PDB instituted an action for judicial confirmation of notarial
7, 1998 she filed a Motion for Leave to admit amended answer
rescission and delivery of possession against respondent for
citing among others that her husband has already passed. As a
failure to settle her obligations despite demand. For failure of
result, petitioner filed a motion, dated 5 August 1999, to
branch sheriff to serve the summons to respondent, her
require respondent to disclose the heirs of Manuel. The
mother acknowledged receipt thereof. She failed to file her
Motion for Substitution that Manuel be substituted by his
answer, hence, PDB filed an ex parte motion to declare her in
children was granted by the court.
default.
Instead of filing a demurrer to evidence, the respondents
In Feb 2001, Chnadumal filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside
instead filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the complaint
Order of Default and to Admit Attached Answer. She
failed to implead an indispensable party or real party in
maintained that she did not receive the summons and/or was
interest. Respondent also alleged that petitioner is barred by
not notified of the same. She further alleged that her failure to
laches.
file an answer within the reglementary period was due to
fraud, mistake or excusable negligence. She likewise denied RTC – Motion denied for being filed out of time/ MR denied
CA – Petition granted. When petitioner filed the complaint, company. However, a conflict arose when respondents
Manuel was already dead. Hence, the court a quo could not appointed Erlinda as the new administratrix of the properties
have acquired jurisdiction over the person of defendant and terminated Araceli’s and Arnel’s services.
Manuel S. Toledo.
Respondents moved for the dismissal of the case for lack of
On appeal: Respondent is already estopped from questioning jurisdiction, failure to state cause of action, and legal capacity
the jurisdiction of the court of petitioners to sue the heirs of Severino
Issue: WON RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of RTC – Granted the Motion. Case dismissed
Manuel Toledo (NO)
CA – Affirmed
Issue: WON RTC has jurisdiction over the case (NO)
Ruling: Since the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person
Ruling: In determining whether an action is one the subject
of a party to a case is not one of those defenses which are not
matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this
deemed waived under Section 1 of Rule 9, such defense must
Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature
be invoked when an answer or a motion to dismiss is filed in
of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for
order to prevent a waiver of the defense. If the objection is not
the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered
raised either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, the
objection to the jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff or capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in
the municipal courts or in the Courts of First Instance would
the defendant is deemed waived by virtue of the first sentence
of the above-quoted Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic
issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of
Jurisdiction over the person of a defendant is acquired through money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
a valid service of summons; trial court did not acquire consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has
jurisdiction over the person of Manuel Toledo In the first place, considered such actions as cases where the subject of the
jurisdiction over the person of Manuel was never acquired by litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
the trial court. A defendant is informed of a case against him cognizable exclusively by Courts of First Instance (now
when he receives summons. "Summons is a writ by which the Regional Trial Courts).
defendant is notified of the action brought against him. Service
It can be readily seen from the allegations in the Complaint
of such writ is the means by which the court acquires
that petitioners’ main purpose in filing the same is to collect
jurisdiction over his person." In the case at bar, the trial court
the commission allegedly promised them by respondents
did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel since
should they be able to sell Lot No. 1782-B. Indeed, the
there was no valid service of summons upon him, precisely
payment of such money claim is the principal relief sought and
because he was already dead even before the complaint
not merely incidental to, or a consequence of another action
against him and his wife was filed in the trial court.
where the subject of litigation may not be estimated in terms
ARACELI J. CABRERA and ARNEL CABRERA and in behalf of of money. Hence, when petitioners filed their Complaint on
the heirs of SEVERINO CABRERA, Petitioners, vs. ANGELA September 3, 2001, the said increased jurisdictional amount
G. FRANCISCO, FELIPE C. GELLA, VICTOR C. CELLA, ELENA was already effective. The demand in their Complaint must
LEILANI G. REYES, MA. RIZALINA G.ILIGAN and DIANA ROSE therefore exceed ₱200,000.00 in order for it to fall under the
GELLA, Respondents. jurisdiction of the RTC
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 ALLEN A. MACASAET, NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR., ISAIAS
ALBANO, LILY REYES, JANET BAY, JESUS R. GALANG, AND
Petitioners instituted a complaint for Cancellation of Agent’s
RANDY HAGOS, Petitioners, vs. FRANCISCO R. CO, JR.,
Compensation against the respondents. Respondent.
Respondent’s father, Atty Gella, executed a private document Petition for Review under Rule 65
confirming that he has appointed Severino Cabrera (Severino),
husband of Araceli and father of Arnel as administrator of all Respondent is a retired police officer assigned at Western
his real properties located in San Jose, Antique. When Severino Police District Manila who sued Abante Tonite, (including its
died, petitioners took over the administration of the publishers, petitioners).
properties. This was made with consent of the respondents.
RTC Sheriff Raul Medina proceeded to the stated address to
Respondents instructed them to look for potential buyers and
effect the personal service of the summons on the defendants.
they would have 5% of the total purchase price as
But his efforts to personally serve each defendant in the
compensation. Accordingly, petitioners introduced real estate
address were futile because the defendants were then out of
broker and President of ESV Marketing and Development
the office and unavailable. He returned in the afternoon of that
Corporation, Erlinda Veñegas (Erlinda), to the respondents
day to make a second attempt at serving the summons, but he
who agreed to have the said properties developed by Erlinda’s
was informed that petitioners were still out of the office. He Tangkal to pay the value of the land within 35 years, or until
decided to resort to substituted service of the summons, and 1997; otherwise, ownership of the land would revert to
explained why in his sheriff’s return. Macalabo. The agreement allegedly imposed a condition upon
the Municipality of Tangkal to pay the value of the land within
Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the case for lack of 35 years, or until 1997; otherwise, ownership of the land would
jurisdiction over the petitioners because of the invalid revert to Macalabo.
substituted service of summons.
The municipality failed to settle its obligations , hence, the
complaint.
RTC – MD denied/ MR denied
Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground
CA – Petition dismissed of improper venue and lack of jurisdiction. It argued that it has
no religious nor cultural affiliation with the Muslim, thus, the
Issue: WON RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of the case must be filed with the RTC.
petitioners (YES)
Shari’a – Motion denied/MR denied
Ruling: As the initiating party, the plaintiff in a civil action
voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court by Issue: WON Shari’a has jurisdiction over the case (NO)
the act of filing the initiatory pleading. As to the defendant, the Ruling: Although the Special Rules of Procedure in Shari' a
court acquires jurisdiction over his person either by the proper Courts prohibits the filing of a motion to dismiss, this
service of the summons, or by a voluntary appearance in the procedural rule may be relaxed when the ground relied on is
action.1
lack of jurisdiction which is patent on the face of the complaint.
Under the Rules of Court, the service of the summons should The reason why lack of jurisdiction as a ground for dismissal is
firstly be effected on the defendant himself whenever treated differently from others is because of the basic principle
practicable. Such personal service consists either in handing a that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the
copy of the summons to the defendant in person, or, if the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render
defendant refuses to receive and sign for it, in tendering it to judgment on the action to the extent that all proceedings
him. The rule on personal service is to be rigidly enforced in before a court without jurisdiction are void.
order to ensure the realization of the two fundamental It is clear from the title and the averments in the complaint
objectives earlier mentioned. If, for justifiable reasons, the that Mayor Batingolo was impleaded only in a representative
defendant cannot be served in person within a reasonable capacity, as chief executive of the local government of Tangkal.
time, the service of the summons may then be effected either When an action is defended by a representative, that
(a) by leaving a copy of the summons at his residence with representative is not-and neither does he become-a real party
some person of suitable age and discretion then residing in interest. The person represented is deemed the real party in
therein, or (b) by leaving the copy at his office or regular place
interest; the representative remains to be a third party to the
of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
action. That Mayor Batingolo is a Muslim is therefore irrelevant
In reality, petitioners’ insistence on personal service by the for purposes of complying with the jurisdictional requirement
serving officer was demonstrably superfluous. They had under Article 143(2)(b) that both parties be Muslims. To satisfy
actually received the summonses served through their the requirement, it is the real party defendant, the
substitutes, as borne out by their filing of several pleadings in Municipality of Tangkal, who must be a Muslim. Such a
the RTC, including an answer with compulsory counterclaim ad proposition, however, is a legal impossibility.
cautelam and a pre-trial brief ad cautelam. They had also Furthermore, as a government instrumentality, the
availed themselves of the modes of discovery available under
Municipality of Tangkal can only act for secular purposes and
the Rules of Court. Such acts evinced their voluntary in ways that have primarily secular effects consistent with the
appearance in the action. non-establishment clause. Hence, even if it is assumed that
THE MUNICIPALITY OF TANGKAL, PROVINCE OF LANAO juridical persons are capable of practicing religion, the
DEL NORTE, Petitioner,vs. HON. RASAD B. BALINDONG, in Municipality of Tangkal is constitutionally proscribed from
his capacity as Presiding Judge, Shari’a District Court, 4th adopting, much less exercising, any religion, including Islam.
Judicial District, Marawi City, and HEIRS OF THE LATE EXERCISE OF EQUITY IN JURISDICTION
MACALABO ALOMPO, represented by SULTAN DIMNANG
B. ALOMPO, Respondents. VIVA SHIPPING LINES, INC., Petitioner, vs. KEPPEL
PHILIPPINES MINING, INC., METROPOLITAN BANK &
The private respondents, heirs of the late Macalabo Alompo, TRUST COMPANY, PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM
filed a Complaint with the Shari'a District Court of Marawi City CORPORATION, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF LUCENA,
(Shari'a District Court) against the petitioner. The agreement PROVINCE OF QUEZON, ALEJANDRO OLIT, NIDA
allegedly imposed a condition upon the Municipality of

MONTILLA, PIO HERNANDEZ, EUGENIO BACULO, and be unfair to the creditors, it is contrary to the goals of
HARLAN BACALTOS,Respondents. corporate rehabilitation, and will invalidate the cardinal
principle of due process of law.
The failure of petitioner to implead its creditors as respondents
Petitioner filed a Petition for the Corporate Rehabilitation cannot be cured by serving copies of the Petition on its
before RTC. RTC initially denied the petition for failure to creditors. Since the creditors were not impleaded as
comply with the requirements of the Interim Rules of respondents, the copy of the Petition only serves to inform
Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation. On its Amended them that a petition has been filed before the appellate court.
Petition, it was found that the attached documents are
contrary to the allegations made by the petitioner. This was
SPOUSES PRUDENTE D. SOLLER AND PRECIOSA
granted by the RTC.
M. SOLLER, RAFFY TELOSA, AND GAVINO
Before the initial hearing, respondents/creditors filed their MANIBO, JR. PETITIONERS, V. HON. ROGELIO
respective comments and oppositions to Viva Shipping Lines’
SINGSON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF
Amended Petition.
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
RTC – Dismissed the petition for failure of the company to HIGHWAYS, RESPONDENT.
show viability and feasibility of rehabilitation, it appearing that
all its assets are non-performing.
CA – dismissed for failure to comply with the procedural Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
requirements under 43/ The Court of Appeals ruled that due Petitioners filed a complaint against the respondent for the
to the failure of Viva Shipping Lines to implead its creditors as issuance of Permanent Injunction and Damages with prayer for
respondents, "there are no respondents who may be required TRO against respondents. They alleged that the respondents
to file a comment on the petition, pursuant to Section 8 of Rule initiated an elevation of the national highway to around one
43. meter thereby blocking and retaining floodwaters naturally
Issue: WON the court correctly dismissed the petition for coming from the nearby Bansud River and farm lands from the
procedural lapses of the petitioner (YES) direction of the mountains of Conrazon; and submerging
houses and lands on the left side of the road including their
Ruling: Rule 43, Section 7, which states that non-compliance properties.
with any of the requirements of proof of service of the Petition,
and the required contents, shall be sufficient ground for the Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
dismissal of the Petition. issuance of injunctive writs is prohibited by PD 1818 and State
Immunity applies.
Corporate rehabilitation is a remedy for corporations,
partnerships, and associations "who [foresee] the impossibility RTC – MD granted/ MR denied
of meeting [their] debts when they respectively fall due." Issue: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case (YES)
Petitioner did not comply with some of these requirements. Ruling: Section 3 of R.A. No. 8975 expressly vests jurisdiction
First, it did not implead its creditors as respondents. Instead, upon the Supreme Court to issue any TRO, preliminary
petitioner only impleaded the Presiding Judge of the Regional injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against the
Trial Court, contrary to Section 6(a) of Rule 43. Second, it did government, or any of its subdivisions, officials or any person
not serve a copy of the Petition on some of its creditors, or entity, whether public or private acting under the
specifically, its former employees. Finally, it did not serve a government's direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel
copy of the Petition on the Regional Trial Court. specified acts. It is a well-settled rule that jurisdiction of the
Our courts are not only courts of law, but are also courts of court is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the
equity. Equity is justice outside legal provisions, and must be character of the relief sought.26
exercised in the absence of law, not against it. Equity In this case, the allegations and the reliefs prayed for in the
jurisdiction aims to do complete justice in cases where a court complaint reveal that petitioner, as landowners of the
of law is unable to adapt its judgments to the special surrounding estate of the highway elevation project, sought to
circumstances of a case because of the inflexibility of its enjoin such construction; or if completed, to restore the
statutory or legal jurisdiction. Equity is the principle by which affected portion thereof, to their original state. Clearly, the
substantial justice may be attained in cases where the principal action is one for injunction, which is within the
prescribed or customary forms of ordinary law are inadequate. jurisdiction of the RTC.
This court cannot exercise its equity jurisdiction and allow JURISDICTION vis-à-vis EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION
petitioner to circumvent the requirement to implead its
creditors as respondents. Tolerance of such failure will not only
PLATINUM TOURS AND TRAVEL, INCORPORATED, CA – Petition granted/ annulled RTC Decision for lack of
Petitioner, v. JOSE M. PANLILIO, Respondent. jurisdiction
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 Issue: WON RTC exercised excess of its jurisdiction
Platinum Tours and Travel Inc. (Platinum) filed a complaint for Ruling: Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of
a sum of money with damages against Pan Asiatic Travel judgment refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person
Corporation (PATC) and its president Nelida G. Galvez. of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim.
Platinum sought to collect payment for the airline tickets In a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of
which PATC bought from it. jurisdiction, petitioner must show not merely an abuse of
jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of jurisdiction.
RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner. There is no dispute that the RTC is vested with appellate
A writ of execution was issued on motion of Platinum. jurisdiction over ejectment cases decided by the MeTC, MTC
Pursuant to the writ, Manila Polo Club Proprietary or MCTC.
Membership Certificate No. 2133 in the name of Nelida G. Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As
Galvez was levied upon and sold for P479,888.48 to a certain distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is
Ma. Rosario Khoo. the authority to decide a cause, and not the decision rendered
Private respondent Jose M. Panlilio filed a motion to intervene. therein. The ground for annulment of the decision is absence
He claimed that, in October 1992, Galvez had executed in his of, or no, jurisdiction; that is, the court should not have taken
favor a chattel mortgage over her shares of stock in the Manila cognizance of the petition because the law does not vest it
Polo Club to secure her P1 million loan and that Galvez had with jurisdiction over the subject matter.
already delivered to him the stock certificates valued at P5
Section 22 of B.P. Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary
million.
Reorganization Act of 1980, vests upon the RTC the exercise of
RTC – Motion denied an "appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
SPOUSES EULOGIA MANILA and RAMON MANILA, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective territorial
Petitioners,vs. SPOUSES EDERLINDA GALLARDO-MANZO jurisdictions." Clearly then, when the RTC took cognizance of
and DANIEL MANZO, Respondents. petitioners’ appeal from the adverse decision of the MTC in the
ejectment suit, it (RTC) was unquestionably exercising its
appellate jurisdiction as mandated by law. Perforce, its
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 decision may not be annulled on the basis of lack of jurisdiction
as it has, beyond cavil, jurisdiction to decide the appeal.
Respondents filed an ejectment case against petitioner before
MTC Las Pinas. They alleged that Ederlinda Gallardo leased 2 JURISDICTION vis-à-vis VENUE
parcels of land to petitioners. They also agreed that petitioners
shall have the option to buy the property within two (2) years ARMAND NOCUM and THE PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER,
from the date of execution of the contract of lease at a fair INC., Petitioners, vs. LUCIO TAN, Respondent.
market value of P150,000.00. The contract already expired in Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
1992 but the lessee/petitioner continued to be in possession
of the property despite the formal demand to vacate and pay Lucio Tan filed a complaint against petitioner seeking moral
the rental arrearages. and exemplary damages for the alleged malicious and
defamatory imputations contained in a news article before
Respondent claimed that no rental fee is due because she RTC Makati.
allegedly became the owner of the property at the time she
communicated to the plaintiff her desire to exercise the option Petitioners filed a joint answer wherein they alleged that the
to buy the property. complaint failed to state a cause of action, the defamatory
statements are general conclusions without factual premises.
MTC – Ruled in favor of the petitioners
ALPAP and UMALI likewise questioned the cause of action of
RTC – Reversed/ found that petitioners have in fact exercised the respondent, the venue was not properly laid, and
their option to buy the leased property but the respondents respondent was not a real party in interest.
refused to honor the same / Ordered respondent to sell the
property to petitioners RTC – originally dismissed the complaint for improper venue/
subsequently set aside the dismissal on the ground that the
Appeal ground - court’s appellate jurisdiction in ejectment deficiency was cured in the amended complaint
cases is limited to the determination of who is entitled to the
physical possession of real property CA – Petition dismissed
Issue: WON RTC has jurisdiction over the case
Ruling: It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should
on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients
a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
plaintiff's causes of action.11 In the case at bar, after Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where
examining the original complaint, we find that the RTC the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the
acquired jurisdiction over the case when the case was filed offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus it
before it. From the allegations thereof, respondent’s cause of cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense
action is for damages arising from libel, the jurisdiction of allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.
which is vested with the RTC.
It has been found by both the RTC and the CA that the
Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a case; respondent resides in Manila; hence, the filing of the case
venue is the place where the case is to be heard or tried; (b) before the RTC of Manila was proper. Thus, the trial court
Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue, of should have taken cognizance of the case, and if it will
procedural law; (c) Jurisdiction establishes a relation between eventually be shown during trial that the offense was
the court and the subject matter; venue, a relation between committed somewhere else, then the court should dismiss the
plaintiff and defendant, or petitioner and respondent; and, (d) action for want of jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannot be conferred by the
Undoubtedly, such erroneous outright dismissal of the case is
parties; venue may be conferred by the act or agreement of
a nullity for want of due process. The prosecution and the
the parties.
respondent as the private offended party were not given the
EILEEN P. DAVID, Petitioner vs. GLENDA S. MARQUEZ, opportunity to present and prosecute their case. Indeed, the
Respondent prosecution and the private offended party are as much
entitled to due process as the accused in a criminal case.
SASHA M. CABRERA v. PHIIPPINE STATISTICS AUTHORITY
Two separate Informations were filed against petitioner for
Illegal Recruitment and Estafa which stemmed from a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
complaint filed by the respondent before the Office of the City
Petitioner alleged that she was born on July 20, 1989 at Zuba
Prosecutor. She allegedly approached respondent in
Estate, Malysia but because of the distance from the same to
Kidapawan City and represented that she could recruit her to
the Philippine Embassy in Malaysia, her birth was reported on
work abroad. It was further alleged that petitioner demanded
August 2006. PSA received her first report of birth in 2009. She
payment of placement fees. Respondent’s application was
subsequently discovered that her birth was wrongly registered
denied and the money was never returned.
to be sometime in 1980. However, instead of correcting the
Petitioner averred that it was physically impossible for her to same, her mother registered her birth the second time.
committed the said acts as she was in Canada at the alleged Because she has 2 reports of birth, she encountered difficulties
time of the recruitment as evidenced by the entries in her in securing official documents prompting her to file a petition
passport. The petitioner alleged that the amount deposited in for cancellation of her first Report of Birth before RTC Davao.
her account was not for her but was just coursed through her After due proceedings to meet the jurisdictional requirements,
to be given to her friend in Canada who was the one processing and with the appearance of OSG, she received a favorable
respondent's application, as evidenced by a certification to decision.
that effect issued by the said friend. She filed a Motion to
OSG filed an MR which was denied by the RTC.
Quash Information on the ground that Manila City Prosecutor
has no jurisidiction over an offense allegedly committed in CA – granted the appeal
Kidapawan.
Present petition: Petitioner refiled the case for the correction
RTC – Motion to Quash denied/ Due to MR filed by petitioner, of her birth date, which was raffled to RTC Br 14
RTC issued another order dismissing the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction RTC – Dismissed/ ruled that the same should have been filed
before the RTC Davao where the first action was instituted
CA – Ruled that civil aspects may be appealed/ RTC has
jurisdiction over the cases since criminal action arising from Issue: WON the dismissal is correct
illegal recruitment may be filed in the place where the Ruling: Venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, hence, may be
offended party actually resides at the time of the commission waived. Venue is the place of trial or geographical location in
of the offense. which an action or proceeding should be brought. In civil cases,
Issue: WON RTC has jurisdiction over the case venue is a matter of procedural law. Rules on venue are
intended to provide convenience to the parties, rather than
Ruling: Indeed, venue in criminal cases is an essential element restrict their access to the courts. It simply arranges for the
of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to convenient and effective transaction of business in the courts
and do not relate their power, authority, or jurisdiction over The ultimate relief sought by respondents is for the recovery
the subject matter of the action of the property through the enforcement of its sale in their
favor by the late spouses Ramiro. Their other causes of action
It is notable that when petitioner filed her first petition before for the cancellation of the original title and the issuance of a
RTC Davao she had already pleaded exemption from new one in their name, as well as' for injunction and damages,
complying with the rule on venue by fiilng her petition in her are merely incidental to the recovery of the property. 26
place of domicile as she is a student who cannot afford to Before any of the other reliefs respondents prayed for in their
engage a lawyer to file it on her behalf. complaint can be granted, the issue of who between them and
PAYMENT OF DOCKET FEES petitioners has the valid title to the lot must first be
determined.
The Heirs of the Late Spouses ALEJANDRO RAMIRO and
FELICISIMA LLAMADA, namely; HENRY L. RAMIRO; MERLYN On the issue of docket fee: Furthermore, it is not simply the
R. TAGUBA; MARLON L. RAMIRO; MARIDEL R. SANTELLA, filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading but
WILMA L. RAMIRO; VILMA R. CIELO and CAROLYN R. the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial
CORDERO, Petitioners vs. Spouses ELEODORO and VERNA court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the
BA CARON, Respondents action. In resolving the issue of whether or not the correct
amount of docket fees were paid, it is also necessary to
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 determine the true nature of the complaint. Having settled
Respondents filed a complaint against petitioners before RTC that the action instituted by respondents is a real action and
alleging that the parcel of land in question was sold to them. not one incapable of pecuniary estimation, the basis for
Spouses Bacaron took possession of the land but they found determining the correct docket fees shall, therefore, be the
out that the land was earlier mortgaged by sposes Ramiro to assessed value of the property, or the estimated value thereof
the DBP. Respondents paid the sum for the redemption of the as alleged by the claimant.
property and, petitioners forcibly dispossessed spouses MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL.,
Bacaron of the property. petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CITY LAND
Petitioners denied the allegations them. They averred that RTC DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, STEPHEN ROXAS,
has no jurisdiction over the case considering that it involves ANDREW LUISON, GRACE LUISON and JOSE DE MAISIP,
recovery of the property and , that the instrument was actually respondents.
an equitable mortgage and not Deed of Sale, and that the The case merely revolves on the issue of the filing fee.
respondents are barred by laches. Petitioners insist that Petitioners contend that the filing fee should be levied
respondent failed to alleged the value of the property considering the amount of damages sought in the original
RTC – ruled in favor of the respondents complaint. Notably, the Magaspi case was an action for
recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land with
CA – Petition denied damages. While the present case is an action for torts and
damages and specific performance with prayer for temporary
Issue: WON RTC has jurisdiction of the case (NO)
restraining order, etc.
Ruling: Settled is the rule that the nature of the action and
In the Magaspi case, the prayer in the complaint seeks not only
which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
the annulment of title of the defendant to the property, the
same is determined by the material allegations of the
declaration of ownership and delivery of possession thereof to
complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff and the
plaintiffs but also asks for the payment of actual moral,
law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether
exemplary damages and attorney's fees arising therefrom in
the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims asserted
the amounts specified therein.
therein.
Issue: WON the filing fee should be based on the amount of
It is clear from the foregoing that while respondents claim that
damages sought in the original complaint (YES)
their amended complaint before the RTC is denominated as
one for the declaration of validity of the Deed of Sale and for Ruling: As reiterated in the Magaspi case the rule is well-
specific performance, the averments in their amended settled "that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the
complaint and the character of the reliefs sought therein docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court. Thus,
reveal that the action primarily involves title to or possession in the present case the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
of real property. An action "involving title to real property" over the case by the payment of only P410.00 as docket fee.
means that the plaintiffs cause of action is based on a claim Neither can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest
that he owns such property or that he has the legal rights to jurisdiction upon the Court. For an legal purposes there is no
have exclusive control, possession, enjoyment, or disposition such original complaint that was duly filed which could be
of the same. Title is the "legal link between (1) a person who amended. Consequently, the order admitting the amended
owns property and (2) the property itself.
complaint and all subsequent proceedings and actions taken The contention that Manchester cannot apply retroactively to
by the trial court are null and void. this case is untenable. Statutes regulating the procedure of the
courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
The Court of Appeals therefore, aptly ruled in the present case undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
that the basis of assessment of the docket fee should be the retrospective in that sense and to that extent.
amount of damages sought in the original complaint and not
in the amended complaint. The pattern and the intent to defraud the government of the
docket fee due it is obvious not only in the filing of the original
SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., (SIOL), E.B. PHILIPPS and complaint but also in the filing of the second amended
D.J. WARBY, petitioners, vs. HON. MAXIMIANO C.
complaint.
ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional Trial
Court, Quezon City and MANUEL CHUA UY PO TIONG, In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is
respondents. called for considering that, unlike Manchester, private
respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules
by paying the additional docket fees as required. The
Petitioner filed a complaint before RTC Makati for the promulgation of the decision in Manchester must have had
consignation of a premium refund on a fire insurance policy that sobering influence on private respondent who thus paid
with a prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity against the additional docket fee as ordered by the respondent court.
private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent as It triggered his change of stance by manifesting his willingness
declared in default for failure to file the required answer within to pay such additional docket fee as may be ordered.
the reglementary period.
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO. and SOLIDBANK
A month later, respondent filed before RTC Qc a refund of CORPORATION, Petitioners, vs. BERNARDITA H. PEREZ,
premium and issuance of writ of preliminary attachment represented by her Attorney-in-Fact PATRIA H. PEREZ,
against petitioner and Philipps and Warby as additional Respondent.
defendants. Although the prayer in the complaint did not
quantify the amount of damages sought said amount may be
inferred from the body of the complaint to be about Fifty Petitioner Solibank, which was later acquired by Metrobank,
Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00). He paid. Docket fee of forged a lease contract with respondent, represented by her
PhP210.00 which has been objected to by the petitioners’ attorney-in-fact over 2 parcels of land in Bulacan for a period
counsel. of 15 years commencing from Jan 1998. Solidbank was to, as it
did, construct a one-storey building specifically suited for bank
The following year, Court en banc issued a Resolution in premises.
Administrative Case No. 85-10-8752-RTC directing the judges
in said cases to reassess the docket fees and that in case of Metrobank sent a notice of termination of the lease contract
deficiency, to order its payment. Hence, the present case was effective September 30, 2002. Respondent, objecting to the
re-raffled with the exclusion of Judge Castro, who presided the termination, filed a complaint for breach of contract and
previous branch. The docket fee was reassessed based on damages against herein petitioners Solidbank and Metrobank
respondent’s claim of not less than PhP10 Million pesos. The before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan
docket fee amounted to PhP39, 786.00 which was paid by praying that, inter alia, herein petitioners be ordered to pay
respondent. her "the would be unrealized income for the ensuing idle
months of the said building."
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with CA alleging that
the docket fee should be higher because the supplemental RTC – Ruled in favor of respondents
complaint filed by the respondent added PhP20 Million pesos.
Ground for appeal: Petitioners challenged the jurisdiction of
CA – Denied RTC on the ground that award of unrealized income was given
despite respondent’s failure to pay the docket fee
Issue: WON the docket fee should be based on the amount
alleged in the original complaint (YES) CA – Affirmed
Ruling: It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate Issue: WON RTC had jurisdiction over the case
initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket
Ruling: Plainly, while the payment of prescribed docket fee is
fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject
a jurisdictional requirement, even its non-payment at the time
matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory
pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case,
as long as the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or
court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time
reglementary period, more so when the party involved
but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing
reglementary period.
such payment. Thus, when insufficient filing fees were initially
paid by the plaintiffs and there was no intention to defraud the value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value
government, the Manchester rule does not apply. thereof, shall be alleged by the claimant.
The ensuing months in which the leased premises would be
G.R. No. 221815 November 29, 2017
rendered vacant could not be determined at the time of the
GLYNNA FORONDA-CRYSTAL, Petitioner,
filing of the complaint. It bears recalling that the building
vs.
constructed on respondent’s leased premises was specifically
ANIANA LAWAS SON, Respondent
constructed to house a bank, hence, the idle period before
another occupant with like business may opt to lease would be
difficult to project.
Although the payment of the proper docket fees is a
jurisdictional requirement, the trial court may allow the
plaintiff in an action to pay the same within a reasonable time PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45
before the expiration of the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period. If the plaintiff fails to comply with this DOCTRINE:
requirement, the defendant should timely raise the issue of
“As it currently stands, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court concerns
jurisdiction or else he would be considered in estoppel. In the
the amount of the prescribed filing and docket fees which
latter case, the balance between the appropriate docket fees
bestows jurisdiction to entertain pleadings, whose amount is
and the amount actually paid by the plaintiff will be considered
determined by the fair market value of the real property in
a lien on any award he may obtain in his favor.
litigation stated in the current tax declaration or current zonal
BARANGAY PIAPI, herein represented by its chairman valuation of the BIR or the stated value of the real or personal
ANDRES L. LUGNASIN vs.IGNACIO TALIP representing the property in litigation as alleged by the claimant.”
HEIRS OF JUAN JAYAG, Respondent.
FACTS
Petitioner is the daughter of a registered owner of a parcel of
Petitioners filed a complaint before RTC for the reconveyance land derived form a successful grant of a Free Patent.
and damages with prayer for issuance of a temporary Respondent instituted an action for reconveyance and
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction against damages against petitioner alleging that, for twelve and a half
respondent. The complaint alleges that petitioners and their years, she has been the lawful owner and possessor of the
predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, peaceful, subject lot. However, the RTC dismissed the case asserting that
continuous and open possession for more than 30 years of the the market value is only P2,830 as per Tax Declaration attached
parcel land located in Davao Del Sur. The land’s total assessed and thus, first level court has jurisdiction. However, the RTC
valued was allegedly PhP41,890.00 Respondent fraudulently reconsidered on the ground that the complaint stated that the
obtained from the said Registry of Deeds a Transfer Certificate property was worth P200,000.00. Thus, RTC rendered decision
of Title (TCT) in his name. In 1998, he paid real estate taxes and favorable to respondent. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
subsequently, he threatened to build a barb-wire fence around
the land. ISSUE
Respondent move for the dismissal of the complaint on the
• Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction to hear the case
ground that RTC has no jurisdiction over the case considering
the assessed value of the land is only PhP6,030.00 RULING
RTC – dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
For a full disclosure on the resolution of the present petition,
Issue: WON RTC has jurisdiction over the case (NO) emphasis must be given on the assessed values – not the fair
market values – of the real properties concerned. In Heirs of
Ruling: Indeed, basic as a hornbook principle is that the nature Conchita, it is only the assessed value of the realty involved
of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction that should be computed. BP 129 also provides that in
over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the determining jurisdiction of real property, assessed value is the
complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the prime consideration.
plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein. It can easily be discerned that petitioners’ A failure to allege the assessed value of a real property in the
complaint involves title to, or possession of, real property. complaint would result to a dismissal of the case. Absent any
However, they failed to allege therein the assessed value of the allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the
subject property. Instead, what they stated is the market value property, it cannot be determined whether the RTC or the MTC
of the land at ₱15,000.00. The Rule requires that "the assessed has original exclusive jurisdiction. This is determined from the
facts alleged, and the courts cannot take judicial notice.
However, this can be liberally interpreted as in the case of
Tumpag. Here, the Court pointed to the facts contained in the
Declaration of Real Property attached the complaint. The
Court said that the failure to allege the real property’s assessed PROTON PILIPINAS CORPORATION, AUTOMOTIVE
value in the complaint would not be fatal if, in the documents PHILIPPINES, ASEA ONE CORPORATION and AUTOCORP,
annexed to the complaint, an allegation of the assessed value Petitioners, vs. BANQUE NATIONALE DE PARIS,
could be found. Respondent.
TWO-TIERED RULE
1. General rule is that jurisdiction is determined by the It appears that sometime in 1995, petitioner Proton Pilipinas
assessed value of the real property as alleged in the Corporation (Proton) availed of the credit facilities of herein
complaint respondent, Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP). To guarantee
the payment of its obligation, its co-petitioners Automotive
2. Liberally applied if the assessed value, while not Corporation Philippines (Automotive), Asea One Corporation
alleged, could still be identified through a facial (Asea) and Autocorp Group (Autocorp) executed a corporate
examination of the documents already attached to guarantee2 to the extent of US$2,000,000.00. BNP and Proton
the complaint subsequently entered into three trust receipt agreements
dated June 4, 1996,3 January 14, 1997,4 and April 24, 1997.5
(Not explicitly mentioned in this case, but supplemented by
digester for better understanding). Proton would receive imported passenger motor vehicles and
hold them in trust for BNP. Proton would be free to sell the
However, the Court recognizes that the use of such rule is only vehicles subject to the condition that it would deliver the
applicable in delineation of jurisdictions of the first and second proceeds of the sale to BNP, to be applied to its obligations to
level courts. Although in Barangay Piapi, the Court held that in it. In case the vehicles are not sold, Proton would return them
the absence of the assessed value, the Court shall consider the to BNP, together with all the accompanying documents of title.
alleged market value in determining the amount of payment
Proton failed to deliver the proceeds of sales and the unsold
of docket fees, the rule alluded to by this ruling is now deleted
the vehicles. This led to the filing of a complaint against
through an amendment by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC.
petitioner. RTC Makati Clerk of Court assessed the docket fees
As it currently stands, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court concerns which BNP paid at ₱352,116.30.
the amount of the prescribed filing and docket fees which Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the
bestows jurisdiction to entertain pleadings, whose amount is ground that BNP failed to pay the docket fees hence the court
determined by the fair market value of the real property in never acquired jurisdiction.
litigation stated in the current tax declaration or current zonal
valuation of the BIR or the stated value of the real or personal RTC – Motion denied
property in litigation as alleged by the claimant. CA – Denied
This new rule, however, should only refer to the acquisition of Appeal ground - The clerk of court should thus have assessed
jurisdiction by the courts through the payment of the the filing fee by taking into consideration "the total sum
prescribed filing and docket fees. When it comes to the claimed, inclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
delineation of the jurisdictions of the first and second level attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs, or the stated
courts, the two-tiered rule mentioned above is still the value of the property in litigation."
prevailing one.
Issue: WON the docket fees were properly paid
This case involves the second scenario. The respondent failed
Ruling: The principle in Manchester could very well be applied
to allege in her complaint the assessed value of the subject
in the present case. The pattern and the intent to defraud the
property but rather an allegation of its market value
government of the docket fee due it is obvious not only in the
amounting to P200,000.00. However, the tax declaration only
filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the
showed P1,030.00 (sic.). Because the rule applicable in this
second amended complaint. In the present case, a more liberal
case is that on delineation of the jurisdictions of the first and
interpretation of the rules is called for considering that,
second level courts, and not to the acquisition of jurisdiction
unlikeManchester, private respondent demonstrated his
through the payment of the prescribed filing and docket fees,
willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional
then the two-tiered rule should be applied. With no alleged
docket fees as required. The promulgation of the decision in
assessed value, then a facial examination of the attached
Manchester must have had that sobering influence on private
documents must be done. The tax declaration is one such
respondent who thus paid the additional docket fee as ordered
document, and with its value sitting below the threshold of the
by the respondent court. It triggered his change of stance by
RTC, then the RTC has no jurisdiction.
manifesting his willingness to pay such additional docket fee as payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket
may be ordered. clerk in the assessment of the filing fee.
Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the
jurisdictional requirement, even its non-payment at the time payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the
of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction
as long as the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based
reglementary period, more so when the party involved on the amounts sought in the amended pleading.
SPOUSES ROSALINA S. DE LEON and ALEJANDRO L. DE
such payment. Thus, when insufficient filing fees were initially
LEON, petitioners, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, GLICERIO
paid by the plaintiffs and there was no intention to defraud the
MA. ELAYDA II, FEDERICO ELAYDA and DANILO ELAYDA,
government, the Manchester rule does not apply
respondents.
INTERCONTINENTAL BROADCASTING CORPORATION (IBC-
13), Rep. by Its President Renato Bello, Petitioner, vs. HON.
ROSE MARIE ALONZO LEGASTO and ANTONIO SALVADOR, Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
Respondents.
Respondents filed in the RTC QC a complaint for annulment or
rescission of a contract of sale of 2 parcels of land against
petitioners. Upon the filing of the complaint, the clerk of court
required private respondents to pay docket and legal fees in
This case stemmed from a suit for a sum of money before RTC the total amount of P610.00.
QC. The parties entered into a compromise agreement which
states that the petitioner shall pay PhP2 million pesos in 3 Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
installments to respondent. With the submission of the said
case by reason of private respondent’s nonpayment of the
compromise agreement, and the subsequent motion to
correct docket fees. Petitioners contended that in addition to
dismiss, the case was dismissed.
the fees already paid based on the claim for P100,000.00 for
However, petitioner, 2 years later commenced an action to attorney's fees, private respondents should have paid docket
declare the said Compromise Agreement null and void ab fees in the amount of P21,640.00, based on the alleged value
initio. By then already privatized and under a new of the two (2) parcels of land subject matter of the contract of
management, petitioner alleged, among other matters, that sale sought to be annulled.
aside from its non-existent cause or object, said agreement
RTC – motion denied but required respondents to pay
was entered into by its erstwhile management without the
additional docket fees/ MR of petitioner denied
requisite approval of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG); and, that private respondent should CA – annulled the order of RTC/ held that the action for
refund the P2,000,000.00 he received. rescission of contract is not susceptible of pecuniary
estimation
To sum the case, the petitioner moved for the suspension of
all the proceedings on the ground that the proper docket fee Issue: WON an action for rescission of contract is not
was not previously paid by the respondent. susceptible of pecuniary estimation (YES)
RTC - The court denied the same. The court held that estopped Ruling: Conformably with this discussion of actions "where the
from raising the issue of deficient docket fee in view of its value of the case cannot be estimated," the Court in Bautista
active participation in the proceedings; that the deficiency in v. Lim, held that an action for rescission of contract is one
the filing fees did not divest it of its jurisdiction hence the which cannot be estimated and therefore the docket fee for its
proceedings need not be dismissed or suspended. filing should be the flat amount of P200.00 as then fixed in the
former Rule 141
CA – Affirmed
TOKIO MARINE MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY
Issue: WON the petitioner is already estopped from
INCORPORATED, ALMA PEÑALOSA, KIMIO HOSAKA,
questioning the jurisdiction on the ground of the deficient
SUMITOMI NISHIDA, TERESITA H. QUIAMBAO and
docket fee
ANTONIO B. LAPID, petitioners, vs. JORGE VALDEZ,
Ruling: The Court cannot close this case without making the respondent.
observation that it frowns at the practice of counsel who filed
the original complaint in this case of omitting any specification
of the amount of damages in the prayer although the amount Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of over P78 million is alleged in the body of the complaint. This
is clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the
Respondent file before RTC Manila a complaint for damages members of the litigant's immediate family must likewise
against the petitioners. He alleged that petitioners violated the execute sworn statements in support of the petition. Expressio
terms of the Unit Management Contract by refusing him his unius est exclusio alterius
commissions and bonuses. Respondent prayed for the
DAVID LU, Petitioner, vs. PATERNO LU YM, SR., PATERNO
following reliefs: a) actual damages in the total amount of
LU YM, JR., VICTOR LU YM, JOHN LU YM, KELLY LU YM, and
P71,866,205.67 and the corresponding interests; b) moral
LUDO & LUYM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
damages of P10,000,000.00; c) exemplary damages amounting
Respondents.
to P10,000,000.00; d) attorney's fees corresponding to 30% of
the said amounts; and e) costs of the suit. Eventually, The High Court sitting En Banc revisited its previous ruling of
respondent filed with the trial court an "Urgent Ex Parte the present case.
Motion For Authority To Litigate As Indigent Plaintiff." This was
granted by the court, hence, the nonpayment of docket fees. The three consolidated cases stemmed from the complaint for
"Declaration of Nullity of Share Issue, Receivership and
Petitioners filed Motion to Dismiss the complaint. Dissolution" filed on August 14, 2000 before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cebu City by petitioner. RTC ruled in favor of
RTC – denied the MD
him. Several incidents arising from the complaint reached the
On appeal - petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with Court through the present three petitions. Since an amended
prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary pleading supersedes the pleading that it amends, the original
injunction with the Court of Appeals/ Granted complaint of David, et al. was deemed withdrawn from the
records.
Respondent filed with CA - "Urgent Notice of Taking of
Deposition Upon Oral Examination of Private Respondent As reflected early on, the Court, in a turnaround, by Resolution
Jorge Valdez For Purposes of the Above-Captioned Pending of August 4, 2009, reconsidered its position on the matter of
Case And For Such Other Legal Purposes As May Be Warranted docket fees. It ruled that the trial court did not acquire
By Existing Law and Jurisprudence." It appears that respondent jurisdiction over the case for David Lu, et al.’s failure to pay the
was already 75 years old and sickly. correct docket fees, hence, all interlocutory matters and
incidents subject of the present petitions must consequently
CA - Petitions filed by petitioner was dismissed and writ of be denied.
preliminary injunction lifted
New Ruling: Upon deeper reflection, we find that the movants’
Issue: WON the MD for nonpayment of docket fees was [Lu Ym father & sons] claim has merit. The 600,000 shares of
properly dismissed stock were, indeed, properties in litigation. They were the
Ruling: A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim subject matter of the complaint, and the relief prayed for
or defense as an indigent if the court, upon an ex parte entailed the nullification of the transfer thereof and their
application and hearing, is satisfied that the party is one who return to LLDC. David, et al., are minority shareholders of the
has no money or property sufficient and available for food, corporation who claim to have been prejudiced by the sale of
shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family. the shares of stock to the Lu Ym father and sons. Thus, to the
extent of the damage or injury they allegedly have suffered
Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of from this sale of the shares of stock, the action they filed can
docket and other lawful fees and of transcripts of stenographic be characterized as one capable of pecuniary estimation. The
notes which the court may order to be furnished him. The shares of stock have a definite value, which was declared by
amount of the docket and other lawful fees which the indigent plaintiffs [David Lu, et al.] themselves in their complaint.
was exempted from paying shall be a lien on any judgment Accordingly, the docket fees should have been computed
rendered in the case favorable to the indigent, unless the court based on this amount. This is clear from the following version
otherwise provides. of Rule 141, Section 7, which was in effect at the time the
For purposes of a suit in forma pauperis, an indigent litigant is complaint was filed[
not really a pauper, but is properly a person who is an indigent To be sure, the annulment of the shares, the dissolution of the
although not a public charge, meaning that he has no property corporation and the appointment of receivers/management
or income sufficient for his support aside from his labor, even committee are actions which do not consist in the recovery of
if he is self-supporting when able to work and in employment. a sum of money. If, in the end, a sum of money or real property
In the instant cases, petitioners maintain that respondent's ex would be recovered, it would simply be the consequence of
parte motion to litigate as an indigent is defective since it was such principal action. Therefore, the case before the RTC was
not accompanied or supported by the affidavits of his children, incapable of pecuniary estimation.
the immediate members of his family. The argument lacks On the issue of annulment/rescission of contract: A review of
merit. Section 19 clearly states that it is the litigant alone who the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in determining
shall execute the affidavit. The Rule does not require that all whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not

capable of pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the Deposit and deposited to the RTC Clerk of Court the amount of
criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action ₱500,000.00 representing the amount of the check, ‘subject to
or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of the condition that it shall remain deposited until the
money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary disposition of the case.
estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts
Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the case unless the full
or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount
of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something RTC - Judge Nabong issued an order that ‘in the interest of
other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the justice and because of the huge amount of outlay involved (the
money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the Court considers the business climate and the peso crunch
principal relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant prevailing),’ allowed private respondent to first deposit
perform his part of the contract (specific performance) and in ₱25,000.00 on or before December 15, 1999 and ₱20,000.00
actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or to every month thereafter until the full amount of docket fees is
foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such actions paid, and ‘only then shall the deposits be considered as
as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be payment of docket fees.’
estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by
courts of first instance. The rationale of the rule is plainly that CA - Staggered docket fee allowed
the second class cases, besides the determination of damages, Issue: WON Staggered docket fee is allowed (YES)
demand an inquiry into other factors which the law has
deemed to be more within the competence of courts of first Ruling: As a rule, docket fees should be paid upon the filing of
instance, which were the lowest courts of record at the time the initiatory pleadings. However, for cogent reasons to be
that the first organic laws of the Judiciary were enacted determined by the trial judge, staggered payment thereof
allocating jurisdiction. within a reasonable period may be allowed. Unless grave
abuse of discretion is demonstrated, the discretion of the trial
STAGGERED DOCKET FEE judge in granting staggered payment shall not be disturbed.
Spouses GREGORIO GO and JUANA TAN GO, petitioners, vs. Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a
JOHNSON Y. TONG; COURT OF APPEALS; and Honorable jurisdictional requirement, even its nonpayment at the time of
Judge JUAN NABONG of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as
Manila, respondents. long as the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period; more so when the party involved
such payment.
Petition for Review under Rule 65
ADHERENCE TO JURISDICTION
Petitioner purchased a cashier’s check dated Sept. 13, 1996
from the Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) in the PACIFIC ACE FINANCE LTD. (PAFIN), Petitioner, vs. EIJI*
amount of PhP500,000.00 payable to respondent. YANAGISAWA, Respondent
On petitioner’s instructions, the cashier check bore the words
“Final Payment/Quitclaim” after the name of the payee private
respondents allegedly to insure the private respondent would Petition for Review under Rule 65
honor his commitment. After the check was delivered to Yanagisawa, a Japanese national, and Evelyn Castaneda, a
private respondent, he deposited it with the words ‘Final Filipina, contracted marriage in 1989 in the City Hall of Manila.
Payment/Quitclaim’ already erased, hence, it was not Evelyn purchased a 152 square-meter townhouse unit located
honored. at Bo. Sto. Niño, Parañaque, Metro Manila. This was registered
Counsel of respondent informed FEBTC of the problem but under her name indicating that she is married to Yanagisawa.
FEBTC did not the grant the request. Hence, he filed a Yanagisawa filed a complaint for the declaration or marriage
complaint against FEBTC and petitioners. with Evelyn. During the pendency of the case, he filed a Motion
For their part, petitioners alleged that the erasure was for the Issuance of Restraining order against Evelyn and a Writ
intentional on respondent’s part, reflective of his intent to for Preliminary Injunction. He asked that Evelyn be enjoined
collect more money from them. from disposing or encumbering all of the properties registered
in her name.
Petitioner’s son likewise filed a complaint for viol of BP 22
against the respondent. Evelyn voluntarily dispose of the properties registered under
her name, hence the motion of respondent was declared
Respondent filed a Motion for Leave to file a Supplemental moot. It was found out however, that sometime in 1997,
Complaint thereby increasing the amount of moral and Evelyn obtained a loan from petitioner with the Paranaque
exemplary damages. Petitioners filed a Manifestation of townhouse as security. At the time of the mortgage, Eiji’s

appeal in the nullity of marriage case was pending before the Lucia Barrameda Vda. De Ballesteros (Lucia) filed a complaint
CA. The Makati RTC had dissolved Eiji and Evelyn’s marriage, for Annulment of Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, Deed of
and had ordered the liquidation of their registered properties, Mortgage and Damages with prayer for Preliminary Injunction
including the Parañaque townhouse unit, with its proceeds to against her children, Roy, Rito, Amy, Arabel, Rico, Abe, Ponce
be divided between the parties. The Decision of the Makati Rex and Adden, all surnamed Ballesteros, and the Rural Bank
RTC did not lift or dissolve its October 2, 1996 Order on of Canaman, Inc., Baao Branch (RBCI) before the RTC-Iriga.
Evelyn’s commitment not to dispose of or encumber the Lucia alleged that her deceased husband, Eugenio, left two (2)
properties registered in her name. parcels of land located in San Nicolas, Baao, Camarines Sur.
Without her knowledge, her children executed a deed of
When Respondent learned of the mortgage, he filed a extrajudicial partition and waiver of the estate of her husband
complaint for the annulment of the same. Petitioner denied wherein all the heirs, including Lucia, agreed to allot the two
prior knowledge of the circumstances. Evelyn on the other parcels to Rico Ballesteros (Rico); that, still, without her
hand, asserted that she paid for the property hence, she owns knowledge and consent, Rico mortgaged Parcel B of the estate
it. in favor of RBCI which mortgage was being foreclosed for
RTC Makati – Case was still pending failure to settle the loan secured by the lot; and that Lucia was
occupying Parcel B and had no other place to live. She prayed
RTC Paranaque – Dismissed that the deed of extrajudicial partition and waiver, and the
CA – reversed / t was determined therein that the registered subsequent mortgage in favor of RBCI be declared null and
properties should be sold at public auction and the proceeds void having been executed without her knowledge and
thereof to be divided between Eiji and Evelyn. The appellate consent. She also prayed for damages.
court determined that the Parañaque RTC’s Decision was Respondent claimed that it was Lucia who sold the parcels of
improper because it violated the doctrine of non-interference. land to Rico which represented her share in the estate of her
Courts of equal jurisdiction, such as regional trial courts, have husband. All the extrajudicial partition, waiver and mortgage
no appellate jurisdiction over each other were executed with her knowledge.
Issue: WON RTC Paranaque violated Doctrine of Non- Respondent filed Motion to Dismiss on the ground that RTC
Interference (YES) Iriga has no jurisdiction over the case and RTC Makati already
Ruling: Makati RTC had acquired jurisdiction over the said constituted itself the liquidation of all assets of respondents
question and should not have been interfered with by the including the land in question
Parañaque RTC. The CA only clarified that it was improper for RTC Iriga – Motion to Dismiss granted
the Parañaque RTC to have reviewed the ruling of a co-equal
court. CA – Consolidated the case pending before RTC Makati
It has been held that "even in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, Issue: WON the consolidation is proper considering that RTC
it is, also, axiomatic that the court first acquiring jurisdiction Makati acted as liquidation court
excludes the other courts."
Ruling: Indeed, the Court recognizes the doctrine on
In addition, it is a familiar principle that when a court of adherence of jurisdiction. Lucia, however, must be reminded
competent jurisdiction acquires jurisdiction over the subject that such principle is not without exceptions. The requirement
matter of a case, its authority continues, subject only to the that all claims against the bank be pursued in the liquidation
appellate authority, until the matter is finally and completely proceedings filed by the Central Bank is intended to prevent
disposed of, and that no court of co-ordinate authority is at multiplicity of actions against the insolvent bank and designed
liberty to interfere with its action. This doctrine is applicable to to establish due process and orderliness in the liquidation of
civil cases, to criminal prosecutions, and to courts-martial. The the bank, to obviate the proliferation of litigations and to avoid
principle is essential to the proper and orderly administration injustice and arbitrariness (citing Ong v. CA, 253 SCRA 105
of the laws; and while its observance might be required on the [1996]). The lawmaking body contemplated that for
grounds of judicial comity and courtesy, it does not rest upon convenience, only one court, if possible, should pass upon the
such considerations exclusively, but is enforced to prevent claims against the insolvent bank and that the liquidation court
unseemly, expensive, and dangerous conflicts of jurisdiction should assist the Superintendents of Banks and regulate his
and of the process. operations. As regards Lucia’s contention that jurisdiction
already attached when Civil Case No. IR-3128 was filed with,
LUCIA BARRAMEDA VDA. DE BALLESTEROS, Petitioner, vs. and jurisdiction obtained by, the RTC-Iriga prior to the filing of
RURAL BANK OF CANAMAN INC., represented by its the liquidation case before the RTC-Makati, her stance fails to
Liquidator, the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation, persuade this Court.
Respondent.
It is clear, therefore, that the liquidation court has jurisdiction
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 over all claims, including that of Lucia against the insolvent

bank. As declared in Miranda v. Philippine Deposit Insurance
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.
Corporation,14 regular courts do not have jurisdiction over
actions filed by claimants against an insolvent bank, unless SPOUSES PLACIDO and CLARA DY ORILLA,
there is a clear showing that the action taken by the BSP, Respondents.
through the Monetary Board, in the closure of financial
institutions was in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion. The same is not obtaining in this present case. Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
APO CEMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. MINGSON Respondents were the owner of the parcel located in Bohol. In
MINING INDUSTRIES CORPORATION, Respondent. the latter part of 1996, DARPARO of Bohol sent a Notice of
Land Valuation and Acquisition to respondents informing them
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the compulsory acquisition of their land pursuant to CARL
The instant case arose from a dispute involving the mining with a compensation based on valuation made by petitioner.
claims known as "Allied 1 and 2" and "Lapulapu 31 and 32" Respondents rejected the valuation. A summary hearing was
(subject mining claims) between petitioner Apo Cement conducted by DARAB to determine the amount of just
Corporation (Apocemco) and respondent Mingson Mining compensation. After proceedings, DARAB affirmed the
Industries Corporation (Mingson). For the supposed failure of valuation
the old locators to develop and put to productive use the
mineral properties found in the area, Apocemco submitted a SAC – Modified/ increased the amount/ pending appeal, SAC
Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) proposal on issued an Order granting the Motion for Execution Pending
June 19, 1991 before the DENR, essentially seeking to take Appeal, likewise ordered the respondents to deposit bond
over their current holder, Luvimin Cebu Mining Corporation equivalent to1/2 of the amount due them/ MR denied
(Luvimin)
CA - Should the SAC find upon recomputation that the just
DENR – declared the mining proceedings as abandoned compensation previously rendered is bigger than the
recomputed value, the petitioners-appellees are ordered to
Mingson assailed the aforementioned declarations on the return the excess, considering that payment may already have
ground that its own mining claims, i.e., "Yellow Eagle I to VII," been given by the LBP in pursuant to the finality of the motion
overlapped with the subject mining claims. for execution pending appeal."
DENR - Upon MR, declared that mining claims be awarded to Issue: WON CA properly remanded the case
petitioner.
Ruling: A void judgment or order has no legal and binding
DENR MAB – Reversed. Ruled in favor of Mingson effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation of
CA – Petition dismissed / Mingson was not afforded by the POA law, it is non-existent. Such judgment or order may be resisted
its right to due process, given that none of the applicable in any action or proceeding whenever it is involved. It is not
procedures found in DENR DAO 95-23 were followed. even necessary to take any steps to vacate or avoid a void
judgment or final order; it may simply be ignored. Accordingly,
Issue: WON the petition was correctly dismissed a void judgment is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source
of any right nor of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant
Ruling: The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation
to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect.
of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted from their
Hence, it can never become final, and any writ of execution
jurisdiction.1âwphi1 The violation of a party’s right to due
based on it is void
process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be
glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the NILO PADRE, Petitioner, vs. FRUCTOSA BADILLO, FEDILA
fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision BADILLO, PRESENTACION CABALLES, EDWINA VICARIO (d)
rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of represented by MARY JOY VICARIO-ORBETA and NELSON
jurisdiction. Besides, an apparent lack of due process may be BADILLO, Respondents.
raised by a party at any time since due process is a
jurisdictional requisite that all tribunals, whether Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
administrative or judicial, are duty bound to observe. In Salva RTC Allen Br 23 Northern Samar rendered its judgment in favor
v. Valle,43 the Court pronounced that "[a]decision rendered pf herein respondents against petitioner for Ownership and
without due process is void ab initio and may be attacked at Recovery of Possession with Damages. The Decision became
anytime directly or collaterally by means of a separate action, final and executory in Nov. 5, 1986.
or by resisting such decision in any action or proceeding where
it is invoked." The Court sees no defensible reason as to why Petitioner, in 1997, filed another complaint against those who
this principle should not be herein applied. occupy their property which included some of the defendants
before MTC Northern Samar. Although denominated as
EFFECT OF LACK OF JURISDICTION
Ownership and Possession, the case is really that of unlawful inferior court is in issue, the Court of Appeals certified the case
detainer. to the Supreme Court along with the records of the case.
MTC – ruled in favor respondents/ interpreting the revival of ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant's motion to dismiss on the
the RTC case, an action for enforcement of a dormant ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance
judgment is a personal action, and hence may be filed either at during the pendency of the appeal will prosper.
the court of the place where plaintiffs reside or where the
RULING: A party may be estopped or barred from raising a
defendants reside.
question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we
Ground for MR: lack of jurisdiction – Denied speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and
of estoppel by laches.
RTC - Petition dismissed on the ground that it was filed out of
date/ Agreed with MTC that the revival was personal action Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
Issue: WON the dismissal is correct (NO) which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been
Ruling: [W]hat determines the nature of the action and which done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within
court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations in the a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
complaint and the character of the relief sought.". However, as entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to
the alleged dispossession occurred in 1990, the one-year assert it.
period to bring a case for forcible entry had expired since the The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon
Badillos filed their suit only in December 1997. We thus grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of
construe that the remedy they availed of is the plenary action society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the
of accion publiciana, which may be instituted within 10 years.
statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is
It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right
principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of
of possession of realty independently of title. It also refers to permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from
the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of
withholding of possession of the realty." a court to sure affirmative relief against his opponent and,
after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
A void judgment is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86
of any right nor the creator of any obligation. All acts A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule,
performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have it was further said that the question whether the court had
no legal effect." jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the
SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. parties was not important in such cases because the party is
MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order
SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA BAGUIO, defendants, MANILA of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for
SURETY AND FIDELITY CO., INC. (CEBU BRANCH) bonding the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated —
company and defendant-appellant obviously for reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily
submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on
FACTS: The action at bar, which is a suit for collection of a sum the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction
of money in the sum of exactly P 1,908.00, exclusive of interest or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S.
filed by Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog against Spouses 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141
Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio, was originally U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo.
instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has
1948. A month prior to the filing of the complaint, the Judiciary affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular
Act of 1948 (R.A. 296) took effect depriving the Court of First matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that
Instance of original jurisdiction over cases in which the same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
demand, exclusive of interest, is not more than P 2,000.00
(Secs. 44[c] and 86[b], R.A. 296.) Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases
mentioned in the resolution of the Court of Appeals of May 20,
The case has already been pending now for almost 15 years, 1963 (supra) — to the effect that we frown upon the
and throughout the entire proceeding the appellant never "undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for
raised the question of jurisdiction until the receipt of the Court decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable,
of Appeals' adverse decision. and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse — as well
Considering that the Supreme Court has the exclusive as in Pindañgan etc. vs. Dans, et al., G.R. L-14591, September
appellate jurisdiction over all cases in which jurisdiction of any 26, 1962; Montelibano, et al., vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co.,

Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court before this Court, after almost three long decades of active and
of Industrial Relation et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and participative litigation, that the issue on lack of jurisdiction was
Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277. raised. The Court shall thus examine whether the doctrine of
estoppel by laches finds application.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety
became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the FACTS:
question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance
of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of Involved in the case are two portions of land consisting of one
the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in hectare each, which are parts of a bigger lot, i.e., Lot No. 1305-
force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior A. The said lot contains an area of 47,817 square meters,
courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the situated at Mamali II, Lambayong, Province of Cotabato (now
proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Sultan Kudarat) registered in the name of respondent
Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain Guillermo Lucero (Guillermo). The lot was previously owned by
affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication and registered in the name of respondent Guillermo's parents,
on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was Marcos Lucero (Marcos) and Tomasa Rebamonte (Tomasa).
rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise Respondent parents, obtained a loan from the Rehabilitation
the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct Finance Corporation, now the Development Bank of the
on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the Philippines (DBP). As security for the loan, Lot No. 1305-A was
proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced mortgaged. For their failure to pay the loan obligation, DBP
on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up extrajudicially foreclosed the lot, wherein DBP, as the lone
their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is bidder, purchased the lot in the public auction conducted. The
not only patent but revolting. period of redemption then lapsed without Marcos and Tomasa
redeeming the lot. DBP entered into a repurchase agreement
Coming now to the merits of the appeal: after going over the
with Marcos and Tomasa. The latter were able to repurchase
entire record, We have become persuaded that We can do
the lot from DBP and regained ownership over the lot.
nothing better than to quote in toto, with approval, the
decision rendered by the Court of Appeals x x x granting Afterwards, on November 14, 1980, Marcos and Tomasa sold
plaintiffs' motion for execution against the surety x x x Lot No. 1305-A to respondent Guillermo.
However, prior to the sale that occurred on November 14,

1980, three separate unregistered sales, executed by Tomasa,
and respondent’s sisters Josefin and Agripina in favor of
Tomasa's cousin, petitioner Lino who allegedly took place
covering certain portions of Lot No. 1305-A spanning an area
of three hectares.
Determined to recover possession of the portions of the lot

occupied by petitioner Lino, respondent Guillermo, together
with his wife Genoveva Lucero (respondents Sps. Lucero),
instituted a Complaint for Recovery of Real Estate Property,
Recovery of Possession, Quieting of Title, Damages, and
Attorney's Fees against the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte. The
case was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Tacurong City.
The RTC rendered a Judgment voiding the two Deeds of

Absolute Sale dated May 29, 1976 and June 17, 1980 entered
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45
into by petitioner Lino and respondent Guillermo's sisters
DOCTRINE: Because of the elementary rule that jurisdiction Josefina and Agripina, respectively.The RTC held that during
over the subject matter is conferred by law, jurisdiction cannot the time that these deeds were executed, Josefina and
be bargained away by the litigant-parties. Otherwise stated, as Agripina had absolutely no right to convey the subject portions
a general rule, a party cannot be estopped in raising the ground as the lot was owned by their parents, Marcos and Tomasa.
of lack of jurisdiction. And such ground may be raised at any Marcos and Tomasa never authorized Josefina and Agripina to
stage of the proceedings, whether during trial or on appeal. sell any portion of the lot. However, the RTC declared that the
Nevertheless, it is well-established in our jurisprudence that, sale by Tomasa to petitioner Lino of the one-hectare portion
upon the existence of certain exceptional circumstances, a on February 5, 1976 was valid and binding.
party is deemed to have waived his or her right to raise the
ground of lack of jurisdiction. In the instant case, it is only

The CA denied the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte's appeal for lack of the subject lot was plainly indicated in the Complaint, a copy
of merit. of which was fully furnished to the petitioners. In fact, the
petitioners Sps. Rebamonte filed an Answer and an Amended
On their petition for review on certiorari, they are now Answer in response to the categorical allegations in the
invoking the issue on the jurisdiction of the RTC considering Complaint. Yet, the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte totally ignored
that the assessed value of the subject portions establish that the issue on jurisdiction in their responsive pleadings. Not even
the jurisdiction of the Complaint falls within the Municipal Trial a whimper on lack of jurisdiction was made.
Court of Tacurong City (MTC) and not the RTC.
As well, the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte participated in every
ISSUE: stage of the proceedings before the RTC and CA. Aside from
filing their Answer and Amended Answer, they even sought
• Whether sps. Rebamonte can invoke the issue on affirmative relief before the RTC by filing a counterclaim
Jurisdiction on the subject matter first time on against the respondents Sps. Lucero. A Motion for
appeal? Reconsideration was likewise filed by the petitioners Sps.
Rebamonte before the RTC. Analogous to the factual
RULING:
circumstances in Tijam, the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte were
No. The Complaint filed by the respondents Sps. Lucero before also able to file an appeal and a Motion for Reconsideration
the RTC for "Recovery of Real Estate Property, Recovery of before the CA. Yet, even before the CA, the ground of lack of
Possession, Quieting of Title, Damages and for Attorney's jurisdiction was never invoked.
Fees" is unquestionably an action involving title to or
In Tijam, the unreasonable delay that warranted the
possession of real property, or any interest therein.
application of the doctrine of estoppel by laches spanned 15
According to Section 33(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, years. In Amoguis, the delay lasted for 22 years. In the instant
otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, case, reckoned from the date of the receipt of the respondents
as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 7691, the MTC has Sps. Lucero's Complaint in 1990 to the filing of the instant
exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve Petition in 2018, which was the first time the ground of lack of
title to, or possession of, real property located outside Metro jurisdiction was invoked by the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte,
Manila, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the an outstandingly long period of 28 years has passed. To make
property or interest therein does not exceed P20,000.00. matters worse, the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte fail to make
any justification whatsoever explaining why they failed to raise
As admitted by the respondents Sps. Lucero in their Complaint, the ground of lack of jurisdiction after almost three decades of
Lot No. 1305-A "has a total market assessed value litigation.
of P11,120.00. Hence, on the question of jurisdiction, the
petitioners Sps. Rebamonte are correct in saying that the RTC Therefore, the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte are estopped from
had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the instant case. invoking the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The Court refuses to
Considering that the assessed value of the subject property, as reward the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte's lethargy and
alleged by the respondents Sps. Lucero in their Complaint, is ineptitude by taking cognizance of their argument on lack of
well below P20,000.00, the MTC has jurisdiction over the jurisdiction. Equity, fair play, and public policy prevent the
Complaint. Court from doing so.
While it is true that the Court has held that the jurisdiction of
a court may be questioned at any stage of the proceedings, and G.R. No. 178842 January 30, 2017
that lack of jurisdiction is one of those excepted grounds where
the court may dismiss a claim or a case at any time when it
appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that any RENE H. IMPERIAL AND NIDSLAND RESOURCES AND
of those grounds exists, even if they were not raised in the DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. HON. EDGAR
answer or in a motion to dismiss, nevertheless, the Court has L. ARMES, PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 4, REGIONAL
likewise pronounced that this general rule is not absolute. It is TRIAL COURT, 5TH JUDICIAL REGION, LEGAZPI CITY AND
settled that, upon the existence of certain exceptional ALFONSO B. CRUZ, JR., Respondents.
circumstances, a party may be barred from raising lack of
subject matter jurisdiction on the ground of estoppel.
As already explained, the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte had FACTS:

every right to question the jurisdiction of the RTC. Same as 1. Julian C. Napal (Napal) and Imperial entered into a
in Tijam, the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte utterly failed to Memorandum of Agreement to organize a domestic
invoke the ground of lack of jurisdiction despite having full corporation to be named NIDSLAND. Under the Memorandum
knowledge of this ground, considering that the assessed value of Agreement, Napal and Imperial agreed to engage in the real
estate business. For his capital contribution to the corporation, 2. Respondents filed a MTD for lack of jurisdiction.
Napal undertook to convey to NIDSLAND a tract of land
RTC: DISMISSED. Presiding Judge Gregorio A. Consulta, without
consisting of four lots (the Property) covered by Transfer
issuing summons, dismissed the Petition motu proprio. He
Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 37737, 37738, 37739 and 21026,
justified his dismissal on the ground that regional trial courts
and to Imperial a two hectare portion of the Property situated
have no jurisdiction over the SEC and as such, an action
in Taysan, Legazpi City. Napal and Imperial intended to develop
assailing the decision of the SEC should be brought before the
this land into a subdivision. Imperial, on the other hand, as his
CA.
contribution to NIDSLAND, committed to perform the
following obligations: to settle Napal's obligation to the Rural CA: Aggrieved by the RTC Main Decision, Imperial and
Bank of Ligao, Inc., which was about to foreclose its mortgage NIDSLAND filed before the CA an appeal under Rule 41 of the
on the Property; pay Napal's tax liabilities to the Bureau of Rules of Court. In a Decision dated September 13, 2010
Internal Revenue (BIR) which encumbered with a tax lien the (Second Assailed Decision), the CA reversed the RTC Decision.
largest portion of the Property; fund NIDSLAND's initial The dispositive portion of the Assailed Decision states-
operating capital; and provide for Napal's personal drawings in WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated March 24, 2009,
an amount not exceeding P1,200,000. issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch -4, Legazpi City is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; accordingly, Civil Case No.
While Imperial faithfully complied with his obligations under
10325 is hereby DISMISSED.
the Memorandum of Agreement, Napal failed to convey to
NIDSLAND a certain portion of the Property. ISSUE/S: The core issue is whether RTC Legazpi City has
jurisdiction to declare the nullity of the Decision of the SEC. To
As Napal continued to refuse to convey the Subject Property
resolve this issue, we once again clarify the apparent 82 clash
to NIDSLAND under the Memorandum of Agreement, Imperial
filed on July 30, 1996, for himself and in representation of of jurisdiction between the SEC and the ordinary courts in
cases involving Presidential Decree No. 902-A.
NIDSLAND, a derivative suit (SEC Petition) before the Securities
and Exchange Commission. This was filed after the sale to Cruz HELD:
but before its registration.
We rule that that the RTC Petition should have been dismissed
On November 10, 1998, SEC Hearing Officer Santer G. Gonzales for lack of jurisdiction. We likewise rule that the SEC Decision
(SEC Hearing Officer Gonzales) rendered a Decision in favor of was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to an
Imperial and NIDSLAND (SEC Decision). The Decision declared excess of jurisdiction. There is no law at the time pertinent to
the Deed of Absolute Sale between Napal and Cruz void ab this case, which allows the filing of a petition for annulment of
initio as the SEC found that the sale was simulated and was judgment before the regional trial courts and the CA to set
intentionally made to appear to have been perfected prior to aside a void judgment of the SEC on the basis of lack of
the filing of the notice of lis pendens. Thus, the SEC ordered jurisdiction. We hasten to emphasize, however, that this
the cancellation of the TCT in the name of Cruz. Further, the pertains only to cases filed prior to Republic Act No. 8799 (RA
SEC directed Napal to execute the proper deed of conveyance 8799) which transferred the jurisdiction over intra-corporate
of the Subject Property in favor of NIDSLAND. The SEC also disputes to regional trial courts designated as commercial
mandated Napal to deliver the possession of the Subject courts. As to the latter, Rule 47 clearly applies.
Property to NIDSLAND.
This leads to the conclusion that the RTC Petition is .not the
Since Napal did not appeal the SEC Decision, it became final proper remedy to assail the SEC Decision. Since it is an action
and executory and was enforced on January 13, 1999. As for the annulment of judgment, the RTC Petition cannot
ordered in the SEC Decision, a Deed of Conveyance was issued prosper as we have already ruled that this remedy is not
on the same date, transferring the Subject Property to available in this particular case.
NIDSLAND. TCT No. 43936 in the name of Cruz was cancelled
and a new TCT No. 49730 was issued in the name of NIDSLAND However, the error in Cruz's RTC Petition does not
on January 19, 1999. automatically warrant a dismissal of these proceedings. We
rule that the SEC, in nullifying the sale between Napa! and Cruz
Napal filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of Judgment and in ordering the cancellation of Cruz's TCTs in favor of
under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. The CA promulgated a NIDSLAND, overstepped its jurisdiction. The SEC Decision was
Decision on August 31, 1999 dismissing the Petition for rendered with grave abuse of discretion.
Annulment of Judgment. The CA explained that Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court is not available to annul the judgment of the Through the years that the SEC had quasi-judicial power over
SEC. According to the CA, the proper remedy in this case is a intracorporate controversies, this Court explained the
special civil action for certiorari and prohibition. None of the delineation of jurisdiction between the trial courts and the
parties appealed the CA Decision. Cruz filed a pleading SEC. Our finding in this case that the SEC acted with grave
denominated as a "Petition" before RTC Legazpi City (RTC abuse of discretion is rooted on the proper understanding of
Petition), which sought to nullify the SEC Decision.

the limits of the jurisdiction of the SEC. We now review this brought before us, we must also place premium on the
Court's pertinent rulings on the jurisdiction of the SEC. importance of rules of procedure. Rules of procedure serve to
protect the interests of litigants who seek redress before the
The SEC also does not possess the expertise to go into the courts. They ensure that litigants plead before the proper
reception of evidence and the conduct of hearings geared for forum that has the necessary expertise and legal tools to fully
the purpose of resolving issues proper for a civil action. The resolve a legal problem. They also ensure that litigants employ
resolution of a civil action requires preponderance of evidence the proper remedies that will allow them to successfully obtain
as a burden of proof. On the other hand, cases before quasi- the appropriate relief. With this in mind, litigants must be
judicial bodies require only substantial evidence. Hence, the
more circumspect in invoking the jurisdiction of the various
propriety of annulling a sale and cancelling a Torrens title- tribunals and the multiple remedies available to them.
which are in the nature of a civil action-on the basis merely of
substantial evidence determined by an administrative body WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals' Resolution dated March 6,
raises due process concerns. 2007 in the First Consolidated Case is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Further, we rule that Branch 4, Regional Trial Court,
When grave abuse of discretion taints a judgment, it becomes Legazpi City has no jurisdiction over Cruz's Petition. Thus, the
wholly void. It may be challenged by direct action which has Regional Trial Court's Decision dated March 24, 2009 is
for its object the declaration of the nullity of the judgment. It NULLIFIED. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated September
may also be set aside through a collateral attack.
13, 2010 in the Second Consolidated Case is also REVERSED
Hence, because the SEC Decision was issued with grave abuse and SET ASIDE. We rule that the Securities and Exchange
of discretion and is therefore void, all acts emanating from it Commission's Decision dated November 10, 1998 is VOID.
have no force and effect. Thus, the Deed of Conveyance issued Thus, the Deed of Conveyance dated January 13, 1999
pursuant to it has no legal effect. executed in compliance with this Decision is NULLIFIED. The
Nevertheless, while the certificates of title issued in the name

Buenaflor vs. Ramirez
of NIDSLAND arose from a void judgment, this Court cannot
nullify them in these proceedings. The indefeasibility of a GR.No. 201607, February 15, 2017
Torrens title prevents us from doing so. Further, we are bound proper parties can file the appropriate petition for cancellation
by rules on jurisdiction and the nature of the proceedings of title in the trial court which has jurisdiction to nullify the
before us. certificates of title issued to NIDSLAND by virtue of the void
SEC Decision.
Moreover, there are procedural barriers that prevent us from
determining the validity of the certificates of title questioned Facts:
in this case. First, we do not have jurisdiction over the
cancellation of certificates of title. Second, the nature of the Eufemio Domingo is the chairman of the Presidential
action before us bars us from going into the certificates of title Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC). He appointed respondent Jose
themselves. We emphasize that this case is a petition for R. Ramirez Jr., as an executive assistant 3 and concurrently
review on certiorari of an action for annulment of judgment on designated him as assistant accountant. Eufemio Domingo
the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Our ruling is anchored on the resigned, and petitioner Cesar D. Buenaflor succeeded him.
lack of jurisdiction of the SEC to annul the sale to Cruz and The petitioner terminated Ramirez as of the same date as
order the cancellation of the certificates of title. In this former chairman Domingo’s resignation on the ground that his
Decision, we emphasized that the proper jurisdiction to annul tenure had expired by virtue of the position of Executive
the sale and to cancel the certificates of title belongs to the Assistant being personal and confidential, and, hence, co-
regular courts, in particular, the regional trial courts. We must terminus with that of the appointing authority. Believing that
thus also respect the rule on jurisdiction and exercise restraint his appointment had been contractual in nature, Ramirez sued
in this case. The proper action to cancel the void certificates of in the RTC to declare his dismissal null and void. Buenaflor,
title must be brought before the tribunal designated by law to represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, filed his
possess jurisdiction over the matter. The proper party may, answer contending that Ramirez had failed to exhaust all
however, use this Decision as it definitively settles that the administrative available remedies and should have instead
certificates of title issued to NIDSLAND arose out of a void filed an administrative complaint in the Civil Service
judgment and as such, should have no force and effect. This Commission. On December 28, 2007 the RTC rendered
Decision is res judicata as to this question. judgement declaring Buenaflor guilty of unlawful termination
because he had not discharged his burden of proving that
Further, we also cannot rule on the validity of the sale of the Ramirez’s employment was co-terminus with that of former
Subject Property to Cruz as well as Napal's obligation to Chairman Domingo. Buenaflor assailed the order of the RTC by
Imperial and NIDSLAND under the Memorandum of petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, alleging that the
Agreement. These matters require the presentation of facts RTC thereby gravely abused its discretion amounting to lac or
before the proper forum and through appropriate procedural
remedies. While we endeavor to fully settle legal disputes
excess of jurisdiction. Motion for Reconsideration was also prosecution of the employees. The mere fact that the parties
denied. are members of the Civil Service should not remove the
controversy from the general jurisdiction of the courts of
justice and place them under special jurisdiction of the Civil
Issue: Service Commission. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred only by the Constitution or law. It cannot be
acquired through a waiver. It cannot be enlarged by the
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed omission of the parties. It cannot be conferred by the
grave abuse of discretion in not declaring that the RTC has no acquiescence of the court. Specifically, Batas Pambansa Blg.
jurisdiction to hear and decide the instant civil service-related 129 as amended, did not vest jurisdiction to RTC over matters
case, which is under the sole jurisdiction of the Civil Service relating to the Civil Service. Consequently, the RTC could not
Commission? arrogate unto itself the hearing and decision of a subject
matter outside of its jurisdiction. Buenaflor was entirely
justified in raising in his answer the special and affirmative
defense that the RTC was bereft of jurisdiction to hear and
Held:
resolve Ramirez’s complaint. When a court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the
action. Any further actions the RTC took, including rendering
Yes. Buenaflor submits that it was the Civil Service decision on December 28, 2007 were void and ineffectual.
Commission, not the RTC, that had jurisdiction over Ramirez’s Verily, the decisions or orders rendered by courts without or in
complaint that involved matters relative to the Civil Service. excess of their jurisdiction are void and cannot be the source
The submission of Buenaflor is upheld. The jurisdiction of a of any right, or the creator of any obligation. A void judgement
court over the subject matter of a particular action is being non-existent in legal contemplation does not become
determined by the plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint and final and executory even belated filing of an appeal.
the principal relief seeks in the light of the law that apportions
the jurisdiction of courts. It cannot be disputed that Ramirez’s
complaint was thereby challenging the validity of his
SUSPENDED JURISDICTION
termination from the service and that he thereby wanted the
RTC to pry into the circumstances of the termination. Such PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES SADIC AND
challenge was outside of the RTC’s sphere of authority. AISHA KURANGKING and SPOUSES ABDUL SAMAD T.
Instead, it was the Civil Service Commission that was vested by DIANALAN AND MORSHIDA L. DIANALAN, respondents.
law with jurisdiction to do so. Disciplinary cases involving the
personnel actions affecting employees in the Civil Service
Commission, like appointment or separation from service are Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission. Indeed, the Constitution vests in the Civil Service FACTS:
Commission the jurisdiction over all employees of the Respondents filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court
Government, including all its branches, subdivisions,
(RTC) of Marawi City against PAL for breach of contract
instrumentalities, and agencies, as well as government-owned resulting in damages due to negligence in the custody of the
or controlled corporations with original charters. Ramirez was
missing luggage.
one such employee. The agency in which he had been
appointed by Chairman Domingo was the PAGC, and office PAL moved for the suspension of the proceedings on the
established by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo through E.O ground that it had suffered serious business losses due to the
12 as an agency under the Office of the President. His Asian economic crisis, followed by a massive strike by its
complaint thus came under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service employees which was subsequently approved by SEC in
Commission. We reiterate that any question regarding the conformity with Section 6(d) of Presidential Decree No. 902, as
appointment or separation from the service of a civil servant amended. In line with this, PAL moved for the suspension of
was lodged in the Civil Service Commission as the sole arbiter the proceedings before the Marawi City RTC.
of controversies relating to the Civil Service. It is clarified that
RTC denied the motion on ground that the claim of
the Civil Service Commission has jurisdiction over a case
respondents was only yet to be established. PAL's motion for
involving a civil servant if it can be regarded as equivalent to
reconsideration was denied by the trial court.
labor dispute resoluble under the Labor Code. Conversely, the
regular court has jurisdiction if the case can be decided under PAL went to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari
the general laws, such as when the case is for the recovery of which was dismissed on the ground of that PAL failed to serve
private debts, or for the recovery of damages due to a copy of the petition on respondents.
slanderous remarks of the employer or for malicious

ISSUE: WON the proceedings before the trial court should have RTC granted the motion and dismissed the case. Due to the
been suspended in view of the approval of SEC of Corporate non-delivery of the certificates of title by Abad, et al., DBP filed
Rehabilitation of PAL (YES) its Motion/Application to Call on Plaintiff's Surety Bond.
RULING: RTC – denied the motion on the ground that it is no part of its
residual power
The rules require trial courts to issue, among other things, a
stay order in the "enforcement of all claims, whether for CA – Dismissed
money or otherwise, and... whether such enforcement is by
Issue: WON RTC erred in denying the motion
court action or otherwise," against the corporation under
rehabilitation, its guarantors and sureties not solidarily liable Ruling: Residual jurisdiction refers to the authority of the trial
with it. court to issue orders for the protection and preservation of the
rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated
Section 6, Rule 4, of the Interim Rules of Procedure On
by the appeal; to approve compromises; to permit appeals by
Corporate Rehabilitation, provides:
indigent litigants; to order execution pending appeal in
"SEC. 6. Stay Order. - If the court finds the petition to be accordance with Section 2, Rule 39; and to allow the
sufficient in form and substance, it shall withdrawal of the appeal, provided these are done prior to the
transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal, even
(b) staying enforcement of all... claims, whether for money or if the appeal has already been perfected or despite the
otherwise and whether such enforcement is by court action or approval of the record on appeal 24 or in case of a petition for
otherwise, against the debtor, its guarantors and sureties not review under Rule 42, before the CA gives due course to the
solidarily liable with the debtor; petition.
The stay order is effective from the date of its issuance until The "residual jurisdiction" of the trial court is available at a
the dismissal of the petition or the termination of the stage in which the court is normally deemed to have lost
rehabilitation proceedings. jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in the
A "claim" is said to be "a right to payment, whether or not It is appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of the
reduced to judgment, liquidated or unliquidated, fixed or appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the records on
contingent, matured or unmatured, disputed or undisputed, appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original records or
legal or equitable, and secured or unsecured. The Court has the records on appeal. In either instance, the trial court still
defined the word "claim," contemplated in Section 6(c) of P.D. retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to issue protective
902-A, as referring to debts or demands of a pecuniary nature orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent
and the assertion of a right to have money paid as well. Verily, litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the
the claim of private respondents against petitioner PAL is a withdrawal of the appeal.
money claim for the missing luggages, a financial demand, that
From the foregoing, it is clear that before the trial court can be
the law requires to be suspended pending the rehabilitation
said to have residual jurisdiction over a case, a trial on the
proceedings.
merits must have been conducted; the court rendered
RESIDUAL JURISDICTION judgment; and the aggrieved party appealed therefrom.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. In this case, there was no trial on the merits as the case was
HON. EMMANUEL C. CARPIO dismissed due to improper venue and respondents could not
have appealed the order of dismissal as the same was a
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 dismissal, without prejudice.
Abad, et al., represented by their attorney-in-fact, Manuel L. HIERARCHY OF COURTS
Te, filed a complaint for delivery of certificates of title,
damages, and attorney's fees against petitioner Development LIZA L. MAZA, SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, TEODORO A.
Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and Guarantee Fund for Small CASIÑO, AND RAFAEL V. MARIANO , petitioners, vs. HON.
and Medium Enterprise (GFSME) before the RTC. They pray for EVELYN A. TURLA
the for the issuance of a writ of seizure, pending hearing of the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
case, for delivery of their certificates of title they claimed to be
unlawfully detained by DBP and GFSME. They alleged that their Petitioners were former members of the House of
certificates of title were submitted to DBP for safekeeping Representatives. Police Senior Inspector Arnold M. Palomo
pursuant to the loan agreement they entered into with DBP. (Inspector Palomo), Deputy Provincial Chief of the Nueva Ecija
Criminal Investigation and Detection Team, referred to the
RTC issued the Writ of Seizure. DBP filed its Omnibus Motion Provincial Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, three
to Dismiss Complaint and to Quash Writ of Seizure. (3) cases of murder against petitioners and 15 other persons.

Investigating Prosecutor Antonio L. Lapus, Jr. issued a determination of probable cause by the prosecutors is an
subpoena requiring petitioners to testify at the hearings. executive function. Thus, when Judge Turla held that the
Petitioners filed a Special Appearance with Motion to Quash prosecutors' conduct of preliminary investigation was
Complaint/Subpoena and to Expu[ng]e Supporting Affidavits. "incomplete" 79 and that their determination of probable
They alleged that the investigating prosecutor has no cause "has not measured up to [the] standard," 80 she
jurisdiction over them since no criminal Information was filed encroached upon the exclusive function of the prosecutors.
against them. This was denied and subsequently, probable Instead of determining probable cause, she ruled on the
cause for the murder of the deceased. However, the panel propriety of the preliminary investigation.
considered one of the suspects, Julie Flores Sinohin, as a state
HA DATU TAWAHIG (RODERICK D. SUMATRA), TRIBAL
witness. The panel recommended that the corresponding
CHIEFTAIN, HIGAONON TRIBE, PETITIONER, v. THE
Informations be filed against the remaining suspects. The case
HONORABLE CEBU CITY PROSECUTOR I LINETH LAPINI
was filed before 2 branches in RTC Nueva Ecjia.
Petition for Mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Petitioners moved for the Judicial Determination of Probable
Procedure
Cause with Prayer to Dismiss the Case Outright on the Guimba
case. After hearing, the case was dismissed for lack of probable Petitioner was previously accused of rape by the City
cause. On the other Palayan case, Judge Turla ruled that "the Prosecutor. The Information was filed before the court of
proper procedure in the conduct of the preliminary respondent Judge Singco. She issued a warrant of arrest, but
investigation was not followed in [the Palayan] cases. She at the time, petitioner cannot be arrested. When he finally was
ordered a conduct of preliminary investigation anew. arrested, he filed a Motion to Quash on the ground that RTC
has no jurisdiction over the case of indigenous people.
Issues:
1. WON the petitioners violated the hierarchy of courts A certain Vicente Gonzales appeared before the court claiming
by filing the present petition (NO) that he is the customary lawyer of the petitioner. However,
Judge Singco ordered him to show proof that he has the right
2. WON the order of Judge Turla is valid (NO) to appear before the Court as counsel of the petitioner.
Ruling: Thus, Sumatra filed this Petition for Mandamus. He notes that
Igot had already brought her accusations against him before
1. The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of the concerned Council of Elders and that the Dadantulan Tribal
courts was created by this court to ensure that every level of Court was subsequently formed.
the judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and
efficient manner. The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an Issues:
iron-clad rule. This court has "full discretionary power to take
1. WON petitioner violated the hierarchy of courts (YES)
cognizance and assume jurisdiction [over] special civil actions
for certiorari . . . filed directly with it for exceptionally 2. WON RTC has jurisdiction over the case (YES)
compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues
clearly and specifically raised in the petition." In this case, the Ruling:
presence of compelling circumstances warrants the exercise of 1. The 1987 Constitution vests this Court original
this Court's jurisdiction. At the time the petition was 8led, jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
petitioners were incumbent party-list representatives. The mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. However, it is
possibility of their arrest and incarceration should the assailed not only this Court that has the competence to issue writs of
Orders be affimed, would affect their representation of their certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. The Court of Appeals
constituents in Congress. and regional trial courts are equally capable of taking
2. Upon filing of an information in court, trial court cognizance of petitions for such writs.
judges must determine the existence or non-existence of Nonetheless, the original jurisdiction this Court shares with the
probable cause based on their personal evaluation of the Court of Appeals and regional trial courts is not a license to
prosecutor's report and its supporting documents. They may immediately seek relief from this Court. Petitions for certiorari,
dismiss the case, issue an arrest warrant, or require the prohibition, and mandamus must be filed in keeping with the
submission of additional evidence. However, they cannot doctrine of hierarchy of courts
remand the case for another conduct of preliminary
investigation on the ground that the earlier preliminary 2. The capacity to prosecute and punish crimes is an
investigation was improperly conducted. The trial court judge's attribute of the State's police power.73 It inheres in "the
determination of probable cause is based on her or his sovereign power instinctively charged by the common will of
personal evaluation of the prosecutor's resolution and its the members of society to look after, guard and defend the
supporting evidence. The determination of probable cause by interests of the community, the individual and social rights and
the trial court judge is a judicial function, whereas the

the liberties of every citizen and the guaranty of the exercise basis of the conflicting claims of the parties and without the
of his rights." evidence being properly before it.
To yield criminal prosecution would be to disregard the State This doctrine of hierarchy of courts guides litigants as to the
and the Filipino people as the objects of criminal offenses. The proper venue of appeals and/or the appropriate forum for the
application of customary laws may enable a measure of issuance of extraordinary writs. Thus, although this Court, the
reparation for private injuries engendered by criminal CA, and the RTC have concurrent original jurisdiction[110] over
offenses, but it will never enable the consummate recompense petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
owed to the State and the Filipino people. Ultimately then, and habeas corpus, parties are directed, as a rule, to file their
yielding prosecution would mean sanctioning a miscarriage of petitions before the lower-ranked court. Failure to comply to
justice. sufficient cause for the dismissal of the petition.
It was never the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act's intent to An examination of the cases wherein this Court used
facilitate such miscarriage of justice. Its view of self- "transcendental importance" of the constitutional issue raised
governance and empowerment is not myopic, but is one that to excuse violation of the principle of hierarchy of courts would
balances. Preservation is pursued in the context of national show that resolution of factual issues was not necessary for the
unity and is impelled by harmony with the national legal resolution of the constitutional issue/s.
system. Customary laws cannot work to undermine penal
Strict observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts should
statutes designed to address offenses that are an affront to
sovereignty. not be a matter of mere policy. It is a constitutional imperative
given (1) the structure of our judicial system and (2) the
GIOS-SAMAR, INC., represented by its Chairperson requirements of due process.
GERARDO M. MALINAO, petitioner, vs. DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS and CIVIL The doctrine of hierarchy of courts operates to: (1) prevent
AVIATION AUTHORITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention
which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive
DOTC Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP), posted jurisdiction;[176] (2) prevent further over-crowding of the
an Invitation to Pre-qualify and Bid (Invitation) on the airport Court's docket;[177] and (3) prevent the inevitable and
development, operations, and maintenance of the Bacolod- resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of
Silay, Davao, Iloilo, Laguindingan, New Bohol (Panglao), and cases which often have to be remanded or referred to the
Puerto Princesa Airports. The Invitation stated that the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure,
Projects aim to improve services and enhance the airside and or as the court better equipped to resolve factual questions.
landside facilities of the key regional airports through
RULE 1, SECTIONS 1 TO 6, ROC
concession agreements with the private sector. The Projects
will be awarded through competitive bidding. The general
procedure for the bidding of the Bundled Projects stated that
" [p]rospective [b]idders may bid for only Bundle 1 or Bundle TANCREDO REDEÑA, Petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF
2, or bid for both Bundle 1 and Bundle 2. APPEALS and LEOCADIO REDEÑA, Respondents.
Giosmara GIOS-SAMAR, Inc., represented by its Chairperson G.R. No. 146611; February 6, 2007
Gerardo M. Malinao (petitioner), suing as a taxpayer and
invoking the transcendental importance of the issue, filed the
present petition for prohibition. It assails the constitutionality FACTS: certiorari under rule 65
of the bundling of the Projects and seeks to enjoin the DOTC
Petitioner Tancredo filed an action for partition against his
and the CAAP from proceeding with the bidding of the same.
older half-brother, Leocadio before the RTC..
CAAP asserts that the petition violated the basic fundamental
In the complaint it was alleged that Tancredo and Leocadio are
principle of hierarchy of courts. Petitioner had not alleged any
both sons of Maximo: Tancredo by marriage with Magdelena
special and compelling reason to allow it to seek relief directly
and Leocadio by the previous marriage to Emerenciana. It is
from the Court. The case should have been filed with the trial
also alleged that Maximo left several pieces of realty.
court, because it raises factual issues which need to be
threshed out in a full-blown trial. The RTC ruled that the property located in Maate be
partitioned while the other realty belongs to Leocadio.
Issue: WON Petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of
court (YES) Petitioner filed a notice of appeal before the CA and was
directed to file an appellant’s brief. However, the petitioner
Ruling: The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and it is
failed to file an appellant’s brief thus the CA dismissed the
beyond its function to make its own findings of certain vital
appeal as having been considered abandoned.
facts different from those of the trial court, especially on the

After 8 months from the issued resolution above by the CA, G.R. No. 147550 January 26, 2005
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. However, the CA ISIDRA VDA. DE VICTORIA, Substituted by MARIO
denied the motion. VICTORIA, Petitioners,
Thereafter, petitioner filed a Petition for Relief. In that vs.
pleading, petitioner prays the CA to set aside its dismissal HON. COURT OF APPEALS, et. al., Respondent
resolution and reinstate his appeal and grant him a fresh
period of forty-five (45) days from notice within which to file
his appellant’s brief. The CA denied the petition for relief.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in not granting the petition PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45
for relief
DOCTRINE: “A cause of action may be single although the
HELD: The CA is correct in not granting the relief. Generally a plaintiff seeks a variety of remedies. The mere fact that the
counsel’s negligence has a binding effect on the litigant plaintiff prays for multiple reliefs does not indicate that he has
however there are some cases or exceptions that the Court has stated more than one cause of action. The prayer may be an
relaxed this rule. However, none of these exceptions are aid in interpreting the petition and in determining whether or
present in this case. not more than one cause of action is pleaded. If the allegations
From the petition, it is clear that this Court is called upon to of the complaint show one primary right and one wrong, only
relax the application of procedural rules, or suspend them one cause of action is alleged even though other matters are
altogether, in favor of petitioner’s substantial rights. incidentally involved, and although different acts, methods,
elements of injury, items of claims or theories of recovery are
The Rules itself expressly states in Section 2 of Rule 1 that the set forth. Where two or more primary rights and wrongs
rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their appear, there is a joinder of causes of action.”
object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding. FACTS
Courts, therefore, not only have the power but the duty to
construe and apply technical rules liberally in favor of Luis and Zenaida Gibe (respondent spouses) filed a Complaint
substantive law and substantial justice. Furthermore, this for Ejectment and Damages with a Writ of Preliminary
Court, unlike courts below, has the power not only to liberally Mandatory Injunction (ejectment case) against Isidra Vda. de
construe the rules, but also to suspend them, in favor of Victoria, mother of petitioner, and other occupants
substantive law or substantial rights. Such power inherently (defendants) of a parcel of land that respondent spouses
belongs to this Court, which is expressly vested with rule- acquired from the heirs of the late Judge Lantin.
making power by no less than the Constitution.
The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) ruled in favor of respondent
This Court has relaxed the rule on the binding effect of spouses. Thus, the respondent spouses, without notice to the
counsel’s negligence and allowed a litigant another chance to defendants in the ejectment case, filed a motion for Immediate
present his case (1) where the reckless or gross negligence of Execution and Demolition. Eight days after promulgation and
counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (2) when receipt of the MTC decision, the defendants in the ejectment
application of the rule will result in outright deprivation of the case filed a notice of appeal without, however, filing a
client’s liberty or property; or (3) where the interests of justice supersedeas bond. Therefore, the MTC granted the motion for
so require. None of these exceptions obtains here. Immediate Execution and Demolition filed by the respondent
spouses.
For a claim of counsel’s gross negligence to prosper, nothing
short of clear abandonment of the client’s cause must be A Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition assailing the MTC
shown. Here, petitioner’s counsel failed to file the appellant’s Decision was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), averring
brief. While this omission can plausibly qualify as simple that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the ejectment case and
negligence, it does not amount to gross negligence to justify committed grave abuse of discretion in deciding said case and
the annulment of the proceedings below. ordering the execution pending appeal.
The RTC issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. In the

meantime, the appeal filed by the defendants in the ejectment
case before another branch of the RTC was dismissed for
failure to file their appeal memorandum (August ruling).
The RTC dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground

that the MTC, in deciding the ejectment case, did not commit

an error of jurisdiction but possibly only an error of judgment, prescribed procedure. Concomitant to a liberal application of
thus a certiorari proceeding is unwarranted. The RTC denied the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration dated December 7, party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to
1999. abide by the rules.
On March 28, 2000, petitioner instituted another special civil Petitioner has not provided any cogent explanation that would
action for certiorari, this time with the Court of Appeals (CA), absolve him of the consequences of his repeated failure to
questioning both the August decision of the RTC and the abide by the rules.
decision of the MTC. On April 10, 2001, the petitioner filed a
motion for extension of time to file the petition conditioned on NOTE: This case also held that the petitioner’s allegation that
the Motion of Extension of Time to File a Petition for Review the DARAB, not the MTC, should have jurisdiction due to the
on Certiorari. The CA dismissed the certiorari petition on the presence of a tenancy relationship. But there was no evidence
grounds that the correct remedy was an ordinary appeal and to substantiate the existence of the essential requisites of
that the instant petition is filed out of time. However, tenancy.
petitioner was granted, on his motion, an extension of thirty
days to file the petition, conditioned upon the timeliness of the Furthermore, the Court also censured petitioner’s attempts,
motion for extension. The CA denied the motion for with aid of counsel, to deliberately mislead this Court as to the
reconsideration for being filed 2 days beyond the material dates and status of the decision appealed from,
reglementary period (receipt of resolution was received on ordering them to show cause on why they should not be held in
June 5, 2000, but motion for reconsideration was only filed on contempt of court and on why petitioner’s counsel should not
June 22). be disciplinarily dealt with.
ISSUE
HERNANDEZ VS RURAL BANK OF LUCENA, INC.
• Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when 81 SCRA 75, Jan 10 1978
it ruled that the instant petition was filed out of time. (NO)
RULING FACTS: Spouses Hernandez obtained from the Rural Bank of

Lucena, Inc. a loan of P6,000, payable in a year. The loan was
The appeal must be denied. secured by a mortgage on their two lots situated in Cubao,
Quezon City. About three months after that loan was obtained,
Petitioner invoked before this Court and the lower courts the
the Lucena bank became a distressed bank. It then received
policy in favor of a liberal interpretation of the Rules of
directives from the Central Bank which it construed as a
Procedure. However, this was not appreciated.
directive to suspend operations. Before the expiration of the
In the case at bar, the reglementary period to appeal had in one-year term of the loan, Hernandez offered to pay the loan
fact expired almost 10 months prior to the filing of petitioner’s by means of a check which was drawn against the bank by a
motion for extension of time on April 10, 2001. Furthermore, depositor, the San Pablo Colleges, and which was payable to
the CA correctly denied the petition because it was filed two Hernandez. The payment was never consummated. Despite
days late, as shown in the facts. several attempts, Hernandez’s check was refused, Lucena bank
being no longer in a position to honor withdrawals. In the
Additionally, the instant petition for review (this case) was filed meantime, the Monetary Board had decided to liquidate the
out of time on May 12, 2001, almost 11 months after the Lucena bank. A petition was filed with CFI of Manila for
expiration of the period to appeal on June 20, 2000. assistance and supervision in the liquidation of the Lucena
bank. Hernandez made a judicial deposit of the check with the
The case should have been terminated as early as January 4, CFI of Lipa City. He then filed with the same court an action to
2000 with the lapse of the period within which petitioner compel the Rural Bank and Central Bank as liquidator to accept
could have appealed from the RTC decision. the check and to execute the cancellation of the real estate
mortgage.
Although it has been said time and again that litigation is not a
game of technicalities, that every case must be prosecuted in ISSUE: Whether or not the venue was properly laid?
accordance with the prescribed procedure so that issues may HELD: An action to foreclose a real estate mortgage is a real
be properly presented and justly resolved, this does not mean action, but an action to compel the mortgagee to accept
that procedural rules may altogether be disregarded. Rules of payment of the mortgage debt and to release the mortgage is
procedure must be faithfully followed except only when, for a personal action. Section 2(a), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court
persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of provides that "actions affecting title to, or for recovery of
an injustice commensurate with his failure to comply with the possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure
of mortgage on, real property, shall be commenced and tried Respondent filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with
in the province where the property or any part thereof lies" Prayer for Issuance of TRO and/or Injunction with the Regional
The rule mentions an action for foreclosure of a real estate Trial Court (RTC) averring that the MeTC’s Decision does not
mortgage but does not mention an action for the cancellation bind him since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over his
of a real mortgage. In the instant case, the action is primarily person. Respondent likewise averred that the MeTC lacked
to compel the mortgagee to accept payment of the mortgage jurisdiction over the case for two reasons: (1) petitioners'
debt and to release the mortgage. Hence, the venue of complaint has no cause of action for failure to make a prior
plaintiffs' personal action is the place where the defendant or demand to pay and to vacate; and (2) petitioner's non-referral
any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the of the case before the barangay.
plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the
A copy of the petition for annulment of judgment was allegedly
plaintiff (Sec. 2[b], Rule 4). The term "resides" in section 2[b]
served to the petitioner through Sally Gonzales (Ms. Gonzales),
of Rule 4 refers to the place of actual residence or the place of
the secretary of petitioner's counsel, Atty. Daniel S. Frias (Atty.
abode and not necessarily to the legal residence or domicile
Frias).
San Juan, Batangas might be the place where the plaintiffs
have their domicile or legal residence but there is no question The RTC issued an Order that respondent is withdrawing his
that Chicago St., Cubao, Quezon City is their place of abode or application for a TRO and is now pursuing the main case for
the place where they actually reside. So, the action in this case, annulment of judgment.
which is a personal action to compel the defendants to honor
the check in question and to cancel the mortgage, should have Respondent filed an Ex-Parte Motion, to declare petitioner in
been filed in Quezon City if the plaintiffs intended to use their default, on the ground that despite her receipt of the
residence as the basis for their choice of venue. summons, she has yet to file any pleading.
Sheriff III Armando S. Camacho, sent a Notice to Pay and to
Vacate to respondent. Attached to the notice was the Writ of
G.R. No. 194262, February 28, 2018 Execution.
BOBIE ROSE D. V. FRIAS, as represented by MARIE REGINE The RTC issued a TRO enjoining the MeTC from implementing
F. FUJITRA, Petitioner vs. ROLANDO F. ALCAYDE, its Decision, and setting the hearing for respondent's prayer
Respondent for writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioner filed a Preliminary. Submission on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction over her person.
Petition for Review on Certiorari
RTC: Granted petitioner's Preliminary Submission. The
DOCTRINE: Due process dictates that jurisdiction over the
summons and copies of the petition and its attachments were
person of a defendant can only be acquired by the courts after
not duly served upon petitioner, either personally or through
a strict compliance with the rules on the proper service of
substituted service of summons strictly in accordance with the
summons.
Rules. There is no proof that Ms. Gonzales or Atty. Frias was
FACTS: Petitioner Bobie Rose D.V. Frias, as lessor and authorized by the petitioner to receive summons on her
respondent Rolando Alcayde, as lessee, entered into a behalf. Since the face of the Officer's Return is patently
Contract of Lease involving a residential house and lot (subject defective, the RTC ruled that the presumption of regularity of
property) for a period of one year with a monthly rental of performance of duty under the Rules does not apply. The RTC,
Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000). Respondent refused to thus, ordered the dismissal of the petition for annulment of
perform any of his contractual obligations, which had judgment.
accumulated for 24 months in rental arrearages.
A series of motions and pleadings were filed by both parties.
Petitioner filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer with the
The RTC, through Judge Juanita T. Guerrero, issued an Order,
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC. The process server, Tobias N.
granting respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, on the
Abellano (Mr. Abellano) tried to personally serve the summons
ground that he was not given an opportunity to file his
to respondent on January 14 and 22, 2006, but to no avail.
Comment or Opposition to petitioner's August 11, 2008
Through substituted service, summons was served upon
Manifestation and Omnibus Motion.
respondent's caretaker, May Ann Fortiles (Ms. Fortiles).
Both parties filed their manifestations and the RTC issued an
The MeTC rendered a Decision in favor of the petitioner and
Order denying petitioner's Manifestation and Omnibus
ordered respondent to vacate the subject premises and to pay
Motion.
the petitioner the accrued rentals at 12% legal interest, plus
P10,000 in attorney's fees. Frias moved for reconsideration but was denied. Respondent
filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Default, to declare petitioner in
default for the latter's failure to comply with the RTC's order
requiring her to file an answer to the Petition for Annulment would set a dangerous precedent that will sanction a violation
of Judgment. of due process. It will foil a respondent from taking steps to
protect his interest, merely because he was not previously
CA: Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA but was informed of the pendency of the petition for annulment of
however denied. judgment filed in court.
ISSUE: 1. WON the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the In this case, had the RTC granted the respondent's petition, the
petitioner. MeTC's July 26 2006 (ordered respondent to vacate the subject
2. WON the CA gravely erred in holding that the RTC need not premises and to pay the petitioner the accrued rentals at 12%
acquire jurisdiction over the petitioner as long as it has legal interest, plus ₱10,000 in attorney’s fees) judgment would
acquired jurisdiction over the res. have been declared a nullity. This would have resulted to the
following consequences: as to the respondent, he would no
HELD: 1. NO. It is elementary that courts acquire jurisdiction longer be required to pay the rentals and vacate the subject
over the plaintiff or petitioner once the complaint or petition property; and, as to the petitioner, she would be deprived of
is filed. On the other hand, there are two ways through which her right to demand the rentals and to legally eject the
jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent is acquired respondent. Clearly, through the RTC's judgment on the
through coercive process - either through the service of petition, only the parties' interests, i.e., rights and obligation,
summons upon them or through their voluntary appearance in would have been affected. Thus, a petition for annulment of
court. judgment is one in personam. It is neither an action in rem nor
In the case of Guiguinto Credit Cooperative, Inc. (GUCCI) v. an action quasi in rem.
Torres: We disagree with the CA's disquisition that since jurisdiction
Fundamentally, the service of summons is intended to give over the res is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the RTC, the
official notice to the defendant or respondent that an action jurisdiction over the person of herein petitioner may be
has been commenced against it. The defendant or respondent dispensed with. Citing the case of Villanueva v. Nite, the CA
is thus put on guard as to the demands of the plaintiff as stated concluded that the petition is not an action in personam since
in the complaint. The service of summons upon the defendant it can be filed by one who was not a party to the case. Suffice
becomes an important element in the operation of a court's it to say that in Villanueva, this Court did not give a categorical
jurisdiction upon a party to a suit, as service of summons upon statement to the effect that a petition for annulment of
the defendant is the means by which the court acquires judgment is not an action in personam. Neither did We make
jurisdiction over his person. Without service of summons, or a remark that said petition is either an action in rem or a quasi
when summons are improperly made, both the trial and the in rem. The issue in Villanueva was simply whether or not the
judgment, being in violation of due process, are null and void, CA erred in annulling and setting aside the RTC's decision on
unless the defendant waives the service of summons by the ground of extrinsic fraud. Unlike in this case, there were no
voluntarily appearing and answering the suit. issues pertaining to the proper service of summons, to the
nature of a. petition for annulment of judgment or to the
When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have denial of due process by reason of a defect in the service of
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. This is not, summons.
however, always the case. Admittedly, and without subjecting
himself to the court's jurisdiction, the defendant in an action
can, by special appearance object to the court's assumption on There was neither a valid service of summons in person nor a
the ground of lack of jurisdiction. If he so wishes to assert this valid substituted service of summons over the person of the
defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the purpose petitioner
of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court, otherwise, he shall
be deemed to have submitted himself to that jurisdiction. At any rate, regardless of the type of action - whether it is in
personam, in rem or quasi in rem — the proper service of
Jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant or summons is imperative.
respondent cannot be acquired notwithstanding his
knowledge of the pendency of a case against him unless he was Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the
validly served with summons. Such is the important role a valid Philippines, as in this case, the service of summons may be
service of summons plays in court actions done by personal or substituted service as laid out in Sections
6 and 7 of Rule 14. Indeed, the preferred mode of service of
2. YES. The CA held that the court need only acquire summons is personal service. To warrant the substituted
jurisdiction over the res, which was "through the institution of service of the summons and copy of the complaint, (or, as in
the petition for annulment of judgment" with the RTC, this case, the petition for annulment of judgment), the serving
conveniently invoking that "jurisdiction over the res x x x is x x officer must first attempt to effect the same upon the
x acquired x x x as a result of the institution of legal defendant in person. Only after the attempt at personal
proceedings with the court" If left unchecked, this disposition
service has become impossible within a reasonable time may answer: for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift
the officer resort to substituted service. order of default with motion for reconsideration, is considered
voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction. This, however,
A perusal, however, of the Officer's Return discloses that the is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such
following circumstances, as required in Manotoc, were not that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge,
clearly-established: (a) personal service of summons within a among others, the court's jurisdiction over his person cannot
reasonable time was impossible; (b) efforts were exerted to be considered to have submitted to its authority.
locate the party; and (c) the summons was served upon a
person of sufficient age and discretion residing at the party's The records show that the Frias never received any copy of the
residence or upon a competent person in charge of the party's the respondent's petition to annul the final and executory
office or place of business. judgment of the MeTC in the unlawful detainer case. As
explained earlier, the copy of the said petition which was
The Officer's Return likewise revealed that no diligent effort served to Ms. Gonzales was defective under the Rules of Court.
was exerted and no positive step was taken to locate and serve Consequently, in order to question the trial court's jurisdiction,
the summons personally on the petitioner. Upon having been the petitioner filed a number of pleadings and motions.
satisfied that the petitioner was not present at her given
address, Sheriff Tolentino immediately resorted to substituted In all these pleadings and motions, the petitioner never
service of summons by proceeding to the office of Atty. Frias, faltered in declaring that the trial court did not acquire
petitioner's counsel. Evidently, Sheriff Tolentino failed to show jurisdiction over her person, due to invalid and improper
that she made several attempts to effect personal service for service of summons.
at least three times on at least two different dates. It is likewise
This Court is of the view that the petitioner never abandoned
evident that Sheriff Tolentino simply left the "Notice of Raffle
and Summons" with Ms. Gonzales, the alleged secretary of her objections to the trial court's jurisdiction even when she
elevated the matter to the CA through her petition for
Atty. Frias. She did not even bother to ask her where the
certiorari. The filing of her pleadings and motions, including
petitioner might be. There were no details in the Officer's
that of her subsequent posturings, were all in protest of the
Return that would suggest that Sheriff Tolentino inquired as to
respondent's insistence on holding her to answer the petition
the identity of Ms. Gonzales. There was no showing that Ms.
for annulment of judgment in the RTC, which she believed she
Gonzales was the one managing the office or business of the
was not subject to. Indeed, to continue the proceeding in such
petitioner, such as the president or manager; and that she has
case would not only be useless and a waste of time, but would
sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of the
violate her right to due process.
petitioner in the summons, its importance, and the prejudicial
effects arising from inaction on the summons.
Indeed, without specifying the details of the attendant In its Order, the RTC harped on the fact that petitioner's
circumstances or of the efforts exerted to serve the summons, counsel, Atty. Frias, attended the summary hearing of the
a general statement that such efforts were made will not respondent's prayer for the issuance of a TRO. This, however,
suffice for purposes of complying with the rules of substituted can hardly be construed as voluntary appearance. There was
service of summons. This is necessary because substituted no clear intention on the part of Atty. Frias to be bound by the
service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It is a proceedings. Precisely, his "special" appearance in the hearing
method extraordinary in character and hence may be used was to challenge the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over her client.
only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by This Court held in Ejercito, et al. v. M.R. Vargas Construction,
statute. Sheriff Tolentino, however, fell short of these et al that the presence or attendance at the hearing on the
standards. For her failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply application of a TRO should not be equated with voluntary
with the requirements of substituted service, the same is appearance, thus:
rendered ineffective. As such, the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official functions, which is generally “…While it is true that an appearance in whatever form,
accorded to a sheriffs return, does not obtain in this case. without explicitly objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over
the person, is a submission to the jurisdiction of the court over
Special appearance to question a court's jurisdiction is not the person, the appearance must constitute a positive act on
voluntary appearance the part of the litigant manifesting an intention to submit to
the court's jurisdiction. Thus, in the instances where the Court
Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is
upheld the jurisdiction of the trial court over the person of the
acquired either by the coercive power of legal processes
defendant, the parties showed the intention to participate or
exerted over his person, or his voluntary appearance in court.
As a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is be bound by the proceedings through the filing of a motion, a
plea or an answer.”
deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. It is
by reason of this rule that we have had occasion to declare that Neither is the service of the notice of hearing on the
the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file application for a TRO on a certain Rona Adol binding on

respondent enterprise. The records show that Rona Adol ordered the sheriff to put the spouses Go in possession of the
received the notice of hearing on behalf of an entity named subject property, which caused the cancellation of Muñoz's
JCB. More importantly, for purposes of acquiring jurisdiction adverse claim and notice of lis pendens.
over the person of the defendant, the Rules require the service
When the spouses Go defaulted on the payment of their loan,
of summons and not of any other court processes.
BPI Family foreclosed the mortgage and executed in favor of
As we have consistently pronounced, if the appearance of a the spouses Spouses Chan a Deed of Absolute Sale for Php
party in a suit is precisely to question the jurisdiction of the 3,350,000.00.
said tribunal over the person of the defendant, then this
In 1991, RTC-Branch 95 rendered its Decision against Spouses
appearance is not equivalent to service of summons, nor does
Ching and Go and found that Muñoz's signature on the Deed
it constitute an acquiescence to the court's jurisdiction.
of Absolute Sale was forged and she never sold the subject
To recapitulate, the jurisdiction over the person of the property to her sister. Further, it held that Sps Go were not
petitioner was never vested with the RTC despite the mere innocent purchasers for value of the subject property.
filing of the petition for annulment of judgment. The manner
The CA affirmed the judgment of the lower court and ordered
of substituted service by the process server was apparently
Sps Go to vacate the property.
invalid and ineffective. As such, there was a violation of due
process. In other words, the service of summons is a vital and In 1994, the RTC-Branch 95 issued an Alias Writ of Execution
indispensable ingredient of due process and compliance with 1994. On February 2, 1994, Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut,
the rules regarding the service of the summons is as much an along with 20 other men, some of whom were armed, ousted
issue of due process as it is of jurisdiction. Regrettably, as had Muñoz of possession of the subject property by stealth, threat,
been discussed, the Constitutional right of the petitioner to be force, and intimidation.
properly served the summons and be notified has been utterly
overlooked by the officers of the trial court. Court of Appeals held that the MeTC should have dismissed the
forcible entry case on the ground of "lis pendens"; that the
[G.R. No. 142676. June 6, 2011.] notice of lis pendens was already cancelled from the spouses
Go's certi􏰁cate of title at the time they mortgaged the subject
EMERITA MUÑOZ, petitioner, vs. ATTY. VICTORIANO R.
property to BPI Family; and that the title to the subject
YABUT, JR. and SAMUEL GO CHAN, respondents.
property was already free of any and all liens and
encumbrances when the spouses Chan purchased the said
property from BPI Family.
[G.R. No. 146718. June 6, 2011.]
In G.R. No. 142676, Muñoz is seeking the reversal, annulment,
EMERITA MUÑOZ, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES SAMUEL GO and setting aside of the Decision of the CA which affirmed the
CHAN and AIDA C. CHAN, and THE BANK OF THE Orders of RTC Branch 88 of Quezon City. The RTC dismissed
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, respondents.
the Civil Case, the forcible entry case instituted by Muñoz
against Atty. Yabut and Samuel Go Chan before the MeTC
Branch 33 of Quezon City; and nullified the MeTC Order
First Division, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. granting Muñoz's prayer for the issuance of a writ of
This is a consolidated petition for review on certiorari under preliminary mandatory injunction which restored possession
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. of the subject property to Muñoz.
FACTS: The subject property in this case is a house and lot In G.R. No. 146718, Muñoz is praying for the reversal, setting
situated in Diliman, Quezon City which was formerly owned by aside, and nullification of the CA, which affirmed the Orders of
Yee Ching. Due to the valuable services rendered by Emerita the RTC Branch 95 denying Muñoz's Motion for an Alias Writ
Munoz, Yee L. Ching agreed to have the subject property of Execution and Application for Surrender of the Owner's
transferred to Muñoz. Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 53297 against respondents BPI and
the spouses Samuel Go Chan and spouses Chan.
In 1972, Muñoz purportedly sold the subject property to her
sister and wife of Yee Ching, Emilia M. Ching. ISSUE:
In 1979, Emilia Ching sold the subject property to spouses Go. Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the decision of the
Muñoz filed a complaint for the annulment of the deeds of RTC.
absolute sale in the name of spouses Go. The civil case was HELD:
raffled to RTC-Branch 95. Thereafter, Muñoz caused the
annotation of a notice of lis pendens on TCT. In Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. v. Enriquez, we described an
action for reconveyance as follows: An action for reconveyance
The RTC-Branch 95 granted the spouses Go's motion for the is an action in personam available to a person whose property
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and has been wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in
another's name. Although the decree is recognized as PERLITA A. URBANO and ATTY. EDWARD MARTIN,
incontrovertible and no longer open to review, the registered respondents.
owner is not necessarily held free from liens. As a remedy, an
G.R. No. 156187; November 11, 2004
action for reconveyance is filed as an ordinary action in the
ordinary courts of justice and not with the land registration
court. Reconveyance is always available as long as the property
has not passed to an innocent third person for value. A notice FACTS: petition under rule 45
of lis pendens may thus be annotated on the certificate of title Petitioner Go and Looyuko, co-owners of Noah Ark, applied for
immediately upon the institution of the action in court. The an Omnibus Line accommodation with respondent UCPB in the
notice of lis pendens will avoid transfer to an innocent third amount of P900,000,000 which was secured by Real Estate
person for value and preserve the claim of the real owner. Mortgages over parcels of land: one in the name of Mr.
The rule is that: (1) a judgment in rem is binding upon the Looyuko and the other in the name of Noah Ark refinery both
whole world, such as a judgment in a land registration case or of which were located at Mandaluyong City,
probate of a will; and (2) a judgment in personam is binding The said Omnibus Line was subsequently cancelled by UCPB
upon the parties and their successors-in-interest but not upon hence petitioner Go demanded the return of the parcels of
strangers. A judgment directing a party to deliver possession land however UCPB refused and instead had the Real Estate
of a property to another is in personam; it is binding only mortgages notarized and filed for an extrajudicial foreclosure
against the parties and their successors-in-interest by title over the real estate mortgage with the Office of the Clerk of
subsequent to the commencement of the action. An action for Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Mandaluyong City.
declaration of nullity of title and recovery of ownership of real
property, or re-conveyance, is a real action but it is an action
in personam, for it binds a particular individual only although
Petitioner Go filed a complaint for Cancellation of Real Estate
it concerns the right to a tangible thing. Any judgment therein
Mortgage and damages, with prayer for temporary restraining
is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded.
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, against
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent bank and its officers before the RTC-Pasig.
we: Petitioner Go alleged that he is a co-owner of one of the lands
which was only in the name of Mr. Looyuko; that UCPB was
GRANT Emerita Muñoz's petition in G.R. No. 142676. We aware of this; that as the Omnibus Line was cancelled so as the
REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision dated July 21, 1995 and REM were likewise cancelled; that UCPB refused to return the
Resolution dated March 9, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA- said parcel of lands; that it notarized the REM and caused the
G.R. SP No. 35322, which affirmed the Orders dated June 10, extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage.
1994 and August 5, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88
of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-94-20632. We DIRECT the Respondent bank filed a motion to dismiss on the ground: 1)
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 33 of Quezon City to reinstate that the court has no jurisdiction over the case due to
Emerita Muñoz's complaint for forcible entry in Civil Case No. nonpayment of the proper filing and docket fees; 2) that the
8286 and to resume the proceedings only to determine complaint was filed in the wrong venue; 3) an indispensable
whether or not Emerita Muñoz was forcibly deprived of party/real party in interest was not impleaded and, therefore,
possession of the subject property from February 2, 1994 until the complaint states no cause of action; 4) that the complaint
finality of this judgment, and if so, whether or not she is was improperly verified; and 5) that petitioner is guilty of
entitled to an award for damages for deprivation of possession forum shopping and submitted an insufficient and false
during the aforementioned period of time; and, certification of non-forum shopping
DENY Emerita Muñoz's petition in G.R. No. 146718 for lack of The RTC granted the writ of preliminary injunction. Likewise
merit, and AFFIRM the Decision dated September 29, 2000 and the RTC denied the motion to dismiss. On appeal, the CA
Resolution dated January 5, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA- dismissed the said civil case due to the ground of improper
G.R. SP No. 40019, which in turn, a􏰁rmed the Orders dated venue.
August 21, 1995 and October 3, 1995 of the Regional Trial
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s complaint for cancellation
Court, Branch 95 of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-28580.
of real estate mortgage is a personal or real action for the
No pronouncement as to costs. purpose of determining venue.
SO ORDERED. HELD: The petitioner’s complaint is a real action. As held by the

SC an action for the cancellation of the real estate mortgage is
a real action considering that a real estate mortgage is a real
JIMMY T. GO, petitioner, vs. UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS right; a real property itself and affecting the title thereto.
BANK, ANGELO V. MANAHAN, FRANCISCO C. ZARATE, Therefore, as a real action it should be commenced where the
subject property lies which in this case is in Mandaluyong City.
In a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real Otherwise stated, a cause of action has three elements, to wit,
property, or as provided for in Section 1, Rule 4, a real action (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under
is an action affecting title to or possession of real property, or whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the
interest therein. These include partition or condemnation of, part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such
or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property. The venue for right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant
real actions is the same for regional trial courts and municipal violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of
trial courts -- the court which has territorial jurisdiction over the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff.
the area where the real property or any part thereof lies.
Applying the foregoing principle to the instant case, we rule
Personal action is one brought for the recovery of personal that private respondent’s cause of action accrued only on July
property, for the enforcement of some contract or recovery of 20, 1995, when its demand for payment of the Home Notes
damages for its breach, or for the recovery of damages for the was refused by petitioner. It was only at that time, and not
commission of an injury to the person or property. The venue before that, when the written contract was breached and
for personal actions is likewise the same for the regional and private respondent could properly file an action in court.
municipal trial courts -- the court of the place where the
The cause of action cannot be said to accrue on the uniform
plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the
maturity date of the Home Notes as petitioner posits because
defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the
at that point, the third essential element of a cause of action,
election of the plaintiff, as indicated in Section 2 of Rule 4
namely, an act or omission on the part of petitioner violative
The case of Carandang v. Court of Appeals, is more particularly of the right of private respondent or constituting a breach of
instructive. There, we held that an action for nullification of the the obligation of petitioner to private respondent, had not yet
mortgage documents and foreclosure of the mortgaged occurred.
property is a real action that affects the title to the property.
G.R. No. 167724, June 27, 2006
Thus, venue of the real action is before the court having
jurisdiction over the territory in which the property lies, which BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK v. VDA. DE COSCOLLUELA
is the Court of First Instance of Laguna.
RULE 2, SECTIONS 1 TO 6
FACTS: Petition for Review under Rule 45
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
Respondent and her late husband Oscar obtained an
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARMED FORCES AND POLICE agricultural sugar crop loan from Far East Bank & Trust Co.
SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC. (AFPSLAI), (later merged with BPI) for crop years 1997 and 1998. In the
respondents. book of Far East, the loan account was treated as a single
account, and evidenced by 67 promissory notes. Sps.
Coscolluela executed a real estate mortgage in favor of FEBTC
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 over their parcel of land as security of loans on credit
accommodation obtained and those that may be obtained.
FACTS: Private respondent filed a complaint for a sum of Under the terms and conditions of the real estate mortgage, in
money against petitioner before RTC QC. Petitioner admitted
the event of failure to pay the mortgage obligation or any
in its Answer that being the registered owner of the Home portion thereof, the entire principal, interest, penalties, and
Notes, the instruments if indebtedness issued in favor of a
other charges shall be immediately due; and Far East mat
corporation named Fund Centrum Finance and were sold and
foreclose the same extra judicially. For failure to settle
assigned to respondent. Petitioner subsequently filed a outstanding obligation on the maturity dates, Far East sent a
Motion to Dismiss alleging that it is not a real party in interest
final demand letter to respondent demanding payment. Since
since it was a mere trustee of FCFI. respondent failed to settle her obligation, Far East filed a
RTC – MD denied/ Another MD was filed on the ground of petition for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged
prescription which was alos denied property, but only only for 31 of the promissory notes. During
pendency of said case, Far East filed a complaint for collection
CA – Petition denied of money representing the amounts for the 36 other
ISSUE: WON the action already prescribed (NO) promissory notes. In respondent’s answer, she alleged that the
complaint was barred by litis pendentia for the pending
RULING: Well-settled is the rule that since a cause of action petition for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the REM. Petitioner
requires, as essential elements, not only a legal right of the presented a loan officer as sole witness, who testified that
plaintiff and a correlative duty of the defendant but also "an respondent were granted a loan, which was a “single loan
act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right," account.” Respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence
the cause of action does not accrue until the party obligated contending that the loan officer’s admission, that there is only
refuses, expressly or impliedly, to comply with its duty. one loan account secured by the REM thus barred the personal

action for collection. She insisted that the filing of said learning of the same, Spouses Gabor filed an action for legal
complaint should be dismissed. Petitioner opposed the redemption. Samson and Ramos thereafter rescinded their
demurrer, stating that each promissory note constituted a agreement. The trial court dismissed the action for legal
separate contract. The trial court denied the demurrer on the redemption which resversed by the CA and became final.
ground that each note covered a loan distinct from the others. Later, Samson filed an action for partition of real property
Respondent filed MR but denied, prompting her to file a which was denied on the ground of res judicata. Samson, filed
certiorari petition under Rule 65 with CA. CA granted the annother action for recovery of property or its value before
petitioner, stating that the remedies sought are alternative RTC of Pasig. The RTC of Pasig dismissed the same for improper
and not cumulative. Thus, in denying the demurrer, RTC venue. Samsom argued that the action is real or personal in
committed grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner filed MR but it alternative, hence may be filed before RTC of Pasig or RTC of
was denied. Hence, this petition. Tanay.
ISSUE: Whether or not the collection suit should be dismissed? ISSUE: Whether or not the action of Samson si Real action.
HELD: Yes. Section 3, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil RULING: Yes. In this jurisdiction, we adhere to the principle
Procedure provides that a party may not institute one suit for that the nature of an action is determined by the allegations in
a single cause of action, and, if two or more suits are instituted the Complaint itself, rather than by its title or heading. Itis also
on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one on a a settled rule that what determines the venue of a case is the
judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground primary objective for the filing of the case. x x x19 While the
for the dismissal of others. The law does not permit the owner complaint of the petitioner was denominated as one for
of a single of entire cause of action or an entire or indivisible "Recovery of Property or its Value," all of his claims are actually
demand to divide and split the cause to make it the subject of anchored on his claim of ownership over the onethird (1/3)
several actions. The true rule which determined whether a portion of the subject property. In his complaint, petitioner
party has only a single and entire cause of action is whether sought the return of the portion of the subject property or its
the entire amount arises from one and the same act or value on the basis of his co-ownership thereof. Necessarily, his
contract or the several parts arise from distinct and different alternative claim for the value of the property is still dependent
acts. As gleaned from the plain terms of the REM, the real on the determination of ownership, which is an action
estate of respondent served as a continuing security liable for affecting title to or possession of real property or an interest
obligations already obtainer and obligations obtained therein. Clearly, petitioner’s claim is a realaction which should
thereafter. In this case, the action of petitioner is anchored on have been filed in the court where the property lies, which in
one and the same cause: the nonpayment of respondent. this case, is the RTC of Morong, Rizal.
Though the debt may be covered by several promissory notes
G.R. No. L-46000 March 18, 1985
and is covered by a real estate mortgage, the latter is
subsidiary to the former and both refer to one and the same GLICERIO AGUSTIN (Deceased) as Administrator of the
obligation. A mortgage creditor may institute two alternative Intestate Estate of Susana Agustin, petitioner-plaintiff-
remedies against the debtor, either to collect debt or to appellant, vs. LAUREANO BACALAN and the PROVINCIAL
foreclose mortgage, but not both. SHERIFF OF CEBU, respondents-defendants-appellees.
G.R. NO. 182970 July 23, 2014
EMILIO S. SAMSON vs. SPOUSES JOSE AND GUILLERMINA DOCTRINES: Under our rules of procedure, the validity of a
GABOR, et. al judgment or order of the court, which has become final and
PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 45 executory, may be attacked only by a direct action or
proceeding to annul the same, or by motion in another case if,
DOCTRINE: A cause of action is a formal statement of the in the latter case, the court had no jurisdiction to enter the
operative facts that give rise to a remedial right. The question order or pronounce the judgment (section 44, Rule 39 of the
of whether the complaint states a cause of action is Rules of Court).
determined by its averments regarding the acts committed by
When court transcends the limits prescribed for it by law and
the defendant. Thus it "must contain a concise statement of
assumes to act where it has no jurisdiction, its adjudications
the ultimate or essential facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause
will be utterly void and of no effect either as an estoppel or
of action." Failure to make a sufficient allegation of a cause of
otherwise
action in the complaint "warrants its dismissal."
FACTS: Bacalan is a lessee of a one-door ground floor space in
FACTS: Spouses Gabor is the owner of the subject parcel of
land located in Tanay. Spouses Gabor executed a Deed of a building owned by the late Susana Agustin. Due to
nonpayment of rentals despite repeated demands an action to
Assignment in favor of Samson as attorney's fees. Samson in
eject him was filed.
turn, executed a Deed of Assignment in favor of Ramos,
transfering the undivided portion of the parcel of land. Upon

In his answer, the defendant-appellee included a counter- The first proceeding is a direct attack against the order or
claim alleging that the present action was "clearly unfounded judgment, because it is not incidental to, but is the main object
and devoid of merits, as it is tainted with malice and bad faith”. of, the proceeding. The other one is the collateral attack, in
which the purpose of the proceedings is to obtain some relief,
City Court of Cebu: rendered judgment dismissing the other than the vacation or setting aside of the judgment, and
counterclaim and ordering the defendant to vacate the the attack is only an incident. A third manner is by a petition
premises in question and to pay the plaintiff the sum of for relief from the judgment order as authorized by the
P3,887.10 as unpaid back rentals and the sum of P150.00 as statutes or by the rules, such as those expressly provided in
attorney's fees. From this decision, the defendant filed an
Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, but in this case it is to be noted
appeal with Branch Ill of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. that the relief is granted by express statutory authority in the
CFI: Judgment is hereby required in favor of the defendant, same action or proceeding in which the judgment or order was
ordering plaintiff to pay damages. entered.
No appeal was taken by the plaintiff-appellant. The decision ISSUES: Whether or not moral damages may be awarded
lapsed into finality and became executory. Plaintiff's counsel ejectment cases.
filed a motion for reconsideration, confessing his fault and Whether or not the Court of First Instance may, in an appeal,
giving the reason why he failed to perfect the appeal on time. award the defendant-appellee's counterclaim in an amount
The motion was denied. exceeding or beyond the jurisdiction of the court of origin.
Thereafter, with the aid of new counsel, the plaintiff-appellant Whether or not the present action for the annulment of the
filed a complaint with Branch V, Court of First Instance of Cebu,
judgment in the ejectment case is the proper remedy after it
against the defendant and the Deputy Sheriff of Cebu for the
has become final and executory.
declaration of the nullity of the above-cited decision of Branch
III, Court of First Instance of Cebu in the ejectment case on the RULING:
ground that the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction was null
and void from the beginning for the following reasons: 1. Yes. Plaintiff-appellant loses sight of the fact that the money
judgment was awarded in the concept of a counterclaim,
(a) It grants relief in the total sum of P16,000.00 (exclusive of which a defending party may set up(Section 6, Rule 6, Revised
costs), which is clearly beyond the jurisdiction of the City Court Rules of Court). The grant of moral damages, in the case at bar,
of Cebu. (P10, 000 maximum) as a counterclaim, and not as damages for the unlawful
detention of property must be upheld. However, the amount
(b) Moreover, said Decision grants moral damages to the thereof is another matter.
defendant in the sum of P10,000.00 which constitutes a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. 2. No. The rule is that a counterclaim not presented in the
inferior court cannot be entertained in the Court of First
A motion to dismiss was filed by the defendant on the grounds
Instance on appeal. Thus, the defendant-appellee's
that the plaintiff has no cause of action and that the court lacks
counterclaim beyond P10,000.00, the jurisdictional amount of
jurisdiction to declare the nullity of a decision of another
the city Court of Cebu, should be treated as having been
branch of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. deemed waived. It is as though it has never been brought
While rejecting the second ground for the motion to dismiss, before trial court. It may not be entertained on appeal.
the court sustained the defendant and ruled:
The amount of judgment, therefore, obtained by the
This Court believes that the present complaint fails to allege a defendant-appellee on appeal, cannot exceed the jurisdiction
valid cause of action as the same is only a clear attempt at of the court in which the action began. Since the trial court did
utilizing the remedy for the annulment of the judgment not acquire jurisdiction over the defendant's counterclaim in
rendered by this Court to offset the adverse effects of failure excess of the jurisdictional amount, the appellate court,
to appeal. likewise, acquired no jurisdiction over the same by its decisions
or otherwise.
CA: Certified the same to us on the ground that it involves pure
questions of law. Yes. It is a well-settled rule that when court transcends the
limits prescribed for it by law and assumes to act where it has
Under our rules of procedure, the validity of a judgment or no jurisdiction, its adjudications will be utterly void and of no
order of the court, which has become final and executory, may effect either as an estoppel or otherwise. The Court of First
be attacked only by a direct action or proceeding to annul the Instance, in the case at bar, having awarded judgment in favor
same, or by motion in another case if, in the latter case, the of the defendant-appellee in excess of its appellate jurisdiction
court had no jurisdiction to enter the order or pronounce the to the extent of P6,000.00 over the maximum allowable award
judgment (section 44, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court). of P10,000.00, the excess is null and void and of no effect. Such
being the case, an action to declare the nullity of the award as

brought by the plaintiff-appellant before the Court of First ... Provided, That where there are several claims or causes of
Instance of Cebu, Branch V is a proper remedy. action between the same or different parties, embodied in the
same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the
G.R. No. L-66620 September 24, 1986 totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of
REMEDIO V. FLORES, Petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE HEILIA S. whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different
MALLARE-PHILLIPPS, IGNACIO BINONGCAL & FERNANDO transactions. ...
CALION, Respondent Section 11 of the Interim Rules provides thus:
APPEAL BY CERTIORARI Application of the totality rule.-In actions where the
DOCTRINE: The Court rules that the application of the totality jurisdiction of the court is dependent on the amount involved,
rule under Section 33(l) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and the test of jurisdiction shall be the aggregate sum of all the
Section 11 of the Interim Rules is subject to the requirements money demands, exclusive only of interest and costs,
for the permissive joinder of parties under Section 6 of Rule 3 irrespective of whether or not the separate claims are owned
which provides as follows: by or due to different parties. If any demand is for damages in
a civil action, the amount thereof must be specifically alleged.
Permissive joinder of parties.-All persons in whom or against
whom any right to relief in respect to or arising out of the same Petitioner compares the above-quoted provisions with the
transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether pertinent portion of the former rule under Section 88 of the
jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except as Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended which reads as follows:
otherwise provided in these rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined ... Where there are several claims or causes of action between
as defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or the same parties embodied in the same complaint, the amount
fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may
of the demand shall be the totality of the demand in all the
arise in the action; but the court may make such orders as may
causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action
be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being arose out of the same or different transactions; but where the
embarrassed or put to expense in connection with any claims or causes of action joined in a single complaint are
proceedings in which he may have no interest. separately owned by or due to different parties, each separate
FACTS: Flores sued the respondents for the collection of sum claim shall furnish the jurisdictional test. ...
of money with the RTC. The first cause of action alleged in the and argues that with the deletion of the proviso in the former
complaint was against Ignacio Binongcal for refusing to pay the rule, the totality rule was reduced to clarity and brevity and the
amount of P11,643 representing cost of truck tires which he jurisdictional test is the totality of the claims in all, not in each,
purchased on credit from Flores on various occasions from of the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of
August to October, 1981. The second cause of action was action arose out of the same or different transactions.
against resp Fernando Calion for allegedly refusing to pay the
amount of P10,212 representing cost of truck tires which he This argument is partly correct.
purchased on credit from pet on several occasions from
Brillo vs. Buklatan (former rule): Separate claims against
March, 1981 to January, 1982.
several defendants of different amounts each of which is not
Binongcal filed a MTD on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since more than P2,000 and falls under the jurisdiction of the justice
the amount of the demand against said resp was only of the peace court. The several claims do not arise from the
P11,643.00, and under Section 19(8) of BP129 the RTC shall same transaction or series of transactions and there seem to
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction if the amount of the be no questions of law or of fact common to all the defendants
demand is more than P20K. as may warrant their joinder under Rule 3, section 6.
Although another person, Fernando Calion, was allegedly The difference between the former and present rules in cases
indebted to pet in the amount of P10,212.00, his obligation of permissive joinder of parties may be illustrated by the two
was separate and distinct from that of the other resp. Calion cases which were cited in the case of Vda. de Rosario vs. Justice
joined in moving for the dismissal of the complaint. of the Peace as exceptions to the totality rule.
The Regional Trial Court of Baguio City and Benguet Province In Soriano y Cia vs. Jose, 29 dismissed employees joined in a
dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. complaint against the defendant to collect their respective
claims, each of which was within the jurisdiction of the
ISSUE: Whether the trial court correctly ruled on the municipal court although the total exceeded the jurisdictional
application of the permissive joinder of parties based on the
amount, this Court held that under the law then the municipal
present ‘novel’ totality rule? court had jurisdiction. Although the plaintiffs' demands were
RULING: Yes. The pertinent portion of Section 33(l) of BP129 separate, distinct and independent of one another, their joint
reads as follows: suit was authorized under Section 6 of Rule 3 and each
separate claim furnished the jurisdictional test.
In International Colleges, Inc. vs. Argonza, 25 dismissed RTC ruled in favor of the respondents. In its ruling, RTC found
teachers jointly sued for unpaid salaries, the MC had that the total of the two claims is definitely more than
jurisdiction because the amount of each claim was within, P20,000.00 which at the time of the incident in question was
although the total exceeded, its jurisdiction and it was a case the jurisdictional amount of the Regional Trial Court. This was
of permissive joinder of parties plaintiff under Section 6 of Rule subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
3.
ISSUE: WON RTC has jurisdiction over the case (YES)
Under the present law, the two cases would be under the
RULING: In ruling for the respondent, the Supreme Court
jurisdiction of the RTC. Similarly, Brillo vs. Buklatan and Gacula
applied the Totality Rule which can be found in Rule 2, Section
vs. Martinez, if the separate claims against the several
2 of the Rules on Civil Procedure. The above provision
defendants arose out of the same transaction or series of
presupposes that the different causes of action which are
transactions and there is a common question of law or fact,
joined accrue in favor of the same plaintiff/s and against the
they would now be under the jurisdiction of the RTC.
same defendant/s and that no misjoinder of parties is
In cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs involved.8 The issue of whether respondents’ claims shall be
or as defendants, under Section 6 of Rule 3, the total of all the lumped together is determined by paragraph (d) of the above
claims shall now furnish the jurisdictional test. Needless to provision. This paragraph embodies the "totality rule" as
state also, if instead of joining or being joined in one complaint exemplified by Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 1299 which states,
separate actions are filed by or against the parties, the amount among others, that "where there are several claims or causes
demanded in each complaint shall furnish the jurisdictional of action between the same or different parties, embodied in
test. the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the
totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of
The lower court correctly held that the jurisdictional test is whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different
subject to the rules on joinder of parties pursuant to Section 5
transactions." As previously stated, respondents’ cause of
of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that,
action against petitioners arose out of the same transaction.
after a careful scrutiny of the complaint, it appears that there Thus, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the
is a misjoinder of parties for the reason that the claims against
claims.
respondents Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct
and neither of which falls within its jurisdiction. G.R. No. 155736 March 31, 2005
PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC., and ALEXANDER SPOUSES DANILO and CRISTINA DECENA, Petitioners, vs.
BUNCAN, Petitioner, vs. STANDARD INSURANCE SPOUSES PEDRO and VALERIA PIQUERO, Respondent
COMPANY, INC., and MARTINA GICALE, Respondents.
(RESOLUTION)
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 DOCTRINE: “A cause of action may be single although the
plaintiff seeks a variety of remedies. The mere fact that the
FACTS: Crispin Gicale was driving the passenger jeepney
plaintiff prays for multiple reliefs does not indicate that he has
owned by his mother Martina Gicale, respondent herein. It was stated more than one cause of action. The prayer may be an
then raining. While driving north bound along the National aid in interpreting the petition and in determining whether or
Highway in Talavera, Nueva Ecija, a passenger bus, owned by not more than one cause of action is pleaded. If the allegations
Pantranco North Express, Inc., petitioner, driven by Alexander
of the complaint show one primary right and one wrong, only
Buncan, also a petitioner, was trailing behind. When the two
one cause of action is alleged even though other matters are
vehicles were negotiating a curve along the highway, the incidentally involved, and although different acts, methods,
passenger bus overtook the jeepney. In so doing, the elements of injury, items of claims or theories of recovery are
passenger bus hit the left rear side of the jeepney and sped set forth. Where two or more primary rights and wrongs
away. appear, there is a joinder of causes of action.”
Crispin reported the incident to Talavera Police Station and FACTS: Spouses Decena (petitioners) were the owners of a
respondent, the insurer of the jeep. he total cost of the repair parcel of land in Parañaque. Petitioners and Spouses Piquero
was P21,415.00, but respondent Standard paid only P8,000.00. (respondents) executed a Memorandum of Agreement, where
Martina Gicale shouldered the balance of P13,415.00. the former sold the property to the latter for P940,250.00
Respondent demanded reimbursement from Pantranco and its payable in six installments via post-dated checks. Under the
driver Buncan to no avail. Hence, respondent filed a complaint MOA, there was a condition that if two of the postdated checks
for sum of money before RTC Manila. Petitioners denied the would be dishonored, respondents would be obliged to
allegations against them and averred that RTC has no reconvey the property to the petitioners.
jurisdiction over the case.

After the first two checks were dishonored, petitioners filed a According to the petitioner, the respondent was able to pay
complaint against the respondents before the Regional Trial the total contract price. However, due to charges for damages
Court for the annulment of the sale/MOA, recovery of to the furniture, a lost key, and an excess guest, there was an
possession and damages. In their complaint, the property’s unpaid balance amounting to P47,810,00. The petitioner sent
value was declared as P6,900,000.00. a demand letter for the unsettled amount, but the respondent
failed to pay. The petitioner filed a Statement of Claim for
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the collection of money before the Metropolitan Trial Court
ground of improper venue and lack of jurisdiction over the (MeTC) Makati.
property subject matter of the action, alleging that the
principal action for rescission and recovery of possession is a The MeTC dismissed the claim with prejudice for lack of cause
real action and must be filed in Parañaque. of action, stating that the petitioner failed to prove by
preponderance of evidence the existence of an obligation and
Initially, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan upheld the that the respondent has an unpaid account.
petitioner’s position that Section 5(c) of Rule 2 of the Rules of
Court is applicable. However, after the case was re-raffled and Aggrieved, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before
a motion for reconsideration from the respondents, The RTC the Regional Trial Court (RTC), argued that the lack of cause of
ordered the dismissal of the complaint, holding that the action was not a valid ground for dismissal, and even if it was,
principal action is a real action. it should not be a ground for dismissal with prejudice. The
MeTC decided to dismiss the motion after hearing the
ISSUE: Whether or not the venue was properly laid in the RTC evidence of the defendant. According to the petitioner, the
of Bulacan (NO) remedy of the defendant should be a demurrer to evidence.
Whether or not Section 5, Rule 2 of the RoC is applicable to this
The RTC ruled against the petitioner, and held that there was
case (NO) no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MeTC.
RULING: Under Section 5, Rule 2 of the RoC, a party may, in Issue: Whether or not the MeTC erred in dismissing the claim
one pleading, assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many due to lack of cause of action.
causes of action as he may have against an opposing party
subject to the conditions therein enumerated, one of which is Held: No. The petition must be denied. The petitioner
Sec. 5(c). The said section provides that “where causes of misinterpreted the ruling in Macaslang v. Zamora. There is a
action are between the same parties but pertain to different difference between failure to state a cause of action, and the
venues or jurisdiction, the joinder may be allowed in the [RTC] lack of cause of action. The former refers to the insufficiency
provided one of the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of the pleading, and is a ground for dismissal under the Rules
of the said court and the venue lies therein.” of Court. On the other hand, lack of cause of action refers to a
situation where the evidence does not prove the cause of
Explaining this, Justice Feria declared that a real action and action alleged in the pleading.
personal action may be joined either in the RTC of the place
where the real property is located or where the parties reside. The basis of the court in dismissing the claim was the lack of
cause of action brought about by the petitioner’s failure in
This rule is not applicable to this case. The petitioners had only preponderantly establishing its claim against the respondent
one cause of action against the respondents, namely, the by clear and convincing evidence.
breach of the MOA upon the latter’s refusal to pay the first two
installments in payment of the property as agreed upon and G.R. No. 192971 January 10, 2018
turn over to the petitioners the possession of the real property,
FLORO MERCENE, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE
as well as the house constructed therein.
INSURANCE SYSTEM, respondent.
This is a real action. As such, the action should have been filed
This petition for review on certiorari.
in the proper court where the property is located, namely, in
Parañaque City. DOCTRINE: In order for cause of action to arise, the following
elements must be present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
G.R. No. 204729 August 6, 2014
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
Lourdes Suites (Crown Hotel Management Corporation), created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant
Petitioner, vs. Noemi Binaro, Respondent to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or
omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of
the plaintiff or constituting a breach of obligation of the
Facts: The petitioner is the owner of a hotel in Makati City. The defendant to the plaintiff.
petitioner and the respondent executed two contracts for FACTS: In 1965, 1965, petitioner Floro Mercene (Mercene)
room accommodations. obtained a loan from GSIS amouting to P29,500.00. As security,
a real estate mortgage was executed over Mercene's property
in Quezon City. In 1968, Mercene contracted another loan with Thus, applying the pronouncements of the Court regarding
GSIS for the amount of P14,500.00 and secured as real estate prescription on the right to foreclose mortgages, the Court
mortgage on the the same parcel of land. finds that the CA did not err in concluding that Mercene's
complaint failed to state a cause of action.
G.R. No. 212674 March 25, 2019
In 2004, Mercene opted to 􏰁le a complaint for Quieting of Title
against GSIS. He alleged that: since 1968 until the time the CENTRAL VISAYAS FINANCE CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.
complaint was filed, GSIS never exercised its rights as a SPOUSES ELIEZER* S. ADLAWAN AND LEILA ADLAWAN,
mortgagee; the real estate mortgage over his property AND SPOUSES ELIEZER* ADLAWAN, SR. AND ELENA
constituted a cloud on the title; GSIS' right to foreclose had ADLAWAN, Respondent
prescribed.
The RTC granted Mercene's complaint and ordered the
FACTS: In 1996, respondents Eliezer and Leila Adlawan
cancellation of the mortgages annotated on the title. On
obtained a Php3,669,685.00 loan from petitioner Central
appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision. The appellate court
Visayas Finance Corporation covered by a Promissory Note,
posited that the trial court erred in declaring that GSIS' right to
Chattel Mortgage over a Komatsu Highway Dump Truck, and a
foreclose the mortgaged properties had prescribed. It ruled
Continuing Guaranty executed by respondents Eliezer, Sr. and
that the appellate court surmised that no prescription had set
Elena Adlawan. They failed to pay the loan, prompting
in against GSIS because it has not made a demand to Mercene.
petitioner to file an action against respondents for replevin
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set before Branch 58 of the Cebu Regional Trial Court.
aside the Resolution issued by Court of Appeals which reversed
In a June 22, 1999 decision, the trial court ruled in petitioner's
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 220, Quezon City
favor, and respondents were ordered to deliver possession of
(RTC).
the dump truck to petitioner. Petitioner then foreclosed on the
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that chattel mortgage and caused the sale at public auction of the
the real estate mortgages had yet to prescribe. dump truck, which was then sold to it as the highest bidder for
Php500,000.00.
RULING: NO. The appellate court did not focus on the question
of payment precisely because it was raised for the first time on In 2000, petitioner commenced a second case before the RTC
appeal. It is noteworthy that, in its answer, GSIS raised the this time for collection of sum of money and/or deficiency
affirmative defense that Mercene's complaint failed to state a judgment relative to respondents' supposed unpaid balance
cause of action. on their loan, which petitioner claimed to be at
Php2,104,604.97 - less the value of dump truck - with
The allegation of prescription in Mercene's complaint is a mere damages. This time, petitioner in its Amended Complaint
conclusion of law. As would be discussed further, the fact that
sought to hold respondents Eliezer, Sr. and Elena Adlawan
GSIS had not instituted any action within ten (10) years after
liable on their continuing guaranty. The RTC ruled in favor of
the loan had been contracted is insufficient to hold that
the defendants that the instant complaint is barred by res
prescription had set in. Thus, even if GSIS' denial would not be judicata under Section 47(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
considered as a specific denial, only the fact that GSIS had not
commenced any action, would be deemed admitted at the The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
most. This is true considering that the circumstances to
ISSUE: Whether or not Res Judicata applies in the amended
establish prescription against GSIS have not been alleged with
complaint for deficiency of judgment considering the absence
particularity.
of identity of parties and similarity of cause of action in the
The CA ruled that Mercene's complaint did not state a cause of earlier case of replevin?
action because the maturity date of the loans, or the demand
RULING: Yes. Petitioner's final claim to reversal is that there
for the satisfaction of the obligation, was never alleged.
could be no identity of causes of action between Civil Case of
In order for cause of action to arise, the following elements Replevin and Civil Case pertaining to deficiency of judgment in
must be present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever relation to continuing guaranty, since the latter case was
means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an instituted for the specific purpose of recovering the deficiency
obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or from respondents Eliezer, Sr. and Elena Adlawan, who were
not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part supposedly liable as guarantors on the continuing guaranty
of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or that accompanied the loan agreement between petitioner and
constituting a breach of obligation of the defendant to the respondents Eliezer and Leila Adlawan.
plaintiff.
However, with the final resolution of the former civil case
(Replevin Case), petitioner's cause of action against

respondents Eliezer, Sr. and Elena Adlawan is likewise barred. Purposes of the requirement:
The contract of guaranty is merely accessory to a principal
(a) to prevent the prosecution of actions by persons without
obligation; it cannot survive without the latter. Under Article
any right, title or interest in the case; (b) to require that the
2076 of the Civil Code, "the obligation of the guarantor is
actual party entitled to legal relief be the one to prosecute the
extinguished at the same time as that of the debtor, and for
action; (c) to avoid a multiplicity of suits; and (d) to discourage
the same causes as all other obligations." The resolution of
litigation and keep it within certain bounds, pursuant to sound
Civil Case No. CEB-22294 and the consequent satisfaction of
public policy
petitioner's claim therein bars further recovery via a deficiency
judgment as against respondents Eliezer and Leila Adlawan, The rule on real party in interest ensures, therefore, that the
who are deemed to have paid their loan obligation. For this party with the legal right to sue brings the action, and this
reason, their obligation has been extinguished which should, interest ends when a judgment involving the nominal plaintiff
in turn, operate to the benefit of their co-respondents, Eliezer, will protect the defendant from a subsequent identical action.
Sr. and Elena Adlawan whose liability is based on guaranty, a Such a rule is intended to bring before the court the party
mere accessory contract to the loan obligation that cannot rightfully interested in the litigation so that only real
survive after the extinguishment of the latter. controversies will be presented and the judgment, when
entered, will be binding and conclusive and the defendant will
V. RULE 3 – SECTIONS 1 TO 3: PARTIES TO A CIVIL ACTION
be saved from further harassment and vexation at the hands
G.R. 216109, Feb 5, 2020 of other claimants to the same demand.
Mutilan vs. Mutilan Petitioners here are not vested with direct and substantial
interest in the subject parcels of land. They are not the present
real owners of the right sought to be enforced. They claim their
Facts: Cadidia bought 2 parcels of land, and executed 2 interests only as heirs of Mahid, who was not proven to have
Affidavits and had them notarized. In the Affidavits, she stated any right or interest in the parcels of land titled in respondent's
that the consideration for the 2 parcels of land exclusively name
came from her separate funds. Not being real parties in interest, petitioners cannot invoke the
Cadidia married Mahid under Muslim Law. Mahid had a son, jurisdiction of the court. Persons having no material interest to
Mohammad. Mahid married Saphia, and later on Sauda. protect cannot invoke its jurisdiction as the plaintiff in an
However, Mahid got into a vehicular crash and died. action. "Nor does a court acquire jurisdiction over a case where
the real party in interest is not present or impleaded."
Saphia, Sauda, and Mohammad filed a Complaint before the
Regional Trial Court of Marawi City, seeking the annulment of
the Deeds of Absolute Sale and Certificates of Title issued in G.R. No. 102976 October 25, 1995
Cadidia's name for allegedly being spurious and illegally issued
IRON AND STEEL AUTHORITY, Petitioner, vs. THE COURT
RTC: ruled in favor of Cadidia and dismissed the Complaint for OF APPEALS AND MARIA CRISTINA FERTILIZER
lack of merit. Saphia, Sauda, Mohammad, and Asliah were not CORPORATION, Respondent
parties in interest in the 2 Deeds of Absolute Sale executed by
Cadidia and Diator.
CA: Affirmed PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65
Issue: WON petitioners Saphia, Sauda, and Mohammad DOCTRINE
Mutilan, who are heirs only of the deceased husband—not
“[T]hose who can be parties to a civil action may be broadly
being party to the Deeds of Absolute Sale entered into by
categorized into two (2) groups:
respondent wife—are real parties in interest in a Complaint
seeking to annul the Deeds (a) those who are recognized as persons under the law
whether natural, i.e., biological persons, on the one hand, or
HELD: No. Generally, every action must be prosecuted or
juridical person such as corporations, on the other hand; and
defended in the name of the real party in interest, the one
"who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the (b) entities authorized by law to institute actions.”
suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." To be a real
party in interest, one "should appear to be the present real
owner of the right sought to be enforced, that is, his [or her] FACTS
interest must be a present substantial interest, not a mere
expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate, or Petitioner Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) was created by P.D.
consequential interest." No. 272, which also empowers ISA to initiate expropriation
proceedings. The National Steel Corporation (NSC) had an
expansion program for the construction of an integrated steel in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. As a
mill. With this, Proclamation No. 2239 was issued reserving a general rule, one having no right or interest to protect cannot
large tract of public land which included a fertilizer plant invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party-plaintiff in an
owned by private respondent Maria Cristina Fertilizer action.
Corporation (MCFC).
FACTS: Petitioner Pablo and Respondent Pedro were sons of
ISA was directed to exercise the power of eminent domain and Rosendo Ralla who apparently loved Pablo but not Pedro.
initiate proceedings relating to the land after NSC and MCFC When Pedro’s mother died, the brothers partitioned 63
failed to negotiate. However, while the trial was ongoing, the parcels of land she left as her paraphernal property.
statutory existence of ISA expired. Thus, MCFC filed a motion Meanwhile, Rosendo executed a will disinheriting Pedro and
to dismiss. leaving everything he owned to Pablo, to whom he had earlier
sold over 149 parcels of land as part of his property. Rosendo
The RTC granted the motion. The CA affirmed the decision of himself filed for the probate of the will but pendente lite died.
the RTC.
The probate judge converted it into an intestate proceeding
ISSUE allowing the last will and testament of Rosendo but on October
Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines may substitute 20,1982, disapproved the disinheritance of Pedro.
ISA after its statutory expiration. (YES) CA: REVERSED the trial court and reinstated the disinheritance
RULING The instant Petition is unmeritorious. clause after finding that the requisites of a valid disinheritance
had been complied with in the will. The appellate court noted
Under Sec. 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, only (1) natural or that Pedro had threatened to kill his father, who was afraid of
juridical persons or (2) entities authorized by law may be him and had earlier sued him for slander and grave oral
parties in a civil action. ISA falls under the second category. defamation. (DISINHERITANCE APPROVED)
However, ISA should also be regarded as an agent or delegate The CA decision was assailed before the SC but it was dismissed
of the Republic. The Republic itself is a body corporate and a holding that the petitioners have not shown that the
juridical person vested with legal personality. When the questioned decision is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
statutory term of a non-incorporated agency, such as ISA, The motion for reconsideration was denied with finality.
expires, the powers, duties and functions as well as the assets
and liabilities of that agency revert back to, and are reassumed NOTE: What is involved in the present petition is the
by, the Republic. correctness of the decision of the respondent court annulling
the deed of sale executed by Rosendo Ralla in favor of Pablo
Therefore, the Republic is entitled to be substituted in the over 149 parcels of land. Pedro had filed a complaint to annul
expropriation proceedings as party-plaintiff in lieu of ISA. the transaction on the ground that it was simulated. The
The non-joinder of the Republic which occurred upon the original decision of the trial court declared the sale null and
expiration of ISA’s statutory term was not a ground for void however, it was completely reversed and held the deed of
dismissal of such proceedings since a party may be dropped or sale to be valid. This was set aside by the respondent court,
added by order of the court, on motion of any party or by the which reinstated the original decision invalidating the deed of
court motu proprio at any stage of the action and on such sale.
terms as are just. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: WON Pedro has a proper personality to question the
[G.R. No. 78646. July 23, 1991.] sale transaction.
PABLO RALLA, substituted by his wife and co-defendant HELD: NO. The decision of the Court of Appeals approved the
CARMEN MUNOZ-RALLA, and his legal heirs, HILDA RALLA- disinheritance of Pedro Ralla. That decision was appealed to
ALMINE, BELISTA, RENE RALLA-BELISTA and GERARDO M. this Court, but the petition for review was dismissed and has
RALLA, petitioners, vs. PEDRO RALLA, substituted by his long since become final. Since then, Pedro Ralla no longer had
legal heirs, LEONI, PETER, and MARINELA, all surnamed the legal standing to question the validity of the sale executed
RALLA, and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. by Rosendo in favor of his other son Pablo.
PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 45 The real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment or the party entitled to
DOCTRINE: The real party-in-interest is the party who stands the avails of the suit. "Interest" within the meaning of the rule
to be benefited or injured by the judgment or the party means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected
entitled to the avails of the suit. "Interest" within the meaning by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the
of the rule means material interest, an interest in issue and to question involved, or a mere incidental interest. As a general
be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest
rule, one having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke Instead of filing an answer, respondent filed a Motion to
the jurisdiction of the court as a party-plaintiff in an action. Dismiss alleging principally that the complaint states no cause
of action because the respondent is not the real party-in-
As the sole heir, Pablo Ralla had the right to inherit the totality interest having already donated the subject land to the
of his father's estate after payment of all its debts. Even if it be Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports, Region VIII, as a
assumed that the deed of sale was indeed invalid, the subject- school site of the Buenavista Barangay High School; and that
matter thereof nevertheless devolved upon Pablo as the the donation not having in any way beneCted the respondent,
universal successor of his father Rosendo. In his will, Rosendo no disturbance compensation is due the petitioner since under
claimed the 149 parcels as "part of my property" — as
Section 36 (1) of the Agrarian Reform Code as amended,
distinguished from the conjugal estate — which he had earlier disturbance compensation holds true only in cases wherein the
sold to Pablo. Significantly, Pedro did not deny this description lessor-owner derives Financial benefits from the conversion of
of the property in his Comment to the present petition, the agricultural land into non-agricultural purposes. LLpr
confining himself to assailing the validity of the sale.
RTC: granted the respondent's Motion to Dismiss and denied
The Court must note the lackadaisical attitude of the heirs of the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
Pedro Ralla, who substituted him upon his death. They seem
to have lost interest in this litigation, probably because of the Intermediate Appellate Court: DISMISSED with costs taxed
approval of their father's disinheritance by the respondent against the appellant.
court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondent is the real party-
Our decision is that as a validly disinherited heir, and not in-interest against whom the suit should be brought.
claiming to be a creditor of his deceased father, Pedro Ralla
RULING:
had no legal personality to question the deed of sale dated
November 29, 1957, between Rosendo Ralla and his son Pablo. No. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires that every
Legally speaking, Pedro Ralla was a stranger to the transaction action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party-in-
as he did not stand to benefit from its annulment. His interest. A corollary proposition to this rule is, that an action
disinheritance had rendered him hors de combat. must be brought against the real party-in-interest, or against a
party which may be bound by the judgment to be rendered
ESPIRIDION TANPINGCO, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE
therein. The real party-in-interest is one who stands to be
APPELLATE COURT, and BENEDICTO HORCA, SR.,
benefitted or be injured by the judgment, or the party entitled
respondents.
to the avails of the suit. If the suit is not brought against the
G.R. No. 76225 March 31, 1992 real party-in-interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the
ground that the complaint states no cause of action (Section 1
(g), Rule 16, Rules of Court).
DOCTRINE: A person who was not impleaded in the complaint
We agree with the contentions of the private respondent. The
could not be bound by the decision rendered therein, for no
petitioner should have impleaded the Ministry of Education,
man shall be affected by a proceeding to which he is a stranger.
Culture and Sports as the party-defendant for as stated in
The remedy then of the petitioner is to claim his disturbance Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals, a
compensation from the new owner or whatever agency, local donation, as a mode of acquiring ownership, results in an
or national, is in a position to pay for it. (Filamer Christian effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to
Institute v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 485 [1990])
the donee and once a donation is accepted, the donee
FACTS: A complaint for payment of disturbance compensation becomes the absolute owner of the property donated.
with damages was filed by petitioner Espiridion Tanpingco
In view of the foregoing, the trial court correctly dismissed the
against respondent Benedicto Horca, Sr. with the RTC. It is complaint for payment of disturbance compensation because
alleged in the complaint that the petitioner is the tenant-lessee the private respondent is not the real party-in-interest. A
in the respondent's parcel of agricultural riceland; that in a person who was not impleaded in the complaint could not be
letter, the respondent through his representative informed bound by the decision rendered therein, for no man shall be
him to desist from working on the subject land, having already affected by a proceeding to which he is a stranger. The remedy
donated the same; that the respondent openly ordered the then of the petitioner is to claim his disturbance compensation
petitioner to vacate the landholding and is determined to oust from the new owner or whatever agency, local or national, is
him from the premises in violation of law; that the petitioner in a position to pay for it.
is willing to accept payment of disturbance compensation in an
amount computed in accordance with law and in the DANTE M. PASCUAL, represented by REYMEL R. SAGARIO,
alternative to remain as tenant-lessee of the subject riceland. petitioner, vs. MARILOU M. PASCUAL, respondent

PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 the petitioner’s superiors in the POEA and to other
personalities not connected with POEA.
DOCTRINE: Where the parties are not actual residents in the
same city or municipality or adjoining barangays, there is no After 6 years, prosecution presented only 2 witnesses. It
requirement for them to submit their dispute to the lupon subsequently requested that a
FACTS: subpoena ad testificandum be issued to and served on Atty.
Oscar Ramos, Resident Ombudsman of the POEA, to compel
By virtue of an SPA, petitioner, who is a permanent resident of him to testify in the criminal case. The hearing was reset due
USA, directed his attorney-in-fact to file a case against the to the unavailability of Atty Ramos.
respondent for the cancellation of TCT issued in her name as
well as to collect the monthly rentals from the tenant. The After failing to present their witnesses on the subsequent
case was filed before RTC Isabela. Respondent filed a Motion hearing dates, RTC ordered the termination of Prosecution’s
to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint failed to comply evidence.
with the requirements provided by the LGC which states that
Petitioner, on his own, questioned this before the CA. He
the dispute must be first referred to the barangay
averred that require Atty. Ramos to appear and testify in the
Petitioner averred that being an American citizen, the lupon May 23, 2001 hearing. He contended that his prior request for
has no jurisdiction over the case. the subpoena for the February 20, 2001 hearing should have
been treated as a continuing request for the subpoena
Nonetheless, RTC granted the Motion to Dismiss on the ground considering that the Rules of Court did not require a party to
that when real property or any interest therein is involved, the apply for a subpoena again should it not be served in the first
dispute shall be filed before the barangay where the property time.
is located, regardless of the residence of the parties. Being the
real party in interest, the Attorney-in-fact may therefore bring CA – Dismissed for lack of merit
the necessary complaint before the Lupon Tagapayapa and
Issue: WON petitioner can file an appeal on his own (NO)
appear in person as if he is the owner of the land.
Ruling: The petitioner did not join the People of the Philippines
ISSUE: WON the case should have been brought first before
as a party in his action for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. He
the barangay (NO)
thereby ignored that the People of the Philippines were
RULING: Where the parties are not actual residents in the indispensable parties due to his objective being to set aside the
same city or municipality or adjoining barangays, there is no trial court's order. The omission was fatal and already enough
requirement for them to submit their dispute to the lupon as cause for the summary rejection of his petition for certiorari.
provided for in Section 6 vis a vis Sections 2 and 3 of P.D. 1508. The petitioner did not also obtain the consent of the Office of
In fine, since the plaintiff-herein petitioner, the real party in the Solicitor General (OSG) to his petition for certiorari. At the
interest, is not an actual resident of the barangay where the very least, he should have furnished a copy of the petition for
defendant-herein respondent resides, the local lupon has no certiorari to the OSG prior to the filing thereof, 8 but even that
jurisdiction over their dispute, hence, prior referral to it for he did not do.
conciliation is not a pre-condition to its filing in court.
EQUITABLE PCI BANK, INC. (now known as BANCO DE ORO
- EPCI, INC.) Petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF ANTONIO C. TIU,
namely: ARLENE T. FU, MICHAEL U. TIU, ANDREW U. TIU,
To construe the express statutory requirement of actual EDGAR U. TIU and ERWIN U. TIU, Respondents.
residency as applicable to the attorney-in-fact of the party-
plaintiff, as contended by respondent, would abrogate the
meaning of a "real party in interest" as defined in Section 2 of
FACTS: Respondent executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor
Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Court vis a vis Section 3 of the same
of Equitable Bank to secure a loan for one Gabriel Ching.
Rule which was earlier quoted but misread and misunderstood
Antonio subsequently executed an Amendment to the REM
by respondent.
increasing the amount secured by the mortgage to ₱26 Million,
GOLANGO V. JONE B. FUNG, G.R. NO. 157952, SEPTEMBER also bearing a signature attributed to his wife Matilde above
8, 2009 the words "With my Marital Consent." Antonio died thereafter
with the obligation remaining unsettled.
Petitioner filed before RTC Tacloban Petition for Sale for the
Certiorari under Rule 45 extrajudicial foreclosure of the AREM. A day before the
FACTS: Petitioner initiated a criminal action for libel against the scheduled auction, respondents filed a Complaint for issuance
respondent before RTC Manila. The respondent allegedly of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and TRO on the ground that
issued an office memorandum maliciously imputing against the AREM has no effect since there was no consent from the
wife of Antonio. RTC granted the same.
Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ownership and divided the lot among themselves. Later, he
ground that respondents are not real parties in interest. testified that he was the biological son of Pedro Mata, Jr. but
was legally adopted by Spouses Emilio and Josefina Agcaoili.
RTC – MD denied (2) As to Rolando, Nathaniel and Bonifacio – they alleged that
CA – Affirmed Josefina transfer the portion of the property to them in
consideration for services rendered; and (3) as to Allan and
Issue: WON the respondents are real parties in interest (NO) Celia – they were declared in default.
Ruling: The AREM was executed by Antonio, with the marital The RTC granted the complaint for nullification of documents
consent of Matilde. Since the mortgaged property is presumed and partition of property. The CA affirmed the decision of the
conjugal, she is obliged principally under the AREM. It is thus RTC. Only George filed a petition before the SC
she, following Art. 1397 of the Civil Code vis a vis Sec. 2 of Rule
3 of the Rules of Court, who is the real party in interest, hence, ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court commit reversible error
the action must be prosecuted in her name as she stands to be when it ordered the partition of the lot even though not all of
benefited or injured in the action. the indispensable parties were impleaded in the case below
Assuming that Matilde is indeed incapacitated, it is her legal HELD: There is no question that the Heirs of Pedro Mata, Jr. are
guardian who should file the action on her behalf. Not only is indispensable parties in the complaint for annulment,
there no allegation in the complaint, however, that partition, and damages hence they should have been made a
respondents have been legally designated as guardians to file party in the said case. But failure to implead them as party
the action on her behalf. The name of Matilde, who is deemed does not warrant the dismissal of the case but instead the
the real party in interest, has not been included in the title of court should have directed to issue an order to implead the
the case, in violation of Sec. 3 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. said heirs of Pedro Mata, Jr.
GEORGE AGCAOILI*, PETITIONER, V. ELMER MATA, Section 1 of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court reads:
RESPONDENT. Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. — A
G.R. No. 224414, February 26, 2020 person having the right to compel the partition of real estate
may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his
complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate
FACTS: petition for review rule 45 description of the real estate of which partition is demanded
and joining as defendants all other persons interested in the
Respondent Elmer filed a complaint for annulment of property. (1a)
documents, partition and damages against petitioner George,
Bonifacio, Rolando, Nathaniel, Alan, and Celia. An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected
by the court's action in the litigation, and without whom no
Respondent alleged that Justo Mata owned a parcel of land. final determination of the case can be had. The party's interest
Justo Mata sold the lot to spouses Pedro Mata, Sr. and Josefina in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so
B. Mata via a deed of absolute sale. Pedro and Josefina had two inextricably intertwined with the other parties' that his legal
(2) children, respondent and Pedro Mata, Jr. Pedro Mata, Sr. presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity.
died and the widowed Josefina married Emilio Agcaoili. In his or her absence, there cannot be a resolution of the
Josefina and Emilio died without any children. dispute of the parties before the court which is effective,
complete, or equitable. Thus, the absence of an indispensable
When Spouses Josefina and Emilio were still alive, the lot was
party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void,
surreptitiously declared in their names without his
for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties
(respondent) knowledge and they used the lot as collateral for
but even as to those present. In an action for partition, all the
their purchase of a rifle. Additionally, some portion of the lot
co-heirs and persons having an interest in the property are
were transferred to the said petitioners.
indispensable parties; as such, an action for partition will not
To protect his inheritance comprising half of the lot, he lie without the joinder of the said parties.
(respondent) prayed that the subdivision plan and all tax
In non-joinder of indispensable parties, the case should not be
declarations in the name of petitioner George Agcoili,
dismissed. Instead, the non-party claimed to be indispensable
Bonifacio Morales, Rolando Paulo, Nathaniel Flores, Alan
should be impleaded. Heirs of Juan M. Dinglasan v. Ayala Corp,
Keane Ancheta and Heirs of Tomas Peralta be declared void.
states:
He also prayed for attorney's fees, moral damages, and
exemplary damages. As to whether or not the subject Complaints should be
dismissed, the settled rule is that the non-joinder of
Petitioners alleged that: (1) as to George - Respondent, his
indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an
brother Pedro Mata, Jr., and petitioner George Agcaoili were
action. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be
co- owners of the lot and decided to terminate their co-
indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court on disqualifying Valeriano as a farmer beneficiary thereof. Thus,
motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the contrary to petitioners' contention, the failure to implead
action and/or at such times as are just. Valeriano or his heirs (i.e., herein petitioners) did not deprive
the DAR-Region VIII, the DARAB Regional Adjudicator, and the
HEIRS OF VALERIANO C. DELA CORTA, SR., petitioners, vs. DARAB Central Office of jurisdiction over the cases filed before
REBECCA ALAG- PITOGO, represented by OSCAR PITOGO, them.
respondent.
STANLEY FINE FURNITURE, ELENA AND CARLOS WANG,
petitioners, vs. VICTOR T. GALLANO AND ENRIQUITO
Certiorari under Rule 45 SIAREZ, respondents.
Pursuant to PD 27, the subject lot was awarded to the late [G.R. No. 190486. November 26, 2014.]
Valeriano through a Certificate of Land Transfer. Respondent
filed before DAR a petition for the reallocation of the subject
lot on the ground that it was erroneously awarded to PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI
Valeriano. She alleged that RTC Ormoc rendered Valeriano
DOCTRINE: A sole proprietorship does not possess a juridical
disqualified as a farmer beneficiary.
personality separate and distinct from the personality of the
DAR – granted the petition for reallocation owner of the enterprise. The law merely recognizes the
existence of a sole proprietorship as a form of business
organization conducted for profit by a single individual and
Respondent filed a Petition for cancellation of Valeriano’s requires its proprietor or owner to secure licenses and permits,
Emancipation Patent. Pedro Valeriano moved for the dismissal register its business name, and pay taxes to the national
of the case since he has still a pending appeal before the Office government. The law does not vest a separate legal personality
of DAR Secretary on the sole proprietorship or empower it to file or defend an
action in court.
DARAB – Pedro’s appeal did not produce any legal effect. It
granted the cancellation of the Emancipation Patent FACTS: Stanley Fine Furniture (Stanley Fine), through its
owners Elena and Carlos Wang, hired respondents Victor T.
DARAB CO – Dismissed the appeal for lack of merit Gallano and Enriquito Siarez in 1995 as painters/carpenters.
CA – Appeal is dismissed On May 26, 2005, Victor and Enriquito filed a labor complaint
Issue: WON the petitioner’s appeal has a legal effect since wherein they indicated in the complaint form that they were
Valeriano is already disqualified as a farmer beneficiary “still working” for Stanley Fine. Respondents filed an amended
complaint on May 31, 2005 for actual illegal dismissal,
Ruling: An examination of the records of the case reveals the underpayment/non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay,
fact that Valeriano's disqualification as a farmer beneficiary of premium for holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, 13th
the subject lot was never contested. In view of the foregoing month pay, ECOLA, and Social Security System (SSS) benefit. In
circumstances, considering that the final the amended complaint, Victor and Enriquito claimed that
they were dismissed on May 26, 2005.
judgment of Valeriano's disqualification as a farmer
beneficiary was never Respondents were allegedly scolded for filing a complaint for
money claims. Later on, they were not allowed to work.
questioned, it was logical for the CA to rule that, at the time
respondent filed a petition for reallocation with the DAR- Petitioner Elena Briones claimed that respondents were
Region VIII, Valeriano and his heirs were not indispensable "required to explain their absences for the month of May 2005,
parties in the case. Moreover, the contentions of petitioners but they refused."
that they were deprived of due process and that the DARAB
LA: Respondents were illegally dismissed noting the
lacked jurisdiction over the persons of the registered contradictory statements in Stanley Fine's position paper that
landowners and over the subject matter. Indispensable parties petitioner “was forced to declare them dismissed due to their
are parties whose legal presence in the proceeding is so failure to report back to work for a considerable length of time
necessary that "the action cannot be finally determined" and also, due to the filing of an unmeritorious labor case
without them because their interests in the matter and in the against it by the two complainants. . . .”
relief "are so
NLRC: REVERSED the decision, ruling that the LA erred in
bound up with that of the other parties." considering the statement, "due to the filing of an
unmeritorious labor case," as an admission against interest.
Valeriano and his heirs ceased to have an interest in the
Respondent’s MR was denied
subject lot after the issuance of the final judgment

CA: Petition for Certiorari GRANTED. NLRC resolution set aside ALICE G. AFRICA, Petitioner, vs. INSURANCE SAVINGS AND
and LA decision reinstated. INVESTMENT AGENCY, INC (ISIA)., REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRESIDENT, DELIA DE BORJA, ET. AL. , Respondent
Elena Briones filed a petition for review alleging that she is the
"registered owner/proprietress of the business operation
doing business under the name and style 'Stanley Fine
Furniture.'"
DOCTRINE
Respondents filed their comment arguing that the petition
should be denied because Elena "is neither the respondent, “If a complaint is filed for and in behalf of the plaintiff who is
party in interest or representatives as parties." not authorized to do so, the complaint is not deemed filed. An
unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal effect.
Elena filed her reply and posited that she has legal standing to
Hence, the court should dismiss the complaint on the ground
file the petition for review because she is the
that it has no jurisdiction over the complaint and the plaintiff.
owner/proprietress of Stanley Fine. In addition, she argued
On the other hand, if a complaint is filed by an agent or
that respondents knew that she, Elena, is the real party-in-
plaintiff, for and in behalf of the principal, the plaintiff who is
interest because during the pendency of the labor case, she
merely the agent is not the proper party. The reason being that
filed an ex-parte manifestation, attaching her Department of
every action must be presented in the name of the real party-
Trade and Industry certificate of registration of business name,
in-interest. The complaint may be dismissed on the ground
showing that the registration is under her maiden name, Elena
that the plaintiff has no cause of action against the defendants,
Y. Briones. As per the Department of Trade and Industry's
conformably to Section l(g), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
certification, Stanley Fine is a sole proprietorship owned by
Procedure.”
"Elena Briones Yam-Wang."
FACTS: Respondent ISIA filed a Special Civil Action for
ISSUE: WON Elena Briones has standing to file this petition for
Mandamus before the RTC, praying for the cancellation of a
reviewon certiorari
TCT issued in the name of Spouses Orfmada and a new title
HELD: YES. Petitioner Elena Briones has standing to file this issued in the name of ISIA. ISIA alleged that it purchased from
case. Elena argued that she is the sole proprietor of Stanley the spouses, through their attorney-in-fact, Jimenez, the
Fine, a fact known to respondents. As the sole proprietor, she subject property evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale.
has standing to file this petition.
Allegedly, the Registrar of Deeds denied the registration of the
Respondents cannot deny Elena Briones' standing to file this sale on the ground that another owner’s duplicate copy of the
petition considering that in their amended complaint filed subject title is in possession of Africa. Although not impleaded
before the Labor Arbiter, they wrote "Stanley Fine Furniture, as one of the respondents in the petition filed by ISIA, Africa
Elina [sic] Briones Wang as owner and Carlos Wang" as their viled an opposition contending that the sale between ISIA and
employers. Spouses Orfmada is tainted with fraud and hence invalid.
Also, respondents did not refute Elena's allegation that Stanley The RTC granted the petition for mandamus and denied the
Fine is a sole proprietorship. In Excellent Quality Apparel, Inc. subsequent motion for reconsideration. Thus, Africa, on behalf
v. Win Multi-Rich Builders, Inc., this court stated that: of the Spouses Orfmada, filed the present petition for review
on certiorari. For the first time, indirectly and collaterally,
A sole proprietorship does not possess a juridical personality
Africa claims ownership over the subject property as an “Agent
separate and distinct from the personality of the owner of the
with Interest.”
enterprise. The law merely recognizes the existence of a sole
proprietorship as a form of business organization conducted ISSUE: Whether or not Africa may litigate the case before the
for profit by a single individual and requires its proprietor or Court in her own name. (NO)
owner to secure licenses and permits, register its business
RULING
name, and pay taxes to the national government. The law does
not vest a separate legal personality on the sole proprietorship The Court denied due course to the petition, Africa not being
or empower it to file or defend an action in court. a proper party under Rule 3, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court.
Thus, Stanley Fine, being a sole proprietorship, does not have With the death of the Spouses Orfinada and despite the claim
a personality separate and distinct from its owner, Elena of ownership by Africa over the subject property, Africa is not
Briones. Elena, being the proprietress of Stanley Fine, can be the proper party to file an appeal on certiorari. Sec. 3 of Rule 3
considered as a real party-in-interest and has standing to file explicitly requires that an agent as a party may sue without
this petition for review. joining the principal except when the contract involves things
belonging to the principal.
G.R. No. 206540 April 20, 2015

The subject property in this case is ostensibly owned by the The Regional Trial Court granted the appeal, finding that the
Spouses Orfinada. Africa’s belated claim of ownership via petitioner has established its claim by a preponderance of
purchase cannot make her a proper party to this case and evidence. It ordered the respondent to pay the value of nine
circumvent the requirements for establishing ownership over unrefunded tickets plus attorney’s fees.
the property.
The Court of Appeals granted the petition for review, and
Furthermore, while Africa claims to be a representative of the dismissed the petitioner’s complaint. The CA held that the
Spouses Orfinada, armed with a Special Power of Attorney, she petitioner is not a real party-in-interest because it merely
simultaneously claims filing and litigating this case on her own. acted as an agent of the passengers who bought the tickets
Africa is using a shotgun approach to obliquely, indirectly and with their (the passengers) own money.
collaterally, claim ownership over the subject property to
ISSUE:
ensure her continued participation in this litigation.
Whether or not the petitioner, V-Gent, is a real party-in-
V-GENT, INC., PETITIONER, V. MORNING STAR TRAVEL
interest as the agent of the passengers who bought the tickets.
AND TOURS, INC., RESPONDENT
HELD:
G.R. NO. 186305; JULY 22, 2015
NO.
The petitioner admitted that it purchased the plane tickets on
DOCTRINE:
behalf of the passengers as their agent. The tickets were issued
General Rule: in the name of the passengers, and paid for with the
passengers’ money. No dispute or conclusion in the lower
In suits where an agent represents a party, the principal is the
courts’ minds on this point. Both the MeTC and the CA found
real party-in-interest; an agent cannot file a suit in his own that V-Gent acted as an agent of the passengers.
name on behalf of the principal.
The Court agrees with the CA that the petitioner failed to meet
Exception (Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court):
the requirements for such a suit by the agent. In suits where
An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an an agent represents a party, the principal is the real party-in-
undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the interest; an agent cannot file a suit in his own name on behalf
principal except when the contract involves things belonging of the principal.
to the principal. Rule 3, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides the exception
FACTS: when an agent may sue or be sued without joining the
principal.
In 1998, the petitioner V-Gent, Inc. bought twenty-six two-way
plane tickets from respondent Morning Star Travel and Tours, Section 3. Representatives as parties. - Where the action is
Inc. allowed to be prosecuted and defended by a representative or
someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be
Later, the petitioner returned a total of fifteen unused tickets included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the
worth $8,747.50. The respondent refunded only six tickets real party-in-interest. A representative may be a trustee of an
worth $3,445.62. The respondent refused to refund the express trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a
remaining nine unused tickets despite repeated demands. party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his
In 2000, the petitioner filed a money claim against the own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may
respondent for payment of the unrefunded tickets. The sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the
complaint was raffled to Branch 2 of the Metropolitan Trial contract involves things belonging to the principal.
Court (MeTC) of Manila. An agent may sue or be sued solely in its own name and
The respondent claimed that the tickets were bought under a without joining the principal when the following elements
“buy one, take one” promo. There were only fourteen tickets concur:
bought, and only seven were refundable. The respondent also The agent acted in his own name during the transaction;
questioned the personality of the petitioner to file the suit. It
asserted that the passengers, in whose names the tickets were The agent acted for the benefit of an undisclosed principal;
issued, are the real parties-in-interest. The transaction did not involve the property of the principal.
The MeTC dismissed the complaint for lack of a cause of action. When these elements are present, the agent becomes bound
It held that while the petitioner, as agents of the passengers, as if the transaction were its own.
stood as a real-party-in-interest, they still failed to prove the
claim by a preponderance of evidence.

In the present case, only the first element is present; the Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines a real party-in-
purchase order and the receipt were in the name of V-Gent. interest as the one "who stands to be benefited or injured by
With regards to the second and third element, V-gent the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of
disclosed the names of the passengers to Morning Star, and the suit." SAFA Law Office is the party that would be benefited
the transaction was paid using the passengers’ money. or injured by the judgment in the suit before the RTC.
Therefore, Rule 3, Section of the Rules of Court cannot apply. Particularly, it is the party interested in the accounting and/or
recomputation of unpaid rentals and damages in relation to
G.R.NO. 193138, AUG. 20, 2018 the contract of lease. It is also the party that would be liable
SALUDO VS. PNB for payment to PNB of overdue rentals, if that claim would be
proven. This is because it is the one that entered into the
contract of lease with PNB. As an entity possessed of a juridical
Petition for review on certiorari personality, it has concomitant rights and obligations with
respect to the transactions it enters into.
Facts: A partnership for the practice of law, constituted in
accordance with the Civil Code provisions on partnership, Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires that every
acquires juridical personality by operation of law. Having a action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
juridical personality distinct and separate from its partners, party-in-interest. As the one primarily affected by the outcome
such partnership is the real party-in-interest in a suit brought of the suit, SAFA Law Office should have filed the complaint
in connection with a contract entered into in its name and by with the RTC and should be made to respond to any
a person authorized to act on its behalf. counterclaims that may be brought in the course of the
proceeding.
SAFA Law Office entered into a Contract of Lease with PNB (3
years) In Aguila, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,77 a case for declaration of
nullity of a deed of sale was filed against a partner of A.C.
August 1, 2001, the Contract of Lease expired. SAFA Law Office Aguila & Sons, Co. We dismissed the complaint and held that it
continued to occupy the leased premises until February 2005, was the partnership, not its partners, which should be
but discontinued paying its monthly rental obligations after impleaded for a cause of action against the partnership itself.
December 2002 Moreover, the partners could not be held liable for the
obligations of the partnership unless it was shown that the
PNB sent a demand letter for SAFA Law Office to pay its
legal fiction of a different juridical personality was being used
outstanding unpaid rents
for fraudulent, unfair, or illegal purposes
Plantiff: Saludo, in his capacity as managing partner of SAFA
In this case, there is likewise no showing that SAFA Law Office,
Law Office, filed an amended complaint17 for accounting
as a separate juridical entity, is being used for fraudulent,
and/or recomputation of unpaid rentals and damages against
unfair, or illegal purposes. Hence, its partners cannot be held
PNB in relation to the Contract of Lease.
primarily liable for the obligations of the partnership. As it was
Defendant: PNB filed a motion to include an indispensable SAFA Law Office that entered into a contract of lease with
party as plaintiff,18 praying that Saludo be ordered to amend respondent PNB, it should also be impleaded in any litigation
anew his complaint to include SAFA Law Office as principal concerning that contract.
plaintiff. PNB argued that the lessee in the Contract of Lease is
Accordingly, the complaint filed by Saludo should be amended
not Saludo but SAFA Law Office, and that Saludo merely signed
to include SAFA Law Office as plaintiff
the Contract of Lease as the managing partner of the law firm.
Thus, SAFA Law Office must be joined as a plaintiff in the SPOUSES NOLASCO FERNANDEZ AND MARICRIS
complaint because it is considered an indispensable party FERNANDEZ, PETITIONERS, v. SMART COMMUNICATIONS,
INC., RESPONDENT
RTC: Issued an Omnibus Order denying PNB's motion to
include an indispensable party as plaintiff and granting
Saludo's motion to dismiss counterclaims
Certiorari under Rule 45
CA: Held that SAFA Law Office is not an indispensable party.
EOL sought SMART sometime in 2006 to provide the mobile
Issue: WON SAFA Law Office is a juridical entity and the real communication requirements for its expansion. Series of
party¬-in-interest in the suit filed with the RTC by Saludo meetings ensued between the parties where it was
against PNB, and be joined as plaintiff in that case. determined that EOL would be needing approximately 2,000
post-paid lines with corresponding cell phone units. EOL
Held: Yes. SAFA Law Office is a partnership and not a single
demanded the release of the remaining phone lines to cover
proprietorship. Having settled that SAFA Law Office is a
its initial order of 2,000 units. SMART informed EOL that before
juridical person, we hold that it is also the real party-in-interest
it approved further phone line applications, the parties should
in the case filed by Saludo against PNB.
restate and clarify the agreements between them, to which FACTS: On May 24, 2007, Charoen, a 100% foreign-owned
EOL agreed. company from Thailand, was registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission. On three (3) different occasions,
SMART averred that after the execution of the EOL Charoen submitted to the Board of Investments its
Undertaking, its credit and collection department sent, by applications for registration as a new producer of different
email, phone bills to EOL that had been previously returned to products and services.
SMART. These bills were for the collection of the monthly
payment due on the lines that were supposedly given to EOL's new producer of aqua feeds;
franchisees. However, EOL allegedly refused to receive the
new producer of hog parent stocks and slaughter hogs; and,
bills, stating that it was not liable for the payment of bills of
phone lines assigned to franchisees. registration for its Integrated Broiler Project
Smart filed a complaint against EOL. Petitioners filed a Motion These all went through a two-step process before they could
to Dismiss. Petitioners averred that they are not the real party be published in a newspaper of general circulation and
in interest in the case. They averred that claimed that the only officially filed with the Board of Investments. First, they
allegation holding the directors and officers personally and underwent check-listing; and second, the Resource-Based
solidarily liable with EOL was the alleged provisions in the Industries Department of the Board of Investments assessed if
Letter Agreements23 and EOL Undertaking they complied with Executive Order No. 226.
RTC – Motion to dismiss granted Petitioners jointly filed before this Court a Petition for
CA – Reversed the CA ruled that there was overwhelming Certiorari 24 with prayer for a temporary restraining order.
evidence indicating that Samaco III and Spouses Fernandez They mainly claim that the three (3) Board Resolutions of
public respondent Board of Investments, which granted
expressly bound themselves to be solidarity liable with EOL to
private respondent Charoen's applications for registration,
SMART
were issued with grave abuse of discretion
Issue: WON respondents are real parties in interest (PARTLY –
Petitioners allege that the assailed Board Resolutions violated
CEO IS A REAL PARTY IN INTEREST)
their constitutional right to be protected against unfair foreign
Ruling: A real party in interest is the party who stands to be competition and trade practices. Further, they assailed Board
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party Resolutions were issued without prior consultation with the
entitled to the avails of the suit. A judicious examination of the Department of Agriculture, as required by Executive Order No.
Amended Complaint46 shows that petitioners were impleaded 226, and were contrary to public policy.
in the instant action based on the provisions of the Letter
On the other hand, public respondent argues that the Petition
Agreement47 and EOL Undertaking which purportedly bound
is dismissible for petitioners' failure to exhaust all
them to be solidarity liable with the corporation in its
administrative remedies before going to this Court.
obligation with SMART. In effect, the Amended Complaint
seeks to pierce the veil of corporate fiction against Nolasco and ISSUE:
Maricris in their capacities as corporate officer and director of
EOL. Whether or not the Petition for Certiorari filed directly before
this Court is the correct remedy;
As a general rule, a corporation's representatives are not
bound by the terms of the contract executed by the Whether or not public respondent Board of Investments
corporation. The doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate committed grave abuse of discretion when it approved the
fiction is a legal precept that allows a corporation's separate applications for registration of private respondent Charoen
personality to be disregarded under certain circumstances, so Pokphand Foods Philippines Corporation.
that a corporation and its stockholders or members, or a RULING:
corporation and another related corporation could be treated
as a single entity. It is meant to apply only in situations where NO. in cases involving an administrative agency's quasi-judicial
the separate corporate personality of a corporation is being power, Congress may empower certain administrative
abused or being used for wrongful purposes. agencies that have the relevant technical expertise to first take
cognizance of the case before judicial remedies are resorted
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF HOG FARMERS, PETITIONERS, to.
VS. BOARD OF INVESTMENTS, G.R. NO. 205835, JUNE 23,
2020 Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction,
jurisdiction over the approval of applications for registration
lies exclusively with the Board of Investments, subject to
This petition for certiorari. appeal to the Office of the President. Hence, this Court is
precluded from taking cognizance of the present Petition.

NO. Republic Act No. 7042, or the Foreign Investments Act of The MeTC granted the complaint for unlawful detainer and
1991, declares that as much as 100% foreign ownership in ordered Albania to vacate the premises and to pay unpaid
domestic enterprises may be allowed, except for areas or rentals.
industries included in the negative list. However, agriculture
The RTC reversed the MeTC Decision and dismissed, without
and agribusiness were not included in the negative list. Clearly,
prejudice, the complaint for failure of petitioner to comply
agribusiness was, and still is, not a nationalized or partly
with the mandatory requirement of impleading the Philippine
nationalized industry. Hence, in this case, private respondent's
Army as a party to the case. It ruled that petitioner is not the
status as a 100% foreign-owned corporation would not cause
real party-in-interest as it is the Philippine Army, and not Brig.
the denial of its applications for registration with public
Gen. Cabusao, which stands to be benefited or injured by
respondent.
whatever judgment is rendered under Section 2 Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court. Since petitioner Brig. Gen. Cabusao alleged in
his complaint that he was the administrator of all
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the Petition is concessionaires inside the military reservation, he is deemed
DISMISSED. The assailed February 28, 2012, April 24, 2012, and by law as a representative and should have included the
November 6, 2012 Board Resolutions issued by the Board of beneficiary, the Philippine Army, in the title of the case.
Governors of public respondent Board of Investments, which
approved private respondent Charoen Pokphand Foods After a decade, upon of the status of the case, petitioner
Philippines Corporation's applications for registration, are through the OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC
AFFIRMED. maintained that the decision may no longer be disturbed as it
had already attained finality. On the real party--in-interest
BRIG. GENERAL MARCIAL A. COLLAO, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY issue, the trial court held that when the complaint for unlawful
AS COMMANDING GENERAL, HEADQUARTERS AND detainer was filed, the same was bereft of any statement or
HEADQUARTERS SUPPORT GROUP, PHILIPPINE ARMY,
supporting document that then Brig. Gen. Cabusao was filing it
PETITIONER, VS. MOISES ALBANIA, RESPONDENT.
for and on behalf of the real party-in-interest, the Philippine
G.R. No. 228905, July 15, 2020 Army.
The CA upheld the denial of petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration essentially on the ground of laches.
FACTS: petition under rule 45
ISSUE: Whether or not THE PHILIPPINE ARMY'S COMMANDING
The Commanding General of the Headquarters and GENERAL OF THE HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS
Headquarters Support Group of the Philippine Army at Fort SUPPORT GROUP, BEING THE ADMINISTRATOR OF FORT
Bonifacio is in charge of the administration of all BONIFACIO MILITARY RESERVATION, HAS THE LEGAL
concessionaire areas inside the military reservation therein. PERSONALITY TO INSTITUTE THE UNLAWFUL DETAINER FOR
Respondent Moises Albania is one of those concessionaires THE PHILIPPINE ARMY
who was granted by the Post Commander with a business HELD: The title of the complaint states that the plaintiff is
permit to operate, for a period of one (1) year, a Tailoring and "B/Gen. Lysias Cabusao, in his capacity as Commanding
Barber Shop within the vicinity of the Army Training Unit. By General, Headquarters and Headquarters Support Group,
virtue of said grant, the former Post Commander Col. Espina, Philippine Army." Accordingly, the beneficiary in the present
entered into a Concession Agreement with Albania. The case, which is the Philippine Army, was actually included in the
agreement provides that the same may be revoked at any time title of the case in compliance with the rule cited above. In fact,
in case of violation of its terms and conditions, of any pertinent the Concession Agreement, which was cited and attached to
Camp rules, or when security, public interest and/or military the complaint similarly states that the lease was entered into
exigencies or necessity require. by the Philippine Army, through its Commanding General. In
Later, pursuant to the Bases Conversion Development the second place, as duly observed by the CA, the complaint
Authority, the displaced unit were to be relocated to the area was continuously amended to reflect the changes in the
occupied by Albania however Albania, despite demands, personalities and successors of the Commanding Generals of
refused to vacate the premises and to pay rentals. Brig. Gen. the Philippine Army. Thus, it cannot be denied that the
Cabusao, filed a complaint for unlawful detainer. Later on, commanding generals initiated the instant case only as
when Brig. Gen. Cabusao was succeeded by Brig. Gen. Marcial representatives of the Philippine Army and not in their
A. Collao, Jr., the complaint was amended to reflect such personal capacities.
change. In his Answer, Albania averred that there was no But even assuming that the complaint failed to implead the
demand letter terminating the month-to-month contract of Philippine Army, case law dictates that the remedy is not the
lease and that the petitioner continuously collected monthly outright dismissal of the complaint but the amendment of the
rentals from him indicating that there was really no need for pleadings and the inclusion of said party in the case especially
the premises. since the omission herein is merely a technical defect.
Sections 2 and 3 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides: foreclosure of the real estate mortgage over the subject
property. It sent respondents a Notice of Sale setting a public
SECTION 2. Parties in Interest. —A real party in interest is the auction. In response, respondents filed a Complaint for
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment injunction with prayer for issuance of TRO. This TRO was
in the suit, or the party entitled to the avail of the suit. Unless granted but upon the expiration of such, Metrobank scheduled
otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must another public auction. RTC Paranaque issued an Order
be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in directing Metrobank to reschedule the auction in view of the
interest. application of a preliminary injunction. Metrobank allegedly
SECTION 3. Representatives as Parties. — Where the action is received the order late and already pushed through with the
allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or auction resulting to the denial of the preliminary injunction
someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be sough of by respondents rendering the issue moot.
included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the Upon Motion for Inhibition filed by respondents, the cases was
real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an transferred to another branch. Respondents likewise filed a
express trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint for annulment of
party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his foreclosure of mortgage, declaration of nullity of certification
own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may of sale, and injunction.
sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the
contract involves things belonging to the principal. Metrobank sold to Asia Recovery Corporation (ARC) its credit
against respondents including all rights, interests, claims and
Settled is the rule that the non-joinder of indispensable parties causes of action arising out of the loan and mortgage
is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The remedy, agreements between Metrobank and respondents. ARC, in
instead, is to implead the non-party claimed to be turn, specifically assigned the credit to petitioner through a
indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court on
Deed of Assignment. Petitioner prayed that it be substituted in
motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the
lieu of Metrobank in the proceedings before RTC Branch 258.
action and/or at such times as are just. If the plaintiff refuses
to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the RTC granted the motion but without dropping Metrobank as
court, then the court may dismiss the complaint for the defendant.
plaintiff's failure to comply with a lawful court order. The
CA annulled this order. CA opined that if it was true that
operative act, then, that would lead to the dismissal of the case
Metrobank had divested itself of any interest in respondents'
would be the refusal to comply with the directive of the court
debt, then the trial court should have forthwith ordered the
for the joinder of an indispensable party to the case. This is in
bank's exclusion from the proceedings. Notwithstanding, CA
accordance with the proper administration of justice and the
ruled that Metrobank cannot be substituted without first
prevention of further delay and multiplicity of suits
disclosing the consideration paid by petitioner for the transfer
VI. RULE 3, SECTIONS 4 TO 6: PARTIES TO A CIVIL ACTION of interest.
Issue: WON Metrobank can be substituted by ACR in the
proceedings (YES)
CAMERON GRANVILLE 3 ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC. ,
petitioner, vs. FIDEL O. CHUA and FILIDEN REALTY AND RULING: Under Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, “All persons in
DEVELOPMENT CORP., respondents. whom or againstwhom any right to relief in respect to or
arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is
alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative,
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 may, except as otherwise provided in these Rules, join as
plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one complaint, where
DOCTRINE: A transferee pendente lite is a proper party that any question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to
stands exactly in the shoes of the transferor, the original party. all such defendants may arise in the action; but the court may
Transferees are bound by the proceedings and judgment in the make such orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or
case, such that there is no need for them to be included or defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense in
impleaded by name. connection with any proceedings in which he may have no
FACTS: interest.”
Respondents obtained an initial loan from Metrobank which The rationale for allowing parties to join in a proceeding that
was secured by a real estate mortgage constituted over 3 delves on a common question of law or fact concerning them
parcels of land located in Paranaque City. The real estate is trial convenience; i.e., to save the parties unnecessary work,
mortgage was amended several times to accommodate trouble and expense. 35 In order to meet the requirements of
subsequent loans obtained by the respondents. For failure to justice and convenience, the rule on the joinder of parties is
settle their obligation, Metrobank sought the extrajudicial construed with considerable Iexibility. Hence, courts are given

broad discretion in determining who may properly be joined in Whether or not the charge against the public officers acting in
a proceeding. their official capacity will prosper.
A transferee pendente lite is a proper party that stands exactly HELD:
in the shoes of the transferor, the original party. Transferees
The suability of a government official depends on whether the
are bound by the proceedings and judgment in the case, such
official concerned was acting within his official or jurisdictional
that there is no need for them to be included or impleaded by
capacity, and whether the acts done in the performance of
name. Nevertheless, "[w]hether or not the transferee should
official functions will result in a charge or financial liability
be substituted for, or should be joined with, the original party
against the government. In its complaint, DOH sufficiently
is largely a matter of discretion." That discretion is exercised
imputes grave abuse of discretion against petitioners in their
in pursuance of the paramount consideration that must be
official capacity. Since judicial review of acts alleged to have
afforded for the protection of the parties' interests and right
been tainted with grave abuse of discretion is guaranteed by
to due process.
the Constitution, it necessarily follows that it is the official
G.R. No. 182358 February 20, 2013 concerned who should be impleaded as defendant or
respondent in an appropriate suit. As regards petitioner DOH,
THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH et al. v. PHIL. the defense of immunity from suit will not avail despite its
PHARMAWEALTH, INC. 518 SCRA 240 (2007) being an unincorporated agency of the government, for the
only causes of action directed against it are preliminary
injunction and mandamus. Under Section 1, Rule 58 of the
FACTS: Rules of Court, preliminary injunction may be directed against
Secretary of Health Alberto G. Romualdez, Jr. issued an a party or a court, agency or a person. Moreover, the defense
Administrative Order providing for additional guidelines for of state immunity from suit does not apply in causes of action
accreditation of drug suppliers aimed at ensuring that only which do not seek to impose a charge or financial liability
qualified bidders can transact business with petitioner against the State.
Department of Health (DOH). Respondent Phil. Pharmawealth, Hence, the rule does not apply where the public official is
Inc. (Pharmawealth) submitted to DOH a request for the charged in his official capacity for acts that are unauthorized
inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited drug or unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Neither does
products, including the antibiotic ―Penicillin G Benzathine. it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his
Petitioner DOH issued an Invitation for Bids for the official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts
procurement of 1.2 million units’ vials of Penicillin G complained of may have been committed while he occupied a
Benzathine. Despite the lack of response from DOH regarding public position. In the present case, suing individual petitioners
Pharmawealth‘s request for inclusion of additional items in its in their personal capacities for damages in connection with
list of accredited products, the latter submitted its bid for the their alleged act of ―illegally abusing their official positions to
Penicillin G Benzathine contract and gave the lowest bid make sure that plaintiff Pharmawealth would not be awarded
thereof. In view, however, of the non- accreditation of the Benzathine contract [which act was] done in bad faith and
respondent‘s Penicillin G Benzathine product, the contract was with full knowledge of the limits and breadth of their powers
awarded to Cathay/YSS Laboratories‘ (YSS). Respondent given by law is permissible, in consonance with the foregoing
Pharmawealth filed a complaint for injunction, mandamus and principles. For an officer who exceeds the power conferred on
damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary him by law cannot hide behind the plea of sovereign immunity
injunction and/or temporary restraining order with the and must bear the liability personally.
Regional Trial praying, inter alia, that the trial court ―nullify
the award of the Penicillin G Benzathine contract to YSS
Laboratories, Inc. and direct petitioners DOH et al. to declare [G.R. No. L-27058. January 17, 1973.]
Pharmawealth as the lowest complying responsible bidder for
the Benzathine contract, and that they accordingly award the AMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellee,
same to plaintiff company and ―adjudge defendants vs. CIRIO H. SANTIAGO, defendant-appellant.
Romualdez, Galon and Lopez liable, jointly and severally to
plaintiff. Petitioners DOH et al. subsequently filed a motion to
dismiss praying for the dismissal of the complaint based on the This case is on appeal directly to this Court by the defendant
doctrine of state immunity. The trial court, however, denied
the motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals (CA) denied DOH‘s DOCTRINE: In an action for the collection of a sum of money,
petition for review which affirmed the order issued Regional the creditor is the real party-in-interest and is the proper party
Trial Court of Pasig City denying petitioners‘ motion to dismiss to file the suit.
the case. FACTS: The plaintiff is a foreign corporation duly registered
ISSUE: and licensed to transact business as a travel agent. As part of

such business, plaintiff adopted a credit system known as the Roman was the owner of two (2) parcels of land. When he died
American Express Credit Card whereby upon application of a intestate, Roman was survived by his son Alfredo and the
customer the plaintiff may issue to him a credit card by means children of his deceased son, Buenaventura, namely,
of which he may enjoy charge privileges in establishments all Marciano, Joaquino, Florentino, Felipe, Marcelo, Sesinando,
over the world listed in directories issued periodically by the and Montano.
company for the guidance of its card holders.
Alfredo, together with his nephews Marciano, Joaquino,
The defendant applied and the corresponding American Florentino, Felipe, Marcelo, Sesinando, and Montano,
Express Credit Card was issued to him. The defendant used it executed an Extrajudicial Settlement.
in making purchases and obtaining services on credit in various
Felipe, Sesinando, Montano, Marcelo, Florentino and
foreign countries which ran up to a total of $15,297.53. The
Joaquino, constituted their brother Marciano as their
plaintiff made demands for payment upon the defendant, and
attorney-in-fact in selling their pro-indiviso shares in the
after the latter refused to pay filed the present suit for
subject lot. Marciano executed a Contract to Sell covering the
collection.
subject Lot in favor of the petitioner for the price of
The main defense raised by the defendant is that the appellee ₱186,948.00.
has no cause of action against him, not being the real party in
Alfredo also executed a Contract to Sell over his undivided
interest, on the allegation that the credit card issued by the
share in the subject Lot in favor of the petitioner, for and in
appellee was merely to introduce the appellant to the different
establishments from which he made purchases and obtained consideration of ₱253,196.00.
services on credit and that it was these establishments who The vendors failed to file a petition for the registration of the
should properly have brought the suit. property under the Torrens System. Consequently, the
CFI: The stores or establishments which sold goods and petitioner, as vendee, refused to pay the balance of the
services to the appellant on credit "bills the American Express purchase price.
Corporation which settles the accounts directly and, in turn Petitioner himself filed an application for the registration of
bills the customers who possess the credit cards." This the Lot under his name. He alleged therein that he was the
corporation pays for the purchase and the defendant has to owner of the property based on a deed of sale executed by
reimburse such payment to the owner of the credit card; in this Alfredo and his nephews; the property was unoccupied; and to
case to the plaintiff." the best of his knowledge and belief, there was never a
mortgage or encumbrance of any kind, affecting the said
ISSUE: WON plaintiff-appellee is a real party-in-interest
property, or any person having an interest therein, legal or
HELD: YES. The plaintiff-appellee is the creditor of the equitable or in possession thereof.
appellant and is the proper party to file this suit for collection.
Around 1 year later from the filing of the application,
As correctly found by the trial court, it is the plaintiff-appellee Marciano, and in behalf of his brothers, executed a Deed of
who settles the charges by the establishments and bills the Sale with Mortgage in favor of the petitioner over their
holder of the credit card, which in this case is the defendant. undivided shares in the same Lot, this time, for the price of
The creditor of the appellant is the appellee and as such is the ₱186,948.00. To secure the payment of the balance of the
proper party to file this suit for collection. On this score the purchase price of the property, the petitioner mortgaged the
finding of the lower court, supported as it is by the evidence property to the vendor. Alfredo similarly did the same
before it, is conclusive. transaction over his undivided share.
VII. RULE 3, SECTIONS 7 TO 12 (PARTIES TO A CIVIL The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the applicant.
ACTION)
Petitioner through his attorney-in-fact Engr. Ilaban, filed an
amended complaint for consignation against the heirs of
Alfredo,; the heirs of Marciano Realon, and the heirs of
RAMON P. ARON, petitioner, vs. FRANCISCO REALON, Marcelo Realon with the RTC.
DOMINGO REALON and FELIPE REALON, representing the
HEIRS OF MARCIANO REALON and ROMAN REALON, The petitioner alleged that pursuant to the 2 deeds of sale with
EMILIANO R. PURIFICACION, representing the HEIRS OF mortgage, his total balance of the purchase price of the
ALFREDO REALON and ROMAN REALON, respondents. property was only ₱42,849.23; he learned about the death of
Alfredo and Marciano when some persons claiming to be their
G.R. No. 159156 January 31, 2005
heirs wanted to collect the money from him, but none of them
could present any authority to collect for and in behalf of the
heirs of the vendors.
FACTS: petition for review on certiorari

Petitioner then deposited the amount of ₱42,849.23 with the Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court further provides that
Clerk of Court of the RTC. facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued, or the
authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative
The defendants therein alleged that their predecessors-incapacity must be averred in the complaint. In order to maintain
interest did not sell the property to the petitioner. an action in a court of justice, the plaintiff must have an actual
The RTC declared the consignation to be valid and released the legal existence, that is, he or she or it must be a person in law
petitioner from his obligation under the Deed of Sale with and possessed of a legal entity as either a natural or an artificial
Mortgage. person, and no suit can lawfully be prosecuted in the name of
that person. The party bringing suit has the burden of proving
Plaintiffs filed a complaint for reconveyance and ownership the sufficiency of the representative character that he claims.
against the petitioner with the RTC. If a complaint is filed by one who claims to represent a party
Plaintiffs alleged that petitioner still had a balance of as plaintiff but who, in fact, is not authorized to do so, such
₱379,908.96; and that petitioner filed an application for the complaint is not deemed filed and the court does not acquire
registration of the title over the land in his name where he jurisdiction over the complaint. It must be stressed that an
falsely claimed that he was the owner of the property, free of unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal effect.
all liens and encumbrances or claim of any person whatsoever. Corollary, the defendant can assail the facts alleged therein
through a motion to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff
Petitioner interposed, among others, the special and has no capacity to sue under Section 1(d) of Rule 16 of the
affirmative defenses that: plaintiff has no cause of action Rules of Court, that is, that he does not have the
against defendant absent any showing that plaintiffs are representative he claims.
authorized to sue in a representative capacity, there being no
testate nor intestate proceedings for the estate of the ABSENT OF ONE INDISPENSABLE PARTY WARRANTS THE
deceased whom they represent. DISMISSAL – RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
The RTC ruled in favour of the plaintiffs. The CA affirmed the Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court reads:
decision of the RTC. SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. – Parties
ISSUE: Whether or not the case should be dismissed for failure in interest without whom no final determination can be had of
implead all indispensable parties an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
HELD: The Court notes that the respondents even failed to Thus, the presence of all indispensable parties is a condition
include the names of all the other heirs, including the sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power. It is precisely
signatories to the assailed deeds in the complaint and in the when an indispensable party is not before the court that the
title thereof, and appending thereto a copy of any special action should be dismissed. The plaintiff is mandated to
power of attorney authorizing the respondents to sue in their implead all indispensable parties, and the absence of one
respective capacity for said heirs. Thus, the petitioner was renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for
prevented from questioning the capacity of the said heirs to want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties, but
sue in their respective capacity either in a motion to dismiss even as to those present. One who is a party to a case is not
the complaint or in his answer to the complaint. bound by any decision of the court; otherwise, he will be
deprived of his right to due process.
Four (4) plaintiffs, Domingo Realon failed to sign the
certification of non-forum shopping. On the other hand, the LOTTE PHIL. CO., INC., Petitioners, vs. ERLINDA DELA CRUZ,
three other plaintiffs who signed the certification failed to LEONOR MAMAUAG, LOURDES CAUBA, JOSEPHINE
append to the complaint a special power of attorney signed by DOMANAIS, ARLENE CAGAYAT, AMELITA YAM, VIVIAN
all the surviving vendors and other heirs specifically DOMARAIS, MARILYN ANTALAN, CHRISTOPHER RAMIREZ,
authorizing them to sign the same for and in their behalf. This ARNOLD SAN PEDRO, MARISSA SAN PEDRO, LORELI
is fatal to the complaint and warrants the dismissal thereto. JIMENEZ, JEFFREY BUENO, CHRISTOPHER CAGAYAT,
GERARD CABILES, JOAN ENRIQUEZ, JOSEPH DE LA CRUZ,
In sum then, the trial court should have rendered judgment NELLY CLERIGO, DULCE NAVARETTE, ROWENA BELLO,
dismissing the respondents’ complaint, and the Court of DANIEL RAMIREZ, AILEEN BAUTISTA and BALTAZAR
Appeals should have reversed the appealed decision of the RTC FERRERA, Respondents.
The settled rule is that every action must be prosecuted or G.R. No. 166302, July 28, 2005
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest. Where the
action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a
representative acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary FACTS: 1995 until 2000, 7J Maintenance and Janitorial Services
must be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed (7J) entered into a contract with Lotte to provide manpower.
to be the real party-in-interest. The name of such beneficiaries In compliance with the contract, and to accommodate the
shall, likewise, be included in the complaint.
needs of Lotte for workers, Dela Cruz were hired and assigned PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45
to Lotte as repackers or sealers. However, Lotte dispensed
DOCTRINE: Where the Court orders the plaintiff to amend its
with their services allegedly due to the expiration/termination
complaint within a certain period of time in order to implead
of the service contract by Lotte with 7J. Respondents were
as party defendants one who is not a party to the case but who
never called back again.
is an indispensable party, plaintiff’s refusal to comply with such
LA declared 7J as employer of respondents and finding 7J guilty order is a ground for the dismissal of the complaint.
of illegal dismissal. NLRC denied the MR.
FACTS:
CA reversed LA and NLRC and declared Lotte as the real
Petitioners filed with the then CFI of Misamis Oriental, a
employer of respondents and that 7J who engaged in labor-
complaint for: "Ownership, Recovery of Possession &
only contracting was merely the agent of Lotte.
Damages" against the private respondents. The complaint,
ISSUE: WON 7J is an indispensable party and should have been among others, alleged that petitioners, then plaintiffs, are the
impleaded in respondent’s petition in the CA true and absolute owners in fee simple of a parcel of land.
Petitioners alleged that having purchased the same from the
RULING: late Esteban Edorot on May 17, 1962; and that sometime in
Yes. An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom the month of February 1964, after the death of Esteban
no final determination can be had of an action, and who shall Edorot, the defendants (herein private respondents) by means
be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of of force, threats and intimidation surreptitiously occupied the
indispensable parties is mandatory. The presence of said property.
indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with Respondents filed an Answer with a Counterclaim claiming
jurisdiction, which is the authority to hear and determine a
that the property in question is owned by them pro-indiviso by
cause, the right to act in a case. Thus, without the presence of
inheritance from their deceased parents.
indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding, judgment of a
court cannot attain real finality. The absence of an Judge Teves gave petitioners 15 days to an amended complaint
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court to include the heirs or representatives of said deceased
null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the defendants since 2 of the defendants died before the case has
absent parties but even as to those present. been filed. This has not been complied with by the petitioners,
hence, in view of the Ex-Parte Manifestation filed by the
Here, 7J is an indispensable party. It is a party in interest respondents, the case was dismissed.
because it will be affected by the outcome of the case. Hence,
the CA did not acquire jurisdiction over 7J. No final ruling on Issue: WON the failure of petitioners to file an amended
this matter can be had without impleading 7J, whose inclusion complaint warrants dismissal of the case
is necessary for the effective and complete resolution of the
RULING: Under Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, “If the plaintiff fails
case and in order to accord all parties with due process and fair
to appear at the time of the trial, or to prosecute his action for
play.
unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these rules or
In Domingo v. Scheer, we held that the non-joinder of any order of the court, the action maybe dismissed upon
indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an motion of the defendant or upon the court’s own motion. This
action and the remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the
be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court merits unless provided by the court.”
on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of
The heirs of deceased defendants in the case at bar being
the action and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner
clearly indispensable parties, respondent Judge acted properly
refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of
in ordering the amendment of the complaint so as to include
the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the
the said heirs as defendants. Since the petitioners failed to
petitioner/plaintiff’s failure to comply therefor.
comply with this Order, respondent Judge acted within his
MR. & MRS. TADEO P. DAEL, Petitioners, v. THE HON. prerogative in dismissing the complaint 4 pursuant to Section
BERNARDO TEVES, as Presiding Judge, Court of First 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court
Instance of Misamis Oriental, Branch VIII and DIONISIO
The other contention of petitioners that there is no more
EDOROT, VIDAL EDOROT, PONCIANO EDOROT, PETRA
necessity of amending the complaint because allegedly an
EDOROT, DIOSDADA EDOROT, JUANA EDOROT, and the
affidavit of waiver of rights have been executed by one Victor
late HERMINIGILDO EDOROT, represented by his heirs.
Edorot is also not meritorious, It is not disputed that said Victor
VICTOR EDOROT, PEDRITO EDOROT and JACOBO EDOROT,
Edorot is only one of the heirs of deceased defendant
Respondents
Herminigildo Edorot. He is not the sole owner of the entire
interest of Herminigildo. Neither is his waiver binding upon the
other heirs of said deceased.
G.R. NO. L-44339 December 2, 1987 CA: certified the instant case to The Supreme Court raising
questions of law
CRISANTA F. SENO, CAROLA SENO SANTOS, MANUEL
SENO, JR., DIANA SENO CONDER, EMILY ISSUE/S:
SENO and WALTER SENO, plaintiffs, vs. MARCOS (1) Are defendants Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido
MANGUBAT and Spouses FRANCISCO LUZAME and Mangubat indispensable parties in the case without whom no
VERGITA PENAFLOR, ANDRES EVANGELISTA and action can be properly taken thereon? (NO)
BIENVENIDO MANGUBAT
(2) Not being indispensable parties, was the dismissal of said
defendants a legal ground for dismissal of the complaint as
against the other defendants?
Appeal to the CA certified to the Supreme Court
HELD: NO. The Court it necessary to consider the distinction
DOCTRINE: Indispensable parties are those with such an between indispensable and proper parties
interest in the controversy that a final decree would
necessarily affect their rights, so that the courts cannot as clearly stated in Sections 7 and 8, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules
proceed without their presence. Necessary parties are those of Court which provide:
whose presence is necessary to adjudicate the whole
Sec. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. — Parties
controversy, but whose interests are so far separable that a
in interest without whom no final determination can be had of
final decree can be made in their absence without affecting
an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
them.
Sec. 8. Joinder of proper parties. — When persons who are not
FACTS: This is an appeal that was certified to the Supreme
indispensable but who ought to be parties if complete relief is
Court by the Court of Appeals Plaintiff Crisanta F. Seno
to be accorded as between those already parties, have not
negotiated negotiate with Marcos Mangubat a mortgage over
been made parties and are subject to the jurisdiction of the
the subject parcel of land so she can pay off a previous
court as to both service of process and venue, the court shall
indebtedness; On the assurance that Marcos will respect their
order them summoned to appear in the action. But the court
true agreement on the mortgage, Plaintiff agreed to the
may, in its discretion, proceed in the action without making
execution of a Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject property
such persons parties, and the judgment rendered therein shall
for a consideration of P5,000.00 in favor of defendant Marcos
be without prejudice to the rights of such persons.
Mangubat and certain Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido
Mangubat. Subsequently, Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Indispensable parties are those with such an interest in the
Mangubat executed a Deed of Absolute Sale transferring their controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their
share in the subject property to defendant Marcos Mangubat rights, so that the courts cannot proceed without their
Later on, Seno learned that defendant Marcos Mangubat sold presence. Necessary parties are those whose presence is
the subject property in favor of spouses Francisco Luzame and necessary to adjudicate the whole controversy, but whose
Vergita interests are so far separable that a final decree can be made
in their absence without affecting them.
Penaflor for the sum of P10,000.00
In the present case, there are no rights of defendants Andres
A complaint filed by Seno seeking the reformation of a Deed of
Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat to be safeguarded if the
Sale executed in favor of defendant Marcos Mangubat and the
sale should be held to be in fact an absolute sale nor if the sale
annulment of a subsequent sale to defendant spouses
is held to be an equitable mortgage. Defendant Marcos
Francisco Luzame and Vergita Penaflor On motion of
Mangubat became the absolute owner of the subject property
defendant spouses Luzame and Penaflor, the trial court
by virtue of the sale to him of the shares of the
ordered on the inclusion as defendants of Andres Evangelista
aforementioned defendants in the property. Said defendants
and Bienvenido Mangubat on the ground that they are
no longer have any interest in the subject property. However,
indispensable parties. The newly impleaded defendants
being parties to the instrument sought to be reformed, their
moved for the dismissal of the case against them on the
presence is necessary in order to settle all the possible issues
ground of prescription.
of tile controversy. Whether the disputed sale be declared an
TRIAL COURT: GRANTED dismissal against Bienvenido and absolute sale or an equitable mortgage, the rights of all the
Mangubat defendants will have been amply protected. Defendants
spouses Luzame in any event may enforce their rights against
TRIAL COURT UPON MR: DISMISS the case against all the
defendant Marcos Mangubat.
defendants.
Notwithstanding, defendants Andres Evangelista and
MR by plaintiff denied. Appeal to CA Bienvenido Mangubat not being indispensable parties but only
proper parties, their joinder as parties defendants was

correctly ordered being in accordance with Sec. 8 of Rule 3 Biscocho. It did not matter who as between them filed the
complaint because the private respondents were liable to
(2) NO. By the dismissal of the case against defendants Andres either of the two as a solidary creditor for the full amount of
Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat, the court a quo had lost the debt. Full satisfaction of a judgment obtained against them
jurisdiction over them. We have already pointed out that the by Quiombing would discharge their obligation to Biscocho,
joinder of proper parties is necessary in order to determine all and vice versa; hence, it was not necessary for both creditors
the possible issues of the controversy; but if for some reason Quiombing and Biscocho to file the complaint. Inclusion of
or another it is not possible to join them, as when they are out Biscocho as a co-plaintiff when Quiombing was competent to
of the jurisdiction of the Court, the court may proceed without
sue by himself alone, would be a useless formality.
them, and the judgment that
2. Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court mandates the
may be rendered shall be without prejudice to their inclusion of indispensable parties as follows:
rights.Hence, notwithstanding the absence of said defendants,
the court could still proceed with the trial of the case as against Sec. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. — Parties
the remaining defendants in accordance with Sec. 8 of Rule 3. in interest without whom no final determination can be had of
an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
Nevertheless, the court is constrained to affirm the dismissal
of the complaint against all the defendants as there is merit in Indispensable parties are those with such an interest in the
the argument raised by defendants-appellees that plaintiffs controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their
are barred by laches to bring suit against them. rights, so that the court cannot proceed without their
presence. Necessary parties are those whose presence is
QUIOMBING V. COURT OF APPEALS, 189 SCRA 325 (1990)
necessary to adjudicate the whole controversy, but whose
interests are so far separable that a final decree can be made
in their absence without affecting them.
FACTS: On August 30, 1983, Nicencio Tan Quiombing and
Dante Biscocho, as the First Party, jointly and severally bound DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
themselves in a “Construction and Service Agreement” to The decision of the respondent court dated March 27, 1990, is
construct a house for private respondents Francisco and SET ASIDE, and the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, is
Manuelita Saligo, as the Second Party, for the contract price of directed to REINSTATE Civil Case No. 913-A. Costs against the
P137,940.00, which the latter agreed to pay. On October 10, private respondents.
1984, Quiombing and Manuelita Saligo entered into a second DOMINGO V. SCHEER, 421 SCRA 468
written agreement under which the latter acknowledged the
completion of the house and undertook to pay the balance of CHRISTINE CHUA, Petitioner, vs. JORGE TORRES and
the contract price in the manner prescribed in the said second ANTONIO BELTRAN, Respondent
agreement. On November 19, 1984, Manuelita Saligo signed a
G.R. No. 151900, August 30, 2005
promissory note for P125,363.50 representing the amount still
due from her and her husband, payable on or before
December 31, 1984, to Nicencio Tan Quiombing.
On October 9, 1986, Quiombing filed a complaint for recovery
of the said amount, plus charges and interests, which the DOCTRINE
private respondents had acknowledged and promised to pay “Section 8, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure defines a
but had not, despite repeated demands. Instead of filing an necessary party as "one who is not indispensable but who
answer, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be
February 4, 1987, contending that Biscocho was an accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete
indispensable party and therefore should have been included determination or settlement of the claim subject of the
as a co-plaintiff. action." Necessary parties are those whose presence is
ISSUE: (1) May one of the two solidary creditors sue by himself necessary to adjudicate the whole controversy, but whose
alone for the recovery of amounts due to both of them without interests are so far separable that a final decree can be made
joining the other creditor as a co-plaintiff? in their absence without affecting them.”
(2) In such a case, is the defendant entitled to the dismissal of FACTS

the complaint on the ground of non-joinder of the second A complaint for damages was lodged before the RTC by Chua,
creditor as an indispensable part? herein petitioner, impleading her brother, Jonathan, as a
RULING: necessary co-plaintiff. It alleged that Jonathan issued in favor
of Caltex Service Center his personal RCBC check in payment
YES. The question of who should sue the private respondents for purchases of diesel oil. However, the check was dishonored
was a personal issue between creditors Quiombing and by the drawee bank. Beltran, one of the respondents and an
employee of Caltex Service Center, sent a demand letter TEODORO Q. PEÑA, GORGONIO MACARIOLA, ORLANDO
informing petitioner of the dishonor of the check and PACIENCIA, JESUS TUPALAR SEVERINO DELA CRUZ, AND FE
demanding payment thereof. She ignored the demand on the CORTEZO, RESPONDENTS.
ground that she was not the one who issued the check.
G.R. NO. 84895; MAY 4, 1989
Without bothering to ascertain who had actually issued the
check, Beltran instituted against petitioner a criminal action for
violation of BP 22. DOCTRINE:
Beltran’s purported negligence amounted to either malicious Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court - … Parties may be
prosecution or serious defamation in prosecuting petitioner. dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party
On the other hand, Torres, as employer, was alleged to have or on its own initiative at any stage the action and on such
failed to observe the diligence of a good father of the family. terms as are just…
While Jonathan was named as plaintiff to the suit, it was The rule presupposes that the original inclusion had been
explicitly qualified that he was being impleaded as a necessary made in the honest conviction that it was proper and the
party-plaintiff. There was no allegation in the complaint of any subsequent dropping is requested because it turned out that
damage or injury sustained by him, and the prayer expressly such inclusion was a mistake.
named petitioner as the only party to whom respondents were
sought to recompense. Neither did Jonathan sign any FACTS:
verification or certification against forum shopping, although On July 22, 1987, the petitioner filed with the respondent
petitioner did sign an attestation as a principal plaintiff. Court a complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
The RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground that Jonathan restitution and damages against Alfredo T. Romualdez,
had not executed a certification against forum shopping. The Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imedla R. Marcos, Jose D. Campos, Jr.
subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied. and forty five other defendants including the private
respondents - seeking to recover from them the ill-gotten
ISSUE: Whether or not Jonathan was a necessary party- wealth which they acquired and accumulated in flagrant
plaintiff (NO) breach of trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public
officers, with grave abuse of right and power, and in violation
RULING
of the Constitution and laws of the Republic of the Philippines,
Jonathan is not a necessary party-plaintiff including misappropriation and theft, plunder of the nation's
wealth, extortion, blackmail, bribery, and other acts of
Under Sec. 8 of Rule [3] of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a corruption and abuse of power.
necessary party is defined as “one who is not indispensable but
who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be In August 1987, Jose D. Campos, Jr., filed with the respondent
accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete Court a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss Complaint with
determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action. Respect to Jose D. Campos. He prayed to be removed as party
Their presence is necessary to adjudicate the whole defendant from the complaint on the grounds that he
controversy, but their interests are so far separable that a final ‘voluntarily surrendered or turned over [any share in his name
decree can be made in their absence without affecting them. on any of the corporations referred to, aside from claiming any
interest, ownership or right thereon] to the Government of the
Jonathan does not stand to be affected should the RTC rule Republic of the Philippines' and that he was 'entitled to the
either favorably or unfavorably of the complaint. The injury is
immunity.
personal to petitioner, and the relief prayed for is to be
adjudicated solely to petitioner. There is no allegation in the The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)
complaint alleging any violation or omission of any right of granted immunity to Jose Y. Campos, and his family, which
Jonathan, either arising from contract or from law. extended to Jose D. Campos, Jr.
However, the Court grants the petition on the ground that the The petitioners filed with the respondent Court a ‘Motion’
RTC erred in dismissing the case. Under Sec. 11, Rule 3 of the seeking to drop defendant Jose D. Campos, Jr., from the
Rules of Civil Procedure, neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of complaint.
parties is ground for dismissal of an action. The dropping of
On February 1988, the respondent Court issued a Resolution,
misjoined parties from the complaint may even be done motu
denying the petitioners, and Jose D. Campos, Jr.’s motions to
proprio by the court, at any stage, without need for a motion
to such effect from the adverse party. drop him from the complaint. On August of the same year, the
respondent Court denied the petitioners, and Jose D. Campos,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, JOSE D. Jr.’s motions for reconsideration.
CAMPOS, JR., PETITIONER-INTERVENOR, VS. THE
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION,
The Sandiganbayan denied the motions for reconsideration to pay a sum of money. There is no showing that the dropping
on, among other grounds, the reason that the PCGG has no of Jose Campos, Jr. as a defendant would be unjust because
power to grant civil immunity. the other defendants can still put up their defenses.
The petitioner contends that the name of Jose D. Campos, Jr. NIEVES PLASABAS and MARCOS MALAZARTE, Petitioners,
was included as defendant in the complaint through mistake vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Special Former Ninth Division),
or oversight, and that pursuant to Section 11, Rule 3 of the DOMINADOR LUMEN, and AURORA AUNZO, Respondents.
Revised Rules of Court, it has the right to drop him as
G.R. No. 166519 March 31, 2009
defendant without prior consent of any party.
The Court issued a temporary restraining order ordering the
Sandiganyan to cease and desist from proceeding with the FACTS: RULE 45
case, and allowed the motion of Jose D. Campos, Jr. to file a
petition in intervention. In 1974, Petitioners filed a complaint for recovery of title to
property with damages before the CFI against respondents.
ISSUE: The property subject of the case was a parcel of coconut land
in the name of petitioner Nieves. In their complaint,
Whether or not the immunity granted by the PCGG to the
petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered confirming their
Campos Family is valid.
rights and legal title to the subject property and ordering the
Whether or not the petitioner can validly drop Jose D. Campos, defendants to vacate the occupied portion and to pay
Jr. as party defendant. damages.
HELD: Respondents, for their part, denied petitioners’ allegation of
ownership and possession of the premises, and interposed, as
Yes. After a careful reading of Executive Order No. 14, the their main defense, that the subject land was inherited by all
Court found that the PCGG is authorized to file both criminal the parties from their common ancestor, Francisco Plasabas.
and civil cases against persons suspected of having acquired ill-
gotten wealth. The well-settled doctrine is that amicable Revealed in the course of the trial, petitioner Nieves was not
settlements and/or compromises are not only allowed but the sole and absolute owner of the land. Based on the
encouraged in civil cases. There is no general rule in criminal testimonies of petitioners’ witnesses, the property passed on
prosecutions, thus immunity in criminal cases must be from Francisco to his son; then to Jovita Talam, petitioner’s
specifically granted. grandmother; then to Antonina Talam, her mother; and then
to her and her siblings—Jose, Victor and Victoria.
The Resolution granting the immunity of the Campos Family
embodies a compromise agreement. In exchange for the Respondents raised in their memorandum the argument that
voluntary surrender of the ill-gotten properties, they were the case should have been terminated at inception for
given full immunity in both civil and criminal prosecutions. petitioners’ failure to implead indispensable parties, the other
co-owners – Jose, Victor and Victoria.
YES. The PCGG was right when it filed a motion to drop Jose
Campos, Jr. as defendant in the civil case. Section 11, Rule 3 of The trial court, without ruling on the merits, dismissed the case
the Rules of Court states: without prejudice.
Section 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. — Neither Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the case to the CA. The CA
misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of affirmed the decision of the trail court. It declared that he non-
an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the joinder of the indispensable parties would violate the principle
court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any of due process.
stage the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner need to implead their co-
against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with
owners in an action for recovery of title.
separately
HELD: Petitioners, in their complaint, do not have to implead
The rule presupposes that the original inclusion had been
their co-owners as parties The allegation of petitioners in their
made in the honest conviction that it was proper and the
complaint that they are the sole owners of the property in
subsequent dropping is requested because it turned out that
litigation is immaterial, considering that they acknowledged
such inclusion was a mistake.
during the trial that the property is co-owned by Nieves and
The dropping of the petitioner-intervenor from the complaint her siblings, and that petitioners have been authorized by the
is based on sound and salutary reasons - the full cooperation co-owners to pursue the case on the latter’s behalf.
to the Commission, the voluntary surrender of the properties Impleading the other co-owners is, therefore, not mandatory,
and assets declared by him to belong to Ferdinand E. Marcos, because, as mentioned earlier, the suit is deemed to be
his full, complete, and truthful disclosure and his commitment instituted for the benefit of all.

The only exception to this rule is when the action is for the In 1961, respondent Mario Ebio married Pedro’s daughter, and
benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner the couple established their home on the lot. In 1964 and 1971,
and is, thus, entitled to the possession thereof. In such a case, Mario Ebio secured building permits from the Paranaque
the action will not prosper unless the plaintiff impleads the municipal office.
other co-owners who are indispensable parties.
In 1999, the Office of Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed
Article 487 of the Civil Code provides that any one of the co- a resolution, seeking assistance from the City Government of
owners may bring an action for ejectment. The article covers Paranaque for the construction of an access road along,
all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, including an traversing the lot occupied by the respondents. The
accion publiciana and a reivindicatory action. A co-owner may respondents registered their opposition, temporarily
file suit without necessarily joining all the other co-owners as suspending the road project.
co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the
In 2003, however, several officials from the barangay and city
benefit of all. Any judgment of the court in favor of the plaintiff
planning office began to cut coconut trees on the lot.
will benefit the other co-owners, but if the judgment is
Prompting the respondents to file letter-complaints before the
adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of the
Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands, the Department of
unimpleaded co-owners.
Interior and Local Government and the Office of the Vice
With this disquisition, there is no need to determine whether Mayor.
petitioners’ complaint is one for ejectment or for recovery of
title. To repeat, Article 487 of the Civil Code applies to both After several meetings, no definite agreement was reached by
the parties. In 2005, the City Administrator, Noli Aldip sent a
actions.
letter ordering the respondents to vacate the area, or they will
The rule is settled that the non-joinder of indispensable parties be physically evicted from the property.
is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to
implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties Threatened, the respondents went to the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Paranaque and applied for a writ of preliminary
may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or
injunction against the petitioners. The RTC denied the
on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or at such
petitioner for lack of merit, reasoning that the respondents
times as are just. If petitioner refuses to implead an
were not able to prove that they have right to the property
indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter
absent an action for confirmation of title. They also failed to
may dismiss the complaint/petition for the
implead the Republic of the Philippines, which is an
plaintiff’s/petitioner's failure to comply therewith.
indispensable party. Their motion for reconsideration was
OFFICE OF THE CITY MAYOR OF PARAÑAQUE CITY, ET AL. denied.
V. MARIO D. EBIO AND HIS CHILDREN/HEIRS NAMELY,
The Court of Appeals (CA) ruled in favor of the respondents. It
ARTURO V. EBIO, EDUARDO, ET AL.,
stated that the respondents were able to prove their
G.R. NO. 178411, JUNE 23, 2010 acquisition of the property by prescription. The evidentiary
records revealed that Pedro Vitalez possessed the property
since 1930, and they have been religiously paying for the
DOCTRINE: property taxes. In addition, construction permits were issued
in favor of Mario Ebio, and Pedro Vitalez transferred his rights
An indispensable party is one whose interest in the to the property to Mario Ebio. The petitioners maintained their
controversy is such that a final decree would necessarily affect arguments, that the respondents failed to implead the
his/her right, so the court cannot proceed without their Republic of the Philippines in their petition, and that they do
presence. In contrast, a necessary party is one whose presence not have established their possession of the property.
in the proceedings is necessary to adjudicate the whole
controversy but whose interest is separable such that a final ISSUES:
decree can be made in their absence without affecting them. Whether or not the State is an indispensable party to the
FACTS: action of the respondents.
The respondents claim that they are the owners of a parcel of Whether or not the respondents substantively established
land in Paranaque City. The land was an accretion of a creek. their possession and occupation of the subject property.
According to the respondents, the original occupant and HELD:

possessor of the land was their great grandfather Jose Vitalez, No. An action for injunction is brought specifically to restrain
who, in 1930, gave the land to his son, Pedro Vitalez. Pedro or command the performance of an act. In the case at bar, the
was able to obtain a tax declaration over the property in his respondents filed an action for injunction to prevent the local
name, and had been religiously paying the property taxes.

government of Paranaque City from proceeding with the not bind third persons with respect to the adjudication of
construction of an access road. property, the CA is also correct in its holding that there is no
provision in the Rules of Court which states that “the
The petitioners argue on the other hand that since the creek is instrument cannot be used to prove that one is an heir” due to
classified as a part of the public domain, any land that may the sheer fact that it was not registered before the Register of
have formed along its banks through time should be Deeds.”
considered part of the public domain. The Court does not
agree. FACTS
In Article 457 of the Civil Code, it was clear that alluvial Republic, represented by DPWH, filed a complaint seeking to
deposits along the banks of a creek do not form part of the expropriate a parcel of land for the implementation of the C-5
public domain, as the alluvial property automatically belongs Northern Link Road Project. The title and registered owner of
to the owner of the estate to which it may have been added. the subject property, however, were not properly identified,
The alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through although diligent efforts to search the owner were exerted. A
prescription by third persons. In contrast, properties of public Writ of Possession was then issued in favor of Republic.
dominion cannot be acquired by prescription. No matter how
Subsequently, a certain Atty. Panlaque appeared before the
long the possession of the properties has been, there can be
RTC, praying that Elena be substituted as party defendant,
no prescription against the State regarding property of public
alleging that she is the real party in interest, being the
domain.
registered owner of the subject property. However, Elena died.
An indispensable party is one whose interest in the Thus, Atty. Pilares (different counsel) prayed that the sole heir,
controversy is such that a final decree would necessarily affect Leonor, represented by Eulogia by virtue of a Special Power of
his/her right, so the court cannot proceed without their Attorney, be substituted in Elena’s place.
presence. In contrast, a necessary party is one whose presence
in the proceedings is necessary to adjudicate the whole The RTC named Elena as party defendant, substituted by
Leonor, being the sole heir. However, Republic filed a Motion
controversy but whose interest is separable such that a final
for Partial Reconsideration, arguing that the substitution was
decree can be made in their absence without affecting them.
improper as the extrajudicial deed of partition, the evidence
In the instant case, the land being not part of the public for allowing Elena to be substituted, was neither registered
domain, the State is neither a necessary nor an indispensable with the Register of Deeds nor published in a newspaper of
party to an action where no positive act shall be required from general circulation. However, the RTC denied the motion. The
it or where no obligation shall be imposed upon it. Neither CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA denied the motion
would it be an indispensable party if none of its properties shall for reconsideration.
be divested nor any of its rights infringed.
ISSUE: Whether or not Leonor’s substitution as party
Yes. The respondents were able to prove that their defendant in the expropriation case should be allowed. (YES)
predecessor-in-interest, Pedro Vitalez, had occupied and
possessed the subject lot as early as 1930. Mario Ebio obtained RULING
a permit from the local government to construct their family The instant Petition is unmeritorious.
dwelling on the lot. The findings of fact by both the Trial Court
and the Court of Appeals lead to one conclusion; that for more As noted by the CA and RTC, Respondent Leonor was able to
than thirty years, the respondents and their predecessors-in- present two witnesses, as well as other pertinent pieces of
interest had acquired ownership over the subject property documentary evidence establishing Leonor’s identity and
through prescription. interest over the subject property.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by While Sec. 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides that an
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, unregistered extrajudicial settlement does not bind third
Petitioner, vs. LEONOR A. MACABAGDAL, represented by persons with respect to the adjudication of property, this does
EULOGIA MAABAGDAL-PASCUAL, Respondent not mean that the instrument cannot be used to prove that
one is an heir.
G.R. No. 203948 , January 22, 2020
Furthermore, the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement was also

PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 duly notarized, a fact not disputed by the Republic.
DOCTRINE Hence, the burden of disproving what is borne in the deed falls
on petitioner Republic. Such burden was not met because
“While petitioner Republic is correct insofar as saying that
Republic did not provide any other evidence, nor make any
under Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court an unregistered
affidavit of self-adjudication or extrajudicial settlement does
allegation, that respondent Leonor is not the sole surviving No. Although the spouses Carandang were correct in invoking
heir and sister of Elena. the aforementioned doctrine, the ground set forth entails an
examination of “whether the parties presently pleaded are
G.R. No. 160347, November 29, 2006 interested in the outcome of the litigation, and not whether all
ARCADIO and MARIA LUISA CARANDANG, Petitioners, vs. persons interested in such outcome are actually pleaded.” The
HEIRS OF QUIRINO A. DE GUZMAN, namely: MILAGROS DE first query seeks to answer the question of whether Milagros
GUZMAN, VICTOR DE GUZMAN, REYNALDO DE GUZMAN, is a real party in interest, while the latter query is asking if she
CYNTHIA G. RAGASA and QUIRINO DE GUZMAN, JR., is an indispensable party. Since the issue of this case calls for
Respondents the definition of an indispensable party, invoking the
abovementioned doctrine is irrelevant to the case because the
doctrine talks about a ‘real party in interest’ and not an
FACTS: ‘indispensable party’.
The Spouses Carandang and the decedent Quirino de Guzman Although it is important to take note that an indispensable
were stockholders and corporate officers of Mabuhay party is also a real party in interest.
Broadcasting System (MBS). The Carandangs have equities at Assuming that the four checks are credits, they are assumed to
54 % while Quirino has 46%. When the capital stock of MBS be conjugal properties of Quirino and Milagros. There being no
was increased, the Carandangs subscribed P345,000 from it, evidence to the contrary, such presumption subsists. As such,
P293,250 from the said amount was loaned by Quirino to the Quirino de Guzman, being a co-owner of specific partnership
Carandangs. In the subsequent increase in MBS’ capital stock, property, is certainly a real party in interest. Being co-owners
the Carandangs subscribed again to the increase in the amount of the alleged credit, Quirino and Milagros de Guzman may
of P93,750. But, P43,125 out of the mentioned amount was separately bring an action for the recovery thereof.
again loaned by Quirino. When Quirino sent a demand letter
to the Carandangs for the payment of the loan, the Carandangs In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real
refused to pay. They contend that a pre-incorporation parties in interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil
agreement was executed between Arcadio Carandang and Code and relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring
Quirino, whereby Quirino promised to pay for the stock an action, any kind of action, for the recovery of co-owned
subscriptions of the Arcadio without cost, in consideration for properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the
Arcadio’s technical expertise, his newly purchased equipment, co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned
and his skill in repairing and upgrading radio/communication property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-
equipment therefore, there is no indebtedness on the part of owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even
the Carandangs. necessary parties, for a complete relief can be accorded in the
suit even without their participation, since the suit is presumed
Thereafter, Quirino filed a complaint seeking to recover the to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.” Therefore,
P336,375 total amount of the loan together with damages. The Quirino de Guzman, being a co-owner of specific partnership
RTC ruled in favor of Quirino and ordered the Carandangs to property, is certainly a real party in interest. Being co-owners
pay the loan plus interest, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit. of the alleged credit, Quirino and Milagros de Guzman may
The Carandangs appealed the trial court’s decision to the CA, separately bring an action for the recovery thereof.
but the CA affirmed the same. The subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the Carandangs were also denied. SPOUSES CEFERINO C. LAUS and MONINA P. LAUS, and
Hence, this appeal to the SC.Spouses Carandang alleged that SPOUSES ANTONIO O. KOH and ELISA T. KOH , petitioners,
three of the four checks used to pay their stock subscriptions vs. OPTIMUM SECURITY SERVICES, INC., respondent.
were issued in the name of Milagros de Guzman, the
decedent’s wife. Thus, Milagros should be considered as an
indispensable party in the complaint. Being such, the failure to PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45
join Milagros as a party in the case should cause the dismissal
of the action by reason of a jurisprudence stating that: “if a suit
is not brought in the name of or against the real party in DOCTRINE: The non- joinder of indispensable parties is still not
interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground that a ground for the dismissal of the suit. The proper course of
the complaint states no cause of action." action is for the court to order that they be impleaded. Only
upon refusal of or non-compliance with such directive, may the
ISSUE: WON the RTC should have dismissed the case for failure
to state a cause of action, considering that Milagros de complaint be dismissed.
Guzman, allegedly an indispensable party, was not included as
a party-plaintiff. FACTS:
RULING: Petitioners filed a Complaint denominated as Damages with

Application for a TRO and WPI against respondents. Petitioners
alleged that on 3 separate occasions in August 2005, they were the avails of the suit. On the other hand, an indispensable party
prevented by armed security guards working for respondent is a party in interest without whom no final determination can
and TIPCO from entering the eight (8) parcels of land in be had of an action, in contrast to a necessary party, which is
Mabalacat, Pampanga belonging to them. one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a
party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already
Respondents averred that petitioners are not entitled for TRO parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the
and WPI prayed for because they do not own the land in claim subject of the action.
question. They maintain that Margarita dela Rosa, Manuel dela
Peña, Michael Pineda, Fermin Dizon, William Lee, and Odon In any event, even on the assumption that they are
Sibug are the real owners thereof, who authorized respondent indispensable parties, the non- joinder of indispensable parties
to secure the subject properties. Respondent company and is, as above-discussed, still not a ground for the dismissal of the
Marivalles further insisted that they acted in good faith in suit. The proper course of action is for the court to order that
denying they be impleaded. Only upon refusal of or non-compliance
with such directive, may the complaint be dismissed. In view
petitioners and their agents access to the subject properties as of the nature of the case as above-explained, respondent and
they were merely complying with a contractual obligation. the other defendants are real parties in interest. Clearly, they
On the other hand, TIPCO denied preventing petitioners from stand to be directly injured by an adverse judgment. They are
entering the subject properties. It pointed out that it did not the parties against whom the prayed for injunction is directed
claim ownership or possession thereof, and, as such, did not and are also alleged to be liable for the resultant damage.
hire the armed security guards who prevented petitioners
from entering the subject properties.
RTC granted the application for WPI based on its finding that
petitioners had presented sufficient evidence to establish that
they are the registered owners of the subject properties.
CA reversed RTC ruling and order the dismissal of the
complaint. CA observed that respondent and the other
defendants from the subject properties, which, under
prevailing jurisprudence, is not allowed where the claimant's
title has not been clearly established by law, as in this case PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45
where petitioners' titles are under contest and they have failed
to establish their prior possession of the subject properties. CA DOCTRINE: An indispensable party is a party in interest without
opined that respondent was not a real party in interest as it whom no final determination can be had of an action and who
was merely contracted to secure the subject properties under shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The presence
the Security Service Contract, of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with
jurisdiction. The absence of an indispensable party renders all
which had since lapsed without being renewed. subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of
Issue: WON the complaint should be dismissed for failing of authority to act not only as to the absent party but even as to
petitioners to include the alleged real owners of the subject those present.
properties as the real parties in interest (NO)
FACTS:
RULING: As aptly pointed out by the CA, although petitioners
appear to be the registered owners of the subject properties, In her complaint for ejectment filed before the MCTC,
they nonetheless failed to establish that they were in actual respondent Mariam K. Kairuz (Mariam) alleged that she had
physical possession of the same at the time the incidents in been in actual and physical possession of a 5.2-hectare
August 2005 property located at Tadiangan, Tuba, Benguet (property) until
May 28, 2007. She alleged that in the afternoon of May 28,
transpired. While the CA was correct in lifting the WPI, it, 2007, petitioners John Cary Tumagan (John), Alam Halil (Alam),
however, erred in ordering the dismissal of the complaint. The and Bot Padilla (Bot) conspired with each other and took
error springs from the CA's misconception that the possession of the property by means of force, intimidation,
alleged real owners of the subject properties, while real parties strategy, threat, and stealth with the aid of armed men. After
in interest, are indispensable parties to the case. The forcibly gaining entry into the property, petitioners then
distinction between the two and the operational parameters padlocked its three gates, posted armed men, and excluded
as to each are well-settled in jurisprudence. Mariam from the property. Mariam likewise sought the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or a writ
A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited of preliminary injunction (WPI) against petitioners.
or injured by the judgment of the suit, or the party entitled to
In their answer, petitioners averred that Mariam could not that Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court provides that
bring the present action for forcible entry because she was neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for
never the sole owner or possessor of the property. They the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead the non-
alleged that Mariam is the spouse of the late Laurence Ramzy party claimed to be indispensable either by order of the court
Kairuz (Laurence), who co-owned the property with his sisters, on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of
Vivien Kairuz (Vivien) and Elizabeth D' Alessandri (Elizabeth). the action. If the party refuses to implead the indispensable
Petitioners claimed that the property is a good source of party despite order of the court, then the latter may dismiss
potable water and is publicly known as Kairuz Spring. During the complaint/petition for the plaintiffs failure to comply
his lifetime, Laurence, in his own capacity and as attorney-in- therewith.
fact for his sisters, entered into a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) with Balibago Waterworks System Incorporated (BWSI) ISSUE:
and its affiliate company, PASUDECO, to establish a new
corporation, Bali Irisan Resources, Inc. (BIRI). As stipulated in Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the
the MOA, Laurence and his two sisters will sell the property Decisions of the MCTC and the RTC dismissing the complaint
containing Kairuz Spring and other improvements to BIRI for for failure to implead BIRI, an indispensable party?
P115,000,000.00. Eventually, the Kairuz family sold the
HELD:
property, including the bottling building, Kairuz Spring,
machineries, equipment, and other facilities following the An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no
terms of the MOA. BIRI took full possession over the property final determination can be had of an action and who shall be
and caused new certificates of title to be issued. BIRI is 30% joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The presence of
owned by the Kairuz family and 70% owned by BWSI and its indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with
allied company, PASUDECO. Its Board of Directors is composed jurisdiction.
of seven members, with a three-person Management
Committee (ManCom) handling its day-to-day operations. The Here, as correctly held by the MCTC and the RTC, it is
one seat accorded to the Kairuz family in the ManCom was indisputable that BIRI is an indispensable party, being the
initially occupied by Laurence, while the two other seats in the registered owner of the property and at whose behest the
ManCom were occupied by John and one Victor Hontiveros. petitioner-employees acted. Thus, without the participation of
Petitioners alleged that Mariam was aware of the MOA, the BIRI, there could be no full determination of the issues in this
ManCom, and of the operations of the BIRI properties precisely case considering that it was sufficiently established that
because she succeeded Laurence's seat in the Board of petitioners did not take possession of the property for their
Directors and ManCom after his death. own use but for that of BIRI's. Contrary to the CA's opinion, the
joinder of indispensable parties is not a mere technicality. We
Furthermore, petitioners claim that the MCTC has no have ruled that the joinder of indispensable parties is
jurisdiction over the action filed by Mariam because the same mandatory and the responsibility of impleading all the
is an intra-corporate dispute which falls under the jurisdiction indispensable parties rests on the plaintiff.In Domingo v.
of the appropriate RTC. Scheer,we ruled that without the presence of indispensable
parties to the suit, the judgment of the court cannot attain real
On March 9, 2009, the MCTC dismissed the case due to
finality. Otherwise stated, the absence of an indispensable
Mariam's failure to implead BIRI, an indispensable party.It
party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void
ruled that the joinder of all indispensable parties must be
for want of authority to act not only as to the absent party but
made under any and all conditions, their presence being sine
even as to those present.
qua non to the exercise of judicial power. Thus, although it
made a finding on Mariam's prior physical possession of the In this case, while the CA correctly pointed out that under Rule
property, ultimately, the MCTC ruled that if an indispensable 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court, failure to implead an
party is not impleaded, as in this case, there can be no final indispensable party is not a ground for the dismissal of an
determination of the action. action, it failed to take into account that it remains essential
that any indispensable party be impleaded in the proceedings
On appeal, the RTC upheld the MCTC's dismissal of the case.
before the court renders judgment.Here, the CA simply
Aggrieved, Mariam filed a petition for review before the CA. proceeded to discuss the merits of the case and rule in
Mariam's favor, recognizing her prior physical possession of
On December 21, 2010, the CA granted the petition and the subject property. This is not correct. The Decision and
reversed the RTC Decision. It ruled that the MCTC and the RTC Resolution of the CA in this case is, therefore, null and void for
should have limited the issue to who had prior physical want of jurisdiction, having been rendered in the absence of
possession of the disputed land. It ruled that the MCTC erred an indispensable party, BIRI.
in dismissing Mariam's complaint because of a technical rule of
failure to implead an indispensable party, BIRI. It pointed out

Nonetheless, while a remand of the case to the MCTC for the itself, the corporation of which Mariam is a shareholder, and
inclusion of BIRI, the non-party claimed to be indispensable, which through Board Resolutions No. 2006-0001, 2007-0004
seems to be a possible solution, a review of the records reveals and 2007-0005 authorized John, its branch manager, to do all
that the remand to the MCTC is not warranted considering that acts fit and necessary to enforce its corporate rights against
the MCTC itself did not acquire jurisdiction over Mariam's the Kairuz family, including the posting of guards to secure the
complaint for forcible entry. property. The controversy is thus one between corporation
and one of its shareholders.
From the beginning, petitioners were consistent in their
position that the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the action filed Moreover, the CA erred in characterizing the action as an
by Mariam. They claim that Mariam is not only a shareholder ejectment case filed by a co-owner who was illegally deprived
of BIRI, she is also the successor of her late husband, Laurence, of her right to possess the property by the presence of armed
and the case involves management of corporate property, an men.
intra-corporate dispute which falls under the jurisdiction of the
appropriate commercial court. Thus, pursuant to Article XII of The CA ruled that since the Kairuzes own 30% of the shares of
the MOA, Mariam should have brought the case before the stocks of BIRI, Mariam, as a co-owner who was unlawfully
RTC of Angeles, Pampanga.Petitioners also argue that Mariam ousted from BIRI property by its employees, may bring an
has already filed a case earlier against BIRI for annulment of action for ejectment against the employees. This is not correct.
the Deed of Assignment before the RTC of Angeles City, that
this case is merely an attempt to split causes of action, and that Here, it is undisputed that the property has already been
Mariam purposely did not mention material facts in order to transferred to BIRI and registered in its name. It is likewise
obtain a favorable judgment. Petitioners likewise point out undisputed that based on the MOA, the Kairuzes own 30% of
that Mariam cannot feign ignorance that petitioners were the outstanding capital stock of BIRI. This, however, does not
merely acting on the orders of BIRI considering that both make Mariam a co-owner of the property of BIRI, including the
Mariam and John are members of the same ManCom which property subject of this case. Shareholders are in no legal
oversaw the day-to-day business operations of BIRI. sense the owners of corporate property, which is owned by the
corporation as a distinct legal person.At most, Mariam's
In Matling Industrial and Commercial Corporation v. Coros, the interest as a shareholder is purely inchoate, or in sheer
Court summarized the guidelines for determining whether a expectancy of a right, in the management of the corporation
dispute constitutes an intra-corporate controversy or not. and to share in its profits, and in its properties and assets on
There, we held that in order that the SEC (now the RTC) can dissolution after payment of the corporate debts and
take cognizance of a case, the controversy must pertain to any obligations.
of the following relationships: (a) between the corporation,
partnership, or association and the public; (b) between the In sum, what appears on record as the true nature of the
corporation, partnership, or association and its stockholders, controversy is that of a shareholder seeking relief from the
partners, members, or officers; (c) between the corporation, court to contest the management's decision to: (1) post guards
partnership, or association and the State as far as its franchise, to secure the premises of the corporate property; (2) padlock
permit, or license to operate is concerned; and (d) among the the premises; and (3) deny her access to the same on May 28,
stockholders, partners, or associates themselves. However, 2007 due to her alleged default on the provisions of the MOA.
not every conflict between a corporation and its stockholders
Thus, we agree with petitioners that while the case purports to
involves corporate matters. Concurrent factors, such as the
be one for forcible entry filed by Mariam against BIRI's
status or relationship of the parties, or the nature of the
employees and contractors in their individual capacities, the
question that is the subject of their controversy, must be
true nature of the controversy is an intra-corporate dispute
considered in determining whether the SEC (now the RTC) has
between BIRI and its shareholder, Mariam, regarding the
jurisdiction over the controversy.
management of, and access to, the corporate property subject
Here, the Court considers two elements in determining the of the MOA. We therefore find that the MCTC never acquired
existence of an intra-corporate controversy, namely: (a) the jurisdiction over the ejectment case filed by Mariam.
status or relationship of the parties; and (b) the nature of the
question that is the subject of their controversy.
RULE 3, SECTIONS 13 TO 17: PARTIES TO A CIVIL ACTION
As discussed earlier, the parties involved in the controversy are
respondent Mariam (a shareholder of BIRI and successor to her
late husband's position on the ManCom), petitioner John (then CHIANG KAI SHEK SCHOOL V. CA, G.R. NO. 58028. APRIL 18,
the branch manager, shareholder, and part of the BIRI 1989
ManCom), and petitioners Bot and Alam (licensed geodetic
engineers engaged by BIRI for a contract to survey the property
subject of the dispute). The controversy also involves BIRI This is a petition for review on certiorari.
FACTS: Fausta F. Oh when she reported for work at the Chiang DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Kai Shek School in Sorsogon in 1968. She was told she had no The appealed decision is AFFIRMED except for the award of
assignment for the next semester. She had been teaching for separation pay, which is reduced to P2,880.00. All the other
almost 33 years. However, for no apparent reason, she was awards are approved. Costs against the petitioner.
abruptly dismissed. She demanded separation pay, social
This decision is immediately executory.
security benefits, salary differentials, maternity benefits and
moral and exemplary damages. SO ORDERED.
The original defendant was the Chiang Kai Shek School but
when it filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that it could
not be sued, the complaint was amended. Certain officials of THE HEIRS OF THE LATE FLORENTINA NUGUID VDA DE
the school were also impleaded to make them solidarily liable HABERER V. CA, 104 SCRA 534 (1981)
with the school.
The Court of First Instance of Sorsogon dismissed the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
complaint. On appeal, its decision was set aside by the Court
respondent court, which held the school suable and liable
while absolving the other defendants. The motion for FACTS: Florentina Nuguid Vda. De Haberer is the duly
reconsideration having been denied, the school then came to registered owner of a parcel of land. In 1964 and 1965, she
this Court in this petition for review on certiorari. filed (11) complaints for the recovery of possession of lot in
Rizal issued by the registry of deeds under her name. The
ISSUE: Whether or not a school that has not been incorporated allegation was that private respondents had entered the land
may be sued by reason alone of its long continued existence and built their houses therein with authority from her.
and recognition by the government.
The lower court rendered a consolidated decision dated May
HELD: The court held in the negative. The court ruled that even 26, 1971, dismissing all the complaints. Upon motion of
though Rule 3, Section 1, of the Rules of Court clearly provides Florentina, the cases were reopened and retried on grounds of
that "only natural or juridical persons may be parties in a civil newly discovered evidence. But on September 15, 1972 the
action." However, it is also not denied that the school has not lower court revived its decision of May 26, 1971. The decision
been incorporated. This omission should not prejudice the was then appealed to the Court of Appeals. Series of motions
private respondent in the assertion of her claims against the from both parties were submitted.
school.
In May 26, 1975 Florentina Nuguid Vda. De Haberer died. A
As a school, the petitioner was governed by Act No. 2706 as motion was submitted to respondent court in June 28, 1975
amended by C.A. No. 180. Having been recognized by the giving notice of the death of Vda de. Haberer through her
government, it was under obligation to incorporate under the counsels and thereby asking for the suspension of the running
Corporation Law within 90 days from such recognition. It of the period within which to file the appellant’s brief, pending
appears that it had not done so at the time the complaint was on the appointment of an executor. This intervening event has
􏰁led notwithstanding that it had been in existence even earlier caused in the further delay of the case in that the appellant as
than 1932. The petitioner cannot now invoke its own non- a party to the case must be substituted as required by Section
compliance with the law to immunize it from the private 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Motions pursuant to this rule
respondent's complaint. As the school itself may be sued in its were done by counsels of Florentina, but respondent court
own name, there is no need to apply Rule 3, Section 15, under remained silent and, instead, contended that the appeal be
which the persons joined in an association without any juridical dismissed for failure to prosecute in that the lawyers of the
personality may be sued with such association. Besides, it has deceased had no longer any legal standing for the reason that
been shown that the individual members of the board of their client-attorney relationship had been terminated upon
trustees are not liable, having been appointed only after the her death. The appeal was eventually dismissed, and motion
private respondent's dismissal. for reconsideration was also turned down.
The petitioner says the private respondent had not been ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing
illegally dismissed because her teaching contract was on a the appeal.
yearly basis and the school was not required to rehire her in
1968. The Court holds, after considering the particular HELD: Supreme Court held that Respondent Court erred in
circumstance of Oh's employment, that she had become a denying the motion for reconsideration on the part of the
permanent employee of the school and entitled to security of appellant, and eventually dismissed the appeal. In the absence
tenure at the time of her dismissal. Since no cause was shown of a retainer from the heirs or authorized representative of his
and established at an appropriate hearing, and the notice then deceased client, the attorney would thereafter have no further
required by law had not been given, such dismissal was invalid. power or authority to appear or to take any further action in
the case.
Section 17, Rule 3 sets the rule on substitution of parties in changes in the caption of the case which may be called the
case of death of any of the parties. In this Rule, formal aspect of it. Such substitution also includes the process
of letting the substitutes know that they shall be bound by any
it is the court that is called upon, after notice of party’s death judgment in the case and that they should therefore actively
and the claim is not thereby extinguished, to order upon participate in the defense of the deceased. This part may be
proper notice the legal representative of the deceased to called the substantive aspect. It is this court's view that
appear within a period of 30 days or such time as the court may compliance with the substantive aspect of the rule despite
grant; failure to comply with the formal aspect may be considered
The claim is not thereby extinguished. substantial compliance. Such is the situation in the case at
bench because the only inference that could be deduced from
More under Rule 3, the Respondent Court should have set a the following facts was that there was active participation of
period for the substitution of the deceased party with her legal the heirs in the defense of the deceased after his death.)
representative or heirs, which the court is called upon to order
the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal The defendant in an ejectment case having died before the
representative of the deceased at the cost of the deceased rendition by the trial court of its decision therein, its failure to
estate, and such representative shall then immediately appear effectuate a formal substitution of heirs before its rendition of
for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. judgment, does not invalidate such judgment where the heirs
themselves appeared before the trial court, participated in the
So here, Respondent Court gravely erred in not following the proceedings therein, and presented evidence in defense of
rule and requiring the appearance of the legal representative deceased defendant, it undeniably being evident that the heirs
of the deceased, but instead dismissed the appeal who yet had themselves sought their day in court and exercised their right
to be substituted in the pending appeal. to due process.
VDA. DE SALAZAR V. CA, G.R. NO. 121510, NOVEMBER 23, Respondent Court of Appeals also correctly ruled that
1995 ejectment, being an action involving recovery of real property,
is a real action which as such, is not extinguished by the
defendant's death.
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI
GOCHAN V. YOUNG, G.R. NO. 131889, MARCH 12, 2001
-Respondents Primitive and Emerenciana Nepomuceno filed
separate complaints CAR for ejectment against petitioner's
deceased husband, Benjamin Salazar. TC: rendered its joint PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45
decision in favor of private respondents.
DOCTRINE: For the protection of the interests of the decedent,
Petitioner: assailed the same trial court decision as having this Court has in previous instances recognized the heirs as
been rendered by a court that did not have jurisdiction over proper representatives of the decedent, even when there is
her and the other heirs of her deceased husband because already an administrator appointed by the court. When no
notwithstanding the fact that her husband had already died, administrator has been appointed, as in this case, there is all
the trial court still proceeded to render its decision without the more reason to recognize the heirs as the proper
effecting the substitution of heirs in accordance with Sec. 17, representatives of the deceased.
Rule 3, of the ROC thereby depriving her of her day in court.
FACTS: Gochan Realty was registered with the SEC with Felix
CA: Affirmed CAR Gochan, Sr., and others as its incorporators. Felix Gochan Sr.'s
Issue: Whether CA erred in ruling in favor of the validity of the daughter, Alice, mother of respondents, inherited 50 shares of
challenged decision despite the trial court's failure to stock in Gochan Realty from the former. Alice died leaving the
effectuate a substitution of heirs before its rendition of 50 shares to her husband, John Young, Sr.
judgment. RTC Cebu adjudicated 6/14 of these shares to her children,
Held: NO. The CA did not err in ruling in favor of the validity of herein respondents.
the challenged decision. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled Five days later, all the children reached the age of majority and
that formal substitution of heirs is not necessary when the their father John Sr., requested Gochan Realty to partition the
heirs themselves voluntarily appeared, participated in the case shares of his late wife by cancelling the stock certificates in his
and presented evidence in defense of deceased defendant. name and issuing in lieu thereof, new stock certificates in the
(In the instant case, the heirs are the proper substitutes. names of respondents.
Substitution gives them the opportunity to continue the Gochan Realty refused saying the right of first refusal granted
defense for the deceased. Substitution is important because to the remaining stockholders by the Articles of Incorporation.
such opportunity to defend is a requirement to comply with John, Sr. died, leaving the shares to the respondents.
due process. Such substitution consists of making the proper
Respondents filed a complaint with the SEC for issuance of sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the
shares of stock to the rightful owners, nullification of shares of contract involves things belonging to the principal."
stock, reconveyance of property impressed with trust,
Section 2 of Rule 87 of the same Rules, which also deals with
accounting, removal of officers and directors and damages
administrators, states:
against respondents. A Notice of Lis Pendens was annotated as
[sic] real properties of the corporation. "SECTION 2. Executor or administrator may bring or defend
actions which survive. — For the recovery or protection of the
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint alleging that: (1)
property or rights of the deceased, an executor or
the SEC had no jurisdiction over the nature of the action; (2)
administrator may bring or defend, in the right of the
the [respondents] [were] not the real parties-in-interest and
deceased, actions for causes which survive."
ha[d] no capacity to sue; and (3) [respondents'] causes of
action [were] barred by the Statute of Limitations. The above-quoted rules, while permitting an executor or
administrator to represent or to bring suits on behalf of the
SEC: GRANTED the motion to dismiss holding that
deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from representing the
complainants had never been stockholders to confer them
deceased. These rules are easily applicable to cases in which
with the legal capacity to bring and maintain their action.
an administrator has already been appointed. But no rule
Respondents appealed to the SEC en banc, contending, among categorically addresses the situation in which special
others, that the SEC had jurisdiction over the case. proceedings for the settlement of an estate have already been
instituted, yet no administrator has been appointed. In such
SEC EN BANC: ruled for the petitioners. Aggrieved, instances, the heirs cannot be expected to wait for the
respondents then filed a Petition for Review with the Court of
appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if
Appeals.
the administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit
CA: SEC had no jurisdiction over the case as far as the heirs of to protect the rights and the interests of the deceased; and in
Alice Gochan were concerned, because they were not yet the meantime, do nothing while the rights and the properties
stockholders of the corporation. On the other hand, it upheld of the decedent are violated or dissipated.
the capacity of Respondents Cecilia Gochan Uy and her spouse The Rules are to be interpreted liberally to promote their
Miguel Uy. It also held that the Intestate Estate of John Young objective of securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive
Sr. was an indispensable party. disposition of every action and proceeding. They cannot be
ISSUE: WON the heirs of John D. Young Sr. are the proper interpreted in such a way as to unnecessarily put undue
representatives in the suit on his behalf when no administrator hardships on litigants. For the protection of the interests of the
was appointed decedent, this Court has in previous instances recognized the
heirs as proper representatives of the decedent, even when
HELD: YES. Courts have recognized heirs as proper there is already an administrator appointed by the court.
representatives of the decedent even if there is already an When no administrator has been appointed, as in this case,
administrator. Moreover, in this case, where no administrator there is all the more reason to recognize the heirs as the proper
has been appointed, it is all the more reason that John D. representatives of the deceased. Since the Rules do not
Young Sr.’s heirs must be recognized as the proper specifically prohibit them from representing the deceased, and
representatives in this suit. since no administrator had yet been appointed at the time of
Petitioners claim that the Estate of John Young Sr. was not the institution of the Complaint with the SEC, we see nothing
properly represented. They claim that "when the estate is wrong with the fact that it was the heirs of John D. Young Sr.
under administration, suits for the recovery or protection of who represented his estate in the case filed before the SEC.
the property or rights of the deceased may be brought only by JUDGE ANTONIO C. SUMALJAG, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES
the administrator or executor as approved by the court." The DIOSDIDIT and MENENDEZ M. LITERATO; and MICHAELES
rules do not, however, make any such categorical and MAGLASANG RODRIGO, respondents. G.R. NO. 149787,
confining statement. JUNE 18, 2008
Section 3 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
"SECTION 3. Representatives as parties. — Where the action is Rules of Court.
allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or FACTS: (1st civil case) Josefa Maglasang (Josefa) filed a
someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be complaint with the RTC for the nullity of a deed of sale of real
included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the property purportedly executed between her as vendor and the
real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an spouses Diosdidit and Menendez Literato (spouses) as
express trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a vendees. Josefa was the sister of Menendez and were 2 of the
party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his 6 heirs who inherited equal parts of a property (Josefa w/ Lot
own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may 1220-D and Menendez w/ Lot 1220-E) passed on to them by

their parents. The spouses responded by filing a counterclaim for execution pending appeal and the same was granted by the
denying Josefa’s allegation and impleaded Josefa as a trial court. Several properties and bank accounts of private
counterclaim defendant, alleging that petitioner Judge respondent and Alfredo S. Tan were levied upon. CA
Antonio Sumaljag (Sumaljag), occupied both Lots 1220-D and subsequently dismissed the appeal but deleted the award of
E) at the instance of Josefa w/out their authority. They claimed exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
that Lot 1220-E is theirs by inheritance and Lot 1220-D by
Hence, respondent Tan filed with the trial court a Motion for
purchase from Josefa. RTC dismissed the counterclaim.
Execution praying that the excess of the amounts she
(2nd civil case) After the RTC dismissed the counterclaim, previously paid be refunded. This was granted by RTC.
Menendez filed a complaint for declaration of the inexistence
Petitioner filed with the RTC a Very Urgent Motion (for recall
of a lease contract, recovery of possession of land and
and reconsideration of order and quashal of alias writ of
damages against Sumaljag & Josefa. Josefa died during
execution, levy, and notice of sheriff's sale, etc.) but this
pendency of both cases. Atty. Puray, Sumaljag and Josefa’s
motion was denied. CA likewise denied the appeal. The CA also
common counsel, filed a notice of death and substitution of
ruled that petitioner's prayer for the recall of the entry of
party, praying that Josefa be substituted by Sumaljag, alleging
judgment cannot be granted, as petitioner's bare assertion,
that prior to her death, Josefa executed a Quitclaim Deed over
that its former counsel had not received notices of orders,
Lot 1220-D in favor Maglasang (her nephew), who in turn sold
resolutions or decisions of the court because said counsel died
the same to Sumaljag. RTC denied the motion for substitution
while the appeal was pending, does not qualify as one of those
and instead ordered Michaeles (Josefa’s sister) to serve as
cases where the court allowed such recall.
Josefa’s representative. MR denied. CA upheld the RTC.
ISSUE: WON the petition for recall should be granted
ISSUE: Whether or not Sumaljag as a transferee pendete lite,
may substitute Josefa pursuant to Rule 3 of the Rules of Court RULING: The CA was correct in ruling that there is no
HELD:NO. The legal representatives contemplated under Sec. extraordinary circumstance in this case that would merit a
recall of the entry of judgment to reopen the case. The reason
16, Rule 3 of the Rules refer to those authorized by law –the
given by petitioner, that its former counsel had died before the
administrator, executor or guardian, who, under the rule on
CA Decision was promulgated, hence, it was not properly
settlement of estate of deceased persons, is constituted to
notified of the judgment, is too tenuous to be given serious
take over the estate of the deceased. Sec. 16, Rule 3 expressly
consideration.
provides that “the heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be
substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator.” Sumaljag is not
one of those mentioned. Instead he is a counterclaim co- Thus, for failure of petitioner to notify the CA of the death of
defendant of Josefa whose proffered justification for its counsel of record and have said counsel substituted, then
substitution is the transfer to him of the interests of Josefa in service of the CA Decision at the place or law office designated
the litigation prior to her death. by its counsel of record as his address, is sufficient notice. The
case then became final and executory when no motion for
O. VENTANILLA ENTERPRISES CORPORATION V. TAN, G.R. reconsideration or appeal was filed within the reglementary
NO. 180325. FEBRUARY 20, 2013 period therefor.
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 ATTY. ROGELIO E. SARSABA V. FE VDA DE TE, REPRESENTED
BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT FAUSTINO CASTAÑEDA, G.R.
DOCTRINE: It is not the duty of the courts to inquire, during
NO. 175910, JULY 30, 2009. [G.R. No. 175910. July 30,
the progress of a case, whether the law firm or partnership
2009.]
representing one of the litigants continues to exist lawfully,
whether the partners are still alive, or whether its associates
are still connected with the firm.
FACTS: Petitioner leased out two of its properties in
Cabanatuan to Alfredo Tan and private respondent Adelina DOCTRINE: The rule on substitution of parties is governed by
Tan. Due to the failure of the Tans to comply with the terms of Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
the lease, petitioner filed a complaint against the Tans for amended.
cancellation and termination of contract of lease with RTC of Strictly speaking, the rule on substitution by heirs is not a
Cabanatuan. matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process. It was
RTC ruled in favor of petitioner ordering the surrender and crafted to protect every party's right to due process. It was
complete control of the property to the petitioner. Both designed to ensure that the deceased party would continue to
Alfredo S. Tan and private respondent Adelina S. Tan appealed be properly represented in the suit through his heirs or the
from said Decision. However, herein petitioner filed a motion duly appointed legal representative of his estate.

FACTS: A Decision was rendered in NLRC, finding Sereno to HELD: 1. NO. In view of Sereno's death, petitioner asks that the
have been illegally dismissed and ordering Gasing to pay him complaint should be dismissed, not only against Sereno, but as
his monetary claims. To satisfy the judgment award, Lavarez to all the defendants, considering that the RTC did not acquire
accompanied by Sereno and his counsel, petitioner Atty. jurisdiction over the person of Sereno.
Rogelio E. Sarsaba, levied a Fuso Truck in the possession of
As a rule, all defenses and objections not pleaded, either in a
Gasing later sold at public auction, with Sereno appearing as
motion to dismiss or in an answer, are deemed waived. The
the highest bidder.
exceptions to this rule are: (1) when the court has no
Meanwhile, respondent Fe Vda. de Te, filed with the RTC, a jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) when there is another
Complaint for recovery of motor vehicle alleging that she is the action pending between the parties for the same cause, or (3)
wife of the late Pedro Te, the registered owner of the truck and when the action is barred by prior judgment or by statute of
Gasing merely rented the truck from her. Also, since neither limitations, in which cases, the court may dismiss the claim.
she nor her husband were parties to the labor case between
In the case before Us, petitioner raises the issue of lack of
Sereno and Gasing, she should not be made to answer for the
jurisdiction over the person of Sereno, not in his Motion to
judgment award.
Dismiss or in his Answer but only in his Omnibus Motion to
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that (1) Dismiss. Having failed to invoke this ground at the proper time,
respondent has no legal personality to sue, having no real that is, in a motion to dismiss, petitioner cannot raise it now
interests over the property subject of the instant complaint; for the first time on appeal.
(2) the allegations in the complaint do not sufficiently state
We cannot countenance petitioner's argument that the
that the respondent has cause of action; (3) the allegations in
complaint against the other defendants should have been
the complaint do not contain sufficient cause of action as
against him; and (4) the complaint is not accompanied by an dismissed, considering that the RTC never acquired jurisdiction
over the person of Sereno. The court's failure to acquire
Affidavit of Merit and Bond that would entitle the respondent
jurisdiction over one's person is a defense which is personal to
to the delivery of the tuck pendente lite.
the person claiming it. Obviously, it is now impossible for
The NLRC also filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction Sereno to invoke the same in view of his death. Neither can
and lack of cause of action. petitioner invoke such ground, on behalf of Sereno, so as to
reap the benefit of having the case dismissed against all of the
Lavarez filed an Answer asserting that the RTC does not have defendants. Failure to serve summons on Sereno's person will
jurisdiction over the subject matter and that the complaint not be a cause for the dismissal of the complaint against the
does not state a cause of action. other defendants, considering that they have been served with
Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss the Case on the copies of the summons and complaints and have long
grounds of lack of jurisdiction over one of the principal submitted their respective responsive pleadings. In fact, the
defendants and to discharge respondent's attorney-in-fact for other defendants in the complaint were given the chance to
lack of legal personality to sue. It appeared that the raise all possible defenses and objections personal to them in
respondent, Fe Vda. de Te, died. their respective motions to dismiss and their subsequent
answers.
Respondent, through her lawyer, Atty. William G. Carpentero,
filed an Opposition, contending that the failure to serve 2. NO. When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is
summons upon Sereno is not a ground for dismissing the not extinguished, the Rules of Court require a substitution of
complaint, because the other defendants have already the deceased. Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court
submitted their respective responsive pleadings. Moreover, enumerates the actions that survived and may be filed against
respondent's death did not render functus officio her right to the decedent's representatives as follows: (1) actions to
sue since her attorney-in-fact, Faustino Castañeda, had long recover real or personal property or an interest thereon, (2)
testified on the complaint for and on her behalf and, actions to enforce liens thereon, and (3) actions to recover
accordingly, submitted documentary exhibits in support of the damages for an injury to a person or a property. In such cases,
complaint. a counsel is obliged to inform the court of the death of his
client and give the name and address of the latter's legal
RTC: DENIED the petitioner’s motion. MR also denied. representative.
ISSUE: WON lack of jurisdiction over the person of Sereno, who The rule on substitution of parties is governed by Section 16,
was not served with summons on account of his death Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
warrants the dismissal of the case
Strictly speaking, the rule on substitution by heirs is not a
WON the death of plaintiff Fe Vda. de Te during the pendency matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process. It was
of the case would result in the dismissal of the case crafted to protect every party's right to due process. It was
designed to ensure that the deceased party would continue to
be properly represented in the suit through his heirs or the
duly appointed legal representative of his estate. Moreover, proceedings and the judgment of the trial court infirm because
non-compliance with the Rules results in the denial of the right the court acquires no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal
to due process for the heirs. Thus, it is only when there is a representatives or of the heirs on whom the trial and the
denial of due process, as when the deceased is not judgment would be binding.
represented by any legal representative or heir, that the court
Nevertheless, there are instances when formal substitution
nullifies the trial proceedings and the resulting judgment
may be dispensed with. In Vda. de Salazarv. Court of Appeals,
therein.
we ruled that the defendant's failure to effect a formal
In the case before Us, it appears that respondent's counsel did substitution of heirs before the rendition of judgment does not
not make any manifestation before the RTC as to her death. In invalidate the court's judgment where the heirs themselves
fact, he had actively participated in the proceedings. Neither appeared before the trial court, participated in the
had he shown any proof that he had been retained by proceedings, and presented evidence in defense of the
respondent's legal representative or anyone who succeeded deceased defendant. The court there found it undeniably
her. evident that the heirs themselves sought their day in court and
exercised their right to due process.
Agency is extinguished by the death of the principal. The only
exception where the agency shall remain in full force and Similarly, in Berot v. Siapno, we ruled that the continued
effect even after the death of the principal is when if it has appearance and participation of Rodolfo, the estate's
been constituted in the common interest of the latter and of representative, in the proceedings of the case dispensed with
the agent, or in the interest of a third person who has accepted the formal substitution of the heirs in place of the deceased.
the stipulation in his favor. Here, while there may have been a failure to strictly observe
the provisions of the rules and there was no formal
The SPA was constituted for the benefit solely of the principal substitution of heirs, the heirs of Francisco, represented by
or for respondent Fe Vda. de Te.
James, voluntarily appeared and actively participated in the
On this ground, We agree with petitioner. However, such case, particularly in the enforcement of the Hatol. As the
ground would not cause the dismissal of the complaint. This is records show, they have filed multiple pleadings and moved
an action for the recovery of a personal property, a motor several times to implement the Hatol to protect Francisco's
vehicle, and is an action that survives pursuant to Section 1, interest. Following our rulings in Vda. de Salazar and Berot, a
Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. As such, it is not extinguished by formal substitution of parties is no longer required under the
the death of a party. circumstances.
In Gonzalez v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, FACTS: In 1996, the spouses Amado and Esther Ibañez
We have laid down the criteria for determining whether an (spouses Ibañez) borrowed from Francisco Muñoz, Sr.
action survives the death of a plaintiff or petitioner, to wit: (Francisco), Consuelo Estrada (Consuelo) and Ma. Consuelo
Muñoz (Ma. Consuelo) the amount of P1,300,000 payables in
. . . The question as to whether an action survives or not three months, with interest at the rate of 3% a month. The
depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. spouses Ibañez issued a Promissory Note binding themselves
If the causes of action which survive the wrong complained [of] jointly and severally to pay Ma. Consuelo and Consuelo the
affects primarily and principally property and property rights, loan amount with interest. As security, the spouses Ibañez
the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Ma.
causes of action which do not survive the injury complained of Consuelo and Consuelo. Alleging that the conditions of the
is to the person the property and rights of property affected mortgage have been violated and that all check payments
being incidental. . . . were dishonored by the drawee, Ma. Consuelo and Consuelo
SPOUSES IBAÑEZ VS. HARPER, G.R. NO. 194272, FEBRUARY moved to foreclosure the real estate mortgage.
15, 2017 The spouses Ibañez filed an Amended Complaint. They alleged
that the public auction was conducted, with Francisco, Ma.
Consuelo and Consuelo as the highest bidders and prayed that
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 the Ex-Officio Sheriff and the Sheriff-in-Charge be enjoined
from executing the certificate of sale in favor of Francisco, Ma.
DOCTRINE: The rationale behind the rule on substitution is to
Consuelo and Consuelo. In the event the certificate of sale is
apprise the heir or the substitute that he is being brought to
already issued, they alternatively prayed for that the Register
the jurisdiction of the court in lieu of the deceased party by
of Deeds of Manila be enjoined from registering the certificate
operation of law. It serves to protect the right of every party to
of sale.
due process. It is to ensure that the deceased party would
continue to be properly represented in the suit through the The RTC issued a status quo order. The parties subsequently
duly appointed legal representative of his estate. Non- filed a Joint Motion for Approval of Amended Compromise
compliance with the rule on substitution would render the Agreement.

Francisco, Ma. Consuelo and Consuelo, then filed an Omnibus the deceased. The court charges in procuring such
Motion for Execution and Lifting of the Status Quo Order and appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be
for the Issuance of Writ of Possession alleging that the spouses recovered as costs.
Ibañez failed to comply with their obligation under the
The rationale behind the rule on substitution is to apprise the
Amended Compromise Agreement. The RTC granted the
heir or the substitute that he is being brought to the
motion. The spouses Ibañez moved to reconsider this order on
jurisdiction of the court in lieu of the deceased party by
the following grounds: (1) Francisco died in June 2004; and (2)
operation of law. It serves to protect the right of every party to
Atty. Prospero Anave (Atty. Anave), counsel on record of
due process. It is to ensure that the deceased party would
Francisco, Ma. Consuelo and Consuelo, failed to inform the
continue to be properly represented in the suit through the
court of such fact; thus, there was no valid substitution of
duly appointed legal representative of his estate. Non-
parties.
compliance with the rule on substitution would render the
The RTC granted the spouses Ibañez' Motion for proceedings and the judgment of the trial court infirm because
Reconsideration. It held that: (1) Atty. Anave's failure to report the court acquires no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal
Francisco's death to the court for purposes of substitution representatives or of the heirs on whom the trial and the
rendered the proceedings thereat null and void; (2) Atty. judgment would be binding.
Anave's subsequent conformity to Atty. Bermejo's actions did
Nevertheless, there are instances when formal substitution
not cure the initial defect in the filing of the Omnibus Motion;
may be dispensed with. In Vda. de Salazarv. Court of Appeals,
neither did it mean the withdrawal, dismissal or substitution of
we ruled that the defendant's failure to effect a formal
Atty. Anave by Atty. Bermejo; and (3) a formal entry of
substitution of heirs before the rendition of judgment does not
appearance with Atty. Anave's conformity is necessary before
invalidate the court's judgment where the heirs themselves
Atty. Bermejo can legally act as collaborating counsel.
appeared before the trial court, participated in the
The spouses Ibañez filed a Motion for the Implementation of proceedings, and presented evidence in defense of the
the Amended Compromise Agreement. They argued that since deceased defendant. The court there found it undeniably
there was no proper substitution of the heirs of Francisco, the evident that the heirs themselves sought their day in court and
proper parties to substitute him are Ma. Consuelo and exercised their right to due process.
Consuelo.
Similarly, in Berot v. Siapno, we ruled that the continued
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Anave's failure to report respondent appearance and participation of Rodolfo, theestate's
Francisco's death to the court for purposes of substitution representative, in the proceedings of the case dispensed with
rendered the proceedings thereat null and void. the formal substitution of the heirs in place of the deceased.
Here, while there may have been a failure to strictly observe
RULING: No. Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court the provisions of the rules and there was no formal
provides: substitution of heirs, the heirs of Francisco, represented by
Sec. 16. Death of party; duly of counsel. – Whenever a party to James, voluntarily appeared and actively participated in the
a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby case, particularly in the enforcement of the Hatol. As the
extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the records show, they have filed multiple pleadings and moved
court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact several times to implement the Hatol to protect Francisco's
thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal interest. Following our rulings in Vda. de Salazar and Berot, a
representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply formal substitution of parties is no longer required under the
with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action. circumstances.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for MAYOR RHUSTOM L. DAGADAG, PETITIONER, V. MICHAEL
the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an C. TONGNAWA AND ANTONIO GAMMOD, RESPONDENTS.
executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian G.R. NOS. 161166-67; FEBRUARY 03, 2005
ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or Doctrine: When the petitioner ceases to be the mayor, the
representatives to appear and be substituted within a period appeal and/or action he initiated may be continued and
of thirty (30) days from notice. maintained by his successor if there is substantial need to do
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the so. If the successor failed to pursue the appeal and/or action,
deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to appear the same should be dismissed.
within the specified period, the court may order the opposing The petitioner was the former mayor of Tanudan, a Province in
party, within a specified time, to procure the appointment of Kalinga. The respondents were municipal engineer and
an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased municipal planning and development coordinator respectively.
and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of

In July 1995, the petitioner, as the mayor of Tanudan, sent a injured by the judgment, or one entitled to the avails of the
memorandum to the respondents ordering them to explain suit. The Court held that the rule refers to a real or present
why they should not be administratively sanctioned for acts substantial interest as distinguished from a mere expectancy,
unbecoming of public servants, and failure to perform their or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest.
duties. As a general rule, one who has no right or interest to protect
cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in
The petitioner later issued an executive order, creating a an action.
grievance committee tasked to investigate the charges against
the respondents. The committee found the respondents liable With regards to the mayor of Tanudan, the Court provided two
for insubordination, non-performance of duties, and absences reasons why he may interpose such appeal. First is rooted in
without official leves. The respondents were later suspended. his power to appoint officials and employees of his
municipality. Given that both the respondents were appointed
The respondents appealed to the Civil Service Commission during the incumbency of the petitioner the petitioner is a real
(CSC), claiming that their right to due process was violated. The party in interest.
petitioner later issued an order dropping them from the roll of
employees, and the respondents once again appealed to the In Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, the Court affirmed
CSC. that the appointing authority stands to be adversely affected
when the CSC disapproves an appointment Thus, the said
The CSC however affirmed the order of suspension of the authority can defend its appointments since it knows the
petitioner, and the order to drop them from the roll of reasons for the same.
employees. Their motions for reconsideration were denied.
Similarly, when a municipal mayor orders the suspension or
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the CSC. It held
dismissal of a municipal employee on grounds he believes to
credence to the claim of the respondents that there were be proper, but his order is reversed or nullified, he has the right
irregularities in the conduct of the committee, including the to contest such adverse ruling. His right to appeal flows from
absence of actual investigation, and the deprivation of the the fact that his power to appoint carries with it the power to
respondents right to explain their side and prove their
remove.
defenses. An affidavit by the Chairman of the Committee
stating that the petitioners were not given the opportunity to The second reason as to why the mayor of Tanudan has the
defend themselves were provided. The Court of Appeals held legal personality to challenge the Decision of the Court of
that the respondents were able to overcome the presumption Appeals is because the salaries of the respondents are drawn
of regularity in the conduct of the Grievance Committee. from the municipal funds. The mayor has real and substantial
interest in the outcome of the administrative cases against the
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration before the respondents.
Court of Appeals but was subsequently denied.
Nevertheless, the petitioner was no longer the mayor of
In the Supreme Court, the petitioners alleged that their Tanudan. Section 17, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
suspension and dismissal orders were supported by Procedure, as amended, is relevant.
substantial evidence; and that the sworn statements
supporting the claim of the respondents were devoid of When a public officer is a party in an action in his official
credibility. capacity and during its pendency dies, resigns, or otherwise
ceases to hold office, the action may be continued and
The respondents on the other hand claimed that the petitioner
maintained by or against his successor if, within thirty days
has no legal personality to file the instant petition, because he
after the successor takes office or such time as may be granted
had ceased to be the municipal mayor of Tanudan. by the court, it is satisfactorily shown to the court by any party
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner, being the former mayor that there is a substantial need for continuing or maintaining it
of Tanudan, may appeal from the Decision of the Court of and that the successor adopts or continues or threatens to
Appeals. adopt or continue the action of his predecessor.
HELD: No. The Court held that the CSC and the mayor of The Court held that from the above rule, when the petitioner
Tanudan are real parties in interest in the case, and therefore ceases to be the mayor, the appeal and/or action he initiated
can contest the Decision of the Court of Appeals. However, may be continued and maintained by his successor if there is
failure of the successor to comply with Section 17, Rule 3 of substantial need to do so. If the successor failed to pursue the
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure warranted the dismissal of appeal and/or action, the same should be dismissed.
the case. ARCADIO and MARIA LUISA CARANDANG, petitioners, vs.
The concept of a real party in interest becomes relevant. HEIRS OF QUIRINO A. DE GUZMAN, namely: MILAGROS DE
GUZMAN, VICTOR DE GUZMAN, REYNALDO DE GUZMAN,
Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that a real party in interest is one who would be benefited or
CYNTHIA G. RAGASA and QUIRINO DE GUZMAN, JR., a jurisdictional requirement, but because non-compliance
respondents. therewith results in the undeniable violation of the right to due
process of those who, though not duly notified of the
proceedings, are substantially affected by the decision
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 rendered therein. Such violation of due process can only be
asserted by the persons whose rights are claimed to have been
DOCTRINE: The lack of jurisdiction over the person, being violated, namely the heirs to whom the adverse judgment is
subject to waiver, is a personal defense which can only be sought to be enforced.
asserted by the party who can thereby waive it by silence.
BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES, INC. VS. CA, G.R. NO.
FACTS: Petitioner leased out two of its properties in De 173946, JUNE 19, 2013
Guzman filed a complaint for the recovery of sum of money.
and Petitioner Spouses are stockholders as well as corporate
officers of MBS with equities at 54% and 46% respectively. PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI
MBS’ capital stock was increased to PhP1 million and PhP345K,
of this increase was subscribed by the petitioners. De Guzman FACTS: Boston Equity Resources filed a complaint of sum of
claims that part of the payment for the subscriptions of the money with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
Carandangs were paid by him. Thus, he sent a demand letter attachment against the Spouses Toledo. Spouses Toledo filed
to the petitioners for the payment of the sum. Petitioners an Answer but a few months after Lolita Toledo filed a Motion
refused to pay on the account that pre-incorporation for Leave to Admit Amended Answer alleging that her husband
agreement was executed between them, whereby De Guzman is already dead.
promised to pay for the stock subscriptions without cost, in
As a result, BER filed a motion to require Lolita to disclose their
consideration for [Arcadio Carandang’s] technical expertise,
heirs, in compliance, Lolita submitted the names of the heirs.
his newly purchased equipment, and his skill in repairing and
upgrading radio/communication equipment therefore, there is BER then filed for a Motion for Substitution praying that
no indebtedness on their part. Manuel be substituted by his children as party defendants
which was granted by the trial court.
Notably, De Guzman died while the case was still pending.
During trial, the evidence presented by BER was admitted
RTC – ruled in favor of De Guzman.
while the reception of evidence for plaintiff was cancelled and
CA – Affirmed was given 15 days to file a demurrer for evidence. However
respondent instead filed a motion to dismiss the complaint.
Issue: WON the decision is void after the death of De Guzman
RTC: DENIED MOTION TO DISMISS; CA: GRANTED PETITION.
RULING: Section 16 of Rule provides that The heirs of the
deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, ISSUE: WON the inclusion of Manuel as party defendant is a
without requiring the appointment of an executor or misjoinder of party
administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem
for the minor heirs. HELD: No. Based on the last sentence of the afore-quoted
provision of law, a misjoined party must have the capacity to
The court shall forthwith order the legal representative or sue or be sued in the event that the claim by or against the
representatives to appear and be substituted within a period misjoined party is pursued in a separate case. In this case,
of thirty (30) days from notice. therefore, the inclusion of Manuel in the complaint cannot be
considered a misjoinder, as in fact, the action would have
In the case at bar, not only do the heirs of de Guzman interpose
proceeded against him had he been alive at the time the
no objection to the jurisdiction of the court over their persons; collection case was filed by petitioner. This being the case, the
they are actually claiming and embracing such jurisdiction. In remedy provided by Section 11 of Rule 3 does not obtain here.
doing so, their waiver is not even merely implied (by their The name of Manuel as party-defendant cannot simply be
participation in the appeal of said Decision), but express (by dropped from the case.
their explicit espousal of such view in both the Court of Appeals
and in this Court). The heirs of de Guzman had no objection to Since the proper course of action against the wrongful
being bound by the Decision of the RTC. inclusion of Manuel as party- defendant is the dismissal of the
case as against him, thus did the trial court err when it ordered
Thus, lack of jurisdiction over the person, being subject to the substitution of Manuel by his heirs. Substitution is proper
waiver, is a personal defense which can only be asserted by the only where the party to be substituted died during the
party who can thereby waive it by silence. pendency of the case, as expressly provided for by Section 16,
It also pays to look into the spirit behind the general rule Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which states:
requiring a formal substitution of heirs. The underlying
principle therefor is not really because substitution of heirs is
Death of party; duty of counsel. — Whenever a party to a unless the court upon motion directs the person to whom the
pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, interest is transferred to be substituted in action or joined with
it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within original party. The word “may” reflect the wide latitude and
thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give considerable leeway given to the court in ascertaining the
the name and address of his legal representative or propriety of substituting a party by another on account of a
representatives. transfer of interest. Whether or not a change or substitution of
party can take place is left to the sound discretion of the court.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for In Heirs of Francisca Medrano v. Devera, the Court even
the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an
enunciated that the trial court is afforded such discretion
executor or administrator. because, after all, the interest of the transferee is already
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or sufficiently represented and safeguarded by the participation
representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of the transferor in the case. The court expounded on the
of thirty (30) days from notice. nature of a transferee pendente lite’s interest in Cameron
Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc. v. Chua. Indeed, a
Here, since Manuel was already dead at the time of the filing transferee pendente lite is a proper party that stands exactly
of the complaint, the court never acquired jurisdiction over his in the shoes of the transferor, the original party. Transferees
person and, in effect, there was no party to be substituted. are bound by the proceedings and judgement in the case, such
GRANDHOLDINGS INVESTEMENT VS. CA, G.R. 221271, that there is no need for them to be included or impleaded by
JUNE 19, 2019 name. We have even gone further and said that the transferee
is joined or substituted in the pending action by operation of
law from the exact moment when the transfer of interest is
perfected between original party and the transferee.
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Nevertheless, whether or not the transferee should be
Court
substituted for, or should be joined with, the original party is
FACTS: The instant petition arose from a complaint for sum of largely a matter of discretion. That discretion is exercised in
money filed by Allied Bank against TJR Industrial Corporation, pursuance of the paramount consideration that must be
Peter C. Yu, Concepcion Yu, Antonio Sia Inhok, and Thelma Siao afforded for the protection of the parties interests and right to
Inhok (private respondents) before the Regional Trial Court due process. However, it is equally true that the discretionary
(RTC) of Makati City, Branch 136, for failure to pay their loan nature of allowing the substitution or joinder by the transferee
obligations covered by Promissory Notes in the total amount demands that the courts determination must be well-within
of P13,800,000. Allied Bank executed a Deed of Assignment the sphere of law, guided by applicable statutory principles,
assigning to petitioner all its rights, title and interest over its and supported by factual and legal basis. The CA in denying
non-performing loans including the subject Promissory Notes. petitioner’s motion for substitution followed the ruling in
The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas issued a Certificate of Eligibility Asset Pool v. Court of Appeals which held: As the notice
stating among others that Allied Bank is qualified as a financial requirement under Section 12, Article III of SPV Law was not
institution having non-performing assets in accordance with amended, the same was still necessary to effect transfer of
R.A No. 9182, as amended by R.A. No. 9343, and its Non-performing loans to an SPV, like petitioner to be effective.
implementing rules and regulations. The certificate also There being no compliance with such notice requirement at
indicates that the transfer or sale of Allied Bank’s non- the time of the assignment to petitioner of the subject
performing assets has been approved by the BSP and that such Promissory notes during the effectivity of the SPV law as
transfer appears to be in the nature of a “true sale” under R.A amended, it could not substitute BPI as party plaintiff appellee.
No. 9182. The RTC rendered a decision ordering private The appellate court’s denial of petitioner’s motion was thus
respondents solidarily pay Allied Bank the amount of 13.8 not attended with grave abuse of discretion. The Asset Pool
million with interest until full payment. Allied Bank merged case bears apparent parallelism to the case at bench in that the
with the Philippine National Bank, the latter being the SPVs in both cases did not adduce evidence to prove that the
surviving entity. Private respondents appealed before the CA. borrowers were notified prior to, or even after execution of
The CA denied the motion. the deed of assignment. But the similarity ends there as the
facts obtaining in this case are not on all fours with the Asset
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of Pool case. Clearly, the CA committed grave abuse of discretion
discretion when it denied petitioner’s motion for substitution when it denied petitioners motion for substitution.
HELD: The substitution of parties on account of a transfer of IX. RULE 3, SECTIONS 18 TO 22: PARTIES TO A CIVIL ACTION
interest is not mandatory. Section 19, Rule 3 of the Rules of G.R. NO. 177836 SEPTEMBER 4, 2009
Court provides: EDWINO A. TORRES (DECEASED), REPRESENTED AND
Sec. 19 Transfer of Interest- In case of any transfer of interest, SUBSTITUTED BY ALFONSO P. TORRES III AND FATIMA P.
the action may be continued by or against the original party, TORRES, SON AND DAUGHTER, RESPECTIVELY, OF

DECEASED PETITIONER, PETITIONERS,VS. BALLIGI V. Mere allegation that such document is spurious and forged do
RODELLAS, RESPONDENT. not make such document spurious and a forgery.
Balligi filed an appeal with the Office of the President. The
FACTS: 45 Office of the President reversed and set the decisions of the
The root of the present controversy is a parcel of alienable and DENR secretary and the DENR-RO and in favour of Balligi. The
disposable residential land. Office of the President opined that "the DENR should have
Respondent Balligi and her family began occupying the subject applied res ipsa loquitur" instead.
property. They built thereon a residential house. Atty. Restor, Edwino’s counsel, filed a Motion for
Balligi filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application (MSA) for the Reconsideration, and at the same time, manifested that his
subject property with the DENR. client, Edwino, had since passed away, but without actually
Balligi and her family left for Manila in order to find work. intimating the exact date of the latter’s death.
Balligi left the country to join her husband in Saudi Arabia as The Office of the President dismissed the motion being filed
an OFW. In the meantime, the house built by Balligi and her out of time and for lack of personality. It held that Ewino’s
family on the subject property was left in the care and death extinguished his agency relationship with Atty. Restor.
possession of her relatives, namely, Aster, Bituin, Sonia, Hence, Atty. Restor had no more authority to continue to act
Inanama and Oscar, Milagros, and Ruiz and family. on Edwino’s behalf.
Sometime thereafter, petitioner Edwino and his spouse moved Atty. Restor filed, on behalf of Edwino, represented and
into the house on the subject property, occupying the portion substituted by the latter’s son and daughter, Alfonso and
vacated by Aster. Edwino claimed that Balligi already sold him Fatima, a Petition for Review with the CA. The CA dismissed
the subject property and the house built thereon for the petition.
₱60,000.00, as evidenced by an Affidavit of ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred that Atty. Restor had no
Relinquishment/Sale of Right supposedly signed by the parties legal personality to file the motion, in view of Ewino’s death
thereto and notarize. From that time on, Edwino collected HELD: Though incomplete, the mention by Atty. Restor of
monthly rental of ₱300.00 from the other occupants of the Edwino’s death in the Motion for Reconsideration effectively
house. informed the Office of the President of the same. Having been
On the basis of the Affidavit of Relinquishment/Sale of Right, apprised of the fact of Edwino’s death, it was incumbent upon
Edwino filed with the DENR-RO an MSA in his own name for the Office of the President, even without Atty. Restor’s motion
the subject property which was then granted to such effect, to order the legal representative/s of the
Respondent Balligi’s son, Eugenio, returned to Occidental deceased party to appear and be substituted; or, at the very
Mindoro. While there, he came to learn that Edwino claimed least, to direct the counsel to furnish the court with the names
ownership of the subject property and the house thereon by and addresses of such representative/s.
virtue of the Affidavit of Relinquishment/Sale of Right. Interestingly, if, as argued by the Office of the President and
Eugenio, alleging to act on behalf of his mother but without the Court of Appeals, Atty. Restor no longer had the
presenting any written authority from the latter, filed before personality to represent Edwino upon the latter’s death,
the CENRO a Protest against Edwino’s MSA. Eugenio insisted assuming he died prior to the rendition of the decision of the
that Balligi never entered into any sale of the subject property Office of the President, should it not also follow that the
and house, much less signed the purported Affidavit of sending of a copy of the 5 August 2003 Decision of the Office
Relinquishment/Sale of Right, considering that Balligi and her of the President to Atty. Restor, as counsel of record, could no
husband were in Saudi Arabia at that time. longer be deemed a notice to the party, and his receipt of the
Eugenio and his aunt, Inanama, filed an Amended Protest same could not have caused the commencement of the period
against Edwino’s MSA. Attached was a Special Power of within which to file a motion for reconsideration? As a
Attorney, which Balligi executed in favor of Eugenio and consequence, the reglementary period within which to move
Inanama, and by Vice Consul of Philippine Embassy in Saudi for reconsideration of the assailed decision in O.P. Case No. 98-
Arabia. 8537 had really not yet begun to toll.
The DENR-RO dismissed the protest for lack of merit. It held Sec. 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:Section
that neither Eugenio nor Inanama had the personality to 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. – Whenever a party to a
represent Balligi. pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished,
Respondent Balligi, who had arrived back in the Philippines, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within
herself filed, another Opposition/Protest against petitioner thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give
Edwino’s MSA. The DENR –RO dismissed the protest for lack of the name and address of his legal representative or
merit. representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with his duty
Balligi moved for the reconsideration before the DENR shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
Secretary. However, it was denied by the DENR Secretary. The The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for
DENR Secretary held that "there is no showing that Balligi ever the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an
filed a complaint with the proper forum, i.e., the Court, against executor or administrator and the court may appoint a
Edwino involving the alleged falsified and spurious document. guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or deceased appellant by her executor or administrator or her
representatives to appear and be substituted within a period heirs shall have been effected within the time set by
of thirty (30) days from notice. respondent court pursuant to the cited Rule
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the xxxx
deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to appear Prescinding from the foregoing, justice and equity dictate
within the specified period, the court may order the opposing under the circumstances of the case at bar that the rules, while
party, within a specified time, to procure the appointment of necessary for the speedy and orderly administration of justice,
an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased should not be applied with the rigidity and inflexibility of
and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of respondent court's resolutions. What should guide judicial
the deceased. The court charges in procuring such action is the principle that a party litigant is to be given the
appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or
recovered as costs. defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or
SUBSTITUTION ONLY IF THE ACTION SURVIVES UPON DEATH property on technicalities. x x x.
Clear from the aforequoted provision that a deceased party G.R. NO. L-18107 AUGUST 30, 1962
may be substituted by his heirs, but it must be emphasized that MARIA G. AGUAS, FELIX GUARDINO AND FRANCISCO
substitution may only be allowed in actions that survive the SALINAS, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, VS. HERMOGENES
death of a party thereto. In Gonzales v. Philippine Amusement LLEMOS, DECEASED DEFENDANT SUBSTITUTED BY HIS
and Gaming Corporation, citing Bonilla v. Barcena: REPRESENTATIVES, PERPETUA YERRO-LLEMOS,
we declared that the determination of whether an action HERMENEGILDO LLEMOS, FELINO LLEMOS AND AMADO
survives the death of a party depends on the nature of the LLEMOS,DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES
action and the damage sued for. We explicated:
In the causes of action which survive the wrong complained of FACTS: Francisco Salinas and the spouses Felix Guardino and
affects primarily and principally property and property rights, Maria Aguas jointly filed an action in the Court of First Instance
the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the of Catbalogan, Samar to recover damages from Hermogenes
causes of action which do not survive the injury complained of Llemos, averring that the latter had served them by registered
is to the person, the property and rights of property affected mail with a copy of a petition for a writ of possession, with
being incidental x x x. notice that the same would be submitted to the said court of
PURPOSE OF SUBSTITUTION Samar; that in view of the copy and notice served, plaintiffs
We emphasize that the purpose behind Section 16, Rule 3 of proceeded to the court from their residence in Manila
the Revised Rules of Procedure is the protection of the right to accompanied by their lawyers, only to discover that no such
due process of every party to a litigation who may be affected petition had been filed; and that defendant Llemos maliciously
by the intervening death. The deceased litigant is himself or failed to appear in court, so that plaintiffs' expenditure and
herself protected, as he/she continues to be properly trouble turned out to be in vain, causing them mental anguish
represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal and undue embarrassment.
representative of his estate.30 The spirit behind the general Before he could answer the complaint, the defendant died.
rule requiring a formal substitution of heirs is "not really Upon leave of court, plaintiffs amended their complaint to
because substitution of heirs is a jurisdictional requirement, include the heirs of the deceased. The heirs filed a motion to
but because non-compliance therewith results in the dismiss.
undeniable violation of the right to due process of those who, CFI: Dismissed it, on the ground that the legal representative,
though not duly notified of the proceedings, are substantially and not the heirs, should have been made the party defendant;
affected by the decision rendered therein." and that anyway the action being for recovery of money,
testate or intestate proceedings should be initiated and the
COUNSEL OF THE DECEASED HAS THE RIGHT TO PRESERVE THE claim filed therein.
RIGHT IF THE DECEASED’S HEIRS/SUCCESSORS Motion for reconsideration having been denied, the case was
In Heirs of F. Nuguid Vda. de Haberer v. Court of Appeals. We appealed to us on points of law.
held that: Plaintiffs: those concerning claims that are barred if not filed
Respondent court therefore erred in ruling that since upon the in the estate settlement proceedings (Rule 87, sec. 5) and
demise of the party-appellant, the attorney-client relationship those defining actions that survive and may be prosecuted
between her and her counsels "was automatically severed and against the executor or administrator (Rule 88, sec. 1), it is
terminated," whatever pleadings filed by said counsel with it apparent that actions for damages caused by tortious conduct
after the death of said appellant "are mere scraps of paper." If of a defendant (as in the case at bar) survive the death of the
at all, due to said death on May 25, 1975 and severance of the latter. Under Rule 87, section 5, the actions that are abated by
attorney-client relationship, further proceedings and death are: (1) claims for funeral expenses and those for the last
specifically the running of the original 45-day period for filing sickness of the decedent; (2) judgments for money; and (3) "all
the appellant's brief should be legally deemed as having been claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract
automatically suspended, until the proper substitution of the

express or implied". None of these includes that of the exemption from payment of legal fees. The motion for
plaintiffs-appellants. reconsideration was denied.
Upon the other hand, Rule 88, section 1, enumerates actions ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners should be considered as
that survive against a decedent's executors or administrators, indigent litigants who qualify for exemption from paying filing
and they are: (1) actions to recover real and personal property fees. (YES)
from the estate; (2) actions to enforce a lien thereon; and (3) RULING: When Rule 141 of the Rules of Court was amended in
actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property. 2000, Sec. 21, Rule 3, which provides for the exemption of
The present suit is one for damages under the last class, it pauper litigants from payment of filing fees, was not revoked
having been held that "injury to property" is not limited to or amended. Rule 141 was further amended in 2004, but again
injuries to specific property, but extends to other wrongs by without any amendment or recall of Sec. 21, Rule 3. Thus,
which personal estate is injured or diminished. To maliciously there are now two existing rules on pauper litigants; namely,
cause a party to incur unnecessary expenses, as charged in this Rule 3, Section 21 and Rule 141, Section 19.
case, is certainly injurious to that party's property. It is undisputed that the Complaint was filed on September 1,
Be that as it may, it now appears from a communication from 1999. However, the RTC incorrectly applied Rule 141, Sec. 18
the Court of First Instance of Samar that the parties have on Legal Fees when the applicable rules at that time were Rule
arrived at an amicable settlement of their differences, and that 3, Section 21 on Indigent Party which took effect on July 1,
they have agreed to dismiss this appeal. The settlement has 1997 and Rule 141, Section 16 on Pauper Litigants which
been approved and embodied in an order of the Court of First became effective on July 19, 1984 up to February 28, 2000.
Instance. Still, the petitioners would have been disqualified under
ALGURA VS. THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF THE CITY OF Section 16, Rule 141 as their monthly income of P13,474
NAGA, G.R. NO. 150135, OCT. 30, 2006 exceeded the P1,500 requirement of the old Section 16, Rule
141, and even the P3,000 requirement of Section 18, Rule 141.
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 Section 19 (formerly 16 and 18), Rule 141 and Section 21, Rule
DOCTRINE:“If the applicant for exemption meets the salary 3 should be harmonized. Section 19, Rule 141 requires that (1)
and property requirements under Section 19 of Rule 141, then applicant’s gross income and that of his immediate family do
the grant of the application is mandatory. On the other hand, not exceed double the monthly minimum wage of an
when the application does not satisfy one or both employee (income requirement) and (2) he does not own real
requirements, then the application should not be denied property with a fair market value of more than P300,000.00
outright; instead, the court should apply the "indigency test" (property requirement). If the applicant meets both, the
under Section 21 of Rule 3 and use its sound discretion in authority to litigate as indigent litigant is automatically granted
determining the merits of the prayer for exemption.” as a matter of right.
FACTS: Spouses Algura filed a complaint for damages against However, if the trial court finds that one or both requirements
the Naga City government and its officers allegedly due to an have not been met, then it would set a hearing to enable the
illegal demolition of their residence and boarding house and applicant to prove that the applicant has “no money or
for payment of lost income derived from fees paid by their property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic
boarders. necessities for himself and his family [pursuant to Sec. 21, Rule
Simultaneously, petitioners filed a motion to litigate as 3.] The adverse party may adduce countervailing evidence to
indigent litigants, having a gross monthly income of disprove the evidence presented by the applicant. After which,
P10,474.00 and a net pay of P3,616.99 for the month of July the trial court will rule on the application depending on the
1999. Furthermore, petitioners had no property declared in evidence adduced. Furthermore, Sec. 21 of Rule 3 also
their name. As a result of the demolition, the Alguras allegedly provides that the adverse party may later still contest the grant
lost a monthly income of P7,000.00 from their boarder’s of such authority at any time before judgment is rendered by
rentals, thus having insufficient income to support their family the trial court, possibly based on newly discovered evidence
of six children. not obtained at the time the application was heard.
The RTC initially granted petitioners’ plea for exemption from Thus, the RTC in this case should have applied Rule 3, Section
filing fees. However, respondents filed a Motion to Disqualify 21 to the application of the Alguras after their affidavits and
the Plaintiffs, alleging that in addition to Antonio Algura’s supporting documents failed to satisfy the twin requirements
monthly income of more than P3,000.00 as a member of the under Rule 141. Instead of disqualifying them outright, the RTC
Philippine National Police, Lorencita Algura also had a mini- should have called a hearing as required by Rule 3, Section 21.
store and computer shop on the ground floor of their Thus, the case must be remanded to the trial court to
residence. Furthermore, respondents claimed that petitioners’ determine whether petitioners can be considered as indigent
second floor was used as their residence and as a boarding litigants using the standards set in Rule 3, Sec. 21.
house, from which they earned more than P3,000.00 a month. RE: QUERY OF MR. ROGER C. PRIORESCHI RE EXEMPTION
The RTC disqualified petitioners as indigent litigants on the FROM LEGAL AND FILING FEES OF THE GOOD SHEPHERD
ground that they failed to substantiate their claim for FOUNDATION, INC. A.M. No. 09-6-9-SC August 19, 2009
RESOLUTION

APPEALS, JULITA C. BENEDICTO, and FRANCISCA
DOCTRINE:“The clear intent and precise language of the Rules BENEDICTO-PAULINO, Respondents.
of Court indicate that only a natural party litigant may be
regarded as an indigent litigant.” PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45
FACTS: Mr. Prioreschi, administrator of the Good Shepherd DOCTRINE: Venue essentially concerns a rule of procedure
Foundation, Inc., wrote to the Chief Justice asking if the which, in personal actions, is fixed for the greatest
requirements under Rule 141 on individual indigents should convenience possible of the plaintiff and his witnesses. The
include Foundations or Associations that work with and for ground of improperly laid venue must be raised seasonably,
Indigent persons. Apparently, Good Shepherd was given an else it is deemed waived. Where the defendant failed to either
indorsement by the Chief Justice to pay a nominal fee of file a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue or
P5,000.00 and a balance upon the collection action of P10M. include the same as an affirmative defense, he is deemed to
However, the Court Administrator pointed out the need of have waived his right to object to improper venue.
complying with Rule 141 which reserves the privilege to FACTS: Irene instituted before the RTC two similar complaints
indigent persons. for conveyance of shares of stock, accounting and receivership
ISSUE: Whether or not the exemptions granted to indigent against the Benedicto Group with prayer for the issuance of a
litigants should be granted to foundations working for indigent temporary restraining order (TRO).
and underprivileged people. (NO) She alleged that sometime in 1968 and 1972, Ambassador
RULING: The Courts cannot grant to foundations like Good Roberto S. Benedicto, now deceased, and his business
Shepherd the same exemption from payment of legal fees associates (Benedicto Group) organized Far East Managers and
granted to indigent litigants even if the foundations are Investors, Inc. (FEMII) and Universal Equity Corporation (UEC),
working for indigent and underprivileged people. respectively. As petitioner Irene Marcos-Araneta would later
The basis for the exemption from legal and filing fees is the free allege, both corporations were organized pursuant to a
access clause embodied in Sec. 11, Article III of the contract or arrangement whereby Benedicto, as trustor,
Constitution. In implementation of the right of free access, the placed in his name and in the name of his associates, as
Supreme Court promulgated rules, specifically Sec. 21, Rule 3 trustees, the shares of stocks of FEMII and UEC with the
and Sec. 19, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. obligation to hold those shares and their fruits in trust and for
The clear intent and precise language of the Rules of Court the benefit of Irene to the extent of 65% of such shares. Several
indicate that only a natural party litigant may be regarded as years after, Irene, through her trustee-husband, Gregorio Ma.
an indigent litigant. Good Shepherd is a juridical person. It has Araneta III, demanded the reconveyance of said 65%
the power to acquire and possess property of all kinds as well stockholdings, but the Benedicto Group refused to oblige.
as incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
conformity with the laws and regulations of their organization. case is an intra-corporate dispute which is under the
Therefore, it cannot be accorded the exemption from legal and jurisdiction of SEC. Respondents likewise raised the issue of
filing fees granted to indigent litigants. improper venue and lack of cause of action. Respondents
That Good Shepherd is working for indigent and maintain that Irene is not a resident of Ilocos Norte but rather
underprivileged people is of no moment. Clearly, the stays in Makati City.
Constitution has explicitly premised the free access clause on Petitioners maintain that Julita and Francisca were effectively
a person’s poverty, a condition that only a natural person can precluded from raising the matter of improper venue by their
suffer. subsequent acts of filing numerous pleadings. To petitioners,
There are other reasons that warrant the rejection of the these pleadings, taken together, signify a waiver of private
request for exemption in favor of a juridical person. For one, respondents' initial objection to improper venue.
extending the exemption to a juridical person on the ground RTC – both complaints were dismissed on the ground that the
that it works for indigent and underprivileged people may be being a real action, the venue was improperly laid.
prone to abuse (even with the imposition of rigid CA – Dismissed the complaints
documentation requirements), particularly by corporations ISSUE: WON the complaints filed by the petitioner should be
and entities bent on circumventing the rule on payment of the dismissed for improper venue (YES)
fees. Also, the scrutiny of compliance with the documentation RULING: Venue essentially concerns a rule of procedure which,
requirements may prove too time-consuming and wasteful for in personal actions, is fixed for the greatest convenience
the courts. possible of the plaintiff and his witnesses. The ground of
In view of the foregoing, the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. improperly laid venue must be raised seasonably, else it is
cannot be extended the exemption from legal and filing fees deemed waived. Where the defendant failed to either file a
despite its working for indigent and underprivileged people. motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue or include
X. RULE 4 VENUE the same as an affirmative defense, he is deemed to have
IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA, DANIEL RUBIO, ORLANDO G. waived his right to object to improper venue. In the case at
RESLIN, and JOSE G. RESLIN, Petitioners, v. COURT OF bench, Benedicto and Francisca raised at the earliest time

possible, meaning "within the time for but before filing the of Attorney Eldrige Marvin B. Aceron (Atty. Aceron) for the
answer to the complaint," the matter of improper venue. purpose of filing an action in court against the respondents.
In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of Pursuant to this, Atty. Aceron filed a Complaint for collection
personal property, the enforcement of a contract, or the of sum of money with the RTC of Quezon City against the
recovery of damages. Real actions, on the other hand, are respondents.
those affecting title to or possession of real property, or Respondents moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the
interest therein. In accordance with the wordings of Sec. 1 of grounds of improper venue and prescription. Insisting that the
Rule 4, the venue of real actions shall be the proper court complaint against them may only be filed in the court of the
which has territorial jurisdiction over the area wherein the real place where either they or the petitioners reside. They averred
property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. The venue that they reside in Bacolod City while the petitioners reside in
of personal actions is the court where the plaintiff or any of the Los Angeles, California, USA. Thus, the respondents maintain,
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the filing of the complaint against them in the RTC of Quezon
the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non- City was improper.
resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of RTC: DENIED the respondents' motion to dismiss. Ruling that
the plaintiff. the SPA clearly states that Atty. Aceron is the duly appointed
The fact that FEMII's assets include real properties does not attorney-in-fact to prosecute the claim against herein
materially change the nature of the action, for the ownership defendants. Considering that Atty. Aceron is in Quezon City,
interest of a stockholder over corporate assets is only inchoate hence, being the plaintiff, venue of the action may lie where
as the corporation, as a juridical person, solely owns such he resides as provided in Section 2, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of
assets. It is only upon the liquidation of the corporation that Civil Procedure.
the stockholders, depending on the type and nature of their CA: ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE the Orders of the RTC of Quezon
stockownership, may have a real inchoate right over the City. The CA held that the complaint should have been filed in
corporate assets, but then only to the extent of their Bacolod City and not in Quezon City.
stockownership. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
Sec. 2 of Rule 4 indicates quite clearly that when there is more COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT RULED
than one plaintiff in a personal action case, the residences of THAT THE COMPLAINT MUST BE DISMISSED ON THE GROUND
the principal parties should be the basis for determining THAT VENUE WAS NOT PROPERLY LAID
proper venue. As earlier stated, no less than the RTC in Batac HELD: NO. The petitioners' complaint should have been filed in
declared Irene as not a resident of Batac, Ilocos Norte. Withal, the RTC of Bacolod City, the court of the place where the
that court was an improper venue for her conveyance action. respondents reside, and not in RTC of Quezon City. Atty.
THEODORE and NANCY ANG, represented by ELDRIGE Aceron is not a real party in interest in the case below; thus,
MARVIN B. ACERON, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES ALAN and his residence is immaterial to the venue of the filing of the
EM ANG, respondents. [G.R. No. 186993. August 22, 2012.] complaint.
It is a legal truism that the rules on the venue of personal
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 actions are fixed for the convenience of the plaintiffs and their
DOCTRINE: The petitioners' complaint for collection of sum of witnesses. Equally settled, however, is the principle that
money against the respondents is a personal action as it choosing the venue of an action is not left to a plaintiff's
primarily seeks the enforcement of a contract. The Rules give caprice; the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court.
the plaintiff the option of choosing where to file his complaint. The petitioners' complaint for collection of sum of money
He can file it in the place (1) where he himself or any of them against the respondents is a personal action as it primarily
resides, or (2) where the defendant or any of the defendants seeks the enforcement of a contract. The Rules give the
resides or may be found. The plaintiff or the defendant must plaintiff the option of choosing where to file his complaint. He
be residents of the place where the action has been instituted can file it in the place (1) where he himself or any of them
at the time the action is commenced. resides, or (2) where the defendant or any of the defendants
FACTS: Spouses Alan and Em Ang (respondents) obtained a resides or may be found. The plaintiff or the defendant must
loan of US$300,000.00 from Theodore and Nancy Ang be residents of the place where the action has been instituted
(petitioners). The respondents executed a promissory note to at the time the action is commenced.
pay the said amount, with interest of ten percent (10%) per However, if the plaintiff does not reside in the Philippines, the
annum, upon demand. However, despite repeated demands, complaint in such case may only be filed in the court of the
the respondents failed to pay the petitioners. place where the defendant resides.
Thus, the petitioners sent the respondents a demand letter Here, the petitioners are residents of Los Angeles, California,
asking them to pay their outstanding debt of US$719,671.23 USA while the respondents reside in Bacolod City. Applying the
accumulated over the years. Respondents still failed to settle foregoing principles, the petitioners' complaint against the
their loan obligation. respondents may only be filed in the RTC of Bacolod City — the
The petitioners then residing in Los Angeles, California, United court of the place where the respondents reside. The
States of America (USA), executed their respective SPA in favor petitioners, being residents of Los Angeles, California, USA, are

not given the choice as to the venue of the filing of their (a) In those cases where a specific rule or law provides
complaint. otherwise; or
UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. (b) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the
ALBERT LIM, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND filing of the action on the exclusive venue thereof.
STYLE "NEW H-R GROCERY", RESPONDENT. G.R. NO. IMPROPER VENUE NOT IMPLEADED IS DEEMED WAIVED.
154338 OCTOBER 5, 2007 Corollarily, Section 1, Rule 9 of the same Rules provides for the
instances when the trial court may motu proprio dismiss a
FACTS: 45. The present controversy stemmed from a contract claim, thus:
of sale between Robina Corp. and Albert. Pursuant to the Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. – Defenses
contract, petitioner sold to respondent grocery products. After and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in
tendering partial payments, respondent refused to settle his the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears
obligation despite petitioner’s repeated demands. from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court
Thus, petitioner filed with the RTC-Quezon City, a complaint has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is
against respondent for a sum of money. another action pending between the same parties for the same
The trial court issued an Order dismissing the complaint motu cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by
proprio on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and improper venue, statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
thus: THE COURT MAY NOT DISMISS MOTU PROPRIO ON THE
The case is misplaced with respect to jurisdiction and venue. GROUND OF IMPROPER VENUE
There is not even a remote connection by the parties to In Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court, this Court held
Quezon City, the plaintiff corporation has principal office at that a trial court may not motu proprio dismiss a complaint on
Pasig City and the defendant is from Laoag City. the ground of improper venue, thus:
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that the Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue is
parties agreed that the proper venue for any dispute relative certainly not the appropriate course of action at this stage of
to the transaction is Quezon City. the proceedings, particularly as venue, in inferior courts as well
The trial court granted the motion and admitted petitioner’s as in the courts of first instance (now RTC), may be waived
amended complaint. expressly or impliedly. Where the defendant fails to challenge
Summons was served upon respondent. For his failure to file timely the venue in a motion to dismiss as provided by Section
an answer seasonably and upon motion of petitioner, the trial 4 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, and allows the trial to be held
court declared him in default and allowing petitioner to and a decision to be rendered, he cannot on appeal or in a
present its evidence ex parte. special action be permitted to belatedly challenge the wrong
The trial court again dismissed the complaint on the ground of venue, which is deemed waived.
improper venue. It held that the filing is based on the Indeed, it was grossly erroneous for the trial court to have
stipulation at the back of the delivery receipt that venue shall taken a procedural short-cut by dismissing motu proprio the
be in Quezon City --- which is not even stated in the Complaint complaint on the ground of improper venue without first
nor admitted to have been signed by the defendant. allowing the procedure outlined in the rules of court to take its
Upon appeal, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for proper course. Although we are for the speedy and expeditious
lack of merit. resolution of cases, justice and fairness take primary
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court may dismiss motu importance. The ends of justice require that respondent trial
proprio petitioner’s complaint on the ground of improper court faithfully adhere to the rules of procedure to afford not
venue. only the defendant, but the plaintiff as well, the right to be
HELD: A court may not dismiss an action motu proprio on the heard on his cause.
ground of improper venue as it is not one of the grounds In Rudolf Lietz Holdings Inc. v. Registry of Deeds of Parañaque,
wherein the court may dismiss an action motu proprio on the the Court likewise held that a trial court may not motu proprio
basis of the pleadings dismiss a complaint on the ground of improper venue, thus:
IN PERSONAL ACTIONS, PLAINTIFF MAY COMMENCE THE Rule 9, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states
ACTION EITHER IN THE PLACE OF HIS OR HER RESIDENCE; OR that defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to
WHERE THE DEFENDANT RESIDES dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. The court may
Sections 2 and 4, Rule 4 of the same Rules provide: only dismiss an action motu proprio in case of lack of
Sec. 2. Venue of personal actions. – All other actions may be jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res
commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the judicata and prescription. Therefore, the trial court in this case
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of erred when it dismissed the petition motu proprio. It should
the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non- have waited for a motion to dismiss or a responsive pleading
resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of from respondent, raising the objection or affirmative defense
the plaintiff. of improper venue, before dismissing the petition.
Sec. 4. When Rule not applicable. – This Rule shall not apply – JIMMY T. GO, Petitioner, vs. UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS
BANK, ANGELO V. MANAHAN, FRANCISCO C. ZARATE,

PERLITA A. URBANO and ATTY. EDWARD MARTIN, The trial court issued an order granting petitioner’s application
Respondent G.R. NO. 156187. NOVEMBER 11, 2004 for a writ of preliminary injunction. Correspondingly, the
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI auction sale was enjoined.
DOCTRINE: The cancellation of the real estate mortgage is a On 09 August 2000, the trial court denied respondent bank’s
real action, considering that a real estate mortgage is a real motion to dismiss. A motion for reconsideration was filed, but
right and a real property by itself. An action for cancellation of the same was likewise denied in an Order dated 08 November
real estate mortgage is necessarily an action affecting the title 2000.
to the property. It is, therefore, a real action which should be Respondent bank questioned said orders before the Court of
commenced and tried in the place where the subject property Appeals via a petition for certiorari alleging that the trial court
lies acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
FACTS: Petitioner Jimmy T. Go and Alberto T. Looyuko are co- of discretion in issuing an order denying the motion to dismiss
owners of Noah’s Ark International, Noah’s Ark Sugar Carriers, and the motion for reconsideration thereof
Noah’s Ark Sugar Truckers, Noah’s Ark Sugar Repacker, Noah’s The Court of Appeals set aside the Orders dated 07 June 2000,
Ark Sugar Insurers, Noah’s Ark Sugar Terminal, Noah’s Ark 09 August 2000 and 08 November 2000 issued by the trial
Sugar Building, and Noah’s Ark Sugar Refinery. They applied for court and directed the trial court to dismiss Civil Case No.
an Omnibus Line accommodation with respondent United 67878 on the ground of improper venue.
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) in the amount of Nine Hundred A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner which was
Million (P900,000,000) Pesos and was favorably acted upon by denied.
the latter. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s complaint for cancellation
The transaction was secured by Real Estate Mortgages over of real estate mortgage is a personal or real action for the
parcels of land located at Mandaluyong City with an area of purpose of determining venue?
24,837 square meters, and registered in the name of Mr. RULING: No. The petitioner’s complaint for cancellation of
Looyuko; and another land also located at Mandaluyong City realestate mortgage is a REAL ACTION.
with an area of 14,271 square meters, registered in the name In a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real
of Noah’s Ark Sugar Refinery. property, or as provided for in Section 1, Rule 4, a real action
On 21 July 1997, the approved Omnibus Line accommodation is an action affecting title to or possession of real property, or
granted to petitioner was subsequently cancelled by interest therein. These include partition or condemnation of,
respondent UCPB. As a consequence, petitioner Jimmy T. Go or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property. The venue for
demanded from UCPB the return of the two (2) TCTs covered real actions is the same for regional trial courts and municipal
by Real Estate Mortgages earlier executed. UCPB refused to trial courts -- the court which has territorial jurisdiction over
return the same and proceeded to have the two (2) pre-signed the area where the real property or any part thereof lies.
Real Estate Mortgages notarized on 22 July 1997 and caused Personal action is one brought for the recovery of personal
the registration thereof before the Registry of Deeds of property, for the enforcement of some contract or recovery of
Mandaluyong City on 02 September 1997. damages for its breach, or for the recovery of damages for the
On 15 June 1999, respondent UCPB filed with the Office of the commission of an injury to the person or property. The venue
Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Mandaluyong City an for personal actions is likewise the same for the regional and
extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage for municipal trial courts -- the court of the place where the
nonpayment of the obligation secured by said mortgage. As a plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the
result, the public auction sale of the mortgaged property was defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the
set. election of the plaintiff, as indicated in Section 2 of Rule 4.
To protect his interest, petitioner Jimmy T. Go filed a complaint It is quite clear then that the controlling factor in determining
for Cancellation of Real Estate Mortgage and damages, with venue for cases of the above nature is the primary objective
prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of for which said cases are filed.
preliminary injunction, against respondent bank and its The case of Carandang v. Court of Appeals, is more particularly
officers with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 266. instructive. There, we held that an action for nullification of the
Respondent bank, instead of filing an answer, filed a motion to mortgage documents and foreclosure of the mortgaged
dismiss based on the following grounds: 1) that the court has property is a real action that affects the title to the property.
no jurisdiction over the case due to nonpayment of the proper Thus, venue of the real action is before the court having
filing and docket fees; 2) that the complaint was filed in the jurisdiction over the territory in which the property lies, which
wrong venue; 3) an indispensable party/real party in interest is the Court of First Instance of Laguna.
was not impleaded and, therefore, the complaint states no Petitioner in this case contends that a case for cancellation of
cause of action; 4) that the complaint was improperly verified; mortgage is a personal action and since he resides at Pasig City,
and 5) that petitioner is guilty of forum shopping and venue was properly laid therein. He tries to make a point by
submitted an insufficient and false certification of non-forum alluding to the case of Francisco S. Hernandez v. Rural Bank of
shopping. Lucena.

Petitioner’s reliance in the case of Francisco S. Hernandez v. injustice by practically denying to the party concerned a fair
Rural Bank of Lucena is misplaced. Firstly, said case was opportunity to file suit in the place designated by the rules.
primarily an action to compel the mortgagee bank to accept FACTS: Torres filed with CFI of Isabela alleging breach of a
payment of the mortgage debt and to release the mortgage. distributorship contract
That action, which is not expressly included in the enumeration Hoechst Philippines filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of
found in Section 2(a) of Rule 4 of the Old Civil Procedure and improper venue. The basis of the motion was the contract
now under Section 1, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil provides that in case of any litigation arising on the
Procedure, does not involve titles to the mortgaged lots. It is a agreements, the venue of any action SHALL be in the
personal action and not a real action. The mortgagee has not competent courts of the province of Rizal.
foreclosed the mortgage. The plaintiffs’ title is not in question. Respondent court: denied the motion to dismiss.
They are in possession of the mortgaged lots. Hence, the venue Respondent judge was on the position that the word "shall" in
of the plaintiffs’ personal action is the place where the the stipulation in question should be construed to be merely
defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, permissive and not mandatory. It was also maintained that
or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the there are no words in the contract expressly restricting the
election of the plaintiff. In the case at bar, the action for venue to the courts of Rizal.
cancellation of real estate mortgage filed by herein petitioner ISSUE: WON the case shall be dismissed on the ground of
was primarily an action to compel private respondent bank to improper venue.
return to him the properties covered by TCTs No. 64070 and HELD: No. It is true that the settled rule of jurisprudence in this
No. 3325 over which the bank had already initiated foreclosure jurisdiction is that a written agreement of the parties as to
proceedings because of the cancellation by the said venue is not only binding between the parties but also
respondent bank of the omnibus credit line on 21 July 1997. enforceable by the courts. However, there may be instances
The prime objective is to recover said real properties. when an agreement as to venue may be so oppressive as to
Secondly, Carandang distinctly articulated that the ruling in effectively deny to the party concerned access to the courts by
Hernandez does not apply where the mortgaged property had reason of poverty. The Court may declare the agreement as to
already been foreclosed. Here, and as correctly pointed out by venue to be in effect contrary to public policy whenever it is
the appellate court, respondent bank had already initiated shown that a stipulation as to venue works injustice by
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, and were it not for the practically denying to the party concerned a fair opportunity
timely issuance of a restraining order secured by petitioner Go to file suit in the place designated by the rules.
in the lower court, the same would have already been sold at But an inquiry to the record before us does not show that
a public auction. private respondent Francisco Torres is really in no position to
In a relatively recent case, Asset Privatization Trust v. Court of carry on a litigation in the Province of Rizal, because of his
Appeals, it was succinctly stated that the prayer for the residence or place of business being in Isabela province.
nullification of the mortgage is a prayer affecting real property, Considering the nature and volume of the business he has with
hence, is a real action. petitioner, there is nothing oppressive in his being required to
In sum, the cancellation of the real estate mortgage, subject of litigate out of his province. After all, for practical reasons, there
the instant petition, is a real action, considering that a real seems to justification also for petitioner to see to it that all
estate mortgage is a real right and a real property by itself. An suits against it be concentrated in the Province of Rizal, as
action for cancellation of real estate mortgage is necessarily an otherwise, considering the nationwide extent of its business, it
action affecting the title to the property. It is, therefore, a real would be greatly inconvenienced if it has to appear in so many
action which should be commenced and tried in Mandaluyong provinces every time an action is filed against it.
City, the place where the subject property lies. PHILIPPINE BANK OF, COMMUNICATIONS, Petitioners, vs.
ELENA LIM, RAMON CALDERON, and TRI-ORO
HOECHST PHILIPPINES, INC. V. TORRES, 83 SCRA 297 INTERNATIONAL TRADING & MANUFACTURING
(1978) CORPORATION, Respondents., G.R. NO. 158135, APRIL 12,
2005
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
DOCTRINE: the settled rule of jurisprudence in this jurisdiction
is that a written agreement of the parties as to venue is not Petition for Review under Rule 45.
only binding between the parties but also enforceable by the FACTS: PBCom filed a complaint against respondents in the
courts. However, there may be instances when an agreement RTC of Manila for the collection of a deficiency. Petitioner
as to venue may be so oppressive as to effectively deny to the alleged therein that respondents obtained a loan from it and
party concerned access to the courts by reason of poverty. executed a continuing surety agreement in favor of petitioner
XxxxIn such an eventuality and depending on the peculiar for all loans, credits, etc. that were extended or may be
circumstances of the case, the Court may declare the extended in the future to respondents. Petitioner granted a
agreement as to venue to be in effect contrary to public policy renewal of said loan upon respondent’s request. It was
whenever it is shown that a stipulation as to venue works expressly stipulated therein that the venue for any legal action

that may arise out of said promissory note shall be Makati City, The petitioner further alleged that the respondent unilaterally
“to the exclusion of all other courts…” Respondents allegedly suspended his account, wrongfully charged for late payment,
failed to pay said obligation upon maturity. Thus, petitioner and subsequently cancelled his credit card.
foreclosed the real estate mortgage. The respondent raised the affirmative defenses of lack of cause
Respondents: Filed MD on the ground of improper venue, of action and improper venue. They claimed that Saludo’s
invoking the stipulation contained in the last paragraph of the community tax certificate was issued at Pasay City, that his
promissory note with respect to the restrictive/exclusive complaint was prepared in Pasay City, and that his lawyer of
venue. the said city signed the complaint.
RTC: denied MD asseverating that petitioner had separate The petitioner commented that he was the congressman of the
causes of action arising from the promissory note and the lone district at the time of the filing of the complaint; that he
continuing surety agreement. Thus, [under] Rule 4, Section 2, was a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, x x x venue Southern Leyte Chapter; and that his tax certificate was issued
was properly laid in Manila. An MR of said order was likewise at Pasay City because he has an office thereat. He claimed that
denied. a community tax certificate is not determinative of one’s
CA: respondents’ alleged debt was based on the Promissory residence.
Note, which had provided an exclusionary stipulation on venue The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of Saludo. It held that as
“to the exclusion of all other courts.” The parties’ Surety the incumbent Congressman of the Lone District of Southern
Agreement, though silent as to venue, was an accessory Leyte, any doubts about his residence are gone. In the case of
contract that should have been interpreted in consonance with Core v. Core, residence, for the purposes of fixing the venue of
the Promissory Note. an action, is synonymous with domicile. A permanent home,
ISSUE: WON the action against the sureties is covered by the the place to which, whenever absent for business or pleasure,
restriction on venue stipulated in the PN one intends to return.
HELD: YES. Since the cases pertaining to both causes of action A man can have but one domicile for one and the same
are restricted to Makati City as the proper venue, petitioner purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of
cannot rely on Section 5 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court. residence. Venue could be at place of his residence.
This rule on venue does not apply when the law specifically The appellate court on the other hand granted the
provides otherwise, or when — before the filing of the action respondent’s petition for certiorari as it found that the venue
— the contracting parties agree in writing on the exclusive is improperly laid. It found that Saludo was not a resident of
venue thereof. Venue is not jurisdictional and may be waived Southern Leyte. Under the law, community tax certificates
by the parties. A stipulation as to venue does not preclude the shall be paid in the place of residence of the individual, or in
filing of the action in other places, unless qualifying or the place where the principal office of the juridical entity is
restrictive words are used in the agreement. located.It opined that under the rules, the possible choices of
In enforcing a surety contract, the “complementary-contracts- venue are Pasay City or Makati City, or any place in the
construed-together” doctrine finds application. According to National Capital Judicial Region, at the option of petitioner
this principle, an accessory contract must be read in its entirety Saludo.
and together with the principal agreement. ISSUE:
ANICETO G. SALUDO, JR., V. AMERICAN EXPRESS Whether or not the Court of Appeals properly held that the
INTERNATIONAL, INC., AND/OR IAN T. FISH AND DOMINIC venue was improperly laid.
MASCRINAS, G.R. NO. 159507, APRIL 19, 2006 HELD:
YES. Absent any evidence to the contrary, he is deemed to
FACTS: possess the qualifications for the position of representative of
The petitioner filed acomplaint for damages against the Southern Leyte, including his residence therein. A residence is
American Express International (AMEX) and respondents Ian T. not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the
Fish - Vice President and Country Manager, and Dominic intention to remain for an unlimited time.
Mascrinas - Head of Operations, before the Regional Trial Following the term “residence” for purposes of election law,
Court of Maasin City, Southern Leyte. Saludo not only had the intention to reside in Southern Leyte,
In his complaint, the petitioner claimed that he was a member but he had personal presence therein. His bodily presence as
of the House of Representatives, and a resident of Southern an inhabitant of Southern Leyte was sufficient for petitioner to
Leyte; that AMEX is a corporation engaged in the business of be considered a resident therein for purposes of venue.
providing credit and other credit facilities. It would be preposterous to acknowledge and recognize the
The petitioner alleged that sometime in April 2000, Saludo’s petitioner as a congressman of Southern Leyte without
daughter’s credit card was dishonored in her purchase in the recognizing him as actually, personally, and physically residing
United States. Another dishonor occurred when Saludo used when his residence was required by law.
his credit card to pay his accountant Hotel Okawa in Tokyo, SAN LUIS V. SAN LUIS, G.R. NO. 133743, FEB. 6, 2007
while he was there to attend the Congressional Recognition.

FACTS: During his lifetime, Felicisimo San Luis, who was the Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition
former governor of the Province of Laguna, contracted three for letters of administration.
marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March ISSUES: Whether or not venue was properly laid
17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, RULING: The petition lacks merit.
Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. Virginia predeceased Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for
Felicisimo. In 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be
whom he had a son, Tobias. However, Merry Lee, an American filed in the RTC of the province “in which he resides at the time
citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of his death.” It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that
in Hawaii, USA, which issued a Decree Granting Absolute “residence,” for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement
Divorce on December 14, 1973. In 1974, Felicisimo married of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with “domicile.”
respondent Felicidad San Luis. He had no children with Needless to say, there is a distinction between “residence” for
respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of purposes of election laws and “residence” for purposes of
their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992. fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, “residence” and
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal “domicile” are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed
partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. permanent residence to which when absent, one has the
She filed a petition for letters of administration before the RTC intention of returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue
of Makati City. Petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children under the Rules of Court, the “residence” of a person is his
of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or
the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal
action, claiming that the petition for letters of administration residence or domicile provided he resides therein with
should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this continuity and consistency. Hence, it is possible that a person
was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death. He may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.
further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file In the instant case, while petitioners established that
the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent
the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang,
Merry Lee. A similar motion to dismiss was filed by Linda, sister Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death.
of petitioner. The trial court Denied the motions to dismiss. In Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale
her opposition thereto, respondent submitted documentary showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property.
evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the powers She also presented proof of membership of the deceased in
of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their the Ayala Alabang Village Association and Ayala Country Club,
house in Alabang which they bought sometime in 1982. Inc., letter-envelopes from 1988 to 1990 sent by the
Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued deceased’s children to him at his Alabang address, and the
by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove deceased’s calling cards stating that his home/city address is
that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been at Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa” while his
dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal office/provincial address is in “Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz,
capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of Laguna.” From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a
the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the
Romillo, Jr. Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the
Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for reconsideration subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in
from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. the Regional Trial Court which has territorial jurisdiction over
The trial court issued an Order denying the motions for Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on
reconsideration. Edgar filed a motion for reconsideration from December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a
the Order denying their motion for reconsideration. The trial municipality and the branches of the RTC of the National
court dismissed the petition for letters of administration on Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over
grounds of improper venue and lack of legal capacity to file the Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme
petition for letters of administration. Court Administrative Order No. 3. Thus, the subject petition
Respondent appealed to the CA which reversed and set aside was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
the orders of the trial court. Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of
separate motions for reconsideration which were denied by limited recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot be
the CA. Hence, the instant petition. Petitioners also contend denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing
that respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo was void and marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and
bigamous because it was performed during the subsistence of capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary
the latter’s marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained
2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it would abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M.
impair vested rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that “if the foreigner obtains
such, respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity

to remarry under Philippine law.” Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of ISSUE: Whether or not Rosemoor committed forum-shopping
Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. in filing the two cases against the Bank.
Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Rosemoor, and
Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a affirming the ruling of the lower courts that there was no
divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in violation of forum shopping.
the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is The Malolos case was filed for the purpose of restraining the
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. As such, the Van Bank from proceeding with the consolidation of the titles over
Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a the foreclosed Bulacan properties because the loan secured by
divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the the mortgage had not yet become due and demandable. While
enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 the right asserted in the Manila case is to receive the proceeds
thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established of the loan, the right sought in the Malolos case is to restrain
through judicial precedent. Petitioners cite Articles 15 and 17 the foreclosure of the properties mortgaged to secure a loan
of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under that was not yet due.
Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in Moreover, the Malolos case is an action to annul the
light of this Court’s earlier rulings on the matter, the Filipino foreclosure sale that is necessarily an action affecting the title
spouse should not be discriminated against in his own country of the property sold. It is therefore a real action which should
if the ends of justice are to be served. Therefore, this case be commenced and tried in the province where the property
should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of or part thereof lies. The Manila case, on the other hand, is a
evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the personal action involving as it does the enforcement of a
marriage of respondent and Felicisimo. Even assuming that contract between Rosemoor, whose office is in Quezon City,
Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, and the Bank, whose principal office is in Binondo, Manila.
nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality Personal actions may be commenced and tried where the
to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the
may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the defendants or any of the principal defendants resides, at the
properties that were acquired through their joint efforts election of the plaintiff.
during their cohabitation. It was subsequent to the filing of the Manila case that
UNITED OVERSEAS BANK V. ROSEMOR MINING & DEV’T., Rosemoor and Dr. Pascual saw the need to secure a writ of
G.R. NO. 159669, MARCH 12, 2007 injunction because the consolidation of the titles to the
mortgaged properties in favor of the Bank was in the offing.
This is a petition for certiorari. But then, this action can only be commenced where the
FACTS: Rosemoore Mining & Development Corporation properties, or a portion thereof, is located. Otherwise, the
(Hereon Rosemoor) in order to secure a credit facility petition for injunction would be dismissed for improper venue.
amounting to 80 Million executed a mortgage agreement with Rosemoor, therefore, was warranted in filing the Malolos case
United Overseas Bank Phils. (Hereon Bank) which covered six and cannot in turn be accused of forum-shopping
(6) parcels of land all registered under Rosemoor. Rosemoor DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the Decisions of the
defaulted which caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the Court of Appeals dated 26 February 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No.
properties. The bank was the highest bidder in all of the 76934 and dated 20 June 2003 in CA-G.R SP No. 73358 are
properties. Hence the filing of the case by Rosemoor before AFFIRMED. Petitioner United Overseas Bank, Phils. and its
the Manila RTC and Malolos RTC. (The issue of the case, filing counsel, Siguion Reyna Montecillo & Ongsiako Law O􏰁ces, are
of 2 actions in 2 different courts) given ten (10) days from notice to EXPLAIN why they should
Manila RTC: (Personal Action) not be held in contempt of court for making a
Rosemoor filed an action to receive the remaining proceeds of misrepresentation before the Court as adverted to in this
the loan. However, the bank filed a motion to dismiss the case Decision. Cost against petitioner.
because it contends Rosemoor is violating forum shopping, VIRGILIO C. BRIONES, Petitioner,
having initiated a case in Malolos RTC. Yet, the motion to vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CASH ASIA CREDIT
dismiss was denied, likewise it was dismissed by the CA holding CORPORATION, Respondents.
that there was no forum shopping.
Malolos RTC: (Real Action) PETITION FOR ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65
Rosemoor second action was filed her to restrain the DOCTRINE: A complaint directly assailing the validity of the
foreclosure of the properties mortgaged to secure the loan written instrument itself should not be bound by the exclusive
which was not due yet. As it here, the bank filed a motion to venue stipulation contained therein and should be filed in
dismiss the case due to violation of forum shopping but the accordance with the general rules on venue.
likewise it was denied by the RTC and CA. FACTS:
Hence the two petitions were consolidated by the Supreme Briones filed a complaint for Nullity of Mortgage Contract,
Court. Hence the case. Promissory Note, Loan Agreement, Foreclosure of Mortgage,
Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title. He alleged that his

sister informed him that his property had been foreclosed and properly dismissed on the ground of improper venue.
a writ of possession had already been issued in favor of Cash Conversely, therefore, a complaint directly assailing the
Asia. Upon investigation, Briones discovered that: (a) on validity of the written instrument itself should not be bound by
December 6, 2007, he purportedly executed a promissory the exclusive venue stipulation contained therein and should
note,9 loan agreement, and deed of real estate mortgage be filed in accordance with the general rules on venue. To be
covering the subject property (subject contracts) in favor of sure, it would be inherently consistent for a complaint of this
Cash Asia in order to obtain a loan in the amount of nature to recognize the exclusive venue stipulation when it, in
₱3,500,000.00 from the latter; and (b) since the said loan was fact, precisely assails the validity of the instrument in which
left unpaid, Cash Asia proceeded to foreclose his property. In such stipulation is contained.
this relation, Briones claimed that he never contracted any RADIOWEALTH FINANCE COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, v.
loans from Cash Asia as he has been living and working in ROMEO T. NOLASCO AND REYNALDO T. NOLASCO,
Vietnam. Respondents
Cash Asia moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of
improper venue. Cash Asia pointed out that the complaint FACTS: Radiowealth is a domestic corporation with principal
should be filed in Makati City as stipulated in the agreement. adress at 7th floor, DMG Center, Domingo Guevara St.,
Briones filed an Opposition asserting that he should not be Mandaluyong City. Nolasco are the obligors who both maintain
covered by the venue stipulation as he is not a party thereto residence at Mandaluyong.
RTC denied Cash Asia’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit. Respondents secured a loan from the petitioner in the amount
CA annulled the RTC order and dismissed Briones’ complaint of 1.9M, secured by a chattel mortgage. They defaulted in
without prejudice to filing the same before the proper court in paying which caused the entire amount to become due and
Makati City. demandable. Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money
Issue: WON Briones is bound by the venue stipulation in the and damages with application for writ of Replevin with the RTC
contract of loan (NO) San Mateo Rizal.
RULING: The general rule is that the venue of real actions is the RTC: Dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Citing Sec. 2,
court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real Rule 4 of ROC--since neither the petitioner nor the
property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated; while the respondents reside within the jurisdiction of the trial court
venue of personal actions is the court which has jurisdiction (either San Mateo or Rodriguez, Rizal), it must be dismissed.
where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the election of Petitioner: Filed MR. The venue is proper considering that
the plaintiff. As an exception, jurisprudence in Legaspi v. Rep. there is a provision in the PN which states that any action to
of the Phils. instructs that the parties, thru a written enforce payment of any sums due shall be exclusively brought
instrument, may either introduce another venue where in the proper court within the NCR or any place where the
actions arising from such instrument may be filed, or restrict petitioner has branch or office at its sole option. RTC denied
the filing of said actions in a certain exclusive venue. The MR.
parties, however, are not precluded from agreeing in writing ISSUE: WON the venue was improperly laid as neither the
on an exclusive venue, as qualified by Section 4 of the same petitioner nor the repondent resides in Rizal.
rule. Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the RULING: NO. The RTC confused the terms venue and
sense that the suit may be filed only in the place agreed upon, jurisdiction. Which are completely different concepts.
or merely permissive in that the parties may file their suit not Apparently, the RTC mistook jurisdiction for the more lenient
only in the place agreed upon but also in the places fixed by concept of venue. Primarily, jurisdiction jurisdiction is
law. As in any other agreement, what is essential is the conferred by law and not subject to stipulation of the parties.
ascertainment of the intention of the parties respecting the It relates to the nature of the case. On the contrary, venue
matter. pertains to the place where the case may be filed. Unlike
As regards restrictive stipulations on venue, jurisprudence jurisdiction, venue may be waived and subjected to the
instructs that it must be shown that such stipulation is agreement of the parties, provided that it does not cause them
exclusive.1âwphi1 In the absence of qualifying or restrictive inconvenience.
words, such as "exclusively," "waiving for this purpose any Section 2, Rule 4 of ROC is not restrictive. A plain reading of the
other venue," "shall only" preceding the designation of venue, provision shows that it is merely permissive as manifested by
"to the exclusion of the other courts," or words of similar the use of the term “may.” Moreover, the clear language of the
import, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an ensuing provision of Section 4 expressly allows the venue of
agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the personal actions to be subjected to the stipulation of the
specified place. parties.
In this relation, case law likewise provides that in cases where Clearly, stipulation on venue is permitted and must be
the complaint assails only the terms, conditions, and/or recognized for as long as it does not defeat the purpose of the
coverage of a written instrument and not its validity, the Rules which primarily aims for the convenience of the parties
exclusive venue stipulation contained therein shall still be to the dispute.
binding on the parties, and thus, the complaint may be

Therefore, there is nothing that prohibits the parties to decide contract, which could have contained stipulations on the
on a different venue for any dispute or action that may arise venue of dispute resolution.
from their agreement. The petitioner’s filing of the case in San Upon examination of the Sales Invoices and the Purchase
Mateo, Rizal where it maintains a branch is proper and Orders, this Court cannot consider the documents as contracts
should’ve been respected by the RTC, especially when there that would bind the parties as to the venue of dispute
appears no objection on the part of the respondents. resolution.
HYGIENIC PACKAGING CORP VS NUTRIA-ASIA, G.R. NO. The act of signing the Purchase Orders, then, was limited to
201302, JAN. 23, 2019 acknowledging respondent's order and facilitating the
payment of the goods to be delivered. It did not bind petitioner
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI to the terms and conditions in the Purchase Orders, which
DOCTRINE: The issuance of a Sales Invoice making reference to included the arbitration clause.
Purchase Orders which contained arbitration clauses was not Since there is no contractual stipulation that can be enforced
considered a binding arbitration agreement in the absence of on the venue of dispute resolution, the venue of petitioner's
proof of any intention of the parties to be bound by the personal action will be governed by the 1997 Revised Rules of
arbitration clause. Civil Procedure.
Nutri-Asia purchased from Hygienic 457,128 plastic containers, It has been consistently held that an action for collection of
for a total consideration of P9,737,674.62. Hygienic issued sum of money is a personal action. Taking into account that no
Sales Invoices and Delivery Receipts to cover these exception can be applied in this case, the venue, then, is
transactions. "where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or
Hygienic filed a Complaint for sum of money against Nutri- where the defendant or any of the principal defendants
Asia. It instituted the case before the RTC of Manila "pursuant resides, ... at the election of the plaintiff." For a corporation, its
to the stipulation of the parties as stated in the Sales Invoices residence is considered "the place where its principal office is
submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the Courts of the located as stated in its Articles of Incorporation."
City of Manila in any legal action arising out of their This Court reminds litigants that while the rules on venue are
transaction." for the convenience of plaintiffs, these rules do not give them
Nutri-Asia argued that the case should be dismissed as unbounded freedom to file their cases wherever they may
Hygienic failed to comply with a condition precedent prior to please.
its filing of the Complaint. Nutri-Asia alleged that the venue LEY CONSTRUCTION VS. SEDANO, G.R. NO. 222711,
was also improperly laid since the Regional Trial Court of AUGUST 23, 2017
Manila was not the proper venue for the institution of
Hygienic's personal action. The Complaint should have been FACTS: March 13, 2012 petitioner filed a complaint for
filed either before the TC of San Pedro, Laguna or Pasig City, collection of sums of money and damages against respondent
where the principal places of business of Hygienic and Nutri- Marvin Medel Sedano, doing business under the name and
Asia are located, respectively. The venue of actions as stated styke “Lola Taba Lolo Pato Palengke at Paluto sa Seaside before
in the Sales Invoices could not bind Nutri-Asia since it did not the Valenzuela-RTC. Petitioner alleged that on January 14,
give its express conformity to that stipulation. 2005, it leased a 50,000 sqm parcel of land located at Financial
RTC: denied the Omnibus Motion Center Area, Pasay City (now, Lot 5-A Diosdado Macapagal
It held that the venue was properly laid. Boulevard, Pasay City) from respondent third party defendant,
Thus, Nutri-Asia filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court the Philippine National Construction Corporation. September
of Appeals. 11, 2006, petitioner subleased the 14,659 sqm portion thereof
CA: granted the Petition. It held that since the signature of to respondent for a term of ten years beginning November 15,
Nutri-Asia's employee in the Sales Invoices was only for the 2005. For a monthly rent of 1,174,780 subject to a ten percent
receipt of goods, Nutri- Asia did not agree to be bound by the increase beginning on the third year and every year thereafter
venue stipulation in the Sales Invoices. (lease contract). Respondent allegedly failed the rent due for
Hygienic filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari against Nutri- the period of August 2011 to December 2011 amounting to a
Asia before this Court. total of 8,828,025 and despite demands refused to settle his
ISSUE: WON the action for collection of sum of money was obligations. Respondent answered that he religiously paid rent
properly filed? to petitioner until PNCC demanded that the rent be paid
RULING: NO. directly to it, in view of the petitioners’ eviction from the
Parties are allowed to constitute any stipulation on the venue subject property by virtue of a court order. During the period
or mode of dispute resolution as part of their freedom to from August 2011 to December 2011, he remitted the rentals
contract under Article 1306 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. to PNCC. Pointed out that the venue was improperly laid since
Here, however, the records lack any written contract of sale Section 21 of the lease contract provides that all actions or
containing the specific terms and conditions agreed upon by cases filed in connection with this case shall be filed with the
the parties. The parties failed to provide evidence of any Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, exclusive of others.

Therefore, the complaint should be dismissed on the ground Alastair John Kane and Patricia Roggenkamp are Australian
of improper venue. citizens. They met in January 2004 in Brisbane, Australia, and
Petitioner answer to respondent’s defense was Section 21 of became lovers immediately. Patricia decided to put up a
the lease contract is not a stipulation as to venue but a business in the Philippines, and eventually travelled with
stipulation on jurisdiction which is void. This is because such Alastair John to Manila. They settled in a condominium unit
stipulation deprives other courts. located in Parañaque City supposedly owned by Patricia. On
RTC granted respondents motion and dismissed the complaint March 30, 2006, an Information for violation of Republic Act
on the ground of improper venue. No. 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and Children Act
ISSUE: Whether or not the venue was improperly laid of 2004 was filed against Alastair John, with Patricia as the
HELD: NO. The petition has no merit. private complainant. The case was then raffled to Branch 260
Rule 4 of the Rules of Court govern the rules on venue of civil of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City.
actions. According to Patricia, she and Alastair John attended a party
Rule 4. VENUE OF ACTIONS. hosted by her son, Ashley Richard Cayzer on November 30,
Section 1. Venue of Real actions- Actions affecting title to or 2004. The next day, December 1, 2004, after they had just
possession of real property, or interest therein shall be arrived at their residence at about 1 :00 a.m., Patricia
commenced and tried in the proper court which has confronted Alastair John for allegedly looking at the
jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, underwear of other female guests at the party. Ignoring
or a portion thereof, is situated. Forcible entry and unlawful Patricia, Alastair John went on to lie down on the bed. Patricia
detainer shall be commenced and tried in the municipal trial then sat on a nearby chair. Alastair John, angered by Patricia's
court of the municipality or city wherein the real property remarks, allegedly approached Patricia, lifted her off the chair,
involved, or a portion thereof is situated. and dropped her on the floor. Patricia further claimed that
Section 2. Venue of Personal actions- All other actions may be Alastair John punche.d her in the head, dragged her by the hair
commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the to the bed, and pushed her head against the pillow. Patricia
principal plaintiffs reside, or where the defendant or any of the fought back and, when she had the chance, ran to the
principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident bathroom and locked herself inside.
defendant where he may be found, at the election of the The next day, on December 2, 2004, Patricia's son, Ashley
plaintiff. Richard, visited his mother and saw her lying in bed in pain.
Venue for personal actions shall as a general rule, lie with the Alastair John told Ashley Richard that his mother had too much
court which has jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the liquor the night of the party and, when they arrived home,
defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff. As an Alastair John tried to carry her to the bed. Unfortunately, he
exception, parties may through a written instrument, restrict accidently dropped her on the floor because the bed, which
the filing of said action in a certain exclusive venue. Briones v. allegedly had wheels, moved Ashley Richard then brought
Court of Appeals, written stipulations as to venue may be Patricia to the San Juan de Dios Hospital where she was
restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only in the prescribed painkillers for 12 days. After the trip to the hospital,
place agreed upon, or merely permissive in that the parties Patricia went home to Alastair John. Their situation went back
may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon but also in to being peaceful, and they even went on vacation from
the places fixed by law. As in any other agreement, what is December 26, 2004 to January 1, 2005.
essential is the ascertainment of the intention of the parties On January 6, 2005, or merely five (5) days after, Alastair John
respecting the matter. allegedly verbally abused Patricia. He then left the next day,
KANE VS. ROGGENKAMP, GR. 214326, JULY 6, 2020 taking Patricia's car with him, as well as the keys to their
Paranaque residence and another condominium unit in Pasig
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI City where he stayed. Patricia, accompanied by her driver,
DOCTRINE: went to the Pasig condominium unit and recovered possession
Venue is "the place where the case is to be heard or tried" of her car.
Under our Rules, the venue of an action generally depends on On February 4, 2005, Patricia finally reported the incidents to
whether it is a real or personal action. the police. She explained that, prior to the December 1, 2004
Real actions are those affecting the title or possession of a real incident, there were already prior incidents of abuse
property, or interest therein, to be commenced and tried in committed against her by Alastair John. After preliminary
the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein investigation, probable cause for violation of Republic Act 9262
the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. All or the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of
other actions, called personal actions, may be commenced and 2004 was found against Alastair John.
tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs reside, After trial, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 260, Paranaque City
or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants acquitted Alastair John on the ground of reasonable doubt.
reside, at the election of the plaintiff. Thereafter, Patricia filed a Complaint for Damages based on
FACTS: Article 33 of the Civil Code before the Regional Trial Court of

Mandaluyong City, praying for actual, moral and exemplary the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein
damages, and attorney's fees. the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. All
Patricia argued that the right of action provided in Article 33 in other actions, called personal actions, may be commenced and
cases of physical injuries is entirely separate and distinct from tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs reside,
the criminal action earlier commenced against Alastair John. or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants
20 Further, she added that the civil actions for damages under reside, at the election of the plaintiff. The action for damages
Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code, called filed by respondent does not involve the title or possession of
independent civil actions, "are not deemed instituted with the a real property, or interest therein. It is a personal action, and
criminal action and may be filed separately by the offended respondent, as plaintiff, had the option of either filing it in her
party even without reservation." Considering that Alastair John place of residence or the defendant, petitioner's, place of
was acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt, not because residence. She chose to file the civil case in her place of
he wasn't the author of the act complained of, Patricia argued residence, that is, Mandaluyong City.
that he may still be held liable under Article 33 of the Civil Petitioner, however, maintains that Mandaluyong City is not
Code. respondent's place of residence. While respondent alleged in
Opposing the civil action, Alastair John filed a Motion to her Complaint for Damages that she resides in a condominium
Dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and improper venue.22 unit in Mandaluyong City, petitioner cites two (2) instances
Alastair John claimed that the dismissal of the criminal case where respondent testified that she resides / at a
barred the filing of the civil case, because the cases allegedly condominium unit in Paranaque City. The venue, petitioner
involved identical causes of action. argues, was improperly laid and the Complaint for Damages
The Motion to Dismiss was denied by the Regional Trial Court should be dismissed accordingly.
of Mandaluyong City. The trial court held that civil liability was Looking into petitioner's allegations, he cites parts of the
not extinguished, because Alastair John's acquittal was based proceedings in the criminal case, specifically, the hearing held
on reasonable doubt. Furthermore, the action filed by Patricia on May 22, 2007 and May 13, 2008 where respondent testified
was an independent civil action which, together with the that she resided in a condominium in Paranaque. The
actions provided in Articles 32, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code, Complaint for Damages, however, was filed on November 28,
is separate and distinct from the criminal action and may be 2008, and it could very well be that, as respondent had alleged
enforced against an offender, separately or simultaneously, in her civil complaint, she was already a resident of
with his civil liability ex delicto under Article 100 of the Revised Mandaluyong City at that time.
Penal Code. Finally, the trial court held that venue was Absent proof to the contrary, this Court affirms the findings of
properly laid because at the time of the filing of the civil the Court of Appeals that "at the time of the filing of this case,
complaint, Patricia was already residing in Mandaluyong City. [respondent] was already residing at Mandaluyong City. Thus,
With his Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by venue was properly laid at the Regional Trial Court of
the trial court, Alastair John filed his Answer with Compulsory Mandaluyong City."
Counterclaim and Patricia, her Reply. On June 8, 2010 Order, As a final note, not only did the Mandaluyong trial court err in
the court dismissed the case motu proprio on the ground of dismissing the action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code by
res judicata and lack of jurisdiction. assuming that the acquittal, by itself, is a declaration that the
Consequently, the action based on Article 33 allegedly had no facts upon which the civil action can arise did not exist is
basis, and Patricia effectively committed forum shopping. already presumed. The court that tried the civil case also
Finally, it ruled that the Paranaque trial court's decision in the possibly erred in the manner by which it interpreted the facts
criminal case already attained finality, thus depriving the on the basis of what it considered as which narrative is "in
Mandaluyong trial court of jurisdiction over Patricia's accord with human experience." The two (2) points articulated
Complaint for Damages. in the decision regarding the criminal case seems to reveal the
Patricia filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was severe lack of gender sensitivity and/or practical wisdom on
subsequently denied. the trial court judge's part. The first is the assertion that the
Alleging error on the part of the Mandaluyong trial court, woman chose to hide her lover's transgressions against her
Patricia appealed before the Court of Appeals. In the March 25, person before the doctor, as well as her son. The second is the
2014 Decision, the Court of Appeals granted the appeal and judge's assertion of his conclusion that the hesitation of the
reversed the June 8, 2010 and August 23, 2010 Orders of the woman to immediately leave her lover is an unnatural act and,
Mandaluyong trial court. hence, unbelievable. These assumptions that provide the
ISSUE: Whether or not the venue was properly laid filters for a judge to eventually acquit, demonstrate that there
RULING: Yes. The Court of Appeals correctly held that the is a possibility that another civil action may interpret the facts
venue was properly laid. Venue is "the place where the case is differently. A more enlightened interpretation of the evidence
to be heard or tried" Under our Rules, the venue of an action may involve a less caricaturized, less patriarchal set of
generally depends on whether it is a real or personal action. assumptions. For instance, the capability of women to sacrifice
Real actions are those affecting the title or possession of a real their own welfare in favor of those who they care for and love
property, or interest therein, to be commenced and tried in is known to many woman.

Thus, protecting the husband's reputation before a stranger, Sections 6 and 7 of the Rules on Summary Procedure required
even if that stranger be a doctor, or sparing the son from a that immediately after the preliminary conference, the MTC
premature dilemma that undermines his view of his father, is should issue an order clearly and distinctly setting forth the
possibly a more ordinary and enlightened view of respondent's issues of the case and the other matters taken up during the
motive, assuming the facts as established by the court trying preliminary conference.
the criminal case. This order is necessary because its receipt by the parties begins
Similarly, that someone, usually the woman, would hesitate to the ten-day period to submit affidavits and other evidence
simply leave her family and deprive them of her caring for her mentioned in Section 7. The MTC however, failed to issue an
part in maintaining the household, even at peril to herself or order to this effect. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that
her dignity, is not outlandish, inconceivable or, sadly, even the failure of the MTC to give opportunity to submit position
exceptional. Certainly, it is "in accord with human experience.” paper and/or affidavit constituted a denial of due process.
These motives, often perpetuated by culture, are the precise Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly
targets of our laws which underscore gender equality in every administration of justice and the protection of substantive
type of relationship. It is the awareness of the possibility of rights in judicial and extra-judicial proceedings. Observance of
abuse that a more gendered perspective of human intentions both substantive and procedural rights is equally guaranteed
is privileged by laws on sexual harassment-including the law by due process, whatever the source of such rights, be it the
which seeks to prohibit violence against women in intimate Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court.
relationships. The rather dismal failure to consider the LUCAS V. FABROS, A.M. NO. MTJ-99-1226, JAN. 31, 2000
complexity of the human psyche in the criminal case may not
be how the judge in the civil case will consider the case given FACTS: Complainant Gloria Lucas charged respondent, Judge
the same set of evidence. It is in these respects that We see Amelia Fabros of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila with
the wisdom of our current rules. Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Discretion
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. relative to the ejectment case filed before the sala of
The Court of Appeals' March 25, 2014 Decision and September respondent. In her complaint, Lucas averred that under
13, 2014 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 96341 are hereby Section 19, (c) of the Rules on Summary Procedure, that a
AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, motion for reconsideration is prohibited, but respondent
Branch 214, is hereby DIRECTED to reinstate Civil Case No. judge, in violation of the rule granted the motion for
MC08-3871, continue with the proceedings, and to resolve the reconsideration. Further, complainant alleged that the
same with dispatch. actuation of respondent was in blatant disregard of the
RULE 5: UNIFORM PROCEDURE IN TRIAL COURTS established rules on procedure, and it is an instance where the
VICTORIA D. BAYUBAY, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY- doctrine of ipsa loquitor may be applied by the Court to
IN-FACT, MARIBEL MAMARIL, V. THE COURT OF APPEALS, discipline judges.
FORMER FOURTH DIVISION, AND BIG MAK BURGER, INC. On June 18, 1997, respondent judge was required to comment
G.R. NO. 105866; JULY 6, 1993 on the complaint. On September 16, 1997, respondent
admitted that she granted the motion for reconsideration but
FACTS: Petitioner Bayubay filed an action for ejectment in the explained that she did it in the interest of justice. After
Municipal Trial Court of Los Baños against respondent Big Mak receiving the comment, the case was referred to the Offce of
Burger, Inc. on the ground of expiration of contract of lease. the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
Private respondent claimed that it had the option to renew the recommendation. The Office of the Court Administrator
term of the lease under the contract, as may be agreed upon recommended that respondent judge be fined in the amount
by the parties. of P2,000.00 for grave abuse of discretion in granting the
The Municipal Trial Court Judge Carteciano rendered a motion for reconsideration.
decision holding that the contract of lease had expired because ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Fabros erred in granting the
no extension had been agreed upon by the parties. motion for reconsideration.
The private respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court on HELD: NO. As a rule, a motion for reconsideration is a
the ground that the MTC violated Sections 6 and 7 of the Rules prohibited pleading under Section 19 of the Revised Rule on
on Summary Procedure when it rendered judgment without Summary Procedure. Thus,
ordering the parties to submit their position papers and SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following
affidavits of their witnesses. The RTC affirmed the decision of pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in the
the MTC, but the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling and cases covered by this Rule.
ordered the remand of the case for further proceedings. xxx
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ordering (c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment,
the remand of the case to the MTC. or for reopening of trial;
HELD: NO. The Court of Appeals was merely enforcing the xxx
mandatory provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure. This rule, however, applies only where the judgment sought to
be reconsidered is one rendered on the merits. As held by the

Court in an earlier case involving Sec. 15 (c) of the Rules on extension and warned that if the survey is not made, the court
Summary Procedure, later Sec. 19 (c) of the Revised Rules on might consider the same abandoned and the writ of execution
Summary Procedure effective November 15, 1991: "The would be issued.
motion prohibited by this Section is that which seeks The criminal case for anti-squatting was filed by spouses
reconsideration of the judgment rendered by the court after Malvar against petitioner. The case is still pending with the
trial on the merits of the case." Here, the order of dismissal RTC.
issued by respondent judge due to failure of a party to appear Petitioner filed a motion for extension deadline for the
during the preliminary conference is obviously not a judgment submission of the relocation survey and to move the deadline,
on the merits after trial of the case. Hence, a motion for the as the engineer concerned could not conduct his survey during
reconsideration of such order is not the prohibited pleading the Holy Week, he being a lay minister and parish council
contemplated under Section 19 (c) of the present Rule on member.
Summary Procedure. Thus, respondent judge committed no Respondent Judge noted that no survey report was submitted
grave abuse of discretion, nor is she guilty of ignorance of the and ordered the record of the case returned to the court of
law, in giving due course to the motion for reconsideration origin for disposal.
subject of the present complaint. The CA held that the lot referred to in the present controversy
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: ACCORDINGLY, the complaint 􏰁led was different from that involved in the anti-squatting case. It
against respondent Judge Amelia A. Fabros is DISMISSED. further ruled that the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC)
TERESITA BONGATO, Petitioner, v. Spouses SEVERO A. had jurisdiction, and that it did not err in rejecting petitioners
MALVAR and TRINIDAD MALVAR, Respondents. G.R. No. Motion to Dismiss.
141614. August 14, 2002 ISSUE: Whether or not MTCC has jurisdiction and that the
Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 Motion to Dismiss was a prohibited pleading.
DOCTRINE: Forcible entry and detainer cases are summary in HELD: the MTCC should have squarely ruled on the issue of
nature and involve disturbances of the social order, procedural jurisdiction, instead of erroneously holding that it was a
technicalities should be carefully avoided and should not be prohibited pleading under the Rule on Summary Procedure.
allowed to override substantial justice. Because the Complaint for forcible entry was filed on July 10,
Pursuant to Section 36 of BP 129, the Court, promulgated the 1992, the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure was
Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases. Under this Rule, applicable.
a motion to dismiss or quash is a prohibited pleading. Under MTCC has no jurisdiction
the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, however, a It is wise to be reminded that forcible entry is a quieting
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the process, and that the restrictive time bar is prescribed to
subject matter is an exception to the rule on prohibited complement the summary nature of such process. Indeed, the
pleadings. one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible
FACTS: The spouses Malvar filed a complaint for forcible entry entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry to the
against petitioner, alleging that petitioner unlawfully entered land. However, when entry is made through stealth, then the
a parcel of land belonging to the spouses and erected thereon one-year period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned
a house of light materials. about it. After the lapse of the one-year period, the party
The petitioner filed a motion for extension of time to file an dispossessed of a parcel of land may file either an accion
answer which the MTCC denied; it being proscribed under the publiciana, which is a plenary action to recover the right of
Rule on Summary Procedure, and likewise containing no notice possession; or an accion reivindicatoria, which is an action to
of hearing. With a new counsel, Atty. Viajar, petitioner filed an recover ownership as well as possession.
answer which the MTCC disregarded, the same having been
filed beyond the ten-day reglementary period. Later, with still On the basis of the foregoing facts, it is clear that the cause of
another counsel, Atty. Chavez of the PAO, petitioner filed a action for forcible entry filed by respondents had already
motion to dismiss which the MTCC denied as being contrary to prescribed when they filed the Complaint for ejectment on July
the Rule on Summary Procedure. 10, 1992. Hence, even if Severo Malvar may be the owner of
Thereafter, the MTCC rendered a decision ordering petitioner the land, possession thereof cannot be wrested through a
to vacate the land in question. The decision was affirmed by summary action for ejectment of petitioner, who had been
respondent RTC judge. Petitioner filed a motion for occupying it for more than one (1) year. Respondents should
reconsideration. have presented their suit before the RTC in an accion
Respondent Judge issued an order granting the motion for publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not before the MTCC in
reconsideration only insofar as to determine the location of summary proceedings for forcible entry. Their cause of action
the houses involved in this civil case so that the Court will know for forcible entry had prescribed already, and the MTCC had no
whether they are located on one and the same lot or a lot more jurisdiction to hear and decide it.
different from that involved in the criminal case for Anti- MOTION TO DISMISS BASED ON LACK OF JURISDICTION IS NOT
Squatting. In the same order, respondent Judge disallowed any A PROHIBITED PLEADING

Forcible entry and detainer cases are summary in nature and submitted, complainant filed a Motion for Summary
involve disturbances of the social order, procedural Judgment.
technicalities should be carefully avoided and should not be Judge Jovellanos granted Motion to Strike Out 120 days after
allowed to override substantial justice. its filing. The Motion for Summary Judgment remained
Pursuant to Section 36 of BP 129, the Court, promulgated the unacted upon.
Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases. Under this Rule, The OCA found that respondent failed to apply the Rule on
a motion to dismiss or quash is a prohibited pleading. Under Summary Procedure.
the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, however, a ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge failed to apply the
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the Rules on Summary Procedure. (YES)
subject matter is an exception to the rule on prohibited RULING: The Rule on Summary Procedure was promulgated
pleadings: precisely to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive
SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following determination of cases. Failure to observe the period within
pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in the which to render a judgment subjects the defaulting judge to
cases covered by this Rule: administrative sanctions. For this reason, the Rule frowns upon
(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint delays and expressly prohibits, altogether, the filing of motions
or information except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over for extension.
the subject matter, or failure to comply with the preceding Respondent judge has shown a clear lack of awareness of the
section; relevant provisions on ejectment. He has evidently been
Further, a courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter remiss in resolving the forcible entry case. Judgment should
cannot be waived by the parties or cured by their silence, have been rendered based on the allegations of the Complaint
acquiescence or even express consent. A party may assail the and the evidence presented therein, inasmuch as the
jurisdiction of the court over the action at any stage of the defendant failed to file his answer after the lapse of 10 days
proceedings and even on appeal. from the service of summons.
In Bayog v. Natino:
The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, as well as its Sec. 6 of the Rule allows the trial court to render judgment,
predecessor, do not provide that an answer filed after the even motu proprio, upon failure of the defendant to file an
reglementary period should be expunged from the records. As answer within the reglementary period. Moreover, under
a matter of fact, there is no provision for an entry of default if Section 10 of the Rule, respondent was duty-bound to render
a defendant fails to answer. It must likewise be pointed out his decision within 30 days from receipt of the last affidavits
that MAGDATOs defense of lack of jurisdiction may have even and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing
been raised in a motion to dismiss as an exception to the rule them.
on prohibited pleadings in the Revised Rule on Summary Respondent also failed to apply these basic rules when he
Procedure. Such a motion is allowed under paragraph (a) granted the defendant’s Motion to Strike Out which was in
thereof, x x x. reality a motion to dismiss, a prohibited pleading. Here, he
applied the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. This is, however, an
FRANCISCA P. PASCUAL, Complainant, vs. action for forcible entry which should be governed by the Rules
JUDGE EDUARDO U. JOVELLANOS, Respondent, 390 SCRA on Summary Procedure.
333 (2002) DR. JOSE S. LUNA, Complainants, vs. JUDGE EDUARDO H.
MIRAFUENTE, Municipal Trial Court, Buenavista,
ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT Marinduque, Respondent. A. M. No. MTJ-05-1610
DOCTRINE: “Summary Procedure was promulgated precisely September 26, 2005
to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of
cases. Failure to observe the period within which to render a FACTS: Respondent, is charged with Grave Misconduct and
judgment subjects the defaulting judge to administrative Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service,
sanctions. For this reason, the Rule frowns upon delays and Violation of the Rules on Summary Procedure in Special Cases
expressly prohibits, altogether, the filing of motions for and Gross Ignorance of the Law by Dr. Luna arising from
extension.” respondent’s act of giving due course to the belatedly filed and
FACTS: Judge Jovellanos is charged with gross ignorance of the unverified answer of the defendants in a complaint for
law, bias and partiality, abuse of discretion and neglect of duty. unlawful detainer.
Complainant filed a complaint for forcible entry but was Dr. Luna filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against
dismissed without prejudice for being insufficient in some Florencio and Alex with the MTC.
material allegations. Thus, complainant filed a corrected Defendants filed an unverified answer to the complaint, 7 days
complaint. Instead of filing an answer, defendant filed a beyond the reglementary period of 10 days from the service of
Motion to Strike Out arguing that the new allegations are false. the summons on them.
After the period to answer lapsed and no answer was Dr. Luna’s counsel filed a Motion for Judgment, invoking
Section 6 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, to which

motion the defendants did not file any opposition. Respondent provisions. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption,
denied the motion. the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are generally not
Dr. Luna later filed an Urgent Manifestation relative to the said subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are
order of respondent which the latter treated as a motion for erroneous.
reconsideration and which he denied. For liability for ignorance of the law to attach, the assailed
Dr. Luna asserted that as the defendants’ answer was order, decision or actuation of the judge in the performance of
unverified and belatedly filed, respondent should have motu official duties must not only be found to be erroneous but,
proprio or on motion of the plaintiffs rendered judgment as most importantly, it must be established that the issuance
warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint, following thereof was actuated by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some
Section 6 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. other like motive. Any of such circumstances does not obtain
Respondent explains that his admission of the defendants’ in the instant case.
unverified, belatedly filed answer was premised on "the spirit LACK OF SHOWING MALICE, CORRUPT MOTIVE OR IMPROPER
of justice and fair play, which underlie[s] every court litigation CONSIDERATIONS MAY BE APPRECIATED AS A MITIGATING
and serves as the bedrock to preserve the trust and faith of CIRCUMSTANCE
parties litigants in the judicial system;" that the admission was In Ruperto v. Banquerigo wherein the therein respondent
proper because the delay was negligible, it involving only 4 Judge was charged also for violation of some provisions of the
days as June 13 to 15 were non-working holidays Revised Rule on Summary Judgment, he was severely
(Independence Day celebration); that the defendants might reprimanded after taking into account the fact that he was not
have believed that the period to file answer was 15 days, which only detailed to the court where the cases therein involved
is the usual or common period to file an answer; and that the were pending, but also to other courts. Such multiple
delay was also excusable as defendants acted pro se, without assignments were seen to affect his efficient handling of cases.
the benefit of legal assistance, and not dilatory. Additionally, lack of showing of malice, corrupt motives or
The OCA recommends that respondent be faulted. improper considerations on the part of the judge was
ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent violated the rules on appreciated.
summary procedures ALL PLEADINGS SHOULD BE VERIFIED
HELD: After considering the appreciation by respondent (of the Respecting respondent’s admission of the unverified answer of
fact that the defendants filed a belated and unverified answer the defendants, while paragraph (B) of Section 3 of the Revised
without the assistance of counsel, and the lack of showing of Rule on Summary Procedure requires that "all pleadings shall
malice, corrupt motives or the like on his part), this Court finds be verified," the requirement is formal, not jurisdictional. The
that the penalty hereby mitigated to severe reprimand. court may order the correction of the pleading if the
Sections 5 and 6 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary verification is lacking or act on the pleading although it is not
Procedure provide: verified, if the attending circumstances are such that strict
Sec. 5. Answer. – Within ten (10) days from service of compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in order that
summons, the defendant shall file his answer to the complaint the end of justice may thereby be served.
and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff. xxx AZUCENA GO and REGENA GLORIA SIONG, Petitioners, v.
Sec. 6. Effect of failure to answer. – Should the defendant fail COURT OF APPEALS and STAR GROUP RESOURCES AND
to answer the complaint within the period above provided, the DEVELOPMENT, INC., Respondents.
court, motu proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render
judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the Petition for review on certiorari
complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein: Provided, DOCTRINE: Where the trial court abuses its discretion by
however, That the court may in its discretion reduce the indefinitely suspending summary proceedings involving
amount of damages and attorney’s fees claimed for being ejectment cases, a petition for certiorari may be entertained
excessive or otherwise unconscionable. This is without by the proper court to correct the blunder. In the interest of
prejudice to the applicability of Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules justice and in view of the procedural void on the subject, an
of Court, if there are two or more defendants. appeal may be treated as a petition for certiorari for this
The word "shall" in the above-quoted sections of the 1991 purpose and only in this instance, pro hac vice.
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure underscores their FACTS: Private respondent filed with the MTCC of Iloilo City an
mandatory character. Giving the provisions a directory ejectment case against petitioners. Upon motion of
application would subvert the nature of the Rule and defeat its petitioners, said court issued an Order holding in abeyance the
objective of expediting the adjudication of the suits covered preliminary conference in said case until after the case for
thereby. To admit a late answer is to put a premium on dilatory specific performance likewise involving the same parties shall
maneuvers – the very mischief that the Rule seeks to redress. have been finally decided by the RTC of Iloilo City.
Respondent’s act, albeit a disregard of procedural rules, does Private respondent appealed to the RTC of Iloilo City.
not, however, constitute grave misconduct. Thereafter, petitioners filed with the respondent RTC a motion
Neither does it constitute gross ignorance of the law. Gross to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the appealed order is
ignorance transcends a simple error in the application of legal interlocutory and therefore not appealable. Said motion was

denied by the respondent RTC. Petitioners subsequently filed However, in the case at bench, what the private respondent
a motion for reconsideration which was likewise denied. sought to be reviewed by way of appeal was a suspension
Hence, petitioners filed the present petition for certiorari, order. An order which to all intents and purposes runs counter
raising the issue of WON the respondent RTC acted without or to the summary nature of ejectment proceedings. Thus, the
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in private respondent as plaintiff in the ejectment proceeding
denying petitioners motion to dismiss appeal. should be given a remedy to question said order which the
Private respondent then filed with respondent RTC a Motion respondent court had judiciously provided for.
to Resume Proceedings. ISSUE: WON CA erred in allowing the appeal of an
Respondent RTC: issued an Order granting said motion and interlocutory order.
directed the remand of the records of the case to the MTCC of RULING: Indisputably, the appealed order is interlocutory, for
Iloilo City for further proceedings. Petitioners filed an MR and it does not dispose of the case but leaves something else to be
clarification but the same was denied. done by the trial court on the merits of the case. It is axiomatic
Petitioners then filed with this Court the present petition for that an interlocutory order cannot be challenged by an appeal.
review, raising the issue of WON the same respondent RTC Thus, it has been held that the proper remedy in such cases is
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment on the merits,
of discretion in ordering the resumption of the proceedings in incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the
the MTCC of Iloilo. interlocutory order. Allowing appeals from interlocutory
A TRO was issued enjoining the respondent RTC from further orders would result in the sorry spectacle of a case being
proceeding. Sometime after the restraining order lapsed, subject of a counterproductive ping-pong to and from the
respondent court remanded the records to the MTCC. appellate court as often as a trial court is perceived to have
Petitioners filed with the MTCC a motion to hold in abeyance made an error in any of its interlocutory rulings. However,
further proceedings. where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous
MTCC: denied the motion and set the case for preliminary and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and
conference. Petitioners MR was likewise denied. expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of
Subsequently, petitioners filed their supplemental petition for redress.
review impleading the presiding Judge of the MTCC, raising the Clearly, private respondent cannot appeal the order, being
issue of WON the respondent MTCC erred in resuming the interlocutory. But neither can it file a petition for certiorari,
proceedings in view of the timely filing of the petition for because ejectment suits fall under the Revised Rules on
review. Summary Procedure. Under these extraordinary
Petitioners motion for a writ of preliminary injunction was circumstances, the Court is constrained to provide it with a
granted and ordered herein private and public respondents to remedy consistent with the objective of speedy resolution of
refrain from continuing with the proceedings in Civil Case cases.
before the MTCC until the herein above-entitled petitions are As correctly held by Respondent CA, the purpose of the Rules
resolved by this Court. on Summary Procedure is to achieve an expeditious and
CA: Recognizing the existence of a procedural void in the Rules inexpensive determination of cases without regard to
on Summary Procedure, it sustained the propriety of appeal as technical rules. (Section 36, Chapter III, BP Blg. 129) Pursuant
a remedy to challenge the suspension of the ejectment suit by to this objective, the Rules prohibit petitions for certiorari, like
the MTCC of Iloilo City: a number of other pleadings, in order to prevent unnecessary
The respondent RTC was cognizant of the impropriety of an delays and to expedite the disposition of cases. In this case,
appeal from an interlocutory order. However, in denying the however, private respondent challenged the MTCC order
motion to dismiss the appeal, it considered the following delaying the ejectment suit, precisely to avoid the mischief
circumstances: 1) the procedural void where the aggrieved envisioned by the Rules.
party (herein private respondent) will have no remedy for the Thus, this Court holds that in situations wherein a summary
ventilation of his rights; and 2) the fact that herein petitioners proceeding is suspended indefinitely, a petition for certiorari
as plaintiffs in the case for specific performance also filed a alleging grave abuse of discretion may be allowed. Because of
motion to hold in abeyance the pre-trial of said case. the extraordinary circumstances in this case, a petition for
Respondent RTC did not abuse its discretion in taking certiorari, in fact, gives spirit and life to the Rules on Summary
cognizance of the appeal. Neither did it act without or in excess Procedure. A contrary ruling would unduly delay the
of its jurisdiction. disposition of the case and negate the rationale of the said
Apparently, the prohibition against petitions for certiorari Rules.
involving interlocutory orders was included to forestall useless DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
petitions and avoid undue inconvenience and delays. In effect, DENIED. Costs against petitioners.
a party is prevented from having to assail orders on incidental RP VS. SUNVAR REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORP., G.R. NO.
matters as they are issued by the court. Instead, a party is 194880, JUNE 20, 2012
obliged to contest all such expeditious resolution of the case.
RULE 45 PETITION

DOCTRINE: The Rules on Summary Procedure expressly petitioners. Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ of
prohibited the filing of a petition for certiorari against the Amparo or not, the judge issued summons and ordered the
interlocutory orders of the MeTC petitioners to file an answer. He also set the case for hearing.
FACTS: Petitioners leased the four parcels of land, including The counsel for petitioners manifested that a Return and not
the subject property, to TRCFI for a period of 25. Under the an Answer is appropriate for Amparo cases but the Judge
Contract of Lease, petitioners granted TRCFI the right to opined that the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure applied
sublease any portion of the four parcels of land. The main lease since an Amparo case is summary in nature, thus, required an
contract with PDAF, as successor of TRCFI, as well as its Answer. The hearing was conducted and the judge ordered the
sublease agreements with respondent Sunvar, all expired. parties to file their respective memoranda.
Respondent Sunvar received from respondent OSG a final RTC then rendered a decision granting the issuance of the Writ
notice to vacate within 15 days. When the period lapsed, of Amparo and interim reliefs prayed for namely: Temporary
respondent Sunvar again refused to vacate the property and protection, production and inspection orders. The decision
continued to occupy it. Petitioners filed the Complaint for was assailed by the petitioners through a Petition for Review
unlawful detainer with the Metropolitan Trial Court. on Certiorari via Rule 45 as enunciated in Sec. 19 of the Rule
Sunvar moved to dismiss the Complaint on the Writ of Amparo.
MeTC: denied the Motion to Dismiss. ISSUE:
Respondent Sunvar filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari with 1. Whether or not the filing of an Answer was appropriate?
the RTC of Makati City. 2. Whether or not the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure
Petitioners: placed in issue the jurisdiction of the RTC and apply in a Petition for Writ of Amparo?
reasoned that the Rules on Summary Procedure expressly 3. Whether or not the holding of the hearing on the main case
prohibited the filing of a petition for certiorari against the was proper?
interlocutory orders of the MeTC. 4. Whether or not the filing of the memorandum was proper?
RTC: denied the motion for dismissal and ruled that 5. Whether or not the decision granting the privilege of the
extraordinary circumstances called for an exception to the Writ and the interim reliefs was correct?
general rule on summary proceedings. The RTC granted the 6. Whether or not the mode of appeal under Rule 45 availed
Rule 65 Petition and directed the MeTC to dismiss the by the Petitioners was correct?
Complaint for unlawful detainer for lack of jurisdiction. HELD:
1. No. It is the Return that serves as the responsive pleading
ISSUE/S: WON the RTC correctly granted the Rule 65 Petition for petitions for the issuance of Writs of Amparo.
HELD: NO. A certiorari petition under Rule 65 against an 2. The Revised Rules of Summary Procedures apply only to
interlocutory order issued by the court in a summary MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is mind-boggling how this rule could
proceeding is a prohibited pleading. The RTC should have possibly apply to proceedings in an RTC. Aside from that, this
dismissed outright respondent Sunvar’s Rule 65 Petition, Court limited the application of summary procedure to certain
considering that it is a prohibited pleading. Petitioners have civil and criminal cases. A writ of Amparo is a special
already alerted the RTC of this legal bar and immediately proceeding. It is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish
prayed for the dismissal of the certiorari Petition. Yet, the RTC a status, a right or particular fact.34 It is not a civil nor a
not only refused to dismiss the certiorari Petition, but even criminal action, hence, the application of the Revised Rule on
proceeded to hear the Rule 65 Petition on the merits. Summary Procedure is seriously misplaced.
The general rule is that no special civil action for certiorari may 3. No. The holding of the hearing without the Return was not
be filed with a superior court from cases covered by the proper. There will be a summary hearing only after the Return
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. Respondent Sunvar is filed to determine the merits of the petition and whether
filed a certiorari Petition in an ejectment suit pending before interim reliefs are warranted. If the Return is not filed, the
the MeTC. Worse, the subject matter of the Petition was the hearing will be done ex parte.
denial of respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, which was 4. No. A memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the Rule
necessarily an interlocutory order, which is generally not the on the Writ of Amparo.
subject of an appeal. When confronted with the MeTC’s 5. No. The decision was not correct. This gives the impression
adverse denial of its Motion to Dismiss in the ejectment case, that the decision was the judgment since the phraseology is
the expeditious and proper remedy for respondent should similar to Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo:
have been to proceed with the summary hearings and to file "SEC. 18. Judgment. — The court shall render judgment within
its answer. ten (10) days from the time the petition is submitted for
SEC. DE LIMA V. GATDULA, G.R. NO. 204528. FEBRUARY 19, decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by
2013 substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the
writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate;
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari via Rule 45 otherwise, the privilege shall be denied." (Emphasis supplied).
FACTS: Respondent Gatdula filed a petition for the issuance of The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished
a Writ of Amparo in the RTC of Manila, directed against from the actual order called the Writ of Amparo. The privilege

includes availment of the entire procedure outlined in the Rule at his former address at 1164 Interior Julio Nakpil St., Paco,
on the Writ of Amparo. The judgment should detail the Manila. On 30 April 2003, petitioner filed a Motion to Strike
required acts from the respondents that will mitigate, if not Out this pleading on the ground that it is prohibited.
totally eradicate, the violation of or the threat to the Petitioner then filed an Amended Complaint, this time,
petitioner's life, liberty or security. impleading both Magdamit, Jr. and Amador Magdamit, Sr.
(Magdamit, Sr.).
A judgment which simply grants "the privilege of the writ" MeTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. The trial court ruled that
cannot be executed. the summons was properly served hence the requirement of
6. The Petition for Review is not the proper remedy to assail due process was satisfied. The fact that the person who
the interlocutory order. A Petition for Certiorari, on the other received the summons was a 13-year old girl does not make
hand, is prohibited. Simply dismissing the present petition, the service of summons invalid. That she was of sufficient age
however, will cause grave injustice to the parties involved. It and discretion is shown by the fact that she was intelligent
undermines the salutary purposes for which the Rule on the enough to immediately bring to the attention of defendant
Writ of Amparo were promulgated. Atty. Amador Magdamit, Jr. the summons and copy of the
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice, complaint she received."
as a prophylactic to the irregularities committed by the trial RTC set aside the MeTC ruling on the ground that amending
court judge, and by virtue of its powers under Article VIII, the original complaint to implead Magdamit, Sr. to cure a
Section 5 (5) of the Constitution, the Court RESOLVES to: defect in the complaint and introduce a non-existing cause of
NULLIFY all orders that are subject of this Resolution issued by action, which petitioner did not possess at the outset, and to
Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. after respondent Gatdula 􏰁led the confer jurisdiction upon the court that never acquired
Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo; jurisdiction in the first place renders the complaint dismissible.
DIRECT Judge Pampilo to determine within forty-eight (48) CA – The CA also rejected petitioner’s contention that
hours from his receipt of this Resolution whether the issuance respondents’ voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the
of the Writ of Amparo is proper on the basis of the petition and court cured any defect in the substituted service of summons
its attached affidavits. when as early as during the infancy of the proceedings in the
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to cause the personal service of MeTC, Magdamit, Jr. seasonably raised the ground of lack of
this Resolution on Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. of Branch 26 of jurisdiction over his person by filing a Notice of Appearance
the Regional Trial Court of Manila for his proper guidance with Motion to Dismiss.
together with a WARNING that further deviation or ISSUE: WON MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
improvisation from the procedure set in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC respondent (NO)
shall be meted with severe consequences. RULING: Fundamental is the rule that jurisdiction over a
PRUDENTIAL BANK (NOW BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE defendant in a civil case is acquired either through service of
ISLANDS) VS. MAGDAMIT, G.R. NO. 183795, NOVEMBER summons or through voluntary appearance in court and
12, 2014 submission to its authority. In the absence or when the service
of summons upon the person of the defendant is defective, the
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 court acquires no jurisdiction over his person, and a judgment
DOCTRINE: Fundamental is the rule that jurisdiction over a rendered against him is null and void.
defendant in a civil case is acquired either through service of In actions in personam such as ejectment, the court acquires
summons or through voluntary appearance in court and jurisdiction over the person of the defendant through personal
submission to its authority. In the absence or when the service or substituted service of summons. However, because
of summons upon the person of the defendant is defective, the substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of
court acquires no jurisdiction over his person, and a judgment service and personal service of summons is preferred over
rendered against him is null and void. substituted service, parties do not have unbridled right to
FACTS: Prudential Bank, now BPI, filed a complaint for unlawful resort to substituted service of summons. Before substituted
detainer before MeTC Manila against respondents for failure service of summons is resorted to, the parties must: (a)
to pay rentals and refusal to vacate the subject property, which indicate the impossibility of personal service of summons
is allegedly part of the Estate located at 1164 Interior, Julio within a reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to
Nakpil St., Paco, Manila. locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was
Instead of filing an Answer, Magdamit, Jr. filed a Notice of served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion who is
Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss. Among others, residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or
Magdamit, Jr. argued that (1) petitioner was not duly regular place of business of the defendant.
authorized through a Board Resolution to institute the Sheriffs are asked to discharge their duties on the service of
complaint, (2) he was not the occupant of the subject property summons with due care, utmost diligence, and reasonable
but instead, his parents, as grantees or awardees of Juliana promptness and speed so as not to prejudice the expeditious
Diez Vda. De Gabriel, and (3) the MeTC did not acquire dispensation of justice. Thus, they are enjoined to try their best
jurisdiction over his person because the summons was served efforts to accomplish personal service on defendant. On the

other hand, since the defendant is expected to try to avoid and was no supporting document that would show that Fairland
evade service of summons, the sheriff must be resourceful, owned the property; that there was no lease contract between
persevering, canny, and diligent in serving the process on the them; that there were no documents attached to the
defendant. For substituted service of summons to be available, complaint which would show that previous demands had been
there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally made and received by him; that the alleged unpaid rental was
serve the summons within a reasonable period [of one month] P220,000.00, but the amount of damages being prayed for was
which eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of P440,000.00; that the issue in the case was one of ownership;
prompt service. "Several attempts" means at least three (3) and that it was the RTC which had jurisdiction over the case.
tries, preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the The MeTC treated the comment/opposition as Po’s answer to
sheriff must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only the complaint. Considering, however, that the case fell under
then that impossibility of service can be confirmed or the Rules of Summary Procedure, the same was deemed filed
accepted. out of time. Hence, the motion was denied.
If the substituted service will be effected at defendant’s house In its March 21, 2013 Decision, the MeTC dismissed the
or residence, it should be left with a person of "suitable age complaint for lack of merit due to Fairland’s failure to prove its
and discretion then residing therein." A person of suitable age claim by preponderance of evidence. The MeTC explained that
and discretion is one who has attained the age of full legal although the complaint sufficiently alleged a cause of action,
capacity (18 years old) and is considered to have enough Fairland failed to prove that it was entitled to the possession
discernment to understand the importance of a summons. of the subject property. There was no evidence presented to
Thus, to be of sufficient discretion, such person must know support its claim against Po either.
how to read and understand English to comprehend the Fairland filed its appeal before the RTC under Rule 40 and
import of the summons, and fully realize the need to deliver argued that an unlawful detainer case was a special civil action
the summons and complaint to the defendant at the earliest governed by summary procedure. In cases where a defendant
possible timefor the person to take appropriate action. Thus, failed to file his answer, there was no need for a declaration of
the person must have the "relation of confidence" to the default. Fairland claimed that the Rules stated that in such
defendant, ensuring that the latter would receive or at least be cases, judgment should be based on the “facts alleged in the
notified of the receipt of the summons. The sheriff must complaint,” and that there was no requirement that judgment
therefore determine if the person found in the alleged must be based on facts proved by preponderance of evidence.
dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what the On September 16, 2013, the RTC affirmed the MeTC ruling and
recipient’s relationship with the defendant is, and whether agreed that Fairland failed to establish its case by
said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the preponderance of evidence.
summons and his duty to immediately deliver it tothe
defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of Fairland appealed to the Court of Appeals. The CA dismissed
summons. These matters must be clearly and specifically the petition and ruled that an action for unlawful detainer
described in the Return of Summons would not lie against Po. Notwithstanding the abbreviated
FAIRLAND KNITCRAFT CORP. VS. PO, G.R. NO. 217694 , JAN proceeding it ordained and the limited pleadings it allowed,
27, 2016 the Rules on Summary Procedure did not relax the rules on
evidence. In order for an action for recovery of possession to
FACTS: Fairland was the owner of a Condominium Unit in Pasig prosper, it was indispensable that he who brought the action
City. The said unit was leased by Fairland to Po by verbal should prove not only his ownership but also the identity of
agreement, with a rental fee of P20,000.00 a month, to be paid the property claimed. The CA concluded, however, that
by Po at the beginning of each month. From March 2011, Po Fairland failed to discharge such bounden duty.
had continuously failed to pay rent. On January 30, 2012, ISSUE: Whether or not the ejectment case was correctly
Fairland sent a formal letter to Po demanding that he pay the dismissed for lack of preponderance of evidence.
amount of P220,000.00, representing the rental arrears, and RULING: NO. The Court agrees with Fairland’s position.
that he vacate the leased premises within fifteen (15) days The summons, together with the complaint and its annexes,
from the receipt of the letter. Despite receipt of the demand was served upon Po on December 28, 2012. This presupposes
letter and the lapse of the said 15-day period to comply, Po that the MeTC found no ground to dismiss the action for
neither tendered payment for the unpaid rent nor vacated the unlawful detainer. Nevertheless, Po failed to file his answer on
premises. Thus, on December 12, 2012, Fairland filed a time and the MeTC had the option to render judgment motu
complaint for unlawful detainer before the MeTC. Po had until proprio or on motion of the plaintiff. In relation thereto,
January 7, 2013 to file his answer but he failed to do so. Hence, Sections 5 and 6 of the Rules on Summary Procedure provide:
on February 6, 2013, Fairland filed a motion to render Sec. 5. Answer. – Within ten (10) days from service of
judgment. On March 1, 2013, Po’s counsel filed his Entry of summons, the defendant shall file his answer to the complaint
Appearance with Motion for Leave of Court to file and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff. Affirmative and
Comment/Opposition to Motion to Render Judgment. He negative defenses not pleaded therein shall be deemed
denied the allegations against him and commented that there waived, except for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Cross-claims and compulsory counterclaims not asserted in the by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is
answer shall be considered barred. The answer to prayed for therein.
counterclaims or cross-claims shall be filed and served within DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
ten (10) days from service of the answer in which they are The October 31, 2014 Decision and the March 6, 2015
pleaded. Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG. R. SP No. 134701
Sec. 6. Effect of failure to answer. – Should the defendant fail are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Arturo Loo
to answer the complaint within the period above provided, the Po is ORDERED TO VACATE Condominium Unit No. 205 located
court, motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render in Cedar Mansion II on Ma. Escriba Street, Pasig City.
judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the Respondent Po is further ORDERED TO PAY the rentals-in-
complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein. The court arrears, as well as the rentals accruing in the interim until he
may in its discretion reduce the amount of damages and vacates the property. The unpaid rentals shall incur a legal
attorney’s fees claimed for being excessive or otherwise interest of six percent (6%) per annum from January 30, 2012,
unconscionable, without prejudice to the applicability of when the demand to pay and to vacate was made, up to the
Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, if there are two or finality of this decision. Thereafter, an interest of six percent
more defendants. (6%) per annum shall be imposed on the total amount due until
Section 6 is clear that in case the defendant failed to file his full payment is made.
answer, the court shall render judgment, either motu proprio
or upon plaintiff’s motion, based solely on the facts alleged in CHINATRUST VS. TURNER, G.R. NO. 191458, JULY 3, 2017
the complaint and limited to what is prayed for. The failure of
the defendant to timely file his answer and to controvert the PETITION FOR REVIEW
claim against him constitutes his acquiescence to every DOCTRINE: It is an established principle that "courts cannot
allegation stated in the complaint. Logically, there is nothing to grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of
be done in this situation except to render judgment as may be what is being sought by the party."
warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint. It is elementary that a judgment must conform to, and be
Similarly, under Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which supported by, both the pleadings and the evidence, and must
governs the rules for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, if be in accordance with the theory of the action on which the
the defendant fails to answer the complaint within the period pleadings are framed and the case was tried. The judgment
provided, the court has no authority to declare the defendant must be secudum allegata et probata. (It is the duty of a judge
in default. Instead, the court, motu proprio or on motion of the to decide according to the allegations and the proofs.)
plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the FACTS: British national Turner (respondent) initiated via
facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for. Chinatrust-Ayala Branch the telegraphic transfer to the
In this case, Po failed to file his answer to the complaint despite account of "MIN TRAVEL/ESMAT AZMY, Account No.
proper service of summons. He also failed to provide a 70946017, Citibank, Heliopolis Branch" in Cairo, Egypt as
sufficient justification to excuse his lapses. Thus, as no answer partial payment to Turner's travel agent for his and his wife's
was filed, judgment must be rendered by the court as may be 11-day tour in Egypt.
warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint. The lower On the same day, petitioner Chinatrust remitted the funds to
courts erroneously dismissed the complaint of Fairland simply credit them to the said account.
on the ground that it failed to establish by preponderance of Chinatrust received a discrepancy notice from Citibank-Cairo.
evidence its ownership over the subject property. As can be Chinatrust relayed this information to Turner and requested
gleaned above, the rules do not compel the plaintiff to attach him to verify from his beneficiary the correct bank account
his evidence to the complaint because, at this inception stage, name. Turner cancelled the trip and requested refund from
he only has to file his complaint to establish his cause of action. Chinatrust.
Here, the court was only tasked to determine whether the According to Chinatrust, the funds were already remitted and
complaint of Fairland alleged a sufficient cause of action and therefore could no longer be withdrawn or retrieved without
to render judgment thereon. These specific provisions under Citibank-Cairo's consent.
the Rules of Summary Procedure which are also reflected in Turner insisted on withdrawing the funds from Chinatrust
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, serve their purpose to hence, Chinatrust required Turner to secure his travel agency's
immediately settle ejectment proceedings. “Forcible entry and written certification denying receipt of the funds so that it
unlawful detainer cases are summary proceedings designed to could act on his request. However, Turner purportedly failed
provide for an expeditious means of protecting actual to submit.
possession or the right to possession of the property involved. Chinatrust received Citibank-Cairo's Swift telex reply
It does not admit of a delay in the determination thereof. It is confirming receipt of funds transfer but Turner continued to
a ‘time procedure’ designed to remedy the situation. Thus, as insist on his demand for a refund and as a result, filed a
a consequence of the defendant’s failure to file an answer, the Complaint against Chinatrust before the MeTC of Makati City
court is simply tasked to render judgment as may be warranted demanding the refund of his telegraphic transfer of P24,129.88
plus damages.

MeTC: DISMISSED for lack of merit finding that Chinatrust was issues defined in the order, together with their position papers
not negligent setting forth the law and the facts relied upon by them.
RTC: REVERSED and set aside MeTC. Chinatrust was negligent The determination of issues at the preliminary conference bars
and liable for the monetary loss suffered by Turner and for the consideration of other questions on appeal. Under Section
damages 9, the parties were required to submit their affidavits and
CA: DISMISSED petition for review under Rule 42 and upheld other evidence on the factual issues as defined in the
the RTC decision. preliminary conference order. Thus, either of the parties
ISSUE: WON the RTC and CA erred in ruling on the negligence cannot raise a new factual issue on appeal, otherwise it would
of the petitioner as such was not raised in the lower court be unfair to the adverse party, who had no opportunity to
HELD: YES. They ruled on an issue that was not raised by present evidence against it.
respondent in the lower court, thereby violating petitioner's HEIRS OF ROMULO BULACANAG VS. DOLE PHILIPPINES,
right to due process. G.R. NO. 225424, JAN 6, 2020
It is an established principle that "courts cannot grant a relief
not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what is being Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
sought by the party." In Development Bank of the Philippines DOCTRINE: “Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
v. Teston, this Court held that it is improper to enter an order conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the
which exceeds the scope of the relief sought by the pleadings: complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate
In Jose Clavano, Inc. v. Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action.”
this Court held: FACTS: A case for ejectment was filed by Dole Philippines
It is elementary that a judgment must conform to, and be (Dole) against Romulo Balucanag, Jr. and several others before
supported by, both the pleadings and the evidence, and must the MTC of South Cotabato. Respondent averred that it has
be in accordance with the theory of the action on which the been in continuous possession of the parcel of land and only
pleadings are framed and the case was tried. The judgment tolerated petitioners’ possession thereof. However, when
must be secudum allegata et probata. demands to vacate went unheeded, respondent was
Due process considerations justify this requirement. It is constrained to file a complaint for ejectment. Balucanag
improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope of relief countered that he has notoriously occupied the subject
sought by the pleadings, absent notice which affords the property since 1974 for commercial and residential purposes.
opposing party an opportunity to be heard with respect to the The MTC rendered a Decision ordering Balucanag and co-
proposed relief. The fundamental purpose of the requirement defendants to vacate the subject property and pay reasonable
that allegations of a complaint must provide the measure of compensation for the use and occupation of the same.
recovery is to prevent surprise to the defendant. While defendants were moving for reconsideration, Balucanag
The bank's supposed negligence was not among respondent's subsequently filed a manifestation before the RTC, questioning
causes of action and was never raised in the MeTC. the jurisdiction of the MTC in trying the case as the complaint
Respondent's cause of action was based on the theory that the did not make out a case for unlawful detainer.
telexed funds transfer did not materialize, and the relief The RTC denied the appeal and found that the complaint
sought was limited to the refund of his money and damages. spelled out an action for unlawful detainer. The CA dismissed
In both his Complaint and Position Paper, respondent the subsequent appeal. It held that as MR is a prohibited
anchored his claim for refund and damages on the pleading under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, it
"discrepancy notice" demanding the return of his money did not stop the running of the period to file an appeal. Hence,
having the impression that the bank was not successful in the decision of the MTC became final and executory.
remitting it. ISSUE: Whether or not the MTC had no jurisdiction as the
The parties' pleadings and position papers as well as during the complaint did not make out an action for unlawful detainer.
preliminary conference did not include the issue of negligence (NO)
on the part of petitioner. RULING: Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
The case was decided pursuant to the Revised Rules on conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the
Summary Procedure. No trial was conducted and the parties complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate
were made to submit their position papers. Thus, no facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action.
opportunity to present witnesses. However, Section 9 of the A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure calls for the submission detainer if it states the following: (a) the possession of the
of witnesses' affidavits together with a party's position paper property by the defendant was by contract with or by
after the conduct of a preliminary conference: tolerance of the plaintiff; (b) such possession became illegal
Section 9. Submission of Affidavits and Position Papers. — upon notice by the plaintiff to the defendant about the
Within ten (10) days from receipt of the order mentioned in termination of the latter’s right of possession; (c) the
the next preceding section, the parties shall submit the defendant remained in possession of the property and
affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence on the factual deprived the plaintiff of its enjoyment; and (d) within one year
from the making of the last demand to vacate the property on

the defendant, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for the case to the RTC, respondent attached additional evidence
ejectment. showing that it transacted with petitioner and her husband as
In this case, respondent’s complaint sufficiently alleged the operators and franchisees of Total.
foregoing. The petitioners and his co-defendants’ possession
was by mere tolerance; such possession became illegal when The RTC affirmed the ruling of the MeTC, holding that the new
demand to vacate was made by respondent, and the same was documents cannot be admitted as it would be offensive to the
disregarded; that petitioners and his co-defendants remained basic rule of fair play and would violate petitioner’s right to due
in possession of the subject property; and that the complaint process.
was filed within one year form the date of the last demand.
Petitioners even admitted the factual narrations proving so in The CA reversed the decision. It held that the MeTC bypassed
their petition. the ultimate facts alleged in the complaint when it referred
As the MTC validly acquired jurisdiction over the subject solely to the sales invoices.
matter of the case, its decision is valid; and by failure of
ISSUE
petitioners’ to timely file their appeal before the RTC, the MTC
decision became final and immutable. • Whether or not the respondent has a cause of action
(NOTE: In this case, it was emphasized that a motion for against petitioner. (YES)
reconsideration is a prohibited pleading in the Revised Rules of
Summary Procedure. Thus, the CA did not err in ruling that it RULING
did not stop the running of the period to file an appeal.)
RULE 6: KINDS OF PLEADINGS The Complaint sufficiently states a cause of action.
G.R. No. 182779 AUGUST 23, 2010 The basic requirement under the rules of procedure is that a
VICTORINA (VICTORIA) ALICE LIM LAZARO, Petitioner, complaint must make a plain, concise, and direct statement of
vs. the ultimate facts on which the plaintiff relies for his claim.
BREWMASTER INTERNATIONAL, INC., Respondent Ultimate facts mean the important and substantial facts which
either directly form the basis of the plaintiff’s primary right and
duty or directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the
defendant. [NOTE: The Revised Rules now require evidentiary
facts]
Petition for Review under Rule 45 Here, the respondent was able to make up a cause of action:
the defendants had the obligation to pay P138,502.92 for beer
DOCTRINE and other products, and they refused to pay the said amount
despite demand. The sales invoices relied upon by the MeTC
“The basic requirement under the rules of procedure is that a when it dismissed the case are not actionable documents. They
complaint must make a plain, concise, and direct statement of were not the bases of respondent’s action for sum of money
the ultimate facts on which the plaintiff relies for his claim. but were merely attached to provide details on the alleged
Ultimate facts mean the important and substantial facts which transactions. They were evidentiary in nature and not needed
either directly form the basis of the plaintiff’s primary right and in the Complaint.* [NOTE: Again, the Revised Rules now require
duty or directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the evidentiary facts]
defendant.”
Furthermore, the sales invoices do not absolutely foreclose the
FACTS probability of petitioner being liable for the amounts reflected
thereon. It is nothing more than a detailed statement of the
Brewmaster International (respondent), a marketing company
nature, quantity and cost of the thing sold and has been
engaged in the selling and distributing of beer and other
considered not a bill of sale. If only the lower court allowed the
products, filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against
case to go further, respondent could have presented evidence
Victorina (petitioner) and Prescillo Lazaro before the MeTC.
linking these sales invoices to petitioner.
Victorina and Prescillo obtained a credit from plaintiff for beer
and other products in the amount of P138,502.92, as
evidenced by sales invoices photocopies. Despite repeated
demands, petitioner failed and refused to pay Brewmaster.
The sales invoices were apparently sold to Total, without any
indication of being sold to petitioner.
The MeTC dismissed the complaint, for the reason that

respondent failed to meet the burden of proof. Upon elevating
were actual issues such as the genuineness of the Deed of Sale
and the nature of Mongao’s title to the subject property.
ISSUE
• Whether or not judgment on the pleadings was proper

(YES)
RULING
Under [Sec. 1, Rule 34], where an answer fails to tender an

Petition for Review under Rule 45 issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the
adverse party’s pleading, the court may, on motion of that
DOCTRINE party, direct judgment on such pleading.
“The basic requirement under the rules of procedure is that a Pryce’s answer admitted the existence of a perfected contract
complaint must make a plain, concise, and direct statement of of sale, and that it refused to tender payment of the purchase
the ultimate facts on which the plaintiff relies for his claim. price solely to Mongao. These admissions clearly make out a
Ultimate facts mean the important and substantial facts which case for rescission of contract.
either directly form the basis of the plaintiff’s primary right and
duty or directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the Furthermore, there is no joinder of issues in this case. When
defendant.” an answer makes a specific denial of the material allegations in
the complaint or asserts affirmative defense which could bar
FACTS recovery by the plaintiff, there is a joinder of issues. With a
proper joinder of issues, the trial court is barred from
Spouses Mongao filed a complaint for rescission and damages rendering judgment only on the issues.
against Pryce Properties Corp. before the RTC. It alleged that
Mongao and Pryce executed a Memorandum of Agreement However, nothing in the allegations in Pryce’s answer makes
where the former agreed to sell to the latter a parcel of land. out a proper joinder of issues. It does not make out a specific
Pryce paid petitioners earnest money considered as part of the denial of a perfected contract of sale, nor contest the due
purchase price. Pryce’s offer to pay the balance through a execution and/or genuineness of the Memorandum of
check was rejected. Pryce continuously refused to heed Agreement.
petitioners’ written and oral demands to pay.
In its answer, Pryce claimed that a certain Animas approached

Manuel C. Bungcayao, Sr., represented in this
Mole, an officer of Pryce, negotiating the sale of properties case by his Attorney-in-fact Romel R.
belonging to the Animas family which were on the verge of Bungcayao, v. Fort Ilocandia Property Holdings,
foreclosure. Pryce further claimed that the subject property and Development Corporation
was one of the two parcels of land it selected for purchase
from Animas, which allegedly belonged to Mongao’s parents G.R. No. 170483; April 19, 2010
but was registered in Mongao’s name as trustee. Pryce
admitted the execution of the Memorandum of Agreement FACTS:
but qualified that Pryce did not pay the earnest money
directly and solely to Mongao. It alleged that the earnest The petitioner claimed to have introduced improvements in
money was part of the amount directly paid to the the foreshore area of Calayab Beach. Other entrepreneurs set
Development Bank of the Philippines in order to redeem up their stalls in the area, and they formed D’Sierto Beach
certain properties of the Animas property. Resort Owners Association, Inc.
Mongao moved for judgment on the pleadings on the ground The foreshore area became the subject of dispute when
that the answer admitted the material allegations of the D’Sierto and Fort Ilocandia Hotel applied for a foreshore lease
complaint and, therefore, failed to tender an issue. over the subject area.
The RTC granted petitioners’ motion for judgment on the The members of D’Sierto was invited to a luncheon meeting by
pleadings and considered the case submitted for decision. the respondent through its Public Relations Manager. Atty.
Marcos, acting as mediator, proposed a P300,000 financial
The CA reversed the trial court’s decision. It held that settlement per claimant, on the condition that they would
judgment on the pleadings was improper, finding that there vacate the area. The negotiation raised the offer to P400,000,
to which the D’Sierto members agreed.
Petitioner alleged that his son, Manuel Bungcayao, Jr., was c. Will substantially the same evidence support
pressured by Atty. Marcos to accept the payment and to sign or refute plaintiff's claim as well as
the Deed of Assignment, Release, Waiver, and Quitclaim in defendant's counterclaim?;
favor of the respondent.
d. Is there any logical relations between the
The petitioner filed an action for declaration of nullity of claim and the counterclaim?
contract before the Regional Trial Court of Laoag. He claimed
that his son had no authority to represent him, and the deed A positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the
was void and not binding upon him. counterclaim is compulsory.
The respondent countered that the area where D’Sierto The counterclaim of the respondent for the recovery of
members constructed their improvements was part of its titled possession of subject property will not be barred if not set up
property. The D’Sierto members who attended the meeting in the answer to the complaint in the same case. It is not a
were able to talk to their parents before they accepted the compulsory counterclaim, but a permissive counterclaim. It is
offer. The respondent counterclaimed, praying the petitioner capable of proceeding independently of the main case.
to return the P400,000 amount, to vacate the portion of the
property he was occupying, and pay damages for his continued The rule in permission counterclaim is that for the trial court
refusal to vacate the property. to acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the
prescribed docket fees. The respondent did not dispute his
The Trial Court confirmed the agreement of the parties to non-payment of docket fees, as such, the judgment of the trial
cancel the deed agreement, and the return of P400,000. court in relation to the counterclaim was null and void without
prejudice.
The Trial Court rendered a Summary Judgment, the only issue
raised by the petitioner was his claim for damages, while the 2. Section 1, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
respondent’s issue was its claim for possession of property and provides that:
damages. The trial court ruled that pressure did not constitute
force, violence, or intimidation that could vitiate consent. It Section 1. Summary Judgment for claimant. - A party seeking
dismissed the claim and ordered the petitioner to vacate the to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to
premises. obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading
in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. It affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment
sustained that when only legal issues were raised, and not in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
issues of fact, resorting to Summary Judgment was a valid
procedural device. Summary judgment has been explained as a procedural device
resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out litigations and
The Court of Appeals ruled that the counterclaims of the useless delays. When the pleadings show that there are no
respondent were compulsory in nature, that the respondent genuine issues of fact to be tried, the Rules allow a party to
was the rightful owner of the property, therefore it had the obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment.
right to recover its possession from any other person to whom
the owner has not transmitted the property. Where the pleadings tender a genuine issue, summary
judgment is not proper. A summary judgment is permitted
ISSUES: only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Since
1. Whether or not the counterclaim is compulsory. we have limited the issues to the damages claimed by the
parties, summary judgment has been properly rendered in this
2. Whether or not summary judgment is proper. case.
HELD:
1. NO. The criteria to determine whether the

counterclaim is compulsory or permissive are as
follows:
a. Are issues of fact and law raised by the claim

and by the counterclaim largely the same?;
b. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on

defendant's claim, absent the compulsory
rule?;
Petition for Review under Rule 45 largely the same? (b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit
on defendant’s claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim
DOCTRINE rule? (c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute
plaintiff’s claim as well as the defendant’s counterclaim? and
“The rule in permissive counterclaims is that for the trial court (d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the
to acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the counterclaim? A positive answer to all four questions would
prescribed docket fees.” indicate that the counterclaim is compulsory.
FACTS Tested against the above-mentioned criteria, the CA was
correct in holding that petitioner’s counterclaim for the
Respondent Fernando and his wife, Sylvia, secured a loan from
recovery of the amount representing rentals is permissive. The
GSIS, executing a real estate mortgage as security. However,
evidence needed by Fernando to cause the annulment of the
he defaulted on the payment of his loan with the GSIS. The
bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT is different from that
mortgage was foreclosed which subsequently led to a title
required to establish petitioner’s claim for the recovery of
issued in the name of the petitioner.
rentals.The issue in the main action is entirely different from
Fernando then asked petitioner if he could repurchase the the issue in the counterclaim
same through partial payments. However, no agreement was
For the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over a permissive
reached between the parties. Thus, petitioner scheduled the
counterclaim, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the
subject property for public bidding which awarded the
prescribed docket fees. Petitioner failed to do so because it
property to CMTC.
asserted that its claim for the collection of rental payments
Thus, Fernando, represented by his daughter, filed with the was a compulsory counterclaim. Since petitioner failed to pay
RTC a Complaint against CMTC, GSIS and the Register of Deeds, the docket fees, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the
praying, among others, that the sale to CMTC be held null and permissive counterclaim. The judgment is thus considered null
void. He also prayed for payment of damages. Such claims and void and a total nullity.
were grounded on the allegation that there were irregularities
in the conduct of the bidding.
On the other hand, petitioner and its officers filed their Answer
with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim. It mainly alleged
that respondent failed to repurchase the property when the
chance was given to him. In its counterclaim, petitioner
alleged that Fernando owed petitioner back rentals with
interest and the amount of rentals respondent unlawfully
collected from a tenant.
Appeal
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner and dismissed the
complaint, granting petitioner’s counterclaim for the FACTS
payment of rentals unlawfully collected by respondent. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, but deleted Plaintiff Calo ordered from defendant a wire rope from
the portion of the judgment with regard to the amount of defendant Ajax. According to plaintiff, when the wire rope was
rentals respondent unlawfully collected from a tenant. The delivered to Butuan City, the same was found short of 300ft.
CA rationalized that the latter claim was in the nature of a Thus, plaintiff wrote defendant asking for either completion of
permissive counterclaim which required the payment of delivery or account adjustment of the undelivered 300ft.
docket fees.
In the meantime, a complaint was filed in the Municipal Court
ISSUE by one Benavides who claimed to have acquired the
outstanding credit account of Calo from Ajax. Subsequently, a
• Whether or not the claim of petitioner for the amount of judgment by default was entered and a writ of execution
rentals respondent unlawfully collected is a permissive issued against Calo. Calo resorted to the Supreme Court on a
counterclaim. (YES) petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, where the
Court set aside the judgment of default and writ of execution
RULING issued against Calo and remanded the case for further
proceedings.
To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not,
the Court has devised the following tests: (a) Are the issues of Shortly thereafter, a complaint was filed by plaintiff Calo
fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim against defendant before the CFI asking for the complete

delivery or relief from paying the amount of the undelivered
portion (P855.00) and that defendant indemnify her for [G.R. No. 76838. April 17, 1990.]
attorney’s fees (P12,000.00; beyond the jurisdiction of the
Municipal Court at this time). Instead of filing an answer, LUALHATI A. COJUANGCO, petitioner vs.
defendant moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground
PURIFICACION VILLEGAS and the PRESIDING
that the subject was involved and intimately related to the
first case filed. JUDGE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH XVII,
MALOLOS BULACAN, respondents.
The CFI sustained the motion and dismissed the case. The
dismissal was predicated on the supposition that plaintiff’s PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
claim is a compulsory counter-claim that should be filed in the
first case. It arose from the same transaction which is the basis DOCTRINE: The adjudication of the issue joined by the parties
of the first case and does not require the presence of third in the earlier case constitutes res judicata, the theory being
parties. that what is barred by prior judgment are not only the matters
actually raised and litigated upon, but also such other matters
ISSUE as could have been raised but were not.
• Whether or not respondent’s claim is a compulsory FACTS: Petitioner Lualhati Cojuangco is the widow of Don Juan
counterclaim. (NO) Cojuangco, the registered owner of the disputed parcel of
residential land. About 60 years ago, the parents of private
RULING respondent, with the acquiescence of Don Juan, constructed a
residential house and a structure housing a bakery. It was
Plaintiff’s claim is not a compulsory counterclaim for the
understood that they could remain on the land with his
reason that the amount thereof exceeds the jurisdiction of the
blessings and without paying rentals with the condition that
municipal court. As a general rule, a compulsory counterclaim
they would vacate the premises when needed by the owner.
not set up is barred. However, when applied to the municipal
After her parents’ death, private respondent remained in the
court, it presupposes that the amount involved is within the
property, and even leased out a portion of the land without
said court’s jurisdiction. Otherwise, there would come an
the knowledge of Don Juan. This latter act apparently
absurd situation where a claim must be filed with the
destroyed her congenial relations with the landowner. Despite
municipal court which it is prohibited from taking cognizance
repeated written demands by Don Juan to private respondent
of, being beyond its jurisdiction.
for her to surrender possession of the property, the latter
The reason underlying the rule which is to settle all related refused, prompting Cojuangco to institute ejectment
controversies in one sitting only does not obtain in this case. proceedings against her before the MTC.
For, even if the counterclaim in excess of the amount
MTC: DISMISSED the action for ejectment for lack of
cognizable by the inferior court is set up, the defendant cannot
jurisdiction. It cited the unassailable fact that Villegas and her
obtain positive relief. The Rules allow this only for the
defendant to prevent plaintiff from recovering from him. This predecessors-in-interest had been in actual possession of the
means that should the court find both plaintiff’s complaint and subject land for no less than sixty years and that in addition,
Villegas asserted an adverse claim of ownership, thus
defendant’s counterclaim meritorious (for an amount
transforming the suit into an accion publiciana which is
exceeding the said court’s jurisdiction), it will simply dismiss
properly cognizable by the RTC.
the complaint on the ground that defendant has a bigger
credit. Since defendant still has to institute a separate action RTC: REVERSED insofar as it had erroneously denied
for the remaining balance of his counterclaim, the previous
jurisdiction over the ejectment case. The RTC ordered Villegas
litigation did not really settle all related controversies. to vacate the premises and to surrender possession thereof to
Cojuangco.
Thus, Calo’s claim of P12,000.00, not being a compulsory
counterclaim, need not be filed in the first case. CA and the SC, and in both instances, Cojuangco’s right of
possession over the land was upheld.
After entry of judgment was made, petitioner went to

the RTC where she filed a motion for execution of the
judgment, the court then ordered a writ of demolition against
Villegas, who did not oppose the ordered demolition,
however, she asked the lower court to give her more time to
effect the transfer of her personal properties and to remove

the improvements on the subject lot to which motion the court actually raised and litigated upon, but also such other matters
acceded. as could have been raised but were not.
Before the lapse of the grace period, Villegas filed a In sum, the Court finds that in taking cognizance of
separate civil action against Cojuangco and the provincial the action for specific performance and in issuing the
sheriff "for specific performance with urgent prayer for questioned orders which interfered with the final judgment of
issuance of a TRO and preliminary injunction. This case, instead a coordinate court, respondent trial court committed grave
of being referred to the RTC Branch which had earlier issued abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction which is
the writ of demolition, was raffled to another branch, which correctible by a writ of certiorari.
issued a TRO on the same day, enjoining Cojuangco and the
sheriff from enforcing or implementing the Order of
Demolition.
ISSUE: WON Villegas can still legally institute a separate

independent action against the adjudged owner of the Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc., v. Felix
disputed lot on the ground that Villegas and her predecessors- Paras and Inland Trailways, Inc., and Honorable
in-interest are builders in good faith and are therefore entitled
Court of Appeals.
to recover the value of the improvements they had introduced
on the lot.
G.R. No. 161909; April 25, 2012
HELD: NO. Rule 9, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court on
compulsory counterclaim provides that: A counterclaim or
cross-claim not set up shall be barred if it arises out of or is
necessarily connected with, the transaction or occurrence that FACTS:
is the subject-matter of the opposing party's or co-party's
Respondent Paras is engaged in the buy and sell of fish
claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of
products. In 1987, on his way to Manila from Bicol Region, he
third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
boarded a bus owned and operated by Inland Trailways, Inc.
Villegas' claim to recover compensation for
The bus was bumped at the rear by another bus, owned and
improvements made on the land is essentially in the nature of
operated by petitioner Philtranco Services Enterprises, Inc. The
a counterclaim since it is inter-woven with the fact of
Inland bus was pushed forward and smashed into a cargo truck
possession. Said claim for compensation should have been
resulting in considerable damages, physical injuries of the
presented as a counterclaim in the ejectment suit. It is deemed
passengers and crew of the buses, and the death of the driver
barred if not raised on time and the party in error is precluded
of the Inland bus.
from setting it up in a subsequent litigation. 9 The rule on
compulsory counter-claim is designed to enable the Respondent Paras was diagnosed with contusion/hematoma,
disposition of the entire conflict at one time and in one action. dislocation of hip and fracture of the fibula on the right leg,
The philosophy of the rule is to discourage multiplicity of suits. fractured small bone on the right leg, and close fracture of the
tibial plateau of the left leg. He underwent two operations
According to Villegas, the reason why the
affecting the fractured portions of his body.
counterclaim for indemnification was not made in the original
action was because it became a "ripe issue" only after the Unable to obtain sufficient financial assistance from Inland, he
ejectment proceedings. Villegas contended that the estoppel filed a complaint for damages based on breach of contract of
of judgment could only extend to those facts and conditions carriage.
existing at the time the judgment was rendered and not to
those which supervened before the second suit. Thus, Villegas Inland claimed that their driver observed utmost and
should have set forth, simultaneously with the assertion that extraordinary care and diligence to ensure the safety of its
she was entitled to the parcel of land by right of inheritance, passengers. It also invoked the investigation report
the alternative claim that assuming she was not legally entitled establishing the fact that the Philtranco bus driver was the one
to the disputed lot, at least as a builder in good faith, she has who caused Paras’ injuries.
the right to the value of the buildings and improvements which
she and her parents had introduced on the land. Upon leave of court, Inland filed a complaint against Philtranco
and its driver as third-party defendants. Inland sought to be
The adjudication of the issue joined by the parties in exonerated of its liabilities to Paras due to Philtranco’s driver’s
the earlier case constitutes res judicata, the theory being that negligence and reckless imprudence.
what is barred by prior judgment are not only the matters

The Regional Trial Court held the third-party defendants liable, means of counterclaim or cross-claim under sections 6 and 7
and were ordered to pay Paras actual and moral damage , as of Rule 6.
well as attorney’s fees and costs.
The claim against the third-party defendant must be based
Paras appealed to the CA, maintaining that Inland should also upon the plaintiff's claim against the original defendant (third-
be liable, and that he was further entitled to the award of party claimant). The crucial characteristic of a claim under
unearned income, and exemplary damages. Inland and section 12 of Rule 6, is that the original defendant is
Philtranco also appealed. attempting to transfer to the third-party defendant the
liability asserted against him by the original plaintiff.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the RTC in its findings that
no trace of negligence was attributable to Inland’s driver, Accordingly, the requisites for a third-party action are:
rendering Inland not guilty of breach of contract of carriage.
Accordingly, the CA:– (a) sustained the award of moral • That the party to be impleaded must not yet be a
damages of ₱50,000.00 in favor of Paras pursuant to Article party to the action;
2219 of the Civil Code based on quasi-delict committed by
Philtranco and its driver; (b) reduced the actual damages to be • That the claim against the third-party defendant must
paid by Philtranco to Paras from ₱54,000.00 to ₱1,397.95 belong to the original defendant;
because only the latter amount had been duly supported by
• The claim of the original defendant against the third-
receipts; (c) granted temperate damages of ₱50,000.00 (in lieu
party defendant must be based upon the plaintiff’s
of actual damages in view of the absence of competent proof
claim against the original defendant; and,
of actual damages for his hospitalization and therapy) to be
paid by Philtranco to Paras; and (d) awarded temperate
• The defendant is attempting to transfer to the third-
damages of ₱250,000.00 under the same premise to be paid
party defendant the liability asserted against him by
by Philtranco to Inland for the material damage caused to
the original plaintiff.
Inland’s bus.
The cause of action of the plaintiff need not to be the same as
ISSUE:
the cause of action of the original defendant against the third-
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in awarding Paras party defendant.
moral damages despite the complaint being anchored on
breach of contract of carriage.
HELD:
NO. The general rule is that moral damages are not

recoverable in an action predicated on a breach of contract.
Nevertheless, the award was proper and valid due to the third-
party complaint against Philtranco and its driver by Inland.
The third-party complaint was based on the liability of

Philtranco and its driver by negligence and reckless
imprudence, as shown in the police investigative report.
The Court held that impleading Philtranco and its driver was
correct. The device of the third-party action was in accord with DOCTRINE:
Section 12, Rule 6 of the Revised Rules of Court. It authorizes a
defendant to bring into a lawsuit any person ‘not a party to the “Under Sec. 13 of Rule 6, the same defenses the third-party
action’ - where the basis is indemnity, subrogation, plaintiff has against the original plaintiff are just some of the
contribution, express or implied warrant. The impleader of allegations a third-party defendant may raise in its answer.
new parties under this rule is proper only when a right to relief Sec. 13 even gives the third-party defendant the prerogative to
exists under the applicable substantive law. In this case, the raise a counterclaim against the original plaintiff in respect of
substantive law on which the right of Inland to seek such the latter’s original claim against the defendant/third-party
other relief was based on tort or quasi-delict. plaintiff.”
The rule requires that the third-party defendant is "not a party FACTS
to the action" for otherwise the proper procedure for asserting
a claim against one who is already a party to the suit is by PPSBI applied for and obtained insurance from Paramount.
Meanwhile, Virgilio Castro, Cherry’s husband and Glenn’s

father (latter two being respondents in this case), obtained a issued by Paramount. The PPSBI need not institute a separate
housing loan from the PPSBI. PPSBI required Virgilio to apply case, considering that its cause of action is intimately related
for a mortgage redemption insurance (MRI) from Paramount to that of Paramount as against Castro’s. The soundness of
to cover the loan. In the application for MRI, Virgilio named admitting a third-party complaint hinges on causal connection
Cherry and Glenn as beneficiaries. between the claim of the plaintiff in his complaint and a claim
for contribution, indemnity or other relief of the defendant
Virgilio later died of septic shock. Consequently, a claim for against the third-party defendant. In this case, the CAstros
death benefits was filed. However, paramount denied the stand to incur a bad debt to the PPSBI – the exact event insured
claim on the ground of the failure of Virgilio to disclose gainst by the group insurance policy – in the event that
material information, or material concealment or Paramount succeeds in nullifying Virgilio’s Individual Insurance
misrepresentation. Allegedly, Virgilio answered “no” to Certificate.
questions on whether he had any adverse health history and
whether he had sought medical advice or consultation Furthermore, as seen in Sec. 13 of Rule 6, the same defenses
concerning it. Virgilio apparently sought consultation in a the third-party plaintiff has against the original plaintiff are just
private hospital after complaining of a dull pain in his some of the allegations a third-party defendant may raise in its
lumbosacral area. Thus, the claim on the insurance was answer. Sec. 13 even gives the third-party defendant the
denied. prerogative to raise a counterclaim against the original plaintiff
in respect of the latter’s original claim against the
Paramount thus filed a complaint before the RTC to declare the defendant/third-party plaintiff.
individual insurance of Virgilio null and void. During the course
of the proceedings, the Castros filed a Motion for Leave to File In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Tempongko, the Court ruled
a Third Party Complaint and to Admit Attached Third-Party that a defendant is permitted to bring in a third-party
Complaint. They argued that due to the death of Virgilio, and defendant to litigate in a separate cause of action in respect of
pursuant to the group insurance policy, PPSBI stepped into the the plaintiff’s claim against a third party in the original and
shoes of Cherry and Glen under the principle of “indemnity, principal case. The objective is to avoid circuitry of action and
subrogation, or any other reliefs” found in Sec. 22, Rule 6 of unnecessary proliferation of lawsuits, as well as to
the RoC. The motion was likewise denied on the ground that expeditiously dispose of the entire subject matter arising from
the controversy was entirely foreign and distinct form the main one particular set of facts, in one litigation.
case.
The CA correctly ruled that to admit the Castro’s Third-Party
On appeal, the CA partially granted the Petition by allowing a Complaint, in which they can assert against the PPSBI an
third-party complaint to be filed against PPSBI. It ruled that the independent claim they would otherwise assert in another
Castros were freed from the obligation to pay the PPSBI by action, would prevent multiplicity of suits. Considering also
virtue of the subrogation, and PPSBI would collect the loan that the original case from which these. Present Petitions arose
amount pursuant to the MRI issued by Paramount in Virgilio’s has not yet been resolved, the Court deems it proper to have
favor. all the parties air all their possible grievances in the original
case still pending with the RTC.
ISSUE
• Whether or not the CA erred in remanding the case to the

RTC for the admission of the Third-Party Complaint against
PPSBI. (NO)
RULING
Sec. 13 of Rule 6 provides:
“Section 13. Answer to third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint. – A

third (fourth, etc.)-party defendant may allege in his answer his
defenses, counterclaims or cross-claims, including such PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45
defenses that the third (fourth, etc.)-party plaintiff may have
against the original plaintiffs claim. In proper cases, he may DOCTRINE:
also assert a counterclaim against the original plaintiff in
“When [judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff in the
respect of the latter's claim against the third-party plaintiff.”
principal complaint and subsequently in favor of the defendant
In allowing the inclusion of the PPSBI as a third-party in a third-party complaint, the third party defendant will
defendant, the Court recognizes the inseparable interest of the consequently be ordered] to reimburse the defendant
bank in the validity of the individual insurance certificates whatever amount said defendant is ordered to pay the plaintiff

in the case. Failure of any of said parties in such a case to against the defendant and in favor of such defendant as third-
appeal the judgment as against him makes such judgment final party plaintiff against, ultimately, the third-party defendant.
and executory. By the same token, an appeal by one party from The third-party complaint is a procedural device whereby a
such judgment does not inure to the benefit of the other party third party may be brought into the case with leave of court by
who has not appealed nor can it be deemed to be an appeal of the defendant, who now acts as third-party plaintiff, to enforce
such other party from the judgment against him.” against such third-party defendant a right for contribution,
indemnity, subrogation or any other relief in respect of the
FACTS plaintiff’s claim. Such complaint is independent and separate
and distinct from the plaintiff’s complaint. In effect, the Court
Sancho Rayos was an overseas contract worker under Aramco. renders two judgments in the same case: one on the plaintiff’s
As part of Aramco’s policy, its employees returning to Saudi complaint and the other on the third-party complaint.
Arabia from Manila are allowed to claim from it
reimbursement for payment of excess baggage of up to 50 Thus, when the plaintiff’s complaint and the third-party
kilograms, as long as it is properly supported by a receipt. complaint are both found to be meritorious, the third-party
defendant is ultimately ordered to reimburse the defendant
After being given a new assignment, Rayos took a Singapore whatever amount the defendant had been ordered to pay the
Airlines (SIA) flight with a 50kg excess baggage. Aramco plaintiff. Failure of any of said parties to appeal the judgment
reimbursed the payment pursuant to its policy. as against him makes such judgment final and executory. By
the same token, an appeal by one party from such judgment
However, Rayos later found out that he was one of the
does not inure to the benefit of the other party who has not
employees being investigated for fraudulent claims by
appealed nor can it be deemed to be an appeal of such other
Aramco. Apparently, SIA’s records show that only 3kg were
party from the judgment against him.
entered as excess and accordingly charged. Thus, Aramco gave
Rayos his travel documents without a return visa, and his In this case, PAL initially disclaimed any liability to the Rayoses
employment contract was not renewed. The spouses and imputed the alleged tampering to SIA’s personnel.
thereafter sued SIA for damages, convinced that SIA was However, PAL suddenly changed its theory on appeal, and
responsible for the non-renewal of Rayos’ employment averred that the spouses Rayos had no valid claim against SIA.
contract. There is no question that PAL, as a third-party defendant, is
allowed to set up in his answer the defenses which the third-
In its defense, SIA claimed that it was not liable to the Rayoses
party plaintiff has or may have to the plaintiff’s claim. There
because the tampering was committed by PAL. Thus, it filed a
are, however, special circumstances present in this case which
third-party complaint against PAL. PAL countered that its
preclude third-party defendant PAL from benefitting from the
personnel did not collect any charges for excess baggage, that
same principle.
it had no participation in the tampering of any excess baggage
ticket, and that if any tampering was done, it was done by SIA’s When SIA grounded its claim against PAL, PAL could have used
personnel. The RTC decided in favor of the Rayoses and the defense that the plaintiffs had no valid claim against it or
against SIA. PAL was then held liable to pay SIA whatever it against SIA by indirectly adopting such a defense to its answer
paid to the Rayoses. if only SIA had raised the same in its answer to the main
complaint, or directly by so stating in unequivocal terms in its
On appeal, PAL’s claim suddenly changed. It now claims that
answer to SIA’s third-party complaint that SIA and PAL were
the spouses Rayos had no valid claim against SIA because it was
both blameless. However, PAL opted to deny any liability
the inefficiency of Rayos which led to the non-renewal of his
which it imputed to SIA’s personnel. It was only on appeal, in a
contract with Aramco, and not the alleged tampering of his
complete turnaround of theory, that PAL raised the issue of no
excess baggage ticket. In response, SIA claimed that the only
valid claim by the plaintiff against SIA, which cannot be
issue on appeal was whether or not it was entitled to
allowed.
reimbursement from PAL. The CA granted PAL’s appeal and
absolved it from any liability to SIA. A third-party defendant would only benefit from a victory by
the third-party plaintiff against the plaintiff only when the
ISSUE
third-party plaintiff and third-party defendant have non-
• Whether or not SIA is entitled to reimbursement from PAL. contradictory defenses. Here, there was no common defense
(YES) between PAL and SIA, and the two were even at odds with each
other.
RULING
Thus, the judgment, as far as the Rayoses and SIA are
The case of Firestone squarely applies to the case at hand. In concerned, is already final. What remains to be resolved is
Firestone, the Court expounded on the nature of a third-party whether SIA is entitled to reimbursement from PAL,
complaint and the effect of a judgment in favor of the plaintiff
considering that PAL appealed that part of the decision to the Appeals were signed by Mildred Santos, as corporate
appellate court. president, who is not a member of the Bar. As such, Sameer
argues that both the Petition and the Motion for
RULE 7 Reconsideration should be considered unsigned pleadings
which produce no legal effect, pursuant to the last paragraph
SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, of Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
INC., Petitioner, v. MILDRED R. SANTOS, in her official
capacity as President of, and/or ASBT INTERNATIONAL
MANAGEMENT SERVICE, INC., LORD NELSON SANTOS, Issue:
DANILO BALCITA, NICSON CRUZ, PEPITO MANGLICMOT, 1. WON Sameer Overseas Placement is liable (YES)
and ALLAN ARANES, Respondents. 2. WON ASBT is guilty of forum shopping (NO)
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 RULING:

DOCTRINE: An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. 1. Every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel
However, the court ay, in its discretion, allow such deficiency to representing him, stating in either case his address
be remedied if it shall appear that the same was due to mere which should not be a post office box. The signature
inadvertence and not intended for delay. of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has
read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge,
FACTS:
information, and belief there is good ground to
Respondents ere recruited by petitioner Sameer Overseas
support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.
Placement Agency, Inc. (Sameer) as aluminum products
manufacturer operators for Ensure Company Ltd. of Taiwan
An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect.
(Ensure), under a one-year employment contract with a basic
However, the court ay, in its discretion, allow such
monthly salary of NT$14,800.00.
deficiency to be remedied if it shall appear that the
same was due to mere inadvertence and not intended
Santos, et al. were deployed and were able to work for Ensure.
for delay. Counsel who deliberately files an unsigned
However, they were repatriated even prior to the expiration of
pleading, or signs a pleading in violation of this Rule,
their contracts. Consequently, in July and August 1996, Santos,
or alleges scandalous or indecent matter therein, or
et al. filed complaints against Sameer before the National
fails to promptly report to the court a change of his
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for illegal dismissal,
address, shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary
underpayment of salaries, and unauthorized salary
action. Obviously, the rule allows the pleadings to be
deductions.
signed by either the party to the case or the counsel
representing that party. In this case, ASBT, as
Sameer filed a third party complaint against private
petitioner, opted to sign its petition and its motion for
respondent ASBT International Management Service, Inc.
reconsideration in its own behalf, through its
(ASBT). It claimed that the latter should be liable for all the
corporate president, Mildred R. Santos, who was duly
contractual obligations of Ensure since Sameer's accreditation
authorized by ASBT's Board of Directors to represent
was transferred to ASBT on June 9, 1997.
the company in prosecuting this case. Therefore, the
said pleadings cannot be considered unsigned and
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the respondents without
without any legal effect.
deciding on the third-party complaint filed by Sameer.
NLRC set aside the LA ruling and entered a new ruling absolving
2. In this case, there is clearly no forum shopping
Sameer from its liabilities in view of the transfer of
committed by ASBT. The July 5, 2001 motion it filed praying for
accreditation to ASBT Management Services.
reconsideration of the June 19, 2001 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals, dismissing the petition on the technical ground of
CA, on the other hand, ruled in favor of ASBT and held that
lack of proof of the authority of ASBT President Mildred R.
Sameer is liable for the payment of the sum of money to the
Santos to bind the corporation in its appeal, is simply what it
respondents. CA found that since Sameer received the
is, a motion for reconsideration. Sameer cannot insist that it be
placement fees for the processing of the documents of Santos,
treated as a new petition just to make it fit the definition of
et al., without any showing that said fees inured to the benefit
forum shopping in an attempt to evade liability to pay the
of ASBT in any way, it should refund the rest of placement fees
amounts awarded to Santos, et al. Nor was Sameer correct
paid by the respondents.
when it asseverated that the Seventh Division, that initially
dismissed then reinstated ASBT's petition, and the Former
Sameer moved for a reconsideration on the ground that the
Fourth Division, that rendered the questioned Decision and
Motion for Reconsideration filed by ASBT before the Court of
Resolution in favor of ASBT, can be considered as different fora
within the ambit of the prohibition. They are mere divisions of HELD:
one and the same Court of Appeals. And as explained by the
appellate court, what actually happened was that after the In Vda. De Formoso v. Philippine National Bank, the
Seventh Division issued its June 19, 2001 Resolution dismissing court reiterated the guidelines respecting non-compliance
the case for failure of ASBT to show that Mildred R. Santos was with submission of a defective certificate of non-forum
authorized to sign and bind the corporation in the proceedings, shopping, the relevant portions of which are as follows:
ASBT complied and submitted the requisite proof of authority. As to certification against forum shopping, non-
The Seventh Division then issued a Resolution on August 14, compliance therewith or a defect therein, is generally not
2001 reinstating the petition. After an internal reorganization, curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof,
it was the Fourth Division which promulgated a decision on unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of
December 10, 2001. ASBT never filed a second petition. substantial compliance or presence of special circumstances or
compelling reasons. Finally, the certification against forum
FACTS: shopping, must be executed by the party-pleader not by his
counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the
Anderson filed a complaint for ejectment against Ho party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. She Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on
alleged that through her mere tolerance, Ho is in possession of his behalf.
her parcel of land at Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. Anderson The requirement that it is the petitioner, not her
counsel who should sign the certificate of non-forum shopping
Anderson v. Ho is due to the fact that a certification is a peculiar personal
G.R. No. 172590, January 7, 2013 representation on the part of the principal party. An assurance
given to the court or other tribunal that there are no other
prayed that the MeTC order Ho to vacate the Roosevelt pending cases involving basically the same parties, issued and
property and pay her damages and attorney’s fees. In his causes of action. It is the petitioner, and not always the counsel
answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, Ho denied that his whose professional services have been retained for a
occupation of the Roosevelt property is through Anderson’s particular case, who is in the best position to know whether
mere tolerance. He claimed that since Anderson is an she actually filed or caused the filing of a petition in that case.
American citizen, he managed her affairs in the Philippines and Who is in the best position to know whether she actually filed
administered her properties in Quezon City and Cebu. When or caused the filing of a petition in that case. However, if a
Anderson sought his assistance in ejecting her relatives from petitioner is unable to sign a certification for reasonable and
Roosevelt property and in demolishing the St. Anthony de justifiable reasons, she must execute and SPA designating her
Padua Church built thereon. Ho secured the services of a counsel of record to sign on her behalf. A certification which
lawyer to file an ejectment case against the occupants of the had been signed by counsel without the proper authorization
property, dutifully appeared in court on Anderson’s behalf is defective and constituted a valid cause for the dismissal of
who was then in the United States, and was able to secure a the petition.
judgment from the court in favor of Anderson. For all these, While the court notes that Anderson tried to correct
Anderson did not pay Ho a single centavo and this error by later submitting an SPA and by explaining her
instead executed a written document which states that as failure to execute one prior to the filing of the petition, this
partial payment for Ho’s services, Anderson is authorizing him does not automatically denote substantial compliance. It must
to make use of the Roosevelt property as his residence free of be remembered that a defective certification is generally not
charge provided he vacates if there is a buyer for the lot and curable by its subsequent correction. And while it is true that
that the balance of Ho’s compensation shall consist of 10 in some case the court considered such a belated submission
percent of the proceed of the sale of any or all of her properties as substantial compliance, it did so only on sufficient and
located in Roosevelt Avenue, M.H del Pilar Street and Ana justifiable grounds that compelled a liberal approach while
Maria Street all in Quezon City, Cebu City and Cebu province. avoiding the effective negation of the intent of the rule on non-
Ho averred that he possesses the property not through mere forum shopping.
tolerance but as part of his compensation for services
rendered to Anderson. Hence, he is entitled to the continued PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI
possession thereof until such time that the property is sold and Facts: Petitioners instituted in SC a special civil action for
he is paid the 10 percent of the proceeds of its sale.
Buan v. Lopez,
ISSUE: G.R. No. 75349. October 13, 1986
prohibition against the acting mayor of Manila, gemiliano
Whether or not Anderson have sufficient justifiable Lopez Jr. to the end that the latter be perpetually prohibited
reason to obtain relaxation of the rules on certification against
forum shopping?
from arbitrarily revoking or cancelling their licenses or permits accused. After having their Motion for Reconsideration denied,
as hawkers or street vendors and threatening the physical petitioners now filed the instant petition.
demolition of their respective business stalls in the places
specified in such licenses or permits. The petitioners are In response, the Ombudsman alleged that the petition does
vendors of religious articles, medicines herbs and plant around not comply with Section 5, Rule 7 as the Verification and
Quiapo church manila. They alleged that their licences were Certification on Non-Forum Shopping were signed only by one
revoked for unknown reason which tantamount to deprivation of the petitioners, Din, and not by all the petitioners and there
of property without due process. is no showing that petitioner Din was authorized by his co-
petitioners to represent them in this case.
While It appears that there was filed in the RTC a special civil
action of "prohibition with preliminary injunction" against ISSUE
Acting Manila City Mayor Gemiliano Lopez, Jr., which was filed
• Whether or not petitioners complied with the rule on
by Samahang Kapatiran Sa Hanapbuhay Ng Bagong Lipunan,
Verification and Certification on Non-Forum Shopping.
Inc.
(NO)
Issue: WON the case at bar shall be dismissed on the ground of RULING
lis pendens.
The petition is defective. Section 5, Rule 7 expressly provides
HELD: Yes. The petition filed by Samahang kapatiran sa that it is the plaintiff or principal party who shall certify under
hanapbuhay is grounded on the same facts as those in the case oath that he has not commenced any action involving the
at bar. There thus exists between the action before this Court same issues in any court. Here, only one of the principal
and RTC Case No. 86-36563 Identity of parties, or at least such parties, Din, signed the certification. There is no showing that
parties as represent the same interests in both actions, as well he was authorized to do so by his co-petitioners. It cannot be
as Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief presumed that Din knew whether his co-petitioners had the
being founded on the same facts, and the Identity on the two same or similar actions or claims filed or pending. Corollary to
preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in this, substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter
the other action, will regardless of which party is successful, involving strict observance by the rules. The attestation
amount to res adjudicata in the action under consideration: all contained in the certification on non-forum shopping requires
the requisites, in fine, of auter action pendant. personal knowledge by the party who executed the same.
Thus, petitioners must show reasonable cause for failure to
personally sign the certification.
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 45
FACTS
DOCTRINE:
Private respondents charged petitioners with violation of R.A.
No. 3019 for their alleged failure to give salary increases and There is substantial compliance with the rule on Non-Forum
benefits for health personnel in the local government of San Shopping when the husband signs the Certification of Non-
Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur. Petitioners are the Mayor, Vice Forum Shopping in behalf of his wife when the spouses are the
Mayor and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the only parties in a case involving a parcel of land alleged to be
municipality. part of their conjugal property.
The Ombudsman found probable cause against petitioners and FACTS

filed an Information with the Sandiganbayan. The Ombudsman
found that despite the recommendation of dismissal by the The case at hand arose from a Complaint of recovery of a
Special Prosecutor, the crime had already been committed parcel of land by private respondent Hombria against
long before any payment that may have been granted by the petitioner-spouses Docena, which the latter alleged to be part
of their conjugal property, where private respondent prevailed

after the Court of Appeals rendered a favorable judgment The casket was lifted, and placed under the heat of the sun
ordering petitioner spouses to vacate the land. while the vault was being prepared. The employees of the
petitioner measured the casket by using a spade.
Thus, respondent Hombria filed a Motion for Execution before
the trial court. A writ of execution was thus issued by The respondent filed a complaint for damages against the
respondent judge, which spouses Docena opposed through a petitioner, and the Park-in-Charge Art Fuentebella before the
Motion to Set Aside or Defer the Implementation of Writ of Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Bacolod City.
Demolition. The trial court denied petitioner-spouses’ motion
and subsequent motion for reconsideration. Hence, the The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
instant petition. However, only Antonio, the husband, signed MTCC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case
the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping. because the amount of damages claimed is more than
P200,000. The respondent filed a motion to withdraw the
ISSUE complaint, which was granted by the MTCC.
• Whether or not the rule on Non-Forum Shopping was
The respondent filed a similar complaint with the Regional Trial
substantially complied with. (YES)
Court of Negros Occidental, attached to the complain was the
RULING Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping required
under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
The Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping signed by Antonio
alone should be deemed to constitute substantial compliance The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
with the rules. Here, there are only two petitioners, the certification was false because the respondent had previously
husband and the wife. Their residence is the property alleged filed an identical complaint with the MTCC. The petition to
to be conjugal in the instant verified petition. dismiss was denied by the trial court due to lack of merit.
Under the Family Code, the administration of the conjugal In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, the Court dismissed the
property belongs to the husband and wife jointly. However, petition on the ground that the Verification and Certification
unlike an act of alienation or encumbrance where the consent Against Forum-Shopping was signed by a certain Lourdes
of both spouses is required, joint management or Pomperada without any showing that she is duly authorized by
administration does not require that husband and wife must the petitioners to sign for and on their behalf.
always act together. Each spouse may validly exercise full
power of management alone, subject to the intervention of ISSUE:
the court in proper cases, such as that provided under Art. 124 1. Whether or not it is necessary to show proof that the
of the Family Code. person signing the petition or the verification and
certification against forum shopping has been duly
Furthermore, Antonio made the certification in his and his authorized by the petitioner company;
wife’s behalf. Being the husband, he may reasonably be 2. Whether or not failure to disclose that a similar case
presumed to have personal knowledge of the filing or non- was earlier filed but was subsequently withdrawn
filing by his wife of any action or claim similar to the instant constituted false certification.
petition given the notice and legal processes involved in a legal
proceeding involving real property. Thus, there is substantial HELD:
compliance in this case. 1. YES. Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Revised Rules on
Civil Procedure mandates that the principal party
must execute the certification against forum
Art Fuentebella, Park-in-Charge, and Rolling shopping. The reason for this is that the principal
Hills Memorial Park, Inc., v. Darlica Castro party has actual knowledge whether a petition has
previously been filed involving the same case or
G.R. No. 150865; June 30, 2006 substantially the same issues. If, for any reason the
principal part cannot sign the petition, the one signing
on his behalf must have been duly authorized.
FACTS:
Respondent, Darlica Castro, engaged the funeral services of Where there are several petitioners, it is insufficient
petitioner, Rolling Hills Memorial Park, Inc. in Bacolod City for that only one of them executes the certification,
the remains of her husband. absent a showing that he was so authorized by the
others. Certification requires personal knowledge,
During the burial, it was discovered that the dimensions of the and it cannot be presumed that the signatory knew
vault did not correspond to the measurements of the casket.

that his co-petitioners had the same or similar actions The RTC dismissed the counterclaim, and the CA denied the
filed or pending. petition for certiorari.
In the present case, Lourdes Pomperada, who signed ISSUE

the Verification and Certification on Non-Forum
Shopping, initially failed to submit a secretary’s • Whether or not the Circular applies to a compulsory
certificate or a board resolution confirmed her counterclaim. (NO)
authority to sign for the corporation, as well as a
RULING
special power of attorney to sign on behalf of co-
petitioner Art Fuentebella, who was sued jointly and The language of the Circular distinctly suggests that it is
solidarily with the corporation. primarily intended to cover an initiatory pleading or an
incipient application of a party asserting a claim for relief. Thus,
it should not be too difficult to sustain the view that the
2. NO. An omission in the certificate of non-forum circular in question has not, in fact, been contemplated to
shopping about any event that would not constitute res include a compulsory counterclaim – a kind of claim which, by
judicata and litis pendentia, is not fatal as to merit the its very nature as being auxiliary to the proceedings in the suit
dismissal and nullification of the entire proceedings. and as deriving its substantive and jurisdictional support
therefrom, can only be appropriately pleaded in the answer
and not remain outstanding for independent resolution except
by the court where the main case pends. Thus, the rule on Non-
Forum Shopping obviously does not include a Compulsory
Counterclaim.
Nevertheless, petitioner is entitled to a mere partial relief. Its

“counterclaim” for unpaid hospital bills is not a compulsory
counterclaim. Only the claim for damages can be considered
as such.
G.R. NO. 151413 February 13, 2008
CAGAYAN VALLEY DRUG CORPORATION,
Petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
DOCTRINE: REVENUE, Respondent.
The rule on Non-Forum Shopping does not apply in case of a
FACTS: Petitioner, a corporation duly organized and existing
Compulsory Counterclaim.
under Philippine laws, is a duly licensed retailer of medicine
FACTS and other pharmaceutical products. It operates two
drugstores, one in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and the other in
The issue in this case arose from a complaint for damages filed Roxas, Isabela, under the name and style of "Mercury Drug."
by respondent spouses against petitioner hospital alleging that Petitioner alleged that in 1995, it granted 20% sales discount
their son, while confined at the said hospital for having been to qualified senior citizens on purchase of medicine pursuant
born prematurely, had accidentally fallen from his incubator to RA 7432 and its IRR. In compliance with Revenue Regulation
which could have caused harm on the child. In response, the No. (RR) 2-94, petitioner treated the 20% sales discounts
hospital filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim granted to qualified senior citizens in 1995 as deductions from
asserting that respondents still owed it hospital bills, along the gross sales in order to arrive at the net sales, instead of
with damages due to the alleged malicious and unfounded suit treating them as tax credit as provided by Section 4 of RA 7432.
filed against it. On December 27, 1996, however, petitioner filed with the BIR
a claim for tax refund/tax credit of the full amount of the 20%
Respondents sought the dismissal of the counterclaim for its sales discount it granted to senior citizens for the year 1995,
non-compliance with Supreme Court Administrative Circular allegedly totalling to P123,083 in accordance with Sec. 4 of RA
no. 04-94 (Circular) requiring that a complaint and other 7432. The BIR’s inaction on petitioner’s claim for refund/tax
initiatory pleadings, such as counterclaim, cross-claim and credit compelled petitioner to file a petition for review before
third/fourth/etc. party complaint must be accompanied by a the CTA.
certificate of non-forum shopping. Petitioner, on the other The CTA dismissed the petition for review for lack of merit. The
hand, contended that the Circular only applies to permissive CTA sustained petitioner’s contention that pursuant to Sec. 4
counterclaims and not to compulsory counterclaims. of RA 7432, the 20% sales discounts petitioner extended to
qualified senior citizens in 1995 should be treated as tax credit
and not as deductions from the gross sales as erroneously a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the
interpreted in RR 2-94. Notwithstanding petitioner’s allegations in the petition."
entitlement to a tax credit from the 20% sales discounts it Second: Yes. Petitioner is entitled to tax credit. The
extended to qualified senior citizens in 1995, the CTA CTA Decision shows that the appellate tax court correctly ruled
nonetheless dismissed petitioner’s action for refund or tax that the 20% sales discounts petitioner granted to qualified
credit on account of petitioner’s net loss in 1995. senior citizens should be deducted from petitioner’s income
The CTA ratiocinated that on matters of tax credit claim, the tax due and not from petitioner’s gross sales as erroneously
government applies the amount determined to be provided in RR 2-94. However, the CTA erred in denying the tax
reimbursable after proper verification against any sum that credit to petitioner on the ground that petitioner had suffered
may be due and collectible from the taxpayer. However, if no net loss in 1995, and ruling that the tax credit is unavailing.
tax has been paid or if no amount is due and collectible from It is true that petitioner did not pay any tax in 1995
the taxpayer, then a tax credit is unavailing. Moreover, it held since it suffered a net loss for that taxable year. This fact,
that before allowing recovery for claims for a refund or tax however, without more, does not preclude petitioner from
credit, it must first be established that there was an actual availing of its statutory right to a tax credit for the 20% sales
collection and receipt by the government of the tax sought to discounts it granted to qualified senior citizens. The law then
be recovered. In the instant case, the CTA found that petitioner applicable on this point is clear and without any qualification.
did not pay any tax by virtue of its net loss position in 1995. Sec. 4 (a) of RA 7432 pertinently provides:
Aggrieved, the petitioner elevated the case to the CA. “Sec. 4. Privileges for the Senior citizens.––The senior
CA: DISMISSED. The the person who signed the verification and citizens shall be entitled to the following:
certification of absence of forum shopping, a certain Jacinto J. a. the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all
Concepcion, President of petitioner, failed to adduce proof establishments relative to utilization of transportation
that he was duly authorized by the board of directors to do so. services, hotels and similar lodging establishments,
As far as the CA was concerned, the main issue was whether or restaurants and recreation centers and purchase of medicines
not the verification and certification of non-forum shopping anywhere in the country: Provided, That private
signed by the President of petitioner is sufficient compliance establishments may claim the cost as tax credit.”
with Secs. 4 and 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It is thus clear that petitioner is entitled to a tax credit
The CA found no sufficient proof to show that Concepcion was for the full 20% sales discounts it extended to qualified senior
duly authorized by the Board of Directors of petitioner. The citizens for taxable year 1995. Considering that the CTA has not
appellate court anchored its disposition on our ruling in disallowed the P123,083 sales discounts petitioner claimed
Premium Marble Resources, Inc. v. Court of Appeals before the BIR and CTA, we are constrained to grant them as
(Premium), that "[i]n the absence of an authority from the tax credit in favor of petitioner.
Board of Directors, no person, not even the officers of the
corporation, can validly bind the corporation.
ISSUE: Chua v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company
First: Whether petitioner’s president can sign the G.R. No. 182311, August 19, 2009
subject verification and certification sans the approval of its
Board of Directors. PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 45
Second: Whether the CTA committed reversible error
in denying and dismissing petitioner’s action for refund or tax DOCTRINE: Forum shopping can be committed in three ways:
credit. (1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and
HELD: with the same prayer, the previous case not
First: Yes. The court held that the following officials or having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis
employees of the company can sign the verification and pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause
certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the of action and the same prayer, the previous case having been
Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2) the President of a finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata);
corporation, (3) the General Manager or Acting General and (3) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action,
Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an Employment but with different prayers (splitting of causes of action, where
Specialist in a labor case. the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res
While the above cases do not provide a complete listing of judicata).
authorized signatories to the verification and certification
required by the rules, the determination of the sufficiency of FACTS: Petitioners obtained from respondent Metrobank a
the authority was done on a case to case basis. The rationale loan of ₱4,000,000.00, which was secured by REM on 3 parcels
applied in the foregoing cases is to justify the authority of of land. The lawyers of respondent Metrobank demanded that
corporate officers or representatives of the corporation to sign petitioners fully pay and settle their liabilities. When
the verification or certificate against forum shopping, being "in petitioners still failed to pay their loans, respondent

Metrobank sought to extra-judicially foreclose the REM which granted the Motion to Consolidate of petitioners; and
constituted on the subject properties. (2) Manifestation and Motion raising the
ground of forum shopping.
Upon a verified Petition for Foreclosure filed by respondent
Metrobank. Respondent Atty. Celestra scheduled the auction RTC 258: GRANTED the first Motion of respondents, thus Civil
sale. Petitioners filed before Branch 257 of the Regional Trial Case No. CV-05-0402 was DISMISSED on the ground of forum
Court of Parañaque (RTCBranch 257), a Complaint for shopping, and rendered the second motion moot.
Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of TRO, Preliminary
Injunction and Damages, against respondents. RTC-Branch 257 CA: AFFIRMED the RTC-Branch 258 Order.
issued a TRO enjoining respondents Metrobank and Atty.
Celestra from conducting the auction sale. ISSUE: W/N THE SUCCESSIVE FILING OF THE TWO CIVIL CASES
BEFORE TWO RTCs AMOUNTS TO FORUM SHOPPING.
The auction sale however, proceeded and a Certificate of Sale
was accordingly issued to respondent Metrobank as the HELD: YES. Forum shopping exists when a party repeatedly
highest bidder of the foreclosed properties. Petitioners filed avails himself of several judicial remedies in different courts,
with RTC Branch 257 a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on
they impleaded as additional defendant the incumbent the same transactions and the same essential facts and
Register of Deeds. Petitioners alleged that the Certificate of circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues
Sale was a falsified document since there was no actual sale either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other
that took place on November 8. And, even if an auction sale court.
was conducted, the Certificate of Sale would still be void
because the auction sale was done in disobedience to a lawful Ultimately, what is truly important in determining whether
order of RTC-Branch 257. forum shopping exists or not is the vexation caused the courts
and party-litigant by a party who asks different courts to rule
RTC-Branch 257 denied petitioners’ application for injunction. on the same or related causes and/or to grant the same or
CA reversed the order of RTC-Branch 257 and remanded the substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the
case for further proceedings possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the
different fora upon the same issue.
Petitioners sought the inhibition of Acting Executive Judge of
the RTC-Branch 257. There motion was granted and the case Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) filing
was re-raffled to RTC-Branch 258. multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the
same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet
Petitioners filed with Branch 195 of the Regional Trial Court of (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing
Parañaque (RTCBranch 195) a Verified Complaint for Damages multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same
against respondents. Petitioners sought in their Complaint the prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (where
award of actual, moral, and exemplary damages against the the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) filing multiple
respondents for making it appear that an auction sale of the cases based on the same cause of action, but with different
subject properties took place. prayers (splitting of
causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either
Petitioners filed with RTC-Branch 195 a Motion to Consolidate litis pendentia or res judicata).
seeking the consolidation of Civil Case No. CV-05-0402, the
action for damages pending before said court, with the with Petitioners committed forum shopping by filing multiple cases
Civil Case No. CV- 01-0207, the injunction case that was being based on the same cause of action, although with different
heard before RTC-Branch 258. prayers. Forum shopping occurs although the actions seem to
be different, when it can be seen that there is a splitting of a
Respondents filed with RTC-Branch 195 an Opposition to cause of action. There is no question that the claims of
Motion to Consolidate with Prayer for Sanctions, praying for petitioners for damages in Civil Case No. CV-01-0207 and Civil
the dismissal of the Complaint for Damages on the ground of Case No. CV-05-0402 are premised on the same cause of
forum shopping. action, i.e., the purportedly wrongful conduct of respondents
in connection with the foreclosure sale of the subject
RTC 195: GRANTED the motion to consolidate and ordered that properties.
the Civil Case No. CV-05-0402 before them be transferred to
the RTC-Branch 258 which was hearing Civil Case No. 01-0207.
Respondents filed two motions before RTC-Branch 258: (1)

Motion for Reconsideration of the Order RTC-Branch 195,

In order to obtain a writ of possession, the purchaser in a
foreclosure sale must file a petition, in the form of an ex parte
motion, in the registration or cadastral proceedings of the
registered property. The reason why this pleading, although
denominated as a petition, is actually considered a motion is
because it is a mere incident in the registration proceeding.
Hence, although it was denominated as a “petition,” it was in
substance merely a motion.
The right to possess a property merely follows the right of

ownership. Thus, after the consolidation of title in the buyer’s
name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem, the writ of
DOCTRINE: possession becomes a matter of right and its issuance to a
purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure is merely a ministerial
The rule on Non-Forum Shopping does not apply in an ex parte function.
petition for a writ of possession.
Since a petition for a writ of possession is neither a complaint
FACTS nor an initiatory pleading, a certificate against non-forum
shopping is not required.
Respondent De Koning received a loan from Metrobank. To
secure the loan, De Koning executed a real estate mortgage
(REM) in favor of Metrobank over a condominium unit and all
its improvements. When De Koning failed to pay the loan,
Metrobank foreclosed the REM. The redemption period lapsed
without De Koning redeeming the property. Thus, Metrobank
demanded that he turn over the unit. Upon De Koning’s
refusal, Metrobank with the RTC an ex parte petition for a writ
of possession over the foreclosed property.
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION
In response, De Koning’s counsel appeared and manifested
during the ex parte hearing that he filed a motion to dismiss on DOCTRINE:
the ground that Metrobank’s petition violated Sec. 5, Rule 7 of
the Rules of Court which required the attachment of a “[V]erification is not an empty ritual or a meaningless
certification against forum shopping to a complaint or other formality. Its import must never be sacrificed in the name of
initiatory pleading. mere expedience or sheer caprice, as what apparently
happened in the present case.”
The trial court agreed with De Koning and dismissed
Metrobank’s petition. On appeal, the CA affirmed the dismissal FACTS
and considered the ex parte petition for a writ of possession
an initiatory pleading. This case arose from proceedings instituted by the DOJ Panel
against petitioner Sen. De Lima for the investigation of the
ISSUE proliferation of dangerous drugs syndicated at the New Bilibid
Prison, wherein four complaints were filed before the DOJ
• Whether or not the ex parte petition for the issuance of a against the senator.
writ of possession is an initiatory pleading asserting a
claim. (NO) During the investigation, Sen. De Lima vehemently opposed
the DOJ Panel’s authority, alleging that it was the Office of the
RULING Ombudsman that has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction
to hear the four complaints against her in an Omnibus Motion.
A writ of possession is defined as a writ of execution employed
The senator also imputed evident partiality on the part of the
to enforce a judgment to recover the possession of land. It
DOJ Panel in another Omnibus Motion. Due to this, Sen. De
commands the sheriff to enter the land and give its possession
Lima manifested during the hearing that she will not submit
to the person entitled under the judgment. One of the
her counter-affidavit citing the pendency of the two motions.
instances when the writ can be availed of is in extrajudicial
The DOJ Panel, however, ruled that it will not entertain
foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under Sec. 7 of Act No.
belatedly filed counter-affidavits, and declared all pending
3135, as amended, in which the present case falls under.
incidents and the cases as submitted for resolution. De Lima’s
motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied.

Thus, Sen. De Lima filed a Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari
before the Court of Appeals. However, as no restraining order
was issued by the CA as of the time, the DOJ instituted
proceedings in the RTC, which subsequently led to Sen. De
Lima’s arrest.
Thus, Sen. De Lima filed the instant petition directly before the
Supreme Court. In opposition, the Office of the Solicitor
General claimed, among others, that petitioner falsified the
jurats appearing in the Verification and Certification against
Forum Shopping as these were made to show that a certain PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI
Atty. Tresvalles-Cabalo notarized the certification, but the
guest logbook in the PNP Custodial Center Unit in Camp Crame, DOCTRINE:
where De Lima was confined, did not bear the name of the
attorney. Thus, the OSG maintained that petitioner did not “[V]erification is not an empty ritual or a meaningless
actually appear and swore before the notary public on such formality. Its import must never be sacrificed in the name of
date in Quezon City, contrary to the allegations in the jurats. mere expedience or sheer caprice, as what apparently
Thus, the petition should be dismissed outright. happened in the present case.”
ISSUE FACTS
• Whether or not the petitioner De Lima did not comply The issue in this case originated from an Application for
with the Rule on Non-Forum Shopping when she failed to Registration of Title filed by petitioners before the RTC which
properly swear under oath the contents in her was opposed by Ayala and Omniport. The RTC and the CA ruled
certification due to her failure to sign it in the presence of against petitioners, holding that petitioners failed to join Orosa
the notary. (YES) as an indispensable party and, even on the merits, petitioners
failed to establish any right over the subject properties.
RULING
Upon filing the instant petition, not all of the petitioners were
Without the presence of the notary upon the signing of the able to sign and execute the Verification and Certification
Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping, there is Against Forum Shopping.
no assurance that the petitioner swore under oath that the
allegations in the petition have been made in good faith or are ISSUE
true and correct, and not merely speculative. Verification is not
an empty ritual or a meaningless formality. Its import must • Whether or not the petition is fatally defective for failure
never be sacrificed in the name of mere expedience or sheer of the other petitioners to sign and execute the
caprice, as what apparently happened in this case. Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping.
(NO)
In this case, Atty. Tresvalles-Cabalo, who claimed to have
stamped and signed the verification inside Camp Crame, still RULING
found it necessary to, hours later, confirm with the senator
In Altres, et al. v. Empleo, et al., the Court summarized the rules
that she had already notarized the Petition. It is immediately
on verification and certification against forum shopping as:
clear that petitioner De Lima did not sign the Verification and
Certification against Forum Shopping and Affidavit of Merit in 1. A distinction must be made between non-compliance with
front of the notary public. the requirement on or submission of defective
verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on
The absence of the notary public when petitioner allegedly
or submission of defective certification against forum
affixed her signature negates a proper attestation that forum
shopping.
shopping has not been committed by the filing of the petition.
Thus, the petition is, for all intents and purposes, an unsigned 2. As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect
pleading that does not deserve the cognizance of this Court. therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally
defective. The court may order its submission or
Petitioner has not proffered any reason to justify her failure to
correction or act on the pleading if the attending
sign the Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping
circumstances are such that strict compliance with the
in the presence of the notary. There is, therefore, no
Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of
justification to relax the rules and excuse the petitioner’s non-
justice may be served thereby.
compliance therewith.

3. Verification is deemed substantially complied with when
one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the
allegations in the complaint or petition signs the
verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have
been made in good faith or are true and correct.
4. As to certification against forum shopping, non

compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in
verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent
submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to
relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance"
or presence of "special circumstances or compelling PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI
reasons."
DOCTRINE:
5. The certification against forum shopping must be signed
by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, “There is forum shopping when, between two actions, there is
those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the identity of parties, causes of action, and reliefs sought.
case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, Absolute identity is not required. Identity of causes of action
however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a ensues when actions involve fundamentally similar breaches of
common interest and invoke a common cause of action the same right-duty correlative. In such instances, separate
or defense, the signature of only one of them in the proceedings will have to consider substantially the same
certification against forum shopping substantially evidence, engendering possibly conflicting interpretations on
complies with the Rule. fundamentally the same incidents and unnecessarily expending
judicial resources.”
6. Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be
executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, FACTS
however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party
pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power Respondent here pursued two successive actions: first, an
of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his action for quo warranto; and second, an action for specific
behalf. performance. The former sought petitioner Cecilia’s ouster
and respondent’s restoration as President and Board
In the instant case, all the petitioners are immediate relatives Chairperson of the Philippine College of Criminology (PCC). The
and heirs of Juan who share a common interest in the land Complaint for specific performance sought respondent’s
sought to be reconveyed, as well as common claims and restoration as Board Member.
defenses, and a common cause of action raising the same
arguments in support thereof. Thus, there was sufficient basis Allegedly, respondent was entitled to the position of President
for Sonia to speak for and in behalf of her co-petitioners when and Board Chairperson as his father, Eduardo Sr., the former
she certified that they had not filed any action or claim in President of the PCC, issued an order choosing respondent as
another court or tribunal involving the same issues. Thus, the the next President and Board Chairperson in the event of
Verification and Certification that Sonia executed constituted Eduardo Sr.’s death or relinquishment of the positions.
substantial compliance under the rules. Eventually, Gregory succeeded his father.
Indeed, in the subsequent case of Medado v. Heirs of the Late However, when Gregory failed to attend a special meeting, the
Antonio Consing, where the Court held that where the Board of Trustees of PCC was reorganized and an election of
petitioners are immediate relatives, who share a common executive officers was held, with Cecilia now elected President
interest in the property subject of the action, the fact that only in lieu of Gregory. Cecilia likewise took over as Board
one of the petitioners executed the verification or certification Chairperson. Thus, Gregory filed the Petition for Quo
of non-forum shopping will not deter the court from Warranto, which the RTC dismissed, but was seasonably
proceeding with the action. appealed to the Court of Appeals and subsequently to the
Supreme Court.
In any case, petitioners have executed a Special Power of
Attorney on March 15, 2002, authorizing Sonia as their In the meantime, Cecilia caused the audit of the PCC’s books.
attorney-in-fact to "file, commence and follow-up Land The findings suggested that several sums had been unduly
Registration Proceedings as well as all cases that may be disbursed to Gregory. Thus, a resolution authorizing Cecilia to
necessary for the quieting of title and/or recovery of undertake legal action against Gregory was passed. Eventually,
possession and ownership of Lot No. 11808, Cad-264 of the the board resolved to file actions against Gregory and expelled
Municipality (now City) of Batangas." him from the Board of Trustees. Thus, the second complaint in

this case was filed: a Complaint for Specific Performance to Rather than this, the course that respondent pursued toyed –
reinstate Gregory as a board member. whether wittingly or unwittingly – with the very dangers which
the rules against forum shopping seek to prevent: diverging
One of petitioner’s contentions was that the case should be interpretation on fundamentally the same incidents, and
dismissed on account of forum shopping. The RTC acted unnecessary conflict, duplication, and expending of judicial
accordingly and dismissed the Complaint for Specific resources.
Performance on the ground of forum shopping and lack of RULE 8
merit. GO TONG ELECTRICAL SUPPLY CO., INC. AND GEORGE C.
GO, Petitioner, vs. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC.,
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC and SUBSTITUTED BY PHILIPPINE INVESTMENT ONE [SPV-
remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings. AMC], INC., Respondent
G.R. No. 187487, June 29, 2015
ISSUE
• Whether or not the CA erred in reinstating respondent PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI
Gregory’s Complaint as he supposedly did not engage in DOCTRINE:
forum shopping. (YES) SEC. 8. How to contest such documents. - When an action or
defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or
RULING attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the
preceding Section, the genuineness and due execution of the
The case of City of Taguig v. City of Makati provided the test instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse
for determining forum shopping, as declared in Yap v. Chua: party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what
whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity he claims to be the facts; but the requirement of an oath does
of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought. It is not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a
not necessary that there be absolute identity as to the party to the instrument or when compliance with an order for
similarity in parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs an inspection of the original instrument is refused.
sought. FACTS:
Respondent, BPI-FSI filed a complaint against petitioners Go
Both actions of respondent (Quo Warranto and Specific Tong Electrical Supply Co., Inc. (Go Tong Electrical) and its
Performance) arose from the same larger narrative of President, George C. Go, seeking that the latter be held jointly
respondent’s conflict with his siblings and other relatives. Both and severally liable to it for the payment of their loan
actions are anchored on respondent’s supposed rights arising obligation in the aggregate amount of P87,086,398.71,
from the Certificate of Acquiescence that he and his petitioner- inclusive of the principal sum, interests, and penalties as of
siblings executed vis-à-vis their father’s Presidential Order, and May 28, 2002, as well as attorney's fees, litigation expenses,
those same petitioner-sibling’s supposed default on their and costs of suit.
commitment. Thus, they involve the same right-duty Initially, Go Tong Electrical had applied for and was granted
correlative, and are both premised on his ouster as a supposed financial assistance by the then Bank of South East Asia (BSA).
violation of his rights and breach of petitioners’ duty. Go Tong Electrical, represented by Go, among others, obtained
a loan from DBS in the principal amount of P40,491,051.65, for
As the same basic factual considerations are involved, the which Go Tong Electrical executed Promissory Note. Upon
same pieces of evidence will need to be considered to default of petitioners, DBS - and later, its... successor-in-
ascertain the extent of rights and duties accruing to each party, interest, herein respondent - demanded payment from
and whatever violation may have ensued. petitioners, but to no avail, hence, the aforesaid complaint
In their Answer with Counterclaim (Answer), petitioners
It is true that the two actions of respondent asked for two
merely stated that they "specifically deny" the allegations
distinct reliefs. However, the grant of relief in every action is
under the complaint. Of particular note is their denial of the
rooted in its cause of action. The nature of the right and duty
execution of the loan agreement, the PN, and the CSA "for
involved, and the ensuing manner of breach are ultimately the
being self-serving and pure conclusions intended to suit
bases of whatever succor a court can extent.
[respondent's] purposes."
A supervening event may very well have ensued – By way of special and affirmative defenses, petitioners argued,
respondent’s ouster as Board Member – inciting respondent to among others, that: (a) the real party-in-interest should be DBS
seek further legal relief. But his proper remedy was not to and not respondent; (b) no demand was made upon them; and
imprudently initiate a nominally distinct proceeding, but (c) Go cannot be held liable under the CSA since there was
rather, to manifest new facts while the appeal emanating from supposedly no solidarity of debtors.
his Quo Warranto Petition was being considered and, RTC ruled in favor of respondent, thereby ordering petitioners
eventually, to file supplemental pleadings, if warranted. to jointly and severally pay the former. It found that
respondent had amply demonstrated by competent evidence

that it was entitled to the reliefs it prayed for. Particularly, which it lacks, are waived by him. Also, it... effectively
respondent's documentary evidence - the authenticity of eliminated any defense relating to the authenticity and due
which the RTC observed to be undisputed - showed the execution of the document, e.g., that the document was
existence of petitioners' valid and demandable obligation. spurious, counterfeit, or of different import on its face as the
Not convinced, petitioners appealed to the CA. one executed by the parties; or that the signatures appearing
The CA sustained the RTC's ruling in toto. thereon were... forgeries; or that the signatures were
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC's unauthorized."
ruling that Go be held jointly and severally liable? CONCEPCION V. VDA, DE DAFFON, petitioner, vs. THE
RULING: No. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, LOURDES OSMEÑA VDA,
The Court concurs with the CA Decision holding that the DE DAFFON, AILEEN DAFFON, JOSELITO DAFFON, JR., ANA
genuineness and due execution of the loan documents in this VANESA DAFFON, LEILA DAFFON and SUZETTE DAFFON,
case were deemed admitted by petitioners. respondents.
The mere statement in paragraph 4 of their Answer, i.e., that
they "specifically deny" the pertinent... allegations of the PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45
Complaint "for being self-serving and pure conclusions DOCTRINE: A defendant who moves to dismiss the complaint
intended to suit plaintiffs purposes," does not constitute an on the ground of lack of cause of action hypothetically admits
effective specific denial as contemplated by law. Verily, a all the averments thereof. The hypothetical admission extends
denial is not specific simply... because it is so qualified by the to the relevant and material facts well pleaded in the
defendant. Stated otherwise, a general denial does not complaint.
become specific by the use of the word "specifically." Neither FACTS: Petitioner Concepcion Villamor was married to the late
does it become so by the simple expedient of coupling the Amado Daffon, with whom she begot one son, Joselito Daffon.
same with a broad conclusion of law that the allegations Joselita married herein respondent and bore six children with
contested are "self-serving" or are intended "to suit plaintiffs her. Amado and Joselito subsequently passed, hence,
purposes." respondent with her minor children instituted an action for
To add, Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules further requires that the partition against petitioner. Respondents alleged that Amado
defendant "sets forth what he claims to be the facts," which left several real and personal properties which formed part of
requirement, likewise, remains absent from the Answer in this his conjugal partnership with petitioner. Joselito being a forced
case. heir of Amado was entitled to at least one half of Amado's
Thus, with said pleading failing to comply with the "specific estate, consisting of his share in the said conjugal properties.
denial under oath" requirement under Section 8, Rule 8 of the However, the said properties were never partitioned between
Rules, the proper conclusion, as arrived at by the CA, is that petitioner and Joselito.
petitioners had impliedly admitted the due execution and Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground
genuineness of the documents... evidencing their loan of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, failure of the
obligation to respondent. complaint to state a cause of action; and (3) waiver,
Principles: abandonment and extinguishment of the obligation. She
When an action or defense is founded upon a written likewise alleged that that the trial court cannot take
instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding cognizance of the action for partition considering her claim of
pleading as provided in the preceding Section, the genuineness absolute ownership over the properties; and that respondents
and due execution of the instrument shall be... deemed themselves admitted that petitioner has repudiated the co-
admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically ownership.
denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts; but RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. CA denied the petition for
the requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse certiorari.
party does not appear to be a party to the instrument or when ISSUE: WON the respondents have a cause of action against
compliance with an order for an inspection of the original the petitioner
instrument is refused. RULING: It should be stressed that in the determination of
This means that the defendant must declare under oath that whether a complaint fails to state a cause of action, only the
he did not sign the document or that it is otherwise false or statements in the complaint may be properly considered.
fabricated Moreover, a defendant who moves to dismiss the complaint
The admission of the genuineness and due execution of a on the ground of lack of cause of action hypothetically admits
document means that the party whose signature it bears all the averments thereof. The test of sufficiency of the facts
admits that he voluntarily signed the document or it was found in a complaint as constituting a cause of action is
signed by another for him and with his authority; that at the whether or not admitting the facts alleged the court can
time it was... signed it was in words and figures exactly as set render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the
out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the prayer thereof. The hypothetical admission extends to the
document was delivered; and that any formalities required by relevant and material facts well pleaded in the complaint and
law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Hence, if the allegations

in the complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint respondents' partition agreement between the respondents
can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed and also a xerox copy of the respondents' transfer certificates
regardless of the defense that may be assessed by the of title.
defendants. While testifying during the trial, Eusebia Toribio was asked
To the mind of the Court, the facts stated in the complaint whether she executed any sale of her share in the parcel of
were sufficient allegations that Joselito Daffon was a legitimate land in litigation. The counsel for private respondents
son of the spouses Amado and Concepcion Daffon; and that objected, raising the proper mode of contesting the
plaintiffs (i.e.,respondents herein) were likewise legitimate genuineness of an actionable document pursuant to Sections
heirs of Joselito Daffon. Admitting the truth of these 7 and 8, Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of Court. The trial court
averments, there was, therefore, no need to inquire whether sustained the objection.
respondent minor children were duly acknowledged by the ISSUE: (1) whether or not the deeds of sale allegedly executed
deceased Amado Daffon. To be sure, the illegitimacy of the by the petitioners in favor of their brother Dionisio Toribio and
said children and the lack of acknowledgment are matters appended to the respondents' answer are merely evidentiary
which petitioner may raise as a defense in her answer and in nature or the very foundation of their defense which must
threshed out by the court during a full-blown trial. be denied under oath by the petitioner.
In the same vein, there is no need for the complaint to (2) whether or not the document is included as a necessary
specifically allege respondents' claim of co-ownership of the part of the defense so as to make it actionable.
properties. The complaint needs only to allege the ultimate HELD: The records show that the deeds of sale are actionable
facts on which the plaintiffs rely for their claim. Contrary to documents.
petitioner's contention, the fact that she repudiated the co- The purpose of the enactment (sec. 103) appears to have been
ownership between her and respondents did not deprive the to relieve a party of the trouble and expense of proving in the
trial court of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action for first instance an alleged fact, the existence or non-existence of
partition. In a complaint for partition, the plaintiff seeks, first, which is necessarily within the knowledge of the adverse party,
a declaration that he is a co-owner of the subject properties; and of the necessity (to his opponent's case) of establishing
and second, the conveyance of his lawful shares. which such adverse party is notified by his opponent's
SEGUNDINO TORIBIO, EUSEBIA TORIBIO, and the HEIRS OF pleading. As stated earlier, the reason for the rule is to enable
OLEGARIO TORIBIO, represented by his widow, ADELA DE the adverse party to know beforehand whether he will have to
LOS REYES, petitioner, vs. THE HON. JUDGE ABDULWAHID meet the issue of genuineness or due execution of the
A. BIDIN, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court document during trial. (In re Dick's Estate, 235 N.W. 401).
of First Instance, City of Zamboanga, DALMACIO RAMOS, While mandatory, the rule is a discovery procedure and must
and JUANITO CAMACHO, respondents. be reasonably construed to attain its purpose, and in a way as
G.R. No. 57821, January 17, 1985, First Division, Gutierrez, not to effect a denial of substantial justice. The interpretation
Jr. J.l should be one which assist the parties in obtaining a speedy,
inexpensive, and most important, a just determination of the
This petition is premised on the interpretation and application disputed issues.
of Sections 7 and 8, Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of Court on The petitioners are themselves parties to the deeds of sale
actionable documents, which are sought to be enforced against them. The complaint
FACTS: The present controversy stems from a complaint filed was filed by the petitioners. They filed suit to recover their
by the petitioners against private respondents Dalmacio hereditary properties. The new owners introduced deeds of
Ramos and Juanito Camacho revolving the parcel of land in sale as their main defense. In other words, the petitioners
Zamboanga. brought the issue upon themselves. They should meet it
The three other heirs, petitioners Segundino, Eusebia and properly according to the Rules of Court. Sections 7 and 8 of
Olegario alleging that their shares had never been sold nor in Rule 8, therefore, apply. The petitioners' counsel was
any wise transferred or disposed to others filed a case against obviously lulled into complacency by two factors. First, the
herein private respondents for recovery of hereditary rights. plaintiffs, now petitioners, had already stated under oath that
How Juanito Camacho, who was entitled to only a total area of they never sold, transferred, or disposed of their shares in the
931 square meters, nor, how one Dalmacio Ramos, Jr., inheritance to others. Second, the usual procedure is for a
acquired 1/4 share of the property was allegedly not known to defendant to specifically deny under oath the genuineness and
them. due execution of documents set forth in and annexed to the
In their answer, the defendants-respondents alleged that the complaint. Somehow, it skipped counsel's attention that the
shares of plaintiffs- petitioners had likewise been sold to rule refers to either an action or a defense based upon a
Dionisio Toribio, their brother, who, in turn, sold the same to written instrument or document. It applies to both plaintiffs
Juanito Camacho and Dalmacio Ramos. The alleged sale from and defendants.
petitioners to Dionisio and the sale from Dionisio to the DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the order of the
respondents were evidenced by deeds of sale, xerox copies of respondent court dated July 20, 1981 is hereby REVERSED and
which were appended to and made an integral part of the SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court which took over the cases

of the respondent court is ordered to receive the petitioners' NO. It has been established that the deed of sale was invalid,
evidence regarding the genuineness and due execution of the therefore, it cannot be made the basis of estoppel.
disputed deeds of sale. SO ORDERED. The contracting parties may not establish pacts, clauses, or
BASILIA BOUGH AND GUSTAVUS BOUGH, V. MATILDE conditions which conflict with the laws, morals, or public
CANTIVEROS AND PRESBITERA HANOPOL order. A party to an illegal contract cannot come into a court
G.R. NO. 13300; SEPTEMBER 29, 1919 of law and ask to have his illegal objects carried out. Where,
however, the parties to an illegal contract are not equally
FACTS: guilty, and where public policy is considered as advanced by
Matilde Cantiveros is reputed to be the richest resident in the allowing the more excusable of the two to sue for relief against
municipality of Cariagara, Leyte. She was the owner of various the transaction, relief is given to him. Cases of this character
parcels of realty. In 1912, Matilde Cantiveros and her husband are, where the conveyance was wrongfully induced by the
signed a marital contract of separation. grantee through imposition or overreaching, or by false
Basilia Hanopol, a cousin of Matilde Cantiveros, was married representations, especially by one in a confidential relation.
to Gustavus Bough. L.O. HIBBERD, Plaintiff-Appellant,vs. WM. J. RHODE AND
Through the influence of Gustavus Bough, Matilde Cantiveros D.J. MCMILLIAN, Defendants-Appellees
was induced to sign a fictitious contract of sale of all her G.R. No. 8418, December 9, 1915
property to Basilia Bough. By this deed, Cantiveros purported
to convey sixty-three parcels of land for ten thousand pesos. PETITION FOR REVIEW
Basilia and Gustavus Bough signed another document, DOCTRINE: “The defenses of illegality or fraud are not barred
donating all the properties conveyed by Cantiveros back to her by the provisions of [Rule 8, Section 8].”
in case of their death. Matilde Cantiveros remained in FACTS
possession of the property. McMillian was in the retail liquor business and secured a stock
Basilia and Gustavus Bough sought to have themselves put in of merchandise valued at P1,200.00 from Brand & Hibberd and
possession of the property in the Court of First Instance of sold it. Alleging that they sold the merchandise to him on
Leyte. The plaintiffs denied under oath the genuineness of the deposit only, Brand & Hibberd filed a complaint of estafa
donation inter vivos. against McMillian.
Matilde Cantiveros answered with a general denial, and a The defendant Rohde was a practicing attorney who
special defense in which she asked that judgment be rendered undertook McMillian’s defense in the estafa case. Rohde knew
declaring the contract null. that the estafa case was without foundation. Sullivan,
The judge of the first instance ruled in favor of the defendants, however, told Rohde that there was evidence to hold
declaring the sale fictitious, null, and without effect. McMillian for trial. Thus, Rohde, fearing that McMillian’s jail
The plaintiffs argued that the lower court erred in permitting time will endanger the latter’s health, executed a Promissory
the defendants to present evidence tending to impugn the Note to have the estafa case dismissed.
genuineness and due execution of the deed of sale. They also Thus, this suit on the Promissory Note. Rohde did not enter a
argued that the acceptance of the donation by the defendant verified specific denial of the genuineness and due execution
has estopped her from denying the consideration set forth. of the note, but claims the special defense of illegality of
ISSUE: consideration.
Whether or not the defendants can be permitted to present ISSUE
evidence that will impugn the genuineness and due execution Whether or not defendant is barred from interposing the
of a written instrument from which the action was brought. special defense of illegality of consideration due to failure to
Whether or not the defendant is estopped from denying the specifically deny the promissory note under oath (NO).
consideration of the deed of sale, having accepted the RULING
donation. The effect of the admission of the genuineness and due
HELD: execution of an actionable document (promissory note in this
YES.The law states that the genuineness and due execution of case) is to create a prima facie case for the plaintiff which
a written instrument properly pleaded shall be deemed dispenses with the necessity of evidence on his part and
admitted unless the plaintiff or defendant shall specifically entitles him to a judgment on the pleadings unless a special
deny the same under oath. Nevertheless, failure of the party defense of new matter, such as payment, is interposed by the
to file an affidavit denying the genuineness and due execution defendant.
of the document does not estop him from controverting it by However, the defense of illegality of consideration, which is a
evidence of fraud, mistake, compromise, payment, statute of defense of new matter, should not be construed as prohibited
limitations, estoppel, and want of consideration.While the by the rule on actionable documents (Rule 8, Section 8,
defendants did not deny the genuineness and due execution formerly Sec. 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure at this time).
of the contract of sale under oath, they could still set up the The defenses of illegality or fraud are not barred by the
defenses of fraud and want of consideration. provisions of [Rule 8, Section 8]. Thus, the special defense
interposed by the defendant of illegality of consideration is not

barred by his failure to enter a verified denial of the RULING: Ordinarily, such failure is an admission. However, this
genuineness and due execution of the note set out in the rule cannot apply in the present case because the
complaint. plaintiff introduced evidence purporting to support his
ON THE MERITS: However, the Promissory Note was not allegations of deposit on the dates he wanted the court to
founded on an illegal consideration. Brand & Hibberd’s believe, and offered no objection during the trial to the
acceptance of the Promissory Note only signifies their promise testimonies of defendant's witnesses and documentary
not to further actively participate in the estafa case, and not to evidence showing different dates of deposit. By these acts, the
actively assist in preventing the due investigation of the plaintiff waived the defendant's technical admission through
criminal charge by suppressing evidence. Thus, the plaintiffs failure to deny under oath the genuineness and due execution
are entitled to judgment, and Rohde is ordered to pay them of the document. It has, likewise, been ruled that: "Where
the amount of P1,000.00 with legal interest. written instrument set forth in answer is not denied by
G.R. NO. L-18401 April 27, 1963 affidavit, yet if evidence in respect to that matter, and tending
PERFECTO JABALDE, plaintiff-appellant, vs. PHILIPPINE to show that instrument is not genuine, or was not delivered,
NATIONAL BANK, defendant-appellant. is introduced by plaintiff without objection on part of
defendant, or motion to strike out, and is met by counter-
Petition for review on certiorari evidence on the part of defendant, the latter ought not to be
Facts: Plaintiff-appellant Perfecto Jabalde seeks recovery of permitted to claim that genuineness and due execution of
P10,000.00 allegedly deposited by him with the defendant- instrument are admitted."
appellee Philippine National Bank, P5,000.00 in genuine [G.R. No. 197923. June 22, 2015.]
Philippine currency, on 21 July 1941, and another P5,000.00 on RUBY RUTH S. SERRANO MAHILUM, petitioner, vs.
30 August 1943 in mixed genuine Philippine currency and SPOUSES EDILBERTO ILANO and LOURDES ILANO,
Japanese military notes. The complaint recites the printed respondents.
wording of plaintiff's passbook, and allegedly reproduces page
one thereof. PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI
Defendant's answer was not under oath, and admits the DOCTRINE: A negative pregnant is a form of negative
making of the foregoing deposits, but denies the dates of expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least an
deposit, alleging as the true dates July 21, 1944 and 30, August implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a
1944, and avers that the entries in the passbook as to the denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts
deposit dates were "knowingly, unlawfully and maliciously" alleged in the pleading.
altered by the plaintiff; and that the deposits were all in "If an allegation is not specifically denied or the denial is a
Japanese military notes. negative pregnant, the allegation is deemed admitted."
Both parties adduced evidence in support of their allegations, "Where a fact is alleged with some qualifying or modifying
and after trial, the CFI dismissed the case. Plaintiff's counsel language, and the denial is conjunctive, a 'negative pregnant'
avers that if there was any tampering, it should be attributed exists, and only the qualification or modification is denied,
to the bank that issued the passbook. On this point, the trial while the fact itself is admitted." "A denial in the form of a
court correctly observed that it would be puerile for any of the negative pregnant is an ambiguous pleading, since it cannot be
bank's officials to do this since the ascertained whether it is the fact or only the qualification that
act would be against the bank's interest. is intended to be denied." "Profession of ignorance about a
Defendant's witnesses have also shown, by their testimonies fact which is patently and necessarily within the pleader's
and business sheets of account during the war years, that knowledge, or means of knowing as ineffectual, is no denial at
appellant Perfecto Jabalde did not have a prewar, or all."
"controlled", account with the defendant bank, although he FACTS: Petitioner Ruby Ruth S. Serrano Mahilum is the
did open a war-time or "free" account. The passbook states on registered owner of a parcel of land covered by TCT 85533
its face that it is a "Free Account". The difference between the which she entrusted the original owner's duplicate copy to
two kinds of accounts, as instituted by the bank, has been well Teresa Perez (Perez) — a purported real estate broker — who
explained. The business sheets of war-time accounts in the claimed that she can assist petitioner in obtaining a loan, with
Cebu bank branch also show that Perfecto Jabalde, along with TCT 85533 serving as collateral.
several clients, deposited money in Japanese military notes After several months, petitioner demanded the return of the
only and on the dates alleged by the bank. The conclusion title, but Perez failed to produce the same; after much
drawn from this array of evidence is inevitably that the prodding, Perez admitted that the title was lost. Thus, in June
deposits were made on 21 July 1944 and on 30 August 1944, 2004, petitioner executed an Affidavit of Loss and caused the
and all in military notes. same to be annotated upon the original registry copy of TCT
ISSUE: WON the bank’s failure to deny under oath the entries 85533
in the passbook as “copied” in the complaint constitutes an Petitioner received a letter from the Registry of Deeds of Las
admission of the genuineness and due execution of the Piñas City informing her that the owner's duplicate copy of TCT
document (NO) 85533 was not lost, but that it was presented to the registry by

respondent spouses Ilano claiming that the property covered 2. NO. A cursory examination of the record will show that
by the title was sold to them. Respondents Spouses executed petitioner's action does not appear to be groundless. There are
an Affidavit of Non-Loss instead of registering the supposed circumstances which lead one to believe that respondents are
sale in their favor. not exactly innocent of the charge. Their failure to register the
unnotarized and undated deed of absolute sale is at the very
Petitioner confronted respondents telling them that she did least unusual; it is contrary to experience. It is uncharacteristic
not execute such documents, and that her signatures were of a conscientious buyer of real estate not to cause the
falsified and forged. She demanded the return of TCT 85533, immediate registration of his deed of sale as well as the
but respondents refused to surrender the title to her. They issuance of a new certificate of title in his name.
claimed that the property was sold to them by Perez and "a Even at the level of the CA, respondents admitted, in their
companion." petition for certiorari, that they bought the property not from
All this time, title to the property remained in petitioner's petitioner, but from their "co-defendants who had a defective
name, as respondents have not registered the unnotarized and title" — presumably Perez and the impostor.
undated Deed of Absolute Sale. The allegations in respondents' pleadings are certainly
Petitioner instituted against respondents and Perez with the revealing. They already knew petitioner's identity and how she
RTC of Las Piñas City a Complaint for "ANNULMENT OF looked, having met her even before the filing of the complaint
AGREEMENT AND DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE, SPECIFIC — when petitioner confronted them and they showed her the
PERFORMANCE, WITH DAMAGES." agreement and deed of sale. Thus, they should not have
Respondent prayed for the dismissal of the complaint, and by referred to the supposed seller as "another person herein
way of counterclaim, sought indemnity. named as 'Jane Doe' whose identity is yet to be established
After pre-trial and presentation of petitioner's evidence who introduced herself as Ruby Ruth Serrano" or "the person
respondents filed a Demurrer to Evidence, arguing that the who introduced herself as Ruby Ruth Serrano" if indeed it was
complaint failed to state a cause of action in that petitioner petitioner herself who appeared and signed the agreement
failed to allege that respondents were purchasers in bad faith and deed of sale in question. They should have categorically
or with notice of a defect in the title alleged that they bought the property from petitioner herself
RTC: DENIED the demurrer for lack of merit. if indeed this was so. Their ambiguous allegations constitute a
CA: NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE RTC Decision. DISMISSED Private negative pregnant, which is in effect an admission.
respondents' complaint for Annulment of Agreement and Evidently, this particular denial had the earmark of what is
Deed of Absolute Sale, Specific Performance with Damages for called in the law on pleadings as a negative pregnant, that is, a
lack of cause of action. Private respondents indeed failed to denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in
allege that petitioners were in bad faith. . . . Thus, absent an the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It
allegation in the subject complaint that petitioners were in bad was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at.
faith or with notice of the vendor's misrepresentation at the Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative
time of sale or prior thereto, they are presumed to be innocent expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least an
purchasers for value of the subject property. implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a
ISSUE: 1. WON CA was correct in granting the demurrer to denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts
evidence alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying
2. WON failure to allege bad faith in the complaint is a fatal or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so
defect qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that
HELD: 1. NO. In granting demurrer, the CA failed to consider the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact
that title to the property remained in petitioner's name; TCT itself is admitted.
85533 was never cancelled and no new title was issued in "If an allegation is not specifically denied or the denial is a
respondents' name. As a matter of fact, what respondents did negative pregnant, the allegation is deemed admitted."
when petitioner annotated her affidavit of loss upon TCT "Where a fact is alleged with some qualifying or modifying
85533 was to cause the annotation of an "affidavit of non-loss" language, and the denial is conjunctive, a 'negative pregnant'
afterward. exists, and only the qualification or modification is denied,
Since a new title was never issued in respondents' favor and, while the fact itself is admitted." "A denial in the form of a
instead, title remained in petitioner's name, the former never negative pregnant is an ambiguous pleading, since it cannot be
came within the coverage and protection of the Torrens ascertained whether it is the fact or only the qualification that
system, where the issue of good or bad faith becomes relevant. is intended to be denied." "Profession of ignorance about a
Since respondents never acquired a new certificate of title in fact which is patently and necessarily within the pleader's
their name, the issue of their good or bad faith which is central knowledge, or means of knowing as ineffectual, is no denial at
in an annulment of title case is of no consequence; petitioner's all."
case is for annulment of the Agreement and Deed of Absolute Thus, the CA's pronouncement — that nowhere in the
Sale, and not one to annul title since the certificate of title is complaint is it alleged that respondents were purchasers in
still in her name. bad faith — is patently erroneous. The primary ground for

reversing the trial court's denial of respondents' demurrer is [Whether the plaintiff’s failure to verify his Reply (wherein the
therefore completely unfounded. Besides, the action itself, validity of the Special Power of Attorney is put into question)
which is grounded on forgery, necessarily presupposes the is an implied admission of its genuineness and due execution?]
existence of bad faith. RULING: NO. The Court could not yield to such an argument
G.R. No. 169548 March 15, 2010 considering that a rigid application of the pertinent provisions
TITAN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. of the Rules of Court will not be given premium when it would
MANUEL A. DAVID, SR. and MARTHA S. DAVID, obstruct rather than serve the broader interest of justice.
Respondent Titan claimed that because Manuel failed to specifically deny
the genuineness and due execution of the SPA in his Reply, he
PETITION FOR REVIEW is deemed to have admitted the veracity of said document, in
DOCTRINE: accordance with Rule 8, Sections 7 and 8 of the Rules of Court.
Where a party acted in complete disregard of or wholly On this point, we fully concur with the findings of the CA that:
overlooked Section 8, Rule 8 and did not object to the It is true that the reply filed by Manuel alleging that the special
introduction and admission of evidence questioning the power of attorney is a forgery was not made under oath.
genuineness and due execution of a document, he must be However, the complaint, which was verified by Manuel under
deemed to have waived the benefits of said Rule. oath, alleged that the sale of the subject property executed by
Consequently, Titan is deemed to have waived the mantle of his wife, Martha, in favor of Titan was without his knowledge,
protection given by Section 8, Rule 8. consent, and approval, express or implied; and that there is
FACTS: nothing on the face of the deed of sale that would show that
Manuel A. David, Sr. (Manuel) and Martha S. David (Martha) he gave his consent thereto. In Toribio v. Bidin, it was held that
were married on March 25, 1957. The spouses acquired a 602 where the verified complaint alleged that the plaintiff never
square meter lot was registered in the name of "MARTHA S. sold, transferred or disposed their share in the inheritance left
DAVID married to Manuel A. David”. by their mother to others, the defendants were placed on
The spouses separated de facto. Later on, Manuel discovered adequate notice that they would be called upon during trial to
that Martha had previously sold the property to Titan prove the genuineness or due execution of the disputed deed
Construction Corporation (Titan). of sale. While Section 8, Rule 8 is mandatory, it is a discovery
Manuel filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract and procedure and must be reasonably construed to attain its
Recovenyance against Titan. Manuel alleged that the sale purpose, and in a way as not to effect a denial of substantial
executed by Martha in favor of Titan was without his justice. The interpretation should be one which assists the
knowledge and consent, and therefore void. He prayed that parties in obtaining a speedy, inexpensive, and most
the property be reconveyed to the spouses, and that a new important, a just determination of the disputed issues.
title be issued in their names. Moreover, during the pre-trial, Titan requested for stipulation
In its Answer with Counterclaim, Titan claimed that it was a that the special power of attorney was signed by Manuel
buyer in good faith and for value because it relied on a Special authorizing his wife to sell the subject property, but Manuel
Power of Attorney (SPA) signed by Manuel which authorized refused to admit the genuineness of said special power of
Martha to dispose of the property on behalf of the spouses. attorney and stated that he is presenting an expert witness to
Titan thus prayed for the dismissal of the complaint. prove that his signature in the special power of attorney is a
In his unverified Reply, Manuel claimed that the SPA was forgery. However, Titan did not register any objection x x x.
spurious, and that the signature purporting to be his was a Furthermore, Titan did not object to the presentation of Atty.
forgery; hence, Martha was wholly without authority to sell Desiderio Pagui, who testified as an expert witness, on his
the property. Report finding that the signature on the special power of
RTC issued a Decision in which it invalidated both the Deed of attorney was not affixed by Manuel based on his analysis of
Sale. It ordered Titan to reconvey the property to Martha and the questioned and standard signatures of the latter, and even
Manuel. It ruled that the property was conjugal in character cross-examined said witness. Neither did Titan object to the
since it was purchased by Manuel and Martha with conjugal admission of said Report when it was offered in evidence by
funds during their marriage. The name of "MARTHA S. DAVID Manuel on the ground that he is barred from denying his
x x x married to Manuel A. David" did not negate the property's signature on the special power of attorney. In fact, Titan
conjugal nature admitted the existence of said Report and objected only to the
CA affirmed the Decision of the trial court. purpose for which it was offered. In Central Surety & Insurance
Titan claimed that because Manuel failed to specifically deny Company v. C.N. Hodges, it was held that where a party acted
the genuineness and due execution of the SPA in his Reply, he in complete disregard of or wholly overlooked Section 8, Rule
is deemed to have admitted the veracity of said document, in 8 and did not object to the introduction and admission of
accordance with Rule 8, Sections 7 and 8 of the Rules of Court. evidence questioning the genuineness and due execution of a
ISSUE: Whether or not Manuel is deemed to have admitted the document, he must be deemed to have waived the benefits of
genuineness and due execution of the SPA due to his failure to said Rule. Consequently, Titan is deemed to have waived the
file a verified reply? mantle of protection given by Section 8, Rule 8.

HEIRS OF NAZARIO VS. ESPINOSA impleaded in the case. Said subsequent pleading was
GR 229463, NOV. 29, 2019 dismissed onthe ground of finality of the decision.
G.R. No. 158819 April 16, 2009
FACTS: ANTERO LUISTRO, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
Spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante deceased,were FIRST GAS POWER CORPORATION, Respondents.
the registered owners of a parcel of land located. Marcelino
Doronio and Fortunato Doronio, deceased, were the children DOCTRINE: In all averments of fraud or mistake, the
of the spouses and the parties in this case are their heirs. circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be stated
Petitioners are the heirs of Marcelino Doronio, while with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge or other
respondents are the heirs of Fortunato Doronio. Eager to condition of the mind of a person may be averred generally.
obtain the entire property, the heirs of Marcelino Doronio and FACTS: Respondent First Gas entered into a Contract of
Veronica Pico filed before the RTC in Urdaneta, Pangasinana Easement of Right-of-Way with Antero Luistro (petitioner),
petition "For the Registration of a Private Deed of owner of a parcel of land located in Lemery, Batangas. Under
Donation"docketed as Petition Case No. U-920. No the Contract, petitioner granted respondent perpetual
respondents were named in the said petition although notices easement over a portion of his property for the erection of the
of hearing were posted on the bulletin boards of Barangay transmission line tower and a 25-year easement portion of the
Cabalitaan, Municipalities of Asingan and Lingayen. During the property for the right to pass overhead line cables.
hearings, no one interposed an objection to the petition. After Petitioner filed a complaint for "Rescission/Amendment And
the RTC ordered a general default, the petition was eventually Or Modification of Contract Of Easement With Damages,"
granted on September 22, 1993. This led to the registration of against respondent. Petitioner alleged that respondent, by
the deed of donation, cancellation of OCT No. 352 and issuance means of fraud and machinations of words, was able to
of anew Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 44481 in the convince him to enter into the Contract. Petitioner alleged that
names of Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico. Thus, the he entered into the Contract under misrepresentation,
entire property was titled in the names of petitioners’ promises, false and fraudulent assurances, and tricks of
predecessors. On April 28, 1994,the heirs of Fortunato Doronio respondent. He alleged that the powerful 230 kilovolts passing
filed a pleading before the RTC in the form of a petition in the the transmission wire/line continuously endanger the lives,
same Petition Case No. U-920. The petition was for the limbs, and properties of petitioner and his family.
reconsideration of the decision of the RTC that ordered the Respondent filed MD on the ground that petitioner failed to
registration of the subject deed of donation. It was prayed in state a cause of action in his complaint.
the petition that an order be issued declaring null and void the RTC: Denied the MD and directed defendants to file their
registration of the private deed of donation and that TCT No. respective answers within ten days from receipt of the order.
44481 be cancelled. However, the petition was dismissed on Respondent filed MR which the trial court also denied.
the ground that the decision in Petition Case No. U-920 had Respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the CA
already become final as it was not appealed. assailing the Orders of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents be can bound by the CA: The alleged right of petitioner as stated in the complaint
decision in Petition Case No. U-920 even if they were not made did not exist and was without any basis. The CA further ruled
parties in the said case? that it could not sustain the allegation of fraud because
HELD: Petitioners cannot use the finality of the RTC decision in petitioner failed to state with particularity the circumstances
Petition Case No. U-920 as a shield against the verification of constituting the alleged fraud.
the validity of the deed of donation. According to petitioners, ISSUE: Whether the complaint alleges fraud with particularity
the said final decision is one for quieting of title. In other as required under Section 5, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
words, it is a case for declaratory relief under Rule 64 (now Procedure.
Rule 63) of the Rules of Court. Suits to quiet title are not RULING: NO. The complaint falls short of the requirement that
technically suits in rem, nor are they, strictly speaking, in fraud must be stated with particularity. The complaint merely
personam, but being against the person in respect of the res, states that the consolidator-facilitator of the Defendants, by
these proceedings are characterized as quasi in rem. The means of fraud and machinations of words, were able to
judgment in such proceedings is conclusive only between the convince the plaintiff to enter into the contract. That the said
parties. Thus, respondents are not bound by the decision in contract was entered into by the plaintiff under the
Petition Case No. U-920 as they were not made parties in the "misrepresentation, promises, false and fraudulent assurances
said case.The rules on quieting of title expressly provide that and tricks" of the defendants. Furthermore, a review of the
any declaration in a suit to quiet title shall not prejudice Contract shows that its contents were explained to petitioner.
persons who are not parties to the action. That respondents Thus, there is clearly no basis for the allegation that petitioner
filed a subsequent pleading in the same Petition Case No. U- only signed the Contract because of fraud perpetrated by
920 after the decision there had become final did not change respondent.
the fact that said decision became final without their being CAPITOL MOTORS CORPORATIONS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
NEMESIO I. YABUT, defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. L-28140 March 19, 1970 deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the
instrument; hence, the same are deemed admitted. (Section 8,
FACTS: 45 Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of Court)
Capitol filed a complaint against Yabut. Second. Defendant-appellant did not oppose the motion for
It was averred that defendant executed in favor of the plaintiff judgment on the pleadings filed by plaintiff appellee; neither
a promissory note that it was stipulated should the defendant has he filed a motion for reconsideration of the order, which
fail to pay two (2) successive installments, the principal sum deemed the case submitted for decision on the pleadings, or
remaining unpaid would immediately become due and of the decision rendered.
demandable. SPECIFIC DENIAL – WITHOUT SUFFICIENT KNOWLEDGE OR
Defendant defaulted, despite demands by the plaintiff, the INFORMATION
defendant failed and refused to pay. Prayer was made that the The doctrine in Warner Barnes & Co., Ltd. was reiterated in J.
defendant be ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P. Juan & Sons, Inc. vs. Lianga Industries, Inc., And in Sy-quia
P30,754.79, as well as the interest due thereon, and an vs. Marsman, , this Court said:
additional sum equivalent to 25% of the amount due, plus With regard to the plea of lack of knowledge or information set
costs. up in paragraph 3 of the answer, this Court's decision in
The defendant, through his counsel, filed an answer which Warner Barnes vs. Reyes, 103 Phil. 662, 665, is authority for
reads: the proposition that this form of denial must be availed of with
DEFENDANT through counsel alleges: sincerity and good faith, not for the purpose of confusing the
1. Paragraph 1 of the complaint is admitted. other party, nor for purposes of delay. Yet, so lacking in
2. Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the complaint are specifically sincerity and good faith is this part of the answer that
denied for lack of knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to defendants-appellants go to the limit of denying knowledge or
the truth thereof. information as to whether they (defendants) were in the
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Complaint be premises (Marsman Bldg.) on January 4, 1961, as averred in
dismissed with costs against the plaintiff. paragraph 4 of the complaint. Yet whether such a fact was or
The plaintiff filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, on was not true could not be unknown to these defendants.
the ground that the defendant, in his answer, had failed to In National Marketing Corporation vs. De Castro, 106 Phil. 803
deny specifically the material allegations of the complaint, (1959), this Court held:
hence, must be deemed to have admitted them. The Furthermore, in his answer to the appellee's complaint, he
defendant did not file an opposition to the motion. merely alleged that 'he has no knowledge or information
The court issued an order granting the said motion and sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the matters
considering the case submitted for decision on the basis of the contained in paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 so much so that he denies
pleadings; and, the court rendered judgment granting in toto specifically said allegations.' A denial is not specific simply
the plaintiff's prayer in its complaint. because it is so qualified.. Material averments in a complaint,
Hence the defendant filed an appeal. Defendant argues that other than those as to the amount of damage, are deemed
Section 10, Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of Court, recognizes admitted when not specifically denied. (Section 8, Rule 9,) The
three (3) modes of specific denial, namely: (1) by specifying court may render judgment upon the pleadings if material
each material allegation of fact in the complaint the truth of averments in the complaint are admitted.
which the defendant does not admit, and, whenever It becomes evident from all the above doctrines that a mere
practicable, setting forth the substance of the matters which allegation of ignorance of the facts alleged in the complaint, is
he will rely upon to support his denial or (2) by specifying so insufficient to raise an issue; the defendant must aver
much of an averment in the complaint as is true and material positively or state how it is that he is ignorant of the facts so
and denying only the remainder or (3) by stating that the alleged.
defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to Defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of a material averment in the form a belief as to the truth of a material averment in the
complaint, which has the effect of a denial, and he has adopted complaint
the third mode of specific denial, his answer tendered an issue, In Arrojo vs. Caldoza, et al., the defendants, in their answer to
and, consequently the court a quo could not render a valid the complaint for recovery of possession of a parcel of land,
judgment on the pleadings. did not merely allege that they had no knowledge or
ISSUE: Whether or not the answer filed by the defendant’s information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
counsel is one of the modes of denial contemplate in Section material allegations in the complaint, but added the following:
10, Rule 8 "The truth of the matter is that the defendants have not
HELD: There are two other reasons why the present appeal occupied or taken any property belonging to the plaintiff. They
must fail. took possession and ownership only of the land belonging to
them, which properties were possessed and owned originally
First. The present action is founded upon a written instrument by their predecessors-in-interest, who were the parents of the
attached to the complaint, but defendant-appellant failed to defendants ...."

In Benavides vs. Alabastro, , the defendant's answer did not ⁃ Comphil again failed to pay said amount, so to settle Capital
only deny the material allegations of the complaints but also City’s loss, it entered into a third contract with Comphil
set up certain special and affirmative defenses the nature of wherein the latter undertook to sell and deliver and Capital
which called for presentation of evidence. City agreed to buy the same quantity of crude coconut oil to
FAILURE OF DEFENDANT TO OBJECT – DEEMED TO HAVE be delivered in April/May 1979 at the c.i.f. price of
ADMITTED THE ALLEGATIONS US$0.3425/lb.
In Santiago vs. Basilan Lumber Company, , this Court said: CFI: Ordered the issuance of a writ of attachment in favor of
It appears that when the plaintiff moved to have the case Stokely upon the latter's deposit of a bond of
decided on the pleadings, the defendant interposed no P1,285,000.
objection and has practically assented thereto. The defendant, Stokely then filed a motion for reconsideration to reduce the
therefore, is deemed to have admitted the allegations of the attachment bond. The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint, so that there was no necessity for the plaintiff to complaint on
submit evidence of his claim. the ground that Stokely, being a foreign corporation, is not
G.R. No. L-61523 July 31, 1986 licensed to do business in the Philippines, has no
ANTAM CONSOLIDATED, INC., petitioner, personality to maintain the instant suit.
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent. CFI: Denied the motion to dismiss by petitioners on the ground
that the reason cited therein does not appear to be
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI indubitable. Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari.
FACTS: Stokely Van Camp. Inc. filed a complaint against CA: Dimissed petition.
Banahaw Milling Corporation, Antam Consolidated, Inc., - It stated that respondent judge did not commit any grave
Tambunting Trading Corporation, Aurora Consolidated abuse of discretion in deferring the petitioners’ motion to
Securities and Investment Corporation, and United Coconut Oil dismiss because the said judge is not yet satisfied that he has
Mills, Inc. for collection of sum of money. the necessary facts which would permit him to make a
Stokely alleged: judicious resolution.
1. It is a corporation organized and existing under Indiana, - It further ruled that in another case, United Coconut Oil Mills,
U.S.A’s state laws. Inc. and Banahaw Milling Corporation v. Hon. Maximiano C.
2. that Stokely and Capital City were not engaged in business Asuncion and Stokely Van Camp, Inc.,where the facts and
in the Philippines prior to the commencement of the suit so issues raised therein are intrinsically the same as in the case at
that Stokely is not licensed to do business in this country and bar, it has already denied the petition for certiorari filed by
is not required to secure such license. Unicom and Banahaw for lack of merit and the same was
3. that Capital City and Coconut Oil Manufacturing (Phil.) Inc. upheld by the Supreme Court.
(Comphil), entered into a contract wherein Comphil undertook Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration but was
to sell and deliver and Capital City agreed to buy 500 long tons also denied.
of crude coconut oil to be delivered in October/November CA: Dismissed the petition.
1978 at the c.i.f. price of US$0.30/lb. Petioners’ arguments:
- but Comphil failed to deliver the coconut oil so that Capital - Appellate court erred in denying their motion to dismiss since
City covered its coconut oil needs in the open market at a price the ground relied upon by them is clear and indubitable, that
substantially in excess of the contract and sustained a loss of is, that Stokely has no personality to sue.
US$103,600; - They argued that to maintain the suit filed with the trial court,
- to settle Capital City’s loss under the contract, the parties Stokely should have secured the requisite license to do
entered into a second contract wherein Comphil undertook to business in the Philippines because, in fact, it is doing business
buy and Capital City agreed to sell 500 long tons of coconut here.
crude oil under the same terms and conditions but at an They anchor their argument that Stokely is a foreign
increased c.i.f. price of US$0.3925/lb. corporation doing business in the Philippines on the fact that
4. that the second contract states that “it is a wash out against by the Stokely’s own allegations, it has participated in three
the [first contract]” so that Comphil was supposed to transactions, either as a seller or buyer, which are by their
repurchase the undelivered coconut oil at an increased price nature, in the pursuit of the purpose and object for which it
by paying the latter US$103,600 which is the same amount of was organized.
loss that Capital City sustained under the first contract. The test of whether one is doing business or not is “whether
⁃ Comphil again failed to pay said amount, so to settle Capital there is continuity of transactions which are in the pursuance
City’s loss, it entered into a third contract with Comphil of the normal business of the corporation” and that the
wherein the latter undertook to sell and deliver and Capital transactions entered into by respondent undoubtedly fall
City agreed to buy the same quantity of crude coconut oil to within this category.
be delivered in April/May 1979 at the c.i.f. price of ISSUES & RATIO:
US$0.3425/lb. 1. W/N Stokely Van Camp. Inc. has personality to maintain the
suit - YES.

The Supreme Court stated different jurisprudence which foreign companies not engaged in business in the Philippines
defined “doing business in the Philippines.” to invoke lack of capacity to sue.
In Top-Weld Mfg., Inc. v. ECED: The doctrine of lack of capacity to sue based on failure to first
- There is no general rule or governing principle laid down as acquire a local license is based on considerations of sound
to what constitutes 'doing' or 'engaging in' or 'transacting' public policy. It was never intended to favor domestic
business in the Philippines. Each case must be judged in the corporations who enter into solitary transactions with unwary
light of its peculiar circumstances. foreign firms and then repudiate their obligations simply
In Far East International v. Nankay Kogyo: because the latter are not licensed to do business in this
- The acts of corporations should be distinguished from a single country.
or isolated business transaction or occasional, incidental and The petitioners in this case are engaged in the exportation of
casual transactions which do not come within the meaning of coconut oil, an export item so vital in our country's economy.
the law. Where a single act or transaction, however, is not They filed this petition on the ground that Stokely is an
merely incidental or casual but indicates the foreign unlicensed foreign corporation without a bare allegation or
corporation's intention to do other business in the Philippines, showing that their defenses in the collection case are valid and
said single act or transaction constitutes 'doing' or 'engaging meritorious.
in' or 'transacting' business in the Philippines.
In Mentholatum Co. v. Mangaliman: STEELCASE, INC., petitioner, vs. DESIGN SELECTIONS, INC.,
- The term implies a continuity of commercial dealings and respondent.
arrangements, and contemplates, to that extent, the G.R. No. 171995. April 18, 2012, THIRD DIVISION, Mendoza
performance of acts or works or the exercise of some of the J.
functions normally incident to, and in progressive prosecution
of, the purpose and object of its organization. In the case at This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
car, the transactions entered into by Stokely with the FACTS: Petitioner Steelcase, Inc. (Steelcase) is a foreign
petitioners are not a series of commercial dealings which corporation existing under the laws of Michigan, USA and
signify an intent on the part of the respondent to do business engaged in the manufacture of office furniture with dealers
in the Philippines but constitute an isolated one which does worldwide. Respondent Design International Selections, Inc.
not fall under the category or "doing business." (DISI) is a corporation existing under Philippine Laws and
- Records show that the only reason why Stokely entered into engaged in the furniture business, including the distribution of
the second and third transactions with the petitioners was furniture. Sometime in 1986 or 1987, Steelcase and DISI orally
because it wanted to recover the loss it sustained from the entered into a dealership agreement whereby Steelcase
failure of the petitioners to deliver the crude coconut oil under granted DISI the right to market, sell, distribute, install, and
the first transaction and in order to give the latter a chance to service its products to end-user customers within the
make good on their Philippines. The business relationship continued smoothly
obligation. Instead of making an outright demand on the until it was terminated sometime in January 1999 after the
petitioners, the respondent opted to try to push through with agreement was breached with neither party admitting any
the transaction to recover the amount of US$103,600 it lost. fault.
- It can be deduced that, there was only one agreement On January 18, 1999, Steelcase filed a complaint for sum of
between the petitioners and Stokely and that was the delivery money against DISI alleging, among others, that DISI had an
by the former of 500 long tons of crude coconut oil to the unpaid account of US$600,000.00. Steelcase prayed that DISI
latter, who in turn, must pay the corresponding price for the be ordered to pay actual or compensatory damages,
same. exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit. RTC
- The three seemingly different transactions were entered into dismissed the complaint, granted the TRO prayed for by DISI.
by the parties only in an effort to fulfill the basic agreement The RTC stated that in requiring DISI to meet the Dealer
and in no way indicate an intent on the part of the respondent Performance Expectation and in terminating the dealership
to engage in a continuity of transactions with petitioners which agreement with DISI based on its failure to improve its
will categorize it as a foreign corporation doing business in the performance in the areas of business planning, organizational
Philippines. structure, operational effectiveness, and efficiency, Steelcase
Thus, the trial court and the appellate court did not err in unwittingly revealed that it participated in the operations of
denying the petitioners’ motion to dismiss not only DISI.
because the ground thereof does not appear to be indubitable It then concluded that Steelcase was “doing business” in the
but because Stokely, being a foreign corporation not doing Philippines, as contemplated by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7042
business in the Philippines, does not need to obtain a license (The Foreign Investments Act of 1991), and since it did not
to do business in order to have the capacity to sue. have the license to do business in the country, it was barred
The SC agreed with Stokely that it is a common ploy of from seeking redress from our courts until it obtained the
defaulting local companies which are sued by unlicensed requisite license to do so. Its determination was further
bolstered by the appointment by Steelcase of a representative

in the Philippines. Finally, despite a showing that DISI taking advantage of its noncompliance with the statutes
transacted with the local customers in its own name and for its chiefly in cases where such person has received the benefits of
own account, it was of the opinion that any doubt in the factual the contract.
environment should be resolved in favor of a pronouncement The rule is deeply rooted in the time-honored axiom of
that a foreign corporation was doing business in the Commodum ex injuria sua non habere debet — no person
Philippines, considering the twelve-year period that DISI had ought to derive any advantage of his own wrong. This is as it
been distributing Steelcase products in the Philippines. should be for as mandated by law, “every person must in the
Steelcase moved for the reconsideration of the questioned exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
Order but the motion was denied by the RTC which the CA with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
likewise affirmed. good faith.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred finding that DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the March 31, 2005
respondent was estopped from challenging Steelcase's legal Decision of the Court of Appeals and its March 23, 2006
capacity to sue, as an affirmative defense in its answer. Resolution are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The dismissal
RULING: YES. By acknowledging the corporate entity of order of the Regional Trial Court dated November 15, 1999 is
Steelcase and entering into a dealership agreement with it and set aside. Steelcase's Second Amended Complaint is ordered
even benefiting from it, DISI is estopped from questioning ADMITTED. The case is REMANDED to the RTC for appropriate
Steelcase's existence and capacity to sue. action. SO ORDERED.
This Court has time and again upheld the principle that a
foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines without a G.R. No. L-35645 May 22, 1985
license may still sue before the Philippine courts a Filipino or a UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET. AL., Petitioners, vs. HON.
Philippine entity that had derived some bene􏰁t from their V.M. RUIZ and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN & CO., INC.,
contractual arrangement because the latter is considered to be Respondents
estopped from challenging the personality of a corporation
after it had acknowledged the said corporation by entering PETITION FOR REVIEW
into a contract with it. DOCTRINE: “The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a
Unquestionably, entering into a dealership agreement with State from being sued in the courts of another State without
Steelcase charged DISI with the knowledge that Steelcase was its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of
not licensed to engage in business activities in the Philippines. the principles of independence and equality of States.
This Court has carefully combed the records and found no However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they
proof that, from the inception of the dealership agreement in are constantly developing and evolving. And because the
1986 until September 1998, DISI even brought to Steelcase’s activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to
attention that it was improperly doing business in the distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental acts
Philippines without a license. It was only towards the latter (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts
part of 1998 that DISI deemed it necessary to inform Steelcase (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends
of the impropriety of the conduct of its business without the only to acts jure imperii.”
requisite Philippine license. It should, however, be noted that FACTS
DISI only raised the issue of the absence of a license with The United States of America (US) had a naval base in Subic. It
Steelcase after it was informed that it owed the latter invited a submission of bids for projects involving the repair of
US$600,000.00 for the sale and delivery of its products under wharves or shoreline. Private respondent Eligio de Guzman &
their special credit arrangement. Co., Inc. submitted their bids. In response, US requested it to
By acknowledging the corporate entity of Steelcase and confirm its price proposals [whether or not his constitutes
entering into a dealership agreement with it and even acceptance has not been determined, as this issue has not
benefiting from it, DISI is estopped from questioning reached the trial stage]. However, the company did not qualify
Steelcase’s existence and capacity to sue. due to its unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair
A foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines may contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the US Naval
sue in Philippine Courts although not authorized to do business Station in Subic Bay.
here against a Philippine citizen or entity who had contracted The company thus filed a complaint against the petitioners
with and benefited by said corporation. To put it in another alleging that the US had already accepted its bids. Petitioners
way, a party is estopped to challenge the personality of a entered a special appearance questioning the jurisdiction of
corporation after having acknowledged the same by entering the court over the subject matter of the complaint and the
into a contract with it. And the doctrine of estoppel to deny persons of the defendants, alleging that as a foreign sovereign,
corporate existence applies to a foreign as well as to domestic the US enjoys sovereign immunity. The Regional Trial Court
corporations. One who has dealt with a corporation of foreign denied the contention.
origin as a corporate entity is estopped to deny its corporate ISSUE: Whether or not the US is covered by state immunity in
existence and capacity: The principle will be applied to prevent this case (YES).
a person contracting with a foreign corporation from later RULING

Under the restrictive application of doctrine of sovereign is not one of the grounds wherein the court may dismiss an
immunity, when proceedings arise out of commercial action motu proprio on the basis of the pleadings.
transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities Where the defendant fails to challenge the venue in a motion
or economic affairs (acts jure gestionis), it is not covered by the to dismiss, and allows the trial to be held, and a decision
said doctrine. rendered, he cannot on appeal or in a special action be
However, in this case, the projects are an integral part of the permitted to belatedly challenge the wrong venue.
naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the US and In the instant case, the respondent, despite proper service of
the Philippines – a function of the government of the highest summons, failed to file an answer and was thus declared in
order. Therefore, the US is covered by the doctrine of default by the trial court. Verily, having been declared in
sovereign immunity and cannot be made the subject of this default, he lost his standing in court and his right to adduce
suit. evidence and present his defense, including his right to
question the propriety of the venue of the action.
UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION, V. ALBERT LIM,
DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE “NEW H-R FELICISSIMA GALINDO, NESTOR GALINDO, BEATRIZ
GROCERY” GALINDO, CATALINA GALINDO, DANILO GALINDO,
G.R. NO. 154338; OCTOBER 5, 2007 LIBRADA GALINDO, CESAR GALINDO, JUANITA GALINDO
RIVERA and/or THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MEYCAUAYAN,
FACTS: BULACAN, petitioners,
There is an existing contract of sale between Universal Robina vs. HEIRS OF MARCIANO A. ROXAS, represented by
Corporation, the petitioner, and Albert Lim, the Reginald S. Roxas, respondents
respondent.The principal office of the petitioner is in Pasig
City, while the respondent is from Laoag City. PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45
Pursuant to this contract, the petitioner sold to the respondent DOCTRINE: A deceased person does not have such legal entity
grocery products. After tendering partial payments, the as is necessary to bring action so much so that a motion to
respondent refused to settle his obligations despite repeated substitute cannot lie and should be denied by the court. An
demands from the petitioner. action begun by a decedent's estate cannot be said to have
The petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court, Quezon been begun by a legal person, since an estate is not a legal
City, a complaint against the respondent for a sum of money. entity; such an action is a nullity and a motion to amend the
The trial court dismissed the complaint on grounds of lack of party plaintiff will not, likewise, lie, there being nothing before
jurisdiction and improper venue. the court to amend. Considering that capacity to be sued is a
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, and correlative of the capacity to sue, to the same extent, a
amended the complaint alleging that the parties agreed that decedent does not have the capacity to be sued and may not
the proper venue for any dispute relative to the transaction is be named a party defendant in a court action.
Quezon City. FACTS:
Summons was served upon the respondent, but he failed to Republic of the Philippines sold the land to Galindo payable in
file an answer seasonably. Upon the motion of the petitioner, installments. When Gregorio died, his only heirs sold the rights
the trial court declared the respondent in default. over the subject property to Mariano Roxas. Urbano Galindo,
The trial court once again dismissed the complaint on the being a minor, did not sign the contract between the parties.
ground of improper venue. The stipulation agreeing that the In the said document, the signatories thereto obligated
venue shall be in Quezon City was not admitted to have been themselves to transfer the land to Marciano A. Roxas as soon
signed by the respondent. as it would become feasible to do so, and as security that
ISSUE: Urbano Galindo would ratify the same upon reaching the age
Whether or not the trial court may dismiss the complaint on of majority, Florencio Galindo ceded to Marciano A. Roxas title
the ground of improper venue. to Lot 833. Since the
HELD: execution of the document Exhibit "B"-deposition, possession
YES. Sections 2 and 4, Rule 4 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and enjoyment of Lot 1048 were immediately transferred to
provides that the plaintiff may commence an action either in Marciano A. Roxas but the possession and enjoyment of Lot
the place of his residence or the place where the defendant 833, although given as security by Florencio Galindo,
resides. The parties may agree to a specific venue which could remained in the latter.
not be in a place where neither of them resides. When Marciano A. Roxas died intestate on, he was survived by
Section 1, Rule 9 of the same Rules provides that when the his widow, Cirila Roxas and their 9 children. They filed an action
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, it shall for specific performance against the petitioners before CFI
dismiss the claim. Implicit from the above provision is that Bulacan to compel the latter to execute a deed of absolute sale
improper venue not impleaded in the motion to dismiss or in over a lot located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan.
the answer is deemed waived. Thus, a court may not dismiss RTC ruled in favor of herein petitioners. CA affirmed this
an action motu proprio on the ground of improper venue as it judgment.

During the pendency of the case, Urbano died intestate. He G.R. No. 212050, January 15, 2020
was survived by Felicissima and their children.
Thereafter, Heirs of Roxas through Reginald filed a complaint FACTS: 45
against the petitioners before RTC for annulment of SCPL is an Australian corporation which operates the Star City
documents, cancellation of title and damages with prayer for Casino in Sydney and is not doing business in the Philippines
writ of preliminary injunction. The complaint alleged, inter alia, and is suing for an isolated transaction. It filed through its
that: Reginald S. Roxas was the representative of the heirs of attorney-in-fact, Jimeno and Cope Law Offices, a complaint for
Marciano Roxas. collection of sum of money with prayer for preliminary
The defendants moved for the dismissal of the case on the attachment against x x x Llorente, who was a patron of its Star
grounds that petitioner has no capacity to sue since there was City casino and Equitable PCI Bank before the RTC.
no allegation in the complaint authorizing Reginald to file a SCPL alleged that Llorente is one of the numerous patrons of
complaint against them; and the action is barred by state of its casino in Sydney. He negotiated 2 Equitable PCI bank drafts
limitations. worth US $150,000.00 each in order to play in the Premium
RTC denied the motion to dismiss. It ruled that based on the Programme of the casino. SCPL contacted EPCIB to check the
plaintiffs' allegation in the complaint that they were the status of the subject drafts and the latter confirmed that the
legitimate children of the deceased Marciano Roxas, such same were issued on clear funds without any stop payment
plaintiffs are the real parties-in-interest. On the second orders. Thus, Llorente was allowed to buy in on a Premium
ground, the trial court ruled that the complaint of the plaintiffs Programme and his front money account in the casino was
was an action for quieting of title, the prescriptive period for credited with US $300,000.00.
which commenced only in 1998. SCPL deposited the subject drafts however it received a "Stop
Issue: WON the respondents have the capacity to sue (NO) Payment Order" prompting it to make several demands upon
Ruling: As gleaned from the averments of the complaint, of the Llorente. However, the latter refused to pay. It likewise asked
nine plaintiffs, six are already deceased, namely, Maximiano EPCIB for a settlement which the latter denied.
Roxas, Benjamin Roxas, Eleazar Roxas, Prescilla Roxas-de Perio, The RTC deemed it proper to grant and issue a writ of
Virginia Roxas-Santos and Uriel Roxas. There is no allegation in preliminary attachment.
the complaint that a special proceeding to settle the estate of Llorente countered that the case should be dismissed on the
the said deceased had been filed and was pending. Indeed, ground that [SCPL] lacks the legal capacity to sue since the
neither a dead person nor his estate may be a party-plaintiff in "isolated transaction rule" for which it anchored its right to
a court action. bring action in our courts presupposes that the transaction
In fine, the deceased Maximiano, Benjamin, Eleazar and Uriel, subject matter of the complaint must have occurred in the
all surnamed Roxas, Prescilla Roxas-de Perio and Virginia Philippines, which however, is not the situation at bar since it
Roxas-Santos have no capacity to sue and may not be sued as is clear from the narration that the same occurred in Australia.
parties-plaintiffs. Neither does respondent Reginald Roxas EPCIB, in its Answer, which among other alleged SCPL's lack of
have the capacity to represent the said deceased as party- personality to sue before Philippine courts.
plaintiff, nor is there any allegation in the complaint that Lydia The RTC held both Llorente and EPCIB solidarily liable to the
Roxas, Elisa Medina and Fortunato Roxas are of legal age and value of the subject drafts. It found that SCPL had the legal
have the capacity to sue. capacity to sue.
While it may be true that the respondents prayed, in their On appeal filed by Llorente and EPPCIB, the CA absolved the
complaint, that the said deed and TCT No. 335593(M) be liability only as against EPCIB and again ruled that SCPL had the
nullified by the court, it cannot thereby be concluded that the legal capacity to sue.
action of the respondents was for the enforcement of the It held that SCPL a foreign corporation not doing business in
decision of the CFI in Civil Case No. 1067. The respondents, in the Philippines suing upon a singular and isolated transaction
fact, did not pray, in their complaint, that the petitioners be — which sufficiently clothed it the necessary legal capacity to
ordered to execute a deed of absolute sale over the property sue in this jurisdiction. The CA emphasized that the subject
as decreed in the decision of the CFI in Civil Case No. 1067; that drafts were drawn by EPCIB, which is a Philippine bank, and
the property covered by the said title be reconveyed to them; since the drawer is a bank organized and existing in the
or that a new title over the property be issued to under their Philippines then naturally a suit on the draft or check it issued
names as owners thereof. The plea of the respondents for the can be filed in any of the places where the check is drawn,
nullification of the said deed and title is but the consequences issued, delivered or dishonored, which, in this case, can be
of and incidental to their plea that their ownership over the lot either the Philippines where the drafts were drawn and issued,
be not clouded by the contrary claim of the petitioners. It must or Australia where the indorsement and dishonor happened
be stressed that an action to quiet title is imprescriptible. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in finding that SCPL has
legal capacity to sue under the isolated transaction rule
QUINTIN ARTACHO LLORENTE, PETITIONER, v. STAR CITY HELD: The CA has correctly ruled that SCPL has personality to
PTY LIMITED, REPRESENTED BY THE JIMENO AND COPE sue before Philippine courts under the isolated transaction
LAW OFFICES AS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, RESPONDENT. rule: the ultimate fact that a foreign corporation is not doing

business in the Philippines must first be disclosed for it to be Philippines, it is duly licensed or if it is not, it is suing upon a
allowed to sue in Philippine courts under the isolated singular and isolated transaction, is an essential part of the
transaction rule element of the plaintiffs capacity to sue and must be
In the case at bar, [SCPL] alleged in its complaint that "it is a affirmatively pleaded.
foreign corporation which operates its business at the Star City
Casino in Sydney, New South Wales, Australia; that it is not G.R. NO. 176014 Sept. 17, 2009
doing business in the Philippines; and that it is suing upon a ALICE VITANGCOL and NORBERTO VITANGCOL,
singular and isolated transaction". Having pleaded these Petitioners, v. NEW VISTA PROPERTIES, INC., MARIA
averments in the complaint sufficiently clothed [SCPL] the ALIPIT, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CALAMBA,
necessary legal capacity to sue before Philippine courts LAGUNA, and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
Besides, it is observed that defendant Llorente in [his] answer Respondents.
pleaded [an] affirmative relief for damages from plaintiff
[SCPL] by way of a counterclaim. This is contrary to his position PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 45
that plaintiff has no capacity to sue in the Philippines because FACTS: Maria and Clemente A. Alipit, with the marital consent
such contention likewise entails that plaintiff may be sued in of the latter's wife, executed SPA constituting Milagros A. De
the Philippines as defendant Llorente also prayed for Guzman as their attorney-in-fact to sell property was
affirmative relief against the plaintiff. He is deemed to have denominated as Lot No. 1735. De Guzman executed a Deed of
admitted the capacity of plaintiff to be subject of our judicial Absolute Sale conveying to New Vista the property.
process. It would be unfair to rule that plaintiff may be sued in New Vista immediately entered the subject lot, fenced it with
the Philippines without at the same time allowing it to sue on cement posts and barbed wires, and posted a security guard to
an isolated transaction here. deter trespassers. New Vista learned that the parcel of land it
Under Republic Act No. (RA) 11232 or the Revised Corporation paid for and occupied was being claimed by petitioners
Code of the Philippines (Revised Corporation Code), which Vitangcol.
became effective on February 23, 2019, the pertinent The TCT in favor of New Vista was canceled and TCT was issued
provision is Section 150, which states: in its stead in favor of Vitangcol.
SEC. 150. Doing Business Without a License. - No foreign New Vista: filed a notice of adverse claim over TCT in favor of
corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a Vitangcol, followed by commencing a suit for quieting of title
license, or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to before the RTC in Calamba Citty. It prayed, among others, for
maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any the cancellation of Vitangcol's TCT and that it be declared the
court or administrative agency of the Philippines; but such absolute owner of the subject lot.
corporation may be sued or proceeded against before Vitangcol: moved to dismiss the complaint which New Vista
Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any valid cause duly opposed.
of action recognized under Philippine laws. New Vista filed an amended complaint. Unlike in its original
ISOLATED TRANSACTION RULE complaint, New Vista's amended complaint did not have, as
The law (presently the Revised Corporation Code or its attachment, the June 18, 1989 SPA. It, however, averred that
predecessor, the Corporation Code) grants to foreign Clemente and Maria Alipit had ratified and validated the sale
corporations with Philippine license the right to sue in the of Lot No. 1702 covered by a TCT
Philippines, the Court, however, in a long line of cases under Vitangcol filed a motion to dismiss, followed by a similar
the regime of the Corporation Code has held that a foreign motion dated August 29, 2003 interposed by Maria Alipit
corporation not engaged in business in the Philippines may not which New Vista countered with an opposition.
be denied the right to file an action in the Philippine courts for RTC: The trial court denied Vitangcol's and Maria Alipit's
an isolated transaction. The issue on whether a foreign separate motions to dismiss the amended complaint.
corporation which does not have license to engage in business Vitangcol sought reconsideration which the RTC granted and
in the Philippines can seek redress in Philippine courts depends dismissed the amended complaint.
on whether it is doing business or it merely entered into an RTC made much of the fact that New Vista did not
isolated transaction. A foreign corporation that is not doing attach the SPA to the amended complaint. To the RTC, this
business in the Philippines must disclose such fact if it desires omission is fatal to New Vista's cause of action for quieting of
to sue in Philippine courts under the "isolated transaction rule" title.
because without such disclosure, the court may choose to
deny it the right to sue. CA: The CA faulted the RTC for dismissing the amended
ISOLATED TRANSACTION MUST BE DISCLOSED OR IN THE complaint, observing that it was absurd for the RTC to require
COMPLAINT a copy of the SPA which was not even mentioned in the
The right and capacity to sue, being, to a great extent, matters amended complaint. CA ruled that even if the SPA were
of pleading and procedure, depend upon the sufficiency of the considered, still the discrepancy thereof relative to the deed of
allegations in the complaint. Thus, as to a foreign corporation, absolute sale in terms of lot and title numbers is evidentiary in
the qualifying circumstance that if it is doing business in the nature and is simply a matter of defense, and not a ground to

dismiss the amended complaint. CA held that the real question dismiss based on the fact that the complaint, on the face
in the case boiled down as to whose title is genuine or thereof, evidently states no cause of action.
spurious, which is obviously a triable issue of fact which can FACTS: Complainants lodged a formal complaint with the NBI
only be threshed out in a trial on the merits.CA denied for violation of PD No. 49 (Decree on the Protection of
Vitangcol's motion for reconsideration. Intellectual Property), as amended, and sought its assistance
ISSUE/S: Whether the Amended Complaint sufficiently states in their anti-film piracy drive. NBI Agents and private
a cause of action, thus should NOT be dismissed. (YES) researchers made discreet surveillance on various video
HELD: establishments in Metro Manila including Sunshine Home
Court ruled that the amended complaint sufficiently states a Video Inc. (Sunshine for brevity), owned and operated by
cause of action. Danilo A. Pelindario
Lack of cause of action is not a ground for a dismissal of the NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes applied for a search warrant
complaint through a motion to dismiss under Rule 16, for the with the court a quo against Sunshine seeking the seizure,
determination of a lack of cause of action can only be made among others, of pirated video tapes of copyrighted films all of
during and/or after trial. In a motion to dismiss for failure to which were enumerated in a list attached to the application;
state a cause of action, the focus is on the sufficiency, not the and, television sets, video cassettes and/or laser disc
veracity, of the material allegations. The test of sufficiency of recordings equipment and other machines and paraphernalia
facts alleged in the complaint constituting a cause of action lies used or intended to be used in the unlawful exhibition,
on whether or not the showing, reproduction, sale, lease or disposition of videograms
court, admitting the facts alleged, could render a valid tapes in the premises above described.
verdict in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. To The search warrant was served to Sunshine and/or their
sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, it must representatives. In the course of the search, the NBI Agents
be shown that the claim for relief in the complaint does not found and seized various video tapes of duly copyrighted
exist, rather than that a claim has been defectively stated, or is motion pictures/films owned or exclusively distributed by
ambiguous, indefinite, or uncertain. private complainants, and machines, equipment, television
The trial court erred in ruling that, taking said SPA into sets, paraphernalia, materials, accessories all of which were
account, the amended complaint stated no cause of action. included in the receipt for properties accomplished by the
Indeed, upon a consideration of the amended complaint, its raiding team. Copy of the receipt was furnished and/or
annexes, with the June 18, 1989 SPA thus submitted, the Court tendered to Mr. Danilo A. Pelindario, registered owner-
is inclined, in the main, to agree with the appellate court that proprietor of Sunshine Home Video.
the amended complaint sufficiently states a cause of action. A "Return of Search Warrant" was filed with the Court.
[G.R. No. 110318. August 28, 1996.] A "Motion To Lift the Order of Search Warrant" was filed but
COLUMBIA PICTURES, INC., ORION PICTURES was later denied for lack of merit
CORPORATION, PARAMOUNT PICTURES CORPORATION, A Motion for reconsideration of the Order of denial was filed
TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX FILM CORPORATION, UNITED and was granted by the court a quo .
ARTISTS CORPORATION, UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC., CA: Petitioners appealed but was dismissed and the motion for
THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY, and WARNER BROTHERS, reconsideration thereof was denied.
INC., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SUNSHINE HOME Hence, this petition was brought to this Court particularly
VIDEO, INC. and DANILO A. PELINDARIO, respondents. challenging the validity of respondent court's retroactive
application of the ruling in 20th Century Fox Film Corporation
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI vs. Court of Appeals, et al., in dismissing petitioners' appeal
DOCTRINE: Lack of legal capacity to sue means that the plaintiff and upholding the quashal of the search warrant by the trial
is not in the exercise of his civil rights, or does not have the court.
necessary qualification to appear in the case, or does not have ISSUE: WON petitioner has personality to sue.
the character or representation he claims. On the other hand, HELD: YES. There is no showing that petitioners are doing,
a case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof transacting, engaging in or carrying on business in the
that the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, hence Philippines as would require obtention of a license before they
grounded on failure to state a cause of action. The term "lack can seek redress from our courts. No evidence has been
of capacity to sue" should not be confused with the term "lack offered to show that petitioners have performed any of the
of personality to sue." While the former refers to a plaintiff's enumerated acts or any other specific act indicative of an
general disability to sue, such as on account of minority, intention to conduct or transact business in the Philippines.
insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality or any Any foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines may
other general disqualifications of a party, the latter refers to maintain an action in our courts upon any cause of action,
the fact that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest. provided that the subject matter and the defendant are within
Correspondingly, the first can be a ground for a motion to the jurisdiction of the court. It is not the absence of the
dismiss based on the ground of lack of legal capacity to sue, prescribed license but "doing business" in the Philippines
whereas the second can be used as a ground for a motion to without such license which debars the foreign corporation

from access to our courts. In other words, although a foreign this ground in his answer. It was only at the pre-trial
corporation is without license to transact business in the conference, that the relationship of petitioner Gaudencio
Philippines, it does not follow that it has no capacity to bring Guerrero and respondent Hernando was noted by respondent
an action. Such license is not necessary if it is not engaged in Judge they being married to half-sisters hence are brothers-in-
business in the Philippines. law, and on the basis thereof respondent Judge ordered
Among the grounds for a motion to dismiss under the Rules of petitioner "to file his motion and amended complaint" to
Court are lack of legal capacity to sue and that the complaint allege that the parties were very close relatives, their
states no cause of action. Lack of legal capacity to sue means respective wives being sisters, and that the complaint to be
that the plaintiff is not in the exercise of his civil rights, or does maintained should allege that earnest efforts towards a
not have the necessary qualification to appear in the case, or compromise were exerted but failed. Apparently, respondent
does not have the character or representation he claims. On Judge considered this deficiency a jurisdictional defect.
the other hand, a case is dismissible for lack of personality to Guerrero moved to reconsider the Order claiming that since
sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, brothers by affinity are not members of the same family, he
hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action. The term was not required to exert efforts towards a compromise.
"lack of capacity to sue" should not be confused with the term Guerrero likewise argued that Hernando was precluded from
"lack of personality to sue." While the former refers to a raising this issue since he did not file a motion to dismiss nor
plaintiff's general disability to sue, such as on account of assert the same as an affirmative defense in his answer.
minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality Respondent Judge dismissed the case, declaring the dismissal
or any other general disqualifications of a party, the latter however to be without prejudice, hence this petition.
refers to the fact that the plaintiff is not the real party-in- ISSUE: Whether the absence of an allegation in the complaint
interest. Correspondingly, the first can be a ground for a that earnest efforts towards a compromise were exerted,
motion to dismiss based on the ground of lack of legal capacity which efforts failed, is a ground for dismissal for lack of
to sue, whereas the second can be used as a ground for a jurisdiction?
motion to dismiss based on the fact that the complaint, on the RULING: The Court ruled in O'Laco v. Co Cho Chit, citing
face thereof, evidently states no cause of action. Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, that the attempt to compromise
Applying the above discussion to the instant petition, the as well as the inability to succeed is a condition precedent to
ground available for barring recourse to our courts by an the filing of a suit between members of the same family, the
unlicensed foreign corporation doing or transacting business in absence of such allegation in the complaint being assailable at
the Philippines should properly be "lack of capacity to sue," not any stage of the proceeding, even on appeal, for lack of cause
"lack of personality to sue." Certainly, a corporation whose of action. `It is not therefore correct, as petitioner contends,
legal rights have been violated is undeniable such, if not the that private respondent may be deemed to have waived the
only, real party-in-interest to bring suit thereon although, for aforesaid defect in failing to move or dismiss or raise the same
failure to comply with the licensing requirement, it is not in the Answer. On the other hand, we cannot sustain the
capacitated to maintain any suit before our courts. proposition of private respondent that the case was, after all,
Lastly, on this point, we reiterate this Court's rejection of the also dismissed pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 17, of the Rules of Court
common procedural tactics of erring local companies which, for failure of petitioner to comply with the court's order to
when sued by unlicensed foreign corporations not engaged in amend his complaint.
business in the Philippines, invoke the latter's supposed lack of A review of the assailed orders does not show any directive
capacity to sue. The doctrine of lack of capacity to sue based which Guerrero supposedly defied. The Order of 7 December
on failure to first acquired a local license is based on 1992 merely gave Guerrero five (5) days to file his motion and
considerations of public policy. It was never intended to favor amended complaint with a reminder that the complaint failed
nor insulate from suit unscrupulous establishments or to allege that earnest efforts were exerted towards a
nationals in case of breach of valid obligations or violations of compromise. The Order of 22 December 1992, which denied
legal rights of unsuspecting foreign firms or entities simply Guerrero's motion for reconsideration, simply stated that
because they are not licensed to do business in the country. "Plaintiff if it (sic) so desire must amend the complaint
GUERRERO V. RTC OF ILOCOS otherwise, the court will have to dismiss the case (emphasis
229 SCRA 274 supplied) . . ." The Order of 29 January 1993 dismissing the case
without prejudice only made reference to an earlier order
FACTS: Respondent Judge dismissed a case filed by petitioner "admonishing" counsel for Guerrero to amend the complaint,
against his brother-in law for failing to allege that earnest and an "admonition" is not synonymous with "order".
efforts were first exerted towards a compromise considering Moreover, since the assailed orders do not find support in our
their relationship. Admittedly, the complaint does not allege jurisprudence but, on the other hand, are based on an
that the parties exerted earnest towards a compromise and erroneous interpretation and application of the law, petitioner
that the same failed. However, private respondent Pedro G. could not be bound to comply with them.
Hernando apparently overlooked this alleged defect since he WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed
did not file any motion to dismiss nor attack the complaint on Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 16, or

whichever branch of the court the case may now be assigned, that it was suing on an isolated transaction which would mean
is directed to continue with Civil Case. that the real party-in-interest was not MAC, but NFSI.
G.R. NO. 216566 FEBRUARY 24, 2016 ISSUE:
MAGELLAN AEROSPACE, PETITIONER, VS. PHILIPPINE AIR Whether the CA erred in finding that the complaint against PAF
FORCE, RESPONDENT failed to sufficiently state a cause of action.
RULING: NO.
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 Cause of action is defined as an act or omission by which a
DOCTRINE: party violates a right of another. In pursuing that cause, a
Cause of action is defined as an act or omission by which a plaintiff must first plead in the complaint a "concise statement
party violates a right of another. In pursuing that cause, a of the ultimate or essential facts constituting the cause of
plaintiff must first plead in the complaint a "concise statement action." In particular, the plaintiff must show on the face of the
of the ultimate or essential facts constituting the cause of complaint that there exists a legal right on his or her part, a
action." In particular, the plaintiff must show on the face of the correlative obligation of the defendant to respect such right,
complaint that there exists a legal right on his or her part, a and an act or omission of such defendant in violation of the
correlative obligation of the defendant to respect such right, plaintiff’s rights. Such a complaint may, however, be subjected
and an act or omission of such defendant in violation of the to an immediate challenge. Under Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the
plaintiff’s rights. Rules of Court (Rules), the defendant may file a motion to
FACTS: dismiss " within the time for but before filing the answer to the
On September 18, 2008, PAF contracted Chervin Enterprises, complaint or pleading asserting a claim" anchored on the
Inc. (Chervin) for the overhaul of two T76 aircraft engines in an defense that the pleading asserting the claim stated no cause
agreement denominated as "Contract for the Procurement of of action. In making such challenge, the defendant's issue is
Services and Overhaul of Two (2) OV10 Engines." not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the
Due to its lack of technical capability to effect the repair and claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. It
overhaul required by PAF, Chervin commissioned MAC to do has nothing to do with the merits of the case. "Whether those
the work for US$364,577.00. MAC, in turn, outsourced the allegations are true or not is beside the point, for their truth is
overhaul service from another subcontractor, National Flight hypothetically admitted by the motion." The inquiry is then
Services, Inc. (NFSI). Eventually, the engines were overhauled limited only into the sufficiency, not the veracity of the
and delivered to the PAF. Satisfied with the service, PAF material allegations.[22] Thus, if the allegations in the
accepted the overhauled engines. complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it can be
On December 15, 2008, MAC demanded from Chervin the maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless of the
payment of US$264,577.00 representing the balance of the defense that may be presented by the defendants.[23]
contract price. In a letter to the Trade Commission of the Conversely, the dismissal of the complaint is permitted if the
Canadian Embassy, dated December 21, 2009, PAF confirmed allegations stated therein fail to show that plaintiff is entitled
that it had already released to Chervin the amount of to relief. Accordingly, the survival of the complaint against a
P23,760,000.00, on November 7, 2008, as partial payment for Rule 16 challenge depends upon the sufficiency of the
the overhaul service,... Notwithstanding the release of funds averments made. In determining whether an initiatory
to Chervin, MAC was not paid for the services rendered despite pleading sufficiently pleads, the test applied is whether the
several demands. Unpaid, MAC demanded from PAF the court can render a valid judgment in accordance with the
release of the retained amount. In a letter, dated March 3, prayer if the truth of the facts alleged is admitted.
2010, however, PAF rejected the demand and informed MAC In essence, MAC asserts that the allegations stating that
that the amount could not be released as it was being held in Chervin "acted for and in behalf of a "principal," PAF, in tapping
trust for Chervin. its services for the overhaul of the aircraft engines, completed
On July 6, 2010, MAC filed a complaint[10] for sum of money with the requirements of sufficiency in stating its cause of
before the RTC against Chervin together with its Managing action against PAF. MAC claims that its allegation of Chervin
Director, Elvi T. Sosing (Sosing), and the PAF. being "mere agents" of PAF in the overhaul contract,
On August 24, 2010, PAF moved to dismiss the complaint establishes clearly, under the premise of admitting them as
averring that its contract with Chervin was one for repair and true for purposes of a Rule 16 challenge, its entitlement to
overhaul and not for agency; that it was never privy to any recover from PAF, the latter being the "principal" and
contract between Chervin and MAC; and that it already paid "beneficiary." The Court is not persuaded. The standard used
Chervin on January 22, 2009, and on July 13, 2010 in full in determining the sufficiency of the allegations is not as
settlement of its obligations comprehensive as MAC would want to impress. The
Chervin also asked the RTC to dismiss the complaint against assumption of truth (commonly known as hypothetical
them asserting that MAC had no capacity to sue because of its admission of truth), accorded under the test, does not cover
status as a nonresident doing business in the Philippines all the allegations pleaded in the complaint. Only ultimate facts
without the required license, and that no disclosure was made or those facts which the expected evidence will support are
considered for purposes of the test. It does not cover legal

conclusions or evidentiary facts. The reason for such a rule is passes upon the issue on the basis of the allegations in the
quite simple. The standard requires that "[e]very pleading shall complaint assuming them to be true and does not make any
contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and inquiry into the truth of the allegations or a declaration that
direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party they are false. Perhaps, the CA might have been
pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be, misunderstood as, indeed, the tenor of its decision apparently
omitting the statement of mere evidentiary facts." Thus, trial gave an untimely conclusion that no agency relationship
courts need not overly stretch its limits in considering all existed. Be that as it may, this Court affirms the findings of the
allegations just because they were included in the complaint. CA - that the order of dismissal of MAC s complaint against PAF
Evidently, matters that are required and expected to be is proper.
sufficiently included in a complaint and, thus, accorded the G.R. No. 109068 January 10, 1994
assumption of truth, exclude those that are mere legal GAUDENCIO GUERRERO, Petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL
conclusions, inferences, evidentiary facts, or even COURT OF ILOCOS NORTE, BR. XVI, JUDGE LUIS B. BELLO,
unwarranted deductions. In this case, the averment that JR., PRESIDING, and PEDRO G. HERNANDO, Respondents
Chervin acted as PAF's mere agents in subsequently
contracting MAC to perform the overhauling services is not an PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45
ultimate fact. Nothing can be found in the complaint that can DOCTRINE: “The attempt to compromise as well as the
serve as a premise of PAF's status as the principal in the inability to succeed is a condition precedent to the filing of a
contract between Chervin and MAC. No factual circumstances suit between members of the same family, the absence of such
were alleged that could plausibly convince the Court that PAF allegation in the complaint being assailable at any stage of the
was a party to the subsequent outsourcing of the overhauling proceeding, even on appeal, for lack of cause of action.”
services. Not even in the annexes can the Court find any FACTS
plausible basis for the assertion of MAC on PAF's status as a This case stemmed from an accion publiciana against private
principal. Had MAC went beyond barren words and included in respondent. Both parties in this case were step-brothers.
the complaint essential supporting details, though not Admittedly, the complaint does not allege that the parties
required to be overly specific, this would have permitted MAC exerted earnest efforts towards a compromise and that the
to substantiate its claims during the trial and survive the Rule same failed. However, private respondent did not file any
16 challenge. In short, factual circumstances serving as motion to dismiss (NOTE: Rule 16 was still applicable in this
predicates were not provided, to add to MAC's barren case) nor attack the complaint on this ground in his answer.
statement concerning PAF's liability. What MAC entirely did The relationship between the two parties was only noted by
was to state a mere conclusion of law, if not, an inference respondent Judge Bello during pre-trial. They were married to
based on matters not stated in the pleading. To clarify, a mere half-sisters, thus being brothers-in-law. Their failure to do
allegation that PAF, as a principal of Chervin, can be held liable earnest efforts were considered by respondent judge as a
for nonpayment of the amounts due, does not comply with the jurisdictional defect, and the judge thus ordered them to
ultimate fact rule. Without the constitutive factual predicates, amend the complaint within 5 days.
any assertion could never satisfy the threshold of an ultimate Guerrero moved to reconsider, claiming that since brothers by
fact. Not being an ultimate fact, the assumption of truth does affinity are not members of the same family, he was not
not apply to the aforementioned allegation made by MAC required to exert efforts towards a compromise. Furthermore,
concerning PAF. Consequently, the narrative that PAF can be Guerrero alleged that private respondent cannot raise this
held liable as a principal in the agreement between Chervin issue due to failure to file a motion to dismiss or assert the
and MAC cannot be considered in the course of applying the same as an affirmative defense in his answer. The judge denied
sufficiency test used in Section 1(g) Rule 16. It, therefore, said motion.
produces no link to the alleged PAF's correlative duty to pay ISSUE
the amounts being claimed by MAC - a necessary element of a Whether the absence of an allegation in the complaint that
cause of action that must be found in the pleading. Lacking that earnest efforts towards a compromise were exerted, which
essential link, and after hypothetically admitting the truth of efforts failed, is a ground for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
all the allegations other than those that are ought to be (YES, but specifically for lack of cause of action) *This is a
excluded for not being ultimate facts, it is demonstrable that question of law. The Court still ruled against dismissal of the
the CA correctly ruled for the dismissal of the complaint on the case.
ground of MAC s failure to state its cause of action against PAF. RULING
The foregoing discussion makes plain that the CA did not act (ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE PARTIES) The pertinent
prematurely in dismissing the complaint. To reiterate, in a provisions of the Family Code and Rules of Court do not apply
motion to dismiss filed under Section 1(g) of Rule 16, the issue in this case.
is not whether the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Instead, the Article 151 of the Family Code provides that “[n]o suit between
issue is simply whether the plaintiff, on the basis of the members of the same family shall prosper unless it should
allegations hypothetically admitted as true, can be permitted appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest
to substantiate the claims during the trial. The trial court only efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the

same failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact The petitioners sent a Demand Letter, requiring the
made, the case must be dismissed.” This was further reiterated respondents to vacate the property, but the latter refused.
under Sec. 1(j), Rule 16 of the RoC (NOTE: repealed) as a Without barangay conciliation proceedings, the petitioners
ground for motion to dismiss. filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and Damages against
There is no occasion for the application of the above-quoted the respondents before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
provisions. In the case of Gayon v. Gayon, the Court already (MTCC) Roxas City. Jimmy Abagatnan and Jenalyn De Leon,
held that the enumeration of “brothers and sisters” as petitioners in this case, do not reside in Roxas City.
members of the same family does not comprehend “sisters-in- The respondents claimed that the barangay conciliation is a
law.” Being brothers-in-law, the same principle likewise mandatory requirement that cannot be dispensed with. Jimmy
applies in favor of the parties in this case. and Jenalyn had already executed a Special Power of Attorney
RELEVANT RULING: The attempt to compromise as well as the in favor of Josephine Parce, who is a resident of Roxas City.
inability to succeed is a condition precedent to the filing of a The MTCC ruled in favor of the petitioners, and ordered the
suit between members of the same family, the absence of such respondents to remove the structures erected on the subject
allegation in the complaint being assailable at any stage of the property, and vacate the same. The MTCC ruled that the
proceeding, even on appeal, for lack of cause of action. petitioners have better right of material possession.
It is therefore incorrect to contend that private respondent The respondents appealed to the Regional Trial Court. THE RTC
may be deemed to have waived the aforesaid defect in failing denied the appeal for lack of merit. The MTCC was justified in
to move to dismiss or raise the same in the Answer (TAKE ruling the case in favor of the petitioners. The RTC held that
NOTE: THIS IS TO ANSWER A LEGAL QUESTION, THERE WAS NO the lack of barangay conciliation proceedings cannot be
DISMISSAL OF THE CASE). brought on appeal because it was not made an issue in the Pre-
Furthermore, the case was not dismissed pursuant to Sec. 3, Trial Order.
Rule 17 for failure to comply with the court’s order to amend The respondents filed a Petition for Review before the Court of
the complaint. Appeals. The CA ruled that both findings of fact of the MTCC
There is no showing of an actual order from Judge Bello. In fact, and the RTC are supported by the evidence on record.
the “order” assailed by private respondent was only Nevertheless, the CA dismissed the complaint for lack of prior
referencing an earlier order admonishing the counsel for referral to the Katarungang Pambarangay. The Court of
Guerrero to amend the complaint, and an admonition is not Appeals held that the dispute between the parties is clearly
synonymous with order. Moreover, since the assailed orders within the ambit of the Lupon’s authority.
do not find support in jurisprudence but, on the other hand, ISSUE:
are based on an erroneous interpretation of law, petitioner Whether or not the requisite of prior barangay conciliation
could not be bound to comply with them. applies where not all parties in interest resided in the same city
Jose Audie Abagatnan, Josephine A. Parce, Jimmy Abagatan, or municipality.
John Abagatnan, Jenalyn A. De Leon, Joey Abagatan, Jojie HELD:
Abagatnan, and Joy Abagatnan, v. Spouses Jonathan Clarito NO. The Local Government Code provides that the lupon of
and Elsa Clarito each barangay shall have authority to bring together the
G.R. No. 211966; August 7, 2017 parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for
JOSE AUDIE ABAGATNAN, JOSEPHINE A. PARCE, JIMMY amicable settlement of all disputes. An exception to this is
ABAGATNAN, JOHN ABAGATNAN, JENALYN A.DELEON, when the parties agree to submit their differences to amicable
JOEY ABAGATNAN, JOJIE ABAGATNAN, and JOY settlement by an appropriate lupon.
ABAGATNAN, Petitioners, Therefore, parties who do not actually reside in the same city
vs. SPOUSES JONATHAN CLARITO and ELSA CLARITO, or municipality are not required to submit their dispute to the
Respondents lupon as a precondition to the filing of a complaint in court.
In the present case, the Complaint specifically alleged that not
FACTS: all the parties in interest in the case actually resided in Roxas
Co-petitioners are children of Lydia Capote who acquired a City. Therefore, the lupon has no jurisdiction over their
parcel of land by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale from Mateo dispute.
Ambrad and Soteraña Clarito. Additionally, the residence of the attorney-in-fact of a real
In 1990, the respondents allegedly approached Wenceslao, the party in interest is irrelevant insofar as the "actual residence"
husband of Lydia, and asked for permission to construct a requirement under the LGC for prior barangay conciliation is
residential house on a portion of the subject property. concerned.
Wenceslao agreed, but on the condition that the respondents VIRGINIA S. DIO and H.S. EQUITIES, LTD., petitioners, vs. SUBIC
will vacate the property should he need to use it. BAY MARINE EXPLORATORIUM, INC., represented by its
In 2006, the petitioners decided to sell portions of the subject Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, TIMOTHY DESMOND,
property, including the portion of the land occupied by the respondents.
respondents. They offered to sell the portion to the G.R. No. 189532. June 11, 2014, SECOND DIVISION, Perez J.
respondents, but the latter denied. VIRGINIA S. DIO and H.S. EQUITIES, LTD., Petitioners,

vs. SUBIC BAY MARINE EXPLORATORIUM, INC., terminated" by the court of appeals after the latter dismissed
represented by its Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, respondents' appeal because of their failure to file their
TIMOTHY DESMOND, Respondents. appellants' brief.
HELD: YES. Petitioners argue that despite the dismissal of the
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 main case, the counterclaim may still remain for independent
FACTS: Petitioner H.S. Equities, Ltd., (HSE) is a foreign adjudication under Section 6, Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Court. As the rule now stands, the nature of the counterclaim
British Virgin Islands. It entered into an isolated transaction notwithstanding, the dismissal of the complaint does not ipso
subject of the instant case. It is represented in this action by jure result in the dismissal of the counterclaim, and the latter
petitioner Virginia S. Dio (Dio). may remain for independent adjudication of the court,
Respondent Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium, Inc. (SBME) is a provided that such counterclaim, states a sufficient cause of
domestic corporation, duly organized and existing under the action and does not labor under any infirmity that may warrant
Philippine laws and is represented in this action by its Chief its outright dismissal. Stated differently, the jurisdiction of the
Executive Officer, respondent Timothy Desmond (Desmond). court over the counterclaim that appears to be valid on its
In 2002, SBME decided to expand its business by operating a face, including the grant of any relief thereunder, is not abated
beach resort inside the property administered by the Subic Bay by the dismissal of the main action. The court's authority to
Metropolitan Authority (SBMA). For the business venture to proceed with the disposition of the counterclaim independent
take off, SBME needed to solicit investors who are willing to of the main action is premised on the fact that the
infuse funds for the construction and operation of the beach counterclaim, on its own, raises a novel question which may be
resort project. HSE (formerly known as Westdale Assets aptly adjudicated by the court based on its own merits and
Limited) thru its authorized director, Dio, agreed to invest. evidentiary support.
After HSE initially paid US$200,000.00 for its subscription, it DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
refused to further lay out money for the expansion project of petition is GRANTED. The assailed RTC Orders dated 3 April
the SBME due to the alleged mismanagement in the handling 2009 and 26 August 2009 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
of corporate funds. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Balanga
Consequently, SBME initiated an intra-corporate dispute City, Bataan for further proceedings, on the matter of
before the RTC of Balanga City, Bataan against petitioners HSE petitioners Virginia S. Dio and H.S. Equities, Ltd.'s
and Dio. Apart from their refusal to honor their obligation counterclaims. No pronouncement as to costs.
under the subscription contract, it was further alleged by SBME
that Dio tried to dissuade local investors and 􏰁nancial AIDA PADILLA, Petitioner, vs. GLOBE ASIATIQUE REALTY
institutions from putting in capital to SBME by imputing HOLDINGS CORPORATION, FILMAL REALTY
defamatory acts against Desmond. To protect the interest of CORPORATION, DELFIN S. LEE and DEXTER L. LEE,
the corporation and its stockholders, SBME sought that Respondent
petitioners be enjoined from committing acts inimical to the G.R. No. 207376 August 6, 2014
interest of the company.
To refute the claims of respondents, petitioners countered PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 45
that their reputation and good name in the business DOCTRINE:
community were tarnished as a result of the filing of the A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have
instant complaint, and thus prayed that they be indemnified in against an opposing party.
the amount of US$2,000,000.00 as moral damages. Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, it is now explicitly
For lack of merit, RTC denied respondents' motion and provided that the dismissal of the complaint due to failure of
affirmed the dismissal. For failure of the respondents to file the plaintiff to prosecute his case is "without prejudice to the
their appellants' brief, the appellate court proceeded to right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the
dismiss. same or in a separate action."
The procedural incidents before the appellate court having FACTS:
been resolved with finality, petitioners went back to the RTC From the years 2005 to 2008, Philippine National Bank (PNB)
to file a motion to set their counterclaims for hearing which entered into several Contracts to Sell (CTS) Facility Agreements
was opposed by the respondents on the ground that the filing with respondents Globe Asiatique Realty Holdings Corporation
of the compulsory counterclaims was not accompanied by (Globe Asiatique) and Filmal Realty Corporation (Filmal)
payment of the required docket fees precluding the court from represented by Delfin S. Lee and Dexter L. Lee, President and
acquiring jurisdiction over the case. Vice-President, respectively, of the two corporations. PNB
RTC refused to reconsider its earlier disposition. Hence, thereby agreed to make available toGlobe Asiatique and Filmal
Petitioners filed this instant Petition for Review on Certiorari. CTS Facility in the amount not exceeding Two Hundred Million
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court committed an error of Pesos (₱200,000,000.00) to finance the purchase of certain
law when it refused to set [petitioners'] counterclaims for Accounts Receivables or the in-house installment receivables
hearing on the ground that the case was deemed "closed and of respondents arising from the sale of subdivision houses in

their real estate/housing projects as evidenced by contracts to GA, et al: Claimed that what they were asking the court is for
sell. These availments werelater increased to a total amount of the RTC, Pasig to allow them to recover damages from Judge
One Billion Two Hundred Million Pesos (₱1,200,000,000.00)." Gutierrez for approving PNB’s attachment bond. Further, they
Pursuant to the CTS, Globe Asiatique executed several Deeds claimed that they= did not commit forum shopping because
of Assignment in favor of PNB covering accounts receivables in both actions may proceed independently.
the amount of P1,195,926,390.72 (1.1 Billion). Globe Asiatique RTC, PASIG: DISMISSED CASE 2 due to lack of jurisdiction.
acknowledged a total amount of 1.3 Billion released to them Petitioner filed motion to set counterclaims for pre-trial
by PNB in consideration of the accounts payable. conference but RTC, Pasig denied the counterclaims for it will
Globe Asiatique later on defaulted in payment of their violate the principle of judicial stability. MR was also denied.
outstanding balance and failed to deliver to PNB the TCTs of ISSUE:
the corresponding accounts receivables. The were decalred in Whether or not a court can take cognizance of a compulsory
default by PNB however, Globe Asiatique made partia counterclaim despite the fact that the corresponding
payments and made proposals for paying its full obligation. complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Despite this, PNB made a formal and final demand for GA to RULING:
settled the total amount of P974, 377, 159.10. Later on, PNB Yes.
discovered that 231 out of 240 CTS have either inexistent Respondents are incorrect in arguing that petitioner adopted
addresses of buyers or the names of the buyers are the wrong mode of appeal,... petitioner raises the lone issue of
nonexistent or both. whether the Pasig City RTC was correct in refusing to hear her
Hence, PNB instituted CASE 1 (PNB vs. Globe Asiatique, Filmal, counterclaims after the dismissal of respondents' complaint
Delfin Lee and Dexter Lee) for recovery of sum of money and for lack of jurisdiction.
damages with prayer for preliminary attachment before RTC of petitioner's counterclaim for damages raised in her answer
Pasay City. They accused GA of falsely representing that they before the Pasig City RTC is compulsory, alleging suffering and
have valid and subsisting CTS which showed that they had NO injury caused to her as a consequence of the unwarranted
INTENTION to pay their loan. filing of the baseless complaint... the RTC of Pasig City should
GA’s verification and verification for non-forum shopping was have allowed petitioner's counterclaim to proceed
signed by PNB’s Senior Vice- President of the Remedial notwithstanding the dismissal of respondents' complaint, the
Management Group, AIDA PADILLA. same being compulsory in nature and with its cause not
RTC, PASAY: GRANTED PNB’S APPLICATION FOR PRELIM. eliminated by such dismissal.
ATTACHMENT. Petitioner was hailed to a separate court (Pasig City RTC) even
GA: Assailed the affidavit executed by Aida Padilla who they while the dispute between PNB and respondents was still
claimed has no personal knowledge of the subject transactions being litigated, and she already incurred expenses defending
and there being no allegation of threat or possibility that GA herself,
and Filmal will dispose of their properties in fraud of creditors. Principles:
GA, et al: filed a complaint (CASE 2) for DAMAGES in the RTC With respect to the fact that when an appeal raises only pure
of Pasig City against Padilla and Judge Gutierrez, the judge in questions of law, this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the
CASE 1. GA, et al averred that CASE 1 filed by PNB brought same.
havoc to their business. The CTS were already novated and A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have
were not yet due and demandable but PNB procured a against an opposing party.
“perjured” affidavit to support their writ of prelim. Attachment Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, it is now explicitly
to the RTC, Pasay. provided that the dismissal of the complaint due to failure of
PADILLA: Filed an answer with compulsory counterclaims. the plaintiff to prosecute his case is "without prejudice to the
Some of the grounds are: right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the
1. Submission of a false certification of non-forum shopping by same or in a separate... action."
respondents and their blatant commission of willful, deliberate Pinga v. The Heirs of German Santiago,... when the Court
and contumacious forum shopping (respondents failed to promulgated the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, including the
disclose a criminal complaint entitled "Tbram Cuyugan v. Aida amended Rule 17, those previous jural doctrines that were
Padilla and Members of the Board of Directors of PNB", inconsistent with the new rules incorporated in the 1997 Rules
pending before the office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City of Civil Procedure were implicitly abandoned insofar as...
2. Litis pendentia; incidents arising after the effectivity of the new procedural
3. Respondents’ failure to attach the alleged actionable rules on 1 July 1997.
document – the supposed "new term loan", in violation of the doctrine that a counterclaim may be necessarily dismissed
Section 7, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court; along with the complaint, clearly conflicts with the 1997 Rules
4. Failure to state a cause of action against petitioner; of Civil Procedure.
GA et al, parrots the very same arguments raised We confirm that BA Finance and all previous rulings of the
andpresented in the RTC, Pasay (CASE 1) – evidently shows Court that are inconsistent with this present holding are now
forum shopping. abandoned.

While the declaration in Pinga refers to instances covered by However, petitioner cancelled the offer to purchase the
Section 3, Rule 17 on dismissal of complaints due to the fault Corinthian Hills on the 2nd Lot. She authorized Megaworld
of plaintiff, it does... not preclude the application of the same Corp. to allocate the amount on the 1st Lot. She vauthorized
rule when the dismissal was upon the instance of defendant... Megaworld Corp. to offer Lot 12, Block 2 of Corinthian Hills to
in stark departure from Metals Engineering, we declared that other interested buyers. It also appears from the records that
the court's jurisdiction over respondent's... complaint is not to petitioner left the country bringing the children with her.
be confused with jurisdiction over petitioner's counterclaim,... Respondent filed an Omnibus Motiton for the Main custody of
Jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter and the parties their children. He presented evidence to establish that
in the counterclaim must thus be determined separately and petitioner brought the children out of the country without his
independently from the jurisdiction of the same court in the knowledge and without prior authority of the trial court. He
same case over the subject matter and the parties in likewise alleged that petitioner failed to turn over to
respondent's complaint. respondent documents and titles in the latter's name.
Anchored on the pronouncement in Pinga, we then RTC granted this Motion and declared the marriage between
categorically ruled that a counterclaim arising from the the parties void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the
unfounded suit may proceed despite the dismissal of the ground of mutual psychological incapacity.
complaint Petitioner moved for the reconsideration alleging that he was
More often than not, the allegations that form the not able to present evidence because of the negligence of her
counterclaim are rooted in an act or... omission of the plaintiff counsel and her own fear for her life and the future of the
other than the plaintiff's very act of filing the complaint. children. She claimed she was forced to leave the country,
The only apparent exception to this circumstance is... if it is together with her children, due to the alleged beating she
alleged in the counterclaim that the very act of the plaintiff in received from respondent. Subsequently, she filed a motion to
filing the complaint precisely causes the violation of the dismiss and motion for reconsideration seeking that all prior
defendant's rights. Yet even in such an instance, it remains orders be recalled as she was not any more interested in
debatable whether the dismissal or withdrawal of the pursuing the case. She alleged that her untimely appeal was
complaint is sufficient to... obviate the pending cause of action due to her counsel’s negligence.
maintained by the defendant against the plaintiff. RTC denied both Motions on the ground that the case already
attained finality.
SUSIE CHAN-TAN, Petitioner, vs. JESSE C. TAN, Respondent Issue:
WON the decision attained finality despite the alleged denial
PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 65 of due process (YES)
DOCTRINE: Nothing is more settled in law than that when a RULING:
judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable Applying the doctrine laid down in Tuason, the alleged
and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any negligence of counsel resulting in petitioner's loss of the right
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is to appeal is not a ground for vacating the trial court's
perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law. he judgments. Further, petitioner cannot claim that she was
reason is grounded on the fundamental considerations of denied due process. While she may have lost her right to
public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional present evidence due to the supposed negligence of her
error, the judgments or orders of courts must be final at some counsel, she cannot say she was denied her day in court.
definite date fixed by law. Once a judgment has become final Records show petitioner, through counsel, actively
and executory, the issues there should be laid to rest. participated in the proceedings below, filing motion after
FACTS: motion. Contrary to petitioner's allegation of negligence of her
The parties were married. They were blessed with two sons; counsel, we have reason to believe the negligence in pursuing
Justin, born in Canada in 1990 and Russel, born in the the case was on petitioner's end, as may be gleaned from her
Philippines in 1993. Twelve years after their marriage, counsel's manifestation dated 3 May 2004. In fact the counsel
petitioner filed a case for annulment of the marriage under who appeared for petitioner, in the nullity proceedings,
Article 36 of the Family Code. They mutually agreed that the 2 respectfully informed the Honorable Court that she has not
lots located in Corinthian Hills, Quezon City shall be considered heard from petitioner since Holy Week. Attempts to call
as part of the presumptive legitimes of their minor children. petitioner have failed. The counsel regrets therefore that she
Petitioner voluntarily agreed to exclusively shoulder the is unable to respond in an intelligent manner to the Motion
remaining balance in the Contract to Sell on said lots directly (Omnibus Motion) filed by respondent
before Megaworld Properties, Inc.
The 1st lot was registered under the name of their children and Petitioner invoked Section 7 on the Rule on Declaration of
petitioner. The 2nd lot was registered under the name of the Absolute Nullity of Marriage. Since petitioner is not the
respondent alone. Part of the Compromise Agreement respondent in the petition for the annulment of the marriage,
included visitation rights of the respondent. This was Section 7 of the Rule does not apply to the motion to dismiss
subsequently approved by the court. filed by her. Section 7 of the Rule not being applicable,

petitioner's claim that it is unconstitutional for allegedly complaint" and on the grounds enumerated in Section 1, Rule
setting an obstacle to the preservation of the family is without 16 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
basis. (a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the
defending party;
ALDERSGATE COLLEGE, INC., ARSENIO L. MENDOZA, (b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter
IGNACIO A. GALINDEZ, WILSON E. SAGADRACA, and of the claim;
FILIPINAS MENZEN, Petitioners, vs. JUNIFEN F. GAUUAN, (c) That venue is improperly laid;
ARTEMIO M. VILLALUZ, SR., TERESITA ARREOLA, (d) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;
FORTUNATA ANDAYA, SALVADOR C. AQUINO, ROBERTO (e) That there is another action pending between the same
M. TUGAWIN JOSE O. RUPAC, Respondents, parties for the same cause;
G.R. No. 192951 November 14, 2012 (f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by
the statute of limitations;
FACTS: PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI (g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of
Petitioners, together with now deceased Justino, Castulo, action;
Samuel and Socorro, filed a case against the respondents (h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff’s
before the SEC. When the SEC was reorganized pursuant to RA pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise
8799, the case was transferred to the RTC. Pre-trial thereafter extinguished;
ensued and a Pre-Trial Order was issued enumerating the (i) That the claim on which the action is founded is
issues. unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds;
In a motion, respondents sought the dismissal of the complaint and
or the issuance of a summary judgment dismissing the case. (j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been
The RTC denied the motion on the ground that "there are complied with.
several issues raised which would still need the presentation The rule is, however, different with respect to intra-corporate
of evidence to determine the rights of the parties." controversies. Under Section 8, Rule 1 of the Interim Rules of
A few years later, respondents-intervenors also sought the Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies, a motion to
dismissal of the complaint in their Answer-in-Intervention with dismiss is a prohibited pleading.
Motion to Dismiss raising the lack of capacity, personality or RULE 9
authority to sue the individual petitioners in behalf of G.R. No. 87917 August 7, 1990
Aldersgate College, Inc. SPS. JUAN B. DULOS and MARIA C. DULOS petitioners, vs.
The RTC once more brushed aside the attempt to have the case COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. MARIANO NOCOM and
dismissed. Unfazed, the respondents-intervenors again filed a ANACORETA NOCOM and SPS. LORENZO ONG ENG CHONG
Motion to Withdraw and/or to Dismiss Case, alleging that the and CARMEN SOCO, and DEPUTY SHERIFF HONORIO
case was instituted without any board resolution authorizing SANTOS of the Office of the Sheriff of Makati, Metro
its filing and that the incumbent members of the Board of Manila, respondents.
Trustees of petitioner Aldersgate College, Inc. had recently
passed a resolution which sought the dismissal and/or FACTS:
withdrawal of the case. The spouses Dulos were sued for forcible entry by the spouses
Mariano and Anacoreta Nocom, private respondents herein, in
The RTC dismissed the case on the basis of the Resolution the
passed by the members of the Board of Trustees of petitioner Earlier, on August 16, 1988, the petitioners had filed a
Aldersgate College recommending the dismissal of the case. complaint against the private respondents for annulment of
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing the case. sale, reconveyance of title, and various other reliefs plus a writ
HELD: As this case involves an intra-corporate dispute, the of preliminary injunction. The petitioners filed a motion for the
motion to dismiss is undeniably a prohibited pleading. suspension of the proceedings in the forcible entry case on the
Moreover, the Court finds no justification for the dismissal of ground that there was a prejudicial question of ownership
the case based on the mere issuance of a board resolution by involved in the annulment case. The petitioners' counsel, Atty.
the incumbent members of the Board of Trustees of Ravelo, set August 18, 1988, for the hearing of the motion at
petitioner-corporation recommending its dismissal, especially the pre-trial conference scheduled on the same date.
considering the various issues raised by the parties before the Neither petitioners nor their counsel appeared on that date.
court a quo. Hence, the RTC should not have entertained, let However, one Ananita Rectra manifested at the hearing that
alone have granted the subject motion to dismiss she was duly authorized by virtue of a special power of
IN INTER-COPORATE CONTROVERSY A MOTION TO DISMISS IS attorney to represent petitioner Juan Dulos, her brother, who
A PROHIBITED PLEADING was then confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital after having
In an ordinary civil action, a motion to dismiss must generally undergone a femur operation. The petitioners were
be filed "within the time for but before filing the answer to the nonetheless declared in default. Judge Alfredo R. Enriquez
denied the motion for the suspension of the proceedings,

holding that the issue of ownership was not a prejudicial xxxx
question in the ejectment case. The evidence of the private In Suzara v. Caluag, this Court held that a motion for
respondents was subsequently received in the absence of the reconsideration of a judgment of default may be considered a
petitioners. petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38 only if the
On October 4, 1988, judgment was rendered in favor of the following requisites are present: (1) it must be verified; (2) it
private respondents. must be filed within 60 days from the time petitioner learns of
They filed a motion for reconsideration and was denied. the decision but not more than 6 months from entry thereof,
ISSUE: and (3) in case of failure to file an answer, the motion must be
Whether or not the petitioners had been properly declared in accompanied by affidavits of merit showing the fraud,
default for failure to appear at the scheduled hearing. accident, mistake and excusable negligence relied upon
RULING:
Yes, petitioners did not employ the proper remedy prescribed
by the Rules of Court. As enumerated in Lina v. Court of
Appeals, 3 the remedies available to a defendant declared in JUAN A. GOCHANGCO, HON. FELINO GARCIA, as Presiding
default are: Judge of the City Court of Bacolod, Branch I, and DEPUTY
1. The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery PROVINCIAL SHERIFF JOSUE DE JOSE, petitioners, vs. THE
thereof and before judgment, file a motion under oath to set COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL,
aside the order of default on the ground that was failure to BRANCH IV, SY HO and MILAGROS MINORIA, respondents
answer or appear on the date set for pre-trial was due to fraud, G.R. No. L-49396 January 15, 1988
accident, mistake or excusable negligence, and that he has a
meritorious defense; FACTS: Petition for certiorari
2. If the judgment has already been rendered when the These appellate proceedings had their origin in an action of
defendant discovered the default, but before the same has unlawful detainer filed by Hodges in the City Court. Hodges
become final and executory, he may file a petition for new trial sought the ejectment from certain parcels of land titled in his
under Sec. 1(a) of Rule 37; name, of several persons, namely: Macanan, Nolan, Santiago,
3. If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment Sy Ho, and Minoria.
has become final and executory, he may file a petition for relief Macanan, Nolan and Santiago were duly served with
under Sec. 2, Rule 38; and summons. Macanan died afterwards, and since his heirs could
4. He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him not be located, and hence could not be substituted in his place,
as contrary to the evidence or the law, even if no petition to the case against him was eventually dismissed without
set aside the order of default has been presented by him. prejudice. Santiago and Nolan voluntarily vacated the
The petitioners did not avail themselves of any of the above premises; so, the case was also dismissed as against them.
remedies. Instead, after taking no action whatsoever for all of Summons was also duly served on Minoria. Although she
sixty days, x x x refused to acknowledge such service, she subsequently filed
It is obvious the petitioners have failed to take into account the an answer to the complaint, thru counsel.
following pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court concerning Sy Ho also appears to have been served with summons. But,
notices in case a party is declared in default: as, will shortly be recounted, Sy Ho would later deny such
Rule 18, Sec. 2. Effect of order of default. — Except as provided service.
in Section 9 of Rule 13, a party declared in default shall not be Hodges died during the pendency of the ejectment suit; the
entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings, nor to take part court-appointed Administrator of his estate, the PCIB, was
in the trial. substituted as party plaintiff. PCIB thereafter filed a motion to
Rule 13, Sec. 9. Service upon party in default. — No service of declare Sy Ho in default for failure to answer the complaint.
papers other than substantially amended or supplemental This was granted by the City Court.
pleadings and final orders or judgments shall be necessary on Sy Ho filed a verified "Opposition to the Motion for Default."
a party in default unless he files a motion to set aside the order He alleged that he had never received summons. He prayed
of default in which event he shall be entitled to notice of all that 'he be allowed to present his answer within ten (10) days
further processings regardless of whether the order of default and that if ever he has been already declared in default
is set aside or not. without due service of the notice to him, the said order be
Rule 18, Sec. 3. Relief from order of default. — A party declared lifted." The City Court overruled his opposition and refused to
in default may at any time after discovery thereof and before lift the order of default against him. .
judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the order of Sy Ho and Minoria thereupon filed a joint petition for certiorari
default upon proper showing that his failure to answer was and prohibition with application for preliminary injunction
due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect and that discretion with the CFI. The petition imputed grave abuse of
he has a meritorious defense. In such case the order of default discretion to the City Court in denying Sy Ho's motion to set
may be set aside on such terms and conditions as the judge aside order of default and motion to dismiss. In the answer
may impose in the interest of justice. filed by him on requirement of the Court, Gochangco averred

that any defect in the service of summons on Sy Ho had been A defendant in default is not and should not be placed in a
cured by his voluntary appearance through submission of situation more favorable than a defendant who has answered
various pleadings, that the motion for judgment on the but who fails to appear for trial despite notice. In the latter
pleadings was entirely correct because Minorias answer stated case, as in the former, the trial may proceed ex parte, but is
no affirmative defense or otherwise tendered no issue; the not invalidated by the fact merely that reception of evidence
declaration of default against Sy Ho was also correct under the had been undertaken by the clerk of court on the Court's
circumstances; that the action for certiorari could not result in instructions; this, despite the fact that the judgment that may
an adjudication for the payment of damages since it is simply be rendered on the basis of such an ex parte trial may award
meant to cure jurisdictional defects, which are non-existent in reliefs exceeding the amount or different from that, prayed for
the case; and Sy Ho's situation is not covered by PD No. 20 or in the complaint, unlike a judgment by default which cannot
G.O. No. 53 because he was occupying the premises in differ from or go beyond what is set down in the prayer of the
question not as a dwelling but for purposes of his scrap iron complaint.
business.
The CFI granting the writ of certiorari and annulling all the G.R. No. 139371 April 4, 2001
proceedings in the Civil Case. It held that If petitioner Sy Ho INDIANA AEROSPACE UNIVERSITY, petitioner
was not properly served with summons there was no basis at vs. COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION (CHED),
all for respondent court to declare him in default. By declaring respondent
Sy Ho in default under the circumstances, the court acted with
grave abuse of discretion. Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
ISSUE: Whether or not Sy Ho is in default FACTS: Dr. Reynaldo B. Vera, Chairman, TPRAM of CHED,
HELD: It was therefore error for the Court a quo to have received a letter from Douglas R. Macias, Chairman, Board of
declared the judgment by default to be fatally flawed by the Aeronautical Engineering, PRC and Chairman, TPRAME
fact that the plaintiffs evidence had been received not by the inquiring whether [petitioner] had already acquired university
Judge himself but by the clerk of court. status in view of the latter's advertisement in [the] Manila
The underlying philosophy of the doctrine of default is that the Bulletin.
defendant's failure to answer the complaint despite receiving CHED was directed to conduct appropriate investigation on the
copy thereof together with summons, is attributable to one of alleged misrepresentation by [petitioner]. The [respondent's]
two causes: either (a) to his realization that he has no defenses Legal Affairs Service was requested to take legal action against
to the plaintiffs cause and hence resolves not to oppose the [petitioner]. [respondent] directed [petitioner] to desist from
complaint, or, (b) having good defenses to the suit, to fraud, using the term University, including the use of the same in any
accident, mistake or excusable negligence which prevented of its alleged branches.
him from seasonably filing an answer setting forth those In the course of its investigation, [respondent] was able to
defenses,. It does make sense for a defendant without verify from SEC that [petitioner had] filed a proposal to amend
defenses, and who accepts the correctness of the specific relief its corporate name from Indiana School of Aeronautics to
prayed for in the complaint, to forego the filing of the answer Indiana Aerospace University.
or any sort of intervention in the action at all. For even if he did RTC: [petitioner] filed a Complaint for Damages with prayer for
intervene, the result would be the same: since he would be Writ of Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction and Temporary
unable to establish any good defense, having none in fact, Restraining Order.
judgment would inevitably go against him. And this would be [respondent] filed a Special Appearance with Motion to
an acceptable result, if not being in his power to alter or Dismiss.
prevent it, provided that the judgment did not go beyond or [petitioner] filed its Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss
differ from the specific relief stated in the complaint. It would [petitioner] formally offered its evidence on July 23, 1998
moreover spare him from the embarrassment of openly while [respondent] made a formal offer of evidence on July 28,
appearing to defend the indefensible. On the other hand, if he 1998 to which [petitioner] filed its Comments/Objections and
did have good defenses, it would be unnatural for him not to finally, [respondent] submitted its Memorandum relative
set them up properly and timely, and if he did not in fact set thereto on October 1, 1998.
them up, it must be presumed that some insuperable cause Public respondent judge, in an Order dated August 14, 1998,
prevented him from doing so: fraud, accident, mistake, denied [respondent's] Motion to Dismiss and at the same time,
excusable negligence. In this event, the law will grant him issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction in favor of [petitioner].
relief, and the law is in truth quite liberal in the reliefs made [Respondent], in the same Order, was directed to file its
available to him: a motion to set aside the order of default Answer within fifteen (15) days from receipt of said Order,
prior to judgment; a motion for new trial to set aside the which was August 15, 1998.
default judgment; an appeal from the judgment by default On September 22, 1998, [petitioner] filed before public
even if no motion to set aside the order of default or motion respondent a Motion To Declare [Respondent] in [D]efault.
for new trial had been previously presented; a special civil On the same date, the [respondent] filed a Motion For
action for certiorari impugning the court's jurisdiction. Extension of Time to File its Answer.

[Petitioner], on November 11, 1998 filed its Opposition to the remedy; to interpose a petition for certiorari seeking the
Motion for Extension of Time to File [Respondent's] Answer nullification of the order of default, even before the
and on November 9, 1998, a Motion to Expunge promulgation of a judgment by default; or in the event that
[Respondent's] Answer and at the same time praying that its judgment has been rendered, to have such order and
[M]otion be heard on November 27, 1998 at 9:00 a.m. judgment declared void.
On even date, public respondent judge issued an Order In prohibiting appeals from interlocutory orders, the law does
directing the Office of the Solicitor General to file within a not intend to accord executory force to such writs, particularly
period of ten (10) days from date its written Opposition to the when the effect would be to cause irreparable damage. If, in
Motion to Expunge [Respondent's] Answer and within the the course of trial, a judge proceeds without or in excess of
same period to file a written [N]otice of [A]ppearance in the jurisdiction, this rule prohibiting an appeal does not leave the
case. Unable to file their written Opposition to the Motion to aggrieved party without any remedy. In a case like this, a
Expunge within the period given by public respondent, the special civil action of certiorari is the plain, speedy and
OSG filed a Motion to Admit Written Opposition stating the adequate remedy.
reasons for the same, attaching thereto the Opposition with Herein respondent controverts the judgment by default, not
[F]ormal [E]ntry of [A]ppearance. on the ground that it is unsubstantiated by evidence or that it
CA: On February 23, 1999, respondent filed with the CA a is contrary to law, but on the ground that it is intrinsically void
Petition for Certiorari, arguing that the RTC had committed for having been rendered pursuant to a patently invalid order
grave abuse of discretion (a) in denying the former's Motion to of default.
Dismiss, (b) in issuing a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, and (c)
in declaring respondent in default despite its filing an Answer. GAJUDO V. TRADERS ROYAL BANK
Respondent should not have been declared in default, because G.R. NO. 151098, MARCH 21, 2006
its Answer had been filed long before the RTC ruled upon
petitioner's Motion to declare respondent in default. Thus, FACTS: In mid-1977 Danilo Chua obtained a loan from the
respondent had not obstinately refused to file an Answer; on Traders Royal Bank in the amount of P75,000.00 secured by a
the contrary, its failure to do so on time was due to excusable real estate mortgage over a parcel of land. The loan was not
negligence. Declaring it in default did not serve the ends of paid and thus the bank commenced extra-judicial foreclosure
justice, but only prevented it from pursuing the merits of its proceedings on the property. The auction sale of the property
case. was set on 10 June 1981, but was reset to 31 August 1981, on
ISSUE: Whether or not the Default Order was valid. Chu’s request, which, however, was made without the
RULING: knowledge and conformity of the other petitioners (Gajudos).
NO. Certiorari was the only plain, speedy and adequate On the re-scheduled auction sale, the Sheriff of Quezon City
remedy in the ordinary course of law, because the default sold the property to the bank, the highest bidder therein, for
Order had improvidently been issued. the sum of P24,911.30. The other petitioners (Gajudo) assailed
Lina v. Court of Appeals discussed the remedies available to a this because bid price was shockingly or unconscionably, low;
defendant declared in default, as follows: (1) a motion to set that the other [petitioners] failed to redeem the property due
aside the order of default under Section 3(b), Rule 9 of the to their lack of knowledge of their right of redemption, and
Rules of Court, if the default was discovered before judgment want of sufficient education; that, although the period of
could be rendered; (2) a motion for new trial under Section redemption had long expired, Chua offered to buy back, and
1(a) of Rule 37, if the default was discovered after judgment bank also agreed to sell back the foreclosed property, on the
but while appeal is still available; (3) a petition for relief under understanding that Chua would pay the bank the amount of
Rule 38, if judgment has become final and executory; and (4) P40,135.53, representing the sum that the bank paid at the
an appeal from the judgment under Section 1, Rule 41, even if auction sale, plus interest and that Chua made an initial
no petition to set aside the order of default has been resorted payment thereon in the amount of P4,000.00 duly receipted
to. by the bank; that, in a sudden change of position, the bank
These remedies, however, are available only to a defendant wrote Chua asking that he could repurchase the property, but
who has been validly declared in default. based on the current market value thereof; and that sometime
Such defendant irreparably loses the right to participate in the later, the bank wrote Chua anew, requiring him to tender a
trial. On the other hand, a defendant improvidently declared new offer to counter the offer made thereon by another buyer.
in default may retain and exercise such right after the order of The bank, filed its answer with counterclaim, asserting that the
default and the subsequent judgment by default are annulled, foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property was done in
and the case remanded to the court of origin. The former is accordance with law; and that the bid price was neither
limited to the remedy set forth in Section 2, paragraph 3 of unconscionable, nor shockingly low; that petitioners slept on
Rule 41 of the pre 1997 Rules of Court, and can therefore their rights when they failed to redeem the property within the
contest only the judgment by default on the designated one year statutory period; and that bank, in offering to sell the
ground that it is contrary to evidence or law. The latter, property to Chua on the basis of its current market price, was
however, has the following options: to resort to this same

acting conformably with law, and with legitimate banking public posting of the notice of sale, and that there was no
practice and regulations. showing of inadequacy of price as no competent evidence was
A big conflagration hit the City Hall of Quezon City, which presented to show the real market value of the land sold or the
destroyed, amongst other things, the records of the case. After readiness of another buyer to offer a price higher than that at
the records were reconstituted, the petitioners discovered which the property had been sold. Moreover, petitioners failed
that the foreclosed property was sold by the bank to the to prove that the bank had agreed to sell the property back to
Ceroferr Realty Corporation, and that the notice of lis pendens them. After pointing out that the redemption period had long
annotated on the certificate of title of the foreclosed property, expired, respondent’s written communications to Petitioner
had already been cancelled. Accordingly, with leave of court, Chua only showed, at most, that the former had made a
the petitioners amended their complaint, but the Trial Court proposal for the latter to buy back the property at the current
dismissed the case ‘without prejudice’ due to their failure to market price.
pay additional filing fees.The petitioners re-filed the complaint The petitioners argue that the quantum of evidence for
impleaded as additional defendants the Ceroferr Realty judgments flowing from a default order under Section 3 of Rule
Corporation and/or Cesar Roque, and Lorna Roque, and 9 is not the same as that provided for in Section 1 of Rule 133
included an additional cause of action, to wit: that said new (Preponderance of Evidence rule - which basically states that
defendants conspired with the bank in canceling the notice of the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by
lis pendens by falsifying a letter sent to and filed with the office a preponderance of evidence)
of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, purportedly for the
cancellation of said notice. ISSUES:
Summons was served on the bank. Supposing that all the Whether or not the CA erred in failing to apply the provisions
defendants had filed their answer, the petitioners filed a of Sec 3, Rule 9 ([and in applying instead] the rule on
motion to set case for pre-trial, which motion was, however, preponderance of evidence under Section 1, Rule 133 of the
denied by the Trial Court in its Order on the ground that the Rules of Court.) - No
bank has not yet filed its answer. The petitioners filed a motion HELD:
for reconsideration, thereunder alleging that they received by No, the CA did not err. Between the two rules, there is no
registered mail, on 19 October 1990, a copy of the bank’s incompatibility that would preclude the application of either
answer with counterclaim, dated 04 October 1990, which copy one of them. Section 3 of Rule 9 governs the procedure the
was attached to the motion. The trial Court denied for lack of trial court is directed to take when a defendant fails to file an
merit, the motion for reconsideration, therein holding that the answer. According to this provision, the court "shall proceed
answer with counterclaim filed by the bank referred to another to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his
civil case pending before Branch 90 of the same Court. pleading may warrant," subject to the court’s discretion on
The petitioners filed a motion to declare the bank in default, whether to require the presentation of evidence ex parte. The
thereunder alleging that no answer has been filed despite the same provision also sets down guidelines on the nature and
service of summons on it on 26 September 1990. The Trial extent of the relief that may be granted.
Court declared the motion submitted for resolution upon Basic is the rule that the party making allegations has the
submission by petitioners of proof of service of the motion on burden of proving them by a preponderance of evidence.
the bank. Upon proof that petitioners had indeed served the Moreover, parties must rely on the strength of their own
bank with a copy of said motion, the Trial Court issued an Order evidence, not upon the weakness of the defense offered by
of default against the bank. On petitioners’ motion, they were their opponent. This principle holds true, especially when the
by the Court allowed to present evidence ex parte. Thereafter, latter has had no opportunity to present evidence because of
the Trial Court rendered the new questioned partial decision. a default order. Needless to say, the extent of the relief that
Aggrieved, the bank filed a motion to set aside the partial may be
decision by default against Traders Royal Bank and admit their granted can only be as much as has been alleged and proved
Answer with counterclaim: thereunder it averred, amongst with preponderant evidence required under Section 1 of Rule
others, that the erroneous filing of said answer was due to an 133.
honest mistake of the typist and inadvertence of its counsel. Complainants are not automatically entitled to the relief
The CA ruled in favor of respondent bank. Even if the CA stated prayed for, once the defendants are declared in default.
that the erroneous docket number placed on the Answer filed Favorable relief can be granted only after the court has
before the trial court was not an excusable negligence by the ascertained that the relief is warranted by the evidence
bank’s counsel and that these were binding on the bank, the offered and the facts proven by the presenting party. Being
petitioners had not convincingly established their right to relief declared in default does not constitute a waiver of rights
as there was no ground to invalidate the foreclosure sale of the except that of being heard and of presenting evidence in the
mortgaged property. They stated that an extrajudicial trial court. Although the defendant would not be in a position
foreclosure sale did not require personal notice to the to object, if the evidence presented should not be sufficient to
mortgagor, that there was no allegation or proof of justify a judgment for the plaintiff, the complaint must be
noncompliance with the publication requirement and the dismissed.

While petitioners were allowed to present evidence ex parte presented their evidence ex parte without giving her a chance
under Section 3 of Rule 9, they were not excused from to present her evidence, thereby violating her right to due
establishing their claims for damages by the required quantum process of law.
of proof under Section 1 of Rule 133. Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the
Moreover, the grant of damages was not sufficiently appeal. The Court of Appeals reminded Monzon that the
supported by the evidence for the following reasons. essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard
The petitioners were not deprived of their property without and submit evidence in support of ones defense. What the law
cause. There has been no allegation or proof of noncompliance proscribes is lack of opportunity to be heard.
with the requirement of publication and public posting of the Monzon claims anew that it was a violation of her right to due
notice of sale. Neither has there been competent evidence to process of law for the RTC to render its Decision immediately
show that the price paid at the foreclosure sale was after respondents presented their evidence ex parte without
inadequate. Thus, there was no ground to invalidate the sale. giving her a chance to present her evidence. Monzon stresses
The petitioners have not convincingly established their right to that she was never declared in default by the trial court. The
damages on the basis of the purported agreement to trial court should have, thus, set the case for hearing for the
repurchase. Without reiterating our prior discussion on this reception of the evidence of the defense. She claims that she
point, we stress that entitlement to actual and compensatory never waived her right to present evidence.
damages must be proved even under Section 3 of Rule 9. ISSUE:
In sum, the petitioners have failed to convince this Court of the Whether or not the RTC Decision constitutes an order of
strength of their position, notwithstanding the advantage they default?
enjoyed in presenting their evidence ex parte. Not in every [Whether or not the RTC erred in applying the Default
case of default by the defendant is the complainant entitled to Doctrine, since the court relied on the failure of Monzon to file
win automatically. responsive pleading within the reglementary period.]
Hence, the petition is denied. RULING:
NO.
G.R. NO. 171827 September 17, 2008 It can be seen that despite the fact that Monzon was not
TERESITA MONZON, Petitioner, declared in default by the RTC, the RTC nevertheless applied
vs. SPS. JAMES & MARIA ROSA NIEVES RELOVA AND SPS. the effects of a default order upon petitioner under Section 3,
BIENVENIDO & EUFRACIA PEREZ, RESPONDENTS. VS. Rule 9 of the Rules of Court
ADDIO PROPERTIES, INC., Respondent In his book on remedial law, former Justice Florenz D. Regalado
writes that failure to appear in hearings is not a ground for the
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI declaration of a defendant in default:
DOCTRINE: Failure to file a responsive pleading within the reglementary
The rigid requirements of a default order are as follows: (1) the period, and not failure to appear at the hearing, is the sole
court must have validly acquired jurisdiction over the person ground for an order of default (Rosario, et al. vs. Alonzo, et al.,
of the defendant either by service of summons or voluntary L-17320, June 29, 1963), except the failure to appear at a pre-
appearance; (2) the defendant failed to file his answer within trial conference wherein the effects of a default on the part of
the time allowed therefor; and (3) there must be a motion to the defendant are followed, that is, the plaintiff shall be
declare the defendant in default with notice to the latter. allowed to present evidence ex parte and a judgment based
FACTS: thereon may be rendered against the defendant (Section 5,
Spouses James and Maria Rosa Nieves Relova and the spouses Rule 18). Also, a default judgment may be rendered, even
Bienvenido and Eufracia Perez, respondents before this Court,
filed against Atty. Ana Liza Luna, Clerk of Court of Branch 18 of ROBERTO OTERO, Petitioner, vs. ROGER TAN, Respondent.
the RTC of Tagaytay City, and herein petitioner Teresita
Monzon an initiatory pleading captioned as a Petition for PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45
Injunction. DOCTRINE: A defendant who fails to file an answer may, upon
The RTC, citing the absence of petitioner and her counsel on motion, be declared by the court in default. A defendant who
said hearing date despite due notice, granted an oral Motion has been declared in default is precluded from raising any
by the respondents by issuing an Order allowing the ex parte other ground in his appeal from the judgment by default.
presentation of evidence by respondents. FACTS:
On 1 April 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for collection
respondents mentioning that the Order allowing the ex parte of sum of money and damages before MCTCC Cagayan de Oro.
presentation of evidence by respondents was due to the Tan alleged that on several occasions from February 2000 to
continuous and incessant absences of petitioner and counsel. May 2001, Otero purchased on credit petroleum products
Monzon filed a Notice of Appeal, which was approved by the from his Petron outlet in Valencia City, Bukidnon in the
trial court. Monzon claims that the RTC gravely erred in aggregate amount of ₱ 270,818.01. Tan further claimed that
rendering its Decision immediately after respondents

despite several verbal demands, Otero failed to settle his However, the statements of account which Tan adduced in
obligation. evidence before the MTCC indubitably are private documents.
Despite receipt of summons and copy of the complaint, Otero Considering that these documents do not fall among the
did not file his answer with MTCC. Hence, Tan moved that he aforementioned exceptions, the MTCC could not admit the
be declared in default. Otero opposed this on the ground that same as evidence against Otero without the required
he never received the summons. He, however, failed to appear authentication thereof pursuant to Section 20, Rule 132 of the
on the next scheduled hearing so he was declared in default. Rules of Court. During authentication in court, a witness
Tan adduced in evidence the testimonies of Rosemarie positively testifies that a document presented as evidence is
Doblado and Zita Sara, his employees in his Petron outlet who genuine and has been duly executed, or that the document is
attended Otero when the latter made purchases of petroleum neither spurious nor counterfeit nor executed by mistake or
products now the subject of the action below. He likewise under duress. Notwithstanding the inadmissibility of the said
presented various statements of account showing the statements of account, this Court finds that Tan was still able
petroleum products which Otero purchased from his to prove by a preponderance of evidence the material
establishment. allegations of his complaint against Otero.
MTCC directed Otero to pay Tan the sum of money as well as if the defendant had filed his answer, under the circumstance
the attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. RTC affirmed this in Sec. 3(c), Rule 29.
ruling on the ground that the statements of account presented Hence, according to Justice Regalado, the effects of default are
by Tan were overwhelming enough to prove Otero’s followed only in three instances: (1) when there is an actual
indebtedness. default for failure to file a responsive pleading; (2) failure to
CA denied the petition for review filed by Otero. CA rejected appear in the pre-trial conference; and (3) refusal to comply
Otero’s allegation with regard to the genuineness and due with modes of discovery under the circumstance in Sec. 3(c),
execution of the statements of account presented by Tan, the Rule 29.
CA held that any defense which Otero may have against Tan’s
claim is already deemed waived due to Otero’s failure to file HEIRS OF DR. MARIANO FAVIS SR. represented by their co-
his answer. heirs and Attorneys-in-Fact MERCEDES A. FAVIS and NELLY
ISSUE: WON any defense which Petitioner may have against FAVIS- VILLAFUERTE, Petitioners, vs. JUANA GONZALES,
respondent was deemed waived for failure to file an answer her son MARIANO G. FAVIS, MA. THERESA JOANA D. FAVIS,
(YES) JAMES MARK D. FAVIS, all minors represented herein by
RULING: their parents SPS. MARIANO FAVIS and LARCELITA D.
A defendant who fails to file an answer may, upon motion, be FAVIS, Respondents.
declared by the court in default. Loss of standing in court, the G.R. No. 185922 January 15, 2014
forfeiture of one’s right as a party litigant, contestant or legal
adversary, is the consequence of an order of default. A party FACTS: petition for review
in default loses his right to present his defense, control the Dr. Favis was married to Capitolina with whom he had seven
proceedings, and examine or cross-examine witnesses. He has children named Purita, Reynaldo, Consolacion, Mariano,
no right to expect that his pleadings would be acted upon by Esther, Mercedes, and Nelly. When Capitolina died, Dr. Favis
the court nor may be object to or refute evidence or motions took Juana as his common-law wife with whom he sired one
filed against him. child, Mariano. When Dr. Favis and Juana got married, Dr. Favis
Nonetheless, the fact that a defendant has lost his standing in executed an affidavit acknowledging Mariano as one of his
court for having been declared in default does not mean that legitimate children. Mariano is married to Larcelita, with
he is left sans any recourse whatsoever. Indeed, a defending whom he has four children, named Ma. Theresa Joana, Ma.
party declared in default retains the right to appeal from the Cristina, James Mark and Ma. Thea.
judgment by default. However, the grounds that may be raised Dr. Favis died intestate leaving 5 properties. in his llifetime, Dr.
in such an appeal are restricted to any of the following: first, Favis allegedly executed a Deed of Donation transferring and
the failure of the plaintiff to prove the material allegations of conveying 2 properties in favor of his grandchildren with
the complaint; second, the decision is contrary to law; and Juana.
third, the amount of judgment is excessive or different in kind Claiming that said donation prejudiced their legitime, Dr. Favis’
from that prayed for. In these cases, the appellate tribunal children with Capitolina, filed an action for annulment of the
should only consider the pieces of evidence that were Deed of Donation, inventory, liquidation and partition of
presented by the plaintiff during the ex parte presentation of property before the RTC against Juana, Spouses Mariano and
his evidence. Larcelita and their grandchildren as respondents.
A defendant who has been declared in default is precluded In their Answer with Counterclaim, respondents assert that the
from raising any other ground in his appeal from the judgment properties donated do not form part of the estate of the late
by default since, otherwise, he would then be allowed to Dr. Favis because said donation was made inter vivos, hence
adduce evidence in his defense, which right he had lost after petitioners have no stake over said properties.
he was declared in default.

The RTC nullified the Deed of Donation and cancelled the may motu proprio dismiss a claim when it appears from the
corresponding tax declarations. The trial court found that Dr. pleadings or evidence on record that it has no jurisdiction over
Favis, at the age of 92 and plagued with illnesses, could not the subject matter; when there is another cause of action
have had full control of his mental capacities to execute a valid pending between the same parties for the same cause, or
Deed of Donation where the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of
The CA motu proprio ordered the dismissal of the complaint limitations. x x x.
for failure of petitioners to make an averment that earnest It was in Heirs of Domingo Valientes v. Ramas cited in P.L. Uy
efforts toward a compromise have been made, as mandated Realty Corporation v. ALS Management and Development
by Article 151 of the Family Code. The appellate court justified Corporation where we noted that the second sentence of
its order of dismissal by invoking its authority to review rulings Section 1 of Rule 9 does not only supply exceptions to the rule
of the trial court even if they are not assigned as errors in the that defenses not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in
appeal. the answer are deemed waived, it also allows courts to dismiss
ISSUE: WON the appellate court may dismiss the order of cases motu propio on any of the enumerated grounds. The
dismissal of the complaint for failure to allege therein that tenor of the second sentence of the Rule is that the allowance
earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made. of a motu propio dismissal can proceed only from the
HELD: The Court of Appeals ignored the facts of the case that exemption from the rule on waiver; which is but logical
clearly demonstrated the refusal by the respondents to because there can be no ruling on a waived ground.
compromise. Instead it ordered the dismissal of petitioner’s COMPROMISE BETWEEN FAMILY IS WAIVABLE
complaint on the ground that it did not allege what in fact was Why the objection of failure to allege a failed attempt at a
shown during the trial compromise in a suit among members of the same family is
Section 1, par. (j), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, waivable was earlier explained in the case of Versoza v.
which provides: Versoza, a case for future support which was dismissed by the
Section 1. Grounds. — Within the time for but before filing the trial court upon the ground that there was no such allegation
answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a of infringement of Article 222 of the Civil Code, the origin of
motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following Article 151 of the Family Code. While the Court ruled that a
grounds: complaint for future support cannot be the subject of a
xxxx compromise and as such the absence of the required
(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been allegation in the complaint cannot be a ground for objection
complied with. against the suit, the decision went on to state thus:
INSTANCES WHEN A COURT CAN MOTU PROPRIO DISMISS A The alleged defect is that the present complaint does not state
CLAIM a cause of action. The proposed amendment seeks to complete
Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: it. An amendment to the effect that the requirements of Article
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. − Defenses 222 have been complied with does not confer jurisdiction upon
and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the lower court. With or without this amendment, the subject-
the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears matter of the action remains as one for support, custody of
from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court children, and damages, cognizable by the court below.
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is To illustrate, Tamayo v. San Miguel Brewery, Inc., allowed an
another action pending between the same parties for the same amendment which " merely corrected a defect in the
cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by allegation of plaintiff-appellant’s cause of action, because as it
statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim. then stood, the original complaint stated no cause of action."
Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances when the We there ruled out as inapplicable the holding in Campos
court may motu proprio dismiss the claim, namely: (a) lack of Rueda Corporation v. Bautista, that an amendment cannot be
jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis pendentia ; (c) res made so as to confer jurisdiction on the court x x x..
judicata ; and (d) prescription of action. Specifically in FAILURE OF A COMPROMISE BETWEEN FAMILY MEMBERS
Gumabon v. Larin, cited in Katon v. Palanca, Jr., the Court held: DOES NOT AFFECT JURISDICTION
x x x [T]he motu proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally Thus was it made clear that a failure to allege earnest but failed
limited to instances when the court clearly had no jurisdiction efforts at a compromise in a complaint among members of the
over the subject matter and when the plaintiff did not appear same family, is not a jurisdictional defect but merely a defect
during trial, failed to prosecute his action for an unreasonable in the statement of a cause of action. Versoza was cited in a
length of time or neglected to comply with the rules or with later case as an instance analogous to one where the
any order of the court. Outside of these instances, any motu conciliation process at the barangay level was not priorly
proprio dismissal would amount to a violation of the right of resorted to. Both were described as a "condition precedent for
the plaintiff to be heard. Except for qualifying and expanding the filing of a complaint in Court." In such instances, the
Section 2, Rule 9, and Section 3, Rule 17, of the Revised Rules consequence is precisely what is stated in the present Rule.
of Court, the amendatory 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure Thus:
brought about no radical change. Under the new rules, a court

x x x The defect may however be waived by failing to make Carson moved to dismiss the complaint instead of submitting
seasonable objection, in a motion to dismiss or answer, the a responsive pleading within fifteen (15) days from April 27,
defect being a mere procedural imperfection which does not 2007 as prayed for in its Appearance and Motion. Clearly,
affect the jurisdiction of the court. Carson failed to answer within the time allowed for by the RTC.
G.R. NO. 225035 FEBRUARY 8, 2017 At this point, Carson could have already been validly declared
CARSON REALTY & MANAGEMENT CORPORATION V. RED in default. However, believing that it has yet to acquire
ROBIN SECURITY jurisdiction over Carson, the RTC issued the September 24,
2007 and September 9, 2008 alias Summons. This culminated
PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 45 in the issuance of the assailed June 29, 2009 Order declaring
FACTS: Santos filed a Complaint for Sum of Money and Carson in default on the basis of the substituted service of the
Damages against petitioner Carson. A copy of the Summons, September 9, 2008 alias Summons. While Carson filed its
together with the Complaint and its annexes, was served upon Urgent Motion to Lift Order of Default, the CA found that the
Carson at its business address same failed to comply with the requirement under Sec. 3(b)
The appointed Corporate Secretary and legal counsel of that the motion be under oath.
Carson, Atty. Roxas, filed an Appearance and Motion with the It bears noting that the propriety of the default order stems
court wherein the latter entered his appearance and from Carson's failure to file its responsive pleading despite its
acknowledged that the Summons was served and received by voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court
one of the staff assistants of Carson. Atty. Roxas prayed for an reckoned from its filing of the Appearance and Motion, and not
extension of fifteen (15) days from April 27, 2007 within which due to its failure to file its answer to the September 8, 2008
to file a responsive pleading, which the RTC granted. alias Summons.
Instead of filing a responsive pleading, Atty. Roxas moved to BELO VS. MARCANTONIO
dismiss the complaint G.R. NO. 243366, SEPT. 8, 2020
Santos countered that while the Summons was initially
received by Serrano, who as it turned out was a staff assistant FACTS: On January 12, 2015, Felicita Z. Belo (petitioner) filed a
and not the corporate secretary of Carson, the corporation complaint for foreclosure of mortgage against Carlita C.
acknowledged receipt of the Summons when Atty. Roxas Marcantonio (respondent). The clerk of court then issued
alleged in his Appearance and Motion that he may not be able summons dated January 26, 2015 addressed to respondent's
to comply with the 15-day prescribed period stated in the known address at 155 Haig St., Mandaluyong City. Per the
Summons within which to file a responsive pleading. Thus, Sheriff's Return, copies of said summons and the complaint
when Carson sought for an affirmative relief of a 15-day along with its annexes were left to a certain Giovanna
extension from April 27, 2007 to file its pleading, it already Marcantonio (Giovanna), respondent's "niece," allegedly
voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the RTC. because respondent was not at the given address at that time.
RTC denied Carson's Motion to Dismiss and directed The Sheriff's Return dated January 29, 2015 reads: This is to
the issuance of an alias summons to be served anew upon the certify that on January 28, 2015, a copy of Summons with
corporation. Complaint, Annexes dated January 26, 2015 issued by the
Attempts to serve summons was to no avail, this prompted to Honorable Court in connection with the above-entitled case
resort to substituted service of the alias Summons by leaving a was cause to be served by substituted service (Sec. 7 - Rule 14).
copy thereof with a certain Mr. JR Taganila, but the latter also The defendant/s cannot be served within a reasonable time as
refused to acknowledge receipt of the alias Summons. provided for in Sec. 8 - Rule 14 because the defendant is not
Santos filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default. RTC around and cannot be found at the given address located at
denied the motion, finding that there was an improper service 155 Haig Street, Mandaluyong City at the time of the service of
of summons on Carson. Thereafter, Santos requested the RTC summons and that earnest efforts were exerted to serve
for the issuance of another alias Summons. Same scenario, summons personally to the defendant and service was
none of the officers were present, so the receptionist received effected by leaving a copy of summons at the defendant's
Summons. given address thru Giovanna Marcantonio — Niece of the
Santos filed a second Motion to Declare Defendant in Default. defendant and a person of suitable age and discretion who
The RTC granted the motion and allowed her to present her acknowledged receipt thereof the copy of summons as
evidence ex-parte. evidenced by her signature located at the lower portion of the
CA: Denied and ruled that RTC had properly acquired original copy of summons.
jurisdiction over Carson due to its voluntary appearance in In April 2016, before judgment was rendered,
court by the act of requesting additional time to file its respondent learned about petitioner's case against her.
responsive pleading. Respondent immediately, thus, filed a Motion to Set Aside/Lift
Issue: Whether Carson was properly declared in default. Order of Default and to Re-Open Trial dated April 11, 2016 on
Held: YES. Carson was properly declared in default the ground of defective service of summons. She averred
therein, among others, that she learned about the case only on
April 5, 2016 through petitioner's niece, a certain Mae Zamora;

that she was not able to file a responsive pleading as she did cured by respondent's filing of a Motion to Set Aside/Lift Order
not receive a copy of the summons; that she is currently a of Default and to Re-Open Trial, which is deemed as a
resident of Cavite and no longer a resident of Mandaluyong voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court.
where the summons was served; and that said summons was
received by her daughter not niece as stated in the Sheriff's RULE 10: AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS
Return Giovanna, who never sent the same to her, being
unaware of the significance thereof. Respondent further G.R. No. 80001 FEBRUARY 27, 1989
averred that she has good and meritorious defenses to defeat CARLOS LEOBRERA, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
petitioner's claim for foreclosure of mortgage as the same was BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Respondent
pursued through fraudulent misrepresentation perpetrated by
one Maria Cecilia Duque, and that at any rate, certain Petition for Review on Certiorari
payments have already been made, which controverted the DOCTRINE
amount claimed in the complaint. Respondent, thus, sought “A supplemental complaint should, as the name implies,
for the court's liberality in setting aside the default order and supply only deficiencies in aid of an original complaint. It
re-opening the case for trial considering her legitimate reason should contain only causes of action relevant and material to
for her failure to file answer, as well as her meritorious the plaintiff's right and which help or aid the plaintiff's right or
defense. defense. The supplemental complaint must be based on
In its order dated August 15, 2016, the RTC held that the matters arising subsequent to the original complaint related to
substituted service of summons upon respondent was validly the claim or defense presented therein, and founded on the
made per Sheriff's Return dated January 29, 2015. same cause of action. It cannot be used to try a new matter or
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent may be granted relief from a new cause of action.”
the RTC's default order? FACTS
HELD: It should be emphasized, at the outset, that petitioner Petitioner Leobrera was granted an P800,000.00 credit facility
no longer questions the appellate court's finding with regard by BPI as part of an amicable settlement for Leobrera to drop
to the invalidity of the service of summons upon respondent. his claims for damages against BPI due to the latter’s alleged
At any rate, it would not go amiss to state in this disquisition failure to deliver three export letters of credit on time. The
that we are one with the CA in ruling that there was a credit facility granted was secured by two real estate
"defective, invalid, and ineffectual" substituted service of mortgages. The facility was entirely converted into a revolving
summons in this case. It is settled that resort to substituted promissory note (PN) line. Aside from this, Leobrera also
service is allowed only if, for justifiable causes, the defendant obtained a 3-year term loan in the amount of P500,000.00
cannot be personally served with summons within a evidenced by a PN, secured by a third real estate mortgage.
reasonable time. As substituted service is in derogation of the No renewal was negotiated and BPI demanded full payment.
usual method of service - personal service is preferred over Due to failure of payment, BPI prepared to foreclose the real
substituted service -parties do not have unbridled right to estate mortgages. However, Leobrera filed a complaint for
resort to substituted service of summons. damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
In the landmark case of Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, the Court injunction.
ruled that before the sheriff may resort to substituted service, The RTC issued an order restraining BPI from foreclosing the
he must first establish the impossibility of prompt personal real estate mortgages, and subsequently issued a writ of
service. To do so, there must be at least three best effort preliminary injunction.
attempts, preferably on at least two different dates, to effect Meanwhile, BPI wrote to Leobrera claiming that he failed to
personal service within a reasonable period of one month or pay the amortization, and thus BPI availed of the acceleration
eventually result in failure. It is further required for the sheriff clause. Again, there was failure to make payment which
to cite why-such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that prompted BPI to threaten to foreclose the third real estate
impossibility of service can be confirmed or accepted. Here, as mortgage.
correctly found by the CA, the sheriff merely made a single Before BPI could do so, petitioner filed a Motion to File
attempt to personally serve. Summons upon respondent. Supplemental Complaint, including a prayer for the issuance of
Further, he merely made a general statement in the Return an injunction to restrain BPI from foreclosing the third
that earnest efforts were made to personally serve the mortgage. The RTC granted the motion and issued a restraining
summons, without any detail as to the circumstances order. BPI filed a motion to set it aside, but this was denied.
surrounding such alleged attempted personal service. Clearly, Before the CA could act on BPI’s petition for certiorari, the trial
this does not suffice. In addition, this Court observed that the court granted the injunction prayed for. However, the CA gave
sheriff even made a mistake in the ident.it} of the .person who- due course to BPI’s petition and enjoined the trial judge from
received the summons, stating in his Return that the same was enforcing the injunction. The CA issued a writ of preliminary
left lo respondent's niece, when it turned out that the recipient injunction in favor of BPI, and subsequently a favorable
is respondent's daughter. Despite the defective service of decision as well. In addition, the CA held that the motion to
summons, petitioner insists that such defect has already been submit supplemental pleading was defective.

ISSUE filed with the RTC Makati a Complaint against the CB for the
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the annulment of MB Resolution No. 955. Thereafter, on 25
trial court abused its discretion in admitting the supplemental January 1985, the CB issued MB Resolution No. 75 ordering the
complaint. (NO) closure of Banco Filipino and placing the latter under
RULING receivership and was forbidden to continue doing business to
Section 6 of Rule 10 states that “[u]pon motion of a party the prevent further losses to its depositors and creditors. Pursuant
court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are to the recent development, Banco Filipino filed a Motion to
just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth Admit Attached Amended/Supplemental Complaint in the
transactions, occurrences or events which happened since the three consolidated cases, respondent bank sought to
date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. If the court substitute the CB-BOL (Central Bank Board of Liquidators) for
deems it advisable that the adverse party should plead the defunct CB and its MB, respondent also aimed to recover
thereto, it shall so order, specifying the time therefor,” at least P18 billion in actual damages, litigation expenses,
The question in this case is whether the “reasonable notice” attorney’s fees, interests, and costs of suit against petitioner
has been complied with. The notice of hearing is intended to and individuals who had allegedly acted with malice and
prevent surprise and to afford the adverse party a chance to evident bad faith in placing the bank under conservatorship
be heard before the motion is resolved by the court. and eventually closing it down in 1985. More than 10 years
In this case, a copy of the motion was received by BPI on March from the enactment of R.A. 7653, Banco Filipino again filed a
13. However, the RTC already granted the motion on March Motion to Admit Second Amended/Supplemental Complaint in
12. Such manner of notice is hardly “reasonable.” The undue the consolidated civil cases, however, the same was opposed
haste of the RTC is at once apparent as no notice had yet been by the CB-BOL.
received by BPI when the RTC granted the motion. ISSUE:
The notice did not also indicate a time and place for hearing of WON RTC erred in admitting Banco Filipino’s Second
the motion, nor does the record reveal any proof of service Amended/Supplemental Complaint in the consolidated civil
attached to the motion. Because the minimum requirements cases before it.
of procedural due process was not satisfied by the notice, the RULING:
motion to which it was attached is thus a mere scrap of paper Yes. The amendment/supplement violates the rules on joinder
not entitled to any cognizance by the trial court. Thus, the of parties and causes of action. If the purpose is to set up a
Court of Appeals committed no reversible error. cause of action not existing at the time of the filing of the
Furthermore, the supplemental complaint’s cause of action is complaint, amendment is not allowed, the original Complaint
not interrelated with that of the original complaint. was based on the alleged illegal closure of Banco Filipino
Petitioner’s main cause of action concerned BPI’s threat to effected in 1985 by the defunct CB and its MB. On the other
foreclose two real estate mortgages. On the other hand, the hand, the Second Amended/Supplemental Complaint
supplemental complaint alleged acts of harassment stemmed from the alleged oppressive and arbitrary acts
committed by BPI in unreasonably opting to declare petitioner committed by the BSP and its MB against Banco Filipino after
in default and demanding full liquidation of the loan secured the respondent bank was reopened in 1994. The acts
by the third real estate mortgage. This was independent of the attributed by Banco Filipino to the BSP and its MB pertain to
amicable settlement secured with the first wo real estate events that transpired after this Court ordered the respondent
mortgages. Thus, the subsequent cause of action in the bank’s reopening in 1994. These acts bear no relation to those
supplemental complaint is unrelated. Thus, it cannot be alleged in the original Complaint, which related to the
pleaded in such manner. propriety of the closure and liquidation of respondent as a
banking institution way back in 1985.
G.R. No. 173399 February 21, 2017 THE PASAY CITY GOVERNMENT, THE CITY MAYOR OF
CENTRAL BANK BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS, Petitioner DEFENDANT PASAY CITY GOVERNMENT, THE MEMBERS OF
vs. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF PASAY CITY and THE CITY
Respondent TREASURER OF PASAY CITY GOVERNMENT, petitioners-
appellants, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
MANILA, BRANCH X and VICENTE DAVID ISIP (doing business
DOCTRINE: If the purpose is to set up a cause of action not under the firm name V.D. ISIP SONS & ASSOCIATES),
existing at the time of the filing of the complaint, amendment respondents-appellees.
is not allowed. G.R. No. L-32162. September 28, 1984, SECOND DIVISION,
FACTS: MAKASIAR, J
Monetary Board of the then Central Bank (CB) allowed Banco THE PASAY CITY GOVERNMENT, THE CITY MAYOR OF
Filipino under MB resolution No.223 to operate as a savings DEFENDANT PASAY CITY GOVERNMENT, THE MEMBERS OF
bank, however the CB issued MB Resolution No. 955placing THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF PASAY ClTY and THE CITY
Banco Filipino under conservatorship after granting the latter’s TREASURER OF PASAY CITY GOVERNMENT, petitioners-
loan applications worth billions of pesos. Respondent bank appellants,

vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF especially where judgment has already been obtained by him
MANILA, BRANCH X and VICENTE DAVID ISIP (doing in the original action.
business under the firm name V.D. ISIP SONS & DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the order of the
ASSOCIATES), respondents-appellees. respondent court dated july 23, 1969 is hereby affirmed and
the petitioners-appellants are hereby directed to pay
This is a petition for review on certiorari. attorney's fees in the amount of eighteen thousand three
FACTS: In 1964, Isip entered into a contract with the City of hundred ninety-two and 78/100 (p18,392.78) pesos. Costs
Pasay represented by then Mayor Pablo Cuneta for the against petitioners-appellants.
construction of a new Pasay City Hall for the contract price of Wilfredo P. Verzosa and Pilar Martinez, v. Court of
P4.9 million. Isip proceeded with the construction and Appeals, Hon. Nicodemo Ferrer, and Fe Giron Uson
accomplished the amount of work equivalent to P1.7 million. G.R. Nos. 119511-13; November 24, 1998
Pasay paid only the total amount of P1.1 million, leaving a
balance of P613,000. Pasay failed to remit the amount, so Isip FACTS:
filed a case for specific performance with damages before CFI Fe Giron Uson is the owner of a parcel of land in Pangasinan
Manila. The parties arrived at a draft amicable agreement covered by O.C.T. No. 12783. Fe mortgaged the land to
wherein it was stated that Pasay will remit P613,000 to Isip and Wilfredo Verzosa.
that Isip will start the construction work corresponding to the The private respondent failed to pay her entire obligation to
next stage. The Municipal Board enacted an ordinance which petitioner, prompting the latter to have the mortgage
approved the Compromise Agreement. CFI approved the foreclosed.
compromise agreement and subsequently issued a writ of To prevent the Office of the Provincial Sheriff from proceeding
execution. An application for and notice of garnishment were with the foreclosure sale, Fe Uson filed with the Regional Trial
made and effected upon Pasay's funds with the PNB. Pasay Court a complaint against Wilfredo Verzosa and the Provincial
filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, alleging that the Sheriff, for annulment of mortgage with prayer for the
Sheriff has no power to levy or garnish on execution the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
general funds, specially the trust funds, of Pasay City. CFI The complaint lacked proper verification, but Fe Unson filed
denied the motion and ordered the enforcement of her amended complaint.
garnishment. Hence, Pasay filed a petition for review before Fe Uson, through counsel, wrote to the Provincial Sheriff
the SC. requesting him to discontinue the foreclosure sale in
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Court was correct in deference to the pending case. The foreclosure sale was
refusing to quash the writ of execution it has issued. nonetheless conducted by the sheriff, and the property was
HELD: YES. The respondent Court was correct in refusing to sold to Verzosa as the highest bidder.
quash the writ of execution it has issued. Having established The trial court issued an order admitting the amended
that the compromise agreement was final and immediately complaint.
executory, and in fact was already enforced, the respondent Verzosa filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari.
Court was in error when it still entertained the supplemental After the expiration of the redemption period, the Sheriff
complaint filed by the respondent-appellee for by then the issued the Sheriff’s Final Deed of Sale. The OCT in the name of
respondent Court had no more jurisdiction over the subject Fe Uson was cancelled, and a TCT was issued in the name of
matter. When a decision has become final and executory, the Verzosa. The land was subsequently sold to Pilar Martinez.
court no longer has the power and jurisdiction to alter, amend The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari filed
or revoke, and its only power thereof is to order its execution. by Verzosa. Fe Uson filed her second amended complaint
Moreover, supplemental pleadings are meant to supply impleading as additional defendants the Register of Deeds of
deficiencies in aid of original pleading, not to entirely Alaminos, and Pilar Martinez.
substitute the latter (British Traders' Insurance Co., Ltd. vs. The respondent court issued an order directing the petitioners
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, L-20501, 13 SCRA 719, 728 to cease and desist from entering, making constructions, and
[April 30, 1965]). Here, the respondent-appellee originally performing any act of possession or ownership over the land
asked for specific performance which was later settled through in question.
a compromise agreement. After this, the respondent-appellee Also, the respondent Judge issued an order directing
asked for rescission of both the contract and agreement and defendants Verzosa and Martinez and/or any and other
the compromise agreement using a supplemental complaint. persons acting under their command to desist and cease from
It is clear that the supplemental complaint We have before Us entering, intruding and making constructions on the land
is not only to "supply deficiencies in aid of original pleading" covered by O.C.T. No. 12783. The Court of Appeals held that
but is also meant as an entirely new "substitute" to the latter. the peaceable uncontested status was when the private
A supplemental complaint must be consistent with and in aid respondent, Fe Uson, was the registered owner of the land. As
of, the cause of action set forth in the original complaint and a the owner of the property, Fe Uson has every right to protect
new and independent cause of action cannot be set up by such her rights. The status quo should be reckoned at the time of
complaint (Bishop vs. Taylor, 210 App. Div. 1, 205 NYS 653), the fling of the original complaint.

The petitioners challenged the orders of the court. REFINING COMPANY (Phil.) INC., CENTRAL VISAYAN
ISSUES: REALTY & INVESTMENTS CO., INC., CEBU CITY SAVINGS &
Whether or not the private respondent was entitled to an LOAN ASSOCIATION and the GOVERNMENT OF THE
injunctive writ. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Whether or not the status quo ante the injunctive writ G.R. No. L-34840 July 20, 1982
preserves refers to the point when Pilar Martinez acquired
ownership of the property. FACTS: petition for review on certiorari
HELD: Petitioners filed a complaint for the recovery of ownership and
YES. An injunctive writ may be issued when the following possession of a parcel of land with damages against Shell Co.,
requisites are established: Central Visayan Realty. and Cebu City Savings in the CFI.
The invasion of the right is material and substantial; Central and Cebu City Savings filed a motion to compel the
The right of complainant is clear and unmistakable; plaintiffs to pay the correct amount for docket fee as the
There is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to complaint of the plaintiffs contains or states two, if not three
prevent serious damage. alternative causes of action which are: a) Reconveyance of real
The requisites are present in the case. The undisputed owner property; b) Recovery of the value of the land and Damages; c)
of the property was the private respondent, who upon learning Cancellation of Titles. Hence the filing fee of P6,730.00 on the
of the scheduled foreclosure immediately filed a complaint to ground that the total demand of the said plaintiffs is
annul the mortgage, and prayed for the restraining order to be P3,390,633.24 and should be the basis for computing the filing
issued to restrain the foreclosure. fee and not the value of the land alone.
She had title to and possession of the property, and claimed The motion was opposed by the plaintiffs who claimed that the
that she had paid her obligation except for the unpaid balance main cause of action was the recovery of a piece of land and
which she was willign to consign judicially. The private on the basis of its assessed valued, P60.00 was the correct
respondent had a clear and unmistakable right to protect her docketing fee.
title to and possession of the property. The RTC orders the plaintiffs to pay an additional sum of
NO. Pilar Martinez’ claim to the property is precisely the bone P3,104.00 as filing fees. Since, the claim for damages far
of contention. The private respondent prayed for the issuance exceeds the value of the land the damages therefore are not
of an injunctive writ to prevent the foreclosure of the property, merely incidental or ancillary but are principal demands.
and the subsequent transfer of ownership. Although the Still the defedants were adamant that the filing fee to be paid
Complaint was subsequently amended, the controversy began besides the sum of P3,104.00, should include an additional
when the first Complaint was filed. sum of P1,000.00 based on the computation done by them.
The petitioners contended that the controversy started only Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint so as
when the Amended Complaint was filed because the previous to include the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
Complaints were expunged from the records. as a defendant. The amended complaint still sought the return
When the amended complaint does not introduce new issues, of the lot in question but the pecuniary claim was limited to
causes of actions, or demands, the suit is deemed to have the following:
commenced on the date the original complaint was filed, not 8. To order the defendants jointly and solidarily except the
on the date of the filing of the amended complaint. In short, Government of the Republic of the Philippines moral damages
for purposes of determining the commencement of a suit, the in such amount as this Court may determine and attorney's
original complaint is deemed abandoned and superseded by fees in the amount of P100,000.00 and the cost of this action;
the amended complaint only if the amended complaint 9. Exemplary damages be imposed on the defendants jointly
introduces a new or different cause of action or demand. and solidarily except the Government of the Republic of the
Amendments which merely supplements and amplifies the Philippines in the amount as this Court may deem just and
facts originally alleged relates back to the date of the proper as an example and deterrent to any similar acts in the
commencement of the action. future.
In this case, an action was brought to enjoin the petitioner The RTC ruled that the correct docket fee must be paid before
from proceeding with the mortgage sale, yet he proceeded to the Court will act on the petition or complaint. Hence, the
do so while the action was pending. Even where an injunction original complaint, up to the present, is not deemed registered
has not been issued, if the suit is one for injunction, the or docketed. It follows, therefore, that there is likewise no
defendant, if he does the thing sought to be enjoined, does so amended complaint deemed to have been filed and admitted.
at his peril. The Court, therefore, is of the view that up to the present the
MARIO RODIS MAGASPI, JUSTINO R. MAGASPI, parties are in the same situation as they were before this
BALDOMERA M. ALEJANDRO, and MANOLITA M. CORTEZ, proceeding was started as the same did not acquired
petitioners, vs. HONORABLE JOSE R. RAMOLETE, Judge of jurisdiction over them.
the Court of First Instance of Cebu, ESPERANZA V. GARCIA, ISSUE: Whether or not the computation of the docket fee
Clerk of Court of First Instance of Cebu, THE SHELL should be based on the amended complaint
COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES LIMITED and/or THE SHELL

HELD: "When a pleading is amended, the original pleading is case. This is premised on the fact that evidence had been
deemed abandoned. The original ceases to perform any introduced on an issue not raised by the pleadings without any
further function as a pleading. The case stands for trial on the objection thereto being raised by the adverse party. In the case
amended pleading only. " at bar, no evidence whatsoever had been introduced by the
On the basis of the foregoing, the additional docket fee to be petitioner on the issue of removability of the improvements
paid by the petitioners should be based on their amended and the case was decided on a stipulation of facts.
complaint. Consequently, the pleadings could not be deemed amended to
Petition for Review conform to the evidence.
DOCTRINE AS TO MERITS: As a builder in bad faith, NAWASA lost whatever
In the case at bar, no evidence whatsoever had been useful improvements it had made without right to indemnity
introduced by petitioner on the issue of removability of the (pursuant to Art. 449 of the Civil Code).
improvements and the case was decided on a stipulation of
facts. Consequently, the pleadings could not be deemed G.R. No. 68636 February 29, 1988
amended to conform to the evidence. NORTHERN CEMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner-Appellant,
FACTS v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and SHIPSIDE
The City of Dagupan filed a complaint against former NAWASA INCORPORATED, Respondents-Appellees.
(succeeded by MWSS) for recovery of the ownership and
possession of the Dagupan Waterworks System. NAWASA DOCTRINE: Even without the necessary amendment, the
invoked R.A. No. 1383 as one of its special defenses, which amount proved at the trial may be validly awarded. If the facts
vests upon it the ownership, possession and control of all shown entitled plaintiff to relief other than that asked for, no
waterworks systems throughout the Philippines. As one of its amendment to the complaint was necessary, especially where
counterclaims, it sought the reimbursement of the expenses it defendant had himself raised the point on which recovery was
incurred for necessary and useful improvements (by virtue of based. The appellate court could treat the pleading as
a loan secured by NAWASA for the improvement of the amended to conform to the evidence although the pleadings
Dagupan Waterworks System). were not actually amended.
The trial court ruled in favor of the City on the basis of a FACTS:
stipulation of facts. The trial court found NAWASA to be a It is contended that the respondent court erred in limiting the
possessor in bad faith and hence not entitled to the refund to the amount specified by the petitioner in its
reimbursement claimed. The appellate court affirmed the counterclaim. The trial court had allowed the refund in the sum
ruling of the trial court. of P526,280.53 on the justification that this had been
In the instant petition, petitioner MWSS raised the issue of established by the evidence adduced at the trial. On appeal,
whether or not it had the right to remove all the useful however, the respondent court reversed, holding that this
improvements introduced by NAWASA to the Dagupan refund should be limited to the sum of P31,652.62, which was
Waterworks System, notwithstanding NAWASA’s bad faith. In the amount claimed in the counterclaim.
response, the City alleged that this issue was not raised in the ISSUE: WON the respondent court erred in limiting the refund
trial court, much less assigned as an error before the then CA. to the amount specified by the petitioners in its counterclaim.
Petitioner, however, argued that although such issue of RULING:
removal was never pleaded as a counterclaim, it was The applicable rule is Rule 10, Section 5. There have been
nevertheless joined with the implied consent of the City instances where the Court has held that even without the
because the latter never filed a counter-manifestation or necessary amendment, the amount proved at the trial may be
objection to petitioner’s manifestation when it stated that the validly awarded, as in Tuazon v. Bolanos, where we said that
improvements were separable from the system, citing Sec. 5, if the facts shown entitled plaintiff to relief other than that
Rule 10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. asked for, no amendment to the complaint was necessary,
ISSUE especially where defendant had himself raised the point on
Whether or not Sec. 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which recovery was based. The appellate court could treat the
is applicable to the contention of petitioner. (NO) pleading as amended to conform to the evidence although the
RULING pleadings were not actually amended. Amendment is also
The procedural objection of the City is technically correct. unnecessary when only clerical errors or non-substantial
NAWASA should have alleged its additional counterclaim in the matters are involved, as we held in Bank of the Philippine
alternative – for the reimbursement of the expenses it had Islands v. Laguna. In Co Tiamco v. Diaz, we stressed that the
incurred for necessary and useful improvements or for the rule on amendment need not be applied rigidly, particularly
removal of all the useful improvements it had introduced. where no surprise or prejudice is caused the objecting party.
Furthermore, Sec. 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, which And in the recent case of National Power Corporation v. Court
provides that issues not raised by the pleadings but are tried of Appeals, we held that where there is a variance in the
by express or implied consent of the parties shall be treated as defendant's pleadings and the evidence adduced by it at the
if they had been raised in the pleadings, is not applicable in this

trial, the Court may treat the pleading as amended to conform setting forth transactions, occurrences or event which have
with the evidence. happened since the date of the pleading sought to be
It is the view of the Court that pursuant to the above supplemented. If the court deems it advisable that the adverse
mentioned rule and in light of the decisions cited, the trial party should plead thereto, it shall so order, specifying the
court should not be precluded from awarding an amount time thereof.
higher than that claimed in the pleadings notwithstanding the The rule is a useful device which enable the court to
absence of the required amendment. But this is upon the award complete relief in one action and avoid the cost of delay
condition that the evidence of such higher amount has been and waste of separate action. Thus, a supplemental pleading is
presented properly, with full opportunity on the part of the meant to supply deficiencies in aid of the original pleading and
opposing parties to support their respective contentions and not to dispense with or substitute the latter. A supplemental
to refute each other's evidence. complaint must be consistent with, and in aid of, the cause of
action set forth in the original complaint. A new and
SPS. LAMBINO V. HON. PRESIDING JUDGE independent cause of action cannot be set up. It must be based
G.R. NO. 169551, JANUARY 24, 2007 on matters arising subsequent to the original complaint
related to the claim or defense presented therein and founded
FACTS: on the same cause of action. Leave will be granted to file a
Petitioners Orland M. Lambino, a lawyer, and his wife, supplemental complaint.
Carmelita C. Lambino, secured a housing of loan of 600,000 The admission or non-admission of a supplemental
from private respondent BPI family Savings Bank Inc. pleading is not a matter of right but is discretionary on the
Petitioners executed a Mortgage Loan Agreement (MLA) over court. Among the factors that the court will consider are: (1)
their property as security. The proceeds of the loan would be Resulting prejudice to the parties; (2) Whether the movant
released to petitioners depending on the percentage of work would be prejudiced if the supplemental pleading were to be
completed on the house. The parties agreed that private denied. A motion to leave to file a supplemental pleading may
respondent would release the net proceeds of the loan by be denied if he is guilty of undue delay or laches which causes
crediting their Savings account and to debit said account all substantial prejudice to the opposing party. Before they filed
amounts that may be due from petitioners. However, their original complaint, petitioners were already aware of the
petitioners failed to pay the monthly amortizations. Private deductions made on the proceeds of the loan, for interest
respondent filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure with charges, MRI premium, and fire insurance premium in the total
the Ex-Officio Sheriff of the RTC of Valenzuela and sought to amount of 44,952. They received notices on several dates.
have the property sold to satisfy the balance of petitioner’s
loan account. Petitioners filed a complaint for annulment of PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, V. WILLIAN GOTHONG &
the MLA and the extra judicial foreclosure sale with a prayer ABOITIZ (WG&A), INC.
for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) before the RTC. They G.R. NO. 158401; JANUARY 28, 2008
alleged that private respondent released 555,047.19 pesos.
They offered their monthly amortization on their loan account, FACTS:
but private respondent refused to release the difference of 44, Petitioner Willian Gothong & Aboitiz, Inc. (WG&A) is a duly
962 pesos. organized domestic corporation engaged in the shipping
The court issued a TRO and the sale in public auction industry. The respondent Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) is a
was reset. Petitioners offered to settle the balance, less late government-owned and controlled company, operating and
payment charges, mortgage redemption insurance, premium administering the country’s sea ports and port facilities.
interest, foreclosure expenses, attorney’s fees and liquidated The petitioner WG&A requested that it be allowed to lease and
damages in the total amount of 305, 042. They proposed to operate the Marine Slip Way in the North Harbor. The
pay on monthly installments for a 15 year period at an interest Economic Coordinating Council (ECC) has approved the
rate 19% per annum. However, private respondent rejected request of the WG&A to lease the Marine Slip Way from
the offer. January 1 to June 30, 2001, or until such time that PPA turns
The Trial court denied the motion of petitioner. It held over its operations to the winning bidder for the North Harbor
that under Section 6, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court, Modernization Project. The petitioner signed, through its
only transactions, occurrences or events which accrued after President/Chief Executive Officer, the Contract of Lease
the date of the complaint may be set forth in the supplemental prepared by the PPA.
complaint. CA affirmed RTC. On November 12, 2001, the PPA sent a letter to the WG&A
ISSUE: Whether or not the supplemental complain should be demanding to vacate the premises not later than November
admitted? 30, and to turnover the improvements pursuant to the terms
HELD: No. Under Rule 10, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. and conditions of the contract. On November 27, 2001, the
Matters subject of supplemental pleadings -upon motion of a WG&A urged the PPA to reconsider its decision, but the
party, the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such request was denied.
terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading

On November 28, 2001, the WG&A commenced an injunction The application of the old Rules by the RTC constitutes grave
suit before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. It claimed that abuse of discretion.
the PPA unjustly, illegally, and prematurely terminated the
lease contract. It prayed for the issuance of a temporary G.R. No. 161849 July 9, 2010
restraining order to arrest the evacuation. WALLEM PHILIPPINES SHIPPING, INC., Petitioner, v. S.R.
On December 11, 2001, WG&A amended its complaint. It FARMS, INC., Respondent.
incorporated statements to effect that the PPA is already
estopped from denying that the correct period of the lease is PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI
“until such time that the North Harbor Modernization Project FACTS: Continental Enterprises loaded on board the vessel
has been bidded out to and operations turned over to the M/V "Hui Yang," at Bedi Bunder, India, a shipment of Indian
winning bidder. It also included the additional relief in its Soya Bean Meal, for transportation and delivery to Manila,
prayer that should they be forced to vacate the facilities, they with S.R. Farms as consignee/notify party.
should be entitled to refund of the value of the improvements The said shipment is said to weigh 1,100 metric tons. The
it introduced. vessel is owned and operated by Conti-Feed, with
The temporary restraining order was denied by the trial court. Wallem as its ship agent.
WG&A moved for reconsideration, and filed a Motion to Admit M/V "Hui Yang" arrived at the port of Manila. Thereafter, the
Attached Second Amended Complaint; the complaint was shipment was discharged and transferred into the custody of
already captioned as one for Injunction with Prayer for the receiving barges. The offloading of the shipment was
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary handled by Ocean Terminal Services, Inc. (OTSI).
Injunction and damages and/or for Reformation of Contract. It At the instance of S.R. Farms, a cargo check of the subject
included as its fourth cause of action, the reformation of the shipment was made by one Lorenzo Bituin of
contract as it failed to express or embody the true intent of the Erne Maritime and Allied Services, Co. Inc., who noted a
contracting parties. shortage in the shipment which was placed at 80.467 metric
The PPA postulated that the reformation sought by the WG&A tons showing that the quantity of cargo unloaded from the
would constitute substantial amendment, which would alter vessel was only 1,019.53 metric tons.
the cause of action and theory of the case. S.R. Farms then filed a Complaint for damages against Conti-
The Admission of the Second Amended Complaint was denied. Feed, RCS Shipping Agencies (the ship agent of Conti-Feed),
The WG&A’s motion for reconsideration was also denied. OTSI and Cargo Trade (the customs broker).
In the WG&A’s petition for certiorari with the CA, the Court of S.R. Farms filed an Amended Complaint impleading Wallem as
Appeals set aside the RTC’s orders, and directed the RTC to defendant alleging that Wallem, and not RCS, was the one
admit the WG&A’s second amended complaint. which, in fact, acted as Conti-Feed's ship agent.
ISSUE: RTC: dismissed S.R. Farms’ complaint
Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion CA: reversed and set aside the RTC decision
when it denied the admission of the second amended ISSUE: W/N THE CLAIM AGAINST PETITIONER
complaint. WALLEM WAS TIMELY FILED. (NO)
HELD: There is no dispute that the vessel carrying the shipment
YES. The Regional Trial Court applied the old Section 3, Rule 10 arrived at the Port of Manila on April 11, 1992 and that the
of the Rules of Court, instead of the provisions of the 1997 cargo was completely discharged therefrom on April 15, 1992.
Rules of Civil Procedure amending Section 3, Rule 10. However, S.R. Farm erred in arguing that the complaint for
damages, insofar as the Wallem is concerned, was filed on
The old rules of court allowed that the leave of court may be March 11, 1993.
refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made As the records would show, Wallem was not impleaded as a
with intent to delay the action, or that the cause of action or defendant in the original complaint filed on March 11, 1993. It
defense is substantially altered. was only on June 7, 1993 that the Amended Complaint,
The Court cited Valenzuela V. CA, where the amended rule impleading Wallem as defendant, was filed. S.R. Farms cannot
struck off the phrase “or that the cause of action or defense is argue that the filing of the Amended Complaint against Wallem
substantially altered”. Under the new rules, the “amendment should retroact to the date of the filing of the original
may substantially alter the cause of action or defense.” This complaint.
should only be true, however, when despite a substantial The settled rule is that the filing of an amended pleading does
change or alteration in the cause of action or defense, the not retroact to the date of the filing of the original; hence, the
amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher statute of limitation runs until the submission of the
interests of substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally amendment. It is true that, as an exception, this Court has held
promote the laudable objective of the rules which is to secure that an amendment which merely supplements and amplifies
a "just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and facts originally alleged in the complaint relates back to the date
proceeding. of the commencement of the action and is not barred by the
statute of limitations which expired after

the service of the original complaint. The exception, however, and that a person occupying another’s land by the latter’s
would not apply to the party impleaded for the first time in the tolerance or permission, without contract, is bound by an
amended complaint. implied promise to leave upon demand, failing which a
In the instant case, Wallem was only impleaded in the summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy.
amended Complaint of June 7, 1993, or one (1) year, one (1) Both the original and the amended complaint required
month and twenty-three (23) days from April 15, 1992, the Wilfredo to defend his possession based on the allegation that
date when the subject cargo was fully unloaded from the he had stayed on the land after Emiliana left out of the owner’s
vessel. Hence, reckoned from April 15, 1992, the one-year mere tolerance and that the latter had demanded that he
prescriptive period had already lapsed. leave. Indeed, Wilfredo did not find the need to file a new
answer.
SPS. VICENTE DIONISIO AND ANITA DIONISIO, Petitioner, AN AMENDED COMPLAIN THAT DOES NOT CHANGES THE
vs. WILFREDO LINSANGAN, Respondent CAUSE OF ACTION IS DEEMED FILED ON THE DATE OF THE
G.R. No. 178159 March 2, 2011 FILING OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT
An amended complaint that changes the plaintiff’s cause of
FACTS: action is technically a new complaint. Consequently, the action
Cruz owned agricultural lands that his tenant Romualdo is deemed filed on the date of the filing of such amended
cultivated. Upon Romualdo’s death, his widow, Emiliana, got pleading, not on the date of the filing of its original version.
Cruz’s permission to stay on the property provided she would Thus, the statute of limitation resumes its run until it is
vacate it upon demand. arrested by the filing of the amended pleading. The Court
acknowledges, however, that an amendment which does not
Spouses Dionisio bought the property from Cruz. The Dionisios alter the cause of action but merely supplements or amplifies
found out that Emiliana had left the property and that it was the facts previously alleged, does not affect the reckoning date
already Wilfredo who occupied it. of filing based on the original complaint. The cause of action,
The Dionisios demand Wilfredo that he vacate the land but the unchanged, is not barred by the statute of limitations that
latter declined, prompting the Dionisios to file an eviction suit expired after the filing of the original complaint
against him before the MTC. Wilfredo filed an answer with To determine if an amendment introduces a different cause of
counterclaims in which he declared that he had been a tenant action, the test is whether such amendment now requires the
of the land as early as 1977. defendant to answer for a liability or obligation which is
At the pre-trial, the Dionisios orally asked leave to amend their completely different from that stated in the original complaint.
complaint. Wilfredo asked for time to respond to it. The
Dionisios filed their amended complaint; Wilfredo maintained [G.R. No. 182435. August 13, 2012.]
his original answer. LILIA B. ADA, LUZ B. ADANZA, FLORA C. BAYLON, REMO
The MTC ordered Wilfredo to vacate the land and remove his BAYLON, JOSE BAYLON, ERIC BAYLON, FLORENTINO
house from it. BAYLON, and MA. RUBY BAYLON, petitioners, vs.
On review, the CA, reversing the decisions of the courts below, FLORANTE BAYLON, respondent.
and ordering the dismissal of the Dionisios’ action. The CA held
that, by amending their complaint, the Dionisios effectively PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45
changed their cause of action from unlawful detainer to DOCTRINE: A supplemental pleading may raise a new cause of
recovery of possession which fell outside the jurisdiction of the action as long as it has some relation to the original cause of
MTC. Further, since the amendment introduced a new cause action set forth in the original complaint. A supplemental
of action, its filing on marked the passage of the one year limit pleading may properly allege transactions, occurrences or
from demand required in ejectment suits. More, since events which had transpired after the filing of the pleading
jurisdiction over actions for possession depended on the sought to be supplemented, even if the said supplemental
assessed value of the property and since such assessed value facts constitute another cause of action.
was not alleged, the CA cannot determine what court has FACTS: This case involves the estate of late Spouses Baylon
jurisdiction over the action. who were survived by their legitimate children, Rita, Victoria,
ISSUE: Whether or not the Dionisios’ amendment of their Dolores, Panfila, Ramon and herein petitioner Lilia B. Ada
complaint effectively changed their cause of action from one (Lilia).
of ejectment to one of recovery of possession The petitioners filed with the RTC a Complaint for partition,
HELD: The amended complaint has essentially identical accounting and damages against Florante, Rita and Panfila
allegations. The only new ones are that the Dionisios allowed alleging that Spouses Baylon owned 43 parcels of land all
Emiliana, Romualdo’s widow to stay "out of their kindness, situated in Negros Oriental. After their death, petitioners
tolerance, and generosity;" that they went to the land in April claimed that Rita took possession of the said parcels of land
2002, after deciding to occupy it, to tell Emiliana of their plan; and appropriated for herself the income from the same to
that Wilfredo cannot deny that Cruz was the previous purchase two parcels of land, Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No.
registered owner and that he sold the land to the Dionisios;

4706. The petitioners averred that Rita refused to effect a proceedings as well as in the determination of the presence of
partition of the said parcels of land. requisite elements of each particular cause of action.
In their Answer, Florante, Rita and Panfila asserted that they By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of
and the petitioners co-owned 22 out of the 43 parcels of land action is meant the uniting of two or more demands or rights
mentioned in the latter's complaint, whereas Rita actually of action in one action, the statement of more than one cause
owned 10 parcels of land out of the 43 parcels sought to be of action in a declaration. It is the union of two or more civil
partitioned. Further, the two lands were acquired by Rita using causes of action, each of which could be made the basis of a
her own money. separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration or petition. A
During the pendency of the case, Rita, through a Deed of plaintiff may under certain circumstances join several distinct
Donation conveyed the two lands to respondent Florante. Rita demands, controversies or rights of action in one declaration,
died intestate and without any issue. Learning of the said complaint or petition.
donation inter vivos in favor of Florante, the petitioners filed a While parties to an action may assert in one pleading, in the
Supplemental Pleading praying that the said donation be alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as they may
rescinded in accordance with Article 1381 (4) of the Civil Code. have against an opposing party, such joinder of causes of
They further alleged that Rita could not have validly given her action is subject to the condition, inter alia, that the joinder
consent since she was already sick and very weak. shall not include special civil actions governed by special rules.
Florante and Panfila opposed the rescission of the said Nevertheless, misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for
donation, asserting that Article 1381 (4) of the Civil Code dismissal. Indeed, the courts have the power, acting upon the
applies only when there is already a prior judicial decree on motion of a party to the case or sua sponte, to order the
who between the contending parties actually owned the severance of the misjoined cause of action to be proceeded
properties under litigation. with separately. However, if there is no objection to the
RTC: Rescinded the donation. The death of Rita during the improper joinder or the court did not motu proprio direct a
pendency of the case had rendered the issue of ownership of severance, then there exists no bar in the simultaneous
the parcels of land moot since the parties below are the heirs adjudication of all the erroneously joined causes of action.
to her estate. RTC regarded Rita as the owner of the said 10 The rule only applies if the court trying the case has jurisdiction
parcels of land and directed that the same be partitioned over all of the causes of action therein notwithstanding the
among her heirs. Donation inter vivos rescinded for it refers to misjoinder of the same. If the court has no jurisdiction over a
parcels of land in litigation. misjoined cause of action, then misjoinder has to be severed
CA: REVERSED and SET ASIDE . Before the petitioners may file from the other causes of action, and if not so severed, any
an action for rescission, they must first obtain a favorable adjudication rendered by the court with respect to the same
judicial ruling that two lots actually belonged to the estate of would be a nullity.
Spouses Baylon. Until then, an action for rescission is 2. YES. A supplemental pleading may raise a new cause of
premature. The petitioners' action for rescission cannot be action as long as it has some relation to the original cause of
joined with their action for partition, accounting and damages action set forth in the original complaint. A supplemental
through a mere supplemental pleading. pleading may properly allege transactions, occurrences or
ISSUE: 1. WON there was a misjoinder causes of actions (YES) events which had transpired after the filing of the pleading
2. WON a new cause of action may be asserted in a sought to be supplemented, even if the said supplemental
Supplemental Pleading (YES) facts constitute another cause of action.
HELD: 1. YES. The actions of partition and rescission cannot be In Young v. Spouses Sy, this Court pointed out that:
joined in a single action. A misjoined cause of action, if not … a supplemental pleading only serves to bolster or add
severed upon motion of a party or by the court sua sponte, something to the primary pleading. A supplement exists side
may be adjudicated by the court together with the other by side with the original. It does not replace that which it
causes of action. supplements. Moreover, a supplemental pleading assumes
The complaint filed by the petitioners with the RTC involves that the original pleading is to stand and that the issues joined
two separate, distinct and independent actions — partition with the original pleading remained an issue to be tried in the
and rescission. Here, there was a misjoinder of causes of action. It is but a continuation of the complaint. Its usual office
action. The action for partition could not be joined with the is to set up new facts which justify, enlarge or change the kind
action for the rescission of the said donation inter vivos in favor of relief with respect to the same subject matter as the
of Florante. An action for partition is a special civil action controversy referred to in the original complaint.
governed by Rule 69 of the Rules of Court while an action for The purpose of the supplemental pleading is to bring into the
rescission is an ordinary civil action governed by the ordinary records new facts which will enlarge or change the kind of
rules of civil procedure. The variance in the procedure in the relief to which the plaintiff is entitled; hence, any
special civil action of partition and in the ordinary civil action supplemental facts which further develop the original right of
of rescission precludes their joinder in one complaint or their action, or extend to vary the relief, are available by way of
being tried in a single proceeding to avoid confusion in supplemental complaint even though they themselves
determining what rules shall govern the conduct of the constitute a right of action.

Here, the issue as to the validity of the donation inter vivos of Mosquera, Jr., in his capacity as Comptroller of the Manila
Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 made by Rita in favor of Hilton and sought the confirmation by the trial court of the
Florante is a new cause of action that occurred after the filing termination of the Management Contract effected by
of the original complaint. However, the petitioners' prayer for DELBROS through the service upon HILTON of the five-day
the rescission of the said donation inter vivos in their notice of termination .
supplemental pleading is germane to, and is in fact, Judge Dayrit issued a writof preliminary injunction, enjoining
intertwined with the cause of action in the partition case. Lot respondents from disposing the corporate stocksm
No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 are included among the evidences,a nd remitting funds to foreign banks. The parties
properties that were sought to be partitioned. presented their respective pleadings. Private respondents
The petitioners' supplemental pleading merely amplified the failed to file a motion for extension of 12 days to answer the
original cause of action, on account of the gratuitous supplemental complaint filed by the petitioner, petitioner
conveyance of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 after the moved for the declaration of the former in default.
filing of the original complaint and prayed for additional reliefs, RTC declared the respondents in default and confirmed the
i.e., rescission. The petitioners claim that the said lots form legal and valid termination of the agreement between the
part of the estate of Spouses Baylon, but cannot be partitioned parties. A writ of execution was issued and served upon the
unless the gratuitous conveyance of the same is rescinded. respondents.
Thus, the principal issue raised by the petitioners in their On appeal. IAC ruled in favor of the respondents.
original complaint remained the same. Issue:
WON the trial court erred in rendering the respondents in
RULE 11: WHEN TO FILE RESPONSIVE PLEADINGS default for failure to answer the supplemental pleading (YES)
DELBROS HOTEL CORPORATION, petitioner, RULING:
vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT [FIRST SPECIAL "A supplemental pleading is not like an amended pleading —
CASES DIVISION], HILTON INTERNATIONAL COMPANY, substitute for the original one. It does not supersede the
ACHIM IHLENFELD as successor to RICHARD CHAPMAN and original, but assumes that the original pleading is to stand, and
FLAVIANO MOSQUERA JR., the latter two in their the issues joined under the original pleading remain as issues
respective capacities as former General Manager and to be tried in the action." While it is conceded that there is
Comptroller of the Manila Hilton International Hotel, authority in support of a default judgment being predicated
respondents upon defendant's failure to answer a supplemental complaint,
the same cannot apply here. The reason is that although in the
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 supplemental complaint, the relief prayed for was altered from
DOCTRINE: A supplemental pleading is not like an amended termination of the management contract to judicial
pleading — substitute for the original one. It does not confirmation of its termination, the basic and principal issue of
supersede the original, but assumes that the original pleading whether or not petitioner was entitled to terminate the
is to stand, and the issues joined under the original pleading management contract, remained. As this basic issue had been
remain as issues to be tried in the action." previously traversed and joined by the Answer filed by HILTON
FACTS: and Chapman, there was no necessity for requiring them to
Petitioner filed before RTC Manila a complaint for the plead further to the Supplemental Complaint. Consequently,
termination of agreement and damages private respondents. the trial judge did not have a legal ground for declaring them
It was alleged that pursuant to the Agreement and Lease in default for such failure to plead.
entered into by and between DELBROS and Hilton Hotels
International, Inc. DELBROS financed, built, furnished and G.R. No. L-50437 February 28, 1983
equipped a first-class hotel of approximately 400 rooms, now SPOUSES GEORGE BARRAZA and YOLANDA GATCHALIAN-
known as the "Manila Hilton," the operation and management BARRAZA, Petitioner,
of which was granted to HILTON; that for their respective vs. HON. JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR., Presiding Judge, Br. XXX,
undertakings, DELBROS was to receive a share in the gross CFI-Rizal, Pasay City, 7th Judicial District, and RENATO
operating profit. Despite demands, Hilton failed to remit to Del GATCHALIAN., Respondent
bros its share in the said GOP.
In its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, Hilton specifically PETITION ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65
denied the allegations of DELBROS and set forth the following DOCTRINE:
as affirmative defenses: that DELBROS had no valid and Section 1 of Rule 11 in relation to Section 4 of Rule 16 allows
sufficient cause of action for failure to give a five-day notice of the defendant to file his answer not only within the original
termination of the Management Agreement as required under fifteen (15) days period but also within "a different period (as)
Article XI of their contract. fixed by the court."
Meanwhile, Del Bros filed in Civil Case No. 85-29489 a motion FACTS:
to admit Supplemental Complaint. The Supplemental On October 3, 1978, private respondent filed a Complaint for
Complaint impleaded as an additional defendant Flaviano damages based on defendants’ (petitioners herein) use of

plaintiff’s (now private respondent) trade name and style of PANLILIO, REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN- FACT
“Gatchalian-The House of Native Lechon and Restaurant”, with AND ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF, VICENTE L. PANLILIO, and
prayer for preliminary injunction. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PAMPANGA, respondents.
After service of summons, petitioners as defendants therein G.R. No. 170427. January 30, 2009, SECOND DIVISION,
filed an “Urgent Ex- Parte Motion” for extension of time of 15 QUISUMBING, Acting C.J
days within which to file an Answer which the Court granted.
Instead of filing the Answer within the extended period of The instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65
fifteen (15) days, defendants filed through their counsel, Atty, FACTS: Private respondents filed a complaint for accounting,
Esmeraldo M. Gatchalian, a “Motion to Dismiss Complaint reconveyance, and damages with prayer for preliminary
Together With Prayer for Preliminary Injunction” which was attachment against David, alleging that David caused the
one (1) day before the expiration of the period as extended by conversion of their agricultural lands and other fraudulent
the court. Said motion moved for the dismissal of the activities. Service of summons failed because David was
complaint on the following grounds: (1) That the complaint abroad. Thereafter, the RTC ordered service by publication.
states no cause of action; (2) That venue is improperly laid; and When David failed to file an Answer 60 days after publication,
(3) That there is another action pending between the same the RTC declared him in default and allowed respondents to
parties for the present evidence ex-parte. David moved for reconsideration,
same cause of action. which the court denied.
Private respondent, then, filed an “Ex-Parte Motion to Declare ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC commit grave abuse of
Defendants in Default” on the ground that the defendants discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to lift order of
failed to file an answer within the reglementary period allowed default.
by the Rules of Court. The defendants were declared in default. HELD: NO. The Supreme Court sustained the RTC's denial.
ISSUE: While default orders are not viewed with favor, David failed to
Whether or not the Order of respondent Judge declaring Sps. comply with the basic requirements of Section 3(b), Rule 9 of
Barraza in default for failure to file their answer within the the Rules of Court. The motion was not under oath. There was
reglementary period provided by law, was issued without or in no allegation that David's failure to file an Answer or any
excess of jurisdiction and with graveabuse of discretion? responsive pleading was due to fraud, accident, mistake, or
[Whether or not a motion to dismiss must be filed within the excusable negligence. David merely stated that declarations of
time for pleading, that is, within the time to answer.] default are frowned upon, that he should be given the
RULING: opportunity to present evidence in the interest of substantial
YES. justice, and that he has meritorious defenses. Unfortunately,
A motion to dismiss under any of the grounds enumerated in his claim that he has meritorious defenses is unsubstantiated.
Sec. 1, Rule 8 (now Sec. 1, Rule 16) of the Rules of Court, must He did not even state what evidence he intends to present if
be filed within the time for pleading, that is, within the time to his motion is granted.
answer including the extension of time granted to file such DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
answer. DISMISSED for lack of merit, and we AFFIRM the Orders dated
There is nothing in the Rules which provide, directly or July 15, 2005 and September 21, 2005 of the Regional Trial
indirectly, that the interruption of the running of the period Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 43 in Civil Case No.
within which to file an answer when a motion to dismiss the 13008. Costs against the petitioner.
complaint is filed and pending before the court, refers only to RULE 12: BILL OF PARTICULARS
the original period of fifteen (15) days and not to the extension
of time to file the answer as granted by the court. It may be
true that under Section 4 of Rule 16, if the motion to dismiss is SALITA V. MAGTOLIS
denied or if the termination thereof is deferred, the movant 233 SCRA 100 (1994)
shall file his answer within the time prescribed by Rule 11, Petition for Certiorari
computed from the time he received notice of the denial or DOCTRINE: A complaint only needs to state the "ultimate facts
deferment, unless the court provides a different period. constituting the plaintiff’s cause or causes of action." Ultimate
This Section 1 of Rule 11 in relation to Section 4 of Rule 16 facts has been defined as "those facts which the expected
allows the defendant to file his answer not only within the evidence will support." As stated by private respondent, "[t]he
original fifteen (15) days period but also within “a different term does not refer to the details of probative matter or
period (as) fixed by the court.” particulars of evidence by which these material elements are
to be established." It refers to "the facts which the evidence on
ROBERTO R. DAVID, petitioner, vs. JUDGE CARMELITA S. the trial will prove, and not the evidence which will be required
GUTIERREZ- FRUELDA, Honorable Presiding Judge, Branch to prove the existence of those facts." And a motion for bill of
43, Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, particulars will not be granted if the complaint, while not very
VICENTE L. PANLILIO, ROBERTO L. PANLILIO, REMEDIOS P. definite, nonetheless already states a sufficient cause of
PAPA, ADELWISA P. FERNANDEZ, and LOURDES D. action. A motion for bill of particulars may not call for matters
which should form part of the proof of the complaint upon
trial. Such information may be obtained by other means. G.R. No. L-15808 April 23, 1963
FACTS: Erwin Espinosa and Joselita Salita separated in fact.
Erwin sued for annulment on the ground that Joselita was FAUSTA AGCANAS, JUAN MIGUEL, JUANITA
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
MIGUEL, assisted by her husband ULPIANO
marital obligations of their marriage.
Joselita moved for a bill of particulars which the trial court PASION, assisted by her husband JUAN
granted. PASCUAL, plaintiffs-appellees, vs.
In his bill of particulars, Edwin specified that at the time of their
marriage, Joselita was psychologically incapacitated to comply BRUNO MERCADO and ANTONIO DASALLA,
with the essential marital obligations of their marriage in that defendants-appellants.
she was unable to understand and accept the demands made
by his profession – that of a newly qualified Doctor of Medicine APPEAL BY DEFENDANTS FROM THE CFI OF ISABELA ON A
– upon petitioner’s time and efforts so that she frequently QUESTION OF LAW
complained of his lack of attention to her even to her mother,
whose intervention caused petitioner to lose his job. DOCTRINE: Both a motion to dismiss and a motion for a bill of
Still Joselita was not contented with the Bill of Particulars. She particulars interrupt the time to file a responsive pleading. In
argued that the assertion in the bill of particulars is a the case of a motion to dismiss, the period starts running
statement of legal conclusion made by petitioner’s counsel against as soon as the movant receives a copy of the order of
and not an averment of ultimate facts as required by the Rules denial. In the case of a motion for a bill of particulars, the
of Court. suspended period shall continue to run upon service on the
RTC: Issued an order upholding its sufficiency and directing movant of the bill of particulars, if the motion is granted, or of
Joselita to file her responsive pleading. the notice of its denial, but in any event he shall have not less
CA: The petition for certiorari was denied due course by the than five days within which to file his responsive pleading.
Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the allegations in the petition for FACTS: Plaintiffs filed this action to recover portions of a parcel
annulment of marriage and the subsequent bill of particulars of land and damages. Defendants filed a motion for a bill of
filed in amplification of the petition is sufficient. (YES) particulars, with notice of hearing. However, defendants filed
RULING: A complaint only needs to state the "ultimate facts a motion to dismiss the complaint, with a prayer that
constituting the plaintiff’s cause or causes of action." Ultimate consideration of their motion for a bill of particulars be held in
facts has been defined as "those facts which the expected abeyance pending resolution of their motion to dismiss. On the
evidence will support." As stated by private respondent, "[t]he day of the hearing, the court issued an order postponing
term does not refer to the details of probative matter or "consideration" of both motions to a later date.
particulars of evidence by which these material elements are
to be established." It refers to "the facts which the evidence on The court denied the motion to dismiss and ordered
the trial will prove, and not the evidence which will be required defendants "to answer the complaint within the reglementary
to prove the existence of those facts." And a motion for bill of period provided for by the Rules of Court." Hearing of the case
particulars will not be granted if the complaint, while not very on the merits was set for October 29, 1957, notice of which
definite, nonetheless already states a sufficient cause of was duly received by defendants. Defendants not having filed
action. A motion for bill of particulars may not call for matters their answer, plaintiffs moved to have them declared in
which should form part of the proof of the complaint upon default. On the same day the court issued the order of default
trial. Such information may be obtained by other means. together with another order commissioning the clerk of court
We sustain the view of respondent Court of Appeals that the to receive plaintiff's evidence.
Bill of Particulars filed by private respondent is sufficient to
Defendants moved to cancel the hearing scheduled for
state a cause of action, and to require more details from
October 29, on two grounds one of which was that their
private respondent would be to ask for information on
motion for a bill of particulars had not yet been resolved. The
evidentiary matters.
motion to cancel was set for hearing on October 26, 1957.
When defendants arrived in court, they learned that an order
of default had been issued, so they immediately filed a motion
asking that the same be set aside that their pending motion for
a bill of particulars be resolved and that they be given a
reasonable period thereafter within which to file their answer
to the complaint.
The court denied the motion and ruled in favor of plaintiffs

Defendants’ MR also denied.
Defendants filed their record on appeal, but as they The order of default issued and the decision rendered by the
subsequently filed a petition for relief from the judgment by trial court are set aside and the case is remanded for further
default, they asked that consideration and approval of their proceedings, pursuant to the Rules. Costs against plaintiffs-
record on appeal be held in abeyance until said petition had appellees.
been resolved. The request was granted. Defendant's petition
for relief was denied and their motion for reconsideration of G.R. No. L-24238 November 28, 1980
the order of denial. The court denied also their motion for a JOSE SANTOS, Plaintiff-Appellant,
writ of preliminary injunction to restrain execution of the vs. LORENZO J, LIWAG, Defendant-Appellee
judgment by default. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: WON upon denial of a defendants' motion to dismiss

the reglementary period within which to file an answer
resumes running even though the motion for a bill of PETITION FOR REVIEW TO REVERSE THE DECISION
particulars of the same defendants is still pending and
unresolved DOCTRINE:
HELD: NO. Both a motion to dismiss and a motion for a bill of “The allowance of a motion for a more definite statement or
particulars interrupt the time to file a responsive pleading. In bill of particulars rests within the sound judicial discretion of
the case of a motion to dismiss, the period starts running the court and, as usual in matters of a discretionary nature, the
against as soon as the movant receives a copy of the order of ruling of the trial court in that regard will not be reversed unless
denial. In the case of a motion for a bill of particulars, the there has been a palpable abuse of discretion or a clearly
suspended period shall continue to run upon service on the erroneous order. In the instant case, the complaint is without
movant of the bill of particulars, if the motion is granted, or of doubt imperfectly drawn and suffers from vagueness and
the notice of its denial, but in any event he shall have not less generalization to enable the defendant properly to prepare a
than five days within which to file his responsive pleading. responsive pleading and to clarify issues and aid the court in an
orderly and expeditious disposition in the case.”
When appellants filed a motion to dismiss, they requested that
resolution of their previous motion for a bill of particulars be FACTS:
held in abeyance. This was but practical because if the court
had granted the motion to dismiss, there would have been no on June 8, 1964 the appellant – Jose Santos filed a complaint
need for a bill of particulars. Resolution of the motion for the against Lorenzo J. Liwag with the Court of First Instance of
purpose was necessary only in the event that court should Manila, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 57282, seeking the
deny, as it did, the motion to dismiss, in which case the period annulment of certain documents as having been executed by
to file an answer remained suspended until the motion for a means of misrepresentations, machination, false pretenses,
bill of particulars is denied or, if it is granted, until the bill is threats, and other fraudulent means, as well as for damages
served on the moving party. and costs.
The lower court deemed appellants to have "tacitly waived Claiming that the allegations in the complaint are indefinite
their right to push through the hearing of the motion for bill of and uncertain, as well as conflicting, the defendant filed a
particulars," because of their failure to set it for hearing or to motion on July 4, 1964, asking the trial court that the plaintiff
ask the clerk of court to calendar it after denial of the motion be ordered to submit a more definite statement or bill of
to dismiss. Appellants did set the motion for hearing on particulars on certain allegations of the complaint, as well as
December 8, 1956, although it was not heard on that day the facts constituting the misrepresentations, machinations,
because it arrived in court only on December 12. Thereafter and frauds employed by the defendant in the execution of the
they did not have to reset it, as the clerk of court scheduled it documents in question in order that he could be well informed
for hearing on December 22, 1956. And on that day the court of the charges filed against him, for him to prepare an
issued an order that "the consideration of the motion to intelligent and proper pleading necessary and appropriate in
dismiss, as well as the bill of particulars, is hereby postponed the premises.
to December 29, 1956." As to whether or not both motions
were actually heard on December 29, does not appear of Despite the plaintiff’s opposition, the trial court granted the
record. But heard or not, the motions should be considered motion and directed the plaintiff to submit a bill of particulars
submitted, and it was the clear duty of the court to resolve the with respect to the paragraphs specified in defendant’s
motion for a bill of particulars, as it did the motion to dismiss. motion. When the plaintiff failed to comply, the court
No action having been taken thereon until the present, the dismissed the complaint upon motion of defendant.
period to answer has not yet expired. The lower court,
therefore, erred in declaring appellants in defaults and in ISSUE:
taking all the subsequent actions it did in the case.
Whether or not the trial court erred in granting the demurrer complained of becomes a criterion in determining whether the
and dismissing the case. (NO) complaint on its face has merits, or within the jurisdiction of
special commercial court, or merely a nuisance suit.
RULING: FACTS:
Private respondent Gilbert G. Guy owned almost 80 percent of
The allowance of a motion for a more definite statement or bill the GoodGold Realty & Development Corporation (GoodGold).
of particulars rests within the sound judicial discretion of the Gilbert is the son of spouses Francisco and Simny.
court and, as usual in matters of a discretionary nature, the Simny alleged that it was she and her husband who established
ruling of the trial court in that regard will not be reversed GoodGold, and put the bulk of its share under Gilbert’s name.
unless there has been a palpable abuse of discretion or a
clearly erroneous order. In the instant case, the complaint is In 1999, the aging Francisco instructed a trusted employee to
without doubt imperfectly drawn and suffers from vagueness collaborate with Atty. Paras to redistribute GoodGold’s
and generalization to enable the defendant properly to shareholdings evenly among his children, namely, Gilbert,
prepare a responsive pleading and to clarify issues and aid the Grace Guy-Cheu, Geraldine Guy, and Gladys Guy. The shares of
court In an orderly and expeditious disposition tion in the case. stock were distributed.
In 2004, Gilbert filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
The present action is one for the annulment of documents
Manila a complaint for the “Declaration of Nullity of Transfers
which have been allegedly executed by reason of deceit,
of Shares in GoodGold and of General Information Sheets and
machination, false pretenses, misrepresentation, threats, and
Minutes of Meetings, and for Damages with Application for a
other fraudulent means. Deceit, machination, false pretenses,
Preliminary Injunctive Relief”, against his mother, Simny, and
misrepresentation, and threats, however, are largely
sisters, Geraldine, Grace, and Gladys. Gilbert, however,
conclusions of law and mere allegations thereof without a
withdrew this complaint after the National Bureau of
statement of the facts to which such terms have reference are
Investigation submitted a report authenticating his signatures.
not sufficient The allegations must state the facts and
In 2008, Gilbert again filed a complaint with the RTC of
circumstances from which the fraud, deceit, machination, false
Mandaluyong, captioned as "Intra-Corporate Controversy: For
pretenses, misrepresentation, and threats may be inferred as
the Declaration of Nullity of Fraudulent Transfers of Shares of
a conclusions In his complaint, the appellant merely averred
Stock Certificates, Fabricated Stock Certificates, Falsified
that all the documents sought to be annulled were all executed
General Information Sheets, Minutes of Meetings, and
through the use of deceits, machination, false pretenses,
Damages with Application for the Issuance of a Writ of
misrepresentations, threats, and other fraudulent means
Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction," against his mother,
without the particular-facts on which alleged fraud, deceit,
Simny, his sisters, Geraldine, Gladys, and the heirs of Grace.
machination, or misrepresentations are predicated. Hence, it
Gilbert alleged that he never signed any document that would
was proper for the trial court to grant the defendant's motion
justify the transfer of his shares to his siblings. He also alleged
for a bill of particulars, and when the plaintiff failed to comply
that the Amended General Information Sheets of GoodGold
with the order, the trial court correctly dismissed the
submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission were
complaint.
spurious as these did not reflect his true shares in the
corporation. He claimed that no valid stockholders’ annual
meeting were held in 2004, therefore the election of corporate
Simny G. Guy, Geraldine G. Guy, Gladys G. Yao, officers was null and void. He further claimed that his siblings
and the Heirs of the Late Grace G. Cheu, v. were foreign citizens, thus cannot own more than forty
Gilbert G. Guy percent of the authorized capital stock of the corporation.
G.R. No. 189486; September 5, 2012 The Regional Trial Court denied Gilbert’s motion. Gilbert filed
a motion for reconsideration, and a motion for inhibition
against Judge Sorongon.
Simny G. Guy, Geraldine G. Guy, Gladys G. Yao, Gilbert’s siblings filed a manifestation claiming that the
and the Heirs of the Late Grace G. Cheu, v. The complaint is a nuisance and a harassment suit.
Hon. Ofelia C. Calo, in her capacity as Presiding The RTC denied the motion for inhibition, and dismissed the
Judge of the RTC-Mandaluyong City, and Gilbert case declaring it a nuisance and harassment suit.
The Court of Appeals upheld Judge Sorongon’s refusal to
G. Guy inhibit from hearing the case as Gilbert failed to substantiate
G.R. No. 189699 his allegation of the judge’s partiality and bias; and denied the
petition for the issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction for
DOCTRINE: failure to establish a clear and unmistakable right that was
A bill of particulars is a prohibited pleading in cases governed violated.
by the Interim Rules of Procedure on Intra-Corporate The CA however found merit in Gilbert's contention that the
Controversies. The act of fraud or misrepresentation complaint should be heard on the merits.

ISSUE: G.R. No. 179638 July 8, 2013
1. Whether or not Gilbert’s complaint is a nuisance and HEIRS OF NUMERIANO MIRANDA, SR., namely:
harassment suit. CIRILA (deceased), CORNELIO, NUMERIANO,
HELD: JR., ERLINDA, LOLITA, RUFINA, DANILO,
1. YES. ALEJANDRO, FELIMON, TERESITA, ELIZABETH
Failure to allege fraud or mistake with much and ANALIZA, all surnamed MIRANDA,
particularity as is desirable is not fatal if the general Petitioner,
purport of the claim or defense is clear. Doubt as to vs. PABLO R. MIRANDA, Respondent
the meaning of the pleading may be resolved by
seeking a bill of particulars.
The above-stated rule however, does not apply to
intra-corporate controversies. In cases governed by
the Interim Rules of Procedure on Intra-Corporate
Controversies, a bill of particulars is a prohibited PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45
pleading. The act of fraud or misrepresentation
complained of becomes a criterion in determining DOCTRINE:
whether the complaint on its face has merits, or
within the jurisdiction of special commercial court, or It is basic and elementary that a Notice of Appeal should be
merely a nuisance suit. filed "within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or
Gilbert, instead of particularly describing the final order appealed from."
fraudulent acts that he complained of, just made a
Under Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, pleadings may
sweeping denial of the existence of the stock
be filed in court either personally or by registered mail. In the
certificates; that he is unaware of any document
first case, the date of filing is the date of receipt. In the second
signed by him that would justify the transfer of his
case, the date of mailing is the date of receipt.
shares. In addition to this, Gilbert also failed to rebut
the NBI report that authenticated his signatures It is established jurisprudence that "the date of delivery of
appearing on the stock certificates. pleadings to a private letter-forwarding agency is not to be
The decision and the resolution of the Court of considered as the date of filing thereof in court;" instead, "the
Appeals were reversed and set aside. The Court date of actual receipt by the court x x x is deemed the date of
declares the complaint a nuisance suit, and orders its filing of that pleading."
immediate dismissal.
Gilbert failed to include Francisco as defendant in the original FACTS:
chase. Gilbert prayed for the return of his original shares in
GoodGold, but did not include Francisco, who owned almost a Petitioners’ Complaint for Annulment of Titles and Specific
third of the total number. Performance was decided by the RTC against their favor on
Francisco is an indispensable party without whom no final August 30, 1999. Without any appeal, the Decision became
determination can be had for the complaint prays that the final and executory. On December 11, 2001, the RTC issued a
shares under him be declared fraudulent; it would impact on Writ of Execution but was not implemented. On July 8, 2005,
the hereditary rights of the contesting parties. respondent filed an Ex-parte Motion praying that the RTC issue
As a separate juridical entity distinct from its stockholders and a “Break-Open and Demolition Order” in order to compel the
directors and officers, GoodGold should have also been petitioners to vacate his property. But since more than five
impleaded as defendant. The trial court, acting as a special years have elapsed from the time the Writ of Execution should
commercial court, cannot settle the issues with finality without have been enforced, the RTC denied the Motion in its Order
impleading GoodGold as defendant. Like Francisco, and for the dated August 16, 2005. This prompted respondent to file with
same reasons, GoodGold is an indispensable party which the RTC a Petition for Revival of Judgment, which was granted.
Gilbert should have impleaded as defendant in his complaint.
On July 13, 2006, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal via LBC,
RULE 13: FILING which was opposed by respondent on the ground that the
Decision dated August 30, 1999 has long become final and
executory. Petitioners, in turn, moved for the transmittal of
the original records of the case to the CA, insisting that
respondent’s opposition is without merit. Finding the appeal
barred by prescription, the RTC denied the Notice of Appeal in
its Order dated October 10, 2006. Feeling aggrieved,
petitioners filed a Petition for Mandamus with the CA praying
that their Notice of Appeal be given due course, but was

denied on June 14, 2007 for being filed out of time. Petitioners PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65
assert that an action to revive judgment is appealable, and that DOCTRINE: Absence in one or two hearings may be negligible
their appeal was perfected on time. They insist that the Notice but want of inquiry or update on the status of his case for
of Appeal, which they filed on the 15th day via LBC, was several months (four, in this case) is inexcusable. It is the duty
seasonably filed since the law does not require a specific mode of a party-litigant to be in contact with his counsel from time
of service for filing a notice of appeal. Besides, even if their to time in order to be informed of the progress of his case.
appeal was belatedly filed, it should still be given due course in
the interest of justice, considering that their counsel had to FACTS:
brave the storm and the floods caused by typhoon “Florita” Secretary of the Department of Tourism and petitioner Peter
just to file their Notice of Appeal on time. D. Garrucho requested then Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation Andrea Domingo to issue Hold Departure Orders
ISSUE: against Ramon Binamira and Faustino Roberto because of the
invesitagation being conducted by DOJ involving anomalous
Was the Notice of Appeal filed on the 15th day via private transactions in government securities affecting the PTA which
courier like LBC considered to be belatedly filed? entailed the loss of some ₱161,000,000.00.
Because of this, Robert filed a complaint for prohibition and
RULING: damages against petitioners before RTC Makati. Binimira filed
a complaint-in-intervention.
NO.
RTC rendered judgment in favor of respondent Binamira. The
It is basic and elementary that a Notice of Appeal should be trial court likewise declared the Hold Departure as void ab
filed “within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or initio for being illegal and unconstitutional.
final order appealed from. Under Section 3, Rule 13 of the On appeal, CA attempted to send notice to petitioner directing
Rules of Court, pleadings may be filed in court either personally his counsel to file his brief, however, the notice was returned
or by registered mail. In the first case, the date of filing is the to Court with notation “Return to Sender, Moved out”. Hence,
date of receipt. In the second case, the date of mailing is the the appeal was dismissed for failure to file his brief. Other
date of receipt. In this case, however, the counsel for subsequent attempts of the Court to reach the petitioner and
petitioners filed the Notice of Appeal via a private courier, a his counsel were likewise fruitless.
mode of filing not provided in the Rules. Though not prohibited Issue: WON the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the
by the Rules, we cannot consider the filing of petitioners’ complaint for failure of petitioner to file his brief (NO)
Notice of Appeal via LBC timely filed. It is established Ruling: Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
jurisprudence that “the date of delivery of pleadings to a provides that if any party has appeared by counsel, service
private letter-forwarding agency is not to be considered as the upon him shall be made upon his counsel unless served upon
date of filing thereof in court;” instead, “the date of actual the party himself is ordered by the trial court. In the absence
receipt by the court x x x is deemed the date of filing of that of a proper and adequate notice to the court of a change of
pleading.” Records show that the Notice of Appeal was mailed address, the service of the order or resolution of a court upon
on the 15th day and was received by the court on the 16th day the parties must be made at the last address of their counsel
or one day beyond the reglementary period. Thus, the CA on record.
correctly ruled that the Notice of Appeal was filed out of time.
In the present case, the law firm of Remollo & Associates, the
Neither can petitioners use typhoon “Florita” as an excuse for petitioner’s counsel of record, moved out from their office at
the belated filing of the Notice of Appeal because work in the Legaspi Suites to Dumaguete City without informing the
government offices in Metro Manila was not suspended on court of such fact. Based on its records, the CA believed that
July 13, 2006, the day petitioners’ Notice of Appeal was mailed the law office of the petitioner’s counsel was still at the Legaspi
via LBC. And even if we, in the interest of justice, give due Suites and sent copies of its resolutions to the counsel of the
course to the appeal despite its late filing, the result would still petitioner at the said address.
be the same. The appeal would still be denied for lack of merit.
The Decision dated August 30, 1999 is already final and Neither did the petitioner inform the court of his home or
executory office address after his resignation as Secretary of the
PETER D. GARRUCHO, petitioner, Department of Tourism where copies of the said order or
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. OSCAR B. PIMENTEL resolution could be sent. Notwithstanding his stature in the
(in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional business community, the CA cannot take judicial notice of the
Trial Court, Branch 148, Makati City), SHERIFF petitioner’s home address or his office address after his
RENATO C. FLORA (in his capacity as Branch departure as Secretary of the Department of Tourism or as
Sheriff), and RAMON BINAMIRA, respondents. Executive Secretary of the President.

Petitioner simply claims that he was busy with his gravel and rules on proof of filing and service and (3) Whether or not the
sand and trading businesses which involved frequent traveling Republic failed to properly serve private respondent’s counsel
from Manila to outlying provinces. But this was not a justifiable of record a copy of the petition
excuse for him to fail to ask about the developments in his case
or to ask somebody to make the query for him. Petitioner HELD: (1) we find that the present petition was filed within the
failed to act with prudence and diligence; hence, his plea that reglementary period. Contrary to the private respondents’
he was not accorded the right to due process cannot elicit this position, the 60- day period within which to file the petition for
Court’s approval or even sympathy. certiorari is counted from the Republic’s receipt of the July 5,
2006 order denying the latter’s motion for reconsideration.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.
Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is clear on this point –
HON. RAMON S. CAGUIOA, Presiding Judge, "In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed,
Branch 74, Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day
Region, Olongapo City, META TRANS TRADING period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, and motion."
HUNDRED YOUNG SUBIC INTERNATIONAL,
(2) We find too that the present petition complied with the
INC., Respondents. rules on proof of filing and service of the petition. Attached to
G.R. No. 174385 February 20, 2013 the petition – in compliance with Sections 12 and 13, Rule 13 of
FACTS: petition for certiorari the Rules of Court – are the registry receipts and the affidavit
of the person who filed and served the petition by registered
14 petitioners filed before the RTC a petition for declaratory mail.
relief with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) and
preliminary mandatory injunction against the Honorable (3) Although private respondent’s counsels did not formally
Secretary of Finance, et al. to nullify the implementation of receive any copy of the petition, the private respondents
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9334. themselves admitted that they received their copy of the
present petition. The records show that the Republic
By way of background, under R.A. No. 7227, the SBMA granted subsequently complied with the rules on service when, after the
the petitioners Certificates of Registration and Tax Exemption private respondents’ comment, the Republic served copies of
in the business of import and export of general merchandise its reply and memorandum to the respondents’ counsel of
(including alcohol and tobacco products). record.
However, in R.A. No. 9334, the SBMA applied duties and taxes Under these circumstances, the lack of a proper service did not
on their importations of tobacco and alcohol products. result in any prejudice; the private respondents themselves
were actually served with, and duly received, their copies of the
Respondent judge granted and issued the preliminary present petition, allowing them to comment and to be heard
injunction. on the petition.
The Republic filed before the SC a petition for certiorari and GR: WRONGFULLY SERVICE OF PETITION IS NOT BINDING
prohibition to annul the respondent judge’s order and the writ Under our rules of procedure, service of the petition on a
issued pursuant to this order. party, when that party is represented by a counsel of record, is
a patent nullity and is not binding upon the party wrongfully
Meanwhile, private respondents herein filed motions for leave served. This rule, however, is a procedural standard that may
to intervene and to admit complaints-in-intervention. The admit of exceptions when faced with compelling reasons of
lower court granted the said motion and issued writ of substantive justice manifest in the petition and in the
preliminary mandatory injunction. surrounding circumstances of the case. Procedural rules can
bow to substantive considerations through a liberal
The Republic moved to reconsider, arguing that it had been construction aimed at promoting their objective of securing a
denied due process because it never received copies of the just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
private respondents’ motions and complaints-in-intervention. proceeding
Respondent judge denied the Republic’s motion. The A COPY OF THE COMPLIANT MUST ALSO BE SERVED ON THE
respondent judge held that all of the parties in the case had DEFENDANT
been duly notified per the records. Additionally, in the same way that an original complaint must
be served on the defendant, a copy of the complaint-in-
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the Republic timely filed the intervention must be served on the adverse party with the
petition; and (2) Whether or not the petition comply with the requisite proof of service duly filed prior to any valid court

action. Absent these or any reason duly explained and Through a lawyer, Barrameda filed a notice of appeal on March
accepted excusing strict compliance, the court is without 11, 1966. Castillo did not interpose in the municipal court any
authority to act on such complaint; any action taken without objection to her appeal. The court gave it due course.
the required service contravenes the law and the rules, and
violates the adverse party’s basic and constitutional right to Castillo filed in a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground
due process. that it was filed out of time. His theory was that the fifteen-day
reglementary period should be counted from the the date of
While we may agree with the private respondents’ claim that the first notice sent by the postmaster to Barrameda's lawyer.
the matter of intervention is addressed to the sound discretion (which was received on January 29, 1966 ad thus the date
of the court, what should not be forgotten is the requirement expired on February 3, 1966)
that the exercise of discretion must in the first place be
"sound." In other words, the basic precepts of fair play and the Eusebia Barrameda opposed Castillo's motion to dismiss her
protection of all interests involved must always be considered appeal. She contended that Castillo failed to prove that her
in the exercise of discretion. Under the circumstances of the counsel actually received the supposed three notices sent by
present case, these considerations demand that the original the postmaster. She argued that because in the municipal
parties to the action, which include the Republic, must have court Castillo did not object to her appeal, his motion could no
been properly informed to give them a chance to protect their longer be entertained in the CFI.
interests. These interests include, among others, the The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the appeal. It
protection of the Republic’s revenue-generating authority that assumed that the fifteen-day period should be counted from
should have been insulated against damage through the filing February 7, 1966, the date of the third notice (the third notice
of a proper bond. Thus, even from this narrow view that does was allegedly sent on February 9, 1966) and the period expired
not yet consider the element of fair play, the private on February 21, 1966, according to the trial court's
respondents’ case must fail; judicial discretion cannot override computation.
a party litigant’s right to due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court correctly dismissed her
petition
EUSEBIA BARRAMEDA, plaintiff-appellant, vs.
ENGRACIO CASTILLO, defendant-appellee. HELD: There is no evidence that the first notice was sent to
G.R. No. L-27211 July 6, 1977 Barrameda's lawyer and that it was delivered to him or should
have been received by him. The envelope containing the
DOCTRINE: In case the service of the order or judgment is unclaimed mail was presented in court. The face of the
sought to be effected by registered mail, but there is no proof envelope contains the notation "Returned to sender. Reason:
that the notice for the registered mail was received by the Unclaimed". Above the stamp, on the back of the envelope,
addressee, the presumption, under Section 8 of Rule 13 of the with the legend "City of San Pablo, Philippines, Jan. 29, 1966",
Rules of Court, of the delivery of the registered mail or are written the dates, "2-3-66 and 2-9-66." Written also on the
completion of the service after five (5) days from date of the back of the envelope are the following: "R to S, notified
first notice, certainly does not arise. 3/3/66."
FACTS: 45 Relying on those notations on the envelope, the trial court

Eusebia Barrameda sued Engracio in the municipal court. A literally and rigidly applied the presumption as to constructive
copy of the court's decision, which was adverse to Barrameda, service. It did not require appellee Castillo to present the
was sent by registered mail and was received in the city post postmaster's certification that a first notice was sent to
office on January 29. On February 3 and 9 the city postmaster's Barrameda's lawyer and that the notice was received by the
office supposedly sent to Barrameda's counsel three notices latter.
regarding the registered mail.
Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides:
Barrameda's lawyer did not claim that mail. It was returned to SEC. 7. Service of final orders or judgments. — Final orders or
the municipal court and was received there on March 3, 1966 judgments shall be served either personally or by registered
as unclaimed mail. mail. ...
SEC. 8. Completeness of service. — Personal service is
Barrameda must have been informed that the adverse complete upon actual delivery. ... Service by registered mail is
decision could not be served upon her lawyer. On March 9, complete upon actual receipt by the addressee; but if he fails
1966 she allegedly received personally a copy of the decision. to claim his mail from the post office within five (5) days from
the date of first notice of the postmaster, service shall take
effect at the expiration of such time.

GENERAL RULE AND EXCEPTION WHEN THE DATE OF SERVICE G.R. No. 171182 AUGUST 22, 2012
IS COMPLETED UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET. AL.,
In service by registered mail, the general rule is that service is Petitioners,
complete upon actual receipt by the addressee. The exception vs.
is that when the addressee does not claim his mail within five HON. AGUSTIN S. DIZON, et. al., Respondents
days from the date of the first notice of the postmaster, then
the service takes effect at the expiration of such time.
As illustrated by Justice Cesar Bengzon, if the first notice is
received by the addressee on December 1, and he gets his mail
on December 3, the service is complete on December 3, the
date of the actual receipt (general rule). Petition for Review on Certiorari
But if the addressee gets his mail only on December 15, service
is deemed complete on December 6 or five days from DOCTRINE
December 1, the date of the first notice (exception).
“It is settled that where a party has appeared by counsel,
If the addressee never gets the mail, service is also deemed service must be made upon such counsel. Service on the party
complete on December 6, as provided in the exception to the or the party's employee is not effective because such notice is
general rule. If he receives his mail two months after it is not notice in law.”
registered and there is no proof of the first notice, then service
is complete on the date of actual receipt, following the general FACTS
rule.
This is an appeal by the University of the Philippines (UP) of the
decision of the Court of Appeals, which upheld the order of the
EXCEPTION REFERS TO CONSTRUCTIVE NOT ACTUAL RECEIPT
RTC directing the garnishment of public funds belonging to the
Bearing in mind that the exception in service by registered mail
UP to satisfy the writ of execution issued to enforce the already
refers to constructive service, not to actual receipt of the mail,
final and executory judgment against UP. This arose from a
it is evident that the fair and just application of that exception
General Construction Agreement entered into with
depends upon conclusive proof that a first notice was sent by
respondent Stern Builders for the construction of the
the postmaster to the addressee. The presumption that official
extension building and renovation of the College of Arts and
duty has been regularly performed should not be applied to
Sciences Building in the campus of UP.
such a situation.
After the RTC ruled in favor of Stern Builders and ordered
A CERTIFICATION OF POSTMASTER IS THE BEST EVIDENCE TO garnishment on May 7, 2002, UP filed a notice of appeal on
PROVE OF CONSTRUCTIVE RECEIPT June 3, 2002. Stern Builders opposed the notice of appeal on
Therefore, to obviate injustice, it is incumbent upon a party, the ground of its filing being belated, and moved for the
who relies on constructive service or who contends that his execution of the decision.
adversary was served with a copy of a final order or judgment
upon the expiration of five days from the first notice of UP countered that the notice of appeal was filed within the
registered mail sent by the postmaster to prove that first reglementary period because the UP’s Office of Legal Affairs
notice was sent and delivered to the addressee. A certification (OLS) received the order of denial only on May 31, 2002.
from the postmaster would be the best evidence of that fact.
The mailman's testimony may also be adduced to prove that The RTC denied the notice of appeal for being filed out of time.
fact. On petition for certiorari before the CA, the CA upheld the
denial of the notice of appeal.
As stressed by Justice Barredo in a recent case, "there must be
clear proof of compliance with the postal regulations The CA rationalized as follows:
governing the sending and receipt of the notice referred to in"
• January 7, 2002 – petitioners received a copy of the
section 8 of Rule 13. The mere exhibition in court of the
Decision. They had until January 22 to file their
envelope containing the unclaimed mail is not sufficient proof
appeal.
that a first notice was sent.
• January 16, 2002 – petitioner, through their counsel
Atty. Nolasco and 9 days after receiving a copy of the
decision, filed a MR. Hence, petitioners still had 6
remaining days to file their appeal.

• May 17, 2002 – Atty. Nolasco received the copy of the upon his counsel or one of them, unless service upon the party
order denying the MR, thus they had only until May himself is ordered by the court. xxx”
23, 2002 to file a notice of appeal.
That counsel was the OLS in Diliman, Quezon City, who was
• June 3, 2002 – Obviously, petitioners were late. served with the denial only on May 31. As such, the running of
the remaining period of 6 days resumed only on June 1, which
UP appealed the decision before the SC by petition for review rendered the filing of the notice of appeal on June 3 timely and
on certiorari. However, the SC denied the petition, which later well within the remaining days of the UP’s period of appeal.
on became final and executory.
Furthermore, equity calls for the retroactive application in the
With this, the RTC authorized the release of the garnished UP’s favor of the fresh-period rule that the Court first
funds. The CA dismissed UP’s petition for certiorari. RTC Judge announced in 2005 through its ruling in Neypes v. Court of
Yadao ordered the immediate release of the garnished Appeals.
amount.
In this new rule, a fresh period of 15 days is given to a party to
UP pleaded that the Court give due course to its petition in the file a notice of appeal counted from receipt of the order
name of equity in order to reverse or modify the SC’s adverse dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
judgment despite finality, as such finality has obstructed UP’s reconsideration. A procedural rule that is amended for the
plea of the return of the garnished amount. UP alleged that benefit of litigants in furtherance of the administration of
their counsel of the record was not Atty. Nolasco of the UPLB justice shall be retroactively applied to likewise favor actions
Legal Office but the OLS. It further submits that the filing of the then pending, as equity delights in equality.
notice of appeal was well within the reglementary period, as
the OLS received the copy of the RTC’s first judgment on May Thus, even if the reckoning date started from May 17, 2002,
31, 2002. Thus, the filing of the notice of appeal on June 3, the fresh period of 15 days would end on June 1, which fell on
2002 was well within the reglementary period. a Saturday. Hence, UP had until the next working day, or June
3, a Monday, within which to appeal.
ISSUE
In this case, the Court also declared that UP’s funds, being
• Whether or not the period of appeal will not start without government funds, are not subject to garnishment. The
effective service of decision upon counsel of record. (YES) Commission on Audit must first adjudicate private
respondents’ claim before execution should proceed.
RULING
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on
The doctrine of immutability of a final judgment is not certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court
absolute, and admits of several exceptions, including: of Appeals under review; ANNULS the orders for the
garnishment of the funds of the University of the Philippines
a. The correction of clerical errors and for the release of the garnished amount to Stern Builders
Corporation and Servillano dela Cruz; and DELETES from the
b. The so-called nunc pro tunc entries that cause no
prejudice to any party decision of the Regional Trial Court dated November 28, 2001
for being void only the awards of actual damages of
c. Void judgments P5,716,729.00, moral damages of P10,000,000.00, and
attorney's fees of P150,000.00, plus P1,500.00 per
d. Whenever circumstances transpire after the finality appearance, in favor of Stern Builders Corporation and
of the decision that render its execution unjust and Servillano dela Cruz.
inequitable.
G.R. No. 138500 September 16, 2005
In this case, the declaration of finality of the judgment of the ANDY QUELNAN, Petitioner,
RTC should be disregarded as it violated UP’s right to due vs.
process. VHF PHILIPPINES, Respondent
The service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration
upon Atty. Nolasco of the UPLB Legal Office was invalid and
ineffectual because he was admittedly not the counsel of
record of the UP. The rule is that it is on the counsel and not
the client that the service should be made. Petition for Review
Under paragraph 2 of Section 2 of the Rules of Court, “[i]f any DOCTRINE
party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made
“There is no doubt that under the Rules, service by registered Before the SC, petitioner’s posture was that the 60-day period
mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee. for filing a petition for relief from judgment must be reckoned
However, if the addressee fails to claim his mail from the post from the time a party acquired knowledge of the judgment.
office within five (5) days from the date of the first notice, According to petitioner, he only became aware of the MeTC
service becomes effective upon the expiration of five (5) days decision on May 18, 1993 when a notice to pay and vacate was
therefrom. In such a case, there arises a presumption that the served on him by the sheriff.
service was complete at the end of the said five-day period. This
means that the period to appeal or to file the necessary ISSUE
pleading begins to run after five days from the first notice given
by the postmaster. This is because a party is deemed to have • Will the presumption of completeness of service of a
received and to have been notified of the judgment at that registered mail matter under Rule 13, Sec. 10 of the 1997
point. xxx Rules apply in relation to the 60-day period for filing a
petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38, sec. 3 of
Rule 13 is intended to embrace and govern the filing of all the Rules? (YES)
pleadings, judgments, orders, notices and other papers, as well
as the service thereof. Whenever necessary and expedient, the RULING
presumption of completeness of service ought to be applied, as
Sec. 3 of Rule 38 provides that a Petition for Relief from
in this case. While it is true that the rule on completeness of
Judgment must be filed within (a) 60 days after the petitioner
service by registered mail only provides for a disputable
learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding ot be
presumption, the burden is on petitioner to show that the
set aside, and (b) not more than 6 months after such
postmaster's notice never reached him and that he did not
judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was
acquire knowledge of the judgment.”
taken.
FACTS
The Court does not take issue with petitioner that the 60-day
In an ejectment suit filed by VHF against petitioner Quelnan, period under the said rule should be reckoned from the time
the MeTC found that summons were validly served on the aggrieved party has knowledge of the judgment. However,
petitioner through his wife on August 25, 1992 by substituted the petitioner’s contention that it was only on May 18, 1993
service, and that petitioner failed to file his answer within the when he became aware of the judgment subject of his petition
reglementary period. Thus, the MeTC rendered judgment for for relief is untenable.
respondent. A copy was served to petitioner by registered mail
There is no doubt that under the Rules, service by registered
on November 25, 1992, but the same was returned unclaimed
mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee.
on account of petitioner’s failure to claim the same despite the
However, if the addressee fails to claim his mail from the post
postmaster’s three successive notices on. This decision
office within five (5) days from the date of the first notice,
became final and executory. Thus, a writ of execution was
service becomes effective upon the expiration of five (5) days
issued, and a notice of levy and a notice to vacate were served
therefrom. In such a case, there arises a presumption that the
on petitioner’s wife who acknowledged receipt thereof.
service was complete at the end of the said five-day period.
Later on, petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Relief This means that the period to appeal or to file the necessary
from Judgment, alleging that he was never served with pleading begins to run after five days from the first notice given
summons and was completely unaware of the proceedings in by the postmaster. This is because a party is deemed to have
the ejectment suit, adding that he learned of the judgment received and to have been notified of the judgment at that
only when a notice of levy on execution came to his point.
knowledge.
Clearly, a copy of the MeTC decision was sent to petitioner
The RTC granted petitioner’s petition for relief and set aside through registered mail at his given address on November 25,
the MeTC decision. The trial court explained that petitioner 1992. Subsequent notices were sent by the postmaster on
had been unduly deprived of a hearing and had been December 7, 1992 and December 11, 1992. For sure, a
prevented from taking an appeal for the reason that certification that the registered mail was unclaimed by the
petitioner’s wife, in a fit of anger, tore the summons and petitioner and thus returned to the sender after three
complaint in the ejectment suit in the heat of a marital successive notices was issued by the postmaster. Hence,
squabble. The RTC found this as excusable negligence as would pursuant to Sec. 10, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules, service by
justify the filing of the petition for relief from judgment. registered mail is deemed completed after 5 days from the
date petitioner received the first notice. Thus, the service
The CA reversed the RTC decision and reinstated the MeTC should be deemed completed on November 30, 1992 – 5 days
decision. Thus, this instant petition. after November 25, 1992.

Thus, the 60-day period for filing a petition for relief must be Labor Arbiter declared that the dismissal was indeed illegally
reckoned from November 30, 1992, as this was the day when made.
actual receipt by petitioner is presumed. In short, petitioner Respondents seasonably appealed the decision to the NLRC's
was deemed to have knowledge of the MeTC decision on Fifth Division in Cagayan de Oro City. Subsequently, the NLRC
November 30. Unfortunately, it was only on May 24, 1993, or reversed the appealed decision, ruling that petitioner's
175 days after petitioner was deemed to have learned of the dismissal from employment was for a just cause and with due
judgment that he filed his petition for relief with the RTC. process of law
On Appeal, CA dismissed the petition for Non-compliance with
Moreover, the records are bereft of any showing why Sec 11 Rule 13 of the Rules on Civil Procedure or lack of
petitioner failed to claim his copy of the MeTC decision. For explanation of service by registered mail.
sure, petitioner has not offered any explanation as to why he Issue: WON the petition was validly dismissed for failure to
was not able to obtain a copy of said decision despite three observe procedural requirements (YES)
notices sent to him by the postmaster. The failure to claim a Ruling: It is not disputed that petitioner's Petition for Certiorari
registered mail matter of which notice had been duly given by filed in the Court of Appeals did not contain an explanation
the postmaster is not an excusable neglect that would warrant why resort was made to other modes of service of the petition
the reopening of a decided case. to the parties concerned. The Court of Appeals considered the
same as not having been filed and dismissed the petition
Rule 13 is intended to embrace and govern the filing of all outright. Pursuant to Rule 13, service and filing of pleadings
pleadings, judgments, orders, notices and other papers, as well and other papers must, whenever practicable, be done
as the service thereof. Whenever necessary and expedient, the personally. To underscore the mandatory nature of this rule
presumption of completeness of service ought to be applied, requiring personal service whenever practicable, said section
as in this case. While it is true that the rule on completeness of gives the court the discretion to consider a pleading or paper
service by registered mail only provides for a disputable as not filed if the other modes of service or filing were resorted
presumption, the burden is on petitioner to show that the to and no written explanation was made as to why personal
postmaster's notice never reached him and that he did not service was not done in the first place.
acquire knowledge of the judgment. Sadly, petitioner failed to We adhere to the pronouncement in the Solar case that, "if
discharge his burden. In fact, petitioner's denial of receipt of motions to expunge or strike out pleadings for violation of
the notice is belied by the postmaster's certification that the Section 11 of Rule 13 were to be indiscriminately resolved
mail was not claimed by petitioner despite the three notices to under Section 6 of Rule 1 Section 6, Rule 1, 1997 Rules of Civil
him. In the situation obtaining in this case, the postmaster's Procedure. Construction. - These Rules shall be liberally
certification is the best evidence to prove that the first notice construed in order to promote their objective of securing a
was sent and delivered to the addressee. just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding. " or as in this case, under the general "protection
Similarly, the Court cannot accept petitioner's argument that
to labor clauses in the Constitution, "then Section 11 would
the MeTC decision could not become final and executory
become meaningless and its sound purpose negated.
because that court never acquired jurisdiction over his person
G.R. No. 124893 April 18, 1997
by reason of his wife's act of tearing the summons and
complaint for ejectment. The records show that the service of
LYNETTE G. GARVIDA, petitioner, vs. FLORENCIO
summons upon petitioner's wife was effected in accordance
G. SALES, JR., THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON
with Section 7 of Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
ELECTIONS, ELECTION OFFICER DIONISIO F. RIOS
the law that provides for substituted service of summons.
and PROVINCIAL SUPERVISOR NOLI PIPO,
AMEN-AMEN vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
respondents.
G.R. No. 143424 | August 89, 2001

DOCTRINE: The Rules shall be liberally construed in order to DOCTRINE: Filing a pleading by facsimile transmission is not
promote their objective of securing a just, speedy, and sanctioned by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, much less by
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. " or as the Rules of Court. A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic
in this case, under the general "protection to labor clauses in pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks
the Constitution, "then Section 11 would become meaningless of an original. Without the original, there is no way of
and its sound purpose negated. determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is
genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party
FACTS: and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading.
Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal suspension and dismissal FACTS: Petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the
against Toyota Davao City before NLRC. After the usual position of Chairman of Sangguniang Kabataan. In a letter,
conciliation proceedings and submission of position papers, petitioner's certificate of candidacy was disapproved due to
her age (21 yrs and 10 months old). Petitioner, however,

appealed to COMELEC Regional Director who set aside the
order of respondents and allowed petitioner to run. G.R. No. 175334 March 26, 2008
On May 2, 1996, respondent Rios issued a memorandum to
petitioner informing her of her ineligibility and giving her 24 SPS. DOMINGO M. BELEN and DOMINGA P.
hours to explain why her certificate of candidacy should not be BELEN, herein represented by their attorney-infact
disapproved. Earlier and without the knowledge of the NERY B. AVECILLA, Petitioners, vs. HON. PABLO
COMELEC officials, private respondent Florencio G. Sales, Jr., a R. CHAVEZ, Presiding Judge, RTCBranch 87,
rival candidate for Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan, Rosario, Batangas and all other persons acting
under his orders and SPS. SILVESTRE N. PACLEB
filed with the COMELEC en banc a "Petition of Denial and/or
and PATRICIA A. PACLEB, represented herein by
Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy" against petitioner
their attorney-infact JOSELITO RIOVEROS,
Garvida for falsely representing her age qualification in her Respondents
certificate of candidacy. The petition was sent by facsimile
and registered mail on to the COMELEC National Office,
Manila.
Respondent Rios issued the memorandum to petitioner, the DOCTRINE: In an action in personam wherein the defendant is
COMELEC en banc issued an order directing the Board of a non-resident who does not voluntarily submit himself to the
Election Tellers and Board of Canvassers of Barangay San authority of the court, personal service of summons within the
Lorenzo to suspend the proclamation of petitioner in the event state is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over her
she won in the election. person. This method of service is possible if such defendant is
ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC en banc has jurisdiction to act physically present in the country. If he is not found therein, the
on the petition to deny or cancel her certificate of candidacy. court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and therefore
RULING: None. the COMELEC en banc did not refer the case to cannot validly try and decide the case against him. An
any of its Divisions upon receipt of the petition. Furthermore, exception was laid down in Gemperle v. Schenker wherein a
the COMELEC en banc also erred when it failed to note that the non-resident was served with summons through his wife, who
petition itself did not comply with the formal requirements of was a resident of the Philippines and who was his
pleadings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. It provides representative and attorney-in-fact in a prior civil case filed by
that every pleading before the COMELEC must be printed, him; moreover, the second case was a mere offshoot of the first
mimeographed or typewritten in legal size bond paper and case.
filed in at least ten (10) legible copies. Pleadings must be filed
directly with the proper Clerk of Court of the COMELEC FACTS: The instant petition originated from the action for the
personally, or, by registered mail. enforcement of a foreign judgment against herein petitioners,
In the instant case, the subject petition was not in proper form. Sps. Belen, filed by private respondent Sps. Pacleb,
Only two (2) copies of the petition were filed with the represented by their attorney-in-fact, Joselito Rioveros, before
COMELEC. Also, the COMELEC en banc issued its Resolution on the RTC of Rosario, Batangas.
the basis of the petition transmitted by facsimile, not by
registered mail. The complaint alleged that private respondents secured a
Filing a pleading by facsimile transmission is not sanctioned by judgment by default in Case No. NC021205 rendered by a
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, much less by the Rules of certain Judge John W. Green of the Superior Court of the State
Court. A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, of California. The summons was served on petitioners’ address
at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original. in San Gregorio, Alaminos, Laguna and received by a certain
Without the original, there is no way of determining on its face Marcelo M. Belen.
whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and
was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in Atty. Reynaldo Alcantara entered his appearance as counsel
fact, be a sham pleading. The uncertainty of the authenticity of for petitioners, stating that his legal services were retained at
a facsimile pleading should have restrained the COMELEC en the instance of petitioners’ relatives. Atty. Alcantara
banc from acting on the petition and issuing the questioned subsequently filed an answer, alleging that contrary to private
order. The COMELEC en banc should have waited until it respondents’ averment, petitioners were actually residents of
received the petition filed by registered mail. California, USA.
In view of petitioners’ failure to attend the scheduled pre-trial

conference, the RTC ordered the ex parte presentation of
evidence for private respondents before the branch clerk of
court. Before the scheduled ex parte presentation of evidence,
Atty. Alcantara filed a motion to dismiss, citing the judgment
of dismissal issued by the Superior Court of the State of
California, which allegedly dismissed Case No. NC021205.

The RTC held in abeyance the ex parte presentation of sufficient to vest jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners.
evidence of private respondents and the resolution of Atty. Through certain acts, Atty. Alcantara was impliedly
Alcantara’s motion pending the submission of a copy of the authorized by petitioners to appear on their behalf. For
judgment of dismissal. For failure to present a copy of the instance, in support of the motion to dismiss the complaint,
alleged judgment of dismissal, the RTC denied the motion to Atty. Alcantara attached thereto a duly authenticated copy of
dismiss. Atty. Alcantara sought the reinstatement of the the judgment of dismissal and a photocopy of the
motion to dismiss attaching a copy of the said foreign identification page of petitioner Domingo Belen’s U.S.
judgment. passport. These documents could have been supplied only by
petitioners, indicating that they have consented to the
Private respondents filed a motion for the amendment of the appearance of Atty. Alcantara on their behalf. In sum,
complaint averring that private respondents were constrained petitioners voluntarily submitted themselves through Atty.
to withdraw their complaint against petitioners from the Alcantara to the jurisdiction of the RTC.
California court because of the prohibitive cost of litigation,
which withdrawal was favorably considered by said court. In Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals, the Court underscored
the necessity of determining first whether the action is in
The answer to the amended complaint raised the defenses of personam, in rem or quasi in rem because the rules on service
lack of cause of action, res judicata and lack of jurisdiction over of summons under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court of the
the subject matter and over the persons of the defendants Philippines apply according to the nature of the action. The
since the amended complaint had raised an entirely new cause Court elaborated, thus:
of action which should have been ventilated in another
complaint. In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide
Petitioners and Atty. Alcantara failed to appear at the the case. Jurisdiction over the person of a resident defendant
rescheduled pre-trial conference. Thus, the RTC declared who does not voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by
petitioners in default and allowed private respondents to personal service of summons as provided under Section 7, Rule
present evidence ex parte. Atty. Alcantara passed away 14 of the Rules of Court. If he cannot be personally served with
without notice to the RTC. summons within a reasonable time, substituted service may be
made in accordance with Section 8 of said Rule. If he is
The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the plaintiffs ordering temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of
the defendants to pay. service may be resorted to: (1) substituted service set forth in
Section 8; (2) personal service outside the country, with leave
A copy of the RTC decision intended for Atty. Alcantara was
of court; (3) service by publication, also with leave of court; or
returned with the notation "Addressee Deceased." A copy of
(4) any other manner the court may deem sufficient.
the RTC decision was then sent to the purported address of
petitioners in San Gregorio, Alaminos, Laguna and was However, in an action in personam wherein the defendant is a
received by a certain Leopoldo Avecilla. non-resident who does not voluntarily submit himself to the
authority of the court, personal service of summons within the
Private respondents filed an ex-parte motion for preliminary
state is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over her
attachment which was granted and subsequently sought the
person. This method of service is possible if such defendant is
execution of the Decision. A writ of execution was issued the
physically present in the country. If he is not found therein, the
real properties belonging to petitioners were levied upon.
court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and therefore
Atty. Carmelo B. Culvera entered his appearance as counsel for cannot validly try and decide the case against him. An
petitioners and filed a Motion to Quash Writ of Execution exception was laid down in Gemperle v. Schenker wherein a
(With Prayer to Defer Further Actions). He then filed a Notice non-resident was served with summons through his wife, who
of Appeal from the RTC Decision averring that he received a was a resident of the Philippines and who was his
copy thereof only on 29 December 2003. representative and attorney-in-fact in a prior civil case filed by
him; moreover, the second case was a mere offshoot of the
RTC: DENIED motion. MR DENIED. CA: DISMISSED Rule 65 first case.
petition. MR DENIED.
In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the
ISSUE: WON the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the persons of person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer
petitioners through either the proper service of summons or jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires
the appearance of the late Atty. Alcantara on behalf of jurisdiction over the res. Nonetheless, summons must be
petitioners served upon the defendant not for the purpose of vesting the
court with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process
HELD: YES. The CA correctly concluded that the appearance requirements. Thus, where the defendant is a non-resident
of Atty. Alcantara and his filing of numerous pleadings were who is not found in the Philippines and (1) the action affects
the personal status of the plaintiff; (2) the action relates to, or
NESTOR BRACERO, Petitioner, v. RODULFO
the subject matter of which is property in the Philippines in
which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest; (3) the ARCELO AND THE HEIRS OF VICTORIANO
action seeks the exclusion of the defendant from any interest MONISIT, namely: LOURDES MENCHAVEZ,
in the property located in the Philippines; or (4) the property ROGELIO RUELO, AND MARTINIANA APOR,
of the defendant has been attached in the Philippines— Respondents.
service of summons may be effected by (a) personal service
G.R. No. 212496, March 18, 2015
out of the country, with leave of court; (b) publication, also
with leave of court; or (c) any other manner the court may
deem sufficient. FACTS: Petition for Review
The Complaint stated that Victoriano owned the subject land.
The action filed against petitioners, prior to the amendment of The heirs of Victoriano inherited and extra-judicially partition
the complaint, is for the enforcement of a foreign judgment in this property upon his death and declared it under their names
a complaint for breach of contract whereby petitioners were for tax purposes.
ordered to pay private respondents the monetary award. It is
in the nature of an action in personam because private During Victoriano's lifetime, the land was mortgaged to
respondents are suing to enforce their personal rights under Rodulfo 's grandmother and upon her death Rodulfo inherited
said judgment. the right over the mortgaged portion of the property. Nestor,
claimed to be Rodulfo's tenant.
Applying the foregoing rules on the service of summons to the
instant case, in an action in personam, jurisdiction over the Victoriano sued Nestor for the recovery of the property.
person of the defendant who does not voluntarily submit Nestor countered that the land belonged to Rodulfo Both
himself to the authority of the court is necessary for the court complaint and counterclaim were dismissed.
to validly try and decide the case through personal service or,
if this is not possible and he cannot be personally served, Nestor expanded his occupation and drove out Victoriano's
substituted service as provided in Rule 14, Sections 6-7. tenant worker. The heirs of Victoriano brought the matter to
the Barangay Captain "but no settlement was reached." Thus,
If defendant cannot be served with summons because he is they filed their Complaint for Quieting of Title/Ownership,
temporarily abroad, but otherwise he is a Philippine resident, Recovery of Possession with Damages.
service of summons may, by leave of court, be effected out of
the Philippines under Rule 14, Section 15. In all of these cases, Rodulfo filed an Answer denying that Nestor was his tenant.
it should be noted, defendant must be a resident of the He claimed he was only impleaded as respondent to help the
Philippines, otherwise an action in personam cannot be heirs oust Nestor from the property. Rodulfo did not claim
brought because jurisdiction over his person is essential to ownership to the said property.
make a binding decision.
Nestor filed a Motion to Dismiss.
Records of the case reveal that herein petitioners have been
permanent residents of California, U.S.A. since the filing of the
The trial court denied Nestor's Motion to Dismiss and also
action up to the present. From the time Atty. Alcantara filed an
denied reconsideration. The CA dismissed his Petition for
answer purportedly at the instance of petitioners’ relatives, it
Certiorari and/or Prohibition and also denied reconsideration.
has been consistently maintained that petitioners were not
physically present in the Philippines. In the answer, Atty.
The RTC declared Nestor Bracero in default for failure to file an
Alcantara had already averred that petitioners were residents
answer.
of California, U.S.A. and that he was appearing only upon the
instance of petitioners’ relatives. Private respondents’
On April 16, 2009, The RTC ruled in favor of the heirs of
attorney-in-fact, Joselito Rioveros, testified during the ex
Victoriano. On May 4, 2009, the trial court served Nestor with
parte presentation of evidence that he knew petitioners to
a copy of its Decision.
be former residents of Alaminos, Laguna but are now living in
California, U.S.A. That being the case, the service of summons
The period to appeal lapsed. The heirs of Victoriano filed a
on petitioners’ purported address in San Gregorio, Alaminos,
motion for execution and furnished the counsels of Nestor and
Laguna was defective and did not serve to vest in court
Rodulfo with copies. The trial court issued the Writ of
jurisdiction over their persons.
Execution without opposition.
Nestor received the Notice to Vacate on Execution dated

January 8, 2010. On the same day, his counsel Atty. Pilapil filed

the Urgent Motion to Vacate the Writ of Execution on the The Office of the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution
ground that counsel was not furnished a copy. recommending the filing of an Information against petitioner
and a Fernandez for falsification of public documents, to which
The RTC denied Urgent Motion to Vacate the Writ of the petitioner and Fernandez filed a Motion for
Execution. The CA affirmed the RTC Order. Reconsideration of said resolution.
MeTC: allowed the reinvestigation of the case and, thereafter,
ISSUE: Whether or not the receipt of petitioner's counsel of a the first ruling of the City Prosecutor was reversed and set
copy of the motion for execution amounts to effective official aside. Thus, a Motion to Withdraw Information was filed
notice of the RTC Decision if he was not furnished a copy of the before the MeTC which was granted.
Decision. RTC: rendered a decision and ruled that the MeTC committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
HELD: Petitioner's counsel was furnished a copy of the motion jurisdiction in reviving and reinstating the criminal case against
for execution on September 11, 2009. As discussed by the Court petitioner and Fernandez on the basis of respondent's motion
of Appeals, this motion categorically states that the trial court for reconsideration filed by the private prosecutor without the
rendered its Decision on April 16, 2009, yet petitioner's counsel concurrence or conformity of the public prosecutor.
filed no opposition. At that time, he did not file any motion Petitioner: petitioner and Fernandez filed a Motion to Expunge
asserting that he was not furnished a copy of the Decision. It the Motion for Reconsideration of the respondent on the
was only on January 8, 2010 when his client informed him of ground that there was a violation of the 3-day notice rule for
the Writ of Execution did petitioner's counsel file an Urgent motions and the lack of MCLE Compliance of the respondent's
Motion to Vacate the Writ of Execution on the ground that he counsel. Respondent also filed an Opposition to the motion to
did not receive a copy of the Regional Trial Court Decision. expunge the motion for reconsideration.
This court has held that "[r]elief will not be granted to a party The RTC denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration. It
who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when was ruled that the failure of the respondent movant to comply
the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence." with the 3-day notice rule on motions rendered the said
Petitioner, through his counsel, did not file an answer to the motion for reconsideration defective. It was found by the RTC
Complaint. After the trial court declared petitioner in default that respondent's motion for reconsideration was set for
for failure to file an answer, his counsel did not file an hearing on April 16, 2010, and that a copy thereof was received
opposition to or motion to lift the Order declaring him in by the petitioner's counsel only on April 19, 2010 or three (3)
default. After petitioner's counsel was furnished a copy of the days after the hearing. Respondent received a copy of the said
motion for execution, he did not immediately file an opposition RTC Resolution on February 11, 2011. Thereafter, respondent
to the motion or raise the ground that he was not furnished a filed a Notice of Appeal on February 24, 2011 which petitioner
copy of the Decision. opposed. Respondent also filed a Motion for the Transmittal of
the Records of the Case to the Court of Appeals.
Rule 13, Section 2 of the Rules of Court states in part that "[i]f The RTC disapproved respondent's Notice of Appeal for not
any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be having been perfected within the fifteen-day reglementary
made upon his counsel or one of them, unless service upon the period, and thus, no order was made to transfer the records of
party himself is ordered by the court." the case to the CA. Respondent, therefore, filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA assailing the Order of the
Notice sent directly to client is not notice in law. Nevertheless, RTC.
this rule admits of exceptions. CA: granted respondent's petition and reversed and set aside
the RTC's Order and, thus, the notice of appeal of respondent
was given due course. The CA further directed the RTC to
G.R. NO. 219260 NOVEMBER 6, 2017 transmit the entire records of the case to the former
TI V. DINO Petitioner: Further insists that respondent violated the three-
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI RULE 45 day notice rule requiring every movant of a motion required to
be heard to ensure the receipt of the said motion with notice
DOCTRINE: It must be remembered that "only when personal of hearing to the other party at least three (3) days before the
service or filing is not practicable may the resort to other date of the hearing. Petitioner argues that respondent should
modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written have resorted to personal service of the motion because such
explanation as to why personal service or filing was not is not impossible considering that the counsel of petitioner's
practicable to begin with." Concomitant to a liberal application office is located in Ortigas Center, Pasig City, while that of the
of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the respondent's counsel is located in Malate, Manila
party invoking liberality to explain his failure to abide by the ISSUE: Whether or not, under the circumstances of this case,
rules. the provisions of the Rules of Court be interpreted liberally.
FACTS: RULING: The petition is meritorious.

Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons. On October 14, 2009, the Regional Trial Court reversed and set
Plainly, such should expedite action or resolution on a aside the MeTC decision. The trial court ruled that PSB failed
pleading, motion or other paper; and conversely, minimize, if to prove its cause of action.
not eliminate, delays likely to be incurred if service or filing is On November 10 2009, PSB filed its motion for
done by mail, considering the inefficiency of the postal service. reconsideration, admitting that it received a copy of the RTC
Likewise, personal service will do away with the practice of decision on October 26, 2009.
some lawyers who, wanting to appear clever, resort to the Papa opposed the motion for reconsideration, claiming that
following less than ethical practices. she received the copy of the motion one day late as the PSB
Personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to availed private courier services. She claimed that although the
other modes of service and filing, the exception. Henceforth, motion for reconsideration was filed on November 10, 2009, it
whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in light of the is deemed to have been made on November 11, 2009, the date
circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or when she received it.
filing is mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not The RTC denied the motion because the decision had already
practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must attained finality.
then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why The Court of Appeals held that the RTC’s decision had attained
personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with. finality due to PSB’s failure to serve on Papa a copy of its
In this case, the office of petitioner's counsel is located in motion for reconsideration within the prescribed period. The
Ortigas Center, Pasig City, while that of the respondent's appellate court further agreed with the RTC that PSB failed to
counsel is at Malate, Manila. Personal service, therefore, is the prove its cause of action.
most practicable considering the close proximity of the places. ISSUE:
Nevertheless, respondent was not able to satisfactorily explain Whether or not the decision of the Regional Trial Court has
why he made use of registered mail instead of personally attained finality.
serving the notice of hearing. HELD:
The liberal interpretation and application of rules apply only in YES.
proper cases of demonstrable merit and under justifiable PSB argues that it filed the motion for reconsideration on the
causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not last day of the 15-day prescriptive period, and that although it
a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must deviated from the usual mode of service as prescribed by the
be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to Rules of Court, there was still effective service upon the
ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. respondent. PSB argues that the timeliness of filing of the
Philippine Savings Bank, v. Josephine L. Papa motion should be reckoned from the receipt of the RTC, and
not the receipt by the adverse party.
The Court held that while the PSB is correct that filing and
G.R. No. 200469; January 15, 2018 service are distinct from each other, the two acts must go
FACTS: hand-in-hand and must be considered together when
The petitioner, Philippine Savings Bank (PSB) filed before the determining whether the pleading, motion, or any other paper
Metropolitan Trial Court a complaint for the collection of sum was filed within the applicable reglementary period.
of money against the respondent, Josephine L. Papa (Papa). The Rules require every motion set for hearing to be
PSB alleged that Papa obtained a flexi-loan in the amount of accompanied by proof of service to the other parties
P207,600.00, payable in twenty-four monthly installments of concerned, otherwise, the court shall not be allowed to act on
P8,650.00 with interest at 38.40% per annum. Papa executed it.
a promissory note, and PSB further alleged that this note To prove service by private courier or ordinary mail, a party
provides additional charges in case of default. must attach an affidavit of the person who mailed the motion
PSB averred that as of March 27, 2006, the total obligation or pleading, and show what it complied with Rule 13, Section
amounted to P1173,000.00, and that despite repeated 7 of the Rules of Court.
demands, Papa failed to meet her obligation. Under the Rules, the lack of registry service available in the
Papa, in her Answer, alleged that PSB had no cause of action locality of either the senders or the addressee is the only
against her, as her liability had been extinguished by several credible justification to resort to service by ordinary mail or
staggered payments. private courier.
After the parties submitted their memoranda, the case was “Lack of material time and personnel to effect personal
submitted for decision. delivery.” failed to indicate that no registry service was
The Metropolitan Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of available. Therefore, the RTC is correct in denying the motion
PSB. It was convinced that PSB was able to establish a cause of for reconsideration, which is deemed as not filed.
action against Papa by preponderance of evidence; and that Since the motion for reconsideration is deemed as not filed, it
Papa never adduced any evidence regarding the payments she did not toll the running of the 15-day reglementary period for
made. Papa moved for reconsideration, but was denied by the the filing of an appeal. As such, the decision had attained
MeTC. Papa appealed before the Regional Trial Court. finality on November 11, 2009.

On April 6, 2016, Atty. Ginete filed a Manifestation with
Motion to withdraw appearance disavowing the receipt of the
FILIPINA D. ABUTIN, petitioner, v. JOSEPHINE copy of the Order and explained that he only found out about
SAN JUAN, respondent it when informed by Josephine. Moreover, that he was
withdrawing his appearance because he was running as mayor.
G.R. No. 247345 July 6, 2020
Convinced that the Order had attained finality, Purita and
Filipina filed a Motion for Entry of Judgment and Writ of
Execution on April 7, 2016. Even as this Motion was pending,
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 on April 12, 2016, Julita and Josephine, through their new
counsel, Atty. Mibolos filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
DOCTRINE: Registered mail is then complete upon actual
receipt or 5 days after the postmaster's initial notice. An Purita and Filipina filed a Motion to Stricken-Out the Motion
addressee is given only a limited period to act on a notice as for Reconsideration insisting that the Order had attained
"the purpose is to place the date of receipt of pleadings, finality. They filed their Opposition to the Motion for
judgments and processes beyond the power of the party being Reconsideration attaching "several registry return receipts of
served to determine at his pleasure.” service of pleadings addressed to Atty. Ginete, but were
actually received for him by Capuno, his driver."
Citing Laza v. Court of Appeals, it ruled that delivery "to any
person of sufficient discretion to receive" was sufficient. At around this point, Julita passed away.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Fernando Alsua: it is Josephine filed a Reply to Purita and Filipina's Opposition
the responsibility of those receiving mail matter "to devise a attaching Atty. Ginete's Affidavit insisting that Capuno was not
system for the receipt of mail intended for them." Failing in this, authorized to receive mail for him and that he himself "used to
intended recipients would only have themselves to blame if get mail matters from the mail box."
mail matter otherwise duly delivered "to a person of sufficient
discretion to receive it" still fails to find the specific addressee Purita and Filipina filed their Rejoinder. Sometime after this,
at such a time as would allow him or her to opportunely act on Purita passed away.
it.
RTC: DENIED probate to the wills.
FACTS: Corazon who had been in a same-sex relationship with
Purita passed away without any surviving ascendants or CA: DISMISSED Filipina's Rule 65 Petition
descendants leaving behind a lot on which a residential house
ISSUE: WON receipt by Capuno does not amount to valid
was constructed. The two lived on this house for 48 years,
service, as Capuno was supposedly never authorized to receive
along with Purita's daughter, Filipina.
mail matter for Atty. Ginete
Purita and Filipina filed before the RTC of Manila, a Petition for
HELD: YES. Capuno had long been authorized by Atty. Ginete
the probate of 3 holographic wills executed and left by
to receive papers and processes on his behalf. Consistent
Corazon. Corazon's sister, Julita, and Corazon's niece,
with this, Capuno effectively and validly received a copy of
respondent Josephine, filed an Opposition to the Petition for
the Order on Atty. Ginete's behalf. Rule 13's standards on
Probate.
what amounts to completed service by registered mail were
During trial, three (3) witnesses authenticated Corazon's satisfied the moment Capuno received the Order.
handwriting and signature.
Rule 13, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines
RTC admitted to probate the wills and both parties were service as "the act of providing a party with a copy of the
served copies of this Order by registered mail. pleading or paper concerned." It further stipulates that, unless
otherwise ordered, service upon a party's counsel effectively
Purita and Filipina, realizing that the Order should have works as service upon the actual party.
attained finality as there was no Motion for Reconsideration
filed in the interim, inquired, through a representative, with When a party is represented by counsel, "notices of all kinds,
the RTC on when Atty. Ginete received a copy of the Order. including motions, pleadings, and orders must be served on
Subsequently, Purita and Filipina obtained a Certification said counsel and notice to him is notice to client."
from the Office of the Postmaster that the copy for Julita and
Under Rule 13, Section 5, service may either be personal or by
Josephine were received on behalf of Atty. Ginete by a
mail. However, should personal service or service by mail be
certain Capuno on February 9, 2016.
unavailable, service may be made through substituted service.

Rule 13, Section 9 specifically governs service of judgments, weakened Land Bank's claims. It also noted that it is the
final orders, or resolutions, such as Judge Patrimonio-Soriaso's responsibility of those receiving mail matter "to devise a
December 28, 2015 Order: system for the receipt of mail intended for them." Failing in
this, intended recipients would only have themselves to blame
SECTION 9. Service of judgments, final orders, or if mail matter otherwise duly delivered "to a person of
resolutions. - Judgments, final orders or resolutions sufficient discretion to receive it" still fails to find the specific
shall be served either personally or by registered mail. addressee at such a time as would allow him or her to
When a party summoned by publication has failed to opportunely act on it.
appear in the action, judgments, final orders or
resolutions against him shall be served upon him also Similarly, in the present case, Capuno was certified by the
by publication at the expense of the prevailing party. Office of the Postmaster to have actually received a copy of
Judge Patrimonio-Soriaso's December 28, 2015 Order on
When resorted to, service by mail or substituted service "must February 9, 2016. Petitioner and her mother attached "several
be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or registry return receipts of service of pleadings which were
filing was not done personally." This requirement applies addressed to Atty. Ginete, but were actually received for him
"except with respect to papers emanating from the court. " by Capuno" to the Opposition they filed to respondent and her
mother's Motion for Reconsideration. The Court of Appeals
Service by mail is preferably done through registered mail. itself noted that, while Atty. Ginete disclaimed Capuno's
Service through registered mail is done "by depositing the copy authority to receive mail matter for him, "he did not refute
in the post office in a sealed envelope, plainly addressed to the the evidence presented by petitioner that several registry
party or his counsel at his office, if known, otherwise at his return receipts ... bore Capuno's name and signature." The
residence, if known, with postage fully prepaid, and with Court of Appeals was even constrained to concede that this
instructions to the postmaster to return the mail to the sender "indicated that Capuno has been customarily receiving
after ten (10) days if undelivered." Service by ordinary mail decisions or orders from the courts."
may be resorted to only "if no registry service is available in the
locality of either the sender or the addressee." From all indications, Capuno had long been authorized by Atty.
Ginete to receive papers and processes on his behalf.
Rule 13, Section 10 provides standards for determining when Consistent with this, Capuno effectively and validly received a
personal service and service by mail, whether by registered copy of Judge Patrimonio-Soriaso December 28, 2015 Order on
mail or ordinary mail are deemed complete: Atty. Ginete's behalf. Rule 13's standards on what amounts to
completed service by registered mail were satisfied the
SECTION 10. Completeness of service. - Personal
moment Capuno received the Order February 9, 2016.
service is complete upon actual delivery. Service by
ordinary mail is complete upon the expiration of ten
(10) days after mailing, unless the court otherwise G.R. No. 138500 September 16, 2005
provides. Service by registered mail is complete upon
actual receipt by the addressee, or after five (5) days ANDY QUELNAN, Petitioner,
from the date he received the first notice of the vs.
postmaster, whichever date is earlier. VHF PHILIPPINES, Respondent
Registered mail is then complete upon actual receipt or 5

Petition for Review
days after the postmaster's initial notice. An addressee is
given only a limited period to act on a notice as "the purpose FACTS
is to place the date of receipt of pleadings, judgments and
processes beyond the power of the party being served to The case originated from a Complaint for Abatement of
determine at his pleasure.” Nuisance filed with the MTC against petitioners, which was
tried and decided under the Rule on Summary Procedure.
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Fernando Alsua clarified Respondent alleged that he is the owner of a house and lot;
what amounts to completed service by registered mail when that in front of the said property is a barangay road where the
actual delivery is made. Citing Laza v. Court of Appeals, it ruled petitioners constructed their house against the objections of
that delivery "to any person of sufficient discretion to receive" the respondent; and that the house of the petitioners
was sufficient. constituted a public nuisance.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Fernando Alsua, the
The MTC rendered its decision in favor of the petitioners and
Court ruled that delivery to persons who were not expressly against the respondent on the ground that respondent had no
authorized to receive mail matter on behalf of the addressee cause of action against the petitioners, thus ordering the
was deemed sufficient. It added that prior instances when dismissal of the complaint. On appeal to the RTC, the RTC
delivery of mail had been made to the security guard further
reversed the MTC, declaring that the house erected by the G.R. No. 104769 MARCH 3, 2000
petitioners on a portion of the road fronting the house of the AFP MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATION, INC.,
respondent is a nuisance. Petitioner,
vs.
Petitioners thus filed a Petition for Review with the CA. The CA
COURT OF APPEALS, SOLID HOMES, INC.,
dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioners failed to
INVESTO INC., and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
include in their petition the required explanation on why
MARIKINA, Respondents
personal service upon the respondent was not resorted to
pursuant to Sec. 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 RoC.
ISSUE
• Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition

Petition for Review
on the ground of failure of the petitioners to include
in their petition the required explanation on why DOCTRINE
personal service upon the respondent was not
resorted to pursuant to Sec. 11, Rule 13, of the Rules. “A notice of lis pendens is not and can not be sought as a
(YES) principal action for relief. "The notice is but an incident to an
action, an extra-judicial one to be sure. It does not affect the
RULING merits thereof. It is intended merely to constructively advise, or
warn, all people who deal with the property that they so deal
Sec. 11, Rule 13 of the RoC provides that whenever practicable,
with it at their own risk, and whatever rights they may acquire
the service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be
in the property in any voluntary transaction are subject to the
done personally – and that except with respect to papers
results of the action, and may well be inferior and subordinate
emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must be
to those which may be finally determined and laid down
accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing
therein."
was not done personally, a violation of which may be cause to
consider the paper as not filed [NOTE: this provision no longer The doctrine of lis pendens is inapplicable in actions in
in the new rules]. personam, as this does not involve delivery of possession and
ownership of real property.
Jurisprudence holds that the said rule is mandatory. However,
such discretionary power must be exercised properly and FACTS
reasonably, taking into account the following factors: (1) the
practicability of personal service; (2) the importance of the Investco, Inc. was the owner of parcels of raw land in QC and
subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein; and Marikina. Investco agreed to sell the parcels to Solid Homes
(3) the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged payable in installments. The contract of sale was not registered
for violation of Sec. 11. with the RD of Marikina nor annotated on the original titles
issued in the name of Investco, Inc.
Considering the prima facie merit of the pleading involving the
issues whether the petitioners' house is a public nuisance; However, Sold Homes failed to pay further installments to
whether the subject house is constructed on an abandoned Investco, as the postdated checks intended for the remaining
road; and whether the alleged nuisance is specially injurious to installments were dishonored. Thus, Investco and its
respondent; and, considering further the fact that the MTC and predecessors-in-interest filed with the CFI an action for specific
the RTC decisions are conflicting, the CA had valid grounds to performance against Solid Homes. Solid Homes presented a
refrain from dismissing the appeal solely on technical grounds. counterclaim alleging excess payment and for damages.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the assailed Solid Homes later filed with the RD of Marikina a notice of lis
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET pendens with reference to the specific performance case,
ASIDE. The Court of Appeals is directed to REINSTATE the requesting that the same be annotated on the titles in
Petition for Review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 69472, for Investco’s name. However, such notice was not actually
further proceedings. annotated on the titles in the name of Investco for the reason
that the action was for a collection of a sum of money and did
not involve the titltes to or possession of the subject property.
The CFI ordered Solid Homes to pay Investco the amount

representing the balance of the purchase price. Solid Homes
appealed before the CA.

Meanwhile, Investo sold the said property to AFP Mutual This is the same for Solid Homes’ counterclaim. Being only for
Benefit Association (Petitioner). Petitioner completed its alleged excess payment and for damages, it does not affect
payments of the purchase price. The RD thus issued TCTs in the title to or possession of real property.
name of petitioner, as these titles appeared “clean” and
without any annotation. ON AFP-MBAI: Petitioner is a purchaser in good faith and for
value. Thus, it acquired clean and valid titles to the property in
Thus, Solid Homes filed an action for annotation of lis pendens question.
and damages against the RD, petitioner and Investco before
the RTC. The RTC ordered the annotation of notice of lis G.R. No. 146262 January 21, 2005
pendens. HEIRS OF EUGENIO LOPEZ, SR, Petitioner,
vs. HON. ALFREDO R. ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity
On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RD, holding that as Administrator of the Land Registration
the action of Investco was not only one for specific Authority and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
performance, but also for rescission. MARIKINA CITY, Respondent
ISSUE
• Whether or not Solid Homes is entitled to the annotation

of its notice of lis pendens on the titles of Investco and
petitioner in relation to the action for specific PETITION FOR REVIEW TO REVERSE THE DECISION
performance filed against Solid Homes. (NO)
DOCTRINE:
RULING
Only a party to the case may cause the annotation of notice lis
This action is actually one for mandamus to compel the RD to pendens.
perform its legal duty to annotate the notice of lis pendens.
Until the order of general default is lifted by the court,
There is no such action for “annotation of lis pendens,” as Solid
petitioner could not be considered as a party to the action. They
Homes sought in its complaint.
are deemed movants whose personality as far as the case is
A notice of lis pendens is not and cannot be sought as a concerned is not yet admitted by the court considering that the
principal action for relief. It is merely an incident to an action, order of default has not been lifted.
and extra-judicial one to be sure. It does not affect the merits
One should be careful, however, to distinguish between
thereof. It is intended merely to constructively advise, or warn,
movants as mere interested parties prescribed under Section
all people who deal with the property that they so deal with it
22 of PD 1529 and movants as intervenors-oppositors to the
at their own risk, and whatever rights they may acquire in the
land registration proceedings. It is only in the latter case that a
property in any voluntary transaction are subject to the results
motion to lift the order of general default is required.
of the action.
Petitioners are not mere interested parties in this case. By filing
In accordance of PD 1529, when a party disagrees with the
their motion to have the decrees and the corresponding
denial of the annotation by the Register of Deeds, it could
certificates of title declared void, they took the role of
appeal the same en consulta with the Commissioner of Land
oppositors to the application for land registration.
Registration, which will then be appealable to the CA. This
should have been the course of action of Solid Homes. FACTS:
Furthermore, the Court disagrees with the ruling of the CA. The Alfonso Sandoval ("Sandoval") and Roman Ozaeta, Jr.
CA went beyond the allegations in the complaint and ventured ("Ozaeta") filed an application for registration of title before
into speculation and conjecture. There is nothing in Investco’s the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City.
complaint that even remotely suggests that Investco has
rescinded the contract, or that it sought the rescission of the The land registration court issued an order of general default
sale as an alternative remedy. Specific performance and and hearings on the application followed. The decision became
rescission are alternative remedies which a party may not avail final and executory, and the land registration court issued a
himself of at the same time. certificate of finality,
Thus, the action is solely for collection of sums of money, and National Land Titles and Deeds Administration (now LRA)
thus specific performance. Thus, the annotation of lis pendens issued on 20 October 1977 Decree Nos. N-217643 and N-
is indeed not proper due to the action being in personam. 217644 in the names of Sandoval and his wife Rosa Ruiz, and
Consequently, the doctrine of lis pendens is inapplicable to this Ozaeta and his wife.
case.
“Petitioners", heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr., filed a motion[6] in LRA agreed with the Register of Deeds that a notice of lis
LRC No. N-18887. The motion alleged that Sandoval and pendens based on a motion is not registrable.
Ozaeta sold the lots... subject of the application to the late
Eugenio Lopez, Sr. on 23 September 1970. Petitioners prayed Petitioners filed with the Register of Deeds of Marikina City an
that the court consider in the land registration case the Deed application to annotate the notice of lis pendens
of Absolute Sale over the lots executed by Sandoval and
Ozaeta and their respective... spouses in favor of Eugenio LRA ruled that only a party to a case has the legal personality
Lopez, Sr. to file a notice of lis pendens relative to the pending case.
Land registration court gave due course to the motion LRA declared that petitioners are not parties in LRC No. N-
and conducted hearings. 18887. Since a land registration case is a proceeding in rem,
an order of general default binds the whole world as a party in
Register of Deeds of Marikina City issued the corresponding the case. Petitioners are mere movants whose personality
OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 in favor of Sandoval and Ozaeta the court has not admitted. Petitioners filed before the
and their spouses. appellate court a petition for review of the LRA's decision.
Petitioners filed another motion on 25 November 1998 to Appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The
declare void Decree Nos. N-217643 and N-217644 and Original appellate court reiterated the LRA's ruling that only a party to
Certificate of Title ("OCT") Nos. O-1603 and O- a case has the legal personality to file a notice of lis
1604. Petitioners pointed out that the OCTs show that pendens. Petitioners have no legal personality because they
incumbent Administrator Alfredo R. Enriquez signed the failed to file a motion to lift the order of general default.
Decrees on 20 October 1997, before he assumed office on 8
July 1998 and even before Hon. Briccio C. Ygaña issued the ISSUE:
Order.
Whether petitioner’s motion to declare void the decrees
LRA Administrator denied the request and explained the issued by the Land Registration Authority is a proper basis for
inconsistencies in the dates in a letter... said decrees were filing the Notice of Lis Pendens?
signed sometime between August 8 and 13 1998 and definitely
RULING:
not on October 20, 1997 as what is reflected thereon because
the undersigned Administrator... assumed office only on July NO.
8, 1998. Apparently, at the time the decrees were signed it
was not noticed, through oversight, that they were dated Doctrine of lis pendens refers to the jurisdiction, power or
October 20, 1977. It is therefore hereby clarified that Decree control which a court acquires over property involved in a suit,
Nos. N-217643 and N-217644 were actually issued sometime... pending the continuance of the action, and until final...
between August 8 and 13 1998 and not on October 20, 1997. judgment.
Regarding the claim that these decrees were prematurely The purposes of lis pendens are (1) to protect the rights of the
issued as the motion for the issuance of the decrees in favor of party causing the registration of the lis pendens, and (2) to
the Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, the properties involved having advise third persons who purchase or contract on the subject
been sold to him by the applicants, is still pending with the property that they do so at their peril and subject to the
court, it is informed that no copy of... said motion nor of the result... of the pending litigation.
order directing this Office to comment thereon appears on file
in the records of the case. Hence, these matters could not The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect. First,
have been taken into consideration in the issuance of the it keeps the subject matter of the litigation within the power
decrees. of the court until the entry of the final judgment to prevent the
defeat of the final judgment by successive
Since the certificates of title transcribed pursuant to said alienations. Second,... it binds a purchaser, bona fide or not,
decrees have already been issued and released by the of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree
Registrar of Deeds concerned, it is now beyond our authority that the court will promulgate subsequently. However, the
to recall them unless duly authorized by the court. filing of a notice of lis pendens does not create a right or lien
that previously did... not exist.
“We regret to inform you that the application, bereft
of the original petition or compaint upon which this Without a notice of lis pendens, a third party who acquires the
office will base its action, is DENIED.” property after relying only on the certificate of title is a
purchaser in good faith. Against such third party, the
Petitioners elevated the denial in consulta to the LRA. supposed rights of a litigant cannot prevail, because the former

is not bound by... the property owner's undertakings not Code provisions on notices cannot replace the rules on
annotated in the transfer certificate of title. summons under the Rules of Court. Rule 14, Section 11 of the
Rules of Court provides an-exclusive enumeration of the
Notice of lis pendens may involve actions that deal not only persons authorized to receive summons for juridical entities.
with title or possession of a property, but also with the use or These persons are the juridical entity's president, managing
occupation of a property.[25] The litigation must directly partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or
involve a specific property which is necessarily... affected by in-house counsel.”
the judgment. FACTS
Respondent cooperative entered into a joint venture
Notice of lis pendens is proper in the following cases, viz:... a) agreement with farmer-beneficiaries. While negotiations were
An action to recover possession of real estate;... b) An action ongoing, petitioner Cathay Metal entered into Irrevocable
to quiet title thereto;... c) An action to remove clouds Exclusive Right to Buy (IERB) contracts with the same farmer-
thereon;... d) An action for partition; and... e) Any other beneficiaries. Under the IERB, the farmer-beneficiaries
proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting the title to committed themselves to sell to petitioner their agricultural
the land or the use or occupation thereof or the buildings properties upon conversion to industrial or commercial
thereon... doctrine of lis pendens has no application in the properties or upon expiration of the period of prohibition from
following cases:... a) Preliminary attachments;... b) transferring title to the properties. Meanwhile, respondent
Proceedings for the probate of wills;... c) Levies on execution;... caused the annotation of its adverse claim on the farmer-
d) Proceedings for administration of estate of deceased beneficiaries certificates of title.
persons; and... e) Proceedings in which the only object is the Petitioner was sent two letters informing it of respondent’s
recovery of a money judgment... notice of lis pendens should claim to the properties, but the former did not respond.
contain a statement of the institution of an action or However, petitioner filed a consolidated petition for
proceeding, the court where the same is pending, and the date cancellation of adverse claims on its transfer certificates of
of its institution. A notice of lis pendens should also... contain title, serving a copy of the petition by registered mail to
a reference to the number of the certificate of title of the land, respondent’s alleged official address. However, respondent
an adequate description of the land affected and its registered could not be found at that address, and the cooperative was
owner. non-existent as expressed in the certification of the postman.
Personal service also failed.
Both the LRA and the appellate court denied the application
Upon petitioner’s motion, the RTC issued an order declaring
for a notice of lis pendens because petitioners are mere
petitioner’s substituted service, apparently by registered mail,
movants, and not original parties, in LRC No.N-18887. As
to have been effected, ordering respondent to file their
petitioners are not parties to an action as contemplated in
opposition within 15 days. Petitioner was later allowed to
Section 76 of PD 1529, they failed to present the requisite
present its evidence ex parte.
pleading to the Register of Deeds of Marikina City. We hold
After learning about the pending case, respondent, through
that the Register of Deeds correctly denied the application for
dela Peña, filed a manifestation and motion, alleging that
a notice of... lis pendens.
respondent never received a copy of the summons and the
Petitioners committed a fatal procedural error when they filed petition. It moved for the service of the summons and for a
a motion in LRC No. N-18887 on 16 July 1997. The remedy of copy of the petition to be sent to its actual address in Laguna.
petitioners is an action for reconveyance against Sandoval, The RTC granted respondent’s manifestation and motion.
Ozaeta and their spouses. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order,
arguing that the case has been submitted for decision after all
Reconveyance is always available as... long as the property has of petitioner’s evidence had been admitted.
not passed to an innocent third person for value. A notice of The RTC granted petitioner’s MR. It also granted petitioner’s
lis pendens may thus be annotated on the certificate of title petition for cancellation of annotations. However, the decision
immediately upon the institution of the action in court. The was subsequently rescinded on the ground that it was
notice of lis pendens will... avoid transfer to an innocent third rendered prematurely. Eventually, the RTC still decided to
person for value and preserve the claim of the real owner. grant petitioner’s petition for cancellation on the ground that
RULE 14: SUMMONS respondent was already inoperative at the time when its
CATHAY METAL CORP., Petitioner, vs. LAGUNA WEST- adverse claims were annotated.
MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, Respondent, G.R. No. On appeal, the CA ruled in favor of respondent, ordering the
172204, JULY 10, 2014 remanding of the case.
Petitioner argued that respondent was sufficiently served with
Petition for Review under Rule 45 summons and a copy of its petition for cancellation of the
DOCTRINE annotations because it allegedly sent these documents to
“The Rules of Court governs court procedures, including the respondent’s official address as registered with the
rules on service of notices and summons. The Cooperative Cooperative Development Authority, pursuant to the

Cooperative Code. It further averred that the Rules of In the interest of judicial economy and efficiency, and given
Procedure cannot trump the Cooperative Code, the latter that the records are already sufficient to make a determination
being a substantive law. on the validity of respondent’s adverse claim, the Court still
ISSUE ruled against respondents. A claim based on a future right does
Whether or not respondent was properly served with not ripen into an adverse claim. A right still subject to
summons or notices of the hearing on the petition for negotiations cannot be enforced against a title holder or
cancellation of annotations of adverse claims on the against one that has a legitimate title to the property based on
properties. (NO) possession, ownership, lien or any valid deed of transfer.
RULING Respondent’s rights were not based on any of those. Its claim
Respondent was not validly served with summons was based on a deal with the farmer-beneficiaries which did
The Cooperative Code does not trump the Rules of Procedure. not materialize.
Pursuant to Article VIII, Sec. 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution, the RAPID REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORP. V. VILLA
Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules of G.R. No. 184197, February 11, 2010
procedure. This means that on matters relating to procedures
in court, it shall be the Rules of Procedure that will govern. FACTS: This is a case wherein Rapid Realty filed a complaint for
Service of notices and summons on interested parties in a civil, declaration of nullity of subdivision plans against Spouses Villa,
criminal or special proceeding is court procedure. Hence, the that after one failed attempt a personal service of summons
Rules of Procedure govern. Gregorio Zapanta. The court process server resorted to
Sec. 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that summons substituted service by serving summons upon respondent’s
may only be served upon a juridical entity only through its house help who did not acknowledge receipt thereof and
officers (president, managing partner, general manager, refused to divulge their names. The defendant spouses are not
corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel). This around. They served the summons and the copy of the
enumeration is exclusive, thus service made other than to complaint with its lady house help on September 24, 2009.
those aforementioned is invalid. Even substantial compliance Respondent failed to file their Answer despite substituted
is not sufficient service of summons. If summons may not be service prompted Rapid Realty a Motion to Declare Spouses
served upon these persons personally at their residences or Villa in default. Eight months later, respondent filed a Motion
offices, summons may be served upon any of the officers to Lift Order of Default. They claimed that on January 27, 2006
wherever they may be found. officially received all pertinent papers such as complaint and
Furthermore, even if the whereabouts of respondent could not annexes.
be found after diligent efforts, the rules provide for service by The Trial Court granted to set aside Order of Default gave them
publication, as provided under Section 14 of Rule 14. 5 days to file their answers. Unfortunately, respondent did not
This is not a matter of acquiring jurisdiction over the person of do. A motion to declare them in default was filed and was
the respondent since this is an action in rem. This case involves granted.
the issue of fair play and ensuring that parties are accorded
due process. ISSUE: Whether or not there is invalid service of summons?
Petitioner only served summons by registered mail and, HELD: No. The court can still acquire jurisdiction through
allegedly, by personal service, which subsequently failed. No voluntary appearance.
service by publication was subsequently done. Thus, It is by reason of this rule that we have had occasion to declare
respondent was not given an opportunity to present evidence, the filing of motions to admit answer for additional time to file
and petitioner was able to obtain from the RTC an order answer, for reconsideration of a default judgments and to lift
cancelling respondent’s annotations of adverse claims. order of default with motion for reconsideration, is considered
In this case, the Court also held that: voluntary submission to the courts jurisdiction. This, however,
Respondent’s alleged non-operation does not bar if from is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such
authorizing a person to act on its behalf in court proceedings. that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge
Prior to dissolution, a cooperative is entitled to exercise its among others, the courts jurisdiction over his person cannot
powers under the Cooperative Code. Even if respondent failed be considered to have submitted to its authority.
to submit any financial report prior to the annotations of Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that special
adverse claims, this can only be construed as a mere indication appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on
of non-operation, and not a conclusive statement. voluntary appearance. Accordingly, objections to the
The trial court could have resolved the issue of representation; jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant must
premature decisions elicit suspicion be explicitly made set forth in an unequivocal manner. Failure
The trial court issued a decision pending incidents yet to be to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of
resolved. It had every opportunity to resolve the validity of Mr. the court especially in instances where a pleading or motion
dela Peña’s alleged authority to act on behalf of respondent. seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court for
Rights still under negotiations are not adverse claims. resolution.

Respondents did not, in said motion, allege that their filing During the trial of Criminal Case, accused Manuel pleaded
thereof was a special appearance for the purpose only to guilty to the crime charged and was sentenced to six months
question the jurisdiction over their persons. Clearly, they had imprisonment.
acquiesced to the jurisdiction of the Court. In the interim period, a fire gutted the City Hall of Manila and
the records of the case were burned to ashes. Subsequently,
PARAMOUNT INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. plaintiffs (herein private respondents Lara and Paed) filed a
HON. MAXIMO M. JAPZON, Presiding Judge, Br. 36, RTC, petition for reconstitution of the judicial records of the case
Manila; City Sheriff and Deputy Sheriffs Nestor Macabilin which was approved.
& Teodoro Episcope, public respondents, JOSE LARA and The court reiterated its order before the reconstitution of the
ARSENIO PAED, private respondents. G.R. No. L-68037 July judicial records declaring defendants Natividad, Manuel and
29, 1992 Paramount in default for their continued failure to appear
during the trial of the case and allowed the plaintiffs (Lara and
DOCTRINE: Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in Paed) to make a formal offer of exhibits and considered the
civil cases is acquired either by his voluntary appearance in case submitted for decision.
court and his submission to its authority or by service of After almost five years, the RTC of Manila, rendered a decision
summons. The service of summons is intended to give notice in favor of the plaintiffs.
to the defendant or respondent that an action has been A copy of the said decision was served on the petitioner's
commenced against it. The defendant or respondent is thus counsel, Atty. Segundo Gloria. Since no appeal from the
put on guard as to the demands of the plaintiff or the judgment was filed within the reglementary period, the same
petitioner. became final and executory. So, on March 2, 1984, Lara and
FACTS: Jose Lara contracted the services of a passenger Paed, now private respondents, filed an ex-parte motion for
jeepney owned and operated by Garcia to transport his family, execution of the said judgment and was granted the same on
relatives and friends from Manila to Pangasinan then driven by July 10, 1984.
Macasieb. On the very same date, a Ford truck F-600 driven by It was only on March 3, 1984 that Paramount, now petitioner,
Manuel, sideswept the said passenger jeepney resulting in the filed a motion to set aside the Decision raising the issue that
injury of the 2 passengers of the jeepney, Lara and Paed. the court has not validly acquired jurisdiction over its person.
After the accident, Natividad filed a notice of claim with ISSUE: WON the court validly acquired jurisdiction over
Paramount and the latter lost no time in dispatching and/or petitioner despite the appearance of Atty. Segundo M. Gloria
contracting an independent adjuster handling casualty and who allegedly was not retained or authorized to file an answer
marine claims, the EM Salvatierra Adjustment Office. for it
Thereafter, the adjustment of Natividad's claims were HELD: NO. Petitioner's contentions that it was not properly
transferred to Speedway Adjustment and Appraisal served with summons and that Atty. Segundo Gloria was not
Corporation which investigated the facts surrounding the authorized to appear for and in its behalf are untenable. In the
incident and recommended petitioner to pay Natividad under case at bar, petitioners failed to substantiate its allegation that
its policy, using the "no fault" clause under the Insurance Code it was not properly served with summons. Hence, the
as its basis of liability. disputable presumption that official duty has been regularly
A check for P800.00 was paid to Paed's wife, Priscilla Paed. performed prevails. In the absence of such clear and positive
Another check for P5,000.00 was paid by Paramount to Central proof, the presumption of authority . . . should prevail over the
Luzon Doctor's Hospital covering the expense for medical petitioner's self-serving denial of such authority.
treatment and hospitalization of the victims, Lara and Paed. Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for
Lara and Paed filed a criminal case against Manuel for Reckless administering justice, that is, for hearing and deciding cases. In
Imprudence resulting in Damage to Property before the MTC order for the court to have authority to dispose of the case on
of Gerona, Tarlac. the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter
During the pendency of said criminal case, Lara filed a and the parties.
manifestation reserving the right to file a separate civil action Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases is
against the operators of the 2 vehicles, Natividad and Garcia acquired either by his voluntary appearance in court and his
and also drivers, Manuel and Macasieb. Lara and Paed filed a submission to its authority or by service of summons. The
civil case for damages against them and impleaded Paramount, service of summons is intended to give notice to the defendant
the latter as insurer of the Ford truck. or respondent that an action has been commenced against it.
A certain Atty. Segundo Gloria filed a notice of appearance The defendant or respondent is thus put on guard as to the
informing the court that he was appearing for and in behalf of demands of the plaintiff or the petitioner.
the defendants Natividad, Manuel and Paramount. The records of the case, however, showed that all the
Subsequently, he filed an answer with crossclaim and pleadings, including the answer with crossclaim and
counterclaim. counterclaim filed by Atty. Segundo Gloria stated that he
represented the defendants Natividad, Manuel and
Paramount. In fact, he even filed a notice of appearance

informing the court that he is representing the said summons is cured by the voluntary appearance of the
defendants. defendant.
This is not the first time petitioner raised the issue of warrant In the case at bar, there is no question that summons was
of jurisdiction over its person as well as warrant of authority of timely issued and received by private respondent. In fact, he
a lawyer to appear for and in its behalf. never denied actual receipt of such summons but confined
It strains credulity that a counsel who has no personal interest himself to the argument that the Sheriff should prove that
in the case would fight for and defend a case with persistence personal service was first made before resorting to substituted
and vigor if he has not been authorized or employed by the service,
party concerned. This brings to the fore the question of procedural due process.
ELISEO BOTICANO, petitioner, vs. MANUEL CHU, JR., In Montalban v. Maximo (22 SCRA 1077 [1968]) the Court ruled
respondent. that "The constitutional requirement of due process exacts
that the service be such as may be reasonably expected to give
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 the notice desired. Once the service provided by the rules
DOCTRINE: The defect of summons is cured by the voluntary reasonably accomplishes that end, the requirement of justice
appearance of the defendant. is answered; the traditional notions of fair play are satisfied;
FACTS: due process is served."
Petitioner is the registered owner of Bedford truck which he Indeed, such construction is but fair, and in accord with
was using in hauling logs for a certain fee. On the alleged date substantial justice. The burden on a plaintiff is not to be
of the incident, while loaded with logs, it was properly parked enlarged with a restrictive construction desired by the
by its driver Maximo Dalangin at the shoulder of the national defendant.
highway in Barrio Labi, Bongabon, Nueva Ecija when it was hit Appeal to the SC on the Dismissal of CA on the Petition for
and bumped at the rear portion by a Bedford truck owned by Certiorari and Mandamus
respondent. Manuel Chu, Jr. acknowledged ownership thereof DOCTRINE:
and agreed with petitioner to shoulder the expenses of the If he (defendant) had not yet appeared, a new summons must
repair of the damaged truck of the latter. be served upon him as regards the amended complaint,
When Chu failed to comply with his obligations, petitioner filed otherwise the court would have no power to try the new
a complaint for damages against Chu and Sigua, the driver of causes of action alleged therein, unless he had lodged an
the truch. answer thereto. Simply sending a copy of the amended
Summons was issued but was returned unserved for Sigua complaint to the defendant by registered mail is not equivalent
because he was no longer employed under Chu, while the to service of summons in such case. However, if the defendant
summons for Chu was received by his wife. had already appeared in response to the first summons, so that
Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the case against Sigua he was already in court when the amended complaint was
and order default against Chu for failure to file the responsive filed, then ordinary service of that pleading upon him,
pleadings within the reglementary period. personally or by mail, would be sufficient, and no new
RTC granted the motion and subsequently ruled in favor of summons need be served upon him
petitioner. Chu filed with the trial court a "Notice of Appeal" FACTS:
and an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to file Record on Destinations Travel Phil., Inc. (hereafter, DESTINATIONS) filed
Appeal which was granted by the trial court on the same date. a complaint against Pan-Asiatic Travel Corp. (hereafter, PAN-
CA remanded the case to RTC for proper proceedings and the ASIATIC) for the refund of the price of alleged unutilized
proper serving of summons to the respondent be made. airplane tickets issued by the latter for passenger recruited by
Issue: WON RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of the the former
respondent despite the summons was received by his wife DESTINATIONS filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default.
(YES) After receipt of said Motion, PAN-ASIATIC, by way of special
Ruling: It can of course be argued that the failure to question appearance, filed a Motion to Dismiss for the sole purpose of
the lower court's jurisdiction cannot be accounted against Chu objecting to the trial court's jurisdiction over its person on the
for his having been declared in default gave him no chance to ground that it was not properly served with summons.
participate in the court deliberations and therefore no chance AMMENDED COMPLAINT:
to raise the jurisdictional issue, but then, he could have done DESTINATIONS filed on June 25, 1980 an amended complaint
so, in the subsequent pleadings he filed. Besides, even increasing its claim for reimbursement of refunds to
assuming that such failure cannot be taken against him, the P103,866.35. At the hearing of said Motion to Dismiss, PAN-
fact is he had VOLUNTARILY submitted himself to the court's ASIATIC was informed of the filing of the amended complaint;
jurisdiction. hence, it withdrew its Motion to Dismiss.
Under Section 23, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, the BILL OF PARTICULARS
defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be Subsequently, a copy of the amended complaint and summons
equivalent to service. Thus, under this principle, it has been were served on PAN-ASIATIC. PAN-ASIATIC filed several
consistently held by the Supreme Court that the defect of motions for extension of time within which to file its answer.

However, instead of filing an Answer, it filed a Motion for Bill Hence, no new summons on the Second Amended Complaint
of Particulars which was granted by the... trial court. was necessary, ordinary service being... sufficient.
2ND AMENDED C. No question that PAN-ASIATIC was properly served with a copy
DESTINATIONS did not file a Bill of Particulars. Instead, on May of the Second Amended Complaint... it received a copy of the
9, 1981, it served and filed a Motion to Admit Attached Order admitting said Second Amended Complaint. Since it
"Second Amended Complaint" which Second Amended failed to serve and file its Answer within fifteen (15) days from
Complaint detailed the causes of action June 9, 1981, the trial court was correct in declaring the
Second Amended Complaint was admitted by the trial judge in company in default, in holding trial ex parte, and in eventually
an Order rendering judgment by default.
Order was served on petitioner G.R. No. 149380 July 3, 2002
However, no new summons was served on petitioner FEDERICO S. SANDOVAL II, Petitioner, vs.
DEFAULT HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
DESTINATIONS filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in (HRET) and AURORA ROSARIO A. ORETA, Respondents.
Default which was granted. Then, trial was held ex parte. On
January 4, 1982 the trial court rendered judgment by default Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
against PAN-ASIATIC, which received a copy of the decision... DOCTRINE: To be a "competent" person to receive the
petitioner filed its Omnibus Motion to Lift Order of Default and summons means that he should be "duly qualified" and
to Vacate Judgment by Default, alleging that the trial court's "having sufficient capacity, ability or authority." The rule
decision was rendered without jurisdiction because petitioner presupposes that a relation of confidence exists between the
was never served with summons on the Second Amended person with whom the copy of the process is left and the
Complaint, and... that it was deprived of its day in court on defendant and, therefore, assumes that such person will
account of fraud, accident, mistake and/or excusable deliver the process to defendant or in some way give him
negligence. The motion was denied by the trial judge notice thereof.
DESTINATIONS filed a Motion for Execution which the trial FACTS: Sandoval and respondent Oreta were candidates for
court granted the lone congressional district of Malabon-Navotas. Sandoval
PAN ASIATIC filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus was proclaimed duly elected representative. Oreta filed with
before the Court of Appeals HRET an election protest against Sandoval.
CA appellate tribunal dismissed the petition. Hence, this HRET: issued the corresponding summons for service upon
present action Sandoval. HRET Process Server Pacifico Lim served the
ISSUE: summons by substituted service upon a certain Gene Maga
Was there need to serve new summons on PAN-ASIATIC? who signed the process server’s copy of the summons and
RULING: indicated thereon his position as "maintenance".
NO. HRET issued Resolution No. 01-081 which took note of
If the defendant had appeared in the action, service of an Sandoval’s failure to file an answer to the election protest
amended complaint (which introduces a new cause of action) within 10 days from date of service of the summons and
in the same manner as any pleading or motion is sufficient, entered in his behalf a general denial of the allegations set
even if no new summons is served. forth in the protest.
If he (defendant) had not yet appeared, a new summons must Sandoval: argued that the substituted service of summons
be served upon him as regards the amended complaint, upon him was improperly effected upon a maintenance man
otherwise the court would have no power to try the new Gene Maga who was "neither a regular employee nor
causes of action alleged therein, unless he had lodged an responsible officer at his (Sandoval’s) office.
answer thereto. Simply sending a copy of... the amended ISSUE: Was substituted service of summons validly effected on
complaint to the defendant by registered mail is not equivalent petitioner Sandoval? (NO)
to service of summons in such case. However, if the defendant There is nothing in the process server's affidavit of service
had already appeared in response to the first summons, so that indicating the impossibility of personal service of summons
he was already in court when the amended complaint was upon Sandoval within a reasonable time.
filed, then ordinary... service of that pleading upon him, We can take judicial notice of the fact that Sandoval is a very
personally or by mail, would be sufficient, and no new visible and active member of Congress such that to effect
summons need be served upon him... summons on the first personal service upon him, all it would have taken the process
amended complaint was properly served on PAN-ASIATIC. server was a few hours more of a little extra work. Regrettably,
After which, the company filed several motions for extension the affidavit of service, indeed the entire record of this case,
of time within which to file responsive pleading, and then a does not specify the efforts exerted to serve the summons
Motion for Bill of Particulars, all of which motions were... personally upon Sandoval. Upon this ground alone, the
granted by the trial court. With the filing of these motions, assailed service of summons should already fail miserably.
PAN-ASIATIC had effectively appeared in the case and We do not find in the record, much less in the affidavit of
voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court. service executed by the process server, that the summons and

a copy of the election protest were served on a competent In the instant case, what was filed before the trial court was an
person in charge of Sandoval’s office. It must be emphasized action for specific performance directed against respondents.
that Gene Maga was merely a "maintenance" man who offered While the suit incidentally involved a piece of land, the
his services not only to Sandoval but to anyone who was so ownership or possession thereof was not put in issue, since
minded to hire his assistance. they did not assert any interest or right over it. Moreover, this
Maga was not an employee of Sandoval but an independent Court has consistently declared that an action for specific
contractor for odd maintenance jobs. It follows from this that performance is an action in personam.
Maga, not being an employee thereof, would be an Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the
incompetent person to receive the summons in petitioner's Philippines, such service may be done by personal or
behalf. substituted service, following the procedures laid out in
Granting that Gene Maga was an employee of Sandoval, still it Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
cannot be said that he was qualified to receive the summons. read:
To be a "competent" person to receive the summons means "Section 6. Service in person on defendant. — Whenever
that he should be "duly qualified" and "having sufficient practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a copy
capacity, ability or authority." thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive
Not only was Gene Maga an incompetent person to receive the and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
summons, he was also, more plainly, not in charge of "Section 7. Substituted service. — If, for justifiable causes, the
petitioner’s office. To be "in charge" means to have "care and defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as
custody of, under control of, or entrusted to the management provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a)
or direction of." Maga had obviously no control and by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence
management of the district office as noticeably shown by his with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
occupation as "maintenance" man. therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or
regular place of business with some competent person in
Spouses PATRICK JOSE and RAFAELA JOSE, Petitioners, v. charge thereof."
Spouses HELEN BOYON and ROMEO BOYON, Respondents. REQUISITES OF SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF SUMMONS
G.R. No. 147369. October 23, 2003. As can be gleaned from the above-quoted Sections, personal
service of summons is preferred to substituted service. Only if
FACTS: 45 the former cannot be made promptly can the process server
Petitioners lodged a complaint for specific performance resort to the latter. Moreover, the proof of service of summons
against respondents before the RTC. A summons was issued to must (a) indicate the impossibility of service of summons
respondent]. As per return of the summons, substituted within a reasonably time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to
service was resorted to by the process server allegedly because locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was
efforts to serve the summons personally to the [respondents] served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion who is
failed. Petitioners filed before the trial court an Ex-parte residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or
Motion for Leave of Court to Effect Summons by Publication regular place of business, of the defendant. It is likewise
which was granted. Thereafter, the trial court declared required that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances
respondent in default and moved for the submission of be stated in the proof of service or in the officer’s return. The
evidence ex-parte. The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. failure to comply faithfully, strictly and fully with all the
On appeal b respondent, the CA held that there as an invalid foregoing requirements of substituted service renders the
service of summons and that the service of publication was service of summons ineffective.
also invalid as the action was in personam. SERVICE BY PUBLICATION CAN ONLY BE DONE IF THE ACTION
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid service of summons IS IN REM OR QUASI IN REM
HELD: In the instant case, it appears that the process server It must be noted that extraterritorial service of summons or
hastily and capriciously resorted to substituted service of summons by publication applies only when the action is in rem
summons without actually exerting any genuine effort to or quasi in rem. The first is an action against the thing itself
locate respondents. A review of the records reveals that the instead of against the defendant’s person; in the latter, an
only effort he exerted was to go to No. 32 Ariza Drive, Camella individual is named as defendant, and the purpose is to subject
Homes, Alabang on July 22, 1998, to try to serve the summons that individual’s interest in a piece of property to the obligation
personally on respondents. While the Return of Summons or loan burdening it.
states that efforts to do so were ineffectual and unavailing
because Helen Boyon was in the United States and Romeo FILOMENA DOMAGAS, V. VIVIAN LAYNO JENSEN. G.R. No.
Boyon was in Bicol, it did not mention exactly what efforts — 158407
if any — were undertaken to find respondents. Furthermore,
it did not specify where or from whom the process server FACTS:
obtained the information on their whereabouts.

Filomena Domagas (petitioner) filed a complaint for forcible the action, restore physical possession to the plaintiff, and pay
entry against respondent Vivian Jensen before the MTC of actual damages by way of reasonable compensation.
Pangasinan. The action in personam, the jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide
The petitioner alleged in her complaint that she was the the case. Jurisdiction over the person of a resident defendant
registered owner of a parcel of land in Barangay Buenlag, who does not voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by
Calasiao, Pangasinan. On January 9, 1999 the respondent, by personal service of summons as provided under Section 7, Rule
means of force, strategy and stealth, gained entry into the 14 of the Rules of Court.If he cannot be personally served with
petitioner’s property by excavating a portion thereof and summons within a reasonable time, substituted service may be
thereafter constructing a fence, depriving the petitioner a made in accordance with Section 8 of said Rule.
portion of her property. Strict compliance with the mode of service is required in order
The summons and the complaint were not served on the that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
respondent because the latter was out of the country. This was defendant.
relayed to the Sheriff by the respondent’s brother, Oscar In Keister v. Narcereo, the Court held that the term ‘dwelling
Layno. The Sheriff left the summons and the complaint with house’ or ‘residence’ refer to the time of service.
Layno. In the Sheriff’s return,
The MTC rendered judgment ordering the respondent and all There is no showing that the house where the Sheriff found
persons occupying the property for and in the latter’s behalf to Oscar Layno was the residence of the respondent, or of Oscar
vacate the disputed area and to pay monthly rentals therefore, Layno.
including actual damages, attorney’s fees, and exemplary The Sheriff failed to ascertain the residence of the respondent.
damages. The house where the Sheriff found Oscar Layno was occupied
Later, the respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner by a lessor, not by Oscar Layno or the respondent.
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City for the Oscar Layno was only visiting the house in order to collect
annulment of the decision of the MTC, on the ground that the rental payments.
MTC did not acquire jurisdiction over her person due to the The service of the summons on a person at a place where he
Sheriff’s failure to serve the complaint and summons. was a visitor is not considered to have been left at the
The respondent claimed that when the summons and residence or place or abode, where he has another place at
complaint were served, she was a resident of Oslo, Norway, which he ordinarily stays and to which he intends to return.
was out of the country, and that Oscar Layno was not a The respondent was not validly served with summons and the
resident or occupant of the address from where he received complaint by substituted service. The MTC failed to acquire
the complaint and summons. jurisdiction over the person of the respondent.
The RTC rendered a judgment in favor of the respondent,
declaring the MTC decision null and void. BIACO V. PHIL. COUNTRYSIDE RURAL BANK, G.R. No.
In her appeal to the Court of Appeals, the court held that the 161417, February 8, 2007
action was one for ejectment, and is an action quasi in rem.
The appellate court ruled that the summons and complaint Petition for review
should have been served via extraterritorial service under
Section 15, in relation to Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of FACTS: Sometime from 1996 to 1998, Ernesto Biaco, husband
Court, which requires leave of court. Absence of a leave of of Teresa Biaco, acquired several loans from Philippine
court, and none of the modes of service prescribed by the Countryside Rural Bank (PCRB). To secure the loans, he
Rules were followed, there was no valid service of summons mortgaged certain property in favor of the bank. He was able
and complaint upon the respondent. to pay loans from 1996 to 1997 but he defaulted in loans
The petitioner argued that the complaint was for forcible obtained in 1998 which amounted to more than a million
entry, and is an action in personam. The substituted service of pesos. Eventually, PCRB filed a complaint for foreclosure
summons and complaint on the respondent, in accordance against the spouses Biaco. Summons were issued by the trial
with Section 7, Rule 14, is valid. judge. The Sherriff served the summons to Ernesto at the
ISSUE: latter's office. No summons was served to Teresa.
Whether or not there was valid service of summons. Ernesto did not file a responsive pleading (so did Teresa
HELD: because she was not aware sans the summons being served
The aforementioned issue is anchored in the determination of her). The case was heard ex-parte and the spouses were
the action, whether or not it is an action in rem or personam. ordered to satisfy the debt and failure to do so will authorize
An action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry is a real action the Sheriff to auction the mortgaged the property.
and in personam because the plaintiff seeks to enforce a Eventually, the mortgaged property was auctioned for P150k
personal obligation or liability on the defendant under Article which is not sufficient to cover the P1 M+ debt. Upon motion
539 of the New Civil Code, to vacate the property subject of by PCRB, a notice of levy was issued against the personal
properties of Teresa to satisfy the deficiency.

It was only at this point that Teresa learned of the previous ex summons. The need for speedy justice must prevail over a
parte proceedings. She then sought to have the judgment technicality.
annulled as she now claims that she was deprived of due FACTS:
process when she did not receive summons; that it was only On several occasions, Centrogen obtained loans from FEBTC in
her husband who received the summons; that there was different amounts. As a security for a fraction of the loan
extrinsic fraud because her husband deliberately hid the fact obligation, Ireneo Santiago executed a Real Estate Mortgage
of the foreclosure proceeding. over a parcel of land. When Centrogen incurred default, and
PRCB argued that the foreclosure proceeding is an action quasi FEBTC merged with the BPI, and the latter assumed all the
in rem, hence Teresa's participation is not required so long as rights, privileges and obligations of former, BPI filed an Extra-
the court acquires jurisdiction over the res which is what Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject
happened in the case at bar; that Teresa cannot invoke property. In order to validly effect the foreclosure, a Notice of
extrinsic fraud because such situation cannot occur in her case Sale was issued by the Provincial Sheriff AND On the same day,
because she is a co-defendant of Ernesto. the Spouses Santiago were served with the copy of the Notice
ISSUE: Whether or not the deficiency judgment is a personal of Sale.
judgment which should be deemed void for lack of jurisdiction Upon receipt of the Notice of Sale, the Spouses Santiago and
over her person. Centrogen filed a Complaint seeking the issuance of a TRO and
HELD: Yes. It is admitted that the proceeding is a quasi in rem Preliminary and Final Injunction and in the alternative, for the
proceeding and that the presence of Teresa is not required annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage with BPI. It alleged that
because the trial court was able to acquire jurisdiction over the the initial loan obligation including interest thereon was fully
res (mortgaged property). However, her constitutional right to paid as evidenced by A Union Bank Check.
due process is superior over the procedural matters
mentioned. Her right to due process was violated when she did BPI was summoned to file and serve its Answer. On the same
not receive summons. day, the Sheriff served a copy of the summons to the Branch
Teresa, as a resident defendant, who does not voluntary Manager of BPI Sta. Cruz, Laguna Branch.
appear in court must be personally served with summons as Instead of filing an Answer, BPI filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
provided under Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. Even ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
if the action is quasi in rem, personal service of summons is BPI claimed that the Branch Manager of its Sta. Cruz, Laguna
essential in order to afford her due process. The substituted Branch, was not one of those authorized by Section 11, Rule 14
service made by the sheriff at her husband's office cannot be of the Revised Rules of Court to receive summons on behalf of
deemed proper service absent any explanation that efforts had the corporation. The summons served upon its Branch
been made to personally serve summons upon her but that Manager, therefore, did not bind the corporation.
such efforts failed. Further, the order of the trial court ISSUE: WON the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of
compelling Teresa to pay off the debt using her personal BPI.
property is a judgment in personam which the court cannot do RULING:
because it only acquired jurisdiction over the res and not over Yes. Basic is the rule that a strict compliance with the mode of
the person of Teresa. service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of the court over a
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is corporation. The officer upon whom service is made must be
GRANTED. The Decision dated August 27, 2003 and the one who is named in the statute; otherwise, the service is
Resolution dated December 15, 2003 of the Court of Appeals insufficient. Hence, the service of summons on BPI’s Branch
in CA-G.R. SP No. 67489 are SET ASIDE. The Judgment dated Manager did not bind the corporation for the branch manager
July 11, 2000 and Order dated February 9, 2001 of the Regional is not included in the enumeration of the statute of the
Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 20, are likewise SET persons upon whom service of summons can be validly made
ASIDE. in behalf of the corporation. Such service is therefore void and
ineffectual.
G.R. No. 169116 March 28, 2007 However, upon the issuance and the proper service of new
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Petitioner, vs. SPS. summons validly served on the Corporate Secretary before the
IRENEO M. SANTIAGO and LIWANAG P. SANTIAGO, Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued, whatever defect
CENTROGEN, INC., REPRSENTED BY EDWIN SANTIAGO, attended the service of the original summons, was promptly
Respondent. and accordingly cured.
In the case of The Philippine American Life and General
DOCTRINE: Although it may be true that the service of Insurance Company v. Brevea, we ruled:
summons was made on a person not authorized to receive the A case should not be dismissed simply because an original
same in behalf of the petitioner, nevertheless since it appears summons was wrongfully served. It should be difficult to
that the summons and complaint were in fact received by the conceive, for example, that when a defendant personally
corporation through its said clerk, the Court finds that there appears before a Court complaining that he had not been
was substantial compliance with the rule on service of validly summoned, that the case against him should be

dismissed. An alias summons can be actually served on said Manila, through the president or any of its officers authorized
defendant. to receive summons. On December 10, 1999, the RTC issued
It is not pertinent whether the summons is designated as an an Order denying the petitioner's motion to dismiss and
“original” or an “alias” summons as long as it has adequately directing the issuance of an alias summons to be served at its
served its purpose. What is essential is that the summons main office in Manila.
complies with the requirements under the Rules of Court and The RTC held that the improper service of summons on the
it has been duly served on the defendant together with the petitioner is not a ground for dismissal of the complaint
prevailing complaint. Moreover, the second summons was considering that the case was still in its initial stage. It ruled
technically not an alias summons but more of a new summons that the remedy was to issue an alias summons to be served at
on the amended complaint. the principal office of the petitioner. It also held that the
In the case of G&G Trading Corporation v. Court of Appeals, it jurisprudence cited by the petitioner was inapplicable, as it
was discussed that although it may be true that the service of involved a case already decided by a court which did not have
summons was made on a person not authorized to receive the jurisdiction over the defendant therein due to improper
same in behalf of the petitioner, nevertheless since it appears service of summons.
that the summons and complaint were in fact received by the ISSUE:
corporation through its said clerk, the Court finds that there Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse
was substantial compliance with the rule on service of of discretion when it denied the motion to dismiss on the
summons. The need for speedy justice must prevail over a ground of lack of jurisdiction over its person because the
technicality. service of the summons at its regional office through an
The ultimate test on the validity and sufficiency on service of insurance service officer was improper?
summons is whether the same and the attachments thereto HELD:
where ultimately received by the corporation under such The petition is without merit.
circumstances that no undue prejudice is sustained by it from The trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion when
the procedural lapse and it was afforded full opportunity to it denied the motion to dismiss filed by the petitioner due to
present its responsive pleadings. This is but in accord with the lack of jurisdiction over its person. In denying the motion to
entrenched rule that the ends of substantial justice should not dismiss, the CA correctly relied on the ruling in Lingner & Fisher
be subordinated to technicalities and, for which purpose, each GMBH vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, thus: A case should
case should be examined within the factual milieu peculiar to not be dismissed simply because an original summons was
it. wrongfully served. It should be difficult to conceive, for
example, that when a defendant personally appears before a
THE PHIL. AMERICAN LIFE & GENERAL INSURANCE CO. V. Court complaining that he had not been validly summoned,
BREVA that the case filed against him should be dismissed. An alias
G.R. No. 147937, November 11, 2004 summons can be actually served on said defendant.
In the recent case of Teh vs. Court of Appeals, the petitioner
FACTS: On September 22, 1999, respondent Milagros P. therein also filed a motion to dismiss before filing his answer
Morales filed a Complaint for damages and reimbursement of as defendant in the trial court on the ground of failure to serve
insurance premiums against the petitioner with the Regional the summons on him. In that case, the Court agreed with the
Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch 10, docketed as Civil appellate court's ruling that there was no abuse of discretion
Case No. 27554-99. The complaint specifically stated that the on the part of the trial court when the latter denied the
petitioner could be served with summons and other court petitioner's motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the
processes through its Manager at its branch office located at issuance of an alias summons.
Rizal St., Davao City. Thereafter, summons dated September We note, however, that in this case, the complaint was
29, 1999, together with the complaint, was served upon the amended after the petitioner filed the motion to dismiss. The
petitioner's Davao regional office, and was received by its trial court even acknowledged this when it rendered its order
Insurance Service Officer, Ruthie Babael, on November 19, denying the motion to dismiss and ordered the issuance of an
1999. On December 8, 1999, the petitioner filed a Motion to alias summons. The Rules on Civil Procedure provide that the
Dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction amended complaint supersedes the complaint that it amends.
over its person due to improper service of summons. It Contrary to the petitioner's claim, the summons issued on the
contended that summons was improperly served upon its amended complaint does not become invalid. In fact,
employee in its regional office at Davao City, and that the said summons on the original complaint which has already been
employee was not among those named in Section 11, 6 Rule served continues to have its legal effect. Thus, where the
14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure upon whom service of defendant has already been served summons on the original
summons may be properly made. On December 9, 1999, the complaint, the amended complaint may be served upon him
respondent filed an Amended Complaint, alleging that without need of another summons. Conversely, when no
summons and other court processes could also be served at its summons has yet been validly served on the defendant, new
principal office at the Philamlife Building, U.N. Avenue, Ermita, summons for the amended complaint must be served on him.

G.R. No. 175334 March 26, 2008 motion to dismiss attaching a copy of the said foreign
SPS. DOMINGO M. BELEN and DOMINGA P. BELEN, herein judgment.
represented by their attorney-infact NERY B. AVECILLA, Private respondents filed a motion for the amendment of the
Petitioners, vs. HON. PABLO R. CHAVEZ, Presiding Judge, complaint averring that private respondents were constrained
RTCBranch 87, Rosario, Batangas and all other persons to withdraw their complaint against petitioners from the
acting under his orders and SPS. SILVESTRE N. PACLEB and California court because of the prohibitive cost of litigation,
PATRICIA A. PACLEB, represented herein by their attorney- which withdrawal was favorably considered by said court.
infact JOSELITO RIOVEROS, Respondents The answer to the amended complaint raised the defenses of
lack of cause of action, res judicata and lack of jurisdiction over
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 the subject matter and over the persons of the defendants
DOCTRINE: In an action in personam wherein the defendant is since the amended complaint had raised an entirely new cause
a non-resident who does not voluntarily submit himself to the of action which should have been ventilated in another
authority of the court, personal service of summons within the complaint.
state is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over her Petitioners and Atty. Alcantara failed to appear at the
person. This method of service is possible if such defendant is rescheduled pre-trial conference. Thus, the RTC declared
physically present in the country. If he is not found therein, the petitioners in default and allowed private respondents to
court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and therefore present evidence ex parte. Atty. Alcantara passed away
cannot validly try and decide the case against him. An without notice to the RTC.
exception was laid down in Gemperle v. Schenker wherein a The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the plaintiffs ordering
non-resident was served with summons through his wife, who the defendants to pay.
was a resident of the Philippines and who was his A copy of the RTC decision intended for Atty. Alcantara was
representative and attorney-in-fact in a prior civil case filed by returned with the notation "Addressee Deceased." A copy of
him; moreover, the second case was a mere offshoot of the the RTC decision was then sent to the purported address of
first case. petitioners in San Gregorio, Alaminos, Laguna and was
FACTS: The instant petition originated from the action for the received by a certain Leopoldo Avecilla.
enforcement of a foreign judgment against herein petitioners, Private respondents filed an ex-parte motion for preliminary
Sps. Belen, filed by private respondent Sps. Pacleb, attachment which was granted and subsequently sought the
represented by their attorney-in-fact, Joselito Rioveros, before execution of the Decision. A writ of execution was issued the
the RTC of Rosario, Batangas. real properties belonging to petitioners were levied upon.
The complaint alleged that private respondents secured a Atty. Carmelo B. Culvera entered his appearance as counsel for
judgment by default in Case No. NC021205 rendered by a petitioners and filed a Motion to Quash Writ of Execution
certain Judge John W. Green of the Superior Court of the State (With Prayer to Defer Further Actions). He then filed a Notice
of California. The summons was served on petitioners’ address of Appeal from the RTC Decision averring that he received a
in San Gregorio, Alaminos, Laguna and received by a certain copy thereof only on 29 December 2003.
Marcelo M. Belen. RTC: DENIED motion. MR DENIED. CA: DISMISSED Rule 65
Atty. Reynaldo Alcantara entered his appearance as counsel petition. MR DENIED.
for petitioners, stating that his legal services were retained at ISSUE: WON the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the persons of
the instance of petitioners’ relatives. Atty. Alcantara petitioners through either the proper service of summons or
subsequently filed an answer, alleging that contrary to private the appearance of the late Atty. Alcantara on behalf of
respondents’ averment, petitioners were actually residents of petitioners
California, USA. HELD: YES. The CA correctly concluded that the appearance of
In view of petitioners’ failure to attend the scheduled pre-trial Atty. Alcantara and his filing of numerous pleadings were
conference, the RTC ordered the ex parte presentation of sufficient to vest jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners.
evidence for private respondents before the branch clerk of Through certain acts, Atty. Alcantara was impliedly authorized
court. Before the scheduled ex parte presentation of evidence, by petitioners to appear on their behalf. For instance, in
Atty. Alcantara filed a motion to dismiss, citing the judgment support of the motion to dismiss the complaint, Atty. Alcantara
of dismissal issued by the Superior Court of the State of attached thereto a duly authenticated copy of the judgment of
California, which allegedly dismissed Case No. NC021205. dismissal and a photocopy of the identification page of
petitioner Domingo Belen’s U.S. passport. These documents
The RTC held in abeyance the ex parte presentation of could have been supplied only by petitioners, indicating that
evidence of private respondents and the resolution of Atty. they have consented to the appearance of Atty. Alcantara on
Alcantara’s motion pending the submission of a copy of the their behalf. In sum, petitioners voluntarily submitted
judgment of dismissal. For failure to present a copy of the themselves through Atty. Alcantara to the jurisdiction of the
alleged judgment of dismissal, the RTC denied the motion to RTC.
dismiss. Atty. Alcantara sought the reinstatement of the In Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals, the Court underscored
the necessity of determining first whether the action is in

personam, in rem or quasi in rem because the rules on service Applying the foregoing rules on the service of summons to the
of summons under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court of the instant case, in an action in personam, jurisdiction over the
Philippines apply according to the nature of the action. The person of the defendant who does not voluntarily submit
Court elaborated, thus: himself to the authority of the court is necessary for the court
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the to validly try and decide the case through personal service or,
defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide if this is not possible and he cannot be personally served,
the case. Jurisdiction over the person of a resident defendant substituted service as provided in Rule 14, Sections 6-7.
who does not voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by If defendant cannot be served with summons because he is
personal service of summons as provided under Section 7, Rule temporarily abroad, but otherwise he is a Philippine resident,
14 of the Rules of Court. If he cannot be personally served with service of summons may, by leave of court, be effected out of
summons within a reasonable time, substituted service may be the Philippines under Rule 14, Section 15. In all of these cases,
made in accordance with Section 8 of said Rule. If he is it should be noted, defendant must be a resident of the
temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of Philippines, otherwise an action in personam cannot be
service may be resorted to: (1) substituted service set forth in brought because jurisdiction over his person is essential to
Section 8; (2) personal service outside the country, with leave make a binding decision.
of court; (3) service by publication, also with leave of court; or Records of the case reveal that herein petitioners have been
(4) any other manner the court may deem sufficient. permanent residents of California, U.S.A. since the filing of the
However, in an action in personam wherein the defendant is a action up to the present. From the time Atty. Alcantara filed an
non-resident who does not voluntarily submit himself to the answer purportedly at the instance of petitioners’ relatives, it
authority of the court, personal service of summons within the has been consistently maintained that petitioners were not
state is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over her physically present in the Philippines. In the answer, Atty.
person. This method of service is possible if such defendant is Alcantara had already averred that petitioners were residents
physically present in the country. If he is not found therein, the of California, U.S.A. and that he was appearing only upon the
court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and therefore instance of petitioners’ relatives. Private respondents’
cannot validly try and decide the case against him. An attorney-in-fact, Joselito Rioveros, testified during the ex parte
exception was laid down in Gemperle v. Schenker wherein a presentation of evidence that he knew petitioners to be
non-resident was served with summons through his wife, who former residents of Alaminos, Laguna but are now living in
was a resident of the Philippines and who was his California, U.S.A. That being the case, the service of summons
representative and attorney-in-fact in a prior civil case filed by on petitioners’ purported address in San Gregorio, Alaminos,
him; moreover, the second case was a mere offshoot of the Laguna was defective and did not serve to vest in court
first case. jurisdiction over their persons.
In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the G.R. No. 170943 September 23, 2008
person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer PEDRO T. SANTOS, JR., Petitioner vs. PNOC Exploration
jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires Corp., Respondent
jurisdiction over the res. Nonetheless, summons must be
served upon the defendant not for the purpose of vesting the Petition for Review
court with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process DOCTRINE:
requirements. Thus, where the defendant is a non-resident SEC. 14 Rule 14. Service upon defendant whose identity or
who is not found in the Philippines and (1) the action affects whereabouts are unknown. – In any action where the
the personal status of the plaintiff; (2) the action relates to, or defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or
the subject matter of which is property in the Philippines in whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be
which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest; (3) the ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court,
action seeks the exclusion of the defendant from any interest be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of general
in the property located in the Philippines; or (4) the property circulation and in such places and for such times as the court
of the defendant has been attached in the Philippines— may order.
service of summons may be effected by (a) personal service "In any action where the defendant is designated as an
out of the country, with leave of court; (b) publication, also unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are
with leave of court; or (c) any other manner the court may unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry." Thus,
deem sufficient. it now applies to any action, whether in personam, in rem or
The action filed against petitioners, prior to the amendment of quasi in rem.
the complaint, is for the enforcement of a foreign judgment in Regarding the matter of the affidavit of service, the relevant
a complaint for breach of contract whereby petitioners were portion of Section 19, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court simply
ordered to pay private respondents the monetary award. It is speaks of the following:
in the nature of an action in personam because private … an affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the summons
respondents are suing to enforce their personal rights under and order for publication in the post office, postage prepaid,
said judgment.

directed to the defendant by registered mail to his last known granted said motion and proceeded with the ex parte
address. presentation and formal offer of its evidence.
Service of summons by publication is proved by the affidavit of Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to
the printer, his foreman or principal clerk, or of the editor, Admit Attached Answer, alleging that the affidavit of service
business or advertising manager of the newspaper which submitted by respondent failed to comply with Section 19,
published the summons. The service of summons by Rule 14 of the Rules of Court as it was not executed by the clerk
publication is complemented by service of summons by of court.
registered mail to the defendant’s last known address. This Trial court denied the said motion and held that the rules did
complementary service is evidenced by an affidavit "showing not require such execution with the clerk of court. It also
the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for publication denied the motion to admit petitioner’s answer because the
in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to the defendant same was filed way beyond the reglementary period.
by registered mail to his last known address." Petitioner appeals to the CA via a petition for certiorari
The rules, however, do not require that the affidavit of contending that the court committed grave abuse of discretion
complementary service be executed by the clerk of court. since it has no jurisdiction due to improper service of
While the trial court ordinarily does the mailing of copies of its summons, failure to furnish him with copies of its orders and
orders and processes, the duty to make the complementary processes and upholding technicality over equity and justice.
service by registered mail is imposed on the party who resorts ISSUE:
to service by publication. Whether or not there was a failure on the part of the trial court
Moreover, even assuming that the service of summons was to furnish Petitioner with copies of orders and processes
defective, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person issued in the course of the proceedings?
of petitioner by his own voluntary appearance in the action RULING:
against him. In this connection, Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules NO.
of Court states: Santos failed to file an answer in time, which is why he had to
SEC. 20. Voluntary appearance. – The defendant’s voluntary file an Omnibus Motion to Admit Attached Answer. The
appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of disputed order of September 11, 2003 was a finding that the
summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other Santos was in default for failure to file an answer or pleading
grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the within the period fixed. It is illogical to notify him of the order
defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance. simply on account of the reality that he was no longer residing
(emphasis supplied) and/or found on his last known address and his whereabouts
Petitioner voluntarily appeared in the action when he filed the unknown thus the publication of summons. Santos could not
"Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached reasonably demand that copies of orders and processes be
Answer."14 This was equivalent to service of summons and furnished him. His residence or whereabouts is not known and
vested the trial court with jurisdiction over the person of he cannot be located. In the case at bar, there is obviously no
petitioner. way notice can be sent to him and the notice requirement
FACTS: cannot apply to him. The law does not require that the
December 23, 2002, PNOC Exploration Corporation, impossible be done. Nemo tenetur ad impossible. The law
respondent, filed a complaint for a sum of money against obliges no one to perform an impossibility. Laws and rules
petitioner Pedro Santos Jr. in the RTC of Pasig. The amount must be interpreted in a way that they are in accordance with
sought to be collected was the petitioner’s unpaid balance of logic, common sense, reason and practicability. Be that as it
the car loan advanced to him by respondent when he was still may, a copy of the September 11, 2003 order was still mailed
a member of its board of directors. to him at his last known address but it was unclaimed.
Personal service of summons were made to petitioner but AURORA N. DE PEDRO, V. ROMASAN DEVELOPMENT
failed because the latter cannot be located in his last known CORPORATION
address despite earnest efforts to do so. Subsequently, on G.R. No. 194751; November 26, 2014
respondent’s motion, the trial court allowed service of
summons by publication. Respondent caused the publication DOCTRINE:
of the summons in Remate, a newspaper of general circulation Personal service is the preferred mode of service of summons.
in the Philippines. Thereafter, respondent submitted the In order to avail other modes of service of summons, there
affidavit of publication and the affidavit of service of must be showing that the summons cannot be served despite
respondent’s employee to the effect that he sent a copy of the diligent and reasonable efforts on the sheriff’s part. Wanting
summons by registered mail to petitioner’s last known of these details, substituted service and service by publication
address. is irregular. Failure to serve summons will mean that the court
Petitioner still failed to answer within the prescribed period failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
despite the publication of summons. Hence, respondent filed However, the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration
a motion for the reception of its evidence ex parte. Trial court is tantamount to voluntary appearance.
FACTS:

Romasan Development Corporation alleged that it was the Service of summons through other modes will not be effective
owner and possessor of a parcel of land in Antipolo City. The without showing serious attempts to serve summons through
respondent alleged that De Pedro, the petitioner, put up personal service.
fences on a portion of its Antipolo property. In this case, summons was served by publication.
Service of summons by publication in a newspaper of general
It was discovered that the Department of Environment and circulation is allowed when the defendant or respondent is
Natural Resources issued free patents covering portions of the designated as an unknown owner or if his or her whereabouts
respondent’s property - the petitioner included. are "unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry."
Respondent further alleged in its separate complaints that the It may only be effected after unsuccessful attempts to serve
government could not legally issue the free patents because at the summons personally, and after diligent inquiry as to the
the time of their issuance, the land was already released for defendant’s or respondent’s whereabouts.
disposition to private individuals. The Sheriff’s Return must show that serious efforts or attempts
Attempts to personally serve summons on De Pedro failed. The were exerted to personally serve the summons and that said
Officer’s Return stated that the summons was ‘Unserved for efforts failed.
the reason that according to the messenger of the Post Office A sheriff’s return enjoys the presumption of regularity in its
of Pasic, there is no person in the given address’. issuance if it contains (1) the details of the circumstances
Upon motion of the respondent, the Regional Trial Court surrounding the sheriff’s attempt to serve the summons
ordered the summons and the complaint be published in personally upon the defendant or respondents; and (2) the
People’s Balita on three issues. Later , the respondent moved particulars showing the impossibility of serving the summons
to declare all defendants in default, including De Pedro. The within the reasonable time.
Regional Trial Court granted the motion, and allowed the Failure to state the facts and circumstances that rendered
respondent to present evidence ex parte. service of summons impossible renders service of summons
The Regional Trial Court issued an order declaring as nullity the and the return ineffective.
titles and free patents issued to all defendants in respondent’s The return in this case showed no detail of the efforts to serve
complaint, including the free patent issued to De Pedro. the summons personally upon the petition. According to the
De Pedro, through counsel filed before the Regional Trial Court return, the summons was unserved because the post office
a motion for new trial. Accordingly, the Regional Trial Court did messenger stated that there was no “Aurora N. De Pedro'' in
not acquire jurisdiction over her person because of improper the service address. The return did not show that the sheriff
and defective service of summons. attempted to locate the petitioner’s whereabouts.
The Regional Trial Court ruled that summons were validly The sheriff’s return in this case was defective. No substituted
served upon De Pedro through publication in accordance with service or service by publication will be allowed based on such
the Rules of Court. Moreover, the decision had become final defective return.
and executory as the motion for new trial was filed beyond the The case would have been dismissible had the petitioner
15-day period within which the motion may be filed. learned about the case while trial was pending. At that time, a
De Pedro filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of motion to dismiss would have been proper. After the trial, the
Appeals. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit, and the case would have been the proper subject of an action for
Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of De Pedro’s motion for annulment of judgment.
a new trial.
De Pedro filed a petition for annulment of the judgment of the However, when the petitioner filed a motion for new trial, she
Trial Court before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals was already aware and informed of the action involving her
denied the petition on the ground that she had already availed title to the property. In her erroneous filing of the motion for
of the remedy of a new trial, and raised the case via petition new trial, and petition for certiorari instead of an action for
for certiorari. annulment of judgement, the petitioner was deemed to have
ISSUE: voluntarily participated in the proceedings against her title.
Whether or not the trial court decision was void for failure to Petitioner’s failure to file an action for annulment of judgment
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. at this time was fatal to her cause.
HELD:
In order to satisfy the requirements of due process, jurisdiction SANSIO PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES ALICIA
over the parties in actions in rem and quasi in rem is required. AND LEODEGARIO MOGOL, JR., Respondents
Due process requires that those with interest to the thing in G.R. No. 172204, JULY 10, 2014
litigation be notified and given an opportunity to defend those Petition for Review under Rule 45
interests. Courts, as guardians of constitutional rights, cannot DOCTRINE
be expected to deny persons their due process rights while at “It is well-established that summons upon a respondent or a
the same time be considered as acting within their jurisdiction. defendant must be served by handing a copy thereof to him in
The preferred mode of service of summons is personal service. person or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him.
Other modes of serving summons may be done when justified. Personal service of summons most effectively ensures that the

notice desired under the constitutional requirement of due complaint to respondent spouses at the courtroom. Here,
process is accomplished. The essence of personal service is the respondent’s counsel was able to read and inform himself of
handing or tendering of a copy of the summons to the the content of the summons and the complaint. Ineluctably, at
defendant himself, wherever he may be found; that is, that point, the act of the counsel already constituted receipt
wherever he may be, provided he is in the Philippines.” on the part of his clients for the same was done with the
FACTS latter’s behest and consent. The operative act of handing a
Petitioner filed a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages copy of the summons to respondent spouses in person had
against respondent spouses Mogol before the MeTC of Manila. already been accomplished. Thus, jurisdiction over the persons
Respondent Spouses were the owners and managers of MR of the respondent spouses was already acquired by the MeTC.
Homes Appliances. They purchased air-conditioning units and The subsequent act of returning the summons is no longer
fans from petitioner and issued post-dated checks as payment. material.
However, said checks were dishonored as the account against Furthermore, the instruction of the counsel for respondent
which the checks were drawn was closed. Despite making spouses not to obtain a copy of the summons and the
partial payments, respondent spouses failed to settle their complaint under the excuse that the same must be served only
obligation. in the address stated therein was a gross mistake. Section 6,
Summons were served at the courtroom of the MeTC of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court does not require that the service
Manila. The respondent spouses were in the said premises, as of summons on the defendant in person must be effected only
they were waiting for the scheduled hearing of the criminal at the latter’s residence as stated in the summons. On the
cases filed by petitioner against respondent Alicia Mogol for contrary, said provision clearly states that whenever
violations of BP 22. Upon being so informed of the summons practicable, summons shall be served by handing a copy
and the complaint, the respondent spouses referred the same thereof to the defendant, or if he refuses to receive and sign
to their counsel, who was also present in the courtroom. After for it, by tendering it to him. Nothing more is required. The
taking hold and reading the content of the summons and the service of the copy of the summons and the complaint inside
copy of the complaint, their counsel pointed out that these the courtroom was also the most practicable act under the
should be served only at the address that was stated in both circumstances, given that the respondent spouses were
documents, and not anywhere else. Thus, the summons and situated far from the court.
the copy of the complaint were given back to the process Respondent spouses’ contention that personal service should
server. As the process server could not convince the be construed with Section 7 (Section 6, as amended), which
respondent spouses to sign for the aforementioned requires substituted service be made at the defendant’s
documents, he proceeded to leave the premises of the residence or at defendant’s office or regular place of business,
courtroom. Thus, the process server issued a Return averring cannot be appreciated. Axiomatically, Sections 6 and 7 of the
that respondent spouses and their counsel refused to receive Rules of Court cannot be construed to apply simultaneously
the summons with no valid reason at all. (Sections 5 and 6 as amended). Said provisions (personal
The MeTC issued an Order declaring respondent spouses in service and substituted service) do not provide for alternative
default. It held that Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court modes of service of summons. Service of summons in the
does not specify where the service is to be effected and may persons of the defendants is generally preferred over
be undertaken wherever the defendant may be found. substituted service, the latter being an extraordinary method
The RTC affirmed the order of the MeTC. On appeal, the CA derogating the regular method of personal service.
reversed the order of the RTC, holding that there was no valid As the Court held in Lazaro v. Rural Bank, service of summons,
service of summons. to be done personally, does not mean that the service is
ISSUE possible only at the defendant’s actual residence. It is enough
Whether or not there was a valid service of summons on that the defendant is handed a copy of the summons in person
respondent spouses. (YES) by anyone authorized by law. This is distinct from substituted
RULING service under Section [6], Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
It is well-established that summons upon a respondent or a Lastly, although the process server erroneously stated that the
defendant must be served by handing a copy thereof to him in summons were “UNSERVED” in the Return, the same was,
person or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. nonetheless, a mere conclusion of law, which does not bind
Personal service of summons most effectively ensures that the the independent judgment of the courts. A simple reading of
notice desired under the constitutional requirement of due the first paragraph of the Return already shows that the
process is accomplished. The essence of personal service is the summons was already validly served on the said respondents.
handing or tendering of a copy of the summons to the
defendant himself, wherever he may be found; that is, SPOUSES BENEDICT AND SANDRA MANUEL, Petitioners, v.
wherever he may be, provided he is in the Philippines. RAMON ONG, Respondent.
In the instant case, there was already a valid service of G.R. No. 205249, October 15, 2014
summons in the persons of respondent spouses Mogol. The
process server presented the summons and the copy of the FACTS: 45

Ong filed with the RTC, a complaint for accion reivindicatoria In this case, the Spouses Manuel have harped on their (self-
against spouses Manuel. Ong filed an "amended complaint." serving) claim of maintaining residence elsewhere but failed to
Summons was issued directed to the Spouses Manuel. even allege that there was anything irregular about the sheriffs
Ong filed with the RTC a motion to declare the Spouses Manuel return or that it was otherwise incomplete.
in default. Per sheriffs return on summons, Sheriff Sales, along
with Ong's counsel and a certain Federico Laureano, Rule 14, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
attempted to personally serve summons on the Spouses provides:
Manuel at their address in Benguet. The Spouses Manuel, SEC. 6. Service in person on defendant. — Whenever
however, requested that service be made at another time practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a copy
considering that her mother was then critically ill. Another thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive
attempt at personal service was made, After Sheriff Sales had and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
personally explained to petitioner Sandra Manuel the content Tendering summons is itself a means of personal service as it
of the summons and the complaint, the latter refused to sign is contained in Rule 14, Section 6. Personal service, as provided
and receive the summons and the complaint. Sheriff Joselito by Rule 14, Section 6, is distinguished from its alternative :—
Sales was thus prompted to merely tender the summons and substituted service — as provided by Rule 14, Section 7:
complaint to petitioner Sandra Manuel and to advise her to file SEC. 7. Substituted service. — If, for justifiable causes, the
their answer within fifteen (15) days. As the Spouses Manuel defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as
failed to file their answer within this period, Ong asked that provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a)
they be declared in default. by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence
The RTC granted the Ong’s motion and moved for the with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
presentation of evidence ex parte. therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or
Spouses Manuel filed a motion to lift the order of default. They regular place of business with some competent person in
alleged that it is the siblings of petitioner Sandra Manuel who charge thereof.
resided in Lower Bacong, Itogon, Benguet, while they resided PERSONAL SERVICE OF SUMMONS
in Ambiong, La Trinidad, Benguet. Thus, summons could not Personal service of summons has nothing to do with the
have been properly served on them in the former address. location where summons is served. A defendant's address is
They further claimed that they only subsequently received via inconsequential. Rule 14, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
registered mail copies of (1) a compliance and manifestation Procedure is clear in what it requires: personally handing the
filed by Ong and (2) the RTC's order scheduling the ex parte summons to the defendant (albeit tender is sufficient should
presentation of evidence. the defendant refuse to receive and sign). What is
The RTC denied the motion to lift order of default. It noted determinative of the validity of personal service is, therefore,
that, first, their motion was not sworn to, and, second, they did the person of the defendant, not the locus of service.
not show that their failure to timely file an answer "was due to SHERIFFS RETURN – PRESUMPTION
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. A sheriffs return, if complete on its face, must be accorded the
On appeal by the spouses Manuel, the CA denied the appeal presumption of regularity and, hence, taken to be an accurate
due to lack of merit. and exhaustive recital of the circumstances relating to the
ISSUE: Whether or not the Spouses Manuel may be granted steps undertaken by a sheriff.
relief from the Regional Trial Court's June 28, 2010 order of
default. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, Petitioner, vs. JULIE
HELD: In this case, the sheriffs return on summons indicated CHANDUMAL, Respondent.
that Sheriff Joselito Sales endeavored to personally hand the
summons and a copy of the complaint to the Spouses Manuel PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45
on two (2) separate occasions. He relented from doing so on DOCTRINE: The fundamental rule is that jurisdiction over a
the first occasion in deference to the medical condition of defendant in a civil case is acquired either through service of
petitioner Sandra Manuel's mother. On the second occasion, summons or through voluntary appearance in court and
he was constrained to tender the summons and copy of the submission to its authority. If a defendant has not been
complaint as petitioner Sandra Manuel refused to accept properly summoned, the court acquires no jurisdiction over its
them. person, and a judgment rendered against it is null and void.
The Spouses Manuel did not deny the occurrence of the events The defect of summons is cured by the voluntary appearance
narrated in the sheriffs return but claimed that no valid service of the defendant.
of summons was made. They claimed that they did not reside FACTS:
in Lower Bacong, Loacan, Itogon, Benguet, where the service PDB instituted an action for judicial confirmation of notarial
of summons, was made. From this, they surmised that the rescission and delivery of possession against respondent for
"Sandra Manuel" who was specifically identified in the sheriffs failure to settle her obligations despite demand. For failure of
return was someone other than petitioner Sandra Manuel. branch sheriff to serve the summons to respondent, her
mother acknowledged receipt thereof. She failed to file her

answer, hence, PDB filed an ex parte motion to declare her in RTC Sheriff Raul Medina: Proceeded to the business address of
default. Abante Tonite to effect the personal service of the summons
In Feb 2001, Chnadumal filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside on the petitioners but they were then out of the office. He
Order of Default and to Admit Attached Answer. She returned in the afternoon but petitioners were still out of the
maintained that she did not receive the summons and/or was office as was informed by Lu-Ann Quijano and Rene Esleta. He
not notified of the same. She further alleged that her failure to decided to resort to substituted service of the summons and in
file an answer within the reglementary period was due to his sheriff's return had explained the reasons.
fraud, mistake or excusable negligence. She likewise denied Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint, alleging
that petitioner made any demand hence she cannot be held in lack of jurisdiction over their persons because of the invalid
default. and ineffectual substituted service of summons in accordance
RTC – denied motion and ordered her in default/ MR was with Section 6 and Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
denied/ Ruled ultimately in favor of PDB They further moved to drop Abante Tonite as a defendant by
CA – Nullified the RTC decision due to invalid and ineffective virtue of its being neither a natural nor a juridical person that
substituted service of summons. could be impleaded as a party in a civil action.
Issue: WON RTC properly acquired jurisdiction over the RTC: denied the motion and directed them to file their answers
respondent (YES) to the complaint within the remaining period. Substituted
Ruling: The fundamental rule is that jurisdiction over a service of summonses was validly applied considering that
defendant in a civil case is acquired either through service of summonses cannot be served within a reasonable time to the
summons or through voluntary appearance in court and persons of all the defendants. Quijano, Secretary of the
submission to its authority. If a defendant has not been President and the wife of the defendant, and Esleta, Editorial
properly summoned, the court acquires no jurisdiction over its Assistant of the defendant, were considered competent
person, and a judgment rendered against it is null and void. persons with sufficient discretion to realize the importance of
Despite that there was no valid substituted service of the legal papers served upon them and to relay it to petitioners
summons, the Court, nevertheless, finds that Chandumal (Sec. 7, Rule 14, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court. Denied petitioners' MR because substituted service of
Given Chandumal’s voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of summons by sheriff considers the nature of the work of the
the trial court, the RTC, Las Piñas City, Branch 255, had all defendants that they are always on field. Regarding the
authority to render its Decision dated May 31, 2004. impleading of Abante Tonite as defendant, the RTC held,
Nonetheless, no valid recsission was made. In this case, it is an Abante Tonite possesses attributes of a juridical person thus
admitted fact that PDB failed to give Chandumal the full the doctrine of corporation by estoppel may appropriately
payment of the cash surrender value. In its complaint. The apply. Petitioners brought a petition for certiorari, prohibition,
allegation that Chandumal made herself unavailable for mandamus in the CA which dismissed it, upholding the trial
payment is not an excuse as the twin requirements for a valid court's finding.
and effective cancellation under the law, i.e., notice of ISSUE: WON summons was duly served to acquire jurisdiction
cancellation or demand for rescission by a notarial act and the over respondents.
full payment of the cash surrender value, is mandatory. HELD:
Consequently, there was no valid rescission of the contract to The SC approved the decision of RTC of Manila City and the CA
sell by notarial act undertaken by PDB and the RTC should not that substituted service of summons complied with the rules.
have given judicial confirmation over the same. We are strict in insisting on personal service on the defendant
ALLEN A. MACASAET, NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR., ISAIAS but we do not cling to such strictness when circumstances
ALBANO, LILY REYES, JANET BAY, JESUS R. GALANG, AND already justify substituted service instead. It is the spirit of the
RANDY HAGOS, Petitioners, vs. FRANCISCO R. CO, JR., procedural rules, not their letter, that governs.
Respondent. The plaintiff in a civil action voluntarily submits himself to the
G.R. No. 156759 June 5, 2013 jurisdiction of the court by the act of filing the initiatory
pleading. As to the defendant, the court acquires jurisdiction
FACTS: over his person either by the proper service of the summons,
Francisco Co, Jr. was a retired police officer assigned at the or by a voluntary appearance in the action; that summons
Western Police District in Manila. Abante Tonite is a daily received by their substitutes is sufficient compliance to inform
tabloid of general circulation which Publisher was Allen A. the parties unless substantially show the otherwise; that
Macasaet; Managing Director was Nicolas V. Quijano; substituted service of summons can be resorted to with
Circulation Manager was Isaias Albano; Editors were Janet Bay, sufficient reasons as when efforts to effect personal service
Jesus R. Galang and Randy Hagos; and Columnist/Reporter is occurred to be futile or impossible within reasonable time.
Lily Reyes.
On July 3, 2000, Co sued petitioners before Branch 51 of the HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION
RTC, Manila claiming damages because of an allegedly libelous LIMITED v. CECILIA DIEZ CATALAN. G.R. No. 159590.
article published in Abante Tonite on June 6, 2000. October 18, 2004.

HSBC TRUSTEE should have been dismissed for lack of
This is a two (2) petitions for review on certiorari under Rule jurisdiction over it.
45. DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No.
FACTS: Frederick Arthur Thomson drew five (5) checks payable 159590 is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
to defendant Cecilia. Catalan presented these checks to August 14, 2003, in CA-G.R. SP No. 75757 dismissing the
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited petition for certiorari of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
(HSBANK). The checks were dishonored for having insufficient Corporation Limited is AFFIRMED.
funds. Thomson demanded that the checks be made good The petition in G.R. No. 159591 is GRANTED. The Decision of
because he, in fact, had sufficient funds. Still, HSBANK did not the Court of Appeals, dated August 14, 2003, in CA-G.R. SP No.
accept the checks. 75756 dismissing the petition for certiorari of the HSBC
Subsequently, Thomson died but Catalan was not paid yet. The International Trustee Limited is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
account was transferred to HSBC International Trustee Limited Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Bacolod City is declared
(TRUSTEE). Catalan then requested TRUSTEE to pay her but still without jurisdiction to take cognizance of Civil Case No. 01-
refused and even asked her to submit back to them the original 11372 against the HSBC International Trustee Limited, and all
checks for verification. its orders and issuances with respect to the latter are hereby
Catalan and her lawyer went to Hong Kong on their own ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The said Regional Trial Court is
expense to personally submit the checks. They still were not hereby ORDERED to DESIST from maintaining further
honored, leading Catalan to file a suit against HSBC to collect proceedings against the HSBC International Trustee Limited in
the money. the case aforestated.
The RTC issued an Order denying the two motions to dismiss
of the petitioners. Thereafter, the CA dismissed the two G.R. NO. 181517 July 6, 2015
petitions for certiorari. The CA held that the filing of GREEN STAR EXPRESS, INC. and FRUTO
petitioners' answers before the RTC rendered moot and SAYSON, JR., Petitioners,
academic the issue of the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the VS. NISSIN-UNIVERSAL ROBINA
person of the petitioners; that the RTC has jurisdiction over the CORPORATION, Respondents.
subject matter since it is one for damages under Article 19 of
the Civil Code. PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 45
DOCTRINE: Notably, under the new Rules (1997 Rules of
Hence, this petition. Court), service of summons upon an agent of the corporation
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed serious error in not is no longer authorized, the rule now likewise states "general
ordering the dismissal of the amended complaint against HSBC manager" instead of "manager"; "corporate secretary" instead
trustee despite the fact it has not been duly served with of merely "secretary"; and "treasure" instead of "cashier.” It
summons. has now become restricted, limited, and exclusive only to
RULING: YES. The Rules of Court provides that a court generally the persons enumerated in the aforementioned provision,
acquires jurisdiction over a person through either a valid following the rule in statutory construction that the express
service of summons in the manner required by law or the mention of one person excludes all others, or expression
person's voluntary appearance in court. unions est exclusion alterius. Service must, therefore, be made
However, both lower courts overlooked Section 20 of Rule 14 only on the person expressly listed in the rules. If the revision
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that "the committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of
inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from summons, it could have easily done so by clear and concise
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not language.
be deemed a voluntary appearance." Nonetheless, such FACTS: A Mitsubishi L-300 van which URC owned got in a
omission does not aid HSBANK's case. The SC held that the vehicular accident with Green Star’s passenger bus, resulting
HSBC was being sued because of their evident failure to heed in the death of the van's driver. Thus, the bus driver, petitioner
the instructions of Thomson. HSBANK cited Sec. 189 of the NIL Fruto Sayson, Jr., was charged with the crime of reckless
but the SC said that what is being sued is how they acted in imprudence resulting in homicide.
relation to Catalan's claim for payment despite repeated Thereafter, Green Star sent a demand letter to respondent
requests and not of the check's value. The reason was likewise NURC for the repair of its passenger bus (P567,070.68). NURC
the same towards TRUSTEE as Catalan even went to Hong Kong denied any liability therefor and argued that the criminal case
to personally deliver the checks. shall determine the ultimate liabilities of the parties.
Admittedly, HSBC TRUSTEE is a foreign corporation, organized Thereafter, the criminal case was dismissed without prejudice.
and existing under the laws of the British Virgin Islands. Francis Tinio, one of NURC's employees, was the one who
There being no proper service of summons, the RTC cannot received the summons. NURC filed a Motion to Dismiss
take cognizance of the case against HSBC TRUSTEE for lack of claiming lack of jurisdiction due to improper service.
jurisdiction over it. Any proceeding undertaken by the RTC is RTC: DENIED NURC's motion to dismiss
therefore null and void. Accordingly, the complaint against

CA: REVERSED the RTC ruling, GRANTED the Motion to Dismiss FACTS:
for lack of jurisdiction. On 22 July 2008, petitioner Interlink Movie Houses, Inc.
ISSUE/S: W/N THE SUMMONS WAS PROPERLY SERVED ON (Interlink), represented by its president, petitioner Edmer Y.
NURC, VESTING THE TRIAL COURT WITH JURISDICTION. Lim (Lim), filed before the RTC a complaint for sum of money
HELD: NO. and damages against respondents Expressions Stationery
Here, Tinio, a, member of NURC’s accounting staff, received Shop, Inc. (Expressions), a corporation duly organized and
the summons on January 22, 2004. Green Star claims that it existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, and
was received upon instruction of Junadette Avedillo, the Joseph Lim Bon Huan (Bon Huan).4 Interlink sought from
general manager of the corporation. Such fact, however, does Expressions the recovery of the latter's unpaid rentals and
not appear in the Sheriff’s Return. The Return did not even damages resulting from its alleged breach of their lease
state whether Avedillo was present at the time the summons contract.
was received by Tinio, the supposed assistant manager. Green In the Sheriff's Return, dated 26 September 2008, Sheriff
Star further avers that the sheriff tendered the summons, but Benedict R. Muriel (Sheriff Muriel) of the RTC's Branch 167
Avedillo simply refused to sign and receive the same. She then certified that on 24 September 2008, he served the summons
allegedly instructed Tinio to just receive it in her behalf. issued in the subject case, together with the copy of the
However, Green Star never presented said sheriff as witness complaint, on the respondents at the office of the defendant
during the hearing of NURC’s motion to dismiss to attest to company's president through a certain Jonalyn Liwanan
said claim. And while the sheriff executed an affidavit which (Liwanan). Sheriff Muriel stated that Liwanan undertook to
appears to support such allegation, the same was likewise not forward the said documents to her superior.
presented as evidence. It was only when the case was already On 5 January 2009, Interlink filed a motion to declare herein
before the CA that said affidavit first surfaced. Since the service respondents in default for their failure to file their answer.
of summons was made on a cost accountant, which is not one On 6 January 2009, respondents entered a special appearance
of the designated persons under Section 11 of Rule 14, the trial through Atty. Generosa Jacinto (Atty. Jacinto) alleging that the
court did not vadily acquire jurisdiction over NURC, although service of the summons was defective and, as such, the RTC
the corporation may have actually received the summons. To did not acquire jurisdiction over them. They further prayed
rule otherwise will be an outright circumvention of the rules, that Interlink's motion for declaration of default be denied.
aggravating further the delay in the administration of justice. Thus, in its Order, dated 2 March 2009, the RTC denied
INTERLINK MOVIE HOUSES, INC. AND EDMER Y. LIM., Interlink's motion to declare defendants in default. The trial
Petitioner vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, court agreed that the summons was not served in accordance
STATIONERY EXPRESSIONS SHOP, INC. AND JOSEPHINE with Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court rendering such
LIM BON HUAN, Respondent service defective. Thus, it ordered the issuance and service of
G.R. No. 203298, January 17, 2018 summonses to the respondents.
In the Sheriff's Return, dated 15 May 2009, Sheriff Muriel
Petition for review on certiorari certified that on 11 May 2009, he served the summons on
DOCTRINE: Expressions at the office of its president, Bon Huan, through a
It is settled that resort to substituted service is allowed only if, certain Amee Ochotorina (Ochotorina), a person of suitable
for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be personally age and discretion, who introduced herself as one of the
served with summons within a reasonable time. In such cases, secretaries of Bon Huan. Sheriff Muriel added that Ochotorina
substituted service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the assured him that the summons would be brought to the
summons at the defendant's residence with some person of attention of Bon Huan. He added that he had insisted that the
suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by summons be received personally by Bon Huan, but Ochotorina
leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of refused and told him that Bon Huan was then attending to
business with a competent person in charge. Because some business matters.
substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of On 25 June 2009, Interlink filed another motion to declare
service, and personal service of summons is preferred over defendants in default. To this motion, respondent again
substituted service, parties do not have unbridled right to entered a special appearance through Atty. Jacinto on 10 July
resort to substituted service of summons. 2009. The respondents alleged that the second service of the
A special appearance operates as an exception to the general summons was still defective because Ochotorina did not work
rule on voluntary appearance. Such special appearance, for nor was connected with the office of the president of
however, requires that the defendant must explicitly and Expressions, and that she was neither its president, managing
unequivocally pose objections to the jurisdiction of the court partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, nor
over his person; otherwise, such failure would constitute its in-house counsel.
voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially
in instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative In the Order, dated 10 February 2010, the RTC granted the
relief is filed and submitted to the court for resolution. motion to declare defendants in default and allowed Interlink
(Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Dy) to present evidence ex parte. The trial court was convinced

that there was sufficient compliance with the rules on service treasurer, or in-house counsel. It is further undisputed that the
of summons to a juridical entity considering that the summons questioned second service of summons was made upon
was received by the assistant/secretary of the president. The Ochotorina, who was merely one of the secretaries of Bon
trial court further stated that corporate officers are usually Huan, and clearly, not among those officers enumerated under
busy and as such, summons to corporations are usually Section 11 of Rule 14. The service of summons upon
received only by assistants or secretaries of corporate officers. Ochotorina is thus void and, therefore, does not vest upon the
On 5 March 2010, the respondents, on special appearance trial court jurisdiction over Expressions,
through Atty. Jacinto, filed an omnibus motion wherein they In this case, the impossibility of prompt personal service was
prayed that the 10 February 2010 order be recalled. The not shown. The 15 May 2009 sheriffs return reveals that Sheriff
respondents insisted that the second service of summons did Muriel attempted to serve the second summons personally
not vest upon the trial court jurisdiction over their persons. only once on 11 May 2009. Clearly, the efforts exerted by
In its Order, dated 9 August 2010, the RTC denied the Sheriff Muriel were insufficient to establish that it was
respondents' omnibus motion. Thereafter, Interlink proceeded impossible to personally serve the summons promptly.
with its ex parte presentation of evidence. Further, Sheriff Muriel failed to cite reasons why personal
The RTC Ruling service proved ineffectual. He merely stated that Ochotorina
In its decision, the RTC ruled in favor of Interlink. It opined that told him that Bon Huan was then attending to business
Interlink was able to prove its claims against Expressions and matters, and that he was assured that the summons would be
Bon Huan. brought to the attention of Bon Huan.
The CA Ruling Sheriffs are asked to discharge their duties on the service of
In its assailed decision, dated 17 May 2012, the CA annulled summons with due care, utmost diligence, and reasonable
the RTC decision. The appellate court ruled that the second promptness and speed so as not to prejudice the expeditious
service of summons was still defective, and the trial court did dispensation of justice. They are enjoined to make their best
not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents, efforts to accomplish personal service on defendant.Sheriff
thus rendering the RTC decision void. Muriel clearly failed to met this requirement.
ISSUE: No voluntary submission to the
Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the jurisdiction of the trial court
persons of the respondents? It must be recalled that the respondents filed an omnibus
RULING: NO. No valid service of summons motion to recall the trial court's order granting Interlink's
It is settled that jurisdiction over a defendant in a civil case is motion for declaration of default and for allowance of ex parte
acquired either through service of summons or through presentation of evidence.
voluntary appearance in court and submission to its authority.
In the absence of service or when the service of summons As a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is
upon the person of the defendant is defective, the court deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.
acquires no jurisdiction over his person, and a judgment Thus, it has been held that the filing of motions to admit
rendered against him is null and void. answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration
In actions in personam, such as collection for a sum of money of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion
and damages, the court acquires jurisdiction over the person for reconsideration is considered voluntary submission to the
of the defendant through personal or substituted service of trial court's jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the
summons. concept of conditional appearance, such that a party who
Personal service is effected by handling a copy of the summons makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the
to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign court's jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to
for it, by tendering it to him. If the defendant is a domestic have submitted to its authority.
private juridical entity, service may be made on its president, At first glance, the respondents may be seen to have submitted
managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, themselves to the jurisdiction of the RTC. Indeed, said omnibus
treasurer, or in-house counsel.21 It has been held that this motion, which is essentially a motion to lift order of default,
enumeration is exclusive.22 Service on a domestic private prayed for an affirmative relief which would not be possible if
juridical entity must, therefore, be made only on the person the movant does not recognize the jurisdiction of the court.
expressly listed in Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.23 Nevertheless, a reading of the said omnibus motion reveals
If the service of summons is made upon persons other than that the respondents expressly stated that the said omnibus
those officers enumerated in Section 11, the same is invalid. motion was filed on special appearance. Further, the
There is no dispute that respondent Expressions is a domestic respondents explicitly objected, in an equivocal manner, to the
corporation duly existing under the laws of the Republic of the jurisdiction of the RTC on the ground of invalid service of
Philippines, and that respondent Bon Huan is its president. summons. Measured against the requirements enunciated in
Thus, for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction, service of Philippine Commercial International Bank, the Court is
summons to it must be made to its president, Bon Huan, or to convinced that the respondents never recognized and did not
its managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, acquiesce to the jurisdiction of the RTC. A party who makes a

special appearance in court challenging the jurisdiction of said some person on whom summons and other legal processes
court based on the ground of invalid service of summons is not may be served. The trial court denied the motion for
deemed to have submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the reconsideration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
court. the RTC, and denied the motion for reconsideration.
RULE 14, SECS. 15 TO 20 ISSUE
NM ROTHSCHILD & SONS (AUSTRALIA) LTD., Petitioner, vs. Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person
LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, of petitioner. (YES)
Respondents RULING
G.R. No. 175799, NOVEMBER 28, 2011 Petitioner’s acts of seeking affirmative reliefs constitute
voluntary appearance, hence the RTC acquired jurisdiction
Petition for Review on Certiorari over petitioner’s person. In leading to this decision, the Court
DOCTRINE discussed the following concepts:
“When the case instituted is an action in rem or quasi in rem, Under Sec. 12 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, a defendant,
Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to hear and decide who is a foreign private juridical entity which has transacted
the case because, in actions in rem and quasi in rem, business in the Philippines, may be served with summons
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a through its resident agent designated in accordance with law
prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that for that purpose, or, if there be no such agent, on the
the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Thus, in such government official designated by law to that effect, or on any
instance, extraterritorial service of summons can be made of its officers or agents within the Philippines.
upon the defendant. The said extraterritorial service of On the other hand, Sec. 15 of Rule 14 provides for
summons is not for the purpose of vesting the court with extraterritorial service, which contemplates of four instances:
jurisdiction, but for complying with the requirements of fair When the action affects the personal status of plaintiffs;
play or due process, so that the defendant will be informed of When the action relates to, or the subject of which is property,
the pendency of the action against him and the possibility that within the Philippines, in which the defendant claims a lien or
property in the Philippines belonging to him or in which he has an interest, actual or contingent;
an interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of the When the relief demanded in such action consists, wholly or in
plaintiff, and he can thereby take steps to protect his interest part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property
if he is so minded. On the other hand, when the defendant or located in the Philippines; and
respondent does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, When defendant non-resident’s property has been attached
and the action involved is in personam, Philippine courts within the Philippines.
cannot try any case against him because of the impossibility of In these instances, service of summons may be effected by
acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily personal service out of the country with leave of court,
appears in court.” publication with leave of court, or any other manner the court
FACTS may deem sufficient. Clearly, extraterritorial summons applies
Respondent Lepanto filed a Complaint against petitioner NM only where the action is in rem or quasi in rem, but not to an
Rothschild for a judgment declaring the loan and hedging action in personam.
contracts between the parties void. Upon respondent’s In actions in rem or quasi in rem, Philippine courts already have
motion, the trial court authorized respondent’s counsel to jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because, in actions in
personally bring the summons and Complaint to the Philippine rem and quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the
Consulate General in Sydney, Australia for the latter office to defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the
effect service of summon petitioner. court, provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the
Petitioner filed a Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss res. Thus, extraterritorial service of summons can be made
praying for the dismissal of the complaint, one of the grounds upon the defendant not for purposes of vesting jurisdiction,
being that the court has not acquired jurisdiction over the but for complying with the requirements of fair play and due
person of petitioner due to the defective and improper service process.
of summons. This case involves an action in personam, as it is a suit in which
Later on, petitioner filed two motions: a Motion for Leave to the plaintiff seeks to be freed from its obligations to the
take the deposition of Mr. Paul Murray (the Director of Risk defendant. Thus, Philippine courts cannot acquire jurisdiction
Management of RM Rothschild) before the Philippine Consul over a defendant who does not reside and is not found in the
General and a Motion for Leave to Serve Interrogatories on Philippines unless he voluntary appears in court. (IN OTHER
respondent. WORDS: Extraterritorial service cannot be done because such
The trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss, holding that there mode of service is only applicable in actions in rem and quasi
was a proper service of summons through the Department of in rem.)
Foreign Affairs on account of the fact that defendant has Under Sec. 20 of Rule 14, which speaks of voluntary
neither applied for a license to do business in the Philippines, appearance, the inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other
nor filed with the SEC a Written Power of Attorney designating grounds aside from the lack of jurisdiction over the person of

the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.
This clearly refers to affirmative defenses, rather than In the same year, Vasquez surfaced and filed a Notice of Appeal
affirmative reliefs. Seeking affirmative relief in a court is which petitioners opposed. The Appeal was granted by the
tantamount to voluntary appearance therein. court. Vasquez argued that the court never acquired
In this case, petitioner, despite the pendency of its Motion to jurisdiction over his person because he never received the
Dismiss, prayed for and was able to avail of modes of discovery summons.
against respondent, such as written interrogatories, requests Issue: WON RTC properly acquired jurisdiction over the
for admission, deposition, and motions for production of respondent (YES)
documents. These are affirmative reliefs that constitute Ruling: To acquire jurisdiction over the person of a defendant,
voluntary appearance. service of summons must be personal, or if this is not feasible
Thus, petitioner, by seeking affirmative reliefs from the trial within a reasonable time, then by substituted service.
court, is deemed to have voluntary submitted to the It is of judicial notice that overseas Filipino seafarers are
jurisdiction of said court. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction contractual employees. They go back to the country once their
of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and contracts expire, and wait for the signing of another contract
after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or with the same or new manning agency and principal if they
question that same jurisdiction. wish. It is therefore common knowledge that a Filipino seaman
DOLORES MONTEFALCON & LAURENCE MONTEFALCON, often has a temporary residence in the urban areas like Metro
petitioners, Manila, where majority of the manning agencies hold offices,
vs. RONNIE S. VASQUEZ, respondent. aside from his home address in the province where he
originates. In this case, respondent Vasquez hails from
PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 65 Camarines Sur but he has lived in Taguig City when the
DOCTRINE "Residence" is the place where the person named complaint was filed. Notice may then be taken that he has
in the summons is living at the time when the service is made, established a residence in either place. Residence is a place
even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the where the person named in the summons is living at the time
time. A plaintiff is merely required to know the defendant's when the service was made, even though he was temporarily
residence, office or regular business place. He need not know abroad at the time. As an overseas seafarer, Vasquez was a
where a resident defendant actually is at the very moment of Filipino resident temporarily out of the country. Hence, service
filing suit. He is not even duty-bound to ensure that the person of summons on him is governed by Rule 14, Section 16 of the
upon whom service was actually made delivers the summons Rules of Court. Because Section 16 of Rule 14 uses the words
to the defendant or informs him about it. The law presumes "may" and "also," it is not mandatory. Other methods of
that for him. It is immaterial that defendant does not receive service of summons allowed under the Rules may also be
actual notice. availed of by the serving officer on a defendant-seaman.
FACTS: In this case, we agree that the substituted service in Taguig was
Petitioner filed a complaint for acknowledgment and support valid and justified because previous attempts were made by
against respondent before RTC Naga City. Alleging that her son the sheriffs to serve the summons, but to no avail. Diligent
Laurence is the illegitimate child of Vasquez, she prayed that efforts were evidently exerted in the conduct of the concerned
Vasquez be obliged to give support to co-petitioner Laurence sheriffs in the performance of their official duty. Also, the
Montefalcon, whose certificate of live birth he signed as father person who received the alias summons was of suitable age
A sheriff tried to serve the summons and complaint on Vasquez and discretion, then residing at Vasquez's dwelling. There is no
in Aro-aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur. Vasquez's grandfather quarrel that it was really Vasquez's residence, as evidenced by
received them as Vasquez was in Manila. Vasquez's mother his employment contract, executed under the supervision and
returned the documents to the clerk of court, who informed authority of the Philippine Overseas Employment
the court of the non-service of summons. Petitioners then filed Administration (POEA).
a motion to declare Vasquez in default. The court denied it for JOSE C. CARIAGA, JR. AND MARIETA CARIAGA, petitioners,
lack of proper service of summons. vs. THE HON. ANTONIO Q. MALAYA, CAROLINA ALMONTE
The Court issued an alias summons on Vasquez Vasquez at "10 CARIAGA-SOON AND ANA ALMONTE CARIAGA,
Int. President Garcia St., Zone 6, Signal Village, Taguig, Metro respondents
Manila" upon petitioners' motion. Albeit a Taguig deputy G.R. No. L-48375 August 13, 1986
sheriff served it by substituted service on Vasquez's caretaker
Raquel Bejer, the sheriff's return incorrectly stated "Lazaro" as PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
Vasquez's surname. Another alias summons was surved which DOCTRINE: Under Section 17, extraterritorial service of
was received by Bejer, his caretaker. summons is proper: (1) when the action affects the personal
Hence, for failure to answer, he was declared in default. RTC status of the plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to, or the
explained that Laurence's certificate of live birth, being a public subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which
document, is irrefutably a prima facie evidence of illegitimate the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or
filiation. contingent; (3) when the relief demanded in such an action

consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any property has been attached within the Philippines (Sec. 17,
interest in property located in the Philippines; and (4) when Rule 14, Rules of Court).
defendant non-resident's property has been attached within In any of such four cases, the service of summons may, with
the Philippines (Sec. 17, Rule 14, Rules of Court). leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines in three ways:
FACTS: Plaintiffs (private respondents herein) Ana Almonte (1) by personal service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of
Cariaga Soon filed in her behalf and in behalf of her minor general circulation in such places and for such time as the court
daughter Carolina, an action for (1) Annulment of a Deed of may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of
Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Property, (2) Cancellation of the court should be sent by registered mail to the last known
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT), (3) Recovery of Real Property address of the defendant; and (3) in any other manner which
with damages, in the RTC of Laguna, Branch IV. the court may deem sufficient. The third mode of
All defendants in said action filed their answer with extraterritorial service of summons was substantially complied
counterclaim with the exception of defendants (petitioners with in this case. (De Midgely v. Fernandos, 64 SCRA 23, 33,
herein) Jose C. Cariaga Jr. and Marieta Cariaga-Celis who were 34).
both residing abroad and were not served with summons. The MARGARITA ROMUALDEZ-LICAROS, V. ABELARDO B.
lower court upon motion of plaintiffs granted them leave to LICAROS
effect extra-territorial service of summons upon said G.R. No. 150656; April 29, 2003
defendants pursuant to Secs. 7, 17 and 18 of Rule 14 of the
New Rules of Court. Summonses with copies of the complaint FACTS: Margarita Romualdez-Licaros (Margarita) and Abelardo
were served to the defendants by registered mail abroad Licaros (Abelardo) were married until they agreed to separate
(Guam and U.S.A.) by the Clerk of Court at the instance of from bed and board.
plaintiffs. Margarita left for the United States with her two children,
Defendants, residents of the Philippines, filed a motion to set where she applied for and was granted a decree of divorce.
aside the said summons and to declare the service of summons In the Philippines, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
abroad by registered mail as null and void, it being allegedly Abelardo and Margarita filed a petition for the dissolution of
irregular and unauthorized under the provisions of Rule 14 of the conjugal partnership of gains, and for the approval of an
the Rules of Court to which motion plaintiffs filed their agreement of separation of properties. This petition was
opposition. granted.
RTC: DENIED for lack of merit. Abelardo commenced a Civil Case for the declaration of nullity
Defendants (petitioner herein), residing abroad, by special of his marriage with Margarita, based on psychological
appearance and thru counsel filed their motion to consider the incapacity under the New Family Code. The court ordered that
service of summons upon them by registered mail as null and the summons be served by publication in a newspaper of
void but was DENIED. general circulation, and at the address of Margarita in the
ISSUE: WON the service of summons by registered mail upon United States through the Department of Foreign Affairs.
defendants in the case at bar is one which is contemplated With a negative report of collusion - Abelardo was allowed to
within the principles laid down in the provisions of Secs. 17, 7 present his evidence ex-parte. The Decision declaring the
and 22, Rule 14 of the New Rules of Court marriage null and void was issued.
HELD: YES. There is no question that the requirement of due Nine years later, Margarita was informed that she no longer
process has been met as shown by the fact that defendants had the right to use the family name ‘Licaros’, since her
actually received the summonses and copies of the complaint marriage had been dissolved. Margarita commenced a petition
and as evidenced by the Registry Return Cards marked as on the grounds that there was extrinsic fraud in the
Annex A-1 (page 56-Record) and Annex B-1. Whatever defect preparation and filing of the petition for dissolution of the
there may have been in the service of summons was aptly conjugal partnership of gains, and that the trial court lacked
corrected by the court a quo in its assailed order giving said jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for declaration of
defendants ninety (90) days from receipt of order within which nullity of marriage.
to file their responsive pleadings. Defendants have no reason ISSUES:
to complain that they were unaware of the action filed against Whether or not Margarita was validly served summons in the
them or claim that they were denied due process. case for declaration of nullity of her marriage.
Under Section 17, extraterritorial service of summons is HELD:
proper: (1) when the action affects the personal status of the YES. Margarita argued that she never validly served summons,
plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which and that she did not appear in court to voluntarily submit to its
is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has jurisdiction. The Court was not convinced.
or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the As a rule, when the defendant is a non-resident who is not
relief demanded in such an action consists, wholly or in part, in found in the Philippines, the Philippine courts cannot try any
excluding the defendant from any interest in property located case against him because it is impossible to acquire jurisdiction
in the Philippines; and (4) when defendant non-resident's over the person, unless he voluntarily appears in court.

However, in actions in rem or quasi in rem, according to personally." On 13 February 1974, defendants, through Atty.
Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, the jurisdiction over Gerardo B. Roldan, Jr., filed a motion for an extension of fifteen
the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential, and (15) days to file answer, stating that "his [Atty. Roldan's]
the Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide the services was (sic) secured by the defendants formally only the
case. other day," and that he "need[ed] sufficient time to study the
In these instances, extraterritorial service of summons may be case, before filing any responsive pleading or pleadings." The
effected under any of three modes: (1) by personal service out motion was granted by the lower court in an order dated 6
of the country, with leave of court; (2) by publication and March 1974. On 28 February 1974, defendants through Atty.
sending a copy of the summons and order of the court by Roldan asked for another extension of ten (10) days to answer,
registered mail to the defendant’s last known address, also as "[Atty. Roldan] has not yet conferred with all of [the four (4)
with leave of court; or (3) by any other means the judge may defendants] which [was] necessary before any responsive
consider sufficient. pleading [could be] filed by him." The lower court granted this
At the time Abelardo filed the petition for nullity of marriage, second extension in an order dated 14 March 1974.
Margarita was residing in the United States. The trial court Notwithstanding the extensions granted, no answer was filed
considered Margarita as a non-resident defendant who is not by the defendants, for which reason, and upon motion of
found in the Philippines, and required the extraterritorial plaintiff Busuego, the lower court declared the defendants in
service of summons to be effected on Margarita, by way of default in an order dated 20 May 1974. Subsequently,
publication in a newspaper of general circulation, and plaintiff's case was heard and his evidence received, and on the
furnishing copy of the summons and the copy of the petitioner basis of that evidence the trial court rendered its decision on
at the given address through the Department of Foreign 26 August 1974 in favor of the plaintiff. Almost two years later,
Affairs. on 12 July 1976, plaintiff filed before the lower court an ex
The trial court’s prescribed mode of extraterritorial service parte motion for execution of the default judgment, which the
does not fall under the first or second mode specified in lower court granted in an order dated 18 August 1976. On 3
Section 15 of Rule 14, but under the third mode. This refers to September 1976, Romeo Lazaro, one of the defendants and a
"any other means that the judge may consider sufficient." respondent herein, "on his own behalf and on behalf of other
defendants," filed a motion to hold execution in abeyance
The Process Server’s Return showed that the summons praying that "for humanitarian reasons, an extension of 30
addressed to Margarita were sent by mail to the Department days, within which to vacate the premises [be allowed] to give
of Foreign Affairs with acknowledgement of receipt. The them sufficient time to look for another place where the five
Process Server’s certificate of service of summons is prima families composed mostly of little children, can reside."
facie evidence of the facts as set out in the certificate. On 18 September 1976, the lower court granted Romeo's
The Court held that the delivery to the Department of Foreign motion and accordingly, the execution of the default judgment
Affairs was sufficient compliance with the rule. The Court was held in abeyance.
upholds the decision of the trial court, and held that ISSUE:
‘compliance with the jurisdictional requirements have been Whether or not jurisdiction was lawfully acquired by the court
duly established’. a quo over the persons of the respondents Jose Lazaro, Romeo
Lazaro and Vivencio Lazaro?
BUSUEGO V. CA HELD:
151 SCRA 376 (1987) The issues raised may be further simplified into
whether or not jurisdiction was lawfully acquired by the court
FACTS: a quo over the persons of the respondents Jose Lazaro, Romeo
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner asks Lazaro and Vivencio Lazaro. Basically, there are two (2) ways
us to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. by which a court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
No. SP-06556, declaring null and void the judgment by default defendant or respondent: (a) by service of summons upon the
and the orders issued by the Court of First Instance of Pasig 1 defendant; and (b) by voluntary appearance of the defendant
in Civil Case No. 18860. On 20 January 19749 petitioner in court and his submission to its authority. With respect to
Bernardo Busuego commenced action before the Pasig Court service of summons, the Revised Rules of Court prescribe that
of First Instance against Jose Lazaro, Romeo Lazaro, Ernesto a copy of the summons be served personally upon the
Lazaro, and Vivencio Lopez (three of whom are respondents defendant by "handing him a copy thereof in person or if he
herein), to recover possession of a parcel of land and a three refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him." Personal service,
(3) unit apartment house standing thereon, situated at No. however, may be dispensed with and substituted service may
260-A. Bonifacio Avenue, Bo. Jesus de la Peña, Marikina, Rizal. be availed of if the defendant cannot be served personally
Immediately thereafter, summons was issued in the name of "within a reasonable time." In the present case, it appears that
the four defendants and per sheriff's return, was personally the sheriff had availed of substituted service in seeking to
served at the address given in the complaint, upon the serve the summons upon all the defendants by serving a copy
defendants "through [defendant] Dr. Ernesto Lazaro, thereof "through Dr. Ernesto Lazaro personally." Perusal,

however, of the sheriff's return reveals that the sheriff failed the trial court, defendants, through their co-defendant Romeo
to specify therein what prior efforts, if any, had been exerted Lazaro, filed a motion for extension of time within which to
to serve summons upon the other defendants personally vacate the premises involved and to look for another place to
within a reasonable period of time, and the lack of success of live in, raising no question concerning the jurisdiction of the
such efforts, before proceeding to substituted service. Such trial court over the persons of the defendants; and (3) the
specification in the sheriff's return is essential for enforcement defendants, through their counsel Atty. Roldan, moved for
of the rule under the Revised Rules of Court that substituted reconsideration of the judgment of the trial court and for
service may be resorted to only where it is not possible to serve dissolution of the writ of execution, again without contesting
the defendant or defendants promptly in person. As this Court the jurisdiction of the court over their persons. We hold that
ruled in Keister vs. Navarro, by anyone or more of these acts, and certainly by the whole
"[T]he impossibility of prompt service in person should be series of acts, the defendants, respondents herein, effectively
shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant waived the initial lack of jurisdiction over their persons and
personally and the fact that such efforts failed. This statement submitted to the authority of the trial court. The respondents
should be made in the proof of service. This is necessary assert that only voluntary appearance during trial is equivalent
because substituted service is in derogation of the usual to waiver of service, and that therefore, the motion for
method of service " extension of time within which to vacate the premises filed by
We therefore uphold the respondent appellate court's finding Romeo Lazaro after trial and after rendition of judgment, was
that, while Ernesto Lazaro was validly served, with respect to not equivalent to waiver of summons.
respondents Jose Lazaro, Romeo Lazaro and Vivencio Lopez, G.R. No. 91486 January 19, 2001
there was no valid service of summons effected. We are, ALBERTO PINLAC VS. CA, ET AL
nonetheless, unable to sustain its conclusion that the trial
court never acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the said DOCTRINE: The modes of service of summons should be
respondents. As earlier noted, jurisdiction over the person of strictly followed in order that the court may acquire
the defendant can also be acquired by his voluntary jurisdiction over respondents, and failure to strictly comply
appearance in court and his submission to its authority, for with the requirements of the rules regarding the order of its
voluntary appearance is equivalent to service of summons. publication is a fatal defect in the service of summons.
As long ago as 1918, the essence of voluntary appearance was FACTS:
explained by this Court through Mr. Justice Johnson in Flores Petitioners in this case are WWII veterans, along with their
vs. Zurbito, as follows: dependents and successors in interest. They filed a class suit
"A voluntary appearance is a waiver of the necessity of a primarily for Quieting of title, claiming that the subject
formal notice. An appearance in whatever form, without property were part of the forest lands belonging to the
explicitly objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the government; that they and their predecessors-in interest
person, is a submission to the jurisdiction of the court over the have occupied said property continuously, adversely, and
person. While the formal method of entering an appearance in exclusively for more that 30 years; and that they have
a cause pending in the courts is to deliver to the clerk a written accordingly filed applications for land titling in their
direction ordering him to enter the appearance of the person respective names. While petitioners claim that the land in
who subscribes it, an appearance may be made by simply filing dispute was part of the public domain, they named as
a formal motion, or plea or answer. This formal method of respondents several persons and corporations who are titled
appearance is not necessary. He may appear without such owners of subdivided parcels of land within the subject
formal appearance and thus submit himself to the jurisdiction property. One of those so impleaded as a partyrespondent
of the court. He may appear by presenting a motion, for was the Vil-Ma Maloles Subdivision (hereinafter, Vil-Ma).
example, and unless by such appearance he specifically objects The individual lot owners of the said subdivision, however,
to the jurisdiction of the court, he thereby gives his assent to were not specifically named. Since personal service of
the jurisdiction of the court over his person. When the summons could not be effected on Vil-Ma and some of the
appearance is by motion objecting to the jurisdiction of the other named respondents, petitioners moved for leave of
court over his person, it must be for the sole and separate court to serve summons by publication which was granted.
purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court. If his Accordingly, the summons was published in the Metropolitan
motion is for any other purpose than to object to the Newsweek, a periodical edited and published in the City of
jurisdiction of the court over his person, he thereby submits Caloocan and Malolos, Bulacan.
himself to the jurisdiction of the court. In the case before us, Resolving the sole issue of whether or not petitioners were
the defendants appeared before the trial court a number of entitled to the land they occupy and possess, even when said
times without raising any objection to the improper service of land was allegedly part of unclassified public forest and and
summons (1) the defendants, through Atty. Gerardo Roldan, yet covered by transfer certificates of title in the names of the
appeared in court and filed two successive motions for defaulted respondents, the court a quo rendered a Partial
extension of time to file an answer to the complaint; (2) more Decision in favor of petitioners.
than two years after rendition of the judgment by default by

Exactly one (1) year and fiftyseven (57) days after the above- that as it may, even granting that the publication strictly
quoted judgment by default was rendered, a Petition for complied with the rules, the service of summons would still
Annulment of Judgment with Certiorari, Prohibition and be ineffective insofar as private respondents are concerned.
Mandamus 384 was brought before the Court of Appeals by At the time the complaint for Quieting of Title was filed on
the titled owners of the subdivided lots within Vil-Ma. They November 2, 1983, Vilma Maloles Subdivision no longer
assailed the default judgment which nullified all their titles, existed as a juridical entity. Vilma Maloles Subdivision, a
arguing that the court a quo had no jurisdiction over them partnership, was dissolved more than six (6) years earlier, as
and their respective titled properties. They also alleged that evidenced by a Certificate of Dissolution issued by the SEC
they only came to know of the adverse judgment when dated January 26, 1976. Consequently, it could no longer be
petitioners sought the execution of the judgment by sued having lost its juridical personality. It was also
attempting to dispossess some of the titled owners of the lots established that all the lots within the subdivision had been
and making formal demands for them to vacate their disposed of to private individuals, herein private respondents.
respective properties. As the titled owners, they should have been impleaded as
...”the summons, as well as the Partial Decision was not party-respondents before the court a quo. They were not
published in a newspaper or periodical of general circulation. made respondents, neither were they informed of the
Thus, the defective service of summons to said defendant did adverse proceedings that would result in the nullification of
not place the individual lot owners under the trial courts their duly registered titles. Clearly, there was a blatant
jurisdiction, nor are they bound by the adverse judgment. disregard for their rights as registered owners. Petitioners
They were denied due process of law as they were not given failed to show that they were the aggrieved parties. If ever
their day in court. They should have been included as there was denial of due process, it was private respondents
indispensable parties- respondents in Civil Case No. Q-35672 who suffered therefrom. It is elementary that before a person
since the petitioners therein were seeking to annul their can be deprived of his right or property he should first be
respective transfer certificates of title.” informed of the claim against him and the theory on which
such claim is premised.
CA: granted the petition and annulled the partial decision REICON REALTY BUILDERS CORP. V. DIAMOND DRAGON
based on its finding that the trial courts lack of jurisdiction REALTY AND MANAGEMENT, INC., G.R. No. 204796,
over the persons of respondents. February 4, 2015
ISSUE/S: WON the court a-quo has acquired jurisdiction over This petition for review on certiorari
respondent Vilma Maloles subdivision by the publication of FACTS: Reicon is the owner of a parcel of land and the one-
the summons and petition as ordered by the court in civil storey building situated in Quezon City. Reicon leased the
case no. Q-35672 and so the partial decision (annex b) was subject property to Diamond for a period of twenty (20) years
legal, valid and proper. for a monthly rental of P75,000.00. Diamond failed to pay the
RULING: The Partial Decision is null and void insofar as private monthly rentals due, and all checks it had issued were all
respondents are concerned since the latter were not duly dishonored upon presentment. This prompted Reicon to send,
served summons or notified of the proceedings against them. through counsel, demanding the payment of the accrued
The summons and the Partial Decision were published in a rentals.
local newspaper edited and published in Caloocan City and Thereafter, it entered into separate contracts with Jollibee and
Malolos, Bulacan. However, the CA found the publication in Maybunga over the portions of the subject property they
said newspaper, namely the Metropolitan Newsweek, to be respectively occupy.
invalid because the said periodical is not considered a Diamond filed a complaint for breach of contract with damages
newspaper of general circulation in Quezon City where the against Reicon, Jollibee, Maybunga, Andrew before the RTC.
subject property is located, as required by Presidential Decree Reicon filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
No. 1079, Section 1. The court orders relied upon by jurisdiction over its person, considering that the summons was
petitioners did not specify the place and the length of time not served upon its president, managing partner, general
that the summons was to be published. In the absence of manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel,
such specification, publication in just any periodical does not as required by the Rules of Court (Rules), but upon a certain
satisfy the strict requirements of the rules. The incomplete Fernando Noyvo, a houseboy/gardener, at a residence located
directive of the court a quo coupled with the defective at 1217 Acacia St., Dasmarinas Village, Makati City, which is not
publication of the summons rendered the service by the principal office of Reicon.
publication ineffective. the RTC denied Reicon's (and Jollibee's) motion to dismiss,
The modes of service of summons should be strictly followed ratiocinating that improper service of summons is not among
in order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the grounds enumerated under Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules
respondents, and failure to strictly comply with the allowing for the dismissal of a complaint.
requirements of the rules regarding the order of its
publication is a fatal defect in the service of summons. Be

Aggrieved, Reicon elevated the matter to the CA via petition ISSUE: WON THE CA ERRED IN DECLARING PNB IN DEFAULT
for certiorari taken under Rule 65 of the Rules, which the CA AND ORDERING THAT THE ANSWER FILED IN THE RTC BE
dismissed. EXPUNGED FROM THE RECORDS OF THE CASE (NO)
Hence, this petition. RULING: NO. Petitioner's Motion for Extension of Time to File
ISSUE: Whether or not Reicon's certiorari petition before the Answer was laden with glaring lapses.
CA was properly served upon the person of Diamond. Petitioner had, following the reglementary 15-day period after
HELD: YES. Reicon's certiorari petition before the CA was service of summons (unless a different period is fixed by the
properly served upon the person of Diamond. court), until May 5, 2006 within which to file an Answer or
In this case, the Court notes that Diamond declared the appropriate pleading. It filed the Motion for Extension,
aforesaid address as its business address in its complaint however, via a private courier on May 14, 2006, which was
before the RTC, and that there is a dearth of evidence to show received by the trial court on May 15, 2006 or ten days late.
that its had since changed its address or had moved out. It is a basic rule that a motion for extension of time to file a
Hence, Reicon cannot be faulted for adopting the said address pleading must be filed before the expiration of the period
in service a copy of its certiotari petition to Diamond in light of sought to be extended. The court's discretion to grant a motion
the requirement under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 46 of the Rules, for extension is conditioned upon such motion's timeliness,
which merely entails service of the petition upon the the passing of which renders the court powerless to entertain
respondent itself, not upon its counsel. or grant it. Since the motion for extension was filed after the
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. lapse of the prescribed period, there was no more period to
The Resolutions dated May 21, 2012 and November 21, 2012 extend.
of the Court of Appeals (CA) areREVERSED andSET ASIDE. Petitioner was not candid enough to aver in the Motion for
Accordingly, the CA is DIRECTED to REINSTATE the petition for Extension that the period had lapsed, as it still toyed with the
certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 116845 under the idea that it could get away with it. Notably, the May 16, 2006
parameters discussed in this Decision. Order expressed no inkling that the motion was filed out of
time. The trial court either was deceived by or it casually
RULE 15: MOTIONS disregarded the apparent falsity foisted by petitioner. Lest this
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner, Court be similarly deceived, it is imperative to carefully
v. DEANG MARKETING CORPORATION and examine the facts.
BERLITA DEANG, Respondents. By petitioner's allegation in its Motion for Extension, it
received the summons on April 24, 2006. This is belied by the
PETITION FOR REVIEW Process Server's Return, which indicates that petitioner
DOCTRINE: It is a basic rule that a motion for extension of time received the summons on April 20, 2006. Petitioner's counsel
to file a pleading must be filed before the expiration of the was to later clarify that it was only on April 24, 2006 that she
period sought to be extended. The court's discretion to grant a received copies of the summons and complaint which were
motion for extension is conditioned upon such motion's faxed from
timeliness, the passing of which renders the court powerless petitioner's main office.
to entertain or grant it. Since the motion for extension was In requesting for a 30-day extension or until June 11, 2006 to
filed after the lapse of the prescribed period, there was no file answer, petitioner apparently reckoned the date from
more period to extend. which the extension would start on May 12, 2006, which was
FACTS: Deang Marketing Corporation and Berlita Deang filed a not the last day of the 15-day period sought to be extended, it
Complaint against petitioner for REFORMATION OF CONTRACT being May 5, 2006. By computation, petitioner actually sought
AND SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, claiming that a dacion en pago more than 30 days, contrary to the period of extension it
arrangement, Consolidation and Restructuring Agreement purportedly
forged by them transformed respondents' outstanding loan requested. The counting of the period was erroneous, even if
obligations into a 7-year term loan of P36,483,699.45 one uses the material dates alleged by petitioner. Petitioner
Summons was served on petitioner. The respondents filed a clearly disregarded elementary rules and jurisprudence on the
MOTION TO DECLARE DEFENDANT [HEREIN PETITIONER] IN matter.
DEFAULT. The trial court received petitioner's Motion for
Extension of Time to File Answer. (30 days). The flaws in petitioner's moves/representations reinforce
RTC: issued an Order denying said motion and granting respondents' claim that the Motion for Extension was
petitioner's Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer. "cunningly" dated May 5, 2006 (the last day to file a responsive
CA: GRANTED the petition, and accordingly, the private pleading) to make it appear that it was timely filed, although it
respondent is declared IN DEFAULT and the Answer filed by was transmitted only on May 14, 2006. Petitioner's allegation
private respondent is ordered EXPUNGED from the records of that the Motion it filed was the one actually prepared and
the case. signed on May 5, 2006 contradicts its earlier claim in its
Opposition to the Motion to Declare [It] in Default that "[s]hort
of time in coming up with [herein petitioner's] Answer on April

28, 2006," its counsel caused to be prepared a Motion for The CA dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the
Extension of Time to File Answer which was, however, person of Ting Guan. The CA held that Tung Ho failed to
misplaced, and establish that Tejero was Ting Guan’s corporate secretary. The
upon discovery thereof "another motion for extension was CA also ruled that a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy
immediately caused to be prepared and filed." to assail the denial of a motion to dismiss if the ground raised
Moreover, petitioner served and filed the Motion for in the motion is lack of jurisdiction. Furthermore, any of the
Extension through a private courier, LBC, a mode not grounds for the dismissal of the case can be raised in a motion
recognized by the rules. The mode was, nonetheless, clearly to dismiss provided that the grounds were raised before the
unjustifiable, considering that (a) petitioner's handling counsel filing of an answer.
was based in nearby San Fernando; (b) postal registry service ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal is barred by res judicata
is, for lack of explanation to the contrary, available in HELD: Tung Ho’s timely filing of a motion for reconsideration
Pampanga; (c) urgency is out of the equation because the and of a petition for review on certiorari prevented the July 5,
official date of filing done via private messengerial service is 2006 decision from attaining finality
the date of actual receipt of the court, and had the motion Furthermore, under Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
been personally filed the following day (May 15, 2006), it Tung Ho may file a petition for review on certiorari before the
would have reached the court earlier. It thus shows that the Court within (15) days from the denial of its motion for
mode was utilized to obscure any indication that the motion reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the judgment.
was filed out of time. Tung Ho’s timely filing of a motion for reconsideration before
In the present case, no satisfactory reason was adduced to the CA and of a Rule 45 petition before this Court prevented
justify the tardiness of the Answer and no compelling reason the July 5, 2006 CA decision from attaining finality. For this
was given to justify its admission. The intention to delay was Court to deny Tung Ho’s petition would result in an anomalous
rather obvious. for Extension. The Court thus finds petitioner's situation where a party litigant is penalized and deprived of his
negligence inexcusable, as the circumstances behind and the fair opportunity to appeal the case by faithfully complying with
reasons for the delay are detestable. the Rules of Court.
TUNG HO STEEL ENTERPRISES CORPORATION, Petitioner, MOTION TO DISMISS
vs TING GUAN TRADING CORPORATION, Respondent. In this respect, Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court requires
G.R. No. 182153 April 7, 2014 the defendant to file a motion to dismiss within the time for,
but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading
FACTS: 45 asserting a claim. Section 1, Rule 11 of the Rules of Court, on
Tung Ho is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of the other hand, commands the defendant to file his answer
Republic of China. On the other hand, Ting Guan is a domestic within fifteen (15) days after service of summons, unless a
corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines. different period is fixed by the trial court. Once the trial court
Ting Guan and Tung Ho entered into a contract of sale. denies the motion, the defendant should file his answer within
Subsequently, Tung Ho filed a request for arbitration before the balance of fifteen (15) days to which he was entitled at the
the ICC in Singapore after Ting Guan failed in his obligation. time of serving his motion, but the remaining period cannot be
The ICC ruled in favor of Tung Ho. less than five (5) days computed from his receipt of the notice
Tung Ho filed an action against Ting Guan for the recognition of the denial. Instead of filing an answer, the defendant may
and enforcement of the arbitral award before the RTC. Ting opt to file a motion for reconsideration.
Guan moved to dismiss the case. Ting Guan subsequently filed Only after the trial court shall have denied the motion for
a supplemental motion to dismiss based on improper venue. reconsideration does the defendant become bound to file his
Ting Guan argued that the complaint should have been filed in answer. If the defendant fails to file an answer within the
Cebu where its principal place of business was located. reglementary period, the plaintiff may file a motion to declare
The RTC denied Ting Guan’s motion to dismiss. Ting Guan the defendant in default. This motion shall be with notice to
moved to reconsider the order and raised the RTC’s alleged the defendant and shall be supported by proof of the failure.
lack of jurisdiction over its person as additional ground for the The trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss is not a license
dismissal of the complaint. Ting Guan insisted that Tejero, on for the defendant to file a Rule 65 petition before the CA. An
whom personal service was served, was not its corporate order denying a motion to dismiss cannot be the subject of a
secretary and was not a person allowed under Section 11, Rule petition for certiorari as the defendant still has an adequate
14 of the Rules of Court to receive a summons. It also asserted remedy before the trial court – i.e., to file an answer and to
that Tung Ho cannot enforce the award in the Philippines subsequently appeal the case if he loses the case. As
without violating public policy as Taiwan is not a signatory to exceptions, the defendant may avail of a petition for certiorari
the New York Convention. if the ground raised in the motion to dismiss is lack of
The RTC denied the motion and ruled that Ting Guan had jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or over the
voluntarily submitted to the court’s jurisdiction when it raised subject matter.
other arguments apart from lack of jurisdiction in its motion to ADHERENCE TO JURISDICTION; JURISDICTION CANNOT BE
dismiss. OUSTED

G.R. NO. 175303, April, 11, 2012 interference dictates that the assumption by the Makati RTC
PACIFIC ACE FINANCE LTD. (PAFIN), Petitioners, vs. EIJI over the issue operates as an “insurmountable barrier” to the
YANAGISAWA, Respondents. subsequent assumption by the Parañaque RTC. By insisting on
ruling on the same issue, the Parañaque RTC effectively
PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 45 interfered with the Makati RTC’s resolution of the issue and
DOCTRINE: When a court of competent jurisdiction acquires created the possibility of conflicting decisions
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, its authority
continues, subject only to the appellate authority, until the It held that when a court of competent jurisdiction acquires
matter is finally and completely disposed of, and that no court jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, its authority
of coordinate authority is at liberty to interfere with its action. continues, subject only to the appellate authority, until the
FACTS: matter is finally and completely disposed of, and that no court
Eiji was a Japanese man married to Evelyn who was a Filipina. of co-ordinate authority is at liberty to interfere with its action.
The former filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of This doctrine is applicable to civil cases, to criminal
marriage with the latter on the ground of bigamy. He likewise prosecutions, and to courts-martial.
filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Restraining Order and an
Application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for
However before the complaint, Evelyn had purchased a lack of merit. The August 1, 2006 Decision of the Court of
townhouse in Paranaque under her name. Eiji prayed that Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78944 is AFFIRMED.
Evelyn be enjoined from disposing of all properties registered PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45
under her name. Upon hearing the Motion, Evelyn voluntarily DOCTRINE: The rule on adherence of jurisdiction is not
undertook to not dispose of the properties under her name, absolute and has exceptions. One of the exceptions is that
while the case was still pending. The Order of Makati RTC when the change in jurisdiction is curative in character.
rendering Eiji’s Application and motion moot was annotated FACTS:
on Evelyn’s Paranaque Townhouse property. Petitioner Lucia Barrameda Vda. De Ballesteros (Lucia) filed a
Evelyn obtained a loan from Pacific Ace Finance Ltd. (PAFIN) complaint for Annulment of Deed of Extrajudicial Partition,
which was secured through a real estate mortgage under Deed of Mortgage and Damages with prayer for Preliminary
PAFIN over the townhouse. At that time, the marriage was Injunction against her children, Roy, Rito, Amy, Arabel, Rico,
already dissolved by Makati RTC and had ordered the Abe, Ponce Rex and Adden, all surnamed Ballesteros, and the
liquidation of their registered properties including the Rural Bank of Canaman, Inc., Baao Branch (RBCI) before the
townhouse which should be divided between the two of them, RTC Iriga. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. IR-3128. In
and the appeal was pending in the CA Nonetheless, Makati RTC her complaint, Lucia alleged that her deceased husband,
did not dissolve Evelyn’s commitment not to dispose or Eugenio, left two (2) parcels of land; that on March 6, 1995,
encumber properties under her name. without her knowledge and consent, her children executed a
Due to this Eiji deemed it a violation of Makati RTC’s order and deed of extrajudicial partition and waiver of the estate of her
filed a complaint for the annulment of the REM against Evelyn husband wherein all the heirs, including Lucia, agreed to allot
and PAFIN in the RTC of Paranaque. the two parcels to Rico Ballesteros (Rico); that, still, without
The RTC dismissed the petition and held that a foreign national her knowledge and consent, Rico mortgaged Parcel B of the
could not own mortgaged property, and therefore Eiji has no estate in favor of RBCI which mortgage was being foreclosed
cause of action to be asserted against Evelyn. for failure to settle the loan secured by the lot; and that Lucia
The CA on the other hand, annulled and set aside RTC’s was occupying Parcel B and had no other place to live. She
decision. It held that the RTC of Paranaque’s decision was prayed that the deed of extrajudicial partition and waiver, and
improper because it violated the doctrine of non-interference. the subsequent mortgage in favor of RBCI be declared null and
Because it is a court of equal jurisdiction as that of RTC Makati, void having been executed without her knowledge and
it had no appellate jurisdiction over the latter. consent. She also prayed for damages.
ISSUE: In its Answer, RBCI claimed that in 1979, Lucia sold one of the
Whether or not the Paranaque RTC can rule on the issue of two parcels to Rico which represented her share in the estate
ownership, even as the same issue was already ruled upon by of her husband. The extrajudicial partition, waiver and
the Makati RTC and is pending appeal in the CA. mortgage were all executed with the knowledge and consent
HELD: of Lucia although she was not able to sign the document. RBCI
No, the court agrees with the CA, that the Makati RTC had further claimed that Parcel B had already been foreclosed way
acquired jurisdiction over the said question and should not back in 1999 which fact was known to Lucia through the
have been interfered with by the Parañaque RTC. auctioning notary public. Attorney’s fees were pleaded as
The issue of ownership and liquidation of properties acquired counterclaim.
during the cohabitation of Eiji and Evelyn has been submitted During the pre-trial, RBCI’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw
for the resolution of the Makati RTC, and is pending appeal after being informed that Philippine Deposit Insurance
before the CA. The doctrine of judicial stability or non- Corporation (PDIC) would handle the case as RBCI had already

been closed and placed under the receivership of the PDIC. fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision
Consequently, on February 4, 2002, the lawyers of PDIC took rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction
over the case of RBCI. On May 9, 2003, RBCI, through PDIC, and may be attacked at anytime directly or collaterally by
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC-Iriga has means of a separate action, or by resisting such decision in any
no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. RBCI action or proceeding where it is invoked.
stated that pursuant to Section 30, Republic Act No. 7653 (RA FACTS: The instant case arose from a dispute involving the
No. 7653),otherwise known as the "New Central Bank Act," the mining claims known as "Allied 1 and 2" and "Lapulapu 31 and
RTC Makati, already constituted itself, per its Order dated 32" (subject mining claims) between petitioner Apocemco and
August 10, 2001, as the liquidation court to assist PDIC in respondent Mingson. For the supposed failure of the old
undertaking the liquidation of RBCI. Thus, the subject matter locators to develop and put to productive use the mineral
of Civil Case No. IR- 3128 fell within the exclusive jurisdiction properties found in the area, Apocemco submitted a Mineral
of such liquidation court. Lucia opposed the motion. Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) proposal before the
On July 29, 2003, the RTC-Iriga issued an order granting the DENR, essentially seeking to take over their current holder,
Motion to Dismiss and ruled that the liquidation court shall Luvimin. The DENR Regional Office declared the subject mining
have jurisdiction to adjudicate all claims against the bank claims, among others, abandoned and open for location to
whether they be against assets of the insolvent bank, for other interested parties, prompting Luvimin to file an appeal.
Specific Performance, Breach of Contract, Damages or Similarly, Mingson assailed the aforementioned declarations
whatever. on the ground that its own mining claims, i.e., "Yellow Eagle I
Not in conformity, Lucia appealed the RTC ruling to the CA on to VII," overlapped with the subject mining claims.
the ground that the RTC-Iriga erred in dismissing the case The DENR Regional Office decreed that portions of the subject
because it had jurisdiction over Civil Case No. IR-3128 under mining claims be awarded to Mingson. However, upon
the rule on adherence of jurisdiction. Apocemco’s motion for reconsideration, the DENR Regional
The CA ordered the consolidation of the Annulment of Deed of Office’s Legal Division issued a Resolution recommending that
Extrajudicial Partition and the liquidation case pending before the subject mining claims be awarded, instead, to Apocemco,
RTC-Makati. subject, however, to the outcome of Luvimin’s appeal. The
Lucia filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by DENR Regional Director affirmed the foregoing resolution, but
the CA. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari. subject to the review and concurrence of the Panel of
ISSUE: Whether the RTC-Iriga has jurisdiction over the civil Arbitrators (POA), considering that POA has been mandated to
case? resolve, among others, disputes involving rights to mining
RULING: areas. The DENR MAB granted Mingson’s appeal. The CA
RTC-IRIGA HAS NO JURISDICTION. Lucia contends that the RTC- dismissed Apocemco’s appeal and sustained the DENR MAB’s
Iriga is vested with jurisdiction over the case because it was finding that Mingson was not afforded by the POA its right to
filed with the RTC-Iriga before the defendant bank was placed due process, given that none of the applicable procedures
under receivership of PDIC. This argument evidently falls out found in DENR DAO 95-23 were followed.
from a strained interpretation of the law and jurisprudence. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly ordered the dismissal
Indeed, courts recognize the doctrine on adherence of of Apocemco’s appeal.
jurisdiction. However, such principle is not without exceptions. RULING:
The rule on adherence of jurisdiction is not absolute and has Yes. The Implementing Rules of the Philippine Mining Act of
exceptions. One of the exceptions is when the change in 1995 clearly require that the parties involved in mining
jurisdiction is curative in character. disputes be given the opportunity to be heard. These rules –
For sure, Section 30, R.A. 7653 is curative in character when it which were already in effect during the time the dispute
declared that the liquidation court shall have jurisdiction in the between the parties arose – flesh out the core requirement of
same proceedings to assist in the adjudication of the disputed due process; thus, a stark and unjustified contravention of the
claims against the Bank. The interpretation of this Section same would oust the errant tribunal of its jurisdiction and, in
(formerly Section 29, R.A. 265) becomes more obvious in the effect, render its decision null and void.
light of its intent. The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic
G.R. No. 206728, November 12 2014 constitutional rights, courts are ousted from their
APO CEMENT CORPORATION, petitioner vs. MINGSON jurisdiction.1âwphi1 The violation of a party’s right to due
MINING INDUSTRIES CORPORATION, respondent process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be
glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 65 fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision
DOCTRINE: The cardinal precept is that where there is a rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of
violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted from jurisdiction.
their jurisdiction.1âwphi1 The violation of a party’s right to due In Salva v. Valle, the Court pronounced that "a decision
process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be rendered without due process is void ab initio and may be
glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the attacked at anytime directly or collaterally by means of a

separate action, or by resisting such decision in any action or PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 45
proceeding where it is invoked." The Court sees no defensible DOCTRINE: A void judgment is no judgment at all. It cannot be
reason as to why this principle should not be herein applied. the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. All
EFFECT OF LACK OF JURISDICTION acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it
have no legal effect.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER VS. SPOUSES FACTS:
PLACIDO AND CLARA DY ORILLA, RESPONDENTS 1. On October 13, 1986, the RTC of Allen, Northern Samar,
G.R. NO. 194168; FEBRUARY 13, 2013 Branch 23, rendered judgment in Civil Case No. A-514 for
Ownership and Recovery of Possession with Damages in favor
Facts: Spouses Placido and Orilla were landowners in Bohol. of Fructosa Badillo, Fedila Badillo, Edwina Badillo, Presentacion
The Department of Agrarian Reform, Provincial Agrarian Badillo and Nelson Badillo and against the then defendants,
Reform Office sent a Notice of Land Valuation and Acquisition including Consesa Padre. This Decision became final and
for P371,154.99 evaluated by the Land Bank of the Philippines. executory on November 5, 1986.
The respondents rejected the valuation and asked the Regional 2. On December 29, 1997, the Badillo family filed another
Trial Court acting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC) to properly complaint against those who occupy their property which
determine the just compensation for the land. The SAC fixed included some of the defendants. The case was filed with the
the value for compensation at the prayer of the petitioners for MTC of San Isidro, Northern Samar and was docketed as Civil
P7.00 per square meter, amounting to P1,479,023. Case No. 104. As Consesa Padre had already died in 1989, her
The petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal while the respondents heir, Nilo Padre (Nilo), was impleaded as one of the
filed a motion for Execution Pending Appeal. The SAC granted defendants. While some of the defendants filed their
the Execution Pending Appeal. respective answers, Nilo was one of those who were declared
The petitioner filed a motion for certiorari, prohibition, and in default for failure to file their answer to the
prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order complaint.
and/or preliminary injunction, assailing the propriety of the MTC:
SAC to grant the order for execution pending appeal. The CA The MTC rendered judgment on July 17, 2003. Interpreting the
denied the motion, and held that the order was consistent with suit of the Badillo family as an action to revive the dormant
justice and fairness. The SC upheld the propriety of the SAC to judgment in Civil Case No. A-514, the court recognized the
issue orders for the execution pending appeal. right of the plaintiffs to finally have such judgment enforced.
On the other hand, the CA granted the appeal by the petitioner The MTC disposed of the case as follows:
and ordered the case be remanded back to the SAC for the WHEREFORE, judgment is ordered reviving the previous
proper determination of just compensation. The CA held that judgment of the Regional Trial Court there being, and still,
the SAC had no sufficient legal basis for the amount they fixed. preponderance of evidence in favor of Badillo. Nilo thereafter
The petitioners argued that the Execution Pending Appeal can appeared and moved to reconsider the MTC judgment. He
no longer be implemented because the decision of the SAC argued that the MTC is without jurisdiction over the case,
fixing the amount of just compensation was set aside by the opining that the action for revival of judgment is a real action
CA. The respondents on the other hand argued that the case and should be filed with the same court, i.e., the RTC, which
has reached finality and can no longer be distrubed. rendered the decision sought to be revived. Or, assuming
Issue: Whether or not the amount for just compensation can arguendo that the MTC has jurisdiction over real actions, it
still be a subject of Execution Pending Appeal. must be noted that the subject property is assessed at
Held: No. The Court clarified that the decision that attained ₱26,940.00, an amount beyond the ₱20,000.00 limit for the
finality was not about the amount of just compensation, MTC to have jurisdiction over real actions, in accordance with
instead, it settled the propriety of the SAC to issue orders Republic Act (RA) No. 7691. Nilo also contended that the action
granting Execution Pending Appeal. With regards to the matter is dismissible for (note: extra procedural issues) a) lack of
of just compensation, the Court held that since the CA set aside certificate of non-forum shopping in the complaint and b)
and nullified the decision of the SAC, the judgment should be prescription, the complaint for revival of judgment having
rendered void and should have no legal effect. Since the been filed beyond the 10-year reglementary period from the
amount of P1,479,023.00 is a fruit of a void judgment, it can no time the judgment sought to be revived became final and
longer be subject to the order granting Execution Pending executory in November 1986.
Appeal. The MTC denied the motion for reconsideration. It held that
the case is an action for revival of judgment and not an action
G.R. NO. 165423 January 19, 2011 for ownership and possession, which had already long been
NILO PADRE, Petitioners, vs. FRUCTOSA BADILLO, FEDILA settled. To the MTC, the former is a personal action under
BADILLO, PRESENTACION CABALLES, EDWINA VICARIO (d) Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court which may be filed, at
represented by MARY JOY VICARIO ORBETA and NELSON the election of plaintiffs, either at the court of the place where
BADILLO, Respondents. they reside or where the defendants reside. The court found
excusable the absence of the certification against forum

shopping, justifying that the action filed before it is merely a because the decision had long obtained its finality. Hence, this
continuation of the previous suit for ownership. Moreover, the petition.
counsel for the Badillo family, a nonagenarian, may not yet Petitioner’s Arguments
have been familiar with the rule when Civil Case No. 104 was Nilo finds the RTC’s adverse ruling as wanting in sufficient
filed. To it, this mistake should not prejudice the Badillo family explanation as to the factual and legal bases for upholding the
who deserve to possess and enjoy their properties. MTC. He also highlights the failure of the Badillo family to
By way of a special civil action for certiorari, Nilo elevated the attach to their complaint a certificate of non-forum 76
case to the RTC to question the MTC’s jurisdiction, reiterating shopping. Petitioner also argues that the date of mailing of his
the same grounds he had raised before the MTC. petition with the RTC is the date of his filing. He stressed that
the filing of his petition on March 1, 2004 was well within the
RTC: prescriptive period. As the 60th day from December 30, 2003
RTC dismissed said petition on the ground that it was filed late. fell on a Saturday, he maintains that the Rules of Court
Moreover, the RTC upheld the MTC’s jurisdiction over the case, allows him to file his petition on the next working day, which
affirming the MTC’s ratiocination that an action for is March 1, 2004, a Monday. As have already been raised in the
enforcement of a dormant judgment is a personal action, and courts below, Nilo mentions the following grounds for the
hence may be filed either at the court of the place where dismissal of the action against him before the MTC:
plaintiffs reside or where the defendants reside. a) (main issue) The MTC lacks jurisdiction. Nilo reiterates that
(other procedural issue) the prime objective of the Badillo family in Civil Case No. 104
In his Motion for Reconsideration, Nilo contended that his is to recover real property, which makes it a real action. Citing
petition with the RTC was timely filed as shown by the registry the case of Aldeguer v. Gemelo, he contends that this suit must
receipt dated March 1, 2004, stamped on the mailing envelope be brought before the RTC of Allen, Northern Samar. Besides,
he used in filing said petition. He argued that this date of the assessed value of the land in controversy, i.e., ₱26,940.00,
mailing is also the date of filing. He also contended that the divests the MTC of jurisdiction.
RTC’s Decision was bereft of any explanation as to why it ruled b) (other procedural issue that was mentioned)
that the case is a personal action. He further alleged that the Prescription. Nilo claims that the Badillo family’s suit had
RTC failed to discuss the issues of prescription and non- already lapsed as they allowed 11 years to pass without
compliance with the rule against forum shopping resorting to any legal remedy before filing the action for revival
RTC denied the motion for reconsideration on the ground that: of judgment. Although the Badillo family moved for the
Assuming that the date of posting was March 1, 2004, as issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. A-514, the same
shown in the registry receipts, still the 60-day reglementary did not interrupt the running of the period to have the
period had already lapsed with December 30, 2003 as the judgment enforced by motion or by action.
reckoning period when petitioner received the December 9, Respondents’ Arguments
2003 Order of Hon. Judge Jose A. Benesisto. With the month While impliedly acknowledging that Nilo seasonably filed his
of February, 2004 having 29 days, it is now clear that the petition for certiorari with the RTC, the Badillo family note that
petition was filed sixty one (61) days after; hence, there is no he should have filed an appeal before the RTC. They claim that
timeliness of the petition to speak of. they properly filed their case, a personal action, with the MTC
Civil Case No. 104 is an ordinary action to enforce a dormant of San Isidro, Northern Samar as they are allowed under
judgment filed by plaintiffs against defendants. Being an action Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court to elect the venue as to
for the enforcement of dormant judgment for damages is a where to file their case.
personal one and should be brought in any province where the Granting that their action is considered a revival of judgment,
plaintiff or defendant resides, at the option of the plaintiff. As the Badillos claim that they filed their suit within the 10-year
regards prescription, the present rule now is, the prescriptive period. They contend that in filing Civil Case No. 104 in
period commences to run anew from the finality of the revived December 1997, the prescriptive period should not be counted
judgment. A revived judgment is enforceable again by motion from the finality of judgment in Civil Case No. A- 514, but
within five years and thereafter by another action within ten should be reckoned from August 22, 1989, when the RTC
years from the finality of the revived judgment. There is, issued an Order that considered as abandoned the motion to
therefore, no prescription or beyond the statute of limitations declare the defendants in default in the contempt
to speak [sic] in the instant case. Petitioner’s contention must proceedings.
therefore fail. ISSUE/S:
It is but proper and legal that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 514 Whether the RTC correctly affirmed the MTC ruling that it has
of which they are the prevailing parties to institute for the jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 104.
enforcement of a dormant judgment [which right] they have HELD:
failed to exercise x x x for more than a decade. Being an Timeliness of the petition for certiorari
ordinary action to enforce a dormant judgment, not even The petition for certiorari before the RTC was timely filed. If
testimonial evidence is necessary to enforce such judgment the pleading filed was not done personally, the date of mailing,
as stamped on the envelope or the registry receipt, is

considered as the date of filing. By way of registered mail, Nilo properly belongs to the RTC. Hence, the MTC has no judicial
filed his petition for certiorari with the RTC on March 1, 2004, authority at all to try the case in the first place. "A decision of
as indicated in the date stamped on its envelope. the court without jurisdiction is null and void; hence, it could
From the time Nilo received on December 30, 2003 the MTC’s never logically become final and executory. Such a judgment
denial of his motion for reconsideration, the last day for him to may be attacked directly or collaterally."
file his petition with the RTC fell on February 28, 2004, a Based on the foregoing discussion, it is not anymore necessary
Saturday. Under the Rules, should the last day of the period to to discuss the issue raised concerning the failure to include a
file a pleading fall on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, a certification of non-forum shopping.
litigant is allowed to file his or her pleading on the next working WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated July
day, which in the case at bar, fell on a Monday, i.e., March 1, 21 and September 20, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Allen,
2004. Northern Samar, Branch 23 in Special Civil Action No. A-927 are
Jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 104 hereby SET ASIDE. The Municipal Trial Court of San Isidro,
What determines the nature of the action and which court has Northern Samar is DIRECTED to dismiss Civil Case No. 104 for
jurisdiction over it are the allegations in the complaint and the lack of jurisdiction.
character of the relief sought." In their complaint in Civil Case
No. 104, some of the allegations of the Badillo family, which SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs.
petitioner never opposed and are thus deemed admitted by MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO
him. SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA BAGUIO, defendants, MANILA
Under paragraph 6 of their complaint, the Badillos alleged that SURETY AND FIDELITY CO., INC. (CEBU BRANCH) bonding
judgment in Civil Case No. A-514 had become final and had company and defendant-appellant
been executed. Further, in paragraph 7, they alleged that in G.R. No. L-21450 April 15, 1968
1990, the defendants re-entered the property and despite
repeated demands they refused to vacate the same. FACTS: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
Thus, the Badillos were not at all seeking a revival of the The case stemmed from a suit for collection of a sum of money
judgment. In reality, they were asking the MTC to legally oust in the sum of exactly P 1,908.00, exclusive of interest filed by
the occupants from their lots. petitioners against herein respondents before the CFI Cebu in
The Badillo family would have been correct in seeking judicial July 1948. Notably, a month prior to the filing of the complaint,
recourse from the MTC had the case been an action for the Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A. 296) took effect thereby
ejectment, i.e., one of forcible entry under Rule 70 of the Rules effectively depriving the CFI of original jurisdiction over cases
of Court wherein essential facts constituting forcible entry in which the demand, exclusive of interest, is not more than P
have been averred and the suit filed within one year from the 2,000.00 (Secs. 44[c] and 86[b], R.A. 296.)
time of unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, as
the MTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over such suit. CFI ruled in favor of the petitioners. Court issued a writ of
However, as the alleged dispossession occurred in 1990, the execution against the defendants. The writ having been
one-year period to bring a case for forcible entry had expired returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of a
since the Badillos filed their suit only in December 1997. We writ of execution against the Surety's bond. Subsequently, the
thus construe that the remedy they availed of is the plenary Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the same
action of accion publiciana, which may be instituted within 10 was issued without the required summary hearing provided
years. "It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the for in Section 17 of Rule 59 of the Rules of Court.
better right of possession of realty independently of title. It The case has already been pending now for almost 15 years,
also refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one and throughout the entire proceeding the appellant never
year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the raised the question of jurisdiction until the receipt of the Court
unlawful withholding of possession of the realty." of Appeals' adverse decision. Hence, the present case filed by
Whether the case filed by the Badillo family is a real or a the respondents, attacking the jurisdiction of the CFI to try the
personal action is irrelevant. Determining whether an action is case.
real or personal is for the purpose only of determining venue. ISSUE: WON the Surety’s Motion to Dismiss on the ground of
In the case at bar, the question raised concerns jurisdiction, lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance during the
not venue. pendency of the appeal will prosper (NO)
Although the Badillo family correctly filed a case for accion RULING: While it is true that the jurisdiction of the court
publiciana, they pleaded their case before the wrong court. In hearing the case may be questioned regardless of the stage of
civil cases involving realty or interest therein not within Metro the proceeding, a party may be estopped or barred from
Manila, the MTC has exclusive original jurisdiction only if the raising a question in different ways and for different reasons,
assessed value of the subject property or interest therein does one of which is estoppel by laches. Laches, in a general sense
not exceed ₱20,000.00. As the assessed value of the property is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained
subject matter of this case is ₱26,940.00, and since more than length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
one year had expired after the dispossession, jurisdiction could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or

omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting Finance Corporation, now the Development Bank of the
a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has Philippines (DBP). As security for the loan, Lot No. 1305-A was
abandoned it or declined to assert it. The doctrine of laches or mortgaged. For their failure to pay the loan obligation, DBP
of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy extrajudicially foreclosed the lot, wherein DBP, as the lone
which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement bidder, purchased the lot in the public auction conducted. The
of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a period of redemption then lapsed without Marcos and Tomasa
mere question of time but is principally a question of the redeeming the lot. DBP entered into a repurchase agreement
inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be with Marcos and Tomasa. The latter were able to repurchase
enforced or asserted. the lot from DBP and regained ownership over the lot.
It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of Afterwards, on November 14, 1980, Marcos and Tomasa sold
a court to sure affirmative relief against his opponent and, Lot No. 1305-A to respondent Guillermo.
after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or However, prior to the sale that occurred on November 14,
question that same jurisdiction. Furthermore, it has also been 1980, three separate unregistered sales, executed by Tomasa,
held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering and respondent’s sisters Josefin and Agripina in favor of
an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to Tomasa's cousin, petitioner Lino who allegedly took place
question the jurisdiction or power of the court. covering certain portions of Lot No. 1305-A spanning an area
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety of three hectares.
became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the Determined to recover possession of the portions of the lot
question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance occupied by petitioner Lino, respondent Guillermo, together
of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of with his wife Genoveva Lucero (respondents Sps. Lucero),
the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in instituted a Complaint for Recovery of Real Estate Property,
force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior Recovery of Possession, Quieting of Title, Damages, and
courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the Attorney's Fees against the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte. The
proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of case was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Tacurong City.
Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain The RTC rendered a Judgment voiding the two Deeds of
affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication Absolute Sale dated May 29, 1976 and June 17, 1980 entered
on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was into by petitioner Lino and respondent Guillermo's sisters
rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise Josefina and Agripina, respectively.The RTC held that during
the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct the time that these deeds were executed, Josefina and
on its part. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only Agripina had absolutely no right to convey the subject portions
patent but revolting. as the lot was owned by their parents, Marcos and Tomasa.
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 Marcos and Tomasa never authorized Josefina and Agripina to
DOCTRINE: Because of the elementary rule that jurisdiction sell any portion of the lot. However, the RTC declared that the
over the subject matter is conferred by law, jurisdiction cannot sale by Tomasa to petitioner Lino of the one-hectare portion
be bargained away by the litigant-parties. Otherwise stated, as on February 5, 1976 was valid and binding.
a general rule, a party cannot be estopped in raising the The CA denied the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte's appeal for lack
ground of lack of jurisdiction. And such ground may be raised of merit.
at any stage of the proceedings, whether during trial or on On their petition for review on certiorari, they are now
appeal. Nevertheless, it is well-established in our invoking the issue on the jurisdiction of the RTC considering
jurisprudence that, upon the existence of certain exceptional that the assessed value of the subject portions establish that
circumstances, a party is deemed to have waived his or her the jurisdiction of the Complaint falls within the Municipal Trial
right to raise the ground of lack of jurisdiction. In the instant Court of Tacurong City (MTC) and not the RTC.
case, it is only before this Court, after almost three long ISSUE: Whether sps. Rebamonte can invoke the issue on
decades of active and participative litigation, that the issue on Jurisdiction on the subject matter first time on appeal?
lack of jurisdiction was raised. The Court shall thus examine RULING:
whether the doctrine of estoppel by laches finds application. No. The Complaint filed by the respondents Sps. Lucero before
FACTS: the RTC for "Recovery of Real Estate Property, Recovery of
Involved in the case are two portions of land consisting of one Possession, Quieting of Title, Damages and for Attorney's
hectare each, which are parts of a bigger lot, i.e., Lot No. 1305- Fees" is unquestionably an action involving title to or
A. The said lot contains an area of 47,817 square meters, possession of real property, or any interest therein.
situated at Mamali II, Lambayong, Province of Cotabato (now According to Section 33(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129,
Sultan Kudarat) registered in the name of respondent otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,
Guillermo Lucero (Guillermo). The lot was previously owned by as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 7691, the MTC has
and registered in the name of respondent Guillermo's parents, exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve
Marcos Lucero (Marcos) and Tomasa Rebamonte (Tomasa). title to, or possession of, real property located outside Metro
Respondent parents, obtained a loan from the Rehabilitation

Manila, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the the ground of lack of jurisdiction after almost three decades of
property or interest therein does not exceed P20,000.00. litigation.
As admitted by the respondents Sps. Lucero in their Complaint, Therefore, the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte are estopped from
Lot No. 1305-A "has a total market assessed value of invoking the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The Court refuses to
P11,120.00. Hence, on the question of jurisdiction, the reward the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte's lethargy and
petitioners Sps. Rebamonte are correct in saying that the RTC ineptitude by taking cognizance of their argument on lack of
had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the instant case. jurisdiction. Equity, fair play, and public policy prevent the
Considering that the assessed value of the subject property, as Court from doing so.
alleged by the respondents Sps. Lucero in their Complaint, is
well below P20,000.00, the MTC has jurisdiction over the G.R. No. 178842, January 30, 2017
Complaint. RENE H. IMPERIAL AND NIDSLAND RESOURCES AND
While it is true that the Court has held that the jurisdiction of DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. HON.
a court may be questioned at any stage of the proceedings, and EDGAR L. ARMES, PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 4,
that lack of jurisdiction is one of those excepted grounds where REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, 5TH JUDICIAL REGION, LEGAZPI
the court may dismiss a claim or a case at any time when it CITY AND ALFONSO B. CRUZ, JR., Respondents.
appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that any
of those grounds exists, even if they were not raised in the FACTS:
answer or in a motion to dismiss, nevertheless, the Court has 1. Julian C. Napal (Napal) and Imperial entered into a
likewise pronounced that this general rule is not absolute. It is Memorandum of Agreement to organize a domestic
settled that, upon the existence of certain exceptional corporation to be named NIDSLAND. Under the Memorandum
circumstances, a party may be barred from raising lack of of Agreement, Napal and Imperial agreed to engage in the real
subject matter jurisdiction on the ground of estoppel. estate business. For his capital contribution to the corporation,
As already explained, the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte had Napal undertook to convey to NIDSLAND a tract of land
every right to question the jurisdiction of the RTC. Same as in consisting of four lots (the Property) covered by Transfer
Tijam, the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte utterly failed to invoke Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 37737, 37738, 37739 and 21026,
the ground of lack of jurisdiction despite having full knowledge and to Imperial a two hectare portion of the Property situated
of this ground, considering that the assessed value of the in Taysan, Legazpi City. Napal and Imperial intended to develop
subject lot was plainly indicated in the Complaint, a copy of this land into a subdivision. Imperial, on the other hand, as his
which was fully furnished to the petitioners. In fact, the contribution to NIDSLAND, committed to perform the
petitioners Sps. Rebamonte filed an Answer and an Amended following obligations: to settle Napal's obligation to the Rural
Answer in response to the categorical allegations in the Bank of Ligao, Inc., which was about to foreclose its mortgage
Complaint. Yet, the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte totally ignored on the Property; pay Napal's tax liabilities to the Bureau of
the issue on jurisdiction in their responsive pleadings. Not even Internal Revenue (BIR) which encumbered with a tax lien the
a whimper on lack of jurisdiction was made. largest portion of the Property; fund NIDSLAND's initial
As well, the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte participated in every operating capital; and provide for Napal's personal drawings in
stage of the proceedings before the RTC and CA. Aside from an amount not exceeding P1,200,000.
filing their Answer and Amended Answer, they even sought While Imperial faithfully complied with his obligations under
affirmative relief before the RTC by filing a counterclaim the Memorandum of Agreement, Napal failed to convey to
against the respondents Sps. Lucero. A Motion for NIDSLAND a certain portion of the Property.
Reconsideration was likewise filed by the petitioners Sps. As Napal continued to refuse to convey the Subject Property
Rebamonte before the RTC. Analogous to the factual to NIDSLAND under the Memorandum of Agreement, Imperial
circumstances in Tijam, the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte were filed on July 30, 1996, for himself and in representation of
also able to file an appeal and a Motion for Reconsideration NIDSLAND, a derivative suit (SEC Petition) before the Securities
before the CA. Yet, even before the CA, the ground of lack of and Exchange Commission. This was filed after the sale to Cruz
jurisdiction was never invoked. but before its registration.
In Tijam, the unreasonable delay that warranted the On November 10, 1998, SEC Hearing Officer Santer G. Gonzales
application of the doctrine of estoppel by laches spanned 15 (SEC Hearing Officer Gonzales) rendered a Decision in favor of
years. In Amoguis, the delay lasted for 22 years. In the instant Imperial and NIDSLAND (SEC Decision). The Decision declared
case, reckoned from the date of the receipt of the respondents the Deed of Absolute Sale between Napal and Cruz void ab
Sps. Lucero's Complaint in 1990 to the filing of the instant initio as the SEC found that the sale was simulated and was
Petition in 2018, which was the first time the ground of lack of intentionally made to appear to have been perfected prior to
jurisdiction was invoked by the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte, an the filing of the notice of lis pendens. Thus, the SEC ordered
outstandingly long period of 28 years has passed. To make the cancellation of the TCT in the name of Cruz. Further, the
matters worse, the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte fail to make SEC directed Napal to execute the proper deed of conveyance
any justification whatsoever explaining why they failed to raise of the Subject Property in favor of NIDSLAND. The SEC also

mandated Napal to deliver the possession of the Subject and in ordering the cancellation of Cruz's TCTs in favor of
Property to NIDSLAND. NIDSLAND, overstepped its jurisdiction. The SEC Decision was
Since Napal did not appeal the SEC Decision, it became final rendered with grave abuse of discretion.
and executory and was enforced on January 13, 1999. As Through the years that the SEC had quasi-judicial power over
ordered in the SEC Decision, a Deed of Conveyance was issued intracorporate controversies, this Court explained the
on the same date, transferring the Subject Property to delineation of jurisdiction between the trial courts and the
NIDSLAND. TCT No. 43936 in the name of Cruz was cancelled SEC. Our finding in this case that the SEC acted with grave
and a new TCT No. 49730 was issued in the name of NIDSLAND abuse of discretion is rooted on the proper understanding of
on January 19, 1999. the limits of the jurisdiction of the SEC. We now review this
Napal filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of Judgment Court's pertinent rulings on the jurisdiction of the SEC.
under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. The CA promulgated a The SEC also does not possess the expertise to go into the
Decision on August 31, 1999 dismissing the Petition for reception of evidence and the conduct of hearings geared for
Annulment of Judgment. The CA explained that Rule 47 of the the purpose of resolving issues proper for a civil action. The
Rules of Court is not available to annul the judgment of the resolution of a civil action requires preponderance of evidence
SEC. According to the CA, the proper remedy in this case is a as a burden of proof. On the other hand, cases before quasi-
special civil action for certiorari and prohibition. None of the judicial bodies require only substantial evidence. Hence, the
parties appealed the CA Decision. Cruz filed a pleading propriety of annulling a sale and cancelling a Torrens title-
denominated as a "Petition" before RTC Legazpi City (RTC which are in the nature of a civil action-on the basis merely of
Petition), which sought to nullify the SEC Decision. substantial evidence determined by an administrative body
2. Respondents filed a MTD for lack of jurisdiction. raises due process concerns.
RTC: DISMISSED. Presiding Judge Gregorio A. Consulta, without When grave abuse of discretion taints a judgment, it becomes
issuing summons, dismissed the Petition motu proprio. He wholly void. It may be challenged by direct action which has
justified his dismissal on the ground that regional trial courts for its object the declaration of the nullity of the judgment. It
have no jurisdiction over the SEC and as such, an action may also be set aside through a collateral attack.
assailing the decision of the SEC should be brought before the Hence, because the SEC Decision was issued with grave abuse
CA. of discretion and is therefore void, all acts emanating from it
CA: Aggrieved by the RTC Main Decision, Imperial and have no force and effect. Thus, the Deed of Conveyance issued
NIDSLAND filed before the CA an appeal under Rule 41 of the pursuant to it has no legal effect.
Rules of Court. In a Decision dated September 13, 2010 Nevertheless, while the certificates of title issued in the name
(Second Assailed Decision), the CA reversed the RTC Decision. of NIDSLAND arose from a void judgment, this Court cannot
ISSUE/S: The core issue is whether RTC Legazpi City has nullify them in these proceedings. The indefeasibility of a
jurisdiction to declare the nullity of the Decision of the SEC. To Torrens title prevents us from doing so. Further, we are bound
resolve this issue, we once again clarify the apparent 82 clash by rules on jurisdiction and the nature of the proceedings
of jurisdiction between the SEC and the ordinary courts in before us.
cases involving Presidential Decree No. 902-A. Moreover, there are procedural barriers that prevent us from
HELD: determining the validity of the certificates of title questioned
We rule that that the RTC Petition should have been dismissed in this case. First, we do not have jurisdiction over the
for lack of jurisdiction. We likewise rule that the SEC Decision cancellation of certificates of title. Second, the nature of the
was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to an action before us bars us from going into the certificates of title
excess of jurisdiction. There is no law at the time pertinent to themselves. We emphasize that this case is a petition for
this case, which allows the filing of a petition for annulment of review on certiorari of an action for annulment of judgment on
judgment before the regional trial courts and the CA to set the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Our ruling is anchored on the
aside a void judgment of the SEC on the basis of lack of lack of jurisdiction of the SEC to annul the sale to Cruz and
jurisdiction. We hasten to emphasize, however, that this order the cancellation of the certificates of title. In this
pertains only to cases filed prior to Republic Act No. 8799 (RA Decision, we emphasized that the proper jurisdiction to annul
8799) which transferred the jurisdiction over intra-corporate the sale and to cancel the certificates of title belongs to the
disputes to regional trial courts designated as commercial regular courts, in particular, the regional trial courts. We must
courts. As to the latter, Rule 47 clearly applies. thus also respect the rule on jurisdiction and exercise restraint
This leads to the conclusion that the RTC Petition is .not the in this case. The proper action to cancel the void certificates of
proper remedy to assail the SEC Decision. Since it is an action title must be brought before the tribunal designated by law to
for the annulment of judgment, the RTC Petition cannot possess jurisdiction over the matter. The proper party may,
prosper as we have already ruled that this remedy is not however, use this Decision as it definitively settles that the
available in this particular case. certificates of title issued to NIDSLAND arose out of a void
However, the error in Cruz's RTC Petition does not judgment and as such, should have no force and effect. This
automatically warrant a dismissal of these proceedings. We Decision is res judicata as to this question.
rule that the SEC, in nullifying the sale between Napa! and Cruz

Further, we also cannot rule on the validity of the sale of the of a Deed of Absolute Sale, over the property in favor of their
Subject Property to Cruz as well as Napal's obligation to co-respondents spouses Recto and Rosemarie Candelario.
Imperial and NIDSLAND under the Memorandum of The petitioners filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and
Agreement. These matters require the presentation of facts Damages against respondents. The petitioners claimed that
before the proper forum and through appropriate procedural they have received the subject property and the house
remedies. While we endeavor to fully settle legal disputes constructed thereon, and that they have been in adverse,
brought before us, we must also place premium on the open, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the
importance of rules of procedure. Rules of procedure serve to property for over four decades. The petitioners also denied
protect the interests of litigants who seek redress before the participating in the execution of the Deed of Adjudication, and
courts. They ensure that litigants plead before the proper Agreement of Subdivision.
forum that has the necessary expertise and legal tools to fully The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petitioners’ complaint,
resolve a legal problem. They also ensure that litigants employ finding no merit in the assertion that they have acquired title
the proper remedies that will allow them to successfully obtain over the property through prescription. The transfer of the
the appropriate relief. With this in mind, litigants must be interests of the respondent siblings in favor of spouses
more circumspect in invoking the jurisdiction of the various Candelario was upheld.
tribunals and the multiple remedies available to them. In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, the petitioners claimed
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals' that the partition should no longer be allowed for being barred
Resolution dated March 6, 2007 in the First Consolidated Case by res judicata - since a case for partition was dismissed with
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Further, we rule that Branch 4, finality.
Regional Trial Court, Legazpi City has no jurisdiction over Cruz's The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Petition. Thus, the Regional Trial Court's Decision dated March ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents’ partition is barred by
24, 2009 is NULLIFIED. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated res judicata.
September 13, 2010 in the Second Consolidated Case is also HELD: NO. There is res judicata when the following requisites
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. We rule that the Securities and are present: (1) the formal judgment or order must be final; (2)
Exchange Commission's Decision dated November 10, 1998 is it must be a judgment or order on the merits; (3) it must be
VOID. Thus, the Deed of Conveyance dated January 13, 1999 rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
executed in compliance with this Decision is NULLIFIED. The and the parties; and (4) there must be identity of parties, of
proper parties can file the appropriate petition for cancellation subject matter, and of cause of action between the first and
of title in the trial court which has jurisdiction to nullify the second actions.
certificates of title issued to NIDSLAND by virtue of the void The question to be answered is whether or not the dismissal of
SEC Decision. the Civil case on the partition operated as a dismissal on the
RULE 17: DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS merits that would complete the requirements of res judicata.
Vilma Quintos, Florencia I. Dancel, and Catalino L. Ibarra v. The petitioners cited Rule 17, Section 3, to wit the dismissal of
Pelagia I. Nicolas, Noli L. Ibarra, Santiago L. Ibarra, Pedro L. a case due to the plaintiff’s fault has the effect of adjudication
Ibarra, David l. Ibarra, Gilberto L. Ibarra, Heirs of Augusto on the merits, and is necessarily understood to be with
L. Ibarra, namely Conchita R. Ibarra, Apolonio Ibarra, and prejudice to the filing of another action, unless otherwise
Narciso Ibarra, and the spouses Recto Candelario and provided in the order of dismissal. Stated differently, the
Rosemarie Candelario general rule is that dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute
G.R. No. 210252 ; June 16, 2014 is to be regarded as an adjudication on the merits and with
prejudice to the filing of another action, and the only exception
DOCTRINE: is when the order of dismissal expressly contains a
The right of the co-owner to demand the partition of the thing qualification that the dismissal is without prejudice.
owned in common under Article 494 of the Civil Code is an Nevertheless, dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Section
exception to Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Court to the 3, cannot defeat the right of a co-owner to ask for partition
effect that even if the order of dismissal for failure to anytime, provided that there is no actual adjudication of
prosecute is silent on whether or not it is with prejudice, it shall ownership of shares. Article 494 of the Civil Code is an
be deemed without prejudice. exception to Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Court to the
FACTS: effect that even if the order of dismissal for failure to
The parents of the Ibarras were the owner of a parcel of land prosecute is silent on whether or not it is with prejudice, it shall
in Camiling Tarlac. In 2002, the respondent siblings brought an be deemed without prejudice.
action for partition against the petitioners. The care was To construe that the Rule 17, Section 3 should prevail over
however dismissed for failure of the parties to appear despite Article 494 of the Civil Code would diminish the substantive
due notice. rights of a co-owner through the promulgation of procedural
The respondent siblings executed a Deed of Adjudication to rules. A substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural
transfer the property in favor of the ten siblings. The rule.
respondent siblings sold their 7/10 undivided share, by virtue

DANTE Y. GO, petitioner, vs. HON. FERNANDO CRUZ,
Judge, etc., CITY SHERIFF OF CALOOCAN CITY, and APPEAL BY CERTIORARI
CALIFORNIA MANUFACTURING CO., INC., respondents. DOCTRINE: A dismissal order is generally deemed to be
without prejudice to the filing of another action. The only
PETITION FOR REVIEWON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 instance when dismissal of an action is with prejudice is, when
DOCTRINE: The dismissal of civil actions is always addressed to the order itself so states. (Sec. 2, Rule 17) Stated differently,
the sound judgment and discretion of the court; this, whether when the court issues, upon the plaintiff's instance, a dismissal
the dismissal is sought after a trial has been completed or order that is silent as to whether it is with or without prejudice,
otherwise, 1 or whether it is prayed for by a defending party, such as in the case at bar, the presumption is, that it is without
2 or by a plaintiff or claimant. 3 There is one instance however prejudice.
where the dismissal of an action rests exclusively on the will of FACTS: The disputed land was under the name of Maximiniana
a plaintiff or claimant, to prevent which the defending party Crisostomo and Ana Billena, wife and daughter, respectively of
and even the court itself is powerless, requiring in fact no the deceased Esteban Billena.
action whatever on the part of the court except the acceptance Maximiniana died during the Japanese occupation, leaving
and recording of the causative document. This is dealt with in behind her only child Ana who was then married to Fortunato
Section 1, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. Vallangca with whom she had 3 children: Benjamin, Rodolfo
FACTS: California Manufacturing filed a case before CFI Manila and Alfredo, petitioners herein.
against petitioner for unfair competition. California averred The controversy began when Fortunato died and his widow
that petitioner is doing business under the name and style of Ana, together with her eldest son Benjamin, mortgaged the
Sugarland International Products and engaged in the land to her cousin Nazario Rabanes (private respondent
manufacture of pasta products under the brand name Great herein) for Eight Hundred Pesos (P800.00) in Japanese war
Italian. in packages which were in colorable and deceitful notes, to cover the burial expenses of her deceased husband
imitation of California's containers bearing its own brand, Fortunato Vallangca. The agreement was not reduced to
"Royal." Its complaint contained an application for preliminary writing but at time of said mortgage, the land was already
injunction commanding Dante Go to immediately cease and mortgaged to PNB.
desist from the further manufacture, sale and distribution of After the Pacific war, Rabanes went to the residence of Ana
said products, and to retrieve those already being offered for and made her sign a document which was represented as a
sale. mortgage contract written in the Ilocano dialect. Being an
California filed a notice of dismissal with the court. California illiterate and trusting in her cousin, Ana affixed her signature
received by registered mail a copy of Dante Go's answer with on the document.
counterclaim. This has been filed prior to the Notice of Ana was informed by a cousin of Rabanes and another witness
Dismissal of California. This remained pending before CFI that the alleged mortgage contract was actually a deed of
Manila. absolute sale to Rabanes of the land. Ana and Benjamin went
California filed another complaint asserting the same cause of to Rabanes for the purpose of redeeming the land and
action against Dante Go, this time with the CFI Caloocan. tendering the loan amount of P800.00 in Philippine currency.
CFI Caloocan – issued an order directing petitioner to cease However, Rabanes told them that the land could no longer be
and desist from manufacturing and selling pasta products redeemed and he drove them out of his house.
contained in said packaging. Since Ana and her 3 sons were in possession and actual
Issue: WON CFI Caloocan’s ruling is correct (YES) cultivation of the land in question, Rabanes filed against them
Ruling: Here, California filed its notice of dismissal of its action an injunction suit before the CFI of Cagayan. At the pre-trial,
in the Manila Court after the filing of Dante Go's answer but Rabanes was advised by the trial court that injunction was not
before service thereof. Thus having acted well within the letter the proper cause of action, because injunction was merely an
and contemplation of the afore-quoted Section 1 of Rule 17 of ancillary or provisional remedy to a main action. Accordingly,
the Rules of Court, its notice ipso facto brought about the Rabanes filed another complaint entitled "Recovery of
dismissal of the action then pending in the Manila Court, Possession".
without need of any order or other action by the Presiding CFI: DISMISSED the action for injunction
Judge. The dismissal was effected without regard to whatever In Respondent Rabanes’ version, Ana knowingly signed a deed
reasons or motives California might have had for bringing it of absolute sale as she had actually sold and not merely
about, and was, as the same Section 1, Rule 17 points out, mortgaged the land in controversy for P800.00. Rabanes
"without prejudice," the contrary not being otherwise "stated alleged that from then on, his tenants, Serapio dela Cruz and
in the notice" and it being the first time the action was being Fernando Gagmante, cultivated the land, until they were
so dismissed. driven out by the sons of Ana.
BENJAMIN VALLANGCA, RODOLFO VALLANGCA and CFI: In the second action involving recovery of possession,
ALFREDO VALLANGCA, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF plaintiff Rabanes (herein respondent) was declared as the
APPEALS and NAZARIO RABANES, respondents. rightful owner of the land and ordered the defendants (herein
[G.R. No. L-55336. May 4, 1989.] petitioners) to vacate the same.

CA: AFFIRMED in toto the trial court's judgment, after finding administration from President Fidel V. Ramos to President
no reversible error therein Joseph Ejercito Estrada, he filed before the Supreme Court a
ISSUE: WON the dismissal of the suit for injunction was made petition for prohibition against the herein petitioners.
with prejudice 2. As respondent Gordon apprehended, upon assuming office,
HELD: NO. President Estrada issued Administrative Order No. 1 canceling
Petitioners would also like to impress that the dismissal order the appointment of respondent Gordon as Chairman of the
in the injunction suit, not having been made without prejudice, SBMA.
bars the second action for recovery of possession. Under Sec. 3. On July 1, 1998, respondent Gordon filed a "Notice of
2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court which provides: Withdrawal of [his] Petition for Prohibition." This was done at
"Sec. 2. Dismissal by order of the court. — Except as provided 9:21 in the morning. At 11:30 A.M. of that same day, he filed a
in the preceding section, an action shall not be dismissed at the petition for certiorari and prohibition in the RTC of Olongapo
plaintiffs instance save upon order of the court and upon such City.
terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a 4. The filing of the case in the Olongapo court gave rise to the
counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the present petition to declare respondents in contempt of court.
service upon him of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss, the action Petitioners claim that "the act of respondents in filing two
shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection unless petitions involving the same issues before the Supreme Court
the counterclaim can remain pending for independent and the RTC at Olongapo City, both pending, constitutes
adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise specified in the forum-shopping and contempt of court."
order, a dismissal under this paragraph shall be without ISSUE: W/N respondents are guilty of forum shopping and
prejudice." should therefore be declared in contempt of court. (NO)
A dismissal order is generally deemed to be without prejudice RULING: Forum-shopping consists of filing multiple suits
to the filing of another action. The only instance when involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
dismissal of an action is with prejudice is, when the order itself simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a
so states. Stated differently, when the court issues, upon the favorable judgment. Thus, it has been held that there is forum-
plaintiff's instance, a dismissal order that is silent as to whether shopping —
it is with or without prejudice, such as in the case at bar, the (1) whenever as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, a
presumption is, that it is without prejudice. The cases cited 10 party seeks a favorable decision (other than by appeal or
by petitioners to support their contention cannot be made to certiorari) in another, or
apply here as they deal with dismissal orders issued as a result (2) if, after he has filed a petition before the Supreme Court, a
of plaintiff's failure to prosecute, and are covered by Section 3, party files another before the Court of Appeals since in such
and not Section 2, Rule 17 which provides: case he deliberately splits appeals "in the hope that even as
"Sec. 3. Failure to prosecute. — If plaintiff fails to appear at the one case in which a particular remedy is sought is dismissed,
time of the trial, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable another case (offering a similar remedy) would still be open,"
length of time, or to comply with these rules or any order of or
the court, the action may be dismissed upon motion of the (3) where a party attempts to obtain a preliminary injunction
defendant or upon the court's own motion. This dismissal shall in another court after failing to obtain the same from the
have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless original court.
otherwise provided by court." Conversely, since a party resorts to forum-shopping in order to
Dismissals of actions under Section 3 which do not expressly increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision, a party
state whether they are with or without prejudice are held to cannot be said to have sought to improve his chances of
be with prejudice or on the merits. obtaining a favorable decision where no unfavorable decision
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY and ARTURO C. LOMIBAO, has ever been rendered against him in any of the cases he has
petitioners, vs. RICHARD J. GORDON, ANACLETO M. DIAS, brought before the courts.
and ORLANDO E. MENDIOLA, respondents. In the case at bar, although respondent Gordon filed a petition
G.R. No. 134171 November 18, 1998 for prohibition before this Court and, after two days, filed
substantially the same petition before the RTC of Olongapo
Petition to Declare Respondents in Contempt of Court City, the fact remains that (1) before filing his petition in the
DOCTRINE: Since a party resorts to forum-shopping in order to Olongapo court he first flied a notice of withdrawal of his
increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision, a party petition which this Court later granted and (2) he withdrew his
cannot be said to have sought to improve his chances of petition in this Court for the following reason:
obtaining a favorable decision where no unfavorable decision Due, however, to the present policy of the Court requiring
has ever been rendered against him in any of the cases he has parties and their counsel to adhere strictly to the hierarchy of
brought before the courts. courts and in order to obviate any technical objection on this
FACTS: 1. Because of respondent Gordon's apprehension that ground, petitioner has deemed it fit to withdraw, as he hereby
he would be removed as chairman of the Subic Bay withdraws, the instant petition so that it may be filed in the
Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) upon the change of proper court where it can be ventilated on its merits.

No adverse decision had been rendered by this Court against FACTS: Petitioners obtained a loan from FEBTC secured by a
respondent Gordon for which reason he thought it proper to real estate mortgage. Petitioners failed to comply with the
institute the second action in the trial court. The situation he terms of the loan agreement so FEBTC filed an application for
found himself in is similar to that in which a party, after filing a extra-judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage with the
suit, realizes he made a mistake because the court in which he Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the
has brought the case has no jurisdiction. He, therefore, Marikinia RTC.
withdraws his action and refiles it in the proper forum. It is FEBTC's application was granted and a Notice of Sheriff's Sale
clear from respondents' actions and explanation that they had was issued, duly published in Rizal-Metro Gazette, and was
no intention of disregarding court processes. They in fact certified by the Sheriff to have been duly posted in 3 public
complied with Rule 7, §5 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. places where the properties were located.
This case is distinguishable from E. Razon, Inc. v. The Philippine FEBTC was the only bidder thereby causing the sheriff to
Port Authority. In the E. Razon case, petitioners, after filing a postpone the public auction sale..
petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a The properties were sold at public auction to FEBTC as the
temporary restraining order in the SC, filed an hour later a highest bidder, and a Certificate of Sale was issued in its favor.
similar petition before the RTC and, having been assured of a Almost two years later, petitioners, together with 7 others,
favorable action by the latter court, then sought the filed a case for "Annulment of Extra-judicial Foreclosure and/or
withdrawal of the petition in this Court. Petitioners were found Nullification of Sale and the Certificates of Title, plus Damages
guilty of forum-shopping. "The acts of petitioners constitute a and with Prayer for a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary
clear case of forum-shopping an act of malpractice that is Injunction." They questioned the validity of the auction sale for
proscribed and condemned as trifling with the courts and alleged lack of posting and publication requirements.
abusing their processes," it was held. Impleaded as defendants BPI, FEBTC, Julia Cecily Coching-
In contrast, in the case at bar, while it is true that Gordon and Sosito, in her capacity as Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff
his counsels did not wait for this Court to act on the "Notice of of the RTC of Marikina City, and the Register of Deeds (ROD) of
Withdrawal of Petition" filed by them before filing Marikina City.
substantially the same petition in the RTC, the Court RTC: DENIED plaintiffs' application for TRO and/or Writ of
understands their situation. They were faced with a Preliminary Injunction. Six months later, the RTC issued an
predicament: Administrative Order I ousting Gordon from the Order dismissing the complaint for failure to prosecute for an
chairmanship of the SMBA had been issued and was in fact unreasonable length of time.
about to be enforced hence a writ of preliminary injunction Petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule
had to be obtained if Gordon was to remain in office. By no 65.
means does the Court by the present decision wish to convey CA: DISMISSED petition.
the impression that it will tolerate any act of disrespect or ISSUE: WON CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari
discourtesy. To be sure, respondents could have apologized at HELD: NO. CA correctly ruled that the proper remedy is appeal.
the very least for the time of the Court which they had taken A writ of certiorari lies only for an error of jurisdiction. It can
and made an effort to explain why they have to refile their case be availed of only if the lower tribunal has acted without or in
without awaiting the Court's resolution on their notice of excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
withdrawal of the petition. But, exercising restraint lest a amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and if there is no
contrary action be seen as mere peeve or petulance, and appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
considering this case instead with compassion, bearing in mind ordinary course of law. Where the error is not one of
that the purpose of contempt is preservative rather than jurisdiction but an error of law or fact which is a mistake of
punitive, this Court has chosen to overlook respondents' lapse. judgment, certiorari is not available. In such case, the remedy
WHEREFORE, the petition for contempt is DISMISSED. is appeal.
BENEDICTA M. SAMSON and MARCIAL M. SAMSON, The assailed RTC Order was issued when petitioners failed to
petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE GERALDINE C. FIEL- move for a pre-trial of the case for annulment of the extra-
MACARAIG, BPI, FEBTC, ATTY. JULIA CECILY COCHING- judicial foreclosure in accordance with Section 1, Rule 18 of the
SOSITO, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR MARIKINA CITY, ROC.
respondents. The ordered dismissed the case with prejudice for failure to
[G.R. No. 166356. February 2, 2010.] prosecute for an unreasonable length of time, pursuant to
Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court which states, thus:
PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 45 Section 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. — If, for no
DOCTRINE: Dismissal of the case for failure to prosecute for an justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the
unreasonable length of time in accordance with Sec. 3 of Rule presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to
17 shall be with prejudice or with the effect of an adjudication prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to
upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court. The comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the
proper remedy is appeal. complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or
upon the court's own motion, without prejudice to the right of

the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in by a real estate mortgage (REM) over its properties. BDO filed
a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an an application for extrajudicial foreclosure before the Office of
adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the the Ex-Officio Sheriff, RTC. A notice was issued setting the
court. auction sale of the mortgaged properties. Petitioners filed a
The RTC Order was a final judgment which disposed of the case complaint for the annulment of REM. BDO filed a motion to
on the merits. This was even clarified in the subsequent RTC dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action but it was
Order (which denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration) denied. BDO then filed its answer. The petitioners failed to
wherein the lower court stated that: "Therefore, the dismissal appear twice during the pre-trial conference despite notice.
was 'with prejudice' or a dismissal that had the effect of Hence, the case was also dismissed twice. After the last
adjudication upon the merits in accordance with Section 3, reconsideration, the case was once again dismissed due to
Rule 17 of the Rules of Court." failure to prosecute. Petitioners appealed to the CA but it
The remedy to obtain reversal or modification of the judgment affirmed the trial court’s dismissal.
on the merits is appeal. The availability of the right to appeal ISSUE: Whether the dismissal of the case against the
precludes recourse to the special civil action for certiorari. The petitioners is proper.
RTC Order subject of the petition was a final judgment which RULING: YES. Under Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
disposed of the case on the merits; hence, it was a subject for Procedure, as amended, the failure on the part of the plaintiff,
an ordinary appeal, not a petition for certiorari. without any justifiable cause, to comply with any order of the
As mentioned earlier, the RTC issued the assailed Order in court or the Rules, or to prosecute his action for an
accordance with Section 3, Rule 17, in relation to Section 1, unreasonable length of time, may result in the dismissal of the
Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. complaint either motu proprio or on motion by the defendant.
We agree with private respondent BPI that the failure of the The failure of a plaintiff to prosecute the action without any
Ex-Officio Sheriff to file her Answer should not have prevented justifiable cause within a reasonable period of time will give
petitioners from performing their duty under Section 1 of Rule rise to the presumption that he is no longer interested to
18. Petitioners could have availed of other remedies, such as obtain from the court the relief prayed for in his complaint;
the filing of a motion to declare Ex-Officio Sheriff in default, to hence, the court is authorized to order the dismissal of the
avoid unnecessary delay in court proceedings. complaint on its own motion or on motion of the defendants.
ELOISA MERCHANDISING, INC. and TREBEL The presumption is not, by any means, conclusive because the
INTERNATIONAL, INC, Petitioner vs. BANCO DE ORO plaintiff, on a motion for reconsideration of the order of
UNIVERSAL BANK and ENGRACIO M. ESCASINAS, JR., in his dismissal, may allege and establish a justifiable cause for such
capacity as ExOfficio Sheriff of the RTC of Makati City failure. The burden to show that there are compelling reasons
Respondent that would make a dismissal of the case unjustified is on the
G.R. No. 192716 June 13, 2012 petitioners.
However, despite the trial court's leniency and admonition,
Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 petitioners continued to exhibit laxity and inattention in
DOCTRINE: attending to their case. Assuming domestic problems had
The failure of a plaintiff to prosecute the action without any beset petitioners' counsel in the interregnum, with greater
justifiable cause within a reasonable period of time will give reason should he make proper coordination with the trial court
rise to the presumption that he is no longer interested to to ensure his availability on the date to be chosen by the trial
obtain from the court the relief prayed for in his complaint; court for the long-delayed conduct of a pre-trial conference.
hence, the court is authorized to order the dismissal of the Petitioners themselves did nothing to get the case moving for
complaint on its own motion or on motion of the defendants. nine months and set the case anew for pre-trial even as BDO
However, despite the trial court's leniency and admonition, was already seeking their judicial ejectment with the
petitioners continued to exhibit laxity and inattention in implementation of the writ of possession issued by Branch
attending to their case. Assuming domestic problems had 143. Such circumstance also belies their pretense that the
beset petitioners' counsel in the interregnum, with greater parties were then still negotiating for a settlement. We have
reason should he make proper coordination with the trial court held that a party cannot blame his counsel when he himself
to ensure his availability on the date to be chosen by the trial was guilty of neglect; and that the laws aid the vigilant, not
court for the long-delayed conduct of a pretrial conference. those who slumber on their rights. Vigilantibus sed non
Petitioners themselves did nothing to get the case moving for dormientibus jura subveniunt (The laws aid the vigilant, not
nine months and set the case anew for pre-trial even as BDO those who slumber on their rights.).
was already seeking their judicial ejectment with the HEIRS OF DR. MARIANO FAVIS, SR, et. al., Petitioners, vs.
implementation of the writ of possession issued by Branch JUANA GONZALES, her son MARIANO FAVIS, MA. THERESA
143. JOANA D. FAVIS, JAMES MARK D. FAVIS, et. al.,
FACTS: Respondents
Respondent BDO extended a credit accommodation to G.R. No. 185922 , JANUARY 15, 2014
petitioner Eloisa Merchandising, Inc. (EMI) and it was secured Petition for Review

DOCTRINE In the case of Katon v. Palanca, Jr., the Court held that the motu
“[A] failure to allege earnest but failed efforts at a compromise proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally limited to
in a complaint among members of the same family, is not a instances when (a) the court clearly had no jurisdiction over
jurisdictional defect but merely a defect in the statement of a the subject matter and (b) when the plaintiff did not appear
cause of action.” during trial, failed to prosecute his action for an unreasonable
FACTS length of time or neglected to comply with the rules or with
Dr. Favis was married to Capitolina, with whom he had seven any order of the court (as provided under Sec. 3, Rule 17).
children. Upon the death of his wife, Dr. Favis took Juana as his At the time of this decision, Rule 16 was still applicable. The
commonlaw wife with whom he sired one child, Mariano (jr.). Court went on to discuss that the failure to allege that earnest
Upon their marriage, Dr. Favis executed an affidavit efforts toward a compromise have been made but had failed
acknowledging Mariano as one of his legitimate children. is a ground for motion to dismiss, particularly that a condition
Mariano was subsequently married to Larcelita, with whom he precedent for filing a claim has not been complied with.
has four children. (Juana’s side of the marriage are the However, with the Revised Rules, such ground must be raised
respondents in this instant petition). as an affirmative defense in the answer under Sec. 12, Rule 8.
Dr. Favis died intestate, leaving several properties. However, Clearly, the Rule requires that the [affirmative defenses under
before his death, he allegedly executed a Deed of Donation Sec. 12, Rule 8] should be [raised in the answer]. If the
transferring and conveying properties in favor of his defendant fails to raise it as an affirmative defense, such
grandchildren with Juana. defense will be barred. The only exception to this rule are the
Dr. Favis’ children with Capitolina (herein petitioners) filed an four aforementioned under Sec. 1 of Rule 9.
action for annulment of the said deed, along with inventory, In the case at hand, the proceedings before the trial court ran
liquidation and partition of property before the RTC. In their the full course. The complaint of petitioners was answered by
Answer with Counterclaim, respondents assert that the respondents without a prior motion to dismiss having been
properties donated do not form part of the estate of the late filed [NOTE: again, the rule on motion to dismiss is still in force
Dr. FAvis because said donation was made inter vivos, hence during the time of this case]. The decision in favor of the
petitioners have no stake over said properties. petitioners was appealed by respondents on the basis of the
The RTC, in its Pre-Trial Order, limited the issues to the validity alleged error in the ruling on the merits, no mention having
of the deed of donation and whether or not respondent Juana been made about any defect in the statement of a cause of
and Mariano are compulsory heirs of Dr. Favis. action.
The RTC nullified the Deed of Donation. Favis, at the age of 92 Therefore, the rule on deemed waiver of the non-
and ill, could not have had full control of his mental capacities jurisdicitional defense is wholly applicable to respondent. If
to execute such deed. Still, Juana and Mariano were declared the respondents as parties-defendants could not, and did not,
compulsory heirs. after filing their answer to petitioner’s complaint, invoke the
On appeal, the CA dismissed the petitioners’ nullification case affirmative defense of the absence of the required allegation
but on grounds different from those invoked by respondents. on earnest efforts at a compromise, the appellate court
The appellate court motu proprio ordered the dismissal of the unquestionably did not have any authority or basis to motu
complaint for failure of petitioners to make an averment that proprio order the dismissal of the petitioner’s complaint.
earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, as Furthermore, the purpose of Art. 151 of the Family Code in
mandated by Art. 151 of the Family Code. The appellate court making sure that there is no longer any possibility of a
justified its order of dismissal by invoking its authority to compromise has been served in this case. The facts show that
review rulings of the trial court even if they are not assigned as compromise was never an option insofar as respondents were
errors in the appeal. concerned. The impossibility of compromise instead of
ISSUE litigation was shown not alone by the absence of a motion to
● Whether or not the appellate court may dismiss the dismiss* [NOTE: Again, today, an affirmative defense] but on
order of dismissal of the complaint for failure to allege therein respondents’ insistence on the validity of the donation in their
that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made. favor of the subject properties. The Pre-Trial Order specifically
(NO) limited the issues to this and the status of respondents as
RULING compulsory heirs of Dr. Favis. Respondents not only confined
Failure to allege earnest but failed efforts at a compromise in their arguments within the pre-trail order; after losing their
a complaint among members of the same family, is not a case, their appeal was based on the proposition that it was
jurisdictional defect but merely a defect in the statement of a error for the trial court to have relied on the ground of vitiated
cause of action. consent on the part of Dr. Favis.
Sec. 1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances when the court The Court of Appeals ignored the facts of the case that clearly
may motu proprio dismiss the claim, namely (a) lack of demonstrated the refusal by the respondents to compromise.
jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis pendentia; (c) res Instead it ordered the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint on
judicata; and (d) prescription of action. the ground that it did not allege what in fact was shown during
the trial. The error of the CA is patent.

As to the other issue, the validity of donation was already fully Preliminary Injunction" against Ramon Ching and Po Wing
litigated and discussed by the trial court. The CA, Properties (the third case) and was eventually raffled to Branch
unfortunately, chose to confine its review on the procedural 6.
aspect. In effect, the judgment of the CA is deemed to have CA: Dismissed the first certiorari case. Ramon Ching and Po
covered all issues including the correctness of the factual Wing Properties’ reliance on the "two-dismissal rule" was
findings of the trial court. Thus, the judgment of the RTC is misplaced since the rule involves two motions for dismissals
affirmed. filed by the plaintiff only.
Upon the denial of their motion for reconsideration, Ramon
RAMON CHING AND PO WING PROPERTIES, INC., Ching and Po Wing Properties filed this present petition for
Petitioners, v. JOSEPH CHENG, JAIME CHENG, MERCEDES review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
IGNE1 AND LUCINA SANTOS, Respondents. ISSUES:
G.R. No. 175507 October 08, 2014 I. Whether the trial court’s dismissal of the second case
operated as a bar to the filing of a third case, as per the "two-
FACTS: Respondents filed a complaint for declaration of nullity dismissal rule"
of titles against Ramon Ching before the RTC Manila Branch 6. RULING:
The complaint was amended, with leave of court, to implead I. NO. Rule 17 of the Rules of Civil Procedure governs dismissals
additional defendants, including Po Wing Properties, of which of actions at the instance of the plaintiff. Hence, the "two-
Ramon Ching was a primary stockholder. The amended dismissal rule" under Rule 17, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil
complaint was for "Annulment of Agreement, Waiver, Extra- Procedure will not apply if the prior dismissal was done at the
Judicial Settlement of Estate and the Certificates of Title Issued instance of the defendant. Dismissals upon the instance of the
by Virtue of Said Documents with Prayer for Temporary defendant are generally governed by Rule 16, which covers
Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction." motions to dismiss.
Sometime after, Lucina Santos filed a motion for intervention As a general rule, dismissals under Section 1 of Rule 17 are
and was allowed to intervene. without prejudice except when it is the second time that the
After the responsive pleadings had been filed, Po Wing plaintiff caused its dismissal. Accordingly, for a dismissal to
Properties filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of operate as an adjudication upon the merits, i.e, with prejudice
jurisdiction of the subject matter. The RTC granted the motion to the re-filing of the same claim, the following requisites must
to dismiss. Upon motion of the Chengs’ counsel, however, the be present:
Chengs and Lucina Santos were given fifteen (15) days to file (1) There was a previous case that was dismissed by a
the appropriate pleading. They did not do so. competent court;
The Chengs and Lucina Santos filed a complaint for (2) Both cases were based on or include the same claim;
"Annulment of Agreement, Waiver, Extra-Judicial Settlement (3) Both notices for dismissal were filed by the plaintiff; and
of Estate and the Certificates of Title Issued by Virtue of Said (4) When the motion to dismiss filed by the plaintiff was
Documents with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and consented to by the defendant on the ground that the latter
Writ of Preliminary Injunction" against Ramon Ching and Po paid and satisfied all the claims of the former.
Wing Properties (the second case) and raffled to Branch 20 of The purpose of the "two-dismissal rule" is "to avoid vexatious
the RTC Manila. When Branch 20 was made aware of the first litigation."When a complaint is dismissed a second time, the
case, it issued an order transferring the case to Branch 6, plaintiff is now barred from seeking relief on the same claim.
considering that the case before it involved substantially the The dismissal of the second case was without prejudice in view
same parties and causes of action. of the "two-dismissal rule"
The Chengs and Lucina Santos filed a motion to dismiss their Here, the first case was filed as an ordinary civil action. It was
complaint in the second case, praying that it be dismissed later amended to include not only new defendants but new
without prejudice. RTC issued an order granting the motion to causes of action that should have been adjudicated in a special
dismiss on the basis that the summons had not yet been served proceeding. A motion to dismiss was inevitably filed by the
on Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties, and they had not yet defendants on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
filed any responsive pleading. The dismissal of the first case was done at the instance of the
Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties filed a motion for defendant under Rule 16, Section 1. Under Section 5 of the
reconsideration of the order. They argue that the dismissal same rule, a party may re-file the same action or claim subject
should have been with prejudice under the "two dismissal to certain exceptions.
rule" of Rule 17, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Thus, when respondents filed the second case, they were
in view of the previous dismissal of the first case. merely refiling the same claim that had been previously
During the pendency of the motion for reconsideration, the dismissed on the basis of lack of jurisdiction. When they moved
Chengs and Lucina Santos filed a complaint for "Disinheritance to dismiss the second case, the motion to dismiss can be
and Declaration of Nullity of Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit considered as the first dismissal at the plaintiff’s instance.
of Extra judicial Agreement, Deed of Absolute Sale, and When respondents filed the third case on substantially the
Transfer Certificates of Title with Prayer for TRO and Writ of same claim, there was already one prior dismissal at the

instance of the plaintiffs and one prior dismissal at the instance Section 2. Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff. - Except as
of the defendants. provided in the preceding section, a complaint shall not be
While it is true that there were two previous dismissals on the dismissed at the plaintiffs instance save upon approval of the
same claim, it does not necessarily follow that the re-filing of court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems
the claim was barred by Rule 17, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant
Procedure. The circumstances surrounding each dismissal prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion for
must first be examined to determine before the rule may dismissal, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint. The
apply, as in this case. Thus, the trial court's dismissal of the dismissal shall be without prejudice to the right of the
second case is not a bar to the filing of the third case. defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in a separate action
unless within fifteen (15) days from notice of the motion he
ALEX RAUL B. BLAY, Petitioner vs. CYNTHIA B. BANA, manifests his preference to have his counterclaim resolved in
Respondent the same action. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a
G.R. No. 232189 March 7, 2018 dismissal under this paragraph shall be without prejudice. A
FACTS: 45 class suit shall not be dismissed or compromised without the
Petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of approval of the court.
Nullity of Marriage. A MANIFESTATION MUST BE FILE WITHIN 15 DAYS FROM
However, petitioner later lost interest over the case, and thus, NOTICE OF DISMISSAL TO PROSECUTE THE COUNTER-CLAIM,
filed a Motion to Withdraw his petition. OTHERWISE FILE A SEPARATE ACTION
Respondent thereto, invoked Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Stated in the third sentence of Section 2, Rule 17, if the
Court and prayed that her counterclaims be declared as defendant desires to prosecute his counterclaim in the same
remaining for the court's independent adjudication. Petitioner action, he is required to file a manifestation within fifteen (15)
averred that respondent's counterclaims are barred. In days from notice of the motion. Otherwise, his counterclaim
particular, petitioner alleged that respondent filed the may be prosecuted in a separate action. As explained by
required manifestation only on March 30, 2015. However, renowned remedial law expert, former Associate Justice
respondent's counsel received a copy of petitioner's Motion to Florenz D. Regalado, in his treatise on the matter:
Withdraw on March 11, 2015; hence, respondent had only Under this revised section, where the plaintiff moves for the
until March 26, 2015 to manifest before the trial court her dismissal of the complaint to which a counterclaim has been
desire to prosecute her counterclaims in the same action. interpose, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint. Such
The RTC granted the motion to withdraw and respondent’s dismissal shall be without prejudice to the right of the
counter-claim. defendant to either prosecute his counterclaim in a separate
The CA dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. It found no grave action or to have the same resolved in the same action. Should
abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC, holding that under he opt for the first alternative, the court should render the
Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, if a counterclaim has corresponding order granting and reserving his right to
been filed by the defendant before the service upon him of the prosecute his claim in a separate complaint. Should he choose
petitioner’s motion for dismissal, the dismissal shall be limited to have his counterclaim disposed of in the same action
to the complaint. wherein the complaint had been dismissed, he must manifest
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC within 15 days from notice to him of plaintiff's motion to
Orders declaring respondent's counterclaim for independent dismiss.
adjudication before the same trial court. The rationale behind this rule is not difficult to discern: the
HELD: the CA confined the application of Section 2, Rule 17 to passing of the fifteen (15)-day period triggers the finality of the
that portion of its second sentence which states that the court's dismissal of the complaint and hence, bars the conduct
"dismissal shall be limited to the complaint." Evidently, the CA of further proceedings, i.e., the prosecution of respondent's
ignored the same provision's third sentence, which provides counterclaim, in the same action. Thus, in order to obviate this
for the alternatives available to the defendant who interposes finality, the defendant is required to file the required
a counterclaim prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's manifestation within the aforesaid period; otherwise, the
motion for dismissal. As may be clearly inferred therefrom, counterclaim may be prosecuted only in a separate action.
should the defendant desire to prosecute his counterclaim, he
is required to manifest his preference therefor within fifteen REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the
(15) days from notice of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss. Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH),
Failing in which, the counterclaim may be prosecuted only in a petitioner, vs. ESTATE OF JUAN MARIA POSADAS III,
separate action. MARIA ELENA POSADAS, and ESTELA MARFORI DE
Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court provides for the POSADAS, respondents.
procedure relative to counterclaims in the event that a G.R. No. 214310. February 24, 2020. SECOND DIVISION.
complaint is dismissed by the court at the plaintiffs instance, A.B. REYES, JR., J.
viz. : This is a petition for review on certiorari

FACTS: On July 4, 1990, the Republic filed a complaint for court. On appeal, the CA rendered decision holding that the
expropriation before the RTC of Makati against 181 individuals RTC did not commit any reversible error in dismissing the case.
and corporations owning land situated along Sucat Road in Hence, the instant Petition.
Parañaque. However, respondents filed a joint motion to ISSUE: Whether or not the absence of a substitute for the late
withdraw deposit, oncurrently reserving their right to Maria Elena
substantiate their claim that the expropriated property had a Posadas justified the Republic's failure to amend its complaint.
fair market value that was higher than what the Republic HELD: NO. At the outset, it bears noting that the RTC based its
alleged. order of dismissal on Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court.
The RTC allowed the respondents to withdraw the amount of The provision contemplates certain instances where the
P1,866,480.00, ruling that there was indeed no issue as to complaint may be dismissed due to the plaintiff's fault: (1) if he
public purpose of the taking. or she fails to appear during a scheduled hearing, especially on
The respondents filed another Joint Motion to Withdraw the date for the presentation of his or her evidence in chief; (2)
Deposit, this time praying for the payment of P16,798,320.00, if he or she fails to prosecute his or her action for an
representing the balance of the property's provisional value. unreasonable length of time; (3) if he or she fails to comply
However, despite the grant of the motion and subsequent with the rules; or (4) if he or she fails to comply with any order
orders directing the disbursement of the balance, the Republic of the court. Thus, failure on the part of the plaintiff, without
never paid. any justifiable cause, to comply with any order of the court
In 1998, DPWH Secretary Gregorio Vigilar informed the OSG may result in the dismissal of the complaint either motu
that the government was no longer interested in pursuing the proprio or on motion by the defendant.
road-widening project. The estate likewise prayed that it be Here, the trial court dismissed the case after Atty. Luis M.
allowed to present evidence on the damages it suffered Posadas, counsel for the Estate of Juan M. Posadas III, orally
because of the suit. moved for dismissal on the ground that the Republic had failed
In 2005, Acting DPWH Secretary Hermogenes Edbane, Jr. to comply with the order directing the filing of an amended
wrote a letter informing the OSG that the Republic had once complaint.
again changed its mind, and that this time it has finally resolved As elsewhere noted, the Republic contends that it was unable
to expropriate the respondents' property. to amend its complaint because it was never informed of the
In 2008, the RTC ordered the submission of an amended substitute for the late Maria Elena Posadas.
complaint to reflect the new area used by the road-widening The contention is without merit.
project. the RTC again directed the Republic, through the OSG, Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court lays down the
to submit an amended complaint. procedure for the substitution of a party-litigant who dies
Instead of amending its complaint, the Republic filed a during the pendency of a case.
manifestation and motion 33 stating that respondent Maria As can be gleaned from the above provision, when a party to a
Elena Posadas had died on December 10, 2007. Accordingly, it case dies, his or her counsel is charged with the duty of
prayed for the suspension of the period to file its amended informing the trial court of, first, the fact of the litigant's death
complaint, contending that it could not make the required and, second, the name and address of the litigant's
amendments without the name of her substitute. representative. The court must then issue an order requiring
the RTC, while refusing to altogether suspend the deadline for the said representative to appear and formally be substituted.
the amendment of the complaint. In the same order, the trial However, if no representative is so named or if he or she does
court directed the respondents' counsel to inform the court of not appear, the court may direct the adverse party to procure
the substitute for the late Maria Elena Posadas. It appears, an executor or administrator, who will be tasked to represent
however, that a substitute was never named by the deceased's the deceased party until the case is terminated.
counsel.
Republic filed a motion seeking an extension citing the tedious In this case, the trial court issued an order directing Atty.
and time-consuming process of securing funds for just Antonio Pesigan (Atty. Pesigan), Maria Elena Posadas's counsel
compensation. The Republic filed another motion for of record, to name his client's substitute. It appears, however,
extension of time, stating that it could not immediately that a representative was never named in the proceedings a
disburse the amount due as just compensation. quo. In accordance with the rules, it thus became incumbent
The OSG, however, failed to appear on the scheduled date due on the trial court to direct the Republic to procure an executor
to his prolonged travel time caused by the construction of the or administrator for the estate of the deceased litigant. Yet,
Skyway extension from Alabang to Bicutan. For that reason, this was never done. The Republic capitalized on this
the respondents orally moved for the dismissal of the case in circumstance, ascribing its failure to file an amended
open court. They maintained that the Republic had no complaint to the fact that a representative was never named.
justification for failing to comply with the RTC's order directing DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the February 19, 2014
the amendment of the complaint. Decision and the September 15, 2014 Resolution of the Court
Agreeing with the respondents, the RTC issued an Order of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94901 are SET ASIDE. The case is
dismissing the case for failure to comply with an order of the

REMANDED to Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati thereon to Lee Ching Bing, who likewise assumed all
City, which is hereby directed to: obligations under the lease contract with Santos. Lee, in turn,
1. ORDER the appointment of a substitute or executed a Deed of Assignment over the leased premises,
representative for deceased respondent Maria Elena Posadas, including all improvements thereon, in favor of petitioner.
or an executor or administrator for her estate; Petitioner filed a complaint before RTC against Santos and
2. DETERMINE the just compensation due on respondent to whom Santos allegedly sold the land to.
respondents' property in accordance with the principles laid Respondents respectively moved for the dismissal of the
down in this Decision; Complaint on the main ground that it stated no cause of action.
3. Pending the determination of the amount provided in Raymundo alleged that there were, in fact, previous offers
the next preceding number, IMMEDIATELY ORDER the made to petitioner that the latter simply ignored. Santos, on
Republic to deposit: the other hand, maintained that petitioner had already
a. The assessed value of those portions of respondents' recognized and respected Raymundo's status as the new
property taken before November 26, 2000, in accordance with owner-lessor of the subject properties due to its payment of
Section 2 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court; and lease rentals to Raymundo, and, as such, is now estopped from
b. 100% of the current relevant zonal valuation of those challenging Raymundo's title.
portions taken on or after November 26, 2000, plus the current RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground that it has no valid
market value of the structures erected thereon, in accordance cause of action.
with Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974 and Section 6 of Petitioner filed a Motion to Cancel Pre-Trial, claiming that it
Republic Act No. 10752. was preparing a petition for certiorari and prohibition which
4. IMPOSE legal interest on the amount arrived at as just (a) was to be filed with the CA before the scheduled pre-trial
compensation, less the amount of P1,866,480.00 representing on July 7, 1998, and (b) was intended to
the prior deposit made by the Republic and any amount that challenge the validity of the RTC's Orders. This was denied by
will actually be paid by the Republic as initial RTC and directed the parties to proceed with the pre-trial as
deposit/provisional value pursuant to the net preceding scheduled.
number, at the rate of 12% percent per annum from the time The trial court then required petitioner to start the pre-trial
of taking up to June 30, 2013 and, thereafter, 6% per annum with the statement of its cause. However, counsel for
from July 1, 2013 until finality of this decision; petitioner, Atty. Nelson Santos, refused to do so saying he
5. AWARD to the respondents the total amount of just would just furnish the court the following day with a copy of
compensation inclusive of interest, which shall earn legal the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed with the CA.
interest at the rate of 6% per annum from finality of the CA affirmed the RTC decision
Decision until full satisfaction; and Issue: WON RTC’s denial of petitioner’s Motion to Cancel Pre-
6. Lastly, anent the portions of the property included in trial is correct
the Republic's original complaint for which return is feasible, Ruling: At the outset, it should be emphasized that the trial
REVEST title thereto in the name of the respondents. court has the discretion on whether to grant or deny a motion
The trial court is also directed to conduct the proceedings in to postpone and/or reschedule the pre-trial conference in
this case with utmost dispatch and to submit to the Court a accordance with the circumstances obtaining in the case. This
report on its findings and recommended conclusions within must be so as it is the trial court which is able to witness
sixty (60) days from notice of this Decision. firsthand the events as they unfold
RULE 18: PRE-TRIAL during the trial of a case. Postponements, while permissible,
PARAÑAQUE KINGS ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner, vs. must not be countenanced
CATALINA L. SANTOS, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, except for clearly meritorious grounds and in light of the
LUZ B. PROTACIO, and DAVID R. RAYMUNDO, attendant circumstances.
respondents. The pattern to delay the pre-trial of the instant case is quite
evident from the foregoing. Petitioner clearly trifled with the
PETITION FOR REVIEWON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 mandatory character of a pre-trial, which is a procedural
DOCTRINE: The mere elevation of an interlocutory matter device intended to clarify and limit the basic issues raised by
through a petition for certiorari does not by itself merit a the parties and to take the trial of cases out of the realm of
suspension of the proceedings before the trial court, unless a surprise and maneuvering. More significantly, a pre-trial has
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction been institutionalized as the answer to the clarion call for the
has been issued. speedy disposition of cases. The mere elevation of an
FACTS: Respondent entered into a Contract of Lease with Chua interlocutory matter through a petition for certiorari does not
over 8 parcels of land located in Paranaque, specifically giving by itself merit a suspension of the proceedings before the trial
the latter the "First option or priority to buy" the same in case court, unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of
of sale. Chua then caused the construction of a 6-door preliminary injunction has been issued.
commercial complex on the leased premises but, by reason of Roberto G. Alarcon, v. The Court of Appeals, and
business reverses, he was constrained to assign his rights Bienvenido Juani

G.R. No. 126802 ; January 28, 2000 as well, of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed
on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by
FACTS: reasonable inquiry.
Petitioner Roberto Alarcon filed a complaint for the annulment The Partial Decision was rendered on the clear admissions of
of a Deed of Sale with damages against Bienvenido Juani, fact by the parties. Since the deed of sale was admitted to be
Edgardo Sulit, and Virginia Baluyot as defendants. a forgery, no parcel of land was transferred, the TCTs issued
The petitioner contended that he left with his father a Special subsequently were null and void.
Power of Attorney to administer, mortgage, or sell his G.R. No. 150611 June 10, 2003
properties in Baliwag, Bulacan. He found out that on the SPA, JACINTO SAGUID, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
a portion of the land was sold to Bienvenido Juani, Edgardo THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 94, BOAC,
Sulit, and Virginia Baluyot for P5,000.00. The title of the MARINDUQUE AND GINA S. REY, respondents.
petitioner was cancelled, and the sale was registered.
In his argument, the petitioner contended that his father’s FACTS: Gina Rey and Jacinto were cohabiting as husband and
signature was forged on the Deed of Sale; there was no wife for 9 years until they decided to end it. When they got
consideration for the sale; that the special power of attorney separated, Gina filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of
had already been revoked; and that the signature of the notary Personal Property with Receivership against the Jacinto Saguid
public was falsified. with the RTC of Boac, Marinduque, for the alleged contribution
Juani claimed that he was never aware of the revocation of the to the construction of their house as well as the purchase of
Special Power of Attorney granted to Tomas Alarcon . their appliances.
During the pre-trial, the parties admitted the document of sale RTC: Declared Jacinto as in default for failure to file a pre-trial
over the property is a forged document, that it was registered brief as required by Supreme Court Circular No. 1-89.13
with the Register of Deeds of Malolos, and that after the Jacinto filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied,
registration of the document, the defendants were issued and Gina was allowed to present evidence ex parte. Jacinto
Transfer Certificates of Titles. filed another motion for reconsideration but the same was also
In view of the facts admitted, the document of sale was denied.
declared void ab initio, the Transfer Certificates of Titles were RTC: Rendered a decision in favor of Gina.
null and void, and the Register of Deeds of Malolos were CA: Affirmed RTC but deleted moral damages. CA ruled that
ordered to cancel the aforesaid titles. the propriety of the order which declared the petitioner as in
Private respondent Juani filed with the Court of Appeals a default became moot and academic in view of the effectivity
petition for the annulment of the Partial Decision rendered by of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It explained that the new
the trial court. Juani claimed that he did not understand the rules now require the filing of a pre-trial brief and the
proceedings in the trial court and the admissions made in the defendant’s non-compliance therewith entitles the plaintiff to
pre-trial conference. present evidence ex parte.
The Court of Appeals granted the petition and set aside the Both parties filed motions for reconsideration which were
Partial Decision of the regional trial court on the ground that it denied; hence, petitioner filed the instant petition.
was vitiated by extrinsic fraud. ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in allowing private
ISSUES: respondent to present evidence ex parte.
Whether or not there was extrinsic fraud. RULING: Under Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
HELD: Procedure, the failure of the defendant to file a pre-trial brief
NO. Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial,
from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the i.e., the plaintiff may present his evidence ex parte and the
court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the court shall render judgment on the basis thereof. The remedy
judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured. The of the defendant is to file a motion for reconsideration
general rule is that the client is bound by the mistakes of his showing that his failure to file a pre-trial brief was due to fraud,
counsel, save when the negligence is so gross, reckless, and accident, mistake or excusable neglect.
inexcusable that the client is deprived of his day in court. In the case at bar, petitioner insists that his failure to file a pre-
The Court found that Juani was properly represented by trial brief is justified because he was not represented by
counsel. The Partial Decision reads that all the parties and their counsel. This justification is not, however, sufficient to set
respective counsels appeared; the transcripts of the aside the order directing private respondent to present
stenographic notes of the hearing also revealed that the evidence ex parte, inasmuch as the petitioner chose at his own
counsel of Juani was not in any way remiss of his duties in risk not to be represented by counsel. Even without the
protecting the interests of his clients. assistance of a lawyer, petitioner was able to file a motion for
The admissions were made during the pre-trial conference, extension to file answer. If it were true that petitioner did not
and therefore, conclusive upon the parties making it. The understand the import of the April 23, 1997 order directing
purpose of entering into a stipulation of facts or admission of him to file a pre-trial brief, he could have inquired from the
facts is to expedite trial and to relieve the parties and the court, court or filed a motion for extension of time to file the brief.

Instead, he waited until May 26, 1997, or 14 days from his HELD: Private respondents' failed to raise any objection: (a)
alleged receipt of the April 23, 1997 order before he filed a when petitioners presented in evidence the 1951 Deed of Sale
motion asking the court to excuse his failure to file a brief. with Right to Repurchase; (b) when petitioners' counsel
However, the CA erred in ruling that the effectivity of the 1997 vigorously cross-examined respondent Teofista Son Arcipe on
Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically, Section 6, Rule 18 thereof, the aforementioned deed; and (c) when Anastacio Son
rendered moot and academic the issue of whether or not the testified on said document, constitutes an implied assent on
plaintiff may be allowed to present evidence ex parte for the part of respondents to depart from the issue contained in
failure of the defendant to file a pre-trial brief. While the rules the pre-trial order.
may indeed be applied retroactively, the same is not called for Section 4, Rule 20 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:
in the case at bar. Even before the 1997 Rules of Civil Sec. 4. Record of pre-trial results. — After the pre-trial the
Procedure took effect on July 1, 1997, the filing of a pre-trial court shall make an order which recites the action taken at the
brief was required under Circular No. 1-89 which became conference, the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and
effective on February 1, 1989. Pursuant to the said circular, the agreements made by the parties as to any of the matters
"failure to file pre-trial briefs may be given the same effect as considered, such order shall limit the issues for trial to those
the failure to appear at the pre-trial," that is, the party may be not disposed of by admissions or agreements of counsel and
declared non-suited or considered as in default. when entered controls the subsequent course of the action,
ESCOLASTICA MONTESCLAROS SON, and HEIRS OF unless modified before trial to prevent manifest injustice.
ANASTACIO SON, petitioners, vs. CARMELINO SON, PRE-TRAIL
TEOFISTA SON, PRIMITIVO SON, CIPRIANA SON, ANATALIA A pre-trial hearing is meant to serve as a device to clarify and
SON, LAREANO SON, GERARDA SON and THE HONORABLE narrow down the basic issues between the parties, to ascertain
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents. the facts relative to those issues and to enable the parties to
G.R. No. 73077 December 29, 1995 obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts
before civil trials and thus prevent that said trials are carried
FACTS: 45 on in the dark.
Private respondents are the children and heirs of the late Pre-trial is primarily intended to make certain that all issues
Pedro Son who left a parcel of land which he inherited from his necessary to the disposition of a case are properly raised. Thus,
parents. to obviate the element of surprise, parties are expected to
Private respondent discovered that a portion of the land was disclose at a pre-trial conference all issues of law and fact
being occupied by petitioners and demanded the same to be which they intend to raise at the trial, except such as may
returned. Petitioners refused and presented a Deed of involve privileged or impeaching matters. The determination
Absolute Sale allegedly executed by Pedro Son. of issues at a pre-trial conference bars the consideration of
Private respondent filed a complaint for annulment of the other questions on appeal.
Deed of Absolute Sale on grounds of forgery and for recovery REMEDY TO SUPPLY ADDITIONAL ISSUES NOT DECLARED IN
of real property before the CFI. THE PRE-TRAIL- AMEND PLEADING
During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed to limit the However, as previously intimated, the rules are not applied
issue to the validity or invalidity of the aforementioned deed with rigidity. To prevent manifest injustice, some exceptions
of absolute sale. are admitted. The rules itself, specifically Section 5 of Rule 10
The RTC declared the Deed of Absolute Sale null and void. on Amended and Supplemental Pleadings, permits the
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration insisting that by following:
virtue of the Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase, wherein Sec. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of
Pedro Son allegedly sold to petitioners 1/2 of the land he evidence. — When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried
inherited but with a right to repurchase within 1 year, by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be
petitioners acquired ownership thereof for failure of Pedro Son treated in all respects, as if they had been raised in the
to redeem the same within the period stipulated. pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be
The RTC reversed its earlier decision and dismissed the necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to
complaint. raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at
The CA reversed the decision of the RTC. It opined that the any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does
Defendants are bound by the delimitation of the issues not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is
contained in the trial courts' order issued on the very day the objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the
pre-trial conference was held. Such order controls the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the
subsequent course of action, unless modified before trial to pleadings to be amended and shall do so freely when the
prevent manifest injustice. In this case, modification of the pre- presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved
trial order was never sought at the instance of any party. thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that
ISSUE: Whether or not the parties are bound by the the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in
delimitation of issues in the Pre-trial Order maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. The court

may grant a continuance to enable the objecting party to meet sent billing statements to Azucena, however, charging her
such evidence. interest charges and late payment penalties. Only after
LACK OF OBJECTION TO A NEW ISSUE WHICH WAS NOT RAISED Azucena’s counsel informed Citibank of imminent legal
IN THE PRE-TRAIL AMOUNTS TO CONSENT remedies on her part did Citibank indulge Azucena with a
In Velasco v. Apostol, we made the following qualification: written explanation why her credit cards were not honored in
xxx xxx xxx Italy. Azucena and Renato (hereafter the spouses) later filed on
. . . A pre-trial order is not meant to be a detailed catalogue of November 12, 1999 a complaint for damages against Citibank
each and every issue that is to be or may be taken up during at the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City. To the Complaint,
the trial. Issues that are impliedly included therein or may be Citibank filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue. The
inferable therefrom by necessary implication are as much spouses opposed the motion and moved to have Citibank
integral parts of the pre-trial order as those that are expressly declared in default. Branch 255 of the RTC, by Order of
stipulated. September 28, 2000, denied the motion to dismiss as well as
In fact, it would be absurd and inexplicable for the respondent the motion to declare Citibank in default. Citibank thus filed its
company to knowingly disregard or deliberately abandon the Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim. After an exchange of
issue of non-payment of the premium on the policy pleadings ─ reply, rejoinder and sur-rejoinder ─ by the parties,
considering that it is the very core of its defense. and the issues having been joined, the trial court set the case
Correspondingly, We cannot but perceive here an undesirable for pre-trial conference on May 5, 2003 during which the
resort to technicalities to evade an issue determinative of a spouses and their counsel failed to appear, despite notice. On
defense duly averred. Citibank’s counsel’s motion, the trial court, by Order 15 of even
Furthermore, as private respondent correctly points out, date, dismissed the spouses’ Complaint and directed Citibank
evidence to prove such late payment was introduced without to present evidence on its Compulsory Counterclaim. The
any objection by the adverse party. This lack of objection spouses moved for the reconsideration of the trial court’s May
amounts to an implied consent conferring jurisdiction on the 5, 2003 Order, explaining that their failure to attend the pre-
court to try said issue. trial conference was due to the negligence of their counsel
SPOUSES AZUCENA B. CORPUZ AND RENATO S. CORPUZ, who "failed to inform [them] about [the pre-trial] and include
petitioners, vs. CITIBANK, N.A. AND HON. RAUL B. the same in his calendar because . . . the pre-trial was still far
VILLANUEVA as Presiding Judge of Branch 255, Regional away."
Trial Court in Las Piñas City, respondents. ISSUE: Whether or not spouses petition asserting that their
G.R. No. 175677. July 31, 2009. SECOND DIVISION. CARPIO non-appearance at the pre- trial may be excused if there is a
MORALES, J. valid cause such as when a party forgets the date of the pre-
trial; that the merits of their case should have been considered
This is a petition for certiorari. when their Complaint was dismissed.
FACTS: In view of her then impending official business trip to RULING: The Court denies the spouses’ petition. Section 5 of
Europe, Azucena paid in full on December 7, 1998 her monthly Rule 18 provides that the dismissal of an action due to the
charges on both credit cards via checks and also made advance plaintiff’s failure to appear at the pre-trial shall be with
check payments of ₱20,000.00 on December 8, 1998 for her prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. In this case,
VISA Card, and another ₱20,000.00 for her Mastercard on the trial court deemed the plaintiffs-herein spouses as non-
December 14, 1998, to cover future transactions. While in Italy suited and ordered the dismissal of their Complaint. As the
on December 9, 1998, Azucena dined at a restaurant. To settle dismissal was a final order, the proper remedy was to file an
her bill of 46,000 liras, she presented her VISA Card, but to her ordinary appeal and not a petition for certiorari. The spouses’
surprise and embarrassment, the restaurant did not honor it. petition for certiorari was thus properly dismissed by the
She then brought out her Mastercard which the restaurant appellate court. Procedural infirmities aside, this Court took a
honored. On even date, Azucena incurred a bill of 378,000 liras considered look at the spouses’ excuse to justify their non-
at a shop which she intended to charge to her credit cards. This appearance at the pre-trial but found nothing exceptional to
time, both her VISA and Mastercard were not honored, warrant a reversal of the lower courts’ disposition thereof.
drawing her to pay the bill in cash. Informed of the incidents Counsel for the spouses admit having failed to inform his
via overseas telephone calls to Manila, Azucena’s husband clients of the scheduled pre-trial because he forgot to note the
Renato Corpuz (Renato) inquired why his wife’s credit cards same in his calendar and eventually forgot about it due to
were not honored, to which Citibank explained that her check- "heavy workload." The spouses eventually admitted too
payments had not yet been cleared at the time. Upon her having received the notice of pre-trial. Azucena, who is a
return to the country, Azucena wrote Citibank on January 13, lawyer herself, advanced the reason that she forgot about the
1999 informing it that her credit cards had not been honored scheduled pre-trial owing to her then forthcoming retirement
and demanding the refund of her overseas call expenses at the Office of the Solicitor General to thus press her to
amounting to 132,000 liras or ₱3,175.00 at the time. Citibank accomplish her assigned work including winding up all
did not respond to the letter, however, drawing Azucena to administrative matters in the office prior to her leaving. While
write Citibank for the cancellation of the cards. Citibank still Section 4 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court allows as an

exception a valid cause for the nonappearance of a party at the brief and to appear in the pre-trial conference, it was not
pre-trial, the instances cited by the spouses and their counsel proper for petitioner, being the defendant in the case a quo,
hardly constitute compelling exigencies or situations which to be declared "non-suited" under the Rules of Court.
warrant occasional flexibility of litigation rules. The failure of a party to appear at the pre-trial has adverse
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition for review in consequences. Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court
G.R. No. 175677 is DENIED for lack of merit. Petitioner's motion provides that if the absent party is the plaintiff, then he may
for reconsideration in G.R. No. 177133 is DENIED for lack of be declared non-suited and his case dismissed; if it is the
merit. Costs against petitioners in both petitions. defendant who fails to appear, then the plaintiff may be
[G.R. No. 213650. June 17, 2019.] allowed to present his evidence ex parte and the court to
BOOKLIGHT, INC., petitioner, vs. RUDY O. TIU, respondent. render judgment on the basis thereof.
At any rate, proceeding to our point, such declaration of non-
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 suit against petitioner was already upheld by this Court with
DOCTRINE: Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court provides finality. Hence, due to its failure to file a pre-trial brief and to
that if the absent party is the plaintiff, then he may be declared appear in the pre-trial conference, petitioner lost its right to
non-suited and his case dismissed; if it is the defendant who present evidence to support its allegations.
fails to appear, then the plaintiff may be allowed to present his It is, thus, bad enough for petitioner's case that the questions
evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the posed before us are purely factual matters that this Court,
basis thereof. generally, cannot review as explained above. The fact that
FACTS: Rudy O. Tiu (respondent) filed a case for Collection of petitioner, for being declared non-suited, was not able to
Sum of Money, Damages, Attorney's Fees, Litigation Expenses present evidence to support its claims is surely fatal to its case.
and Attachment against Booklight, Inc. (petitioner) before the The records are bereft of any evidence to support petitioner's
RTC of Butuan City. claim that it paid advanced rental and deposit and that the
The complaint alleged that petitioner entered into a contract same have not yet been refunded or utilized; nor was there
of lease with respondent for a space in respondent's building any record to definitely show that the subject electric bills
to be used for petitioner's bookstore business. The lease was pertain only to a month when petitioner was not occupying the
for five years, which expired on September 1, 2001. It was premises anymore.
never renewed upon expiration although petitioner continued SPOUSES ROLANDO AND HERMINIA SALVADOR, Petitioner
to occupy the premises until its business operations ceased on vs. SPOUSES ROGELIO AND ELIZABETH RABAJA AND
February 28, 2003. Alleging unpaid rentals from December ROSARIO GONZALES, Respondent
2001, respondent filed the said complaint. G.R. No. 199990 February 04, 2015
Respondent's application for the issuance of a writ of
attachment was granted by the RTC. Thus, petitioner's Petition for review on certiorari
personal properties in the bookstore were attached and its DOCTRINE:
funds in Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation were Sections 4 and 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court provide:
garnished. Sec. 4. Appearance of parties.
In its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, petitioner It shall be the duty of the parties and their counsel to appear
alleged that there was no prior demand made by respondent at the pre-trial. The non-appearance of a party may be excused
and that it fully paid its rentals up to July 2002, among others. only if a valid cause is shown therefor or if a representative
The RTC declared petitioner non-suited for its failure to file a shall appear in his behalf fully authorized in writing to enter
pre-trial brief and for its failure to appear during the scheduled into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of
pre-trial. Petitioner filed a motion to lift order of non-suit, dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions
which was denied by the Petitioner's motion for of facts and of documents.
reconsideration was likewise denied by the RTC. Hence, the Sec. 5. Effect of failure to appear.
RTC set the hearing for the ex parte presentation of The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant
respondent's evidence. to the next preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the
Respondent then proceeded to the presentation of his action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise
evidence ex parte. ordered by the court. A similar failure on the part of the
Meanwhile, the RTC's denial of petitioner's motion to lift order defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his
of non-suit was upheld by the CA, as well as by this Court. evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the
RTC: rendered a Decision IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT basis thereof.
CA: AFFIRMED the RTC's Decision with modification FACTS:
ISSUE: WON RTC was correct in declaring petitioner non-suited Sometime in July 1998, Spouses Rabaja learned that Spouses
for its failure to file a pre-trial brief and for its failure to appear Salvador were looking for a buyer of the subject property.
during the scheduled pre-trial. Petitioner Herminia Salvador (Herminia) personally introduced
HELD: NO. While it was correct to allow respondent to present Gonzales to them as the administrator of the said property.
his evidence ex parte for petitioner's failure to file a pre-trial Spouses Salvador even handed to Gonzales the owner’s

duplicate certificate of title over the subject property. On July, the plaintiff can present his evidence ex parte. Sections 4 and
3, 1998, Spouses Rabaja made an initial payment of P48,000.00 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court provide:
to Gonzales in the presence of Herminia. Gonzales then Sec. 4. Appearance of parties.
presented the Special Power of Attorney3 (SPA), executed by It shall be the duty of the parties and their counsel to appear
Rolando Salvador (Rolando) and dated July 24, 1998. On the at the pre-trial. The non-appearance of a party may be excused
same day, the parties executed the Contract to Sell which only if a valid cause is shown therefor or if a representative
stipulated that for a consideration of P5,000,000.00, Spouses shall appear in his behalf fully authorized in writing to enter
Salvador sold, transferred and conveyed in favor of Spouses into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of
Rabaja the subject property. Spouses Rabaja made several dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions
payments totalling P950,000.00, which were received by of facts and of documents.
Gonzales pursuant to the SPA provided earlier as evidenced by Sec. 5. Effect of failure to appear.
the check vouchers signed by Gonzales and the improvised The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant
receipts signed by Herminia. to the next preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the
Sometime in June 1999, however, Spouses Salvador action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise
complained to Spouses Rabaja that they did not receive any ordered by the court. A similar failure on the part of the
payment from Gonzales. This prompted Spouses Rabaja to defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his
suspend further payment of the purchase price; and as a evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the
consequence, they received a notice to vacate the subject basis thereof.
property from Spouses Salvador for non-payment of rentals. From the foregoing, the failure of a party to appear at the pre-
Thereafter, Spouses Salvador instituted an action for trial has indeed adverse consequences. If the absent party is
ejectment against Spouses Rabaja. In turn, Spouses Rabaja the plaintiff, then his case shall be dismissed. If it is the
filed an action for rescission of contract against Spouses defendant who fails to appear, then the plaintiff is allowed to
Salvador and Gonzales, the subject matter of the present present his evidence ex parte and the court shall render
petition. judgment based on the evidence presented. Thus, the plaintiff
The pre-trial conference began but attempts to amicably settle is given the privilege to present his evidence without objection
the case were unsuccessful. It was formally reset to February from the defendant, the likelihood being that the court will
4, 2005, but Spouses Salvador and their counsel failed to decide in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant having forfeited
attend. Consequently, the RTC issued the pre-trial order the opportunity to rebut or present its own evidence. The
declaring Spouses Salvador in default and allowing Spouses stringent application of the rules on pre-trial is necessitated
Rabaja to present their evidence ex parte against Spouses from the significant role of the pre-trial stage in the litigation
Salvador and Gonzales to present evidence in her favor. process. Pre-trial is an answer to the clarion call for the speedy
A motion for reconsideration, dated March 28, 2005, was filed disposition of cases. Although it was discretionary under the
by Spouses Salvador on the said pre-trial order beseeching the 1940 Rules of Court, it was made mandatory under the 1964
liberality of the court. The rescission case was then re-raffled Rules and the subsequent amendments in 1997. “The
after the Presiding Judge inhibited herself. In the Order, dated importance of pre-trial in civil actions cannot be
October 24, 2005, the RTC denied the motion for overemphasized.
reconsideration because Spouses Salvador provided a flimsy There is no dispute that Spouses Salvador and their counsel
excuse for their non-appearance in the pre-trial conference. failed to attend the pre-trial conference set on February 4,
Thereafter, trial proceeded and Spouses Rabaja and Gonzales 2005 despite proper notice. Spouses Salvador aver that their
presented their respective testimonial and documentary non-attendance was due to the fault of their counsel as he
evidence. forgot to update his calendar. This excuse smacks of
ISSUE: carelessness, and indifference to the pre-trial stage. It simply
Did the Lower Court gravely abused its discretion in declaring cannot be considered as a justifiable excuse by the Court. As a
the petitioners, Spouses Salvador in default when they failed result of their inattentiveness, Spouses Salvador could no
to appear during the pre-trial and in depriving them of the longer present any evidence in their favor. Spouses Rabaja, as
opportunity to cross-examine respondents Rabaja as well as to plaintiffs, were properly allowed by the RTC to present
present evidence for and in their behalf? evidence ex parte against Spouses Salvador as defendants.
RULING: Yes. The failure of Spouses Salvador to attend pre- Considering that Gonzales as co-defendant was able to attend
trial conference warrants the presentation of evidence ex the pre-trial conference, she was allowed to present her
parte by Spouses Rabaja. evidence. The RTC could only render judgment based on the
On the procedural aspect, the Court reiterates the rule that the evidence presented during the trial thereof.
failure to attend the pre-trial conference does not result in the G.R. NO. 202597 February 8, 2017
default of an absent party. Under the 1997 Rules of Civil SPOUSES SERGIO C. PASCUAL AND EMMA SERVILLION
Procedure, a defendant is only declared in default if he fails to PASCUAL, Petitioners, vs. FIRST CONSOLIDATED RURAL
file his Answer within the reglementary period.29 On the other BANK (BOHOL), INC., ROBINSONS LAND CORPORATION
hand, if a defendant fails to attend the pre-trial conference,

AND ATTY. ANTONIO P. ESPINOSA, REGISTER OF DEEDS, (g) The propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or
BUTUAN CITY, Respondents. summary judgment, or of dismissing the action should a valid
PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 45 ground therefor be found to exist."
FACTS: On February 14, 2011, the petitioners filed a petition Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration, which the
for annulment of judgment in the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA denied on January 9, 2012 for being filed out of time.
order to nullify and set aside the decision rendered in Special Unrelenting, they presented a Respectful Motion for
Proceedings Case No. 4577 by the Regional Trial Court in Reconsideration (on the Resolution dated 9 January 2012),
Butuan City (RTC) ordering the cancellation of their notice of which the CA also denied.
lis pendens recorded in Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT- Spouses’ argument:
42190 of the Register of Deeds of Butuan City. a) It was wrong for the CA to rule that it is only at the pre-trial
After the responsive pleadings to the petition were filed, the that the rules allow the courts to render judgment on the
CA scheduled the preliminary conference on October 4, 2011, pleadings & summary judgment.
and ordered the parties to file their respective pre-trial briefs. b) Their motion (Motion for Summary Judgment and a Motion
Instead of filing their pre-trial brief, the petitioners filed a to Hold Pre- Trial in Abeyance) should have been first resolved
Motion for Summary Judgment and a Motion to Hold Pre-Trial before the pre-trial could proceed and that their non-
in Abeyance. At the scheduled preliminary conference, the appearance was not mandatory, wherein Sec. 2(g) R18 was
petitioners and their counsel did not appear. superseded by AM NO. 3-1-9 SC
CA: rendered judgment dismissing the petition for annulment: ISSUE/S:
a.) Citing Sec. 4-6 of rule 18, wherein the parties & their 1. W/N the CA erred in ruling that it is only during pretrial that
counsel should appear at the pre-trial. And that failure of the a court may render judgment on the pleadings/summary
plaintiff to appear is a cause for dismissal of the action (with judgment.
prejudice). Further, failure to file a pre-trial brief has the same 2. W/N their motion should be resolved first before the pre-
effect as that of failure to appear at the pre-trial. trial could proceed.
"Sec. 4. Appearance of parties. - It shall be the duty of the
parties and their counsel to appear at the pre-trial. The non- HELD:
appearance of a party may be excused only if a valid cause is 1.) YES. It is erroneous on the part of the CA to declare that "it
shown therefor or if a representative shall appear in his behalf is only at the pre-trial that the rules allow the courts to render
fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment, as
settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute provided by Section 2(g) of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court." The
resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admission of facts filing of the motion for summary judgment may be done prior
and of documents. to the pretrial.
Sec. 5. Effect of failure to appear. - The failure of the plaintiff Section 1, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court permits a party seeking
to appear when so required pursuant to the next preceding to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or
section shall be cause for dismissal of the action. The dismissal seeking declaratory relief to file the motion for a summary
shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. judgment upon all or any part thereof in his favor (and its
A similar failure on the part of the defendant shall be cause to supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions) "at any time
allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the after the pleading in answer thereto has been served;" while
court to render judgment on the basis thereof. Section 2 of Rule 35 instructs that a party against whom a
Sec. 6. Pre-trial brief. - Failure to file the pre-trial brief shall claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory
have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial." relief is sought may file the motion for summary judgment (and
Petitioners, instead of complying with our order, filed the twin its supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions) upon all or
motions, averring that it behooves us to rule first on their any part thereof "at any time." As such, the petitioners
motions before pre-trial could be conducted, "especially with properly filed their motion for summary judgment prior to the
the incompatibility of a pending Motion for Summary pre-trial (assuming that they thereby complied with the
Judgment vis-a-vis the conduct of pre-trial conference." requirement of supporting affidavits, depositions or
Considering that a Petition for Annulment of Judgment is an admissions).
original action before the Court of Appeals, pre-trial is Summary judgment is a procedural technique that is proper
mandatory, whereby the failure of the plaintiff to appear under Section 3, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court only if there is
would mean dismissal of the action with prejudice. The filing no genuine issue as to the existence of a material fact, and that
of a pre-trial brief has the same import. the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
b.) Only at the pre-trial that the rules allow the courts to render It is a method intended to expedite or promptly dispose of
judgment on the pleadings & summary judgment. [CA cited cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the
Sec. 2(g) R18] "Sec. 2. Nature and purpose. - The pre-trial is pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on record.
mandatory. The court shall consider: The term genuine issue is defined as an issue of fact that calls
for the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue
that is sham, fictitious, contrived, set up in bad faith and

patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue disclosures made at the pre-trial or a judgment based on the
for trial. The court can determine this on the basis of the pleadings, evidence identified and admissions made during
pleadings, admissions, documents, affidavits, and/or counter- pretrial." As such, they could have urged the trial court to
-affidavits submitted by the parties to the court. Where the resolve their pending Motion for Summary Judgment during
facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, the pre-trial.”
proceedings for a summary judgment cannot take the place of WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the assailed resolutions of
a trial. The party moving for the summary judgment has the the Court of Appeals promulgated in CAG. R. SP No. 04020-
burden of clearly demonstrating the absence of any genuine MIN; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
issue of fact. Upon the plaintiff rests the burden to prove the LARA’S GIFT AND DECORS, INC., Petitioner, vs. PNB
cause of action, and to show that the defense is interposed GENERAL INSURERS CO., INC. AND UCPB GENERAL
solely for the purpose of delay. After the plaintiffs burden has INSURANCE CO., INC., Respondents
been discharged, the defendant has the burden to show facts G.R. No. 230429-30 JANUARY 24, 2018
sufficient to entitle him to defend. Petition for Review
2.) No. Although motions for summary judgment can be filed DOCTRINE
before the pre-trial, their nonresolution prior to the pre-trial “The JA Rule, which took effect on January 1, 2013, was
should not prevent the holding of the pre-trial. Petitioners promulgated to address congestion and delays in courts.
cannot validly insist that the CA should have first resolved their Designed to expedite court proceedings, it primarily affects the
Motion for Summary Judgment before holding the pre- trial. manner by which evidence is presented in court, particularly
They could not use the inaction on their motion to justify their with regard to the taking of the witnesses' testimonies.
non-appearance with their counsel at the pre-trial, as well as Consequently, in lieu of direct testimony in court, the parties
their inability to file their pre-trial brief. In that regard, their are required to submit the judicial affidavits of their witnesses
appearance at the pre-trial with their counsel was mandatory. within a given period. Nevertheless, the JA Rule was not
The petitioners argue that their non-appearance was not devised to supplant or amend existing procedural rules; rather,
mandatory, positing that Section 2(g), Rule 18 of the Rules of it is designed to supplement and augment them. In this regard,
Court had been amended by Administrative Circular No. 3-99 reference must be made to the Guidelines on Pre-Trial in
and A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC issued on July 13, 2004 but effective relation to the Rules on Pre-Trial, which, interestingly, both
on August 16, 2004. The petitioners' argument was parties invoke in support of their respective arguments.”
unwarranted: Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January FACTS
15, 1999 still affirmed the mandatory character of the pretrial, FACTUAL BACKDROP: Petitioner LGDI, engaged in the business
to wit: of manufacturing, selling, and exporting various handicraft
“V.) The mandatory continuous trial system in civil cases items and decorative products, leased buildings/warehouses
contemplated in Administrative Circular No. 4, dated from J.Y. & Sons Realty Co. Inc., for its business operations. The
September 1988, and the guidelines provided for in Circular handicraft products, raw materials and machineries and
No. 1-89, dated 19 January 1989, must be effectively equipment of petitioner were insured against fire and other
implemented. For expediency, these guidelines in civil cases allied risks with respondent PNB General Insurers Co., Inc.
are hereunder restated with modifications, taking into account Approximately four hours before the policy was about to
the relevant provisions of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure: expire, a fire broke out and razed three buildings of the JY &
A. Pre-Trial Sons Compound. Petitioner immediately claimed from the
xxxxx respondents for the loss and damage of its insured properties.
6.) Failure of the plaintiff to appear at the pre-trial shall be a However, LCPI and ESTEBAN, both successively engaged as
cause for dismissal of the action. A similar failure of the adjusters, found petitioner’s documents insufficient to
defendant shall be a cause to allow the plaintiff to present his properly evaluate and assess the amount of the loss claimed.
evidence ex-parte and the court to render judgment on the Thus, respondents denied petitioner’s claim for coverage.
basis thereof. (Underlining supplied for emphasis) Petitioner thus filed a Complaint for Specific Performance and
Damages against respondents before the RTC.
A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC (Guidelines to be Observed by Trial Court PERTINENT FACTS: In its Notice of Pre-Trial Conference, the
Judges and Clerks of Court in the Conduct of Pre-Trial and Use RTC gave a stern warning that no evidence shall be allowed to
of Deposition-Discovery Measures) - adopted for the purpose be presented and offered during the trial in support of a party’s
of abbreviating court proceedings, ensuring the prompt evidence-in-chief other than those that had been earlier
disposition of cases, decongesting court dockets, and further identified and pre-marked during the pre-trial, except if
implementing the pre-trial guidelines laid down in allowed by the Court for good cause shown. In the Pre-Trial
Administrative Circular No. 3-99 – similarly underscored the Order, all the parties made a reservation for the presentation
mandatory character of the pre-trial, and reiterated under its of additional documentary exhibits in the course of the trial.
heading Pre-Trial in civil cases that, among others, the trial The parties filed their respective Motions to Amend/Correct
court could then determine "the propriety of rendering a Pre-Trial Order, but none of the parties sought to actually
summary judgment dismissing the case based on the amend for the purpose of submitting additional judicial

affidavits of witnesses or the admission of additional Certainly, the parties are mandated under Sec. 2 of the JA Rule
documentary exhibits not presented and pre-marked during to file and serve the judicial affidavits of their witnesses,
the Pre-Trial Conference. together with their documentary or object evidence, not later
During trial on the merits, Mr. Villafuerte testified on his than five days before pre-trial or preliminary conference. The
involvement and participation in the management and evidence submitted will then be specified by the trial judge in
operations of petitioner corporation, and after being elected the Pre-Trial Order. However, Sec. 10 of the same Rule does
as governor, his participation was reduced to a mere advisor not contain a blanket prohibition on the submission of
of his wife, Mrs. Villafuerte, who became petitioner additional evidence, subject to the conditions that: (a) the
corporation’s president. During the continuation of Mr. court may allow the late submission of evidence only once; (b)
Villafuerte’s cross-examination, petitioner furnished the party presenting the evidence proffers a valid reason for
respondents with a copy of the 2nd Supplemental Judicial the delay; and (c) the opposing party will not be prejudiced
Affidavit of Mrs. Villafuerte (the first was filed during Pre-Trial). thereby.
PNB Gen, through a Motion to Expunge, sought to strike from Corollary thereto, the Guidelines on Pre-Trial instructs the
the records the said 2nd Supplemental Judicial Affidavit of Mrs. parties to submit their respective pre-trial briefs at least 3 days
Villafuerte and all documents attached thereto for alleged before pre-trial, containing all the documents or exhibits to be
violation of the Judicial Affidavit Rule. presented and to state the purposes thereof. Here, there is a
A day prior to the hearing of the Motion to Expunge, the re- proscription on the introduction of additional evidence except
direct examination of Mr. Villafuerte continued. During the if allowed by the court for good cause shown. Thus, the same
trial, petitioner’s counsel produced the Questioned rule confers upon the trial court the discretion to allow the
Documents in open court and asked Mr. Villafuerte to identify introduction of additional evidence during trial other than
those documents, seeking to introduce and mark them as those that had been previously marked and identified during
exhibits. Respondents immediately objected in open court to the pre-trial, provided there are valid grounds.
the introduction and presentation of the Questioned The trial court, in this case, precisely exercised this discretion.
Documents on the ground that since these documents were It allowed the introduction of the Questioned Documents upon
not presented, identified, marked, and even compared with petitioner’s manifestation that the same are being presented
the originals during the Pre-Trial Conference, they should be in response to the questions propounded by PNB Gen’s
excluded pursuant to the Guidelines on Pre-Trial and JA Rule. counsel, Atty. Mejia, during the cross-examination which
The RTC overruled the objections of the respondents and asked about the submission of proofs of purchase of raw
allowed petitioner to propound questions relating to the materials. Thus, the existence of such proofs was injected into
Questioned Documents, without prejudice to the hearing on the testimony due to Mr. Villafuerte’s answers.
the motions to expunge. The RTC denied the motion for Furthermore, the 2nd Supplemental Judicial Affidavit of Mrs.
reconsideration. Villafuerte was properly admitted by the trial court. Again, the
The RTC allowed Mr. Villafuerte to testify on the contested general rule is that provided under Sec. 2 of the JA Rule – such
documentary exhibits, on the ground that both the trial court affidavits must be filed not later than five days before pre-trial
and the parties are bound by the reservations made for the or preliminary conference. In this case, petitioner failed to
presentation of additional evidence, and in keeping with the comply with the several conditions in the exception to the rule.
interest of justice that evidence should be liberally allowed to There was no explanation and valid reason for the delay, and
be heard than to be suppressed, subject to the final the fact that the affidavit introduces new evidence.
appreciation of its weight and credence. The motion for Nevertheless, the 2nd Supplemental Judicial Affidavit was
reconsideration of both respondents of the denial of their properly admitted in evidence by the trial court. All parties
motions to expunge were denied in an Omnibus Order. made a reservation for the presentation of additional
Thus, respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. documentary exhibits in the course of the trial. Clearly, such
The CA dismissed the petitions, upholding the RTC’s discretion. reservation is tantamount to a waiver of the application of
However, upon reconsideration, the CA granted the Secs. 2 and 10 of the JA Rule.
respondents’ petition and ruled that the RTC erred in allowing When the parties had the opportunity to amend the Pre-Trial
the introduction of the 2nd Supplemental Judicial Affidavit. Order to withdraw their assent to their reservation, the
ISSUE records show that none of them did so. Consequently, they
● Whether or not the CA erred in disallowing the cannot now dispute the contents of the Pre-Trial Order.
introduction of additional documentary exhibits during trial Furthermore, the evidence presented are likewise undeniably
and the filing of the 2nd Supplemental Judicial Affidavit of Mrs. relevant to the issues raised during the pre-trial, which mainly
Villafuerte (YES) question petitioner’s entitlement to claim the amount of its
RULING insurance policy from the respondents and if it has proved the
The JA Rule and the Guidelines on Pre-Trial do not totally amount of its loss by substantial evidence.
proscribe the submission of additional evidence even after trial
had already commenced.
RULE 19

G.R. No. 81835 December 20, 1990 In the case at bar, the compromise agreement submitted by
ROMEO J. ORDOÑEZ, Petitioner, vs. THE HON. the plaintiff and the defendants and the decision approving the
ALFREDO J. GUSTILO, in his capacity as presiding same recognized the validity of the Reclamation Contract. In
judge of Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch their answer-in-intervention, petitioner alleges that there was
XVI, Cavite City, Municipality of Rosario, Cavite, no reclamation undertaken by SADECO, that the land in
former Mayor Calixto D. Enriquez of Rosario, question was the result of accretion from the sea and that the
Cavite, and Valeriano Espiritu of Mabolo, Bacoor, Reclamation Contract is null and void. Clearly then, the
Cavite, Respondents. compromise agreement and the decision had in effect resolved
the aforementioned issues raised by the intervenors. As aptly
observed by the trial court, the continuation of the reception
This is a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. of the intervenors' evidence would serve no purpose at all.
Espiritu filed a complaint for specific performance and There is, therefore, no merit to the claim of petitioner that the
damages against Enriquez to enforce their agreement in a lower court "unceremoniously terminated the proceedings"
Reclamation Contract. Enriquez claims that said action was even "without the intervenors completing their evidence."
barred by the statute of limitations, the contract has been Precisely, the court a quo gave credence and weight to the
substantially amended, modified and supplemented; and compromise agreement and denied the claims of the
plaintiff has not performed his reciprocal obligation. intervenors. In other words, due process had been accorded
the intervenors. It would have been different had the court not
Ordonez, barangay captain in Cavite, along with 7 other
taken into consideration the claims of the intervenors.
officials filed an Answer in intervention alleging that no actual
reclamation was done by Espiritu. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, v. The Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Manila Branch 39, Raycor Air
Trial court set the case for pre-trial. All litigants including
Control System, Inc., and Court of Appeals
intervenors, with their respective counsels were present.
G.R. No. 89909 ; September 21, 1990
Intervenors asked the court if they can be allowed to present
their evidence to prove their defense. Hearings were set where FACTS:
the vice mayor and vice governor testified. The petitioner filed a complaint for replevin against Uniwide
Sales, Inc., (Uniwide) and the BPI Investment Corporation, and
Principal litigants, however, filed a compromise agreement
several other banks called BPI-Consortium for the recovery of
with the court which approved it. Thus, the decision became
the possession of air-conditioning units.
immediately final and was duly executed to the satisfaction of
principal litigants.
Metrobank alleged that the air-conditioning units were
Intervenors filed a motion to set aside the compromise installed on a loan it extended to Good Earth Emporium &
agreement but were denied by the court. Supermarket, Inc. The land and the building had been
foreclosed, and purchased by the BPI-Consortium - a deed of
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in
chattel mortgage was constituted over the personal
stopping/preventing the intervenors from further presenting
properties, including the air conditioning units.
their evidence in support of their Answer-in-Intervention.
RULING: No. An intervention has been regarded as "merely Raycor Air Control Systems, Inc. filed a motion for leave to
collateral or accessory or ancillary to the principal action and intervene, alleging it has a direct and immediate interest in the
not an independent proceeding; an interlocutory proceeding subject matter of the litigation. This intervention was admitted
dependent on or subsidiary to, the case between the original by the lower court.
parties." The main action having ceased to exist, there is no
pending proceeding whereon the intervention may be based. On March 15, 1988, Metrobank and BPI Consortium filed a
joint motion to dismiss the complaint, the lower court issued
As we recently ruled in Camacho v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et
the order dismissing the complaint with prejudice.
al., “There is no question that intervention is only collateral or
ancillary to the main action. Hence, it was previously ruled that
The private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration,
the final dismissal of the principal action results in the dismissal
claiming that it was not furnished with a copy of the joint
of said ancillary action."
motion for dismissal. The respondent court issued the order
A judgment approving a compromise agreement is final and granting the motion for reconsideration.
immediately executory. (Samonte v. Samonte, 64 SCRA 524) All
pending issues will become moot and academic once a On April 14, 1989, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
compromise submitted by the parties is approved by the trial and mandamus with the respondent Court of Appeals
court. (Berenguer v. Arcangel, 149 SCRA 164) contending that the lower court erred in allowing the
intervention to survive despite the dismissal of the main action

and admitting the complaint in intervention. The Court of 2. May 18, 2000, QPL filed with the Municipal Assessor a sworn
Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit. statement declaring that the said properties has a value of only
PhP15,055,951,378.00
ISSUE:
Whether or not the intervention suit can prosper despite the 3. On March 16 and 23, 2001, QPL tendered to the Municipal
dismissal of the main action. Assessor the amount of PhP60,223,805.51 as first quarter
installment of the realty taxes, which the latter rejected.
HELD:
YES. The allowance of the intervention suit to proceed has the 4. QPL filed a Complaint for Consignation and Damages before
effect of vacating its previous order of dismissal. the RTC, depositing to the RTC the above-stated amount.
Albeit classified as consignation and damages case, QPL
The motion of the plaintiff and the original defendants to essentially protested the Municipal Assessor’s legal capacity to
dismiss the case, without notice to and consent of the make such assessment and its supposed noncompliance with
intervenor, has the effect of putting rest only the respective the prescribed valuation process
claims of the said original parties, but the same cannot in any
way affect the claim of the private respondent which was 5. Defendants averred that QPL was estopped from denying
allowed by the court to intervene without opposition from the the authority of the Municipal Assessor since it previously paid
original parties. realty taxes for it properties for the year 2001 based on the
assessment of the latter.
Having been permitted to become a party in order to better
protect his interests, an intervenor is entitled to have the 6. On January 28, 2002, Pulgar filed a Motion for Leave to
issues raised between him and the original parties tried and Admit Answer-in- Intervention and Answer-in-Intervention 12
determined. He had submitted himself and his cause of action (motion for intervention), alleging, among others, that as a
to the jurisdiction of the court and was entitled to relief as resident and taxpayer of Quezon Province, he has an interest
though he were himself a party in the action. in the aggressive collection of realty taxes against QPL. By way
of counterclaim, he prayed for the award of moral damages
An intervenor has the right to claim the benefit of the original and attorney's fees, anchoring the same on the "mindless
suit and to prosecute it to judgment. The right cannot be disturbance of the forest and marine environment wherein the
defeated by dismissal of the suit by the plaintiff after the filing power plant of [QPL] stands."
of the petition and notice thereof to the other parties. A
person who has an interest in the subject matter of the action 7. Pulgar's motion was initially granted and his Answer-in-
has the right, on his own motion, to intervene and become a Intervention was admitted.
party to the suit, and even after the complaint has been
dismissed, may proceed to have any actual controversy RTC: DISMISSED CIVIL CASE FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION. IT
established by the pleadings determined in such action. The ALSO DISMISSED PULGAR’S MOTION FOR INTERVENTION
trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's action does not require
dismissal of the action of the intervenor. • Declaring that QPL's complaint essentially challenged the
amount of the taxes assessed, the RTC ruled that it is the Local
G.R. NO. 157583 Sept. 10, 2014 Board of Assessment Appeals that had jurisdiction over the
FRUMENCIO PULGAR, petitioner, vs. THE complaint. Consequently, it also dismissed Pulgar's motion for
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAUBAN, QUEZON, intervention since with the dismissal of the main case, the
BRANCH 64, QUEZON POWER (PHILIPPINES) same had no leg to stand on.
LIMITED, CO., PROVINCE OF QUEZON, and
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, respondents. • Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was also
denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the RTC erred in dismissing Pulgar’s motion for
FACTS: intervention as a consequence of the dismissal of the main
1. In 1999, the Municipal Assessor of Mauban issued 34 tax case
declarations on the buildings and machinery comprising the
Mauban Plant, a facility owned and operated by Quezon Power HELD: NO
Limited, Co. (QPL) and thereby assessed it with a total market Jurisdiction over an intervention is governed by jurisdiction
value of PhP29,626,578’291.00 and, hence, PhP500 Million, over the main action. Accordingly, an intervention
more or less, in realty taxes per annum. presupposes the pendency of a suit in a court of competent
jurisdiction.

In this case, Pulgar does not contest the RTC's dismissal of Civil prayed for the issuance of preliminary attachment over 1.56
Case No. 0587-M for lack of jurisdiction, but oddly maintains hectares of land registered under the name of respondent
his intervention by asking in this appeal a review of the Morning Star located in Calamba Laguna,
correctness of the subject realty tax assessment. This recourse,
the Court, however, finds to be improper since the RTC's lack Sometime in March 2013, the petitioners Yu became aware of
of jurisdiction over the main case necessarily resulted in the Civil Case and 􏰁led their Motion for Leave to Intervene,
dismissal of his intervention. In other words, the cessation of claiming that they have legal interest in the properties subject
the principal litigation — on jurisdictional grounds at that — of the preliminary attachment. The petitioners Yu claimed that
means that Pulgar had, as a matter of course, lost his right to while the subject properties were registered in the name of
intervene. Verily, it must be borne in mind that: respondent Morning Star, the latter is a mere nominal owner
of the subject properties since they were the real owners; and
[I]ntervention is never an independent action, but is that they had transferred the titles covering the subject
ancillary and supplemental to the existing litigation. Its properties to respondent Morning Star only to facilitate the
purpose is not to obstruct nor . . . unnecessarily delay the latter's loan with HDMF under the GLAD program. The
placid operation of the machinery of trial, but merely to afford petitioners Yu further averred that the Deed of Absolute Sale
one not an original party, yet having a certain right or interest which they executed in favor of respondent Morning Star was
in the pending case, the opportunity to appear and be joined null and void ab initio for lack of consideration.
so he could assert or protect such right or interests. Otherwise
stated, the right of an intervenor should only be in aid of the the RTC, through public respondent granting the respondent
right of the original party. Where the right of the latter has Miranda's Complaint. The said Decision eventually became
ceased to exist, there is nothing to aid or fight for; hence, the final and executory.
right of intervention ceases.
the RTC denied the petitioners Yu's Motion for Leave to
PETITION is DENIED. Intervene, stating that they are not the registered owners of
the properties, and that their rights may be protected in a
SEVERINO A. YU, RAMON A. YU, and LORENZO A. YU, separate proceeding.
petitioners, vs. DAVID MIRANDA, MORNING STAR HOMES
CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION-SAN JOSE BIÑAN-HOMEOWNERS the petitioners Yu filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari before
ASSOCIATION, INC., TIMMY RICHARD T. GABRIEL, and the CA. In the assailed Decision, the CA dismissed the
LILIBETH GABRIEL, respondents. petitioners Yu's Rule 65 Petition because the issue has already
G.R. No. 225752. March 27, 2019. SECOND DIVISION. been rendered moot and academic and RTC’s decision already
CAGUIOA, J. became final and executory.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 Hence, the instant appeal.
FACTS: The instant case arose from an action for Sum of ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners Yu may still be allowed
Money with Prayer for Issuance of Preliminary Attachment to intervene in Civil Case No. B-8623 despite the unassailable
by respondent David Miranda (respondent Miranda) against fact that the said case has already been decided upon with
respondents Morning Star Homes Christian Association finality.
(respondent Morning Star), Timmy Richard T. Gabriel
(Timmy) and Lilibeth Gabriel (Lilibeth) before the Regional HELD: NO. the RTC's Decision dated May 19, 2013 is already
Trial Court of Biñan City, Laguna, Branch 24 (RTC). final and executory. The case where the petitioners Yu seek to
intervene in has already ceased. Jurisprudence has made it
In the Complaint, respondent Miranda alleged that respondent clear that "[i]ntervention can no longer be allowed in a case
Morning Star sought to establish a housing project to be already terminated by final judgment."
financed by the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF) or
Pag-IBIG through the Group Land Acquisition and Further, it must be noted that Civil Case No. B-8623 is centered
Development (GLAD) Financing Program. Respondent Miranda on the recovery of sum of money pursued by respondent
entered into a contract with respondent Morning Star for the Miranda against respondents Morning Star, Timmy, and
supply and financing of the back filling material for the latter's Lilibeth on the basis of the latter's obligation to pay the former
housing project. for the supply and financing of the back filling materials
provided by respondent Miranda for the respondents' housing
However, it was alleged that respondent Morning Star project. The petitioners Yu have no participation whatsoever
defaulted on its obligation to pay respondent Miranda, with in the transaction entered into by the respondents Morning
the total amount of unpaid obligation of respondent Morning Star, Timmy, and Lilibeth with respondent Miranda. The said
Star ballooning to P4,100,009.30. Respondent Miranda also

case does not concern itself with the question of ownership
over the subject properties. PRA filed for cancellation of the miscellaneous sales patents,
original certificates of title, and transfer certificates of title,
Further, the petitioners Yu are not parties in interest without plus, reversion before the RTC which was raffled to Branch
whom no final determination of the recovery of sum of money 198.
case can be had — they are not indispensable parties.
Petitioner Republic filed a motion for leave to intervene,
At most, the petitioners Yu may only be considered necessary alleging that it is the true owner of the subject property.
parties as they are not indispensable, but who ought to be
joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those The RTC-Br. 255 dismissed the motion to intervene as the case
already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement was already pending in Branch 198.
of the claim subject of the action. It must be stressed that the
non-inclusion of necessary parties does not prevent the court The CA affirmed the dismissal of the motion.
from proceeding in the action, and the judgment rendered
therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of such ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s motion to intervene and
necessary party. admit answer-in-intervention in RTC-Br 255 proper
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is HELD: when Branch 255 deferred to Branch 198 and declared
hereby DENIED. The Decision dated April 22, 2016 and that it would await the final resolution of the reversion case, it
Resolution dated July 13, 2016 of the Court of Appeals, Special recognized that the parties' dispute will be effectively and fully
Fifth Division in CA-G.R. SP. No. 132394 are AFFIRMED. settled in the reversion case. This is evident in its disquisition
that "[t]his Court deemed it more practical and sensible to
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY THE await the finality of the aforementioned decision for if the
PHILIPPINE RECLAMATION AUTHORITY (PRA), PETITIONER, Court upholds and gives weight to plaintiff's titles and later on
VS. RIA S. RUBIN, RESPONDENT. the decision of Branch 198 declaring the same titles as null and
G.R. No. 213960, October 07, 2020 void is affirmed by a higher court, then there would be the
existence of conflicting decisions not to mention the possible
FACTS: 45 complications that would arise in the execution of the said
President Marcos issued PD 1085 decreeing among others, decisions." So must it be.
that the "land reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore areas of
Manila Bay" is "hereby transferred, conveyed and assigned to What qualifies a person to intervene is his or her possession of
the ownership and administration of the PRA. a legal interest in the matter in litigation or in the success of
either of the parties, or an interest against both; or when he or
PRA and Meralco entered into a Memorandum of Agreement she is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution
granting MERALCO to use a portion of the reclaimed land or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or
(subject land). an officer thereof. As regards legal interest as qualifying factor,
the Court has ruled that such interest must be of a direct and
PRA then later discovered that a certain Espinili Laderas filed a immediate character so that the intervenor will either gain or
Miscellaneous Sales Application (MSA) over a portion of the lose by the direct legal operation of the judgment. The interest
reclaimed land. The DENR-NCR approved the application and must be actual and material, a concern which is more than
awarded the same to Espinili Laderas via Miscellaneous Sales mere curiosity, or academic or sentimental desire; it must not
Patent. be indirect and contingent, indirect and remote, conjectural,
consequential or collateral. As stated, however,
Also a certain Edna Laborte filed a MSA over a portion of the notwithstanding the presence of a legal interest, permission to
reclaimed land. The DENR-NCR, too, approved the application intervene is subject to the sound discretion of the court, the
and awarded the same to Edna Laborte through Miscellaneous exercise of which is limited by considering whether or not the
Sales Patent. intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of
the rights of the original parties and whether or not the
Both patents were registered in the Register of Deeds and an intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate
OCT was issued. proceeding.
Both Espinili and Edna sold the land to Rubin and a new TCT To allow intervention, (a) it must be shown that the movant
was issued in her favor. has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or is otherwise
qualified; and (b) consideration must be given as to whether
Rubin then filed before the RTC-branch 255 an Amended the adjudication of the rights of the original parties may be
Complaint against MERALCO, for accion reinvindicatoria. delayed or prejudiced, or whether the intervenor's rights may

be protected in a separate proceeding or not. Both Yes. The raffle of cases is of vital importance to the
requirements must concur, as the first is not more important administration of justice because it is intended to insure
than the second. impartial adjudication of cases. By raffling the cases public
suspicion regarding assignment of cases to predetermined
RULE 20 judges is obviated.
G.R. Nos. L-76344-46 June 30, 1988 A violation or disregard of the Court’s circular on how the raffle
ANG KEK CHEN, Petitioner of cases should be conducted is not to be countenanced. A
vs. THE HON. ABUNDIO BELLO, as Judge of the Metropolitan party has the right to be heard by an impartial and unbiased
Trial Court of Manila, and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, tribunal.
Respondent
When the respondent judge conducted the raffle of the three
Petition to Review the Order of Metropolitan Trial Court criminal cases in question, apparently in violation of the
Court’s Circular No. 7, he did not only arouse the suspicion that
DOCTRINE: he had some ulterior motive for doing so, but he violated the
cardinal rule that all judicial processes must be done above
The raffle of cases is of vital importance to the administration board. We consider the procedure of raffling cases to be an
of justice because it is intended to insure impartial adjudication important element of judicial proceedings, designed precisely
of cases. By raffling the cases public suspicion regarding to give assurance to the parties that the court hearing their
assignment of cases to predetermined judges is obviated. case would be impartial. On this point, we found the petition
meritorious.
When the respondent judge conducted the raffle of the three
criminal cases in question, he did not only arouse the suspicion Accordingly, the order of the respondent court denying
that he had some ulterior motive for doing so, but he violated petitioner’s motion to re-raffle the criminal cases in question,
the cardinal rule that all judicial processes must be done above except Criminal Case No. 021430 for threat which is hereby
board, We consider the procedure of raffling cases to be an DISMISSED, is set aside and the said cases Criminal Cases No.
important element of judicial proceedings, designed precisely 021429 and 021431 are remanded to the Executive Judge for
to give assurance to the parties that the court hearing their re-raffle in accordance with this Court’s Circular No. 7.
case would be impartial.
RULE 21
FACTS:
UNIVERSAL RUBBER PRODUCTS, INC., Petitioner, vs. HON.
Ang was charged before the then Manila City Court with crimes COURT OF APPEALS, CONVERSE RUBBER CORP., EDWARSON
of Maltreatment, Threats, andSlight Physical Injuries. After the MANUFACTURING CO., INC. AND HON. PEDRO C. NAVARRO,
prosecution had presented its evidence, Ang filed a Demurrer Respondents
to Evidencewhich was denied by the trial court. Ang elevated
the incident to the RTC of Manila on certiorari and prohibition. G.R. No. L-30266, JUNE 29, 1984
The petition was likewise denied. On appeal, the Court of Petition for Review
Appeals affirmed in toto the Regional Trial Court’s Order.
DOCTRINE
Meanwhile, the then presiding judge of the trial court where
the cases were pending was promoted to the RTC. As a “Well-settled is Our jurisprudence that, in order to entitle a
consequence, the judge, as officer-in-charge of the MTC, party to the issuance of a "subpoena duces tecum,” it must
directed the return of the case records to the Clerk of Court for appear, by clear and unequivocal proof, that the book or
"re-raffle." Ang, however, alleged that he received document sought to be produced contains evidence relevant
the corresponding order only after the cases had already been and material to the issue before the court, and that the precise
actually "re-raffled" and assigned to the said judge. Ang filed a book, paper or document containing such evidence has been so
motion to re-raffle the cases, which was denied. The designated or described that it may be identified. A "subpoena
subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. duces tecum" once issued by the court may be quashed upon
motion if the issuance thereof is unreasonable and oppressive,
ISSUE: or the relevancy of the books, documents or things does not
appear, or if the persons in whose behalf the subpoena is issued
Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse fails to advance the reasonable cost of production thereof.”
of discretion regarding the raffle of Criminal Cases?
FACTS
RULING:

Respondent corporations sued the present petitioner before whose behalf the subpoena is issued fails to advance the
the CFI for unfair competition. After the presentation of reasonable cost of production thereof.
evidence, respondents made a request to the respondent
Judge to issue a subpoena duces tecum against the treasurer With these rules mentioned, the denial of the motion to quash
of herein petitioner. The respondent judge acted favorably the subpoena duces tecum was proper. In a suit for unfair
and issued a subpoena duces tecum, directing the treasurer of competition, it is only through the issuance of the questioned
the petitioner to bring with him all the sales invoices, sales subpoena duces tecum that the complaining party is afforded
books and ledgers necessary for the trial. his full rights of redress. The complaint for unfair competition
is basically a suit for “injunction and damages.” The ‘damages’
Petitioner filed a motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum part of the suit allows the aggrieved party to recover the
on the grounds that (1) it is unreasonable and oppressive, (2) damage he has suffered by virtue of the said unlawful
there is no good cause shown for the issuance thereof; and (3) competition. Hence, one need not first be found guilty of
the books and documents are not relevant to the case pending unfair competition before the accounting for purposes of
below. The CFI denied the motion to quash. The subsequent ascertaining the amount of damages recoverable. If it were
motion for reconsideration was denied. otherwise, then the final determination of the unfair
competition case would not only render nugatory the rights of
On petition for certiorari, the CA denied the petition for lack of complainant under Sec. 23 of R.A. 166 (which provides the
merit. guidelines in ascertaining amount of damages), but would be a
repetitious process causing only unnecessary delay.
ISSUE
The sufficiency in the description of the books sought to be
● Whether or not the issuance of the “subpoena duces produced in court by the questioned "subpoena duces tecum"
tecum” is proper in a suit for unfair competition. (YES) is not disputed in this case, hence, We hold that the same has
passed the test of sufficient description.
RULING
G.R. No. L-24154 October 31, 1967
While this present petition remains pending before the SC,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. GREGORIO
petitioner’s establishment was totally burned together with all
D. MONTEJO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
the records which is sought to be produced in court by the
Zamboanga City, and FELIX WEE SIT, respondents.
questioned “subpoena duces tecum.” In effect, it renders the
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS WITH
present petition moot and academic. However, the legal
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
principles arising from the issues deserve discussion and
DOCTRINE: Undoubtedly, it is the inherent power of the Court
resolution.
to compel the attendance of persons to testify in a case
As a general rule, on obtaining an injunction for infringement pending therein. Section 9 of Rule 23 is thus interpreted to
of a trademark, complainant is entitled to an accounting and apply solely to civil cases.
recovery of defendant’s profits on the goods sold under that FACTS: A Criminal Case was filed in the CFI of Zamboanga City
mark, as incident to, and a part of, his property right, and this against Felix Wee Sit for double homicide and serious physical
rule applies in cases of unfair competition. In such case, the injuries thru reckless imprudence.
infringer or unfair trader is required in equity to account for It was stated that Ernesto Uaje y Salvador, "a permanent
and yield up his gains on a principle analogous to that which resident of Montalban, Rizal," then a patrolman in the
charges as trustee with the profits acquired by the wrongful Montalban Police Department, "is a material and important
use of the property of the cestui que trust, and defendant’s witness in the case" his affidavit having served as the basis for
profits are regarded as an equitable measure of the filing the information as he "happened to be an eye-witness
compensation plaintiff should receive for the past harm during the traffic incident wherein a Private Jeep driven
suffered by him. recklessly by the accused, turned turtle in the public highway
in Zamboanga City causing the death of 2 young girls and
In order to entitle a party to the issuance of a “subpoena duces serious physical injuries to 4 young girls, who are all students
tecum,” it must appear, by clear and unequivocal proof, that of a local religious institution.”
the book or document sought to be produced contains The case was called for trial and respondent Judge issued a
evidence relevant and material to the issue before the court, subpoena to patrolman Uaje for him to appear at the trial but
and that the precise book, paper or document containing such he did not appear. The undersigned City Fiscal formally moved
evidence has been so designated or described that it may be for an order of arrest" or in the alternative "to cite him for
identified. A “subpoena duces tecum,” once issued by the contempt for willful failure to appear at the trial of the case as
court, may be quashed upon motion if the issuance thereof is a material witness…"
unreasonable and oppressive, or the relevancy of the books, The motion was formally presented and denied on the same
documents or things does not appear, or if the persons in day. In addition to the plea to declare void such order refusing
to have the witness either arrested or cited for contempt,
there was the further prayer that respondent Judge be witness for the prosecution will not appear and testify when
required to grant the aforesaid motion. required," to order that he "give bail in sum as [it] may deem
The petition was given due course, with preliminary injunction proper for such appearance. Upon refusal to give bail, the
issued. Respondent Judge and the accused in their answer, court must commit him to prison until he complies or is legally
denied that Uaje was "a material, much less an important, discharged."
witness," such denial being based on the very affidavit
executed by him which as noted in the answer admitted "that RULE 22
the said witness did not see how the accident had occurred and
was, therefore, not an eye-witness. . . . " JAIME BELTRAN LUZ, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL
As a First and Special Affirmative Defense, they relied on AMNESTY COMMISSION, respondent.
Section 9 of Rule 23 contending that if a witness was not bound
by a subpoena since his residence was admittedly not less than
50 kilometers from the place of trial, the failure to obey the PETITION FOR REVIEWON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45
same or to comply with it could not in any manner whatsoever
constitute contempt of court. Respondent Judge therefore did DOCTRINE: The interest which entitles a person to intervene in
not commit any error; nor did he abuse his discretion in a suit between other parties must be in the matter in litigation
refusing to issue an order of arrest or to cite said witness for and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor
contempt. will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect
ISSUE: WON respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of of the judgment. Otherwise, if persons not parties of the action
discretion in denying a motion for the arrest of a material could be allowed to intervene,
witness, in a criminal case, or in the alternative, to cite him for proceedings will become unnecessarily complicated, expensive
contempt, relying on Section 9 of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court and interminable. And this is not the policy of the law.
to the effect that a witness is not bound to attend as such
before any court, judge or other officer out of the province in FACTS: Petitioner was charged with violation of Presidential
which he resides unless the distance be less than 50 kilometers Decree 1866 or illegal possession of firearms before RTC
from his place of residence to the place of trial by the usual Makati. Petitioner filed an amnesty with the Local Amnesty
course Board for Metro Manila. In due course, the application was
HELD: YES. The order of respondent judge denying the motion denied. Respondent affirmed this Resolution and denied the
for an order of arrest or a citation for contempt in the Motion for Reconsideration. This was received by petitioner on
alternative, based on a clear misapprehension of the Rules of November 22, 2002.
Court, could be viewed as amounting to grave abuse of
discretion. It would follow then that respondent Judge should Under Rule III, Section 4 of NAC Administrative Order No. 2,
decide said motion without taking into consideration Section 9 Series of 1999, the petitioner had until December 7, 2002, a
of Rule 23. Saturday, within which to file a petition for review of the said
Counsel for respondent, Atty. Rosauro Alvarez, stressed anew resolution with the Court of Appeals. On December 9, 2002,
that the first and decisive question is whether a Court of First the petitioner filed a motion in the appellate court for an
Instance possesses authority in a criminal case "to compel by extension of fifteen (15) days from December 9, 2002, or until
subpoena the attendance of the witness who, as in this case, December 24, 2002 within which to file his petition. The
resides hundreds of miles away from the place of trial." petitioner alleged therein that he had just engaged the
According to him, "an examination of the placement on services of counsel who needed additional time to study the
Section 9 of Rule 23 discloses to us that it is found under the case and draft the petition. However, the petitioner failed to
topic Procedure in Courts of First Instance which file his petition for review.
unquestionably would include both criminal and civil cases.
The provision of Section 9, Rule 23 makes no distinction Since both December 24 and 25 are holidays, he filed a second
between a criminal or civil case and it is a fundamental rule or motion for extension for 15 days from December 26 or until
statutory construction that where the law makes no distinction January 10, 2003. He filed the petition for review with the
it is not proper for the interpreter to make any such Court of Appeals on January 10.
distinction."
This contention of respondents failed to enlist the assent of a CA granted the first Motion for Extension but denied the
majority of the Court. Undoubtedly it is the inherent power of second one for being filed out of time. CA relied on A.M. No.
the Court to compel the attendance of persons to testify in a 00-2-14-SC issued on February 29, 2000, which provides that
case pending therein. Section 9 of Rule 23 is thus interpreted any extension of time to file the required pleading should be
to apply solely to civil cases. A recognition of such power in a counted from the expiration of the period regardless of the
court of first instance conducting the trial of an accused may fact that the said due date is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal
be gleaned from principle that justifies it when satisfied "by holiday.
proof or oath, that there is reason to believe that a material
Issue: WON the second motion was filed out of time (YES)
Ruling: Section 1, Rule 22, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure Reinier Shipping appealed to the National Labor Relations
provides that in computing any period of time prescribed or Commission (NLRC), but the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s
allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court, or by any decision.
applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the Reinier Shipping obtained an extension of 15-days to file a
designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and petition for special civil action of certiorari before the Court of
the date of performance included. If the last day of the period, Appeals. The period counted from July 27, a Saturday, and fell
as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal due on August 10, a Saturday. Reinier Shipping filed its petition
holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run on the following Monday, August 12, 2002.
until the next working day.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for having been
The extension granted by the Court of Appeals should be filed out of time.The petitioner violated the Supreme Court’s
tacked to the original period and commences immediately A.M. 00-2-14-SC. According to the CA, the automatic
after the expiration of such period. Under the Resolution of deferment to the next working day did not apply and Reinier
this Court in A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC, the CA has no discretion to Shipping should have filed its petition before August 10,
reckon the considering that the court is closed on Saturdays.
commencement of the extension it granted from a date later
than the expiration of such ISSUE: Whether or not the petition was filed out of time.
period, regardless of the fact that said due date is a Saturday,
Sunday, or a legal holiday. HELD: NO. Being granted a 15-day extension to file the petition
for special civil action of certiorari, compelling Reinier Shipping
Notwithstanding, the Court granted the petition. Prescinding to file its petition one day short of the extension granted would
from the foregoing considerations, we agree with the unjustly deprive it of the full benefit of that extension.
petitioner’s plea for a liberal interpretation and application of
A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC in light of the peculiar factual mileu in this The language of Section 1, Rule 21 is clear, therefore, it should
case. It appears that the petitioner’s counsel relied in good apply - since the new due date fell on a Saturday when courts
faith on the ruling of this Court in Moskowsky. Moreover, the are closed, Reinier Shipping has until August 12, the next
petitioner filed his petition for review on the same day, January working day to file its petition.
13, 2003, even before the CA granted his first motion for
extension of time to file his petition for review. In fine, when The clarification in A.M. 00-2-14-SC covers a situation of
the CA granted the petitioner’s first motion, the petitioner had extension of time where the due date falls on a Saturday,
already filed his petition for review even as his second motion Sunday, or holiday. The correct rule is that “any extension of
for extension had yet to be resolved by the time to file the required pleadings should x x x be counted from
the expiration of the period regardless of the fact that said
REINIER PACIFIC INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING, INC. AND due date is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday”.
NEPTUNE SHIP MANAGEMENT SVCS., PTE., LTD., V. CAPTAIN
FRANCISCO B. GUEVARRA, Substituted by his heirs. This clarification tackles the period from which the extension
G.R. No. 157020 ; June 19, 2013 will be counted from. Regardless of the fact that the due date
is a Saturday, the extension period shall be counted from the
FACTS: Petitioner Reinier Pacific International Shipping, Inc. due date.
(Reinier Shipping), acting as agent of Neptune Ship
management Services, PTE, Limited, hired respondent Captain If a pleading is due on a Saturday, the time for filing it shall not
Francisco B. Guevarra to work as master of MV Nol Shedar. run, applying Section 1 of Rule 21 on Saturdays, Sundays, or
holidays, but will resume on the next working day. The
In the course of his work, Reinier Shipping sent Guevarra pleading will be due on the latter date.
Notice, relieving him of command of the vessel for being
negligent in the discharge of his duties, upon the insistence of
its charterers and owners. Guevarra filed a case for illegal G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 2005
dismissal and damages against herein petitioners.
DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO,
The Labor Arbiter found Guevarra’s dismissal illegal. The LA LOLITO VICTORIANO, JACOB OBANIA AND DOMINGO
found that Reinier Shipping denied Gueverra his right to due CABACUNGAN, Petitioner
process, for failing to hear Guevarra in his defense. Reinier
vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF BERNARDO DEL
Shipping did not ascertain his guilt, and merely invoked the
MUNDO, namely: FE, CORAZON, JOSEFA, SALVADOR and
insistence of the vessel owners in relieving him of his
CARMEN, all surnamed DEL MUNDO, LAND BANK OF THE
command.
PHILIPPINES AND HON. ANTONIO N. ROSALES, Presiding
Judge, Branch 43, Regional Trial Court, Roxas, Oriental 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within
Mindoro, Respondent the reglementary period for appeal.
DOCTRINE: On September 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed

the petition.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to
afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court ISSUE: WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION
deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within AND IN RULING AND AFFIRMING THE DECISION OR ORDER OF
which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, THE RESPONDENT HON. ANTONIO M. ROSALES THAT
counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new PETITIONERS APPEAL WAS FILED OUT OF TIME WHEN
trial or motion for reconsideration. PETITIONERS RECEIVED THE LAST OR FINAL ORDER OF THE
COURT ON JULY 22, 1998 AND FILED THEIR NOTICE OF APPEAL
Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40 ON JULY 27, 1998 AND PAID THE APPEAL DOCKET FEE ON
governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the AUGUST 3, 1998.
Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the
Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on RULING: Yes. The foregoing issues essentially revolve around
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals the period within which petitioners should have filed their
and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme notice of appeal.
Court.
First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right
The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and
uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with
motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right
or partial) or any final order or resolution. to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules.
Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to appeal.
FACTS: Petitioners Neypes, et al. filed an action for annulment The period to appeal is fixed by both statute and procedural
of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or rules. BP 129, as amended, provides:
reversion with preliminary injunction against the Bureau of
Forest Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the Sec. 39. Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders,
Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo. resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all
these cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice
The trial court dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision
that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly appealed from. Provided, however, that in habeas corpus
received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, cases, the period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from
on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion the notice of judgment appealed from. x x x
for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued
another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration which Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July
27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. ― The appeal shall be taken
appeal fees on August 3, 1998. within fifteen (15) days from the notice of the judgment or
final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record
appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late.This was on appeal within thirty (30) days from the notice of judgment
received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a or final order.
motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order
dated September 3, 1998. The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion
for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of
Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65, time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be
petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before allowed. (emphasis supplied)
the CA.
Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15
In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from.
seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the
15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case,
July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is
order of the trial court denying their motion for an adjudication on the merits which, considering the evidence
reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights

and obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or substantial justice. There, we condoned the delay incurred by
judgment that dismisses an action. the appealing party due to strong considerations of fairness
and justice.
Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from notice
of judgment or final order to appeal the decision of the trial In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due
court. On the 15th day of the original appeal period (March 18, course to tardy appeals, we have not been oblivious to or
1998), petitioners did not file a notice of appeal but instead unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal
opted to file a motion for reconsideration. According to the application of the Rules. In those situations where
trial court, the MR only interrupted the running of the 15-day technicalities were dispensed with, our decisions were not
appeal period. It ruled that petitioners, having filed their MR meant to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set
on the last day of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, by law. But we hasten to add that in those rare cases where
had only one (1) day left to file the notice of appeal upon procedural rules were not stringently applied, there always
receipt of the notice of denial of their MR. existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave
injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always tried
Petitioners, however, argue that they were entitled under the to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement
Rules to a fresh period of 15 days from receipt of the final order of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be
or the order dismissing their motion for reconsideration. given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of
his cause.
In Quelnan and Apuyan, both petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the trial court. We ruled The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all
there that they only had the remaining time of the 15-day courts. It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even
appeal period to file the notice of appeal. establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive
process, and the speedy disposition of cases.
We consistently applied this rule in similar cases, premised on
the long-settled doctrine that the perfection of an appeal in To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to
the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court
mandatory but also jurisdictional. The rule is also founded on deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within
deep-seated considerations of public policy and sound practice which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court,
that, at risk of occasional error, the judgments and awards of counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a
courts must become final at some definite time fixed by law. new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Prior to the passage of BP 129, Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1964 Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40
Revised Rules of Court read: governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the
Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the
Sec. 3. How appeal is taken. Appeal maybe taken by serving Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on
upon the adverse party and filing with the trial court within appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals
thirty (30) days from notice of order or judgment, a notice of and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme
appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on appeal. The time Court.
during which a motion to set aside the judgment or order or
for new trial has been pending shall be deducted, unless such The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period
motion fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 37. uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the
motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full
xxx or partial) or any final order or resolution.
In National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority and We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of
Authority v. Municipality of Libmanan, however, we declared appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July
that appeal is an essential part of our judicial system and the 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion
rules of procedure should not be applied rigidly. This Court has for reconsideration).
on occasion advised the lower courts to be cautious about not
depriving a party of the right to appeal and that every party RULE 23
litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the G.R. No. 71388 September 23, 1986
constraint of technicalities. MARIA MONSERRAT R. KOH, petitioner, v. HONORABLE
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (IAC), HON. JOB. B.
In de la Rosa v. Court of Appeals, we stated that, as a rule, MADAYAG in his capacity as the Presiding Judge, of Branch
periods which require litigants to do certain acts must be CXLV, Regional Trial Court of Makati, et al., respondents
followed unless, under exceptional circumstances, a delay in
the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of
PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 45 The party, who has dispensed with those modes of
discovery shall be deemed to have waived resort
DOCTRINE: The rules on discovery (Rules 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 and thereto, and, unless for good cause shown, motion to
29) are intended to enable a party to obtain knowledge of resort thereto, after termination of the pre-trial, shall
material facts within the knowledge of the adverse party or of not be grantee. The costs entailed the waiving party
third parties through depositions to obtain knowledge of in presenting evidence during trial that could have
material facts or admissions from the adverse party through been obtained through any of those modes of
written interrogatories; to obtain admissions from the adverse discovery which were waived, shall not be assessed
party regarding the genuineness of relevant documents or against the adverse party nor awarded as part of the
relevant matters of fact through requests for admission; to litigation expenses.
inspect relevant documents or objects and lands or other
property in the possession or control of the adverse party; and If, after 30 days from receipt of this notice, no such
to determine the physical or mental condition of a party when manifestation has been filed, the case shall be
such is in controversy. archived or dismissed as the case may be.
FACTS: On June 1983, First Interstate Bank of California Upon Order of the Court, this 19th day of August
(respondent Bank) filed a Complaint against petitioner to 1983.
recover the sum of US-$7,434.90 or its equivalent in Philippine
Currency which, due to a computer error, it had overpaid to Makati, Metro Manila.
her on October 1981. It was alleged that Koh's father sent her
US-$500.00 through the Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company (SGD.) E.R. BELEN
which was the remitting bank of respondent Bank. But due to
computer mistake, respondent Bank's Los Angeles Office No manifestation was filed by the parties' lawyers. The
erroneously overstated the amount to US-$8,500.00 instead of presiding Judge (not respondent Judge),
US-$500.00, and as a consequence respondent Bank issued issued an order dismissing the case for noncompliance with
and delivered to petitioner a check amounting to US-$8,500.00 the notice of case status, the case
which petitioner deposited to her account and subsequently is hereby dismissed. This order was received by respondent
withdrew. Bank's counsel on December 1983.
In her Answer, petitioner admitted the allegations and claimed On July 1984, respondent Bank, through a new counsel, refiled
that immediately after receipt of a formal demand letter to its complaint which was assigned to the RTC branch presided
return the overpayment, she offered to pay respondent Bank over by respondent Judge. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss
through its lawyer in installments of $100.00 a month but the the
offer was unreasonably rejected. complaint on the ground of res judicata, which was opposed
by respondent Bank.
It is significant to note that no copy of said Answer was
attached to the petition for certiorari with IAC and this Court It Respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss he denied
was only in the Comment of respondents' counsel filed with motion for reconsideration, on the following grounds: (1) The
this Court that a copy of said Answer was attached. dismissal was tantamount to depriving the plaintiff of its day in
court; (2) Notwithstanding the failure of the parties in said case
On August 1983, Mr. E.R. Belen, Officer-in-Charge of the RTC, to comply with said notice of case status, the first branch of
sent the “Notice of Case Status” to the parties. court should have set the case for pre-trial conference since
the last pleading had been filed and there are no other
Please take notice that cases where issues have been conditions to be complied with before any case is calendared
joined will be scheduled for pre-trial conference only for pre-trial under Section 1 of Rule 20; (3) It would be better
after Rules 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29-where for the defendant to have a definite and clearcut decision as to
applicable, necessary and or feasible have been her liability or non-liability, instead of winning a case on a
resorted to by the parties. technicality.
If a party believes that those modes of discovery are Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the IAC praying
not applicable, necessary or feasible with respect to that the orders denying the motion to dismiss and the MR, be
him, he shall file a manifestation to that effect. The set aside as null and void and that the complaint be ordered
pre-trial conference, shall be scheduled as soon as the dismissed.
respective manifestations of having resorted to, or of IAC: Found no merit to the petition and concurred with the
dispensing with, those modes of discovery have been findings of the respondent judge. It also ruled on the notice of
filed by the parties. the case status as only a notice and not an order. It reiterated

that the warning in the last paragraph of the notice was not an Petitioner invokes the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 17 which
order of the court rather a warning emanating from the officer- states that: “If plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial,
in-charge, and that failure of the parties to heed the warning or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time,
was not tantamount to disobedience of a lawful order of the or to comply with these rules or any order of the court, the
court, for the 'officer-in-charge' was not action may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or
the court or judge. upon the court's own motion. This dismissal shall have the
effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise
ISSUE/S: W/N THE EARLIER DECISION OF DISMISSING THE CASE provided by court.”
WAS NULL AND VOID
This provision is not applicable to the case at bar. As the IAC
HELD: YES True it is that respondent Bank's counsel who have correctly held, the "notice of case status" was not an order of
been negligent to have taken the precaution of complying with the court. It was signed by Mr. E.R. Belen, officer-in-charge.
the instructions contained in the “notice of case status”. But, Even the warning in the notice about the 30-day compliance
fortunately for respondent Bank, the omissions of its counsel was ambiguous. The failure of the parties to
are not fatal to its cause in view of the defective procedure heed the warning did not constitute disobedience of a lawful
which culminated in the dismissal of the first complaint. order of the court. Consequently, the order of dismissal could
not have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits. Neither
The rules on discovery (Rules 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 and 29) are could respondent Bank be considered to have failed to
intended to enable a party to obtain knowledge of material prosecute its action for an unreasonable length of time.
facts within the knowledge of the adverse party or of third Petitioner contends that if the ruling of the IAC regarding the
parties through depositions to obtain knowledge of material legality of the notice signed by the officer-in-charge were
facts or admissions from the adverse party through written sustained, then court processes such as summons, notices of
interrogatories; to obtain admissions from the adverse party pre-trial, writs of execution and the like can be merely
regarding the genuineness of relevant documents or relevant disregarded by lawyers. This contention is without merit.
matters of fact through requests for admission; to inspect Section 1 of Rule 14 expressly provides that upon the filing of
relevant documents or objects and lands or other property in the complaint, the clerk of court shall forthwith issue the
the possession or control of the adverse party; and to corresponding summons to the defendant. Sections 1 and 5 of
determine the physical or mental condition of a party when Rule 20 authorize the clerk of court to issue the notice of the
such is in controversy. This mutual discovery enables a party to date of the pre-trial and Section 2 of Rule 22 authorizes the
discover the evidence of the adverse party and thus facilitates clerk of court to issue the notice of the date of the trial. A writ
an amicable settlement or expedites the trial of the case. All of execution may be issued by the clerk of court pursuant to an
the parties are required to lay their cards on the table so that order of execution signed by the judge. There is no rule
justice can be rendered on the merits of the case. authorizing the issuance of the "notice of case status" in
question signed by an officer-in-charge.
Trial judges should encourage the proper utilization of the
rules on discovery. However, recourse to discovery procedures WHEREFORE, the decision of the appellate court is affirmed,
is not mandatory. If the parties do not choose to resort to such with costs against petitioner. This decision is immediately
procedures, the pre-trial conference should be set pursuant to executory.
the mandatory provisions of Section 1 of Rule 20.
G.R.No. L-25481 October 31, 1969
Petitioner argued that respondent Judge was wrong in stating
that a pre-trial order should have been issued since the last Geronimo Caguiat, Rufina Caguiat, Felicidad Caguiat,
pleading had been filed, because the "notice of case status" Fabian Caguiat, and Apolonia Caguiat, v. The Honorable
was issued on August 19, 1983, while the last pleading or the Guillermo E. Torres and Francisco Caguiat
answer to petitioner's counterclaim was filed
much later. Although, ordinarily, the last pleading which has to
be filed before the court shall set the case for pre-trial under FACTS:
Section 1 of Rule 20 is the answer to the counterclaim, in the Petitioners, plaintiffs in the Civil Case No. 8050 served a notice
case at bar, petitioner's counterclaim for damages resulting to take his deposition on the private respondent. Private
from the filing of the complaint did not require an answer. respondent, a defendant in Civil Case No. 8050 filed an answer
Since the counterclaim was the last pleading, the court should with counterclaim. Francisco Caguiat filed with the lower court
have issued a pre-trial order after its submission and it was the a motion to prevent the taking of the deposition or to restrict
duty of the clerk of court to place the case in the pre-trial its scope.
calendar under Section 5 of Rule 20.

The respondent judge issued an order to hold in abeyance the DOCTRINES: Certiorari is not available to correct errors of
resolution of the private respondent’s motion until after the procedure or mistakes in the judge's findings and conclusions
pre-trial. The petitioners opposed the motion. and that certiorari will not be issued to cure errors in
proceedings or to correct erroneous conclusions of law and
On October 3, 1964, petitioners served on private respondent fact. Furthermore, the denial of a motion to dismiss or to
a notice for the taking of deposition.The petitioners once again quash, being interlocutory, cannot be questioned by certiorari,
opposed the motion. it cannot be subject of appeal, until final judgment or order is
rendered.
The respondent judge granted the motion of the private
respondent and ordered the petitioners to refrain from taking FACTS:
the contemplated deposition.
PNB initiated the foreclosure proceedings of the mortgaged
The petitioners claimed that the purpose of the deposition is property of Komatsu for failure to pay a loan granted to the
to simplify the proceedings, while the private respondent latter by the former.
argued that he had revealed his entire defense during the pre-
trial. The private respondent further claimed his willingness to Komatsu filed an action with the RTC, seeking to prevent the
enter a stipulation of facts, while the petitioners rejected the foreclosure of the subject property. The trial court issued a
same. temporary restraining order but the property was,
extrajudicially foreclosed by the PNB. Thereafter, respondent
The Court of Appeals found that the private respondent has Komatsu Industries filed an amended petition for the
disclosed all of his evidence during the pre-trial, and that declaration of nullity of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale.
personal animosities between the parties "might endanger the
peaceful and objective conduct of the deposition upon oral During the pendency of the said case, SLDC purchased the
examination". property and a deed of absolute sale was executed.
Consequently, SLDC filed a motion for intervention, SLDC being
The petitioners argue that the fact that the private respondent a transferee pendente lite. SLDC was then allowed to intervene
has disclosed all of his defense, and that the danger of in the case at bar.
heightened animosities between the parties did not warrant
the order of the trial court to prevent the taking of the SLDC served written interrogatories on Komatsu’s counsel. The
deposition. interrogatories were not, however, answered by the
respondent by reason of which SLDC filed a motion to dismiss
ISSUE: the action with prejudice based on Sec. 5, Rule 29 of the Rules
Whether or not the respondent judge erred in ordering the of Court.
petitioners to refrain from taking the deposition.
An opposition to the motion to dismiss was filed by respondent
HELD: Komatsu Industries alleging inter alia that there was no valid
NO. The right of the party to take depositions as means of service of the written interrogatories inasmuch as the service
discovery is not exactly absolute. The findings of the Court of was made on the respondent's counsel and not directly upon
Appeals that the private respondent had disclosed all of his any of the respondent's officers who were competent to testify
defense, and his willingness to enter into a stipulation of facts in its behalf, pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 25 of the Revised Rules of
while the petitioners were not, are binding upon the court. The Court.
deposition could serve no useful purpose, for there was
nothing anymore to discover. The petitioners failed to show The RTC denied the motion to dismiss.
that under the circumstances proven in the records, the
respondent judge erred in holding there existed good reasons Petitioner filed a petition for review before the SC. The CA,
to prevent them from taking the deposition. however, ruled that there was a valid service of the
interrogatories and failure of the respondent to answer the
G.R. No. 103922 July 9, 1996 interrogatories would warrant the dismissal of the case,
nevertheless, it explained that the denial of the motion to
SANTIAGO LAND DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, petitioner, dismiss filed by the petitioner in this case based on his
vs. interpretation of the rules, the said court may hardly be
COURT OF APPEALS and KOMATSU INDUSTRIES (PHILS.), accused of grave abuse of discretion as would be tantamount
INC., respondents. to lack of or excess in jurisdiction.
PETITIONER FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion domestic helper in Malaysia. Believing that it was her ray of
in denying the motion to dismiss hope, she and her husband prepared money to pay her
placement fee. When she finally arrived in Malaysia, she was
RUING: informed by Cristina that the job was no longer available. The
latter then sent her to Indonesia for a vacation trip, with a
We agree with the respondent court that although there was promise that after such, she will have a job upon her return in
an error of judgment in denying the motion to dismiss, Malaysia. Cristina gave Mary Jane her plane ticket as well as a
nevertheless, such cannot be considered as grave abuse of luggage to bring on her trip. Upon her arrival in Indonesia, she
discretion and therefore, correctable by certiorari was apprehended by the police officers for allegedly carrying
2.6kg of heroin inside her luggage. She was later on convicted
Petition for a review by certiorari in the case at bar does not with drug trafficking and sentence to death by firing squad.
lie. In the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration vs. Meanwhile, in the Philippines, the two accused were arrested
Lucero, it was lucidly stated that— for violation of Anti-Human Trafficking Division of the NBI. The
representatives of PDEA and PNP went to Indonesia to
For certiorari to lie, there must be a capricious, arbitrary, and interview Mary Jane. She executed a document known as
whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of the judicial Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Mary Jane Fiesta Veloso. In her
prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil law and Sinumpaang Salaysay, she maintained her innocence.
common law traditions. The abuse of discretion must be grave
and patent and it must be shown that the discretion was The Philippines requested the Indonesia government to
exercised arbitrarily or despotically. suspend her execution since her drug traffickers were already
in the custody of the Philippine government and that Mary
THE DISMISSAL IS DISCRETIONARY ON THE COURT Jane’s testimony is vital for their prosecution. Mary Jane was
granted indefinite reprieve. The Indonesia authorities however
Section 5, Rule 29 of the Rules of Court warrants the dismissal imposed the conditions in doing so, which among others are:
of the complaint when the plaintiff fails or refuses to answer she shall remain in detention in Yogyakarta, Indonesia and the
the written interrogatories. If plaintiff fails or refuses to answer question propounded to her shall be in writing.
the interrogatories, it may be a good basis for the dismissal of
his complaint for not-suit unless he can justify such failure or Thereafter, the State filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Take
refusal. It should be noted that it is discretionary on the court the Testimony of Complainant Mary Jane Veloso by Deposition
to order the dismissal of the action. Upon Written Interrogatories under Rule 23, since she is out of
the country and will not be able to testify in Court due to her
In Arellano vs. CFI, it was held that — imprisonment.
The dismissal of an action for failure of the plaintiff to The accused objected the motion on the ground that
prosecute the same rests upon the sound discretion of the trial depositions under Rule 23 and 25 should be made before the
court and will not be reversed on appeal in the absence of trial and not during the trial. They also asserted that it is not
abuse. The burden of showing abuse of judicial discretion is designed to replace actual testimony of the witness in open
upon appellant since every presumption is in favor of court and the use thereof is confined in civil cases.
correctness of the court's action.
RTC granted the Motion. CA reversed RTC. It held that
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES versus MARIA CRISTINA P. examination of witnesses in criminal proceedings are primarily
SERGIO and JULIUS L. LACANILAO governed by Rule 119 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
There was no compelling reason to depart from such rule and
apply Rule 23 instead.
DOCTRINE: The rules of procedure should be viewed as mere
tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their Issue: WON the deposition of Mary Jane Veloso can be taken
by written interrogatories under Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil
strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities
Procedure (YES)
that tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must al
Ruling: Rule 119 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure in this
ways be avoided.
case. Under Rule 119, in order for the testimony of the
prosecution witness be taken before the court where the case
FACTS:
is being heard, it must be shown that the said prosecution
witness is either: a) too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as
Mary Jane Veloso and the two accused were friends and
directed by the order of the court, or: 2) has to leave the
neighbors in Nueva Ecija. Taking advantage of her dire
Philippines with no definite date of returning. The case of Mary
situation and susceptibility, they offered Mary Jane a job as a
Jane does not fall under either category because she is “The only matters that have to be stated in the notice under
currently imprisoned and convicted by final judgment of the Sec. 15 of Rule 23 are the time and place for taking the
crime of drug trafficking. She was sentenced to death and is deposition, the name and address of each person to be
only awaiting her execution by firing squad. In denying the examined, if known, or if unknown, and a general description
prosecution’s motion to take deposition by written sufficient to identify the person to be examined or the class or
interrogatories, the appellate court in effect silenced Mary group to which he belongs.”
Jane and denied her and the People of their right to due
process by presenting their case against the said accused. By FACTS
its belief that it was rendering justice to the respondents, it
totally forgot that it in effect impaired the rights of Mary Jane Spouses Jose and Felicidad Bejar sold subdivided portions of
as well as the people. By not allowing Mary Jane to testify their lot to different persons. However, petitioner claimed that
through written interrogatories, the Court of Appeals deprived prior to the consolidation and subdivision of the said lots by
her of the opportunity to prove her innocence before the the spouses, the Province of Bulacan already purchased from
Indonesian authorities and for the Philippine Government the Jose a portion of the subject lots. Numerous transactions
chance to comply with the conditions set for the grant of arose, which later led Malonzo, et al. to file a Complaint for
reprieve to Mary Jane. Quieting of Title, Recovery of Possession, and Damages against
respondent. Respondent, on the other hand, filed an
At the outset, the Court is always guided by the principle that additional notice to take deposition with a request for the
rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their issuance of subpoena ad testificandum for the deposition
objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition through oral examination of DAR Usec. Grageda or his
of every action and proceeding. Simply put, rules of procedure representative.
should facilitate an orderly administration of justice. They
The RTC denied the notices for having been filed without leave
should not be strictly applied causing injury to a substantive
of court pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 23 of the RoC. Respondent
right of a party of a case.
filed an MR, alleging that under the same rule, no leave of
court is required when an answer has already been served.
Rules of Criminal Procedure is silent as to how to take a
testimony of a witness who is unable to testify in open court The RTC agreed with respondent’s contention, but since it
because he is imprisoned in another country. Depositions, admitted the motion to implead the Province of Bulacan, it
however, are recognized under Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil deferred its ruling to allow respondent to answer the Amended
Procedure. Although the rule on deposition by written Complaint and decide whether it will still file the notice to take
interrogatories is inscribed under the said Rule, the Court holds deposition. This, the respondent did by filing another Notice to
that it may be applied suppletorily in criminal proceedings so Take Deposition for Anselmo, and Atty. Sampana or his
long as there is compelling reason. The conditions with respect representative. Petitioners opposed the notice on the grounds
to the taking of the testimony of Mary Jane that were laid that it lacked the specific purpose or purposes for the
down by the Indonesian Government support the allowance of deposition, it was a fishing expedition because the case will still
written interrogatories under Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. undergo pre-trial, and respondent could still avail itself of
other modes of discovery.
G.R. No. 240773 February 05, 2020 RTC: Denied respondent’s notice to take deposition for lack of
merit. It reasoned that the scope of, and reasons for, the
ANSELMO D. MALONZO, TERESITA MALONZO-LAO AND depositions are not clear. Furthermore, the RTC held that it
NATIVIDAD MALONZO- GASPAR, HEIRS OF THE DECEASED would be more appropriate to take depositions before the
RONALDO T. PALOMO, NAMELY: TERESA VICTORIA R. court itself, rather than before a notary officer.
PALOMO,* CARLO MAGNO EUGENIO R. PALOMO,
RAPHAEL PAOLO R. PALOMO AND LEO MARCO GREGORIO CA: Reversed. Held that there is no requirement to state the
R. PALOMO, SPOUSES REYNALDO C. ABELARDO AND purpose of taking deposition in the notice to take deposition.
FLORINA T. PALOMO-ABELARDO, DANILO R. TANTOCO
AND MANUEL R. TANTOCO REPRESENTED BY DANILO R. ISSUE
TANTOCO, AND TERESITA E. DEABANICO** REPRESENTED
BY ANSELMO D. MALONZO, JOSE E. CAYSIP, JHOANA C. • Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error when
LANDAYAN, DAVID R. CAYSIP AND EPHRAIM R. CAYSIP, it ruled that there is no requirement to state the purpose
PETITIONERS, VS. SUCERE FOODS CORPORATION, of taking deposition in the notice to take deposition under
RESPONDENT. Rule 23 of the Rules. (NO)
RULING
DOCTRINE

Depositions pending action may be obtained without leave of case disclosed that the claims involved in the instant case was
court after an answer has been served in accordance with Sec. brought about by the tragic death of Dr. Vied Hemedez during
1, Rule 23 of the Rules. the bloody strike of workers of Nestle Cabuyao who are
members of Union of Filipino Employees. For the death of Dr.
There is no provision in Rule 23 that requires the party Hemedez, his parents spouses Hemedez filed civil cases for
requesting for an oral deposition to state the purpose or award of indemnity, damages and attorney’s fees against
purposes of the deposition. The only matters that have to be Nestle and various personalities involved in the security and
stated in the notice, as provided by Sec. 15 of the Rule, are the transport of Nestlé’s goods during the strike to whom the
time and place for taking the deposition, the name and address Request for Admission was made by the petitioners. Through
of each person to be examined, if known, or if unknown, and a their respective counsels, defendants filed their verified
general description sufficient to identify the person to be answers to the request for admission which is herein being
examined or the class or group to which he belongs. contested by petitioner as not being in accordance with Sec. 2
of Rule 26 and thus should be treated in the nature of
The use of deposition, like all other modes of discovery, “hearsay” which must be stricken out.
remains largely unutilized by most lawyers. The courts should
encourage the use of the modes of discovery rather than ISSUE:
burden the parties with requirements that are not stated in the
rules. The statement of the specific purpose or purposes of the Whether a counsel can answer on behalf of his client the
deposition is not required by the rules. client’s answer to written Request for Admission?
Anent the ruling of the RTC denying taking of depositions by RULING:

the notary officer, the Court held that Sec. 10, Rule 23 of the
Rules provides that depositions may be taken before any YES. As provided in Rule 26, a party shall respond to
judge, notary public, or the person referred to in Sec. 14 of Rule the request for admission. It should not be restrictively
23 – any person authorized to administer oaths if the parties construed to mean that a party may not engage the services of
so stipulate in writing. Until the Court revises its rules and a counsel to make the response in his behalf. Indeed the
removes the authority to take depositions from the notary theory of petitioner must not be taken seriously otherwise; it
public or any person authorized to administer oaths if the will negate the principles on agency in the Civil Code as well as
parties so stipulate, these persons retain their authorities to Sec. 23, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Sec. 23 of Rule 138
take depositions. provides that attorneys have authority to bind their clients in
any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing,
RULE 24-28 and in taking appeals, and on all matters of ordinary judicial
procedure. On the other hand Civil Code Art. 1878 on Agency
provides the specific instances when special powers of
G.R. No. 102390 February 1, 2002 attorney are necessary. Petitioners have not shown that the
REY LAÑADA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. case at bar falls under any of the recognized exceptions as
ROGELIO and ELIZA HEMEDEZ, respondents. found in Art. 1878 nor was there any proof that the defendants
x-----------------------x have not authorized their respective counsels to file in their
G.R. No. 102404 behalf the respective answers requested of them by the
NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC. and FRANCIS petitioners Hemedez spouses written Request for Admission.
SANTOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS.
ROGELIO and ELIZA HEMEDEZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 151310 March 11, 2002
SECURITY BANK CORP. vs. DEL ALCAZAR, et al.
FACTS:
This consolidated cases involved petitions for review PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
on Certiorari of CA’s decision dated July 24, 1991 in which it
granted the motions to strike out the answers subject to DOCTRINE: It is apparent then that the deposition of any
request for admission made on behalf of the defendants by person may be taken wherever he may be, in the Philippines or
their counsel and declaring each of the matters requested to abroad.If the party or witness is in the Philippines, his
be impliedly admitted which in effect reversed the lower deposition shall be taken before any judge, municipal, or
court’s decision. The lone question raised by the Spouses notary public (Sec. 10, Rule 24, Rules of Court).If he is in a
Hemedez in their Petition for Certiorari was whether a counsel foreign state or country, the deposition shall be taken: (a) on
of a party to whom a written request for admission is notice before a secretary or embassy or legation, consul
addressed under Section 1 Rule 26 of the Rules of Court may general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic
answer such request on behalf of his client.The facts of the

of the Philippines, or (b) before such person or officer as may [G.R. No. 136051 | June 8, 2006]
be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory
FACTS:
SUMMARY: The petitioners are being sued for annulment and
The present controversy stemmed from a complaint for
specific performance because of the sale of real property made
damages filed by private respondent against petitioner after
by AFP-RSBS to Espreme Realty of parcels of land which
the latter had pre-terminated the contract of lease in violation
allegedly belong to the respondents Lims. The respondents
thereof. Apparently, on December 19, 1995, petitioner,
want to take the deposition of the petitioners, but the
represented by 2 of its vice presidents, entered into and
petitioners refuse to do so by filing a motion and objection to
executed a contract of lease over respondent's property to put
take deposition upon oral examination. Petitioners claim that
up a branch of petitioner. The term of lease was for 10 years
this goes against their right against self-incrimination since
beginning June 1, 1995 until May 31, 2005.However, on
they have pending criminal cases involving the same facts, and
October 26, 1998, respondent received a letter from petitioner
that they can completely refuse to testify. The trial court and
informing her of petitioner's intention to pre-terminate said
the CA denied their motion. The SC upheld the lower courts’
lease contract by December 31, 1998.In response, respondent
ruling, saying that the present case is a civil case, not a criminal
reminded petitioner that under their lease contract, petitioner
one. The pending criminal cases do not give them the right to
had no right to pre-terminate. In spite of this, petitioner went
refuse to testify in the civil cases.
ahead and vacated the leased premises.
On April 22, 1999, private respondent wrote a letter to FACTS:

petitioner demanding payment of arrearages amounting to • Respondents Juliano Lim and Lilia Lim filed before the RTC a
P486,680.00 and rentals for the ensuing months. Petitioner Complaint for Annulment, Specific Performance with Damages
refused to pay. Thus, a case for damages was filed with the against AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-
regional trial court and in due course, respondent filed a Notice RSBS), Espreme Realty and Development Corporation
to Take Deposition by Oral Examination of respondent and 3 (Espreme Realty), Alfredo P. Rosete, Maj. Oscar Mapalo, Chito
other witnesses all residing in Los Angeles, California, USA. P. Rosete, Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), and Register of
Deeds of the Province of Mindoro Occidental.
ISSUE:
• It asked that the Deed of Sale executed by AFP-RSBS covering
Whether or not the respondent who filed the suit in the certain parcels of lands in favor of Espreme Realty and the
Philippines must appear before the Philippine Court for direct titles be annulled; and that the AFPRSBS and Espreme Realty
and cross examination? be ordered to execute the necessary documents to restore
ownership and title of said lands to respondents, and that the
HELD: Register of Deeds be ordered to cancel the titles of said land
under the name of Espreme Realty and to transfer the same in
Yes, deposition is allowed in this case because apparent then the names of respondents.
that the deposition of any person may be taken wherever he
may be, in the Philippines or abroad. If the party or witness is • Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the
in the Philippines, his deposition shall be taken before any court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action
judge, municipal, or notary public (Sec. 10, Rule 24, Rules of or suit and that venue has been improperly laid. A
Court).If he is in a foreign state or country, the deposition shall Supplemental Motion to Dismiss was also filed by petitioner
be taken: (a) on notice before a secretary or embassy or Alfredo.
legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent
of the Republic of the Philippines, or (b) before such person or • Respondents opposed the Motion to Dismiss filed by
officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters petitioners to which petitioners filed their Reply. Respondents
rogatory (Sec. 11, Rule 24) (Dasmariñas Garments, Inc. vs. filed a Comment on the Reply. AFPRSBS, Espreme Realty, and,
Judge, et al, 225 SCRA 622.) BPI filed their respective Motions to Dismiss which
respondents opposed. DENIED by the lower court. Motion for
It is to be noted too that the order to take deposition is
Reconsideration filed by petitioners were also DENIED.
interlocutory in character and may not be questioned by
certiorari. Indeed, petitioner is not deprived of its right to
• BPI filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim and
cross-examine the deponents nor of presenting
Cross-claim to which respondents filed their Reply and Answer
countervailing testimony.
to Counterclaim. Respondents also filed a Motion to Serve
ALFREDO P. ROSETE, OSCAR P. MAPALO and CHITO P. Supplemental Allegation against BPI and petitioner Chito
ROSETE, Petitioners, vs. JULIANO LIM and LILIA LIM, Rosete which the trial court GRANTED.
Respondents.
• Petitioners manifested that they filed a Petition for Certiorari • The lower court denied petitioners’ Motion for
and Prohibition in the Court of Appeals, challenging the trial Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for
court’s Orders that denied their Motions to Dismiss and Reconsideration, and scheduled the taking of the Deposition
Reconsideration. They likewise informed the trial court that Upon Oral Examination.
they filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Answers Ex Abudanti
Cautela. • Respondents filed an Omnibus Motion:
o (1) To Strike Out Answer of Defendants Mapalo and
• Petitioner Chito Rosete filed a motion asking that the order Chito Rosete;
granting the Motion to Serve Supplemental Allegation against o (2) to Declare Defendants Mapalo and Chito Rosete
BPI and him be reconsidered and set aside, and that In Default; and
respondents be ordered to reduce their supplemental o (3) For Reception of Plaintiffs’ Evidence Ex-parte
allegations in the form and manner required by the Rules of
Court. Same was denied. This denial was appealed to the Court • Petitioners opposed.
of Appeals.
• Thus, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition
• Petitioner Chito Rosete filed his Supplemental Answer (Ex for Certiorari and Prohibition assailing the Orders of the lower
Abudanti Cautela). court.
• Respondents filed a Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral • Meanwhile, the lower court:
Examination (! Important !) o ordered the striking out from the record of the
Answer ex abudanti cautela filed by petitioners Mapalo and
• Petitioners filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion and Objection to Chito Rosete for their continued unjustified refusal to be sworn
Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination. pursuant to Rule 29 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure;
o They argued that the deposition may not be taken o declared defendants Mapalo and Chito Rosete in
without leave of court as no answer has yet been served and default; and allowed plaintiffs to present their evidence ex-
the issues have not yet been joined since their Answer was parte.
filed ex abudanti cautela, pending resolution of the Petition for
Certiorari challenging the orders that denied their Motions to • Thus, petitioners filed an Urgent Ex-parte Omnibus Motion
Dismiss and for Reconsideration, respectively. o (1) For Reconsideration;
o (2) To Lift Order of Default; and
o This is in addition to the fact that they challenged o (3) To Hold In Abeyance Presentation of Plaintiffs’
via a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals the Evidence Ex-parte.
lower court’s Orders.
• Petitioners also filed an Amended Omnibus Motion.
o They contend that since there are two criminal
cases pending before the City Prosecutors of Mandaluyong • DENIED by the lower court.
City and Pasig City involving the same set of facts as in the
present case wherein respondent Juliano Lim is the private • Ex-parte presentation of evidence against petitioners
complainant and petitioners are the respondents, to permit Mapalo and Chito Rosete was TERMINATED.
the taking of the deposition would be violative of their right
against self-incrimination. • Respondents filed a Motion to Set Case for Ex-parte
Presentation of Evidence which the lower court set.
• Respondents filed their Comment on the Objection to
Deposition Taking to which petitioners filed their Reply. • Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
before the Court of Appeals questioning the lower court’s
• In an Order, the lower court DENIED petitioners’ motion and Orders.
objection to take deposition upon oral examination, and
scheduled the taking thereof. • The Court of Appeals DISMISSED the Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition, and UPHELD the Orders of the lower court.
• Thus, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration. They The Motion for Reconsideration, which was opposed by
filed an additional Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. respondents, was DENIED.
• Petitioners filed an Urgent Ex-parte Motion to Cancel or ISSUES:

Suspend the Taking of the Deposition Upon Oral Examination. 1. WON the RTC erred in declaring that the right against self-
incrimination would not be violated by the taking of their
deposition in the civil case.

to parties in civil actions which are criminal in nature. As long
2. WON the RTC erred in declaring that the Notice to Take as the suit is criminal in nature, the party thereto can
Deposition Upon Oral Examination need not be with leave of altogether decline to take the witness stand. It is not the
court because an Answer Ex Abutande Cautela been filed. character of the suit involved but the nature of the
proceedings that controls.
RULING:
1. In order to resolve this issue, the SC first determine dthe In the Ayson case, it is evident that the Court treats a party in
extent of a person’s right against self-incrimination. A person’s a civil case as an ordinary witness, who can invoke the right
right against self-incrimination is enshrined in Section 17, against self-incrimination only when the incriminating
Article III of the 1987 Constitution which reads: "No person question is propounded. Thus, for a party in a civil case to
shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." possess the right to refuse to take the witness stand, the civil
case must also partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding.
The right against self-incrimination is accorded to every person
who gives evidence, whether voluntary or under compulsion IN THE PRESENT CONTROVERSY, the case is civil it being a suit
of subpoena, in any civil, criminal or administrative for Annulment, Specific Performance with Damages. In order
proceeding. The right is not to be compelled to be a witness for petitioners to exercise the right to refuse to take the
against himself. It secures to a witness, whether he be a party witness stand and to give their depositions, the case must
or not, the right to refuse to answer any particular partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding. The case on
incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which has a hand certainly cannot be categorized as such. The fact that
tendency to incriminate him for some crime. However, the there are two criminal cases pending which are allegedly based
right can be claimed only when the specific question, on the same set of facts as that of the civil case will not give
incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It them the right to refuse to take the witness stand and to give
cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness their depositions. They are not facing criminal charges in the
the right to disregard a subpoena, decline to appear before the civil case. Like an ordinary witness, they can invoke the right
court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. against self-incrimination only when the incriminating
The witness receiving a subpoena must obey it, appear as question is actually asked of them. Only if and when
required, take the stand, be sworn and answer questions. It is incriminating questions are thrown their way can they refuse
only when a particular question is addressed to which may to answer on the ground of their right against self
incriminate himself for some offense that he may refuse to incrimination.
answer on the strength of the constitutional guaranty.
2. Petitioners contend that the taking of their oral depositions
The right of the defendant in a criminal case "to be exempt should not be allowed without leave of court as no answer has
from being a witness against himself" signifies that he cannot yet been served and the issues have not yet been joined
be compelled to testify or produce evidence in the criminal because their answers were filed ex abudanti cautela pending
case in which he is the accused, or one of the accused. He final resolution of the petition for certiorari challenging the
cannot be compelled to do so even by subpoena or other trial court’s Orders that denied their motions to dismiss and for
process or order of the Court. He cannot be required to be a reconsideration. As per Section 1 of Rule 24 of the Revised
witness either for the prosecution, or for a co-accused, or even Rules of Court, it is evident that once an answer has been
for himself. In other words – unlike an ordinary witness (or a served, the testimony of a person, whether a party or not, may
party in a civil action) who may be compelled to testify by be taken by deposition upon oral examination or written
subpoena, having only the right to refuse to answer a interrogatories. In the case before us, petitioners contend they
particular incriminatory question at the time it is put to him – have not yet served an answer to respondents because the
the defendant in a criminal action can refuse to testify answers that they have filed with the trial court were made ex
altogether. He can refuse to take the witness stand, be sworn, abudanti cautela. In other words, they do not consider the
answer any question. answers they filed in court and served on respondents as
answers contemplated by the Rules of Court on the ground
It is clear, therefore, that only an accused in a criminal case can that same were filed ex abudanti cautela.
refuse to take the witness stand. The right to refuse to take the
stand does not generally apply to parties in administrative The SC found petitioners’ contention to be untenable. Ex
cases or proceedings. The parties thereto can only refuse to abudanti cautela means "out of abundant caution" or "to be
answer if incriminating questions are propounded. This Court on the safe side." An answer ex abudanti cautela does not
applied the exception – a party who is not an accused in a make their answer less of an answer. A cursory look at the
criminal case is allowed not to take the witness stand – in answers filed by petitioners shows that they contain their
administrative cases/proceedings that partook of the nature of respective defenses. An answer is a pleading in which a
a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding. It defending party sets forth his defenses and the failure to file
is likewise the opinion of the Court that said exception applies one within the time allowed herefore may cause a defending

party to be declared in default. Thus, petitioners, knowing fully manufacturing operations. The loans were covered by
well the effect of the non-filing of an answer, filed their promissory notes. To secure the loans, Gateway assigned to
answers despite the pendency of their appeal with the Court Solidbank the proceeds of its Back-end Services Agreement
of Appeals on the denial of their motion to dismiss. with Alliance.
Petitioners’ argument that the issues of the case have not yet Gateway failed to comply with its loan obligations. Thus,
been joined must necessarily fail in light of our ruling that Solidbank filed a Complaint for collection of sum of money
petitioners have filed their answers although the same were against Gateway.
made ex abudanti cautela. Issues are joined when all the
parties have pleaded their respective theories and the terms Earlier, Solidbank filed a Motion for Production and Inspection
of the dispute are plain before the court. In the present case, of Documents on the basis of an information received from Mr.
the issues have, indeed, been joined when petitioners, as well David Eichler, Chief Financial Officer of Alliance, that Gateway
as the other defendants, filed their answers. The respective has already received from Alliance the proceeds/payment of
claims and defenses of the parties have been defined and the the Back-end Services Agreement. The motion asked for ALL
issues to be decided by the trial court have been laid down. DOCUMENTS pertaining to the Agreement. On January 30,
2001, the trial court granted the motion for production and
The SC also did not also sustain petitioners’ contention that the inspection of documents.
lower court erred when it said that the joinder of issues is not
required in order that Section 1, Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules of Gateway filed a motion to reset the production and inspection
Civil Procedure may be availed of. Under said section, a of documents to give them enough time to gather and collate
deposition pending action may be availed of: (1) with leave of the documents in their possession. Motion granted.
court when an answer has not yet been filed but after
jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or property The trial court issued an Order setting the production and
subject of the action, or (2) without leave of court after an inspection of documents in the premises of Gateway. On the
answer to the complaint has been served. In the instant case, said date, Gateway presented the invoices representing the
the taking of the deposition may be availed of even without billings sent by Gateway to Alliance in relation to the Back-end
leave of court because petitioners have already served their Services Agreement.
answers to the complaint.
Solidbank was not satisfied with the documents produced by
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the instant petition Gateway. Thus, it filed a motion to cite Gateway and its
is dismissed for lack of merit. responsible officers in contempt for their refusal to produce
G.R. No. 164805 April 30, 2008 the documents.
SOLIDBANK CORPORATION, NOW KNOWN AS RTC: DENIED motion in contempt but chastised Gateway for
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, exerting no diligent efforts to produce the documents. The
vs. GATEWAY ELECTRONICS CORPORATION, JAIME M. documents not produced shall be taken to be established in
HIDALGO AND ISRAEL MADUCDOC, respondents. accordance with plaintiff's claim, but only for the purpose of
this action.
CA: NULLIFIED RTC Order. both the Motion for Production of
DOCTRINE: Rule 27 of the Revised Rules of Court permits Documents and the January 30, 2001 Order of the trial court
"fishing" for evidence, the only limitation being that the failed to comply with the provisions of Section 1, Rule 27 of the
documents, papers, etc., sought to be produced are not Rules of Court.
privileged, that they are in the possession of the party ordered
to produce them and that they are material to any matter ISSUE: WON Solidbank's motion for production and inspection
involved in the action. of documents and the Order of the trial court dated January
30, 2001 failed to comply with Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules
A motion for production and inspection of documents should of Court
not demand a roving inspection of a promiscuous mass of
documents. The inspection should be limited to those HELD: YES. Solidbank was able to show good cause for the
documents designated with sufficient particularity in the production of the documents that the said documents are
motion, such that the adverse party can easily identify the material or contain evidence relevant to an issue involved in
documents he is required to produce. the action. However, Solidbank's motion was fatally defective
and must be struck down because of its failure to specify with
FACTS: Gateway obtained from Solidbank foreign currency particularity the documents it required Gateway to produce.
denominated loans to be used as working capital for its Solidbank's motion for production and inspection of

documents called for a blanket inspection. Solidbank's request the agreement. In order to ascertain the veracity of the
for inspection of "all documents pertaining to, arising from, in information, Solidbank availed of the discovery procedure
connection with or involving the Back-end Services under Rule 27. The purpose of Solidbank's motion is to compel
Agreement" was simply too broad and too generalized in Gateway to produce the documents evidencing payments
scope. received from Alliance in connection with the Back-end
Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Court provides the mechanics A motion for production and inspection of documents should
for the production of documents and the inspection of things not demand a roving inspection of a promiscuous mass of
during the pendency of a case. It also deals with the inspection documents. The inspection should be limited to those
of sources of evidence other than documents. documents designated with sufficient particularity in the
motion, such that the adverse party can easily identify the
Rule 27 of the Revised Rules of Court permits "fishing" for documents he is required to produce.
evidence, the only limitation being that the documents,
papers, etc., sought to be produced are not privileged, that Eagleridge Development Corporation, Marcelo N. Naval
they are in the possession of the party ordered to produce and Crispin I. Oben, v. Cameron Granville 3 Asset
them and that they are material to any matter involved in the Management, Inc.
action. 33 The lament against a fishing expedition no longer G.R. No. 204700 ; November 24, 2014
precludes a party from prying into the facts underlying his
opponent's case. Mutual knowledge of all relevant facts
gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To DOCTRINE:
that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge
whatever facts he has in his possession. However, fishing for Modes of discovery are accorded a broad and liberal
evidence that is allowed under the rules is not without treatment.The availment of a motion for production, as one of
limitations. the modes of discovery, is not limited to the pre-trial stage. Rule
27 does not provide for any time frame within which the
In Security Bank Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court discovery mode of production or inspection of documents can
enumerated the requisites in order that a party may compel be utilized. The rule only requires leave of court “upon due
the other party to produce or allow the inspection of application and a showing of due cause.”
documents or things, viz.:
(a) The party must file a motion for the production or FACTS:
inspection of documents or things, showing good cause The private respondent claims P10,232,998.00 exclusive of
therefor; interests and penalties from petitioner EDC by way of
obligation via deed of assignment.
(b) Notice of the motion must be served to all other parties of
the case;
• The petitioners filed a motion for production of a Loan
(c) The motion must designate the documents, papers, books, Sale and Purchase Agreement (LSPA) to compel the
accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things respondent to present the same in order to
which the party wishes to be produced and inspected; determine the amount of their liability. .
(d) Such documents, etc., are not privileged;

• The respondent argued that the motion for
(e) Such documents, etc., constitute or contain evidence production of the LSPA was filed out of time for being
material to any matter involved in the action, and filed during the trial proper. It further argued that the
production of the LSPA will neither prevent it from
(f) Such documents, etc., are in the possession, custody or pursuing its claim, nor will it write off the petitioner’s
control of the other party. liability. Furthermore, the respondent claimed that
the issue can be readily resolved by application of the
In the case at bench, Gateway assigned to Solidbank the Civil Code provisions and jurisprudence, and not by
proceeds of its Back-end Services Agreement with Alliance. By the production of the LSPA.
virtue of the assignment, Gateway was obligated to remit to
Solidbank all payments received from Alliance under the
agreement. In this regard, Solidbank claims that they have • The respondent also argued that the production of
received information from the Chief Financial Officer of the LSPA will violate the parol evidence rule; and that
Alliance that Gateway had already received payments under the LSPA is a privileged/confidential bank document.

It has not been shown by the parties that the LSPA falls under
• The petitioners counter that their motion for any of the categories, or other privileged matters. Moreover,
production was not filed out of time, and that there is the privilege is not absolute, and the court may compel
no proscription under any provisions of the Rules of disclosure where it is indispensable for doing justice.
Court, from filing motions for production, beyond the
pre-trial.
G.R. No. 205045 January 25, 2017
• The petitioners added that the amount of their COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner
liability is one of the factual issues to be resolved, vs.
which makes the LSPA relevant and material to the SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, Respondent
disposition of the case.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a motion for production/inspection of DOCTRINE: Rule 27, Section 1 of the Rules of Court does not
a document may be availed beyond pre-trial. provide when the motion may be used. Hence, the allowance
2. Whether or not the LSPA is privileged and of a motion for production of document rests on the sound
confidential. discretion of the court where the case is pending, with due
regard to the rights of the parties and the demands of equity
HELD: and justice.
1. YES. The availment of a motion for production, as one
of the modes of discovery, is not limited to the pre- FACTS:
trial stage. Rule 27 does not provide for any time
frame within which the discovery mode of production SMC was allowed to manufacture and register "San Mig Light,"
or inspection of documents can be utilized. The rule as a new brand by the BIR which is to be taxed at P9.15 per
only requires leave of court “upon due application liter. However, the CIR issued a Notice of Discrepancy against
and a showing of due cause.” SMC stating that "San Mig Light" was a variant of its existing
beer products and must, therefore, be subjected to the higher
Modes of discovery are accorded a broad and liberal excise tax rate of ₱19.91 per liter. Hence, the Notice demanded
treatment. The evident purpose of discovery payments of deficiency excise tax.
procedures is to enable the parties, consistent with
recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible To prevent the issuance of additional excise tax assessments
knowledge of the issues and facts before civil trial. on San Mig Light products and the disruption of its operations,
San Miguel Corporation paid excise taxes at the rate of ₱13.61
Technicalities in pleading should be avoided in order
to obtain substantial justice. The LSPA is relevant and When the matters were brought before the CTA, the CTA
material to the issue raised by the petitioners. ordered that respondent refund the petitioner for the
Allowing its production and inspection by petitioners erroneous excise tax paid.
would be more in keeping with the objectives of the
discovery rules. To deny the petitioners the The Commissioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with
opportunity to inquire into the LSPA would bar their Motion for Production of Documents praying that San Miguel
access to relevant evidence and impair their Corporation be compelled to produce the following: (a)
fundamental right to due process. "Kaunlaran" publication; (b) 1999 Annual Report to
stockholders; and (c) copies of the video footage of two (2) San
Mig Light commercials as seen in its website. The
2. NO. Rule 27 provides that documents sought to be Commissioner claimed "that the admission of said documents
produced and inspected must not be privileged against would lead to a better illumination of the outcome of the case.
disclosure. Rule 130, Section 24 describes the types of The CA denied the motion for lack of merit.
privileged communication. These are communication between
or involving the following: ISSUE: (1) Whether or not a motion for production of
a. between husband and wife; documents and objects may be availed of after the court has
b. between attorney and client; rendered judgment; and (2) whether or not petitioner
c. between physician and patient; complied with all requisites of a motion for production of
d. between priest and penitent; and documents and objects under Rule 27, such as a showing of
e. public officers and public interest. good cause

HELD: In this case, petitioner filed its Motion for Production of DOCTRINE: As a general rule, the scope of discovery is to be
Documents after the Court of Tax Appeals Division had liberally construed so as to provide the litigants with
rendered its judgment. According to the Court of Tax Appeals information essential to the expenditious and proper litigation
Division, the documents sought to be produced were already of each of the facts in dispute. Moreover, it cannot be disputed
discussed in the Commissioner's Memorandum and were that the various methods of discovery as provided for in the
already considered by the tax court when it rendered its Rules are clearly intended to be cumulative, as opposed to
Decision. If petitioner believed that the evidence in the custody alternative or mutually exclusive.
and control of respondent "would provide a better illumination
of the outcome of the case," it should have sought their
production at the earliest opportunity as it had been already FACTS:
aware of their existence. Petitioner's laxity is inexcusable and
is a fatal omission. An action for breach of contract was filed by petitioner Fortune
Corporation against respondent Inter-Merchants Corporation,
Under these circumstances, there was indeed no further need docketed as Civil Case No. SP-3469, before the Regional Trial
for the production of documents and objects desired by Court of San Pablo City, Branch 30. After respondent
petitioner. These pieces of evidence could have served no useful corporation had filed its Answer, petitioner served the former
purpose. On the contrary, the production of those documents with written interrogatories pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules
after judgment defeats the purpose of modes of discovery in of Court. The interrogatories were answered by respondent
expediting case preparation and shortening trials. corporation through its board chairman, Juanito A. Teope.
This Court discussed the importance of a motion for RTC denied the request for the deposition for it appears
production of documents under Rule 27 of the Rules of Court unwarranted since the proposed deponent had earlier
in expediting time-consuming trials: responded to the written interrogatories of the plaintiff and
has signified his availability to testify in court.
This remedial measure is intended to assist in the
administration of justice by facilitating and expediting the CA dismissed the appeal on the ground that section18 of Rule
preparation of cases for trial and guarding against 24 imply that the right of a party to take depositions as means
undesirable surprise and delay; and it is designed to simplify of discovery is not absolute. Moreover, the respondent court,
procedure and obtain admissions of facts and evidence, in its assailed Order, has indicated at least three (3) valid
thereby shortening costly and time-consuming trials. It is reasons for it not to order the deposition taken: First, that the
based on ancient principles of equity. More specifically, the proposed deponent had earlier responded to the written
purpose of the statute is to enable a party-litigant to discover Interrogatories; Second, that the proposed deponent had
material information which, by reason of an opponent's signified his availability to testify in court; and Third, that to
control, would otherwise be unavailable for judicial scrutiny, allow the deposition would deprive the trial court of the
and to provide a convenient and summary method of opportunity to ask clarificatory questions, if any, on the
obtaining material and competent documentary evidence in proposed deponent who appears to be a vital witness.
the custody or under the control of an adversary. It is a further
extension of the concept of pretrial.
Issue: WON the denial of the taking of deposition by the trial
In Eagleridge Development Corporation v. Cameron Granville court is valid (NO)
3 Asset Management, Inc., we held that a motion for
production of documents may be availed of even beyond the Ruling: Section 16 of Rule 24 provides that after notice is
pre-trial stage, upon showing of good cause as required under served for taking a deposition by oral examination, upon
Rule 27. We allowed the production of documents because the motion seasonably made by any party or by the person to be
petitioner was able to show "good cause" and relevance of the examined and upon notice and for good cause shown, the
documents sought to be produced, and the trial court had not court in which the action is pending may, among others, make
yet rendered its judgment. an order that the deposition shall not be taken.
RULE 29 This provision explicitly vests in the court the power to order
that the deposition shall not be taken and this grant connotes
FORTUNE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. the authority to exercise discretion in connection therewith. It
HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND INTER-MERCHANTS is well settled, however, that the discretion conferred by law is
CORPORATION, respondents. not unlimited: that it must be exercised, not arbitrarily,
capriciously, or oppressively, but in a reasonable manner and
in consonance with the spirit of the law, to the end that its
purpose may be attained.

Section 16 of Rule 24 clearly states that it is only upon notice FACTS
and for good cause that the court may order that the
deposition shall not be taken. The matter of good cause is to This case stems from a complaint filed by petitioners against
be determined by the court in the exercise of judicial respondents for recovery of ownership and possession of two
discretion. Good cause means a substantial reason — one that parcels of land. Laluan and Malpaya are spouses. Here,
affords a legal excuse. Whether or not substantial reasons exist petitioners sought for a declaration of ownership in their favor
is for the court to determine, as there is no hard and fast rule that they are the owners pro indiviso of the subject parcels of
for determining the question as to what is meant by the term Riceland, basing their claim on a right to inheritance.
"for good cause shown."
The 1st parcel was sold by respondent Malpaya to Tambot and
It is quite clear, therefore, and we so hold that under the Jasmin by taking advantage of the senility of his wife, while the
present Rules the fact that a party has resorted to a particular 2nd parcel was the conjugal property of spouses Malpaya and
method of discovery will not bar subsequent use of other Laluan, with Malpaya only having rights to ½ of the property.
discovery devices, as long as the party is not attempting to
The case proceeded to trial. However, during the hearing
circumvent a ruling of the court, or to harass or oppress the
scheduled to be presented before the clerk of court, neither
other party. As a matter of practice, it will often be desirable
the respondents nor their counsel appeared even with due and
to resort to both interrogatories and depositions in one or the
proper notice served on them. They did not file a motion for
other sequence. Additional lines of inquiry may come to light
postponement. Thus, petitioners moved for leave to continue
after the deposition has been taken, as to which written
with the presentation of their evidence which the trial court
interrogatories probably would be adequate, and there is no
granted. Both sales of the 1st and 2nd parcel of land were
reason why the examining party should not be entitled to
annulled by the CFI.
obtain all the relevant information he desires if no substantial
prejudice is done to the party from whom discovery is sought. On appeal, the CA set aside the decision of the CFI, ruling in
On the other hand, interrogatories may well be used as a favor of respondents. Thus, this instant petition.
preliminary to the taking of depositions, in order to ascertain
what individuals have the information sought. ISSUE
RULE 30 • Whether or not the reception by the clerk of court of

petitioners’ evidence in the absence of respondents and
counsel constitutes a prejudicial error. (YES, to 1st parcel
of land)
G.R. No. L-21231 July 30, 1975 RULING
CONCORDIA LALUAN, et al., petitioners, vs. APOLINARIO No provision of law or principle of public policy prohibits a
MALPAYA, MELECIO TAMBOT, BERNARDINO JASMIN, et court from authorizing its clerk of court to receive the evidence
al., respondents. of a party litigant. After all, the reception of evidence by the
clerk of court constitutes but a ministerial task — the taking
Petition for Review under Rule 45 down of the testimony of the witnesses and the marking of the
pieces of documentary evidence, if any, adduced by the party
DOCTRINE present. This task of receiving evidence precludes, on the part
of the clerk of court, the exercise of judicial discretion usually
“No provision of law or principle of public policy prohibits a called for when the other party who is present objects to
court from authorizing its clerk of court to receive the evidence questions propounded and to the admission of the
of a party litigant. After all, the reception of evidence by the documentary evidence proffered. More importantly, the duty
clerk of court constitutes but a ministerial task — the taking to render judgment on the merits of the case still rests with the
down of the testimony of the witnesses and the marking of the judge who is obliged to personally and directly prepare the
pieces of documentary evidence, if any, adduced by the party decision based upon the evidence reported.
present. This task of receiving evidence precludes, on the part
of the clerk of court, the exercise of judicial discretion usually But where the proceedings before the clerk of court and the
called for when the other party who is present objects to concomitant result thereof prejudice the substantial rights of
questions propounded and to the admission of the the aggrieved party, then there exists sufficient justification to
documentary evidence proffered. More importantly, the duty grant the latter complete opportunity to thresh out his case in
to render judgment on the merits of the case still rests with the court.
judge who is obliged to personally and directly prepare the
decision based upon the evidence reported.” In this case, there were discrepancies with regard to the
ownership of the other parcels of land allegedly found within
the 1st parcel. Such discrepancies became more evident when Whether or not the plaintiff’s counsel is correct when it
an apparent difference between the area of the land described refused to comply the order of the trial court to present
in a Deed of Absolute Sale and the areas of the parcels in evidence and demanded that he would introduce evidence
cluded in the deed of donation propter nuptias arose, thus only in rebuttal.
requiring full and proper explanation. Petitioners neither RULING:
offered nor attempted to offer any evidence indicating that the Yes. Since the answer admitted defendant's obligation as
land sold by the respondent Malpaya to Tambot corresponds stated in the complaint, albeit special defenses were pleaded,
with any of the three parcels described in the deed of plaintiff had every right to insist that it was for defendant to
donation. They failed to specify precisely which of the three come forward with evidence in support of his special defenses.
parcels constitute the very land delimited in the Deed of Section 2 of Revised Rule of Court 129 plainly supports
Absolute Sale. Thus, the court a quo should have investigated appellant:
further, either in the form of a hearing or ocular inspection, or
both, to enable it to know positively the land in litigation. Thus, Sec. 2. Judicial admissions.— Admissions made by the parties
the case as to the 1st parcel must be remanded to the court a in the pleadings, or in the course of the trial or other
quo. proceedings do not require proof and cannot be contradicted
unless previously shown to have been made through palpable
As to the 2nd parcel, the court a quo was correct in annulling mistake.
one-half of the portion of the Absolute Deed of Sale. The 2nd
parcel was indeed the conjugal property of the spouses Laluan Defendant not having supported his special defenses, the
and Malpaya, and thus it relies heavily on the presumption dismissal of the case was manifestly untenable and contrary to
established by Art. 1407 of the Civil Code – that the property law. The court below is directed to enter judgment in favor of
of the spouses shall be deemed partnership property in the plaintiff and against the defendant for the sum of P2, 800.00.
absence of proof that it belongs exclusively to the husband or
to the wife. Therefore, Malpaya’s conveyance of Laluan’s half G.R. No. L-60937 May 28, 1988
is unlawful, enough for the annulment as to that particular half
of the property. WALTER ASCONA LEE, ESPIRITU TAN, BENITO CHIONGBIAN
and HENRY CHIONGBIAN, petitioners vs. HON. MANUEL V.
G.R. No. L-29742 March 29, 1972 ROMILLO, JR., Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of
VICENTE YU, plaintiff-appellant, vs. EMILIO Rizal, Branch 37; CITY SHERIFF OF PASAY CITY and LEONCIO
MAPAYO, defendant-appellee. C. MENDIORO, respondents.
FACTS:
Vicente Yu filed a suit against Emilio Mapayo to recover the PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
sum of P 2,800 representing the unpaid balance of the
purchase price of a Gray Marine Engine sold by the plaintiff to DOCTRINE: It is a well settled rule that when a party is
the defendant in the City Court of Davao. The answer admitted represented by counsel, notice should be made upon the
the transaction and the balance due but contended that by counsel of record at his given address appearing in the
reason of hidden defects of the article sold, the defendant had counsel's entry of appearance, to which notices of all kinds
been forced to spend P2, 800 for repairs and labor, wherefore emanating from the court should be sent in the absence of a
plaintiff had agreed to waive the balance due on the price of proper and adequate notice to the court of a change of
the engine, and counterclaimed for damages and attorneys' address.
fees.
FACTS:
The City Court, after trial, disallowed the defenses and ordered
On May 6, 1975, the private respondent filed a complaint for
the defendant to pay plaintiff P2, 500.00 and costs. Defendant
accounting with damages entitled "Leoncio C. Mendioro, doing
Mapayo appealed to the Court of First Instance of Davao.
business under the name and style "Leoncio C. Mendioro
When, after several continuances, the case was called for
Services' v. Walter Ascona Lee, Espiritu Tan and Benito
hearing on 13 March 1968, the defendant, as well as his
Chiongbian." The Court of First Instance of Rizal at Pasay City
counsel, failed to appear and the court scheduled the case for
docketed the case as Civil Case No. 4343-P. The complaint was
hearing ex parte on the same day. The Court ordered plaintiff
based on a contract for arrastre services at Pier 14, North
to present his evidence. However, the attorney for the plaintiff
Harbor, Manila executed between respondent Mendioro and
refuses to present evidence, either oral or documentary, when
William Lines, Inc., represented by Benito Chiongbian as
required by the Court. Thus, the case was dismissed for lack of
evidenced by the Memorandum Agreement dated July 28,
prosecution.
1973. Among the substantial allegations in the complaint
were: (1) In the year 1973, specifically from August 1 up to
ISSUE:
November 30, plaintiff Mendioro conducted arrastre
operations at Pier 14 as per arrastre contract with William These facts indicate a correct application of the aforequoted
Lines, Inc.; (2) All the income from the arrastre operations provision whereby the law create a presumption of valid
during the said period were received and held in trust for service once there is a failure on the part of the addressee to
Mendioro by defendants Lee, Tan and Chiongbian who were claim his mail as required despite the receipt of the proper
also tasked with the disbursement of the said income for notices.
operational expenses; (3) Defendants Lee, Tan and Chiongbian
were duty-bound to turn over to plaintiff Mendioro the income The fact that the petitioners' allegedly negligent counsel, Atty.
they held in trust for him; and (4) They failed to do so despite Abraham Drapiza, had resigned as counsel of William Lines,
Mendioro's repeated demands. On June 16, 1975, the Inc., in the latter part of September 1981 and left his office at
defendants in Civil Case No. 4343-P filed a motion to dismiss William Lines Building cannot justify the petitioners' claim of
the complaint. The motion was denied after which they filed non-applicability of Rule 13, Section 8 in their case.
an answer on July 28, 1975. On January 28, 1977, the trial court
granted the motion to include Jose (3) Millares Cesar Almario It is a well settled rule that when a party is represented by
and Henry Chiongbian as indispensable parties. Millares did counsel, notice should be made upon the counsel of record at
not file an answer. Almario voluntarily appeared and his given address appearing in the counsel's entry of
manifested that he was joining Mendioro as co-plaintiff. Henry appearance, to which notices of all kinds emanating from the
Chiongbian filed his answer with counterclaim on April court should be sent in the absence of a proper and adequate
15,1977. notice to the court of a change of address. The court cannot be
expected to take judicial notice of the new address of a lawyer
At the pre-trial stage of the proceedings on December 12, who has moved or to ascertain on its own whether or not the
1977, the parties filed a partial stipulation of facts During the counsel of record has been changed and who the new counsel
hearing on March 30, 1978, where the counsel for the could possibly be or where he probably resides or holds office.
petitioners failed to show up, Mendioro was allowed to It is logical to assume that processes mailed to petitioner
present evidence ex-parte. On July 20,1978, an amended order Chiongbian and his group, addressed to their lawyer at the
of the trial court granted the petitioners an opportunity to William Lines Building were in fact received, in the absence of
adduce their evidence. Protracted and lengthy trials were a notice of change of address or counsel. Atty. Drapiza should
conducted until May 22, 1981. On September 11, 1981, the have observed the legal formality required before a counsel of
trial court rendered its decision against the petitioners. On record may be considered relieved of his responsibility as such
October 6, 1981, copies of the trial court's decision were counsel on account of withdrawal. On their part, the
mailed to the petitioners' counsel at William Lines Building, petitioners themselves should have informed the court of the
Pier 14, North Harbor, Manila. On October 9,19 and 22,1981, withdrawal of their counsel after the several reminders they
the first, second and third notices of the registered mail were made to him anent his withdrawal had allegedly been ignored.
delivered respectively to the guard-on-duty at counsel's offices
but the mailed decision remained unclaimed at the post office On the last issue, the petitioners question the delegation of the
despite the proper notices. On November 26, 1981, an reception of the evidence ex-parte in the lower court to its
urgent ex-parte motion for execution was granted and the legal researcher invoking our ruling in Lim Tanhu v.
corresponding writ of execution was issued. Then petitioners Ramolete (66 SCRA 425).<They argue that such practice does
filed a motion to set aside the judgment and to quash recall not have any basis in law. Their argument is not meritorious.
the writ of execution but it was denied by the trial court. In a In the case of The National Housing Authority v. Court of
special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with Appeals (121 SCRA 777, 781), we categorically stated that:
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction filed with the
The contention that the Trial Court cannot delegate the
Court of Appeals, the petitioners questioned the issuance by
reception of evidence to its Clerk of Court, citing the case of
the respondent judge of the order dated November 26, 1981.
Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete (supra) is not well taken. Suffice it to
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit
say, for purposes of this suit, that the Id case referred to
and set aside the writ of preliminary injunction it had earlier
reception of evidence by a Clerk of Court after declaration of
issued
defendant's default. No default is involved herein. As held in
ISSUE: Whether or not the service of the decision was valid? the case of Laluan v. Manalo (65 SCRA 494 [1975l), no provision
of law or principle of public policy prohibits a Court from
HELD: Yes because in the instant case, there is proof that authorizing its Clerk of Court to receive the evidence of a party
copies of the lower court's decision were mailed to the litigant.
petitioners' counsel at the address on record, the William Lines
Building, Pier 14, North Harbor, Manila on October 6, 1981; More important, however, is the fact that the trial court
that first, second and third notices of said registered mail were reconsidered its earlier order and allowed the petitioners to
delivered on October 9, 19 and 22, 1981, respectively to the present their evidence. For almost three years, from July 20,
guard-on-duty at counsel's offices; and that petitioners' 1978 to May 22, 1981, the petitioners participated in the
counsel failed to claim the mailed decision at the post office. protracted trials which followed.

G.R. NO.50480. December 14, 1979 ISSUE: W/N the judgment in question is void and
CONTINENTAL BANK, Petitioner-appellant, vs.HON. JOEL unenforceable because it was based on evidence which was
P. TIANGCO, Presiding Judge of Branch XXVIII, Court of heard by the deputy clerk of court as commissioner.
First Instance of Manila, INCOME AND ACCEPTANCE
CORPORATION, STAR LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION HELD: NO.
and PRIMITIVO E. DOMINGO, Respondents-appellees We have admonished the trial courts not to issue a minute
order like the one under appeal. A trial court should specify in
PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 45 its order the reasons for the dismissal of the complaint so that
when the order is appealed, this Court can readily determine
FACTS: The Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a from a casual perusal thereof whether there is a prima facie
decision dated September 26, 1967, ordering Income and justification for the dismissal.
Acceptance Corporation, Star Life Insurance Corporation and
Primitive E. Domingo to pay solidarily to the Continental Bank Also erroneous and unmeritorious is respondents' contention
the sum of forty-six thousand three hundred pesos and eighty- that the judgment in question is void and unenforceable
one centavos (P46,300.81), with twelve percent interest per because it was based on evidence which was heard by the
annum from June 1, 1967 until the principal has been fully deputy clerk of court as commissioner. That judgment is valid
paid, plus attorney's fees of three thousand pesos and the and enforceable because it was rendered by a court of
costs (Civil Case No. 69703). competent jurisdiction and it was not impaired by extrinsic
fraud nor by lack of due process. The trial court acquired
Judgment was rendered on the basis of the evidence which jurisdiction over the person of the judgment debtors. They
was presented before the deputy clerk of court who was acquiesced in the validity of the judgment when they made
commissioned to receive the same after the defendants were partial payments to satisfy it.
declared in default for nonappearance at the pre-trial. As no
appeal was interposed from the said judgment, it became final The defendants or private respondents did not question in the
and executory. It was not satisfied. The sheriff in his return lower court its delegation to the deputy clerk of court of the
dated August 30, 1968 stated that he served the writ of duty to receive plaintiff's evidence. 'There is no showing that
execution upon the judgment debtor, P.E. Domingo, who they were prejudiced by such a procedure, that the
manifested that he would settle the case with the bank. After commissioner committed any mistake or abuse of discretion,
the expiration of the sixty-day period, without the judgment or that the proceedings were vitiated by collusion and
having been satisfied, the sheriff returned the writ to the collateral fraud. It is too late at this hour for them to question
court. the reception of plantiff's evidence by the deputy clerk of court
acting as commissioner.
CFI: On March 17, 1977, the bank, "through the Statutory
Receiver", filed a complaint also in the Court of First Instance WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of dismissal is reversed and
of Manila for the revival of the said judgment (Civil Case No. set aside. Costs against the private respondents.
107556). lt was alleged therein that the judgment debtors
(now the private respondents) had made partial payments and RULE 31
that the amount due as of March 15, 1977 was thirty-four
thousand six hundred twenty-two pesos and nineteen
centavos (P34,622.19) with twelve percent interest a year
from March 16, 1977. The bank prayed that the judgment be G.R. No. 169677 February 18, 2013
revived. The defendants answered the complaint. Then, they
filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the action for METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, as
revival of judgment had prescribed and that the plaintiff bank successor-in-interest of
had no cause of action because the judgment sought to be ASIAN BANK CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON.
revived is void since it was based on the evidence received by EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL, HON. FRANCISCO H. VILLARUZ,
the deputy clerk of court as commissioner. The motion to JR. and HON. RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA (in their
dismiss was opposed by the bank. capacities as Chairman and Members, respectively, of the
Second Division of SANDIGANBAYAN) and the REPUBLIC
RTC: The trial court granted the motion in a minute order OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
which reads: "Considering the allegations contained, the
arguments advanced and the doctrine cited in defendants' SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI
motion to dismiss as well as those of the opposition filed
thereto by the plaintiff, the Court resolves to grant the DOCTRINE: The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid
motion." The plaintiff appealed under Republic Act 5440. prejudice, may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim,
counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any separate issue

or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third- ownership of the properties because the Sandiganbayan,
party complaints or issues. But a separate trial may be denied being a special court with limited jurisdiction, could only
if a party is thereby deprived of his right to be heard upon an determine the issue of whether or not the properties were
issue dealt with and determined in the main trial. illegally acquired by the original defendants.
Exceptions to the general rule are permitted only when there SANDIGANBAYAN: GRANTED Motion for separate trial.
are extraordinary grounds for conducting separate trials on Defendant Asian Bank is not actually opposing the conduct of
different issues raised in the same case, or when separate trials a separate trial insofar as the said bank is concerned. What it
of the issues will avoid prejudice, or when separate trials of the seeks is the opportunity to confront the witnesses and
issues will further convenience, or when separate trials of the whatever documentary exhibits that may have been earlier
issues will promote justice, or when separate trials of the issues presented by plaintiff in the case before the Court grants a
will give a fair trial to all parties. Otherwise, the general rule separate trial.
must apply.
ISSUE: WON the Sandiganbayan erred in granting the motion
FACTS: Republic brought a complaint for reversion, for separate trial
reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages in the
Sandiganbayan against Andres V. Genito, Jr., Ferdinand E. HELD: YES. Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of its
Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos and other defendants. The action discretion in ordering a separate trial as to Asian Bank
was obviously to recover allegedly ill-gotten wealth of the (Metrobank) on the ground that the issue against Asian Bank
Marcoses, their nominees, dummies and agents. Among the was distinct and separate from that against the original
properties subject of the action were two parcels of defendants. Thereby, the Sandiganbayan veered away from
commercial land located in Tandang Sora registered in the the general rule of having all the issues in every case tried at
names of Spouses Andres V. Genito, Jr. and Ludivina L. Genito. one time, unreasonably shunting aside the dictum in
Corrigan, supra, that a "single trial will generally lessen the
The Republic moved for the amendment of the complaint in delay, expense, and inconvenience to the parties and the
order to implead Asian Bank as an additional defendant. The courts."
Sandiganbayan granted the motion. It appears that
Asian Bank claimed ownership of the two parcels of land as the Exceptions to the general rule are permitted only when there
registered owner. are extraordinary grounds for conducting separate trials on
different issues raised in the same case, or when separate trials
When the Republic was about to terminate its presentation of of the issues will avoid prejudice, or when separate trials of the
evidence against the original defendants in Civil Case No. 0004, issues will further convenience, or when separate trials of the
it moved to hold a separate trial against Asian Bank. issues will promote justice, or when separate trials of the
issues will give a fair trial to all parties. Otherwise, the general
Asian Bank sought the deferment of any action on the motion rule must apply.
until it was first given the opportunity to test and assail the
testimonial and documentary evidence the Republic had The rule on separate trials in civil actions is found in Section 2,
already presented against the original defendants, and Rule 31 of the Rules of Court. The text of the rule grants to the
contended that it would be deprived of its day in court if a trial court the discretion to determine if a separate trial of any
separate trial were to be held against it without having been claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or
sufficiently apprised about the evidence the Republic had of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims,
adduced before it was brought in as an additional defendant. counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues should be held,
provided that the exercise of such discretion is in furtherance
Republic maintained that a separate trial for Asian Bank was of convenience or to avoid prejudice to any party.
proper because its cause of action against Asian Bank was
entirely distinct and independent from its cause of action The rule is almost identical with Rule 42 (b) of the United
against the original defendants as well as the issues set forth. States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules), a
provision that governs separate trials in the US Federal Courts.
Asian Bank's rejoinder asserted that the issue concerning its
supposed actual or constructive knowledge of the properties The US Jursiprudence provides that (1) having separate trials is
being the subject of the complaint in Civil Case No. 0004 was intended to further convenience, avoid delay and prejudice,
intimately related to the issue delving on the character of the and serve the ends of justice; (2) separate trials remained the
properties as the ill-gotten wealth of the original defendants; exception, and emphasized that the moving party had the
that it thus had a right to confront the evidence presented by burden to establish the necessity for the separation of issues;
the Republic as to the character of the properties; and that the (3) the holding of separate trials are for only the exceptional
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction to decide Asian Bank's instances where there were special and persuasive reasons for

departing from the general practice of trying all issues in a case In 1955, Velez filed a petition for relief from orders, judgment
at only one time. and proceedings, and motion for new trial and reconsideration
on the ground of excusable negligence. He filed no answer
Further, Corpus Juris Secundum makes clear that neither party because he believed that an amicable settlement was being
had an absolute right to have a separate trial of an issue; negotiated. The court ordered the parties and their attorneys
hence, the motion to that effect should be allowed only to to appear before the court to 'explore the possibility of an
avoid prejudice, further convenience, promote justice, and amicable settlement'.
give a fair trial to all parties.
Upon the motion of Velez' counsel, the court granted to defer
Bearing in mind the foregoing principles and parameters, the for two weeks the resolution on the defendant's petition for
Sandiganbayan’s decision was improper as it did not constitute relief. After two weeks had expired, the defendant and his
a special or compelling reason like any of the exceptions. To counsel failed to appear.
begin with, the issue relevant to Asian Bank was not
complicated. In that context, the separate trial would not be in Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the
furtherance of convenience. And, secondly, the cause of action court, but Velez' counsel informed the court that the chances
against Asian Bank was necessarily connected with the cause of settling the case amicably were nil. The court subsequently
of action against the original defendants. Should the issued an order denying the petition of Velez.
Sandiganbayan resolve the issue against Spouses Genito in a
separate trial on the basis of the evidence adduced against the The lower court found that the affidavit attached by Velez in
original defendants, the properties would be thereby adjudged his petition stated conclusions or opinions, instead of facts,
as ill-gotten and liable to forfeiture in favor of the Republic and therefore are invalid.
without Metrobank being given the opportunity to rebut or
explain its side. The outcome would surely be prejudicial Velez on the other hand claimed that the judgment sought to
towards Metrobank. be set aside was null and void for the evidence was adduced
before the clerk of court.
We must safeguard Metrobank's right to be heard in the
defense of its registered ownership of the properties, for that ISSUE:
is what our Constitution requires us to do. Hence, the grant by Whether or not the clerk of court can be designated as
the Sandiganbayan of the Republic's motion for separate trial, commissioner when there was no consent from Velez.
not being in furtherance of convenience or would not avoid
prejudice to a party, and being even contrary to the HELD:
Constitution, the law and jurisprudence, was arbitrary, and, YES. The judgment sought to be set aside was not null and void.
therefore, a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or Having based on evidence adduced before the clerk of court
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan. does not make the judgment null and void.
RULE 32 In the case of Province of Pangasinan v. Palisoc, L-16519,

October 30, 1962, the Court pointed out that the procedure of
Beatriz P. Wassmer, v. Francisco X. Velez designating the clerk of court as commissioner to receive
G.R. No. L-20089 ; December 26, 1964 evidence is sanctioned by the Rules of Court.
In the case above, the Court held that the consent of Velez did
FACTS: not have to be obtained for he was declared in default. As an
Velez and Wassmer decided to get married on September 4, effect, he had no standing in court.
1954. However, two days prior, Velez left a note. The wedding
had to be postponed because Velez' mother opposed it. He RULE 33
informed that he will be leaving, and that she should not ask
too many people because it would only create a scandal. G.R. No. 138739 July 6, 2000
The next day, Velez sent a telegram reassuring Wassmer, but RADIOWEALTH FINANCE COMPANY, petitioner, vs.
he was never heard from again. Spouses VICENTE and MA. SUMILANG DEL ROSARIO,
respondents.
Wassmer sued for damages. Velez filed no answer and was
declared in default. Wassmer adduced evidence before the DOCTRINE: Defendants who present a demurrer to the
clerk of court as commissioner. Judgment was rendered plaintiff’s evidence retain the right to present their own
ordering Velez to pay Beatriz for damages. evidence, if the trial court disagrees with them; if the trial court
agrees with them, but on appeal, the appellate court disagrees

with both of them and reverses the dismissal order, the Applying Rule 33, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Court, the CA
defendants lose the right to present their own evidence. The should have rendered judgment on the basis of the evidence
appellate court shall, in addition, resolve the case and render submitted by the petitioner. While the appellate court correctly
judgment on the merits, inasmuch as a demurrer aims to ruled that "the documentary evidence submitted by the
discourage prolonged litigations. [petitioner] should have been allowed and appreciated xxx,"
and that "the petitioner presented quite a number of
FACTS: documentary exhibits xxx enumerated in the appealed order,"
Respondents, jointly and severally, executed a promissory we agree with petitioner that the CA had sufficient evidence on
note in favor of petitioner for loan that was extended to them record to decide the collection suit. A remand is not only
by petitioner. frowned upon by the Rules, it is also logically unnecessary on
the basis of the facts on record.
Thereafter, respondents defaulted on the monthly
installments. Despite repeated demands, they failed to pay Explaining the consequence of a demurrer to evidence, the
their obligations under their Promissory Note. Court in Villanueva Transit v. Javellana pronounced:
"The rationale behind the rule and doctrine is simple and
Petitioner filed a Complaint for the collection of a sum of logical. The defendant is permitted, without waiving his right
money before the RTC. During the trial, Famatico, the credit to offer evidence in the event that his motion is not granted,
and collection officer of petitioner, presented in evidence the to move for a dismissal (i.e., demur to the plaintiff’s evidence)
respondents’ check payments, the demand letter, the on the ground that upon the facts as thus established and the
customer’s ledger card for the respondents, another demand applicable law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If the
letter and Metropolitan Bank dishonor slips. Famatico trial court denies the dismissal motion, i.e., finds that plaintiff’s
admitted that he did not have personal knowledge of the evidence is sufficient for an award of judgment in the absence
transaction or the execution of any of these pieces of of contrary evidence, the case still remains before the trial
documentary evidence, which had merely been endorsed to court which should then proceed to hear and receive the
him. defendant’s evidence so that all the facts and evidence of the
contending parties may be properly placed before it for
The trial court issued an Order terminating the presentation of adjudication as well as before the appellate courts, in case of
evidence for the petitioner. Thus, the latter formally offered its appeal. Nothing is lost. The doctrine is but in line with the
evidence and exhibits and rested its case. established procedural precepts in the conduct of trials that
the trial court liberally receive all proffered evidence at the
Respondents filed a Demurrer to Evidence for alleged lack of trial to enable it to render its decision with all possibly relevant
cause of action. The trial court dismissed the complaint for proofs in the record, thus assuring that the appellate courts
failure of petitioner to substantiate its claims, the evidence it upon appeal have all the material before them necessary to
had presented being merely hearsay. make a correct judgment, and avoiding the need of remanding
the case for retrial or reception of improperly excluded
The CA remand the case back to the RTC. According to the CA, evidence, with the possibility thereafter of still another appeal,
the judicial admissions of respondents established their with all the concomitant delays. The rule, however, imposes
indebtedness to the petitioner, on the grounds that they the condition by the same token that if his demurrer is granted
admitted the due execution of the Promissory Note, and that by the trial court, and the order of dismissal is reversed on
their only defense was the absence of an agreement on when appeal, the movant losses his right to present evidence in his
the installment payments were to begin. Indeed, during the behalf and he shall have been deemed to have elected to stand
pretrial, they admitted the genuineness not only of the on the insufficiency of plaintiff’s case and evidence. In such
Promissory Note, but also of the demand letter dated July 12, event, the appellate court which reverses the order of
1991. Even if the petitioner’s witness had no personal dismissal shall proceed to render judgment on the merits on
knowledge of these documents, they would still be admissible the basis of plaintiff’s evidence."
"if the purpose for which [they are] produced is merely to
establish the fact that the statement or document was in fact RULE 34
made or to show its tenor[,] and such fact or tenor is of
independent relevance."
G.R. No. 153867 February 17, 2005
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in ordering the remand of this WOOD TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION, CHI TIM CORDOVA
case to the trial court instead of rendering judgment on the AND ROBERT TIONG KING YOUNG, petitioners, vs.
basis of petitioner’s evidence. EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION, Respondent.
HELD: Petition for Review

DOCTRINE character, on the other, are what distinguish a proper case for
summary judgment from one for a judgment on the pleadings.
“The existence or appearance of ostensible issues in the In a proper case for judgment on the pleadings, there is no
pleadings, on the one hand, and their sham or fictitious ostensible issue at all because of the failure of the defending
character, on the other, are what distinguish a proper case for party’s answer to raise an issue. On the other hand, in case of
summary judgment from one for a judgment on the pleadings. a summary judgment, issues apparently exist – facts are
In a proper case for judgment on the pleadings, there is no asserted in the complaint regarding which there is as yet no
ostensible issue at all because of the failure of the defending admission, disavowal or qualification; or specific denials or
party’s answer to raise an issue. On the other hand, in case of affirmative defenses are in truth set out in the answer but the
a summary judgment, issues apparently exist – facts are issues thus arising from the pleadings are sham, fictitious or
asserted in the complaint regarding which there is as yet no not genuine.
admission, disavowal or qualification; or specific denials or
affirmative defenses are in truth set out in the answer but the Applying such principles, the judgment rendered by the RTC
issues thus arising from the pleadings are sham, fictitious or was not a judgment on the pleadings, but a summary
not genuine.” judgment. Although the Answer of the petitioners apparently
raised issues, both the RTC and the CA, after considering the
FACTS parties’ pleadings, petitioners’ admissions and the documents
attached to the Complaint, found that the issues are not
WTC obtained from respondent a loan in the amount of factual ones requiring trial, nor were they genuine issues.
US$75,000.00, with 8.75% interest per annum, signed by
Cordova and Young as representatives of WTC, with the Summary judgment is a procedure aimed at weeding out sham
representatives binding themselves as sureties of WTC for the claims or defenses at an early stage of the litigation. The
loan. Petitioner failed to pay on final demand, thus respondent proper inquiry in this regard would be whether the affirmative
filed a complaint. defenses offered by petitioners constitute genuine issues of
fact requiring a full-blown trial. The crucial question is: are the
In their answer, petitioners stated WTC obtained $75,000 loan issues raised by petitioners not genuine so as to satisfy a
and that they did, indeed, bind themselves as its sureties. summary judgment?”
Petitioners claimed that there was only one demand letter,
and that the promissory note did not provide the due date for A genuine issue means an issue of fact which calls for the
payment. Since the date was purposely left blank, petitioners presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue which
aver that the date would be agreed upon later. Since no is fictitious or contrived, an issue that does not constitute a
maturity date was fixed, the Complaint was allegedly genuine issue for trial.
premature, and thus does not state a cause of action. They
further claimed that the promissory note was a contract of In this case for a sum of money, petitioners have admitted that
adhesion with unconscionable interest, and for the they have obtained the loan, the due execution of the loan
reformation of the said instrument. documents, and their receipt of the final demand letter made
by the respondent. These documents were all attached to the
Respondent moved for a judgment on the pleadings, and the Complaint. Petitioners merely claimed that the obligation has
RTC granted said motion, ordering petitioners to pay not matured. Both the RTC and CA found that this was not a
respondent. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s decision. factual issue for trial, the loan being payable on demand. Thus,
the Court upholds the decision of the RTC and the CA.
ISSUE
G.R. No. 171873 July 9, 2010
• Whether or not the RTC properly rendered judgment on MUNICIPALITY OF TIWI vs BETITO
the pleadings. (NO: should have been summary judgment)
RULING Facts:
On June 4, 1990, this Court issued a Decision in the case of
Petitioners aver that the issues raised by the Answer are National Power Corporation v. Province of Albay finding,
genuine. However, whether or not such issues are genuine is among others, the NPC liable for unpaid real estate taxes from
not the crux of inquiry in a motion for judgment on the 1984 to 1987 on its properties located in Albay. These
pleadings. It is only so in a motion for summary judgment. In a properties consisted of geothermal plants in the Municipality
case for judgment on the pleadings, the Answer is such that no of Tiwi and substations in the Municipality of Daraga.
issue is raised at all. The essential question in such a case is Previously, the said properties were sold at an auction sale
whether there are issues generated by the pleadings. conducted by Albay to satisfy NPC’s tax liabilities. As the sole
bidder at the auction, Albay acquired ownership over said
The existence or appearance of ostensible issues in the properties. On July 29, 1992, the NPC, through its then
pleadings, on the one hand, and their sham or fictitious President Pablo Malixi and Albay, represented by then
Governor Salalima, entered into a MOA where the former Under the Contract of Legal Services, respondent is entitled to
agreed to settle its tax liabilities estimated at 10% of whatever amount that would be collected from the
P214,845,104.76. NPC. However, despite repeated demands for the Sangguniang
On August 3, 1992, then Mayor Naomi Corral of Tiwi formally Bayan of Tiwi to pass an appropriate ordinance for the
requested Governor Salalima to remit the rightful tax shares of payment of his attorney’s fees, the former refused to pass the
Tiwi and its barangays where the NPC’s properties were ordinance and to pay what is justly owed him.
located relative to the payments already made by NPC to In their Answer, petitioners admitted that the Sangguniang
Albay. On even date, the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi passed Bayan of Tiwi passed Resolution No. 15-92 but denied that said
Resolution No. 12-92 requesting the Sangguniang resolution authorized then Mayor Corral to enter into the
Panlalawigan of Albay to hold a joint session for the purpose subject contract. In particular, Mayor Corral exceeded her
of discussing the distribution of the NPC payments. On August authority when she bound Tiwi to a gargantuan amount
10, 1992, Governor Salalima replied that the request cannot be equivalent to 10% of the amount of realty taxes recovered
granted as the initial payment amounting to P17,763,000.00 from NPC. Further, the legal services under the subject
was only an “earnest money” and that the total amount to be contract should have been limited to the execution of the
collected from the NPC was still being validated. Due to the decision in National Power Corporation v. Province of Albay as
brewing misunderstanding between Tiwi and the concerned per Resolution No. 15-92. For these reasons, the subject
barangays on the one hand, and Albay on the other, and so as contract is void, unenforceable, unconscionable and
not to be caught in the middle of the controversy, NPC unreasonable. Petitioners further claim that they are not
requested a clarification from the Office of the President as to aware of the cases which respondent allegedly handled on
the scope and extent of the shares of the local government behalf of Tiwi since these cases involved officials of the
units in the real estate tax collections. previous administration; that some of these cases were
On August 30, 1992, the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi passed actually handled by the Office of the Solicitor General; and that
Resolution No. 15-92 authorizing Mayor Corral to hire a lawyer these were personal cases of said officials. In addition, the
to represent Tiwi and its barangays in the recovery of their Contract of Legal Services was not ratified by the Sangguniang
rightful share in the aforesaid realty taxes. Thereafter, Mayor Bayan of Tiwi in order to become effective. Petitioners also
Corral sought the services of respondent Atty. Betito raise the defense that the realty taxes were recovered by
(respondent) and Atty. Lawenko. As a result, on January 25, virtue of the opinion rendered by then Chief Presidential Legal
1993, Mayor Corral, representing Tiwi, and respondent and Counsel Antonio T. Carpio and not through the efforts of
Atty. Lawenko entered into a Contract of Legal Services respondent. As to the amount of realty taxes, the same was
(subject contract). received by Albay and not Tiwi while the amount of
On December 3, 1992, the Office of the President, opined that P35,594,480.00 is part of the share of Tiwi in the utilization of
the MOA entered into by NPC and Albay merely recognized the national wealth. Furthermore, in a Commission on Audit
and established NPC’s realty taxes. He further clarified that the (COA) Memorandum dated January 15, 1996, the COA ruled
sharing scheme and those entitled to the payments to be made that the authority to pass upon the reasonableness of the
by NPC under the MOA should be that provided under the law, attorney’s fees claimed by respondent lies with the
and since Tiwi is entitled to share in said realty taxes, NPC may Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi. Pursuant to this memorandum, the
remit such share directly to Tiwi. Because of this opinion, NPC Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi passed Resolution No. 27-98 which
President Malixi, through a letter dated December 9, 1992, declared the subject contract invalid. Petitioners also allege
informed Mayor Corral and Governor Salalima that starting that the contract is grossly disadvantageous to Tiwi and that
with the January 1993 installment, NPC will directly pay Tiwi its respondent is guilty of laches because he lodged the present
share in the payments under the MOA. As of December 9, complaint long after the death of Mayor Corral; and that the
1992, payments made by NPC to Albay reached amount collected from NPC has already been spent by Tiwi.
P40,724,471.74. On December 19, 1992, in an apparent Issue: Whether the application of the rule of judgment on the
reaction to NPC’s Decision to directly remit to Tiwi its share in pleadings and/or summary judgment is baseless, improper and
the payments made and still to be made pursuant to the MOA, unwarranted in the case at bar.
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Albay passed Ordinance No.
09- 92. The present controversy arose when respondent Ruling:
sought to enforce the Contract of Legal Services after The petition is meritorious. Judgment on the pleadings is
rendering the aforementioned legal services which allegedly improper when the answer to the complaint tenders several
benefited Tiwi. In his Complaint for sum of money against Tiwi, issues .A motion for judgment on the pleadings admits the
represented by then Mayor Patricia Gutierrez et al., truth of all the material and relevant allegations of the
respondent claims that he handled numerous cases which opposing party and the judgment must rest on those
resulted to the recovery of Tiwi’s share in the realty taxes. As allegations taken together with such other allegations as are
a result of these efforts, Tiwi was able to collect the amount of admitted in the pleadings.14 It is proper when an answer fails
P110,985,181.83 and another P35,594,480.00 from the NPC as to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material
well as other amounts which will be proven during the trial. allegations of the adverse party’s pleading. However, when it

appears that not all the material allegations of the complaint party’s answer to raise an issue. On the other hand, in the case
were admitted in the answer for some of them were either of a summary judgment, issues apparently exist ― i.e. facts are
denied or disputed, and the defendant has set up certain asserted in the complaint regarding which there is as yet no
special defenses which, if proven, would have the effect of admission, disavowal or qualification; or specific denials or
nullifying plaintiff’s main cause of action, judgment on the affirmative defenses are in truth set out in the answer―but the
pleadings cannot be rendered. In the instant case, a review of issues thus arising from the pleadings are sham, fictitious or
the records reveal that respondent (as plaintiff) and not genuine, as shown by affidavits, depositions, or admissions.
petitioners (as defendants) set-up multiple levels of claims and
defenses, respectively, with some failing to tender an issue FACTS: Respondents filed a complaint for quieting of title and
while others requiring the presentation of evidence for for declaration of nullity of Free Patent against the heirs of
resolution. The generalized conclusion of both the trial and Macario Mencias and he Secretary of the Department of
appellate courts that petitioners’ answer admits all the Environment and Natural Resources, the Director of the Land
material averments of the complaint is, thus, without basis. For Management Bureau and the Register of Deeds of Marikina.
this reason, a remand of this case is unavoidable. However, in The complaint was later amended to implead herein petitioner
the interest of justice and in order to expedite the disposition purchasers of the disputed lot. Respondents contended that
of this case which was filed with the trial court way back in Macario’s OCT No. 711 and its derivative titles-TCT No. 186516,
1999, we shall settle the issues that can be resolved based on in the name of defendant heirs and petitioners’ TCT NO.
the pleadings and remand only those issues that require a trial 272191, are void because the area they cover is entirely within
on merits as hereunder discussed. their (respondents) land.
Preliminarily, it was erroneous for the trial court to rule that
the genuineness and due execution of the Contract of Legal On the other hand, petitioners asserted, inter alia, that they
Services was impliedly admitted by petitioners for failure to are purchasers in good faith and for value and that they have
make a sworn specific denial thereof as required by Section no knowledge of any defect in the title of the Corporation from
8,17 Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. This rule is not applicable whom they purchased the controverted lot.
when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the
instrument. In the instant case, the subject contract was For failure to file their Answer, defendant Aurora M. Gabat,
executed between respondent and Atty. Lawenko, on the one public defendants Secretary of the Department of
hand, and Tiwi, represented by Mayor Corral, on the other. Environment and Natural Resources, Director of Land
None of the petitioners, who are the incumbent elective and Management Bureau and the Register of Deeds of Marikina,
appointive officials of Tiwi as of the filing of the Complaint, were declared in default.
were parties to said contract. Nonetheless, in their subsequent
pleadings, petitioners admitted the genuineness and due Respondents filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings
execution of the subject contract. We shall, thus, proceed from which was granted by the trial court.
the premise that the genuineness and due execution of the
Contract of Legal Services has already been established. RTC held that the disputed lot is within Lot 89 covered by
Furthermore, both parties concede the contents and efficacy respondents’ TCT No. 257152, issued on June 20, 1969. Said lot
of Resolution 15-92. As a result of these admissions, the issue, therefore became a private land long before the Free Patent
at least as to the coverage of the subject contract, may be was issued to Macario
resolved based on the pleadings as it merely requires the
interpretation and application of the provisions of Resolution Issue: WON the judgment based on pleading is proper in this
15-92 vis-à-vis the stipulations in the subject contract. case (NO)
EDWARD ROCO TAN and EDWIN ROCO Ruling: In a proper case for judgment on the pleadings, there
TAN, Petitioners, vs. BENIGNO DE LA VEGA, ANGELA is no ostensible issue at all because of the failure of the
TUASON STALEY and ANTONIO PEREZ Y defending party’s answer to raise an issue. The answer would
TUASON, Respondents. fail to tender an issue, of course, if it does not deny the
material allegations in the complaint or admits said material
allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings by confessing the
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal with them at all.
Now, if an answer does in fact specifically deny the material
DOCTRINE: The existence or appearance of ostensible issues in averments of the complaint and/or asserts affirmative
the pleadings, on the one hand, and their sham or fictitious defenses (allegations of new matter which, while admitting the
character, on the other, are what distinguish a proper case for material allegations of the complaint expressly or impliedly,
summary judgment from one for a judgment on the pleadings. would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by the plaintiff), a
In a proper case for judgment on the pleadings, there is no judgment on the pleadings would naturally be improper.
ostensible issue at all because of the failure of the defending

In this case, we find that the trial court erred in rendering thereafter, respondent never again saw or heard from
judgment on the pleadings because the pleadings filed by the petitioner.
parties generated ostensible issues that necessitate the
presentation of evidence. It is clear from the foregoing that the She alleged that the TCT which was issued in the name of
pleadings filed in the instant case generated the following respondent “FE M. TUDTUD, x x x married to Teofilo Adolfo.”
issues: (1) whether respondents’ TCT No. 257152 is valid; (2) does not make petitioner a co-owner of the property, but was
whether Lot 89 is covered by TCT No. 257152; and (3) whether merely necessary to describe respondent’s civil status.
petitioners are purchasers in good faith. This is clearly not a
proper case for judgment on the pleadings considering that the Partition case
Answers tendered factual issues. The trial court rendered a Respondent’s sister Florencia Tudtud and her husband Juanito
summary judgment on March 21, 2003 and not a judgment on Gingoyon (the Gingoyons) filed a case for partition with
the pleadings. damages against respondent. The complaint alleged that
respondent executed a deed of sale in favor of the
In sum, we find that respondents failed to prove that Gingoyonsbut that respondent refused to partition/subdivide
presentation of evidence may be dispensed with in the present the same even after the Gingoyons paid the taxes, fees and
controversy. The instant case is neither a proper case for expenses of the sale.
rendition of judgment on the pleadings nor of summary
judgment. A full blown trial should therefore be conducted to Respondent claimed that when the sale to the Gingoyons was
resolve the issues raised by the parties. made, the subject property constituted conjugal property of
her marriage with petitioner.
G.R. No. 201427, March 18, 2015
TEOFILO B. ADOLFO, Petitioner, v. FE. T. ADOLFO, The RTC declared the subject property to be conjugal
Respondent.
Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings in the
separation case
DOCTRINE: A party is precluded from obtaining judgement if Petitioner filed a Request for Admission of 1) the genuineness
such motion for judgement on the pleadings or summary of the duly marked certified true copies of the Complaint,
judgment is based on admission by the adverse party which is Answer, and Decision in the partition case; 2) respondent’s
still subject to a pending case. declaration in said Answer that the subject property
constituted conjugal property of the marriage; and 3) the trial
FACTS: Separation case court’s pronouncement in said case that the subject property
Petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for judicial separation forms part of the conjugal estate.
of property against respondent.
Respondent failed to file her answer or response to the request
The petition alleged that the parties were married and had one for admission. Thus, upon motion for judgement of petitioner,
child. During the marriage, they acquired through conjugal the RTC granted it and ruled in favor of petitioner.
funds the subject property.
The CA reversed the decision of the RTC. It held that the trial
Later on, the parties separated due to irreconcilable court cannot treat petitioner’s motion for judgment on the
differences. Petitioner suggested a separation of the conjugal pleadings as one for summary judgment. It added that
property, but respondent refused. Respondent denied respondent’s Answer appeared on its face to tender an issue;
petitioner’s co-ownership of the subject property, claiming the it disputed petitioner’s claim that the subject property is their
same as her paraphernal property. conjugal property. The next thing to be determined is whether
this issue is fictitious or sham as to justify a summary
In her Answer with counterclaim, respondent contended that judgment.
while she remained married to petitioner, she is the sole
owner of the subject property, which she inherited from her ISSUE:
mother. She alleged that petitioner is a lazy bum, gambler,
drunkard, wife abuser, and neglectful father and that Whether or not the CA erred in setting aside the decision of
respondent supported the family even as petitioner neglected the RTC
it. Petitioner subsequently abandoned her and their child, and
transferred to Davao City where he took a mistress and begot HELD:
four children by her; Petitioner returned to Cebu City seeking
reconciliation with respondent; that respondent took In rendering summary judgment, the trial court relied on
petitioner back, but they once more separated; that respondent’s failure to reply to petitioner’s request for
admission, her admission in the partition case, as well as its

Decision declaring that the subject property is a conjugal due to economic prejudice or lesion; and that it was
asset. It took judicial notice of the proceedings in said consequently declining to recognize the February 11, 2009
case. While there is nothing irregular with this – as courts may agreement because of the lack of approval by its Board of
“take judicial notice of a decision or the facts prevailing in Trustees and for having been signed by Maglaya whose term
another case sitting in the same court if (1) the parties present of office had expired.
them in evidence, absent any opposition from the other party;
or (2) the court, in its discretion, resolves to do so” – the trial On June 24, 2009, the petitioner sent a demand letter to the
court however disregarded the fact that its decision was then respondent. Due to the respondent's failure to pay as
the subject of a pending appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971. It demanded, the petitioner filed its complaint for sum of money
should have known that until the appeal is resolved by the in the RTC.
appellate court, it would be premature to render judgment on
petitioner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings; that it The respondent moved to dismiss the complaint upon the
would be presumptuous to assume that its own decision would following grounds, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the
be affirmed on appeal. One of the issues raised in the appeal person of the defendant; (b) improper venue; (c) litis
is precisely whether the subject property is conjugal, or a pendentia; and (d) forum shopping. In support of the ground
paraphernal asset of the respondent. Thus, instead of of litis pendentia, it stated that it had earlier filed a complaint
resolving petitioner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, for the rescission of the four contracts and of the February 11,
the trial court should have denied it or held it in abeyance. It 2009 agreement in the RTC in Cabanatuan City; and that the
should have guided petitioner to this end, instead of aiding in resolution of that case would be determinative of the
the hasty resolution of his case. In the first place, Civil Case No. petitioner's action for collection.
MAN-4821 was transferred to it from Branch 56 precisely for
the reason that it was the court which tried the closely related After the RTC denied the motion to dismiss on July 19, 2009,
Civil Case No. MAN-2683. the respondent filed its answer. On September 28, 2011, the
petitioner filed its Motion for Judgment Based on the
FERNANDO MEDICAL ENTERPRISES, INC. VS. WESLEYAN Pleadings, stating that the respondent had admitted the
UNIVERSITY PHILIPPINES, INC. material allegations of its complaint and thus did not tender
G.R. No. 207970. January 20, 2016 any issue as to such allegations. The respondent opposed the
Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, arguing that it
had specifically denied the material allegations in the
Doctrine: complaint.
The trial court may render a judgment on the pleadings upon
motion of the claiming party when the defending party's Judgment of the RTC
answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the At the hearing, the court issued an Order denying the Motion
material allegations of the adverse party's pleading. For that for Judgment Based on the Pleadings considering that the
purpose, only the pleadings of the parties in the action are allegations stated on the Motion are evidentiary in nature. The
considered. It is error for the trial court to deny the motion for Court, instead of acting on the same, sets the case for pre-trial,
judgment on the pleadings because the defending party's considering that with the Answer and the Reply, issues have
pleading in another case supposedly tendered an issue of fact. been joined.
FACTS: From January 9, 2006 until February 2, 2007, the Judgment of the CA
petitioner, a domestic corporation dealing with medical On July 2, 2013, the CA promulgated its decision. Although
equipment and supplies, delivered to and installed medical observing that the respondent had admitted the contracts as
equipment and supplies at the respondent's hospital. well as the February 11, 2009 agreement, the CA ruled that a
According to the petitioner, the respondent paid only P67,3 judgment on the pleadings would be improper because the
57,683.23 of its total obligation of P123,901,650.00, leaving outstanding balance due to the petitioner remained to be an
unpaid the sum of P54,654,195.54. issue in the face of the allegations of the respondent in its
complaint for rescission in the RTC in Cabanatuan City.
However, on February 11, 2009, the petitioner and the
respondent entered into an agreement whereby the former Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in going outside of
agreed to reduce its claim to only P50,400,000.00, and allowed the respondent's answer by relying on the allegations
the latter to pay the adjusted obligation on installment basis contained in the latter's complaint for rescission.
within 36 months.
RULING: Yes, the Court of Appeals erred in going outside of the
In the letter dated May 27, 2009, the respondent notified the respondent's answer by relying on the allegations contained in
petitioner that its new administration had reviewed their the latter's complaint for rescission. In order to resolve the
contracts and had found the contracts defective and rescissible petitioner's Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, the

trial court could rely only on the answer of the respondent filed A wire was received by the petitioners from Judge Estenzo to
in Civil Case No. 09-122116. Under Section 1, Rule 34 of the the effect that the Motion to Admit Amended Answer had
Rules of Court, the answer was the sole basis for ascertaining become moot and academic because a Summary Judgment
whether the complaint's material allegations were admitted or had already been rendered by him. The judgment ruled in
properly denied. As such, the respondent's averment of favor of the plaintiffs (herein private respondents), and
payment of the total of P78,401,650.00 to the petitioner made ordered the defendants (herein petitioners) to open right of
in its complaint for rescission had no relevance to the way in favor of the private respondents.
resolution of the Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings.
The CA thus wrongly held that a factual issue on the total The petitioners moved for reconsideration on the ground that
liability of the respondent remained to be settled through trial it was prematurely rendered.
on the merits. It should have openly wondered why the
respondent's answer in Civil Case No. 09-122116 did not allege ISSUE:
the supposed payment of the P78,401,650.00, if the payment Whether or not Judge Estanzo erred in rendering judgment
was true, if only to buttress the specific denial of its alleged without proper hearing.
liability. The omission exposed the respondent's denial of
liability as insincere. HELD:
YES. Firstly, no motion for a summary judgment with
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and supporting affidavits and of depositions was filed by
SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on July 2, 2013; DIRECTS respondents Capahi and served on the petitioners.
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, in Manila to resume its
proceedings in Civil Case No. 09-122116 entitled Fernando The purpose of the motion for summary judgment is to enable
Medical Enterprises, Inc. v. Wesleyan University-Philippines, the trial court to determine whether or not a bona fide issue
and to forthwith act on and grant the Motion for Judgment exists between the parties, and if none, for the court to render
Based on the Pleadings by rendering the proper judgment on a summary judgment as prayed for. A proper notice to the
the pleadings; and ORDERS the respondent to pay the costs of adverse party, who has to be served with a copy of the motion
suit. for summary judgment with its supporting affidavits, at least
ten days before the date of the hearing, is required under
RULE 35 Section 3, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court. The adverse party is
given time to prepare and submit his own counter affidavits,
Fauso Auman, Librado Auman, Jorge Auman, Gregorio depositions, and other documents to show real and valid
Auman, Ernesto Auman, Vicenta Auman, Concepcion A. defense.
Mapas, and Carlos Auman, v. Hon. Numeriano G. Eztenso,
Judge, Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch V (Ormoc In the present case, the petitioners were denied the right
Branch), Geronimo C. Capahi, Encarnacion Cortes provided by the Rules of Court when the respondent Judge
G.R. No. L-40500 ; February 27, 1976 rendered judgment against them without proper hearing.
FACTS: Furthermore, the issues of fact exist in the case, including

Private respondents in this case, spouses Capahi, filed a whether or not there was adequate outlet to the public
complaint with the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch V, highway; there were other possible exits; and if it was the least
for an easement of right-of-way and damages against prejudicial to the owners of the servant estate.
petitioners.
A summary judgment can only be rendered where there are no
The parties were ordered to submit a list of witnesses and questions of fact, or where the material allegations of the
documents supporting their action or defense; affidavits of pleadings are not disputed.
witnesses; and memorandum in support of the contentions.
The Orders also included a warning wherein failure to submit G.R. No. L-40948 June 29, 1976
the above required documents on time would lead to being
declared non-suited or defaulted. GREGORIO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE
FRANCISCO CONSOLACION, Judge of the Court of First
When the case was called for pre-trial, the private respondents Instance of Davao, Br. II, CORAZON RAMIREZ UY, and
requested that the case be reset for a later date. LUCIO GALAURA, respondents.
The petitioner filed a “Motion to Admit Amended Answer” Petition for Certiorari with Prohibition
alleging that the sketch presented by the private respondent is
different from that attached to the complaint. DOCTRINE

“It has been held that "a trial court in granting summary accident, respondent Judge did not, therefore, act arbitrarily in
judgment should file findings of fact and conclusion of law or a declaring that there is no genuine issue and no controversial
memorandum opinion so as to disclose grounds upon which the question of fact to be submitted. This was only a mere
trial court reached its determination." In this jurisdiction, interlocutory order directing that a hearing be conducted for
pursuant to Section 9 of Article X of the Constitution and the the purpose of ascertaining the amount or the assessment of
procedural rules, all judgments determining the merits of cases damages which may be adjudged in favor of the prevailing
should state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on party. It is a determination of the court of a preliminary point
which it is based. or directing some steps in the proceedings, but not a
disposition of the merits. Upon the rendering of the
There being no judgment, the present petition is, therefore, assessment, the court will then direct the entry of the
premature.” appropriate summary judgment.
FACTS In the absence of any findings of fact and conclusions of law,

the aforesaid order of respondent Judge cannot be considered
Petitioner’s wife was a passenger of a jeep owned and a judgment. There being no judgment, the present petition is,
operated by defendant Uy and driven by defendant Galaura. It therefore, premature.
met an accident where the wife died. Thus, petitioner sued
private respondents for breach of their obligations as common 193 SCRA 748 Feb. 7, 1991
carrier. In defense, private respondents claimed that the GRAND FARMS, INC. and PHILIPPINE SHARES CORP. v. CA
proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of third [RTC presiding judge, RTC clerk of court, & deputy sheriff-in-
persons over whom they had no supervision and control, and charge] (BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK)
set up a counterclaim for damages. Subsequently, they moved
for a summary judgment against the plaintiff, raising the NATURE
ground that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact Appeal from the decision of CA, which found no grave abuse of
in the case, except as to the amount of damages sought by way discretion on the part of respondent judge in denying
of counterclaim, and submitted supporting affidavits to petitioners' motion for summary judgment
disprove liability for the offense. In opposition, plaintiff alleged
that the fault of the carrier is presumed, as the passenger died. FACTS
Respondent Judge issued an order declaring that there was no - Petitioners filed Civil Case No. 2816-V-88 in the Regional Trial
genuine issue to any material fact and no question of fact was Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila for annulment and/or
submitted to the trial court. A motion for reconsideration was declaration of nullity of the extrajudicial foreclosure
filed, but was denied. Thus, the instant petition. proceedings over their mortgaged properties, with damages,
against respondents clerk of court, deputy sheriff and herein
ISSUE
private respondent Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank.
- After the bank filed its answer, petitioners requested an
• Whether or not the granting of a motion for summary
admission by the bank that no formal notice of intention to
judgment may be raised in a petition for certiorari. (NO)
foreclose the real estate mortgage was sent by the bank to
RULING petitioners.
- The bank responded and said that petitioners were notified
Under Sec. 2, Rule 34 of the Revised Rules, a party against of the auction sale by the posting of notices and the
whom a claim, counterclaim, or crossclaim is asserted or a publication of notice in the Metropolitan Newsweek, a
declarative relief is sought may, at any time, move with newspaper of general circulation in the province where the
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to subject properties are located and in the Philippines.
all or any part thereof. The defendant who believes that he is - On the basis of implied admission that no formal notice was
entitled to a judgment either on the pleading or on the basis served personally, petitioners filed a motion for summary
of extrinsic facts established by affidavits or depositions may judgment contending that the foreclosure was violative of the
move for summary judgment in his favor. provisions of the mortgage contract, specifically paragraph (k)
thereof which provides:
The Court is not unmindful that the issue as to whether a "k) All correspondence relative to this Mortgage, including
carrier used such reasonable precautions to avoid the accident demand letters, summons, subpoena or notifications of any
as would ordinarily used by careful, prudent persons under the judicial or extrajudical actions shall be sent to the Mortgagor
circumstances is a question essentially one of fact and, at the address given above or at the address that may
therefore, ordinarily such issue must be decided at the trial. hereafter be given in writing by the Mortgagor to the
But where, as in the case at bar, petitioner has not submitted Mortgagee, and the mere act of sending any correspondence
opposing affidavits to controvert private respondents’ by mail or by personal delivery to the said address shall be valid
evidence that the driver of the passenger jeepney was free of and effective notice to the Mortgagor for all legal purposes,
contributory fault as he stopped the jeepney to avoid the
and the fact that any communication is not actually received - In Community Savings & Loan Association, Inc., et al. vs. Court
by the Mortgagor, or that it has been returned unclaimed to of Appeals, at al., the SC held that the stipulation is the law
the Mortgagee, or that no person was found at the address between [the parties] and as it not contrary to law, morals,
given, or that the address is fictitious, or cannot be located, good customs and public policy, the same should be complied
shall not excuse or relieve the Mortgagor from the effects of with faithfully (Art. 1306 CC). Thus, while publication of the
such notice;" foreclosure proceedings in the newspaper of general
- The bank opposed the motion saying that based on other circulation was complied with, personal notice is still required,
paragraphs (b and d) in the contract, the mortgagor authorized when the same was mutually agreed upon by the parties as
extra-judicial sale upon breach of contract and that the additional condition of the mortgage contract. Failure to
mortgagee was appointed atty-in-fact with full powers upon comply with this additional stipulation would render illusory
any breach of the obligations in the contract. Art. 1306. And as the record is bereft of any evidence which
- The RTC issued an order denying petitioners' motion for even impliedly indicate that the required notice of the
summary judgment. MFR was also denied on the ground that extrajudicial foreclosure was ever sent to the debtor-
genuine and substantial issues exist which require the mortgagor, the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the
presentation of evidence during the trial. property in question are fatally defective and are not binding
- Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari to CA attacking said on the debtor-mortgagor.
orders of denial as having been issued with grave abuse of - To still require a trial notwithstanding private respondent's
discretion. CA dismissed the petition, holding that no personal admission of the lack of such requisite notice would be a
notice was required to foreclose since private respondent was superfluity and would work injustice to petitioners whose
constituted by petitioners as their attorney-in-fact to sell the obtention of the relief to which they are plainly and patently
mortgaged property. It further held that paragraph (k) of the entitled would be further delayed. That undesirable
mortgage contract merely specified the address where contingency is obviously one of the reasons why our
correspondence should be sent and did not impose an procedural rules have provided for summary judgments.
additional condition on the part of private respondent to notify
petitioners personally of the foreclosure. CA also denied G.R. No. 196251 July 9, 2014
petitioners MFR.
OLIVAREZ REALTY CORPORATION and DR. PABLO R.
ISSUES: WON summary judgment was proper OLIVAREZ, petitioners, vs. BENJAMIN
CASTILLO, respondent.
HELD: YES. Ratio The Rules of Court authorize the rendition of
a summary judgment if the pleadings, depositions and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that, PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 45
except as to the amount of damages, there is no issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a DOCTRINE: Trial may be dispensed with and a summary
judgment as a matter of law. Although an issue may be raised judgment rendered if the case can be resolved judiciously by
formally by the pleadings but there is no genuine issue of fact, plain resort to the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and other
and all the facts are within the judicial knowledge of the court, papers filed by the parties.
summary judgment may be granted.
FACTS: Respondent Benjamin Castillo (Castillo) was the
The real test, therefore, of a motion for summary judgment registered owner of a parcel of covered by a TCT which the PTA
is whether the pleadings, affidavits and exhibits in support of allegedly claimed ownership of based on another TCT.
the motion are sufficient to overcome the opposing papers
In April 2000, Castillo and petitioner Olivarez Realty
and to justify a finding as a matter of law that there is no
Corporation (ORC) entered into a contract of conditional sale
defense to the action or that the claim is clearly meritorious.
over the property where Castillo agreed to sell his property to
Reasoning Private respondent tacitly admitted in its answer to
ORC for ₱19M. ORC agreed to fled the action against PTA and
petitioners' request for admission that it did not send any
pay a down payment of ₱5M to be paid according to a
formal notice of foreclosure to petitioners. Stated otherwise,
schedule. The remaining ₱14M will be paid in 30 equal monthly
and as is evident from the records, there has been no denial by
installments beginning in the receipt of the decision denying
private respondent that no personal notice of the extrajudicial
the PTA’s claim to the land. Should the action be denied,
foreclosure was ever sent to petitioners prior thereto. This
Castillo will reimburse ORC.
omission, by itself, rendered the foreclosure defective and
irregular for being contrary to the express provisions of the Castillo alleged that ORC convinced him into selling his on the
mortgage contract. There is thus no further necessity to representation that the corporation shall be responsible in
inquire into the other issues cited by the trial court, for the clearing the property of the tenants and in paying them
foreclosure may be annulled solely on the basis of such defect. disturbance compensation. He further alleged ORC solely
prepared the deed of conditional sale and that he was made to
sign the contract with its terms "not adequately explained [to This is provided under Section 3, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of
him] in Tagalog." Civil Procedure.
After the parties had signed the deed of conditional sale, ORC An issue of material fact exists if the answer or responsive
immediately took possession of the property. However, the pleading filed specifically denies the material allegations of fact
corporation only paid 2,500,000.00 of the purchase price. set forth in the complaint or pleading. If the issue of fact
Furthermore, ORC did not file any action against the PTA. ORC "requires the presentation of evidence, it is a genuine issue of
also neither cleared the land of the tenants nor paid them fact." However, if the issue "could be resolved judiciously by
disturbance compensation. Despite demand, ORC refused to plain resort "to the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and
fully pay the purchase price so Castillo filed for rescission of other papers on file, the issue of fact raised is sham, and the
contract arguing that ORC committed substantial breach of the trial court may resolve the action through summary judgment.
contract.
A summary judgment is usually distinguished from a judgment
ORC admitted in their answer that they only paid ₱2.5M and on the pleadings. Under Rule 34 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
alleged that Castillo failed to "fully assist" the corporation in Procedure, trial may likewise be dispensed with and a case
filing an action against the PTA. Neither did Castillo clear the decided through judgment on the pleadings if the answer filed
property of the tenants within six months from the signing of fails to tender an issue or otherwise admits the material
the deed of conditional sale. Thus, according to ORC, they had allegations of the claimant’s pleading.
"all the legal right to withhold the subsequent payments to
[fully pay] the purchase price." Judgment on the pleadings is proper when the answer filed
fails to tender any issue, or otherwise admits the material
After a year, Castillo filed a motion for summary judgment allegations in the complaint. On the other hand, in a summary
and/or judgment on the pleadings arguing that ORC judgment, the answer filed tenders issues as specific denials
"substantially admitted the material allegations of [his] and affirmative defenses are pleaded, but the issues raised are
complaint," specifically that ORC failed to pay purchase price, sham, fictitious, or otherwise not genuine.
failed to file action against PTA, and cleared the property of the
tenants and pay the disturbance compensation. In this case, Olivarez Realty Corporation admitted that it did
not fully pay the purchase price as agreed upon in the deed of
RTC: GRANTED summary judgement. ORC breached the conditional sale. As to why it withheld payments from Castillo,
contract of conditional sale. The deed of conditional sale it set up the following affirmative defenses: First, Castillo did
rescinded and the ₱2.5M forfeited in favor of Castillo "as not file a case to void the Philippine Tourism Authority’s title
damages. The trial court awarded Castillo damages. to the property; Second, Castillo did not clear the land of the
tenants; third, Castillo allegedly sold the property to a third
CA: AFFIRMED IN TOTO the trial court’s decision. According to person, and the subsequent sale is currently being litigated
the appellate court, the trial court "did not err in its finding that before a Quezon City court.
there is no genuine controversy as to the facts involved [in this
case]." The trial court, therefore, correctly rendered summary Considering that Olivarez Realty Corporation and Dr. Olivarez’s
judgment. CA likewise denied the motion for reconsideration. answer tendered an issue, Castillo properly availed himself of
a motion for summary judgment. However, the issues are not
ISSUE/S: Did the trial court correctly render summary genuine issues of material fact. These are issues that can be
judgement? resolved judiciously by plain resort to the pleadings, affidavits,
depositions, and other papers on file; otherwise, these issues
HELD: YES. The trial court correctly rendered summary are sham, fictitious, or patently unsubstantial.
judgment, as there were no genuine issues of material fact in
this case. Castillo's alleged failure to "fully assist" the corporation in filing
the case is not a defense. As the trial court said, "how can
There are instances, however, when trial may be dispensed [Castillo] assist [the corporation] when [the latter] did not file
with. Under Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a trial the action [in the first place?]"
court may dispense with trial and proceed to decide a case if
from the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and other papers Neither can Olivarez Realty Corporation argue that it
on file, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. In such refused to fully pay the purchase price due to the Philippine
a case, the judgment issued is called a summary judgment. Tourism Authority's adverse claim on the property. The
corporation knew of this adverse claim when it entered into a
A motion for summary judgment is filed either by the claimant
contract of conditional sale. It even obligated itself under
or the defending party. The trial court then hears the motion
paragraph C of the deed of conditional sale to sue the
for summary judgment. If indeed there are no genuine issues
Philippine Tourism Authority. This defense, therefore, is sham.
of material fact, the trial court shall issue summary judgment.

The obligations must be performed simultaneously. In this Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). Union Bank agreed to
case, the parties should have coordinated to ensure that purchase, from time to time, installment accounts receivables
tenants on the property were paid disturbance compensation arising from the former's sale of units in its real estate projects
and were made to vacate the property six months after the and as evidenced by the Contracts to Sell executed by the
signing of the deed of conditional sale. former and its homebuyers.
Olivarez Realty Corporation's obligation to pay disturbance From October 2006 to May 2007, GA executed 10 Deeds of
compensation is a pure obligation. The performance of the Assignments (DAs) and 11 copies of Special Powers of Attorney
obligation to pay disturbance compensation did not depend on (SPAs) in favor of Union Bank covering 10 condominium units
any condition. Moreover, the deed of conditional sale did not located at GA Tower 1, Condominium Project. A common
give the corporation a period to perform the obligation. As provision of the DAs provides that Globe Asiatique absolutely
such, the obligation to pay disturbance compensation was transferred, assigned, and conveyed to Union Bank, its
demandable at once. Olivarez Realty Corporation should have successors and assigns, all its rights, title, interests and
paid the tenants disturbance compensation upon execution of participation "on that parcel of land, and subsequent
the deed of conditional sale. improvements thereon" located at the specific subject units of
GA Tower 1.
Castillo's obligation to clear the land of the tenants within six
months from the signing of the contract was an obligation with The SPAs granted Union Bank the authority to do the following
a resolutory period. Olivarez Realty Corporation, therefore, acts, among others, to wit: (1) to deliver and/or send a Notice
had no right to withhold payments of the purchase price. of Cancellation to the Installment Purchaser and cancel the
defaulted Contract to Sell; (2) to execute, sign, and deliver in
Castillo's alleged prayer for the irreconcilable reliefs of favor of the buyer, or the buyer's rightful assignee, or in favor
rescission of contract and reformation of instrument is not a of Union Bank or its beneficiary or assignee, the necessary
ground to dismiss his complaint. A plaintiff may allege two or Deed of Absolute Sale to cede, convey, and transfer, absolutely
more claims in the complaint alternatively or hypothetically, and irrevocably, the title to, and rights and interests in, to the
either in one cause of action or in separate causes of action per subject parcel of land, including any and all improvements
Section 2, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It is the thereon; and (3) to restructure and/or convert to Real Estate
filing of two separate cases for each of the causes of action that Mortgage the assigned Contract to Sell in their behalf.
is prohibited since the subsequently filed case may be
On November 2011, GA sent Union Bank a letter requesting
dismissed under Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
the reformation of the DAs and the SPAs alleging that some of
Procedure on splitting causes of action.
their provisions do not conform to their real agreement.
However, GA’s request remained unheeded. On September
As demonstrated, there are no genuine issues of material fact
2012, Globe Asiatique filed a Complaint for reformation of the
in this case. These are issues that can be resolved judiciously
DAs and SPAs for failing to express the parties' real intent and
by plain resort to the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and
agreement. GA claimed that the parties only intended the sale
other papers on file. As the trial court found, Olivarez Realty
or assignment of rights, title, and interests over the
Corporation illegally withheld payments of the purchase price.
receivables, and not the parcels of land themselves. It asserted
The trial court did not err in rendering summary judgment.
that the DAs are the result of a mutual mistake and prayed that
G.R. No. 229339 Union Bank be ordered to pay attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation.
GLOBE ASIATIQUE REALTY HOLDINGS CORPORATION,
Petitioner vs. UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, In its Answer, Union Bank admitted that it indeed entered into
Respondent a MOA wherein it agreed to purchase GA's accounts
receivables; the MOA shall be implemented through GA's
assignment, in favor of Union Bank, of its rights, title, and
PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 45 interests over the receivables under a particular contract to
sell; one of the provisions of the MOA is the execution by GA
DOCTRINE: For summary judgment to proceed in lieu of a full- of an SP A in favor of Union Bank; upon the execution of the
blown trial, the party who moves for summary judgment has MOA, GA submits the requirements for the purchase of the
the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of genuine receivables to Union Bank; and after the execution of the
issues of fact, or that the issue posed is patently insubstantial MOA, the parties commenced with the selling and purchasing
as to constitute a genuine issue of the receivables. However, Union Bank denied that the
subject DAs failed to express the true intent or agreement
FACTS:
between the parties. It also denied that the parties only
On May 2006, Globe Asiatique (GA) and herein respondent intended the sale or assignment of rights, titles and interests
Union Bank of the Philippines (Union Bank) entered into a over the receivables. As an affirmative defense, Union Bank
alleged that when the parties executed the subject MOA, they the meeting of their minds. Verily, GA seeks reformation under
also signed, as annexes, forms for the DAs, SPAs, and the Article 1361 of the Civil Code which provides that an
Notice of Assignment and Instruction to Pay (NAIP) Union Bank instrument may be reformed when mutual mistake of the
which constitute as supplementary agreements to the MOA. It parties caused the failure of the instrument to disclose their
further averred that when the parties signed the MOA and the real agreement. However, Union Bank's Answer poses material
forms, they knew and were fully aware of the contents of the allegations which clearly dispute those alleged by Globe
forms attached to the MOA. Asiatique in its Complaint, particularly with regard to the
allegation of mutual mistake. While Union Bank admits the
Moreover, Union Bank claimed that it is the NAIP, not the DAs, execution of the MOA for the purchase of GA's receivables,
which served as the document for the assignment or and that the MOA shall be implemented by the execution of
purchaseof the receivables; and that the DAs are actually deeds of assignments, it nevertheless explicitly denies that
intended to constitute as security, and collateral for the credit mutual mistake attended the execution of the subject DAs and
facility which it extended in favor of Globe Asiatique. Union SPAs, and that the parties only intend the sale or assignment
Bank prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and order to of rights, titles and interests over the receivables. Union Bank
pay cost of suit and attorney’s fees. On June 2014, after the counters that if there is mistake, it is only on the part of GA,
termination of the pre-trial of the case, GA filed a Motion for but not mutual. It further avers that the subject DAs are
Summary Judgment. Union Bank filed its Opposition. RTC executed by GA to secure a credit facility. From the foregoing,
denied GA’s motion for summary judgment. While on appeal, it is clear that a factual dispute arises from the parties'
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. opposing versions of facts, which dispute may only be resolved
with the parties presenting their respective evidence in a full-
ISSUE: blown trial.
Whether or not the decision of the Court of Appeals in granting Furthermore, it has been held that a trial should be conducted
the Summary Judgment? and the trial court should receive the respective evidence of
the parties when the complaint raises, among others, the issue
HELD:
that the contract does not express the true intention or
No, a summary judgment is permitted only if there is no agreement of the parties. The alleged failure to express the
genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving party is true intention between the parties in the DAs and SPAs is the
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A genuine issue very reason for GA's complaint for reformation. Due to the
means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of parties' conflicting factual positions, and considering that GA's
evidence, as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or main allegation is the alleged failure of the DAs and SPAs to
contrived, an issue that does not constitute a genuine issue for express the true agreement with Union Bank, it is clear that the
trial. The court can determine this on the basis of the trial court properly denied the move for a summary judgment.
pleadings, admissions, documents, affidavits, and/or counter- As aptly observed by the appellate court. Whether there was
affidavits submitted by the parties to the court. Where the mutual mistake on the part of GA and Union Bank is an issue
facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, that calls for the presentation of evidence. Since the facts are
proceedings for a summary judgment cannot take the place of in dispute, the RTC is not allowed to decide the case
a trial. For this to proceed in lieu of a full-blown trial, the party summarily. The contrasting allegations engender a cloud of
who moves for summary judgment has the burden of doubt as to the certainty of the facts as alleged. In such a case,
demonstrating clearly the absence of genuine issues of fact, or such doubt should be resolved against the grant of a motion
that the issue posed is patently insubstantial as to constitute a for summary judgment. Thus, it has been held that lower
genuine issue. courts, when faced with a motion for summary judgment,
should resolve doubts in favor of the party against whom it is
In this case, the SC concurs with the CA that there is nothing directed, giving such party the benefit of all favorable
capricious or whimsical in the RTC's Orders which determined inferences.
that summary judgment was not proper under the
circumstances of the case. In denying the Motion for Summary G.R. NO. 233850 July 01, 2019
Judgment, the RTC found that the pleadings submitted by the TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
parties clearly show conflicting allegations between them OF THE PHILIPPINES ALSO KNOWN AS PHILIPPINE
making the facts disputed. It ruled that GA failed to discharge EXPORT-IMPORT CREDIT AGENCY, petitioner, vs.
its burden of showing that there was no genuine issue to be PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, respondent.
tried. These ruling and findings by the trial court could not be
considered as tainted by grave abuse of discretion as they are PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45
sufficiently and properly supported by legal and factual bases.
In this case, GA alleges that the subject instruments must be FACTS: The instant case stems from a Complaint for Specific
reformed because mutual mistake by the parties prevented Performance filed before the RTC by PVB against petitioner

TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Judgment. Thereafter, TIDCORP filed its Comment (On
(TIDCORP). Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment).
In its Complaint, PVB alleged that on November 23, 2011, PVB, RTC: RTC issued the assailed Order GRANTING PVB's Motion
together with other banking institutions (Series A for Summary Judgment.
Noteholders), entered into a Five-Year Floating Rate Note
Facility Agreement (NFA) with debtor Philippine Phosphate It held that, as made manifest in the pleadings, supporting
Fertilizer Corporation (PhilPhos), up to the aggregate amount affidavits, and admissions on record, there was no genuine
of P5 billion. Under the NFA, PVB committed the amount of P1 issue as to any material fact posed by TIDCORP with respect to
billion. its liability under the Guarantee Agreement, except as to the
amount of damages. Thus, the RTC found that PVB was entitled
To secure payment of the Series A Notes, TIDCORP, with the to a judgment in its favor as a matter of law.
express conformity of PhilPhos, executed a Guarantee
Agreement whereby TIDCORP agreed to guarantee the TIDCORP directly filed the instant Petition before the Court
payment of the guaranty obligation to the extent of 90% of the under Rule 45, in relation to Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules
outstanding Series A Notes, including interest, on a rolling of Court. PVB filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that TIDCORP
successive three month period commencing on the first filed the wrong mode of appeal. The Court denied PVB's
drawdown date and ending on the maturity date of the Series Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit.
A Notes.
ISSUE: W/N THE RTC ERRED IN GRANTING RESPONDENT PVB'S
On November 8, 2013, Typhoon Yolanda made landfall in MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Central Visayas, which resulted in widespread devastation in
the province of Leyte where PhilPhos' manufacturing plant was HELD: NO.
situated. Due to the damage brought by said typhoon to An order or resolution granting a Motion for Summary
PhilPhos' manufacturing facilities, it failed to resume its Judgment which fully determines the rights and obligations of
operations. the parties relative to the case and leaves no other issue
unresolved, except the amount of damages, is a final
Thus, on September 17, 2015, PhilPhos filed a Petition for judgment.
Voluntary Rehabilitation under the Financial Rehabilitation
and Insolvency Act of 2010 (FRIA) before the RTC of Ormoc As explained in Ybiernas, et al. v. Tanco-Gabaldon, et al.,when
City. The RTC then issued a a court, in granting a Motion for Summary Judgment,
Commencement Order, which included a Stay Order. adjudicates on the merits of the case and declares categorically
what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which
On November 5, 2015, or 45 days as provided in the Guarantee party is in the right, such order or resolution takes the nature
Agreement, PVB filed its Notice of Claim with TIDCORP, which of a final order susceptible to appeal. In leaving out the
received the same on November 6, 2015. determination of the amount of damages, a summary
judgment is not removed from the category of final judgments.
In a Letter, TIDCORP declined to give due course to PVB's
Notice of Claim, invoking the Stay Order issued In the instant case, it is clear that the assailed Order discussed
by the RTC. Despite PVB’s several demands pursuant to the at length the applicable facts, the governing
Guarantee Agreement, TIDCORP maintained its position to law, and the arguments put forward by both parties, making
deny PVB's claim due to the issuance of the said Stay Order. an extensive assessment of the merits of PVB's
Complaint. The RTC then made a definitive adjudication in
In its Complaint, PVB asserted that "[t]o secure the payment of favor of PVB. As manifestly seen in the assailed Order, the RTC
the Series A Notes, TIDCORP, with the express conformity of categorically determined what the rights and obligations of the
PhilPhos, executed a Guarantee Agreement with the Series A parties are, ruling in no uncertain terms that PVB's Complaint
Noteholders (except CBC) x x x, whereby, among others, it: (a) was meritorious and that TIDCORP should be made liable
agreed to guarantee payment to the Series A Noteholders to under the Guarantee Agreement.
the extent of Ninety (90%) Percent of the Series A Notes and
interest; and (b) waived the benefit of excussion, x x x." Hence, PVB's argument in its Motion to Dismiss is
unmeritorious.
In its Answer with Counterclaim, TIDCORP argued that the RTC
cannot validly try the case because of the Stay Order, which The solitary matter to be dealt with by the Court is the
enjoined the enforcement of all claims, actions and propriety of the RTC's Order granting PVB's Motion for
proceedings against PhilPhos. PVB filed a Motion for Summary Summary Judgment. Summary judgment is a device for
weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the

litigation, thereby avoiding the expense and loss of time vehicle, and consequently entitled to its possession.
involved in a trial. Complainant points out that Claudio admits the sale of the
subject vehicle to defendant, and the same had been the
According to Sec. 1, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, a party object of several conveyances to third persons.
seeking to recover upon a claim may, at any time after the
pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with In addition, complainant avers that respondent judge delayed
supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary the release of the property despite a third-party claim thereon.
judgment in his/her favor. Apparently, respondent judge granted plaintiffs an extension
of time within which to post the required indemnity bond. As
According to Sec. 3 of the same Rule, the judgment sought shall such, the subject vehicle remained with the sheriff in excess of
be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, five-day period provided in Section 6, Rule 60 of the Rules of
depositions, and admissions on file, show that, except as to the Court. Thereafter, respondent judge, instead of ordering the
amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any return of the vehicle to the third-party claimant, issued an
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a order not only granting plaintiffs' motion for delivery of the
judgment as a matter of law. vehicle, but also setting aside an earlier order which required
plaintiffs to post an indemnity bond.
The term has been defined as an issue of fact which calls for On the second charge relating to Civil Case No. 4884,
the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue complainant alleges that respondent judge rendered a
which is sham, fictitious, contrived, set up in bad faith and Decision in violation of the constitutional mandate to state
patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based,
for trial. The court can determine this on the basis of the and Section 1, Rule
pleadings, admissions, documents, affidavits and/or counter- 36 of the Rules of Court echoing the same
affidavits submitted by the parties before the court. requisite. Complainant further charges that respondent judge
issued an order written in the English language, and in a
In assailing the RTC's decision granting the Motion for fashion that does not befit an RTC Judge which thereby
Summary Judgment, TIDCORP, in the main, asserts that PVB is demonstrates her incompetence and lack of diligence.
not entitled to judgment as a matter of law and that there are
genuine issues on material facts that necessitate trial on the Corollary to the proffered grounds for dismissal of the
merits, contrary to the findings of the RTC. complaint, respondent judge argues that complainant is not
the real party in interest in Civil Case No. 4971. She posits that
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition is the proper parties are the defendants-litigants whose interests
hereby DENIED. The Order dated August 16, 2017 rendered by were ostensibly aggrieved and prejudiced by the Order of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 150 in Civil Case Release of the vehicle in favor of the plaintiffs-applicants, and
No. R-MKT-16-02011-CV is AFFIRMED not the complainant who has no apparent authority to
institute the administrative complaint against her. Respondent
RULE 36 judge next contends that the issuance of the writ of replevin
was done in the discharge of her judicial functions which are
ATTY. UBALDINO A. LACUROM , complainant, vs. JUDGE presumed to have been regularly performed.
JUANITA C.
TIENZO, Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Cabanatuan City, Issue: WON the administrative complaint is the proper remedy
respondent.. to assail the legality of the respondent judge’s order (NO)
Ruling: The instant administrative complaint is not the proper

ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT remedy to assail the legality of respondent judge's order. In
this regard, we have previously held that where sufficient
DOCTRINE: Although not every judicial error signifies judicial remedies exist, the filing of an administrative
ignorance of the law which warrants administrative sanction, complaint is not the proper recourse to correct a judge's
this holds true only in instances of tolerable misjudgment. allegedly erroneous act.
Where, however, an elementary constitutional mandate is
violated, the blunder constitutes ignorance of the law. It is obvious that the decision rendered by respondent judge
failed to conform to this requirement. The cryptic decision
FACTS: simply referenced the appealed decision of the MTCC and
forthwith found the same as compliant with procedural due
According to complainant, respondent judge should have process under
desisted from issuing the writ as plaintiff Claudio in Civil Case the Rules of Summary Procedure. Nowhere in the decision
No. 4971 failed to prove that he is the owner of the subject does respondent judge make a statement of the facts which

led to the filing of the appeal. More importantly, the decision HELD:
does not contain respondent judge's factual findings, albeit
affirming those of the MTCC, from which she based her In denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss the RTC acted with
conclusions of law. Ineluctably, respondent judge transgressed grave abuse of discretion. In every case, the resolution shall
the constitutional directive. The transgression is compounded state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor.
by respondent judge's insistence that her decision conformed
to our ruling on memorandum decisions. While an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory
and non-appeallable, however, if the denial is without or in
Indeed, as a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake excess of jurisdiction, certiorari and prohibition are proper
committed by judges in the performance of their official duties remedies from such order of denial. In Time, Inc. v. Reyes, this
renders them administratively liable. In the absence of fraud, Court, speaking through Justice J.B. L. Reyes, held: The motion
dishonesty or deliberate intent to do an injustice, acts done in to dismiss was predicated on the respondent court’s lack of
their official capacity, even though erroneous, do not always jurisdiction to entertain the action; and the rulings of this Court
constitute misconduct. Although not every judicial error are that writs of certiorari or prohibition, or both, may issue in
signifies ignorance of the law which warrants administrative case of a denial or deferment of an action or on the basis of a
sanction, this holds true only in instances of tolerable motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Verily, the writ of
misjudgment. Where, however, an elementary constitutional certiorari is granted to keep an inferior court within the bounds
mandate is violated, the blunder constitutes ignorance of the of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave
law. abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
G.R. No. 154282 April 7, 2006 JULIE S. SUMBILLA, PETITIONER, VS. MATRIX FINANCE
CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.
VANGIE BARRAZONA, Petitioner, G.R. No. 197582, June 29, 2015, Villarama Jr.
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 61, BAGUIO CITY and
SAN-AN REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
herein represented by RODRIGO CHUA TIU, Respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner obtained a cash loan from respondent
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 Matrix Finance Corporation. petitioner issued Philippine
Business Bank Check with a uniform face value of P6,667.00
DOCTRINE: A trial court should state in its order the reasons for each. Upon maturity, the six checks were presented by
the dismissal of the complaint so that when the order is respondent to the drawee bank for payment. However, all the
appealed, the appellate court can readily determine from a checks were dishonored on the ground that they were drawn
casual perusal thereof whether there is a prima facie against a closed account.
justification for the dismissal.
Petitioner's refusal to heed the demand letter of respondent
FACTS: for the payment of the face value of the dishonored checks
culminated in her indictment for six counts of violation of Batas
Respondent owns a building which petitioner has been Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22).
leasing.
The MeTC found petitioner criminally and civilly liable for the
Petitioner defaulted and failed despite demand in the payment issuance of the six rubber checks. For each count of violation
of the monthly rentals. Thus, respondent filed with the RTC a of BP 22 involving a check with a face value of P6,667.00, the
Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money with Damages. MeTC meted petitioner a penalty of fine amounting to
P80,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment. Her civil liability for
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that it is the the six consolidated cases was computed in the total amount
MTC that should have jurisdiction over the complaint of P40,002.00.
considering that the action is one for ejectment (illegal
detainer). The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss for lack of Instead of filing a Notice of Appeal, petitioner opted to file a
merit. Motion for Reconsideration before the MeTC. The Motion was
denied being a pleading barred under the Revised Rules on
ISSUE: Summary Procedure.
Whether or not the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion Subsequently, the Notice of Appeal filed by petitioner was also
when it denied the motion to dismiss denied for having been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary
period.

to the latter, as specifically mandated under Section 2, Rule 1
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the of the Rules of Court.
Rules which was raffled to Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
City. Consequently, final and executory judgments were reversed
when the interest of substantial justice is at stake and where
Ruling that the MeTC did not act with grave abuse of discretion special and compelling reasons called for such actions.
in denying the Notice of Appeal filed by petitioner, the RTC
dismissed. In Barnes v. Judge Padilla, the court declared as follows: x x x a
final and executory judgment can no longer be attacked by any
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the
petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. The CA, highest court of the land. However, the Court has relaxed this
however, ruled that an ordinary appeal under Section 2 (a), rule in order to serve substantial justice considering (a)
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court is the correct remedy under the matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence of
circumstances because the RTC rendered the decision in the special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
exercise of its original jurisdiction. negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the
rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is
ISSUE: whether or not the penalty imposed in the MeTC merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not
Decision dated January 14, 2009, which is already final and be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
executory, may still be modified.
Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools
RULING: YES. The petition is meritorious. Petitioner does not designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and
dispute the finality of the Decision. Petitioner asserted that the rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend
maximum penalty of fine that can be imposed against her in to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must
each count of violation of BP 22 is double the amount of the always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflects this
face value of the dishonored check only or P13,334.00. The fine principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be
of P80,000.00 for each count is thus excessive. She further so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this
implied that the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment Court itself had already declared to be final.
contravened Section 20 of Article III of the Constitution which
proscribes imprisonment as a punishment for not paying a ON THE ISSUE THAT SUBSIDIARY PENALTY CANNOT BE
debt. Indubitably, the MeTC meted the petitioner a penalty of IMPOSED AS TO RUN COUNTER THE CONSTITUTION: The clear
fine way beyond the maximum limits prescribed under Section tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is
1 of BP 22. The fine of P80,000.00 is more than 11 times the not to remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to
amount of the face value of each check that was dishonored. lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties
Instead of using as basis the face value of each check provided for in B.P. Big. 22. The pursuit of this purpose clearly
(P6,667.00), the MeTC incorrectly computed the amount of does not foreclose the possibility of imprisonment for violators
fine using the total face value of the six checks (P40,002.00). of B.P. Big. 22. Neither does it defeat the legislative intent
Unfortunately, in the present case, the MeTC Decision is behind the law. Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000
already final and executory after petitioner failed to timely file establishes a rule of preference in the application of the penal
a Notice of Appeal. Under the doctrine of finality and provisions of B.P. Big. 22 such that where the circumstances
immutability of judgments, a decision that has acquired finality of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good
becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the more
correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law, and whether it appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the determination of
will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest whether the circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine
court of the land. Upon finality of the judgment, the Court alone rests solely upon the Judge. Should the Judge decide that
loses its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty, Administrative
Circular No. 122000 ought not be deemed a hindrance.
Nonetheless, the immutability of final judgments is not a
hard and fast rule. The Court has the power and prerogative In sum, we find the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the
to suspend its own rules and to exempt a case from their police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional
operation if and when justice requires it. After all, procedural inhibition against imprisonment for debt.
rules were conceived to aid the attainment of justice. If a
stringent application of the rules would hinder rather than DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
serve the demands of substantial justice, the former must yield In the interest of justice, the Decision dated January 14, 2009

of Branch 67, Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City in sold by Delfino to SM Prime Holdings will form part of the 5-
Criminal Case Nos. 321169 to 321174 is MODIFIED. hectares.
Accused Julie S. Sumbilla is hereby found GUILTY beyond ISSUE:

reasonable doubt of six counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Whether or not the clarification of the new Secretary violated
Blg. 22, and is sentenced to pay a FINE of THIRTEEN THOUSAND the rule on immutability of final judgments.
AND THREE HUNDRED THIRTY-FOUR PESOS (P13,334.00) for
each count, and to indemnify private complainant Matrix HELD:
Finance Corporation the total amount of P40,002.00 plus 6% NO. A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable
interest per annum from September 21, 2002 until full and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect.
payment. This doctrine is grounded on the fundamental considerations
of public policy and sound practice to the effect that the
Renato L. Delfino, Sr. (Deceased), Represented by his judgments of the courts must become final at some definite
Heirs, namely: Gracia Delfino, Gregorio A. Delfino, Ma. date set by law.
Isabel A. Delfino, Renato A. Delfino, Jr., Ma. Regina Delfino
Rosella, Ma. Gracia A. Delfino, Mariano A. Delfino, Ma. However, this general rule is subject the following exceptions:
Luisa Delfino Gregorio, and Rev. Fr. Gabriel A. Delfino, v. 1. Correction of clerical errors;
Avelino K. Anasao and Angel K. Anasao (Deceased and 2. Nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any
represented by his sole heir, Sixto C. Anasao) party;
G.R. No. 197486 ; September 10, 2014 3. Void judgments; and
4. Whenever circumstances transpire after the finality
of the decision rendering its execution unjust and
FACTS: inequitable.
In 1975, the tenanted portion of rice lands owned by Delfino,
being tilled by respondents, was placed under Operation Land The clarification made by the new Secretary falls under the
Transfer (OLT) pursuant to PD. 27. After full payments of the fourth exception.
amortizations, the farmer-beneficiaries were issued
Emancipation Patents. Delfino “cannot be allowed to simultaneously enjoy the
proceeds of the sale and at the same time exercise the right of
In 1992, Delfino filed an Application for Retention over the retention” to the maximum of five hectares of land The
entire riceland property. The DAR Regional Office Director clarification on the new Secretary was done in order not to
denied the retention of the entire property, and granted only circumvent the limit on the five-hectare retained land.
the part which was not covered by the OLT.
Since the sale of the two-hectares of land to SM Prime Holdings
The DAR Secretary, upon appeal of Delfino, issued an Order was done without clearance from DAR, the Secretary found it
granting a maximum of five hectares as his retained area. fair and equitable to include the said portion to Delfino’s
retention area.
By way of motion for intervention, the respondents argued
that the implementation of the order will have the effect of With respect to the remaining three-hectares of retained land,
cancelling the Emancipation Patents, and deprive them of the petitioners, heirs of Delfino are allowed to choose the
ownership of the lands they acquired under PD. 27. portions of landholdings.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for being

insufficient in form and substance. Entry of Judgment was G.R. No. 168406 January 14, 2015
issued by the CA on the case.
CLUB FILIPINO, INC. and ATTY. ROBERTO F. DE LEON,
Delfino filed a petition with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Petitioners, vs. BENJAMIN BAUTISTA, RONIE SUALOG,
Adjudicator (PARAD) for the cancellation of the EPs issued to JOEL CALIDA, JOHNNY ARINTO, CARLITO PRESENTACION,
the respondents on the basis of the DAR Secretary order and ROBERTO DE GUZMAN, Respondents.
granting him five-hectares of retained area - The petition of
Delfino is granted. Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution
The respondents filed a petition to annul and/or cancel the DOCTRINE

DAR Secretary’s Order, but this was denied by the new
secretary. However, the new DAR Secretary clarified the extent “It is immaterial that the Entry of Judgment was made without
of the five-hectare land. Two hectares of ricelands which were the Court having first resolved P&G’s second motion for

reconsideration. This is because the issuance of the entry of Thus, for the court to entertain second MRs, the second
judgment is reckoned from the time the parties received a copy motions must present extraordinary persuasive reasons and
of the resolution denying the first motion for only upon express leave first obtained. Once leave to file is
reconsideration. The filing by P&G of several pleadings after granted, the second Motion for Reconsideration is no longer
receipt of the resolution denying its first motion for prohibited.
reconsideration does not in any way bar the finality or entry of
judgment. Besides, to reckon the finality of a judgment from Despite granting petitioner’s motion for leave to file the
receipt of the denial of the second motion for reconsideration Supplemental MR, this did not prevent the court’s resolution
would be absurd. First, the Rules of Court and the Internal from becoming final and executory. A grant of leave to file the
Rules of the Supreme Court prohibit the filing of a second second MR does not toll this 15-day period. It only means that
motion for reconsideration. Second, some crafty litigants may the Entry of Judgment first issued may be lifted should the
resort to filing prohibited pleadings just to delay entry of second MR be granted.
judgment.”
In Aliviado v. Procter and Gamble Philippines, Inc., the Court
FACTS held that:
CLUFEA is a union representing the employees of petitioner. “It is immaterial that the Entry of Judgment was made without
During CBA negotiations, the union and petitioner reached a the Court having first resolved P&G’s second motion for
deadlock. CLUFEA thus filed with the NCMB a Notice of Strike reconsideration. This is because the issuance of the entry of
on the ground of bargaining deadlock. Subsequently, Club judgment is reckoned from the time the parties received a
Filipino, Inc. submitted its counter-proposals. However, copy of the resolution denying the first motion for
CLUFEA still proceeded to conduct a strike vote, with the reconsideration. The filing by P&G of several pleadings after
majority of the total union membership voting to strike, and receipt of the resolution denying its first motion for
later followed through by staging the strike. Petitioner thus reconsideration does not in any way bar the finality or entry of
filed before the NLRC a petition to declare the strike illegal. The judgment. Besides, to reckon the finality of a judgment from
Labor Arbiter declared the strike illegal, considering as a receipt of the denial of the second motion for reconsideration
ground the failure to attach the counter-proposals of would be absurd. First, the Rules of Court and the Internal
petitioner. Rules of the Supreme Court prohibit the filing of a second
motion for reconsideration. Second, some crafty litigants may
Later on, respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari before the resort to filing prohibited pleadings just to delay entry of
CA. The CA held that the LA gravely abused its discretion. The judgment.”
CA also ordered the reinstatement of the concerned
employees. The case already being final and executory, after the lapse of
the 15th day from petitioner’s receipt of the Resolution denying
When the case reached the SC, the SC affirmed the CA’s its first MR, Entry of Judgment was already in order.
decision. The SC denied the MR (Sept. 9, 2009), but a
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration was later filed by G.R. No. 184295 July 30, 2014
Limpingco and Fajardo. Therefore, petitioner also filed a
motion for leave to file and admit further pleading/motion. NATIONAL TRANSMISSION CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.
The SC granted the motions. ALPHAOMEGA INTEGRATED CORPORATION, Respondent.
However, because of the Court’s Resolution dated Sept. 9, Facts

2009, an Entry of Judgment was already made declaring that AIC, a duly licensed transmission line contractor, participated
the case had become final and executory as of Oct. 26, 2009. in the public biddings conducted by TRANSCO and was
awarded six ( 6) government construction projects. In the
ISSUE course of the performance of the contracts, AIC encountered
difficulties and incurred losses allegedly due to TRANSCO’s
• Whether or not petitioner’s filing of the Supplemental MR breach of their contracts, prompting it to surrender the
prevented the SC’s Initial Resolution from becoming final projects to TRANSCO under protest. AIC submitted a request
and executory. (NO) for arbitration before the CIAC on August 28, 2006, and,
thereafter, filed an Amended Complaint against TRANSCO
RULING
alleging that the latter breached the contracts.
The filing of the Supplemental MR did not prevent this court’s
Resolution from becoming final and executory. On April 18, 2007, the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal rendered its Final
Award ordering the payment of actual and compensatory
As a general rule, the filing of second Motions for damages which AIC would not have suffered had it not been
Reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution is prohibited.
for the project delays attributable to TRANSCO. TOTAL: (9) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation
₱17,495,117.44 of the specific evidence on which they are based; and
(10) when the findings of fact of the [CA] are premised on the
Unconvinced, TRANSCO instituted a petition for review with absence of evidence but such findings are contradicted by the
the CA. evidence on record. (G.R. No. 109849, February 26, 1997, 268
SCRA 703, 709)
CA: Affirmed the Arbitral Tribunal’s factual findings that
TRANSCO failed to exercise due diligence in resolving the Significantly, jurisprudence teaches that mathematical
problems regarding the right-of-way and the lack of materials computations as well as the propriety of the arbitral awards
before undertaking the bidding process and entering into the are factual determinations. In any case, the Court finds no
contracts with AIC. The CA upheld the Arbitral Tribunal’s Final reason to disturb the factual findings of the CIAC Arbitral
Award as having been sufficiently established by evidence but Tribunal on the matter of AIC’s entitlement to damages which
modified the total amount of the award after noting a the CA affirmed as being well supported by evidence and
supposed mathematical error in the computation. properly referred to in the record. It is well-settled that
findings of fact of quasijudicial bodies, which have acquired
ISSUE: expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific
Whether TRANSCO can seek a petition for recalibration of the matters, are generally accorded not only respect, but also
evidence presented before the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal. finality, especially when affirmed by the CA. The CIAC
(insisting that AIC is not entitled to any damages not only possesses that required expertise in the field of construction
because it had previously waived all claims for standby fees in arbitration and the factual findings of its construction
case of project delays but had eventually failed to perform the arbitrators are final and conclusive, not reviewable by this
workable portions of the projects.) Court on appeal.
RULING:
NO. Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that a G.R. No. 247345 July 6, 2020
petition for review on certiorari under the said rule, as in this
case, "shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly FILIPINA D. ABUTIN, Petitioner, vs. JOSEPHINE SAN JUAN,
set forth." Thus, absent any of the existing exceptions Respondent.
impelling the contrary, the Court is, as a general rule,
precluded from delving on factual determinations, as what
TRANSCO essentially seeks in this case. Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
The rule, however, precluding the Court from delving on the DOCTRINE: A judgment can no longer be disturbed, altered, or
factual determinations of the CA, admits of several exceptions. modified as soon as it becomes final and executory; "nothing
In Fuentes v. Court of Appeals, we held that the findings of is more settled in law." Once a case is decided with finality, the
facts of the CA, which are generally deemed conclusive, may controversy is settled and the matter is laid to rest.
admit review by the Court in any of the following instances, Accordingly, a final judgment may no longer be modified in any
among others: respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is
perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and
(1) when the factual findings of the [CA] and the trial court are regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be
contradictory; made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the
(2) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, land.
surmises, or conjectures;
(3) when the inference made bythe [CA] from its findings of FACTS: Corazon who had been in a same-sex relationship with
fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; Purita passed away without any surviving ascendants or
(4) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation descendants leaving behind a lot on which a residential house
of facts; was constructed. The two lived on this house for 48 years,
along with Purita's daughter, Filipina.
(5) when the [CA], in making its findings, goes beyond the
issues of the case, and such findings are contrary to the Purita and Filipina filed before the RTC of Manila, a Petition for
admissions of both appellant and appellee; the probate of 3 holographic wills executed and left by
(6) when the judgment of the [CA] is premised on a Corazon. Corazon's sister, Julita, and Corazon's niece,
misapprehension of facts; respondent Josephine, filed an Opposition to the Petition for
(7) when the [CA] fails to notice certain relevant facts which, if Probate.
properly considered, will justify a different conclusion;
(8) when the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;

During trial, three (3) witnesses authenticated Corazon's because Josephine opposed it. This Opposition was
handwriting and signature. accompanied by Filipina's Motion to Admit Record on Appeal.
In an Order dated December 28, 2015, RTC admitted to RTC: DENIED Filipina's Motion to Admit Record on Appeal, and
probate the wills and both parties were served copies of this dismissed her appeal for failing to include the record on
Order by registered mail. appeal.
Purita and Filipina, realizing that the Order should have CA: DISMISSED Filipina's Rule 65 Petition
attained finality as there was no Motion for Reconsideration
filed in the interim, inquired, through a representative, with ISSUE: WON the RTC Order has already attained finality
the RTC on when Atty. Ginete received a copy of the Order.
Subsequently, Purita and Filipina obtained a Certification from HELD: YES. The 15-day period for respondent and her mother
the Office of the Postmaster that the copy for Julita and to file a motion for reconsideration should be reckoned from
Josephine were received on behalf of Atty. Ginete by a certain February 9, 2016, when respondent's counsel, Atty. Ginete,
Capuno on February 9, 2016. received a copy of the Order through his representative,
Capuno. As no motion for reconsideration was filed on
On April 6, 2016, Atty. Ginete filed a Manifestation with respondent and her mother's behalf until April 12, 2016, the
Motion to withdraw appearance disavowing the receipt of the December 28, 2015 Order had lapsed into finality. In
copy of the Order and explained that he only found out about accordance with Rule 36, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
it when informed by Josephine. Moreover, that he was Procedure, unless a Motion for Reconsideration is timely filed,
withdrawing his appearance because he was running as mayor. the judgment or final order from which it arose shall become
final.
Convinced that the Order had attained finality, Purita and
Filipina filed a Motion for Entry of Judgment and Writ of Gatmaytan v. Dolor extensively discussed finality of judgments
Execution on April 7, 2016. Even as this Motion was pending, and final orders in relation to the timely filing of motions for
on April 12, 2016, Julita and Josephine, through their new reconsideration:
counsel, Atty. Mibolos filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
A judgment can no longer be disturbed, altered, or modified as
Purita and Filipina filed a Motion to Stricken-Out the Motion soon as it becomes final and executory; "nothing is more
for Reconsideration insisting that the Order had attained settled in law." Once a case is decided with finality, the
finality. They filed their Opposition to the Motion for controversy is settled and the matter is laid to rest.
Reconsideration attaching "several registry return receipts of Accordingly, a final judgment may no longer be modified in any
service of pleadings addressed to Atty. Ginete, but were respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is
actually received for him by Capuno, his driver." perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and
regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be
At around this point, Julita passed away. made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the
land.
Josephine filed a Reply to Purita and Filipina's Opposition
attaching Atty. Ginete's Affidavit insisting that Capuno was not Once a judgment becomes final, the court or tribunal loses
authorized to receive mail for him and that he himself "used to jurisdiction, and any modified judgment that it issues, as well
get mail matters from the mail box." as all proceedings taken for this purpose are null and void.
Purita and Filipina filed their Rejoinder. Sometime after this, This elementary rule finds basis in "public policy and sound
Purita passed away. practice that at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of
courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become
RTC: DENIED probate to the wills. final at some definite date fixed by law." Basic rationality
dictates that there must be an end to litigation. Any contrary
Filipina filed her Notice of Appeal while Josephine filed a posturing renders justice inutile, reducing to futility the
Manifestation with Motion asking that Filipina's Notice of winning party's capacity to benefit from the resolution of a
Appeal be dismissed as it was unaccompanied by the record on case.
appeal.
It is damaging enough for respondent's case that the Motion
Filipina filed her Opposition explaining that she was unable to for Reconsideration was long-delayed and not filed until April
furnish the record on appeal because the RTC Clerk of Court 12, 2016. To make matters worse, it was only filed after
told her that the completion of the records was "stopped" petitioner and her mother filed a Motion for Entry of Judgment
and Writ of Execution on April 7, 2016. This raises doubts on

whether respondent and Atty. Ginete's replacement acted out incorporated. When said incorporation came to the knowledge
of bona fide intent to file a motion for reconsideration at the of the affected employees, they all filed 63 separate
soonest time possible, or were merely impelled to act by the complaints against Aris for illegal dismissal. Essentially, the
Motion for Entry of Judgment and Writ of Execution. In any complainants insisted that FAPI was organized by the
case, even if this doubt were to be resolved in their favor, it management of Aris to continue the same business of Aris,
remains that a long time had passed before February 9, 2016, thereby intending to defeat their right to security of tenure.
enough for the December 28, 2015 Order to attain finality. This They likewise impleaded in their subsequent pleadings that
is precisely why petitioner and her mother sought the SLC and SLP are the major stockholders of FAPI, and Cruz as
execution of the Order. Vice-President and Director of Aris. Aris countered that it had
complied with all the legal requirements for a valid closure of
Unfortunately for respondent, Atty. Ginete's withdrawal and business operations; that it is not, in any way, connected with
disavowal, and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration FAPI, which is a separate and distinct corporation; that the
were too late. She had already become bound by her counsel's contracts of Aris with its contractors were already terminated;
negligence and all its consequences. It is not only improper, and that there is no truth to the claim that its export quota
but outright unethical-a grave abuse of discretion-for courts to with Garments and Textile Export Board was transferred to
facilitate remedies that have been foregone by a counsel's FAPI because the export quota is non- transferable.
negligence.
The labor arbiter ruled in favour of Macatlang finding the
dismissal illegal. Petitioner Corporations filed a NOTICE OF
G.R. No. 180147 June 4, 2014 APPEAL with Motion to Reduce Appeal Bond and To Admit
Reduced Amount with the NLRC to reduce the appeal bond to
SARA LEE PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner, vs. EMILINDA D. ₱1 Million each on the grounds that it is impossible for any
MACATLANG, ET AL., Respondents. insurance company to cover such huge amount; in requiring
them to post in full the appeal bond would be tantamount to
denying them their right to appeal. The Corporations posted a
total of ₱4.5 Million. Upon appeal to the NLRC, Motion for
DOCTRINE: Forum shopping exists when the elements of litis Reduction of the appeal bond is granted. In light of the
pendentia are present, and when a final judgment in one case impossibility for any surety company to cover the appeal bond
will amount to res judicata in the other. and the huge economic losses which the companies and their
employees might suffer if the ₱3.45 Billion bond is sustained,
FACTS: the NLRC granted the reduction of the appeal bond. The Court
directed the Corporations to post an additional ₱4.5 Million
There are 6 consolidated petitions for review on certiorari bond, bringing the total posted bond to ₱9 Million. CA reversed
pertaining to the P3.45 Billion appeal bond, which, as the decision of the NLRC, It deemed it reasonable under the
mandated by Art. 233 of the Labor Code, is equivalent to the circumstances of the case to order the posting of an additional
monetary award adjudged by the labor arbiter in the cases. appeal bond of P1Billion.
The first 5 petitions seek a relaxation of the rule while the last
urges its strict interpretation. Petitioners in 5 cases are the ISSUE:
following (They shall be collectively referred to as the
Corporations; (a) Sara Lee Philippines Inc (SLPI), (b) Aris Whether or not the filing of 2 petitions for certiorari
Philippines Inc (Aris); (c) Fashion Accessories Philippines Inc constitutes forum shopping?
(FAPI); (d) Sara Lee Corporation (SLC), and (e) Atty. Cesar Cruz.
One petition was filed by respondent Emilinda Macatlang and HELD:
5,983 other former employees of Aris. Macatlang allegedly YES. The Corporations claim that the group of Macatlang
represents the employees whose employment was terminated committed forum shopping by filing two petitions before the
upon the closure of Aris. This controversy stemmed from a Court of Appeals.Forum shopping exists when the elements of
Notice of Permanent Closure filed by with the DOLE stating litis pendentia are present, and when a final judgment in one
that it will permanently cease its operations. All employees of case will amount to res judicatain the other. For litis pendentia
Aris were duly informed. to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, there must be: (a)
identity of the parties or at least such as to represent the same
Aris Philippines Workers Confederation of Filipino Workers
interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief
(Union), which represents 5,984 rank-and-file employees of
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same acts; and (c)
Aris, staged a strike. After conciliation, the parties entered into
the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment
an agreement whereby Aris undertook to pay its employees
which may be rendered in one would, regardless of which
the benefits which accrued by virtue of the company’s closure,
party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other
which settlement amounted to ₱419 Million and an additional
₱15 Million Benevolent Fund to the Union. FAPI was
reached ₱4,400,000.00. Initially, Goroza was able to pay his
credit purchases with SMC. However, Goroza started to
The Macatlang petition was filed on 8 September 2006 while become delinquent with his accounts. Demands to pay the
the Abelardo petition was filed 10 days later, or on 18 amount of ₱3,722,440.88 were made by SMC against Goroza
September 2006. The Macatlang petition consists of 5,984 and PNB, but neither of them paid. Thus, SMC filed a Complaint
dismissed employees of Aris while the Abelardo petition has for collection of sum of money against PNB and Goroza.
411 dismissed employees, all of which were already included
as petitioners in the Macatlang petition. Clearly, the After summons, petitioner filed its Answer, while Goroza did
petitioners in the Abelardo petition committed forum not. Goroza was declared in default. Trial ensued insofar as
shopping. Goroza was concerned and respondent presented its evidence
ex parte against the former. Respondent made a formal offer
Now, should the act of these 411 employees prejudice the of its exhibits and the trial court admitted them. Thereafter,
rights of the 5,573 other complainants in the Macatlang pre-trial between PNB and SMC was held.
petition? The answer is no. Forum shopping happens when
there is identity of the parties or at least such as to represent RTC rendered a Decision in favor of plaintiff [SMC] ordering
the same interest in both actions. We do not agree that the defendant Rodolfo Goroza to pay plaintiff the following: 1. The
411 petitioners of the Abelardo petition are representative of principal amount of ₱3,722,440.00; 2. The interest of 12% per
the interest of all petitioners in Macatlang petition. First, the annum on the principal amount reckoned from January 27,
number is barely sufficient to comprise the majority of 1998 up to the time of execution of the Judgment of this case;
petitioners in Macatlang petition. Second, it would be the 3. Attorney's fees of ₱30,000.00; 4. Litigation expenses of
height of injustice to dismiss the Macatlang petition which ₱20,000.00.
evidently enjoys the support of an overwhelming majority due
to the mistake committed by petitioners in the Abelardo Goroza filed a Notice of Appeal, while SMC filed a Motion for
petition. In the absence of substantial similarity between the Reconsideration. The RTC granted SMC's motion for
parties in Macatlang and Abelardo petitions, we find that the reconsideration. The trial court amended its Decision by
petitioners in Macatlang petition did not commit forum increasing the award of litigation expenses to ₱90,652.50.11.
shopping. This view was implicitly shared by the Thirteenth Thereafter, the RTC issued an Order: “Finding the Notice of
Division of the Court of Appeals when it did not bother to Appeal filed within the reglementary period and the
address the issue of forum shopping raised by petitioners corresponding appeal fee paid. The same is hereby given due
therein precisely because at the time it rendered the assailed course. Considering that the case as against defendant PNB is
decision, the Abelardo petition had already been summarily still on-going, let the Record in this case insofar as defendant
dismissed. Rodolfo R. Goroza is concerned, be reproduced at the expense
of defendant-appellant so that the same can be forwarded to
G.R. No. 186063 January 15, 2014
the Court of Appeals, together with the exhibits and transcript
of stenographic notes in the required number of copies.”
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner, vs. SAN MIGUEL
CORPORATION, Respondent.
In the meantime, trial continued with respect to PNB. PNB filed
an Urgent Motion to Terminate Proceedings on the ground
Petition for review on certiorari.
that a decision was already rendered on May 10, 2005 finding
Goroza solely liable. The RTC denied PNB's motion.
Facts: SMC entered into an Exclusive Dealership Agreement
with Goroza wherein the latter was given by SMC the right to
The RTC issued a Supplemental Judgment, thus: “The Court
trade, deal, market or otherwise sell its various beer products.
omitted by inadvertence to insert in its decision dated May 10,
2005 the phrase "without prejudice to the decision that will be
Goroza applied for a credit line with SMC, but one of the
made against the other co-defendant, PNB, which was not
requirements for the credit line was a letter of credit. Thus,
declared in default." WHEREFORE, the phrase "without
Goroza applied for and was granted a letter of credit by the
prejudice to the decision made against the other defendant
PNB in the amount of ₱2,000,000.00. Under the credit
PNB which was not declared in default" shall be inserted in the
agreement, the PNB has the obligation to release the proceeds
dispositive portion of said decision.”
of Goroza's credit line to SMC upon presentation of the
invoices and official receipts of Goroza's purchases of SMC
On even date, the RTC also issued an Amended Order, to wit:
beer products to the PNB, Butuan Branch. Goroza availed of his
“The Court's Order dated July 25, 2005 is hereby amended to
credit line with PNB and started selling SMC's beer products.
include the phrase "this appeal applies only to defendant
Rolando Goroza and without prejudice to the continuance of
Goroza applied for an additional credit line with the PNB, and
the hearing on the other defendant Philippine National
was granted 1 year revolving credit line in the amount not
Bank".”
exceeding 2,400,000.00. Thus, Goroza's total credit line
the RTC finding him liable, will not prevent the continuation of
PNB then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above- the ongoing trial between SMC and PNB. The RTC retains
quoted Supplemental Judgment and Amended Order, but the jurisdiction insofar as PNB is concerned, because the appeal
RTC denied the said motion via its Resolution. Aggrieved, PNB made by Goroza was only with respect to his own liability. In
filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA imputing fact, PNB itself, in its Reply to respondent's Comment,
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC for having admitted that the May 10, 2005 judgment of the RTC was
issued its July 6, 2006 Resolution. The CA rendered its "decided solely against defendant Rodolfo Goroza."
questioned Decision denying the petition and affirming the
assailed Resolution of the RTC. PNB filed a Motion for The propriety of a several judgment is borne by the fact that
Reconsideration, but the CA denied it in its assailed Resolution. SMC's cause of action against PNB stems from the latter's
Hence, the instant petition. alleged liability under the letters of credit which it issued. On
the other hand, SMC's cause of action against Goroza is the
Issue/s: latter's failure to pay his obligation to the former. As to the
1. WON CA erred in holding that the RTC was correct in separate judgment, PNB has a counterclaim against SMC which
rendering its Supplemental Judgment and Amended Order is yet to be resolved by the RTC.
despite the perfection of Goroza's appeal. (NO)
Indeed, the issues between SMC and PNB which are to be
2. WON CA erred in ruling that proceedings against it may resolved by the RTC, as contained in the trial court's Pre-Trial
continue in the RTC, despite the trial court's complete Order dated January 21, 2005, were not addressed by the RTC
adjudication of relief in favor of SMC. (NO) in its Decision rendered against Goroza. In particular, the RTC
judgment against Goroza did not make any determination as
PNB’s contention: PNB claims that when Goroza's appeal was to whether or not PNB is liable under the letter of credit it
perfected, the RTC lost jurisdiction over the entire case making issued and, if so, up to what extent is its liability. In fact,
the assailed Supplemental Judgment and Amended Order void contrary to PNB's claim, there is nothing in the RTC judgment
for having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction. which ruled that Goroza is "solely liable" to pay the amount
which SMC seeks to recover.
PNB avers that the May 10, 2005 Decision of the RTC, finding
Goroza solely liable to pay the entire amount sought to be In a letter of credit transaction, such as in this case, where the
recovered by SMC, has settled the obligation of both Goroza credit is stipulated as irrevocable, there is a definite
and PNB, and that there is no longer any ground to hold PNB undertaking by the issuing bank to pay the beneficiary
for trial and make a separate judgment against it; otherwise, provided that the stipulated documents are presented and the
SMC will recover twice for the same cause of action. conditions of the credit are complied with. Precisely, the
independence principle liberates the issuing bank from the
Held: The petition lacks merit. duty of ascertaining compliance by the parties in the main
It is clear from the proceedings held before and the orders contract. As the principle's nomenclature clearly suggests, the
issued by the RTC that the intention of the trial court is to obligation under the letter of credit is independent of the
conduct separate proceedings to determine the respective related and originating contract. In brief, the letter of credit is
liabilities of Goroza and PNB, and thereafter, to render several separate and distinct from the underlying transaction. In other
and separate judgments for or against them. While ideally, it words, PNB cannot evade responsibility on the sole ground
would have been more prudent for the trial court to render a that the RTC judgment found Goroza liable and ordered him to
single decision with respect to Goroza and PNB, the procedure pay the amount sought to be recovered by SMC. PNB's liability,
adopted the RTC is, nonetheless, allowed under Section 4, Rule if any, under the letter of credit is yet to be determined.
36 of the Rules of Court, which provides that "in an action
against several defendants, the court may, when a several WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of
judgment is proper, render judgment against one or more of the Court of Appeals, dated June 17, 2008, and its Resolution
them, leaving the action to proceed against the others." In dated December 15, 2008, both in CA-G.R. SP No. 01249-MIN,
addition, Section 5 of the same Rule states that "when more are AFFIRMED.
than one claim for relief is presented in an action, the court at SO ORDERED.
any stage, upon a determination of the issues material to a
particular claim and all counterclaims arising out of the RULE 37
transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the
claim may render a separate judgment disposing of such
claim." Further, the same provision provides that "the ABE INDUSTRIES, INC., TEOFILO SEE, TIRSO AMPEN SE
judgment shall terminate the action with respect to the claim KING FU, ANTONIO SEE, SUSAN SY, SY CHIN KIONG,
so disposed of and the action shall proceed as to the remaining AURELIANO SEE AND CLAUDIO SEE, petitioners vs.
claims." Thus, the appeal of Goroza, assailing the judgment of HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RAMON AM. TORRES, IN

HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BR. VI OF THE R.T.C. motion for execution pending appeal which was filed on
OF CEBU, ERLINDA LEONARDO, AS ADMINISTRATRIX, ETC., November 19, 1985 was therefore filed on time. Had she filed
ET AL., respondents. the motion on November 22, 1985 it would have been filed
late.
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 G.R. No. L-45885 April 28, 1983
JULIAN MENDOZA, petitioner,

FACTS:
vs.
HON. CRISPIN V. BAUTISTA, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF
Private respondent as administratrix of the estate of her
FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN, BRANCH III, and SPOUSES
deceased husband, Victoriano See Leonardo, filed a complaint
RENATO MACAPAGAL and CORAZON MACAPAGAL,
for recovery of property against petitioners herein before
respondents
RTC Cebu. After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered
judgment on October 29, 1985 in favor of plaintiff. Defendants
filed a notice of appeal, and on November 25, 1985 the trial
court gave due course to the appeal and ordered the elevation
of the records to the appellate court.
DOCTRINE: An affidavit of merit is required in a motion for new
trial pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 37 if the motion for new trial
Plaintiff filed with the trial court a motion for partial execution
is based on any of the causes mentioned in subdivision (a) of
of the decision pending appeal. This was opposed by the
Section I of Rule 37, to wit, fraud, accident, mistake or
defendants on the ground that the appeal had been perfected
excusable negligence. No similar requirement is imposed for a
and the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the case.
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration under
subdivision (c) of the same section.
RTC issued a special order granting the partial execution of the
decision pending appeal.
FACTS: Petitioner and spouses Macapagal, entered into a
"Kasunduan Sa Pagpapatayo Ng Tirahang Bahay" whereby
CA sustained the lower court’s decision. Citing Rule 23 of the
petitioner undertook to construct a residential house for the
Interim or Transitional Rules and Guidelines relative to the
spouses.
implementation of Batas Blg. 129, 1 it held that since the
petitioners received a copy of the lower court's decision on
Petitioner claimed that he is entitled to certain amounts which
November 7, 1985, "the appeal was not deemed perfected
the spouses refused to pay, and the latter in turn alleged that
until the last day of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal
the petitioner should pay them damages for having abandoned
or on November 22, 1985 to be precise." Hence, it concluded
the job.
that when private respondent filed her motion for partial
execution pending appeal on November 19, 1985, the lower
Petitioner filed a complaint in the CFI against the spouses for
court was still competent to entertain the motion.
the recovery of two separate sums, representing the value of
the additional work performed in constructing the house; and
Issue: WON the trial court still had jurisdiction when it heard
(b) the the unpaid balance of the contract price.
the respondent’s Motion for Execution pending appeal (NO)
Before any trial was conducted, however, the spouses filed a
Ruling: We agree with respondent appellate court's decision,
motion to dismiss on the ground that the same does not state
but not with the reason it adduced in support thereof In order
a cause of action which was granted on the ground that the
to clarify the meaning of Section 23 of the Rules and Guidelines
additional price to be paid to the contractor must be
promulgated by this Court, we hold that if one party has
determined in writing pursuant to the provision of the Civil
already perfected his appeal, the clause "upon the expiration
Code.
of the last day to appeal by any party" obviously no longer
applies to him, but only to the other party whose period to
A motion for reconsideration was filed but was subsequently
appeal has not yet expired.
denied for lack of merit.
Thus, in the instant case, since the petitioners had already ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge erred in denying the
perfected their appeal on November 15, 1985, although they motion for reconsideration
had until November 22, 1985 within which to file their appeal,
the latter date had become immaterial. However, the other HELD: The contention that the petition was filed out of time is
party received the decision on November 4, 1985, hence she predicated on the claim that the motion for reconsideration
had until November 19, 1985 within which to appeal. Her was defective for being pro-forma and for failing to comply
with the requirements of the Rules of Court regarding such a Petitioner maintains that the judgment of the Court of Appeals
motion. We fail to see how the motion for reconsideration filed did not become final and executory because his Motion for
by the petitioner may be considered pro-forma, the same Reconsideration was filed within the reglementary period, the
having called the attention of the trial court to a point which date of mailing being the date of filing; that said Court failed to
the latter totally ignored in the order dismissing the complaint. act on said Motion; and that the entry of judgment was
erroneous.
While it is true that a motion for reconsideration is equivalent
to a motion for new trial if based on a ground for new trial, the ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment of the Court of Appeals
so-called "motion for reconsideration" which is not called as become final and executory.
such in Rule 37 is the term commonly used to refer to a motion
for new trial under subdivision (c) of Section I of Rule 37. An RULING: YES. Petitioner's Motion, although seasonably
affidavit of merit is required in a motion for new trial pursuant presented from the foregoing standpoint, bore an erroneous
to Section 2 of Rule 37 if the motion for new trial is based on docket number. For this reason, it could not be attached to the
any of the causes mentioned in subdivision (a) of Section I of expediente of the correct case. To all intents and purposes, the
Rule 37, to wit, fraud, accident, mistake or excusable Motion was legally inexistent. Thus, the Court of Appeals
negligence. No similar requirement is imposed for a motion for committed no error in remanding the case to the Court of
new trial or motion for reconsideration under subdivision (c) origin for execution of the judgment.
of the same section.
Petitioner's counsel's oversight can not be considered
MOISES LLANTERO represented by his son, TRANQUILINO excusable. This is one case where petitioner has to bear the
LLANTERO petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and adverse consequences of his counsel's act, for, it has been
J.M. TUASON & CO., INC. respondents. held, a client is bound by his lawyer's inexcusable negligence.
G.R. No. L-28421 July 20, 1981 No abuse of discretion, therefore, can be laid at the door of
respondent Court when it declared its judgment final.
This is a Petition for certiorari
Moreover, petitioner's claim to the property in question is
FACTS: The respondent Corporation instituted an action for based on a document of sale of possessory rights executed by
recovery of possession against petitioner in the Court of First Felicidad Campos in favor of his son. On this score, respondent
Instance of Rizal, petitioner, through force, strategy and Court ruled that the trial Court aptly rejected these evidences,
stealth, and without its consent, entered into, occupied and as it had been clearly established that the Corporation is the
subsequently constructed his house on a 200-square-meter registered owner of the large tract of land.
portion of the land at Barrio North, Tatalon, Quezon City,
covered by the title of the Corporation. DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby
dismissed. Costs against petitioner.
Petitioner, in his Answer, claimed that he bought the land from
Felicidad Campos, whose title thereto could be traced back to Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Hon. Rodolfo
Telesforo Deudor, the first known "owner" of the property. Ortiz, Rogelio Maraviles, and Quezon City Sheriff
G.R. No. L-49223 ; May 29, 1987
the trial Court rendered judgment ordering petitioner or any
person claiming under him, to surrender possession thereof.
FACTS:
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals that Court An action for the recovery of damages resulting from the
affirmed the Decision of the trial Court. Through counsel, he dishonor of checks was instituted against Philippine
filed a Motion for Reconsideration on June 14, 1967 by Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) by Rogelio Maraviles.
registered mail, but erroneously placed as docket number After Maraviles presented his evidence, the trial was reset for
thereof, Motion was attached to the expediente of the former the reception of PCIB’s proofs, but the lawyers of PCIB failed to
case. There being no Motion for Reconsideration of record in appear.
CA-G.R. No. 27311-R, the judgment against petitioner became
final, an entry of judgment was made, and the records of the The Trial Court ordered the case submitted for decision. It
case were remanded to the Lower Court for execution. rendered judgment for the plaintiff.
petitioner moved to set aside the entry of judgment on the PCIB lawyers filed a Motion for Reconsideration, and provided
ground that, except for the mistake in docket number, an explanation for the prior nonappearance. Atty. Mangohig
reconsideration was timely filed so that the Decision had not who was handling the case suddenly resigned from the law
yet become final. firm. The present case was not listed in his report of pending
cases, therefore, no one was reassigned on time.

They further claimed that the notice of judgment was not sent
to their address - 3rd Floor, LRT Building, but to COMMEX - G.R. No. 159695 September 15, 2006
Ground Floor, LRT Building. As a result, they received the
notice two days after it was received in the Ground Floor. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. RAMON G.
ASUNCION, PEDRO ASUNCION, CANDIDA ASUNCION-
Maraviles opposed, asserting that the judgment had already SANTOS, LEONORA ASUNCION-HENSON, ARISTON
become final, and that PCIB was bound by the counsel’s ASUNCION and ANABELLE* ASUNCION-PERLAS,
mistakes. respondents.
The Trial Court denied the PCIB’s motion. It held that the Petition for Review
motion was filed out of time; that failure of PCIB’s lawyer to
appear at the trial is not constitutive of excusable negligence; DOCTRINE
and that it appears that PCIB has no good and valid defenses.
The Court subsequently issued a writ of execution. “[A] motion for reconsideration is equivalent to a motion for
new trial if based on a ground for new trial. Section 1, Rule 37
ISSUE: of the Rules of Court provides that a motion for new trial must
Whether or not the notice of judgment was properly served. be based on the following causes: (a) fraud, accident, mistake
or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not
HELD: have guarded against and by reason of which such aggrieved
YES. With respect to the inconsistent address - The PCIB had party has probably been impaired in his rights; or (b) newly
accepted service at the COMMEX address without objection of discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable
any sort. They cannot disown the adopted address to relieve diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial, and which
them from the effects of their negligence, complacency, or if presented would probably alter the result. xxx
inattention. Service of notice of judgment at the Ground Floor,
LRT Building should be deemed as effective service on PCIB’s [However,] [m]ere reiteration of issues already passed upon by
attorneys. the court does not automatically make a motion for
reconsideration pro forma. What is essential is compliance with
Failure of the lawyers of PCIB to inquire as to the date the the requisites of the Rules”
notice of judgment was received by the clerk is warrant
FACTS
imprudence and cannot in any sense be deemed to constitute
that excusable negligence as would warrant reconsideration. Paciencia Asuncion and the Heirs of Felipe Asuncion applied for
the registration of the titles of nine (9) parcels of land with the
Additionally, the finding of the Trial Court that PCIB has no then CFI. The applicants alleged that they have registerable
good and valid defense which might change or alter the titles over the subject lands which they acquired by
judgment of this Court is correct. A perusal of the PCIB’s inheritance, accretion, and through open, continuous,
unverified answer reveals that its defenses were mostly denial exclusive and notorious possession under color of title for at
for lack of knowledge; and that human error is inevitable. least 30 years.
These defenses are unsubstantial and unmeritorious.
Therefore it makes no sense to reopen the case and allow PCIB Petitioner, represented by the OSG, opposed the application
to present evidence of defenses which are inconsequential, on the ground that the subject lands are inalienable forest
and would not at all negate or mitigate its liability. lands of the public domain, within the unclassified area of
Bulacan, Bulacan. Other persons also opposed the motion. The
When fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence is applicants then entered into a compromise agreement with
invoked as a ground of a motion for new trial, it should be oppositors, which the trial court approved despite the OSG’s
proved in the manner provided for proof of motions - by opposition. The OSG sought for additional time to file his
affidavits or depositions. It should be accompanied by two comment. However, the trial court considered the case
affidavits: one, setting forth the facts and circumstances submitted for decision and ordered the registration of 5
alleged to constitute such fraud, accident, mistake, or parcels of land. The OSG’s MR was denied. The trial court ruled
excusable negligence; and the other, an affidavit of merits, that the OSG was in effect seeking a new trial and that the
setting forth the particular facts claimed to constitute the motion for reconsideration was pro forma since it lacked an
movant’s meritorious cause of action or defense. affidavit of merit required by the second paragraph of Sec. 2,
Rule 37 of the RoC. The trial court later dismissed the notice of
When a motion for new trial on the above mentioned grounds appeal for being filed out of time. Thus, the OSG filed a petition
is unaccompanied by either or both affidavits, it is pro forma a for certiorari with the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of the
scrap of paper.

RTC – that the MR of the OSG before the trial court was pro 3. For the Tadeja brothers’ defense, they claimed that Ruben
forma. and his sons Rusell and Robenson still went to the plaza after
being prevented by barangay tanods from entering due to the
ISSUE drunken state of Rusell. Due to this Ruben brandished his knife
while cursing at the crowd and later on challenged Reynante
• Did the CA err in sustaining the dismissal of the OSG’s MR (one of the Tadeja brothers). Reynante’s other brothers
on the ground that the motion was in effect one for a new testified
trial and was pro forma? (YES) that they were all at home.
4. Defense: The Bernardos continued attaching Reynante. The
RULING
latter was stabbed on the right part of his chest and the left
A motion for reconsideration is equivalent to a motion for new side of his body. Meanwhile, Ruben died due to multiple stab
trial if based on a ground for new trial. Sec. 1, Rule 37 of the wounds and a hacking wound.
RoC provides that a motion for new trial must be based on the 5. An information for homicide was filed against the Tajeda
following causes: (a) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable brothers (RTC Mindoro, CASE 1)
negligence (FAME) which ordinary prudence could not have 6. Reynante filed a complaint for frustrated homicide against
guarded against and by reason of which such aggrieved party Russell and Robenson. (CASE 2)
has probably been impaired in his rights; or (b) newly
discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable RTC Case 1: Tajeda brothers GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial, and which DOUBT of HOMICIDE.
if presented would probably alter the result.
RTC Case 2: Russell and Robenson ACQUITTED
Here, the OSG’s MR did not aver the grounds for new trial. It
was not based on FAME that would need affidavits of merit, 7. Tajeda brothers appealed, except for Plaridel who
nor is the motion based on newly discovered evidence as to absconded.
require affidavits of witnesses. The OSG’s arguments were: (1)
that the trial court deprived petitioner of its right to present CA: AFFIRMED the RTC
evidence; and, (2) that the decision was tainted with serious
errors of law and fact. Both are not valid causes for new trial 8. Tajeda brothers moved for reconsideration and submitted
per Sec. 1, Rule 37. transcripts of other witnesses which were missing from the
Criminal CASE 1 fowarded to the CA. MR Denied by CA.512
Furthermore, the MR filed by the OSG is not pro forma. Mere 9. Tajeda brothers filed a Petition for Review to the SC. They
reiteration of issues already passed upon by the court does not claim that since the 2 cases were tried jointly, all pieces of
automatically make a MR pro forma. What is essential is evidence should have been considered and given due weight
compliance with the requisites of the Rules. The allegations of in the resolution of both cases.
the OSG stress that the findings or conclusions of the trial court
were allegedly not supported by the evidence or were contrary SC: Issued a decision AFFIRMING the CA. While petitioners
to law. Patently, the MR was not pro forma. were correct in asserting that the totality of the evidence in
both CASES should have been considered and given due
Not being pro forma, the OSG filed his notice of appeal within weight, the testimonies of the other witnesses would not have
the ‘fresh period’ of 15 days to file the notice of appeal. Thus, altered the judgment of conviction by the
the notice of appeal of the OSG deserves to be given due RTC.
course. 10. The Tajeda brothers filed an MR (1st MR) which the SC
denied.
11. Tajeda brothers filed another Motion with leave of court to
G.R. No. 145336, February 20, 2013 vacate judgement and attached a Pinagsamang Salaysay
REYNANTE TADEJA, RICKY TADEJA, RICARDO TADEJA AND signed by 228 residents of their barangay attesting to the
FERDINAND TADEJA, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES brothers’ innocence of the crime charged.
12. The brothers again filed a motion with leave of court to
THIS IS A PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 45 vacate judgement due to a SUPERVENING EVENT (2nd MR) due
FACTS: to the arrest of their other Plaridel who also admitted of killing
1. Tadeja brothers (petitioners) prayed for the reopening of Ruben. This motion was DENIED by the SC because it was a
the homicide case against them on the strength of Plaridel’s prohibited pleading.
(co-accused) extrajudicial confession 13. The brothers filed another MR (3rd MR) which was also
2. It was established that the crime was committed during a DENIED. Hence, the brothers wrote a letter to the Chief Justice
barangay fiesta. Witnesses claim that Ruben Bernardo was for the REOPENING of the case on the basis of the confession
hacked to death by the Tadeja brothers. of Plaridel, to which the SC again, DENIED.

14. The brothers again filed another MR (4th MR) which was In said case, People v. Licayan, all the accused were convicted
denied with finality for lack of merit. Another motion for leave of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and sentenced to death
to file another MR by En Banc was also DENIED because it was by the trial court. More than two years after their conviction
a prohibited pleading. became final and executory, the accused Lara and Licayan filed
15. Another letter was sent by one of the Tajeda brothers an Urgent Motion to ReOpen the Case with Leave of Court.
(Ferdinand) for a prayer to declare a mistrial but was They attached thereto the Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by
EXPUNGED by the SC from the records as no further pleadings two of their co-accused in the case, to the effect that Lara and
shall be entertained. Another letter and various other Licayan had not paticipated in the commission of the crime.
pleadings were also expunged as the entry of judgement was Since the OSG also recommended the reopening of the case,
already made. this Court remanded the case to the trial court for the
16. Ferdinand again wrote a letter, this time, to CJ Renato reception of newly discovered evidence. WHEREFORE, the
Corona requesting for the reopening of the case due to the fact motion of petitioners to reopen the case for reception of
that another parallel case was allowed to be reopened even further evidence in the trial court is DENIED.
tho the judgement of conviction had already been entered.
[G.R. No. 187836. March 10, 2015.]
ISSUE: W/N THE COURT SHALL ALLOW THE REOPENING OF THE SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) OFFICERS, NAMELY,
CASE DUE TO NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE. SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, and VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T.
CABIGAO, petitioners, vs. ALFREDO S. LIM, in his capacity
HELD: as mayor of the City of Manila, respondent.
NO. The Court denied the petitioners’ motion to reopen the
case for reception of further evidence in the trial court. Section
1 of Rule 121 of the RoC provides: A new trial may only be DOCTRINE: The filing of a motion for reconsideration,
granted by the court on motion of the accused, or motu authorized by Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, does not impose
proprio with the consent of the on the Court the obligation to deal individually and specifically
accused "(a)t any time before a judgment of conviction with the grounds relied upon therefor, in much the same way
becomes final."In this case, petitioners' judgment of conviction that the Court does in its judgment or final order as regards the
already became final and executory on 26 July 2007 the date issues raised and submitted for decision. This would be a
on which the Decision of this Court denying the petition and useless formality or ritual invariably involving merely a
affirming the ruling of the CA was recorded in the Book of reiteration of the reasons already set forth in the judgment or
Entries of Judgments. Thus, pleas for the remand of this case final order for rejecting the arguments advanced by the
to the trial court for the conduct of a new trial may no longer movant; and it would be a needless act, too, with respect to
be entertained. On their claim that a new trial should be made issues raised for the first time, these being, as above stated,
on the ground of newly discovered evidence (Plaridel’s deemed waived because not asserted at the first opportunity.
extrajudicial confession), the Court found this claim without It suffices for the Court to deal generally and summarily with
merit. the motion for reconsideration, and merely state a legal
Newly discovered evidence refers to that which: ground for its denial (Sec. 14, Art. VIII, Constitution); i.e., the
a) is discovered after trial; motion contains merely a reiteration or rehash of arguments
b) could not have been discovered and produced at the trial already submitted to and pronounced without merit by the
even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; Court in its judgment, or the basic issues have already been
c) is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or passed upon, or the motion discloses no substantial argument
impeaching; and or cogent reason to warrant reconsideration or modification of
d) is of such weight that it would probably change the the judgment or final order; or the arguments in the motion
judgment if admitted are too unsubstantial to require consideration, etc.
The most important requisite is that the evidence could not FACTS: In the Decision promulgated on 25 November 2014,
have been discovered and produced at the trial even with this Court declared Ordinance No. 8187 UNCONSTITUTIONAL
reasonable diligence; hence, the term "newly discovered." The and INVALID with respect to the continued stay of the
confession of Plaridel does not meet this requisite. He Pandacan Oil Terminals.
participated in the trial before the RTC and even gave Intervenor Shell submitted a Motion for Reconsideration of the
testimony as to his defense. It was only after he and petitioners Decision.
had been convicted by the trial court that he absconded. Thus, ISSUE: WON the motion for reconsideration shall be denied.
the contention that his confession could HELD: YES. It bears stressing that these cases were called in
not have been obtained during trial does not hold water. On session several times to give the members of the Court time to
the petitioners’ claim that the SC granted a motion for new study and present their respective positions. Before the
trial in a parallel case, the court emphasized that the motion Decision was finally promulgated, the Court had thoroughly
was granted “pro hac vice”. A ruling expressly qualified as such deliberated on the arguments of the parties, including the
cannot be relied upon as a precedent to govern other cases. basic issues herein raised — the rationale for upholding the

position of the Court in G.R. No. 156052, on one hand, and the case, this Court already held that if a certificate of title has not
safety measures adopted by the intervenors, including the been lost but is in fact in the possession of another person, the
alleged "imagined fears, causes, surmises and conjectures reconstituted title is void and the court rendering the decision
interposed by the petitioners," on the other; the argument of has not acquired jurisdiction. Consequently the decision may be
whether or not the petition should have been filed with the attacked any time. Indeed, Rep. Act No. 26, § 18 provides that
trial court or at least referred to the Court of Appeals to receive "in case a certificate of title, considered lost or destroyed be
evidence; and the issue on whether or not the enactment of found or recovered, the same shall prevail over the
Ordinance No. 8283 has rendered the instant petitions moot reconstituted certificate of title." It was, therefore, error for the
and academic. And for failure to reconcile diverse views on Court of Appeals to dismiss the petition for annulment of
several issues, a Concurring and Dissenting Opinion was judgment of the petitioners.
written.
The grounds relied on being mere reiterations of the issues FACTS:
already passed upon by the Court, there is no need to "cut and
paste" pertinent portions of the Decision or re-write the Petitioners brought an action in the CA seeking the annulment
ponencia in accordance with the outline of the instant motion. of the decision of the RTC at Tabaco, Albay which ordered the
As succinctly put by then Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa in Register of Deeds to issue a new owner's duplicate certificate
Ortigas and Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Judge Velasco on the effect of title to private respondent. Their petition was, however,
and disposition of a motion for reconsideration: denied due course on the ground that the fraud alleged therein
The filing of a motion for reconsideration, authorized by Rule was not extrinsic fraud but, if at all, only intrinsic fraud which
52 of the Rules of Court, does not impose on the Court the did not justify setting aside the final decision of the trial court.
obligation to deal individually and specifically with the grounds Hence this petition for review of the decision of the CA.
relied upon therefor, in much the same way that the Court Petitioner alleged that the property in question is in the name
does in its judgment or final order as regards the issues raised of Pablo Ralla, private respondent's deceased father, wherein
and submitted for decision. This would be a useless formality they are co-owners; that petitioners acquired two- thirds of
or ritual invariably involving merely a reiteration of the reasons the property by 2 Deeds of absolute Sale, which was ratified
already set forth in the judgment or final order for rejecting the and confirmed by virtue of an order date 11 May 1989 of the
arguments advanced by the movant; and it would be a Regional Trial Court of Fifth Judicial Region, Branch 8 Legaspi
needless act, too, with respect to issues raised for the first City. That at the time of the sale of the Property to the
time, these being, as above stated, deemed waived because petitioners, there was a ten-year lease contract over the
not asserted at the first opportunity. It suffices for the Court to property which was scheduled to expire on 15 July 1991, for
deal generally and summarily with the motion for this reason, the petitioners decided to await the termination
reconsideration, and merely state a legal ground for its denial of the lease before registering the sale and obtaining a new
(Sec. 14, Art. VIII, Constitution); i.e., the motion contains title in their name; and soon after the expiration of the lease
merely a reiteration or rehash of arguments already submitted contract, the father of the petitioners went to the Register of
to and pronounced without merit by the Court in its judgment, Deeds to have the deed of sale registered and to obtain new
or the basic issues have already been passed upon, or the title in the name of the petitioners and learned from the
motion discloses no substantial argument or cogent reason to Register of Deeds that by an order of Judge Rhodie A. Nidea of
warrant reconsideration or modification of the judgment or the RTC of Tabaco, Albay, Branch 16, the owner's duplicate
final order; or the arguments in the motion are too copy of TCT No. T- 65878 in the possession of the petitioner
unsubstantial to require consideration, etc. had been declared of no further force and effect and that a
new second owner's duplicate copy of said title has been
RULE 38 issued to the private respondent; that subsequent
investigation by the petitioners disclosed that on Sept. 20,
1990 private respondent filed a petition with the RTC of
G.R. No. 115595 November 14, 1994 Tabaco, Albay, Branch 16 and docketed as CAD Case No. T-
1024 wherein she falsely and fraudulently alleged that "the
ANTONIO DEMETRIOU, HARRIET DEMETRIOU, ET AL., owner's duplicate copy of the said Transfer Certificate of Title
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE RHODIE No. T-65878 was lost and/or destroyed while in the possession
A. NIDEA, and HILDA RALLA-ALMINE, respondents. and custody of herein petitioner.
Respondent Judge Rhodie A. Nidea, the Presiding Judge of the

PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 45 Regional Trial Court of Tabaco, Albay, Branch 16, issued an
order dated Dec. 7, 1990 ordering the Register of Deeds to
DOCTRINE: Ajudgment otherwise final may be annulled not issue a second owner's duplicate copy of transfer certificate of
only on the ground of extrinsic fraud but also because of lack title No. T-65878 with all the annotations and encumbrances
of jurisdiction of the court which rendered it. In Serra Serra vs. thereon, which shall be of like faith and credit as the one lost
Court of Appeals, on facts analogous to those involved in this and declaring the lost or destroyed owner's duplicate copy of
the TCT No. T-65878 of no further force and effect, and that purpose of seeking the annulment of the judgment in CAD Case
pursuant to the order, the Register of Deeds issued a new No. T- 1024 granting private respondent's petition for the
second owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. T-65878 to the issuance of a new owner's duplicate certificate of title.
private respondent; that despite repeated demands by
petitioners and despite protracted attempts at settlement, G.R. NO. L-46674 September 16, 1985
private respondent refused to deliver or turn over to the Arcilla v. Arcilla
petitioners the second owner's duplicate copy of TCT No.
65878 issued pursuant to the aforesaid order of Judge Rhodie SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65
A. Nidea; that the aforesaid order of Judge Rhodie A. Nidea has
become final and executory DOCTRINE: The rule is that, in order for a petition for relief filed
under Rule 38 to be entertained by the court, the petitioner
ISSSUE: must satisfactorily show that he has faithfully and strictly
complied with the provisions of said Rule 38. The same must
Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in reversing be filed within the period allowed by Section 3 of Rule 38. As
the annulment of Judgment by the RTC? in previous cases, this Court holds and so rules that the petition
for relief filed after the lapse of the reglementary period
HELD:
cannot be entertained.
NO. While the appellate court is certainly right in holding that
the use of a false affidavit of loss does not constitute extrinsic FACTS:
fraud to warrant the invalidation of a final judgment. The use 1. Petitioner was among the several defendants in an action
of the alleged false affidavit of loss by private respondent is for Annulment of Sale with damages filed by the respondents
similar to the use during trial or forged instruments or perjured before the CFI Cebu. (Civil Case no. 395- T)
testimony. In the leading case of Palanca v. Republic, it was
held that the use of a forged instrument constituted only After the issues were joined by the filing of defendants'
intrinsic fraud for while perhaps it prevented a fair and just Answer, the case was set for pre-trial conferences. At the
determination of a case, the use of such instrument or scheduled pre-trial on July 29, 1975, the CFI issued an Order
testimony did not prevent the adverse party from presenting ordering the continuation of the pre-trial of the case be set to
his case fully and fairly. In the case at bar, petitioners were not October 2, 1975.
really kept out of the proceedings because of the fraudulent
acts of the private respondent. They could have rebutted or On October 2, 1975, defendants (petitioners in here) was
opposed the use of the affidavit and shown its falsity since they declared in default upon motion of plaintiffs (respondents in
were theoretically parties in the case to whom notice had been here) because the former as well as their counsel failed to
duly given. But a judgment otherwise final may be annulled not appear at the pre-trial. The plaintiffs were then allowed to
only on the ground of extrinsic fraud but also because of lack present ex parte their defense.
of jurisdiction of the court which rendered it. In Serra Serra vs.
Court of Appeals, on facts analogous to those involved in this On October 27, 1976, CFI rendered judgment in favor of the
case, this Court already held that if a certificate of title has not plaintiffs declaring the sale executed in favor of Laureano as
been lost but is in fact in the possession of another person, the null and void. Although the defendants had been declared in
reconstituted title is void and the court rendering the decision default, a copy of the decision was furnished to their counsel.
has not acquired jurisdiction. Consequently the decision may
be attacked any time. Indeed, Rep. Act No. 26, § 18 provides 2. On March 25, 1977, the herein petitioner (Laureano),
that "in case a certificate of title, considered lost or destroyed through his counsel, filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default and
be found or recovered, the same shall prevail over the to Set Aside Decision which was denied by Respondent Judge.
reconstituted certificate of title." It was, therefore, error for
the Court of Appeals to dismiss the petition for annulment of 3. On April 16, 1977, petitioner Laureano filed a Petition for
judgment of the petitioners. We find that the allegation of Relief from Judgment. Petitioner alleged that they were not
forum shopping is without basis. While they indeed alleged duly notified of the setting of the pre-trial on October 2, 1975.
that private respondent had obtained a second owner's And only on March 24, 1977 when the herein undersigned
duplicate of TCT T-65878 knowing that 2/3 of the land covered counsel showed him a photocopy of the same which the
by the certificate had been sold to them and that the "2nd undersigned counsel procured a day earlier.
owner's copy should be cancelled and recalled considering the
fact that the original is in fact still existing and not lost, "the The defendants therefore seek the setting aside and lifting the
allegation was made more for the purpose of demanding a effects of the decision aforementioned based on mistake
partition, recognizing that private respondent is the owner of and/or excusable neglect for their failure to inquire from their
1/3 of the land. Petitioner's intervention is thus different from lawyer Atty. Monteclaros or with this Court believing that they
their action in the Court of Appeals which is solely for the will be duly notified of any proceeding by their lawyer Atty.

Monteclaros or by the Office of the Clerk of Court of this Court chance, and failure to avail of such last chance within the grace
inasmuch as they are not the plaintiffs and are therefore in the period fixed by the statute or the Rules of Court is fatal.
defensive side of the case.
The rule, therefore, is that in order for a petition for relief filed
4. On May 18, 1977, respondent Judge issued an Order denying under Rule 38 to be entertained by the court, the petitioner
the Petition for Relief on the ground that the Petition for Relief must satisfactorily show that he has faithfully and strictly
from Judgment was filed out of time following the provisions complied with the provisions of said Rule 38. Consequently, in
on Section 3 of Rule 38. assailing the lower court's dismissal of his petition for relief for
having been filed out of time, it is incumbent upon herein
5. Attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of petitioner to show that the said petition was filed within the
respondent Judge, the petitioner through this special civil reglementary period specified in Section 3, Rule 38.
action prays that the said order be set aside and declared null
and void. In this case, petitioner failed to do so, instead he argues on the
merits of his petition for relief, without first showing that the
ISSUE: W/N THE CFI ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF same was filed on time in the court below. On this ground
DISCRETION AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN DENYING alone, the instant case should be dismissed.
THE MOTION FOR HAVING BEEN FILED OUT OF TIME.
The Court agrees with the respondent Judge that the petition
HELD: NO. was filed late. The decision sought to be set aside was
The pertinent provisions of Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of rendered on October 27, 1976. The petitioner, through his
Court on "Relief from Judgments, Orders or Other counsel, received the copy of the decision on November 8,
Proceedings" state— Sec. 2. Petition to Court of First Instance 1976. He filed the petition for relief from judgment only on
for relief from judgment or other proceeding thereof.—When April 18, 1977.
a judgment or order is entered, or any other proceeding is
taken, against a party in a Court of First Instance through fraud, Arguing on the merits of his petition for relief, petitioner's
accident, mistake or excusable negligence, he may file a main contention is that the order of default was illegally and
petition in such court and in the same cause praying that the improperly issued because he was not notified of the pretrial
judgment, on October 2, 1975, consequently, all subsequent proceedings
order or proceeding be set aside. including the judgment by default were all null and void.
Sec. 3. Time for filing petition contents and verification. —A In this case, the records would show that petitioner was
petition provided for in either of the preceding sections of this present during the pre-trial conference on July 29, 1975 when
rule must be verified filed within sixty (60) days after the the lower court re-set the pre-trial to October 2, 1975. On the
petitioner learns of the judgment, order or other proceeding said date, however, although notified, both petitioner and his
to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such counsel did not appear, hence, the declaration of default
judgment or order was entered or such proceeding was taken; pursuant to Sec. 2, of Rule 20 of the Rules of Court. Examining
and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, the petition for relief filed by petitioner, while the same
accident, mistake or excusable negligence relied upon, and the appears verified and accompanied by an affidavit of merit, the
facts constituting the petitioner's good and substantial cause allegations of fact made therein do not prove either fraud,
of action or defense, as the case may be. accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, nor show a valid
defense in favor of the party seeking relief ... The general
In the case of Turqueza vs. Hernando, this Court held that— allegation made therein to the effect that "petitioner has a
The Court has said time and again that the doctrine of finality good and valid defense considering that the late Segunda O.
of judgments is grounded on fundamental considerations of Vda. de Arcilla voluntarily and willingly executed the document
public policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional of Sale", is not sufficient compliance with the rules.
error, the judgments of courts must become final at some
definite date fixed by law. The law gives an exception or "last Since the Deed of Sale sought to be annulled was written in
chance" of a timely petition for relief from judgment within the English and it is admitted that Segunda O. Vda. de Arcilla is an
reglementary period (within 60 days from knowledge and 6 illiterate and do not know how to read and write, it would have
months from entry of judgment) under Rule 38 supra, but such been an easy matter for petitioner to have secured the
grace period must be taken as "absolutely fixed, inextendible, affidavit of Nemesio Jubay, the Notary Public who allegedly
never interrupted and cannot be subjected to any condition or notarized the document as well as the witnesses to the
contingency. Because the period fixed is itself devised to meet execution and signing thereof to show that the contents of the
a condition or contingency (fraud, accident, mistake or document was fully explained to said Segunda O. Vda. de
excusable neglect), the equitable remedy is an act of grace, as Arcilla and that she voluntarily signed the same. This way,
it were, designed to give the aggrieved party another and last petitioner could convince the Court that in his legal fight, he

had a leg on which to stand. It thus results that reversal of the he learned of the judgment rendered thereon when a notice
order complained of, as well as the judgment rendered of levy on execution came to his knowledge.
thereon would be an Idle ceremony. It would not advance or
for that matter serve the ends of justice. It would only result in RTC granted the petition for relief and set aside the MeTC
another waste of time, effort and expense. Paraphrasing what ruling on the ground that petitioner had been unduly deprived
this Court has stated in Paner vs. Yatco, it would be pointless of a hearing and had been prevented from taking an appeal for
to re-open this case, "for like a mirage it would merely raise the reason that petitioner's wife, in a fit of anger, tore the
false hopes and in the end avail her (him) nothing." summons and complaint in the ejectment suit in the heat of a
marital squabble.
WHEREFORE, the instant special civil action is hereby
DISMISSED. CA reinstated the MeTC ruling.
ANDY QUELNAN , petitioner, vs. VHF PHILIPIINES, Issue: WON petitioner can still disturb the MeTC ruling for lack
respondent.. of jurisdiction over his person (NO)
Ruling: Under Rule 38, it is clear from the that a petition for
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 relief from judgment must be filed within: (a) 60 days from
knowledge of judgment, order or other proceedings to be set
DOCTRINE: If the addressee fails to claim his mail from the aside; and (b) six (6) months from entry of such judgment,
post office within five (5) days from the date of the first notice, order or other proceeding. These two periods must concur.
service becomes effective upon the expiration of five (5) days Both periods are also not extendible and never
therefrom. In such a case, there arises a presumption that the interrupted. [12] Strict compliance with these periods stems
service was complete at the end of the said five-day period. This from the equitable character and nature of the petition for
means that the period to appeal or to file the necessary relief. Indeed, relief is allowed only in exceptional cases as
pleading begins to run after five days from the first notice given when there is no other available or adequate remedy. As it
by the postmaster. This is because a party is deemed to have were, a petition for relief is actually the 'last chance given by
received and to have been notified of the judgment at that law to litigants to question a final judgment or order. And
point. failure to avail of such last chance within the grace period fixed
by the Rules is fatal. We do not take issue with petitioner that
the 60-day period under Section 3, Rule 38, supra 'should be
FACTS: reckoned from the time the aggrieved party has knowledge of
the judgment. The Rule expressly says so.
The case stemmed from an ejectment suit filed by respondent
against petitioner involving a condominium unit at the Legaspi There is no doubt that under the Rules, service by registered
Towers 300 at Roxas Boulevard, Manila which respondent mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee.
claimed to have been leased by petitioner. However, if the addressee fails to claim his mail from the post
office within five (5) days from the date of the first notice,
MeTC Manila issued a decision in favor of herein respondent service becomes effective upon the expiration of five (5) days
after its finding that summons together with a copy of the therefrom. [14] In such a case, there arises a presumption that
complaint was served on petitioner thru his wife by substituted the service was complete at the end of the said five-day period.
service and petitioner failed to file his Answer within the This means that the period to appeal or to file the necessary
reglementary period. Copy of the aforementioned decision pleading begins to run after five days from the first notice given
was served on petitioner by registered mail but the same was by the postmaster. This is because a party is deemed to have
returned unclaimed on account of petitioner's failure to claim received and to have been notified of the judgment at that
the same despite the postmaster's three (3) successive notices. point.
No appeal having been taken by the petitioner, the MeTC
decision became final and executory. A writ of execution, a G.R. No. 161864 April 27, 2007
notice of levy and a notice to vacate were served on
petitioner's wife who acknowledged receipt thereof. SPS. ROLANDO DELA CRUZ and TERESITA DELA CRUZ,
Petitioners,
Petitioner filed with the RTC at Manila a Petition for Relief from vs.
Judgment With Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or SPS. FELICIANO ANDRES and ERLINDA AUSTRIA, and the
temporary restraining order, thereunder alleging, inter alia, DIRECTOR OF LANDS, Respondents.
that he was never served with summons' and was' completely
unaware of the proceedings in the ejectment suit, adding that PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45

DOCTRINE: Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure uses in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due
the phrase "any court," it refers only to process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very
Municipal/Metropolitan and Regional Trial Courts. The essence of due process. Here, the case underwent a full-blown
procedure in the Court of Appeals and this Court are governed trial. Both parties were adequately heard, and all issues were
by separate provisions of the Rules of Court and may, from time ventilated before the decision was promulgated.
to time, be supplemented by additional rules promulgated by
this Court through resolutions or circulars. As it stands, neither It should be pointed out that in petitions for relief from
the Rules of Court nor the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of judgment, meritorious defenses must be accompanied by the
Appeals allows the remedy of petition for relief in the Court of ground relied upon, whether it is fraud, accident, mistake,
Appeals. excusable negligence, extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction. In
the instant case, there being neither excusable nor gross
FACTS: negligence amounting to a denial of due process, meritorious
defenses cannot alone be considered.
Spouses Dela Cruz filed a complaint for annulment of title
and/or reconveyance with damages against spouses Feliciano A petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the 1997
and Erlinda and the Director of Lands before the MCTC. Rules of Civil Procedure is an equitable remedy that is allowed
only in exceptional cases when there is no other available or
The MCTC ordered the Director of Lands to cancel the OCT adequate remedy. It may be availed of only after a judgment,
insofar as the portion owned and occupied by petitioners were final order or other proceeding was taken against the
concerned. On appeal, the RTC reversed and set aside the petitioner in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or
decision of the MCTC. excusable negligence.
Petitioners, assisted by Atty. Villarosa, filed with the CA a PURCON V. MRM PHILIPPINES,
petition for review which was dismissed since the Certification G.R. No. 182718, September 26, 2008
of Non-Forum Shopping was signed by Atty. Villarosa instead
of petitioners FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45
Thereafter, Atty. Villarosa withdrew his appearance. Petitioner filed a case for reimbursement of medical expenses,
Petitioners, assisted by Atty. Hernandez, Jr., requested for an sickness allowance and permanent disability benefits before
extension of time to file their petition. Later, they abandoned the Arbitration branch of the NLRC  He alleged that
the motion and the case was declared closed and terminated. respondent hired him as a seaman on board the M/T Sarabelle
2; he signed a contract for 3 months and was extended for
Petitioners filed with the CA a petition for relief from judgment another 3 months  
praying that the dismissal of their petition for review be set
aside since the gross negligence of their previous counsel did His work involved strenuous work; One day, he felt an
not bind them. The CA, however, denied their petition. It ruled excruciating pain in his left testicle. After being examined by a
that petitioners were bound by the action of their counsel as doctor at the port of France, he was diagnosed with hernia;
well as by his mistake or negligence. It added that petitioners after that he was repatriated due to his ailment.  
could not belatedly complain on petition or appeal about their
counsel’s incompetence since they could have easily dismissed The company physician told him that he is fit to work but there
him at the initial or trial stage if they were not satisfied with was no vacancy at that time  
his performance. Since petitioners slept on their rights, they
had no one to blame but themselves. He asked another doctor and after a thorough medical
examination and evaluation, he was diagnosed with
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners can avail of a petition for EPIDIDYMITIS, LEFT; UPPER RESPIRATORY TRACT INFACTION
relief under Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure from WITH INPEDIMENT  GRADE XIV.  
a judgment of the Court of Appeals due to their counsel’s
negligence when he signed the Certification of Non-Forum Respondents answered that Hermia is not work related and
Shopping that petitioner signed a quitclaim and release. LA dismissed the
complaint for Hermia is not work related and that he was
HELD: For a claim of counsel’s gross negligence to prosper, already cured;  the fact that he was not re-hired by
nothing short of clear abandonment of the client’s cause must respondent did not mean that he was suffering from disability.
be shown. The negligence of counsel must be so gross that the  
client is deprived of his day in court, the result of which is that
he is deprived of his property without due process of law. Thus, NLRC resolution became final and executory and was recorded
where a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in the Book of Entries of  Judgments; petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari under R.65 which CA dismissed due to Third, the procedure in the CA and the Supreme Court are
formal  infirmities; CA decision became final and executory governed by separate provisions of the Rules of Court. It may,
  from time to time, be supplemented by additional rules
promulgated by the Supreme Court through resolutions or
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under R.45 in the SC; SC circulars. As it stands, neither the Rules of Court nor the
denied the petition and ruled  that the petition was filed Revised Internal Rules of the CA allows the remedy of petition
beyond the reglementary period, failure to pay docket fees, for relief in the CA.
and  defective verification. Petitioner filed for a petition for
relief from judgment. The procedure in the CA from Rules 44 to 55, with the
exception of Rule 45 which pertains to the Supreme Court,
ISSUE: WON the petition for relief should be granted  identifies the remedies available before said.
HELD: NO. A petition for relief from judgment is not an If a petition for relief from judgment is not among the
available remedy in the Supreme Court. First, although Section remedies available in the CA, with more reason that this
1 of Rule 38 states that when a judgment or final order is remedy cannot be availed of in the Supreme Court. This Court
entered through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable entertains only questions of law. A petition for relief raises
negligence, a party in any court may file a petition for relief questions of facts on fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
from judgment, this rule must be interpreted in harmony with negligence, which are beyond the concerns of this Court.
Rule 56, which enumerates the original cases cognizable by the
Supreme Court, thus: Nevertheless, even if We delve into the merits of the petition,
the same must still be dismissed. The late filing of the petition
Section 1. Original cases cognizable. Only petitions for for review does not amount to excusable negligence.
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, Petitioners lack of devotion in discharging his duty, without
habeas corpus, disciplinary proceedings against demonstrating fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
members of the judiciary and attorneys, and cases negligence, cannot be a basis for judicial relief. For a claim of
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and counsels’ gross negligence to prosper, nothing short of clear
consuls may be filed originally in the Supreme Court. abandonment of the clients’ cause must be shown.
 
The relief afforded by Rule 38 will not be granted to a party
In Dela Cruz v. Andres, a petition for relief from judgment is not who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the judgment
an available remedy in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme when the loss of the remedy of law was due to his own
Court. The Court explained that under the 1997 Revised Rules negligence, or mistaken mode of procedure for that matter;
of Civil Procedure, the petition for relief must be filed within otherwise the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving
sixty (60) days after petitioner learns of the judgment, final the right of appeal which has already been lost, either because
order or other proceeding to be set aside and must be of inexcusable negligence or due to a mistake of procedure by
accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, counsel.
mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts
constituting petitioners good and substantial cause of action Abubakar A. Afdal and Fatima A Afdal, v. Romeo Carlos
or defense, as the case may be. Most importantly, it should be G.R. No. 173379 ; December 1, 2010
filed with the same court which rendered the decision
FACTS:
Second, while Rule 38 uses the phrase any court, it refers only In 2003, the respondent Romeo Carlos filed a complaint for
to Municipal/Metropolitan and Regional Trial Courts. unlawful detainer and damages against petitioners before
MTC Laguna.
As revised, Rule 38 radically departs from the previous rule as
it now allows the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court which The respondent alleged that the petitioners sold the property
decided the case or issued the order to hear the petition for to him, but he allowed the petitioners to stay in the property
relief. Under the old rule, a petition for relief from the by mere tolerance.
judgment or final order of Municipal Trial Courts should be
filed with the Regional Trial Court The respondent further alleged that when he demanded the
petitioners to turn the property over to him, the petitioners
The procedural change in Rule 38 is in line with Rule 5, refused to heed his demand. The petitioners ignored the
prescribing uniform procedure for Municipal and Regional Trial notices from Lupon, which forced him to file the complaint
Courts and designation of Municipal/Metropolitan Trial Courts before the MTC.
as courts of record.

The records reveal three attempts to serve the summons and Service of summons shall be by personal service first, and only
complaint on the petitioners, but the party failed to file an when the defendant cannot be promptly served in person will
answer. The respondent filed an ex-parte motion - the case substituted service be availed of. The indorsements failed to
was submitted for decision based on the pleadings on record. state that prompt and personal service on the petitioners was
The MTC ruled in favor of the respondent. rendered impossible.
In 2004, the petitioners filed a petition for relief from judgment The petitioners were not validly served with summons and the
with the MTC. After realizing that it was a prohibited pleading complaint by substituted service. Hence, the MTC failed to
under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, the acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioners.
petitioners manifested their intention to withdraw the same.
The petitions filed the petition for relief before the RTC. They G.R. No. 174411 July 2, 2014
alleged that:
1. They are the lawful owners of the property, and CITY OF DAGUPAN, represented by the CITY MAYOR
denied its sale in favor of the respondent. In 2003, BENJAMIN S. LIM, Petitioner, vs. ESTER F. MARAMBA,
2. They were absent, for they filed before the represented by her ATTORNEY-IN-FACT JOHNNY FERRER,
Commission on Elections his certificate of candidacy Respondent.
as mayor in Labangan, Zamboanga del Sur;
3. They never received any demand letter, nor were Petition for Review
they informed of any proceedings before the Lupon;
and DOCTRINE
4. They claim that they were never served a copy of the
summons and the complaint. “A petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 is an
equitable remedy which allows courts to review a judgment
The RTC dismissed the petition for relief. Under Section 1, Rule tainted with neglect bordering on extrinsic fraud. In this case,
38, that the petition for relief should be filed “in such court and total damages in the amount of P11 million was awarded in
in the same case praying that the judgment, order, or spite of the evidence on record. The motion for reconsideration
proceeding be set aside”. of such judgment filed by the legal officer of the City of
Dagupan inexplicably omitted the required notice for hearing.
ISSUE: Considering the damage that would be suffered by the local
Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissed the petition for government, such mistake was so glaring as to raise suspicion
relief from judgment. that it was contrived to favor the plaintiff.”
HELD: FACTS
NO.
Respondent Maramba was a grantee of a DENR miscellaneous
lease contract. She caused the construction of a commercial
The Rules on Summary Procedure prohibits petition for relief
fish center on the property. However, petitioner city caused
from judgment in cases covered by the same rules. A petition
the demolition of the commercial fish, allegedly without giving
for relief from judgment in forcible entry and unlawful detainer
direct notice to respondent and with threat of taking over the
cases is a prohibited pleading.
property. This prompted Maramba, through her attorney-in-
fact, to file a complaint for injunction and damages with prayer
The petitioner cannot file the petition with the MTC because it
for a WPI and/or TRO.
is a prohibited pleading. The petitioner cannot also file the
petition for relief with the RTC because it has no jurisdiction to In the complaint’s prayer, Maramba asked for a judgment
entertain petitions for relief from judgments of the MTC. ordering defendant corporation ot pay plaintiff the amount of
“Ten Thousand (P10,000.00),” but the word “million,” was
The remedy of the petitioner is to file a petition for certiorari handwritten on top of the word “thousand,” and an additional
before the RTC under Rule 65 on the ground of lack of zero was handwritten at the end of the numerical figure. Such
jurisdiction over the persons of the petitioner. intercalation was not explained in any part of the records and
in the proceedings. The trial court ruled in favor of Maramba.
As a real action in personam, the jurisdiction over the person The trial court later denied petitioner city’s motion for lack of
of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and notice of time and place of hearing, thus not being entitled to
decide the case. Any judgment of the court which has no judicial cognizance. The trial court also granted Maramba’s
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and void. motion for execution and ordered the issuance of a writ of
execution.

Petitioner city then filed a petition for relief with prayer for is no other available or adequate remedy that will allow for
preliminary injunction, together with an affidavit of merit. The substantive justice.
city alleged that the decision, were it not for the City Legal
Officer’s mistake, negligence and gross incompetence, would On the first ground, the presence of fraud, accident, mistake
not have been obtained by the plaintiff, or should have been or excusable negligence (FAME) must be assessed from the
reconsidered or otherwise overturned, the damage award in circumstances of the case. Excusable negligence as a ground
the total amount of P11M being not only unconscionable and for a petition for relief requires that the negligence be so gross
unreasonable, but completely baseless. The trial court denied “that ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded
petitioner city’s petition for relief and ordered that the writ of against it.” This excusable negligence must also be imputable
execution be implemented. However, upon reconsideration, to the party-litigant and not to his or her counsel whose
the trial court granted the petition for relief. negligence binds his or her client. The binding effect of
counsel’s negligence ensures against the resulting uncertainty
The CA granted Maramba’s petition for certiorari, holding that and tentativeness of proceedings if clients were allowed to
petitioner city’s motion for reconsideration lacked a notice of merely disown their counsels’ conduct.
hearing and was a mere scrap of paper that did not toll the
period of appeal. Fraud, as a ground for a petition for relief from judgment
pertains to extrinsic or collateral fraud. There is extrinsic fraud
ISSUE when a aprty is prevented from fully presenting his case to the
corut as when the lawyer connives to defeat or corruptly sells
• Whether the lack of notice of hearing in a motion for out his client’s interest. Extrinsic fraud can be committed by a
reconsideration is excusable negligence that allows the counsel against his client when the latter is prevented from
filing of a petition for relief of judgment (IN THIS CASE, IT presenting his case to the court.
WAS ACTUALLY EXTRINSIC FRAUD);
• Whether the 60-day period to file a petition for relief from Mistake as used in Rule 38 means mistake of fact and not of
judgment, when reckoned from receipt of the denial of mistake of law. A wrong choice in legal strategy or mode of
the motion for reconsideration, is considered filed on time procedure will not be considred a mistake for purposes of
(YES) granting a petition for relief of judgment.
RULING Here, the gross disparity between the award of actual damages
and the amount actually proved during the trial, the
Under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the RoC, the notice of magnitude of the award, the nature of the “mistake” made,
requirement in a motion is mandatory, which is rendered and that such negligence did not personally affect the legal
defective by failure to comply with the requirement. As a rule, officer of the city all contributed to a conclusion that the
a motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro forma mistake or negligence committed by counsel bordered on
and does not affect the reglementary period for the appeal or extrinsic fraud.
the filing of the requisite pleading. The three-day notice
requirement by the Rules is not intended for the benefit of the Periods for filing a petition for relief under Rule 38
movant. Rather, the requirement is for the purpose of avoiding
surprises that may be sprung upon the adverse party, who The double period required under this provision (60 days after
must be given time to study and meet the arguments in the learning of judgment, final order, or other proceeding; 6
motion before a resolution by the court. months after entry of judgment or final order) is jurisdictional
and should be strictly complied with. Otherwise, a petition for
The test is the presence of the opportunity to be heard, as well relief from judgment filed beyond the reglementary period will
as the time to study the motion and meaningfully oppose or be dismissed outright.
controvert the grounds upon which it is based.
The 60-day period to file a petition for relief from judgment is
In this case, Maramba was able to file an opposition to reckoned from actual receipt of the denial of the motion for
petitioner city’s MR on the ground that the motion was not set reconsideration when one is filed.
for hearing. This shows that there was an opportunity to be
heard for Maramba on the matters raised by petitioner city in Petitioner city received a copy of the July 30, 2004 decision on
its MR. The court has relaxed procedural rules when a rigid August 11, 2004. It filed a motion for reconsideration on
application of these rules only hinders substantial justice. August 26, 2004. On October 25, 2004, it received a copy of the
October 21, 2004 trial court order denying its motion for
The mistake borders on extrinsic fraud. reconsideration. Four days later or on October 29, 2004, it filed
its petition for relief from judgment. Thus, the petition for
A petition for relief form judgment under Rule 38 of the RoC is relief from judgment was considered filed on time.
an equitable remedy “allowed in exceptional cases when there
G.R. No. 214593 July 17, 2019
DANA S. SANTOS, petitioner, v. LEODEGARIO R. SANTOS, marriage but only their property relations. Aggrieved, Dana
respondent. filed the present petition for review on certiorari.
FACTS: ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial
Dana and Leodegario cohabited and lived together which court's decision declaring the marriage void had attained
produced two children. They married each other on December finality despite the filing of the petition for relief from
3, 1987. Two more children were born after the marriage. judgment.
However, their relationship started to deteriorate. This led
Dana and Leodegario file a joint petition for the dissolution of RULING:
their conjugal partnership. This, in turn, was granted. Yes. It must be borne in mind that Civil Case No. 03-6954 is a
Leodegario filed a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the marriage
marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-6954, alleging between Dana and Leodegario on the ground of psychological
psychological incapacity on the part of Dana. Dana filed her incapacity. The applicable substantive laws are, therefore, the
Answer, alleging that Leodegario filed the petition in order to Family Code and the New Civil Code, while the governing
marry his paramour, with whom he had a son. On June 24, procedural law is A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, with the Rules of Court
2009, the trial court declared the marriage between Dana and applying suppletorily. In the case at bar, the CA and the OSG
Leodegario null and void on the ground of psychological both concluded that the trial court decision had attained
incapacity. The court held that Dana was afflicted with grave, finality after Dana's inability to file an appeal therefrom. The
incurable, and juridically antecedent Histrionic Personality two resolutions of the appellate court presuppose that the
Disorder. judgment on the validity of Dana and Leodegario's marriage
Dana filed a Notice of Appeal but was later on withdrawn. had attained finality. Dana, on the other hand, asserts that it
Instead, she filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment with the had not.
RTC, alleging that extrinsic fraud and mistake prevented her The Court agrees with the conclusion of the CA regarding the
from presenting her case at the trial. The trial court denied finality of the RTC decision. There is no provision in A.M. No.
Dana's petition, ruling that there was no sufficient allegation 02-11-10-SC prohibiting resort to a petition for relief from
of fraud or mistake in the petition. Dana filed a motion for judgment in a marriage nullity case. Furthermore, the said Rule
reconsideration, which was also denied. sanctions the suppletory application of the Rules of Court31 to
Aggrieved, she filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, in cases within its ambit. It cannot, therefore, be said that Dana
which the latter referred Dana's petition to the Philippine availed of
Mediation Center. Dana and Leodegario entered into a an inappropriate remedy to question the decision of the trial
compromise agreement where they agreed to transfer the court. Dana then properly and seasonably assailed the order of
titles to their conjugal real properties in the name of their four denial via certiorari to the CA. It is, therefore, clear that the
common children. Thus, it declared the case closed and proceedings in Civil Case No. 03-6954 continued even after the
terminated and ordered the issuance of entry of judgment. trial court had rendered judgment and even after the lapse of
Dana later on filed a Manifestation alleging that the 15-day period for appealing the decision. Nevertheless,
Leodegario was not complying with the compromise considering the nature of a petition for relief, which is to set
agreement. She reiterated this allegation in her Motion to aside a final judgment, the Court cannot agree with Dana's
Reopen and/or Reinstate the Petition.Leodegario countered assertion that the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 03-6954
that he has complied with the essential obligations under the had not attained finality. In fact, the decision has already been
compromise agreement. He subsequently filed a annotated in their marriage contract. This finding, however,
Manifestation showing such compliance. does not detract from the fact that the proceedings in Civil
Case No. 03-6954 continued even after the trial court had
CA: MOTION TO REINSTATE THE PETITIONIS DENIED FOR LACK rendered judgment, precisely because Dana filed a petition for
OF MERIT. LEODEGARIO COMPLIES WITH THE COMPROMISE relief from that judgment. From the denial of her petition, she
AGREEMENT. sought recourse to the appellate court. The appellate court, in
dismissing the case upon the parties' compromise on their
Dana filed a Motion for Reconsideration, asserting that the conjugal properties, invoked the finality of the RTC decision as
compromise agreement was never intended to settle the issue a bar to the litigation of the other issues raised by Dana's
of the validity and subsistence of her marriage to petition. This conclusion is untenable.
Leodegario. In Servicewide Specialists, Inc. v. Sheriff of Manila, decided
prior to the enactment of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
CA: denied Dana’s Motion for Reconsideration. CA held that the Court held: There is no question that a judgment or order
the marital ties between Dana and Leodegario had been denying relief under Rule 38 is final and appealable, unlike an
severed by the trial court's decision of June 24, 2009; hence, order granting such relief which is interlocutory. However, the
the compromise agreement did not involve the validity of their second part of the above-quoted provision (that in the course
of an appeal from the denial or dismissal of a petition for relief,

a party may also assail the judgment on the merits) may give GEORGE KATON, petitioner, vs. MANUEL PALANCA JR.,
the erroneous impression that in such appeal the appellate LORENZO
court may reverse or modify the judgment on the merits. This AGUSTIN, JESUS GAPILANGO and JUAN FRESNILLO,
cannot be done because the judgment from respondents.
which relief is sought is already final and executory. x x x The
purpose of the rule is to enable the appellate court to
determine not only the existence of any of the grounds relied PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45
upon whether it be fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence, but also and primarily the merit of the petitioner's DOCTRINE: The "residual jurisdiction" of trial courts is
cause of action or defense, as the case may be. If the appellate available at a stage in which the court is normally deemed to
court finds that one of the grounds exists and, what is of have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter
decisive importance, that the petitioner has a good cause of involved in the appeal. This stage is reached upon the
action or defense, it will reverse the denial or dismissal, set perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval
aside the judgment in the main case and remand the case to of the records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the
the lower court for a new trial in accordance with Section 7 of original records or the records on appeal. In either instance, the
Rule 38. (Citations omitted)Presently, the 1997 Rules of Civil trial court still retains its so-called residual
Procedure changed the nature of an order of denial of a jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve compromises,
petition for relief from judgment, making it unappealable and, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending
hence, assailable only via a petition for certiorari. appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the appeal.
Nevertheless, the appellate court, in deciding such petitions
against denials of petitions for relief, remains
tasked with making a factual determination, i.e., whether or FACTS:
not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying the petition. To do so, it is still obliged, as Service Petitioner filed a request with the District Office of the Bureau
Specialists instructs, to "determine not only the existence of of Forestry in Puerto Princesa, Palawan, for the re-
any of the grounds relied upon whether it be fraud, accident, classification of a piece of real property known as Sombrero
mistake or excusable negligence, but also and primarily the Island, located in Tagpait, Aborlan, Palawan, which consists of
merit of the petitioner's cause of action or defense, as the case approximately 18 hectares. Thereafter, the Bureau of Forestry
may be."Stated otherwise, the finality of the RTC decision District Office, Puerto Princesa, Palawan, ordered the
cannot bar the appellate court from determining the issues inspection, investigation and survey of the land subject of the
raised in the petition for relief, if only to determine the petitioner's request for eventual conversion or re-classification
existence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial from forest to agricultural land, and thereafter for George
court in denying such petition. While a Rule 38 Petition does Katon to apply for a homestead
not stay the execution of the judgment, the grant thereof patent.
reopens the case for a new trial; and thus, if merit be found in
Dana's certiorari petition assailing the trial court's denial of her Gabriel Mandocdoc (now retired Land Classification
petition for relief, the case will be reopened for new trial. The Investigator) undertook the investigation, inspection and
CA, therefore, erred in refusing to reopen Dana's survey of the area in the presence of the petitioner, and his
petition on the basis of the finality of the trial court decision.A cousin, Manuel Palanca, Jr. During said survey, there were no
careful perusal of the petitions filed by Dana before the trial actual occupants on the
court, the appellate court, and this Court betrays the lack of island but there were some coconut trees claimed to have
allegations sufficient to support a petition for relief from been planted by the parties, respondent as an alleged overseer
judgment under Rule 38. The petition makes no specific of petitioner who went to the island from time to time to
citation of other acts or circumstances attributable to her undertake development work, like
counsel that fraudulently deprived Dana of her opportunity to planting of additional coconut trees.
fully ventilate her claims and defenses with the trial court. The
acts complained of in the petition constitute neither "gross and Petitioner contends that the whole area known as Sombrero
palpable Island had been classified from forest land to agricultural land
negligence" nor corruption or collusion amounting to extrinsic and certified available for disposition upon his request and at
fraud.. All told, the trial court did not commit grave abuse of his instance. However, Mr. Lucio Valera, then land investigator
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it of the District Land Office, Puerto Princesa, Palawan, favorably
dismissed her petition for relief. endorsed the request of respondent for authority to survey.
"Records show that respondent Juan Fresnillo filed a
RULE 39 homestead patent application for a portion of the island.

Palanca denies that he is a mere overseer of the petitioner appeal. What the CA referred to as residual prerogatives were
because he said he was acting for himself in developing his own the general residual powers of the courts to dismiss an action
area and not as anybody's caretaker. Respondents aver that motu proprio upon the grounds mentioned in Section 1 of Rule
they are all bona fide and lawful possessors of their respective 9 of the Rules of Court and under authority of Section 2 of Rule
portions and have declared said portions for taxation purposes 1 of the same rules. To be sure, the CA had the excepted
and that they have been faithfully paying taxes thereon for instances in mind when it dismissed the Complaint motu
twenty years. Respondents :led their Answer with Special proprio "on more fundamental grounds directly bearing on the
and/or Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim in due time. lower court's lack of jurisdiction" and for prescription of the
They also filed a Motion to Dismiss alleged defiance by action. Indeed, when a court has no jurisdiction over the
petitioner of the trial court's Order to amend his Complaint so subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the
he could thus effect a substitution by the legal heirs of the action. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law
deceased, and is determined by the
Respondent Gapilango. allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought.
The Motion to Dismiss was granted by the RTC in its Order. The
Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner was dismissed. CITY OF MANILA, represented by Mayor Gemiliano C.
Lopez, Jr., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
CA decided the case on merits instead of the procedural THE ARMY & NAVY CLUB, INC., respondents.
aspect. It held that while petitioner had caused the G.R. No. 100626 November 29, 1991
reclassification of Sombrero Island from forest to agricultural
land, he never applied for a homestead patent under the Public PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65
Land Act. Hence, he never acquired title to that land.
Nonetheless, the Complaint was dismissed motu proprio by DOCTRINE: Execution pending appeal is allowed under Rule 39,
the challenged Resolution of the CA Special Division of five Sec. 2, of the Rules of Court, this provision must be strictly
members — with two justices dissenting — construed, being an exception to the general rule. The reason
pursuant to its "residual prerogative" under Section 1 of Rule allowing this kind of execution must be of such urgency as to
9 of the Rules of Court. outweigh the injury or damage of the losing party should it
secure a reversal of the judgment on appeal. Absent any such
justification, the order of execution must be struck down as
Issue: WON CA erred in dismissing the complaint motu proprio flawed with grave abuse of discretion.
pursuant to its residual prerogative (NO)
FACTS: This was a complaint for unlawful detainer filed by the
Ruling: Suffice it to say that the appellate court indeed acted City of Manila against private respondent for violation of the
ultra jurisdictio in ruling on the merits of the case when the lease agreement. A summary judgment in favor of the
only issue that could have been, and was in fact, raised petitioner was rendered by the MTC and seasonably elevated
was the alleged grave abuse of discretion committed by the to the RTC which affirmed the decision of the MTC.
trial court in denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
Settled is the doctrine that the sole office of a writ of certiorari Petitioner filed an ex parte motion for execution on the ground
is the correction of errors of jurisdiction. Such writ does not that the judgment had already become final and executory.
include a review of the evidence, more so when no The motion was granted and a writ of execution was served on
determination of the merits has yet been made by the trial ANC.
court, as in this case.
ANC moved to quash the writ, but hours later, sensing that the
In the Assailed Resolution, the CA acknowledged that it had motion could not be acted upon, filed a petition for certiorari
erred when it ruled on the merits of the case. It agreed with and prohibition with the CA. The CA set aside the order of
petitioner that the trial court had acted without jurisdiction in execution and the writ as well.
perfunctorily dismissing his September 10, 1999 Motion for
Reconsideration, on the erroneous ground that it was a third ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in annulling the writ of
and prohibited motion when it was actually only his first execution
motion.
HELD: In the present case, the private respondent had up to
The CA's motu proprio dismissal of petitioner's Complaint June 25, 1991, to appeal the decision of the regional trial court.
could not have been based, therefore, on residual jurisdiction The motion for execution was filed by the petitioner on June 10,
under Rule 41. Undeniably, such order of 1991, before the expiration of the said reglementary period. As
dismissal was not one for the protection and preservation of the decision had not yet become final and executory on that
the rights of the parties, pending the disposition of the case on date, the motion was premature and should therefore not have

been granted. Contrary to the petitioner's contention, what the Before the pre-trial, Chiquita and other foreign corporations
trial court authorized was an execution pending appeal. entered into a settlement. The parties executed a
Compromise Agreement. Under the agreement, the foreign
Both RA 6031 and BP 129 provide that decisions of the regional corporations will place the settlement money in an escrow
trial court in its appellate capacity may be elevated to the account, and leave the individual releases to a mediator.
Court of Appeals in a petition for review. In effect, both laws
recognize that such judgments are "final" in the sense that Chiquita and other foreign corporations moved to dismiss the
they finally dispose of, adjudicate, or determine the rights of case. The RTC approved the Compromise Agreement by way of
the parties in the case. But such judgments are not yet "final judgment on compromise and dismissed the case.
and executory" pending the expiration of the reglementary
period for appeal. During that period, execution of the Several claimants moved for the execution of the judgment on
judgment cannot yet be demanded by the winning party as a compromise. Chiquita opposed the execution on the ground of
matter of right. mootness. They argued that they have already complied with
their obligation by depositing the settlement amounts in an
The rule is that if the judgment of the metropolitan trial court escrow account, which was administered by the mediator. The
is appealed to the regional trial court and the decision of the RTC granted the motion for execution.
latter is itself elevated to the Court of Appeals, whose decision
thereafter became final, the case should be remanded through The petitioner filed a motion to suspend the execution and be
the regional trial court to the metropolitan trial court for allowed to present evidence on their behalf. During the
execution. The only exception is the execution pending hearing of the case, the claimants accused the RTC Judge as a
appeal, which can be issued by the regional trial court under corrupt official who delayed the execution. Petitioner
Sec. 8 of Rule 70 or the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court requested for change of venue, and was granted. The case was
under Sec. 10 of the same Rule. transferred to RTC Davao City.
As previously observed, the petitioner has shown no weighty Judge Omelio ordered the execution of the compromised
justification for the application of the exception. Hence, the agreement.
respondent court committed no error in reversing the Regional
Trial Court of Manila and annulling the writ of execution issued Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari without
by it on June 10, 1991, pending appeal of its decision. prior appeal to the Court of Appeals. Chiquita claimed that
their obligation under the Compromise Agreement consisted
Chiquita Brands, Inc. and Chiquita Brands International, of depositing the settlement amount in an escrow fund - that
Inc., v. Hon. George E. Omelio, Regional Trial Court, Davao they were not required to release and to directly give the
City, Branch 14, Sheriff Roberto C. Esguerra, Cecilio G. amount to each claimant. Judge Omelio, in ordering the
Abenion, and 1,842 Other Plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 95-45 execution of the compromised agreement, acted in grave
G.R. No. 189102 ; June 07, 2017 abuse of discretion amounting to lack of excess of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
FACTS: Whether or not the respondent court committed ‘grave abuse
In 1993, thousands of banana plantation workers from over 14 of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
countries instituted class suits for damages against 11 foreign issuing the writ of execution.
corporations.Chiquita Brands, Inc., and Chiquita Brands
International, Inc. (collectively Chiquita) were included in the HELD:
11 foreign corporations. YES. Under the judicially approved Compromise Agreement,
Chiquita is obligated to deposit the settlement amount in
The plantation workers claimed to have been exposed to escrow within 10 business days after they received a signed
dibromochloropropane while working in the plantations and Compromise Agreement from the counsel of the claimants.
suffered serious and permanent injuries.
The Compromise Agreement does not require Chiquita to
The United States court dismissed the actions on the ground of ensure the distribution of the settlement amount. Its
forum non conveniens, and directed the claimants to file obligation was limited to the depositing of the amount in
actions in their respective home countries. escrow.
In 1996, 1,843 Filipino claimants filed a complaint for damages A writ of execution derives its validity from the judgment it
against the same foreign corporations before the RTC, Davao seeks to enforce. Hence, it should not “vary the terms of the
del Norte. judgment or go beyond its terms.” Courts can neither modify
nor impose terms different from the terms of a compromise

agreement that the parties have entered in good faith. Doing his academic records. This became final and executory. The CA
so would amount to grave abuse of discretion. granted the motion for execution.
A judicial compromise is regarded as a “determination of the ISSUE

controversy” between the parties and “has the force and effect
of a final judgment.” In other words, it is both a contract and • Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion,
“a judgment on the merits.” It may neither be disturbed nor amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in directing the
set aside except in cases where there is forgery or when either execution of its Decision dated August 30, 2004 granting
of the parties’ consent has been vitiated. the quo warranto petition of Brito. (YES)
RULING
The doctrine on immutability of judgments applies to
compromise agreements approved by the courts in the same Courts may modify a final and executory decision when
manner that it applies to judgments that have been rendered circumstances transpire that render the execution unjust or
on the basis of a full-blown trial. inequitable.
It is true that the execution of a court’s judgment becomes a

G.R. No. 202860 matter of right upon the expiration of the period to appeal and
no appeal was duly perfected. Generally, therefore, courts may
LEE T. ARROYO, PETITIONER, v. THE HONORABLE COURT
no longer review or modify a final and executory judgment.
OF APPEALS AND ULYSSES A. BRITO, RESPONDENTS.
This is otherwise referred to as the principle of immutability of
judgments, which dictates that once a decision becomes final,
Petition for Certiorari the enforcement or execution of the judgment becomes a
purely ministerial act.
DOCTRINE
Notwithstanding this, the doctrine admits of the following
“Courts may modify a final and executory decision when exceptions: (a) correction of clerical errors; (b) the so-called
circumstances transpire that render the execution unjust or nunc pro tunc entries that cause no prejudice to any party; (c)
inequitable.” void judgments; and (d) whenever circumstances transpire
after the finality of the judgments rendering execution unjust
FACTS and inequitable.
This case arose from the enactment of RA 8371, or the Here, Arroyo invoked the last exception – which relates to
Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997, which resulted into the supervening events. According to Arroyo, the OP’s decision
reorganization of two offices: the Office for Northern Cultural which found Brito liable for dishonesty changed the situation
Communities (ONCC) and the Office of Southern Cultural in such a manner that renders the execution of the quo
Communities (OSCC). They were merged into the National warranto judgment unjust and inequitable.
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). A reorganization of
positions and personnel later followed. A supervening event, in order to apply, must rest on proven or
certain facts. While Arroyo raised the fact that Brito falsified
Brito, who was then the Regional Director for Region V of the his college degree in her motion for the reconsideration of the
OSCC, was temporarily appointed to the same position quo warranto decision, it was only after the reglementary
pursuant to the NCIP Executive Director’s Memorandum. period that the OP declared final its decision to dismiss and
Unsatisfied with the appointment of Arroyo and three other disqualify Brito from government service. Verily, the
appointees, Brito, together with several other individuals supervening event referred to in the present case transpired
initiated a petition for quo warranto to challenge their after the finality of the judgment that Brito sought to execute.
appointment before the CA. Brito invoked his right to security
of tenure and argued that Arroyo does not possess the Since Brito was found, by final judgment, liable for Dishonesty
required CBS eligibility for the position of RD. and Falsification of Official Documents, the Court agrees that
the CA gravely abused its discretion in directing the execution
The CA partially granted the petition for quo warranto insofar of its judgment on the quo warranto petition. The subsequent
as Brito and his co-petitioner Batay-an were concerned. When ruling finding Brito administratively liable for Dishonesty and
the decision became final and executory, Brito filed a Motion Falsification of Official Documents, substantially changed the
for Entry of Judgmetn and for the Issuance of a Writ of situation of the parties in the present case. By falsifying his
Execution. Arroyo’s opposition hinged on the ground that the scholastic records, Brito became ineligible for admission into
petition for quo warranto was rendered moot and academic as the career service. This holds especially true for positions
Brito was dismissed from government service due to falsifying falling within the third level of the career service, which has
more stringent eligibility requirements.
G.R. NO. 160786 JUNE 17, 2013 ISSUE/S: Whether or not the sale by respondent Jimmy Flores
SIMPLICIA O. ABRIGO V. JIMMY F. FLORES, ET AL of his 1/4 share in the western portion of the 402-square meter
lot constituted a supervening event that rendered the
DOCTRINE: Once a judgment becomes immutable and execution of the final judgment against petitioners
unalterable by virtue of its finality, its execution should follow inequitable.
as a matter of course. A supervening event, to be sufficient to
stay or stop the execution, must alter or modify the situation RULING:
of the parties under the decision as to render the execution NO. The decision became final after its affirmance by the CA
inequitable, impossible, or unfair. The supervening event modifying the decision only by deleting the award of rentals.
cannot rest on unproved or uncertain facts. There being no further appellate proceedings after the
affirmance with modification, the CA issued its entry of
FACTS: judgment. The reopening would be legally impermissible,
After Francisco’s death, his widow and Gaudencia entered into considering that the November 20, 1989 decision, as modified
an extrajudicial partition whereby the western half of the same by the CA, could no longer be altered, amended or modified,
lot was assigned to Francisco’s heirs while the eastern half even if the alteration, amendment or modification was meant
thereof to Gaudencia. The trial court rendered judgment for to correct what was perceived to be an erroneous conclusion
the private respondents by ordering the partition of the land of fact or of law and regardless of what court, be it the highest
in dispute. The heirs of Gaudencia went on appeal, and the CA Court of the land, rendered it.
affirmed the appealed judgment of the respondent court,
minus the award for rentals. With no further appellate The issuance of the special order of demolition would also not
proceedings having been taken by the petitioners and their constitute an abuse of discretion, least of all grave. Such
other co-heirs, an Entry of Judgment was issued. issuance would certainly be the necessary and logical
consequence of the execution of the final and immutable
Thereafter, the heirs of Francisco filed with the court a quo a decision. According to Section 10( d) of Rule 39, Rules of Court,
motion for execution to enforce and implement its decision of when the property subject of the execution contains
November 20, 1989. However, upon survey of the land, a improvements constructed or planted by the judgment obligor
garage, a small portion of the heirs of Guadencia’s residence or his agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove
was extended to a portion of the property of the plaintiffs– said improvements except upon special order of the court
thus, they were required to remove such. To forestall issued upon motion of the judgment obligee after due hearing
compliance with the above, petitioners, as defendants below, and after the judgment obligor or his agent has failed to
again prayed the respondent court for a final extension of sixty remove the improvements within a reasonable time fixed by
(60) days within which to comply with the order. The the court. With the special order being designed to carry out
respondent court denied such motion for extension and issued the final judgment of the RTC for the delivery of the western
a writ of execution. portion of the property in litis to their respective owners, the
CA's dismissal of the petition for certiorari could only be
Upon service of the sheriff, the writ was returned “partially upheld.
satisfied”, with the information that the heirs of Guadencia
failed to remove that portion of their residence as well as their EUFEMIA A. CAMINO v. ATTY. RYAN REY L. PASAGUI
garage and poultry fence on the western half of the property. A. C No. 11095, January 31, 2017
The heirs of Francisco then filed a Motion for Issuance of
Special Order of Demolition. Before the respondent court
could act on private respondents’ aforementioned motion for FACTS: Disbarment complaint was filed against respondent
demolition, petitioners filed a Motion to Defer Resolution on Atty. Ryan Rey L. Pasagani before the Integrated Bar of the
Motion for Demolition. Philippines-commission on bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), that the
The respondent court denied petitioners’ motion to defer respondent violated their agreement for the latter to facilitate
resolution of private respondents’ motion for a special order and secure a loan to finance the payment of necessary
of demolition and directed the issuance of an alias writ of expenses to transfer the title of a certain property under her
execution. MR was filed but denied. And an alias writ of name, she claimed that respondent obtained a loan using their
execution was again issued. Again, petitioners failed and property as a collateral, but atty. Pasagni arrogated the
refused to comply. Petitioners instituted a special civil action proceeds.
for certiorari in the CA against respondents and the RTC,
alleging that the RTC had gravely abused its discretion ISSUE: Whether or not a malpractice or gross misconduct can
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in denying their be used as grounds for disbarment of a lawyer.
motion to defer resolution on the motion for Demolition as
well as the MR. However, the CA dismissed. RULING: The court ruling was in favor of the complainant, the
Court found that the respondent was guilty of deceit,

malpractice and gross misconduct in converting the money of in obtaining a loan from the bank, the proceeds of which would
his client to his own use without her consent, his failure to use finance respondents' rice mill business.
the proceeds for the transfer of the title in complainant’s
name. He did not only betray the trust and confidence of his The complaint was dismissed upon motion of the private
client, he is likewise guilty of engaging in dishonest and respondents on the ground that it did not state a cause of
deceitful conduct. action, and assuming there was a cause of action, it was
already barred by statute of limitations. Spouses Zaballero
The Court affirmed the findings and conclusions of the IBP filed an amended complaint which was denied admission by
Board of Governors and imposed the penalty to disbarment. the trial judge. The dismissal order was not appealed or
The Court also ordered to return the load proceeds he received otherwise elevated to an appellate court. Instead, petitioner
from Perpetual Help Credit Cooperative Inc. Spouses filed a new complaint for “Annulment of Deed, Title,
Reconveyance and Damages” before the CFI which was
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: Wherefore, Resolution No. XX1-2014- likewise dismissed on the ground of res judicata.
938 dated December 14, 2014 of the IBP Board of Governors
which found respondent Atty. Ryan Rey I Pasagan GUILTY of In the meantime, private respondents Paterno and Aurora filed
violation for Rule 1.0 if the Code of Professional responsibility filed a motion for the issuance of a Writ of Possession.
affirmed with Modification as to the penalty. Respondent is
instead meted the penalty of Disbarment, Respondent is CFI: GRANTED AND ISSUED WRIT OF POSSESSION
further ordered to Return the load proceeds amounting to
1,000.000.00 and to pay legal interest at the rate of twelve CA: AFFIRMED CFI. Respondent Judge obviously believed that
percent per annum computed from the release of the loan on to issue a writ of execution to implement an order dismissing
February 15, 2011 up to June 30, 2013 and six percent per a complaint was a superfluity. The effect of a writ of execution
annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid as well as the would have been the same. the action taken by the respondent
120,000.00 received for the purpose or transferring of the title Judge could not be error, much less grave abuse of discretion.
in the name of the complainant to pay legal interest at the rate
of twelve percent per annum computed from receipt of the Before the SC, petitioner argues that the lower court acted in
amount on February 3, 2011 up to June 30, 2013 and six excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion
percent per annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid. He is when it issued the writ of possession because the case was not
likewise ordered to return all other documents pertinent to decided on the merits and the rights and obligations of the
the load obtained from PHCCI and those received from parties were not defined. They alleged that there was no
complaint. decision on who the owners were in the order dismissing the
complaint.
G.R. No. L-60800 October 18, 1982 ISSUE: WON a writ of possession can be issued in a case not
decided on the merits?
JAIME PELEJO and BELEN C. ZABALLERO, petitioners, vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PATERNO C. HELD: NO. Execution is the remedy provided by law for the
ZABALLERO and AURORA GONZALES, respondents. enforcement of a judgment and the only portion of a decision
that becomes the subject of execution is that ordained or
decreed in the dispositive part. Whatever may be found in the
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI body of the decision can only be considered as part of the
reasons, or conclusions of the court and while they may serve
DOCTRINE: Execution is the remedy provided by law for the as guide or enlightenment to determine the ratio decidendi
enforcement of a judgment and the only portion of a decision what is controlling is what appears in the dispositive part of the
that becomes the subject of execution is that ordained or decision (Robles vs. Timario, et. al., 107 Phil. 809)
decreed in the dispositive part. Whatever may be found in the
body of the decision can only be considered as part of the In the case at bar, the trial judge issued the writ of possession
reasons or conclusions of the court and- while they may serve which was dismissed in an Order, dated August 22, 1980. In
as guide or enlightenment to determine the ratio decidendi; other words, the complaint for "Annulment of Deed of Sale,
what is controlling is what appears in the dispositive part of the Title, Reconveyance and Damages" was not decided on the
decision (Rubles vs. Timarin, et al., 107 Phil. 809). merits because the order states:
FACTS: Petitioner spouses Zaballero filed a complaint for "Acting on defendants" Motion to Dismiss for the grounds
Annulment of Deed of Sale, Title, Reconveyance and Damages therein alleged which the Court finds to be well taken the
alleging that the Deed of Sale petitioners executed in favor of Complaint is hereby DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to
respondents, is merely simulated to accommodate the latter costs. However, considering that defendant have no objection

to plaintiffs amending their complaint, plaintiffs may do so, subsilencio denial by the lower court of their application for
provided they file in Court an amended complaint within ten injunctive relief. CA issued a resolution giving petitioners and
(10) days from today. respondents 10 days from notice within which to filed their
comment on the petition and in the meantime restrained them
G.R. NO. 135180-81 & 135425-26 from enforcing the writ of execution. Incidentally the
August 16, 2000 resolution was signed by only 2 members of the CA hence
Heirs of the Late Justice JOSE B. L. REYES represented by resolution is void.
ADORACION D. REYES and Heirs of EDMUNDO A. REYES,
namely, MA. TERESA P. REYES and CARLOS P. REYES, RTC Pasay City Branch 231: Issued an order DISMISSING the
Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND METRO MANILA petition on the ground that respondent’s remedy is appeal in
BUILDERS, INC., Respondents. due time which, when withdrawn, was effectively abandoned.
FACTS: 6. With the imminent expiration of the TRO, MMB filed with
1. Brothers Justice Jose Benedicto Luna Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes) the CA a series of petitions and motions urging the CA to issue
and Dr. Edmundo A. Reyes were coowners of a parcel of land. injunctive relief: (1) May 14, 1998 – Motion for Leave of Court
The brothers entered into a 25-year lease contract with Metro to Admit a Supplemental Petition (2) May 18, 1998 – Urgent
Manila Builders, Inc. (MMB, Inc) in consideration of the fact Motion for the Issuance of another TRO in the second CA case
that the lessee would cover all present and future & Manifestation alleging that it filed with the RTC an action for
improvements in the property with insurance against certain annulment of the unilateral termination of lease contract and
risks and maintain the premises in good, sanitary and damages (3) May 20, 1998 – Filed a case seeking to set aside
tenantable condition at all times. However, petitioners found the order of the RTC, dismissing the action and praying that a
out that MMB had not properly maintained the premises or TRO be issued against the MTC.
covered the same with an adequate insurance and had even
sub-leased the property to third-parties. 7. The CA consolidated the second and third cases. It issued a
resolution for the third case requiring the respondent to file
2. Petitioners served MMB a notice terminating the lease their Comment to the petition. Respondents filed with the RTC
contract and demanding that they vacate and surrender the a petition seeking a TRO to enjoin the MTC Branch 45 and the
premises subject of the lease to petitioners. Failing to do so, sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution. Petitioners filed
petitioners filed with the MeTC a complaint for unlawful their comment/opposition.
detainer based on breach of the contract of lease. MTC:
Rendered decision in favor of petitioners. CA: SET ASIDE the decision of the MTC Pasay City Branch 45.
MMB is ordered to restore the subject property in the
3. Petitioners filed with the MTC of Pasay City Branch 45 a possession of petitioner and are hereby permanently enjoined
motion for execution of the judgment of eviction while the from further committing acts disturbing physical possession of
Respondent appealed the decision to the RTC of Pasay City but the subject property by petitioner until after the expiration of
the appeal was dismissed. MMB then filed an appeal to the CA. the Contract of Lease.
8. Respondent filed with the CA another motion expart for
4. MTC Branch 45 granted the motion for execution and issued execution pending appeal, motion to cite in contempt and
the execution on December 1, however, the CA issued a TRO motion to stop demolition. Petitioners filed with the CA a
against the execution of the ejectment on December 8. Even motion requesting for an extension of time to file explanation
before the CA could rule on the injunctive relief, MMB on the motion to declare petitioners and counsel in contempt.
withdrew the appeal in which the CA granted the withdrawal. GRANTED.
Simultaneously with the withdrawal of the first CA case, 9. Petitioners filed with the CA a motion for extension of time
private respondent filed a petition for annulment of the to file comment/memorandum for at least 5 days. Petitioners
ejectment decision before the RTC of Pasay City Branch 231 on filed with the SC a petition for review of decision of the CA.
the ground that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals their consolidated
ejectment case. MMB prayed for a TRO and/or Preliminary comment to the very urgent motion for execution pending
Injunction against the execution of the ejectment decision. The appeal, manifestation/motion to cite in contempt/motion to
court did not issue the TRO against the MTC. stop demolition, with motion to defer consideration.
5. Petitioners filed with the RTC their memorandum in support 10. The CA despite the pending petition with this Court,
of their opposition against the injunctive relief sought by MMB promulgated its resolution granting the instant petition and
and filed a MD as well. In an attempt to dramatize the plea, executing a Writ of Execution Pending Appeal on its own
MMB filed another petition with the CA for certiorari and Decision.
mandamus complaining about what it termed as the

The CA designated a special sheriff to enforce the writ, and on By the mere fact of the filing of the petition, the finality of the
the same day, he evicted petitioners from the premises and Court of Appeals' decision was stayed, and there could be no
restored possession in favor of private respondent. Petitioners entry of judgment therein, and, hence, no premature
filed with the SC a petition for certiorari to nullify the execution could be had. The Court of Appeals adopted its
resolution of the CA allowing execution pending appeal and resolution granting execution pending appeal on September
the writ of execution issued. 18, 1998, after the petition for review was already filed in the
Supreme Court. It thereby encroached on the hallowed
ISSUE/S: Whether the Court of Appeals has authority to issue grounds of the Supreme Court. Worst of all, the Court of
immediate execution pending appeal of its own decision Appeals has no authority to appoint a special sheriff . It
appointed an employee of the mailing section, who was not
HELD: NO. even bonded as required by law. Such display of keen interest
It was bad enough that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that in the immediate execution of its decision coupled with the
the lease contract must be judicially rescinded before exercise of excessive authority by illegally appointing a "special
respondent MMB, Inc. may be evicted from the premises. It sheriff" makes the concerned members of the Court of Appeals
was worse that the Court of Appeals immediately enforced its liable to disciplinary action and the imposition of appropriate
decision pending appeal restoring respondent in possession of penalty.
the leased premises and worst, appointed a special sheriff to
carry out the writ of execution. In the first place, we WHEREFORE, the Court declares VOID the resolution of the
emphatically rule that the Court of Appeals has no authority to Court of Appeals, dated September 18, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No.
issue immediate execution pending appeal of its own decision. 47158 and SP No. 47720, and the writ of execution dated
Discretionary execution under Rule 39, Section 2 (a), 1997 September 21, 1998, issued pursuant thereto. Petitioners are
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is allowed pending acquitted of the charge of contempt of court.
appeal of a judgment or final order of the trial court, upon
good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing. The Court REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on August 21, 1998, in CA-G.R. SP No. 47158 and
A judgment of the Court of Appeals cannot be executed SP No. 47720, and REINSTATES the decision of the Regional
pending appeal. Once final and executory, the judgment must Trial Court, Pasay City, Branch 231, dated March 23, 1998, and
be remanded to the lower court, where a motion for its order dated April 14, 1998, in Civil Case 98-0366.
execution may be filed only after its entry. In other words,
before its finality, the judgment cannot be executed. There can Costs against respondent MMB, Inc.
be no discretionary execution of a decision of the Court of
Appeals. In the second place, even in discretionary executions, NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION , petitioner, vs. HEIRS
the same must be firmly founded upon good reasons. The OF ANTONINA RABIE, represented by ABRAHAM R. DELA
court must state in a special order the "good reasons" CRUZ, respondents.
justifying the issuance of the writ. The good reasons allowing
execution pending appeal must constitute superior
circumstances demanding urgency that will outweigh the PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45
injuries or damages to the adverse party if the decision is
reversed. Jurisprudence teaches us what are "good reasons" DOCTRINE: Prior to the transmittal of the original record or the
that justify a premature execution of judgment, such as record on appeal, the court may issue orders for the protection
"deterioration of commodities subject of litigation" and "the and
deteriorating condition of the vessel, M/V 'Valiant' . . . left to preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve
rot at the pier and without a crew to guard it." any matter litigated by the appeal, approve compromises,
permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending
In this case, the good reasons given by the Court of Appeals to appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow
support the discretionary execution of its decision are (1) that withdrawal of the appeal.
respondent would be deprived of income from its business
endeavors; (2) that "it is of public knowledge" that the Court FACTS:
of Appeals and the Supreme Court are clogged with cases and
it may take some time before the decision in the case may NAPOCOR filed a complaint for expropriation 5 against
attain its finality; and (3) that petitioners acted with bad faith respondents Heirs of Antonina Rabie (respondents) for the
and malice. None of the cited reasons is "good" enough. acquisition of the a residential lot located in Barangay Lewin,
According to jurisprudence, respondent's precarious financial Lumban, Laguna to be used as access road for the Caliraya
condition is not a compelling circumstance warranting Hydro Electric Power Plant of the Caliraya Botocan-Kalayaan
immediate execution. Build Rehabilitate and Operate Transfer Project of the
NAPOCOR. The case was raffled to Regional Trial Court, Branch

91, Sta. Cruz, Laguna. SPOUSES ERNESTO AND VICENTA TOPACIO, AS
REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT MARILOU
Respondents filed a Verified Answer claiming that the then TOPACIO-NARCISO, PETITIONERS, VS. BANCO FILIPINO
current market value of the property was P10,000 per square SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, RESPONDENT.
meter on the inner portion and P12,000 per square meter near G.R. No. 157644, November 17, 2010
the highway. Respondents prayed, among others, for a just
compensation in the amount of P1,250,700, representing the PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) zonal valuation for the
"actual area to be occupied" by NAPOCOR. DOCTRINE: Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court finds
application only to civil actions and not to special
NAPOCOR deposited with the Land Bank the amount proceedings.
representing the BIR zonal valuation of the affected portion of
the subject property. Respondents filed a Motion to Withdraw FACTS:
Deposit which the trial court granted. NAPOCOR filed a
Motion to Issue Order of Expropriation. Petitioners obtained a loan from the respondent which was
secured by a real estate mortgage.
Board of Commissioners assisted the court in determining the
amount of just compensation. NAPOCOR also questioned the Petitioner failed to pay the loan thus respondent to file a
Commissioners' recommendation on the payment of rentals Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage.
and the fact that NAPOCOR was not given the opportunity to
be heard and to argue as to the amount of just compensation. The mortgaged property was then sold at public auction,
where the respondent emerged as the highest bidder.
NAPOCOR filed its Notice of Appeal and Record on Appeal. The
trial court gave due course to NAPOCOR's Notice of Appeal and Respondent filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
directed the transmittal of the records of the case to the Court Possession over the mortgaged property before the RTC
of Appeals. Nonetheless, the trial court heard the respondent’s which was granted.
Motion for Execution Pending Appeal.
The writ of possession was not implemented because,
CA dismissed the petition. petitioners, filed with the RTC, a petition to set aside the
auction sale and the writ of possession (with application for a
temporary restraining order and a writ... of preliminary
Issue: WON the trial court still had jurisdiction when it heard injunction). The RTC issued a temporary restraining order
the respondent’s Motion for Execution pending appeal (NO) enjoining the respondent and the Deputy Sheriff from
implementing the writ of possession it previously issued.
Ruling: Execution pending appeal, also called discretionary
execution under Section 2 (a), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, is The RTC granted and issued an alias writ. The CA affirmed the
allowed upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after decision of the RTC.
due hearing. In this case, the motion for execution pending
appeal was filed by respondents seven days after their receipt ISSUE: Whether or not a writ of possession may not be
of the trial court's order denying the motions for enforced upon mere motion of the applicant after the lapse
reconsideration filed by both parties. Clearly, respondents of more than five (5) years from the time of its issuance.
filed the motion for execution pending appeal before the lapse
of the period to file an appeal, which is fifteen days from notice HELD: In the present case, Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of
of the order denying the motion for reconsideration. Court is not applicable to an ex parte petition for the issuance
Therefore, the trial court still had jurisdiction when of the writ of possession as it is not in the nature of a civil
respondents filed their motion for execution pending appeal. action governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure but a judicial
Further, prior to transmittal of the records of the case, the trial proceeding governed separately by Section 7 of Act No. 3135
court does not lose jurisdiction over the case and in fact, may which regulates the methods of effecting an extrajudicial
issue an order for execution pending foreclosure of mortgage.
appeal.
The issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in an
While the trial court still had jurisdiction when it issued the extrajudicial foreclosure is summary and ministerial in nature
order granting execution pending appeal, the Court holds that as such proceeding is merely an incident in the transfer of
discretionary execution does not apply to eminent domain title.
proceedings.

In sum, based on these considerations, the SC finds that the
RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing an alias There should be proof of service of a copy of said judgment or
writ of possession in favor of the Respondent. order on the parties to determine if the period of appeal had
lapsed, before a motion of execution may be granted and
Andres Dy and Gloria Dy, v. The Honorable Court of implemented. While an ex-parte motion for the issuance of a
Appeals, Honorable Zeus G. Abrogar, Honorable Felicidad writ of execution may be filed in the proper court, such motion
Navarrio-Quiambo, Sheriff Ernesto Adan, Clerk of Court must be supported by a proof of service of the judgment or
Carlos N. Aguillon, Jr., and Ramon V. Roxas order on the losing party.
G.R No. 93756 ; March 22, 1991
If judgment or order may be immediately executed without
prior notice to the losing party, then such a party shall be left
FACTS: without any remedy against a judgment not supported by any
In 1982, the private respondent filed a complaint for ejectment evidence and/or the applicable law.
of petitioners from his property in the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MTC) Makati. At the preliminary conference, the issues were
defined and the parties were required to submit the affidavits G.R. No. 179104 February 29, 2008
of their witnesses and other evidence together with their
position papers. ANASTACIO TUBALLA HEIRS, namely: JULIANA TUBALLA,
AGUSTIN TUBALLA, and HERMAN TUBALLA, petitioners,
In 1989, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and vs. RAUL CABRERA, ET AL., respondents.
against the defendants. The defendants interposed an appeal
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Makati - which affirmed Petition for Review
the decision of the MTC. As a case governed by the Rules on
Summary Procedure, the decision became immediately DOCTRINE
executory.
“The only exceptions to the rule that final judgments may no
The private respondent filed an ex-parte motion for the longer be modified in any respect are (1) the correction of
immediate execution of the judgment. The respondent sheriff, clerical errors, (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which
several policemen and other persons ejected the petitioners cause no prejudice to any party, and (3) void judgments.”
from the premises by throwing out all their belongings to the
street. FACTS
Tuballa filed a Complaint against Cabrera Enterprises, Inc. for

In 1990, the petitioners filed before the Court of Appeals (CA)
Recovery of Possession of a parcel of sugar land under Lot No.
a petition for certiorari alleging that they have not been
5697. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Tuballa, but the
furnished a copy of the decision of the trial court. The CA
dispositive portion designated the Lot as “Lot No. 6597,” with
dismissed the petition for lack of merit
the first two digits mistakenly swapped. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC, which later became final and
The petitioners therefore filed a petition alleging that the
executory. Subsequently, Tuballa filed a manifestation before
appellate court committed a grave abuse of discretion in
the RTC, pointing out the typographical error in the dispositive
dismissing the petition when execution of judgment was
portion of the RTC decision. The RTC, in its order, stated that it
affected before a copy of the same was served on the
was the CA that had authority to correct or clarify the clerical
petitioners.
error. On petition for certiorari, the CA dismissed on the
ground of procedural omissions and deficiencies, denying the
ISSUE:
subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Whether or not judgment of the Regional Trial Court be
immediately executed even before a copy was serving on the ISSUE
losing party.
• Whether or not a decision that has acquired finality,
HELD: becoming immutable and unalterable, may no longer be
NO. modified. (As a general rule, YES, but there are exceptions)
Section 1 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that RULING

“execution shall issue only upon a judgment or order that
finally disposes of the action or proceeding”. A copy of the final A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
order or judgment shall be served personally or by registered unalterable. A final judgment may no longer be modified in any
mail on the parties, and that there must be proof of service. respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous

conclusions of fact and law; and whether it be made by the HEREIN REPRESENTED BY DAVID M. PORTICOS, BOARD
court that rendered it or by the highest court in the land. CHAIRMAN, Petitioner vs. HEIRS OF AMANTE P. CABOTAJE,
NAMELY: ESTHER M. CABOTAJE, AMANTE M. CABOTAJE,
The orderly administration of justice requires that the JR., JULINDA M. CABOTAJE, FERNANDO M. CABOTAJE,
judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body must CHRISTINA IMELDA M. CABOTAJE-NELAM, ALL HEREIN
reach a point of finality set by the law, rules, and regulations. REPRESENTED BY ESTHER M. CABOTAJE, Respondents
The noble purpose is to write finis to dispute once and for all.
This is a fundamental principle in our justice system, without DOCTRINE: The execution of a judgment may not necessarily
which there would be no end to litigations. Utmost respect and be a supervening event that renders an appeal without value
adherence to this principle must always be maintained by and of no practical value.
those who exercise the power of adjudication. Any act, which
violates such principle, must immediately be struck down. FACTS:
Indeed, the principle of conclusiveness of prior adjudications is Petitioner FACOMA instituted an action for quieting of title
not confined in its operation to the judgments of what are against respondents Heirs of Cabotaje. RTC ruled in favor of
ordinarily known as courts, but it extends to all bodies upon FACOMA. The Heirs of Cabotaje filed a Motion for
which judicial powers had been conferred. Reconsideration which was also denied by the RTC.
The only exceptions to the rule that final judgments may no
Later on, the Heirs of Cabotaje filed the Notice of Appeal while
longer be modified in any respect are (1) the correction of
FACOMA filed a Motion to Dismiss the Notice of Appeal
clerical errors, (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which
averring that the MR did not toll the running of the
cause no prejudice to any party, and (3) void judgments.
reglementary period to appeal for the reason that the Motion
Under OCT No. FV-16880, the technical description of the land was but pro forma.
refers to Lot No. 5697, Pls-659-D and not Lot No. 6597. The RTC
committed a typographical error in its Decision when it RTC denied the Notice of Appeal for being filed out of time. The
ordered Cabrera Enterprises to vacate Lot No. 6597, Pls-659-D RTC deemed the Heirs of Cabotaje's MR as a pro forma motion,
and turn over the possession of the same to Tuballa. And, in failing to toll the reglementary period to file an appeal.
accordance with the first exception to modification of final
judgment mentioned earlier, this Court hereby modifies the The Heirs of Cabotaje filed a Petition for Certiorari before the
clerical error in the Decision of the RTC. CA. During the pendency of the Certiorari Petition, FACOMA
filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment, which was initially
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 30, 1994 of the denied by the RTC. FACOMA filed a Motion for
RTC is hereby MODIFIED by changing Lot No. 6597 to Lot No. Reconsideration. The RTC granted FACOMA's Motion for
5697 in the first paragraph thereof, the fallo of which shall now Execution of Judgment.
read:
CA: The MR filed by the Heirs of Cabotaje is not a pro forma
motion. Hence, the Notice of Appeal was not filed out of time.
FACOMA filed a MR, which was denied by the CA.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
ISSUE: Whether the CA committed an error for failing to
1. Ordering the defendant corporation, Cabrera declare the Certiorari Petition moot and academic, considering
Enterprises Incorporated to vacate Lot No. 5697, Pls- that the RTC had granted the Motion for Execution of
659-D and turn over the possession of the same to the Judgment filed by FACOMA during the pendecy of the
plaintiff Anastacio Tuballa; Certiorari Petition.
2. x x x x;
RULING:
3. Sentencing defendants to pay the costs of [these] NO. The alleged execution of the RTC judgment cannot be
proceedings. considered as a supervening event that would automatically
moot the issues in this petition. A case or issue is considered
SO ORDERED. moot and academic only when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an
G.R. No. 219984 adjudication of the case or a
declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use.
VALENCIA (BUKIDNON) FARMERS COOPERATIVE
MARKETING ASSOCIATION, INC., REPRESENTED BY THE However, it must be stressed that the Rules of Court precisely
BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF FARMERS COOPERATIVE covers the situation wherein an already executed judgment
MARKETING ASSOCIATION (FACOMA) AS TRUSTEES, may still be reversed or remedied upon appeal. In other words,

the execution of a judgment may not necessarily be a and later, the trial court issued Orders lifting and cancelling the
supervening event that renders an appeal without value and Notice of Levy on Adelina Tan's properties and also on several
of no practical value. Rule 39, Section 5 of the Rules of Court bank accounts in the name of the Tans.
states that where the executed judgment is reversed totally or
partially, or annulled, on appeal or otherwise, the trial court CA: Dismissed appeal filed by Alfredo, but proceeded in due
may, on motion, issue such orders of restitution or reparation course with Adelina’s appeal.
of damages as equity and justice may warrant under the
circumstances. Simply stated, in the eventuality that the None of the parties filed any motion for reconsideration or
appeal of respondents Heirs of Cabotaje will prosper, contrary appeal from the CA decision. It became final and executory,
to the mistaken view of petitioner FACOMA, the RTC may still per Entry of Judgment issued by the CA.
order the restitution or reparation of damages in favor of
respondents Heirs of Cabotaje. Hence, the argument raised by Adelina filed with the trial court a Motion for Execution,
petitioner FACOMA is erroneous; the appeal filed by praying that the excess of the amounts she previously paid as
respondents Heirs of Cabotaje would not be a futile and purely exemplary damages, attorney's fees and liquidated damages
hypothetical exercise that has no practical use or value. be refunded to her, in accordance with the judgment of the CA.
To counter such move, Ventanilla Enterprises filed with the CA
As held by the Court in Silverio v. Court of Appeals, execution an Omnibus Motion (with entry of appearance) praying that
"does not bar the continuance of the appeal on the merits, for the entry of judgment be recalled, lifted and set aside; that the
the Rules of Court precisely provide for restitution according CA Decision be recalled, reconsidered, and/or vacated and,
to equity and justice in case the executed judgment is reversed thereafter, the appeal of Adelina Tan be dismissed or the
on appeal." appeal be reopened to allow petitioner to file an appeal brief.
Petitioner argued that its counsel, Atty. Liberato Bauto died

O. VENTANILLA ENTERPRISES CORPORATION, prior, hence, any notice sent to him must be deemed
petitioner(s), vs. ADELINA S. TAN and SHERIFF REYNANTE ineffective; that the parties have arrived at a settlement of the
G. VELASQUEZ, Presiding Judge, respondent(s). case, as shown by the fact that private respondent already paid
G.R. No 180325 February 20, 2013 P9,073,694.76 as complete and full satisfaction of the
adjudged obligations of the defendants to petitioner, and thus,
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 the appeal should have been deemed mooted.
DOCTRINE: There is no extraordinary circumstance in this case RTC: Meanwhile, granted motion for execution.
that would merit a recall of the entry of judgment to reopen
the case. The reason given by petitioner, that its former Ventanilla Enterprises filed with the RTC a Very Urgent Motion
counsel had died before the CA Decision was promulgated, (for recall and reconsideration of order and quashal of alias
hence, it was not properly notified of the judgment, is too writ of execution, levy, and notice of sheriff's sale, etc.), but
tenuous to be given serious consideration. In Mojar, et al. v. this motion was denied.
Agro Commercial Security Service Agency, Inc., the Court
explained that it is the party's duty to inform the court of its Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA to
counsel's demise, and failure to apprise the court of such fact assail the trial court's denial of the Very Urgent Motion, but as
shall be considered negligence on the part of said party. admitted by petitioner in the present petition, said action for
certiorari was denied due course and dismissed by the CA.
FACTS:
Ventanilla Enterprises leased two of its properties in CA: As to petitioner's Omnibus Motion (with entry of
Cabanatuan City to Alfredo Tan and Adelina Tan (the Tans). appearance) filed with the CA, the appellate court issued a
Due to the failure of the Tans to comply with the terms of the Resolution, merely noting petitioner's motion because its
lease, petitioner filed a complaint against the Tans for Decision has long become final and executory. Undaunted,
cancellation and termination of contract of lease with the petitioner again filed a Manifestation and Motion, praying that
Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City (RTC). its Omnibus Motion and Supplemental Motion be resolved on
the merits instead of merely being noted as the CA did in its
RTC: Rendered judgment in favor of Ventanilla Enerprises. Resolution; that the petition for certiorari be resolved and
granted; and that the proceedings in the trial court with regard
The Tans appealed. However, petitioner filed a motion for to the execution of the CA Decision, be annulled and set aside.
execution pending appeal and the same was granted by the
trial court. Several properties and bank accounts of private CA promulgated the Resolution denying the abovementioned
respondent and Alfredo S. Tan were levied upon. The Tans Manifestation and Motion. The CA pointed out that the
decided to pay the amounts as ordered in the RTC Decision,

separate petition for certiorari which petitioner sought to be enforced by the institution of a complaint in a regular court
resolved had already been dismissed. within 10 years from the time the judgment becomes final.
ISSUE/S: Whether CA Decision had not attained finality FACTS: In consideration for a loan obtained from respondent
because petitioner’s counsel, who died while case was pending Citibank, petitioner Anama executed a promissory note in
before the CA, was unable to receive a copy thereof. favor of Citibank. To secure payment of the obligation, Anama
also executed a chattel mortgage over various industrial
HELD: NO (it had attained finality). machineries and equipment located on his property. For
Although the petition is an appeal from the Resolution of the Anama's failure to pay the monthly installments due on the
CA issued on May 24, 2007, refusing to recall its entry of promissory note, Citibank filed a complaint for sum of money
judgment, and its Resolution dated October 19, 2007, denying and replevin RTC of Manila.
reconsideration of the earlier resolution, petitioner is actually
making a vain attempt to reopen a case that has long been final Anama filed his answer with counterclaim and his amended
and executory. The Court frowns upon such conduct of answer with counterclaim, alleging that his failure to pay the
litigants and their lawyers. The Court strikes down the monthly installments was because Citibank refused to receive
argument that the CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 58817 did not the checks he issued, and that the chattel mortgage was
attain finality because petitioner's counsel, who died while the defective and void.
case was pending before the CA, was unable to receive a copy
thereof. The CA was correct in ruling that there is no RTC issued an Order of Replevin over the machineries and
extraordinary circumstance in this case that would merit a equipment covered by the chattel mortgage.
recall of the entry of judgment to reopen the case. The reason Citibank filed a motion for issuance of alias writ of seizure
given by petitioner, that its former counsel had died before the alleging that the properties subject of the Order of Replevin
CA Decision was promulgated, hence, it was not properly taken by the Sheriff under his custody were not delivered to it.
notified of the judgment, is too tenuous to be given serious The RTC granted the motion.
consideration. In Mojar, et al. v. Agro Commercial Security
Service Agency, Inc., the Court explained that it is the party's Anama filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied
duty to inform the court of its counsel's demise, and failure to by the RTC
apprise the court of such fact shall be considered negligence
on the part of said party. CA: GRANTED Anama's petition for certiorari and prohibition
and nullified the RTC's orders of seizure.
Thus, for failure of petitioner to notify the CA of the death of SC: DISMISSED Citibank’s petition for review on certiorari for
its counsel of record and have said counsel substituted, then lack of merit and AFFIRMED the Decision of the CA. An Entry of
service of the CA Decision at the place or law office designated Judgment was subsequently issued on April 12, 1999.
by its counsel of record as his address, is sufficient notice. The
case then became final and executory when no motion for During the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 06499 (Anama’s
reconsideration or appeal was filed within the reglementary petition for petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of
period therefor. preliminary injunction) in the CA, the fourth floor of the Manila
City Hall and its records were destroyed by fire.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED
for utter lack of merit. On February 10, 1982, Anama filed a petition for
reconstruction of record with the RTC, which the latter
[G.R. No. 192048. December 13, 2017.] granted. The RTC issued an Order directing that all pending
DOUGLAS F. ANAMA, petitioner, vs. CITIBANK, N.A. incidents in Civil Case No. 95991 be suspended until G.R. No.
(formerly First National City Bank), respondent. 61508 (Citibank’s petition for review on certiorari w/ SC) has
been resolved.
DOCTRINE: An action to revive a judgment is an action whose Anama filed a petition for revival of judgment with the CA
exclusive purpose is to enforce a judgment which could no (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 107748). Anama sought to revive
longer be enforced by mere motion. Section 6 of Rule 39 is the CA's July 30, 1982 (Granted motion for certiorari and
clear that once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prohibition) Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 06499 and argued that
prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right by Citibank's failure to file an action for the reconstitution of the
mere motion within five years from the date of entry of records in the RTC in Civil Case No. 95991 constituted
judgment. If the prevailing party fails to have the decision abandonment of its cause of action and complaint against
enforced by a motion after the lapse of five years, the said Anama. In addition to the revival of the CA's July 30, 1982
judgment is reduced to a right of action which must be Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 06499, Anama sought to remand the

case to the RTC for further proceedings in Civil Case No. 95991, As an action for revival of judgment is a new action with a new
particularly his counterclaims against Citibank. cause of action, the rules on instituting and commencing
actions apply, including the rules on jurisdiction. Its
Citibank argued that the petition should be dismissed as an jurisdictional requirements are not dependent on the previous
action for revival of judgment is within the exclusive original action and the petition does not necessarily have to be filed in
jurisdiction of the RTC. It also argued that laches has set in the same court which rendered judgment.
against Anama for having slept on his rights for almost 10
years. Lastly, Citibank claimed that it did not abandon its 2. YES. As an action to revive judgment raises issues of whether
money claim against Anama when it did not initiate the the petitioner has a right to have the final and executory
reconstitution proceedings in the RTC. judgment revived and to have that judgment enforced and
does not involve recovery of a sum of money, we rule that
CA: DENIED the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The petition for jurisdiction over a petition to revive judgment is properly with
revival of judgment should have been filed with the the RTCs. Thus, the CA is correct in holding that it does not
appropriate RTC which has exclusive original jurisdiction over have jurisdiction to hear and decide Anama's action for revival
all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of judgment.
of pecuniary estimation and/or all cases not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body Under BP 129, RTCs shall exercise exercise exclusive original
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. jurisdiction in all civil actions in which the subject of the
litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
ISSUES: 1. WON Anama can still file for a petition for revival of
judgment In determining the jurisdiction of an action whose subject is
2. WON the CA correctly denied the petition for revival of incapable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal
judgment because it does not have jurisdiction action or remedy sought must first be ascertained. If it is
primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
HELD: 1. NO. SC denies the petition. An action to revive a considered capable of pecuniary estimation and the
judgment is an action whose exclusive purpose is to enforce a jurisdiction of the court depends on the amount of the claim.
judgment which could no longer be enforced by mere motion. But, where the primary issue is something other than the right
Section 6, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely
Sec. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. — A incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought,
final and executory judgment or order may be executed on such are actions whose subjects are incapable of pecuniary
motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the estimation, hence cognizable by the RTCs.
lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of
limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived The CA also has concurrent original jurisdiction over petitions
judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years for issuance of writ of amparo, writ of habeas data, and writ
from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is of kalikasan. Not being one of the enumerated cases above, it
barred by the statute of limitations. is clear that the CA is without jurisdiction to hear and decide
an action for revival of judgment.
Section 6 is clear. Once a judgment becomes final and
executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a G.R. NO. 137391 December 14, 2001
matter of right by mere motion within five years from the date ENRIQUEZ v. CA
of entry of judgment. If the prevailing party fails to have the
decision enforced by a motion after the lapse of five years, the DOCTRINE: Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that an
said judgment is reduced to a right of action which must be action to revive judgment only requires proof of a final
enforced by the institution of a complaint in a regular court judgment which has not prescribed and has remained
within 10 years from the time the judgment becomes final. unexecuted after the lapse of five (5) years but not more than
ten (10) years from its finality. Nowhere does the rule require
A revival suit is a new action, having for its cause of action the proof that the judgment is still enforceable by and against the
judgment sought to be revived. It is different and distinct from original parties who have died.
the original judgment sought to be revived or enforced. It is a
new and independent action, wherein the cause of action is FACTS:
the decision itself and not the merits of the action upon which 1. On January 5, 1987, the Metropolitan Trial Court of
the judgment sought to be enforced is rendered. Revival of Muntinlupa City rendered a decision in an unlawful
judgment is premised on the assumption that the decision to detainer case, favoring private respondents and ordering
be revived, either by motion or by independent action, is petitioners to vacate, restore the premises to private
already final and executory. respondents, and pay the accrued rentals, P5,000 attorneys

fees and cost of suit. The decision likewise dismissed AND ENGR. ALEX CAPARIDA REYES; AND STEVE DIAZ, ET
petitioners counterclaim. AL.,
respondents..
2. Respondents failed to enforce the judgment by motion
within the five-year period from its entry. They then filed an
action to revive the judgment pursuant to Section 6, Rule 39 of PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45
the then Rules of Court.
FACTS:
METC: The MeTC rendered its decision directing the After a judicious review of the records, the Court resolves to
enforcement of the judgment in the 1987 Unlawful Detainer DENY the instant petition and AFFIRM the September 30, 2014
Case. Decision 1 and December 12, 2014
Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
RTC: DISMISSED the appeal by the petitioners and affirmed the 03161-MIN for failure of the Heirs of Eulogio Bariquit, namely:
decision of the METC. Celestino B. Bariquit, et al. (petitioners) to show that the CA
committed any reversible error in upholding the dismissal of
CA: DENIED the petition for review their forcible entry complaint against the Heirs of Lim Chuan
Juna (also known as Francisco Villa-Abrille Lim Juna),
ISSUE/S: W/N PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FAVE TO PROVE THE represented by his Attorney-in-Fact Antonio Carlos V.A.
ENFORCEABILITY OF THE JUDGMENT Llamas, Maria Loreto A. Lopez, and Antonio V.A. Tan; Fil-Invest
Land, Inc., and Engr. Alex Caparida Reyes; and Steve Diaz, et al.
HELD: NO. (respondents).
Sec. 6 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that an action to As correctly ruled by the CA, respondents' possession over the
revive judgment only requires proof of a final judgment which subject land which may be traced all the way back in 1911 was
has not prescribed and has remained unexecuted after the superior to petitioners' purported possession over the same
lapse of five (5) years but not more than ten (10) years from its which commenced only in 1926. Further, the CA also correctly
finality. Nowhere does the rule require proof that the ruled that petitioners were not deprived by respondents of the
judgment is still enforceable by and against the original parties 2-hectare portion of the subject land that they were
who have died. While the action is still subject to defenses and occupying. Well-established is the principle that factual
counterclaims which arose after the judgment became findings of the trial court, when adopted and confirmed by the
effective, proof of the death of some of the parties is not CA, are binding and conclusive upon this Court and will
required because the judgment can still be enforced by the generally not be reviewed on appeal absent any of the
executor, administrator or successor-in-interest of the exceptions laid down by jurisprudence, as in this case.
judgement creditor against the judgment debtor. Petitioners
further alleged that respondents are not the owners of the ESTEBAN YAU, PETITIONER, VS. RICARDO C. SILVERIO,
subject premises, hence the action must fail. SR., RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 158848, February 04, 2008
An action to revive judgment is not meant to retry the case all
over again. Its cause of action is the judgment itself and not the
merits of the original action. The non-ownership by private DOCTRINE: In computing the time limit for enforcing a final
respondents refer to the merits of the first civil case which has judgment, the general rule is that there should not be included
long been decided with finality and thus become conclusive the time when execution is stayed, either by agreement of the
between the parties. parties for a definite time, by Injunction, by the taking of an
appeal or writ of error so as to operate as a supersedeas, by
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision and the death of a party or otherwise. Any interruption or delay
resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. occasioned by the debtor will extend the time within which the
writ may be issued without scire facias. Thus, the time during
HEIRS OF EULOGIO BARIQUIT, NAMELY: CELESTINO B. which execution is stayed should be excluded, and the said time
BARIQUIT, will be extended by any delay occasioned by the debtor.
ET AL., petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF LIM CHUAN JUNA [ALSO
KNOWN AS FACTS:
FRANCISCO VILLA-ABRILLE LIM JUNA], REPRESENTED BY Esteban Yau bought from Philfinance a Promissory Note No.
HIS 3447 issued by the Philippine Shares Corporation (PSC).
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT ANTONIO CARLOS V.A. LLAMAS, Philfinance then issued postdated checks to Yau drawn against
MARIA the Insular Bank of Asia and America. But when the checks
LORETO A. LOPEZ, AND ANTONIO V.A. TAN; FIL-INVEST were deposited in the bank, they were dishonored for
LAND, INC.,

insufficiency of funds. When Yau complained to the PSC, it Heirs of Numeriano Miranda, Sr., namely; Cirila
denied having issued the promissory note. (deceased), Cornelio, Numeriano, Jr., Erlinda Lolita, Rufina,
Danilo, Alejandro, Felimon, Teresita, Elizabeth, and
Yau filed a complaint with the RTC for recovery of the value of Analiza, all surnamed Miranda, v. Pablo R. Miranda
the promissory note and for damages against Philfinance and G.R. No. 179638 ; July 8, 2013
the members of its board of directors, among whom were
Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr.
FACTS:
Respondent failed to file an answer and was declared in In 1994, the petitioners filed before the Regional Trial Court
default upon motion of Esteban. (RTC) of Muntinlupa City, a Complaint for Annulment of Titles
and Specific Performance against the heirs of Pedro Miranda,
The RTC ruled in favor of Estaban. including the respondent.
Thereafter, upon motion of Estaban, the RTC issued a writ of The RTC rendered a Decision sustaining the validity of the titles
execution. subject of the complaint, ordered the plaintiffs to vacate the
residential house in the lots, and pay Pablo Miranda monthly
Defendants, including Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr., filed a notice of rentals from the date of notice of promulgation of judgment
appeal which interrupted the said implementation of the writ up to the time they have vacated the property. Pablo Miranda
of execution. on the other hand was ordered to indemnify the plaintiffs
equivalent to the fair market value of the co-owned residential
The CA dimissed the appeal filed and thus the court then again house erected on the land.
resume the implementation of the writ.
The petitioners did not file an appeal, the Decision became
Silverio filed with the trial court an omnibus motion praying final and executory. In 2001, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution
that the levy on execution, the notice of auction sale and the but the same was not implemented.
certificate of sale be declared void. He contends that the writ
of execution has become functus oficio since more than five In 2005, the respondent filed an ex-parte motion praying that
(5) years have elapsed from the finality of the judgment sought the plaintiffs be compelled to vacate the property. However,
to be executed. The RTC denied the same. since more than five years have elapsed from the time the Writ
of Execution should have been enforced, the RTC denied the
Upon appeal by Silverio, the CA granted the same and reversed motion.
the decision of the RTC.
The respondent filed before the RTC a Petition for Revival of
ISSUE: Whether or not the Decision rendered by the RTC may Judgment. The RTC rendered a decision and revived the civil
no longer be enforced against Silverio and Macapagal since case.
more than five (5) years have already lapsed from its finality.
The petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal, but the RTC denied the
HELD: the judgment of the trial court sought to be executed same for it is barred by prescription. The petitioners filed a
became final and executory on December 26, 1991. The writ of Petition for Mandamu before the CA - the appellate court
execution was issued on September 17, 1992. It could not be denied the petition on the ground that the notice of appeal
enforced for the full satisfaction of the judgment within the was filed out of time.
five-year period because Macapagal and Silverio filed with the
Court of Appeals and this Court petitions challenging the trial ISSUE:
court's judgment and the writ of execution. Such petitions 1. Whether or not the Notice of Appeal was filed out of
suspended or interrupted the further enforcement of the writ. time.
2. Whether or not an action for revival of judgment is
"Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere appealable.
and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration 3. Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has
of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning jurisdiction over actions for revival of judgments.
party be, not through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits
of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme HELD:
calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are 1. YES. It is basic and elementary that a Notice of Appeal
to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any should be filed within fifteen days from notice of the
attempt to prolong them." judgment or final order. The petitioners filed the
Notice of Appeal via a private courier, a mode of filing
not provided inthe Rules. The actual date of receipt

by the court is deemed the date of filing. The records Thus, on January 25, 1974, petitioner Republic filed before the
show that the court received the Notice of Appeal one trial court a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of
day beyond the reglementary period. execution, alleging that the writ previously issued in 1969 was
recalled in an order dated May 28, 1969 in view of the
pendency of respondents’ petition attempting to nullify the
2. YES. In action for revival of judgment is an entry of judgment.
independent action. It is different and distinct from the original
judgment sought to be revived. The original judgment, which The trial court granted the motion for an alias writ of
is already final and executory, may no longer be reversed. The execution. Private respondents moved to quash the alias writ,
party aggrieved may appeal the decision, but only insofar as which was subsequently denied by the trial court. On appeal,
the merits of the action for revival is concerned. the CA reversed the trial court and ruled in favor of
respondents and ordered the nullification of the orders of the
trial court judge. Thus, the instant petition.
3. YES. An action for revival of judgment may be filed
either “in the same court where said judgment was rendered, ISSUE
or in the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides, or in
• Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the decision of
any other place designated by the statutes which treat the
the trial court, nullifying the issuance of the alias writ of
venue of actions in general”. The respondent filed the Petition
execution. (YES)
for Revival of Judgment in the same court which rendered the
Decision being sought to be revived. RULING
Under Sec. 6 of Rule 39 of the RoC, a judgment may be

G.R. No. L-43179 June 27, 1985 executed on motion within 5 years from the date of its entry
or from the date it became final and executory and, thereafter,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
and before it is barred by the statute of limitations (10 years
Director of Buildings and Real Property Management and
computed from the time the judgment became final), it may
ClTY SHERIFF OF MANILA, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF
be enforced by an independent civil action.
APPEALS, MERCY DE VERA and JUAN A. DE VERA,
respondents. In computing the time limited for suing out an execution,
although there is authority to the contrary, the general rule is
Petition for Review that there should not be included the time when execution is
stayed, either by agreement of the parties for a definite time,
DOCTRINE: “In computing the time limited for suing out an by injunction, by the taking of an appeal or writ of error so as
execution, although there is authority to the contrary, the to operate as supersedeas, by the death of a party, or
general rule is that there should not be included the time when otherwise. Any interruption or delay occasioned by the debtor
execution is stayed, either by agreement of the parties for a will extend the time within which the writ may be issued
definite time, by injunction, by the taking of an appeal or writ without scire facias.
of error so as to operate as supersedeas, by the death of a
party, or otherwise. Any interruption or delay occasioned by Here, the judgment sought to be executed was rendered on
the debtor will extend the time within which the writ may be August 27, 1968. On November 20, 1968, the record of the
issued without scire facias.” case was remanded to the trial court. On April 15, 1969,
petitioner Republic filed a motion for execution. However, on
FACTS April 28, 1969, respondents filed a motion to recall and/or
quash the writ of execution due to their pending petition with
This case stemmed from a complaint filed by the petitioner the CA. The trial court thus recalled the writ of execution and
against respondents for collection of unpaid rentals and held in abeyance the enforcement thereof pending resolution
termination of the lease contract over a parcel of land owned of private respondents’ petition.
by petitioner. The CFI ruled in favor of petitioner. On appeal,
the CA affirmed the CFI’s ruling in toto. The decision became The resultant interruption in the execution of the judgment,
final and executory, and Republic thus filed a motion for the being occasioned by and attributable to the private
execution of the decision, which was granted on April 17, 1969. respondents, the filing by petitioner Republic, of a motion of
alias writ of execution on January 25, 1974, is thus still
Attempts were made by private respondents to nullify the seasonable and well within the 5-year period.
entry of judgment made. Such efforts were put to an end upon
a decision by the Supreme Court. Thus, with the petition of G.R. No. 156596 August 24, 2007
private respondents dismissed, entry of judgment was ADELAIDA INFANTE, Petitioner, vs. ARAN BUILDERS, INC.,
accordingly made on November 1, 1973. Respondent.
In Aldeguer v. Gemelo, the Court held that an action upon a
DOCTRINE: The rule does not specify in which court the action judgment must be brought either in the same court where said
for revival of judgment should be filed. An action upon a judgment was rendered or in the place where the plaintiff or
judgment must be brought either in the same court where said defendant resides, or in any other place designated by the
judgment was rendered or in the place where the plaintiff or statutes which treat of the venue of actions in general. But
defendant resides, or in any other place designated by the emphasized that other provisions in the rules of procedure
statutes which treat of the venue of actions in general. But which fix the venue of actions in general must be considered
emphasized that other provisions in the rules of procedure such as Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.
which fix the venue of actions in general must be considered
such as Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. The allegations in the complaint for revival of judgment
determine whether it is a real action or a personal action. The
FACTS: previous judgment has conclusively declared private
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the action (for revival of respondent's right to have the title over the disputed property
judgment) on the grounds that the Muntinlupa RTC has no conveyed to it. It is, therefore, undeniable that private
jurisdiction over the persons of the parties and that venue was respondent has an established interest over the lot in
improperly laid. Private respondent opposed the motion. question; and to protect such right or interest, private
respondent brought suit to revive the previous judgment.
Muntinlupa RTC: The MD is denied. Admittedly, the Decision
was rendered by the Makati RTC, but it must be emphasized The sole reason for the present action to revive is the
that at that time, there was still no Regional Trial Court in enforcement of private respondent's adjudged rights over a
Muntinlupa City, so that cases piece of realty. Verily, the action falls under the category of a
from this City were tried and heard at Makati City. With the real action, for it affects private respondent's interest over real
creation of the Regional Trial Courts of Muntinlupa City, property. The present case for revival of judgment being a real
matters involving properties located in this City, and cases action, the complaint should indeed be filed with the Regional
involving Muntinlupa City residents were all ordered to be Trial Court of the place where the realty is located.
litigated before these Courts. The case at bar is a revival of a
judgment which declared the plaintiff as the owner of a parcel Thus, it is now the RTC in Muntinlupa City which has territorial
of land located in Muntinlupa City. jurisdiction or authority to validly issue orders and processes
concerning real property within Muntinlupa City.
Her motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner
came to the CA via the instant special civil
action for certiorari. Petitioner asserts that the complaint for
specific performance and damages before the Makati RTC is a
personal action and, therefore, the suit to revive the judgment G.R. NO. 176906 AUGUST 4, 2009
therein is also personal in nature; and that, consequently, the NUDO V. CAGUIA
venue of the action for revival of judgment is either Makati City
or Parañaque City where private respondent and petitioner FACTS: Private respondents, spouses Petronilo and Marcela
respectively reside, at the election of private respondent. Nudo, filed a complaint for partition and damages against the
spouses, Gumersindo and Zosima Nudo. Petronilo and
CA: Since the judgment sought to be revived was rendered in Gumersindo are brothers and pro-indiviso co-owners of a
an action involving title to or possession of real property, or parcel of land in Baguio City. Petronilo had requested
interest therein, the action for revival of judgment is then an Gumersindo to accede to the partition of the property, but the
action in rem which should be filed with the Regional Trial latter refused, thus forcing him to initiate the complaint.
Court of the place where the real property is located.
During the pendency of the case, Gumersindo Nudo died. No
Issue: WON the RTC Muntinlupa was the proper venue for substitution was effected by the court. The RTC rendered
petitioner’s action for revival of judgment judgment in favor of private respondents. Defendants' counsel
brought the case to the CA on appeal. CA issued a resolution
HELD: YES. Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil dismissing the appeal for failure to file appellants' brief. It then
Procedure provides that after the lapse of five (5) years from issued an entry of judgment. Thereafter, on June 22, 2003,
entry of judgment and before it is barred by the statute of Zosima Nudo died. Private respondents filed a motion for
limitations, a final and executory judgment or order may be execution, which was granted by the court. A writ of execution
enforced by action. The Rule does not specify in which court was issued by the Clerk of Court. Sheriff Ruben L. Atijera
the action for revival of judgment should be filed. returned the writ unenforced on the ground that Susana Nudo,
daughter of Gumersindo and Zosima Nudo, promised to settle

with private respondents and offer the purchase of their share a complete farce of a duly promulgated decision that has long
in the subject property. become final and executory. Under Section 2, Rule 47 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, the only grounds for annulment of
Private respondents filed an Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Lack of
of an Alias Writ of Execution, which the court jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to
granted. An Alias Writ of Execution was issued, but the same either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending
was again returned unenforced, that Susana Nudo refused to party or over the subject matter of the claim.
accept private respondents' proposed partition. Petitioner,
Andrew B. Nudo, son of Gumersindo and Zosima Nudo, filed a Non-substitution of the heirs of a deceased party is not
Petition for Annulment of Judgment, seeking to annul the RTC jurisdictional. The rule on substitution by heirs is not a matter
Decision in the partition case. Petitioner alleged therein that of jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process. It was
neither he nor the other heirs were substituted in place of their designed to ensure that the deceased party would continue to
parents in the proceedings for partition before the trial court. be properly represented in the suit through his heirs or the
This allegedly rendered the proceedings null and void. duly appointed legal representative of his estate. It is only
when there is a denial of due process, as when the deceased is
CA issued a Resolution dismissing outright the petition for not represented by any legal representative or heir, that the
annulment of judgment. According to the CA, annulment of court nullifies the trial proceedings and the resulting judgment
judgment could not be availed of since petitioner's therein.
predecessors-in-interest had availed themselves of the
remedy of appeal. ATTY. RICO PAOLO R. QUICHO, representing Bank of
Commerce ,
ISSUE: complainant, vs. BIENVENIDO S. REYES, JR., Sheriff IV,
Whether the judgment in Civil Case No. 3493-R could be Branch 98,
annulled on the ground that petitioner was not substituted for Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, respondent.
his deceased parents in the said case.
HELD: ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT

NO. The records, however, show that Zosima died on June 22,
2003, after the CA's resolution dismissing the appeal became DOCTRINE: Sheriffs play an important part in the
final and executory. Therefore, at no time were the petitioner's administration of justice. Being in the grassroots of our judicial
parents deprived of any representative in the partition case, machinery they are indispensably in close contact with
until the judgment therein became final and executory..‚ litigants, hence, their conduct should be geared towards
maintaining the prestige and integrity of the court, for the
Petitioner cannot therefore claim now that the judgment in image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the
the partition case is null and void for failure of the court to conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who
implead him, as the judgment became final and executory work thereat, from the judge to the least and lowest of its
prior to the death of his mother. The judgment in the partition personnel. As an agent of the law, he is therefore called upon
case is now enforceable against Gumersindo and Zosima's to discharge his duties with due care and utmost diligence. He
successor-in-interest, including herein petitioner, following cannot afford to err in serving court writs and processes and in
Sec. 7(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which implementing court orders lest he undermines the integrity of
provides: his office and the efficient administration of justice.
Sec. 7. Execution in case of death of party. - In case of FACTS:

death of a party, execution may issue or be enforced
in the following manner: The present case stemmed from the Alias Writ of Execution
(b) In case of death of the judgment obligor, issued on March 9, 2010 by Branch 98 of the Regional Trial
against his executor or administrator or Court of Quezon City (RTC) in Civil Case No. Q-89-
successor in interest, if the judgment be for 3580, the validity of which was then pending determination in
the recovery of real or personal property, or the Court of Appeals (CA),
the enforcement of a lien thereon; docketed as CA-G.R. No. 91285.
An action to annul a final judgment is an extraordinary remedy, Atty. Quicho alleged that the procedure observed by Reyes in
which is not to be granted indiscriminately by the Court. It is a implementing the alias writ violated the 2002 Revised Manual
recourse equitable in character allowed only in exceptional for Clerks of Court (Manual). He cited the Manual which
cases. The reason for the restriction is to prevent this provides that "[i]f the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part
extraordinary action from being used by a losing party to make of the obligation in cash, certified bank check or

other mode of payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, important role he/she plays in the administration of justice.
the officer shall levy upon the properties of the judgment While the trial court still had jurisdiction when it issued the
obligor of every kind and nature whatsoever which may be order granting execution pending appeal, the Court holds that
disposed of for value and not otherwise exempt from discretionary execution does not apply to eminent domain
execution giving the latter the option to immediately choose proceedings.
which property or part thereof may be levied upon, sufficient
to satisfy the judgment." Reyes, in his Comment, had admitted that he refused to accept
the real estate property offered by the BOC to settle the
BOC was given the option to choose which property to be judgment award because he believed that it was not allowed
surrendered to satisfy the judgment. It was only when BOC was under the law and also because it was offered late. Reyes
unable to exercise the option that Reyes was allowed to levy ignored BOC's option to surrender the said property. He
on other properties. He added that BOC was forced to insisted and
surrender under protest a real estate property situated in pursued to levy on cash and other personal properties of the
Barangay Manggahan, Parañaque City, to satisfy the judgment BOC despite the said offer.
and preserve its other properties from being wrongfully levied Such act indeed constituted a clear violation of the Rules.
by Reyes. He argued that Reyes did not give BOC a chance to
exercise that option. Instead of accepting the said property, ATAL MOSLEM and AMADO MOSLEM, Petitioners, vs.
Reyes blow-torched the locked grill door of BOC's cash vault in ANTONIO M. SORIANO, and the HONORABLE COURT OF
Lipa City and forcibly took the money deposits of its clients as FIRST INSTANCE OF TAGUM DAVAO DEL NORTE, Branch
well as its computers. VIII, SALA I, Respondents.
G.R. No. L-36837 August 17, 1983
Reyes denied the charges against him. According to him, he did
not violate any law when he refused to accept BOC's offer of a
property located in Parañaque City to satisfy the judgment PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65
debt. He contended that under
the law, the judgment obligor was mandated to pay all or part DOCTRINE: mere refusal or unwillingness on the part of the
of the obligation in cash, certified bank check or other mode of defeated party to relinquish the property would not constitute
payment acceptable to the judgment obligee and the law was contempt. The proper procedure must be followed in the
silent on a real estate property being offered as a form of execution of the judgment.
payment. He also argued that BOC had refused to pay the
judgment award despite the fact that the CA. Reyes claimed FACTS:
that before he enforced the alias writ, he sent notices of Antonio M. Soriano filed a recovery of possession of 4 hectares
garnishment of land plus damages against Atal Moslem and Amado
to seventeen (17) banks, but only three (3) positively Moslem. In their answer, the defendants specifically denied
responded. These three banks, however, defied the court the material averments of the complaint and contended that
order to release the cash money and shares of stock they held they entered and peacefully possessed for more than twenty
in (20) years the area which was known as public land.
custodia legis. As garnishment was futile, levy on the BOC
assets was resorted to. The parties agreed to have the land surveyed and in case
defendants be found within the land, subject matter of this
The OCA found sufficient grounds to hold Reyes complaint, they will leave.
administratively liable for his overzealousness in implementing
the alias writ of execution. The OCA opined that when BOC The commissioner submitted his report, it was found that the
offered its real estate properties in Parañaque to answer for defendants were within the land titled in the name of Soriano.
the judgment debt, a legal issue arose as to whether the offer Atal Moslem and Amado Moslem interposed no objection to
was acceptable under the law. Thus, according to OCA, Reyes the report. The court, therefore, ordered the petitioners
should have brought the matter to the attention of the Court, herein to vacate the disputed land and pay the costs.
instead of resolving it himself.
When the judgment was being executed, the petitioners
Issue: WON Reyes should be administratively held liable (YES) refused to vacate the land. Soriano filed a motion to declare
them in contempt of court which the court found them to be
Ruling: Time and again, the Court has declared that the highest guilty of.
standard of professionalism in the performance of judicial
tasks is demanded from every court personnel. The Court ISSUE: Whether or not the contempt order is valid
expects every court personnel to perform his/her duties
promptly, with great care and diligence, having in mind the

HELD: It is plain from the records that the judgment being G.R. No. 81552 ; May 28, 1990
enforced is an ordinary one. It is not a special judgment. The
case filed by Antonio M. Soriano is an ordinary civil action for
the recovery of possession of a parcel of land and damages. FACTS:
The judgment directing the petitioners to vacate the land is As a consequence of the petitioners’ failure to pay their
nothing but a judgment to deliver possession of real property. mortgage indebtedness, Lot No. 2-B was extrajudicially
A special judgment under Section 9, Rule 39 is one which foreclosed by the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP)
"requires the performance of any other act than the payment to the highest bidder, which was also the DBP.
of money, or the sale or delivery of real or personal property.
" The petitioners failed to redeem the property within the one-
year period in 1980. Their TCT over the subject property was
Section 13 of Rule 39 provides: How execution for the delivery cancelled by the Register of Deeds, and another was issued in
or restitution of property enforced - The officer must enforce favor of the DBP.
an execution for the delivery or restitution of property by
ousting therefrom the person against whom the judgment is In 1982, DBP sold the lot to Francisco Peria - the DBP’s title
rendered and placing the judgment creditor in possession of over the lot was cancelled, and another was issued to Francisco
such property, and by levying as hereinafter provided upon so Peria.
much of the property of the judgment debtor as will satisfy the
amount of the judgment and costs included in the writ of Peria later mortgaged the lot to Philippine National Bank,
execution. Vigan Branch (PNB). Since the petitioners were in possession
of the property, the Provincial Sheriff ordered them to vacate
WHEN IN CONTEMPT the premises.
Chinese Commercial Company v. Martinez, et al (6 SCRA 848)
is clear that: The petitioners on the other hand filed a complaint for
... Under Section 8(d) of Rule 39, if the judgment be for the annulment of sale, mortgage, and cancellation of transfer
delivery of the possession of real property, the writ of certificates of titles against DBP, PNB, Peria, and the Register
execution must require the sheriff or other officer to whom it of Deeds of Ilocos Sur.
must be to deliver the possession of the property, describing
it, to the party entitled thereto. This means his means that the The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Vigan dismissed the
sheyiff must dispossess or eject the losing party from the complaint and upheld the validity of the extrajudicial
premises and deliver the possession thereof to the winning foreclosure sale, its subsequent sale to Peria, and the same
party. If subsequent to such dispossession or ejectment the being mortgaged as a security. The Court of Appeals (CA)
losing party enters or attempts to enter into or upon the real affirmed the decision of the RTC.
property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or
possession or in any manner disturbs the possession of the The petitioners filed the instant petition for review on
person adjudged to be entitled thereto, then and only then certiorari before the Supreme Court.
may be loser be charged with and punished for contempt
under paragraph (h) of Section 3, Rule 64. " The petitioners argue that the extrajudicial foreclosure sale on
the mortgaged property is invalid on the ground that it was
A similar ruling was rendered in Fuentes, et al vs. Leviste, et al conducted without first effecting a levy on the property before
(117 SCRA 958), where this Court held - selling the same. As a consequence of this, the certificate of
Under Sec. 13, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, it is not enough sale issued by the Sheriff cannot transfer ownership of the
for the sheriff, in the enforcement of a judgment for delivery property to DBP, and therefore, the subsequent transactions
or restitution of property, to merely direct the defeated party are likewise void.
to effect such delivery or restitution. The refusal of the
defeated party to surrender the property to the winning party ISSUE:
upon the order of the sheriff does not constitute contempt. Whether or not the formalities of a levy is a requirement in
The sheriff himself must oust the defeated party from the extrajudicial foreclosure of properties.
property and effect the delivery or restitution by placing the
winning party in possession of the property (U.S. vs. Ramayat HELD:
22 PhiL 183) NO.
A distinction should be made of the three different kinds of
Dionisio Fiesta and Juanita Arconado v. Court of Appeals; sale under the law: an ordinary execution sale, a judicial
Development Bank of the Philippines, Laoag City Branch; foreclosure sale, and an extrajudicial foreclosure sale.
Philippine National Bank, Vigan Branch, Ilocos Sur,
Francisco Peria, and Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur

An ordinary execution sale is governed by the pertinent respondent and served the writ of execution on the persons
provisions of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Rule 68 of the Rules concerned, but nothing seemed to have happened thereat.
of Court applies in case of judicial foreclosure sale. Finally, Act
No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118 applies in cases of Thereafter, the Sheriff prepared on his own a Notice of
extrajudicial foreclosure sale. Garnishment addressed to 6 banks in Bacolod, one of which
the petitioner herein, directing the bank concerned to
The case above clearly involves extrajudicial foreclosure sale. immediately issue a check in the name of the Deputy Provincial
Therefore, there is no justifiable basis to apply by analogy the Sheriff of Negros Occidental in an amount equivalent tp the
provisions of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court on ordinary amount of the garnishment and that proper receipt would be
execution sale, particularly Section 15 therefore to an issued therefor. Incidentally, the house lawyer of private
extrajudicial foreclosure sale. respondent requested the withholding of any release of the
deposit of the private respondent with the petitioner bank.
The formalities of levy, as essential requisite of a valid
execution sale under Section 15 of Rule 39, and a valid Still, petitioner Henares still allowed the encashment of a
attachment lien under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court are not check amounting P37,466.18 – the total amount of private
requirements before an extrajudicially foreclosed property can respondent’s full balance with petitioner bank – upon being
be sold at an auction. told that there was no restraining order from the NLRC.
Private respondent, then plaintiff, filed a complaint before the

On the other hand, the Court finds that the formalities
RTC against petitioners and the deputy provincial sheriff,
prescribed under Sections 2,3, and 4 of Act No. 3135, as
alleging that the former’s current deposit with the petitioner
amended, were substantially complied with.
bank was levied upon, garnished, and with undue haste
unlawfully allowed to be withdrawn, and notwithstanding the
G.R. No. 84526 January 28, 1991
alleged unauthorized disclosure of the said current deposit and
unlawful release thereof. The trial court ruled in favor of
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL & INDUSTRIAL BANK and
private respondent. On appeal, the respondent court initially
JOSEHENARES, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF
reversed the trial court’s judgment, but later affirmed the
APPEALS and MARINDUQUE MINING AND INDUSTRIAL
decision upon reconsideration.
CORPORATION, respondents.
ISSUE
Petition for Review • Whether or not a bank is liable for releasing its depositor’s
funds on the strength of the notice of garnishment made
DOCTRINE
by the deputy sheriff pursuant to a writ of execution
“Garnishment is considered as a specie of attachment for issued by the NLRC. (NO)
reaching credits belonging to the judgment debtor and owing
RULING
to him from a stranger to the litigation. Under the provision of
Section 8, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, the garnishee [the third The respondent court cited the case of De la Rama in
person] is obliged to deliver the credits, etc. to the proper upholding its decision. However, the said case is not exactly on
officer issuing the writ and "the law exempts from liability the all fours with the facts of the case at bar. In De la Rama, the
person having in his possession or under his control any credits amount garnished was not actually taken possession of by the
or other personal property belonging to the defendant, . . ., if sheriff, even from the time of garnishment, because the
such property be delivered or transferred, . . ., to the clerk, judgment debtor was able to appeal and obtain from the CA
sheriff, or other officer of the court in which the action is an injunction prohibiting the execution of the judgment. In this
pending." (Engineering Construction, Inc. v. National Power case, however, there was no evidence of an appeal by private
Corp., G.R. No. L-34589, June 29, 1988)” respondent or the existence of any restraining order.
FACTS On the contrary, the uncontroverted statements in the
deposition of the petitioner Henares that he had previously
The instant case originated form an action filed with the NLRC
sought the advise of the bank’s counsel and that he had
by a group of laborers who obtained therefrom a favorable
checked twice with the Acting Provincial Sheriff who had
judgment for the payment of backwages amounting to
informed him of the absence of any restraining order, belie any
P205,853.00 against the private respondent. On 1976, the said
allegation of undue and indecent haste in the release of the
Commission issued a writ of execution directing the Deputy
said deposit in question.
Sheriff to enforce the aforementioned judgment. Accordingly,
the deputy sheriff when to the mining site of the private Moreover, there is no issue concerning the indebtedness of
the petitioner bank to private respondent since the latter has
never denied the existence of its deposit with the former, the 1979. She declared under oath that the Cimarron PUJ
said deposit being considered a credit in favor of the depositor registered in her name was covered by a third-party liability
against the bank. Thus, there is no need for the application of insurance policy issued by petitioner Perla. Private respondent
Sec. 39, Rule 39 of the RoC as to necessitate the examination Palmes filed a motion for garnishment praying that an order of
of the debtor of the judgment debtor. garnishment be issued against the insurance policy issued by
petitioner in favor of the judgment debtor.
Rather, the immediate release of the funds by the petitioners
on the strength of the notice of garnishment and writ of Respondent Judge issued an Order directing the Provincial
execution, whose issuance, absent any patent defect, enjoys Sheriff or his deputy to garnish the third-party liability
the presumption of regularity, sufficiently supported by Sec. insurance policy. Petitioner then appeared before the trial
41, Rule 39 of the RoC. court and moved for reconsideration of the 6 August 1979
Order and for quashal of the writ of garnishment, alleging that
Finally, the subject of the judgment sought to be enforced the writ was void on the ground that it (Perla) was not a party
were the laborers’ backwages – thus, petitioners should rather to the case and that jurisdiction over its person had never been
be commended for having acted with urgent dispatch despite acquired by the trial court by service of summons or by any
attempts by private respondent to frustrate or unjustifiably process. The trial court denied petitioner's motion. An Order
delay the prompt satisfaction of final judgments. for issuance of an alias writ of garnishment was subsequently
issued on 8 April 1980. More than 2 years later, the present
G.R. No. L-60887 November 13, 1991
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed with this Court
PERLA COMPANIA DE SEGUROS, INC., petitioner, vs. HON.
on 25 June 1982 alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part
JOSE R. RAMOLETE, PRIMITIVA Y. PALMES, HONORATO
of respondent Judge Ramolete in ordering garnishment of the
BORBON, SR., OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF,
third-party liability insurance contract issued by petitioner
PROVINCE OF CEBU, respondents.
Perla in favor
of the judgment debtor, Nelia Enriquez.
DOCTRINE: In order that the trial court may validly acquire
jurisdiction to bind the person of the garnishee, it is not
ISSUE:
necessary that summons be served upon him. The garnishee
Whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion or act in
need not be impleaded as a party to the case. All that is
excess of or without jurisdiction on the part of respondent
necessary for the trial court lawfully to bind the person of the
Judge Ramolete in ordering the garnishment of the judgment
garnishee or any person who has in his possession credits
debtor’s third- party liability insurance.
belonging to the judgment debtor is service upon him
of the writ of garnishment.
RULING:
NO. Garnishment has been defined as a species of attachment
FACTS:
for reaching any property or credits pertaining or payable to a
A PUJ owned and registered in the name of Nelia Enriquez, and
judgment debtor. In legal contemplation, it is a forced
driven by Cosme Casas collided with a private jeep owned by
novation by the substitution of creditors: the judgment debtor,
the late Calixto Palmes (husband of private respondent
who is the original creditor of the garnishee is, through service
Primitiva Palmes) who was then driving the private jeep.
of the writ of garnishment, substituted by the judgment
Calixto Palmes died. The accident also caused physical injuries
creditor who thereby becomes creditor of the garnishee. In
on the part of Adeudatus Borbon who was then only two (2)
order that the trial court may validly acquire jurisdiction to
years old.
bind the person of the garnishee, it is not necessary that
summons be served upon him. The garnishee need not be
Private respondents Primitiva Palmes (widow of Calixto
impleaded as a party to the case. All that is necessary for the
Palmes) and Honorato Borbon, Sr. (father of minor Adeudatus
trial court lawfully to bind the person of the garnishee or
Borbon) filed a complaint against Cosme Casas and Nelia
any person who has in his possession credits belonging to the
Enriquez (assisted by her husband Leonardo Enriquez) before
judgment debtor is service upon him of the writ of
the then Court of First Instance, claiming actual, moral,
garnishment. The Rules of Court themselves do not require
nominal and exemplary damages as a result of the accident.
that the garnishee be served with summons or impleaded in
the case in order to make him liable.
CFI: Rendered a Decision in favor of private respondent
Through service of the writ of garnishment, the garnishee
Primitiva Palmes, ordering common carrier Nelia Enriquez to
becomes a "virtual party" to, or a "forced intervenor" in, the
pay her damages. The judgment of the trial court became final
case and the trial court thereby acquires jurisdiction to bind
and executory and a writ of execution was thereafter issued.
him to compliance with all orders and processes of the trial
The writ of execution was, however, returned unsatisfied.
court with a view to the complete satisfaction of the judgment
of the court.
Consequently, the judgment debtor Nelia Enriquez was
summoned before the trial court for examination on 23 July
In the present case, there can be no doubt, therefore, that the before the RTC BR. 17 ultimately seeking that a Final Bill of Sale
trial court actually acquired jurisdiction over petitioner Perla over the subject lots be issued to him.  
when it was served with the writ of garnishment of the third-
party liability insurance policy it had issued in favor of RTC ruled in petitioner's favor, and accordingly ordered the
judgment debtor Nelia Enriquez. Perla cannot successfully City Treasurer to issue the Final Bill of Sale as prayed for. The
evade liability thereon by such a contention. Every interest CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling in toto.  
which the judgment debtor may have in property may be
subjected to execution. In the instant case, the judgment PRI appealed to the Court, which was denied outright for
debtor Nelia Enriquez clearly had an interest in the proceeds having been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period and
of the third-party liability insurance contract. for failure to pay the docket and other fee on time. On October
23, 2007, the Court's ruling became final and executory. 
In a third-party liability insurance contract, the insurer
assumes the obligation of paying the injured third party to Petitioner moved for execution before the RTC br. 15 and was
whom the insured is liable. The insurer becomes liable as soon granted the corresponding writ. This notwithstanding, the City
as the liability of the insured to the injured third person Treasurer refused to issue the Final Bill of Sale positing that
attaches. Prior payment by the insured to the injured third petitioner still had to settle the delinquent real property taxes
person is not necessary in order that the obligation of the over the subject lots.
insurer may arise. From the moment that the insured became
liable to the third person, the insured acquired an interest in Instead of paying the taxes, petitioner filed a Motion for Order
the insurance contract, which interest may be garnished like Divesting PRI of Title and Vesting Title to plaintiff Edmund Sia.
any other credit. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari and The RTC issued an order granting petitioner’s motion and held
Prohibition is hereby DISMISSED for having been filed out of that petitioner cannot be held liable for any real property tax
time and for lack of merit. prior to the issuance of a Final Bill of Sale.
EDMUND SIA, petitioner, vs. WILFREDO ARCENAS, Petitioner moved for the delivery of the possession of the
FERNANDO LOPEZ, and PABLO RAFANAN, respondents. subject lots as they were already being occupied by third
G.R. NO. 209672-74 January 14, 2015 parties, including herein respondents Wilfredo Arcenas,
Fernando Lopez, and Pablo Rafanan (respondents). Thus, a
Writ of Possession dated June 19, 2009, and eventually, a Writ
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI of Demolition dated August 28, 2009 were issued in
petitioner's favor.
DOCTRINE: It is well-settled that orders pertaining to
execution of judgments must substantially conform to the Respondents, who, at that time, were occupying the subject
dispositive portion of the decision sought to be executed. As lots as lessees of PRI, moved for the quashal of the
such, it may not vary, or go beyond, the terms of the judgment abovementioned writs, essentially contending that the
it seeks to enforce. Where the execution is not in harmony with March 21, 2001 Decision in SCA No. V-7075 sought to be
the judgment which gives it life and exceeds it, it has no executed arose from a mandamus petition where a writ of
validity. possession is proscribed. They posited that the execution of
a final judgment in a mandamus case is similar to the
FACTS: execution of special judgments as provided in Section 11,
Due to the real property tax delinquencies of Panay Railways, Rule 39 in relation to Section 9, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Incorporated (PRI) over the subject lots covering the years 11. In his Opposition, petitioner argued that the ruling in SCA
1992 to 1996, the City Treasurer of Roxas City (City Treasurer) No. V-7075, as well as the orders directing the issuance of the
auctioned the subject lots, with petitioner as the highest Final Bill of Sale and the divesting of PRI's title over the subject
bidder. A Certificate of Sale was then issued to petitioner.   lots entitles him to their possession.
Petitioner was not able to take possession thereof due to the RTC Br. 15: Denied respondents' motion to quash.
refusal of the City Treasurer to issue a Final Bill of Sale despite
the lapse of the redemption period. Worse, then-Mayor CA: Set aside RTC Br. 15's Writ of Possession and Writ of
Juliano Alba (Mayor Alba) of Roxas City issued Executive Order Demolition, and directed the said court to enforce with
No. (EO) 08-97, nullifying the auction sale. dispatch the Writ of Execution dated February 28, 2008 in
accordance with Section 11, Rule 39 in relation to Section 9,
Hence, petitioner was constrained to file a Petition for the Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
annulment of EO 08-97, mandamus, and damages on against
the City Treasurer, Mayor Alba, the members of the City
Council of Roxas City, the Roxas City Government, and the PRI
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the CA correctly declared the writs of this case — should be deemed to be limited to directing
possession and demolition null and void, and accordingly compliance with the judgment, and in case of disobedience, to
directed the RTC to enforce the writ of execution. (YES) have the disobedient person required by law to obey such
judgment punished with contempt.
HELD: At the outset, it is essential to note that the petition in
SCA No. V-7075 before the RTC Br. 17 is primarily that of In this case, it is undisputed that the City Treasurer obstinately
mandamus, seeking that the court, through the issuance of a refused to issue the Final Bill of Sale in petitioner's favor,
writ of mandamus, compel the City Treasurer to issue a Final despite the finality of the judgment in SCA No. V-7075, as well
Bill of Sale covering the subject lots in petitioner's favor as the issuance and service of the Writ of Execution dated
pursuant to its mandate under the "Local Government Code of February 28, 2008 commanding him to do so. In view of such
1991" (LGC). In fact, the RTC Br. 17 granted such petition when refusal, the RTC Br. 15 should have cited the City Treasurer in
it declared valid the auction sale where petitioner purchased contempt in order to enforce obedience to the said judgment.
the subject lots in supersession of EO 08-97, and accordingly However, instead of simply doing so, it granted petitioner's
ordered the City Treasurer to issue the sought for Final Bill of numerous motions, resulting in, among others, the issuance of
Sale. a writ of possession.
As case law defines, a writ of mandamus is a "command issuing A writ of possession is defined as a "writ of execution
from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of employed to enforce a judgment to recover the possession of
the state or sovereign, directed to an inferior court, tribunal, land. It commands the sheriff to enter the land and give its
or board, or to some corporation or person, requiring the possession to the person entitled under the judgment." It may
performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty be issued under the following instances: (a) land registration
results from the official station of the party to whom the writ proceedings under Section 17 of Act No. 496, otherwise known
is directed, or from operation of law. It is employed to compel as "The Land Registration Act;" (b) judicial foreclosure,
the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, which, provided the debtor is in possession of the mortgaged realty
as opposed to a discretionary one, is that which an officer or and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had
tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed intervened; (c) extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate
manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, mortgage under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act
without regard to or the exercise of his or its own judgment No. 4118; and (d) in execution sales. Proceeding therefrom,
upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done." the issuance of a writ of possession is only proper in order to
execute judgments ordering the delivery of specific
In this case, the judgment in SCA No. V-7075 primarily compels properties to a litigant, in accordance with Section 10, Rule
the City Treasurer to issue the Final Bill of Sale covering the 39, of the Rules of Court.
subject lots in favor of petitioner pursuant to Section 262 of
the LGC, a ministerial duty, which said officer unduly refused As already discussed, the judgment in SCA No. V-7075 sought
to perform. Thus, it may be properly deemed as a judgment to be enforced in the case at bar only declared valid the auction
ordering the issuance of a writ of mandamus against the City sale where petitioner bought the subject lots, and accordingly
Treasurer. ordered the City Treasurer to issue a Final Bill of Sale to
petitioner. Since the said judgment did not order that the
Given that the judgment in SCA No. V-7075 ordered the possession of the subject lots be vested unto petitioner, the
issuance of a writ of mandamus compelling the performance RTC Br. 15 substantially varied the terms of the aforesaid
of a ministerial duty, and not the payment of money or the sale judgment — and thus, exceeded its authority in enforcing the
or delivery of real or personal property, the same is in the same — when it issued the corresponding writs of possession
nature of a special judgment — that is which a judgment and demolition to vest unto petitioner the possession of the
directs the performance of a specific act requiring the party subject lots. It is well-settled that orders pertaining to
or person to personally do because of his personal execution of judgments must substantially conform to the
qualifications and circumstances. As such, execution of the dispositive portion of the decision sought to be executed. As
said judgment should be governed by Section 11, Rule 39 of such, it may not vary, or go beyond, the terms of the judgment
the Rules of Court. it seeks to enforce. Where the execution is not in harmony
with the judgment which gives it life and exceeds it, it has no
This is in consonance with the rule on service and enforcement validity. Had the petitioner pursued an action for ejectment or
of orders or judgments concerning, among others, the special reconveyance, the issuance of writs of possession and
civil action of mandamus under Section 9, Rule 65 of the Rules demolition would have been proper; but not in a special civil
of Court. action for mandamus, as in this case.
rule therefore is that the service and execution of a special DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
judgment, such as a favorable judgment in mandamus — as in

[G.R. No. 145222. April 24, 2009.] CA: REVERESED. Branch 21 has jurisdiction.
SPOUSES ROBERTO BUADO and VENUS BUADO,
petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ISSUE: WON the husband of the judgment debtor may file an
Former Division, and ROMULO NICOL, respondents. independent action to protect the conjugal property subject to
execution
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI HELD: YES. The filing of a separate action by the respondent is
DOCTRINE: A spouse is deemed a stranger to the action proper and jurisdiction is thus vested on Branch 21.
wherein the writ of execution was issued and is therefore Apart from the remedy of terceria available to a third-party
justified in bringing an independent action to vindicate her claimant or to a stranger to the foreclosure suit against the
right of ownership over his exclusive or paraphernal property. sheriff or officer effecting the writ by serving on him an
A third-party claim must be filed by a person other than the affidavit of his title and a copy thereof upon the judgment
judgment debtor or his agent. Only a stranger to the case may creditor, a third-party claimant may also resort to an
file a third-party claim. The husband of the judgment debtor independent separate action, the object of which is the
cannot be deemed a "stranger" to the case prosecuted and recovery of ownership or possession of the property seized by
adjudged against his wife for an obligation that has redounded the sheriff, as well as damages arising from wrongful seizure
to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. and detention of the property. If a separate action is the
recourse, the third-party claimant must institute in a forum of
FACTS: Spouses Buando filed a complaint for damages against competent jurisdiction an action, distinct and separate from
Erlinda with Branch 19 RTC Bacoor. Said action originated from the action in which the judgment is being enforced, even
Erlinda Nicol's civil liability arising from the criminal offense of before or without need of filing a claim in the court that issued
slander filed against her by petitioners. the writ.
RTC: Ordered Erlinda to pay. A third-party claim must be filed by a person other than the
judgment debtor or his agent. In other words, only a stranger
CA: AFFIRMED and became final and executory on 5 March to the case may file a third-party claim. In Mariano v. Court of
1992. Appeals, the husband of the judgment debtor cannot be
The RTC issued a writ of execution on 14 October 1992. Finding deemed a "stranger" to the case prosecuted and adjudged
Erlinda Nicol's personal properties insufficient to satisfy the against his wife for an obligation that has redounded to the
judgment, the Deputy Sheriff issued a notice of levy on real benefit of the conjugal partnership. But in Naguit v. Court of
property on execution addressed to the Register of Deeds of Appeals and Sy v. Discaya, the Court stated that a spouse is
Cavite. The notice of levy was annotated on the TCT. deemed a stranger to the action wherein the writ of execution
A notice of sheriff's sale was issued and 2 days before the was issued and is therefore justified in bringing an
auction sale, an affidavit of third-party claim from one Arnulfo independent action to vindicate her right of ownership over his
F. Fulo was received by the deputy sheriff prompting exclusive or paraphernal property.
petitioners to put up a sheriff's indemnity bond. The auction There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in
sale proceeded with petitioners as the highest bidder. nature. Article 122 of the Family Code explicitly provides that
Respondent Romulo Nicol, husband of Erlinda, filed a payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the
complaint for annulment of certificate of sale and damages wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the
with preliminary injunction against petitioners and the deputy conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the
sheriff alleging that petitioners, connived and directly levied benefit of the family. The civil obligation arising from the crime
upon and execute his real property without exhausting the of slander committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of
personal properties of Erlinda Nicol. Further, he claimed that the conjugal partnership.
his property which was valued at P500,000.00 was only sold at
a "very low price" of P51,685.00, whereas the judgment
obligation of Erlinda Nicol was only P40,000.00. The case was G.R. No. L-55076 September 21, 1987
assigned to Branch 21 RTC Imus. MATILDE S. PALICTE, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE O.
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of RAMOLETE as Presiding Judge of Court of First Instance of
jurisdiction and that they had acted on the basis of a valid writ Cebu, Branch III, and MARCELO SOTTO, Administrator,
of execution. Respondent should have filed the case with respondents
Branch 19 where the judgment originated and which issued
the order of execution, writ of execution, notice of levy and PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 45
notice of sheriff's sale.
DOCTRINE: In Magno v. Viola and Sotto: The term “‘successor-
RTC: DISMISSED complaint. Branch 19 has jurisdiction. in-interest’ includes one to whom the debtor has transferred
his statutory right of redemption; one to whom the debtor has

conveyed his interest in the property for the purpose of may be redeemed in the manner hereinafter provided, by the
redemption; one who succeeds to the interest of the debtor by following persons: (a) The judgment debtor, or his successor in
operation of law; one or more joint debtors who were joint interest in the whole or any part of the property; (b) A creditor
owners of the property sold; the wife as regards her husband’s having a lien by attachment, judgment or mortgage on the
homestead by reason of the fact that some portion of her property sold, or on some part thereof, subsequent to the
husband’ title passes to her. This court has held that a surety judgment under which the property was sold. Such redeeming
cannot redeem the property of the principal sold on execution creditor is termed a redemptioner."
because the surety, by paying the debt of the principal, stands
in the place of the creditor, not of the debtor, and Under Subsection (a), property sold subject to redemption
consequently is not a successor in interest in the property." may be redeemed by the judgment debtor or his successorin-
interest in the whole or any part of the property.
FACTS:
1. A sale at public auction was held pursuant to a writ of In the case at bar, petitioner Palicte is the daughter of the late
execution issued by the respondent judge and to Don Filemon Sotto whose estate was levied upon on execution
a court order in the case of Pilar Teves, Et. Al. v. Marcelo Sotto, to satisfy the money judgment against it. She is one of the
Administrator, for the satisfaction of judgment in the amount declared heirs in the special proceeding. As a legitimate heir,
of P725,270.00. The following properties belonging to the late she qualifies as a successor-in-interest.
Don Filemon Sotto and administered by respondent Marcelo
Sotto were levied upon 6 parcels of land and 2 residential Art. 777 of the Civil Code states that: "The rights to the
houses (1 of which is situated in a government lot) in Cebu City. succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of
the decedent." At the moment of the decedent’s death, the
2. 7 of those properties were awarded to Pilar Teves, who done heirs start to own the property, subject to the decedent’s
bid for them for the amount of P217,300.00. One residential liabilities. In fact, they may dispose of the same even while the
house situated on a government lot in Cebu City, was awarded property is under administration. If the heirs may dispose of
to lone bidder Asuncion Villarante for the amount of their shares in the decedent’s property even while it is under
P10,000.00. administration with more reason should the heirs be allowed
to redeem redeemable properties despite the presence of an
3. Within the period for redemption, petitioner, as one of the administrator.
heirs of the late Don Filemon Sotto, redeemed from purchaser
Pilar Teves, 4 lots for the sum of P60,000.00. It may be true that the interest of a specific heir is not yet fixed
and determinate pending the order of distribution but,
4. A deed of redemption, executed by Deputy Provincial Sheriff nonetheless, the heir’s interest in the preservation of the
and approved by the Clerk of Court, was issued for the 4 lots estate and the recovery of its properties is greater than
anybody else’s, definitely more than the administrator’s who
5. On July 24, 1980, petitioner filed a motion with respondent merely holds it for the creditors, the heirs, and the legatees.
Judge for the transfer to her name of the titles to the four (4)
parcels of land covered by the deed of redemption. This The lower court, therefore, erred in considering the person of
motion was opposed by the plaintiffs in Pilar Teves, Et. Al. v. the administrator as the judgment debtor and as the only
Marcelo Sotto, administrator, on several grounds, principal "successor- in-interest." The estate of the deceased is the
among which, is that movant, Palicte, is not one of those judgment debtor and the heirs who will eventually acquire that
authorized to redeem under the provisions of the Rules of estate should not be prohibited from doing their share in its
Court. A hearing on the said motion, with both parties preservation.
adducing evidence was held.
Although petitioner Palicte validly redeemed the properties,
6. The lower court held that although Palicte is one of the her motion to transfer the titles of the four (4) parcels of land
declared heirs in the special proceeding, she does not qualify covered by the Deed of Redemption from registration in the
as a successor- in-interest who may redeem the real properties name of Filemon Sotto to her name cannot prosper at this
sold. It ruled that the deed of redemption is null and void. The time. Otherwise, to allow such transfer of title would amount
motion of Palicte was denied. Hence, the present petition. to a distribution of the estate.
ISSUE/S: W/N PETITIONER MAY VALIDLY EXERCISE THE RIGHT VICENTA P. TOLENTINO and JOSE TOLENTINO , petitioners,
OF REDEMPTION UNCER SEC. 29 RULE 39 vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
HELD: YES CONSUELO B. DE LA CRUZ, et al., respondents.
Sec. 27 of Rule 39 provides: “Real property sold as provided in
the last preceding section, or any part thereof sold separately,

DOCTRINE: Under the last sentence of Section 31, Rule 39 of Issue: WON there was a valid tender of payment when the
the Rules of Court, it is check was consigned with the Sheriff (YES)
expressly provided that the tender of the redemption money
may be made to the Sheriff who made the sale. And the Ruling: To start with, the Tolentinos are not indebted to BPI,
redemption it not rendered invalid by the fact that the said their mortgage indebtedness having been extinguished with
officer accepted a check for the amount necessary to make the the foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged properties. After
redemption instead of requiring payment in money. But this said foreclosure and sale, what remains is the right vested by
cannot affect the validity of the payment. The check as a law in
medium of payment in commercial transactions is too firmly favor of the Tolentinos to redeem the properties within the
established by usage to permit of any doubt upon this point at prescribed period. This right of redemption is an absolute
the present day. privilege, the exercise of which is entirely dependent upon the
will and discretion of the redemptioners. There is, thus, no
FACTS: legal obligation to exercise the right of redemption. Said right,
can in no sense, be considered an obligation, for the Tolentinos
The dela Cruz family sold the homestead land to the Tolentinos are under no compulsion to exercise the same. Should they
which in turn constituted a mortgage over the land in favor of choose not to exercise it, nobody can compel them to do so
BPI. Another mortgage was constituted over the said nor will such choice give rise to a cause of action in favor of the
properties in favor of PNB. The Tolentinos failed to pay their purchaser at the auction sale. In fact, the relationship between
mortgage indebtedness to the BPI upon maturity. In the said purchaser and the redemptioners is not even that of
judicial foreclosure sale that followed, conducted by the City creditor and debtor.
Sheriff of Davao on July 15, 1967, BPI was the sole and highest
bidder. Under existing jurisprudence, what the redemptioner should
pay, is not the amount of the "loan of which the mortgage was
Dela Cruz family filed an action before CFI Davao against the constituted" as stated by the Court of Appeals, but the auction
Tolentinos for the repurchase of the homestead land under purchase price plus 1% interest per month on the said amount
Section 119 of the Public Land Act. They alleged that they up to the time of redemption, together with the taxes or
extrajudicially tried to repurchase the said land to no avail. BPI assessment paid by the purchaser after the purchase if any.
and Philippine Banking Corporation were included in the action And in this connection, a formal offer to redeem, accompanied
as formal party defendants, being the first and second by a bona fide tender of the redemption price, although
mortgagees, respectively, of the homestead land. proper, is not essential where, as in the instant case, the right
to redeem is exercised thru the filing of
Tolentinos filed a motion for extension to file their Answer. judicial actions, which as noted earlier was made
This was granted by the trial court. De la Cruzes filed a petition simultaneously with the deposit of the
to declare the Tolentinos, in default for failure to file an redemption price with the Sheriff, within the period of
answer. On that same day, the Tolentinos filed a Motion to redemption. The formal offer to redeem accompanied by a
Dismiss the repurchase case on the ground that the complaint bona fide tender of the redemption price within the period of
states no cause of action, but said motion was denied by the redemption prescribed by law, is only essential to preserve the
lower court on the ground that the same was filed out of time. right of redemption for future enforcement even beyond such
Subsequently, the Tolentinos were declared in default and the period of redemption. The filing of the action
De la Cruzes were allowed to present their evidence ex parte. itself, within the period of redemption, is equivalent to a
formal offer to redeem.
RTC dismissed the redemption case filed by petitioner Vicenta Moreover, when the action to redeem was filed, a
Tolentino against the BPI with simultaneous deposit of the redemption money was tendered
simultaneous consignation of a PNB crossed check which was to the Sheriff and under the last sentence of Section
later the subject of 31, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, it is expressly provided that
petitioners' stop-payment order, with the OBce of the City the tender of the redemption money may be made to the
Sheriff, for the redemption Sheriff who made the sale. And the redemption is not rendered
of all their foreclosed properties including the homestead land. invalid by the fact that the said officer accepted a check for the
Petitioners elevated the amount necessary to make the redemption instead of
denial of their motion to quash the Writ of Possession issued requiring payment in money.
in favor of the De La
Cruzes and of their petition for relief from the decision G.R. No. 152343 January 18, 2008
allowing said repurchase.

MA. FE BACOS, petitioner, claimant to submit an affidavit of his title to the property. The
vs. Rule does not require that her title of ownership be produced.
DOMINGO ARCEGA, respondent.
HELD: Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found that the
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 Deed of Absolute Sale involving the sewing machines between
petitioner and Marlon Viado is spurious. Likewise, the Court of
DOCTRINE: a third-party claim must be supported by an Appeals found that no copy of the said document is on file with
affidavit stating the claimant’s title to, or right to possession of the Clerk of Court. The appellate court aptly held that the
the property, and the grounds therefor. In other words, a mere absence of such document is "itself a badge of fraud and
affidavit will not suffice. The circumstances supporting the simulation that could make any court suspicious and wary of
third-party claimant’s ownership or possession of the levied imputing any legitimacy and validity to the same, and actually
properties must be specified. militates against its use as basis for petitioner’s claim.".
FACTS: Sections 2 and 3, Rule VI of the NLRC Manual of Instructions

for Sheriffs provide:
Respondent, filed with the LA, a complaint for illegal dismissal
and other monetary claims against Viabel and/or Viado. Section 2. Proceedings. If property levied upon be claimed by
any person other than the losing party or his agent, such
The LA ruled in favor of respondent and ordered Viabel and person shall make an affidavit of his title thereto or right to the
Viado to pay respondent a total of P183,912.16 possession thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title
and shall file the same with the sheriff and copies thereof
Due to the failure of Viabel and/or Viado to appeal to the NLRC, served upon the Labor Arbiter or proper officer issuing the writ
the LA’s Decision became final and executory. Upon and upon the prevailing party. Upon receipt of the third-party
respondent’s motion, a writ of execution was issued. claim, all proceedings with respect to the execution of the
property subject of the third-party claim shall automatically be
The sheriff levied 28 sewing machines belonging to Viabel suspended and the Labor Arbiter or proper officer issuing the
and/or Marlon Viado and scheduled their sale at a public writ shall conduct a hearing with due notice to all parties
auction concerned and resolve the validity of the claim within ten (10)
working days from receipt thereof and his decision is
Petitioner, filed with the NLRC a notice of third party claim, appealable to the Commission within ten (10) working days
alleging that the levied machines were previously sold to her from notice, and the Commission shall likewise resolve the
by Viado as shown by the Deed of Absolute Sale notarized by appeal within the same period.
Notary Public Ramos.
The LA dismissed the third-party claim on the ground that the Section 3. Resolution of the Third-Party Claim, Effect. – In the
Deed of Absolute Sale appears to be spurious. event the third party claim is declared to be valid, the sheriff
shall immediately release the property to the third party
The NLRC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. claimant, his agent or representative and the levy on execution
shall immediately be lifted or discharged. However, should the
Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari which was third party claim be found to be without factual or legal basis,
dismissed. The CA held that the “deed of sale was indeed the sheriff must proceed with the execution of the property
spurious. The fact alone that no copy of the "Deed of Sale" was levied upon as if no third party claim has been filed.
on file with the Clerk of Court, is itself a "badge of fraud and
simulation" that could "make any court suspicious and wary of Magdalena T. Villasi, v. Filomeno Garcia, substituted by his
imputing any legitimacy and validity" to the same, and actually heirs, namely, Ermelinda H. Garcia, Liza Garcia-Gonzales,
militates against its use as basis for petitioner’s claim. Under Theresa Garcia-Tiangson, Marivic H. Garcia, Marlene
the procedure and requirements of the Notarial Law, a notary Garcia-Momin, Gerardo H. Garcia, Gideon H. Garcia, and
public is required to submit to the Office of the Clerk of Court Generoso H. Garcia, and Ermelinda H. Garcia
of his monthly notarial report, with copies of acknowledged G.R. No. 190106 ; January 15, 2014
documents thereto attached.
ISSUE: FACTS:
In 1990, petitioner Villasi engaged the services of respondent
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition, Fil-Garcia Construction, Inc (FGCI) to construct a seven-storey
claiming that Section 16, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil condominium building. For failure of Villasi to fully pay the
Procedure, as amended, merely requires the third-party contract price despite several demands, FGCI initiated a suit

for collection of sum of money before the Regional Trial Court 1. Terceria - to determine whether the sheriff has rightly
(RTC) of Quezon City. FGCI prayed for payment of unpaid or wrongly taken hold of property not belonging to
accomplishment billings. the judgment debtor;
2. Independent “Separate” action - to vindicate his claim
Villasi filed an answer specifically denied the material of ownership and/or possession over the foreclosed
allegations of the complaint. She claimed that FGCI property.
accomplished only 28% of the project.
What the court can do is limited to the determination of
RTC found that FGCI was able to preponderantly establish by whether the sheriff has acted rightly or wrongly in the
evidence its right to the unpaid accomplishment billings. performance of his duties. The court cannot pass upon the
question of title to the property.
The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the decision of the RTC. It
held that Villasi made an overpayment, and directed FGCI to In the present case, Spouses Garcia failed to prove that they
pay the amount in excess. have a bona fide title to the building in question. Villasi on the
other hand was able to satisfactorily establish the ownership
FGCI filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court. of FGCI thru the pieces of evidence. While tax receipts and tax
The appeal was denied for being filed out of time, and the declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership,
resolution became final and executory. they constitute credible proof of claim of title over the
property.
Villasi filed a Motion for Execution. The sheriff levied on a
building declared for taxation purposes in the name of FGCI,
and on lots in which the building was erected. These lots were G.R. No. 215933
in the name of Spouses Filomeno Garcia and Ermelinda Garcia.
POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT
Spouses Garcia filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim and a CORPORATION (PSALM), Petitioner vs. MAUNLAD HOMES,
Motion to Set Aside Notice of Sale on Execution. They claim INC., Respondent
that the building covered by the levy was mistakenly assessed
by the City Assessor in the name of FGCI. Petition for Review
RTC directed the Sheriff to hold in abeyance the conduct of DOCTRINE

the sale on execution.
A third-party claimant may file a proper action to vindicate his
RTC denied Villasi’s motion for reconsideration; The Court of claim to the levied property. The object of such action is for the
Appeals dismissed the petition. recovery of ownership or possession of the property seized by
the sheriff, as well as damages resulting from the allegedly
ISSUE: wrongful seizure and detention thereof despite the third party
Whether or not suspending the sale on execution of the claim and it may be brought against the sheriff and such other
buildings levied is proper on the basis of the respondent’s parties as may be alleged to have colluded with him in the
claim. supposedly wrongful execution proceedings, such as the
judgment creditor himself.
HELD:
NO. If the claimant’s proof does not persuade the court of the FACTS
validity of his title or right of possession thereto, the claim will
This case stemmed from an unlawful detainer case filed by
be denied.
respondent Maunlad Homes. The first-level court rendered a
decision ordering NPC to vacate the subject premises and
The power of the court in executing judgments extends only to
surrender physical possession thereof to respondent. On
properties unquestionable belonging to the judgment debtor
appeal to the RTC, the decision was affirmed in toto.
alone.
Respondent then filed a Motion for Execution which was
opposed by the NPC. The NPC also filed a MR of the RTC
If the property belonging to any third person is mistakenly
decision. The RTC denied the NPC’s motion for reconsideration
levied upon to answer for another man’s indebtedness, such
and granted respondent’s motion for execution. Subsequently,
person has all the right to challenge the levy through any of
a writ of execution pending appeal was issued. Thus, the sheriff
the remedies provided for under the Rules of Court.
served a Notice of Demand of payment to the NPC.
Section 16, Rule 39 specifically provides that a third person Respondent then filed an urgent motion for issuance of a Break
may avail himself of the remedies of either: Open Order since the sheriff ho tried to implement the writ of
execution was prevented by the security guards assigned in the wrongful seizure and detention thereof despite the third party
NPC Warehouse. The NPC argued that the warehouse is also claim and it may be brought against the sheriff and such other
being used by petitioner PSALM, and as of the moment, due to parties as may be alleged to have colluded with him in the
the enactment of the EPIRA Law, the ownership over the items supposedly wrongful execution proceedings, such as the
stored in the warehouse cannot be established with certainty. judgment creditor himself.
The RTC issued a Break Open Order authorizing the sheriff and Notably, petitioner cannot appeal from the denial of its third-
his deputies, police officers/escorts, representatives from both party claim since it is not one of the parties in the action where
parties to enter/break open into the NPC’s warehouse the writ of execution was issued, as the unlawful detainer case
facilities. After this, the sheriff issued a Notice of Levy of 7 units was between respondent and the NPC. Also, the denial of the
transformer radiator fins and 1 unit power transformer, and 4 third-party claim is not appealable as provided under the
pieces angle bars. above-quoted Sec. 16, Rule 39 of the ROC. The remedy of the
claimant is to file a separate and independent action to
PSALM eventually filed an affidavit of third-party claim, vindicate his claim of ownership or right of possession of the
alleging that it is the owner of the properties levied. levied properties against the judgment creditor or the
Consequently, the RTC issued an Order holding in abeyance purchaser of the property at the public auction sale. In such
the public sale of the subject levied property until further separate action, the court may issue a writ of preliminary
orders. However, the trial court later rendered a decision injunction against the sheriff enjoining him from proceeding
against PSALM. with the execution sale, which is a speedy and adequate
remedy to immediately relieve petitioner from the adverse
On certiorari, the CA denied the petition, holding that the effects of the lower court’s judgment.
proper remedy should have been Section 16 of Rule 39 of the
RoC – the recourse in case a property belonging to a third G.R. No. 201812 January 22, 2020
person is placed under the coverage of the writ of execution
and, thereafter, sold at public auction. THELMA B. SIAN REPRESENTED BY ROMUALDO A. SIAN,
PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES CAESAR A. SOMOSO AND ANITA
ISSUE B. SOMOSO, THE FORMER BEING SUBSTITUTED BY HIS
SURVIVING SON, ANTHONY VOLTAIRE B. SOMOSO,
• Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing petitioner’s
MACARIO M. DE GUZMAN, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS
petition for certiorari assailing the denial of the latter’s
SHERIFF III OF THE REGIONAL COURT OF PANABO, DAVAO,
third party claim for being a wrong remedy. (NO)
BRANCH 4, RESPONDENTS.
RULING
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
The power of the court in executing judgments extends only to Rules of Court.
properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor
alone. An execution can be issued only against a party and not FACTS:
against one who did not have his day in court. The duty of the Somoso filed with the RTC a collection suit with prayer for
sheriff is to levy the property of the judgment debtor, not that issuance of writ of preliminary attachment against Sps.
of a third person. Thus, if the property levied by virtue of a Quiblatin. The RTC granted the prayer and the Provincial
writ of execution is claimed by a third person who is not the Sheriff attached the properties of Sps. Quiblatin, which
judgment obligor, Sec. 16 of Rule 39 of the RoC provides for included a parcel of land. Before the writ of execution could be
the remedy of such third party claimant. implemented, petitioner, represented by her husband,
Romualdo Sian a third-party claim over the subject property.
The third-party claimant may execute an affidavit of his title or They alleged that the subject property was sold to them by
right to the possession of the property levied, and serve the lluminada and the deed of sale was duly registered with the RD
same to the officer making the levy and a copy thereof to the of Davao. Hence, petitioner prayed for the auction sale not to
judgment creditor. This remedy is known as terceria. The proceed, and the immediate release of the subject property to
officer shall not be bound to keep the property, unless the her.
judgment creditor files a bond approved by the court to
indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum not less than the The RTC dismissed the third-party claim declaring that the
value of the property levied on. An action for damages may be third-party claim can only be taken up in a separate and
brought against the officer within 120 days from the date of independent action. Thus, petitioner filed an action for
filing of the bond. The same section also provides that a third- annulment and cancellation of writ of attachment and notice
party claimant may file a proper action to vindicate his claim to of levy, injunction, damages and attorney's fees against
the levied property. The object of such action is for the respondents before the RTC. Petitioner alleged that she is the
recovery of ownership or possession of the property seized by registered owner of the subject property. Respondents
the sheriff, as well as damages resulting from the allegedly
countered that TCT No. T-34705, in the name of petitioner, is When the third-party complaint was denied by the RTC,
null and void, as it was obtained through machination petitioner's remedy was to file an independent reivindicatory
employed by petitioner in connivance with Iluminada, a action against the judgment creditor - herein respondents.
fugitive of justice. Hence, when petitioner filed the complaint for annulment and
cancellation of writ of attachment and notice of levy,
RTC: Eventually declared petitioner as the legal owner of the injunction, damages and attorney's fees, she did not act in bad
property, subject to the timely and valid attachment/levy on faith nor was the complaint frivolous.
the subject property by the Sheriff. As such owner, she may
well be in the material possession of the subject property, but The remedies of a third-party claimant under Section 16 of
because of the timely and valid attachment/levy effected by Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is further explained by Justice
the Sheriff, such property, though owned by petitioner, was Florenz D. Regalado in this wise:
brought under custodia legis.
The remedies of a third-party claimant mentioned in Section
Respondents filed an appeal before the CA. 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, that is, a summary hearing
before the court which authorized the execution, or a
CA: Partly granting the appeal. The third-party claimant is not "terceria" or third-party claim filed with the sheriff, or an
prevented from vindicating his ownership of the attached action for damages on the bond posted by the judgment
property in an appropriate proceeding, which in this case, was creditor, or an independent revindicatory action, are
by way of reivindicatory action or a suit for damages; that the cumulative remedies and may be resorted to by a third-party
reivindicatory action had not prescribed; and that the sale of claimant independently of or separately from and without
the subject property by Iluminada to petitioner is not fictitious. need of availing of the others. If he opted to file a proper action
The CA awarded damages to respondents after considering to vindicate his claim of ownership, he must institute an action,
petitioner's suit to be frivolous. It explained that petitioner's distinct and separate from that in which the judgment is being
main cause of action is to annul or declare the attachment on enforced, with a competent court even before or without filing
the subject property null and void. Thus, when petitioner a claim in the court which issued the writ, the latter not being
registered the sale, she was aware of the levy on the subject a condition sine qua non for the former. This proper action
property. Hence, she knew that her action to have the levy would have for its object the recovery of ownership or
cancelled was frivolous. possession of the property seized by the Sheriff, as well as
damages against the sheriff and other persons responsible for
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but it was the illegal seizure or detention of the property. The validity of
denied. Hence, this petition. the title of the third-party claimant shall be resolved in said
ISSUE: action and a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued
Whether the petitioner’s complaint for annulment and against the sheriff.
cancellation of writ of attachment and notice of levy is not
frivolous.
BENITO DILAG, SUSETTE DILAG, SUSSIE DILAG and SUSAN
RULING: DILAG, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
NO. A frivolous action is a groundless lawsuit with little AND MARCIANO ARELLANO, respondents.
prospect of success. It is often brought merely to harass, G.R. No. 72727, July 30, 1987
annoy, and cast groundless suspicions on the integrity and
reputation of the defendant. When petitioner filed the third- FACTS: Petition for Certiorari
party complaint, she was merely exercising her right to litigate, Herminio Arellano died in a vehicular accident on July 1, 1968
claiming ownership over the subject property, submitting as involving a truck owned by spouses Pablo and Socorro Dilag.
evidence the Deed of Sale and TCT No. T-34705 issued in her His father, Marciano Arellano, was awarded by the trial court
name. Being the registered owner of the subject property, she money damages, and the decision became final and executory.
has a remedy under the law to assail the writ of attachment A writ of execution was issued on February 16, 1979.
and notice of levy. A third-party claimant or any third person
may vindicate his claim to his property wrongfully levied by The Dilag spouses and Arellano came into a compromise
filing a proper action, which is distinct and separate from that agreement but the same was disapproved by the court for
in which the judgment is being enforced. Such action would failure of the Dilags to sign it. Pursuant to the writ of execution,
have for its object the recovery of the possession of the a notice of Levy on Execution was annotated on a parcel of land
property seized by the Sheriff, as well as damages resulting owned by the Dilags. An examination of the title shows that
from the allegedly wrongful seizure and detention thereof there is an adverse claim inscribed therein, dated March 11,
despite the third-party claim. 1974 filed by the Dilag spouses’ children. The children had a
Deed of Absolute Sale executed on November 21, 1973. The
adverse claim also stated that the owner’s duplicate certificate

was then in the possession of the Development Bank of the coupled with a clear legal right of possession over the land in
Philippines, to which the property had been mortgaged. The question.
title further shows an inscription on July 25, 1979 of a Contract
of Lease executed on February 9, 1979. The lease was in favor Thus, Marciano Arellano filed his petition for certiorari,
of David and Erlinda Diancin. prohibition and/or injunction with preliminary mandatory
injunction and damages to invalidate the Orders issued by the
But pursuant to the writ of execution, the provincial sheriff trial court with the Intermediate Appellate Court. IAC sided
sold at a public auction to Marciano Arellano the parcel of land. with Arellano when it issued a writ of certiorari setting aside as
This was on August 26, 1981. The next day, a corresponding null and void the Order of the lower court granting the writ of
Certificate of Sale was inscribed to the title, subject to the right preliminary injunction.
of redemption. However, on the same date of the sale (August
26, 1981), another inscription appears bearing a Deed of ISSUES: WON the decision and the consequent writ of
Absolute Sale executed by the Dilag spouses in favor of their execution in the case of the court below are operative against
children. The land was supposedly sold for Php30,000. petitioners who admittedly were not parties to said civil case.
A year after the Certificate of Sale was inscribed in favor or RULING: Petitioners' contentions has no merit. It is not
Arellano, the Dilag spouses failed to exercise their right of disputed that at the time of the levy on execution in Civil Case
redemption. Thus, a Definite Deed of Sale was executed. No. 8714 the Dilag spouses were still the registered owners of
According to the Sheriff’s Return of Service, the delivery was Lot 288 as shown in TCT No. 30137 and they were also the
made to Arellano, who executed a Delivery Receipt. Later on, declared owners of Lot 1927 as shown in Tax Declaration No.
Arellano sold the parcel of land to Marcelino Florete Jr. and 411900-3039. On the other hand, it is alleged by private
Leon Coo for Php150,000. respondent herein and not refuted by petitioners herein that
David Diancin, the lessee, executed a deed giving up his claim the title in the name of herein petitioners was issued on August
or interest as a lessee over the land in favor of Arellano in 14, 1981, several days ahead of the deed of sale, dated August
consideration of Php38,000 as payment for his fish fry in the 26, 1981 on which the new title in the name of the petitioners
fish pond in the property. Because of this, Sussie Dilag, one of was based, and inscribed on August 27, 1981. Clearly the Deed
the Dilag children, executed a Notarial Rescission of the Lease of Absolute Sale in favor of petitioners herein executed in 1974
Contract effective July 2, 1983. after the filing of Civil Case No. 8714 was a simulated and
fictitious transaction to defraud Arellano who obtained a
Dilag children subsequently filed a civil case for the annulment money judgment against the parents of petitioners.
of decision and all proceedings thereafter with prayer for
injunction and temporary restraining order, alleging that the The supposed sellers, spouses Pablo and Socorro Dilag who
levy on execution was illegal since it was made on property no sold the lot in question to their children (petitioners herein) for
longer owned by judgment debtors; that they were not parties an insufficient consideration continued exercising acts of
in the civil case; and that the claim of the judgment creditor ownership over Lot No. 288 by leasing the same to David
should be brought against the administrator of the estates of Diancin and turning over material possession thereof to the
the spouses Pablo and Socorro Dilag. latter as lessee. In fact, when the deed of sale in favor of
Arellano was executed on August 30, 1982, by virtue of the
Court issued a restraining order directing Arellano and his failure of the former owners to redeem the property within the
agents to desist from entering and wresting possession of the period prescribed by law, the actual possessor was David
lot and from disturbing the possession of the Dilag children. Diancin. He however recognized Arellano's right of ownership
when he was notified of the delivery of possession to Arellano
Motion to Dismiss was filed by Arellano on the ground that the by the Provincial Sheriff
court has no jurisdiction to annul a judgment of another
branch of the same. Motion was denied and order was issued as evidenced by a signed delivery receipt, dated December 12,
by the court granting the prayer of the Dilag children for 1983. Diancin ceased performing acts of' cultivation on the
preliminary prohibitory injunction. fishpond situated within the lot in question and he merely
requested for an extension of his stay while he looked for
Marciano Arellano filed a Motion for Reconsideration and another place to stay. Subsequently, Arellano sold the lot to
exception to the bond and offered a counterbond double that Marcelino Florete and Leon Coo When Diancin was paid the
of the Dilag children. The lower court denied it on the ground value of the fish fry he placed in the fishpond, he executed a
that the answer with the defenses and counterclaim raised the Discharge and Release Claim in favor of Florete, one of the
issue of ownership, which is within the exclusive and original vendees, on July 2, 1983. When the Dilag children (petitioners
jurisdiction of the RTC and that the offer of a counterbond by herein) filed Civil Case no. 15085 on July 5, 1983, they were not
Marciano Arellano cannot dissolve the injunction not being in possession of the property in question. There was therefore
no factual and legal basis for the restraining ordering Arellano

and/or dated July 8, 1983 of the lower court ordering Arellano of another, would be to deprive the garnishee of property
and/or his agents to desist from entering Lot No. 288. Thus upon summary proceeding and without due process of law.
Rule 39 Sec. 135 relied upon by petitioners will not apply in the (Sec. 43 Rule 39)
case at bar.
FACTS: The instant action arose from an attempt to execute a
Likewise, it cannot be denied that in securing the cancellation final judgment rendered on October 8, 1987 of RTC Manila
of TCT No. 30137 covering Lot No. 288 in the names of Pablo instituted by ACEC to recover a sum of money from BBGMI.
and Socorro Dilag, petitioners had to rely on another deed of The judgment having become final, execution was ordered by
absolute sale supposedly executed by their parents in their the Court at ACEC's instance on December 18, 1987.
favor in 1981, instead of relying on the first deed of sale
executed in 1974, an indication that petitioners do not really Evidently the attempt at execution failed. Hence, ACEC filed an
consider the 1974 deed of sale valid and legal. "Ex-Parte Motion for Examination of Debtor of Judgment
Debtor," alleging that NPC was a debtor of BBGMI and praying
The records of the case do not support petitioners' contention that certain officials of the NPC be required to appear before
that the obligation of spouses Pablo and Socorro Dilag was the Court and examined regarding its debt to BBGMI.
already extinguished when Arellano acknowledged the receipt GRANTED by respondent judge.
of payment of the money judgment, by virtue of their own
admission thru counsel in Civil Case No. 12832 that payment The Manager of NPCs General Accounts Division, Ariel Vinoya,
was only partial and did not cover the whole amount of the appeared in response to subpoena and was duly examined on
money judgment in Civil Case No. 8714. It is also an oath. A denial by the witness that the amount was due to
undisputable fact that the compromise agreement in Civil Case BBGMI, respondent Judge resolved to direct the NPC to pay
No. 8714 was denied by the trial court in its order of October ACEC "its judgment rendered in October 8,1987 out of the
24, 1979. This order of denial had become final and executory remaining credit NPC holds in favor of defendant," and
because no appeal was taken by petitioners' predecessors-in- ordered his deputy sheriff (respondent Adriano) "to garnish
interest. Furthermore, even assuming that petitioners became and attach the said credit due Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc."
the valid and legal owners of the lot in question by virtue of invoking Section 15 of Rule 39 to levy on “debts” and “credits”.
the deed of sale executed in their favor in 1981, they Later on, Vinoya admitted that the amount was due to
nonetheless failed to avail themselves of their right as defendant Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc.
registered owners to redeem the property from the private
respondent herein (buyer in the sale by public auction) within The NPC filed a "Manifestation" stating that (1) the Court had
the period provided for by law. "no jurisdiction to issue the Order of Garnishment ... since
movant NPC was never a party in the said civil case ..(h)ence,
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby the aforesaid Order is null and void insofar as movant NPC is
DENIED for lack of merit and the assailed decision of the concerned and (2) NPC was "not in possession nor in control of
appellate court is hereby AFFIRMED. any .. property belonging to BBGMI nor does BBGMI have any
receivable of whatsoever kind and nature from NPC;" and NPC
ceased to have any "legal obligation to pay or amortize the
G.R. No. 87140 September 7, 1989 balance of the cost of the transmission line constructed by
BBGMI" after the latter ceased operations,"
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON.
ARSENIO M. GONONG, Judge, RTC, Manila, Br. 8, No action was taken by respondent Judge and neither was any
DOMINADOR B. ADRIANO, Deputy Sheriff, ALLIED traversing pleading or paper ever presented by ACEC.
CONTROL & ELECTRIC CORPORATION, and PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK, respondents. PNB debited NPC's account representing P 828,796.00 amount
of Cashier's Cheek delivered and paid to … Sheriff Dominador
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION OF CERTIORARI B. Adriano.
DOCTRINE: The only power of the court in proceedings ISSUE: WON respondent Judge committed grave abuse of
supplemental to execution is to make an order authorizing the discretion when in authorized the execution of the judgment
creditor to sue in the proper court to recover an indebtedness against a stranger to the action on the theory that the latter
due to the judgment debtor. The court has no jurisdiction to was a "debtor of the judgment debtor”
try summarily the question whether the third party served
with notice of execution and levy is indebted to defendant HELD: YES. In Section 39 (now Sec. 37) or Rule 39, clearly within
when such indebtedness is denied. To make an order in respondent Judge's prerogative to require the appearance, by
relation to property which the garnishee claimed to own in his subpoena, of officials of the NPC to appear and be questioned
own right, requiring its application in satisfaction of judgment regarding the latter's claimed indebtedness to the judgment

debtor, BBGMI. But just as clearly, it was not within His Honor's The only disposition that said Court could legitimately have
power to order the payment by the alleged debtor of the made in the premises, was that indicated in Section 46 of Rule
judgment debtor to pay the claimed debt without indubitable 39, above quoted, i.e., authorize ACEC, as judgment creditor,
admission or conclusive proof that the debt existed and was to bring a separate action against NPC, as alleged debtor of
demandable. BBGMI, the judgment debtor, for establishment by satisfactory
proof of the postulated indebtedness of NPC to BBGMI, and
The relevant provisions must be Section 42 and 45 (now Sec. consequent payment to it ACEC of so much of that
40 and 43) of Rule 39. indebtedness as corresponds to the amount of its judgment.
A reading of these two provisions leaves no doubt about the G.R. No. 246995, January 22, 2020 BRITANIA, PETITIONER,
proposition that after summary examination of a person or V. HON. LILIA MERCEDES ENCARNACION A. GEPTY IN HER
entity alleged to be a debtor of the judgment debtor or holding CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
property belonging to the latter, in accordance with Section BRANCH 75, VALENZUELA CITY, AND MELBA C.
39, Rule 39, execution may issue against such person or entity PANGANIBAN, RESPONDENTS.
only upon an incontrovertible showing that the person or This petition for review
entity in fact holds property belonging to the judgment debtor Facts: Britania initiated an action for judicial foreclosure of
or is indeed a debtor of said judgment debtor, i.e., that such mortgage against respondent Panganiban. Britania alleged
holding of property, or the indebtedness, is not denied. that he and Panganiban executed an agreement
captioned "Magkasanib na Kasunduan" where he agreed to
In the event of such a denial, it is not, to repeat, within the loan Panganiban the sum of P1,500,000.00 with interest of
judge's power to order delivery of property allegedly belonging P100,000.00, payable in monthly installments of P40,000.00
to the judgment debtor or the payment of the alleged debt. A starting August 2011 until fully paid. The loan was secured by
contrary rule would allow a court to adjudge substantive a 120-square meter property, which Panganiban was paying on
liability in a summary proceeding, incidental merely to the installment to a certain Florencia Francisco.
process of executing a judgment, rather than in a trial on the Panganiban failed to comply with the first agreement so they
merits, to be held only after the party sought to be made liable executed a second "Magkasanib na Kasunduan" wherein a
has been properly summoned and accorded full opportunity to new payment scheme was laid out for the unpaid sum of
file the pleadings permitted by the Rules in ventilation of his P1,500,000.00. The same property secured the loan.
side. This would amount to a denial of due process of law. Panganiban possessed the property. Despite repeated
demands, Panganiban continuously refused to pay her
In Economic Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Torres, it was held that “the obligation.
only power of the court in proceedings supplemental to The case was docketed and raffled to the RTC Branch 75,
execution is to make an order authorizing the creditor to sue Valenzuela City, presided by respondent judge Hon. Lilia
in the proper court to recover an indebtedness due to the Mercedes Encarnacion Gepty.
judgment debtor. The court has no jurisdiction to try The trial court rendered its Decision denying the complaint for
summarily the question whether the third party served with judicial foreclosure, albeit granting Britania's monetary claims.
notice of execution and levy is indebted to defendant when The defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the
such indebtedness is denied. To make an order in relation to amount of Php1,193,000.00 plus interest at 6% per annum,
property which the garnishee claimed to own in his own right, reckoned from November 16, 2012 until the finality of this
requiring its application in satisfaction of judgment of another, Decision. Thereafter, the principal amount due as adjusted by
would be to deprive the garnishee of property upon summary interest shall likewise earn interest at 6% per annum until fully
proceeding and without due process of law.” paid, and attorney's fees in the amount of Php 30,000.00 plus
costs of suit.
The record demonstrates that the supposed indebtedness of Upon finality of the aforesaid decision, a corresponding Writ of
NPC to BBGMI was denied not only by the representative of Execution14 dated January 29, 2016 was issued.
NPC but also by its lawyers. The respondent Judge's Order Per Notice of Sheriffs Sale on Execution (Personal
makes a general reference to later admissions supposedly Property/ies)15 dated April 6, 2016, the following personal
made by Vinoya, the NPC representative. Such unspecified properties of Panganiban were levied on:
admissions are, of course, not only contradictory of the earlier 2pcs Marmol Bench, 1pc Wood Sofa, 1lpc Center Table, 1pc
denial of Vinoya, but are themselves contradicted by the Corner table, 1pc Dining Table and 6pcs Chairs, 1pc Wood
subsequent assertions of the NPC through its lawyers. This Cabinet, 1pc Stand Fan, 1pc Comer Cabinet, 2pcs Flower Vase,
state of things, when the least that can be said is that it is 2pcs Oven Toaster, 1pc Rice Cooker, 1pc Bread Toaster, 1pc
doubtful if there has been a categorical admission of liability Mirror, 1pc Glass Cabinet, 1pc Refrigerator, 2pcs Washing
on the part of the NPC, cannot operate to invest the Machine, 1pc Turbo Broiler and 2pcs Wall Painting.
respondent Court with jurisdiction to order NPC to pay its The Sheriffs Return16 dated April 20, 2016 reported that an
alleged indebtedness to BBGMI. execution sale was held on April 14, 2016 and Britania offered

the highest bid of P15,000.00 for the entire bulk of the levied At the time of the execution thereof, the owner of the
personal properties. aforesaid property was one Florencia Francisco. Moreover,
After the sale, Britania filed his Motion to Examine Judgment even at the time of default and at the time of the filing of this
Debtor Melba C. Panganiban dated April 15, 2016. According case, the mortgagor-debtor did not own the subject property
to Britania, the 120-square-meter property was fraudulently as evidence was presented that Agreement to Sell has been
transferred to Panganiban's sister and then to another person cancelled on account of the failure of the mortgagor-debtor to
a few days before the trial court's decision was issued. pay the monthly amortizations thereon since 2010. Thus, not
The motion was set for hearing on June 7, 2016, during which, being the absolute owner of the mortaged property, the same
Panganiban did not appear. For this reason, Britania moved cannot be subject of a valid mortgage.
todte Panganiban in indirect contempt of court. By It is a fundamental principle that a judgment that lapses into
Order dated June 7, 2016, the trial court ordered Panganiban finality becomes immutable and unalterable. The primary
to comment thereon within ten (10) days from notice. consequence of this principle is that the judgment may no
The trial court denied Britania's oral motion for indirect longer be modified or amended by any court in any manner
contempt and motion to examine Panganiban. Britania moved even if the purpose of the modification or amendment is to
for reconsideration, which the trial court denied per second correct perceived errors of law or fact. This principle known as
Order. Britania moved up to the Court of Appeals via an action the doctrine of immutability of judgment is a matter of sound
for certiorari and mandamus. public policy, which rests upon the practical consideration that
He faulted the trial court with grave abuse of discretion every litigation must come to an end.32 Here, Britania cannot
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for denying his revive his claim on the 120-square-meter property by
motion to examine and motion to cite Panganiban in indirect subjecting Panganiban to examination under Section 36, Rule
contempt. 39 of the Rules of Court which, as stated, is not even applicable
CA affirmed the RTC. here.
Issue: WON Panganiban should be held in indirect contempt As for Britania's motion to cite Panganiban for indirect
for violating Section 36, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (NO) contempt of court, we reckon with the rule that the power to
Ruling: Sec. 36. Examination of judgment obligor when declare a person in contempt of court and in dealing with him
judgment unsatisfied. or her accordingly is an inherent power lodged in courts of
When the return of a writ of execution issued against property justice, to be used as a means to protect and preserve the
of a judgment obligor, or any one of several obligors in the dignity of the court, the solemnity of the proceedings therein,
same judgment, shows that the judgment remains unsatisfied, and the administration of justice from callous misbehavior,
in whole or in part, the judgment obligee, at any time after offensive personalities, and contumacious refusal to comply
such return is made, shall be entitled to an order from the with court orders. This contempt power, however plenary it
court which rendered the said judgment, requiring such may seem, must be exercised judiciously and sparingly with
judgment obligor to appear and be examined concerning his utmost self-restraint with the end in view of utilizing the same
property and income before such court or before a for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, not
commissioner appointed by it, at a specified time and place; for retaliation or vindication. It should not be availed of unless
and proceedings may thereupon be had for the application of necessary in the interest of justice.
the property and income of the judgment obligor towards the Here, the trial court itself whose authority and dignity the
satisfaction of the judgment. But no judgment obligor shall be contempt rules seek to protect, did not consider as
so required to appear before a court or commissioner outside contemptuous Panganiban's non appearance during the
the province or city in which such obligor resides or is found. hearing on Britania's motion to examine her. The trial court
The provision applies to cases where the judgment remains aptly held that "whether said defendant and her counsel
unsatisfied and there is a need for the judgment obligor to appears or not on said hearing, the same is their look out. Their
appear and be examined concerning his or her property and failure to appear on said hearing will only waive their right to
income to determine whether the same may be properly held be present on said date and/or to oppose the motion. The
to satisfy the full judgment amount. same is not a ground to cite the defendant in indirect contempt
The provision speaks of the judgment obligor's property and of court." Since the trial court did not find any ill intent on
income only; not those belonging to third persons. For a Panganiban's part, it cannot be compelled to hold Panganiban
judgment creditor or purchaser at an execution sale acquires in indirect contempt of court.
only whatever rights the judgment obligor may have over the ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED, and the assailed
property at the time of levy. Thus, if the judgment obligor has Decision dated May 8, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
no right, title or interest over the levied property, there is SP No. 150820, AFFIRMED.
nothing for him or her to transfer. SO ORDERED.
Here, in the trial court's final and executory Decision dated
June 30, 2015, it categorically held that Panganiban did not OROPEZA MARKETING CORPORATION, ROGACIANO
validly mortgage the 120-quare-meter property to Britania OROPEZA and
because she did not own in the first place. IMELDA S. OROPEZA, petitioners, vs. ALLIED BANKING

CORPORATION, respondent. paid. Consequently, it having been determined with finality in
CA-G.R. CV No. 41986 that the debt of the Oropezas had been
settled, respondent's cause of action in Civil Case No. 19325-
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 88 must be deemed extinguished. Accordingly, the instant
petition was granted.
DOCTRINE: The rule is that a party may not evade the
application of res judicata by simply including additional There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first
parties in subsequent litigation or by excluding parties in the case where the judgment was rendered and the second case
later case certain parties in the previous suit. that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject
matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in
the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action.
FACTS: Otherwise put, the judgment or decree of the court of
competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation
Allied Banking Corporation extended a loan to the petitioners between the parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a
and spouses Rogaciano and Imelda Oropeza that was secured bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action
by a promissory note and a real estate mortgage. Thereafter, before the same or any other tribunal. But where there is
petitioners failed to pay their obligation. Respondent then filed identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity
a collection suit with an application for a writ of preliminary of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to
attachment. those matters actually and directly controverted and
determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. This
While the application for a writ of attachment was pending, is the concept of res judicata known as "conclusiveness of
respondent discovered that the judgment.
Oropeza spouses executed an Absolute Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage in favor of Solid Gold Commercial The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to
Corporation, covering most of their real properties, including bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have
those mortgaged to respondent. been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the
Consequently, respondent filed a complaint for the Annulment case must be a judgment on
of Deed of Sale. Allied Bank likewise instituted a separate the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first and
criminal complaint for fraudulent insolvency under Article 314 second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes
of the Revised Penal Code. of action. The existence here of the first three requisites is not
disputed. With respect to the fourth element, however, the
RTC declared the sale as valid and the promissory notes parties disagree. We must, therefore, focus now on whether
executed by petitioners as void. Thus, respondent appealed to identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action are
the Court present in the two civil cases below. Should identity of parties,
of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 41986. Consequently, subject matter, and causes of action be shown in the two
the lower court dismissed Civil Case No. 19325-88 on the cases, then res judicata in its aspect as a "bar by prior
ground of litis pendentia. Again, respondent elevated this case judgment" would apply. If as between the two cases, only
to the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 47775. In identity of parties can be shown, but not identical causes of
this case, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the order action, then res judicata as "conclusiveness of judgment"
of dismissal by the lower court and remanded the records of applies.
the case to the court of origin.
G.R. NO. 157125 September 19, 2008
Issue: WON the civil case is barred by res judicata (YES)
ILUMINADA "LUMEN" R. POLICARPIO, Petitioner,
Ruling: There being substantial identity of parties but no v.
identity of causes of action, ACTIVE BANK (FORMERLY MAUNLAD SAVINGS AND LOAN
the applicable aspect of res judicata in the instant case is BANK), Respondents.
"conclusiveness of judgment."
There is conclusiveness of judgment only as to the matters PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45
actually determined by the trial
court in Civil Case No. 19634-89, as armed by the Court of DOCTRINE: Ordinarily, a purchaser of property in an
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. extrajudicial foreclosure sale is entitled to possession of the
41986. These include the findings that: (1) the promissory note property. Thus, whenever the purchaser prays for a writ of
relied upon by respondent bank was spurious; and (2) that the possession, the trial court has to issue it as a matter of course.
loan obligation of the Oropeza spouses has been settled and However, the obligation of the trial court to issue a writ of

possession ceases to be ministerial once it appears that there In any event, we note that the deed was not even registered,
is a third party in possession of the property claiming a right a truly fatal defect in this case.
adverse to that of the debtor/mortgagor. Where such third
party exists, the trial court should conduct a hearing to In Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, the third party
determine the nature of his adverse possession. possessor had been occupying the property even prior to the
mortgage in favor of the bank. More importantly, the bank was
FACTS: aware that there was a third party possessor before it granted
the loan to the original owners of the property. Such is not the
Spouses Septem and Grelita are the registered owners of a case here. The mortgage in favor of respondent preceded the
parcel of land which they mortgage to respondent. They failed sale in favor of petitioner. There was no allegation either that
to settle their obligation, hence, respondent foreclose the respondent was at any point of time aware that petitioner
mortgage. Later on, respondent consolidated its ownership occupied the property.
over the property for failure of the spouses to redeem the
same.
LZK Holdings and Development Corporation, v. Planters
Respondent filed a Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession. Development Bank
However, petitioner opposed it and submitted a Deed of Sale G.R. No. 187973 ; January 20, 2014
of the property executed by Septem in her favor.
FACTS:
The RTC granted the writ finding that the Deed of Sale appears In 1996, LZK Holdings obtained a P40,000,000.00 loan from
to be void since only Septem signed it and it was not shown Planters Bank (Planters) and secured it with a Real Estate
that he was authorized by Grelita to sell the conjugal property. Mortgage.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the In 1998, the lot was sold at a public auction after Planters
CA, arguing that the RTC could not issue the Writ of Possession extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate mortgage due to LZK’s
in favor of respondent since she was a third party in possession failure to pay its loan. Planters emerged as the highest bidder
of the property contemplated under Section 33, Rule 39 of the during the auction.
Rules of Court.
In 1999, LZK Holdings filed before the Regional Trial Court
The CA denied the petition. It ruled that the validity of the sale (RTC), Makati, a complaint for annulment of extrajudicial
in petitioner's favor was questionable since only Septem foreclosure, mortgage contract, promissory note and
signed the deed. It also noted that unlike the mortgage, the damages.
Deed of Sale was not registered.
Planters filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of a writ of
ISSUE: possession with the RTC, San Fernando.
Whether or not petitioner is a third party in possession of the Before the expiration of the redemption period, RTC-Makati
property contemplated under Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules issued a TRO, enjoining Planters from consolidating its title
of Court such as to preclude the trial court from issuing a Writ over the property. It also ordered the issuance of a writ of
of Possession in favor of respondent preliminary injunction. RTC-San Fernando suspended the
proceedings of Planter’s ex-parte motion in view of the TRO
HELD: and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by RTC-Makati.
In this case, the trial court conducted the required hearing but Planters succeeded in consolidating its ownership over the
neither petitioner nor her counsel appeared. We cannot property. However, upon the motion of LZK Holdings, RTC-
therefore fault the trial court for evaluating the only Makati declared null and void the consolidated title of
documentary evidence submitted by petitioner, the Deed of Planters. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals
Sale (CA), and was sustained by the Court.
As it is, the trial and appellate courts found the validity of the With regards to motion for the issuance of a writ of possession,
sale in petitioner's favor questionable since only Septem Planters appealed the order of the RTC-San Fernando. The CA
signed the Deed of Sale and it was not shown that he was granted the appeal and annulled the assailed order.
authorized by Grelita to sell the conjugal property. In our view,
however, even if both Ricaza spouses had signed, the result
would still be the same, given the circumstances in this case. ISSUE:

Whether or not Planters Bank may apply for and is entitled to FACTS
a writ of possession as the purchaser of the property in the
foreclosure sale. This case stems from the CIR’s formal demand letter and
corresponding assessment notices demanding payment of
HELD: deficiency taxes against petitioner imposed on the latter’s
YES. The duty of the trial court to grant a writ of possession is health care agreement with the members of its health care
ministerial. Such writ issues as a matter of recourse upon the program. The CTA rendered a decision cancelling the DST
filing of the proper motion and the approval of the assessment, which respondent contended, claiming that
corresponding bond. petitioner’s health care agreement was a contract of insurance
subject to DST. On appeal, the CA held that petitioner’s health
No discretion is left to the trial court. care agreement was in the nature of a non-life insurance
contract subject to DST.
An injunction is not allowed to prohibit the issuance of a writ
of possession. Neither does the pendic case for annulment of Interestingly, the Court rendered a minute resolution
foreclosure sale, mortgage contract, promissory notes and dismissing the appeal in CIR v. PNB, a CA decision that held that
damages stay the issuance of said writ. the health care agreement of petitioner is not an insurance
contract for purposes of DST. Petitioner claims that the said
All the elements of the doctrine of res judicata are present in minute resolution was akin to a judgment on the merits, and
this case. The Final judgment was rendered by the Court on a thus, the Court should apply the CA ruling there that a health
judgment on the merits of Planters Bank’s right to apply for care agreement is not an insurance contract.
and be issued a writ of possession. The parties are the same
ISSUE
parties involved in the present case.
• Whether or not the Court is Bound by a Minute Resolution
LZK Holdings herefore can no longer question Planter Bank’s in Another Case. (NO)
right to a writ of possession over the subject property because
the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment bars the RULING
relitigation of the particular issue.
It is true that, although contained in a minute resolution, the
No hearing is required because the proceeding in a petition for Court’s dismissal of the petition in CIR v. PNB was a disposition
a writ of possession is non-litigious, and ex-parte and summary of the merits of the case, effectively affirming the CA ruling
in nature. It is a judicial proceeding brought for the benefit of being questioned. As a result, the ruling in that case has
one party only. already become final.
In effect, such minute resolution constitutes res judicata with

G.R. No. 167330 September 18, 2009 respect to the same subject matter and the same issues
concerning the same parties. However, if other parties or
PHILIPPINE HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS, INC., Petitioner, vs. another subject matter is involved, the minute resolution is
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent. not binding precedent.
There are substantial, not simply formal, distinctions between

Resolution a minute resolution and a decision. The constitutional
requirement under the 1st paragraph of Sec. 14, Article VIII of
DOCTRINE
the Constitution – that the facts and the law on which the
“With respect to the same subject matter and the same issues judgment is based must be expressed clearly and distinctly –
concerning the same parties, [a minute resolution] constitutes applies only to decisions, not to minute resolutions. A minute
res judicata. However, if other parties or another subject resolution is signed only by the clerk of court by authority of
matter (even with the same parties and issues) is involved, the the justices, unlike a decision. It does not require the
minute resolution is not binding precedent. Thus, in CIR v. certification of the Chief Justice. Moreover, unlike decisions,
Baier-Nickel, the Court noted that a previous case, CIR v. Baier- minute resolutions are not published in the Philippine Reports.
Nickel involving the same parties and the same issues, was Finally, the proviso of Sec. 4(3) of Article VIII speaks of a
previously disposed of by the Court thru a minute resolution decision. Indeed, as a rule, this Court lays down doctrines or
dated February 17, 2003 sustaining the ruling of the CA. principles of law which constitute binding precedent in a
Nonetheless, the Court ruled that the previous case "ha(d) no decision duly signed by the members of the Court and certified
bearing" on the latter case because the two cases involved by the Chief Justice.
different subject matters as they were concerned with the
Accordingly, since petitioner was not a party in G.R. No.
taxable income of different taxable years.”
148680 and since petitioner’s liability for DST on its health care
agreement was not the subject matter of G.R. No. 148680, imposable penalty for kidnapping for ransom is death, reduced
petitioner cannot successfully invoke the minute resolution in to reclusion perpetua.
that case (which is not even binding precedent) in its favor. Escobar's bail is, thus, a matter of judicial discretion, provided
Nonetheless, in view of the reasons already discussed, this that the evidence of his guilt is not strong.
does not detract in any way from the fact that petitioner’s
health care agreements are not subject to DST. The RTC denied Escobar's Second Bail Petition on the ground
of res judicata. The CA overturned this and correctly ruled that
G.R. No. 214300 July 26, 2017 his Second Bail Petition was not barred by res judicata.
People of the Philippines, petitioner, v. Manuel Escobar,
respondent In Trinidad v. Marcelo declares that res judicata, as found in
Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, is a principle in civil law
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 and "has no bearing on criminal proceedings. Further,an
interlocutory order denying an application for bail, in this case
DOCTRINE: Res judicata applies only in a final judgment in a being criminal in nature, does not give rise to res judicata.
civil case, not in an interlocutory order in a criminal case. An
order disposing a petition for bail is interlocutory. This order An interlocutory order "settles only some incidental, subsidiary
does not attain finality when a new matter warrants a second or collateral matter arising in an action"; in other words,
look on the application for bail. something else still needs to be done in the primary case-the
rendition of the final judgment. Res judicata applies only when
FACTS: there is a final judgment on the merits of a case; it cannot be
Manuel Escobar was suspected of conspiring in the kidnap for availed of in an
ransom of Mary Grace Cheng Rosagas, daughter of Filipino- interlocutory order even if this order is not appealed.
Chinese businessman Robert G. Cheng (Robert), and two
other victims.
PRISCILLA C. MIJARES, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, HILDA B.
Robert paid the ransom of PhP15M. Mary Grace NARCISO, SR. MARIANI DIMARANAN, SFIC, and JOEL C.
and the other two victims were released more than 12 hours LAMANGAN in their behalf and on behalf of the Class
since they were abducted. Cubillas, the driver of the group of Plaintiffs in Class Action No. MDL 840, United States
kidnappers, District Court of Hawaii, Petitioner, vs. HON. SANTIAGO
became a state witness. He executed an extrajudicial JAVIER RANADA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
confession and implicated Escobar as an adviser for Villaver, Branch 137, Regional Trial Court, Makati City, and the
the group leader. ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, through its court
appointed legal representatives in Class Action MDL 840,
Escobar filed a petition for bail (First Bail Petition). RTC denied United States District Court of Hawaii, namely: Imelda R.
the First Bail Petition stating that the petition filed is denied for Marcos and Ferdinand Marcos, Jr,
lack of merit considering hat state witness Cancio Cubillas G.R. NO. 139325 April 12, 2005
positively identified him. It was affirmed by the CA. A
subsequent development in the accused's case compelled him PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 45
to file a second petition for bail (Second Bail Petition).
FACTS:
RTC: denied Second Bail Petition on the ground of res judicata On 9 May 1991, a complaint was filed with the US District
Court, District of Hawaii, against the Marcos Estate. The action
ISSUE: was brought forth by ten Filipino citizens who each alleged
Whether or not res judicata is applicable to bail. having suffered human rights abuses such as arbitrary
detention, torture and rape in the hands of police or military
RULING: forces during the Marcos regime. The Alien Tort Act was
NO. Res judicata is not applicable to bail. Bail may be a matter invoked as basis for the US District Court's jurisdiction over the
of right or judicial discretion. The accused has the right to bail complaint, as it involved a suit by aliens for tortious violations
if the offense charged is "not punishable by death, reclusion of international law. These plaintiffs brought the action on
perpetua or life imprisonment" before conviction by the RTC. their own behalf and on behalf of a class of similarly situated
However, if the accused is charged with an offense the penalty individuals.
of which is
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment" regardless of On 20 May 1997, the present petitioners filed Complaint with
the stage of the criminal prosecution" and when evidence of the Makati RTC for the enforcement of the Final Judgment.
one's guilt is not strong, then the accused's prayer for bail is They alleged that they are members of the plaintiff class in
subject to the discretion of the trial court. In this case, the whose favor the US District Court awarded damages, and

hence should be recognized and enforced in the Philippines, Judgment of the US District Court. The provision does not
pursuant to Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court then in make any distinction between a local judgment and a foreign
force. judgment, and where the law does not distinguish, we shall not
distinguish.
The Marcos Estate filed a motion to dismiss, raising, among
others, the non-payment of the correct filing fees. It alleged Neither the complaint nor the award of damages adjudicated
that petitioners had only paid P410.00 as docket and filing by the US District Court involves any real property of the
fees, notwithstanding the fact that they sought to enforce a Marcos Estate.
monetary amount of damages of over US$2.25 Billion.
Thus, respondent judge was in clear and serious error when he
Respondent Judge Ranada issued the subject Order dismissing concluded that the filing fees should be computed on the basis
the complaint without prejudice. Respondent judge opined of the schematic table of Section 7(a), as the action involved
that contrary to the petitioners' submission, the subject matter pertains to a claim against an estate based on judgment.
of the complaint was indeed capable of pecuniary estimation,
as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering The rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have
the payment of definite sums of money, allowing for easy established a usage among civilized states by which final
determination of the value of the foreign judgment. judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are
reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which Judge conditions that may vary in different countries. The procedural
Ranada denied. From this denial, petitioners filed a Petition for rule now outlined in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil
Certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the twin orders of Procedure provides that there is an evident distinction
respondent judge. between a foreign judgment in an action in rem and one in
personam. For an action in rem, the foreign judgment is
Petitioners submit that their action is incapable of pecuniary deemed conclusive upon the title to the thing, while in an
estimation as the subject matter of the suit is the enforcement action in personam, the foreign judgment is presumptive, and
of a foreign judgment, and not an action for the collection of a not conclusive, of a right as between the parties and their
sum of money or recovery of damages. They also point out that successors in interest by a subsequent title. However, in both
to require the class plaintiffs to pay P472,000,000.00 in filing cases, the foreign judgment is susceptible to impeachment in
fees would negate and render inutile the liberal construction our local courts on the grounds of want of jurisdiction or notice
ordained by the Rules of Court, as required by Section 6, Rule to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly the inexpensive Thus, the party aggrieved by the foreign judgment is entitled
disposition of every action. to defend against the enforcement of such decision in the local
forum. It is essential that there should be an opportunity to
The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) was permitted to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this
intervene in this case. For the CHR, the Makati RTC erred in jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy.
interpreting the action for the execution of a foreign judgment
as a new case, in violation of the principle that once a case has It is clear then that it is usually necessary for an action to be
been decided between the same parties in one country on the filed in order to enforce a foreign judgment, even if such
same issue with finality, it can no longer be relitigated again in judgment has conclusive effect as in the case of in rem actions,
another country. The CHR likewise invokes the principle of if only for the purpose of allowing the losing party an
comity, and of vested rights. opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, and in order
ISSUE: Whether or not the action filed with the lower court is for the court to properly determine its efficacy. Consequently,
a "money claim against an estate not based on judgment"— the party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of
NO overcoming the presumption of its validity.
What provision, if any, then should apply in determining the The rules are silent as to what initiatory procedure must be
filing fees for an action to enforce a foreign judgment? — undertaken in order to enforce a foreign judgment in the
Section 7(b)(3) of Rule 141, i.e., within the class of "all other Philippines. But there is no question that the filing of a civil
actions not involving property." complaint is an appropriate measure for such purpose. A civil
action is one by which a party sues another for the
RULING: In dismissing the complaint, the respondent judge enforcement or protection of a right, and clearly an action to
relied on Section 7(a), Rule 141 as basis for the computation of enforce a foreign judgment is in essence a vindication of a right
the filing fee of over P472 Million. prescinding either from a "conclusive judgment upon title" or
the "presumptive evidence of a right."
Petitioners' complaint may have been lodged against an
estate, but it is clearly based on a judgment, the Final

As stated in Section 48, Rule 39, the actionable issues are capable of pecuniary estimation. But at the same time, it is also
generally restricted to a review of jurisdiction of the foreign an action based on judgment against an estate, thus placing it
court, the service of personal notice, collusion, fraud, or beyond the ambit of Section 7(a) of Rule 141.
mistake of fact or law. The limitations on review is in
consonance with a strong and pervasive policy in all legal Notably, the amount paid as docket fees by the petitioners on
systems to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues. the premise that it was an action incapable of pecuniary
Otherwise known as the policy of preclusion, it seeks to protect estimation corresponds to the same amount required for
party expectations resulting from previous litigation, to "other actions not involving property." The petitioners thus
safeguard against the harassment of defendants, to insure that paid the correct amount of filing fees, and it was a grave abuse
the task of courts not be increased by never-ending litigation of discretion for respondent judge to have applied instead a
of the same disputes. If every judgment of a foreign court were clearly inapplicable rule and dismissed the complaint.
reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on
his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the The viability of the public policy defense against the
previously concluded litigation. enforcement of a foreign judgment has been recognized in this
jurisdiction. This defense allows for the application of local
Petitioners go on to add that among the actions the Court has standards in reviewing the foreign judgment, especially when
recognized as being incapable of pecuniary estimation include such judgment creates only a presumptive right, as it does in
legality of conveyances and money deposits, validity of a cases wherein the judgment is against a person. The defense is
mortgage, the right to support, validity of documents, also recognized within the international sphere, as many civil
rescission of contracts, specific performance, and validity or law nations adhere to a broad public policy exception which
annulment of judgments. It is urged that an action for may result in a denial of recognition when the foreign court, in
enforcement of a foreign judgment belongs to the same class. the light of the choice-of-law rules of the recognizing court,
applied the wrong law to the case. The public policy defense
This is an intriguing argument, but ultimately it is self-evident can safeguard against possible abuses to the easy resort to
that while the subject matter of the action is undoubtedly the offshore litigation if it can be demonstrated that the original
enforcement of a foreign judgment, the effect of a providential claim is noxious to our constitutional values.
award would be the adjudication of a sum of money. Perhaps
in theory, such an action is primarily for "the enforcement of While the definite conceptual parameters of the recognition
the foreign judgment," but there is a certain obtuseness to that and enforcement of foreign judgments have not been
sort of argument since there is no denying that the authoritatively established, the Court can assert with certainty
enforcement of the foreign judgment will necessarily result in that such an undertaking is among those generally accepted
the award of a definite sum of money. principles of international law.
Thus, relative to the enforcement of foreign judgments in the
But before we insist upon this conclusion past beyond the Philippines, it emerges that there is a general right recognized
point of reckoning, we must examine its possible ramifications. within our body of laws, and affirmed by the Constitution, to
Petitioners raise the point that a declaration that an action for seek recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, as
enforcement of foreign judgment may be capable of pecuniary well as a right to defend against such enforcement on the
estimation might lead to an instance wherein a first level court grounds of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
such as the Municipal Trial Court would have jurisdiction to collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
enforce a foreign judgment. But under the statute defining the
jurisdiction of first level courts, B.P. 129, such courts are not The preclusion of an action for enforcement of a foreign
vested with jurisdiction over actions for the enforcement of judgment in this country merely due to an exhorbitant
foreign judgments. assessment of docket fees is alien to generally accepted
practices and principles in international law. Indeed, there are
An examination of Section 19(6), B.P. 129 reveals that the grave concerns in conditioning the amount of the filing fee on
instant complaint for enforcement of a foreign judgment, even the pecuniary award or the value of the property subject of the
if capable of pecuniary estimation, would fall under the foreign decision. Such pecuniary award will almost certainly be
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts, thus negating the fears in foreign denomination, computed in accordance with the
of the petitioners. Indeed, an examination of the provision applicable laws and standards of the forum. The vagaries of
indicates that it can be relied upon as jurisdictional basis with inflation, as well as the relative low- income capacity of the
respect to actions for enforcement of foreign judgments, Filipino, to date may very well translate into an award virtually
provided that no other court or office is vested jurisdiction unenforceable in this country, despite its integral validity, if the
over such complaint: docket fees for the enforcement thereof were predicated on
the amount of the award sought to be enforced. The theory
Thus, we are comfortable in asserting the obvious, that the adopted by respondent judge and the Marcos Estate may even
complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one lead to absurdities, such as if applied to an award involving real

property situated in places such as the United States or by defendant on behalf of the plaintiff under the said
Scandinavia where real property values are inexorably high. agreement, Northwest sued Sharp in Japan, for collection of
We cannot very well require that the filing fee be computed the unremitted proceeds of the ticket sales, with claim for
based on the value of the foreign property as determined by damages.
the standards of the country where it is located.
A writ of summons was issued by the District Court of Japan
As crafted, Rule 141 of the Rules of Civil Procedure avoids against Sharp. The attempt to serve the summons was
unreasonableness, as it recognizes that the subject matter of unsuccessful because the bailiff was advised by a person in the
an action for enforcement of a foreign judgment is the foreign office that Mr. Dinozo, the person believed to be authorized to
judgment itself, and not the right-duty correlatives that receive court processes was in Manila.
resulted in the foreign judgment. In this particular
circumstance, given that the complaint is lodged against an Bailiff returned to the defendant's office to serve the
estate and is based on the US District Court's Final Judgment, summons. Mr. Dinozo refused to accept the same claiming
this foreign judgment may, for purposes of classification under that he was no longer an employee of the defendant.
the governing procedural rule, be deemed as subsumed under
Section 7(b)(3) of Rule 141, i.e., within the class of "all other After the two attempts of service were unsuccessful, the Tokyo
actions not involving property." Thus, only the blanket filing District Court decided to have the complaint and the writs of
fee of minimal amount is required. summons served at the head office of the defendant in Manila.
The Director of the Tokyo District Court requested the
It bears noting that Section 48, Rule 39 acknowledges that the Supreme Court of Japan to serve the summons through
Final Judgment is not conclusive yet, but presumptive evidence diplomatic channels upon the defendant's head office in
of a right of the petitioners against the Marcos Estate. Manila.
Moreover, the Marcos Estate is not precluded to present
evidence, if any, of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the Defendant received from the Deputy Sheriff Balingit the writ
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. This of summons. Despite receipt of the same, defendant failed to
ruling, decisive as it is on the question of filing fees and no appear at the scheduled hearing. Thus, the Tokyo Court
other, does not render verdict on the enforceability of the Final proceeded to hear the plaintiff's complaint and rendered
Judgment before the courts under the jurisdiction of the judgment ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum
Philippines, or for that matter any other issue which may of 83,158,195 Yen and damages for delay at the rate of 6% per
legitimately be presented before the trial court. Such issues are annum from August 28, 1980 up to and until payment is
to be litigated before the trial court, but within the confines of completed.
the matters for proof as laid down in Section 48, Rule 39. On
the other hand, the speedy resolution of this claim by the trial Defendant received from Deputy Sheriff Balingit copy of the
court is encouraged, and contumacious delay of the decision on judgment. Defendant not having appealed the judgment, the
the merits will not be brooked by this Court. same became final and executory.
G.R. No. 112573 February 9, 1995 Plaintiff was unable to execute the decision in Japan, hence, a
suit for enforcement of the judgment was filed by plaintiff
NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES, INC. petitioner, vs. COURT before the RTC manila.
OF APPEALS and C.F. SHARP & COMPANY INC.,
respondents. Defendant filed its answer averring that the judgment of the
Japanese Court sought to be enforced is null and void and
unenforceable in this jurisdiction having been rendered
DOCTRINE: A judgment in an action in personam of a tribunal without due and proper notice to the defendant and/or with
of a foreign country having jurisdiction to pronounce the same collusion or fraud and/or upon a clear mistake of law and fact.
is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and
their successors-in-interest by a subsequent title. The Defendant filed a Motion for Judgment on a Demurrer to
judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of Evidence, the RTC granted the same and held that the foreign
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or judgment in the Japanese Court sought in this action is null and
clear mistake of law or fact. void for want of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
considering that this is an action in personam; the Japanese
FACTS: Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
Northwest and Sharp, through its Japan branch, entered into defendant because jurisprudence requires that the defendant
an International Passenger Sales Agency Agreement, whereby be served with summons in Japan in order for the Japanese
the former authorized the latter to sell its air transportation Court to acquire jurisdiction over it, the process of the Court in
tickets. Unable to remit the proceeds of the ticket sales made Japan sent to the Philippines which is outside Japanese

jurisdiction cannot confer jurisdiction over the defendant in ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS (M) BERHAD, Petitioner,
the case before the Japanese Court of the case at bar vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, Respondents.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. It held that he service
of summons effected in Manila or beyond the territorial PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI ON THE DECISION OF
boundaries of Japan was null and did not confer jurisdiction THE CA AFFIRMING THE RTC OF PASIG WHICH DISMISSED THE
upon the Tokyo District Court over the person of SHARP; COMPLAINT OF PETITIONER FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE
hence, its decision was void. MONEY JUDGMENT OF THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA IN
KUALA LUMPUR AGAINST THE RESPONDENT.
ISSUE: Whether or not a Japanese court can acquire
jurisdiction over a Philippine corporation doing business in DOCTRINE: A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and
Japan by serving summons through diplomatic channels on the binding in the country from which it comes, until a contrary
Philippine corporation at its principal office in Manila after showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of
prior attempts to serve summons in Japan had failed. proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum.
HELD: it was the Tokyo District Court which ordered that FACTS: Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad is a corporation
summons for SHARP be served at its head office in the organized under the laws of Malaysia while private respondent
Philippine's after the two attempts of service had failed. The Philippine National Construction Corporation is a corporation
Tokyo District Court requested the Supreme Court of Japan to duly incorporated and existing under Philippine laws.
cause the delivery of the summons and other legal documents
to the Philippines. Acting on that request, the Supreme Court In 1983, petitioner initiated a suit for collection against private
of Japan sent the summons together with the other legal respondent, before the High Court of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur.
documents to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan which, in
turn, forwarded the same to the Japanese Embassy in Manila . Petitioner sought to recover the indemnity of the performance
Thereafter, the court processes were delivered to the Ministry bond it had put up in favor of private respondent to guarantee
(now Department) of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, then to the completion of the Felda Project and the non-payment of
the Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance (now the loan it extended to Asiavest-CDCP for the completion of
Regional Trial Court) of Manila, who forthwith ordered Deputy Paloh Hanai and Kuantan By-Pass Project.
Sheriff Rolando Balingit to serve the same on SHARP at its
principal office in Manila. This service is equivalent to service On September 13, 1985, the High Court of Malaya rendered
on the proper government official under Section 14, Rule 14 of judgment in favor of the petitioner and against
the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 128 of the Corporation the private respondent. It also issued an Order directing the
Code. Hence, SHARP's contention that such manner of service private respondent to pay petitioner interest on the sums
is not valid under Philippine laws holds no water. covered by the said Judgment.
SERVICE OF SUMMONS FROM A FOREIGN COUNTRY Following unsuccessful attempts to secure payment from
If the foreign corporation has designated an agent to receive private respondent under the judgment, petitioner initiated on
summons, the designation is exclusive, and service of September 5, 1988 the complaint before RTC of Pasig to
summons is without force and gives the court no jurisdiction enforce the judgment of the High Court of Malaya.
unless made upon him.
Private respondent filed Motion to Dismiss filed on October 5,
Where the corporation has no such agent, service shall be 1988, contending that the alleged judgment
made on the government official designated by law, to wit: (a) of the High Court of Malaya should be denied recognition or
the Insurance Commissioner in the case of a foreign insurance enforcement since on its face, it is tainted with want of
company; (b) the Superintendent of Banks, in the case of a jurisdiction, want of notice to private respondent, collusion
foreign banking corporation; and (c) the Securities and and/or fraud, and there is a clear mistake of law or fact. The
Exchange Commission, in the case of other foreign motion was DENIED by the trial court considering that the
corporations duly licensed to do business in the Philippines. grounds relied upon are not the proper grounds in a motion to
Whenever service of process is so made, the government dismiss under Rule 16.
office or official served shall transmit by mail a copy of the
summons or other legal proccess to the corporation at its
home or principal office. The sending of such copy is a On May 22, 1989, private respondent filed its Answer with
necessary part of the service. Compulsory Counterclaim and therein raised the grounds it
brought up in its Motion to Dismiss. In its Reply, the petitioner
G.R. No. 110263 July 20, 2001 contended that the High Court

of Malaya acquired jurisdiction over the person of private by the evidence it offered. In addition to testimonial evidence,
respondent by its voluntary submission to the court’s petitioner offered multiple pieces of documentary evidence
jurisdiction through its appointed counsel, Mr. Khay Chay Tee. such as a certified and authenticated copy of the Judgment and
Furthermore, private respondent’s counsel waived any and all Order promulgated by the Malaysian High Court. Having thus
objections to the High Court’s jurisdiction in a pleading filed proven, through the foregoing evidence, the existence and
before the court. es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary authenticity of the foreign judgment, said foreign judgment
RTC: DISMISSED petitioner’s complaint. Petitioner Interposed enjoys presumptive validity and the burden then fell upon the
an appeal with the Court of Appeals. party who disputes its validity, herein private respondent, to
CA: DISMISSED the appeal and AFFIRMED the decision of the prove otherwise.
trial court. Hence, the instant petition.
The foregoing reasons or grounds relied upon by private
ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in denying the recognition and respondent in preventing enforcement and recognition of the
enforcement of the Malaysian Court Judgment. Malaysian judgment primarily refer to matters of remedy and
RULING: YES. Generally, in the absence of a special compact, procedure taken by the Malaysian High Court relative to the
no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a suit for collection initiated by petitioner. Needless to stress,
judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country; however, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not
the rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have necessarily affected by the fact that the procedure in the
established a usage among civilized states by which final courts of the country in which such judgment was rendered
judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are differs from that of the courts of the country in which the
reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain judgment is relied on. Ultimately, matters of remedy and
conditions that may vary in different countries. procedure such as those relating to the service of summons or
court process upon the defendant, the authority of counsel to
In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign appear and represent a defendant and the formal
tribunal may be recognized insofar as the immediate parties requirements in a decision are governed by the lex fori or the
and the underlying cause of action are concerned so long as it internal law of the forum, i.e., the law of Malaysia in this case.
is convincingly shown that there has been an opportunity for a
full and fair hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction; In this case, it is the procedural law of Malaysia where the
that the trial upon regular proceedings has been conducted, judgment was rendered that determines the validity of the
following due citation or voluntary appearance of the service of court process on private respondent as well as other
defendant and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure matters raised by it. As to what the Malaysian procedural law
an impartial administration of justice; and that there is nothing is, remains a question of fact, not of law. It may not be taken
to indicate either a prejudice in court and in the system of laws judicial notice of and must be pleaded and proved like any
under which it is sitting or fraud in procuring the judgment. other fact. Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 provide that it may
be evidenced by an official publication or by a duly attested or
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the authenticated copy thereof. It was then incumbent upon
country from which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the private respondent to present evidence as to what that
basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the Malaysian procedural law is and to show that under it, the
giving of due notice in the foreign forum. assailed service of summons upon a financial officer of a
corporation, as alleged by it, is invalid. It did not.
Under Section 50(b) of Rule 39, which was the governing law
at the time, a judgment, against a person, of a tribunal of a Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity of
foreign country having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and the High Court of Malaya must stand.
their successors in interest by a subsequent title. The judgment
may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction, Furthermore, there is no basis for or truth to the appellate
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake court’s conclusion that the conditional appearance of private
of law or fact. In addition, under Section 3(n), Rule 131 of the respondent’s counsel who was allegedly not authorized to
Revised Rules of Court, a court, whether in the Philippines or appear and represent, cannot be considered as voluntary
elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the submission to the jurisdiction of the High Court of Malaya,
lawful exercise of its jurisdiction. Hence, once the authenticity inasmuch as said conditional appearance was not premised on
of the foreign judgment is proved, the party attacking a foreign the alleged lack of authority of said counsel but the conditional
judgment, is tasked with the burden of overcoming its appearance was entered to question the regularity of the
presumptive validity. service of the writ of summons. Such
E conditional appearance was in fact subsequently withdrawn
In the instant case, petitioner sufficiently established the when counsel realized that the writ was properly served.
existence of the money judgment of the High Court of Malaya

Lastly, there is no merit to the argument that the foreign agreed to undertake maintenance and modification works on
judgment is not enforceable in view of the absence of any respondent's aircraft. The parties agreed on the mode and
statement of facts and law upon which the award in favor of manner of payment by respondent of the contract price,
the petitioner was based. As aforestated, the lex fori or the including
internal law of the forum governs matters of remedy and interest in case of default. They also agreed that the
procedure. "construction, validity and performance thereof" shall be
governed by the laws of Singapore. They further agreed
Considering that under the procedural rules of the High Court to submit any suit arising from their agreement to the non-
of Malaya, a valid judgment may be rendered exclusive jurisdiction of the Singapore courts.
even without stating in the judgment every fact and law upon
which the judgment is based, then the same must be accorded Subsequently, the parties verbally agreed the petitioner will
respect and the courts in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the repair and undertake maintenance works on respondent's
judgment of the foreign court simply because our rules provide other aircraft. Petitioner undertook the contracted works and
otherwise. thereafter promptly delivered the
aircrafts to respondent. But despite petitioner's repeated
All in all, private respondent had the ultimate duty to demands, respondent failed to pay, in violation of the terms
demonstrate the alleged invalidity of such foreign judgment, agreed upon.
being the party challenging the judgment rendered by the High
Court of Malaya. But instead of doing so, private respondent Petitioner filed with the High Court of Republic of Singapore an
merely argued, to which the trial court agreed, that the burden action for the collection of sum of money including interest
lay upon petitioner to prove the validity of the money and costs, against respondent. Writ of Summons to be served
judgment. Such is clearly erroneous and would render extraterritorially or outside Singapore upon respondent. The
meaningless the presumption of validity accorded a foreign court sought the assistance of the sheriff of Pasay City to effect
judgment were the party seeking to enforce it be required to service of the summons upon respondent. However, despite
first establish its validity. receipt of summons, respondent failed to answer the claim.
Hence, respondent was declared in default.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of
the CA sustaining the Decision of the RTC of Petitioner filed with RTC Pasay a Petition for the Enforcement
Pasig, denying the enforcement of the Judgment of the High of Judgment.
Court of Malaya is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another in its
stead is hereby rendered ORDERING private respondent to pay Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition on two
petitioner the amounts adjudged in the said foreign Judgment, grounds: (1) the Singapore High Court did not acquire
subject of the said case. Costs against the private respondent. jurisdiction over its person; and (2) the foreign judgment
sought to be enforced is void for having been rendered in
ST. AVIATION SERVICES CO., PTE., LTD., petitioner, vs. violation of its right to due process.
GRAND
INTERNATIONAL AIRWAYS, INC., respondent. RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that neither
of the grounds are recognized under Rule 16 of Rules of Civil
Procedure.
CA granted the petition for certiorari and set aside the RTC
DOCTRINE: Generally, in the absence of a special contract, no ruling.
sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a
judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country; however, Issue: WON RTC Pasay has jurisdiction over the case (YES)
under the rules of comity, utility and convenience, nations have
established a Ruling: Certainly, the Philippine legal system
usage among civilized states by which final judgments of has long ago accepted into its jurisprudence and procedural
foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally rules the viability of an action for enforcement of foreign
respected and rendered efficacious under certain conditions judgment, as well as the requisites for such valid enforcement,
that may vary in different countries. as derived from internationally accepted doctrines. The
conditions for the recognition and enforcement of a foreign
FACTS: judgment in our
legal system are contained in Section 48, Rule 39 of the 1997
Sometime in January 1996, petitioner and respondent Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the above Rule, a foreign
executed an "Agreement for the Maintenance and judgment or order against a person is merely presumptive
Modification of Airbus. Under this stipulation, petitioner evidence of a right as between the parties. It may be repelled,

among others, by want of jurisdiction of the issuing authority About five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit
or by want of notice to the party against whom it is enforced. for the declaration of nullity was pending - respondent was
The party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Australia.
overcoming the presumption of its validity.
Respondent then moved for the dismissal of the complaint on
Generally, matters of remedy and procedure such as those the ground that it stated no cause of action. The OSG agreed
relating to the service of process upon a defendant are with respondent.
governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum, which
in this case is the law of Singapore. Here, petitioner moved for The RTC declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that
leave of court to serve a copy of the Writ of Summons outside the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the
Singapore. In an Order dated December 24, 1997, the Philippines.
Singapore High Court granted "leave to serve a copy of the
Writ of Summons on the Defendant by a method of service ISSUE:
authorized by the law of the Philippines for service of any
originating process issued by the Philippines at ground Loor, Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha
APMC Building, 136 Amorsolo corner Gamboa Street, 1229 Samson was proven
Makati City, or elsewhere in the Philippines."
Considering that the Writ of Summons was served upon HELD:
respondent in accordance with our Rules, jurisdiction was
acquired by the Singapore High Court over its person. Clearly, The herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that
the judgment of default rendered by that court against reads:
respondent is valid. "1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this
decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has died)
G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001 commits the offence of bigamy."
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce
petitioner, obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did not
v. absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents. his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the
trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to remarry
despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.
DOCTRINE: before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized
by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a Burden of Proving Australian Law
fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the
it. existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or
defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden
FACTS: of proving the material allegations of the complaint when
those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the
Respondent was married to Editha, an Australian citizen. Later burden of proving the material allegations in their answer
on, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, when they introduce new matters.
was issued by an Australian family court.
Our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any
Respondent became an Australian citizen and married other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian
petitioner. In their application for a marriage license, marital laws are not among those matters that judges are
respondent was declared as "single" and "Filipino." supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. The
power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and
Petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved
Marriage, on the ground of bigamy. in the negative
Respondent averred that, he had revealed to petitioner his Wolfgang O. Roehr, v. Maria Carmen D. Rodriguez, Hon.
prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution. He contended Judge Josefina Guevara-Salonga, Presiding Judge of Makati
that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly RTC, Branch 149
dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia; thus, he G.R. No. 142820 ; June 20, 2003
was legally capacitated to marry petitioner.
FACTS:

Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such,
of Germany, married private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a is subject to proof to the contrary.
Filipina. Their marriage was ratified in Tayasan, Negros
Oriental. Out of their union were born Carolynne and In the present case, the private respondent was not given the
Alexandra Kristine. opportunity to challenge the judgment of the German court.
The divorce judgment was issued by virtue of the German Civil
In 1996, the private respondent filed a petition for declaration Code and did not touch on the issue as to who the offending
of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of spouse was. There was no finding that the private respondent
Makati . is unfit to obtain custody of the children.
Meanwhile, the petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from The trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to
the Court of First Instance of Hamburg, parental custody of the determine the issue of parental custody, care, support, and
children was granted to the father. education mindful of the best interests of the children.
The petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the

trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter as a G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010
decree of divorce had already been promulgated dissolving the
marriage of petitioner and private respondent. Judge Guevara- GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner, vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO.
Salonga issued an order granting the petitioner's motion to TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
dismiss.
Direct Appeal
Private respondent filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration,
praying that the case proceed for the purpose of determining DOCTRINE
the custody of the children and distribution of properties. The
respondent judge issued an order setting aside the earlier “Direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign
order with respect to the issues of property relations and judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite
support and custody of the children. interest to institute an action before the Philippine courts for
the recognition of the foreign judgment. The divorce obtained
The petitioner ascribes lack of jurisdiction of the trial court and by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines,
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge. provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national
law.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused her FACTS
discretion when she assumed and retained jurisdiction over
Petitioner Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired
the present case despite the divorce decree from a German
Canadian citizenship in 2000. In 2005, Gerbert married
court.
respondent Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig. Due to work and
other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon
HELD:
after the wedding. When he returned to the Philippines to
NO. As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners
surprise his wife, he was shocked to discover that his wife was
in other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the
having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed,
legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care, and support of the
Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce.
children, must still be determined by our courts.
The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada
granted the petition on December 8, 2005, taking effect a
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign
month later, on January 8, 2006.
judgment, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the
judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on Two years after the divorce, Gerbert moved on and has found
grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of another Filipina to love. Desirous to marry his new Filipina
Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on
It is essential that there should be an opportunity to his and Sto. Tomas’ marriage certificate. However, the then
challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this NSO (now PSA) informed Gerbert that the marriage between
jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this him and Sto. Tomas still subsists under Philippine law, and to
jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with be enforceable, the foreign decree must first be judicially
respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions recognized by a competent Philippine court.
in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of Direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign
foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite
with the RTC. The RTC denied Gerbert’s petition, holding that interest to institute an action before the Philippine courts for
the Filipino spouse must be the one to institute the action to the recognition of the foreign judgment. The divorce obtained
avail of the remedy under Art. 26 of the Family Code. by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national
ISSUE law.
• Whether or not the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the FC The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce
extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take
jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree. judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera
(NO) explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect
within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of
RULING another country." This means that the foreign judgment and
its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second
evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to
paragraph of Art. 26 of the FC as the substantive right it
show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.
establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse.
The recognition may be made in an action instituted
As the RTC correctly held, the provision was included to avoid specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party
the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is defense.
no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The legislative intent
In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and
is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her
the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to
marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce
obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign
decree. Without the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the FC, the
authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into
judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether
play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official
in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a
publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal
related issue in another proceeding, would be of no
custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are
significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not
not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by
recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond.
a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by
of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree the seal of his office.
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy
that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract
of the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates
another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can
proving its authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the
make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that
Canadian law on divorce. Under this situation, we can, at this
already established by the decree), whose status and legal
point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of
capacity are generally governed by his national law.
supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce
purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of
provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words,
action, given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the
only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of
Filipina wife’s (respondent’s) obvious conformity with the
Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no
petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other
right under this provision.
interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and
However, the unavailability of Art. 26 for Gerbert is not overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by
sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party,
The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to
conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity
proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata
to Sec. 48, Rule 39 of the RoC which provides for the effect of between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the
foreign judgments. Rules of Court.
RULE 40: APPEAL FROM INFERIOR COURTS TO THE RTCs the appeal of the interlocutory order may be included in the
appeal of the judgment itself. The
G.R. No. 178933 September 16, 2009 interlocutory order generally cannot be appealed separately
RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR. Petitioner, vs. COURT OF from the judgment. It is only when such interlocutory order
APPEALS (Fifth Division) and NELIA S. SILVERIO-DEE, was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
Respondents. abuse of discretion that certiorari under Rule 65 may be
resorted to. In the instant case, Nelia Silverio-Dee appealed the
FACTS: Controversy stemmed from the settlement of estate May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC on the ground that it ordered
of the deceased Beatriz Silverio. After her death, her surviving her to vacate the premises of the property located at No. 3
spouse, Ricardo Silverio, Sr., filed an intestate proceeding for Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. On that aspect the order
the settlement of her estate. During the pendency of the case, is not a final determination of the case or of the issue of
Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a petition to remove Ricardo C. distribution of the shares of the heirs in the estate or their
Silverio, Sr. as the administrator of the subject estate. RTC rights therein. It must be borne in mind that until the estate is
issued an Order granting the petition while appointing Ricardo partitioned, each heir only has an inchoate right to the
Silverio, Jr. as the new administrator. Ricardo Silverio Jr. filed properties of the estate, such that no heir may lay claim on a
an Urgent Motion for an Order Prohibiting Any Person to particular property. In the instant case, the purported
Occupy/Stay/Use Real Estate Properties Involved in the authority of Nelia Silverio-Dee, which she allegedly secured
Intestate Estate of the Late Beatriz Silverio, Without Authority from Ricardo Silverio, Sr., was never approved by the probate
from this Honorable Court. The Omnibus Order also directed court. She, therefore, never had any real interest in the specific
Nelia S. Silverio Dee to vacate the property within fifteen (15) property. As such, the May 31,
days from receipt of the order. January 6, 2006, Nelia Silverio- 2005 Order of the RTC must be considered as interlocutory
Dee filed a Notice of Appeal dated January 5, 2006 from the and, therefore, not subject to an appeal. Thus, private
Order dated December 12, 2005 while the Record on Appeal respondent employed the wrong mode of appeal by filing a
dated January 20, 2006 was filed on January 23, Notice of Appeal with the RTC. Hence, for employing the
2006.Thereafter, on October 23, 2006, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed improper mode of appeal, the case should have been
a Motion to Dismiss Appeal and for Issuance of a Writ of dismissed. The implication of such improper appeal is that the
Execution against the appeal of Nelia Silverio-Dee on the notice of appeal did not toll the reglementary period for the
ground that the Record on Appeal was filed ten (10) days filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the proper
beyond the reglementary period. April 2, 2007, the RTC issued remedy in the instant case. This means that private respondent
an Order denying the appeal on the ground that it was not has now lost her remedy of appeal from the May 31, 2005
perfected within the reglementary period. Order of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC is an

Interlocutory Order, not subject to an appeal. G.R. NO. 178034 & 178117 September 18, 2009 ANDREW
JAMES MCBURNIE, Petitioner, vs. EULALIO GANZON, EGI-
RULING: On May 31, 2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order MANAGERS, INC. and E. GANZON, INC., Respondents.
ordering Nelia Silverio-Dee to vacate the premises of the
property located at No. 3, Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati Review on certiorari under Rule 45
City. She received a copy of the said Order on June 8, 2005. DOCTRINE: The failure of the respondents to comply with the
Instead of filing a Notice of Appeal and Record on Appeal, requirement of posting a bond equivalent in amount to the
private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the monetary award is fatal to their appeal. For filing their motion
Order. This motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order only on the final day within which to perfect an appeal,
dated December 12, 2005. This Order was received by private respondents cannot be allowed to seek refuge in a liberal
respondent on December 22, 2005. On January 6, 2006, application of the rules. Under such circumstance, there is
private respondent filed her Notice of Appeal while she filed neither way for the NLRC to exercise its discretion to grant or
her Record on Appeal on January 23, 2006. Appeal taken by deny the motion, nor for the respondents to post the full
the movant Nelia Silverio-Dee from the Order of this Court amount of the bond, without risk of summary dismissal for
dated December 12, 2005 denying the Motion for non-perfection of appeal.
Reconsideration is misplaced as no appeal may be taken from
the order denying the motion for reconsideration. FACTS: Andrew James McBurnie, an Australian national,
Furthermore, assuming that what said movant had appealed is signed a five-year employment contract as Executive Vice-
the final Order dated May 31, 2005, still, the appeal cannot be President of respondent EGI Manager's, Inc. (EGI), through its
given due course as the Record on Appeal had been filed President respondent Eulalio Ganzon. McBurnie's
beyond the thirty-day period to appeal. It is only after a responsibilities were to oversee the general management of
judgment has been rendered in the case that the ground for the company's hotels and resorts within the Philippines.

Petitioner featured in an accident that fractured his skull and to the appeal and to conduct further proceedings. Petitioners
necessitated his confinement at the Makati Medical Center. MR was likewise denied.
While recuperating from his injuries in Australia, petitioner
was informed by respondent Ganzon that his services were no ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed error in finding that
longer needed since the project had been permanently the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion (YES)
discontinued. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
with prayer for the payment of his salary and benefits for the HELD: YES. Article 223 of the Labor Code provides:
unexpired term of the contract. On September 30, 2004, Labor Article 223. Appeal.- Decisions, awards, or orders of
Arbiter rendered decision declaring petitioner's illegal the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless
dismissal with prayer for the payment of his salary and benefits appealed to the Commission by any or both parties
for the unexpired term of the contract. within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such
decisions, awards, or orders. x x x In case of a
On November 5, 2004, or 10 days after receipt of the Labor judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by
Arbiter's decision, respondents filed before the NLRC a the employer may be perfected only upon the posting
Memorandum of Appeal and Motion to Reduce Bond, and of a cash or surety bond x x x
posted as bond the amount of P100,000.00. They argued that
the awards of the Labor Arbiter were null and excessive, with The posting of a bond is indispensable to the perfection of an
the premeditated intention to render the employer incapable appeal in cases involving monetary awards from the decision
of posting an appeal bond and consequently deprive him of the of the Labor Arbiter. The lawmakers clearly intended to make
right to appeal. the bond a mandatory requisite for the perfection of an appeal
by the employer as inferred from the provision that an appeal
In an Order dated March 31, 2005, NLRC denied the motion to by the employer may be perfected "only upon the posting of a
reduce bond and ordered respondents to post an additional cash or surety bond." Moreover, the filing of the bond is not
bond of P54,083,910.00 together with the other requirements only mandatory but a jurisdictional requirement as well, that
within a non-extendible period of 10 days from receipt thereof, must be complied with in order to confer jurisdiction upon the
otherwise the appeal shall be dismissed. Respondents moved NLRC. Non- compliance therewith renders the decision of the
for reconsideration but it was denied July 15, 2005; Labor Arbiter final and executory.
respondents were again ordered to post the additional appeal
bond within another non-extendible period of 10 days from The jurisdictional principle and the mandatory nature of the
receipt thereof. appeal bond posted within the 10-day reglementary period are
reaffirmed by the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC. While
Instead of complying with the order of the NLRC, respondents the bond may be reduced upon motion by the employer, this
filed on August 12, 2005, a petition for certiorari and is subject to the conditions that (1) the motion to reduce the
prohibition with the Court of Appeals with prayer for issuance bond shall be based on meritorious grounds; and (2) a
of a preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award is
order. A TRO effective for 60 days was issued enjoining the posted by the appellant, otherwise the filing of the motion to
NLRC from enforcing its March 31, 2005 and July 15, 2005 reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect
Orders. an appeal. The qualification effectively requires that unless the
NLRC grants the reduction of the cash bond within the 10 day
After the TRO expired and respondents still failed to post reglementary period, the employer is still expected to post the
additional bond, the NLRC dismissed their appeal. cash or surety bond securing the full amount within the said
Respondents filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for 10-day period. If the NLRC does eventually grant the motion
certiorari with prayer for issuance of TRO and/or writ of for reduction after the reglementary period has elapsed, the
preliminary injunction. correct relief would be to reduce the cash or surety bond
already posted by the employer within the 10-day period.
CA: CA issued a TRO enjoining the NLRC from enforcing its
Resolution dismissing respondents' appeal Petitioner assailed Records show that respondents filed their Memorandum of
the issuance of the writ before the Supreme Court. However, Appeal and Motion to Reduce Appeal Bond on the 10th or last
it was dismissed for submitting an affidavit of service which day of the reglementary period. Although they posted an initial
failed to show a competent evidence of affiant's identity. appeal bond of P100,000.00, the same was grossly inadequate
compared to the monetary awards of US$985,162.00
CA: Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed representing salaries and benefits for the unexpired portion of
Decision granting respondents' Motion to Reduce Appeal Bond the contract, P2,000,000 as moral and exemplary damages and
and directing them to post an appeal bond of P10,000,000.00 attorney's fees equivalent to the total monetary award.
with the NLRC, which was likewise ordered to give due course Further, there is no basis in respondents' contention that the
awards of the Labor Arbiter were null and excessive, and with

premeditated intention to render respondents incapable of
posting an appeal bond and deprive them of the right to DOCTRINE: The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot
appeal. incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of
the lower court only by remote reference, which is to say that
The failure of the respondents to comply with the the challenged decision is not easily and immediately
requirement of posting a bond equivalent in amount to the available to the person reading the memorandum decision.
monetary award is fatal to their appeal. For filing their For the incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must
motion only on the final day within which to perfect an provide for direct access to the facts and the law being
appeal, respondents cannot be allowed to seek refuge in a adopted, which must be contained in a statement attached to
liberal application of the rules. Under such circumstance, the said decision.
there is neither way for the NLRC to exercise its discretion to
grant or deny the motion, nor for the respondents to post the FACTS:
full amount of the bond, without risk of summary dismissal
for non-perfection of appeal. The petitioner leased his apartment in Makati to the
respondent. Pursuant to the lease contract, the private
The records show that after the motion to reduce appeal bond respondent deposited the amount of P9,000 to answer for
was denied, the NLRC still allowed respondents a new period unpaid rentals or any damage to the leased premises. On May
of 10 days from receipt of the order of denial within which to 31, 1985, respondent vacated the property and requested for
post the additional bond. Nonetheless, respondents failed to the refund of his deposit minus P1,000, representing the
post the additional bond and instead moved for additional ten days of his occupancy. Petitioner rejected this
reconsideration. On this score alone, their appeal should have request because the lessee still owed him for other charges,
been dismissed outright for not having been perfected on including the electricity and water bills and the sum of
time. The NLRC even bent backwards by entertaining the P2,500.00 for repainting of the leased premises to restore
motion for reconsideration and even granted respondents them to their original condition. Respondent sued in the MTC
another 10 days within which to post the appeal bond. of Makati, a summary judgment was rendered.
However, respondents did not take advantage of this liberality
MTC: sustained the complainant and holding that the
when they persistently failed and refused to post the
repainting was not chargeable to him. The defendant was
additional bond despite the extensions given them.
ordered to pay the plaintiff the amount of P7,750.00,
representing the balance of the deposit after deducting the
Time and again, it has been held that the right to appeal is not
water and electricity charges. The plaintiff was also awarded
a constitutional right, but a mere statutory privilege. Hence,
the sum of P1,250.00 as attorney’s fees, plus the costs.
parties who seek to avail themselves of it must comply with
the statutes or rules allowing it. To reiterate, perfection of an RTC: The decision was appealed to the RTC of Makati and was
appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law affirmed by Judge Jose de la Rama. This was done in a
is mandatory and jurisdictional. The requirements for memorandum decision.
perfecting an appeal must, as a rule, be strictly followed. Such
requirements are considered indispensable interdictions CA: When respondent-complainant went to the CA, his
against needless delays and are necessary for the orderly petition for review was denied, so as his motion for
discharge of the judicial business. Failure to perfect the appeal reconsideration.
renders the judgment of the court final and executory. Just as
a losing party has the privilege to file an appeal within the He is now before us to fault the respondent court, principally
prescribed period, so does the winner also have the correlative for sustaining the memorandum decision of the regional trial
right to enjoy the finality of the decision. Thus, the propriety of court. His contention is that it violates Article VIII, Section 14
the monetary awards of the Labor Arbiter is already binding of the Constitution. The provision provides:
upon this Court, much more with the Court of Appeal.
Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
GRANTED. or which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a

G.R. No. 81006 May 12, 1989 decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied
without stating the legal basis therefor.
VICTORINO C. FRANCISCO, Petitioner
v. According to the complainant, the memorandum decision
WINAI PERMSKUL and THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, rendered by the regional trial court should be revoked for
Respondents non-compliance with the above-quoted constitutional
mandate. He asks that the case be remanded to the
regional trial court for a full-blown hearing on the merits, It is clear that where the decision of the appellate court
to be followed by a decision stating therein clearly and actually reproduces the findings of fact or the conclusions of
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. For his law of the court below, it is not a memorandum decision as
part, the private respondent demurs. He justifies the envisioned in the above provision. The distinctive features of
memorandum decision as authorized by B.P. Blg. 129 and the memorandum decision are, first, it is rendered by an
invokes the ruling of this Court in Romero v. Court of appellate court, and second, it incorporates by reference the
Appeals, which sustained the said law. findings of fact or the conclusions of law contained in the
decision, order or ruling under review. Most likely, the purpose
Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 reads as follows: is to affirm the decision, although it is not impossible that the
approval of the findings of fact by the lower court may lead to
Sec. 40. Form of decision in appealed cases. - Every decision a different conclusion of law by the higher court. At any rate,
or final resolution of a court in appealed cases shall clearly the reason for allowing the incorporation by reference is
and distinctly state the findings of fact and the conclusions evidently to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the
of law on which it is based which may be... contained in the decision of the lower court, or portions thereof, in the decision
decision or final resolution itself, or adopted by reference of the higher court. The idea is to avoid having to repeat in the
from those set forth in the decision, order or resolution body of the latter decision the findings or conclusions of the
appealed from. lower court since they are being approved or adopted anyway.
The Court has deliberated extensively on the challenge posed
In the case at bar, a judgment was made by the metropolitan
against the memorandum decision as now authorized by law.
trial court in compliance with the rule on summary procedure.
Taking into account the salutary purpose for which it is
The decision consisted of three typewritten pages, single
allowed, and bearing in mind the above- discussed restraint we
space, and stated clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
must observe when a law is challenged before us, we have
which it was based. It was a concise and well-written decision,
come to the conclusion that Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129, as we
and a correct one to boot, for which Judge Paciano B. Balita is
shall interpret it here, is not unconstitutional. What is
to be commended. The problem, though, as the petitioner sees
questioned about the law is the permission it gives for the
it, is that in affirming this judgment, the regional trial court of
appellate court to merely adopt by reference in its own
Makati rendered a mere memorandum decision that simply
decision the judgment of the lower court on appeal. It is easy
adopted by reference the findings of fact and law made by
to understand that this device may feed the suspicion feared
Judge Balita and then concluded, without saying more, that
by Justice Feria that the court has not given the appeal the
"there (was) no cogent reason to disturb the same." It is
attention it deserved and thus deprived the parties of due
claimed that as Judge de la Rama did not make his own
process. True or not, this impression is likely to undermine
statement of the facts and the law as required by the
popular faith in the judiciary as an impartial forum which hears
Constitution, his memorandum decision was a total nullity.
before it decides and bases its decision on the established facts
Worse, when the appeal was taken to the respondent court,
and the applicable law.
what it reviewed was not the memorandum decision of the
regional trial court but the decision rendered by the As to this problem, the Solicitor General correctly points out
metropolitan trial court which, legally speaking, was not before that it does not exist in the case at bar because the decision of
the appellate court. the Court of Appeals extensively quoted from the decision of
the metropolitan trial court. Although only incorporated by
ISSUE:
reference in the memorandum decision of the regional trial
Whether or not such incorporation by reference of the RTC’s court, Judge Balita's decision was nevertheless available to the
memorandum to the decision of MTC was a valid act that Court of Appeals. It is this circumstance, or even
effectively elevated the case to the Court of Appeals? happenstance, if you will, that has validated the memorandum
decision challenged in this case and spared it from
HELD: constitutional infirmity. That same circumstance is what will
move us now to lay down the following requirement, as a
The law does not define the memorandum decision and simply condition for the proper application of Section 40 of B.P. Blg.
suggests that the court may adopt by reference the findings of 129. The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot
fact and the conclusions of law stated in the decision, order or incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of
resolution on appeal before it. No particular form is the lower court only by remote reference, which is to say that
prescribed; the conditions for its use are not indicated. In fact, the challenged decision is not easily and immediately available
B.P. Blg. 129 does not even employ the term "memorandum to the person reading the memorandum decision. For the
decision" in Section 40 or elsewhere in the rest of the statute. incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must provide for
This phrase appears to have been introduced in this direct access to the facts and the law being adopted, which
jurisdiction not by that law but by Section 24 of the Interim must be contained in a statement attached to the said
Rules and Guidelines. decision. In other words, the memorandum decision

authorized under Section 40 of B.P Blg. 129 should actually RTC: in favour of ATROP, INC. Orderered defendants to vacate
embody the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the lower A notice of appeal was filed by Atty. Gatpatan but Atty. Aguilar
court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part failed to fo the same.
of the decision. It is expected that this requirement will allay In its omnibus motion to dismiss the appeal and for the
the suspicion that no study was made of the decision of the issuance of a writ of execution, ATROP INC., argued that as far
lower court and that its decision was merely affirmed without as petitioner Casolita was concerned, the decision had become
a proper examination of the facts and the law on which it was final and executory for his counsel failed to file a notice of
based. The proximity at least of the annexed statement should appeal. As to the other petitioners, ATROP INC., observed that
suggest that such an examination has been undertaken. It is, while they timely filed the notice of appeal the notice was
of course, also understood that the decision being adopted fatally defective for they did not serve the same to the counsel
should, to begin with, comply with Article VIII, Section 14 as no of ATROP, INC.
amount of incorporation or adoption will rectify its violation. RTC: GRANTED the omnibus motion to dismiss and ordered the
The interpretation we make today will not apply retroactively issuance of a writ of execution.
to the memorandum decision rendered by the regional trial Atty. Alfredo C. Baylon, Jr. thereafter filed a notice of
court in the case at bar, or to the decision of the respondent appearance as counsel for all the defendants and moved for
court affirming such decision on the strength of Romero v. reconsideration of the Order alleging that the dismissal of the
Court of Appeals. As earlier observed, there was substantial notice of appeal and the issuance of the writ of execution x x x
compliance with Section 40 because of the direct availability is repugnant to the principle of due process as it amounted to
and actual review of the decision of Judge Balita incorporated denial of justice, citing Alonzo vs. Villamor. He contended that
by reference in the memorandum decision of Judge de la petitioners Casolita, et. al., were not properly notified of the
Rama. The memorandum decision as then understood under decision since Atty. Aguilar had withdrawn as counsel due to
the Romero decision was a valid act at the time it was rendered poor health; hence, the decision had not become final and
by Judge de la Rama and produced binding legal effect. We also executory. As a last ditch effort, said counsel, for the first time,
affirm the finding of the respondent court that the summary alleged that the issuance of the writ of execution x x x would
judgment without a formal trial was in accord with the Rule on be violative of Article VII of the Urban Development and
Summary Procedure and that the award of attorney's fees is Housing Act of 1992. DENIED.
not improper. Henceforth, all memorandum decisions shall There are two Notices of Appeal submitted by two different
comply with the requirements herein set forth both as to the lawyers without particularizing which among the defendants
form prescribed and the occasions when they may be they represent. The Notice submitted by Atty. Gatpatan, Jr.
rendered. Any deviation will summon the strict enforcement was received and well within the period of fifteen-day to
of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution and strike down interpose an Appeal. Atty. Gatpatan Jr. represented the
the flawed judgment as a lawless disobedience. defendants except Casolita who was represented by Atty.
Aguilar. Here comes now Atty. Baylon who was not a counsel
[G.R. No. 115703. July 8, 1997] of record for any defendant at the trial. Atty. Baylon, Jr.
EPIFANIO L. CASOLITA, SR., ARTHUR AQUINO, BENITO formally appeared only long after the lapse of fifteen-day
GATPATAN, JR., HENRY RELOSA, EDGAR LA TORRE, period to Appeal.
BERNARDO OCAG and CECILIA VIERNES, Petitioners, v. THE This Court presupposes that Atty. Baylon, Jr. represents the
COURT OF APPEALS, THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF defendant Casolita only. The records, however, does not show
MANILA, NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION, BRANCH 34, Presided that Atty. Aguilar ever withdrew from the case, hence, the
by Judge Romulo A. Lopez, and ATROP, INC., Respondents. appearance of Atty. Bayhon, Jr. is improper and cannot be
DOCTRINE: recognized by this Court, there being no showing that Atty.
FACTS: Private respondent ATROP, INC., a domestic Aguilar withdrew from the case.
corporation, filed a complaint against herein petitioners with When the plaintiff [herein private respondent] submitted a
the RTC of Manila for recovery of possession of a parcel of land Motion to Dismiss Appeal and for Issuance of a Writ of
claiming that it owned said land. In answer thereto, petitioner Execution on the ground that the Notice of Appeal is defective
Casolita through his counsel, Atty. Aguilar, alleged that he and not having been served either on plaintiff or its counsel, no
his family had been in continuous possession of the land since opposition was filed. That was why the Court granted the
1953, having been designated as caretaker by the supposed motion and issued the Writ prayed for.
real owners Ramon LeQuina and Portia Pueo. The records show likewise, that Atty. Bayhon, Jr. submitted a
The other petitioners, represented by Atty. Gatpatan, Jr. filed Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of this Court
their answer unequivocally adopting and incorporating the dismissing the Appeal of Atty. Gatpatan, Jr., and granting
allegations of Casolita in his answer to the complaint and execution. The motion for reconsideration deserves scant
further alleged they were not swuatters as they occupied said consideration, because the lawyer who filed it has no
land in open, public, adverse and continuous possession for personality in the case. Moreover, the notice to the adverse
more than ten years invoking Article 1134 of the Civil Code in counsel of the Notice of Appeal is a mandatory requirement
relation to the existing land reform code. for perfecting an Appeal.

CA: DISMIESSED petition via Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and denied his appeal. He filed an MR but was also denied because
Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 seeking the annulment it lacked a notice of hearing. SC still ruled in favor of
of the Orders of the lower court. respondent because a notice of hearing is mandatory even in
ISSUE: WON CA committed grave abuse of discretion RTC contrary to the contention of the petitioner.
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction in denying their petition for
certiorari based on their failure to furnish private respondent FACTS:
with a copy of the notice of appeal. 1. Lamberto Casalla issued two (2) Bank of Commerce checks
HELD: NO. The adverse party may only be apprised initially of in payment of the obligation of his wife, TERESITA CASALLA, to
the pendency of an appeal by the notice of appeal. To deprive private respondent MILAGROS SANTOS-ESTEVANES, in order
him of such notice is tantamount to depriving him of his right to avert a court litigation. The two (2) checks, however, were
to be informed that the judgment in his favor is being dishonored by the drawee bank for reason of insufficiency of
challenged. This requirement should be complied with so that funds.
he may be afforded the opportunity to register his opposition
to the notice of appeal if he so desires. 11 And service of the 2. Private respondent filed two (2) criminal complaints against
notice of appeal upon him may not be dispensed with on the petitioner for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law (BP 22) in
basis of the appellants whims and caprices, as in this case. MTC.
The judicial position on the requirement that a notice of appeal
be served upon the adverse party is articulated in the early MTC: It rendered a decision convicting the accused (petitioner
case of Philippine Resources Development Corp. vs. Narvasa, 4 herein) of the crime charged on two (2) counts.
SCRA 414 (1962), when the Supreme Court stated:
Under Section 3, Rule 41 (now Sec. 3 Rule 40), of the Rules of 3. Petitioner interposed an appeal to the Regional Trial Court
Court, an appeal may be taken by serving upon the adverse (RTC) of Pasig City
party and filing with the trial court within 30 days from notice RTC: The RTC affirmed the judgment of MTC.
of the judgment a notice of appeal, appeal bond, and a record
on appeal. This section clearly requires that not only shall the 4. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. Lower court
three documents be filed with the court within the period of denied the motion for reconsideration on account of the
30 days but that copies thereof shall be served upon the absence of a notice of hearing. Petitioner filed a second motion
adverse party. This requirement is made in order that the for reconsideration.
adverse party may not only be notified of the intention of the
appellant to take the case to the appellate court, but also to 5. Private respondent filed with the RTC a motion for the
afford him an opportunity to register his opposition to any of issuance of a writ of execution. Opposition to the motion for
them if he desires to do so. the issuance of a writ of execution was filed by petitioner. The
As posited and as aptly argued in the private respondents brief, court a quo denied petitioner's second motion for
the requirement is not a mere technicality but goes into reconsideration and granted the motion for the issuance of a
procedural due process which, in the absence of opposition writ of execution.
from the petitioners (Annex A, Petition), despite proper notice
and opportunity to do so (Annexes 2 and 3 Comment), cannot 6. Petitioner interposed an appeal via a petition for review with
be countenanced as basis for alleged grave abuse of discretion. prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
Moreover, the motion to reconsider the order of dismissal was order.
filed by counsel not of record, no proper substitution having
been made. CA: The appellate court promulgated its decision denying the
LAMBERTO CASALLA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and appeal for lack of merit.
MILAGROS S. ESTEVANES • In its decision, the Court of Appeals noted that the petition
before it did not contain a statement of material dates showing
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI the timeliness of the petition. It also maintained that the
petition was filed out of time, because the motion to
DOCTRINE: The requirements laid down in the Rules of Court, reconsider the decision of the trial court did not contain a
that the notice of hearing shall be directed to the parties notice of hearing. Hence, being a mere scrap of paper, it did
concerned and shall state the time and place for the hearing of not interrupt the period for filing the petition before the
the motion, are mandatory. If not religiously complied with, appellate court, and the period had lapsed before the petition
they render the motion pro forma. As such the motion is a was filed. It also ruled that petitioner's second motion was not
useless piece of paper that will not toll the running of the only a prohibited pleading but it was also filed out of time.
prescriptive period. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration before the Court of
Appeals was denied.
SUMMARY: Lamberto Casalla was convicted in MTC for
violation of the BP 22. He filed an appeal in RTC but the RTC

ISSUE/S: WON a notice of hearing for an MR is required when
such is filed in RTC CA likewise dismissed the petition.
HELD: YES. The requirements laid down in the Rules of Court, Issue: WON RTC correctly dismissed the petition (YES)
that the notice of hearing shall be directed to the parties
concerned and shall state the time and place for the hearing of Ruling:
the motion are mandatory. The SC has ruled in a number of
cases that the requirements laid down in the Rules of Court In denying the petition, the Supreme Court ruled that the Court
that the notice of hearing shall be directed to the parties of Appeals committed no reversible error of law when it
concerned and shall state the time and place for the hearing of upheld the order of the RTC. Rule 40, Section 7 (b) of the 1997
the motion, are mandatory. If not religiously complied with, Rules of Civil Procedure provides that, it shall be the duty of
they render the motion pro forma. As such the motion is a the appellant to submit a memorandum and failure to do so
useless piece of paper that will not toll the running of the shall be a ground for the dismissal of the appeal. The use of the
prescriptive period. word "shall" in a statute or rule expresses what is mandatory
and compulsory. Further, the Rule imposes upon an appellant
Under the present rules, the notice of hearing is expressly the duty to submit his
made a requirement. In the instant case, it is undisputed that memorandum. Thus, under the express mandate of said Rule,
the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner with the the appellant is duty-bound to submit his memorandum on
Regional trial Court did not contain any notice of hearing. It appeal. Such submission is not a matter of discretion on his
was therefore pro forma; hence, it did not suspend the running part. His failure to comply with this mandate or to perform said
of the prescriptive period. This defect was not cured by the duty will compel the RTC to dismiss his appeal. In rules of
filing of a second motion for reconsideration, which is procedure, an act which is jurisdictional, or of the essence of
prohibited under the rules. the proceedings, or is prescribed for the protection or bene7t
of the party affected, is mandatory. In appeals from inferior
Petitioner claims that the requirement of a notice of hearing courts to the RTC, the appellant's brief is mandatory for the
did not apply to the motion for reconsideration he filed before assignment of errors is vital to the decision of the appeal on
the Regional Trial Court, since it was acting only in its appellate the merits. This is because on appeal only errors specifically
jurisdiction. This is error, as the Rules of Court apply to all assigned and properly argued in the brief or memorandum will
courts, except as otherwise provided by the Supreme Court. be considered, except those affecting jurisdiction over the
Regional Trial Courts are not precluded from conducting subject matter as well as plain and clerical errors. It is true that
hearings on matters on which the parties need to be heard, the Rules should be interpreted so as to give litigants ample
even in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction. opportunity to prove their respective claims and that a
possible denial of substantial justice due to legal technicalities
MELBA MONCAL ENRIQUEZ, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT should be avoided. But it is equally true that an appeal being
OF APPEALS and VICTORINA TIGLE, respondents. purely statutory right, an appealing party must strictly comply
with the requisites in the Rules of Court. This the petitioner
failed to do when she did not submit her memorandum of
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 appeal as required by the Rules. That she lost her case is not
the trial court's fault but her own.
DOCTRINE: In rules of procedure, an act which is jurisdictional,
or of the essence of the proceedings, or is prescribed for the This is because on appeal only errors specifically assigned and
protection or benefit of the party affected is properly argued in the brief or memorandum will be
mandatory. considered, except those affecting jurisdiction over the subject
matter as well as plain and clerical errors. Otherwise stated, an
FACTS: appellate court has no power to resolve an unassigned error,
which does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the subject
Respondent Tigle filed an action for unlawful detainer against matter, save for a plain or clerical error.
petitioner before the MCTC of Bayawan-Basay, Negros
Oriental for the latter's refusal to vacate the parcel of land
owned by the former. The trial court decided in favor of private ANTONIO NAVARRO, Petitioner, vs. METROPOLITAN BANK
respondent. & TRUST COMPANY, Respondent,
G.R. No. 165697 August 4, 2009
Petitioner appealed to the RTC of Dumaguete City, which PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45
dismissed the appeal for failure of petitioner to file her
memorandum of appeal.

DOCTRINE: A losing party has the right to file an appeal within Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error in
the prescribed period, the winning party also has the directing the dismissal of the complaint
correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his
case by the execution and satisfaction of the judgment. Any HELD:
attempt to thwart this rigid rule and deny the prevailing litigant
his right to savor the fruit of his victory must immediately be A perusal of the Court of Appeals decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
struck down 55780, which ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 99-177,
tells that the complaint therein was dismissed not on the
FACTS: ground of non-joinder of Belen as an indispensable party, but
rather on the ground of laches. Indeed, what is clear from the
Petitioners Antonio and Clarita Navarro were married. During said decision is that the dismissal of the case was due to
their union, they acquired three parcels of land. However, the Clarita’s unjustifiable neglect to timely initiate the prosecution
lands are registered in the name of "Antonio N. Navarro… of her claim in court -- a conduct that warranted the
married to Belen B. Navarro." MBTC had caused the judicial presumption that she, although entitled to assert a right, had
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage which Antonio had resolved to abandon or declined to assert the same.
earlier mortgage to MBTC. The properties were sold at public
auction where MBTC, as the lone bidder, was issued a While the Court agrees that an action to declare the nullity of
certificate of sale. contracts is not barred by the statute of limitations, the fact
that Clarita was barred by laches from bringing such action at
Clarita filed an action for the declaration of nullity of the real the first instance has already been settled by the Court of
estate mortgage and the foreclosure sale before the RTC Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55780. At this point in the
alleging that the properties involved belonged to her and proceedings, the Court can no longer rule on the applicability
Antonio’s conjugal partnership property as the same were of the principle of laches vis-à-vis the imprescriptibility of
acquired during their marriage and that Antonio, with the Clarita’s cause of action because the said decision is not the
connivance of a certain Belen, had secured the registration one on appeal before us. But more importantly, the Court
thereof in their names without her knowledge. She ascribed takes notice that the decision rendered in that case had
fault and negligence to MBTC because it failed to consider that already become final without any motion for reconsideration
the properties given to it as security belonged to her and being filed or an appeal being taken therefrom. Thus, we are
Antonio’s conjugal partnership property. left with no other recourse than to uphold the immutability of
the said decision.
MBTC filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which was
denied. MBTC filed a petition for certiorari before the CA which IMMUTABILITY OF FINAL JUDGEMENT
ordered the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the No other procedural law principle is indeed more settled than
same was already barred by laches, pointing out that it had that once a judgment becomes final, it is no longer subject to
taken Clarita 11 long years since the issuance of the TCTs change, revision, amendment or reversal, except only for
before she actually sought to annul the mortgage contract. The correction of clerical errors, or the making of nunc pro tunc
decision had attained finality without a motion for entries which cause no prejudice to any party, or where the
reconsideration being filed or an appeal being taken judgment itself is void. The underlying reason for the rule is
therefrom. two-fold: (1) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and
thus make orderly the discharge of judicial business, and (2) to
Clarita instituted another action also before the RTC but this put judicial controversies to an end, at the risk of occasional
time for the declaration of nullity of the TCTs covering the errors, inasmuch as controversies cannot be allowed to drag
same properties. MBTC moved to dismiss the complaint on the on indefinitely and the rights and obligations of every litigant
ground that it was already barred by the prior judgment but must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time.
the same was denied.
In Heirs of Wenceslao Samper v. Reciproco-Noble, we had
Aggrieved, MBTC elevated the case to the CA. The CA occasion to emphasize the significance of this rule, to wit:
dismissed the civil case on the ground of laches because the It is an important fundamental principle in our Judicial system
earlier civil case had the effect of an adjudication on the that every litigation must come to an end x x x Access to the
merits. lso, it pointed out that inasmuch as the two cases courts is guaranteed. But there must be a limit thereto. Once
presented identical issues and causes of action and prayed for a litigant’s rights have been adjudicated in a valid final
the same relief, the second complaint must likewise suffer the judgment of a competent court, he should not be granted an
effect of laches. unbridled license to come back for another try. The prevailing
party should not be harassed by subsequent suits. For, if
ISSUE: endless litigations were to be encouraged, then unscrupulous

litigants will multiply in number to the detriment of the
administration of justice. Tansipek filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Default
Order, upon denial, a Petition for Certiorari before the CA. The
remedy availed by Tansipek was erroneous from the
Banco De Oro-EPCI, Inc. (formerly Equitable PCI Bank), v. John beginning. Tansipek should have filed a Motion to Lift Order of
Tansipek Default pursuant to Rule 9, Section 3(b) of the Rules of Court.
G.R. No. 181235 ; July 22, 2009
Furthermore, since Tansipek did not appeal the ruling of the
FACTS: Court of Appeals, the decision has reached finality.
J.O. Construction, Inc., (JOCI), a domestic corporation in Cebu
City filed a complaint against Philippine Commercial and Nevertheless, once a decision attains finality, it becomes the
Industrial Bank (PCIB) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) law of the case, whether or not said decision is erroneous.
Makati. Having been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction
acting within its authority, the judgment may no longer be
JOCI alleged that it entered into a contract with Duty Free altered even at the risk of legal infirmities and errors.
Philippines, Inc, (Duty Free) for the construction of a Duty Free
Shop. Payments were received by the respondent, John RULE 41: APPEAL FROM THE RTCs
Tansipek, JOCI’s authorized collector.
One payment of the check in the amount of four million pesos

G.R. No. 178696 & 102607 July 30, 2018
was not remitted to JOCI, instead, the respondent endorsed
and deposited the check in his account in PCIB. JOCI claims that
the check was crossed for deposit to the payee's account only, BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, Petitioner,
and that Tansipek had no authority to endorse the check. vs.
BANCO FILIPINO, Respondents
PCIB further alleged in its answer that JOCI had given Tansipek
the authority to act as its agent. It moved for leave of court to Petition for Review
admit its third-party complaint against Tansipek, for the
respondent presented a board resolution stating that the DOCTRINE
check payable to JOCI may be deposited in his name.
“In the appellate stage, the rigid policy is to make the
consolidation of all cases and proceedings resting on the same
Tansipek failed to file his answer and was declared in default.
set of facts, or involving identical claims or interests or parties
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
mandatory. Such consolidation should be made regardless of
denied, and then filed a Petition or Certiorari before the Court
whether or not the parties or any of them requests it. A
of Appeals (CA) assailing the default order. His petition was
mandatory policy eliminates conflicting results concerning
denied, and his subsequent motion for reconsideration was
similar or like issues between the same parties or interests as it
denied for being filed out of time.
enhances the administration of justice.”
Meanwhile, the RTC promulgated a decision in the case of JOCI FACTS
and PCIB. PCIB was ordered to pay JOCI, while Tansipek was
ordered to pay PCIB of all amounts. The two consolidated petitions in the instant petition share the
same set of facts as follows:
Tansipek appealed the Decision before the CA - which found
error in the trial court’s order declaring Tansipek in default. • The CB-MB ordered the closure of BFSMB due to its
The case was remanded to the RTC for further proceedings. insolvency.
• Thus, BFSMB filed before the Court a petition for
Petitioner Banco de Oro-EPCI, Inc., as successor in interest of certiorari and mandamus seeking to annul the MB
PCIB filed the petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution. The Court annulled and set aside the said
decision of the CA. resolution. The CB-MB was then ordered to
reorganize petitioner BFSMB to allow the latter to
ISSUE: resume business in the Philippines.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals can reverse a decision • Two years thereafter, The New Central Bank Act took
that attained finality. effect, abolishing the CB and establishing BSP. Under
the same law, the CB will continue to exist under the
HELD: name Central Bank-Board of Liquidators for the sole
NO.

purpose of administering and liquidating the assets opposed decisions by the CA, could have been prevented by
and liabilities of CB not transferred to BSP. consolidation of the two petitions for certiorari.
• BSP-MB then issued a resolution allowing BFSMB to
reopen. G.R. No. 238203 September 03, 2020
• A memorandum of agreement was entered into, with LIGAYA ANG, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, AND
BFMSB repaying to BSP the amount of more than P3M WARREN T. GUTIERREZ, REPRESENTED BY HIS ATTORNEY-
by way of daicion en pago of some of its real IN-FACT, CARMELITA T. GUTIERREZ, RESPONDENTS.
properties.
• Subsequently, BFMSB experienced massive FACTS:
withdrawals. It thus applied for emergency financial Warren filed an action for unlawful detainer against Spouses
assistance from the BSP to maintain liquidity. Ricardo and Ligaya Ang before the MeTC, alleging that he is the
• BSP later made a business plan, premised on the owner of a 94-square meter lot registered under Transfer
assertion that BSP stepped into the shoes of CB, which Certificate of Title No. 013-2015003219.4 On December 29,
BSP denies. 1998, Warren sold the lot on installment basis to Spouses Ang.
• Thus, BFSMB filed a Petition for Revival of Judgment They agreed that the contract shall be extinguished in case of
of the SC, with a prayer to enjoin BSP to comply with non-payment of monthly amortizations. After giving the initial
all mandates therein, such as that of putting payment, however, Spouses Ang refused to settle the balance
Petitioner in such condition and footing to continue in of the purchase price despite repeated demands. In their
business with safety to its depositors. BSP filed answer, Spouses Ang moved to dismiss the complaint for lack
separate motions to dismiss. of jurisdiction over the subject matter. They also claimed that
• RTC: Denied the said motions, and denied MR. the ejectment case must fail because the contract was not
validly cancelled in accordance with RA No. 6552 or the Realty
• CA: dismissed petition for certiorari – no grave abuse
of discretion on the part of RTC. Installment Buyer Protection Act.
• In another CA ruling, the CA ordered the dismissal of
The MeTC ruled in favor of Warren and ordered Spouses Ang
BFSMB’s petition for revival of judgment for being
to vacate the lot. It held that the complaint sufficiently alleged
time-barred.
and proved a cause of action for unlawful detainer. On the
ISSUE other hand, RA No. 6552 is inapplicable since Spouses Ang
failed to pay any installment.
• Whether or not the Proper Appellate Court Procedure was
followed. (NO) Spouses Ang appealed to the RTC. The RTC affirmed the
MeTC's findings and explained that the requisites for filing an
RULING action for unlawful detainer are present.
The instant petitions, including the two petitions in the CA, Unsuccessful at a reconsideration, Ligaya Ang elevated the
showed that they involved the same parties, set of facts and case to the CA through a motion for extension of time to file a
issues raised; and basically assailed the same orders of the RTC. Petition for Review under Rule 42. The CA denied the motion
Thus, there was no reason why the two cases under the CA for non-payment of docket fees: Considering that Petitioner
should not have been consolidated at the first instance. merely filed her Motion for Extension of Time without
however paying in full the amount of docket and other lawful
In the appellate stage, the rigid policy is to make the
fees, this Court may not grant the said motion consistent with
consolidation of all cases and proceedings resting on the same
the rules and jurisprudence.
set of facts, or involving identical claims or interests or parties
mandatory. Such consolidation should be made regardless of Ligaya sought reconsideration arguing that her counsel's
whether or not the parties or any of them requests it. A messenger was unable to purchase postal money orders on the
mandatory policy eliminates conflicting results concerning last day for filing the motion for extension of time. Thus, the
similar or like issues between the same parties or interests as messenger decided to enclose the docket fees of P4,730.00 in
it enhances the administration of justice. the envelope containing the motion. The messenger allegedly
panicked and thought that he would not be able to file the
In this connection, the Court reminds all attorneys appearing
motion on time if he would transfer to another post office. As
as counsel for the initiating parties of their direct responsibility
supporting evidence, she submitted the messenger's affidavit.
to give prompt notice of any related cases pending in the
Lastly, Ligaya manifested that she already filed her petition for
courts, and to move for the consolidation of such related cases
review and expressed her willingness to pay again the docket
in the proper courts.
fees. CA denied the motion for lack of merit absent compelling
Precisely, the very evil that the rule against forum shopping reason to suspend the rules.
seeks to forestall, the rendition of the two diametrically

Division Clerk of Court Ally. Josephine Yap referred to Ms. docket fees. It is only when persuasive reasons exist that the
Myrna Almira ("Almira," for brevity), Chief Receiving Section of rules may be relaxed to spare a litigant of an injustice not
this Court, petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, with the commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed
attached Salaysay of Cajipe. procedure. In this case, Ligaya is under no threat of suffering
an injustice if her prayer is not granted. Quite the contrary, it
ISSUE: Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion will be unfair if we reinstate Ligaya's appeal as this would mean
when it denied Ligaya's motion for extension of time and further waiting on the part of the private respondent who has
refused to admit her petition for review for non-payment of long been deprived of the right to possess the property he
the required docket fees owns. FOR THESE REASONS, the petition is DISMISSED.
RULING: NO. The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor

a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may MAKATI INSURANCE CO., INC., Petitioner, v. HON.
be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the WILFREDO D. REYES, as Presiding Judge of the RTC of
provisions of law. One who seeks to avail of the right to appeal Manila, Branch 36, RUBILLS INTERNATIONAL, INC., TONG
must comply strictly with the requirements of the rules. Failure WOON SHIPPING PTE LTD, and ASIAN TERMINALS, INC.,
to do so often leads to the loss of the right to appeal. Respondents.
Specifically, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court provides the G.R. No. 167403 August 6, 2008
requirements in appealing the Decision of the RTC in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Petition for Review under Rule 45
Notably, the grant of any extension for the filing of a Petition DOCTRINES: An appeal should be taken within 15 days from
for Review under Rule 42 is discretionary and subject to the the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. No appeal
condition that the full amount of the docket and lawful fees may be taken from an order dismissing an action without
are paid before the expiration of the reglementary period. prejudice.
Indeed, the full payment of docket fees within the prescribed
period is mandatory and necessary to perfect the appeal. FACTS: Petitioner filed a Complaint against respondents. The
Corollarily, the non-payment of docket fees is a ground to case was set for pre-trial conference. For the failure of
dismiss the appeal. petitioner's counsel to appear at the scheduled pre-trial
conference, RTC Presiding Judge Reyes dismissed the case
In this case, Ligaya failed to establish that the appellate docket without prejudice.
fees were duly paid. Foremost, the messenger's affidavit is
insufficient to establish payment. The affidavit merely stated Petitioner filed its Verified Motion for Reconsideration alleging
the reason why the messenger opted to enclose the docket that sickness prevented its counsel from attending the pre-trial
fees together with the motion for extension. Yet, there is no conference.
evidence such as photocopies of the money bills to prove that
the envelope containing the motion has the actual cash On 3 July 2002, petitioner received Judge Reyes's Order dated
payment. The affidavit is likewise suspect since it was executed 17 June 2002 denying its Verified Motion for Reconsideration.
only after the CA denied the motion. At any rate, the CA had
conducted an investigation and confirmed that no payment
was actually remitted. The personnel assigned to the appellate
G.R. NO. 169314 March 14, 2008
court's receiving section corroborated this finding. Moreover,
Ligaya's manifestation to pay again the docket fees is
inconsistent with her claim of payment. Lastly, Ligaya has not PNB-REPUBLIC BANK (NOW KNOWN AS MAYBANK
PHILIPPINES, INC.), Petitioner
shown any compelling reason to warrant a liberal application
v.
of the rules. The alleged theft is speculative. The justifications
SPOUSES JOSE AND SALVACION CORDOVA,
that the messenger panicked because he was unable to
Respondents
purchase postal money orders and that he might not be able
to file the motion on time if he would transfer to another post
office are neither convincing nor adequate to merit leniency.
On 17 July 2002, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal, which was
Ligaya's counsel could have asked the messenger to buy postal
promptly opposed by respondents for having been filed out of
money orders in advance instead of waiting for the last minute
time. Petitioner countered that its failure to file the Notice of
in filing the motion.
Appeal on time was due to its counsel's inadvertence in
computing the appeal period.
All told, the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion when
it denied Ligaya's motion for extension of time and refused to
admit her petition for review for non-payment of the required

Petitioner filed a Motion to Admit Notice of Appeal. Judge Therefore, it no longer matters whether the second notice of
Reyes dismissed petitioner's Notice of Appeal for being filed appeal was timely filed.
three days beyond the 15-day reglementary period.
FACTS:
Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Certiorari. The Petition, however, was denied by the CA. PNB-Republic Bank (PNB) filed a complaint for rescission of a
ISSUES: contract of lease with the RTC. Spouses Cordova filed an
1. W/N the Notice of Appeal filed by petitioner was filed Answer with Counterclaim. RTC on its first decision dismissed
out of time. (NO) the complaint of PNB but it granted the Spouses Cordova’s
2. W/N a Notice of Appeal is the proper remedy from an counterclaim. Then PNB received a copy of the decision on
order dismissing an action without prejudice. (NO) March 15,2002 and it filed its notice of appeal on March
20,2002. While the Sps. Cordova filed for a Motion for
RULING: Reconsideration. Later the RTC reconsidered its first decision
1. Based on Rule 41, Section 3, an appeal should be taken and it amended its first decision increasing the amount of
within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order damages awarded. PNB received a copy of the denial order on
appealed from. Propitious to petitioner is Neypes v. Court of October 14, 2002, and subsequently filed another Notice of
Appeals wherein the SC pronounced that: Appeal (Second Notice of Appeal) on October 23, 2002. The
Spouses filed a motion to dismiss, but this was denied. Thus,
To standardize the appeal periods, the Court deems it practical the same was filed with the CA arguing that PNB only had 1 day
to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice left t file the second notice when it received the order of denial
of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order of the MR, inasmuch as it had already consumed the 15-day
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reglementary period when it filed the MR. In the CA dismissed
reconsideration. the appeal.
ISSUE:
The "fresh period rule" is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section
3 which states that the appeal shall be taken "within fifteen Whether or not the Court of Appeals, was correct in granting
(15) days from notice of judgment or final order appealed the Motion to Dismiss the Appeal and in declaring the First
from." The use of "or" supposes that the notice of appeal may notice of appeal as ineffective and invalid while the second
be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within notice of appeal had not perfected on time?
15 days from notice of the "final order," which, in this case is
the 17 June 2002 RTC Order denying petitioner's Verified
Motion for Reconsideration, received by petitioner on 3 July
2002. HELD:
We thus hold that when herein petitioner filed its notice of No, PNB's appeal is deemed perfected "as to it" when it timely
appeal on 17 July 2002, the same was seasonably filed within led its first notice of appeal, following Section 9, Rule 41.
the fresh period of 15 days, counted from 3 July 2002. Incidentally, this perfected appeal is not docketed with the CA,
because the trial court, which was still to resolve respondents'
2. Under Rule 41, Section 1(h), no appeal may be taken from motion for reconsideration, had not yet transmitted the
an order dismissing an action without prejudice. It may be records of the case to the appellate court. Incumbent,
subject of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. The nonetheless, on the part of the RTC is the elevation of the
CA, therefore, acted correctly in stating that the Notice of records after a resolution of the merits of respondents'
Appeal filed by the petitioner was dismissible. motion. Its appeal having been perfected, petitioner did not
need to file a second notice of appeal even if the trial court
In all, we find that while it is true that the petitioner's Notice granted, as it did, the other party's motion for reconsideration
of Appeal was timely filed based on our ruling in Neypes, said and modified the decision to increase the monetary award.
Notice of Appeal was the wrong remedy. The logical inference is that petitioner would all the more want
to appeal from the decision as modified. An essential and
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. logical implication is that the filing of a second notice of appeal
from the modified decision is a superfluity, if not a useless
ceremony. It, therefore, matters no longer whether that
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 second notice is timely led or not. Hence, in this case, PNB’'s
filing of a belated second notice of appeal does not affect or
DOCTRINE: When the first notice of appeal has already been foreclose its already perfected appeal. Petitioner's filing of the
perfected, filing of a second notice of appeal, even if granted MR does not have the effect of a waiver of the appeal, and, like
by the trial court, is a superfluity, if not a useless ceremony.

the second notice, is a pointless formality which does not On September 19, 2007, petitioner filed a Notice of
prejudice the already perfected appeal. Appeal before the Office of RD Sampulna. By Order of
October 16, 2007, RD Sampulna denied the notice of appeal,
When the appeal is perfected as to PNB's filing of the first holding that it was filed beyond the reglementary period.
notice in due time, the trial court, insofar as PNB is concerned, The RD explained that petitioner should have filed her
loses its jurisdiction over the case except to issue orders for the appeal on September 13, 2007 as she had only one day left
protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which of the 15-day reglementary period for the purpose, pursuant
do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal. Obviously, to DENR A.O. No. 87 Sec. 1(b), Series of 1990, which provides
the issue of the correctness of the decision is the subject of the that “If a motion for reconsideration of the decision/order
perfected appeal. The trial court no longer had jurisdiction to of the Regional Office is filed and such motion for
reverse the Reconsidered Decision which would have meant reconsideration is denied, the movant shall have the right
PNB’s abandonment of its appeal. The necessary consequence to perfect his appeal during the remainder of the period for
of the SC’s ruling that PNB's perfected appeal springs from the appeal, reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial.
first notice is that such first appeal should be the one docketed If the decision is reversed on reconsideration, the aggrieved
by the CA, the subject of this petition, is the mistaken appeal, party shall have fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
for it traces its origin from the superfluous second notice. resolution of reversal within which to perfect his appeal.”
Considering, however, that the records were already
transmitted to the CA in the appeal, for the SC to have to go Under SECTION 6 of the said A.O., The Rules of Court shall
through the process of dismissing the said mistaken appeal, apply when not inconsistent with the provisions hereof.
then have the perfected appeal from the first notice docketed,
and finally, order the records of the case re-transmitted Invoking Neypes, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., petitioner
through that docketed appeal, would be too circuitous a argued in her that she still had a fresh period of fifteen days
procedure. Thus, for expediency, the SC simply reinstate the from her receipt on September 12, 2007 of copy of the
appeal without a further re-docket, and direct the appellate September 6, 2007 Order denying her motion for
court to resolve the case without further delay. reconsideration of the June 19, 2007 Decision of the RD or
until September 27, 2007. Her motion was denied by
[G.R. No. 183616. June 29, 2010.] Order of November 28, 2007.
JULIETA PANOLINO, petitioner, vs. JOSEPHINE CA: DISMISSED it on the ground that petitioner failed to
L. TAJALA, respondent. exhaust administrative remedies, she having bypassed the
Office of the DENR Secretary and the Office of the President
before resorting to judicial action.
ISSUE: WON the "fresh period rule" laid down
DOCTRINE: If the case is of an administrative nature, the in Neypes applies to petitioner's case, i.e., that he had a
“fresh period” rule laid down in Neypes will not apply and the fresh period of 15 days to appeal RD Sampulna's October 16,
rules that will apply will be that of the Administrative Order. 2007 Order to the DENR Secretary, counted from her notice
Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, as clarified in Neypes, on September 12, 2007 of the RD's Order of September 6,
being inconsistent with Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 2007 denying her motion for reconsideration of the decision.
87, Series of 1990, it may not apply to the case of petitioner
whose motion for reconsideration was denied. HELD: NO. Petitioner's present case is administrative in
nature involving an appeal from the decision or order of the
FACTS: By Decision on June 19, 2007, the DENR RD DENR regional office to the DENR Secretary. Such appeal is
Sampulna ( 1) denied for lack of merit the application of indeed governed by Section 1 of Administrative Order No.
Julieta Panolino (petitioner), opposed by herein respondent 87, Series of 1990. As earlier quoted, Section 1 clearly
Josephine L. Tajala, for a free patent over a parcel of land provides that if the motion for reconsideration is denied, the
located in Kinayao, Bagumbayan, Sultan Kudarat, (2) movant shall perfect his appeal "during the remainder of the
directed petitioner to vacate the contested property and period of appeal, reckoned from receipt of the resolution of
remove at her expense whatever improvements she may denial;" whereas if the decision is reversed, the adverse
have introduced thereon, and (3) advised respondent to file party has a fresh 15-day period to perfect his appeal.
her free patent application over the contested property
within sixty days. Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, as clarified
in Neypes, being inconsistent with Section 1 of
Petitioner received a copy of the decision on June 27, 2007, Administrative Order No. 87, Series of 1990, it may not apply
of which she filed a motion for reconsideration on July 11, to the case of petitioner whose motion for reconsideration
2007. Her motion was denied by Order of September 6, was denied.
2007, copy of which she received on September 12, 2007.
The "fresh period rule" in Neypes shall apply to Rule (15th) day from December 21, 2012, i.e., January 5, 2013, fell
40 (appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional on a Saturday.
Trial Courts); Rule 41 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts In its Order dated January 14, 2013, the NCIP RHO IV, through
to the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court); Rule 42 (appeals Gabaen, denied due course the Memorandum on Appeal of
from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals); Rule PDSPI for being filed beyond the reglementary period.
43 (appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of According to the NCIP RHO IV, since PDSPI filed its Motion for
Appeals); and Rule 45 (appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Reconsideration a day before the end of the reglementary
Court). Obviously, these Rules cover judicial proceedings period to file an appeal of the NCIP RHO IV s Decision, PDSPI
under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. had only one (1) day remaining to file an appeal upon receipt
of the NCIP RHO IV's Order denying its Motion for
Reconsideration. Simply stated, according to the NCIP RHO IV,
PDSPI was not granted a fresh period to appeal after it received
a copy of the NCIP RHO IV's denial of its Motion for
G.R. No. 212607 March 27, 2019
Reconsideration.
PUERTO DEL SOL PALAWAN, INC.,, Petitioner
Feeling aggrieved, PDSPI filed its Petition for Certiorari dated
vs.
March 4, 2013 before the CA. PDSPI alleged that grave abuse
HON. KISSACK B. GABAEN, Regional Hearing Officer,
of discretion was extant in the issuance of the NCIP RHO IV s
Regional Hearing Officer IV, National Commission on
Order dated January 14, 2013.
Indigenous Peoples and ANDREW ABIS, Respondents
CA: denied outright PDSPI's Certiorari Petition, invoking the
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. According
to the CA, instead of filing a petition for certiorari, PDSPI should
FACTS: On August 15, 2011, Abis filed with the NCIP RHO IV a
have first filed a motion for reconsideration of the NCIP RHO
Complaint entitled "Andrew Abis v. Puerto Del Sol
IV's Order dismissing outright its Memorandum on Appeal.
Resort/Michael Bachelor" for "Unauthorized and Unlawful
Hence, the CA held that there was a plain, adequate, and
Intrusion with Prayer for TRO and Permanent Injunction with
speedy remedy available to PDSPI that precluded the
Damages."
institution of a Certiorari Petition. In addition, the CA pointed
In the said Complaint, Abis alleged that he and his
out several formal defects of the Certiorari Petition, i.e., (1)
predecessors-in-interest, who are all members of the Cuyunen
failure of PDSPI's counsel to indicate the date of issuance of his
Tribe, have been occupying and cultivating property located in
MCLE compliance number, and (2) defect in the jurat of the
Sitio Orbin, Brgy. Concepcion, Busuanga, Palawan as their
Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.
ancestral land since time immemorial. It is claimed that PDSPI,
PDSPI filed a Motion for Reconsideration wherein PDSPI
through Michael Batchelor, entered the Cuyunen ancestral
attached a photocopy of its counsel's MCLE certification, as
lands, put up a "no trespassing, private property" sign therein,
well as an affidavit executed by its corporate representative,
installed armed security guards, destroyed crops and plants
Ms. Edna V. Blach, affirming and authenticating her signature
planted by the tribe, and occupied a portion of the Cuyunen
in the jurat of the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum
ancestral lands. The Puerto del Sol Resort was subsequently
Shopping.
developed in the Cuyunen ancestral lands. A TRO was issued
CA denied PDSPI's Motion for Reconsideration, holding that,
by the NCIP RHO IV.
while PDSPI was able to cure the formal defects of its Certiorari
PDSPI filed an Answer, denying the allegations of Abis. PDSPI
Petition, the supposed violation of the doctrine of exhaustion
maintained that the Puerto del Sol Resort is not in conflict and
of administrative remedies still warranted the dismissal of the
does not overlap with any ancestral domain.
Certiorari Petition. Hence, the instant Petition.
NCIP RHO IV, through Gabaen, rendered its Decision in favor
Issue: WON the CA was correct in invoking the doctrine of
of Abis, holding that the land wherein the Puerto del Sol Resort
exhaustion of administrative remedies to deny PDSPI's
is situated in the ancestral lands of the Cuyunen Tribe. Further,
Certiorari Petition assailing the NCIP RHO IV's Order dated
the NCIP RHO IV found that PDSPI unlawfully intruded into the
January 14, 2013. (NO)
ancestral domain of the Cuyunen Tribe.
Held: The instant Petition is meritorious. The Court rules in
PDSPI received a copy of the Decision dated November 22,
favor of PDSPI.
2012 on November 29, 2012.
First and foremost, the CA was incorrect in holding that a
A Motion for Reconsideration dated December 10, 2012 was
motion for reconsideration was an available remedy at the
filed by PDSPI fourteen (14) days from November 29, 2012 or
disposal of PDSPI in questioning NCIP RHO IVs Order dated
on December 13, 2012, which was eventually denied by the
January 14, 2013. Neither can it be validly argued that the NCIP
NCIP RHO IV in its Order dated December 18, 2012.
RHO IV s Order denying due course to PDSPI's Memorandum
PDSPI received the NCIP RHO IV's Order denying its Motion for
on Appeal should have first been appealed before the NCIP En
Reconsideration on December 21, 2012.
Banc.
Unsatisfied, PDSPI filed a Memorandum on Appeal with the
According to Section 97, Rule XVII of the 2003 NCIP Rules of
NCIP RHO IV on January 7, 2013, considering that the fifteenth
Procedure, the provisions of the Rules of Court shall apply in

an analogous and suppletory character. Hence, following Oppositely, Section 46, Rule IX of the 2003 NCIP Rules of
Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, which states that an Procedure clearly adopts the Fresh Period Rule, stating that, in
appeal may be taken only from a judgment or final order that a situation wherein a motion for reconsideration was filed, a
completely disposes the case, and that an appeal may not be judgment rendered by the RHO shall become final only when
taken from an order disallowing an appeal, the NCIP RHO IV s no appeal is made within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
Order denying due course to PDSPI's appeal cannot be subject order denying such motion for reconsideration. By issuing an
of an appeal before the NCIP En Banc. Order that plainly and unmistakably goes against the above-
In any case, although the general rule states that the filing of a stated rule, the Court finds that NCIP, RHO IV gravely abused
prior motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for its discretion.
the filing of a petition for certiorari, such rule is subject to well- As a final note, the Court stresses that the dismissal of appeals
recognized exceptions. Jurisprudence has held that the special purely on technical grounds is frowned upon and procedural
civil action of certiorari will lie even without a party first rules ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense,
availing itself of a motion for reconsideration if, among other for they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial
exceptions, the order challenged is a patent nullity or where justice, and thereby defeat their very aims. Indeed, while the
the issue raised is one purely of law. right to appeal is merely statutory and not a natural right, the
Moreover, while the general rule dictates that it must be first courts, as well as administrative bodies, are nonetheless
shown that all the administrative remedies prescribed by law enjoined to respect the minimum period laid down by the
have been exhausted before filing an extraordinary action for applicable Rules within which to allow an appeal. All litigants,
certiorari under the principle of exhaustion of administrative to the extent allowed by the Rules, must be afforded the fullest
remedies, there are however exceptions to this rule, such as opportunity for the adjudication of their cases on the merits.
where the issue is purely a legal one or where the WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is
controverted act is patently illegal. hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions dated April 3, 2013 and May
Applying the foregoing to the instant case, the issue raised by 20, 2014 promulgated by the Court of Appeals, Second Division
PDSPI in the instant Petition, i.e., the correct reglementary and Former Second Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 129036 are
period applicable with respect to appeals of RHO decisions REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
before the NCIP En Banc, is a purely legal one. Accordingly, the Order dated January 14, 2013 issued by the
The Court is not unaware that jurisprudence has held that the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Regional Hearing
Neypes Rule strictly applies only with respect to judicial Office IV is likewise REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The National
decisions and that the said rule does not firmly apply to Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Regional Hearing Office IV
administrative decisions. is hereby ORDERED to give due course to petitioner Puerto Del
However, in the cases wherein the Court did not apply the Sol Palawan, Inc.'s Memorandum on Appeal dated January 4,
Neypes Rule to administrative decisions, the specific 2012.
administrative rules of procedure applicable in such cases SO ORDERED.
explicitly precluded the application of the Fresh Period Rule. EMELINDA V. ABEDES , petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF
For instance, in Panolino v. Tajala, which involved an appeal of APPEALS,
a decision of a Regional Executive Director of the DENR before RELIA QUIZON ARCIGA and SHERIFF RONBERTO B. VALINO
the DENR Secretary, the Court held that "Rule 41, Section 3 of ,
the Rules of Court, as clarified in Neypes, being inconsistent respondents.
with Section 1 of Administrative Order Nof 87, Series of 1990,
it may not apply to the case of petitioner whose motion for
reconsideration was denied." The Court did not apply the Fresh SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65
Period Rule because, according to Administrative Order No. 87,
Series of 1990, which was the applicable rule of procedure in DOCTRINE: In a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
that case, "if a motion for reconsideration of the Rules of Court, the petitioner is burdened to establish that the
decision/order of the Regional Office is filed and such motion respondent tribunal acted without jurisdiction, meaning, that
for reconsideration is denied, the movant shall have the right it does not have the legal power to determine the case; or that
to perfect his appeal during the remainder of the period for it acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, meaning, that
appeal, reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial." having been clothed with power to determine the case, it
In the instant case, there is no similar provision in the 2003 oversteps its authority as determined by law, or that it
NCIP Rules of Procedure which states that in case the committed grave abuse of its discretion or acted in a
aggrieved party files a motion for reconsideration from an capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the
adverse decision of the RHO, the said party has only the exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to lack of
remaining balance of the period within which to appeal, jurisdiction.
reckoned from receipt of notice of the RHO's decision denying
the motion for reconsideration. FACTS:

Sometime in 1996, respondent Relia Quizon Arciga filed an according to the petitioner, Section 2 33 of Rule 50 of the Rules
action before the RTC of Pasig City against Wilfredo P. Abedes, of Court mandates the dismissal of appeals which involve pure
husband of herein petitioner Emelinda V. Abedes, seeking questions of law erroneously brought to the Court of Appeals.
support for her daughter, Dannielle Ann Arciga.
Issue: WON the CA wrongly reversed the RTC ruling (NO)
RTC declared Wilfredo as the father of Danielle and ordered a Ruling: To draw a distinction, an appeal by
fixed amount of PhP10,000.00 support per month. petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is a continuation
of the judgment complained of, while that under Rule 65 is an
No appeal was interposed, thus, the judgment became final original or independent action. The remedies
and executory. Respondent Relia Quizon Arciga filed a Motion of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not
for Execution. Accordingly, a writ of execution was issued by alternative or successive. Hence, the special civil action for
the RTC of Pasig City. Unfortunately, the Sheriff's certiorari under Rule 65 is not and cannot be a substitute for
Return showed that no personal property of Wilfredo could be an appeal, where the latter remedy is available. Such a remedy
levied upon to satisfy the judgment. will not be a cure for failure to timely file a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45. Rule 45 is clear that decisions, final
Later on, a property under the name of Wilfredo was orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any case, i.e.,
discovered, hence, Sheriff caused the registration of a Notice regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved,
to Levy on Execution on the TCT. Petitioner alleged that the may be appealed to this Court by filing a petition for review,
property solely belongs to her, and cannot be levied to satisfy which would be but a continuation of the appellate process
the judgment. Notwithstanding this adverse claim, a Notice of over the original case.
Sheriff's Sale was made announcing the sale to the public and
to the highest bidder of all the rights, claims, and shares of
Wilfredo in the property. This conclusion is made ineluctably certain for the further
reason that even as petitioner files a special civil action for
Petitioner filed a complaint for Injunction with Prayer for Writ certiorari under Rule 65 before us, there is no allegation
of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order whatsoever that the Court of Appeals acted without or in
and Damages before the RTC of Tarlac City. excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. What petitioner
After due hearing, the RTC of Tarlac City issued a Temporary ascribes is merely lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Court
Restraining Order. Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss of Appeals which, to the mind of this Court, does not satisfy
which was denied by the trial court. the legal fundamentals for a writ of certiorari to lie.
In their Answer, respondents Relia Quizon Arciga and Sheriff G.R. No. 137761 April 6, 2000
Ronberto B. Valino principally contended that the property
subject of the levy is presumed conjugal property; and as such, GABRIEL LAZARO and the heirs of FLORENCIA PINEDA and
liable for the judgment against Wilfredo. EVA VIERNES, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
Spouses JOSE and ANITA ALESNA, respondents.
RTC Tarlac opined that the property is paraphernal in character
hence cannot be levied to satisfy the judgment. The RTC of PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65
Tarlac City further explained that even assuming that the
property covered by TCT No. 292139 is part of the conjugal DOCTRINE: Failure to pay docket and other lawful fees within
partnership, it may not be held liable for the support of the prescribed period is a ground for the dismissal of an appeal.
Danielle Ann who is an illegitimate child of Wilfredo. This rule cannot be suspended by the mere invocation of "the
interest of substantial justice." Procedural rules may be relaxed
CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision on the ground that only in exceptionally meritorious cases.
Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships govern the
property relations between petitioner and Wilfredo, FACTS:
notwithstanding the fact that their marriage was celebrated
prior to the effectivity of the Spouses Jose and Anita, filed an annulment of title,
Family Code. reconveyance and damages against Petitioners before the
RTC.
Petitioner contends that CA erred in reversing the decision. In
raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners. Thereafter, the
appellate court over the matters raised on appeal because the private respondents filed a Notice of Appeal.
issues involved are purely questions of law, she averred that

The CA dismissed the appeal for failure of herein private
respondents to pay the required docket fees within the The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General
prescribed period. sought to appeal the trial court’s order.
However, the CA reinstated the appeal for "the interest of Since the case is a special proceeding, and there was no record
substantial justice.” However, No specific circumstance or any on appeal that was filed and served as required by Section 2(a),
other explanation was cited in support of its ruling. Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court
disapproved the Notice of Appeal.
ISSUE:
The Republic’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied,
Whether or not the CA acted in excess of jurisdiction, and/or prompting it to file a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of
with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition Appeals. It contended that the declaration of presumptive
death of a person under Article 41 of the Family Code is not a
HELD: special proceeding requiring a record on appeal.
Private respondents failed to pay the required docket fees The Court of Appeals denied the petition on procedural and
within the reglementary period. In fact, the Court notes that substantive grounds, but discussed the issue as to whether or
they paid the fees only after the CA had dismissed the appeal, not a petition for declaration of the presumptive death of a
or six months after the filing of the Notice of Appeal. Clearly, person is in the nature of a special proceeding.
existing jurisprudence and the Rules mandate that the appeal
should be dismissed. The CA held that the petition is in the nature of a special
proceeding. The petition seeks to declare the presumptive
The appellate court nonetheless reinstated the appeal "in the death of the absentee spouse. It did not seek the enforcement
interest of substantial justice." But as earlier observed, it did or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a
not cite any specific circumstance or any other explanation in wrong.
support of its ruling. For their part, private respondents failed
to offer a satisfactory explanation why they paid the docket As a special proceeding, in order for an appeal to be perfected,
fees six months after the prescribed period. Indeed, neither the OSG should have filed, in addition to its Notice of Appeal,
they nor the Court of Appeals showed fraud, accident, mistake, a record on appeal in accordance with Section 2(a), Rule 41 of
excusable negligence, or any other reason to justify the the Rules of Court.
suspension of the aforecited rule.
ISSUE:
The payment of the docket and other legal fees within the Whether or not a petition for the declaration of the
prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional. Section presumptive death of a person is a special proceeding.
1 (c), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides: "Failure of the
appellant to pay the docket and other fees as provided in HELD:
Section 4 of Rule 41" is a ground for the dismissal of the appeal. NO. Article 41 of the Family Code specifically provides that:
Indeed, it has been held that failure of the appellant to ...For the purpose of contracting the subsequent
conform with the rules on appeal renders the judgment final marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouses present
and executory. Verily, the right to appeal is a statutory right must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code
and one who seeks to avail of that right must comply with the for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee…
statute or the rule.
By the trial court’s decision, the petition was granted citing
Article 41 of the Family Code. Ergo, the petition for the purpose
Republic of the Philippines, v. The Hon. Court of Appeals of the second paragraph of Article 41 is a summary
(Twentieth Division), Hon. Presiding Judge Fortunito L. proceeding.
Madrona, RTC-BR. 35 and Apolinaria Malinao Jomoc
G.R. No. 163604 ; May 6, 2005 Since the petition is a summary proceeding under the Family
Code, and not a special proceeding under the Revised Rules of
FACTS:
The private respondent Apolinaria Malinao Jomoc petitioned
to declare her absentee spouse, Clemente Jomoc G.R. No. 93559 April 26, 1991
presumptively dead before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
Ormoc City. On the basis of the Commissioner’s Report, by MAJOR ROMEO G. ELEPANTE, Petitioner,
Order of September 29, 1999, the petition was granted by the vs.
respondent judge, Madrona. HON. MADAYAG, Respondent

Court, the filing of a Notice of Appeal from the trial court’s shall be taken to the CA where it involves factual questions or
order sufficed. directly to the SC on pure questions of law. Amplifying the
Saulo ruling, the Court ruled that the decision of the Judge to
Petition for Certiorari whom the writ is made returnable, either for the release of the
detainee or for sustaining his detention, if not appealed on
DOCTRINE time, can become final just like an ordinary case.
Sec. 18 of Rule 41 of the RoC explicitly provides that an appeal In computing the 48-hour period, the date on which the
in habeas corpus cases shall be perfected by filing with the clerk decision was promulgated and/or served is not counted and
of the court of the judge who rendered the judgment, within 48 the period starts to run the following day unless the same by a
hours from notice of such judgment, a statement that the Sunday or legal holiday in which case the period of appeal is to
person making it appeals therefrom. be considered from the succeeding day. To perfect an appeal,
a notice of appeal is required to be filed with the Clerk of Court
This rule, as interpreted in the case of Saulo v. Brig. Gen. Cruz,
or Judge who rendered the judgment.
is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. Hence, the court
has no other alternative but to dismiss the appeal filed out of In this case, counsel for petitioner received on May 29, 1990 a
time. copy of the trial court’s decision. Clearly, when he filed the
instant petition on June 11, 13 days had lapsed, so it was filed
FACTS
outside the 48-hour reglementary period. This being so, the
Major Elepante filed a petition for habeas corpus with the decision sought to be reviewed is already final so that this
Court docketed as G.R. No. 93172. He alleged that he was Court following the Saulo ruling, has no alternative but to
brought by a platoon of armed soldiers to the National Capital dismiss the instant petition.
Region Defense Command where he was detained without any
However, the Court as protector of the rights of the people,
warrant and investigated for years, confined as a prisoner at
must stress the point that if the participation of petitioner in
Fort Bonifacio. No formal charges were filed against him. The
several coup attempts for which he is confined on orders of
Court resolved to issue a writ returnable to the Executive Judge
Adjutant General Jorge Agcaoili cannot be established and no
of the RTC of Makati, directing the latter to hear and decide
charges can be filed against him or the existence of a prima
the case.
facie case warranting trial before a military commission is
The RTC dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Major wanting, it behooves respondent then Major General Rodolfo
Elepante was arrested because of his involvement in several Biazon (now General) to release petitioner. Respondents must
coup attempts, and military procedure does not require a also be reminded that even if a military officer is arrested
formal charge. pursuant to Article 70 of then Articles of War, indefinite
confinement is not sanctioned, as Article 71 thereof, mandates
Thus, Major Elepante filed this petition for review on certiorari. that immediate steps must be taken to try the person accused
The OSG filed its comment, pointing out that the appeal was or to dismiss the charge and release him. Any officer who is
not filed within 48 hours from the notice of judgment. (Notice: responsible for unnecessary delay in investigating or carrying
May 29, 1990; Petition: June 11, 1990) the case to a final conclusion may even be punished as a court
martial may direct.
ISSUE
• Whether or not the instant petition was timely filed. (NO) G.R. No. 117438 June 8, 1995
RULING RAUL SESBREÑO, petitioner, vs. HON, COURT OF APPEALS,

and PATRICIA GIAN, SOTERO BRANZUELA, ANDRES C. YPIL,
Sec. 18 of Rule 41 of the RoC explicitly provides that an appeal
SANTIAGO BACAYO, BRIGIDO COHITMINGAO, VICTORINO
in habeas corpus cases shall be perfected by filing with the
DINOY, GUILLERMO MONTEJO and EMILIO RETUBADO,
clerk of the court of the judge who rendered the judgment,
respondents.
within 48 hours from notice of such judgment, a statement
that the person making it appeals therefrom.
FACTS:
This rule, as interpreted in the case of Saulo v. Brig. Gen. Cruz, Private respondents Hermilo Rodis, Sr., together with Douglas
is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. Hence, the court Sandiego and Ricardo Silverio, Sr., were charged with estafa
has no other alternative but to dismiss the appeal filed out of before the Cebu RTC. The information alleged that the accused
time. received from Atty. Raul H. Sesbreno the sum of P300,000.00
as money market placement. The said accused, once
Furthermore, in the case of Medina v. Yan, where the Court in possession of said sum of money, misappropriated,
ruled that appeal in habeas corpus from the decision of the CFI
misapplied and converted into their own personal use and the Court of Appeals, which it did resolve, was whether private
benefit the same, and despite repeated demands respondent could be held liable for estafa under the facts
made upon them by Atty. Raul H. Sesbreno, they have obtaining in the criminal case. This certainly is a question of
failed and refused to comply with their obligation. law that should fall within the jurisdiction of this Court.
Petitioner did not assail the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
Respondent Rodis moved to quash the information on the during the pendency of his petition. As a matter of fact, he
ground that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), actively participated in the proceedings before said appellate
not the regular courts, had jurisdiction over the offense court. While it is true that jurisdiction over the subject matter
charged and that the facts stated herein did not constitute an of a case may be raised at any time of the proceedings, this
offense. The trial court denied the motion and private rule presupposes that laches or estoppel has not supervened.
respondent A party may be estopped or barred from raising the question
elevated the case to the then Intermediate Appellate of jurisdiction for the first time in a petition before the
Court on a petition for certiorari. Supreme Court when it failed to do so in the early stages of the
proceedings.
The appellate court dismissed the petition after finding no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in
denying the motion to quash. The motion for reconsideration
was, likewise, denied. Thus, private respondent filed a petition
for review on certiorari with SC. The petition was denied. FELIZARDO S. OBANDO, JUAN S. OBANDO and THE ESTATE OF
Hence, trial ensued in the criminal case. After the prosecution ALEGRIA STREBEL Vda. DE FIGUERAS, petitioners, vs. HON.
had rested its case, private respondent filed a motion to COURT OF APPEALS, HON. PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC-
dismiss on demurrer to evidence based on the core MANILA, BRANCH 17, ESTATE and/or HEIRS OF EDUARDO
proposition that there was no criminal offense of estafa from FIGUERAS & HEIRS OF FRITZ STREBEL, respondents.
the non-payment of a money market placement.
FACTS: Jose Figueras died testate leaving as heirs Alegria
Trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Private respondent Strebel, his second wife, and Francisco and Eduardo Figueras,
then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the his two legitimate children by his first wife, Rosario Francisco.
Intermediate Appellate Court as tainted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Francisco instituted a petition for probate of the last will and
testament of Jose Fargas.
The appellate court rendered a decision granting the
petition and dismissed the criminal case. It upheld private When Alegria Strebel died, Felizardo Obando instituted a
respondent's contention that a money market petition for probate of the last will and testament of Alegria.
placement is in the nature of a loan which entails the Felizardo claimed that he and his brother, Juan, are the
transfer of ownership of the money so invested and therefore children of Alegria's sister and that they have been named as
the liability for its return is civil in nature. Upon a motion for heirs in the last will and testament. The two probate
the reconsideration of said decision, the Court of Appeals proceedings were consolidated. Eduardo and Felizardo were
modified its decision dismissing the criminal case as against appointed as co-administrators.
Hermilo Rodis, Sr. only.
Felizardo filed with the probate court a motion for the removal
Consequently, petitioner interposed the instant petition of Eduardo Figueras as his co-administrator.
alleging that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in taking
cognizance over the case even if it has no jurisdiction over the Meanwhile, the National Bureau of Investigation found that
issue raised by the petition for certiorari filed therein and in the last will and testament of Alegria was a forgery. Criminal
deciding the case in a way probably not in accord with law or charges were filed against Felizardo and Juan Obando who
with the applicable decisions of this Honorable Supreme Court were thereafter convicted of falsification.
ISSUE: Whether the facts obtained in the case, which he can Eduardo Figueras and intervenor Fritz Strebel filed a motion to
be held liable for estafa, is purely a question of law for which remove Felizardo as co-administrator citing as ground the
said appellate court had no jurisdiction conviction of Felizardo and Juan Obando.
The trial court granted the motion of Eduardo and denied the
HELD: YES. An examination of the petition filed before the motion of Felizardo to remove Eduardo as co- administrator.
Court of Appeals disclosed that indeed no question of fact was
raised. What private respondent asserted therein was that the Felizardo filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied
facts as alleged and proved by petitioner did not constitute a on Feb. 5, 1998. Felizardo filed an Urgent Motion for
criminal offense. Clearly then, the only issue to be resolved by Reconsideration, which the probate court denied for being

actually a second motion for reconsideration. The probate DOCTRINE: The power of the trial court to disallow or
court also denied Felizardo's motion for reconsideration of the disapprove a notice of appeal that has been filed out of time is
order dismissing Special Proceeding No. 123948. Again, expressly recognized by the Rules of Court. The approval of the
Felizardo filed a motion for reconsideration of his removal as notice becomes a ministerial duty of the court only when the
administrator, as well as the order dismissing Special appeal is filed on time. Otherwise, the court has the discretion
Proceeding No. 123948 on July 17, 1998 which were denied. to refuse or disallow it in accordance with the Rules.
On August 6, 1998, Felizardo filed a notice of appeal against FACTS:

the orders of the probate court. The Probate court denied
finding that the second and third motions for reconsideration, Manejero is a tenant of Oro over a landholding located in Iloilo.
being prohibited under the Rules, did not toll the reglementary When Manejero maliciously failed to pay his rentals for 1988
period to appeal. and 1989, Oro brought an action before the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) for the collection
Petitioner filed with CA a petition for certiorari and mandamus, of said rentals. Throughout the course and/or pendency of the
which was dismissed by the court. Felizardo filed a motion for said DARAB Case, Manejero did not pay rentals until the same
reconsideration, but it was denied. was decided and finally executed in 1998; he was made to pay
the past due rentals from 1988 to 1998 without interests and
ISSUE: Whether or not the second and third appeal toll the damages. Believing that Manejero was liable for damages
reglementary period to appeal. arising from his malicious act of delaying the said DARAB case
and not paying the rentals during the pendency of the
HELD: No. the Rules of Court are explicit that a second motion aforesaid case, Oro filed an action for Damages before the RTC
for reconsideration shall not be allowed.9 In this case, of Dumangas, Iloilo, which was presided by the respondent
petitioners filed not only a second motion for reconsideration, judge, Judge Diaz. After considering the ‘urgent’ Motion to
but a third motion for reconsideration as well. Since the period Dismiss filed by the private respondent, and before trial, the
to appeal began to run from the denial of the first motion for respondent judge DISMISSED the complaint of the petitioner.
reconsideration, consequently, petitioners' Notice of Appeal Oro filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Judge Diaz DENIED the
filed six months later was correctly denied by the probate said motion. RTC disapproved the notice of appeal.
court for being late.
ISSUE:
Likewise, the remedy of certiorari was no longer available to
petitioners. It is well-settled that the special civil action for Whether or not the judge erred in disapproving the notice of
certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal?
appeal. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually
exclusive and not alternative or successive. HELD:
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, No. For the disapproval of his Notice of Appeal, petitioner
the instant petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the ascribes grave abuse of discretion to public Respondent. He
Court of Appeals dated May 7, 1999 is AFFIRMED in toto. likewise questions the finding of the trial court that his MR,
being pro forma, did not interrupt the running of the period
within which to file an appeal. He argues that because it was
the appellate court which had jurisdiction to disapprove the
G.R. No. 140974 July 11, 2001
Notice of Appeal for having been filed late, public respondent
had no authority to do so.
RAMON ORO Petitioner
v. At the outset, the Court emphasizes that the power of the trial
JUDGE GERARDO D. DIAZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial court to disallow or disapprove a notice of appeal for being
Court, Branch 68, Dumangas, Iloilo; and DONATO filed out of time is expressly recognized. Section 13, Rule 41 of
MANEJERO, Respondents Rules of Court, explicitly provides:
SECTION 13. Dismissal of appeal. — Prior to the transmittal of

the original record or the record on appeal to the appellate
court, the trial court may motu proprio, or on motion, dismiss
the appeal for having been taken out of time.
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 CHALLENGING
THE ORDER ISSUED BY RTC DISAPPROVING THE PETITIONER’S Petitioner also contends that respondent judge should not
NOTICE OF APPEAL FOR HAVING BEEN FILED BEYOND THE have deemed the MR as pro forma, simply because it was a
REGLEMENTARY PERIOD mere rehash of the earlier arguments in the Complaint. The
former believes that a contrary finding would have tolled the
running of the 15-day prescriptive period, and so his Notice of Petitioner raises questions of fact, the determination of which
Appeal would not have been considered late. Indeed, although is beyond the scope of certiorari.
an MR merely reiterates issues already passed upon by the
court, that by itself does not make it pro forma. What is Moreover, a special civil action for certiorari cannot and should
essential is compliance with the requisites of the Rules. not be a substitute for a lapsed appeal.
However, even if petitioner’s MR is not considered pro forma

— in which case the running of the 15-day reglementary period
is effectively interrupted — still, the trial court was correct in
G.R. No. 156067 August 11, 2004
ruling that the Notice of Appeal had been filed out of time.
MADRIGAL TRANSPORT INC., petitioner, vs. LAPANDAY
A review of the records of the case shows that the RTC Order
HOLDINGS CORPORATION; MACONDRAY AND
dismissing the Complaint was received by petitioner on June 2,
COMPANY, INC., and LUIS P. LORENZO JR., respondents..
1999. On that date, the 15-day prescriptive period within
which to file an appeal began to run. Instead of preparing an
appeal, petitioner filed his MR on June 14, 1999. His filing of
the motion interrupted the reglementary period to appeal. By PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 45
that time, however, twelve (12) days had already lapsed; thus, DOCTRINE: Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party,
from his receipt of the Order denying his MR, he had only three the action for certiorari will not be entertained. Remedies of
(3) days left within which to file a notice of appeal. On August appeal (including petitions for review) and certiorari are
19, 1999, petitioner received the RTC Order denying his MR. mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive.
Accordingly, he had three (3) days or until August 22, 1999 to Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an
file a notice of appeal. Unfortunately, he was able to do so only appeal
on August 26, 1999, or four (4) days late. The approval of a FACTS: Petitioner Madrigal filed a Petition for Voluntary
notice of appeal becomes the ministerial duty of the lower Insolvency before the RTC, Branch 49. Subsequently,
court, provided the appeal is filed on time and if the notie of petitioner filed a Complaint for damages against
appeal is however filed beyond the reglamentary period the Respondents Lapanday, Macondray and Lorenzo before RTC
trial court may exercise its power to refuse or disallow the Branch 36.
same. The insolvency court declared petitioner
insolvent. Respondents filed their respective Motions to
It should be stressed that the right to appeal is not a natural Dismiss the case pending before the RTC Branch 36 which the
right or a part of due process. Rather, it is a procedural remedy court granred for failure of the Complaint to state a cause of
of statutory origin and, as such, may be exercised only in the action.
manner prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing its Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was later
exercise. Hence, its requirements must be strictly complied denied. Subsequently, petitioner filed a Petition
with. Failure of a party to perfect an appeal within the period for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, seeking to set aside
fixed by law renders final the decision sought to be appealed. the Orders of the trial court.
As a result, no court could exercise appellate jurisdiction to The CA ruled that since the main issue in the instant case was
review the decision. Moreover, the perfection of an appeal purely legal, the Petition could be treated as one for review as
within the period and in the manner prescribed by law is an exception to the general rule that certiorari was not proper
essential; noncompliance with this legal requirement is fatal when appeal was available. Respondents Lapanday and
and has the effect of rendering the judgment final and Lorenzo challenged this ruling through a Motion for
executory. After a decision is declared final and executory, Reconsideration.
vested rights are acquired by the winning party. Just as a losing CA: GRANTED Respondents’ MR and DISMISSED petitioner’s
party has the right to appeal within the prescribed period, the Petition for Certiorari. The order granting a motion to dismiss
winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of was final and thus the proper subject of an appeal,
the case. Further, a discussion of damages can no longer be not certiorari. The issues raised by petitioner involved pure
entertained because of the lateness of the appeal notice, the questions of law that should be brought to the Supreme Court,
impropriety of the mode of review and, consequently, the pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 50 and Section 2(c) of Rule 41 of
finality of the assailed Order as discussed above. The sole office the Rules of Court.
of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction ISSUE: WON appeal is the proper remedy
and does not include a review of public respondent’s HELD: YES. Under Rule 41, Rules of Court, an appeal may be
evaluation of the evidence and factual findings. In a special civil taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by
questions of fact are generally not permitted, the inquiry being the Rules of Court to be appealable.
limited to whether the public respondent acted without or in An order or a judgment is deemed final when it finally disposes
excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. of a pending action, so that nothing more can be done with it
in the trial court. In other words, the order or judgment ends Execution. Danilo filed his Comment on Simeon’s Motion for
the litigation in the lower court. Au contraire, an interlocutory Issuance of Writ of Execution. He prayed that the PhP 2,000
order does not dispose of the case completely, but leaves monthly rental he was ordered to pay be computed from April
something to be done as regards the merits of the latter. 1988 to March 1994 only since he had vacated the premises by
Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action for April 1994. RTC order issuance of writ of execution. MR was
certiorari will not be entertained. Remedies of appeal filed but was later on denied. Danilo filed a Supplemental
(including petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually Petition with Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary
exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction to
and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, especially if one's enjoin the RTC from enforcing the judgment against Danilo for
own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned him to pay PhP 2,000 in monthly rentals from April 1994
such loss or lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari is that onwards.
there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not On August 23, 2010, this Court issued a Resolution requiring
prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of Simeon to file his Comment on Danilo’s Petition for Review on
discretion. Certiorari. Simeon filed his Comment before Us. He argued
that the RTC and CA correctly ruled that the prayer for a
G.R. NO. 192217 March 2, 2011 reduction of back rentals should be denied, since Danilo never
DANILO L. PAREL, Petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF SIMEON turned over possession of the subject premises to him.
PRUDENCIO, Respondents.
ISSUE: W/N the CA committed an error of law in upholding the
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. RTC Orders.
FACTS: A complaint for recovery of possession and damages HELD: Yes.

was filed by Simeon Prudencio (Simeon) against Danilo Parel It is true that Danilo should have brought to the Court’s
(Danilo) with the RTC in Baguio City. Simeon alleged that he attention the date he actually left the subject premises at an
was the owner of a two-story house at No. 61 Forbes Park earlier time. The RTC is also correct in ruling that the judgment
National Reservation in Baguio City. involved was already final and executory.
Simeon allowed Danilo and his parents to live on the ground However, it would be inequitable to order him to pay monthly
floor of the house since his wife was the elder sister of Danilo’s rentals "until he actually vacates" when it has not been
father, Florentino. determined when he actually vacated the ground floor of
Simeon’s house. He would be paying monthly rentals
In November 1985, Simeon needed the whole house back and indefinitely. The RTC should have determined via hearing if
thus informed Danilo and his parents that they had to vacate Danilo’s allegation were true and accordingly modified the
the place. Danilo’s parents acceded to Simeon’s demand. period Danilo is to be held accountable for monthly rentals.
Danilo, however, remained in the house with his family despite Though issuance of writ of execution is a matter of right such
repeated demands on him to surrender the premises. This is not without exception. A writ of execution may still be
development drove Simeon to institute an action for recovery appealed. One of the exceptions wherein a writ of execution
of possession and damages. Danilo offered a different version may be appealed is when there is a change in situation of the
of events. He maintained that the land on which Simeon’s parties making the execution unjust. The fact that Danilo has
house was constructed was in his father Florentino’s name. He left the property under dispute is a change in the situation of
explained that his father Florentino, who had by then passed the parties that would make execution inequitable or unjust.
away, did not have enough funds to build a house and thus The writ of execution sought to be implemented does not take
made a deal with Simeon for them to just contribute money into consideration the circumstances that merit a modification
for the construction of a house on Florentino’s land. Florentino of judgment. Given that there is a pending issue regarding the
and Simeon were, thus, co-owners of the house of which execution of judgment, the RTC should have afforded the
Simeon claims sole ownership. parties the opportunity to adduce evidence to determine the
period within which Danilo should pay monthly rentals before
RTC ruled in favor of Danilo. CA reversed RTC’s decision. Danilo issuing the writ of execution in the instant case. Should Danilo
was ordered to pay from April 1988 until the former actually be unable to substantiate his claim that he vacated the
vacates the same, and the sum of P50,000.00 as attorney’s premises in April 1994, the period to pay monthly rentals
fees. Danilo challenged the CA Decision before this Court via should be until June 19, 2007, the date he informed the CA that
an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. he had already left the premises
SC affirmed CA. Simeon sought to enforce this Court’s April 19, Unjustified delay in the enforcement of a judgment sets at
2006 Decision and thus filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of naught the role of courts in disposing justiciable

controversies with finality. Once a judgment becomes final and involved in the execution. The court may stay or suspend the
executory, all the issues between the parties are deemed execution of its judgment if warranted by the higher interest
resolved and laid to rest. All that remains is the execution of of justice. It has the authority to cause a modification of the
the decision which is a matter of right. decision when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of
justice or when supervening events warrant it.
Banaga v. Majaducon, however, enumerates the instances
where a writ of execution may be appealed: The court is also vested with inherent power to stay the
1) the writ of execution varies the judgment; enforcement of its decision based on antecedent facts which
2) there has been a change in the situation of the parties show fraud in its rendition or want of jurisdiction of the trial
making execution inequitable or unjust; court apparent on the record. (Emphasis supplied.)
3) execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt
from execution; The writ of execution sought to be implemented does not take
4) it appears that the controversy has never been subject to into consideration the circumstances that merit a modification
the judgment of the court; of judgment. Given that there is a pending issue regarding the
5) the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there execution of judgment, the RTC should have afforded the
remains room for interpretation thereof; or parties the opportunity to adduce evidence to determine the
6) it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently period within which Danilo should pay monthly rentals before
issued, or that it is defective in substance or is issued against issuing the writ of execution in the instant case. Should Danilo
the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or be unable to substantiate his claim that he vacated the
otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority; premises in April 1994, the period to pay monthly rentals
should be until June 19, 2007, the date he informed the CA that
In these exceptional circumstances, considerations of justice he had already left the
and equity dictate that there be some mode available to the premises.
party aggrieved of elevating the question to a higher court.
That mode of elevation may be either by appeal (writ of error WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The CA Decision in CA-
or certiorari), or by a special civil action of certiorari, G.R. SP No. 105709 is hereby SET ASIDE. The RTC, Branch 60 in
prohibition, or mandamus. Baguio City is ORDERED to determine the actual date
petitioner left the subject premises before issuing the writ of
The instant case falls under one of the exceptions cited above. execution in Civil Case No. 2493-R that will be based on the
The fact that Danilo has left the property under dispute is a resolution of said issue.
change in the situation of the parties that would make
execution inequitable or unjust. Moreover, there are
exceptions that have been previously considered by the Court PATRICIA SIBAYAN represented by TEODICIO SIBAYAN ,
as meriting a relaxation of the rules in order to serve petitioner,
substantial justice. These are: (1) matters of life, liberty, honor vs. EMILIO COSTALES, SUSANA ISIDRO, RODOLFO ISIDRO,
or property; (2) the existence of special or compelling ANNO
circumstances; (3) the merits of the case; (4) a cause not ISIDRO and ROBERTO CERANE, respondents.
entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
favored by the suspension of the rules; (5) a lack of any
showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45
dilatory; and (6) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby.20 We find that Danilo’s situation merits a relaxation DOCTRINE: The failure to file Appellant's Brief, though not
of the rules since special circumstances are involved; to jurisdictional, results in the
determine if his allegation were true would allow abandonment of the appeal which may be the cause for its
a final resolution of the case. dismissal. The right to appeal is not a natural right but a
statutory privilege, and it may be exercised only in the manner
Applicable, too, is what Sec. 5, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court and in accordance with the provisions of the law. The party who
states as one of the powers of a court: seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements
Section 5. Inherent powers of the courts. Every court shall have of the Rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost. In the
power: present case, petitioner failed to
(g) To amend and control its process and orders so as to make 5le the required brief within the period prescribed under
them conformable to law and justice. Section 7, Rule 44 of the Rules.
Thus, the Court ruled in Mejia v. Gabayan:

x x x The inherent power of the court carries with it the right FACTS:
to determine every question of fact and law which may be

Petitioner initiated an action for Recovery of Possession and DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner vs.
Ownership with Damages against respondents before RTC HON. EMMANUEL C. CARPIO, in his capacity as Presiding
Urdanta, Pangasinan. She averred that she is the registered Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Davao City, COUNTRY
owner of a parcel of land. Due to the encroachment effected BANKERS INSURANCE CORPORATION, DABAY ABAD, HATAB
by respondents on her property, petitioner was compelled to ABAD, OMAR ABAS, HANAPI ABDULLAH, ROJEA AB
file a case against them to protect her rights thereon. To ABDULLAH, ABDULLAH ABEDIN, ALEX ABEDIN, et al.,
support her claims, petitioner appended in her complaint a represented by their Attorney-in-Fact, MR. MANUEL L. TE,
copy of the relocation survey showing that the Respondents
abovementioned lots are within the bounds.
For their part, respondents assailed the ownership of the
petitioner on the disputed property and asserted that they, as DOCTRINE: The stage of "residual jurisdiction" of the trial court
the lawful owners and occupants, have the right to cultivate is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or
the land and enjoy the fruits accruing thereon. Respondents upon the approval of the records on appeal, but prior to the
asserted that they, together with their predecessors-in- transmittal of the original records or the records on appeal.
interest, were in possession of the subject property for over 80
years already. Section 1 (h), Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure states that
no appeal may be taken from an order dismissing an action
RTC dismissed the case and ruled in favor of the respondents. without prejudice. Indeed, there is no residual jurisdiction to
An examination of the relocation survey submitted by the speak of where no appeal has even been filed.
petitioner and reception of testimonial evidence from
opposing sides reveals that there was no overlapping or FACTS:
encroachment of properties in the case at bar that warrants
the removal of cloud. Abad, et al., represented by their attorney-in-fact, Manuel,
filed a complaint for delivery of certificates of title, damages,
CA ordered petitioner to file her corresponding Appellant's and attorney's fees against petitioner DBP and GFSME before
Brief within 45 days from the receipt of the copy of the notice. the RTC.
Faulting her counsel for the non-filing of the Appellant's Brief
within the reglementary period, petitioner sought for the They alleged that their certificates of title were submitted to
reconsideration of the earlier CA Resolution dismissing her DBP for safekeeping. The same certificates of title were turned
appeal. over by DBP to GFSME. They prayed for an issuance of writ of
seizure.
Issue: WON the CA’s denial of the appeal was proper for failure
of petitioner to file her Appellant’s Brief (YES) DBP filed its Omnibus Motion to Dismiss Complaint and to
Quash Writ of Seizure on the ground of improper venue. The
Ruling: We find no reason to disturb the appellate court's RTC granted the same and dismissed the case for improper
exercise of discretion in dismissing the appeal. We perused the venue.
explanation proffered by petitioner and we found nothing that
would compel us to reverse the appellate court. The Abad, et al. filed a petition for certiorari before the CA which
attribution of was denied.
negligence to the counsel does not automatically shield the
client from adverse DBP filed a Motion for Writ of Execution and accordingly the
consequence of her own negligence and relieve her from the RTC issued the same. However, the sheriff return of service
unfavorable result of such lapse. Truly, a litigant bears the indicated that Abad, et al. failed to deliver the certificates of
responsibility to monitor the status of his case, for no prudent title.
party leaves the fate of his case entirely in the hands of his
lawyer. DBP filed its Motion/Application to Call on Plaintiff's Surety
Bond but was denied plaining that the resolution of the motion
It is the client's duty to be in contact with his lawyer from time was no longer part of its residual power.
to time in order to be informed of the progress and
developments of his case; hence, to merely rely on the bare The CA likewise dismiss their appeal. It noted that DBP did not
reassurances of his lawyer that everything is being taken care move for reconsideration of the order of dismissal. It
of is not enough. considered the RTC decision as final and executory. It added
that Section 20, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court provided that the
G.R. No. 195450 February 1, 2017 claim for damages against the bond must be filed before trial

or before appeal was perfected or before the judgment only if they have secured the aid of the court prior to entering
became executory. into possession of the disputed property.
ISSUE: MCDP filed a notice of appeal with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC).
Whether or not the RTC may exercise its residual jurisdiction
over the case The RTC reversed the decision of the MTC. The disputed area
is foreshore land and therefore considered a part of the public
HELD: domain belonging to the State. The removal of the fence is not
an act of forcible entry.
In this case, there was no trial on the merits as the case was
dismissed due to improper venue and respondents could not The
have appealed the order of dismissal as the same was a
G.R. No. 170979 February 9, 2011
dismissal, without prejudice. Section 1 (h), Rule 41 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure states that no appeal may be taken from an
order dismissing an action without prejudice. Indeed, there is JUDITH YU, Petitioner,
no residual jurisdiction to speak of where no appeal has even vs.
been filed. HON. ROSA SAMSON-TATAD, Respondent
Here, the RTC dismissed the replevin case on the ground of

petitioners filed their petition with the appellate court.
improper venue. Such dismissal is one without prejudice and
does not bar the refiling of the same action; hence, it is not
The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition outright. The
appealable. Clearly, the RTC did not reach, and could not have
petitioners failed to attach to their petition copies of the
reached, the residual jurisdiction stage as the case was
complaint, answer, parties’ position papers filed with the MTC,
dismissed due to improper venue, and such order of dismissal
and parties’ appeal memoranda filed with the RTC, in violation
could not be the subject of an appeal. Without the perfection
of Section 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
of an appeal, let alone the unavailability of the remedy of
appeal, the RTC did not acquire residual jurisdiction. Hence, it
ISSUE:
is erroneous to conclude that the RTC may rule on DBP's
Whether or not the dismissal of the petition is proper.
application for damages pursuant to its residual powers.
HELD:
RULE 42: PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE RTCs TO THE CA
YES.
Sofia Canton, deceased, represented by co-administrators of
Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
her estate, Macaraig Canton, Jr., and Juan V. Bolo, Domingo
The petition shall be…. (d) accompanied by clearly
L. Antigua, Rogelio Uy, and Juan V. Bolo, v. City of Cebu,
legible duplicate originals or true copies of the judgments or
and/or Metro Cebu Development Project
final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk
G.R. No. 152898 ; February 12, 2007
of court of the RTC, the requisite number of plain copies thereof
and of the pleadings and other material portions of the record
FACTS:
as would support the allegations of the petition.
Metro Cebu Development Project (MCDP) identified that the
area disputed in this case is a part of the South Cebu
Section 4 of the same rule provides that non-compliance with
Reclamation Project.
any of Section 2’s requirements is a ground for the dismissal of
the petition.
In 1998, MCDP with the assistance of the Squatters Prevention
Encroachment Elimination Division (SPEED) of the Office of the
The insistence of the petitioner’s counsel that the pleadings
City Mayor of Cebu, removed the barbed wire fence from the
required by the CA are not indispensable to support the
disputed area on the ground that it was an ‘illegal construction
allegations of the parties. However, the ruling in Atillo v.
for lack of necessary permit’.
Bombay establishes that the appellate court knows best what
pleadings or material portions of the record of the case would
The petitioners claimed that their property is outside the South
support the allegations in the petition.
Cebu Reclamation Project. They filed a case for forcible entry
against MCDP and the City of Cebu (respondents) before the
In this case, the insufficiency of the supporting documents
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Talisay, Cebu.
combined with the unjustified refusal of petitioner to even
attempt to substantially comply with the attachment
The MTC ruled in favor of the petitioners. It held that the
requirement justified the dismissal of her petition.
removal made by the respondents may be legal and proper

in a civil case and in a criminal case. Furthermore, the
Petition for Certiorari provisions of Sec. 3 of Rule 41 and Sec. 6 of Rule 122 of the RoC
mean exactly the same, though worded differently. There is no
DOCTRINE substantial difference between the two insofar as legal results
are concerned. Thus, no reason exists why this situation in
“Clearly, if the modes of appeal to the CA (in cases where the criminal cases cannot be similarly addressed.
RTC exercised its appellate jurisdiction) and to this Court in civil
and criminal cases are the same, no cogent reason exists why Furthermore, the ruling in Neypes was also made applicable to
the periods to appeal from the RTC (in the exercise of its Rule 42 and 45 of the Rules, both of which also apply to appeals
original jurisdiction) to the CA in civil and criminal cases under in criminal cases.
Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and
Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure Clearly, no cogent reason exists why the periods to appeal
should be treated differently.” from the RTC, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, to the
CA in civil and criminal cases should be treated differently. If
FACTS the fresh period rule were to be so strictly interpreted, an
absurd situation will be effectively fostered and encouraged
This case stems from an information for estafa against where a litigant in a civil case will have a better right to appeal
petitioner. The RTC convicted petitioner as charged. Fourteen than an accused in a criminal case – a situation that gives
days later, petitioner filed a motion for new trial, which was undue favor to civil litigants and unjustly discriminates against
denied on October 17, 2005. On November 16, petitioner filed the accused-appellants.
a notice of appeal with the RTC, citing the case of Neypes in
reasoning that she had a fresh period of 15 days from Thus, petitioner seasonably filed her notice of appeal on
November 3, the receipt of the denial of the motion for new November 16, 2005, within the fresh period of 15 days,
trial. counted form November 3, 2005, the date of receipt of notice
denying her motion for new trial.
Still, the RTC considered the prosecution’s motion to dismiss
and motion for execution. RULE 43: APPEALS FROM THE CTA AND QUASI-JUDICIAL
AGENCIES TO THE CA
ISSUE Ferdinand T. Santos, Robert John Sobrepena and Rafael Perez
De Tagle, Jr., v. Wilson Go
• Whether or not the fresh period rule enunciated in Neypes
G.R. No. 156081 ; October 19, 2005
applies to appeals in criminal cases. (YES)
RULING FACTS:
The petitioners are corporate directors and officers of Fil-
The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent Estate Properties, Inc. (FEPI).
right – it is a statutory privilege and of statutory origin and,
therefore, available only if granted or as provided by statutes. In 1995, FEPI allegedly entered into a Project Agreement with
It may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the Manila Southcoast Development Corporation (MSDC). Under
provisions of the law. this agreement, FEPI would develop parcels of land in Batangas
allegedly owned by MSDC. The development includes the
In Neypes, the Court categorically set a fresh period of 15 days raising of first-class residential,commercial, resort, leisure, and
from a denial of a motion for reconsideration within which to recreational complex. The agreement also gave FEPI the
appeal. authority to sell the subdivision lots to the public.
The rationale of the fresh period rule is to standardize the Respondent Wilson Go offered to buy a lot from FEPI for P4.3
appeal period provided in the Rules and to do away with the million. The agreed upon payment stipulation will be a
confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be downpayment and installment. FEPI would execute a Deed of
counted. Thus, the 15-day period to appeal is no longer Sale in favor of Go, and deliver the owner’s duplicate copy of
interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or motion for the TCT after the complete payment of the purchase price.
reconsideration – it is now counted from receipt of any final
order or resolution. Go complied with the contract, but FEPI did not release the TCT
to go. FEPI also failed to develop the property by reason of a
While Neypes contemplated civil cases, the fresh period rule cease and desist order issued by the Department of Agrarian
must likewise apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases. Reform, since some of the properties were under the cover of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
Under BP 129, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court
is based, makes no distinction between the periods to appeal

After FEPI failed to heed Go’s repeated demands of returning Sandiganbayan, the RTC, or any authorized court, and should
the payment of the purchase price, Go filed a complaint before only raise questions of law.
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, and a separate
complaint for estafa under Articles 316 and 318 of the Revised The Department of Justice is not a court - and the petitioners
Penal Code against the petitioners. Go averred in his complaint raised factual matters. The Court has no basis to review the
that FEPI misrepresented itself as the owner of the subject DOJ’s factual findings.
property during the sale.
JESUS R. GONZALES, Petitioner, v. CIVIL SERVICE
The City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint for estafa for COMMISSION, and PHILIPPINE CHILDREN’S MEDICAL
insufficiency of evidence; and found no misrepresentation on CENTER (PCMC), Respondents.
the part of FEPI. G.R. No. 139131. September 27, 2002.
Go appealed the resolution of the City Prosecutor to the FACTS: Petitioner Jesus R. Gonzales was one of the two Utility
Department of Justice (DOJ). Who reversed the findings of the Workers II assigned at the Pharmacy Section of respondent
City Prosecutor and ordered the same to file an information Philippine Children’s Medical Center (PCMC).
for estafa. The DOJ found that the petitioner sold the property
to Go despite full knowledge that FEPI was not its owner. The On March 2, 1998, petitioner started absenting himself
petitioners did not deny the due execution of the contract, and without an approved leave (AWOL) and without explaining the
accepted payments of the purchase price. FEPI exercised acts reason for his absence to his superiors.
of ownership when it conveyed the property to respondent
Go. In view of the exigency of petitioner’s functions, Ms. Jara
Corazon O. Ehera, Human Resources Management Officer III,
Petitioners filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for wrote a letter-notice dated March 5, 1998 to petitioner
review. directing him to report for work within three (3) days from
The CA dismissed the petitioner for lack of merit. It held that receipt of said notice, otherwise, he would be dropped from
a petition for review pursuant to Rule 43 cannot be availed of the rolls.
as a mode of appeal from the ruling of the Secretary of Justice
because the Rule applies only to agencies or officers exercising During his absence, petitioner was seen on several occasions
quasi-judicial functions. The decision to file an information is within the premises of PCMC, particularly in the Budget Office,
an executive function. Billing and Cashier, and Personnel Clinic. He allegedly visited
the clinic without consulting any medical problem. Dr. Corazon
ISSUE: D. Rivera recommended that petitioner be dropped from the
Whether or not a petition for review under Rule 43 is a proper rolls.
mode of appeal for a resolution of the Secretary of Justice in
the filing of an information. Despite the written letter-notice sent to him, petitioner failed
to report for work thus constraining PCMC to drop him from
HELD: the rolls, effective March 20, 1998.
NO.
The Department of Justice is not a quasi-judicial agency Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the Civil Service Commission
enumerated in Section 1 of Rule 43. Since DOJ is not a quasi- (CSC). In Resolution No. 98-2359 dated September 8, 1998, the
judicial body, the resolution of the Secretary of Justice is not CSC upheld the action taken by PCMC. The decision, however,
appealable to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review stated that considering that the separation of petitioner was
under Rule 43. not disciplinary in character, he may be re-employed in the
same agency at the discretion of the appointing authority.
A preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but it was denied.
It does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused,
but is only a means of discovering whether the persons may be When he filed a petition for review in the CA, the petition was
reasonably charged with a crime. It is not a trial of the case on denied for failure to comply with Section 6 (c), Rule 43 of the
the merits. It cannot be said that a fiscal conducting Revised Rules of Court, particularly for failure to attach
preliminary investigation is acting as a quasi-court. certified true copies of material portions of the records and
supporting papers. In a Motion for Reconsideration and
The mode of appeal under Rule 45 cannot be used to review Compliance, petitioner attached the certified true copies of
determinations of the Department of Justice. Rule 45 is the required papers. But the CA denied the motion in a
explicit, it is a mode of appeal to the Supreme Court covering Resolution.
the judgments, orders, or resolutions of the CA, the

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave (Provincial Adjudicator) alleging that Rosenda was the original
error in dismissing the appeal of herein petitioner based on owner of a parcel of coconut land. Rosenda allegedly instituted
pure technicality. respondent and her husband, the late Igmedio Pelaez, as
tenants of the land but however, the said land was sold to
RULING: YES. In Cadayona v. Court of Appeals, we already held petitioner by Ricardo, heir of Rosenda. Petitioner Cesar Jaro
that Section 6, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court is not to now wants to eject respondent from the land.
be construed as imposing the requirement that all supporting
papers accompanying the petition should be certified true In his Answer, petitioner countered that respondent is not and
copies. We compared this provision with its counterpart had never been a tenant of the land for respondent never
provision in Rule 42, on petitions for review from the RTC to shared in the harvests nor was respondent given any share as
the CA, and noted that under the latter, only the judgments or payment for her work. When petitioner purchased the land
final orders of the lower court need to be certified true copies from Ricardo, petitioner allowed respondent to remain on the
or duplicate originals. In numerous resolutions issued by this land allegedly with the understanding that petitioner could
Court we emphasized that in an appeal via a petition for remove respondent's house at any time if petitioner so
certiorari under Rule 45 and in an original civil action for desired.
certiorari under Rule 65 in relation to Rules 46 and 56, what is Provincial Adjudicator: In favor of petitioner. Respondent was
required to be a certified true copy is the copy of the not a tenant. The affidavits presented as evidence were
questioned judgment, final order or resolution. We see no conflicting and the inconsistencies therein were material to
reason why a stricter requirement should be made for the resolution of the case. Ricardo’s affidavit declared that the
petitions under Rule 43, which governs appeals from the Court land is not tenanted and is not covered by the agrarian reform
of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies to the CA. This could program since it is neither rice nor corn land. The joint affidavit
not have been intended by the framers of the rules. A contrary executed by respondent with her husband stated that they are
ruling would be too harsh and would not promote the mere occupants by virtue of the landowner's generosity, and
underlying objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive they are willing to vacate the same in case it is sold to another
disposition of every action and proceeding. person.
Further, we note that petitioner had attached certified true
copies of the documents supporting his Motion for DARAB: REVERSED the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator.
Reconsideration and Compliance. As previously held, The land is agricultural and the applicable agrarian law is
submission of a required document with the Motion for Republic Act No. 1199, the Agricultural Tenancy Act, and not
Reconsideration constitutes substantial compliance with Presidential Decree No. 27 which applies only to tenanted rice
Section 3, Rule 46. or corn lands covered by Operation Land Transfer. The DARAB
gave more weight to Ricardo’s affidavit stating that his mother,
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the Rosenda, instituted respondent and her spouse as tenants of
Court of Appeals dated January 14, 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. the land.
UDK-2819 and its Resolution dated February 16, 1999 are SET
ASIDE insofar as it denied petitioner’s appeal for his failure to Applying RA No. 1199, the DARAB declared that respondent
comply with Section 6 (c), Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of enjoys security of tenure as tenant of the land there being no
Court. showing that she had renounced her rights as such.
CA: DISMISSED appeal on certiorari holding that it should be in
G.R. No. 127536 February 19, 2002 the form of a petition for review and the annexes to the
petition are certified not by the proper public official who has
CESAR JARO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE custody of the records
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION Upon verification that his petition had been dismissed,
BOARD (DARAB), and ROSARIO VDA. DE PELAEZ, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and for
respondents. Admission of Amended Petition but was denied by the CA.
ISSUE: WON CA committed reversible error when it dismissed
REVERSAL OF THE CA RESOLUTIONS outright the appeal and refused to give due course to the
DOCTRINE: In Cadayona vs. Court of Appeals, we held that amended petition
Section 6 of Rule 43 does not require that all of the supporting HELD: YES. While we agree with the Court of Appeals that the
papers or annexes accompanying the petition should be defective petition deserved to be dismissed, the amended
certified true copies or duplicate originals. What is mandatory petition filed by petitioner should have been given due course.
is to attach the clearly legible duplicate originals or certified Petitioner filed the amended petition, now in proper form,
true copies of the judgment or final orders of the lower courts. accompanied by annexes, all of which were certified true
FACTS: Respondent Rosario Vda. de Pelaez filed a complaint copies by the DARAB. This is more than substantial compliance.
for prohibition under Section 27 of the Agricultural Tenancy To recall, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for two
Act (R.A. No. 1199) against petitioner before the DARAB reasons. First, the appeal was not in the form of a petition for

review as required by Supreme Court Revised Administrative
Circular No. 1-95. Second, the annexes attached to the petition G.R. No. 158071 April 2, 2009
were neither duplicate originals nor were they certified true JOSE SANTOS, Petitioner, vs. COMMITTEE ON CLAIMS
copies. The annexes were only certified as true xerox copies by SETTLEMENT, and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
the counsel of petitioner, not by the authority or the SYSTEM (GSIS), Respondents
corresponding officer or representative of the issuing entity, in
contravention of Administrative Circular No. 3-96.
At the time that petitioner appealed the DARAB decision to PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45
the Court of Appeals, Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95
was then the rule that governed appeals to the Court of DOCTRINE: a question of fact or question of law alone or a mix
Appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax question of fact and law may be appealed to the CA via Rule
Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies, including the DARAB. 43.
Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 has now been
formulated as Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Court. FACTS:
Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 prescribed the
manner by which the appeal was to be taken to the CA and Petitioner retired from the DAR after rendering almost 21
that failure to comply with the foregoing requirements would years of service.
be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the appeal.
In Cadayona vs. Court of Appeals, we held that Section 6 of Petitioner was re-employed in the Office of the Deputy
Rule 43 does not require that all of the supporting papers or Ombudsman for Luzon.
annexes accompanying the petition should be certified true
copies or duplicate originals. What is mandatory is to attach Petitioner intended to avail the early retirement under RA 660,
the clearly legible duplicate originals or certified true copies of requested and received from the GSIS operating unit a
the judgment or final orders of the lower courts. Not only did tentative computation of retirement benefits amounting to
petitioner attach to his amended petition and motion for ₱667,937.40. Thereafter, Petitioner formally applied for
reconsideration certified true copies of the assailed DARAB retirement.
decision and resolution, petitioner also attached certified true
copies of other supporting documents. Petitioner on his own However, in a Letter, the GSIS operating unit informed
initiative complied with the required attachments when he petitioner that he could no longer retire under R.A. 660 but he
filed the amended petition. could do so under R.A. 8291, under which petitioner is entitled
There is ample jurisprudence holding that the subsequent and to a reduced benefit of ₱81,557.20. This computation did not
substantial compliance of an appellant may call for the consider petitioner’s 20.91553 years of service with the DAR
relaxation of the rules of procedure. In Cusi-Hernandez vs. Diaz prior to his previous retirement.
and Piglas-Kamao vs. National Labor Relations Commission,
we ruled that the subsequent submission of the missing Petitioner appealed to respondent GSIS Committee on Claims.
documents with the motion for reconsideration amounts to Unfortunately, respondent affirmed the GSIS Operating Unit’s
substantial compliance. The reasons behind the failure of the computation under R.A. 8291.
petitioners in these two cases to comply with the required
attachments were no longer scrutinized. What we found Petitioner filed with the GSIS Board of Trustees a complaint
noteworthy in each case was the fact that the petitioners against respondent which it denied the said complaint.
therein substantially complied with the formal requirements.
We ordered the remand of the petitions in these cases to the Meanwhile, petitioner was compulsorily retired for reaching
Court of Appeals, stressing the ruling that by precipitately the age of sixty-five.
dismissing the petitions "the appellate court clearly put a
premium on technicalities at the expense of a just resolution Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which again was
of the case." denied.
If we were to apply the rules of procedure in a very rigid and
technical sense, as what the Court of Appeals would have it in Petitioner filed an appeal before the CA under Rule 43. The CA
this case, the ends of justice would be defeated. In Cusi- dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Being a pure
Hernandez vs. Diaz, where the formal requirements were question of law it should be filed before the SC under rule 45.
liberally construed and substantial compliance was
recognized, we explained that rules of procedure are mere
tools designed to expedite the decision or resolution of cases
and other matters pending in court. Hence, a strict and rigid
application of technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice must be avoided.

ISSUE:
G.R. No. 170979 February 9, 2011
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition as the
petition was well within its jurisdiction under Rule 43 OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN , Petitioner,
vs.
HELD: ALEX M. VALENCERINA, Respondent
The question on whether petitioner can retire under RA 660 or
RA 8291 is undoubtedly a question of law because it centers on DOCTRINE
what law to apply in his case considering that he has previously
retired from the government under a particular statute and A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
that he was re-employed by the government. These facts are cases shall be executed as a matter of course.
admitted and there is no need for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented. An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In
case the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent
Rule 43 provides for an instance where an appellate review wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under
solely on a question of law may be sought in the CA instead of preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such
this Court. other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the
suspension or removal.
As a general rule, appeals on pure questions of law are brought
FACTS
to this Court since Sec. 5 (2) (e), Art. VIII of the Constitution
includes in the enumeration of cases within its jurisdiction "all Ecobel, through its Chairman Boright, applied for a medium
cases in which only an error or question of law is involved." It term loan financial facility with the GSIS to finance the
should not be overlooked, however, that the same provision construction of its condominium project. The loan was denied.
vesting jurisdiction in this Court of the cases enumerated
therein is prefaced by the statement that it may "review, Intent on pursuing the project, Ecobel, this time, applied for a
revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the surety bond with the GSIS to guarantee the re-payment of the
law or the Rules of Court may provide," the judgments or final principal loan obligation to be procured with the PVB. Ecobel’s
orders of lower courts in the cases therein enumerated. Rule application was now approved subject to analysis/evaluation
43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure constitutes an of the project and the offered collaterals.
exception to the aforesaid general rule on appeals.
Respondent Valencerina, then VP for Marketing and Support
QUESTION OF FACT VS. LAW Services of the GSIS Insurance Group, submitted Ecobel’s
In Posadas-Moya and Associates Construction Co., Inc. v. Guarantee Payment Bond application for evaluation and
Greenfield Development Corporation, et al., the Court endorsement of the GSIS Investment Committee. Valencerina
distinguished a question of law from one of fact, thus: made it appear that Ecobel’s application was fully secured by
reinsurance and real estate collaterals, and that its approval
A question of law exists when there is doubt or controversy on was urgent considering Ecobel’s limited time to avail of the
what the law is on a certain state of facts. There is a question loan from the funder.
of fact when the doubt or difference arises from the truth or
the falsity of the allegations of facts. Later on, however, GSIS President Pascual issued a
memorandum suspending the processing and issuance of
Explained the Court: guaranty payment bonds. Accordingly, Valencerina prepared a
"A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy cancellation notice to Ecobel for Mallari’s signature, but was
concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a told that the subject bond could no longer be cancelled
certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an because it was already a “done deal.” Thus, Valencerina signed
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, a Certification that GSIS had no counterclaim, defense or right
the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of to set-off with respect to the subject bond.
fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth
or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of Later on, it was found that the major collateral was spurious,
the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the and Ecobel also defaulted in the payment of its loan from BSIL.
witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding Thus, GSIS was similarly advised by BSIL of the notice of default
circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the and its intention to recover the repayment amount.
whole, and the probability of the situation."
Thus, GSIS conducted an investigation ad forwarded its report
Petition for Certiorari to the Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the
Ombudsman, which then conducted its own fact-finding
investigation. Consequently, the Ombudsman recommended would be violated with the execution of the Ombudsman’s
the filing of appropriate criminal and administrative charges removal order pending appeal.
against the concerned GSIS officials including Valencerina.
Accordingly, an administrative case was filed. GR No. 192957 September 29, 2014
EMMANUEL B. MORAN
The Ombudsman found Valencerina guilty of grave v.
misconduct. Valencerina’s MR was denied. Thus, Valencerina OFFICE OF PRESIDENT OF PHILIPPINES
filed a petition for review under Rule 43 before the CA.
Subsequently, Ombudsman Gutierrez directed GSIS President
and GM Garcia to execute the Ombudsman’s order. Thus, the DOCTRINE: “Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy available in
GSIS informed Valencerina that he is deemed dismissed from extraordinary cases where a tribunal, board or officer, among
the service as of the close of office hours that day. Aggrieved, others, completely acted without jurisdiction. Ineluctably, a
Valencerina filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Writ of judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the subject
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. The CA granted the matter is void. While errors of judgment are correctible by
motion. appeal, errors of jurisdiction are reviewable by certiorari
considering that the OP had no jurisdiction to entertain private
ISSUE
respondent's appeal, certiorari lies to correct such
• Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of jurisdictional error. The CA thus erred in dismissing the petition
for certiorari on the ground of being an improper remedy.”
discretion in issuing the WPI. (YES)
RULING FACTS: The late Emmanuel B. Moran, Jr. (Emmanuel) filed with
the Consumer Arbitration Office (CAO) a verified complaint
Sec. 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the against private respondent PGA Cars, Inc. (PGA) pursuant to
Ombudsman provides that the office’s decision imposing the the relevant provisions of the Consumer Act of the Philippines.
penalty of removal, among others, shall be executed as a
matter of course and shall not be stopped by an appeal The complaint alleged that PGA should be held liable for the
thereto. product imperfections of a BMW car which it sold to
Emmanuel.
Based on the aforementioned, it is clear that the
Ombudsman’s order imposing the penalty of removal was CAO: Rendered a Decision IN FAVOR OF EMMANUEL and
immediately executory, notwithstanding the pendency of his ordered the PGA to refund the purchase price of the BMW car
appeal. The general rule on appeals from quasi-judicial bodies in addition to the payment of costs of litigation and
stated under Section 12, Rule 43, which provides that the administrative fines.
appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order or
resolution sought to be reviewed unless the CA shall direct PGA appealed to the Secretary of the Department of Trade and
otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just, would not Industry (DTI)
apply in this case for the following reasons:
DTI: DISMISSED the appeal of the PGA who then filed an appeal
• Under Sec. 3, Rule V of the Ombudsman Rules of with the herein public respondent OP.
Procedure, the RoC applies suppletorily or analogously
only when the procedural matter is not governed by any OP: GRANTED the appeal, reversed the DTI Secretary's
specific provision in the said rules. Here, there is already a Resolution, and dismissed the complaint. The OP ruled that the
specific provision, particularly Sec. 7, Rule III. DTI erred in holding the private respondent liable for product
• When two rules apply to a particular case, that which was defects which issue was never raised by the complainant and
specially designed for the case must prevail over the because the private respondent was not the manufacturer,
other. builder, producer or importer of the subject BMW car but only
• The Ombudsman is constitutionally authorized to its seller. As such, it could not be held liable especially since
promulgate its own rules of procedure. none of the circumstances under the Consumer Act were
• The previous ruling in Lapid v. CA has already been present in the case. The OP further ruled that the private
superseded b the more recent ruling in Buencamino v. CA respondent could also not be held liable for product
– here, the Court applied the current Ombudsman Rules imperfections because the product was never proven to be
of Procedure. unfit or inadequate under the conditions laid down by law.
• Lastly, the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure are only Neither was there any inconsistency in the information
procedural. Hence, Valencerina had no vested right that provided in the container or product
advertisements/messages. More, it was only after the lapse of

a considerable time (nearly 10 months) since the purchase of thirty (30) days from receipt by the aggrieved party of the
the car and after it had been driven for 12,518 kilometers, that decision/resolution/order complained of or appealed from.
the complainant first complained about it. The vehicle never
once broke down before then and the complainant could not, The executive power of control over the acts of department
in fact, point to any specific part that is defective. secretaries is laid down in Section 17, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution. The power of control has been defined as the
Emmanuel filed a petition for certiorari with the CA and alleged "power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside
lack of jurisdiction on the part of the what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
OP for ruling on cases involving a violation of the Consumer Act duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of
the latter."
CA: DISMISSED the petition for certiorari on the ground that it
was a wrong mode of appeal and for the failure of the Such "executive control" is not absolute. The definition of the
petitioner to state material dates. structure of the executive branch of government, and the
corresponding degrees of administrative control and
Emmanuel passed away and his widow, Concordia V. Moran supervision is not the exclusive preserve of the executive. It
(Concordia) filed the present petition for review on certiorari. may be effectively limited by the Constitution, by law, or by
judicial decisions. All the more in the matter of appellate
ISSUE: Is the CA correct in dismissing the petition for certiorari procedure as in the instant case. Appeals are remedial in
on the ground that petitioner resorted to a wrong mode of nature; hence, constitutionally subject to this Court's rule-
appeal? making power. The Rules of Procedure was issued by the Court
pursuant to Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, which
RULING: NO. Under the Consumer Act, the DTI has the expressly empowers the Supreme Court to promulgate rules
authority and the mandate to act upon complaints filed by concerning the procedure in all courts. Parenthetically,
consumers pursuant to the State policy of protecting the Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 1 expressly recognizes an
consumer against deceptive, unfair and unconscionable sales, exception to the remedy of appeal to the Office of the
acts or practices. Said law provided for an arbitration President from the decisions of executive departments and
procedure whereby consumer complaints are heard and agencies. Under Section 1 thereof, a decision or order issued
investigated by consumer arbitration officers whose decisions by a department or agency need not be appealed to the Office
are appealable to the DTI Secretary. Article 166 thereof of the President when there is a special law that provides for a
provides: different mode of appeal.
ART. 166. Decision on Appeal. The Secretary shall decide the In the instant case, the enabling law of respondent BOI, E.O.
appeal within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof. The No. 226, explicitly allows for immediate judicial relief from the
decision becomes final after fifteen (15) days from receipt decision of respondent BOI involving petitioner's application
thereof unless a petition for certiorari is filed with the proper for an ITH. E.O. No. 226 is a law of special nature and should
court. prevail over A.O. No. 18.
In his motion for reconsideration from the OP's Decision which In this case, a special law, RA 7394, likewise expressly provided
reversed and set aside the resolution of the DTI Secretary, for immediate judicial relief from decisions of the DTI Secretary
Emmanuel raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction of the OP, not by filing a petition for certiorari with the "proper court."
being the proper court referred to in Article 166 of R.A. 7394. Hence, private respondent should have elevated the case
The OP, however, denied his motion on the ground that the directly to the CA through a petition for certiorari.
President's power of control over the executive department
grants him the power to amend, modify, alter or repeal In filing a petition for certiorari before the CA raising the issue
decisions of the department secretaries. On the other hand, of the OP's lack of jurisdiction, complainant Emmanuel thus
the CA, in dismissing outright the petition for certiorari filed by availed of the proper remedy. Certiorari is an extraordinary
Emmanuel implicitly sustained such reasoning when it held remedy available in extraordinary cases where a tribunal,
that the proper remedy from an adverse order or judgment of board or officer, among others, completely acted without
the OP is a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules jurisdiction.
of Civil Procedure, as amended.
Ineluctably, a judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the
The SC reversed the decision of the CA. The procedure for subject matter is void. While errors of judgment are correctible
appeals to the OP is governed by Administrative Order No. 18 by appeal, errors of jurisdiction are reviewable by certiorari
Series of 1987. Section 1 thereof provides: considering that the OP had no jurisdiction to entertain private
SECTION 1. Unless otherwise governed by special laws, an respondent's appeal, certiorari lies to correct such
appeal to the Office of the President shall be taken within

jurisdictional error. The CA thus erred in dismissing the petition furnish a copy of the petition to the RTC; and 3) They did not
for certiorari on the ground of being an improper remedy. furnish a copy of the petition to some of its creditors.
Further, we hold that the Resolution dated April 28, 2006 of RULE 44: ORDINARY APPEALED CASES
the DTI Secretary had become FINAL and EXECUTORY with
private respondent's failure to appeal the same within the 15- ADELIA C. MENDOZA and as Attorney-in-Fact of ALICE
day reglementary period. MALLETA, petitioners, vs. UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS
BANK, INC., respondent.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED.
The Resolutions dated March 13, 2009 and June 25, 2010 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 107059 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45
Decision dated April 3, 2007 and Order dated October 22, 2008
of the Office of the President are hereby declared NULL DOCTRINE: The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a
andVOID. Consequently, the Resolution dated April 28, 2006 of part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may
the DTI Secretary is hereby REINSTATED and UPHELD. No be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED provisions of law. An appeal being a purely statutory right, an
appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid
G.R. No. 177382. February 17, 2016 down in the Rules of Court.
VIVA SHIPPING LINES, INC., Petitioner, v. KEPPEL FACTS:

PHILIPPINES MINING, INC., METROPOLITAN BANK &
TRUST COMPANY, PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM Petitioner Adelia Mendoza, attorney-in-fact of petitioner Alice
CORPORATION, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF LUCENA, Malleta, filed a Complaint for annulment of titles, foreclosure
PROVINCE OF QUEZON, ALEJANDRO OLIT, NIDA proceedings and certificate of sale with the RTC Lipa City,
MONTILLA, PIO HERNANDEZ, EUGENIO BACULO, AND Fourth Judicial Region. Petitioners averred that they entered
HARLAN BACALTOS, Respondents. into a Real Estate Mortgage Contract with respondent UCPB.
The properties were sold at a public auction. An Affidavit of
FACTS: Consolidation was executed by UCPB. Petitioners contended
Viva filed a Petition for Corporate Rehabilitation before the that the foreclosure proceedings violated due process and the
RTC of Lucena City which initially denied it for non-compliance legal requirements, hence, she prays for the annulment of
with Rule 4 sections 2 (which enumerates the contents of the Certificate of Sale.
petition) and 3 (which provides for a verification requirement)
Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation (This UCPB denied the petitioners entered into a Real Estate
case was decided after the FRIA was passed but the facts of the Mortgage Contract, the truth being petitioner executed
case occurred before so the Interim Rules apply). several promissory notes to secure the loan. Respondent
denied that the foreclosure proceedings were legally
Viva filed an amended petition but the allegations in the defective, as the said proceedings were done in accordance
petition were contrary to the documents that they attached. with the provisions of Act No. 3135, as amended. Moreover,
respondent stated that on August 10, 1995, as partial security
The RTC found the amended petition sufficient in form and for the promissory notes, petitioner Malleta, through her
stayed the enforcement of all monetary and judicial claims attorney-in-fact, petitioner Adelia Mendoza, executed a real
against Viva Shipping Lines. The RTC eventually dismissed estate mortgage in favor of UCPB over several parcels of land
Viva’s amended petition for failure to show the company’s registered under the name of Alice B. Malleta.
viability and the feasibility of rehabilitation.
The Sheriff prepared a Notice of Sale and set the date for the
Viva filed a rule 43 petition for review but only impleaded the public sale which was published and posted as required by the
judge of the RTC and they did not implead any of their law. The mortgaged properties were sold in the amount of
creditors. The CA dismissed their petition on procedural P31,300,000.00 to UCPB as the highest and winning bidder. A
grounds for failing to implead its creditors as respondents. Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of UCPB. Petitioners
failed to redeem the foreclosed properties within the one-year
ISSUE: WON Rule 43 was properly applied. redemption period.
RULING: NO. The SC ruled that Viva did not comply with rule Respondent then filed a Motion to Dismiss for failing to
43. According to the Interim Rules, petitions for rehabilitation prosecute. It stated that under Section 1, Rule 18 of the 1997
are appealable to the CA under rule 43. Viva violated the rules Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioners have the positive duty to
by 1) Not impleading its creditors as respondents; 2) failing to promptly set the case for pre-trial after the last pleading had

been ;led. It stated that the Answer was the last pleading, since G.R. No. 173987 February 25, 2012
petitioners failed to file a Reply thereon within the
reglementary period.
PADILLA MERCADO, ZULUETA MERCADO, BONIFACIA
MERCADO, DAMIAN MERCADO and EMMANUEL
Petitioners filed its opposition and stated that their original
MERCADO BASCUG, Petitioner
counsel on record had died and forgot all about the case.
v.
SPOUSES AGUEDO ESPINA and LOURDES ESPINA,
RTC Lipa dismissed the case for failure to prosecute.
Respondents
On appeal, the respondent moved for the dismissal of the case
for failure of the Appellant’s Brief to comply with the Rules on PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45
Civil Procedure. The Appellants' Brief did not have the
following items: (1) A subject index of the matter in the brief DOCTRINE: There is no dispute that the issue of timeliness of
with a digest of the arguments and page references, and a respondents' Motion to Dismiss petitioners' Amended
table of cases alphabetically arranged, textbooks and statutes Complaint was not raised by pet itioners before the RTC.
cited with references to the pages where they are cited; (2) an Neither was this issue raised in their Comment to respondents'
assignment of errors; (3) on the authorities cited, references petition for certiorari filed with the CA. It was only in their
to the page of the report at which the case begins and page of Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision that this matter
the report on which the citation is found; (4) page was raised. It is well established that issues raised for the first
references to the record in the Statement of Facts and time on appeal and not raised in the proceedings in the lower
Statement of the Case. court are barred by estoppel. Points of law, theories, issues,
and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court
CA dismissed the appeal. ought not to be considered by a reviewing court, as these
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Basic
Issue: WON the CA’s dismissal of the appeal was proper for considerations of due process impel the adoption of this rule.
failure of petitioner to comply with the procedural
requirements on her Appellant’s Brief (YES) FACTS:
Subject of the instant controversy is a 338 square meter parcel

Ruling: In regard to ordinary appealed cases to the Court of
of land located at the then Municipality of Maasin in the
Appeals, such as this case, Section 13, Rule 44 of the 1997
Province of Southern Leyte. Petitioners filed with the RTC a
Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the contents of an
Complaint for Recovery of Property and Declaration of Nullity
Appellant's Brief.
of Deed of Sale, Certificate of Title and Damages. The
Petitioners allege that they are the heirs of the late spouses
In this case, the Appellants' Brief of petitioners did not have a
Santiago and Sofronia Mercado, who were owners of the
subject index. The importance of a subject index should not be
parcel of land. Respondents claimed ownership over the land
underestimated. The index is intended to facilitate the review
alleging that they bought the same from one Josefa Mercado
of appeals by providing ready reference, functioning much
Espina who in turn bought the same from Genivera Mercado
like a table of contents. Unlike in other jurisdictions, there is
Kavanaugh; that Genivera purchased the same from
no limit on the length of appeal briefs or appeal memoranda
Escolastico Mercado who bought it from Santiago Mercado.
filed before appellate courts. The danger of this is the very real
possibility that the reviewing tribunal will be swamped with Petitioners further alleged that through fraudulent
voluminous documents. machinations, Josefa was able to obtain a title over the subject
Rules 44 and 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure are parcel of land and therefore the abovementioned contracts
designed for the proper and prompt disposition of cases of sale never happened. Petitioners prayed that the TCT in the
before the Court of Appeals. Rules of procedure exist for a name of respondents be nullified and for petitioners to be
noble purpose, and to disregard such rules in the guise of named owners of the disputed lot. Respondents filed a Motion
liberal construction would be to defeat such purpose. to Dismiss on the grounds that the RTC has no jurisdiction over
the case. RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. Then the CA
denied the petition for certiorari filed by the respondents.
Petitioners, by leave of court, filed an Amended Complaint to

include the assessed value of the subject property.
Respondents filed an Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint
on the grounds of prescription, laches, indefeasibility of title
and lack of cause of action. Then the RTC denied the
respondents Motion to Dismiss on the amended complaint.

Then they filed a petition for certiorari with the CA and it was The lower court rendered judgment in respondent’s favor. On
later granted. appeal, petitioner argued that since respondent’s husband had
acquired the property from an awardee of the National
ISSUE: Housing Authority (NHA) within five years from the award
without the NHA’s prior written consent and authority, the
Whether or not an argument raised in the lower courts may be acquisition was void and transferred no title to respondent.
raised for the first time on appeal? And because respondent had no title to the property, the Deed
of Conditional Sale in favor of petitioner was also void. Hence,
HELD:
respondent had no right to ask for its rescission.
No, There is no dispute that the issue of timeliness of
respondents' Motion to Dismiss petitioners' Amended The CA held that such argument had not been presented
Complaint was not raised by petitioners before the RTC. before the trial court and could not be raised for the first time
Neither was this issue raised in their Comment to respondents' on appeal. Hence, this recourse.
petition for certiorari filed with the CA. It was only in their
Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision that this matter ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in ruling that petitioner could
was raised. It is well established that issues raised for the first not, on appeal, be allowed to present and rely on a theory that
time on appeal and not raised in the proceedings in the lower had not been presented before the trial court. (NO)
court are barred by estoppel. Points of law, theories, issues,
and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court RULING: As a rule, no question will be entertained on appeal
ought not to be considered by a reviewing court, as these unless it has been raised in the court below. Points of law,
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Basic theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of
considerations of due process impel the adoption of this rule. the lower court need not be, and ordinarily will not be,
Moreover, respondent's filing of their Motion to Dismiss considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for
Amended Complaint may not be considered as a the first time at that late stage. Basic considerations of due
circumvention of the rules of procedure. Under Section 8, Rule process impel this rule.
10 of the Rules of Court, an amended complaint supersedes an
original one. In this case, the records show that the theory of petitioner
before the trial court was different from that before the
As a consequence, the original complaint is deemed appellate court. In the lower court, she had argued that
withdrawn and no longer considered part of the record. In the rescission may be invoked only by both Spouses Deodato and
present case, the Amended Complaint is, thus, treated as an Melinda Bonga, and not by the latter alone. Likewise, she said
entirely new complaint. As such, respondents had every right that since there was a dispute between the spouses about the
to move for the dismissal of the said Amended Complaint. subject property, she was justified in suspending the payment
Were it not for the filing of the said Motion, respondents of the balance of the purchase price. Furthermore, she
would not have been able to file a petition for certiorari before manifested her willingness to settle her obligation, urging the
the CA which, in turn, rendered the presently assailed court to fix a period for, and to determine to whom to give, the
judgment in their favor. payment.
. ELAINE A. DEL ROSARIO, Petitioner, v. MELINDA F. BONGA, However, on appeal, she abandoned such legal theories and
Respondent. adopted a different stance, relying instead on the alleged
G.R. No. 136308 January 23, 2001 nullity of the transaction between respondent’s husband and
one Renato Morales, an NHA awardee. The invalid agreement
Petition for Review supposedly conferred no title to respondent and,
consequently, rendered the subject Deed of Conditional Sale
DOCTRINE: Issues and arguments not presented before the void. It should be stressed that this matter had not been
trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. presented or discussed in the trial court and involved
personalities not parties to the case. Petitioner’s posturing
FACTS: before the CA was not a mere shift of emphasis or an
Respondent Melinda Bonga filed a Complaint against the elaboration of a priorly argued defense; it was a new and
petitioner. During the pre-trial, the parties agreed on the only different theory altogether. In this light, we agree with the
two issues to be resolved by the trial court. These were so following disquisition of the CA rejecting petitioner’s
stated in the Pre-trial Order, to wit: i. Whether or not maneuver:
respondent has the right to rescind the Contract, and, ii.
Damages suffered by the prevailing party. The appeal is not convincing. The appellant tries to
pull this Court from the delimited field of inquiry in
which she knows her position to be shoddy and weak

to a forbidden ground where she thinks she can make
a good stand. This Court will not accommodate her on In LTC’s Answer with Counterclaim, it stated that it was the
that maneuver. It is a fundamental rule that no true owner of the subject portion and that it was within the
question will be entertained on appeal unless it has territorial part of Surigao.
been raised below.
RTC: issued an order granting the writ of preliminary
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby injunction. In the order it was stated that the subject portion
DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against was part of Agusan. The concessions covered by the timber
petitioner. licenses of both parties are adjacent to each other, and their
common boundary is the provincial boundary line of Agusan
G.R. NO. 169314 March 14, 2008 and Surigao. Sec. 1 of Act 1693 fixed the boundary (political
LIANGA LUMBER COMPANY AND NORTH ZAMBALES boundary) of Agusan and Surigao in the crest of the watershed
LUMBER COMPANY, Petitioners, between the Agusan River Valley and the Pacific Ocean. It
vs. further stated that the claim of LTC that the contested area is
LIANGA TIMBER CO., INC AND CA, Respondents. part of its lumber concession (in Surigao) is not supported by
evidence. On the merits, the RTC subsequently declared the
APPEAL BY CERTIORARI (TREATED BY THE COURT contested are as part of the timber concession of LLC which
AS AN APPEAL THRU PETITION FOR REVIEW) concession was situated in Agusan in the light of the boundary
fixed by law.
DOCTRINE: Well-settled is the rule that questions which were
not raised in the lower court cannot be raised for the first time CA: (PENNED BY J. ESGUERRA on Feb 1971 – ORIGINAL
on appeal. In order that the question may be raised on appeal, DECISION) AFFIRMED EN TOTO the decision of the RTC.
it is essential that it be within the issue made by the parties in
their pleadings. Consequently, when a party deliberately LTC filed a MR of the Feb. 1971 decision. The CA DENIED the
adopts a certain theory and the case is tried and decided upon MR in the March 1971 Resolution. LTC filed its Second MR
that theory in the lower court, he will not be permitted to alleging that the political boundary relied upon by the court is
change his theory on appeal because to permit him to do so contrary to the established facts during the trial through the
will be unfair to the adverse party. technical descriptions submitted by the parties.
The petitioners would have no more opportunity to present CA: (J. ESGUERRA on June 1972 – ESGUERRA RESOLUTION)
further evidence, material to the new theory, which they could REVERSED the Original decision (Feb 1971 decision) stating
have done had they been aware earlier of the new theory at that the contested portion was part of LTC’s concession.
the time of the hearing before the trial court, since a reopening
for that purpose would be out of the question after the appeal. LLC filed a Motion for Rehearing/Reconsideration of the
In other words, in the interest of justice and within the sound Esguerra Resolution on the ground that the interprovincial
discretion of the appellate court, a party may change his legal lone delimiting the Agusan-Surigao boundary must prevail
theory on appeal only when the factual bases thereof would over the technical description.
not require presentation of any further evidence by the
adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue CA: (PENNED BY J. ENRIQUEZ on April 1973 – ENRIQUEZ
raised in the new theory. RESOLUTION) REVERSED the Esguerra Resolution, and
reinstated its original decision (Feb. 1971 decision)
FACTS: Lianga Lumber Co. (LLC) is the licensee of a timber
concession in Agusan; while Lianga Timber Co. (LTC) is the LTC filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Enriquez
licensee of another time concession in Surigao. LLC is the Resolution (April 1973 decision) alleging that the official
owner and possessor of an Ordinary Timber License the area interpretation by Bureau of Forestry as the meaning of
of which included includes a portion which is the junction of “Agusan-Surigao Provincial Boundary” should prevail (known
the interprovincial road and the boundary between the as the Forest Boundary).
Province of Agusan and Surigao. LLC filed a complaint for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against LTC alleging CA: (PENNED BY J. GANCAYCO on Feb 1974 – GANCAYCO
the following that LTC entered a portion (Tagabaca potion) of RESOLUTION) SET ASIDE the Enriquez resolution ordering the
the concession of LLC, and thru force, intimidation, and threats remand of the records to the trial court for proceedings with
prevented LLC’s laborers from entering the said place. LTC and the instruction of resurvey.
LLC entered into an agreement that both shall desist from
logging within the disputed area pending settlement. ISSUE/S:
Notwithstanding the agreement, LTC entered the are and (1) W/N there is a necessity for the remand of the case to the
started its construction. trial court. (NO);

Agusan, while east thereof is the concession of the defendants
RELATED TO APPEAL: (2) W/N the subject portion was location which lies within the Province of Surigao."
in Surigao. (NO) – This one is related to appeal because there
was a change of theory. In essence, the issue is W/N LTC can LTC did not question the correctness of this statement of the
change the issue on appeal. issue of the case. As a matter of fact, LTC conceded that such
was the issue when it insisted in its Motion for Reconsideration
HELD:(This case is unique in the sense that the that "the contested area is a territorial part of Surigao
decisions/resolutions of the respondent Court of Appeals, Province." This theory of LTC was continued in the brief which
during a period of four (4) years, had swayed from one side to it led with the Court of Appeals. Thus, it stated that "the lower
the other, finally ending in an order for the remand of the case court actually had no jurisdiction over the subject matter as
to the trial court for a rehearing.) the area in dispute is beyond its territorial jurisdiction"
considering that on the basis of the technical description of its
(1) concession the disputed area is within the municipality of
There’s no necessity for the remand of the case to the RTC for Lianga, Surigao.
further proceedings. The RTC in granting the WPI already
found as clearly established by the evidence that the contested The invocation of LTC’s counsel of the “theory of forest
area known as Tagabaca is part of the Province of Agusan, and boundary” does not necessarily imply that such was the issue
that the claim of the defendant that the contested area is part of the case when it was being tried before the RTC. The issues
of its lumber concession is not supported by the evidence. in each case are limited to those presented in the pleadings.
Thing finding was affirmed en toto by the CA (J. Esguerra’s Since the issue raised in the RTC, on the basis of the evidence
original decision). Even in the Gancayco resolution, it was presented and upon which the court rendered its judgment, is
stated that there was no dispute that the portion was located whether or not the contested area is located within the
in the province of Agusan. The remand would be unnecessary province of Surigao, such question could not now be changed
because the purpose sought to be accomplished (ascertain by LTC on appeal. Well-settled is the rule that questions which
whether the Agusan- Surigao boundary line is located) by the were not raised in the lower court cannot be raised for the first
remand has already been specifically fixed and described by time on appeal. In order that the question may be raised on
law – the crest of the watershed between the Agusan River appeal, it is essential that it be within the issue made by the
Valley and the Pacific Ocean (Sec. 1, Act 1693). parties in their pleadings.
(2) Consequently, when a party deliberately adopts a certain

LTC now claims that it has been its theory even before the RTC theory and the case is tried and decided upon that theory in
that the boundary between the two concessions is not the the lower court, he will not be permitted to change his theory
political boundary between the provinces of Agusan and on appeal because to permit him to do so will be unfair to the
Surigao but the forestry boundary indicated in the control map adverse party.
of the Bureau of Forestry, which may not actually coincide with
the political boundary mentioned by law. In effect, LTC’s The petitioners would have no more opportunity to present
position is that the location of the political boundary of the two further evidence, material to the new theory, which they could
provinces is not relevant to the issue since the area of its have done had they been aware earlier of the new theory at
concession may extend beyond such political boundary. the time of the hearing before the trial court, since a reopening
for that purpose would be out of the question after the appeal.
However, according to the SC, this was not fully supported by In other words, in the interest of justice and within the sound
the records. LTC has always insisted in the RTC that its timber discretion of the appellate court, a party may change his legal
concession was entirely located in the Province of Surigao, theory on appeal only when the factual bases thereof would
while that of LLC was within the Province of Agusan. LTC never not require presentation of any further evidence by the
alleged in its answer that its timber concession extended to the adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue
Province of Agusan, since its forestry boundary is not raised in the new theory.
necessarily delimited by the political boundary of the two
provinces. WHEREFORE, the resolution-decision of the Court of Appeals
of February 19, 1974 45 and its Resolution of May 9, 1974 46
The principal issue litigated by the parties before the RTC is denying reconsideration thereof are REVERSED, and, instead,
whether or not the disputed area falls within the province of the judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED, with the
Surgiao. The RTC specifically stated that the concessions sole modification that private respondent shall pay petitioners
covered by the timber licenses of both parties "are adjacent to the sum of P32,863.62 as actual damages, instead of
each other, and their common boundary is the provincial P47,578.75, plus P3,000.00 as attorney's fees, and private
boundary line of Agusan and Surigao. West of this line is the respondent to pay the costs.
forestry concession of the plaintiffs located in the Province of

G.R. No. 127263 April 12, 2000 psychological incapacity falls short of the quantum of evidence
FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF required to nullify a marriage celebrated with all the formal
APPEALS, THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN and essential requisites of law.
FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, BRANCH XLI, and FERNANDO SY,
respondents. ISSUE:
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 Whether or not the petitioner can raise the issue, of the
marriage being void for lack of a valid marriage license at the
DOCTRINE: we have repeatedly ruled that litigants cannot time of its celebration, for the first time on appeal
raise an issue for the first time on appeal, as this would
contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice, in a number HELD:
of instances, we have relaxed observance of procedural rules,
noting that technicalities are not ends in themselves but exist The case at bar requires that we address the issue of the
to protect and promote substantive rights of litigants. validity of the marriage between Filipina and Fernando which
petitioner claims is void from the beginning for lack of a
FACTS: marriage license, in order to arrive at a just resolution of a
deeply seated and violent conflict between the parties. Note,
Petitioner and private respondent were married. Their union however, that here the pertinent facts are not disputed; and
was blessed with twao children. what is required now is a declaration of their effects according
to existing law.
However, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the
spouses lived separately, and their two children were in the The marriage certificate and marriage license are only
custody of their mother. photocopies. Nevertheless, these documents were marked as
Exhibits during the course of the trial below, which shows that
Petitioner filed a petition for legal separation before the RTC. these have been examined and admitted by the trial court, with
Later, upon motion of petitioner, the action was later no objections having been made as to their authenticity and
amended to a petition for separation of property on the due execution. Likewise, no objection was interposed to
grounds that her husband abandoned her without just cause; petitioner's testimony in open court when she affirmed that the
that they have been living separately for more than one year; date of the actual celebration of their marriage was on
and that they voluntarily entered into a Memorandum of November 15, 1973. We are of the view, therefore, that having
Agreement, containing the rules that would govern the been admitted in evidence, with the adverse party failing to
dissolution of their conjugal partnership. Judgment was timely object thereto, these documents are deemed sufficient
rendered dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains and proof of the facts contained therein.
approving a regime of separation of properties based on the
Memorandum of Agreement executed by the spouses. The The evidence presented clearly shows that on the day of the
trial court also granted custody of the children to Filipina. marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license, absence of
which renders the marriage void ab initio.
Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation against
private respondent. The RTC granted the petition and issued a G.R. No. 158332 February 11, 2008
decree of legal separation. It awarded custody of their
daughter Farrah Sheryll to petitioner, and their son Frederick MARICALUM MINING CORP. , Petitioner,
to respondent. vs.
REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORP., Respondent
Filipina filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of
her marriage to Fernando on the ground of psychological
incapacity such as (1) habitual alcoholism; (2) refusal to live
with her without fault on her part, choosing to live with his Petition for Review on Certiorari
mistress instead; and (3) refusal to have sex with her,
DOCTRINE
performing the marital act only to satisfy himself. The RTC
denied the petition stating that e alleged acts of the “Indeed, one party's appeal from a judgment will not inure to
respondent, as cited by petitioner, do not constitute the benefit of a co-party who failed to appeal; and as against
psychological incapacity which may warrant the declaration of the latter, the judgment will continue to run its course until it
absolute nullity of their marriage. becomes final and executory. To this general rule, however,
one exception stands out: where both parties have a
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. It ruled that the commonality of interests, the appeal of one is deemed to be
testimony of petitioner concerning respondent's purported the vicarious appeal of the other.”
FACTS c. Whatever judgment is rendered in the case or
appeal, their rights and liabilities will be affected, even if to
Private respondent Remington Industrial Sales Corp. varying extents.
(Remington) sued petitioner and other co-defendants, for
payment of P921,755.95 worth of construction materials and In the case of DBP, the main issue resolved was whether
other merchandise. Apparently, Marinduque Mining Marinduque Mining and DBP and its transferees, including
transferred its properties to petitioner and other co- petitioner, are one and the same corporate entity such that the
defendants pursuant to a mortgage and foreclosure. latter may be held liable for the obligations of the former. The
Remington alleged the presence of fraud, as Marinduque Court held in the negative, holding that there was no fraud on
Mining and its transferees were allegedly one and the same the part of Marinduque Mining and its transferees (including
corporation. The case arrived at the CA, which rendered a petitioner) to warrant the piercing of the corporate veil.
decision against petitioner and its other co-defendants. DBP Furthermore, the Court held that the subsequent transfer by
and PNB filed before the SC separate appeals. Petitioner also DBP of the properties of Marinduque Mining to several
attempted an appeal, but such was denied due to lack of an corporations, including petitioner, was legitimate.
affidavit of service. Petitioner was also denied intervention in
the PNB v. CA case. Based on the foregoing findings, the Court concluded that
private respondent failed to discharge its burden of proving
Thus, Remington filed with the RTC a Motion for Execution bad faith on the part of Marinduque Mining and its transferees
solely against petitioner on the ground that the CA decision in the mortgage and foreclosure of the subject properties as to
against petitioner has become final and executory. The RTC justify the piercing of the corporate veil.
granted the Motion for Execution. A writ of execution was
issued on the basis of which certain bank accounts of Likewise in PNB, the Court held that private respondent had no
petitioner were garnished. Thus, petitioner filed a Petitioner cause of action against PNB because its acquisition by
for Certiorari and Prohibition with the CA. foreclosure sale of the properties of Marinduque Mining was
legitimate and did not result in damage to private respondent.
Meanwhile, the Court rendered a decision in DBP v. CA,
granting DBP’s, who was a co-defendant of Remington, The adjudication in both DBP and PNB is plain: private
petition and dismissing the original complaint filed in the respondent has no cause of action against DBP, PNB and their
Regional Trial Court. The Court also ruled in favor of another transferees, including petitioner.
co-defendant, PNB, in PNB v. CA.
RULE 45: APPEAL BY CERTIORARI TO THE SC
Thus, citing PNB v. CA, petitioner filed a manifestation urging
the appellate court to dismiss the claim of private respondent G.R. No. 149473 August 9, 2002
and annul the RTC orders. However, the CA dismissed the
petition. TERESITA PACAA CONEJOS, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and EUTIQUIO PLANIA, Respondents
ISSUE
FACTS:
• Whether or not the Court’s Decisions in DBP v. CA and PNB Respondent Plania alleged in his Complaint for specific
v. CA inured to the benefit of petitioner which was not a performance/rescission with damages filed with the MTCC
party to either case, as to bar execution of the April 10, that he entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with
1990 RTC Decision. (YES) Teresita Pacaña Conejos whereby they agreed that each of
them would pay half of the purchase price of the 134-square-
RULING meter residential lot and that upon full payment they would
equally divide the lot and register it in their individual names.
One party’s appeal from a judgment will not inure to the Plania averred that after paying the value of his one half share,
benefit of a co-party who failed to appear. However, where petitioner Teresita Pacaña Conejos, despite repeated
both parties have a commonality of interests, the appeal of demands, refused to divide the subject lot and register it in
one is deemed to be the vicarious appeal of the other. In their individual names conformably with their agreement.
Director of Lands v. Reyes, the Curt identified the
circumstances indicative of a commonality in the interests of Respondent Plania brought the matter to the Office of their
the parties, such as when: Barangay Captain. Plania shelled out the value to the
Borromeo Bros. Estate, Inc., as payment for his one-half
a. Their rights and liabilities originate from only one
portion of the lot. At the same time Plania admitted having
source or title;
authorized herein petitioner Teresita Pacaña Conejos to sell his
b. Homogeneous evidence establishes the existence of
share in the property to Nenita Gavan but petitioner Conejos
their rights and liabilities; and
failed to remit the proceeds of the sale to him. These

admissions were evidenced by the Minutes of the Hearing. twenty-five (25) days after the lapse of the allotted period
During their meeting, Teresita Pacaña Conejos promised to pay within which to file a petition for review on certiorari.
the amount to Plania, but Conejos reneged on her
promise so that Plania instituted this instant action before the Apparently, petitioner resorted to this special civil action after
MTCC. failing to appeal within the fifteen (15)-day reglementary
period. This cannot be countenanced. The special civil action
Conejos alleged that the Memorandum of Agreement was of certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal which
mutually abandoned by the parties and that Plania's alleged petitioner already lost. Certiorari lies only where there is no
payment was frowned upon by the Statute of Frauds. appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
According to Conejos, the stipulations contained in the ordinary course of law. There is no reason why the question
Minutes of the Hearing were mere proposals by Plania for an being raised by petitioner could not have been raised on
amicable settlement which she rejected. MTCC dismissed the appeal. Concededly, there were occasions when this Court
complaint ruling that Plania had failed to present sufficient treated a petition for certiorari as one filed under Rule 45 of
evidence to substantiate his allegations. the Rules of Court. However, the circumstances prevailing in
the instant case do not justify a deviation from a general rule.
The RTC reversed the MTCC. It ruled that except for the
unilateral claim by Conejos that the Memorandum of Notably, the instant petition was filed way beyond
Agreement had been cancelled no other evidence was the reglementary period allowed under Rule 45 without any
proffered to prove the same. It ratiocinated that a written justifiable reason therefor nor any reasonable explanation
agreement like the subject Memorandum of Agreement could being proffered by petitioner. In addition, the arguments she
not be considered abandoned by the mere say-so of one of the cited are without merit and are in fact mere rehash of the
parties. The trial court validated the Minutes of the Hearing issues raised before and judiciously resolved by the courts a
and ruled that the Minutes was admissible and should be given quo. The issues require a review of the factual findings which,
weight as it did not lose its evidentiary value verily, could not be done because this Court is not a trier of
as a record of what transpired during the meeting despite the facts. More importantly, a reading of the records of
lack of signatures of Plania and Conejos. the case strengthens our disposition that both the trial and the
appellate courts did not abuse their discretion in assessing
Conejos moved for reconsideration but the same was their factual findings. We find their conclusions amply
denied, hence she filed a Petition for Review with the Court of supported by the records of the case and grounded in law.
Appeals. Finding no merit in her arguments, the appellate
court affirmed the Regional Trial Court. Petitioner's motion for People of the Philippines, and Ma. Milagros G. Wilson, v. Hon.
reconsideration having been denied, she filed the instant Court of Appeals, Ma. Lourdes Deutsch, Nercy Demeterio,
Petition for Certiorari. and Excel Mangubat.
G.R. No. 132396 ; September 23, 2002
ISSUE: WON the respondent appellate court gravely
abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in not Nercy Demeterio, and Excel Mangubat, v. People of the
ruling that there was mutual cancellation by both parties of the Philippines, and Ma. Milgaros G. Wilson
Memorandum of Agreement; and, in giving any probative G.R. No. 132396; September 23, 2002
value to the Minutes of Hearing and the official receipts
presented in evidence by Plania. FACTS:
Demeterio, Mangubat, Deutsch, Rabadon and Burlaos were
RULING: At first glance, petitioner's Petition for Certiorari charged with Estafa under Article 315, par. 2 (a) of the Revised
should be summarily dismissed for adopting the wrong mode Penal Code (RPC). The Information claimed that they
of appeal. The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision convinced Milagros Wilson to buy a portion of a beach
dismissing petitioner's petition for review on 9 January 2001 property for P250,000.00, knowing that the portion was under
and received by petitioner on 22 January 2001. Petitioner filed the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
a motion for reconsideration on 29 January 2001 but the Court (CARP). They assured Wilson that the property is free from
of Appeals denied the same in its Resolution of 31 May 2001, liens or encumbrances.
notice of which was received by petitioner on 13 June 2001.
Petitioner's remedy would have been to file a petition for When Wilson learned of this deception, she demanded the
review on certiorari before this Court, and, counting fifteen return of her payment, but the accused refused.
(15) days from receipt of the resolution denying her motion for
reconsideration petitioner had until 28 June 2001 to file a Rabadon and Burlaos, upon motion of the prosecution, were
petition for review on certiorari before this Court. However, discharged to become state witnesses.
instead of a petition for review on certiorari petitioner filed on
13 August 2001 a petition for certiorari or one (1) month and

In 1994, The Trial Court rendered a decision finding Deutsch, Grave abuse of discretion is not an allowable ground
Demeterio, and Mangubat conspired with one another to under Rule 45.
commit Estafa.
However, a petition for review on certiorari may be
In 1997, The Court of Appeals acquitted Deutsch whose crime considered as one for certiorari under Rule 65 if it is
has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. It affirmed alleged that the respondents have abused their
the conviction of Demeterio and Mangubat, but reduced the discretion in their questioned actions.
damages awarded in favor of the private complainant.
Wilson, and Demeterio and Mangubat filed separate Motions 2. YES.

for Reconsideration but they were denied by the appellate
court. Generally, it is the Office of the Solicitor General who
can bring actions on behalf of the state in criminal
The petitioner, Wilson, filed a petition for review on certiorari proceedings before the Supreme Court and/or Court
under Rule 45. of Appeals. The action must be filed in the name of
the private complainant, not of the People of the
She alleged that the acquittal of Deutsch was Philippines.
unfounded and arbitrary, constituting grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Pursuant to the underlying spirit of liberal
The act of one is the act of all, and the appellate court construction, granting that Wilson has sufficient
erred in acquitting Deutsch since the finding of the interest as a ‘person aggrieved’ to file the special
RTC was that of conspiracy to commit Estafa. civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, the Court
shall consider the allegations in her petition.
The petitioner claims that Deutsch will not suffer
double jeopardy since a petition is a continuation of
the case before the trial court, and not a new one. 3. YES.
Furthermore, she claimed that Deutsch, even Double jeopardy attaches in case the prosecution
acquitted, should still be civilly liable to Wilson. appeals a decision acquitting the accused. It will,
however, not attach if the acquittal is based on a void
Deutsch on the other and questions the standing of the indictment, or is rendered in grave abuse of discretion
petitioner to appeal her acquittal. Deutsch contended that the amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Solicitor General alone is authorized in criminal appeals to
represent the state. However, the Court finds that no grave abuse of
discretion could be imputed on the part of the
ISSUE: appellate court in rendering its decision acquitting
1. Whether or not the petitioner availed of the Deutsch of estafa for lack of proof beyond reasonable
appropriate remedy of petition for review on doubt.
certiorari.
2. Whether or not the petitioner can appeal on the
acquittal of Deutsch.
3. Whether or not there is double jeopardy if the G.R. No. 152776 October 8, 2003
acquittal of Deutsch is reversed.
HELD: HENRY S. OAMINAL, petitioner, vs. PABLITO M. CASTILLO

1. YES. and GUIA S. CASTILLO, respondents.
The petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45

and the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65
are two separate and distinct remedies. PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 45
DOCTRINE: A petition for certiorari may be treated as a petition
Under Rule 45, a petition brings up for review errors for review under Rule 45. Such move is in accordance with the
of judgment while a petition for certiorari under Rule liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of
65 concerns errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of substantial justice, especially (1) if the petition was filed within
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. the reglementary period for filing a petition for review; (2)

errors of judgment are averred; and (3) there is sufficient the summons had been improperly served on them.
reason to justify the relaxaation of the rules. It based its finding on the Sheriffs Return, which did
not contain any averment that effort had been
FACTS: Petitioner Oaminal filed a complaint for collection exerted to personally serve the summons on them
against Respondents Pablito and Guia Castillo with the RTC before substituted service was resorted to.
praying that respondents be ordered to pay P1,500,000.00
by way of liquidated damages and P150,000.00 as attorney's ISSUE: WON Petition for certiorari before the CA may be
fees. treated as a petition for review under Rule 45
The summons together with the complaint was HELD: YES. Well-settled is the rule that certiorari will lie only
served upon Ester Fraginal, secretary of respondent when a court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
Mrs. Castillo. or with grave abuse of discretion. As a condition for the filing
of a petition for certiorari, Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules
Respondents filed their 'Urgent Motion to Declare of Court additionally requires that "no appeal nor any plain,
Service of Summons Improper and Legally Defective' speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law"
alleging that the Sheriff's Return has failed to comply must be available. It is axiomatic that the availability of the
with Section (1), Rule 14 of the Rules of Court or right of appeal precludes recourse to the special civil action
substituted service of summons. for certiorari.
Petitioner Oaminal filed an Omnibus Motion to Here, the trial court's judgment was a final Decision that
Declare respondents in default and to Render disposed of the case. It was therefore a fit subject of an appeal.
Judgment because no answer was filed by the latter. However, instead of appealing the Decision, respondents filed
a Petition for certiorari.
Respondents forthwith filed the following:
(a) Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam to Admit Motion to Be that as it may, a petition for certiorari may be treated as a
Dismiss and Answer with Compulsory Counter-claim; petition for review under Rule 45. Such move is in accordance
(b) Urgent Motion to Dismiss anchored on the with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the
premise that petitioner's complaint was barred by interest of substantial justice, especially (1) if the petition was
improper venue and litis pendentia; and (c) Answer filed within the reglementary period for filing a petition for
with Compulsory Counter-Claim. review; (2) errors of judgment are averred; and (3) there is
sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the rules. Besides,
The judge denied the Motion to Dismiss. Respondents
it is axiomatic that the nature of an action is determined by the
filed an 'Urgent Motion to Inhibit Ad Cautelam'
allegations of the complaint or petition and the character of
against Judge Zapatos but was denied. Respondents
the relief sought.
subsequently filed an 'Urgent Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration with the Accompanying Plea to The present case satisfies all the above requisites. Hence, there
Reset'. Said motion prayed 'that an order be issued by are enough reasons to treat the Petition for certiorari as a
the Honorable Court reconsidering its adverse order, petition for review.
by dismissing the case at bar on the ground of
improper venue or in the alternative, that the
Honorable Presiding Judge reconsider and set aside, G.R. No. 119393 April 26, 2000
its order by inhibiting himself from the case at hand.
RTC: IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER. DENIED respondents’ REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner
Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam to Admit Motion to v.
Dismiss and Answer with Counterclaim for being filed COURT OF APPEALS, Robert Peuker, and Ma. Luz
out of time. Hence, he (1) denied the Motion to Admit Trumpeta Esmeralda, Respondents
Motion to Dismiss and Answer; (2) declared
respondents in default; and (3) ordered petitioner to
present evidence ex-parte within ten days from
receipt of the order, failing which, the case will be
dismissed.
Spouses filed with the CA a Petition for certiorari, DOCTRINE: The reason is that issues purely of law are
prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a writ of exclusively reviewable by this Court. When an appeal is taken
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order to either the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the
(TRO). wrong or inappropriate mode, it shall be dismissed.
CA: SET ASIDE RTC Decision. The trial court did not FACTS:
validly acquire jurisdiction over respondents, because
Private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, In the case at bar, the procedure resorted to by petitioner is
Metro Manila a petition entitled, "In the Matter of the Petition incorrect. Petitioner merely filed a notice of appeal which is
for Correction of entry in the Birth Certificate of the Minor Child directed to the Court of Appeals, and raised therein only a
Michael Esmeralda Peuker, Robert Peuker and Maria Luz question of law. But, to reiterate, the Court of Appeals does
Trumpeta Esmeralda, petitioners" not exercise jurisdiction over appeals from the regional trial
courts which raise purely a question of law. Appeals of this
The trial court set the case for hearing on March 29, 1989. nature should be elevated to the Supreme Court. Petitioner
However, the petition was not called on said date because the should have filed directly with this Court a petition for review
court personnel staged a mass leave on that day. Thus, private on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. But it chose
respondent's counsel asked the court officer-in-charge to reset to file its notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals..
the initial hearing to April 17, 1989. But petitioner's counsel
(office of the Solicitor General), pleading non-availability on IMMACULATE CONCEPTION ACADEMY/DR. JOSE PAULO E.
said date, asked the court officer-in-charge to reset the hearing CAMPOS, petitioners, vs. EVELYN E. CAMILON,
to May 2, 1989. On April 17, 1989, despite prior opposition by respondent.
the OSG to said date of hearing, the trial court heard the case.
Private respondents marked and submitted in evidence the
following: (a) affidavit of publication of the order setting the PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45
case for hearing on March 29, 1989; (b) February 27, 1989
issue of Manila Standard; (c) March 6, 1989 issue of Manila DOCTRINE: CA and Labor adjudicatory officials must demur
Standard; and (d) March 13, 1989 issue of Manila Standard, the award of separation pay based on social justice when an
containing the order fixing the date of hearing of the petition. employee's dismissal is based on serious misconduct or willful
disobedience; gross and habitual neglect of duty; fraud or
On May 2, 1989, the Court personnel went on mass leave willful breach of trust; or commission of a crime against the
again. The next day, the OSG filed a manifestation and motion person of the employer or his immediate family — grounds
that it had not received a copy of the petition and moved that under Art. 282 of the Labor Code that sanction dismissals of
private respondents be required to furnish the OSG a copy of employees.
the petition. On February 16, 1990, the trial court admitted all
the exhibits formally offered by private respondents and
directed the latter to furnish the OSG a copy of the petition. FACTS:
On April 24, 1990, the OSG received copy of the petition and
its annexes. Then on May 15, 1990, the trial court granted the Respondent Evelyn Camilon was an employee of ICA for 12
petition of the Local Civil Registrar. Believing that the trial years. She was ICA's
court's judgment is contrary to law and evidence, the OSG filed Chief Accountant and Administrator from June 2000 until her
a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals. But later on it dismissal. As Chief Accountant, respondent was responsible,
dismissed the petition on the ground of wrong venue. among others, for pre-auditing the school cashier's report,
checking the entries therein and keeping custody of the petty
ISSUE: cash fund.
She has also direct supervision over the School Cashier, Janice
Whether the trial court acted without jurisdiction as well as Loba.
whether it gravely abused its discretion in granting the petition
for correction of entry based on pure question of law? ICA's Treasurer, Shirley Enobal, received a complaint from the
father of one student who claimed that his son was denied
HELD:
issuance of an examination permit for nonpayment of tuition
We agree with the appellate court's ruling that if an appeal is fees despite the fact that the said fees had already been paid.
taken from the regional trial court to the Court of Appeals and
appellant raises only a question of law, the appeal should be Cristina Javier, Internal Auditor of ICA, conducted an audit
dismissed. The reason is that issues purely of law are upon the instruction of petitioner Campos. There were several
exclusively reviewable by this Court. When an appeal is taken payments of tuition and school fees made by a number of ICA
to either the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the students which were neither accounted for, turned over
wrong or inappropriate mode, it shall be dismissed. Supreme and/or posted by the ICA Cashier, Ms. Janice C. Loba.
Court Circular No. 2-90; Incorporated now in Sections 5(f) and
6, Rule 56 in conjunction with Section 2, Rule 41, of the 1997 Respondent was placed under suspension pending
Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, if an appeal by notice of appeal investigation. Respondent denied any involvement in the
is taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals irregularities committed and claimed that she had no intention
and in the latter court, the appellant raises naught but issues of profiting at the expense of the school or of betraying the
of law, the appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. trust reposed on her by the corporation.

She was then terminated after finding that respondent was The heirs of Yabao filed a complaint for ownership and
negligent and remiss in her duties as the superior officer of possession in 2001 before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
Loba. Hence, she filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before (MTCC) of Calbayog City against Paz Lentejas Van der Kolk.
the NLRC.
They claim that they are absolute co-owners of the parcel of
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the respondent on the land, that sometime in 1996 the respondent asserted claim of
ground that petitioners failed to present substantial evidence ownership despite the opposition of the petitioners. The
to prove that respondent has been negligent in her duties as respondent refused to vacate or leave the premises despite
Chief Accountant. repeated demands. The respondent also filed for a free patent
for the property in DENR Samar, to which the petitioners filed
NLRC rendered a decision finding respondent's dismissal and an opposition.
preventive suspension legal and setting aside the awards for
back wages, separation pay and attorney's fees. Copies of the summons and the complaint was served upon
the attorney-in-fact of the respondent, Ventures, who was
CA affirmed the NLRC decision and granted an award of authorized to institute and defend all actions for the
separation pay to the respondent as a measure of social protection of her rights and interests over her properties.
justice.
Van der Kolk filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint. She
Issue: WON the CA correctly granted an award of separation reasoned that the MTCC has no jurisdiction over her person
pay to respondent as a measure of social justice (NO) due to defective service of summons, and lack of cause of
action.
Ruling: Again in the recent case of Moya v. First Solid Rubber
Industries, Inc., the Court disallowed the payment of Van der Kolk also claimed that the petitioners executed a joint
separation pay to an employee dismissed from work based on affidavit renouncing their hereditary rights over the subject lot
one of the grounds under Article 282 of the Labor Code or and declared that the money of Van der Kolk as its true owner.
willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by
his employer. Therein, the Court held that Moya's act of The Heirs of Yabao filed an opposition to the motion and
concealing the truth from the company is outside of the moved to declare Van der Kolk in default since the motion to
protective mantle of the principle of social justice. dismiss was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period, and
no answer has been filed.
Respondent was holding a position which involves a high
degree of responsibility requiring trust and confidence as it In 2004, the MTCC denied the motion to dismiss. It held that
involves the financial interests of the school. However, there was proper service of summons. It also denied the
respondent proved to be unfit for the position when she failed motion to declare the respondent in default since the motion
to exercise the necessary diligence in the performance of her to dismiss was seasonably filed.
duties and responsibilities as Chief Accountant, thus justifying
her dismissal from service. Respondent was guilty of gross and Van der Kolk’s counsel filed a Manifestation with Motion
habitual negligence when she failed to regularly pre-audit the praying that he be relieved as her counsel because she never
report of the school cashier, check the entries therein and keep contacted him about the case.
custody of the petty cash fund. Had respondent been
assiduously doing her job, the unaccounted school funds The Heirs of Yabao reiterated their motion to declare Van der
would have been discovered right away. Respondent's Kolk in default because no answer had been filed.
dereliction in her duties spanned a period of 11 months thus In 2006, the MTCC rendered a decision declaring Van der Kolk
enabling the school cashier to misappropriate tuition fee in default - finding that her non-filing of answer was
payments, manipulate the school records and destroy official deliberately calculated to delay the termination of the case.
receipts, in the total amount of P1,167,181.45 to the prejudice
of petitioners. Hence, she should not be granted separation
pay. To rule otherwise would be to reward respondent for her Van der Kolk appealed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
negligent acts instead of punishing her for her offense. However, the RTC dismissed the appeal for failure of Van der
Kolk to file the memorandum on appeal within the period
Heirs of Paciano Yabao, Represented by Remedios Chan, v. mandated by the Rules of Court. The reason given by the
Paz Lentejas Van Der Kolk counsel, heavy pressures of work, was not enough to relax the
G.R. No. 207266 ; June 25, 2014 rules.
FACTS: Van der Kolk filed a petition for review under Rule 42 before
the CA.

DOMINADOR MANALO, petitioner, vs. REAL ESTATE
The CA rendered a decision dismissing the complaint of the INVESTORS, INC.,
Heirs of Yabao on the ground that they failed to prove by the REPRESENTED BY J. ANTONIO LEVISTE, respondent.
required quantum of evidence their entitlement to the
subject property. The MTCC erred when it should have This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
required the Heirs of Yabao to present evidence ex parte, when
Van der Kolk was declared in default to prove the allegations Facts: The subject of this case is a 41-square meter parcel of
in their complaint. land. The property was formerly a portion of a larger 1,384-
square meter lot owned by REII. As evidenced by a Contract to
Sell, REII agreed to convey the subject property to Manalo
ISSUE: upon the full payment of P26,650.00, payable in monthly
Whether or not the Court of Appeals can consider other installments over a five-year period. Manalo was eventually
grounds not raised or assigned as errors. able to fully pay the purchase price.
HELD: Manalo was unable to secure a Torrens title over his newly
YES. purchased parcel of land. Thus, he executed an uncaptioned
The Court has allowed the consideration of other grounds not document, reconveying the property to REII in exchange for a
raised or assigned as errors specifically in the following unit in a condominium project to be built by the latter.
instances: Notably, Manalo's lot occupied a portion of the building's
(1) grounds not assigned as errors but affecting planned area.
jurisdiction over the subject matter;
(2) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are Several others who had purchased parcels of land from REII
evidently plain or clerical errors within the also decided to reconvey their properties for problems relating
contemplation of the law; to the procurement of Torrens certificates. They joined
(3) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but Manalo in the execution of the aforementioned document.
consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just
decision and complete resolution of the case or to The controversy arose when Manalo refused to heed to REII's
serve the interest of justice or to avoid dispensing several demands to vacate the subject property. Because of his
piecemeal justice; inaction, the latter could not begin the construction of its
(4) matters not specifically assigned as errors on condominium project. Eventually, REII sent Manalo a letter
appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of demanding that he vacate the premises under threat of
record having some bearing on the issue submitted litigation. The
which the parties failed to raise or which the lower company was allegedly sustaining pre-development costs
court ignored; amounting to P5,000,000.00 by reason of his inaction. Because
(5) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but of Manalo's persistent refusal, REII filed a Complaint for
closely related to an error assigned; and unlawful detainer before the MeTC.
(6) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon
which the determination of a question properly After a lengthy exchange of motions and pleadings, the MeTC
assigned is dependent. rendered a decision dismissing REII's complaint for failure to
The Court agrees with the observation of the CA. The several comply with the jurisdictional requisite of prior demand. The
errors committed by the MTCC justify the reversal of its trial court found that the registry receipt number of the
decision. The MTCC should have directed the Heirs of Yabao to demand letter dated January 23, 2015 did not match that
adduce evidence to substantiate the allegations in their contained in the Postmaster's Certification proving Manalo's
complaint. After all, he who alleges a fact has the burden of receipt of said letter. It was therefore ruled that REII failed to
proving it. prove that it had made any prior demand to vacate the
premises.
The MTCC should have admitted Van der Kolk’s answer instead
of declaring her in default. It is within the sound discretion of The RTC, however, found otherwise, giving credence to REII's
the trial court to permit the defendant to file his answer, even explanation of the discrepancy. According to REII, the demand
after the reglementary period. The rule is that the defendant’s letter was sent twice. Since the letter was returned to sender
answer should be admitted where it is filed before a the first time, REII's counsel attempted to mail it once again,
declaration of default and no prejudice is caused to the this time under a new registry receipt number, the one
plaintiff. Van der Kolk filed her answer beyond the appearing on the Postmaster's Certification.
reglementary period, but before she was declared in default.
Her answer should have been admitted. Strangely, the RTC did not touch upon the merits of the case,
[G.R. No. 240387. December 11, 2019.] ordering Manalo to vacate the subject property simply

because REII was able to prove that it had sent a demand extension of time before the CA. Surely, his recurring wanton
letter. disregard of procedural rules cannot be countenanced.
Before Manalo interposed an appeal with the CA, he fled a First, Manalo filed his motion for extension nine days late.
Motion for Extension of Time, praying for an additional 15 days Under the rules, such motions must be filed within the
within which to file a petition for review. The motion was reglementary period for the filing of the petition for review,
subsequently granted through a Resolution dated May 16, viz.:
2017. However, REII moved for the reconsideration of the CA's
resolution, pointing out that the motion for extension was Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing . — A party desiring
belatedly filed. Since Manalo received the RTC's Decision on to appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered
March 24, 2017, he only had until April 8, 2017 to file a motion in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified
for reconsideration or an appeal. Since he filed his motion for petition for review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the
extension only on April 17, 2017, REII prayed that the appeal same time to the clerk of said court the corresponding docket
be dismissed. and other lawful fees, depositing the amount of P500.00 for
costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the adverse
CA: respondent's Urgent Motion for Reconsideration is party with a copy of the petition. The petition shall be filed and
GRANTED. The Court's May 16, 2017 Resolution is SET ASIDE served within 15 days from notice of the decision sought to be
and the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. reviewed or of the denial of petitioner's motion for new trial
or reconsideration filed in due time after judgment. Upon
It was then Manalo who moved for reconsideration. His proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the
motion having been denied, he comes to the Court praying for docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before
a relaxation of the rules of procedure so that he may fully the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of
ventilate the merits of his case. Appeals may grant an additional period of 15 days only within
which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN DISMISSING be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no
MANALO'S APPEAL FOR BEING FILED OUT OF TIME (NO) case to exceed fifteen (15) days.
Held: As mentioned at the outset, REII points out that Manalo Since Manalo was notified of the RTC's decision on March 24,
has once again failed to comply with the rules on reglementary 2017, he only had until April 8, 2017 to file his motion for
periods. It appears that Manalo was notified of the second extension of time. However, he did so only on April 17, 2017.
assailed CA resolution on July 6, 2018. As such, he had until July The CA was therefore correct in dismissing his petition for
21, 2018 to file the instant petition, but since that day fell on a review. The mere lapse of the 15-day reglementary period
Saturday, he was given until the next working day, July 23, to meant that the RTC's March 7, 2017 Decision had already
do so. When July 23 came, Manalo filed an Urgent Motion for become final and executory, leaving the CA without
Extension of Time, praying for an additional 45 days to file his jurisdiction to act on Manalo's appeal.
petition for review on certiorari. The Court then issued a
Resolution dated August 6, 2018 granting Manalo's prayer, but Next, when Manalo sought to elevate the assailed CA
giving him only 30 days, or until August 20, 2018 to submit the resolutions to the Court, he once again prayed for an extension
petition. Regrettably, Manalo filed this petition only on of time to file his petition for review. He asked for 45 days, but
September 6, 2018. the Court, through its August 6, 2018 Resolution granted him
only 30 days, giving him until August 20, 2018 to file the instant
The Petition is dismissible on this ground alone. petition for review on certiorari.
Enshrined is the rule that the right to appeal neither a natural However, this petition was 􏰁led only on September 6, 2018,
right nor a component of due process. It is a mere statutory long after the expiration of the extended reglementary period.
privilege. Accordingly, appeals must be exercised in the In fact, even if the Court had granted Manalo the entire 45-day
manner and within the period provided by law. It has been period prayed for, his petition would still have been filed two
held that failure to perfect an appeal within the prescribed days late. At this juncture, it is worth reiterating the Court's
reglementary period renders the challenged judgment final pronouncement in Santos v. Court of Appeals:
and executory. Having no jurisdiction to alter such judgments,
an appellate court faced with a belatedly filed appeal must Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities
dismiss the same. that may be ignored at will to suit the convenience of a party.
Adjective law is important in insuring the effective
Here, the record shows that Manalo was guilty of belatedly enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and
filing not only the instant petition, but also his motion for speedy administration of justice. These rules are not intended
to hamper litigants or complicate litigation but, indeed, to

provide for a system under which suitors may be heard in the
correct form and manner and at the prescribed time in a Respondent company claimed that, petitioner showed
peaceful confrontation before a judge whose authority they disinterest in his work and stopped reporting to the office.
acknowledge. The other alternative is the settlement of their Nonetheless, he received his salary and bonus, negating his
conflict through the barrel of a gun. claim that he was illegally dismissed from employment.
One key objective of the rules on procedure is to ensure the The LA found the petitioner to be illegally dismissed. The NLRC
swift administration of justice. No set of rules serves this dismissed petitioners complaints.
purpose more directly than the rules on reglementary periods.
Verily, it has been held that "the requirements for perfecting Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration that he "be
an appeal within the reglementary period specified in the law allowed to pay once more the docketing fee so required."
must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable Because when he filed the petition through registered mail, he
interdictions against needless delays." Manalo, through his enclosed ₱1,030.00 in cash as docket fee. The CA denied the
failure to act on time, has subverted the cardinal purpose of motion.
the rules. The fact that he is twice guilty of belated 􏰁ling only
serves to highlight his indifference toward the speedy ISSUE:
resolution of this dispute. It certainly does not help his case
that the action originally instituted, unlawful detainer, is Whether or not the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion
governed by the rules on summary procedure. when it dismissed his petition for his failure to pay the required
docket fees
Nevertheless, Manalo prays for a relaxation of the rules.
Considering that he stands to be evicted from his family home, HELD:
he argues that the Court should afford him every opportunity
to be heard. The relaxation of the periods governing appeals is Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
done only in exceptional cases. The Court finds no reason to provides:
simply turn a blind eye to Manalo's blatant violation of the Xxx
rules. The petitioner shall pay the corresponding docket and other
lawful fees to the clerk of court and deposit the amount of
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Resolutions dated ₱500.00 for costs at the time of the filing of the petition.
January 25, 2018 and June 27, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in Xxx
CA-G.R. SP No. 150444 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED." In the instant case, however, petitioner has not shown any
reason which justifies relaxation of the Rules. His insistence
RULE 46: ORIGINAL CASES that he enclosed in the mailing envelope the amount of
₱1,030.00 as docket fee does not convince us. If it were true,
G.R. No. 148505 February 20, 2007 why did he pray in his motion for reconsideration that he be
allowed to pay once more the docketing fee?
LEOPOLDO V. MENDOZA, Petitioner vs THE COURT OF
APPEALS and MERCHANDISING INSPECTION COMPANY, It bears stressing that procedural rules are not to be belittled
LTD., Respondents. or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have
prejudiced a party’s substantive rights. Like all rules, they are
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of
reasons when they may be relaxed. Not one of these
DOCTRINE: a court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the subject exceptions is present here.
matter of a case unless the docket fees are paid. It is clear that
non-compliance with any of the requirements stated above G.R. NO. 129132 July 8, 1998
warrants the dismissal of a petition.
ISABELA VITAL-GOZON, Petitioner vs. HONORABLE COURT
FACTS: OF APPEALS and ALEJANDRO
DE LA FUENTE, Respondents.
Leopoldo alleged that he was employed as a checker by private
respondent. Sometime later, respondent company did not give FACTS:
him any work assignment due to his union activities. His only In the early months of 1987, President Corazon Aquino
job was to distribute the company’s Christmas calendars. Thus, enacted Executive Order No. 13 which sought to reorganize
he filed with the Arbitration Branch, NLRC, a complaint for various offices of the Ministry of Health. Pursuant thereto,
constructive dismissal and non-payment of backwages. existing offices were abolished and personnel were

transferred. At the time of the reorganization, Dr. Alejandro De to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of
La Fuente was the chairman of the Chief of Clinics of the the wrongful acts of the defendant."
National Children’s Hospital. Before, he occupied the position
of Medical Specialist II. However, pursuant to the Executive The provision makes plain that the damages are an
Order, Dr. De La Fuente received a notice from the Department incident, or the result of, the defendant's wrongful act in failing
of Health that he would be re-appointed as a Medical Specialist and refusing to do the act required to be done. It is noteworthy
II. that the Rules of 1940 had an identical counterpart provision.
The Solicitor General's theory that the rule in question is a
Considering that it was a demotion from his previous position, mere procedural one allowing joinder of an action of
he filed a protest with the Department of Health. However, mandamus and another for damages, is untenable, for it
when the protest was ignored, he brought the case to the Civil implies that a claim for damages arising from the omission or
Service Commission. failure to do an act subject of a mandamus suit may be litigated
separately from the latter, the matter of damages not being
CSC: Held that the demotion was NULL AND VOID. No motion inextricably linked to the cause of action for mandamus which
for reconsideration of the CSC’s decision was ever brought up is certainly not the case.
nor an appeal was submitted.
2. NO. The Court ruled that petitioner was not denied due
Dr. De La Fuente then sent two letters to Dr. Vital Gozon, the process because her failure to ! file the answer to the petition
Medical Center Chief of the National Children’s Hospital, was due to her own fault. She was, by formal resolutions of the
demanding for the implementation of the decision. No action Court of Appeals, required to give the answers to both original
was taken upon by Dr. Vital-Gozon. This led to Dr. De La Fuente petition and the
to go to the CSC seeking enforcement of its decision. He was supplemental/amended petition, yet she failed to heed both
however told to file in court a petition for mandamus because resolutions. It cannot be then successfully maintained that the
of its belief that CSC has no coercive powers. Court of Appeals committed reversible error, much less, grave
abuse of discretion, when it denied admission to an answer
Dr. De La Fuente instituted an action for mandamus and that was led only after the Court's decision in G.R. No. 101428
damages with preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals had long become final and immutable.
to compel Dr. Vital-Gozon to comply with the decision of the
CSC. The Court of Appeals required the filing of an answer but
despite the extension asked for by the petitioner, no answer NARCISO ZAPANTA, EDILBERTO CAPULONG AND CLARITA
was filed. About a month afterwards, Dr. De La Fuente filed CAPULONG, petitioners, vs. CO KING KI as represented by his
with the same court a Supplemental/Amended Petition Attorney-in-Fact WILLIAM CO, respondent.
described as quo warranto. Again, the appellate court asked G.R. No. 191694. December 3, 2014. Third Division.
for the filing of the answer by the petitioner but none was filed. VILLARAMA, JR., J.
CA issued a decision based on the allegations and Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
annexes in favor of Dr. De La Fuente but did not award him Rules of Civil Procedure
damages.
FACTS: respondent Co King Ki, alleged that he is the owner of
MR: Awarded damages to Dr. De La Fuente. It was only at this a parcel of land located at Barangay San Francisco, Lubao,
point that Dr. Vital-Gozon entered her appearance questioning Pampanga, filed a Complaint for Ejectment against petitioners.
the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.
ISSUES: The defendants filed their Answer with Compulsory
1. WON the court of appeals may take cognizance of the action Counterclaim, they are qualified farmer beneficiaries of the
for mandamus filed by dr. de la fuente. subject property and that respondent was no longer the owner
as the same was already foreclosed by the Philippine Veterans
2.WON the court of appeals violated petitioner’s right to due Bank.
process when it refused to admit her answer
On December 27, 2007, the Regional Agrarian Reform
RULING: Adjudicator (RARAD) rendered a Decision in favor of
1. YES. The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to award respondent. defendants filed their Motion for
damages in mandamus petitions. Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Reconsideration.
Rules of Court explicitly authorized the rendition of judgment
in a mandamus action "commanding the defendant, On June 30, 2008, defendants' new counsel Atty. Marc Terry C.
immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act Perez (Atty. Perez) filed a Notice of Appeal and Formal Entry of
required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and Appearance.

and March 22, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
On September 18, 2008, the PARAD issued an Order, denying 106882 are AFFIRMED.
the notice of appeal filed by defendants for having been filed
out of time. Invoking the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) Rules of Procedure. Petitioners,
together with Ernesto and Marciano, filed a petition for G.R. No. 204796 February 4, 2015
certiorari before the CA.
REICON REALTY BUILDERS CORPORATION,
The CA issued a Resolution, dismissing the petition for petitioner, vs. DIAMOND DRAGON
certiorari because petitioners failed to append a clearly legible REALTY AND MANAGEMENT, INC., respondent.
duplicate original/certified true copy of the assailed PARAD
Order. Likewise, the CA held that petitioners should have
elevated their case before the DARAB on appeal as provided
by Section 1, Rule XIV of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure. PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI
DOCTRINE: A certiorari proceeding is, by nature, an original
and independent action, and, therefore not considered as part
ISSUE: Whether the CA committed a serious reversible error in
of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment
dismissing the petition for certiorari on the basis of a strict
or order complained of. Hence, at the preliminary point of
application of Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
serving the certiorari petition, as in other initiatory pleadings,
Procedure, as amended, on the attachment of clearly legible
it cannot be said that an appearance for respondent has been
duplicate original/certified true copy of the judgment, order,
made by his counsel. Consequently, the requirement under
resolution or ruling subject thereof.
Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules, which provides that if any party
has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon
HELD: NO. The complaint in this case was filed on September
his counsel, should not apply.
7, 2000, during the effectivity of the 1994 DARAB New Rules of
Procedure which is applicable in this case. It expressly provides FACTS: Reicon is the owner of a parcel of land and the one-
in Section 1, Rule XXIV (Miscellaneous Provisions) thereof that storey building erected.
"[a]ll cases pending with the Board and the Adjudicators, prior Reicon and respondent Diamond entered into a Contract of
to the date of effectivity of these Rules, shall be governed by Lease whereby Reicon leased the subject property
the DARAB Rules prevailing at the time of their filing." to Diamond for a period of twenty (20) years for a P75,000
monthly rental. In turn, Diamond sublet portions of the
However, petitioners failed to consider the effect on their subject property to Jollibee and Maybunga, represented by
appeal of the motion for reconsideration which they filed to its proprietor, Andrew D. Palangdao.
assail the December 27, 2007 Decision. Section 12, Rule VIII of
Diamond failed to pay the monthly rentals due, and the checks
the same DARAB Rules clearly provides that if a motion for
it had issued by way of payments were all dishonored upon
reconsideration is denied, the movant shall have the right to
presentment. This prompted Reicon to send, a demand letter
perfect his appeal during the remainder of the period for
for payment of the accrued rentals and terminating the
appeal, reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial.
Contract. Thereafter, it entered into separate contracts with
Jollibee and Maybunga over the portions of the subject
In this case, petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration
property they respectively occupy.
thereof on February 29, 2008 or 14 days from their receipt of
a copy of the Decision. Hence, petitioners only had one more Diamond filed a complaint for breach of contract with
day or until June 19, 2008 within which to file their Notice of damages against Reicon, Jollibee, Maybunga, Andrew, and a
Appeal. before the PARAD. However, it is evident that their certain Mary Palangdao (Mary) (defendants) before the RTC
new counsel Atty. Perez belatedly filed said Notice of Appeal alleging that the Contract did not provide for its unilateral
on June 30, 2008. Clearly, petitioners' Notice of Appeal in this termination by either of the parties and that the act of
case was filed out of time. defendants in entering into separate contracts, despite the
existence of the first Contract, constitutes unlawful
It bears reiterating that appeal is not a constitutional right, but interference, for which they must be held solidarily liable for
a mere statutory privilege. Thus, parties who seek to avail damages. As such, Diamond prayed that the unilateral
themselves of it must comply with the statutes or rules termination of Contract effected by Reicon, as well as the
allowing it. separate contracts of lease it entered into with Jollibee and
Maybunga, be declared invalid and illegal.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the present petition is
DENIED. The assailed Resolutions dated November 20, 2009 Reicon filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (a)
lack of jurisdiction over its person because summons were

improperly served; (b) lack of legal capacity to sue as a juridical and shall be accompanied by a clearly legible
person on the part of Diamond since its license was revoked; duplicate original or certified true copy of the
and (c) lack of cause of action, in the absence of the requisite judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject
allegations of the ultimate facts constituting bad faith and thereof, such material portions of the record as
malice on the part of the defendants as would support the are referred to therein, and other documents
cause of action of "unlawful interference." relevant or pertinent thereto. . . . .
Diamond argued that, (a) improper service is not a ground to xxx xxx xxx
dismiss its complaint; (b) it has legal capacity to sue, as
the corporation whose certificate of registration was revoked The failure of the petitioner to comply
was "Diamond Dragon Realty and Mgt. Inc.,"; and (c) that its with any of the foregoing requirements shall be
legal existence cannot be attacked except in a quo sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
warranto petition. SEC. 4. Jurisdiction over the person
Jollibee filed a separate motion to dismiss on the ground of of respondent, how acquired. — The court shall
lack of jurisdiction over its person; lack of jurisdiction over the acquire jurisdiction over the person of
subject matter; and improper venue. As for Maybunga, the respondent by the service on him of its order
records do not show that they filed a similar motion for the or resolution indicating its initial action on the
dismissal of the complaint. petition or by his voluntary submission to such
jurisdiction.
RTC: DENIED Reicon and Jollibees motion to dismiss.
Improper service of summons is not among the grounds for A punctilious review of the records, particularly of
the dismissal of a complaint. the certiorari petition filed by Reicon before the CA, shows
that it contains the registry numbers corresponding to the
Aggrieved, Reicon elevated the matter to the CA via petition registry receipts as well as the affidavit of service and/or
for certiorari taken under Rule 65 of the Rules. filing of the person who filed and served the
CA: DISMISSED Reicon's certiorari petition without passing petition via registered mail on behalf of Reicon. These imply
that a copy of Reicon's certiorari petition had been served to
upon its merits based on the following grounds: (a) non-
the RTC as well as to Diamond through its address at "Suite 305
compliance with the requirements of proof of service of the
AIC Burgundy Empire Tower, ADB Avenue corner Garnet Road,
petition on Diamond pursuant to Section 3, Rule 46 of
Ortigas Center, Pasig City," in compliance with Section 13, Rule
the Rules, and (b) non-compliance with the rule on service
13 of the Rules on proof of service as well as with Sections 3
upon a party through counsel under Section 2, Rule 13 of
and 4 of Rule 46 above-quoted.
the Rules.
On this score, the Court notes that Diamond declared the
ISSUE: WON Reicon's certiorari petition before the CA was
aforesaid address as its business address in its complaint
properly served upon the person of Diamond.
before the RTC, and that there is dearth of evidence to show
HELD: YES. Sections 3 and 4, Rule 46 of the Rules covers that it had since changed its address or had moved out.
cases originally filed before the CA, provide as follows: Hence, Reicon cannot be faulted for adopting the said address
SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; in serving a copy of its certiorari petition to Diamond in light of
effect of non-compliance with requirements. — the requirement under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 46 of
The petition shall contain the full names and the Rules as above-cited, which merely entails service of the
actual addresses of all the petitioners and petition upon the respondent itself, not upon his counsel.
respondents, a concise statement of the matters The underlying rationale behind this rule is that
involved, the factual background of the case, and a certiorari proceeding is, by nature, an original and
the grounds relied upon for the relief prayed for. independent action, and, therefore not considered as part of
In actions filed under Rule 65, the the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or
petition shall further indicate the material dates order complained of. Hence, at the preliminary point of serving
showing when notice of the judgment or final the certiorari petition, as in other initiatory pleadings, it
order or resolution subject thereof was received, cannot be said that an appearance for respondent has been
when a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if made by his counsel. Consequently, the requirement under
any, was filed and when notice of the denial Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules, which provides that if any party
thereof was received. has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon
his counsel, should not apply.
It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible
copies together with proof of service thereof on Thus, the CA erred when it
the respondent with the original copy intended dismissed Reicon's certiorari petition outright for non-
for the court indicated as such by the petitioner, compliance with Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules as well as the
rule on service upon a party through counsel under Section 2, litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case,
Rule 13 of the Rules. The service of said pleading upon the whereby the defeated party has been prevented from
person of the respondent, and not upon his counsel, is what exhibiting fully his side of the case, by fraud or deception
the rule properly requires, as in this case. practiced on him by his opponent. On the other hand, intrinsic
fraud takes the form of “acts of a party in a litigation during the
RULE 47: ANULMENT OF JUDGMENTS OR FINAL ORDERS trial such as the use of forged or false document or perjured
AND RESOLUTIONS testimony, which did not affect the presentation of the case,
but did not prevent a fair and just determination of the case.
G.R. No. 115595 November 14, 1994
The use of the alleged false affidavit of loss by private
ANTONIO DEMETRIOU, HARRIET DEMETRIOU, ET. AL. , respondent is similar to the use during trial of forged
Petitioners, instruments or perjured testimony. In the case of Palanca v.
vs. Republic, such use of a forged instrument was held to
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE RHODIE A. NIDEA, and constitute only intrinsic fraud, for while it perhaps prevented a
HILDA RALLA-ALMINE, Respondent fair and just determination of the case, the use of such
instrument or testimony did not prevent the adverse party
from presenting his case fully and fairly. In the case at bar,
petitioners were not really kept out of the proceedings – they
Petition for Certiorari
could have rebutted or opposed the use of the affidavit and
DOCTRINE shown its falsity since they were theoretically parties in the
case to whom notice had been duly given.
“Indeed, one party's appeal from a judgment will not inure to
the benefit of a co-party who failed to appeal; and as against However, a judgment may also be annulled because of lack of
the latter, the judgment will continue to run its course until it jurisdiction. If a certificate of title has not been lost but is
becomes final and executory. To this general rule, however, actually in the possession of another person, the reconstituted
one exception stands out: where both parties have a title is void and the court rendering the decision has not
commonality of interests, the appeal of one is deemed to be acquired jurisdiction. In this case, it was alleged that 2/3 of the
the vicarious appeal of the other.” land had been sold to petitioners. This being so, the
reconstituted title in this case could be void. Consequently the
FACTS decision may be attacked any time.
Petitioners brought an action in the Court of Appeals for the The case was remanded to the CA for further proceedings.
annulment of the decision of the RTC which ordered the
Register of Deeds to issue a new owner’s duplicate certificate G.R. No. 145370 March 4, 2004
of title to private respondent. However, the petition was
denied due course on the ground that the fraud alleged therein MARIETTA B. ANCHETA, Petitioner
was not extrinsic fraud but, if at all, only intrinsic fraud which v.
did not justify setting aside the final decision of the trial court. RODOLFO S. ANCHETA, Respondents
The allegation of fraud involves admission by the respondent

court of an alleged false affidavit of loss. Allegedly, the PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI
duplicate certificate was lost during the devastation brought
by typhoon “Sisang.” Despite this being so, petitioner allegedly DOCTRINE: In a case where a petition for the annulment of a
ought to have known that 2/3 of the property had already been judgment or final order of the RTC filed under Rule 47 of the
sold to petitioners. Rules of Court is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant/respondent or over the nature or
ISSUE subject of the action, the petitioner need not allege in the
petition that the ordinary remedy of new trial or
• Whether or not the CA erred in denying the petition for reconsideration of the final order or judgment or appeal
annulment of judgment (YES) therefrom are no longer available through no fault of her own.
This is so because a judgment rendered or final order issued by
RULING the RTC without jurisdiction is null and void and may be
assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct action or by
The appellate court is correct in holding that the use of a false resisting such judgment or final order in any action or
affidavit of loss does not constitute extrinsic fraud to warrant proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless barred by laches.
the invalidation of the final judgment. To distinguish, extrinsic
fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the FACTS:

After their marriage on March 5, 1959, the petitioner and the was residing at Munting Paraiso, Bancal, Carmona, Cavite. CA
respondent resided in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. They had issued a Resolution dismissing the petition.
eight children. On December 6, 1992, the respondent left the
conjugal home and abandoned the petitioner and their ISSUE:
children. On January 25, 1994, petitioner Marietta Ancheta
filed a petition with the RTC of Makati against the respondent Whether or not the Court of Appeals should dismiss the
for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership and judicial petition for annulment of Judgment?
separation of property with a plea for support and support
HELD:
pendente lite. At that time, the petitioner was renting a house
at No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, No, because An original action in the Court of Appeals under
Las Piñas, Metro Manila. On April 20, 1994, the parties Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, as amended, to annul a judgment
executed a Compromise Agreement where some of the or final order or resolution in civil actions of the RTC may be
conjugal properties were adjudicated to the petitioner and her based on two grounds: (a) extrinsic fraud; or (b) lack of
eight children. The court rendered judgment based on the said jurisdiction. If based on extrinsic fraud, the remedy is subject
compromise agreement. In the meantime, the respondent to a condition precedent, namely, the ordinary remedies of
intended to marry again. On June 5, 1995, he filed a petition new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
with the RTC of Cavite, for the declaration of nullity of his remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
marriage with the petitioner on the ground of psychological petitioner. The petitioner must allege in the petition that the
incapacity. Although the respondent knew that the petitioner ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from
was already residing at the resort Munting Paraiso in Bancal, judgment, under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court are no longer
Carmona, Cavite, he, nevertheless, alleged in his petition that available through no fault of hers; otherwise, the petition will
the petitioner was residing at No. 72 CRM Avenue corner CRM be dismissed. If the petitioner fails to avail of the remedies of
Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro Manila, "where new trial, appeal or relief from judgment through her own fault
she may be served with summons." The clerk of court issued or negligence before filing her petition with the Court of
summons to the petitioner at the address stated in the Appeals, she cannot resort to the remedy under Rule 47 of the
petition. The sheriff served the summons and a copy of the Rules; otherwise, she would benefit from her inaction or
petition by substituted service on June 6, 1995 on the negligence.
petitioner's son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, at his
residence in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite. The petitioner failed to It is not enough to allege in the petition that the said remedies
file an answer to the petition. On June 22, 1995, the were no longer available through no fault of her own. The
respondent filed an "Ex-Parte Motion to Declare Defendant as petitioner must also explain and justify her failure to avail of
in Default" setting it for hearing on June 27, 1995. During the such remedies. The safeguard was incorporated in the rule
hearing on the said date, there was no appearance for the precisely to avoid abuse of the remedy. Access to the courts is
petitioner. The public prosecutor appeared for the State and guaranteed. But there must be limits thereto. Once a litigant's
offered no objection to the motion of the respondent who rights have been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a
appeared with counsel. The trial court granted the motion and competent court, he should not be granted an unbridled
declared the petitioner in default, and allowed the respondent license to sue anew. The prevailing party should not be vexed
to adduce evidence ex-parte. The respondent testified in his by subsequent suits.
behalf and adduced documentary evidence. On July 7, 1995,
the trial court issued an Order granting the petition and In this case, the petitioner failed to allege in her petition in the
declaring the marriage of the parties void ab initio. The clerk of CA that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, and petition
court issued a Certificate of Finality of the Order of the court for relief, were no longer available through no fault of her own.
on July 16, 1996. On February 14, 1998, the respondent and She merely alleged therein that she received the assailed order
Teresita H. Rodil were married in civil rights before the of the trial court on January 11, 2000. The petitioner's
municipal mayor of Indang, Cavite. amended petition did not cure the fatal defect in her original
petition, because although she admitted therein that she did
On July 7, 2000, the petitioner filed a verified petition against not avail of the remedies of new trial, appeal or petition for
the respondent with the Court of Appeals under Rule 47 of the relief from judgment, she did not explain why she failed to do
Rules of Court, as amended, for the annulment of the order of so.
the RTC of Cavite in Special Proceedings No. NC-662. The
petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the respondent committed We, however, rule that the Court of Appeals erred in
gross misrepresentations by making it appear in his petition dismissing the original petition and denying admission of the
that she was a resident of No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM amended petition. This is so because apparently, the Court of
Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro Manila, when Appeals failed to take note from the material allegations of the
in truth and in fact, the respondent knew very well that she petition, that the petition was based not only on extrinsic fraud
but also on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the

petitioner, on her claim that the summons and the copy of the reconveyance of the one-half portion of the property to
complaint in were not served on her. While the original private respondents and the issuance of a new title in their
petition and amended petition did not state a cause of action names. The CA AFFIRMED the trial court’s order in a Decision
for the nullification of the assailed order on the ground of dated June 29, 1998. Petitioners elevated the CA’s decision the
extrinsic fraud, we rule, however, that it states a sufficient SC, but the petition was DENIED due course per Resolution
cause of action for the nullification of the assailed order on the dated January 27, 1999.
ground of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the person of the
petitioner, notwithstanding the absence of any allegation On December 23, 1999, petitioners filed a petition for
therein that the ordinary remedy of new trial or annulment of judgments in Civil Case Nos. 11085 and 402
reconsideration, or appeal are no longer available through no before the CA.
fault of the petitioner.
CA: DISMISSED the petition for their failure to state the
In a case where a petition for the annulment of a judgment or material dates showing that it was filed on time and to attach
final order of the RTC filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court an affidavit of merit. Thus, petitioners seek recourse with this
is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the Court through the present petition for review on certiorari.
defendant/respondent or over the nature or subject of the
action, the petitioner need not allege in the petition that the ISSUE: W/N in a petition for annulment of judgment under rule
ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the final 47 of the 1997 rules of civil procedure still needs to state the
order or judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer available material dates to show timeliness of the filing thereof.
through no fault of her own. This is so because a judgment
rendered or final order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction RULING: YES. Petitioners argue that the petition filed before
is null and void and may be assailed any time either collaterally the CA need not contain a statement of material dates to show
or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order that it was filed on time since it presupposes that the judgment
in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked unless sought to be annulled is null and void ab initio, hence, it can
barred by laches. In this case the original petition in the CA be attacked anytime. Their argument is erroneous. Annulment
were based not only on extrinsic fraud but also on lack of of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only
jurisdiction of the trial court over the person of the petitioner in exceptional cases as where there is no available or other
because of the failure of the sheriff to serve in her the adequate remedy. Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
summons and a copy of the complaint. as amended, governs actions for annulment of judgments or
final orders and resolutions, and Section 2 thereof explicitly
G.R. NO. 144273 October 20, 2005 provides only two grounds for annulment of judgment, i.e.,
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. The underlying reason
RODOLFO RAMOS, EMMA R. MILLADO, and NORMA R. is traceable to the notion that annulling final judgments goes
ERIE, Petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE ALFONSO V. COMBONG, against the grain of finality of judgment. Litigation must end
JR., and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to
an effective administration of justice that once a judgment has
FACTS: become final, the issue or cause involved therein should be laid
The decision in Civil Case No. 11085 dated February 25, 1977 to rest. The basic rule of finality of judgment is grounded on
declared petitioners Rodolfo Ramos, Emma R. Millado and the fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice
Norma R. Erie as owners pro indiviso of one-half portion of the that at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and
western side of Lot 196, while private respondents Teresita the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final at
Medina, Teodoro Medina and Jesus Medina were declared some definite date fixed by law.
owners of the other half on the eastern portion. The foregoing
decision was AFFIRMED by the then Intermediate Appellate In the petition filed before the CA, extrinsic fraud was
Court in AC-G.R. CV No. 62059, which decision became final alleged as basis for annulling the final decision in Civil Case No.
and executory per Entry of Judgment dated May 23, 1986. 11085 and the final order in Civil Case No. 402.Section 3 of Rule
47 lays down the period to bring an action for annulment of
On the other hand, in Civil Case No. 402, which is an action for judgment based on extrinsic fraud; within 4 years from its
"revival and enforcement of judgment and for cancellation of discovery. Petitioners should have filed an annulment of
titles and reconveyance with damages," the trial court, in an judgment based on extrinsic fraud within four years from
Order dated May 8, 1996, granted private respondents’ discovery of the alleged fraudulent acts committed by private
Motion for Partial Judgment Based on the Pleadings with respondents. A perusal of the petition filed before the CA
Reservation of Right to Present Evidence on Damages. The trial shows that there is no indication of the dates or time from
court ordered the enforcement and revival of the decision in whence petitioners discovered private respondents’ alleged
AC-G.R. CV No. 62059, and declared petitioners’ titles over the fraudulent acts.
property null and void. The trial court also ordered the

While Rule 47 does not explicitly require that a statement of BRANCH 66 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN MAKATI CITY
material dates should accompany the petition, nevertheless, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
there must be a manifest showing in the petition that it was G.R. No. 149588. September 29, 2009.
filed within the four-year period. Consequently, the CA was
right in dismissing the petition, as it had no basis for Petition for Annulment of Judgment and Certiorari, with
determining the timeliness of the filing of the petition. Preliminary Injunction
Petitioners further argue that they have a valid ground for the
annulment of the decision in Civil Case No. 11085 and the final FACTS: Petitioners were charged before the Regional Trial
order in Civil Case No. 402. According to petitioners, private Court (RTC) of Makati for the crime of "other forms of
respondents failed to disclose in these cases that petitioners’ swindling". Petitioners allegedly the mortgaged parcel of land
predecessors, Luis Galvez and Matea Ramos, never transferred to the Rural Bank of Imus, did then and there willfully,
the one-half portion of Lot 196 to private respondents’ unlawfully and feloniously sell said property to one Conrado P.
predecessors, as evidenced by Cadastral Decree No. 32855 and Avila, falsely representing the same to be free from all liens
reconstituted Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-4809, which and encumbrances.
are still in the names of Luis Galvez and Matea Ramos. They
also contend that the General Powers of Administration and After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered finding petitioners
Deed of Sale dated June 18, 1947 relied upon by the trial court guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and
in Civil Case No. 11085 was executed in Spanish and it was only sentencing them to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for two
recently that petitioners were able to comprehend its months and to pay the fine. On appeal, affirmed the decision
contents. Petitioners alleged that said documents did not of the trial court. The Court denied the same for petitioners'
validly transfer one-half of the property to respondents’ failure to state the material dates. Therefore, the judgment of
predecessor, Pedro Medina. These, however, do not constitute conviction became final and executory.
extrinsic fraud. Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a fraudulent
act committed by the prevailing party outside of the trial of the With the consequent issuance by the trial court the police
case, whereby the defeated party was prevented from arrested, on April 27, 2001, petitioner Carmelita C. Llamas for
presenting fully his side of the case by fraud or deception her to serve her 2-month jail term. The police, nevertheless,
practiced on him by the prevailing party. Fraud is regarded as failed to arrest petitioner Francisco R. Llamas because he was
extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from nowhere to be found. petitioner Francisco moved for the
presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates lifting or recall of the warrant of arrest, raising for the first time
upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the the issue that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the
manner in which it is procured. The overriding consideration offense charged.
when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of
the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in Here, petitioners are invoking the remedy under Rule 47 to
court. By no means were petitioners deprived by respondents assail a decision in a criminal case.
of their day in court. Their arguments for the annulment of
judgment are evidentiary matters, which should have been ISSUE: Whether or not the remedy provided in Rule 47 may
earlier brought out before the trial court. Petitioners be availed of in criminal cases.
themselves filed Civil Case No. 11085 against respondents, and
they had all the opportunity to raise these matters before the HELD: NO. In People v. Bitanga, the Court explained that the
trial court. remedy of annulment of judgment cannot be availed of in
criminal cases. The remedy cannot be resorted to when the
With regard to Civil Case No. 402, the only matter that had to RTC judgment being questioned was rendered in a criminal
be determined in that case was whether the decision in AC- case. The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure itself does
G.R. CV No. 62059 has already become final and executory. The not permit such recourse, for it excluded Rule 47 from the
trial court cannot go beyond such issue or delve into the enumeration of the provisions of the 1997 Revised Rules of
rightful ownership of the subject property even if petitioners Civil Procedure which have suppletory application to criminal
brought it to the trial court’s attention. Thus, petitioners cases.
cannot argue that they were prevented from fully presenting
their side due to respondents’ alleged fraudulent acts. Here, petitioners are invoking the remedy under Rule 47 to
assail a decision in a criminal case. Following Bitanga, this
Hence, the petition for annulment of judgment does not have Court cannot allow such recourse, there being no basis in law
any legal basis. or in the rules.
FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS and CARMELITA C. LLAMAS, DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, premises considered,
petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, the petition is DENIED.

Republic of the Philippines (Department of Environment and ISSUE:
Natural Resources), v. Technological Advocates for Agro- Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the
Forest Programs Association, Inc. (TAFPA, Inc.) finality of the trial court’s judgment.
G.R. No. 165333 ; February 9, 2010
HELD:
FACTS: NO. Under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
In 1995, respondent Technological Advocates for Agro-Forest the only grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud
Association, Inc., (TAFPA) and the Department of Environment and lack of jurisdiction.
and Natural Resources (DENR), Regional Office No. 9 entered
into a contract for community organizing activities, social In a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of
investigation, and information education campaign. jurisdiction, the petitioner must show not merely an abuse of
jurisdictional discretion, but an absolute lack of jurisdiction.
The respondent submitted Accomplishment Reports and
Request for Billing in 1998, and the Composite Inspection Under Section 21 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, the
Committee recommended the payment of P800,000. RTC exercises original jurisdiction in the issuance of the writ of
mandamus. The court deemed that the action is one for
However, Regional Executive Director of DENR Region 9 specific performance and proceeded to hear it as such.
informed the respondent that it owed DENR the amount of Furthermore, the same law grants the RTC exclusive original
P1,190,000.00 as penalty for delay in the submission of the jurisdiction over all cases in which the demand exceeds
reports. P100,000.00.
The Legal Division of the DENR Region 9 interpreted the Petition for Review on Certiorari
stipulation to refer to delays in the undertaking of the
community activities, social developments, training and DOCTRINE
consultations with community members, and not the
“Section 1 of Rule 47 provides that it does not allow a direct
submission of reports. The Program Director for National
recourse to a petition for annulment of judgment if other
Forestation Development Office on the other hand issued a
appropriate remedies are available, such as a petition for new
memorandum stating that the regional office was correct in its
trial, appeal or a petition for relief. If petitioner fails to avail of
imposition of the penalty clause.
these remedies without sufficient justification, she cannot
resort to the action for annulment of judgment under Rule 47,
In 1999, the respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court
for otherwise, she would benefit from her inaction or
(RTC), Zamboanga City, a special civil action for Mandamus
negligence.”
with Prayer for Damages. The RTC ruled in favor of the
respondent, stating that the language of the contract was FACTS
clear. The judgment became final and executory. A writ of
execution was issued upon the respondent’s motion. There are two preceding cases between the two parties to this
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation

G.R. No. 166819 June 16, 2010
and Motion asking the RTC to set aside the decision, but the
RTC denied the motion. The OSG filed a Notice of Appeal,
which was subsequently disapproved. SPOUSES ARCENAS, Petitioner,
vs.
The petitioner filed a petition for Annulment of Judgment QUEEN CITY DEVELOPMENT BANK, Respondent
before the Court of Appeals (CA) under Rule 47 based on the
following grounds: petition – the first being a petition filed by petitioners for
1. The action lies within the jurisdiction of the declaratory relief, wherein the bank filed its counterclaim, and
Commission on Audit; and another where petitioners initiated a case for breach of a
2. The private respondent did not exhaust contract of lease subject to the first case. These two cases were
administrative remedies; pending in the same RTC branch, and motion for consolidation
by petitioners was denied. On the second case, the parties
In 2004, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. It held that attempted to settle amicably, and on the first case, a proposal
resort to COA is only proper when the money claim is not yet by petitioners and a counter-proposal by the respondent bank
appropriated by law. It further held that the right to due was filed, with the RTC later ordering the parties to prepare
process of the petitioner was not violated given that it had one compromise agreement until December 4, 2003.
been given all opportunity to participate in the proceedings.

However, the second case still continued on to Pre-Trial, and 47 clearly states that extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground
petitioners were declared non-suited for allegedly violating the for annulment of order if it was availed of, or could have been
three-day notice rule on November 11, 2003. The RTC later availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief. Thus,
issued an order submitting the case for decision on January 8, extrinsic fraud is effectively barred if it could have been raised
2004, received by spouses on January 14, 2004. In response, as a ground in an available remedial measure.
petitioners alleged that they mistakenly believed that
respondent bank was seeking a settlement on both civil cases, Petitioner tries to justify her failure to avail of the appropriate
thus praying that the orders be lifted. This was denied. remedies on a promise of settlement. However, such promise
was not an excuse for petitioner's counsel not to lift the order
Thus, petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for annulment of of non-suit and to file a petition for relief.
order under Rule 47 seeking to annul the November 11, 2003
Order of non-suit on the ground of extrinsic fraud. The CA Petitioner's claim that she was present when respondent
dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioners failed to bank's counsel moved for the issuance of the order of non-suit
avail of the appropriate remedies without sufficient against her was not proven by any evidence.
justification before resorting to the petition for annulment of
order, as the petitioner should have filed a petition for relief There was indeed a failure satisfactorily show that petitioner
under Rule 38. could not have availed of the ordinary and appropriate
remedies under the Rules. Thus, she cannot resort to the
Later on, the RTC decided both cases before it, considering the remedy under Rule 47 of the Rules; otherwise, she would
contract of lease rescinded and ordering petitioners to pay benefit from her inaction or negligence.
actual damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses.
Petitioners filed a notice of appeal.
Petitioner Dolores, after the death of her spouse, later filed
DOCTRINE: A Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule
this instant petition for review on the CA’s decision.
47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy granted only under
ISSUE exceptional circumstances where a party, without fault on his
part, has failed to avail of the ordinary remedies of new trial,
• Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies. The
annulment of order filed by therein petitioners. (NO) same petition is not available as a substitute for a remedy
which was lost due to the party's own neglect in promptly
RULING
G.R. No. 207443 July 23, 2014
Section 1 of Rule 47 provides that it does not allow a direct
recourse to a petition for annulment of judgment if other GENATO INVESTMENTS, INC. petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE
appropriate remedies are available, such as a petition for new OSCAR P. BARRIENTOS, … respondents.
trial, appeal or a petition for relief. If petitioner fails to avail of
these remedies without sufficient justification, she cannot availing of the same. There is here no attempted substitution;
resort to the action for annulment of judgment under Rule 47, annulment of judgment is the only remedy available to
for otherwise, she would benefit from her inaction or petitioner.
negligence.
FACTS: TCT No. 33341 is registered under the name of
The spouses were declared non-suited for failure to appear at petitioner and covers two (2) adjacent parcels of land Lots
the pre-trial conference, and respondent bank was allowed to Nos. 1-A and 13-B-1 with a total assessed value of
present evidence on its counterclaim. There was no motion to P8,697,870.00.
lift the order of non-suit filed, and petitioner did not take an Due to alleged deficiency in real property taxes due on Lot No.
remedial action until the January 8 order. 13-B-1, the Office of the City Treasurer of Caloocan City sold
the lot at public auction in which private respondent emerged
Furthermore, petitioner’s counsel filed the Manifestation and
as the highest bidder.
Motion asking for reconsideration of the Order declaring the
Spouses Arcenas non-suited for honest mistake or excusable The Office of the City Treasurer, through the City Treasurer of
negligence, admitting all the material dates and only alleging Caloocan, Evelina M. Garma (respondent Garma), issued a
the mistaken belief that respondent bank was earnestly Certificate of Sale of Delinquent Property to Purchaser and a
seeking a settlement. There were no allegations of the Final Deed of Conveyance over Lot 13-B-1 in favor of private
commission of extrinsic fraud. respondent.
Petitioner should have filed a petition for relief under Rule 38 Petitioner was not made aware of any of the proceedings
within the period provided for by the Rules. Section 2 or Rule before the Office of the City Treasurer, as the Notice of

Levy and Warrant of Levy issued by the Office of the City direct private respondent to vacate the property and
Treasurer, through respondent Garma, were sent to petitioner surrender possession thereof to petitioner.
at an inexistent office in Tondo, Manila and were, thus,
returned unserved. CA: DISMISSED on the ground that the Petition for
Annulment of Judgment that petitioner filed is not the
By virtue of the above-mentioned final deed of proper remedy, as it had other available remedies to
conveyance, private respondent filed LRC-Case No. C-5748 question the Orders of the RTC Caloocan. The proper
with the RTC Caloocan praying for the consolidation of the remedy to annul said transfer was to file an action for
ownership of the property covered by TCT No. 33341, the reconveyance on the ground of fraud. Moreover, the
cancellation of the same TCT in the name of petitioner, and the Petition for Certiorari petitioner had earlier filed but later
issuance of a new title in the name of private respondent, withdrew showed that other remedies were available to
notwithstanding the fact that the delinquency sale involved petitioner. The CA, likewise, denied petitioner's motion for
only Lot No. 13-B-1. reconsideration.
The RTC issued an Order setting the initial hearing on ISSUE: WON the proper remedy for the petitioner is
the Petition, and directing that copies of the said order be Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47
posted at the subject premises and furnished petitioner. HELD: YES. We have repeatedly ruled that a Petition for
However, the records of the case, particularly the Certificate of Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is
Posting and the Process Server's Returns executed by a remedy granted only under exceptional circumstances where
respondent Jimmy T. Soro (respondent Soro), the Process a party, without fault on his part, has failed to avail of the
Server of RTC Caloocan, will show that the order was not ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or
posted at the subject premises, and that petitioner did not other appropriate remedies. The same petition is not available
receive any such copies of the Order, as respondent Soro as a substitute for a remedy which was lost due to the party's
sought to serve the same at the inexistent offices. own neglect in promptly availing of the same. There is
here no attempted substitution; annulment of judgment is the
After private respondent adduced its evidence, the RTC
only remedy available to petitioner.
Caloocan issued an Order granting private respondent's
petition. Inasmuch as petitioner was unaware of the The general rule is that a final and executory judgment
proceedings, the same order became final and executory. can no longer be disturbed, altered, or modified in any
Thereafter, RTC, upon motion of private respondent, issued respect, and that nothing further can be done but to execute
another Order directing the issuance of a Writ of Possession in it. A final and executory decision may, however, be
favor of private respondent. invalidated via a Petition for Relief or a Petition to Annul the
same under Rules 38 or 47, respectively, of the Rules of
Petitioner learned of the auction sale only when the Sheriff of
Court.
the RTC Caloocan, respondent Renebert B. Baloloy
(respondent Baloloy), left a Notice to Vacate in the subject Under Rule 38, when a judgment or final order is entered, or
premises. Petitioner claimed that it was very much surprised any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any
at the auction sale of Lot 13-B-1 because it had been religiously court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
paying its real property taxes thereon up to 2012. In fact, it had negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same
in its possession a Certification stating that the real property case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set
taxes due on Lots 1-A and 13-B-1 have been duly paid by aside. The verified petition must be filed within sixty (60) days
petitioner. after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or
other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6)
Notwithstanding the representations made by petitioner with months after such judgment or final order was entered.
the RTC Caloocan and Office of the City Treasurer, Baloloy, However, it is uncontested that petitioner learned about the
proceeded to implement the Writ of Possession over both proceedings in LRC-Case No. C-5748 more than six (6) months
lots and as a result thereof, private respondent wrested after the Order dated 31 August 2011 had become final and
physical possession of the entire property covered by TCT No. executory on 11 October 2011. Thus, this remedy under Rule
33341 from petitioner. 38 of the Rules of Court was clearly unavailing.
Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed with the CA a Petition Thus, the only remedy left to petitioner in this case is
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, but later a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47, which it,
withdrew the same. in fact, filed.
Petitioner, filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of It should be stressed that petitioner instituted the
Judgment praying, among others, for the annulment and case before the CA precisely to seek relief from the declaration
setting aside of the Orders and the Writ of Possession issued of nullity of TCT No. 33341, which had been issued without first
by the RTC Caloocan. Petitioner likewise prayed that the CA giving petitioner an opportunity to be heard.

Petitioner not only puts in question the complete lack before the service of the writ. RTC dismissed the complaint for
of due process in the conduct of the auction sale and the lack of cause of action. It opined that the issue on the alleged
proceedings before the RTC Caloocan, but the absolute lack of irregularity of the issuance of the writ of execution was
basis for the declaration by the Office of the City Treasurer that rendered moot by its implementation. It noted that Nena had
it had been delinquent in the payment of real property taxes already voluntarily relinquished her possession of the
due on its property, particularly Lot 13-B-1. property-including the building-before the demolition. It held
that Nena availed of the wrong remedy; instead of a petition
for annulment under Rule 47, Nena should have filed a petition
G.R. No. 193397 January 25, 2017 for relief from judgment under Rule 38. CA reversed the RTC.
It held that Nena correctly filed the petition for annulment
ESTRELLA MEJIA-ESPINOZA AND NORMA MEJIA with the RTC of Dagupan City in accordance with Section 10 of
DELLOSA, Petitioner Rule 47. It opined that because Nena did not receive a copy of
v. the order granting Espinoza's motion for issuance of writ of
NENA A. CARIÑO, Respondents execution, it "did not become final and executory insofar as
[Nena] is concerned.
ISSUE:
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI Whether or not Nena is correct in filing a petition for
annulment of judgment with the RTC?
DOCTRINE: Rule 47 does not apply to an action to annul the
levy and sale at public auction. Neither does it apply to an HELD:
action to annul a writ of execution because a writ of execution
is not a final order or resolution, but is issued to carry out the NO. Because Under the Rules, there are three requirements
mandate of the court in the enforcement of a final order or of that must be satisfied before a Rule 47 petition can prosper.
a judgment. It is a judicial process to enforce a final order or First, the remedy is available only when the petitioner can no
judgment against the losing party. longer resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies through no
FACTS: fault of the petitioner. This means that a Rule 47 petition is a
remedy of last resort-it is not an alternative to the ordinary
Espinoza was the plaintiff in an action for ejectment against remedies under Rules 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 43, and 45. Second,
respondent Nena A. Cariño before the Municipal Trial Court. an action for annulment of judgment may be based only on
The MTC rendered a joint decision in favor of Espinoza. It two grounds: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.33Third,
ordered Nena and Alberto to vacate the respective properties the action must be filed within the temporal window allowed
and to pay rents from time of default. Nena and Alberto by the Rules. The averments of Nena's complaint a quo,
separately appealed the joint decision to the Regional Trial however, do not make out an action for annulment of
Court. On Espinoza's petition for review, the Court of Appeals judgment or final order. It was therefore inaccurate for both
reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the MTC the CA 4th Division and the RTC Branch 41 to characterize it as
decision. An entry of judgment was issued. a Rule 47 petition. While the non-compliance with the
requisites laid down in Rule 47 is glaring-there is neither any
Nena filed a complaint captioned as "Annulment of Court's
averment in the complaint showing prima facie compliance
Processes with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary
with the aforementioned requisites nor even a reference to
Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction and/or Prohibition,
Rule 47- the first thing the lower courts should have
and Damages" before the RTC. Nena argued that she was
considered is the subject of the complaint. Nena is challenging
deprived of the opportunity to ask for reconsideration of the the MTC's order granting the issuance of the writ of execution,
order granting Espinoza's motion for issuance of writ of the writ of execution itself, as well as the sheriffs notice of levy
execution because she was not furnished a copy of the order. and notice of sale on her real property. Clearly, these are not
She claimed that Espinoza, illegally caused the demolition, the judgments or final orders contemplated by Rule 47. A final
without a special court order, of a one-story building which order or resolution is one which is issued by a court which
Nena allegedly constructed on the land subject of the disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a
ejectment suit. Furthermore, she questioned the levy on her particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be
commercial lot for being premature, as well as the done but to enforce by execution what has been determined
computation of the judgment debt. by the court. The proper remedy for Nena was to file a motion
to nullify the writ of execution and notices of levy and sale
Espinoza emphasized that the writ of execution was properly
before the MTC, instead of instituting a new complaint before
served and received by Nena and that Nena had already
the RTC. This is because the execution of a decision is merely
removed all her personal belongings from the premises weeks
incidental to the jurisdiction already acquired by a trial court.
RTC further issued a Writ of Execution authorizing the Sheriff
to attach sufficient properties belonging to the spouses.
Respondent filed a motion for clarificatory order seeking
MATEO ENCARNACION (Deceased), substituted by his further amendment of the writ of execution to expressly
heirs, namely: ELSA DEPLIAN-ENCARNACION, KRIZZA authorize the levy of the properties in the name of Mateo
MARIE D.
ENCARNACION, LORETA ENCARNACION, CARMELITA E. Mateo filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim claiming that he is
STADERMAN, CORAZON S. ENCARNACION, RIZALINA the owner of 14 parcels of land which were being levied.
ENCARNACION-PARONG, VICTORIA ENCARNACION-DULA,
MARIA More than 2 years after the Amended RTC decision, petitioners
HELEN ENCARNACION-DAY, TERESITA ENCARNACION- filed a petition for annulment of judgement before CA.
MANALANG,
GEORGE ENCARNACION, MARY MITCHIE E. EDWARDSON, CA denied the petition on the ground that the remedy of
ERNESTO annulment of judgment is improper because the order of RTC
ENCARNACION, MATEO ENCARNACION, JR., and GRACE is not final
WAGNER,
petitioners, vs. THOMAS JOHNSON, respondent. Issue: WON an action for annulment of judgment is the proper
remedy of a third party claimant of properties levied and sold
under an execution sale (NO)
Ruling: Owing to the extraordinary nature and objective of the
DOCTRINE: It is a condition sine qua non that one must have
remedy of annulment of judgment or final order, there are
availed of the proper remedies before
requirements that must be complied with before the remedy
resorting to the action for annulment of judgment..
is granted. First, the remedy is only available when the
petitioner can no longer resort to the ordinary remedies of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate
remedies through no fault of the petitioner. Second, the
FACTS:
ground for the remedy is limited to either extrinsic fraud or
lack of jurisdiction (although lack of due process has been cited
Respondent filed an action for breach of contract with prayer
as a ground by jurisprudence). Third, the time for availing the
for damages and costs against spouses Narvin Edwarson
remedy is set by the rules: if based on extrinsic fraud, it must
(Narvin) and Mary Mitchie Edwarson before the Vancouver
be filed within four years from the discovery of extrinsic fraud;
Registry of the Supreme Court of British Columbia, Canada.
if based on lack of jurisdiction, it must be brought before it is
Respondent alleged that Narvin and Mary convinced him to
barred by laches or estoppel. Fourth, the petition should be
invest his money and personal property in a vehicle leasing
verified and should allege with particularity the facts and law
company owned by the couple, which turned out to be a
relied upon, and those supporting the petitioner's good and
fraudulent business scheme. The couple neither deposited the
substantial cause of action or defense. Petitioners failed to
promised profits into his account nor gave an accounting or
show their standing to file the petition. They have also failed
explanation as to where his funds went.
to comply with the first requirement
Respondent moved that the Supreme Court of British
Columbia grant him a Mareva injunction, with ex juris affect.
Here, the action sought to be annulled is a recognition of
This was granted and the respondent was authorized to obtain
foreign judgment in a collection case rendered by the Supreme
orders in foreign jurisdictions which would permit its
Court of British Columbia filed by respondent against Narvin
enforcement in those jurisdictions. Subsequently, Supreme
and Mary. Once admitted and proven in a Philippine court, a
Court of British Columbia issued a Default Judgment finding
foreign judgment can only be repelled by the parties and their
Narvin and Mary liable.
successors in interest by subsequent title on grounds external
to its merits. Consequently, the right being enforced in the
Subsequently, respondent filed an action for recognition and
action is the subject of the collection case, which is a personal
enforcement of foreign judgment before RTC Olongapo, which
one against the couple and their successors in interest.
granted the same.
Considering the foregoing, Mateo is not a party who could be
adversely affected by the outcome of Civil Case No. 110- 0-
A restraining order was likewise issued by RTC preventing
2003.
Narvin and Mary from disposing and encumbering their
properties.
Furthermore, it is a condition sine qua non that one must have
availed of the proper remedies before resorting to the action

for annulment of judgment. There are, however, other 13, 2008. No resolution was as yet been issued resolving the
appropriate remedies available to Mateo that he could have said Motion. Upon verification of the status of their motion,
resorted to. Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides petitioner Nora discovered that there was already an Entry of
for the remedies of a third party claimant of an alleged Final Judgment on the case (for consolidation of ownership).
wrongfully levied property. Based on this section, a third-party This prompted the petitioners to file a Petition for Annulment
claimant has the following cumulative remedies: (a) he may of Judgment before the Court of Appeals grounded on lack of
avail of "terceria" by serving on the levying officer making the jurisdiction over their person.
levy an affidavit of his title, and serving also a copy to the
judgment creditor; (b) he may file a case for damages against CA: Dismissed the Petition for Annulment of Judgment based
the bond issued by the judgment debtor within 120 days from on two grounds:
the date of the filing of the bond; and (c) he may file "any 1. failure to attach certain documents
proper action" to vindicate his claim to the property. In this 2. failure to act immediately to have the case dismissed and
case, the proper recourse for petitioners is to vindicate and that they did not resort to ordinary remedies of appeal, new
prove their ownership over the properties in a separate trial, petition from relief from judgment and any other
action as allowed under Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of remedies.
Court.
MR filed by petitioners was denied.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not CA acted without jurisdiction or with

G.R. NO. 192472 JUNE 3, 2019 grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the Petition for
NORA ALVAREZ AND EDGAR ALVAREZ v. THE FORMER Annulment of Judgment? – YES
12TH DIVISION, CA
RULING: Annulment of judgment is a remedy in law
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 independent of the case presupposes the filing of a separate
and original action for the purpose of where the judgment
DOCTRINE: Under Section 5, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, it is sought to be annulled was rendered. It is a recourse that
incumbent that when a court finds no substantial merit in a annulling or avoiding a decision in another case. It is not a
petition for annulment of judgment, it may dismiss the petition continuation or progression of the same case, as in fact the
outright but the "specific reasons for such dismissal" shall be case it seeks to annul is already final and executory, but rather,
clearly set out as it is an extraordinary remedy that is equitable it is an extraordinary remedy that is equitable in character and
in character and is permitted only in exceptional cases. In this is permitted only in exceptional cases.
case, the dismissal through technical grounds by the CA of the
Petition for Annulment of Judgment exceeded the bounds of Under Section 5, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, it is incumbent
its jurisdiction. that when a court finds no substantial merit in a petition for
annulment of judgment, it may dismiss the petition outright
FACTS: The case arose from a petition for Consolidation of but the "specific reasons for such dismissal" shall be clearly set
Ownership filed by private respondent spouses Alejandro and out.
Rebecca Domantay over a parcel of land. It was alleged that
the former owners Nicanor Alvarez and Juanita Alvarez Here, the allegations in the petition clearly set forth the ground
executed a Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase over the of the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners.
subject land and that their heirs and assigns failed to It was alleged that petitioner Nora Alvarez was never
repurchase it. personally served with summons and petitioner Edgar Alvarez,
who is one of the heirs of the spouses Alvarez was not
Petitioner Nora Alvarez (one of the deendants in the impleaded as party-defendant in the case. Should the
abovementioned case) and some other defendants were never allegation of lack of jurisdiction be proven, then this would
served with summons. Thus, failed to file an Answer and was constitute a serious ground that could affect the validity of the
declared in default and private respondents Domantay were Court's judgment.
allowed to adduce evidence ex-parte.
The CA, instead, outrightly dismissed the petition based on
RTC: ordered the registration of the consolidated ownership of technical grounds. First, the CA did not give due course to the
the petitioner spouses Alejandro and Rebecca Domantay over petition as it is not compliant with Section 4, Rule 47 of the
the subject land. Rules of Court, for failure of the petitioners to attach with their
petition, documents supporting their cause of action. True,
Petitioners Nora Alvarez and Edgar Alvarez (who was not owing to the exceptional character of the remedy of
impleaded as party-defendant in the case) filed a Motion to Set annulment of judgment, the limitations and guidelines set
Aside Judgment By Way of Special Appearance on November forth by Rule 47 should be strictly complied with. A petition for

annulment which ignores or disregards any of these limitations
and guidelines cannot prosper. PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45
The petitioners submitted the said lacking documents in their DOCTRINE: the CA, on its own motion or that of the appellee,
motion for reconsideration. Without determining whether said may dismiss the appeal on the ground that appellant failed to
additional documents are relevant or not, it is more prudent pay the docket and other lawful fees. It is clear that the CA did
for the CA to have reconsidered their ruling of dismissal when not acquire jurisdiction over petitioner’s appeal except to
petitioners submitted the documents which were said to be order its dismissal
lacking thereby substantially complying with what was
required of them. FACTS:
Second, the CA dismissed the petition for failure to avail first Petitioner owned a reclaimed land in Barangay Tambo.
the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from
judgment or other appropriate remedies. If these remedies The City of Parañaque passed an Ordinance which provides a
were not availed of, petitioners must allege in their petition discount of 70% of the base value of the lots such as the lots
that said ordinary remedies are no longer available through no reclaimed and owned by petitioner.
fault on their part. It bears to stress that these mandatory
requirements apply only when the ground for the petition for An tax assessment was done to petitioner but the rates applied
annulment of judgment is extrinsic fraud. lf the petition for was that of Barangay Baclaran’s which is higher than those
annulment of judgment is based on lack of jurisdiction, applicable to Barangay Tambo.
petitioners need not allege that the ordinary remedies of new
trial, reconsideration or appeal were no longer available Due to the wrongful assessment, petitioner did not pay the tax
through no fault on their part. and hence was declared delinquent and it’s properties were
included in the auction sale.
Likewise, petitioners consistently maintained that the RTC did
not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, due to the invalid Petitioner filed with the RTC a Complaint for collection of
service of summons and failure to implead one of the heirs in excess real property taxes.
the case. It was notable from the said motion that it was filed
by way of special appearance, that is, to question only the Petitioner argued that it should have paid only ₱6,172,979.516
jurisdiction of the Court over their persons. No other instead of ₱111,424,157.107 pursuant to the Ordinance. Thus,
affirmative relief was being sought. Hence, the said filing of the petitioner claimed that the City of Parañaque is liable to return
Motion cannot be considered as a voluntary submission to the the excess realty taxes under the principle of solutio indebiti.
jurisdiction of the RTC.
Respondent moved for the dismissal of the case on the
Thus, on the bases of the allegations in the petition as well as following grounds: (1) the cause of action is barred by prior
the appropriate supporting documents, there is a prima facie judgment or by the statute of limitations; (2) the court has no
case of annulment of judgment that could warrant the CA's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim; and (3) the
favorable action. The bottom line is that if the allegations in complaint is filed in violation of the rule on forum shopping.
the Petition for Annulment of Judgment turned out to be true,
then the RTC Decision would be void and the CA would have The RTC dismissed the petition.
been duty-bound to strike it down.
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal before the CA but was
Thus, the CA has exceeded the bounds of its jurisdiction when dismissed for non-payment of docket and other lawful fees.
it outrightly dismissed the Petition on a very strict
interpretation of technical rules. The Court finds it more ISSUE:
prudent to remand the case to the CA for further proceedings
to first resolve the above-discussed jurisdictional issue Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing petitioner’s appeal
for late payment of docket fees
RULES 48-50
HELD:
G.R. No. 170728 August 31, 2011
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
D. M. WENCESLAO AND ASSOCIATES, INC., Petitioner, vs. Procedure, as amended, the CA, on its own motion or that of
CITY OF PARAÑAQUE, PARAÑAQUE CITY ASSESSOR, the appellee, may dismiss the appeal on the ground that
PARAÑAQUE CITY TREASURER and PARAÑAQUE CITY appellant failed to pay the docket and other lawful fees.
COUNCIL, Respondents.

Additionally, petitioner has not shown any reason such as Thus, PBCOM filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus
fraud, accident, mistake, excusable negligence, or a similar with the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
supervening casualty which should justify the relaxation of the
rules. The explanation advanced by petitioner’s counsel that ISSUE
the failure to pay the appellate docket and other legal fees
within the prescribed period was due to his extremely heavy • Whether or not the instant petition should be given due
workload and by excusable inadvertence does not convince us. course despite the availment of the wrong remedy. (YES)
RULING
G.R. No. 166819 June 16, 2010
The PBCOM availed of the wrong mode of appeal in bringing
SPOUSES ARCENAS, Petitioner, the case before the Court. A petition for certiorari under Rule
vs. 65 is not the proper remedy to assail the July 31, 2014 Decision
QUEEN CITY DEVELOPMENT BANK, Respondent and May 5, 2015 Resolution of the CA. In Mercado v. Valley
Mountain Mines Exploration, Inc., the Court held that the
Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus proper remedy should have been a petition or review under
Rule 45, as the same rule provides that decisions, final orders
DOCTRINE or resolutions of the CA in any case, regardless of the nature of
the action or proceeding involved, may be appealed by filing a
“Moreover, while it is a settled rule that a special civil action petition for review, which would be a continuance of the
for certiorari under Rule 65 will not lie unless a motion for appellate process, unlike a petition for certiorari, which is a
reconsideration is filed before the respondent court; there are special civil action.
well-defined exceptions established by jurisprudence, such as
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo However, under exceptional circumstances, as when stringent
has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the application of the rules will result in manifest injustice, the
certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon Court may set aside technicalities and proceed with the
by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed appeal.
upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity
for the resolution of the question and any further delay would Considering that what is at stake in the present case is PBCOMs
prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner statutory right to appeal and the amplest opportunity for the
or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, proper and just determination of its cause, the Court resolves
under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would to set aside PBCOM’s procedural mistake and give due course
be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process to its petition.
and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal
In this case, the CA appears to have confused the RTC Order
case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting
dismissing PBCOM’s complaint with the RTC order denying
of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the
PBCOM’s notice of appeal, and mistakenly ruled that the
proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due
petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by PBCOM was a
process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which
wrong mode of appeal. Here, PBCOM raised the issue of the
the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the
disallowance of the notice of appeal, whose remedy is a
issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is
special civil action under Rule 65. Contrary to the CA’s finding,
involved.”
PBCOM availed itself of the correct remedy in questioning the
FACTS disallowance of its appeal.
The case originated from a Complaint for collection of a sum of Moreover, the general rule that a special civil action for
money filed by PBCOM against private respondents. Private certiorari under Rule 65 will not lie admits of exceptions, such
respondents moved for the dismissal of the Complaint, alleging as where the order is a patent nullity, and where the court a
that their obligation had already been paid in full and that the quo has no jurisdiction.
RTC had no jurisdiction over the case because PBCOM failed to
The authority to dismiss an appeal for being an improper
pay the correct docket fees.
remedy is specifically vested upon the CA and not the RTC.
The RTC issued an order directing the payment of additional Rule 50, Section 1 of the Rules states that an appeal may be
docket fees. PBCOM paid, but filed its compliance late. In the dismissed by the CA, on its own motion or on that of the
interim, however, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the appellee, on the ground that the fact that the order or
complaint. The RTC denied PBCOM’s motion for judgment appealed from is not appealable. This is exclusive
reconsideration. PBCOM filed a notice of appeal, which was only to the CA, as the RTC is not authorized to dismiss appeals
denied by the RTC, holding that it was not the proper remedy. on said grounds.

Therefore, the RTC acted without or in excess of its vote cast by a member of the Court after the deliberation is
jurisdiction. always understood to be subject to confirmation at the time
he has to sign the decision that is to be promulgated. The vote
RULE 51: JUDGMENT is of no value if it is not thus confirmed by the Justice casting
it. The purpose of this practice is apparent. Members of this
Court, even after they have cast their votes, wish to preserve
their freedom of action till the last moment when they have to
sign the decision, so that they may take full advantage of what
JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG , petitioner, vs. COMMISSION they may believe to be the best fruit of their most mature
ON reflection and deliberation. In consonance with this practice,
ELECTIONS, NAPOLEON N. CAMERO and RENALD F. before a decision is signed and promulgated, all opinions and
VILLANDO , conclusions stated during and after the deliberation of the
respondents. Court, remain in the breasts of the Justices, binding upon no
one, not even upon the Justices themselves. Of course, they
may serve for determining what the opinion of the majority
provisionally is and for designating a member to prepare the
DOCTRINE: A Decision must not only be signed by the Justices decision of the Court, but in no way is that decision binding
who took part in the deliberation, but must also be unless and until signed and promulgated.
promulgated to be considered a Decision. A true Decision of the
Court is the decision signed by the Justices and duly Thus, an unpromulgated decision is no decision at all. At the
promulgated. Before that decision is so signed and very least, they are part of the confidential internal
promulgated, there is no decision of the Court to speak of.” deliberations of the Court which must not be released to the
public. A decision becomes binding only after it is validly
FACTS: promulgated. Until such operative act occurs, there is really no
decision to speak of, even if some or all of the Justices have
The Supreme Court granted petitioner’s petition for certiorari already affixed their signatures thereto. During the intervening
in reversing the Joint Resolution issued by the respondent period from the time of signing until the promulgation of the
which disqualified her as a congressional candidate of Negros decision, any one who took part in the deliberation and had
Oriental for failure to meet the citizenship requirement. signed the decision may, for a reason, validly withdraw one's
vote, thereby preserving one's freedom of action.
Louis Biraogo filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the ground G.R. No. 178309 January 27, 2009
that the promulgated decision is a complete turn-around from
the ruling of Justice Ruben Reyes signed by 14 Associate AKLAN COLLEGE, INC., Petitioner
Justices and approved by the Court En Banc. He contends that v.
this is a violation of the constitution as there was no PERPETUO ENERO, ARLYN CASTIGADOR, NUENA
explanation for the completely different decision SERMON and JOCELYN ZOLINA, Respondents
promulgated.

Issue: WON Biraogo’s contention is correct (NO)
DOCTRINE: The CA may reverse the decision of the lower
Ruling: The Supreme Court explained that at any time before tribunal on the basis of grounds other than those raised as
promulgation, the ponencia may be changed by the ponente. errors on appeal in the following instances: … (3) Matters not
Indeed, if any member of the court who may have already assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is
signed it so desires, he may still withdraw his concurrence and necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete
register a qualification or dissent as long as the decision has resolution of the case or to serve the interest of justice or to
not yet been promulgated. A promulgation signifies that on the avoid dispensing piecemeal justice.
date it was made the judge or judges who signed the decision
continued to support it. FACTS:
Petitioner is an educational institution in Aklan, while

The SC elaborated that a Decision must not only be
respondents were high school teachers of petitioner. In 1995,
signed by the Justices who took part in the deliberation,but
high school students of the College held mass actions against
must also be promulgated to be considered a Decision. A true
the principal of the high school department at the public plaza
Decision of the Court is the decision signed by the Justices and
opposite the school. The demonstrations were held with
duly promulgated. Before that decision is so signed and
validly issued permits from the Office of the Mayor. Petitioner
promulgated, there is no decision of the Court to speak of. The
averred that the protest rallies were in the nature of illegal than those raised as errors on appeal in the following
strikes instigated by the respondents and not purely student instances: (1) Grounds not assigned as errors but affecting
demonstrations. An administrative investigation was jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) Matters not assigned
conducted at which respondents were given an opportunity to as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors
explain their side. Thereafter, respondents were dismissed within contemplation of law; (3) Matters not assigned as errors
from employment for causes provided in the Labor Code, on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at
Education Act of 1982, and Manual of Regulations for Private a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve
Schools. Respondents filed a case for illegal dismissal against the interest of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice;
petitioner before the Labor Arbiter (LA). They alleged that (4) Matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but
what took place was a peaceful assembly wherein the students raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some
demonstrated their sympathy on what they perceived to be bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise
wrongs committed by the high school principal against some or which the lower court ignored; (5) Matters not assigned as
teachers. They maintained that they did not instigate the errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned; and
students to rally. The Labor Arbiter ruled that there was an (6) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which
illegal dismissal. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision of the determination of a question properly assigned, is
the LA. The CA held that the failure of the dismissed teachers dependent.
to question the NLRC’s denial of the MR, the Decision became
final and executory as to them, thus, limiting the issue to be The CA committed no reversible error in increasing the
resolved to that presented by petitioner, i.e., the propriety of amounts of the 13th month pay and the SIL pay in order to
the award of 13th month pay and SIL pay to the dismissed correct the error committed by the NLRC in the computation.
teachers. It also held that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse The instant controversy falls squarely under the third
of discretion in awarding respondents 13th month pay and SIL exception enumerated above. A just, fair and complete
pay. resolution of the case necessarily entails the correct
computation of these benefits. To avoid dispensing piecemeal
ISSUE: justice, the full period of employment of respondents was
rightfully considered by the CA in the computation of the 13th
Whether or Not The Court Of Appeals Committed Grave Abuse month pay and the SIL pay. The procedural lapse on the part
Of Discretion when it increased the monetary awards of 13th of the NLRC in this case in failing to take into account the
month pay and service incentive leave pay in favor of the non- number of years when the private respondents did not receive
appealing private respondents? their 13th Month and SIL Pay cannot defeat their right to
receive these benefits as granted under substantive law. This
HELD: Court simply could not uphold an erroneous computation of
the said unpaid benefits. Hence, it had to re-compute, and as
No. As a rule, a party who does not appeal from the decision
a consequence, increased it.
may not obtain any affirmative relief from the appellate court
other than what he has obtained from the lower tribunal, if G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992
any, whose decision is brought up on appeal. Due process
prevents the grant of additional awards to parties who did not ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF
appeal. As an exception, he may assign an error where the APPEALS, THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding
purpose is to maintain the judgment on other grounds, but he Judge, Branch 168, Regional Trial Court, NCJR Pasig, M.M.,
cannot seek modification or reversal of the judgment or and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
affirmative relief unless he has also appealed or filed a
separate petition. In this case, the CA is not precluded from
FACTS: Petitioner, while traveling in the wrong direction on a
affirming, reversing or modifying the decision of the NLRC on
one-way street, almost had a collision with another vehicle.
the propriety of payment of 13th month pay and SIL pay to the
Petitioner thereafter got out of his car, shot the driver of the
respondents. It is the propriety of the award of these benefits
other vehicle, and drove off. An eyewitness of the incident was
which were precisely the issues raised by petitioner in its
able to take down petitioner’s plate number and reported the
appeal before the said appellate court. Section 8, Rule 51
same to the police, who subsequently ordered a manhunt for
provides that only those issues assigned as errors will be
petitioner. 6 days after the shooting, petitioner presented
considered in the appealed decision. The appealing party is
himself in the police station, accompanied by 2 lawyers, the
legally required to indicate in his brief an assignment of errors,
police detained him. Subsequently a criminal charge was
and only those assigned shall be considered by the appellate
brought against him. Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor
court in deciding the case. However, this is not without
filed the case to the lower court, setting and commencing trial
qualification, for the appellate court is accorded a broad
without preliminary investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the
discretionary power to waive the lack of proper assignment of
petitioner has waived his right to preliminary investigation as
errors and to consider errors not assigned. The CA may reverse
bail has been posted and that such situation, that petitioner
the decision of the lower tribunal on the basis of grounds other
has been arrested without a warrant lawfully, falls under The Court resolved the case of Natalia Realty v. CA and Antonio
Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985 Rules Martinez, et al., dated November 12, 2002, denying the
of Criminal Procedure which provides for the rules and petitioner’s petition for certiorari. It ordered the RTC to issue
procedure pertaining to situations of lawful warrantless an Alias Writ of Execution granting possession to private
arrests. Petitioner in his petition for certiorari assails such respondents. The decision is immediately executory.
procedure and actions undertaken and files for a preliminary
investigation. Before the Court are two motions filed by the private
respondents, a Motion for Execution against TRO Bond
ISSUE: (Manager’s Check), and Manifestation with Motion for Entry of
1. Whether warrantless arrest of petitioner was lawful. Judgment.
2. Whether petitioner effectively waived his right to
preliminary investigation. The petitioner argues with regards to the execution against the
TRO Bond that a hearing should be conducted to determine
RULING: Petitioner and prosecutor err in relying on Umil v. the extent of the damage suffered by the private respondent.
Ramos, wherein the Court upheld the warrantless arrest as It invoked Section 18 of Rule 57.
valid effected 1 to 14 days from actual commission of the
offenses, which however constituted “continuing crimes,” i.e. The private respondents on the other hand claimed that they
subversion, membership in an outlawed organization, etc. would rather withdraw the Motion for Execution against TRO
There was no lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule Bond if it would delay the immediate execution of the Court’s
113. This is because the arresting officers were not actually decision.
there during the incident, thus they had no personal
knowledge and their information regarding petitioner were ISSUE:
derived from other sources. Further, Section 7, Rule 112, does Whether or not an entry of judgment is required in the present
not apply. case.
Petitioner was not arrested at all, as when he walked in the HELD:

police station, he neither expressed surrender nor any NO. Section 1 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that
statement that he was or was not guilty of any crime. When a before a writ of execution could be issued, the judgment
complaint was filed to the prosecutor, preliminary obligee must first apply for execution with the court of origin
investigation should have been scheduled to determine and with notice to the adverse party.
probable cause. Prosecutor made a substantive error,
petitioner is entitled to preliminary investigation, necessarily The judgment obligee must submit certified true copies of the
in a criminal charge, where the same is required appear judgment sought to be enforced, and the entry of such
thereat. Petition granted, prosecutor is ordered to conduct judgment. As a general rule, entry of judgment is required
preliminary investigation, trial for the criminal case is before a writ of execution could be issued.
suspended pending result from preliminary investigation,
petitioner is ordered released upon posting a bail bond. However, Section 11 of Rule 51 provides that - except where
the judgment or final order or resolution, or a portion thereof,
is ordered to be immediately executory, the motion for its
Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals execution may only be filed in the proper court after its entry.
G.R. No. 126462 ; February 5, 2003
As long as the private respondents have on motion applied for
FACTS: a writ of execution, with notice to the adverse party, and
Natalia Realty, Inc. filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) submitted certified true copies of the judgment sought to be
an action for the recovery of possession of two parcels of land enforced, the RTC should comply with the Court’s directive.
against private respondents. The RTC dismissed the case and The absence of records and entry of judgment should not be
ordered the petitioner to surrender possession of portions of an excuse in delaying the execution of the Court’s decision
the property to private respondents. The petitioner’s motion which it declares to be ‘immediately executory’.
for reconsideration was denied for being filed out of time.
G.R. No. 167693 September 19, 2006
The petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition (Formerly G.R. Nos. 147678-87)
for certiorari. However, the petition was dismissed for being
filed out of time, and that the decision of the RTC had become PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MELCHOR
final and executory. CABALQUINTO, appellant.

DOCTRINE: The posting of the full text of decisions in cases telephone number, school, business
involving child abuse on the Supreme Court Web Page violates address, employer, or other identifying
the right to privacy of the aggrieved parties. The fact that the information of a victim or an immediate
aggrieved child may have consented, through a parent or family member, without the latter's
guardian, to a public hearing of the case does not negate the consent, shall be liable to the contempt
expectation of privacy which the child may later invoke because power of the court.
child victims cannot be presumed to have intended their initial
agreement to extend beyond the termination of their case to Any person who violates this
the posting of the decision reached by the Court on the Web provision shall suffer the penalty of one (1)
Page. year imprisonment and a fine of not more
than Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
FACTS: Cabalquinto was convicted by the RTC on two (2) (P500,000.00).
counts for the rape of his eight-year-old daughter, AAA. The
dispositive portion of the decision states: Likewise, the Rule on Violence Against Women and
their Children states:
The records of the case were thereafter forwarded to the SC
on automatic review. The SC issued a Resolution requiring the Sec. 40. Privacy and
parties to submit their respective briefs. The parties complied. confidentiality of proceedings. — All
The SC then issued a Resolution transferring the case to the hearings of cases of violence against
Court of Appeals for appropriate action. women and their children shall be
conducted in a manner consistent with the
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The case is again dignity of women and their children and
before SC for the final disposition. The conviction is affirmed. respect for their privacy.
ISSUE: WON it is proper for the Court to post in its Internet Records of the cases shall be
Web Page the full text of decisions in cases involving child treated with utmost confidentiality.
sexual abuse Whoever publishes or causes to be
published, in any format, the name,
HELD: NO. The provisions on confidentiality of law enactments address, telephone number, school,
uniformly seek to respect the dignity and protect the privacy business address, employer or other
of women and their children. Sec. 29 of RA 7610 provides: identifying information of the parties or an
Sec. 29. Confidentiality. — at the immediate family or household member,
instance of the offended party, his name without their consent or without authority
may be withheld from the public until the of the court, shall be liable for contempt of
court acquires jurisdiction over the case. court and shall suffer the penalty of one
year imprisonment and a fine of not more
It shall be unlawful for any editor, than Five Hundred Thousand
publisher, and reporter or columnist in (P500,000.00) Pesos.
case of printed materials, announcer or
producer in the case of television and It is worth mentioning in this connection that the Court has
radio broadcasting, producer and director resolved to refrain from posting in its Internet Web Page the
in the case of the movie industry, to cause full text of decisions in cases involving child sexual abuse in
undue and sensationalized publicity of any response to a letter from a mother of a child abuse victim
case of a violation of this Act which results addressed to the Chief Justice expressing anxiety over the
in the moral degradation and suffering of posting of full text decisions of the Supreme Court on its
the offended party. Internet Web Page. The mother submitted that confidentiality
and the best interest of the child must prevail over public
Sec. 44 of RA 9262 similarly provides: access to information and pleaded that her daughter's case, as
well as those of a similar nature, be excluded from the Web
Sec. 44. Confidentiality. — All
Page.
records pertaining to cases of violence
against women and their The Court required the Office of the Solicitor General
children including those in the barangay (OSG), the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), National
shall be confidential and all public officers Press Club (NPC), Philippine Press Institute (PPI), Kapisanan ng
and employees and public or private mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP) and the Department of Social
clinics or hospitals shall respect the right Welfare and Development (DSWD) to comment on whether or
to privacy of the victim. Whoever not it is proper to post the full text of decisions of similar cases
publishes or causes to be published, in any on the Supreme Court Web Page.
format, the name, address,
The OSG submits that the posting of the full text of decisions victims-survivors or any other information tending to establish
in cases involving child abuse on the Supreme Court Web Page or compromise their identities, as well those of their
violates the right to privacy of the aggrieved parties. In order immediate family or household members, shall not be
to determine whether the subject matter upon which the right disclosed.
to privacy being invoked falls within the constitutionally-
protected zone of privacy, it must be shown that the person's MERCURY GROUP OF COMPANIES, INC., petitioner, vs.
expectation of privacy is reasonable. The reasonableness of HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND, respondent.
such expectancy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether by G.R. No. 171438. December 19, 2007. SECOND DIVISION.
his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of CARPIO-MORALES, J
privacy; and (2) whether this expectation is one that society
recognizes as reasonable. CADHcI FACTS:
The law of the case doctrine cannot be adhered to when the
According to the OSG, the fact that the aggrieved child may same will result in an unjust decision.
have consented, through a parent or guardian, to a public
hearing of the case does not negate the expectation of privacy P.D. No. 1752, the ―Home Development Mutual Fund Law of
which the child may later invoke because child victims cannot 1980 created the Pag-IBIG Fund System. Under P.D. No. 1752,
be presumed to have intended their initial agreement to coverage of the Pag-IBIG Fund is mandatory for all employees
extend beyond the termination of their case to the posting of covered by the SSS and the GSIS and their employers. The law
the decision reached by the Court on the Web Page. Moreover, provides, however, for a waiver or suspension from coverage
such an expectation of privacy is reasonable considering the or participation in the Fund. Upon the effectivity of the law in
various statutes and rules which reveal the intention of the 1980 up to 1995, Mercury Drug and its subsidiaries were, on
State to maintain the confidentiality of information pertaining their application, annually granted waiver from coverage of
to child abuse cases. the Fund because their Retirement or Provident Plan was
superior to it.
In conclusion, the OSG suggests the adoption of a system of
coding which could include the use of pseudonyms in cases of In 1995, the Board of Trustees of Home Development Mutual
a similar nature. Short of withdrawing the full text of decisions Fund (HDMF), issued Amendment to the Rules and Regulations
in such cases from the Web Page, the OSG proposes that the Implementing R.A. No. 7742. Under the Amendment and the
Court instead replace the material information, such as the Guidelines, an employer with a provident/retirement and
name of the child-victim, in its decisions. housing plan superior to that provided under the Pag-IBIG
The DSWD imparted the same sentiment. It submits that the Fund is entitled to execution/waiver from Fund coverage. In
court records of child abuse cases should be treated with strict 1996, HDMF had once again amended the Rules and
confidentiality not only throughout the court proceedings, but Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 1752, as amended, this
even after the promulgation of the decision in order to protect time limiting waiver from Fund coverage only to ―distressed
the right to privacy of the child and her family and to preclude employers‖. Mercury then filed a petition for certiorari and
instances where undue disclosure of information may impair prohibition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to
the treatment and rehabilitation of the child-victim. declare null and void the 1996 amendment to the Rules and
Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 1752, as amended. By
The SC likewise appreciates the separate comments of the KBP Order, RTC dismissed Mercury‘s petition for certiorari on the
and NPC. The KBP informs the Court that its members have ground that it failed to exhaust administrative remedies, and
agreed not to identify in their broadcasts the names of children that HDMU‘s questioned amendment of the implementing
who are victims of abuse or are in conflict with the law. The rules was made in the exercise of its legislative/administrative,
NPC, on the other hand, tells us that the prevailing media not judicial, function. The Court of Appeals affirmed HDMF‘s
practice is to inquire whether these individuals wish to have denial
their names appear in the report. If they do not, media would of Mercury‘s request applying the law of the case doctrine.
normally take off the names and merely provide a very general
description of the individual in recognition of the need to ISSUE: Whether or not the law of the case doctrine will apply
carefully balance the right to information with the welfare of in this case.
the parties involved.
HELD: NO. Law of the case has been defined as the opinion
Taking all these opinions into account and in view of recent
delivered on a former appeal. More specifically, it means that
enactments which unequivocally express the intention to
whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling
maintain the confidentiality of information in cases
legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same
involving violence against women and their children, in this
case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on
case and henceforth, the Court shall withhold the real name of
general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such
the victim-survivor and shall use fictitious initials instead to
decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case
represent her. Likewise, the personal circumstances of the
before the court.
The RTC found Avila guilty of simple negligence, and ordered
"Law of the case" has been de􏰁ned as the opinion delivered on him to pay the defendants together with Philippine Hawk
a former appeal. . . . It is a rule of general application that the Corporation the sum of ₱745,575.00 representing loss of
decision of an appellate court in a case is the law to the case earnings and actual damages plus ₱50,000.00 as moral
on the points presented throughout all the subsequent damages.
proceedings in the case in both the trial and appellate courts
and no question necessarily involved and decided on that On appeal by petitioner, the CA affirmed the decision of the
appeal will be considered on a second appeal or writ of error RTC and modified the amounts as follows: (a) ₱168,019.55 as
in the same case, provided the facts and issues are actual damages; (b) ₱10,000.00 as temperate damages; (c)
substantially the same as those on which the first question ₱100,000.00 as moral damages; (d) ₱590,000.00 as unearned
rested and, according to some authorities, provided the income; and (e) ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity
decision is on the merits.
ISSUE:
The doctrine of the law of the case does not apply to the
present case vis a vis the decision of this Court in G.R. No. Whether or not the CA erred in awarding other kinds of
132416. The present case is not a subsequent proceeding of damages in favor of respondent
the same case — G.R. No. 132416. This is an entirely new one
which was commenced by petitioner's filing of an original HELD:
petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus before the
Court of Appeals against respondent. The Court of Appeals correctly awarded civil indemnity for the
death of respondent’s husband, temperate damages, and
In fine, the doctrine of the law of the case cannot be made to moral damages for the physical injuries sustained by
apply to the case at bar, hence, petitioner's application for respondent in addition to the damages granted by the trial
waiver from Fund coverage for the year 1996 must be court to respondent. The trial court overlooked awarding the
processed by respondent. additional damages, which were prayed for by respondent in
her Amended Complaint. The appellate court is clothed with
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review ample authority to review matters, even if they are not
on Certiorari is GRANTED. Respondent is enjoined to process assigned as errors in the appeal, if it finds that their
petitioner's application for waiver from Pag-IBIG Fund consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the
coverage for the year 1996. case.
Section 8, Rule 51 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

G.R. No. 166869 February 16, 2010 provides:
SEC. 8. Questions that may be decided. -- No error which does
PHILIPPINE HAWK CORPORATION, Petitioner, not affect the jurisdiction over the subject matter or the
vs. validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings
VIVIAN TAN LEE, Respondent. therein will be considered unless stated in the assignment of
errors, or closely related to or dependent on an assigned error
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 and properly argued in the brief, save as the court pass upon
plain errors and clerical errors.
DOCTRINE: The appellate court is clothed with ample
authority to review matters, even if they are not assigned as Philippine National Bank v. Rabat cited the book of Justice
errors in the appeal, if it finds that their consideration is Florenz D. Regalado to explain the section above, thus:
necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case
In his book, Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado commented on this
FACTS: section, thus:
Respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioner. 1. Sec. 8, which is an amendment of the former Sec. 7 of this
She testified that she and her husband were riding a Rule, now includes some substantial changes in the rules on
motorcycle and when they were about to make a turn, the bus assignment of errors. The basic procedural rule is that only
owned by petitioner and driven by Avila, petitioner’s employee errors claimed and assigned by a party will be considered by
hit them as it was running at fast speed. the court, except errors affecting its jurisdiction over the
subject matter. To this exception has now been added errors
Avila denied the allegations. affecting the validity of the judgment appealed from or the
proceedings therein.

Also, even if the error complained of by a party is not expressly The appellate court denied the motion for new trial of
stated in his assignment of errors but the same is closely petitioner on the following grounds:
related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly (1) the Affidavit of merit attached to the motion alleged that
argued in his brief, such error may now be considered by the efforts were exerted to locate unnamed witnesses only after
court. These changes are of jurisprudential origin. the court's decision was handed down, and
(2) the unnamed witnesses would allegedly shed light on the
2. The procedure in the Supreme Court being generally the fact of grave illness of the testatrix as well as the undue
same as that in the Court of Appeals, unless otherwise influence exerted on her which are merely corroborative or
indicated (see Secs. 2 and 4, Rule 56), it has been held that the cumulative since these facts were brought to light during the
latter is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even trial.
if they are not assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their
consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the The motion for reconsideration of petitioner was likewise
case. Also, an unassigned error closely related to an error denied by the appellate court on the ground that the affidavit
properly assigned, or upon which the determination of the of one Patricia Delgado submitted with the motion constitutes
question raised by error properly assigned is dependent, will cumulative evidence and the motion being in reality a second
be considered by the appellate court notwithstanding the motion for reconsideration which is prescribed by law.
failure to assign it as error
ISSUE/S:
It may also be observed that under Sec. 8 of this Rule, the 1. W/N the CA erred in denying petitioners' motion for new
appellate court is authorized to consider a plain error, although trial on the ground that the evidence sought to be presented
it was not specifically assigned by the appellant, otherwise it is merely cumulative (NO)
would be sacrificing substance for technicalities. 2. W/N the CA erred in denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of the resolution denying the aforesaid
motion for new trial
RULES 52 & 53
HELD: The lone affidavit of a witness who was already
G.R. NO. 76648 February 26, 1988 presented said the hearing is hardly sufficient to justify the
THE HEIRS OF THE LATE MATILDE MONTINOLASANSON holding of new trial. The alleged new witnesses were unnamed
petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS and EDUARDO F. without any certainty as, to their appearance before the court
HERNANDEZ, respondents. to testify. Affiant attests only on his belief that they would
testify if and when they are subpoenaed by the court.
FACTS: This is a petition filed by respondent Atty. Eduardo F.
Hernandez seeking the probate of the holographic will of the Furthermore, the allegations in the affidavit as to the undue
late Herminia Montinola. The testatrix, who died single, influence exerted on the testatrix are mere conclusions and
parentless and childless devised in this will several of her real not statement of facts. The requisite affidavits must state facts
properties to specified persons. Private respondent who was and not mere conclusions or opinions, otherwise they are not
named executor in the will filed an urgent motion for valid. The affidavits are required to avoid waste of the court's
appointment of special administrator. time if the newly discovered evidence turns out to be
immaterial or of any evidentiary weight.
Matilde Montinola Sanson (petitioner), the only surviving
sister of the deceased but who was not named in the said will, Moreover, it could not be said that the evidence sought to be
filed her Opposition to Probate of Will. presented is new having been discovered only after the trial. It
is apparent from the allegations of affiant that efforts to locate
After a hearing on the merits, the probate court, finding the the witnesses were exerted only after the decision of the
evidence presented in support of the petition to be conclusive appellate court was handed down. The trial lasted for about
and overwhelming, rendered its decision allowing the probate four years so that petitioner had ample time to find said
of the disputed will. Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto alleged witnesses who were admittedly known to her.
the decision.
The evidence which the petitioner now propose to present
Petitioner filed with the respondent court a motion for new could have been discovered and presented during the hearing
trial. Attached to her motion was the Affidavit of Merit of of the case, and there is no sufficient reason for concluding
Gregorio Montinola Sanson, petitioner's son, alleging that that had the petitioner exercised proper diligence she would
witnesses have been located whose testimonies could shed not have been able to discover said evidence.
light as to the ill health of the testatrix as well as undue
influence exerted on the latter. In addition, We agree with the appellate court that since the
alleged illness of the testatrix as well as the charges of undue

influence exerted upon her had been brought to light during having expired without the petitioners exercising their right of
the trial, and new evidence on this point is merely redemption, ownership of the five parcels of land was
corroborative and cumulative which is generally not a ground transferred to the private respondent.
for new trial. Accordingly, such evidence even if presented win
not carry much probative weight which can alter the judgment. Planters sent a letter of demand to the petitioners to vacate
the premises, but the demand was rejected. It then filed a
It is very patent that the motion for new trial was filed by petition for the issuance of a writ of possession before the RTC.
petitioner only for the purpose of delaying the proceedings. In When the petition wan set for hearing, no oppositor appeared
fact, petitioners son in his manifestation admitted that he had nor was a written opposition filed. Upon motion, Planters was
to request a new law firm to do everything legally possible to allowed to present its evidence ex parte. However, the spouses
meet the deadline for the filing of a motion for reconsideration Navarro and the RRRC Development Corporation filed their
and/or for new trial. This would explain the haphazard written opposition, alleging inter alia that they were the
preparation of the motion, thus failing to comply with the plaintiff in the pending Civil Case No. 16917, which is a
requirements of rule 53, which was filed on the last day of the complaint for specific performance filed by the petitioners to
reglementary period of appeal so that the veracity of the compel the respondent bank to execute in their favor a deed
ground relied upon is questionable. The appellate court of sale covering the five lots.
correctly denied the motion for new trial.
Acting upon the written opposition, the trial court set the
The motion for new trial being pro-forma, it does not interrupt hearing of the petition. Planters filed its comment/rejoinder to
the running of the period for appeal. Since petitioner's motion the opposition and the petitioners filed their sur-rejoinder. The
was filed on September 24,1986, the fifteenth or last day of petitioners filed a written manifestation stating that they were
the period to appeal, the decision of the respondent court not presenting evidence and, citing the case of Zaragoza vs.
became final on the following day, September 25. And when Diaz, argued that the petition for a writ of possession should
the motion for reconsideration of petitioner was filed on be dismissed because it was filed after the one-year period of
October 30,1986, it was obviously filed out of time. redemption. The trial court granted the petition, ordered the
writ of possession, and later denied the motion for
Since the questioned decision has already become final and reconsideration. The petitioners filed with the respond Court
executory, it is no longer within the province of this Court to of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari, alleging that the
review it. This being so, the findings of the probate court as to trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
the due execution of the will and the testamentary capacity of lack of jurisdiction. It was, however, denied by the CA. The
testatrix are now conclusive. motion for reconsideration was also denied. Petitioners went
up to the Supreme Court under rule 45 and in their petition,
the petitioners attached four letters, claiming these to be
newly-discovered evidence that would substantiate their
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI G.R. No. 86237 December 17, 1991
DOCTRINE: A no less important consideration is that the Rules JORGE NAVARRA and CARMELITA BERNARDO NAVARRA
of Court allow only two occasions when a party may file a and THE RRRC DEVELOPMENT CORP., Petitioner
motion for new trial on the ground of newly-discovered v.
evidence. That motion may be filed only with the trial court COURT OF APPEALS and PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK,
under Rule 37 or with Court of Appeals under Rule 53 but never Respondents
with the Supreme Court.
Meliton Emuslan, Amante Tiu Nalus & Associates,
FACTS: for Petitioners
The petitioners, spouses Jorge Navarra and Carmelita
Bernardo, together with Ruben Bernardo and Cresencia R. C. Domingo & Associates for Private Respondent
Villanueva, and their family corporation, the RRRC
Development Corporation, executed a real estate mortgage in
allegation that they made a down payment to Planters for the
favor of private respondent Planters Development Bank over
repurchase of the subject properties.
five parcels registered land to secure the payment of a loan.
When the petitioners failed to pay their obligation, Planters ISSUE:
caused the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage in
accordance with Act No. 3135 Thereafter, a public auction was Whether or not the attached letters can be considered as
held; the following day the sheriff issued a certificate of sale in newly-discovered evidence to warrant a new trial?
favor of Planters as the highest bidder. The one-year period
HELD: In both cases, the Court, opting to brush aside technicalities
and despite the opposition of the Solicitor General, granted
The SC held that the attached letters cannot be considered as new trial to the convicted accused concerned on the basis of
newly-discovered evidence. The decision of the respondent proposed testimonies or affidavits of persons which the Court
Court of Appeals was promulgated on September 12, 1988. On considered as newly discovered and probably sufficient
the other hand, the letters are dated October 24, 1988, and evidence to reverse the judgment of conviction. Being similarly
November 12, 1988. As they were not existing at the time the circumstanced, there is no nagging reason why herein
respondent court rendered its decision, and indeed prior to petitioner should be denied the same benefit. It becomes all
the trial, they could not by any kind of diligence have been the more plausible under the circumstances considering that
discovered at all during that period. It is clear that they do not the "People" does not raise any objection to a new trial, for
qualify as newly-discovered evidence under the definition as which reason the Solicitor General ought to be specially
they came into existence only after the trial. A no less commended for displaying once again such statesmanlike
important consideration is that the Rules of Court allow only gesture of impartiality. The Solicitor General's finest hour,
two occasions when a party may file a motion for new trial on indeed.
the ground of newly-discovered evidence. That motion may be practice, before a decision is signed and promulgated, all
filed only with the trial court under Rule 37 or with Court of opinions and conclusions stated during and after the
Appeals under Rule 53 but never with the Supreme Court. deliberation of the Court, remain in the breasts of the Justices,
binding upon no one, not even upon the Justices themselves.
Of course, they may serve for determining what the opinion of
the majority provisionally is and for designating a member to
prepare the decision of the Court, but in no way is that decision
EDILBERTO M. CUENCA, petitioner, binding unless and until signed and promulgated.
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE Thus, an unpromulgated decision is no decision at all. At the
PHILIPPINES, respondents. very least, they are part of the confidential internal
respondents. deliberations of the Court which must not be released to the
public. A decision becomes binding only after it is validly
promulgated. Until such operative act occurs, there is really no
decision to speak of, even if some or all of the Justices have
DOCTRINE: The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public already affixed their signatures thereto. During the intervening
prosecution is not to convict but to see that justice is done. The period from the time of signing until the promulgation of the
suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable decision, any one who took part in the deliberation and had
of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly signed the decision may, for a reason, validly withdraw one's
reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action. vote, thereby preserving one's freedom of action.
FACTS:
G.R. No. 196231 January 28, 2014
Petitioner was charged by violation of the Trust Receipts Law
by the RTC which was later on affirmed by the Court of EMILIO A. GONZALES III vs.
Appeals. Hence, he filed a pleading entitled “Substitution of OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE
Counsel with Motion for Leave of Court to File Motion for New PHILIPPINES
Trial”. The Court denied this Motion. Notwithstanding,
petitioner still filed a Motion to Admit Attached Motion for
DOCTRINE: The Supreme Court may still review the case even
New Trial and Manifestation and Second Motion to Admit.
if only the Office of the President, through the Office of the
Solicitor General is the only one who filed a motion for
Solicitor General himself recommends that petitioner be
reconsideration. This omission, however, poses no obstacle for
entitled to a new trial, proceeding from the same impression
the Court’s review of its ruling on the whole case since a serious
that a certain Rodolfo Cuenca's (petitioner's brother) sworn
constitutional question has been raised and is one of the
statement is an admission against interest which may
underlying bases for the validity or invalidity of the presidential
ultimately exonerate petitioner from criminal liability.
action. In other words, since the validity of the OP’s decision on
the merits of the dismissal is inextricably anchored on the final
and correct ruling on the constitutional issue, the whole case –
Issue: WON the Motion for New Trial should be granted (YES)
including the constitutional issue – remains alive for the Court’s
consideration on motion for reconsideration.
Ruling:
FACTS: Gonzales was the Deputy Ombudsman for Military and HELD: YES. At the outset, the Court notes that Gonzales did not
Other Law Enforcement Officers (MOLEO). Complaints filed file a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s Decision; only
against Manila Police District Senior Inspector Rolando the OP, through the OSG, moved for the reconsideration of our
Mendoza were under him. Pending Gonzales’ action on ruling reinstating Gonzales.
Mendoza, et al.’s case, the Office of the City Prosecutor of This omission, however, poses no obstacle for the Court’s
Manila City dismissed the complaints against Mendoza. review of its ruling on the whole case since a serious
After preparing a draft decision on Mendoza, et al.’s case, constitutional question has been raised and is one of the
Gonzales forwarded the entire records to the Office of then underlying bases for the validity or invalidity of the presidential
Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez for her review. Gonzales action. If the President does not have any constitutional
found Mendoza, et al. guilty of grave misconduct and imposed authority to discipline a Deputy Ombudsman and/or a Special
on them the penalty of dismissal from the service. Prosecutor in the first place, then any ruling on the legal
Mendoza, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration. The case correctness of the OP’s decision on the merits will be an empty
records were forwarded to the Criminal Investigation, one.
Prosecution and Administrative Bureau-MOLEO and was In other words, since the validity of the OP’s decision on the
assigned to Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer (GIPO) merits of the dismissal is inextricably anchored on the final and
Dennis Garcia for review and recommendation. correct ruling on the constitutional issue, the whole case –
Gonzales reviewed the draft released by GIPO Garcia and including the constitutional issue – remains alive for the
endorsed the order, together with the case records for the Court’s consideration on motion for reconsideration.
final approval by the Ombudsman.
Pending final action by the Ombudsman, Mendoza hijacked a
tourist bus. The hostage-taking ended tragically, resulting in RULE 56: ORIGINAL AND APPEALED CASES
the deaths of Mendoza and several others on board the
hijacked bus. G.R. No. 127022 June 28, 2000
In the aftermath, the DILG and DOJ issued Joint Department
Order No. 01-2010, creating an Incident Investigation and FIRESTONE CERAMICS, INC., ET. AL., Petitioners,
Review Committee (IIRC). vs.
The IIRC found the Ombudsman and Gonzales accountable for COURT OF APPEALS, et. al., Respondent
their "gross negligence and grave misconduct in handling the
case against Mendoza." The IIRC recommended the referral of
its findings to the OP for further determination of possible
administrative offenses and for the initiation of the proper Resolution
administrative proceedings.
DOCTRINE
OP: GUILTY as charged for Gross Neglect of Duty and/or
Inefficiency in the Performance of Official Duty and for “It bears stressing that where, as in the present cases, the Court
Misconduct in Office.and dismissed Gonzales from the service. En Banc entertains a case for its resolution and disposition, it
Gonzales posited in his petition before the SC arguing that the does so without implying that the Division of origin is incapable
OP has no administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy of rendering objective and fair justice. The action of the Court
Ombudsman. Under Section 21 of RA No. 6770, it is the simply means that the nature of the cases calls for en banc
Ombudsman who exercises administrative disciplinary attention and consideration.”
jurisdiction over the Deputy Ombudsman.
SC: The Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA FACTS
No. 6770 and ruled that the President has disciplinary
jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special The cases at bar involve a vast tract of land with an area of
Prosecutor. The Court, however, reversed the OP ruling that: around 99 hectares presumptively belonging to the Republic of
(i) found Gonzales guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave the Philippines, which land had been adjudicated to private
Misconduct constituting betrayal of public trust; and (ii) individuals by a court alleged to be without jurisdiction. Since
imposed on him the penalty of dismissal. Gonzales the validity of the said decision and the original certificate of
REINSTATED. title as well as transfer certificates of title hinges on the
In view of the Court’s ruling, the OP filed the present motion classification of subject area at the time it was so adjudicated,
for reconsideration through the Office of the Solicitor General determination of the validity of the disposition thereof is in
(OSG). order.
ISSUE: WON the SC may still review the ruling on the case even Initially, the Supreme Court’s Third Division voted 4-1 to deny
if the OP through the OSG is the only one who filed a motion petitioners’ motion to transfer these cases to the Banc.
for reconsideration
ISSUE
• Whether or not the instant petition should be given due which is claimed as government property, there is merit in the
course despite the availment of the wrong remedy. (YES) prayer of petitioners that their pending motions for
reconsideration should be resolved by the Court En Banc.
RULING
RULE 57: PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT
The Court deliberated on the consulta and thereafter, voted 9- Davao Light & Power Co., Inc., v. The Court of Appeals,
5 to accept the cases for the Banc to pass upon in view of the Queensland Hotel or Motel or Queensland Tourist Inn, and
finding that the cases above entitled are of sufficient Teodorico Adarna
importance to merit its attention. G.R. No. 93262 ; December 29, 1991
Untenable is the contention of Justice Panganiban that the FACTS:

Chief Justice and the eight (8) Associate Justices who voted to Davao Light & Power Co., Inc., (Davao Light) filed a verified
treat these consolidated cases as En Banc cases, have not given complaint for recovery of a sum of money and damages
any cogent or compelling reason for such action. Considering against Queensland Hotel, etc., and Teodorico Adarna with an
that paragraph 9 of the Resolution of this Court dated expert application for a writ of preliminary attachment.
November 18, 1993, has been cited to support the majority
opinion, it is decisively clear that these consolidated cases have The ex parte application was granted, petitioner submitted an
been found to be of sufficient importance to merit the attachment bond of P4,600,500, and the writ of attachment
attention and disposition of the entire Court en banc and was issued.
therefore, the prayer of the Republic of the Philippines and the
private petitioners for the Court en banc to hear and resolve Summons and the copy of the complaint, as well as the writ of
their pending motions for reconsideration, is meritorious. attachment, and a copy of the attachment bond were served
on the private respondents. The sheriff seized the properties
It bears stressing that where, as in the present cases, the Court
of the private respondents pursuant to the writ of attachment.
En Banc entertains a case for its resolution and disposition, it
does so without implying that the Division of origin is incapable
The private respondents filed a motion to discharge the
of rendering objective and fair justice. The action of the Court
attachment for lack of jurisdiction. They argued that at the
simply means that the nature of the cases calls for en banc
time the order of attachment was promulgated, the court had
attention and consideration. Neither can it be concluded that
not yet acquired jurisdiction over the cause and the persons of
the Court has taken undue advantage of sheer voting strength.
the private respondents. The motion to discharge was denied
It was merely guided by the well-studied finding and
by the Trial Court.
sustainable opinion of the majority of its actual membership —
that, indeed, subject cases are of sufficient importance
The private respondents challenged the order of the trial court.
meriting the action and decision of the whole Court. It is, of
The Court of Appeals declared the order granting the issuance
course, beyond cavil that all the members of this highest Court
of the writ of preliminary attachment null and void, and
of the land are always imbued with the noblest of intentions in
discharged the same.
interpreting and applying the germane provisions of law,
jurisprudence, rules and Resolutions of the Court — to the end
The CA cited Sievert v. Court of Appeals, that the critical time
that public interest be duly safeguarded and rule of law be
which must be identified is when the trial court acquires
observed.
authority under law to act coercively against the defendant or
Reliance by Justice Panganiban on the ruling of the Court in the his property, that the critical time is the vesting of the
Sumilao case is misplaced. The said case is not on all fours with jurisdiction in the court over the person of the defendant.
these cases. In the Sumilao case, before it was brought to the
Banc en consulta, the motion for reconsideration of the The CA held that the Court does not acquire jurisdiction over
decision therein rendered had been voted upon by the Second the person of the defendant until he is duly summoned or
Division with a vote of 2-2. The Court ruled that the stalemate voluntarily appears. Adding the phrase ex parte does not
resulting from the said voting constituted a denial of the confer jurisdiction before actual summons.
motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
In the two consolidated cases under consideration, however, Whether or not a writ of preliminary attachment may issue ex
the Motions for Reconsideration of the petitioners, Republic of parte against a defendant before acquisition of jurisdiction of
the Philippines and Firestone Ceramics, Inc., et al., are pending the latter’s person by service of summons or his voluntary
and unresolved. submission to the Court’s authority.
Considering the importance of these cases and the issues HELD:

raised, let alone the enormous value of the area in litigation,

YES. It is incorrect to theorize that nothing can be validly done PAQUITO P. PALADIN, IRASMO P. TABALANZA,
by the plaintiff or the court before the acquisition of ALEJANDRO P. PARTOSA, CARLINA MALLILLIN, ESTIPANIA
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. F. ANDRES, ELPIDIO N. BURLAOS, REDENTOR T. TEPECO,
LORENZA S. JESALVA, PILAR CRUZ ABAYA, LOURDES N.
During the interval between the filing of the complaint and the PANES, LORETO PALADIN, VIRGINIA R. BALRAZAR,
day of service of summons of the defendant, different acts may FLORENCIA R. OCOP, ANGEL BONGAYAN, NATY CORAZON
be done by the plaintiff or by the Court which are valid. These EMA, RESTITUTA C. TOCA, VIRGILIO ALINTEJO, YOLANDA
are: SEBASTIAN, ELISEO CAGUNGON, LOPE GELLANA, LORETA
• Appointment of a guardian ad litem; DOMIQUIL, VIRGINIA SANCHEZ, JOSE AFABLE, SERAFIN
• Grant of authority to the plaintiff to prosecute the suit BERMUDO, ONOFRE SANTOS, NORA SABAYLE, LYDIA
as a pauper litigant; VALDEZ, LAURA TENEFERE, MA. ERLINDA DE CHAVEZ,
• Amendment of the complaint by the plaintiff as a FRANCISCO HILARIO, RODRIGO MINION, TERESITA PANA,
matter of right without leave of court; EVELYN OREBIADA, GLORIA SANTOS, JUAN MIRASOL,
• Authorization by the Court of service of summons by SALOME MAGALLANES, GERMINIO CALNEA, EMILIO
publication; SANTILICES, PABLO GALAYAN, RAMON LOZADA, CALIXTA
• Dismissal of the action by the plaintiff on mere notice. CAYLAO and MANUEL MADRILEJO,
Petitioners vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, PABLO
The same is true with regard to provisional remedies of ESPORLAS, SALUD ESPORLAS, ADRIANO ESPORLAS,
preliminary attachment, preliminary injunction, receivership TOMASA ISLA, SEBASTIAN ISLA, CIRILO ESPORLAS,
or replevin. CONSOLACION ESPORLAS, and The HON. PRESIDING
JUDGE of BRANCH 256 of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT of
Rule 57 of the Rules of Court speaks of the grant of the remedy MUNTINLUPA CITY, Respondents.
of preliminary attachment “at the commencement of the
action or at any time thereafter”. The rule states that after the FACTS: On January 5, 1987, the Metropolitan Trial Court of
action is properly commenced, the plaintiff may apply for and Muntinlupa City rendered a decision in an unlawful detainer
obtain a writ of preliminary attachment upon fulfillment of the case, favoring private respondents and ordering petitioners to
pertinent requisites. vacate, restore the premises to private respondents, and pay
the accrued
In Mindanao Savings & Loans Asso. Inc., v. CA, the Court held rentals, P5,000 attorneys fees and cost of suit. The decision
that no hearing is required on an application for preliminary likewise dismissed petitioners counterclaim.
attachment, such hearing would defeat the objective of the
remedy. Respondents failed to enforce the judgment by motion within
the five-year period from its entry. They then filed an action to
An attachment may be discharged in two ways, by posting a revive the judgment pursuant to Section 6, Rule 39 of the then
counterbond under Section 5 before the actual levy or Section Rules of Court.
12, Rule 57, or by showing of its improper or irregular issuance
under Section 13 of the same rule. METC: The MeTC rendered its decision directing the
enforcement of the judgment in the 1987 Unlawful Detainer
Nevertheless, these cannot bind and affect the defendant until Case.
and unless jurisdiction over his person is eventually obtained
by the court. Hence, when the sheriff or other proper officer RTC: DISMISSED the appeal by the petitioners and affirmed
commences implementation of the writ of attachment, it must the decision of the METC.
be accompanied by:
1. Service on the defendant of summons; CA: DENIED the petition for review
2. A copy of the complaint (and of the appointment of
guardian ad litem, if any); ISSUE: Whether private respondents failed to prove the
3. Application for attachment; enforceability of the judgment
4. Order of attachment; and
5. Plaintiff’s attachment bond. RULING: NO. Sec. 6 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that an
action to revive judgment only requires proof of a final
G.R. NO. 137391 December 14, 2001 judgment which has not prescribed and has remained
unexecuted after the lapse of five (5) years but not more than
JUAN ENRIQUEZ, RENATO V. HERNANDEZ, RAUL DOMO, ten (10) years from its finality. Nowhere does the rule require
GREGORIO MANGILA, AURORA BRUSOLA, CELIA C. proof that the judgment is still enforceable by and against the
CAYLAO, CARDO L. TANADA, JOSE ANCAJAS, JR., EUFEMIA original parties who have died. While the action is still subject
NAVARRA, ALFONSO D. NADUNZA, CORAZON D. DAVID, to defenses and counterclaims which arose after the judgment

became effective, proof of the death of some of the parties is is an ancillary remedy, the withdrawal of the complaint left it
not required because the judgment can still be enforced by the with no leg to stand on.
executor, administrator or successor-in-interest of the
judgement creditor against the judgment debtor. Petitioners Thereafter, Aboitiz filed yet again a complaint for sum of
further alleged that respondents are not the owners of the money and prayed for the issuance of writ of attachment. The
subject premises, hence the action must fail. RTC granted and issued a writ of attachement upon filing by
Aboitiz of the bond.
An action to revive judgment is not meant to retry the case all
over again. Its cause of action is the judgment itself and not the Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that
merits of the original action. The non-ownership by private the since the property subject of the writ of attachment have
respondents refer to the merits of the first civil case which has earlier been attached or replevied, the same property were
long been decided with finality and thus become conclusive under custodia legis and therefore could not be the subject of
between the parties. other writs of attachment.
G.R. Nos. 65957-58 July 5, 1994 ISSUE:
ELEAZAR V. ADLAWAN and ELENA S. ADLAWAN, Whether or not the issuance of the writ of attachment was
petitioners, vs. Hon. Judge RAMON AM. TORRES, as proper
Presiding Judge of Branch 6, Regional Trial Court Cebu
City, ABOITIZ & COMPANY, INC. and THE PROVINCIAL HELD:
SHERIFFS OF CEBU, DAVAO, RIZAL and METRO MANILA,
Respectively, respondents. The affidavit submitted by respondent Aboitiz in support of its
prayer for the writ of attachment does not meet the
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 requirements of Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court regarding
the allegations on impending fraudulent removal, concealment
DOCTRINE: [T]he general rule is that the affidavit is the and disposition of defendant's property.
foundation of the writ, and if none be filed or one be filed which
wholly fails to set out some facts required by law to be stated It is evident from said affidavit that the prayer for attachment
therein, there is no jurisdiction and the proceedings are null rests on the mortgage by petitioners of 11 parcels of land in
and void." Cebu, which encumbrance respondent Aboitiz considered as
fraudulent concealment of property to its prejudice. We find,
FACTS: however, that there is no factual allegation which may
constitute as a valid basis for the contention that the mortgage
Aboitiz filed a complaint for a collection of sum of money. was in fraud of respondent Aboitiz.
Aboitiz also moved for the preliminary attachment of
petitioner’s properties which the RTC granted and accordingly When petitioners filed a motion for the reconsideration of the
a writ of attachment was issued and enforced by the sheriff. order directing the issuance of the writ of attachment,
respondent Judge should have considered it as a motion for the
Aboitiz filed a notice of dismissal which was granted. Adlawan discharge of the attachment and should have conducted a
moved for the enforcement of the dismissal but was denied on hearing or required submission of counter-affidavits from the
account of the filing by Aboitiz of an action or delivery of petitioners, if only to gather facts in support of the allegation
personal property and the filing of Adlawan for damages for of fraud (Jopillo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 167 SCRA 247 [1988]).
the seizure of his property by virtue of the preliminary This is what Section 13 of Rule 57 mandates.
attachment.
JUSTIFYING WRIT OF ATTACHMENT
In the replevin suit, the court ordered the seizure and delivery In Carpio v. Macadaeg, to justify a preliminary attachment, the
of the property to Aboitiz. removal or disposal must have been made with intent to
defraud defendant's creditors. Proof of fraud is mandated by
Petitioner filed an omnibus motion praying for the paragraphs (d) and (e) of Section 1, Rule 57 of the Revised
reconsideration and dissolution of the writ of seizure, the Rules of Court on the grounds upon which attachment may
retrieval of the property seized, and the dismissal of the issue. Thus, the factual basis on defendant's intent to defraud
complaint. However, the same was not granted. must be clearly alleged in the affidavit in support of the prayer
for the writ of attachment if not so specifically alleged in the
The SC in the replevin suit order the attached properties left in verified complaint.
the custody of private respondent Aboitiz and Company, Inc.
be returned to petitioner Eleazar V. Adlawan. since attachment ATTACHMENT

Attachment is a harsh, extraordinary and summary remedy While the Motion refers to the transaction complained of as
and the rules governing its issuance must be construed strictly involving trust receipts, the violation of the terms of which is
against the applicant. Verily, a writ of attachment can only be qualified by law as constituting estafa, it does not follow that a
granted on concrete and specific grounds and not on general writ of attachment can and should automatically issue.
averments quoting perfunctorily the words of the Rules Petitioner cannot merely cite Sections 1(b) and (d), Rule 57 of
the Revised Rules of Court. An order of attachment cannot be
G.R. NO. 119723 February 23, 2001 issued on a general averment.
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, Petitioner v.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND FILIPINAS TEXTILE MILLS, The Supreme Court, likewise, agrees with the appellate court
Respondents. that the lower court should have conducted a hearing and
required the private respondent to substantiate its allegations.
DOCTRINE: Not only was the petitioner's application for writ of
attachment defective for merely giving general averments, In sum, not only was the petitioner's application for writ of
what is worse, there was no hearing to afford private attachment defective for merely giving general averments,
respondents an opportunity to ventilate their side, in what is worse, there was no hearing to afford private
accordance with due process. respondents an opportunity to ventilate their side, in
accordance with due process.
FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint against private respondent
Bernardino Villanueva, Filipinas Textile Mills, and one Sochi WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the instant petitions
Villanueva before the Regional Trial Court of Manila seeking are DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
the payment of various textile goods covered by surety No. 32863 and CA-G.R. SP No. 32762 are AFFIRMED. No
agreements and trust receipts. In their Answer, private pronouncement as to costs.
respondents admitted the existence of the surety agreements
and trust receipts but argued that they have already paid. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. MEGA PACIFIC
eSOLUTIONS, INC., WILLY U. YU, BONNIE S. YU, ENRIQUE T.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Attachment contending that TANSIPEK, ROSITA Y. TANSIPEK, PEDRO O. TAN, JOHNSON
violation of the trust receipts law, constitutes estafa, thus W. FONG, BERNARD I. FONG, and LAURIANO * A. BARRIOS,
providing ground for the issuance of a writ of preliminary respondents.
attachment, quoting Section 1, Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of G.R. No. 184666. June 27, 2016. FIRST DIVISION
Court. Both motions were opposed by private respondents.
This is a Petition for Certiorari
RTC: Both Motions were GRANTED.
CA: REVERSED the decision of the trial court ruling that there FACTS: Republic Act No. 8436 authorized the COMELEC to use
was grave abuse of discretion in not conducting a hearing on an automated election system for the May 1998 elections.
the application for a writ of preliminary attachment and not However, the automated system failed to materialize and
requiring petitioner to substantiate its allegations of fraud, votes were canvassed manually during the 1998 and the 2001
embezzlement, or misappropriation. (CASE AGAINST elections. The Supreme Court declared the automation
BERNARDINO VILLANUEVA) contract by Mega Pacific and COMELEC for the supply of
automated counting machines (ACMs) for the 2004 national
REVERSED the decision of the trial court finding that the elections void. Upon the finality of the declaration of nullity of
grounds cited by the petitioner in the Motion do not provide the automation contract, respondent filed a Complaint for
sufficient basis for the issuance of a writ of preliminary Damages before the RTC Makati, arguing that,
injunction, the grounds being general averments. (CASE notwithstanding the nullification of the automation contract,
AGAINST FILIPINAS TEXTILE MILLS) the COMELEC was still bound to pay for the ACMs and support
services already delivered. Petitioner filed its Answer with
ISSUE: WON THERE WAS NO SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR THE Counterclaim and argued that respondent MPEI could no
ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT IN longer recover the unpaid balance from the void automation
SPITE OF ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUD, EMBEZZLEMENT, AND contract, since the payments made were illegal disbursements
MISAPPROPRIATION of public funds. It contended that a null and void contract vests
no rights and creates no obligations. Pursuant to Section 1(d)
HELD: YES. The Supreme Court agrees with the Court of of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, petitioner prayed for the
Appeals that the Motions for Attachment filed by petitioner issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the
and its supporting affidavits did not sufficiently establish the properties of MPEI and individual respondents. The application
grounds relied upon in applying for the writ of preliminary was grounded upon the fraudulent misrepresentation of
attachment. respondents as to their eligibility to participate in the bidding

for the COMELEC automation project and the failure of the T. Tansipek, Rosita Y. Tansipek, Pedro O. Tan, Johnson W. Fong,
ACMs to comply with mandatory technical requirements. Bernard I. Fong and Lauriano Barrios.
RTC: Trial court denied the prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment, ruling that there was an absence of G.R. No. 171124 February 13, 2008
factual allegations as to how the fraud was actually
committed. ALEJANDRO NG WEE, petitioner, vs. MANUEL
TANKIANSEE, respondent.
CA: Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal with the CA. CA
reversed and set aside the trial court's Orders and ruled that PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45
there was sufficient basis for the issuance of a writ of
attachment in favor of petitioner. CA allowed the attachment DOCTRINE: The affidavit, being the foundation of the writ,
of the properties belonging to both MPEI and individual must contain such particulars as to how the fraud imputed to
respondents. The appellate court explained that the respondent was committed for the court to decide whether or
averments of petitioner in support of the latter's application not to issue the writ. Absent any statement of other factual
actually reflected pertinent conclusions reached by this Court circumstances to show that respondent, at the time of
in its 2004 Decision. Petitioner filed Rule 45 petition arguing contracting the obligation, had a preconceived plan or
that the CA erred in ordering the remand of the case to the intention not to pay, or without any showing of how
trial court for the reception of evidence to determine the respondent committed the alleged fraud is insufficient to
presence of fraud. support the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.
ISSUE: Whether a writ of preliminary attachment may be FACTS:

issued against the properties of individual respondents,
considering that they were not parties to the 2004 case. Wee made several money placements Wincorp.
HELD: Yes, the writ may be issued against the properties of the Petitioner received disturbing news on Wincorp's financial
individual respondents. Application of the piercing doctrine condition and thus investigated on the matters. He then
justifies the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment over discovered that the company extended a loan equal to his total
the properties of the individual respondents. Respondent money placement to Power Merge and Hottick Holdings.
MPEI was formed to perpetrate the fraud against petitioner. When the latter defaulted in its obligation, Wincorp instituted
MPEI was nothing but a sham corporation formed for the a case against it and its surety. Settlement was reached in
purpose of defrauding petitioner. Its ultimate objective was to which Hottick's president, Virata, assumed the obligation of
secure the P1,248,949,088 automation contract. The scheme the surety.
was to put up a corporation that would participate in the bid
and enter into a contract with the COMELEC, even if the former Finding that Virata purportedly used Power Merge as a conduit
was not qualified or authorized to do so. Without the and connived with Wincorp to fraudulently obtain for his
incorporation of MPEI, the defraudation of the government benefit without any intention of paying the said placements,
would not have been possible. The formation of MPEI paved petitioner instituted, a civil case for damages with the RTC.
the way for its participation in the bid, through its claim that it
was an agent of a supposed joint venture, its On the basis of the complaint and affidavit of petitioner, the
misrepresentations to secure the automation contract, its trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary
misrepresentation at the time of the execution of the contract, attachment against the properties not exempt from execution
its delivery of the defective ACMs, and ultimately its of all the defendants in the civil case subject, among others, to
acceptance of the benefits under the automation contract. petitioner's filing of a P50M-bond. The writ was, consequently,
issued.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the Petition is GRANTED. The Amended Decision dated 22 Respondent moved for the discharge of the attachment but
September 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. was denied by the RTC.
95988 is ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. A new one is entered
DIRECTING the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 59, Respondent then again filed before the RTC a Motion to
to ISSUE in Civil Case No. 04-346, entitled Mega Pacific Discharge Attachment but the same was denied. Ruling that
eSolutions, Inc. vs. Republic of the Philippines, the Writ of the grounds raised were already passed upon by it in the
Preliminary Attachment prayed for by petitioner Republic of previous orders affirmed by the CA and this Court.
the Philippines against the properties of respondent Mega
Pacific eSolutions, Inc., and Willy U. Yu, Bonnie S. Yu, Enrique On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the
RTC and lifted the writ of preliminary attachment.

attachment which may have been issued as an incident of that
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed serious legal error action, is also considered appealed and so also removed from
when it lifted the writ of preliminary attachement the jurisdiction of the court a quo. The attachment itself
cannot be the subject of a separate action independent of the
HELD: principal action because the attachment was only an incident
of such action.
Petitioner's Affidavit is bereft of any factual statement that
respondent committed a fraud. The affidavit narrated only the FACTS: Petitioner Northern Islands Co., Inc. filed a Complaint
alleged fraudulent transaction between Wincorp and Virata with application for a writ of preliminary attachment, before
and/or Power Merge, which, by the way, explains why this the RTC against respondents (Main Case), which was
Court, affirmed the writ of attachment issued against the subsequently amended. It alleged that: (a) from March to July
latter. As to the participation of respondent in the said 2004, petitioner caused the delivery to respondents of various
transaction, the affidavit merely states that respondent, an appliances in the aggregate amount of P8,040,825.17; (b) the
officer and director of Wincorp, connived with the other goods were transported, shipped, and delivered by Sulpicio
defendants in the civil case to defraud petitioner of his money Lines, Inc., and were accepted in good order and condition by
placements. No other factual averment or circumstance details respondents’ representatives; (c) the parties agreed that the
how respondent committed a fraud or how he connived with goods delivered were payable within 120 days, and that the
the other defendants to commit a fraud in the transaction sued unpaid amounts would earn interest at a rate of eighteen
upon. In other words, petitioner has not shown any specific act percent (18%) per annum; (d) however, the value of the goods
or deed to support the allegation that respondent is guilty of were not paid by respondents despite repeated demands; and
fraud. (e) respondents fraudulently asserted that petitioner had no
proof that they had indeed received the quantity of the subject
Therefore, that, in this case, petitioner has not fully satisfied goods.
the legal obligation to show the specific acts constitutive of the
alleged fraud committed by respondent, the trial court acted in In connection with the application for a writ of preliminary
excess of its jurisdiction when it issued the writ of preliminary attachment, petitioner posted a bond, through Visayan Surety
attachment against the properties of respondent. and Insurance Corporation, in the amount of P8,040,825.17.
RTC issued the writ sought for.
GROUND FOR ATTACHMENT
In Liberty Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we Instead of filing an answer, respondents filed on November 11,
explained as follows: 2001, an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File Proper
To sustain an attachment on this ground, it must be shown that Pleading and Motion for Discovery (November 11, 2001
the debtor in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation Motion), asking the RTC to allow them to photocopy and
intended to defraud the creditor. The fraud must relate to the personally examine the original invoices, delivery cargo
execution of the agreement and must have been the reason receipts, and bills of lading attached to the Amended
which induced the other party into giving consent which he Complaint, claiming that they could not “come up with an
would not have otherwise given. To constitute a ground for intelligent answer” without being presented with the originals
attachment in Section 1 (d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, fraud of such documents.
should be committed upon contracting the obligation sued
upon. A debt is fraudulently contracted if at the time of Thereafter, respondents filed a Motion to Discharge Excess
contracting it the debtor has a preconceived plan or intention Attachment, alleging that the attachment previously ordered
not to pay, as it is in this case. Fraud is a state of mind and need by the RTC exceeded by P9,232,564.56 given that the
not be proved by direct evidence but may be inferred from the estimated value of the attached properties, including the
circumstances attendant in each case. garnished bank accounts, as assessed by their appraiser,
G.R. NO. 203240 March 18, 2015 Gaudioso W. Lapaz (Lapaz), amounted to P17,273,409.73,
NORTHERN ISLANDS, CO., INC., Petitioner, v. SPOUSES while the attachment bond is only in the amount of
DENNIS AND CHERYLIN GARCIA, DOING BUSINESS UNDER P8,040,825.17.
THE NAME AND STYLE “ECOLAMP MULTI RESOURCES,”,
Respondents. RTC denied the November 11, 2001 Motion, and, instead,
directed respondents to file their answer, which the latter
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI complied with through the filing of their Answer Ad Cautelam
Ex Abudante with Compulsory Counterclaim on April 3, 2006.
DOCTRINE: Being merely ancillary to a principal proceeding, Despite this, respondents again filed a Motion for Leave of
the attachment must fail if the suit itself cannot be maintained Court to File Motion for Discovery on April 7, 2006. It was
as the purpose of the writ can no longer be justified. The granted but no production or inspection was made.
consequence is that where the main action is appealed, the

RTC: DENIED the Motion to Discharge Excess Attachment, trial by commissioners in order to determine the excessiveness
finding that the appraisal made by Lapaz was not reflective of of the subject preliminary attachment, being a mere ancillary
the true valuation of the properties, adding too that the bond matter to the Main Case, is now mooted by its supervening
posted by petitioner stands as sufficient security for whatever appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 98237.
damages respondents may sustain by reason of the
attachment. Respondents filed a Motion for Partial Note that in Sps. Olib v. Judge Pastoral, the Court, in view of
Reconsideration assailing the denial of their Motion to the nature of a preliminary attachment, definitively ruled that
Discharge Excess Attachment. It was DENIED. the attachment itself cannot be the subject of a separate
action independent of the principal action because the
In the interim, the RTC rendered a Decision dated September attachment was only an incident of such action, viz.:
21, 2011 in the Main Case. Essentially, it DISMISSED Attachment is defined as a provisional remedy by which the
petitioner’s Amended Complaint due to the absence of any property of an adverse party is taken into legal custody, either
evidence to prove that respondents had agreed to the pricing at the commencement of an action or at any time thereafter,
of the subject goods. as a security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be
recovered by the plaintiff or any proper party.
The foregoing decision was later APPEALED by petitioner
before the CA on October 27, 2011. Finding that the Notice of It is an auxiliary remedy and cannot have an independent
Appeal was seasonably filed, with the payment of the existence apart from the main suit or claim instituted by the
appropriate docket fees, the RTC ordered the elevation of the plaintiff against the defendant. Being merely ancillary to a
entire records of the Main Case to the CA. The appeal was then principal proceeding, the attachment must fail if the suit itself
raffled to the CA’s Eighth Division. On the other hand, records cannot be maintained as the purpose of the writ can no longer
do not show that respondents filed any appeal. be justified.
CA: PARTLY GRANTED the certiorari petition of respondents, The consequence is that where the main action is appealed,
ordering the RTC to appoint a commissioner as provided under the attachment which may have been issued as an incident of
Rule 32 of the Rules of Court as well as the subsequent that action, is also considered appealed and so also removed
discharge of any excess attachment if so found therein, and, from the jurisdiction of the court a quo. The attachment itself
on the other hand, denying respondents’ Motion for cannot be the subject of a separate action independent of the
Discovery. principal action because the attachment was only an incident
of such action.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration
on February 13, 2012 but was, however, denied. Hence, the WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
present petition. January 19, 2012 and the Resolution dated August 24, 2012 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97448 are hereby SET
ISSUE/S: W/N THE RTC HAD LOST JURISDICTION OVER THE ASIDE.
MATTER OF THE PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT AFTER
PETITIONER APPEALED THE DECISION IN THE MAIN CASE, AND G.R. No. 174996 December 3, 2014
THEREAFTER ORDERED THE TRANSMITTAL OF THE RECORDS
TO THE CA.
BRO. BERNARD OCA, FSC, BRO. DENNIS MAGBANUA,
HELD: YES. Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides FSC, MRS. CIRILA MOJICA, MRS. JOSEFINA PASCUAL AND
that in appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction ST. FRANCIS SCHOOL OF GENERAL TRIAS, CAVITE,
over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due INC., petitioners, vs. LAURITA CUSTODIO, respondent.
time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other `
parties.
DOCTRINE: It is settled in jurisprudence that an application for
a status quo order which in fact seeks injunctive relief must
In this case, petitioner had duly perfected its appeal of the
comply with Section 4, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court: i.e., the
RTC’s Decision resolving the Main Case through the timely
application must be verified aside from the posting of the
filing of its Notice of Appeal dated October 27, 2011, together
requisite bond. In the present case, the Manifestation and
with the payment of the appropriate docket fees.
Motion, through which respondent applied for injunctive relief
or in the alternative a status quo order, was merely signed by
Thus, based on Section 9, Rule 41, it cannot be seriously
her counsel and was unverified.
doubted that the RTC had already lost jurisdiction over the
Main Case. With the RTC’s loss of jurisdiction over the Main FACTS: Petitioners are members of the Board of Trustees of
Case necessarily comes its loss of jurisdiction over all matters St. Francis School resolved to remove respondent
merely ancillary thereto. Thus, the propriety of conducting a

Laurita Custodio as a member of the Board of Trustees and as Jurisprudence tells us that a status quo order is merely
a member of the Corporation. intended to maintain the last, actual, peaceable and
uncontested state of things which preceded the controversy.
Subsequently, respondent Custodio was issued a It further states that, unlike a temporary restraining order or
Memorandum informing her of her immediate removal as a preliminary injunction, a status quo order is more in the
Curriculum Administrator of St. Francis School on the grounds nature of a cease and desist order, since it neither directs the
of willful breach of trust and loss of confidence and for failure doing or undoing of acts as in the case of prohibitory or
to explain the charges against her despite notice from the mandatory injunctive relief.
Board of Trustees.
Pertinently, the manner of the issuance of a status quo order
In reaction to her removal, respondent filed with RTC a in an intra-corporate suit such as the case at bar is governed
Complaint with Prayer for the Issuance of a Preliminary by Section 1, Rule 10 of the Interim Rules of Procedure for
Injunction against petitioners again assailing the legality of Intra-Corporate Controversies which reads:
the membership of the Board of Trustees of St. Francis
School. SECTION 1. Provisional remedies. — A party may
apply for any of the provisional remedies provided in
Respondent filed a Motion for Clarification asking the trial the Rules of Court as may be available for the
court to issue an order as to whom the matriculation fees purposes. However, no temporary restraining order
should be paid pending the hearing of the complaint and the or status quo order shall be issued save in
earlier Manifestation and Motion. The RTC appointed exceptional cases and only after hearing the parties
Herminia Reynante (Reynante) as cashier of the school and and the posting of a bond.
required all parties to turn over all money previously collected
with respect to matriculation fees and other related In the case before us, the trial court's Status Quo Order
collectibles of the school to the latter. conflicted with the rules and jurisprudence in the following
manner:
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration seeking to set
aside the Order of the RTC appointing Reynante averring that First, the directive to reinstate respondent to her former
Reynante lacks moral integrity to act as court appointed position as school director and curriculum administrator is a
cashier. command directing the undoing of an act already
consummated which is the exclusive province of prohibitory
Respondent filed her Comment in which she averred that
or mandatory injunctive relief and not of a status quo order
contrary to petitioners' claim, petitioners had not complied
which is limited only to maintaining the last, actual, peaceable
with the Order for failure to include in their accounting, the
and uncontested state of things which immediately preceded
funds allegedly in Special Savings Deposit No. 239 and Special
the controversy.
Savings Deposit No. 459 or the retirement fund for the
teachers of the School, amounts paid by the canteen Second, the trial court's omission of not requiring respondent
concessionaire, and amounts paid to three resigned teachers. to file a bond before the issuance of the Status Quo Order is
in contravention with the express instruction of Section 1,
Petitioners filed a Manifestation, Observation, Compliance,
Rule 10 of the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate
Exception and Motion to the Order of the trial court which
Controversies. Even the subsequent order to post a bond did
contests the inclusion of specific funds to be turned over to
not cure this defect.
Reynante.
Third, it is settled in jurisprudence that an application for
RTC: IN FAVOR OF CUSTODIO. Accordingly, a status quo order a status quo order which in fact seeks injunctive relief must
is hereby issued wherein the plaintiff is hereby allowed to comply with Section 4, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court: i.e., the
continue discharging her functions as school director and application must be verified aside from the posting of the
curriculum administrator as well as those who are presently requisite bond. In the present case, the Manifestation and
and actually discharging functions as school officer to Motion, through which respondent applied for injunctive
continue performing their duties until the application for the relief or in the alternative a status quo order, was merely
issuance of a temporary restraining order is resolved. signed by her counsel and was unverified.
CA: DISMISSED petitioners' special civil action
G.R. NO. 219345 January 30, 2017
for certiorari. Petitioners moved for reconsideration but this
was also thwarted by the Court of Appeals in the assailed
SECURITY BANK CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. GREAT
October 9, 2006 Resolution.
WALL COMMERCIAL PRESS COMPANY INC., ALFREDO
ISSUE: WON the RTC failed to comply with the pertinent BURIEL ATIENZA, FREDINO CHENG
procedural rules regarding the issuance of a status quo order ATIENZA and SPS. FREDERICK CHENG ATIENZA and
MONICA CU ATIENZA, respondents.
HELD: YES. The RTC has failed to comply with the pertinent
procedural rules regarding the issuance of a status quo order.
FACTS: On May 15, 2013, Security Bank filed a Complaint for After a judicious study of the records, the Court finds that
Sum of Money (with Application for Issuance of a Writ of Security Bank was able to substantiate its factual allegation of
Preliminary Attachment) against respondents Great Wall fraud, particularly, the violation of the trust receipt
Commercial Press Company, Inc. (Great Wall) and its sureties, agreements, to warrant the issuance of
Alfredo Buriel Atienza, Fredino Cheng Atienza, and Spouses the writ of preliminary attachment. The CA stated in the
Frederick Cheng Atienza and Monica Cu Atienza (respondents), assailed decision that under Section 1 (d) of Rule 57, fraud
before the RTC. The complaint sought to recover from must only be present at the time of contracting the obligation,
respondents their unpaid obligations under a credit facility and not thereafter. Hence, the CA did not consider the
covered by several trust receipts and surety agreements, as allegation of fraud — that respondents offered a repayment
well as interests, attorney's fees and costs. Security Bank proposal but questionably failed to attend the meeting with
argued that in spite of the lapse of the maturity date of the Security Bank regarding the said proposal — because these
obligations, respondents failed to pay their obligations. The acts were done after contracting the obligation.
total principal amount sought was P10,000,000.00. In this regard, the CA erred.
RTC granted the application for a writ of preliminary While the Court finds that Security Bank has substantiated its
attachment of Security Bank, which then posted a bond in the allegation of fraud against respondents to warrant the
amount of P10,000,000.00. On June 3, 2013, respondents filed issuance of writ or preliminary attachment, this finding should
their Motion to Lift Writ of Preliminary Attachment Ad not in any
Cautelam, claiming that the writ was issued with grave abuse manner affect the merits of the principal case. The writ of
of discretion. preliminary attachment is only a provisional remedy, which is
not a cause of action in itself but is merely adjunct to a main
RTC: DENIED respondent’s motion to lift. Respondents filed a suit.
motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the RTC.
Dissatisfied, respondents filed a petition for certiorari before G.R. No. 193572 April 04, 2018
the CA
TSUNEISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES (CEBU), INC., Petitioner
CA: LIFTED the writ of preliminary attachment. The allegations
v.
of Security Bank were insufficient to warrant the provisional
MIS MARITIME CORPORATION, Respondents
remedy of preliminary attachment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court of appeals erred in nullifying

the writ of preliminary attachment issued by the trial court.
RULING: YES. A writ of preliminary attachment is a provisional DOCTRINE: A writ of preliminary attachment effectively
remedy issued upon the order of the court where an action is functions as a lien. This is crucial to resolving Tsuneishi's
pending. Through the writ, the property or properties of the alleged novel question of law in this case. Tsuneishi is correct
defendant may be levied upon and held thereafter by the that the Ship Mortgage Decree doesnot provide for the specific
sheriff as security for the satisfaction of whatever judgment procedure through which a maritime lien can be enforced. It is
might be secured by the attaching creditor against the error that a maritime lien can only be operationalized by
defendant. The provisional remedy of attachment is available granting a writ of preliminary attachment.
in order that the defendant may not dispose of the property
attached, and thus prevent the satisfaction of any judgment FACTS:
that may be secured by the plaintiff from the former.
Respondent contracted petitioner to dry dock and repair its
In this case, Security Bank relied on Section 1 (d), Rule 57 of the vessel. Petitioner caused a burnt crank journal on the vessel.
Rules of Court as basis of its application for a writ of The crankpin also showed hairline cracks due to defective
preliminary attachment. To support its allegation of fraud, lubrication or deterioration. Petitioner insisted that the
Security Bank attached the Affidavit of German Pulgar, the damage was not due to its fault while respondent insisted on
Manager of the Remedial Management Division of the said the contrary. Respondent refused to pay petitioner for its
bank. The several demand letters sent by Security Bank to services. This prompted petitioner to file a complaint against
respondents, which were unheeded, were likewise attached to respondent before RTC. Petitioner likewise prayed for the
the complaint. These pieces of evidence were presented by issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. RTC issued a writ
Security Bank during the hearing of the application for the of preliminary attachment without hearing. Consequently,
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment in the RTC. MIS' condominium units located in the financial district of
Makati, cash deposits with various banks, charter hire
receivables from Shell were attached. Respondent then filed a

special civil action for certiorari before the CA. CA ruled in favor that the party in whose favor the lien was established may ask
of respondent finding that the RTC acted with grave abuse of the court to enforce it by ordering the sale of the subject
discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary attachment. The CA property and using the proceeds to settle the obligation.
found that the RTC ordered the issuance of the writ of
preliminary attachment despite Tsuneishi's failure to prove the On the other hand, a writ of preliminary attachment is issued
presence of fraud. It held that the bare and unsubstantiated precisely to create a lien. When a party moves for its issuance,
allegation in their affidavit that MIS willfully refused to pay its the party is effectively asking the court to attach a property
obligation is not sufficient to establish prima facie fraud. The and hold it liable for any judgment that the court may render
CA added that while notice and hearing are not required for in his or her favor. This is similar to what a lien does. It
the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, it may functions as a security for the payment of an obligation. In
become necessary in instances where the applicant makes Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Valmonte Peña & Marcos v. Juan, 47
grave accusations based on grounds alleged in general terms. we held: An attachment proceeding is for the purpose of
creating a lien on the property to serve as security for the
Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari before the payment of the creditors' claim. Hence, where a lien already
SC. Tsuneishi pleads that this case involves a novel question of exists, as in this case a maritime lien, the same
law. It argues that while Section 21 of the Ship Mortgage is already equivalent to an attachment. To be clear, we
Decree grants it a maritime lien, the law itself, unfortunately, repeat that when a lien already exists, this is already equivalent
does not provide for the procedure for its enforcement. It to an attachment. This is where Tsuneishi's argument fails.
posits that to give meaning to this maritime lien, this Court Clearly, because it claims a maritime lien in accordance with
must rule that the procedure for its enforcement is Rule 57 of the Ship Mortgage Decree, all Tsuneishi had to do is to file a
the Rules of Court on the issuance of the writ of preliminary proper action in court for its enforcement. The issuance of a
attachment Tsuneishi invokes a provision in its contract with writ of preliminary attachment on the pretext that it is the only
MIS which states that: In case of default, either in payment or means to enforce a maritime lien is superfluous. The reason
in violation of the warranties stated in Section 11, by the that the Ship Mortgage Decree does not provide for a detailed
Owner, the Owner hereby appoints the Contractor as its duly procedure for the enforcement of a maritime lien is because it
authorized attorney in fact with full power and authority to is not necessary. Section 21 already provides for the simple
take possession, control, and custody of the said Subject Vessel procedure—file an action in rem before the court.
and / or any of the Subject Vessel's accessories and equipment,
or other assets of the Owner, without resorting to court action; LORENZO SHIPPING CORP. V. VILLARIN
and that the Owner hereby empowers the Contractor to take GR NO. 1755727 MARCH 6, 2019
custody of the same until the obligation of the Owner to the Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
Contractor is fully paid and settled to the satisfaction of the
Contractor. It insists that the writ of preliminary attachment DOCTRINE: "The provisional remedy of preliminary attachment
must be issued so as to give effect to this provision in the is harsh and rigorous for it exposes the debtor to humiliation
contract. and annoyance. The rules governing its issuance are, therefore,
strictly construed against the applicant, such that if the
ISSUE: requisites for its grant are not shown to be all present, the court
shall
Whether or not a maritime lien under Section 21 of the Ship
Mortgage Decree may be enforced through a writ of FACTS: Guerrero G. Dajao (Dajao), as President and General
preliminary attachment under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court? Manager of CASSCOR, entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) with Serafin Cabanlit (Cabanlit) and
HELD:
Florencio Villarin (Villarin).
NO. A maritime lien cannot be enforced through a writ of
preliminary attachment. A writ of preliminary attachment Under the MOA, Villarin and Cabanlit undertook to operate
effectively functions as a lien. This is crucial to resolving and manage the arrastre and stevedoring operations of
Tsuneishi's alleged novel question of law in this case. Tsuneishi CASSCOR with respect to LSC's vessels.
is correct that the Ship Mortgage Decree does provide for the
specific procedure through which a maritime lien can be Alleging failure on the part of CASSCOR and Dajao to remit
enforced. It is error that a maritime lien can only be their shares from July 1999 onwards, Villarin, Cabanlit, and FCC
operationalized by granting a writ of preliminary (Villarin, et al.) filed a Complaint for specific performance and
attachment. Tsuneishi's argument is rooted on a faulty accounting against CASSCOR and Dajao. The Complaint was
understanding of a lien and a writ of preliminary attachment. subsequently amended on June 20, 2000 to implead LSC as a
As we said, a maritime lien exists in accordance with the nominal defendant; to include a prayer for a writ of preliminary
provision of the Ship Mortgage Decree. It is enforced by filing attachment against CASSCOR and Dajao; and to include a
a proceeding in court. When a maritime lien exists, this means prayer for mandatory injunction against LSC. The case was

docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-25283 and raffled to Branch 5 LSC sought reconsideration of the decision but was denied.
of the RTC of Cebu City. A writ of preliminary attachment was
thereafter issued by the RTC against CASSCOR and Dajao on ISSUE: Whether or not the CA seriously erred in affirming the
June 21, 2000. order of the court a quo in extending the writ of preliminary
attachment as to include LSC, which was merely described as
CASSCOR and Dajao filed their Answer on June 27, 2000, while a nominal defendant, by charging it as guilty of fraud in
LSC filed its Answer on August 27, 2001. However, on contracting the obligation, when the application for the writ of
September 22, 2003, Villarin, et al. filed a Second Amended preliminary attachment was only directed to co- defendants
Complaint. The case was then re-raffled to Branch 6 of the RTC CASSCOR and Dajao.
of Cebu City.
Villarin, et al. filed a motion for issuance of a writ of preliminary RULING: YES. A writ of preliminary attachment is a provisional
attachment. Judge Anacleto Caminade (Judge Caminade) of remedy issued upon order of the court where an action is
RTC Branch 6 subsequently granted the motion and ordered pending to be levied upon the property or properties of the
the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment upon the defendant therein, the same to be held thereafter by the
posting by Villarin, et al. of a Php 150,000.00 bond. On May 17, Sheriff as security for the satisfaction of whatever judgment
2004, LSC filed a Motion for Clarification/Reconsideration, might be secured in said action by the attaching creditor
arguing that it cannot be subjected to the attachment writ. against the defendant. It is governed by Rule 57 of the Revised
However, before the court can act on LSC's Motion for Rules of Court.
Clarification/Reconsideration, a Notice of Garnishment was
served on LSC on May 20, 2004, prompting it to file a motion The provisional remedy of attachment is available in order that
to post a counter-bond. On June 1, 2004, Judge Caminade the defendant may not dispose of his property attached~, and
issued an order granting LSC's motion to post a counter-bond. thus secure the satisfaction of any judgment that may be
Hence, LSC and CASSCOR both posted counter-bonds worth secured by plaintiff from defendant. The purpose and function
Php 150,000.00 each, resulting in the discharge of the writ of of an attachment or garnishment is two-fold. First, it seizes
attachment. upon property of an alleged debtor in advance of final
judgment and holds it subject to appropriation thus preventing
On June 16, 2004, Judge Caminade, ruling on LSC's Motion for the loss or dissipation of the property by fraud or otherwise.
Clarification/Reconsideration, issued an Order clarifying that Second, it subjects to the payment of a creditor's claim
the writ of attachment issued under the Order dated May 11, property of the debtor in those cases where personal service
2004 is directed at all the defendants, including LSC. cannot be obtained upon the debtor.
The Court, reiterated the long-standing doctrine that "The
Aggrieved, LSC filed a petition for certiorari with the CA provisional remedy of preliminary attachment is harsh and
claiming that Judge Caminade committed grave abuse of rigorous for it exposes the debtor to humiliation and
discretion in subjecting LSC to the attachment writ since it had annoyance. The rules governing its issuance are, therefore,
no contract or juridical relation with Villarin and the other strictly construed against the applicant, such that if the
plaintiffs. LSC further argued that it cannot be subjected to the requisites for its grant are not shown to be all present, the
attachment writ because it was only impleaded as a nominal court shall refrain from issuing it, for, otherwise, the court
party. which issues it acts in excess of its jurisdiction."
Judge Caminade subsequently inhibited himself from the case, It must be borne in mind that Villarin' s action is for specific
which was then re-raffled to RTC Branch 20. performance. The main thrust of his complaint is to compel
Dajao and CASSCOR to observe the provisions of the MOA. All
CA rendered its Decision in favor of Villarin stating that: (1) the the other remedies sought by the complaint are merely
complaint contained averments which allege fraud on the part ancillary to this primary relief. The MOA, therefore, is the
of all the defendants, including LSC; (2) as regards LSC's obligation upon which Villarin's action is brought; hence the
assertion of the absence of privity of contract, the CA ruled obligation sought to be upheld in this case is ex contractu.
that LSC is a beneficiary of the contract between Villarin and
CASSCOR; and that Section 1(d) of Rule 57 does not require the Pertinently, Article 1311 of the New Civil Code provides that
existence of a contractual obligation. The CA noted that contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns
Section 1 (d) also contemplates other sources of obligation, and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations
such as law, crime, or quasi-delict, without stating the precise arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature,
nature of the obligation involved in the case at bar; and (3) the or by stipulation or by provision of law." In the case at bar, the
admission cited by LSC in its petition was not an admission of MOA was entered into by Dajao (as CASSCOR President) on
the absence of privity of contract between LSC and Villarin but one hand, and Villarin, et al. on the other. LSC cannot be guilty
is instead an admission by Villarin that LSC has payables to FCC. of fraud within the contemplation of Section 1(d), Rule 57 of
the Rules of Court because it did not enter into any agreement

or contract with Villarin. In the absence of any assignment of
rights to LSC, the MOA can only bind the parties thereto. Not
being a party to the MOA, LSC cannot be subjected to an G.R. No. 213650 June 17, 2019
attachment writ on the basis of Section 1(d).
BOOKLIGHT, INC., Petitioner,
Villarin admits that he has no express or written contract with vs.
LSC. He nevertheless asserts in his Memorandum the existence RUDY O. TIU, Respondent
of an implied trust relation among himself, LSC, and CASSCOR.
He alleges in the Second Amended Complaint that LSC was
aware of the arrangement under the MOA for CASSCOR to Petition for Review on Certiorari
subcontract its LSC arrastre operations to Villarin. He asserts
that the relation between them was "a business relation that DOCTRINE
requires them to repose trust and confidence in each other
and exercise a corresponding degree of fairness and good faith “[W]hile the proceeds of the sale of the attached properties
pursuant to an existing quasi-contract or implied contract may indeed be considered by the sheriff in the satisfaction of
created by law." He then denominates this relation as an judgment pursuant to Sec. 15, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, it
implied constructive trust, where LSC holds 73% of the amount is unwarrantedly premature for this Court to rule on the matter
payable to CASSCOR in trust for payment to him. when no writ of execution had been issued and referred to the
sheriff yet. There is no breach of the procedure in the execution
At this point, the Court emphasizes that it cannot make an which this Court may evaluate at this point. The court’s
authoritative characterization of the juridical relation between intervention may, if at all, eventuate only if the sheriff should
LSC and Villarin, so as to not preempt any ruling of the RTC refuse to follow the outlined procedure in the execution of
Branch 20 in Cebu City in the main controversy. Be that as it judgment under the Rules.”
may, the Court shall make an initial determination herein if
only to resolve the issue on the propriety of the issuance of FACTS
provisional remedies by the trial court.
Respondent Tiu filed a case for Collection of Sum of Money
against petitioner Booklight before the RTC, arising out of
In this regard, the Court cannot sustain the finding a quo that
unpaid rentals pursuant to a contract of lease with respondent
constructive trust relation obtains in this case.
for a space in respondent’s building to be used for petitioner’s
bookstore business, with petitioner continuing to occupy the
A constructive trust is "a trust not created by any words, either
premises despite the expiration of the said contract.
expressly or impliedly, evincing a direct intention to create a
trust but by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the Respondent’s application for the issuance of a writ of
demands of justice and prevent unjust enrichment. It does not attachment was granted by the RTC. Thus, petitioner’s
arise by agreement or intention but by operation of law against personal properties in the bookstore were attached and its
one who, by fraud, duress, or abuse of confidence obtains or funds in RCBC were garnished. During the proceedings,
holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity petitioner was non-suited for failure to file its pre-trial brief
and good conscience, to hold." and failure to appear during the scheduled pre-trial. The RTC
rendered a decision in favor of respondent, which the CA
In the case at bar, it appears that LSC has a legal justification affirmed.
for refusing to yield to Villarin's demands, based on the law on
privity of contract. Thus, it cannot be said that LSC is In this instant petition, petitioner alleges that the value of the
withholding payment for fraudulent reasons. Nevertheless, proceeds made on the auction sale of its attached properties
assuming without conceding that a constructive trust relation were P3,375,161.12, but the sheriff turned over only
does exist in this case, it has already been held in Philippine P352,028.05.
National Bank v. CA46 that, "in a constructive trust, there is
neither a promise nor any fiduciary relation to speak of and the ISSUE
so-called trustee neither accepts any trust nor intends holding
the property for the beneficiary." This takes the case out of the • Whether or not the alleged proceeds of the auction sale is
purview of Section l(b) of Rule 57, since there would be no a proper subject of review. (NO)
fiduciary relation between LSC and Villarin.
RULING
LSC's refusal to directly remit its payables to Villarin cannot be The alleged proceeds of the auction sale of the attached
considered wrongful, because LSC contracted only with properties is not the proper subject of this review. For one,
CASSCOR and not with Villarin; and such refusal is justified by matters with regard to the fact of the sale of the attached
the legal principle of privity of contract. properties and the amount of its proceeds are likewise factual
in nature, which this Court cannot judiciously determine for
lack of evidence. Notably, petitioner’s allegation of P3M as BDO filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of writ of
value of said proceeds is without support, while respondent’s preliminary attachment, the RTC granted the motion and
allegation of the sheriff’s turn over is only supported by an issued a writ of preliminary attachment against the properties
allegation on record. Clearly, these are matters which should of the defendants. The writ of preliminary attachment was
be presented before, and determined by the trial court in the issued against Carmelita’s property in Valle Verde Pasig.
execution of the final judgment.
In 2006, the sheriff reported that Carmelita was not personally
While the proceeds of the sale of the attached properties may served with summons because she is ‘no longer residing at her
indeed be considered by the sheriff in the satisfaction of Valle Verde property’, the property is for ‘rent’ as per
judgment pursuant to Sec. 15, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, it information given by the security guard on duty. In the
is unwarrantedly premature for this Court to rule on the meantime, service of summons by publication was done in a
matter when no writ of execution had been issued and newspaper of general circulation.
referred to the sheriff yet. There is no breach of the procedure
in the execution which this Court may evaluate at this point. Upon the BDO’s motion, the RTC declared the defendants in
The court’s intervention may, if at all, eventuate only if the default, including Carmelita.
sheriff should refuse to follow the outlined procedure in the
execution of judgment under the Rules. In 2007, the RTC promulgated a Decision in favor of BDO.
Tancho Corporation and the individual defendants were
Besides, the satisfaction of judgment out of property attached deemed solidarily liable for payment of the loan obligation in
is not mandatory to warrant this Court to unconditionally the amount of P32,500,000. The decision was published upon
order the satisfaction of the judgment against petitioner out of motion and granted by the trial court. The execution of the
the attached properties. Under Sec. 15 of Rule 57, the sheriff Decision proceeded, and the Valle Verde property was sold
may cause the judgment to be satisfied out of the property during the auction sale.
attached, if it be sufficient for that purpose. The use of the
word “may” clearly makes the procedure directory, in which Carmelita and her spouse, Eliseo Borlongan, Jr., discovered the
case, the sheriff may disregard the properties attached and sale of the property in 2012. Carmelita filed a petition for
proceed against other properties of the judgment debtor, if annulment of judgment with the Court of Appeals (CA) on the
necessary. ground of defective service of summons as well as the issuance
of injunctive relief.
The proper procedure, therefore, is for the prevailing party,
respondent in this case, to move for the execution of the
In 2018, the CA held that there was defective service of
judgment upon finality before the RTC, wherein the proper
summons which rendered the judgment of Makati RTC null
satisfaction thereof should be addressed.
and void. The CA found that earnest efforts to serve the
summons personally were not exerted. The petition for
Banco de Oro [formerly Equitable PCI Bank], v. Carmelita T. annulment of judgment was granted.
Borlongan
G.R. No. 247672 ; March 4, 2020 ISSUE:
Whether or not there was proper service of summons.
FACTS:
A complaint for a collection of sum of money was initiated by HELD:
the petitioner Banco de Oro (BDO) against Tancho Corporation NO.
as the principal debtor in several loan obligations.
BDO alleges that the service of summons at the time was
Private respondent Carmelita and other individuals were consistent with the prevailing rules - the service was
impleaded in the complaint in their capacity as attempted twice, first at the Fumikilla Compound, and at the
accommodation parties. Valle Verde property. The Court is not convinced with the
argument of the petitioner. The Court held that substituted
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati issued an order for the service must be preceded by impossibility of service of
service of summons to all defendants at the address of Tancho summons within a reasonable time. Yet, the findings indicate
Corporation in Fumikilla Compound in Pasig City. that there was no satisfactory indication of the attempts to
determine the address of Carmelita, nor was there a narration
In 2003, the process server reported that the defendants no of the circumstances that prove the impossibility of locating
longer hold office at the Fumikilla Compound. BDO moved for Carmelita.
leave to serve the summons by publication, which was granted
by the RTC.
As a result, the implementation of the writ of attachment on
the Valle Verde property was invalid. Philippine Rabbit’s Motion for Reconsideration was again
denied by the Judge Roura, hence, Philippine Rabbot filed a
Before a provisional remedy may be implemented, the court Petition for Certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for a
must first acquire jurisdiction over the defendant. Belated preliminary mandatory injunction before the Court of Appeals
service of summons does not serve to cure the defective seeking to enjoin the implementation of the Subsidiary Writ
implementation of the writ of attachment. which was subsequently granted.
The preliminary writ of attachment must be served after or However, respondent Pulgar reminded Sheriff Carreon that
simultaneous with the service of summons on the defendant the TRO was already expired hence a Notice of Sale for a public
whether by personal service, substituted service, or by auction was set. Philippine Rabbit reacted by filing, on 13 April
publication as warranted by the circumstances of the case. 1987, with the Court of Appeals an Urgent Motion seeking the
extension of the lifetime of the Temporary Restraining Order
RULE 58: PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION on the same date and by filing with the respondent Judge an
RICARDO L. PARAS, Complainant, v. JUDGE REYNALDO "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Hold in Abeyance the scheduled
ROURA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 55, MACABEBE, sale of PRBL, Inc. property."c
PAMPANGA, ATTY. FRUMENCIO C. PULGAR, and MR.
DIOSDADO CARREON, DEPUTY SHERIFF, REGIONAL TRIAL Judge Roura denied the Motion for being moot and academic
COURT, BRANCH 55, MACABEBE, since the auction was already made.
PAMPANGA, Respondents.
Issue: WON Judge Roura and Sheriff Carreon should be

ADMINISTRATIVE CASE administratively sanctioned for implementing the Subsidiary
Writ of Execution notwithstanding the TRO issued by the Court
DOCTRINE: The Interim Rules and Guidelines were of Appeals (NO)
promulgated to implement the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1981 (B.P. Blg. 129) which included the Intermediate Appellate Ruling:
Court among the Courts reorganized thereunder. This is This administrative complaint has no legal basis. Section 8 of
emphasized in the preamble of the Interim Rules which states the Interim Rules and Guidelines embodied in the en banc
that the same shall apply to ‘all inferior courts according to the Resolution of the Supreme Court dated 11 January 1983, which
Constitution.’ The term ‘inferior courts’ as used therein refers section in effect reproduces Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of
to all courts except the Supreme Court, the Sandiganbayan and Court, as amended by B.P. Blg. 224 dated 16 April 1982, set out
the Court of Tax Appeals. Thus, paragraphs 14 and 15 of the a general rule concerning the duration of effectivity of
Interim Rules expressly provide for ‘Procedure in the restraining orders issued by "all inferior courts". If it shall
Intermediate Appellate Court.’ appear from the facts shown by affidavits or by the verified
complaint that a great or irreparable injury would result to the
applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the judge
FACTS: to whom the application for preliminary injunction was made,
may issue a restraining order to be effective only for a period
Respondent judge rendered a Decision finding Oscar Tiglao, of twenty-days from date of its issuance.
former driver of Philippine Rabbit, guilty of rime of damage of
property with multiple physical injuries through reckless Indeed, if paragraph 8 of the Interim Rules were not intended
imprudence. The Decision became final and executory, hence, to apply to temporary restraining orders issued by the
Writ of Execution was issued against Oscar G. Tiglao. respondent Court, there would have been absolutely no
reason for the inclusion of said paragraph in the Interim Rules.
Because the Writ of Execution was returned unsatisfied, The limited life-span of temporary restraining orders issued by
respondent Judge issued an Order dated directing issuance of the regional trial courts and municipal trial courts is already
a Subsidiary Writ of Execution against the employer of Oscar provided for in B.P. Blg. 224. It was precisely to include the
G. Tiglao, that is, the Philippine Rabbit. Upon receipt of this Intermediate Appellate Court within the same limitation as to
Order, Philippine Rabbit filed a Notice of Appeal which was the effectivity of its temporary restraining orders that B.P. Blg.
denied by the respondent Judge. A Subsidiary Writ of 224 was incorporated in the Interim Rules, with the significant
Execution was issued to respondent Deputy Sheriff Carreon. change of the word ‘judge’ to ‘court,’ so as to make it clear and
Two months later, respondent Sheriff Carreon levied upon an unequivocal that the temporary restraining orders
Isuzu bus of Philippine Rabbit. Respondent Sheriff Carreon contemplated therein are those issued not only by trial judges
issued a Notice of Sale of Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 239 and but also by justices of the appellate court.
scheduled the public auction sale thereof on 6 March 1987.

G.R. No. 88384 July 14, 1994 RTC: On August 8, 1988, RTC issued an order for the
maintenance of the status quo and restrained the defendants
from ejecting Torres.
FEDERATION OF LAND REFORM FARMERS OF THE
PHILIPPINES and VIC TAGLE, Petitioner On August 23, 1988, upon the agreement of the parties, the
v. trial court ordered that the status quo be maintained and
THE COURT OF APPEALS (FIFTEENTH DIVISION), HON. created a committee, composed of representatives of the
PATRICIO M. PATAJO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, court, the DENR and private respondent, to conduct a survey
Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 71, and JAIME T. and ocular inspection for the purpose of pinpointing the areas
TORRES, Respondents allegedly titled in private respondent’s name, the Marikina
Watershed Reservation, the untitled disposable and alienable
lands and the areas for townsite reservation under
Proclamation No. 1283.
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65
Before the issuance of said order, petitioner FLRP, had filed a
DOCTRINE: Ordinarily, the efficacy of a temporary restraining
motion for intervention on the ground that it had entered into
order is non-extendible and the courts have no discretion to
a MOA with DENR for the lease of 500 hectares of the Marikina
extend the same considering the mandatory tenor of the Rule.
Watershed Reservation. The trial court, noting that petitioner
However, there is no reason to prevent a court from extending
FLRFP’s interest as a lessee was not direct but merely collateral
the 20-day period when the parties themselves ask for such
and that such interest may be protected in a separate
extension or for the maintenance of the status quo. The
proceeding, denied the motion to intervene.
questioned order of August 23, 1988 was necessary for an
orderly resolution of the application for a writ of preliminary Petitioner FLRFP filed a motion to declare without force and
injunction. effect the restraining order earlier issued by the trial court
arguing that said order had long become functus officio
FACTS:
because under Section 5, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court
Respondent Jaime Torres was ordered by then Secretary a temporary restraining order has a lifespan of only 20 days
Fulgencio Factoran of the Department of Environment and and that by its failure to decide whether to grant the writ of
Natural Resources (DENR) to vacate a parcel of land located in preliminary injunction within said period, the trial court could
Boso-Boso, Antipolo Rizal. He refused to leave the premises, no longer grant the said writ.
claiming that he had been in actual possession thereof for
The Court, however, denied petitioner FLRFP’s motion to
more than 30 years.
declare the restraining order without force and effect since the
Secretary of Justice: opined that Torres had not shown any parties agreed to maintain the status quo before the incident
proof that the land had been validly transferred to him or that on preliminary injunction could be resolved by the Court, the
his predecessor-in-interest, Carmen Garcia, had a title to it. maintenance of status quo is likewise necessary since the
Thus, he can be ejected and prosecuted for unlawful Court has still to wait for the result of the relocation survey and
occupation of forest lands under P.D. 705 or the Revised ocular inspection which was directed by the Court
Forestry Code of the Philippines. He was then formally
demanded by DENR to vacate to which he again refused.
Instead he filed a complaint for injunction before the RTC to ISSUE:
enjoin the DENR from ejecting him, wherein he alleged that he
had a pending application for registration of title of the Whether or not the trial court could extend the TRO beyond
property. the 20-day period?
DENR alleged that he was squatting on watershed and forest HELD:
reservation. The areas Torres occupies is also claimed by
Federation of Land Reform Farmers of the Philippines. The NO. The "20-day Rule" is found in Section 5, Rule 58 of the
DENR also alleged that private respondent had not exhausted Revised Rules of Court, which provides: … the judge to whom
all administrative remedies and that the trial court had no the application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue
jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction as such a restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty
issuance was proscribed by Section 1 of P.D. No. 605. This days from date of its issuance. Within the said twenty-day
decree banned the issuance by courts of preliminary period, the judge must cause an order to be served on the
injunctions in cases involving concessions, licenses and other defendant, requiring him to show cause, at a specified time
permits issued by administrative officials or agencies for the and place, why the injunction should not be granted, and
exploitation of natural resources. determine within the same period whether or not the

preliminary injunction shall be granted, and shall accordingly Federation of Land Reform Farmers and earmarked by the
issue the corresponding order. government for them". Clearly then, this Order was issued to
maintain the status quo while the committee ascertained facts
The August 8, 1988 Order explained: "In the instant case, necessary in resolving whether or not the writ of preliminary
plaintiff seeks for the issuance of Preliminary Injunction with injunction should be issued. By issuing said Order, the trial
prayer for a restraining order to restrain defendants, their court should be deemed as merely exercising its inherent
agents, representatives, employees or any person or persons power under Section 5(b), Rule 135 of the Revised Rules of
acting in their behalf to eject the plaintiff; to demolish the Court "to enforce order in proceedings before it" in the
several houses constructed thereon and the removal of the absence of any showing that it has gravely abused its discretion
fences which kept the cattle and carabaos in the area. in so doing.
It appearing from the facts shown by the verified complaint WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is
that great irreparable injury would resort (sic) to the plaintiff DENIED and the trial court is DIRECTED to consolidate Civil
before the matter can be heard on notice, let the said Case Nos. 1223-A and 1300-A and to proceed with dispatch in
application for preliminary injunction be set for hearing on resolving them.
August 19, 1988 at 8:30 o’clock (sic) in the morning, at which
time and date, defendants are directed to appear in Court to
show cause if any why the injunction should not be granted.
xxx” GOLDEN GATE REALTY CORPORATION, Petitioner, v.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. ANTONIO
Apparently, because this order does not clearly show what acts DESCALLAR, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
were being restrained, the trial court issued the August 10, Iloilo Branch XXIV; Spouses EMILIO YOUNG and ALBERTA
1988 Order as a supplement. " Considering that it will take time YOUNG, Respondents.
before the incident on the prayer for injunction could be
resolved by the Court and in order not to make the incident PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
moot and academic, let a status quo be ordered, and to
restrain the defendants, their agents, representatives, DOCTRINE: A judge may issue a temporary restraining order
employees or any person or persons acting in their behalf to with a limited life of twenty (20) days from date of issue. If
eject the plaintiff, to demolish the several houses constructed before the expiration of the 20-day period the application for
thereon and the removal of the fences which kept the cattle preliminary injunction is denied, the temporary restraining
and the carabaos" order would thereby be deemed automatically vacated. If no
action is taken by the judge on the application for preliminary
injunction within the said 20- days the temporary restraining
order would automatically expire on the 20th day by the sheer
Counted from August 8, 1988, the temporary restraining order force of law, no judicial declaration to that effect being
automatically expired on August 28, 1988, the end of the necessary.
twentieth day from its issuance. Thus, when the trial court
issued the Order of August 23, 1988 directing the maintenance FACTS: Golden Gate Realty Corporation filed 3 SEPARATE
of the status quo upon agreement of the parties, the COMPLAINTS FOR EJECTMENT against private-respondent
temporary restraining order was still in full force and effect. Emilio Young before the City Court of Iloilo. Young filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
Ordinarily, the efficacy of a temporary restraining order is non-
considering that the complaint failed to allege prior demand to
extendible and the courts have no discretion to extend the
vacate the premises but the motion to dismiss was denied. A
same considering the mandatory tenor of the Rule. However,
motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied by the
there is no reason to prevent a court from extending the 20-
same court.
day period when the parties themselves ask for such extension
or for the maintenance of the status quo. The questioned
Respondent Young filed with the then CFI of Iloilo a petition for
order of August 23, 1988 was necessary for an orderly
certiorari and prohibition seeking the nullification of the order
resolution of the application for a writ of preliminary
of the City Court denying his motion to dismiss. Meanwhile,
injunction.
the City Court of Iloilo rendered a decision in the ejectment
Said Survey and ocular inspection is for the purpose of case IN FAVOR of petitioner Golden Gate and against private-
pinpointing the area allegedly titled in the name of Plaintiff respondents Young.  
Jaime Torres, the area of Marikina Watershed Reservation, the
disposable and alienable area not yet titled in favor of any In view of the decision rendered by the City Court of Iloilo, the
other person and the area for the townsite reservation CFI of Iloilo rendered a decision dismissing the petition for
pursuant to Proclamation No. 1283 now being claimed by the certiorari for having become moot and academic. A petition
for review on certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court but
the petition was dismissed for having been filed out of time. application for preliminary injunction is denied, the
A writ of execution was issued and the City Sheriff ejected the temporary restraining order would thereby be
respondent Young and scheduled for auction sale the deemed automatically vacated. If no action is taken
properties levied upon. by the judge on the application for preliminary
injunction within the said 20-days the temporary
Respondent Young filed an action seeking to  NULLIFY THE restraining order would automatically expire on the
DECISION AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE EJECTMENT CASE. The 20th day by the sheer force of law, no judicial
RTC of Iloilo issued ex-parte a temporary restraining order, declaration to that effect being necessary. A
enjoining Golden Gate and the City Sheriff of Iloilo from temporary restraining order can no longer exist
conducting the sale at public auction and set the hearing for indefinitely for it has become truly temporary (Board
the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioner of Transportation v. Castro, 125 SCRA 417 (1983)
filed its answer and opposition to the issuance of a writ of citing Dionisio, et. al. v. Court of First Instance of
preliminary injunction. Thereafter, a hearing was conducted. South Cotabato, Branch II, G.R. No. 61048
  promulgated on August 17, 1983) . . ."
For lack of material time within which to decide the prayer for A temporary restraining order has a limited life of twenty (20)
preliminary injunction, CFI of Iloilo issued an order extending days. The respondent trial court erred in extending the period
to ten (10) days the effectivity of the restraining order.  of the temporary restraining order for another ten (10) days in
order to give itself more time to decide on the propriety of the
CFI: The CFI of Iloilo City issued the questioned order nullifying issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
the decision in the ejectment case of the City Court of Iloilo
for having been rendered without jurisdiction. The court, The Court also ruled that the said court should not have
further, permanently restrained the petitioners from enforcing permanently enjoined the sheriff from conducting an auction
and executing the annulled decision and directed the Sheriff to sale and more importantly, it should not have annulled the
desist from carrying out the public auction sale and to return proceedings in in the ejectment case altogether because by
the properties levied upon by him to the private respondents. doing so, the said court pre-empted itself from conducting any
further trial on the merits of the case. It went beyond the
The petitioner appealed contending that the trial court extent of the relief that the called-for hearing may grant, and
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing a temporary that is, the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
restraining order and in extending the effectivity thereof. The Court found that the City Court of Iloilo acquired
jurisdiction over the ejectment case and rendered a valid and
CA: The CA dismissed the petition and ruled that the trial court final judgment which may very well serve as a basis for
acted correctly in extending the TRO because the prescribed invoking the principle of res judicata.
20-day period for the efficacy of such an order is not a hard
and fast rule. DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE
FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the
In this instant petition, the petitioner maintains that the respondent Court of Appeals dated January 28, 1986 and the
respondent appellate court erred in sustaining the order of the order of the respondent Regional Trial Court dated June 4,
trial court. Petitioner contends that the twenty (20)-day period 1984 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
of efficacy of a temporary restraining order is non-extendible
and the courts have no discretion to extend the same,
otherwise the life of such provisional remedy would be only
permissive and not mandatory. UNIVERSAL MOTORS CORPORATION Represented by
GERARDO M. GELLE, Complainant, v. JUDGE FRANCISCO G.
ISSUE: Whether the 20-day period of the TRO is non-extendible ROJAS, SR., Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Cagayan De
and trial courts have no discretion to extend the same Oro City, Respondent.
RULING: YES. In the recent case of Ortigas & Company,

ADMINISTRATIVE CASE
Limited Partnership v. Hon. Vivencio M. Ruiz, et. al., this Court
ruled that a temporary restraining order has a limited life of DOCTRINE: The bond under Rule 58 is intended to pay all the
twenty (20) days: damages which the party or person against whom the
temporary restraining order or injunction is issued may sustain
"Finally, under Section 5, Batas Pambansa Blg. 224, a by reason thereof should the court finally decide that the
judge may issue a temporary restraining order with a applicant was not entitled thereto. Hence, it follows that unless
limited life of twenty (20) days from date of issue. If it appears that the enjoined party will not suffer any damage,
before the expiration of the 20-day period the the presiding judge must require the applicant to post a bond,
otherwise the courts could become instruments of oppression grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary
and harassment. injunction.
FACTS: Hence, complainant filed the instant complaint against

respondent judge for serious misconduct, gross ignorance of
One of UMC’s dealers was Nissan Specialist Sales Corporation the law, manifest partiality and grave abuse of discretion.
(NSSC) covering Misamis Oriental and other provinces and
cities in northern Mindanao, including Cagayan De Oro City. Issue: WON respondent judge should be administratively
NSSC ordered from complainant Nissan vehicles and spare sanctioned for serious misconduct, gross ignorance of the law,
parts worth P5,476,500.00. NSSC issued several postdated manifest partiality and grave abuse of discretion. (YES)
checks in favor of complainant to pay for the purchases. The
checks, however, were dishonored due to insufficient funds.
Complainant demanded payment from NSSC but the latter Ruling: Under Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
repeatedly failed to comply. Hence, complainant stopped Procedure, a temporary restraining order may be issued only
transacting with NSSC, although the latter still remained as if it appears from the facts shown by affidavits or by the
dealer. Complainant later appointed Nissan Cagayan De Oro verified application that great or irreparable injury would
Distributors, Inc. (NICAD) to co-exist as dealer with NSSC to result to the applicant before the writ of preliminary
meet the market demand in Northern Mindanao. injunction could be heard. In addition, Section 4(a) of Rule 58
of the Rules of Court is clear with regard to the procedure to
be followed in the issuance of writs of preliminary
Because of NSSC's continued failure and refusal to pay its injunction, i.e., a preliminary injunction or temporary
obligation, complainant terminated its dealership agreement restraining order may be granted only when the application in
with NSSC. It also filed a criminal complaint for violation the action or proceeding is verified, and shows facts entitling
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and/or estafa against the officers the applicant to the relief demanded.
of NSSC.
Second, respondent judge issued the temporary restraining

In response, NSSC filed a complaint for breach of contract order without requiring the plaintiff to post a bond. While
against complainant and its officers, and NICA. The case was Section 4(b) of Rule 58 gives the presiding judge the discretion
raffled to the sala of respondent Judge Francisco G. Rojas, Sr. to require a bond before granting a temporary restraining
order, the Rules did not intend to give the judge the license to
exercise such discretion arbitrarily to the prejudice of the
Judge Rojas issued an order setting a summary hearing on the defendant. Certainly, each member of the Bench is not a
propriety of the issuance of a temporary restraining order. depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction
NSSC filed an amended complaint which respondent judge of law.
admitted in his order. The amended complaint inserted a
prayer for temporary restraining order which was not found in
the original complaint.
After a hearing on the temporary restraining order, Judge G.R. No. 143994 July 11, 2002
Rojas granted the same. Hence, NSSC filed an Urgent Motion
to Fix Bond for Plaintiff/Applicant and Approve/Admit LOS BAÑOS RURAL BANK, INC., Petitioner,
Defendant's Counterbond with Prayer to Lift Temporary v.
Restraining Order. This was denied by the court. PACITA O. AFRICA, GLORIA AFRICA, ANTONIO AFRICA,
Respondent judge subsequently held several hearings with ARISTEO AFRICA, SOCORRO AFRICA, CONSUELO AFRICA,
respect to the preliminary injunction and ultimately ordered and LOURDES AFRICA, Respondents.
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon posting
by the plaintiff of a bond in the amount of one million pesos PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 45
(P1,000,000.00). The writ of preliminary injunction was issued
after NSSC filed its bond. On the same day, complainant filed DOCTRINE: A writ of preliminary injunction is issued to preserve
with the trial court an Urgent Motion to Recall/Dissolve the status quo ante, upon an applicant’s showing of two
Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction. But respondent judge important requisite conditions; namely, (1) the right to be
denied the same. protected exists prima facie, and (2) the acts sought to be
Complainant filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven that the
for Certiorari and Prohibition assailing the preliminary violation sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable
injunction issued by respondent judge. The Court of Appeals injustice.
promulgated its decision finding that the trial court committed

FACTS: to the property in its name and enjoy the unbridled freedom
to dispose of it to third persons, to the damage and prejudice
The Quezon City hall was ravaged by a fire, which among of respondents. What respondents stand to lose is material
others destroyed by the fire was the TCT, covering a parcel of and substantial. Clearly, the act sought to be enjoined is
land issued in the name of Pacita and her late husband Alberto violative of their proprietary right over the property.
Africa.
Preliminary Injunction, defined
Pacita, with Macy, reconstituted a new TCT to be issued in the Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at no other purpose
name of Pacita. But later did Pacita know, Macy executed a than to protect the complainant’s substantive, rights and
deed of sale forging the signature of Pacita, purporting to interests during the pendency of the principal action. A
transfer the parcel of land to Macy. Macy also gave Pacita a preliminary injunction, as the term itself suggests, is merely
fake TCT to make the latter believe that a TCT was issued in her temporary. It is to be resorted to only when there is a pressing
name. necessity to avoid injurious consequences that cannot be
remedied under any standard of compensation.
The heirs of Alberto and Pacita discovered, later on that, Macy
mortgage the same to Los Banos Bank. Thus, they filed for Evidence required to justify the issuance of WPI is only
Annulment of Title, Deed of Absolute Sale and Deed of “sampling”
Mortgage. The evidence required to justify the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction in the hearing thereon need not be
After the filing of the case, the bank foreclosed the subject conclusive or complete. The evidence need only be a
property without due notice, prompting respondents herein to "sampling" intended merely to give the court an idea of the
amend the complaint, with a prayer for the issuance of a justification for the preliminary injunction, pending the
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary decision of the case on the merits. Thus, to be entitled to the
injunction, to stop the bank from, among others, consolidating writ, respondents are only required to show that they have the
title to the subject property. ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in their Complaint.
The RTC granted the application for a writ of preliminary G.R. No. 144499 February 19, 2002
injunction. FIRST GLOBAL REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, petitioners, v. CHRISTOPHER SAN
The CA granted the issuance of a preliminary injunction. AGUSTIN respondents.
ISSUE: PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45
Whether or not the appellate court erred in issuing a writ of DOCTRINE: A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy
preliminary injunction to stop petitioner’s consolidation of its that a party may resort to in order to preserve and protect
title to the subject property certain rights and interests during the pendency of an action.
It is issued to preserve the status quo ante – the last actual,
HELD: peaceful, and uncontested status that preceded the actual
controversy.
In the case at bar, we find ample justification for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction. FACTS: The subject property was previously covered by TCT
No. 180235 was issued in the name of Christopher San
1st requisite - Existence of the Right Agustin’s mother, Lilian Sales-San Agustin. San Agustin,
As alleged in the Complaint, Pacita Africa is the registered together with his parents, brothers and sisters have been in
owner of the subject property. If indeed the Deed of Sale is a possession of the subject property since 1967 up to the
forgery, no parcel of land was ever transferred to the present.
purported buyer who, not being the owner, could not have
validly mortgaged the property. On the basis of the evidence The subject property was then sold to spouses Enrique and
presented, respondents possess the right to prevent petitioner Angelina Camacho in 1994 for of P2.5M, ‘net of capital gains
from consolidating the title in its name. The first requisite — tax, documentary stamp tax, transfer taxes and the remaining
the existence of a right to be protected — is thus present. balance of the petitioner’s loan with DBP.
2nd requisite - Violation of Applicant’s Right Records show that spouses Camacho succeeded in convincing
What is sought to be enjoined by respondents is the First Global Realty and Development Corporation (First Global)
consolidation of the title to the subject property in petitioner’s to accept a partial payment of P100,000 upon the execution of
name. Unless legally stopped, petitioner may consolidate title a deed of absolute sale in their favor over the subject property.

The balance of P2.4M would be paid once the title over the order and/or a writ of injunction’ against First Global, seeking
same was transferred in the name of spouses Camacho. The to enjoin the latter from taking possession of the subject
latter agreement came about because spouses Camacho property.
would use the subject property to raise the amount of P2.M,
that is to say, they would secure a loan from a bank or financial The court a quo issued an order denying San Agustin’s prayer
institution with the subject property as collateral. for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. First Global
filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied for lack of
On May 24, 1994, DBP released the subject property to First merit.
Global upon full payment of the latter’s outstanding loan.
Thereafter, San Agustin executed a deed of sale in favor of RTC: DENIED San Agustin’s application for a preliminary
spouses Camacho, who in turn paid San Agustin the amount of injunction to prevent First Global from evicting him from the
P100,000. TCT No. 194868 was later issued in the name subject property.
spouses Camacho.
It held that San Agustin had sold the property to the Camacho
First Global granted spouses Camacho’s loan application with spouses for P2,500,000. The spouses initially gave him
the subject property as collateral, in the amount of P1.190M. P100,000, with the balance to be paid after they would have
However, despite receipt of the loan and First Global’s demand secured a loan using the property as collateral. It added that
to pay the balance of the purchase price of the subject cause of action of San Agustin was to demand payment of the
property, spouses Camacho did not pay the same. balance from the Camachos.
San Agustin filed a criminal complaint for estafa against CA: REVERSED the RTC and GRANTED the injunctive relief
spouses Camacho. Unfortunately, the case did not prosper prayed for by San Agustin.
because the spouses Camacho could not be located for the
proper service of the warrant of arrest. In the ensuing period, It held that First Global should not be given possession of the
San Agustin discovered that First Global filed a special civil property pendente lite, because it knew of the agreement
action for the foreclosure of the subject property inasmuch as between San Agustin and the Camachos. Moreover, the fact
spouses Camacho defaulted in the payment of their loan that the property remained in the possession of San Agustin’s
obligation. mother at the time the couple sold it to First Global should
have warned it of a defect in its claims.
The RTC rendered a decision ordering the foreclosure of the
subject property and the subsequent sale thereof at public ISSUE: W/N SAN AGUSTIN IS ENTITLED TO THE POSSESSION OF
auction. Spouses Camacho did not file a motion for THE PROPERTY WHILE THE MAIN CASE FOR RESCISSION IS
reconsideration of the said decision. Consequently, First Global PENDING IN THE RTC?
filed a motion for execution which was granted. The sale of the
subject property at public auction was, nevertheless, thrust HELD: NO. To dispossess San Agustin pendente lite would be
aside in view of the dacion en pago which spouses Camacho clearly unjust. A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy
executed in favor of First Global. The dacion en pago was that a party may resort to in order to preserve and protect
registered before the Register of Deeds of Makati City, which certain rights and interests during the pendency of an action.
paved the way for the issuance of TCT No. 209050 in the name It is issued to preserve the status quo ante – the last actual,
of First Global. peaceful, and uncontested status that preceded the actual
controversy.
On September 8, 1997, First Global demanded rentals from
San Agustin for his mother’s use of the subject property. When The purpose of a preliminary injunction, then, is “to prevent
First Global’s demand was unheeded by San Agustin, it filed a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the
motion for issuance of a writ of possession before the RTC. parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and
adjudicated. Its sole aim is to preserve the status quo until the
San Agustin filed a motion for intervention wherein he asked merits of the case can be heard fully.” Thus, it will be issued
for the rescission of the deed of absolute sale/mortgage, only upon a showing of a clear and unmistakable right that is
dacion en pago and cancellation of First Global’s title over the violated. Moreover, an urgent and permanent necessity for its
subject property. issuance must be shown by the applicant.
However, finding the motion for intervention to be a futile In the present case, the status quo that is sought to be
undertaking, San Agustin filed a separate complaint for preserved is the possession of the property by San Agustine
‘rescission of the deed of absolute sale, annulment of the and his right to use it as his dwelling, pending determination of
dacion en pago and cancellation of title and issuance of a new whether or not he had indeed sold it to the Camachos and,
title with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining

consequently, whether the latter’s transfer of its ownership to REM was yet determined. It found that petitioners were bound
First Global via dacion en pago should be upheld. to suffer grave injustice if they were deprived of their property
before the RTC could rule on the validity of the REM.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision Respondent filed an MR but was DENIED. Respondent filed a
AFFIRMED. Special Civil Action for Certiorari
before the CA
G.R. NO. 169846 March 28, 2008
SPS. NESTOR AND MA. NONA BORROMEO, CA: REVERSED THE RTC’S ORDER. The CA decreed that pending
Petitioners, vs. HONOROBALE COURT OF APPEALS the RTC’s determination of the validity of the
and EQUITABLE SAVINGS BANK, Respondents. REM, its validity should be presumed. Petitioners filedfor an
MR of the foregoing Decision but was DENIED.
FACTS:
Spouses Borromeo were offered a loan by respondent ISSUE: Whether or not a writ of preliminary injunction should
Equitable PCI Bank (EPCIB) under its “Own-a-Home Loan be issued to enjoin the foreclosure and public auction of
Program.” Petitioners applied for such loan of P4,000,000.00 petitioner’s property during theproceedings and pending
and signed blank loan documents, in order to secure the determination of the main cause of action for annulment of
payment for the loan, they also executed a Real Estate the REM on said property
Mortgage over their land in favor of EPCIB.
HELD: YES. Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides
Respondent released a total of P3,600,000.00 in four that:
installments, while the balance of P400,000.00 was not drawn
by petitioners. Petitioners made repeated verbal requests to SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunctions. — A
EPCIB to furnish them their copies of the loan documents and preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:
further claimed that they purposely did not draw the (a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and
remaining balance and stopped paying their loan the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the
amortizations to protest EPCIB’s continued failure to provide commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of,
them copies of the loan documents. or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a
limited period or perpetually;
Vice President of EPCIB explained to petitioners through letter (b) That the commission, continuance or nonperformance of
that their clients were given original copies of the loan the act or acts complained of during the litigation would
documents only upon full release of the amount loaned. probably work injustice to the applicant; or IATSHE
Respondent also sent a letter demanding the payment for their (c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening,
obligation, upon which failure to do so would result in its taking or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done,
of legal action against petitioners. some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the
applicant respecting the
Petitioners received copies of the loan documents and were subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the
surprised that the Loan Agreement and REM designated judgment ineffectual.
respondent ESB as lender and mortgagor instead of EPCIB.
When petitioners failed to pay for the loan, respondent sought As such, a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only
to extra-judicially foreclose the REM. Petitioners filed with the upon clear showing of an actual existing right to be protected
RTC a Complaint for Injunction, Annulment of Mortgage with during the pendency of the principal action. The twin
Damages and with Prayer for TRO and Preliminary and requirements of a valid injunction are the existence of a right
Mandatory Injunction against EPCIB alleging that the loan and its actual or threatened violations. Thus, to be entitled to
documents failed to reflect the true agreement between the an injunctive writ, the right to be protected and the violation
parties. against that right must be shown.
The Extrajudicial Foreclosure that was scheduled fell on a In this case, petitioners assert that their creditor mortgagee is
holiday and as a result did not push through 738so the RTC EPCIB and not respondent. While ESB claims that petitioners
determined that there was no need for have had transactions with it, particularly the five check
the TRO and/or preliminary injunction. Respondent re-filed its payments made in the name of ESB, it fails to categorically
petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the REM. Petitioners state that ESB and not EPCIB is the real creditor-mortgagor in
reacted by filing with the RTC an MR of its Order in order to this loan and mortgage transaction. This Court finds the
forestall the extrajudicial sale of their property. position taken by the petitioners to be more credible. The four
Promissory Notes designate EPCIB as the "lender." In a letter
RTC: MR was granted and ordered the issuance of a dated 19 December 2002, addressed to Home Guaranty
preliminary injunction after declaring that the validity of the Corporation, EPCIB Vice President Gary Vargas even specified

petitioners' loan as one of its housing loans for which it sought disregarded their right over the properties despite the
insurance coverage. Records also show that petitioners execution of an Affidavit of Adverse Claim.
repeatedly dealt with EPCIB. . DTE
The RTC denied the application for a writ of preliminary
From a perusal of the records, petitioners did not enter into a injunction. Thus, a public auction took place. Thus, petitioners
Loan Agreement and REM with respondent. Respondent, filed with the RTC the instant case for Annulment of Sheriff’s
therefore, has no right to foreclose the subject property even Auction Sale Proceedings and Certificate of Sale against
after default, since this right can only be claimed by the iBank, which included a prayer for the issuance of a TRO
creditor- mortgagor, EPCIB; and, consequently, the and/or WPI. An order was issued by Judge Janolo granting
extrajudicial foreclosure of the REM by respondent would be petitioner’s application for the issuance of a WPI. The
in violation of petitioners' property rights. This Court respondents filed special civil actions before the CA and SC,
emphasizes that the determination of who is the creditor- both of which were dismissed.
mortgagee is only for purposes of determining the propriety of
issuing a writ of preliminary injunction, based on the evidence Subsequently, respondents filed before the RTC an Omnibus
presented before the hearing for the issuance of a preliminary Motion praying for the dismissal of the case and the
injunction. It will not bar the RTC from making its own dissolution of the WPI. The trial court recalled and dissolved
determination as to who is the true creditor mortgagee after the WPI and ordered respondents to post a counter-bond
trial and presentation of evidence on the main case. To amounting to P10M.
establish the essential requisites for a preliminary injunction,
Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA, which
the evidence submitted by the plaintiff need not be conclusive
was denied due to the petitioners’ failure to file a motion for
and complete. The plaintiffs are only required to show that
reconsideration of the trial court’s order. Thus, the instant
they have an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in
petition.
their complaint.
ISSUE
G.R. No. 175145 March 28, 2008 • Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, may the
trial court recall and dissolve the preliminary injunction it
SPOUSES ALFREDO and SHIRLEY YAP, Petitioners, issued despite the rulings of the Court of Appeals and by
vs. this Court that its issuance was not tainted with grave
INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE BANK, ET. AL., Respondents abuse of discretion? (YES)
RULING
The trial court may still order the dissolution of the preliminary
DOCTRINE injunction it previously issued. The issuance of a preliminary
injunction is different from its dissolution. Its issuance is
“The issuance of a preliminary injunction is different from its
governed by Section 3, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
dissolution. Its issuance is governed by Section 3, Rule 58 of the
Procedure while the grounds for its dissolution are contained
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure while the grounds for its
in Section 6, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As
dissolution are contained in Section 6, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules
long as the party seeking the dissolution of the preliminary
of Civil Procedure. As long as the party seeking the dissolution
injunction can prove the presence of any of the grounds for its
of the preliminary injunction can prove the presence of any of
dissolution, same may be dissolved notwithstanding that the
the grounds for its dissolution, same may be dissolved
Supreme Court previously ruled that its issuance was not
notwithstanding that [the Supreme Court] previously ruled that
tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
its issuance was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion.”
Under Sec. 6 of Rule 58, a preliminary injunction may be
FACTS
dissolved if it appears after hearing that although the applicant
Respondent iBank filed a collection suit with application for the is entitled to the injunction or restraining order, the issuance
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against Looyuko or continuance thereof, as the case may be, would cause
and Go in the RTC, which found for respondent bank and irreparable damage to the party or person enjoined while the
ordered the defendants to pay P96M, plus penalty. applicant can be fully compensated for such damages as he
may suffer, and the former files a bond in an amount fixed by
A Writ of Execution was then issued against the defendants. the court on condition that he will pay all damages which the
However, petitioner-spouses filed a Complaint for Injunction applicant may suffer by the denial or dissolution of the
with Prayer for TRO and/or Preliminary Injunction with the injunction or restraining order. Two conditions must concur:
RTC, claiming that they were the owners of parcels of land, by (1) court in the exercise of its discretion, finds that the
virtue of a DoAS, sought to be executed, and that the sheriff continuance of the injunction would cause great damage to
the defendant, while the plaintiff can be fully compensated The respondent bank on the other hand claimed that the
for such damages as he may suffer; and (2) the defendant files transfer did not specify that the securities of the loan was also
a counter-bond. transferred to PIO.
In this case, the trial court, after hearing, found that The RTC issued an order denying the applications for TRO and
respondents duly showed that they would suffer great and preliminary injunction of the petitioners. The petitioners’
irreparable injury if the injunction shall continue to exist. Also, motion for reconsideration was denied.
the respondents were willing to post a counter-bond.
The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition for lack of
The well-known rule is that the matter of issuance of a writ of merit.
preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound judicial
discretion of the trial court, and its action shall not be ISSUE:
disturbed on appeal unless it is demonstrated that it acted Whether or not the petitioners are entitled for TRO and
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or, otherwise, in preliminary injunction.
grave abuse of discretion. By the same token, the court that
issued such a preliminary relief may recall or dissolve the writ HELD:
as the circumstances may warrant. In the case on hand, the NO.
trial court issued the order of dissolution on a ground provided
for by the Rules of Court. The same being in accordance with The test for issuing a TRO or an injunction is whether the facts
the rules, we find no reason to disturb the same. show a need for equity to intervene in order to protect
perceived rights in equity.
G.G. Sportswear Manufacturing Corp. and Naresh K. Gidwani,
As a general rule, a higher court will not set aside the trial
v. Banco de Oro Unibank, Inc., Philippine Investment One
court’s grant or denial of an application for preliminary
(SPV-AMC), Inc., and the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex
injunction unless it:
Officio Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
• Gravely abused its discretion as when it lacks
Branch 133, as represented by Atty. Engracio M. Escasinas, Jr.
jurisdiction over the action;
G.R. No. 184434 ; February 8, 2010
• Ignores relevant considerations that stick out of the
FACTS: parties’ pleadings;
In 1994, petitioners G.G. Sportswear Manufacturing Corp. • Sees the facts with a blurred lens;
(G.G. Sportswear) and Naresh Gidwani mortgaged a lot and a • Ignores what is relevant;
house in Makati, to Equitable-PCI Bank, now respondent Banco • Draws illogical conclusions; or
de Oro Unibank, Inc. (BDO), as securities to a loan. An • Simply acts in random fashion.
additional loan was extended to the petitioners, the parties
amended the real estate mortgages to include the extended The plaintiff must clearly show that he has a cause of action,
loan. that he enjoys some right and that the defendant has violated
it. The opposition of the BDO corrected the understanding of
In 2005, respondent BDO informed G.G. Sportswear of the the petitioner that the assignment was only for a portion of the
transfer of its loan obligation to Philippine Investment One loans receivable to respondent PIO.
(SPV-AMC), Inc., (PIO). The bank has transferred all of its rights,
titles, benefits, and interests to the Loans Receivables of G.G. The issue raised by the petitioner as to which party between
Sportswear. BDO and PIO have the right to foreclose the property is not a
genuine issue. The real estate mortgage remained in BDO’s
Subsequently, BDO applied with the Ex Officio Sheriff of Makati name, and the PIO which had been impleaded in the case did
for the foreclosure of the properties that the petitioners not contest BDO’s ownership of the loans receivable and its
mortgaged. The sheriff auctioned off the lot property in 2007. right to foreclose the mortgage.
Two days before the scheduled auction of the house property, The provisional remedy of preliminary injunction may only be
the petitioners filed an action with the Regional Trial Court resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid
(RTC) of Makati to annul the foreclosure, and enjoin further injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any
foreclosure by temporary restraining order (TRO) and standard of compensation. Since there is a valid cause to
preliminary injunction. Since BDO transferred its rights to PIO foreclose on the mortgages, the petitioners are not entitled to
in 2005, the BDO lost the right to foreclosure. injunction.

A.M. No. RTJ-10-2255 January 17, 2011 Court since they were not required "to show cause, at a
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 10-3335-RTJ) specific time and place, why the injunction should not be
granted."
SPOUSES DEMOCRITO and OLIVIA LAGO, complainants,
Due to these acts of respondent judge, complainants filed a
vs. JUDGE GODOFREDO B. ABUL, JR., REGIONAL TRIAL
motion for inhibition from further hearing the case, since
COURT, BRANCH 43, GINGOOG CITY, respondent.
they perceive that respondent judge was bereft of the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge. The motion was denied by
respondent judge in his Resolution. Complainants thus
DOCTRINE: Rule 58, as amended, mandates a full and consider respondent judge's non-inhibition as violative of
comprehensive hearing for the determination of the propriety the Code of Judicial Conduct, as it denied them due process
of the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, separate and equal protection of the law.
from the summary hearing for the extension of the 72-hour After due investigation, the Office of the Court
TRO. The absence of the hearing required by the Rules of Administrator (OCA) issued its Report. The OCA found
Court is downright reprehensible and, thus, should not be respondent judge to have been grossly and deliberately
countenanced. The requirement of a hearing is so ignorant of the law and procedure for violation of Rule 58 of
fundamental that failure to comply with it not only amounts the Rules of Court, specifically by means of the following
to gross ignorance of rules and procedure, but also to an acts: (1) when the civil complaint with prayer for the
outright denial of due process to the party denied such a issuance of a TRO was filed on July 2, 2009,
hearing. respondent judge assumed jurisdiction thereon and,
FACTS: Complainants Sps. Lago were the defendants in a civil without the mandated raffle and notification and service of
action for Preliminary Injunction, Easement of Road Right of summons to the adverse party, issued a 72-hour TRO on July
Way, and Attorney's Fees, with prayer for a TRO filed by 7, 2009; (2) when respondent judge set the case for
Christina M. Obico (Obico) before the RTC. The action was summary hearing on July 14, 2009, purportedly to determine
spawned by the alleged threats of complainants to close the whether the TRO could be extended for another period,
access road leading to Obico's property, where the latter's when the hearing should be set within 72 hours from the
milkfish (bangus) farm is located. Obico claimed that, if the issuance of the TRO; (3) when he eventually granted an
access road leading to her property was closed, she would extension of an already expired TRO to a full 20-day period;
be prevented from harvesting her milkfish, causing massive and (4) when he issued a writ of preliminary injunction in
fish kills, and leading to heavy financial losses on her part. favor of Obico without prior notice to herein complainants
and without the required hearing.
Sps. Lago assert that the civil complaint was never raffled,
and that no notice of raffle was ever served upon them, yet ISSUE: WON respondent judge violated Section 4 and 5 or
the case went directly to Branch 43, where Rule 58 of the Rules of Court
respondent judge is the acting presiding judge and also the HELD: YES. The records of this case clearly show that
acting executive judge of RTC, Gingoog City. Complainants respondent judge failed to cause the raffle of Civil Case No.
claim that this is violative of Section 4 (c), Rule 58 of 2009-905, since RTC, Gingoog City, is a multiple-sala court,
the Rules of Court. or to cause the notification and service of summons to
Respondent judge issued an Order directing the issuance of complainants after he issued the 72-hour TRO.
a TRO "effective seventy-two (72) hours from date of issue," Respondent judge's Order was explicit when the civil case
without requiring Obico to put up a bond. Complainants was set for summary hearing purportedly to determine
allege that at that time, they were not yet in receipt of the whether or not the TRO issued could be extended for
summons and copy of the complaint, as well as Obico's another period. Thus, it is manifest that
affidavit and bond. Complainants claim that this is violative respondent judge had directly assumed jurisdiction over the
of Section 4 (c) and (d) of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court. civil action and all together disregarded the mandatory
requirements of Section 4 (c), Rule 58, relative to the raffle
Respondent judge issued an Order extending the 72-hour in the presence of the parties, and service of summons. This
TRO and again, failed to require Obico to put up a bond even is gross error.
as complainants assert that it is already of judicial notice that
a TRO under the amended new rules has been elevated to With respect to the second paragraph of Section 5, Rule 58
the level of an injunction. of the Rules of Court, as amended, it is clear that, on the
matter of the issuance of an ex parte 72-hour TRO, an
In his Resolution, respondent judge ordered the issuance of executive judge of a multiple-sala court (applicable to
the writ of preliminary injunction conditioned upon the respondent judge), or the presiding judge of a single-sala
application of a bond by Obico in the amount of court, is empowered to issue the same in matters of extreme
P100,000.00. Complainants argue, however, that said emergency, in order to prevent grave injustice and
directive was violative of Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of irreparable injury to the applicant. However, it is also an
unequivocal provision that, after the issuance of the 72-hour expected to keep abreast of and be conversant with the rules
TRO, the executive judge of a multiple-sala court is bound to and the circulars which the Supreme Court has adopted and
comply with Section 4 (c) of the same rule with respect to which affect the disposition of cases before them. Although
the service of summons and the documents to be served judges have in their favor the presumption of regularity and
therewith. good faith in the performance of their judicial functions, a
blatant disregard of the clear and unmistakable terms of the
An already expired TRO can no longer be extended.
law obviates this presumption and renders them susceptible to
Respondent judge should have known that the TRO he
administrative sanctions.
issued in his capacity as an acting executive judge was valid
for only 72 hours. Beyond such time, the TRO automatically
expires, unless, before the expiration of the said period, he,
FACTS:
supposedly in his capacity as presiding judge to whom the
case was raffled, conducted the required summary hearing
National Electrification Administration ("NEA") published an
in order to extend the TRO's lifetime. Indubitably, a 72-hour
invitation to pre-qualify and to bid for a contract, otherwise
TRO, issued by an executive judge, is a separate and distinct
known as IPB No. 80, for the supply and delivery of woodpoles
TRO which can stand on its own, regardless of whether it is
and crossarms needed in the country’s Rural Electrification
eventually extended or not. It is not, as
Project. In response to the said invitation, bidders, such as
respondent judge attempts to impress upon us, a mere part
private respondent [Nerwin], were required to submit their
of the 20-day TRO issued by a presiding judge to whom the
application for eligibility together with their technical
case is raffled.
proposals. At the same time, they were informed that only
Moreover, respondent judge committed another blunder those who would pass the standard pre-qualification would be
when he ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary invited to submit their financial bids.
injunction without the required hearing and without prior
notice to the defendants, herein complainants. The records
plainly disclose that the only hearing conducted prior to the Following a thorough review of the bidders’ qualifications and
August 11, 2009 Resolution granting the preliminary eligibility, only 4 bidders, including Nerwin. Nerwin ultimately
injunction was the July 14, 2009 summary hearing for the offered the lowest bid, hence, NEA conducted a pre-award
extension of the 72-hour TRO. inspection of private respondent’s [Nerwin’s] manufacturing
plants and facilities, including its identified supplier in
Again, Rule 58, as amended, mandates a full and
Malaysia, to determine its capability to supply and deliver
comprehensive hearing for the determination of the
NEA’s requirements. NEA recommended the approval of
propriety of the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,
award to Nerwin.
separate from the summary hearing for the extension of the
72-hour TRO. hearing for the extension of the TRO as the
NEA’s Board of Directors passed Resolution No. 32 reducing by
very same hearing required for the issuance of the writ of
50% the material requirements for IBP No. 80 "given the time
preliminary injunction.
limitations for the delivery of the materials, xxx, and with the
Verily, the absence of the hearing required by the Rules of loan closing date of October 2001 fast approaching". Nerwin
Court is downright reprehensible and, thus, should not be protested the said 50% reduction, alleging that the same was
countenanced. The requirement of a hearing is so a ploy to accommodate a losing bidder. On the other hand, the
fundamental that failure to comply with it not only amounts losing bidders Tri State and Pacific Synnergy appeared to have
to gross ignorance of rules and procedure, but also to an filed a complaint, citing alleged false or falsified documents
outright denial of due process to the party denied such a submitted during the pre-qualification stage which led to the
hearing. award of the IBP-80 project to private respondent Nerwin.
Thus, finding a way to nullify the result of the previous bidding,

NERWIN INDUSTRIES CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.
NEA officials sought the opinion of the Government Corporate
PNOC-ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, and ESTER
Counsel who, among others, upheld the eligibility and
R. GUERZON, Chairman, Bids and Awards
qualification of Nerwin. Dissatisfied, the said officials
Committee, Respondents.
attempted to seek a revision of the earlier opinion but the
Government Corporate Counsel declared anew that there was
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 no legal impediment to prevent the award of IPB-80 contract
to Nerwin. Notwithstanding, NEA allegedly held negotiations
DOCTRINE: In resolving matters in litigation, judges should with other bidders relative to the IPB-80 contract, prompting
endeavor assiduously to ascertain the facts and the applicable private Netwin to file a complaint for specific performance
laws. Moreover, they should exhibit more than just a cursory with prayer for the issuance of an injunction.
acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. Also, they are

PNOC-Energy Development Corporation purporting to be In the afternoon of June 3, 2011, a Friday, RTC Executive Judge
under the Department of Energy, issued Requisition No. FGJ Amor Reyes (Judge Reyes) issued an ex-parte 72-hour TRO,
30904R1 or an invitation to pre-qualify and to bid for wooden later extended to 20 days by Presiding Judge Cicero D. Jurado,
poles needed for its Samar Rural Electrification Project ("O- Jr. (Judge Jurado). Early on June 7, 2011, Tuesday, believing
ILAW project") that the 72-hour TRO issued by Judge Reyes had expired on
June 6, 2011, PAGCOR issued a Closure Order against the
Nerwin filed a civil action in the RTC in Manila alleging that respondents, followed the next day by the withdrawal of its
Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 was an attempt to subject a monitoring teams from their casinos. Incidentally, on July 19,
portion of the items covered by IPB No. 80 to another bidding; 2011, PAGCOR also wrote the respondents to deny their
and praying that a TRO issue to enjoin respondents’ proposed pending requests to import playing cards because "there are
bidding for the wooden poles. no PAGCOR Monitoring Teams (PMTs) inside the Fiesta Casinos
in Binangonan, Rizal and Poro Point, La Union. Under existing
Respondents sought the dismissal of the case, stating that the policies and procedures, the processing and implementation of
complaint averred no cause of action, violated the rule that requests are hinged on the presence of the PMT. We have no
government infrastructure projects were not to be subjected established procedures to process and evaluate requests
to TROs, contravened the mandatory prohibition against non- without the PMT inside the casinos."
forum shopping, and the corporate president had no authority
to sign and file the complaint. ISSUE: WON the trial court abused its discretion in extending
the 72- hour TRO to 20 days.
RTC granted the TRO. CA on the other hand set aside this
decision RULING: NO. On one particular point of controversy, PAGCOR
has been insistent that the court a quo has no power to extend
an "already" expired 72-hour ex-parte TRO. But the facts will
Issue: WON temporary restraining order may be granted clarify the matter. Civil Case Nos. 11-125832-33 were filed on
against government infrastructure projects (YES) June 3, 2011, a Friday, and at 4:30 that same afternoon, Judge
Reyes issued an ex-parte 72-hour TRO to hold off any cessation
Ruling: Republic Act No. 89751 expressly prohibits any court, proceedings threatened by PAGCOR against the
except the Supreme Court, from issuing any temporary respondents.57 The next two days being a weekend, it was only
restraining order (TRO), preliminary injunction, or preliminary on June 6, 2011, Monday, that the cases were raffled to Judge
mandatory injunction to restrain, prohibit or compel the Jurado. The Court shall presume that notices, summons and
Government, or any of its subdivisions or officials, or any copies of the complaints were duly served on PAGCOR, since it
person or entity, whether public or private, acting under the has been silent on the matter.
Government’s direction, from: (a) acquiring, clearing, and
developing the right-of-way, site or location of any National
On June 7, 2011, Tuesday, Judge Jurado conducted a summary
Government project; (b) bidding or awarding of a contract or
hearing on the respondents’ TRO application, and when he
project of the National Government; (c) commencing,
granted the same,58 PAGCOR verbally moved for
prosecuting, executing, implementing, or operating any such
reconsideration on the ground that Judge Reyes’ 72-hour TRO
contract or project; (d) terminating or rescinding any such
had already expired and could no longer be extended. Judge
contract or project; and (e) undertaking or authorizing any
Jurado denied the motion, saying that his TRO was based on
other lawful activity necessary for such contract or project.
his summary hearing wherein testimonies and documents
were presented by the parties, whereas the 72-hour TRO
Accordingly, a Regional Trial Court (RTC) that ignores the issued by Judge Reyes was based merely on the respondents’
statutory prohibition and issues a TRO or a writ of preliminary initiatory pleadings. However, as Judge Jurado noted in his
injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against a assailed Order59 of June 23, 2011, PAGCOR preempted his
government contract or project acts contrary to law. order extending the 72-hour TRO, which was the very subject
of the hearing on June 7, 2011, when it served its closure
G.R. Nos. 197942-43, 199528 orders upon the respondents at their offices that same
morning.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING
CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. THUNDERBIRD PILIPINAS On June 13 and 16, 2011, the trial court heard the respondents’
HOTELS AND RESORTS, INC., EASTBAY RESORTS, INC., and applications for writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction
HON. CICERO JURADO, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial against PAGCOR’s cessation order. On June 23, 2011, the 20th
Court of Manila, Branch 11, Respondent. and last day of the TRO, Judge Jurado issued the writ. As
already noted, without moving for reconsideration, PAGCOR
went up directly to this Court on certiorari.

Concerning the grant of a writ of preliminary injunction or a shall immediately comply with the provisions of the next
TRO, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court are found preceding section as to service of summons and the
in Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 58, viz: documents to be served therewith. Thereafter, within the
aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours, the judge before whom the
SEC. 4. x x x case is pending shall conduct a summary hearing to determine
whether the temporary restraining order shall be extended
xxxx until the application for preliminary injunction can be heard. In
no case shall the total period of effectivity of the temporary
restraining order exceed twenty (20) days, including the
(c) When an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or
original seventy-two (72) hours provided herein.
a temporary restraining order is included in a complaint or any
initiatory pleading, the case, if filed in a multiple-sala court,
shall be raffled only after notice to and in the presence of the G.R. No. 181293 February 23, 2015
adverse party or the person to be enjoined. In any event, such
notice shall be preceded, or contemporaneously accompanied ANA THERESIA "RISA" HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, DANIEL
by service of summons, together with a copy of the complaint L. EDRALIN, VICTOR M. GONZALES, SR., JOSE APOLLO R.
or initiatory pleading and the applicant’s affidavit and bond, ADO, RENE D. SORIANO, ALLIANCE OF PROGRESSIVE
upon the adverse party in the Philippines. LABOR, BUKLURAN NG MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO,
LAHING PILIPINO MULTIPURPOSE TRANSPORT SERVICE
However, where the summons could not be served personally COOPERATIVE, PNCC SKYWAY CORPORATION
or by substituted service despite diligent efforts, or the EMPLOYEES UNION (PSCEU), and PNCC TRAFFIC
adverse party is a resident of the Philippines temporarily MANAGEMENT & SECURITY DEPARTMENT WORKERS
absent therefrom or is a non-resident thereof, the ORGANIZATION (PTMSDWO), Petitioner
requirement of prior or contemporaneous service of summons v.
shall not apply. TOLL REGULATORY BOARD, THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND
(d) The application for a temporary restraining order shall COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC), PNCC SKYWAY
thereafter be acted upon only after all parties are heard in a CORPORATION, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION
summary hearing which shall be conducted within twenty- CORPORATION, SKYWAY O & M CORPORATION, and
four (24) hours after the sheriff’s return of service and/or the CITRA METRO MANILA TOLLWAYS CORP., Respondents
records are received by the branch selected by raffle and to
which the records shall be transmitted immediately. ORIGINAL PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION
UNDER RULE 65
SEC. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice;
exception. – No preliminary injunction shall be granted without DOCTRINE: The rationale for the law is easily discernible.
hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be Injunctions and restraining orders tend to derail the
enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by expeditious and efficient implementation and completion of
the verified application that great or irreparable injury would government infrastructure projects; increase construction,
result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on maintenance and repair costs; and delay the enjoyment of the
notice, the court to which the application for preliminary social and economic benefits therefrom. Thus, unless the
injunction was made, may issue ex parte a temporary matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue,
restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty judges of lower courts who shall issue injunctive writs or
(20) days from service on the party or person sought to be restraining orders in violation of the law shall be
enjoined, except as herein provided. Within the twenty-day administratively liable.
period, the court must order said party or person to show
cause, at a specified time and place, why the injunction should FACTS:
not be granted. The Court shall also determine, within the
same period, whether or not the preliminary injunction shall Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), pursuant
be granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding order. to P.D. 1113, was granted with the right, privilege, and
authority to construct, and operate toll facilities and toll
expressways. In a series of agreements transferred authority
However, subject to the provisions of the preceding sections,
to perform operations of the South Metro Manila Skyway to
if the matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will
Skyway O & M Corporation (SOMCO). Petitioner-legislators
suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive
and the Union of PNCC opposed the said transfer. They argue
judge of a multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of a single-
that the Toll Operation Certificate issued by the Toll Regulatory
sala court may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order
Board (TRB) to SOMCO is highly irregular and that the transfer
effective for only seventy-two (72) hours from issuance, but he
of authority is grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Petitioners filed a complaint for injunction and prohibition There is no question that the ultimate prayer in the instant
with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or a case is the nullification of a national government project
temporary restraining order, and sought to prohibit the considering that the ASTOA involved the design and
implementation of the ASTOA and the MOA, as well as the construction of Stage 2 of the South Metro Manila Skyway, as
assumption of the toll operations by SOMCO. well as the operation and maintenance of Stage 1 thereof. The
prayer is grounded on the contract’s alleged
The RTC denied the prayer because the petitioners were unconstitutionality, violation of the law, and gross
seeking to enjoin a national government infrastructure project. disadvantage to the government. Such principal action and
Under Republic Act No. (R.A.) 8975, lower courts are relief were within the jurisdiction of the RTC, which acted
prohibited from issuing a temporary restraining order or correctly when it ordered respondents to file their respective
preliminary injunction against the government – or any person answers to the complaint, even while it denied the prayer for
or entity acting under the government’s direction – to restrain the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
the execution, implementation, or operation of any such temporary restraining order in observance of R.A. 8975.
contract or project. Furthermore, the RTC ruled that it could
no longer issue a temporary restraining order or preliminary It was therefore error on the part of petitioners to come
injunction, considering that the act sought to be restrained had directly before this Court for the sole reason that the lower
already been consummated. courts will not be able to grant the prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
Due to the denial of the ancillary prayer, RTC required order to enjoin the assumption of toll operations by SOMCO.
defendants to file their respective Answers to the Amended The error even takes on a whole new meaning, because
Complaint. However, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari SOMCO assumed responsibility for the operations and
and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with a maintenance of the South Metro Manila Skyway at 10:00 p.m.
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on 31 December 2007. On the other hand, the complaint
and/or temporary restraining order before the Supreme Court. before the RTC seeking to enjoin the assumption by SOMCO
was filed only on 3 January 2008, while the instant petition was
ISSUE: filed on 4 February 2008.
Whether or not lower courts are prohibited from issuing As the SC held in Aznar Brothers Realty, Inc. v. CA, injunction
temporary restraining orders or preliminary injunctions does not lie when the act sought to be enjoined has already
against national government projects under R.A. 8975. become a fait accompli or an accomplished or consummated
act.
HELD:
Parties must observe the hierarchy of courts before seeking
Yes, R.A. 8975 prohibits lower courts from issuing any
relief from this Court. Observance thereof minimizes the
temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or
imposition on the already limited time of this Court and
preliminary mandatory injunction against the government – or
prevents delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of
any of its subdivisions, officials or any person or entity,
cases. We do not appreciate the litigants’ practice of directly
whether public or private, acting under the government’s
seeking recourse before this Court, relying on the gravitas of a
direction – to restrain, prohibit or compel acts related to the
personality yet making serious claims without the proof to
implementation and completion of government infrastructure
support them.
projects.
G.R. No. 195905 July 04, 2018
The rationale for the law is easily discernible. Injunctions and
restraining orders tend to derail the expeditious and efficient
THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF BAGUIO, Petitioners,
implementation and completion of government infrastructure
v.
projects; increase construction, maintenance and repair costs;
ATTY. BRAIN MASWENG, et. al., Respondents.
and delay the enjoyment of the social and economic benefits
therefrom. Thus, unless the matter is of extreme urgency
involving a constitutional issue, judges of lower courts who PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45
shall issue injunctive writs or restraining orders in violation of
the law shall be administratively liable. DOCTRINE: The following requisites must concur before a
preliminary injunction is issued: (1) the invasion of a right
The law is clear that what is prohibited is merely the issuance sought to be protected is material and substantial; (2) the right
of provisional orders enjoining the implementation of a of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (3) there is
national government project. R.A. 8975 does not bar lower an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent
courts from assuming jurisdiction over complaints that seek serious damage.
the nullification or implementation of a national government
infrastructure project as ultimate relief. FACTS:
Municipality of Famy, Laguna, v. Municipality of Siniloan,
In the Gumangan and Ampaguey petition, private respondents Laguna
filed a petition and sought to restrain petitioners from G.R. No. 203806 ; February 10, 2020
enforcing demolition orders affecting their properties inside
the Buso Forest Reverse pending their application before the FACTS:
NCIP. Both municipalities of Famy and Siniloan are public
corporations existing under Philippine law.
Atty. Masweng, NCIP-CAR Hearing Officer, granted and issued
a 72-hour TRO and also a writ of preliminary injunction. Family and Siniloan were separated and became two distinct
entities by virtue of Executive Order (EO) No. 72, series of
The CA dismissed the petition filed by petitioner. It held that 1909. This led to a boundary dispute between the different
he NCIP had the power to issue the injunctive relief noting that municipalities over two barangays, Kapatalan and Liyang.
the NCIP did not act with grave abuse of discretion because the
issuances were in accordance with law. In 1962, the Provincial Board of Laguna rendered its Decision
ruling that Siniloan had jurisdiction over the barangays.
ISSUE:
In 2001, the elementary school in Famy was transferred to
Whether or not private respondents were entitled to Kapatalan, yet, it was considered under Famy’s jurisdiction. Its
injunctive relief barangay officials were elected and declared under Famy’s
authority.
HELD:
Siniloan filed a Petition to Revive Judgment before the
While the Court does not discount the possible loss private Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna for the implementation
respondents may suffer should their land claims be recognized of the 1962 Decision.
with finality, still it bears reiterating that they failed to show
that they are entitled to an injunctive relief. Private Family opposed the petition, sending a copy of a 1942 Decision
respondents do not have a clear and unmistakable legal right by the Provincial Board which granted jurisdiction to Famy.
because their land claims are still pending recognition and any
loss or injury they may suffer can be compensable by damages. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan sustained Famy’s position
To add, their occupation of the Busol Water Reserve poses a holding that the 1962 Decision could not be executed because
continuing threat of damaging the preservation or viability of it did not specify the bounds of the municipalities. It held that
the watershed. Any danger to the sustainability of the Busol by placing the barangays under Siniloan’s jurisdiction, Family’s
Water Reserve affects not only individuals or families inside population and land area would significantly decrease below
the watershed but also the entire community relying on it as a the law’s requirements.
source of a basic human necessity-water. Furthermore, unlike
the injury private respondents may suffer, any damage to the Siniloan thus filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a
Busol Water Reserve is irreversible and may not only affect the petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with a prayer for
present generation but also those to come. temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary
injunction.
Irreparable damages, defined
In Social Security Commission v. Bayona: The RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the
Damages are irreparable within the meaning of the rule implementation of the Sanggunian Panlalawigan’s
relative to the issuance of injunction where there is no resolutions, and a TRO prohibiting both parties from
standard by which their amount can be measured with exercising authority over the barangays. Siniloan was ordered
reasonable accuracy. An irreparable injury which a court of to post a bound as a requirement for the Writ of Preliminary
equity will enjoin includes that degree of wrong of a repeated Injunction.
and continuing kind which produce hurt, inconvenience, or
damage that can be estimated only by conjecture, and not by Famy filed a petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals
any accurate standard of measurement. An irreparable injury (CA) seeking to annul the RTC’s Order. The CA upheld the RTC’s
to authorize an injunction consists of a serious charge of, or is order, ruling that the writ of preliminary injunction was
destructive to, the property it affects, either physically or in the correctly issued.
character in which it has been held and enjoined, or when the
property has some peculiar quality or use, so that its pecuniary The petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in
value will not fairly recompense the owner of the loss thereof. upholding the trial court's issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction incidental to the Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition.

it that he adheres to the above standard of his trust and limits
The respondent argues that the petitioner could have the expenses of the receivership to the minimum.
appealed instead of filing a petition for certiorari or
prohibition. It also maintained that the taxes of the properties FACTS: Saura was appointed receiver of the WARVETS. He was
of the barangays were being paid, and its voters were required to post a bond of 50k. His function is generally to do
registered to Siniloan. and perform such acts respecting the property, assets and
transactions" of the organization "as the court may authorize."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction During his term, Saura went to Japan by authority of the lower
in favor of Siniloan is proper. court's order. For this trip, he incurred around 9k pesos worth
of expenses, and was ordered by the lower court to be
HELD: reimbursed. For a continuous period of three years performing
YES. his duty, he received no other fee or compensation from
WARVETS (except for the reimbursed one).
A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary and interlocutory
order. It is a provisional remedy, temporary in nature - it is an 3 years after appointment, he asked the lower court to fix his
ancillary, an incident adjunct to a main action. The court’s compensation, as well as that of his co-receiver Ofilada. The
order issuing the injunction is neither a judgment on the merits lower court denied this, hence he asked for reconsideration.
nor a final disposition of the case.
Without awaiting action on his MR, Saura filed another
Courts are given wide discretion in granting a writ of motion, on May 28, 1964, resigning from his post as receiver
preliminary injunction. However, this discretion is with limit and praying that the lower court accept it and at the same time
and must be exercised with great caution. In the absence of fix the amount of his fees and compensation as receiver.
grave abuse of discretion, this Court shall not intervene in their
exercise of discretion in injunctive matters. On June 5, 1964, the motion was approved and he was
discharged as the receiver and his compensation was fixed at
In the present case, as an incident to its Petition for Certiorari P10,000.
and Prohibition, respondent Siniloan prayed for injunctive
relief to curtail the implementation of the Sangguniang After this, a certain Atty. Magno appeared. He presented into
Panlalawigan’s Resolutions. There being a considerable the lower court a motion for the payment of attorney's fees to
reduction of the Siniloan’s Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) him in the amount of P10,000.00 for his alleged services as
under the assailed resolutions, Siniloan stood to suffer legal counsel for Saura when he was still a receiver.
irreparable injuries.
Saura filed another motion for the payment and cancellation
For the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, evidence is of his receiver's bond (yung 50k kanina) and for the
needed to establish the applicant’s rights or interests in the reimbursement to him of the sum of P2,030.00 which he paid
subject matter of the main action. It is not required that the out of his personal funds as premium for said bond from Sept
applicant show conclusive proof that there was a violation of 1960- 1964.
his right, he is required to show ostensible right to the final
relief prayed for in his complaint. TC: Allowed only 1k compensation to Magno, and granted the
whole amount prayed for by Saura (2,030).
In this case, the injunctive relief was sought to bar the
implementation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan Resolutions, After two months, Saura filed ANOTHER motion for
which would have significantly affected the exercise of power reimbursement, for the amount he allegedly paid as
of the municipalities in conflict. compensation of a clerk, a certain Melchor Ordoño whom he
employed when he was still a receiver, at the rate of P120.00
RULE 59: RECEIVERSHIP a month, or a total of P5,236.00.
29 SCRA 385 AUGUST 29, 1969
NORMANDY VS. DUQUE Lower court denied this second motion for reimbursement.
Hence, this appeal.
Doctrine: It is inherent in the office of a receiver not only that
he should act at all times with the diligence and prudence of a Issue: Whether or not Saura is entitled to the second
good father of a family but should also not incur any obligation reimbursement – NO
or expenditure without leave of the court and it is the
responsibility of the court to supervise the receiver and see to HELD: A receiver is a representative of the court appointed for
the purpose of preserving and conserving the property in

litigation and prevent its possible destruction or dissipation if the grounds for its dissolution, same may be dissolved
it were left in the possession of any of the parties. notwithstanding that [the Supreme Court] previously ruled that
its issuance was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion.”
The receiver is not the representative of any of the parties but
of all of them to the end that their interests may be equally FACTS
protected with the least possible inconvenience and expense.
Severino was the father of respondent Jose and Torcuato
It is inherent in the office of a receiver not only that he should Reyes, with the latter two coming upon their inheritance of
act at all times with the diligence and prudence of a good several properties after the former’s death, and thereafter had
father of a family but should also not incur any obligation or an oral partition. Torcuato died with a last will and testament,
expenditure without leave of the court and it is the admitted by the Court for probate. Believing that Torcuato did
responsibility of the court to supervise the receiver and see to not receive his full share of the estate of Severino, petitioners
it that he adheres to the above standard of his trust and limits instituted an action for Partition and Recovery of Real Estate
the expenses of the receivership to the minimum. before the RTC, Branch 28.
The trial court directed the formation of a three-man

For these reasons, it is generally the receivership court that is
commission with due representation from both parties, and
in a better position to determine whether a particular
the third member, appointed by the trial court, acting as a
expenditure is reasonable and satisfied or not and its ruling
chairperson. The disputed properties were then annotated
thereon may not be disturbed by this Court.
with notices of lis pendens upon the instance of petitioners.
The motion in question of the receiver was not opposed by any Thereafter, petitioners filed a Motion to Place Properties in
of the parties. It is to be observed, however, that the records Litigation under Receivership, alleging that to their prejudice
show that the court a quo had previously allowed or approved respondent had, without prior court approval and without
reimbursements to the receiver of expenditures made by him petitioners’ knowledge, sold to third parties and transferred in
in connection with the performance of his duties, more his own name several common properties. Furthermore, they
particularly, for a trip made to Japan and for the fees of a alleged that some of the properties were antedated to appear
lawyer who had allegedly assisted him, notwithstanding he is as not included in Severino’s estate under litigation, and that
a lawyer himself. respondent was and is in possession of the common
Besides, the court a quo fixed the total compensation properties, exclusively enjoying the fruits and income without
to the appellant receiver at P10,000.00 for his rendering an accounting on them. The RTC later granter the
services as such and said amount, from all motion and placed Salantin as receiver conditioned on the
appearances, is agreeable to everyone, including filing of a P50,000 bond. The RTC later denied the motion to
appellant. discharge receiver upon the filing of a counterbond.
(Note: The SC refers again to the reasoning of the lower court, On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC, holding
and said that---) We find these reasons to be cogent enough in that it is proper that the appointed receiver be discharged on
the premises, specially because appellant's alleged the filing of a counterbond. Moreover, the CA ratiocinated that
employment of a clerk was made without prior leave of court. respondent has adequately demonstrated that the
In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the court a quo appointment of the receiver has no sufficient basis, and that
abused its discretion, much less gravely. the rights of petitioners over the properties in litigation are
already protected by the notice of lis pendens.
G.R. No. 155408 February 13, 2008
ISSUE
JULIO A. VIVARES and MILA G. IGNALING, Petitioners, Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the decision of the
vs. RTC which granted the motion for receivership. (NO)
ENGR. JOSE J. REYES, Respondent
Petition for Review on Certiorari RULING
DOCTRINE Receivership is a harsh remedy to be granted only in extreme

situations. In the case of Velasco & Co. v. Gochuico & Co., the
“The issuance of a preliminary injunction is different from its Court enunciated that:
dissolution. Its issuance is governed by Section 3, Rule 58 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure while the grounds for its “The power to appoint a receiver is a delicate one and should
dissolution are contained in Section 6, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules be exercised with extreme caution and only under
of Civil Procedure. As long as the party seeking the dissolution circumstances requiring summary relief or where the court is
of the preliminary injunction can prove the presence of any of satisfied that there is imminent danger of loss, lest the injury

thereby caused be far greater than the injury sought to be FACTS: Alcantara sued Bacaron partly to foreclose the chattel
averted. The court should consider the consequences to all of mortgage executed by the latter on a caterpillar tractor with
the parties and the power should not be exercised when it is its accessories. Pursuant to a clause in the mortgage contract,
likely to produce irreparable injustice or injury to private rights the Davao court designated Alcantara as receiver of the
or the facts demonstrate that the appointment will injure the tractor; and he duly qualified as such. With the court's
interests of others whose rights are entitled to as much approval, he leased it to Serapio Sablada. Upon the expiration
consideration from the court as those of the complainant.” of the lease, Sablada failed to return the machinea and the
court at the instance of Alcantara, declared Sablada to be in
First, petitioners miserably failed to adduce clear, convincing contempt of court and fined him in the amount of P100.00.
and hard evidence to show the alleged fraud in the transfers
and the antedating of said transfers. The fact that the transfers Bacaron alleged that Alcantara neglected his duties as receiver
were dated prior to the demise of Torcuato does not because he did not get the tractor. And so, he petitioned the
necessarily mean the transfers were attended by fraud. He court to relieve Alcantara and to appoint him (Bacaron) as the
who alleges fraud has the burden to prove it. receiver instead. Alcantara opposed manifesting that (1) he
has exerted all efforts to secure the possession of the tractor
Moreover, respondent has adduced documentary proof that but it seems that even Honorable Court is at mercy of said
Torcuato himself similarly conveyed several lots in the estate Serapio Sablada; (2) until and unless the tractor is delivered to
of Severino based on the oral partition between the siblings. the receiver as ordered by the Honorable Court, Sablada is
To lend credence to the transfers executed by Torcuato but liable for continuous contempt in as much as the subject of the
distrust to those made by respondent would be highly contempt is non-compliance with the order of the Honorable
inequitable as correctly opined by the court a quo. Court; and (3) prayed that he be immediately authorized to file
a case of replevin with damages against Sablada.
Second, petitioner is willing to post a counterbond in the
amount to be fixed by the court. Anchored on this rule, the trial
Davao Court: RELIEVED Alcantara and appointed Bacaron as
court should have dispensed with the services of the receiver,
receiver without bond. MR DENIED.
more so considering that the alleged fraud put forward to
justify the receivership was not at all established.
ISSUE: WON Alcantara’s removal as receiver is proper
The contention that receivership should not be recalled simply
because the adverse party offers to post a counterbond is HELD: NO. If it was error to remove Alcantara, a clearer error
devoid of merit. The rule states that the "application may be occurred when Bacaron — the defendant — was appointed, as
denied or the receiver discharged." In statutory construction, receiver without bond, over the objection of Alcantara — the
the word "may" has always been construed as permissive. If plaintiff. The general rule is that neither to a litigation should
the intent is to make it mandatory or ministerial for the trial be appointed receiver without the other's consent because
court to order the recall of the receiver upon the offer to post "a receiver ought to be an indifferent person between the
a counterbond, then the court should have used the word parties" and "should be impartial and disinterested". Note
"shall." Thus, the trial court has to consider the posting of the that Bacaron was the defendant, and his personal interest
counterbond in addition to other reasons presented by the would conflict with his duties to the court and the
offeror why the receivership has to be set aside. plaintiff. Furthermore, under the Rules of Court, the receiver
must file a bond; and yet Bacaron was exempted from such
obligation. The effect of the whole proceeding was to
G.R. No. L-14890 September 30, 1963 discharge the receiver ship at the request of the defendant,
without so much a bond — contrary to sec. 4, Rule 61, of the
CONRADO ALCANTARA, petitioner, vs. HON. MACAPANTON Rules of Court.
ABBAS, Presiding Judge, Branch II of the Court of First
Instance of Davao and MARTIN T. BACARON, respondents. It is not clear what steps the court had in mind when it declared
that "plaintiff-receiver failed to take steps to take possession
ANNULMENT OF ORDER ON RECEIVERSHIP of the tractor leased to Sablada". It could have meant that
Alcantara failed to take the tractor directly from the hands of
DOCTRINE: The general rule is that neither to a litigation Sablada from the place where it was, without resorting to
should be appointed receiver without the other's official help. If the court meant — as it must have meant —
consent because "a receiver ought to be an indifferent person that Alcantara failed to exhaust judicial remedies to compel
between the parties" and "should be impartial and Sablada to comply with the order to place the tractor at the
disinterested". Under the Rules of Court, the receiver must file "junction" previously mentioned, then it fell into error,
a bond. (Sec. 4, Rule 59) because Alcantara had in effect, suggested that Sablada be
held in "continuous contempt" (Annex J) i.e., imprisoned
until he placed the tractor at the "junction"; and the court

instead of acting accordingly under Rule 64, sec. 7 held 92 hectares previously sold to Lumampao by Generoso Tupas
Alcantara to be negligent, and removed him. Jr. . It will be noted that at this time, the validity of the sale to
Lumampao was still pending adjudication in the Court of
G.R. No. L-27631 April 30, 1971 CIRILO D. DOLAR and LUIS Appeals. The probate court approved the said deed of sale
B. TUPAS, petitioners, vs. CARLOS L. SUNDIAM, GREGORIO executed by Luis Tupas.
LIRA and REMIGES LUMAMPAO, respondents
Lumampao filed a motion to set aside the order of authorizing
ORIGINAL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION the sale made by Luis Tupas. Pending decision on his motion to
set aside, Lumampao filed with the probate court a petition for
DOCTRINE: A piece of property which originally is a part of the the appointment of a receiver over the two parcels of land
estate of a deceased person is sold by an heir of the deceased conveyed and adjudicated to him. The probate court granted
having a valid claim thereto, and said piece of property is, by Lumapao’s petitioner and appointed herein respondent
mistake, subsequently inventoried or considered part of the Gregorio Lira as receiver over the said parcels of land Tupas
deceased's estate subject to settlement, and, thereafter, with and Dolar filed with this Court the instant petition to set aside
the authority and approval of the probate court, is sold once the receivership order of the court a quo
more to another person, a receiver of the property so sold
may, during the pendency of a motion to set aside the second ISSUE: W/N THE APPOINTMENT OF A RECEIVER WAS PROPER
sale, be appointed by the court when in its sound judgment the
grant of such temporary relief is reasonably necessary to HELD: YES. The principal object of the ancillary relief of
secure and protest the rights of its real owner against any receivership is to secure and preserve the property or thing in
danger of loss or material injury to him arising from the use controversy pending litigation in order that, as far as
and enjoyment thereof by another who manifestly cannot practicable, a judicial tribunal, in aid of its jurisdiction, may be
acquire any right of dominion thereon because the approving able to effectively bestow to the parties litigant the rights to
surrogate court had already lost jurisdiction to authorize the which they are entitled, or exact from them the obligations to
further sale of such property to another person. which they are subject, under the law. Ordinarily, therefore,
this remedy will not lie where the property involved is already
FACTS: Generoso Tupas Jr. filed a petition before with the in custody of law, such as that in the hands of an executor or
Court of First Instance(CFI) of Iloilo for the allowance of his administrator. In these cases, the practical and equitable
father's will and the appointment of an administrator for the purposes to be accomplished under a receivership are then
deceased's estate. virtually available.
After the probate of the will and the appointment of the The fact remains, however, that relief by way of receivership is
deceased's widow (later replaced by petitioner Luis Tupas) as essentially equitable in nature, and consequently, must be
judicial administrator of the testate estate, GenerosoTupas, controlled by, and administered on, equitable principles, in the
Jr., sold to the herein respondent Lumampao two (2) parcels absence of statutory principles specifically defining or laying
of land bequeathed to him by his father. out the dimension of its coverage, scope or application.
Subsequently, a project of partition of the testate estate was In appreciating the foregoing principles, it must be borne in
submitted to the probate court for approval with Luis Tupas as mind that, thus far, we have proceeded upon the assumption
judicial administrator therefor. The two parcels of land of the that the estate upon which receivership is prayed for is under
testate estate previously sold to Lumampao were thereunder the custody of law. Apparently, the two parcels of land in
expressly assigned to Generoso Tupas, Jr. This project of dispute cannot be said to be within this category, judged from
partition was approved by the probate court the records of this case. The said two parcels of real estate
were, by virtue of a final and executory judgment, adjudicated
However, a complaint for recovery of the said two parcels of in favor of Lumampao Consequently, they can no longer be
land was filed by Lumampao against Generoso Tupas, Jr. and said to form part of the testate estate of the late Generoso
Luis Tupas with the CFI, on the ground that the defendants Tupas, Sr. over which the probate court can validly exercise
therein, by use of force, threats, stealth, strategy and jurisdiction in connection with the distribution and liquidation
intimidation, deprived him of the possession of the said of the said estate..
properties and gathered all the products therefrom. The
validity of the sale to Lumampaohowever was upheld by the The Court finds it essential for the purpose of disposing of the
Supreme Court in L-23134. specific issue raised in the instant petition to allow the
respondent court the benefit of the doubt, that when it
Prior to the final adjudication on the aforementioned authorized Luis Tupas to sell the real properties in dispute and
complaint of Lumampao, Luis Tupas sold to his herein co- approved their sale in favor of Cirilo Dolar, it was acting under
petitioner Cirilo Dolar four (4) parcels of land, inclusive of the an honestly mistaken impression that the questioned

properties still formed part of the inventoriable estate of the “The judge may, by order, appoint the sheriff, or other
late Generoso Tupas, Sr. proper officer or person, receiver of the property of the
In our opinion, where, as in this case, a piece of property which judgment debtor; and he may also, by order, forbid a transfer
originally is a part of the estate of a deceased person is sold by or other disposition of, or any interference with, the property
an heir of the deceased having a valid claim thereto, and said of the judgment debtor not exempt from execution. If a bonded
piece of property is, by mistake, subsequently inventoried or officer be appointed receiver, he and his sureties shall be liable
considered part of the deceased's estate subject to settlement, on his official bond as such receiver, but if another person be
and, thereafter, with the authority and approval of the probate appointed he shall give a bond as receiver as in other cases.”
court, is sold once more to another person, a receiver of the
property so sold may, during the pendency of a motion to set ISSUE:
aside the second sale, be appointed by the court when in its Whether or not in an action for the collection of a debt, where
sound judgment the grant of such temporary relief is there is already a final and executory judgment, the court has
reasonably necessary to secure and protest the rights of its real the authority to appoint a receiver of the properties of the
owner against any danger of loss or material injury to him judgment debtor which are not involved in the action, in aid of
arising from the use and enjoyment thereof by another who the execution of the judgment.
manifestly cannot acquire any right of dominion thereon
because the approving surrogate court had already lost HELD:
jurisdiction to authorize the further sale of such property to YES. The order of receivership is upheld.
another person.
It is the duty of the court to appoint a receiver in order to
Under the particular facts of the instant dispute, the Courts protect and preserve the property and assets for the benefit of
finds no compelling reason for disturbing the respondent the creditors.
court's order granting the petition of Lumampao for the
appointment of a receiver over the parcels of land in question. The Supreme Court however clarified that in the petition for
the appointment of receiver, Rule 61 (Now Rule 59), Section 1
Central Sawmills, Inc., v. Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Et al, is not applicable in the present case because the rule
Alto Surety & Insurance Co. contemplates cases wherein the property being placed under
G.R. No. L-24508 ; April 25, 1969 receivership are those involved in the very litigation in which
such receivership is ordered. In the present case, the
FACTS: properties being placed under receivership are not the subject
A decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the of the action.
defendants, and a writ of execution was issued to enforce said
judgment. The writ of execution was returned by the Sheriff of Section 2 of the same rule is also not applicable in the case
Manila unsatisfied. because it refers to receivership as a consequence of the
dissolution of a corporation. The receivership contemplated in
In 1958, the Insurance Commissioner wrote to Alto Surety & this section must be in relation exclusive to such insolvency or
Insurance Co., Inc that its company net worth amounted to imminent danger before the court in an appropriate principal
P70,000.00 In 1960, another letter was sent to the company action, not as an ordinary action.
stating that it had a capital deficiency amounting to P747,000.
It ordered the company to pay the same amount and comply The Court held that in this case, it is Section 39 of Rule 39 (Now
with all other requirements. Section 41, Rule 39) that is applicable to the receivership in
question.
The plaintiff filed a petition for receivership, relying on Section
1 (d) of Rule 61 of the Rules of Court, and Philippine Trust Co. Central Sawmills, Inc., v. Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Et al,
v. Francisco Santa Maria wherein the Court ordered the Alto Surety & Insurance Co.
appointment of a receiver of all the properties and assets of a G.R. No. L-24508 ; April 25, 1969
judgment debtor in aid of execution of judgment rendered
against it. FACTS:
A decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
The plaintiff also cited Section 2, Rule 61 of the Rules of Court, defendants, and a writ of execution was issued to enforce said
that the Alto Surety is in imminent danger of insolvery as judgment. The writ of execution was returned by the Sheriff of
manifested in the Insurance Commissioner’s letter. Manila unsatisfied.
The plaintiff furthermore cited Section 39 of the Rules of Court In 1958, the Insurance Commissioner wrote to Alto Surety &
on the Appointment and Bond of Receiver which provides that: Insurance Co., Inc that its company net worth amounted to
P70,000.00 In 1960, another letter was sent to the company

stating that it had a capital deficiency amounting to P747,000. The Court held that in this case, it is Section 39 of Rule 39 (Now
It ordered the company to pay the same amount and comply Section 41, Rule 39) that is applicable to the receivership in
with all other requirements. question.
The plaintiff filed a petition for receivership, relying on Section G.R. No. 106473 July 12, 1993
1 (d) of Rule 61 of the Rules of Court, and Philippine Trust Co.
v. Francisco Santa Maria wherein the Court ordered the
ANTONIETTA O. DESCALLAR, Petitioner
appointment of a receiver of all the properties and assets of a
v.
judgment debtor in aid of execution of judgment rendered
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and CAMILO F.
against it.
BORROMEO, Respondents
The plaintiff also cited Section 2, Rule 61 of the Rules of Court,
Gilberto C. Alfafara for petitioner
that the Alto Surety is in imminent danger of insolvery as
manifested in the Insurance Commissioner’s letter.
Bernadito A. Florido for private respondent.
The plaintiff furthermore cited Section 39 of the Rules of Court
on the Appointment and Bond of Receiver which provides that:
“The judge may, by order, appoint the sheriff, or other PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI
proper officer or person, receiver of the property of the
DOCTRINE: In actions involving title real property, the
judgment debtor; and he may also, by order, forbid a transfer
appointment of a receiver cannot be entertained because its
or other disposition of, or any interference with, the property
effect would be to take the property out of the possession of
of the judgment debtor not exempt from execution. If a bonded
the defendant, except in extreme cases when there is clear
officer be appointed receiver, he and his sureties shall be liable
proof of its necessity to save the plaintiff from grave and
on his official bond as such receiver, but if another person be
irremediable loss of damage.
appointed he shall give a bond as receiver as in other cases.”
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not in an action for the collection of a debt, where Camilo Borromeo (respondent), a realtor, purchased 3 parcels
there is already a final and executory judgment, the court has of land from Wilhelm Jambrich, an Australian and former lover
the authority to appoint a receiver of the properties of the of petitioner, Antonietta Descallar. Based on the deed of sale,
judgment debtor which are not involved in the action, in aid of Borromeo filed a complaint for recovery of 3 parcels of land
the execution of the judgment. and the house built thereon against Descallar.
HELD: Meanwhile, Descallar claims that the property belongs and is

YES. The order of receivership is upheld. registered under her name and that Jambrich. Borromeo’s
vendor, is not qualified to acquire or own real property.
It is the duty of the court to appoint a receiver in order to
protect and preserve the property and assets for the benefit of Borromeo asked the trial court to appoint a receiver to the
the creditors. property during the pendency of the case. The Judge granted
this and appointed the clerk of court as receiver with a bond of
The Supreme Court however clarified that in the petition for P250,000. Descallar’s MR was denied so she sought relief from
the appointment of receiver, Rule 61 (Now Rule 59), Section 1 the CA through a petition for certiorari.
is not applicable in the present case because the rule
CA: Dismissed Descallar’s petition. Hence, she filed a petition
contemplates cases wherein the property being placed under
for certiorari under Rule 45 with the SC.
receivership are those involved in the very litigation in which
such receivership is ordered. In the present case, the ISSUE:
properties being placed under receivership are not the subject
of the action. Whether or not the trial court gravely abused its discretion in
appointing a receiver for real property registered in the name
Section 2 of the same rule is also not applicable in the case of Descallar in order to transfer its possession from Descallar
because it refers to receivership as a consequence of the to Borromeo?
dissolution of a corporation. The receivership contemplated in
this section must be in relation exclusive to such insolvency or HELD:
imminent danger before the court in an appropriate principal
action, not as an ordinary action. YES. Descallar, besides being the actual possessor of the
property, is also the registered owner thereof.

Descallar’s title and possession cannot be defeated by mere DOCTRINE: There must be a hearing of some form or a regular
verbal allegations that although she appears in the deed of sale trial of the issues in the civil case between the parties so as to
as vendee of the property, it was Descallar’s Austrian lover, determine who is legally entitled to the property in question,
Jambrich, who paid the price of the sale of the property. and until such party is adjudged that right, the property must
Descallar’s Torrens certificates of title are indefeasible or remain under the control and supervision of the court, through
incontrovertible. its receiver.
Although Descallar was not the one who paid for the FACTS: By virtue of the resolution of the La Paz Ice Plant and
acquisition of the land (as she was formerly a waiter and have Cold Storage Co., its franchise, factory, and equipment and the
no means to purchase the property), that circumstance did not premises were leased to petitioner Natalio Ventosa.
make her any less the owner since the sale was made to her
and not to the alien (Jambrich) who is disqualified under our On September 24, 1958, respondent C.N. Hodges and Ricardo
laws to own real property. Gurrea filed an action in the CFI of Iloilo, against the president
and secretary of the corporation praying, among others, for
The deed of sale was duly registered in the Registry of Deeds the appointment ex parte of a receiver for the properties of
and new titles were issued in her name. The source of the the corporation. Respondent Jose Dineiros was appointed
purchase money is immaterial for there is no allegation, nor receiver and took possession of the plant.
proof, that she bought the property as trustee or dummy for
the monied Austrian, and not for her own benefit and Petitioner Ventosa wrote a letter to receiver Dineiros stating
enjoyment. that he could not deliver the possession of the properties of
the corporation as they were leased to him. Notwithstanding
No law declares null and void a sale where the vendee to
the letter, the receiver Dineiros continued to possess and
whom the title of the thing sold is transferred or conveyed,
refused to return the possession of the properties to the
paid the price with money obtained from a third person. If that
corporation.
were so, a bank would be the owner of whatever is purchased
with funds borrowed from it by the vendee.
This led to the filing of the petitioner for a Motion to Intervene
Hence, the order of receivership was tainted with grave abuse and a complaint for intervention. Petitioner also filed a motion
of discretion. for restraining order praying for the court to direct the receiver
not to interfere with the management of the corporation. He
In the case of Motoomul vs. Arrieta, it was established that argues that the receiver is only entitled to receive monthly
“only when the property is in danger of being materially rentals stipulated in the contract of lease.
injured or lost, as by the prospective foreclosure of a mortgage
thereon for non-payment of the mortgage loans despite the CFI: DENIED the petitioner’s motion for restraining order. The
considerable income derived from the property, or if portions Court ruled that it must first determine the validity of the
thereof are being occupied by third persons claiming adverse contract of lease before the petitioner could regain or assume
title thereto, may the appointment of a receiver be justified.” control of the management and administration of the
corporation.
In this case, there is no showing that grave or irremediable
damage may result to respondent Borromeo unless a receiver ISSUE/S: W/N THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTER WITH GRAVE
is appointed. The property in question is real property, hence, ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE
it is neither perishable or consumable. MOTION FOR RESTRAINING ORDER BY THE PETITIONER
Further, it is erroneous for the trial judge to appoint her own HELD: NO. The trial court is correct in ruling that the validity of
clerk of court as her receiver. This practice is frowned upon by the contract of lease should be first decided before the
the Court. petitioner could regain or assume control of the management
and administration of the corporation. There must be a
PETITION GRANTED.
hearing of some form or a regular trial of the issues in the civil
case between the parties so as to determine who is legally
entitled to the property in question, and until such party is
G.R. NO. L-14941 January 31, 1964 adjudged that right, the property must remain under the
NATALIO VENTOSA, Petitioner v. HONORABLE control and supervision of the court, through its receiver.
WENCESLAO FERNAN, JUDGE OF COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF ILOILO, C.N. HODGES, RICARDO GUTTEA, As regards the nature of the property under receivership, the
AND JOSE DINEIROS, AS RECEIVER OF THE LA PAZ ICE Court held that Property under receivership is property under
PLANT & COLD STORAGE CO. INC., Respondents. custodia legis which should remain under the administration
and control of the receivership court, through its creation, the

receiver, for the purpose of preservation and for the benefit of ISSUE: Whether or not Pajarillo is liable to plaintiff for the
the party who may be adjudged entitled to it. unpaid amount claimed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is, therefore, dismissed; the Order HELD:

of the respondent Judge complained of affirmed, and the writ
of preliminary injunction issued herein dissolved, with costs In the case at bar, Pajarillo never secured the court's approval
against the petitioner. of either the agreement with Pacific Merchandising
Corporation or of his Indemnity Agreement with the
G.R. No. L-30204 October 29, 1976 Consolacion Insurance & Surety Co., Inc.. Consequently, the
aforesaid agreement and undertaking entered into by
PACIFIC MERCHANDISING CORPORATION, plaintiff- appellant Pajarillo not having been approved or authorized by
appellee, the receivership court should, therefore, be considered as his
vs. personal undertaking or obligation. The judgment creditor
CONSOLACION INSURANCE & SURETY CO., INC., having been induced to enter into the aforesaid agreement by
defendant-appellee, appellant Pajarillo it was the duty of the latter to comply with
is end of the bargain.
RULE 60: REPLEVIN
DOCTRINE: Unauthorized contracts of a receiver do not bind
the court in charge of receivership. They are the receiver's own BACHRACH MOTOR COMPANY, INC., plaintiff, vs.
contracts and are not recognized by the courts as contracts of RICARDO SUMMERS, defendant.
the receivership. Consequently, not having been approved or
authorized by the receivership court should, therefore, be
considered as personal undertaking or obligation
FACTS:
DOCTRINE: It will be observed that the law places the
responsibility of conducting the sale upon "a public officer;"
In civil case, Pacific Merchandising Corporation vs. Leo
and it might be supposed that an officer, such as the sheriff,
Enterprises, Inc., the CFI issued a writ of execution on some
can seize the property where the creditor could not. This
equipment of Leo Enterprises and that a notice of sale was
suggestion is, we think, without force, as it is manifest that the
given.
sheriff or other officer proceeding under the authority of the
language already quoted from section 14 of the Chattel
Subsequently, in civil case, Gregorio V. Pajarillo vs. Leo
Mortgage Law, becomes pro hac vice the mere agent of the
Enterprises, Inc., Atty Pajarillo was appointed as receiver of all
creditor. There is nothing in this provision which creates a
the assets owned by Leo Enterprises.
specific duty on the part of the officer to seize the mortgaged
property; and no intention on the part of the law-making body
The public sale did not push through due to representation by
to impose such a duty can be implied. The conclusion is clear
Atty. Pajarillo as receiver, which then the latter applied for a
that for the recovery of possession, where the right is disputed,
surety bond to guarantee to said plaintiff the payment of
the creditor must proceed along the usual channels by action
obligations.
in court.
Atty. Pajarillo also executed an indemnity agreement in favor
FACTS:
of plaintiff.
Elias Aboitiz executed a chattel mortgage upon
Thereafter, the receivership was terminated, Atty. Pjarillo,
a Nash automobile in favor of the Bachrach Motor Company,
despite demand, refused to pay his obligations.
Inc., to secure a debt for P3,675, payable in twelve
installments. In the month of November of the same year, the
Plaintiff filed an action for collection of sum of money against
mortgagor defaulted in the payment of the installment for that
defendant, who in turn, filed a third-party complaint against
month; and as a consequence the Motor Company determined
Pajarillo. The City Court ruled in favor of plaintiff.
to have the car sold for the purpose of foreclosing the
mortgage.
The CFI affirmed the decision of the City Court.
It accordingly requested Ricardo Summers, as sheriff of the city
The CA
of Manila, to take the car from the debtor and to expose it to
public sale, as provided in said section. Acting in pursuance of
this authority the sheriff applied to the mortgagor for the
automobile; but the mortgagor refused to surrender must in this case be the same; for whether the mortgagee
possession; and the Motor Company instituted an action of becomes the real owner of the mortgaged property — as some
replevin to recover the car. suppose — or acquires only certain rights therein, it is none the
less clear that he has after default the right of possession;
However, its effort to get possession were again destined to be though it cannot be admitted that he may take the law into his
temporarily baffled, as Aboitiz gave bond for the retention of own hands and wrest the property violently from the
the automobile pendente lite. The Motor Company thereupon possession of the mortgagor. Neither can he do through the
filed the present petition in this court for the writ medium of a public officer that which he cannot directly do
of mandamus to compel the sheriff to seize the car from the himself. The consequence is that in such case the creditor must
mortgagor and sell it. To this petition the sheriff demurred, and either resort to a civil action to recover possession as a
the cause is now before us for the determination of the issues preliminary to a sale, or preferably he may bring an action to
thus presented. obtain a judicial foreclosure in conformity, so far as
practicable, with the provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law.
Issue: WON a mandamus should be issued to compel Sheriff
Summers to seize the automobile (YES) G.R. No. 131283 October 7, 1999 OSCAR C. FERNANDEZ and
NENITA P. FERNANDEZ, petitioners, vs. THE INTERNATIONAL
Ruling: Where, however, the debtor refuses to yield up the CORPORATE BANK, now UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
property, the creditor must institute an action, either to effect and PREMIERE INSURANCE & SURETY CORP., respondents
a judicial foreclosure directly, or to secure possession as a
preliminary to the sale contemplated in the provision above This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
quoted. He cannot lawfully take the property by force against Rules of Court.
the will of the debtor. Upon this point the American authorities
are even more harmonious than they are upon the point that DOCTRINE: Under the Resolution of the Supreme Court en
the creditor is entitled to possession. As was said many years banc, dated January 11, 1983, providing for the interim rules
ago by the writer of this opinion in a monographic article and guidelines relative to the implementation of BP 129, a writ
contributed to an encyclopedic legal treatise, "if possession of replevin like the one issued in the present case may be
cannot be peaceably obtained the mortgagee must bring an served anywhere in the Philippines.
action."
The reason why the law does not allow the creditor to possess FACTS: Spouses Oscar C. Fernandez and Nenita P. Fernandez
himself of the mortgaged property with violence and against challenge, via the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari
the will of the debtor is to be found in the fact that the under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the September 4, 1997
creditor's right of possession is conditioned upon the fact of Decision and the November 14, 1997 Resolution, both issued
default, and the existence of this fact may naturally be the by the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 44409. The assailed
subject of controversy. The debtor, for instance, may claim in Decision dismissed petitioners' suit for certiorari and
good faith, and rightly or wrongly, that the debt is paid, or that prohibition praying for the redelivery of the vehicle seized
for some other reason the alleged default is nonexistent. His from them and for the declaration of nullity of the Writ of
possession in this situation is as fully entitled to protection as Replevin, which had been issued by Judge Estelita M. Paas of
that of any other person, and in the language of article 446 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City, and all other Orders
the Civil Code he must be respected therein. To allow the subsequent thereto. The challenged Resolution, on the other
creditor to seize the property against the will of the debtor hand, denied reconsideration.
would make the former to a certain extent both judge and
executioner in his own cause — a thing which is inadmissible On or about October 26, 1993, petitioners purchased a Nissan
in the absence of unequivocal agreement in the contract itself Sentra Sedan through a financing scheme of the private
or express provision to that effect in the statute. respondent, the International Corporate Bank, now Union
Bank of the Philippines, and the chattel mortgage was
A chattel mortgage is a contract which purports to be, and in executed in favor of the financing institution on November 10,
form is, a sale of personal property, intended as security for 1993. As borne out by the Disclosure Statement in the credit
the payment of a debt, or the performance of some other transaction, the cash purchase price was P492,000.00, minus
obligation specified therein, upon the condition subsequent the down-payment of P147,500.00, leaving the amount of
that such sale shall be void upon payment of the debt or P344, 500.00 to be financed. The total amount to be paid for
performance of the specified obligation according to the terms 48 monthly installments would amount to P553,944.00.
of the contract.
Petitioner added that due to the respondent bank's 'greedy
desire' to unjustly enrich itself at the expense of the
But whatever conclusion may be drawn in the premises with petitioners, the former filed an unfounded complaint for a
respect to the true nature of a chattel mortgage, the result

sum of money with replevin before the Metropolitan Trial bond double the amount of the chattel. In this respect,
Court, Branch 44, Pasay City.   defendants failed to exercise his right."
When the respondent bank filed its complaint with prayer for
the issuance of a Writ of Replevin on November 28, 1997, the Indeed, a careful perusal of the records shows that petitioners
monthly installments were almost fully paid; they would have failed to comply with the requirements prescribed by Secs. 5
been fully paid on November 26, 1997.   and 6 of Rule 60 of the Rules of Court in effect at the time.
Their petition for the outright dismissal of the complaint, as SECTION 5. Return of Property. — If the defendant
well as the lifting of the Writ of Replevin was denied even if objects to the sufficiency of the plaintiff's bond, or of
the amount of P553,344.00 representing the value of the the surety or sureties thereon, he cannot require the
chattel was beyond the jurisdiction of the court.   return of the property as in this section provided; but
if he does not so object, he may, at any time before
CA upheld the decision. the delivery of the property to the plaintiff, require
the return thereof, by filing with the clerk or judge of
ISSUE: the court a bond executed to the plaintiff, in double
1. Whether or not the Writ of Replevin issued by the the value of the property as stated in the plaintiff's
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay could be enforced affidavit, for the delivery of the property to the
only within the confines of Pasay City. (NO) plaintiff, if such delivery be adjudged, and for the
2. Whether or not the seized vehicle should be released payment of such sum to him as may be recovered
since a Manager's Check in the amount of P69,168 against the defendant, and by serving a copy of such
was issued for the redelivery of the vehicle within five bond on the plaintiff or his attorney.
days from its seizure. (NO)
SECTION 6. Disposition of property by officer. — If
RULING: within five (5) days after the taking of the property by
Under the Resolution of the Supreme Court en banc, dated the officer, the defendant does not object to the
January 11, 1983, providing for the interim rules and guidelines sufficiency of the bond, or of the surety or sureties
relative to the implementation of BP 129, a writ of replevin thereon; or require the return of the property as
like the one issued in the present case may be served provided in the last preceding section; or if the
anywhere in the Philippines. Specifically, the said Resolution defendant so objects, and the plaintiff's first or new
states: bond is approved; or if the defendant so requires, and
his bond is objected to and found insufficient and he
Writs and processes. — (a) Writs of certiorari, does not forthwith file an approved bond, the
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus property shall be delivered to the plaintiff. If for any
and injunction issued by a regional trial court may be reason the property is not delivered to the plaintiff,
enforced in any part of the region. the officer must return it to the defendant.
(b) All other processes, whether issued by a regional
trial court or a metropolitan trial court, municipal trial In their Petition for Review, petitioners plainly admit that they
court or municipal circuit trial court may be served issued a check for only P69,168 for the purpose of covering the
anywhere in the Philippines, and, in the last three advance payments plus the redelivery bond. Clearly, that
cases, without a certification by the judge of the amount was insufficient to cover even just the required
regional trial court. redelivery bond alone, which should be in an amount double
that of the chattel. Hence, the MTC's refusal to grant
Thus, the Writ of Replevin issued by Judge which obviously petitioners' Motion for redelivery was correct, and the Court
does not fall under item "a" of the above-cited Rule, may be of Appeals did not err in upholding it.
validly enforced anywhere in the Philippines. Petitioners
confused the jurisdiction of a court to hear and decide a case DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby
on the one hand with, on the other, its power to issue writs DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against
and processes pursuant to and in the exercise of said petitioners.
jurisdiction.
G.R. No. 103301 December 8, 1995
2. As observed by the trial court, petitioners failed to comply
with the requisites for the redelivery of the vehicle seized: SERVICEWIDE SPECIALISTS INC., Petitioner,
"Under the Rules of Court, the defendant has a period of 5 days vs.
from January 7, 1997 to post a re-delivery bond, in order to COURT OF APPEALS and ARMANDO CUSTODIO, JR.,
secure the return of the subject vehicle and to post a counter Respondents

RULING
Petition for Review on Certiorari In a suit for replevin, a clear right of possession must be
established. A foreclosure under a chattel mortgage may
DOCTRINE properly be commenced only once there is default on the part
of the mortgagor of his obligation secured by the mortgage.
“Rule 60 of the Rules of Court allows a plaintiff, in an action for The replevin in the instant case has been sought to pave the
the recovery of possession of personal property, to apply for a way for the foreclosure of the object covered by the chattel
writ of replevin if it can be shown that he is "the owner of the mortgage. The conditions essential for that foreclosure would
property claimed . . . or is entitled to the possession thereof." be to show, firstly, the existence of the chattel mortgage and,
The plaintiff need not be the owner so long as he is able to secondly, the default of the mortgagor. These requirements
specify his right to the possession of the property and his legal must be established since the validity of the plaintiff's exercise
basis therefor.” of the right of foreclosure are inevitably dependent thereon.
FACTS It would thus seem, considering particularly an adverse and
independent claim of ownership by private respondent, that
The litigation in this case involves a motor vehicle owned by
the lower court acted improvidently when it granted the
Bondoc, which was constituted as a chattel mortgage in favor
dismissal of the complaint against Dollente, albeit on
of Carmark Philippines and subsequently assigned in favor of
petitioner's (then plaintiff) plea, on the ground that the non-
Filinvest Corp. Bondoc, as vendor, sold the motorcycle with an
service of summons upon Ernesto Dollente would only delay
assumption of mortgage in favor of Cesar Dollente, where
the determination of the merits of the case, to the prejudice of
Cesar executed in favor of Filinvest a promissory note for the
the parties.
balance of the mortgage. Another sale with assumption of
mortgage was executed by Cesar in favor of Ernesto Dollente. Without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit or
Filinvest later assigned all its rights and interests on the proceeding, a judgment of a court cannot attain real finality.
promissory note and chattel mortgage to plaintiff, with notice
to Ernesto. Here, Custodio allegedly obtained the motor Having arrived at the foregoing conclusion, the Court need not
vehicle in question by purchase from Ernesto, and the former take up the other issues raised by petitioner.
was issued a clearance from the Constabulary Highway Patrol
Group. In passing, the failure of summons upon Ernesto Dollente, per
the Sheriff's Return dated July 19, 1983, is said to have been
With Ernesto later defaulting in payment, this case was filed due to defendant's being no longer a resident "at the given
and, upon filing and upon motion, a writ of seizure of the address as per information gathered from the present
motorcycle was issued and the same implemented by the occupant of the premises." It appears that the remedial
sheriff. A counter-replevin bond having been filed, defendant measures provided in Rule 14 of the Rules of Court regrettably
Custodio had obtained possession of the motor vehicle. It must have not been properly availed of; for instance, substitute
be noted that Ernesto was not served with summons as he was service of summons under Section 8 thereof could have been
no longer a resident of the address. Thus, the trial court resorted to.
dismissed the case as to Ernesto, but still pursued the same as
to Custodio.
G.R. No. 79021 May 17, 1993
The lower court ruled against Custodio, holding that the
registration of the chattel mortgage is an effective and ROMEO S. CHUA, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF
binding notice to him of its existence. Furthermore, it found APPEALS, DENNIS CANOY AND ALEX DE
that the registration of the motor vehicle is doubtful and must LEON, respondents.
have been conveniently arranged or manipulated.
On appeal, the Ca saw merit in the contention of Custodio and This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
held that there was a failure to serve summons on Dollente,
an indispensable party. DOCTRINE: The basic principle that a judge who presides in one
court cannot annul or modify the orders issued by another
ISSUE branch of the same court because they are co-equal and
independent bodies acting coordinately, must always be
Whether or not an action filed by the mortgagee for replevin adhered to.
to effect a foreclosure of the property covered by the chattel
mortgage would require that the mortgagor be so impleaded FACTS:
as an indispensable party thereto. (YES)

On April 12, 1986, Judge Lauro V. Francisco of the RTC of Cebu RULING:
City Branch XIII, issued a search warrant directing the YES. The principle followed among courts in the dispensation
immediate search of the premises of R.R. Construction and the of justice is that a judge who presides in a branch of a court
seizure of an Isuzu dump truck. At twelve noon of the same cannot modify or annul the orders issued by another branch of
date, respondent Canoy seized the aforesaid vehicle and took the same court, since the two (2) courts are of the same rank,
custody thereof. and act independently but coordinately (Montesa vs. Manila
Cordage Co.).
On April 14, 1986, a civil action for Replevin/Sum of Money for
the recovery of possession of the same Isuzu dump truck was It is a basic tenet of civil procedure that replevin will not lie for
filed by Chua against respondent Canoy and one "John Doe" in property in custodia legis. A thing is in custodia legis when it is
the RTC, presided by Judge Leonardo B. Cañares alleging shown that it has been and is subjected to the official custody
among other things, petitioner's lawful ownership and of a judicial executive officer in pursuance of his execution of
possession of the subject vehicle; that he has not sold the a legal writ. The reason posited for this principle is that if it was
subject vehicle to anyone; that he has not stolen nor otherwise, there would be interference with the possession
carnapped it, and that he has never been charged of the crime before the function of the law had been performed as to the
of carnapping or any other crime for that matter. process under which the property was taken. Thus, a
defendant in an execution or attachment cannot replevy goods
Judge Cañares directed the issuance of a writ of replevin upon in the possession of an officer under a valid process, although
the posting of a bond in the amount of P100,000.00. The writ after the levy is discharged, an action to recover possession will
of replevin was also issued on the same date, and the subject lie.
vehicle was seized the next day by Deputy Sheriff Galicano V.
Fuentes. Construing the Pagkalinawan case together with the Vlasons
case, it was ruled that where personal property is seized under
Canoy filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaint and for a search warrant and there is reason to believe that the seizure
the quashal of the writ of replevin. The motion was opposed will not anymore be followed by the filing of a criminal and
by petitioner and denied by the court. MR was filed by Canoy there are conflicting claims over the seized property, the
but was again denied and the court directed the delivery of the proper remedy is the filing of an action for replevin, or an
subject vehicle to petitioner. Not satisfied, private interpleader filed by the Government in the proper court, not
respondents filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari and necessarily the same one which issued the search warrant;
Prohibition. however, where there is still a probability that the seizure will
be followed by the filing of a criminal action, as in the case at
Meanwhile, a case for Carnapping entitled "Alex De Leon, bar where the case for carnapping was "dismissed
Complainant, vs. Romeo Chua, Respondent" pending provisionally, without prejudice to its reopening once the issue
preliminary investigation before the Office of the City Fiscal of of ownership is resolved in favor of complainant", or the
Cebu City was provisionally dismissed upon motion of Romeo criminal information has actually been commenced, or filed,
Chua with the following reservation. and actually prosecuted, and there are conflicting claims over
the property seized, the proper remedy is to question the
CA: reversed the RTC and nullified the questioned orders. CA validity of the search warrant in the same court which issued it
ordered the dismissal of the Replevin action, and directed that and not in any other branch of the said court.
possession of the subject vehicle be restored to Canoy. It
applied the ruling in the case of Pagkalinawan vs. Gomez (21 Thus, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu Branch VIII erred when
SCRA 1275 [1967]) which held: it ordered the transfer of possession of the property seized to
petitioner when the latter filed the action for replevin. It
“Once a Court of First Instance has been informed that a search should have dismissed the case since by virtue of the
warrant has been issued by another court of first instance, it "provisional dismissal", of the carnapping case there is still a
cannot require a sheriff or any proper officer of the court to probability that a criminal case would be filed, hence a conflict
take the property subject of the replevin action, if theretofore in jurisdiction could still arise.
it came into custody of another public officer by virtue of a
search warrant. Only the court of first instance that issued such G.R. No. 89020 May 5, 1992
a search warrant may order its release.”
STRONGHOLD INSURANCE CO., INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF
ISSUE: APPEALS, respondent.
Whether or not Judge Cañares erred in directing the issuance
of a writ of replevin over a property seized pursuant to a search PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI
warrant issued by another branch.

DOCTRINE: In the case of Visayan Surety & Insurance Macronics failed to pay its bills to Northern Motors Inc., so the
Corp. vs. Pascual, the Court explained the nature of the latter was forced to terminate the lease; (c) Because of
proceedings to recover damages against a surety, in this wise: Macronics' unpaid liabilities, Northern Motors Inc., was forced
to sell off the former's properties in an auction with Northern
In such case, upon application of the Motors Inc. as the buyer; and (d) The properties sold were the
prevailing party, the court must order the sole means available by which Northern Motors Inc. could
surety to show cause why the bond should enforce its claim against Macronics.
not respond for the judgment of damages. If
the surety should contest the reality or The lower court found Stronghold liable under its surety bond
reasonableness of the damages claimed by for damages to Northern Motors Inc.
the prevailing party, the court must set the
application and answer for hearing. ISSUE: WON the lower court erred in holding Stronghold liable
The hearing will be summary and will under its surety bond
be limited to such new defense, not
previously set up by the principal, as the HELD: NO. Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc., never denied that it
surety may allege and offer to prove. issued a replevin bond. Under the terms of the said bond,
Stronghold Insurance together with Leisure Club Inc. solidarily
FACTS: Leisure Club, Inc. filed a Civil Case against Northern bound themselves in the sum of P42,000 — (a) for the
Motors Inc. for replevin and damages for the recovery of prosecution of the action, (b) for the return of the property to
certain office furnitures and equipments. The lower court the defendant if the return thereof be adjudged, and (c) for the
ordered the delivery of subject properties to Leisure Club Inc. payment of such sum as may in the cause be recovered against
subject to the posting of the requisite bond under Section 2, the plaintiff and the costs of the action.
Rule 60 of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, Leisure Club Inc.
posted a replevin bond in the amount of P42,000.00 issued by In the case at bar, all the necessary conditions for proceeding
Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. In due course, the lower court against the bond are present, to wit:
issued the writ of replevin, thereby enabling Leisure Club Inc.
to take possession of the disputed properties.
(i) the plaintiff a quo, in bad faith, failed to
prosecute the action, and after relieving the
Northern Motors Inc. filed a counterbond for the release of the property, it promptly disappeared;
disputed properties but its efforts were futile as Leisure Club
Inc. was never heard of again.
(ii) the subject property disappeared with
the plaintiff, despite a court order for their
For failure to appear in the pre-trial of the case, Leisure Club, return; and
Inc. was declared non-suited. Northern Motors Inc. presented
its evidence ex-parte.
(iii) a reasonable sum was adjudged to be
due to respondent, by way of actual and
LOWER COURT: In favor of Northern Motors Inc. (1) It had exemplary damages, attorney's fees and
rightful ownership and right of possession over the subject costs of suit.
properties; (2) Leisure Club Inc. is a sister company of
Macronics Inc., a debtor of Northern Motors Inc., and former
In the case of Visayan Surety & Insurance Corp. vs. Pascual, the
owner of these properties; and (3) Leisure Club Inc. instituted
Court explained the nature of the proceedings to recover
the action for replevin as part of a scheme to spirit away these
damages against a surety, in this wise:
properties and pave the way for the evasion of lawful
obligations by its sister company.
In such case, upon application of the
prevailing party, the court must order the
Northern Motors Inc. filed a "Motion for Issuance of Writ of
surety to show cause why the bond should
Execution Against Bond of Plaintiff's Surety", pursuant to
not respond for the judgment of damages. If
Section 10, Rule 20 of the Rules of Court, which was treated by
the surety should contest the reality or
the lower court as an application for damages against the
reasonableness of the damages claimed by
replevin bond.
the prevailing party, the court must set the
application and answer for hearing.
At the hearing of the said motion, Northern Motors Inc. The hearing will be summary and will
presented one witness, its former manager Clarissa G. be limited to such new defense, not
Ocampo. Her testimony proved that (a) Northern Motors Inc., previously set up by the principal, as the
and Macronics Marketing entered into a leased agreement; (b) surety may allege and offer to prove.
As correctly held by respondent CA –– Stronghold Insurance,
Inc. has no ground to assail the awards against it in the The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision and declared Astorga’s
disputed Order. Unless it has a new defense, it cannot dismissal illegal.The abolishment of departments must be
simplistically dissociate itself from Leisure Club, Inc. and done in good faith and for causes beyond the control of the
disclaim liability vis-a-vis the findings made in the Decision of company. Furthermore, contracting out functions performed
the lower court dated June 9, 1986. Under Section 2, Rule 60 by employees was illegal. The NLRC however sustained
the bond it filed is to ensure "the return of the property to the Astorga’s dismissal and reversed the ruling of the Labor
defendant if the return thereof be adjudged, and for the Arbiter.
payment to the defendant of such sum as he may recover from
the plaintiff in the action." The bond itself ensures, inter alia, The RTC denied Astorga’s motion to dismiss the replevin. It
"the payment of such sum as may in the cause be recovered held that the case is to enforce a right of possession over a
against the plaintiff and the cost of the action." company car. The car is registered in the name of SMART, and
despite demand, Astorga did not return the car.
Smart Communications, Inc., v. Regina M. Astorga The Court of Appeals dismissed the replevin case and held that
G.R. No. 148132 ; January 28, 2008 it was intertwined with the case for illegal dismissal - the labor
tribunal has jurisdiction over the complaint.
FACTS: ISSUE:
Astorga was employed by respondent, Smart Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject
Communications, Incorporation as District Sales Manager. company car.
In 1998, Smart launched an organizational realignment to HELD:

achieve more efficient operations. Smart abolished the YES. The Regional Trial Court acted with its jurisdiction. The
division where Astorga was employed after entering into a demand of SMART for payment of the market value of the car,
joint venture agreement with NTT Japan forming Smart-NTT or its surrender is a civil dispute, not a labor dispute. It involves
Multimedia, Incorporated. the relationship of a debtor and a creditor, not an employer-
employee.
SNMI agreed to absorb personnel who would be
recommended by SMART. Astorga landed last in the In Basaya, Jr., v. Militante, the Court held that replevin is a
performance evaluation, and she was not recommended by possessory action. The primary relief sought therein is the
Smart. She was offered a supervisory position, but refused the return of the property wrongfully detained by another person.
same for having low salary rank and rate. The labor dispute involved is not intertwined with the issue of
the Replevin Case. The respective issues raised in each forum
Smart later issued a memorandum advising Astorga of her can be resolved independently of the other.
termination from employment on the ground of redundancy.
Labor Issue:
Astorga filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of Whether or not Astorga’s dismissal was valid.
salaries and other benefits. She claimed that the abolishment
of the division she was in was a violation of her right to security Held:
of tenure. She also alleged that it was illegal for Smart to NO. An employer is not precluded from adopting a new policy
contract out services which will displace the employees. conducive to a more economical and effective management.
Redundancy can be used as a ground even without economic
Smart argued that there was valid dismissal on the ground of reasons. The law does not require that the employer should
redundancy. Smart further argued that the organizational suffer financial losses before he can terminate the services of
realignment was management prerogative. the employee on the ground of redundancy.
Smart also sent Astorga a letter demanding her to pay the The procedural infirmity, failure of SMART to issue a notice one
current market value of the Honda Civic which was given to her month before the date of termination, would not render the
under the company’s car plan program, or surrender the same. termination of Astorga illegal.
Astorga failed and refused to do so, prompting Smart to file a
suit for replevin with the RTC Makati. Astorga’s dismissal was valid, but the Court awarded
indemnity for violation of her statutory right.
Astorga moved to dismiss the replevin, and argued that the
RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject car because it pertains
to benefits arising from employment contracts.
4. Respondent only showed to complainant’s counsel a
[A.M. No. P-91-549. July 5, 1993.] copy of the writ but did not furnish him with a copy of
the application for the writ, the supporting affidavit
REYNALDO SEBASTIAN, Complainant, v. SHERIFF ALBERTO and the bond.
A. VALINO, Respondent. Bautista, Picaso, Buyco, Tan &
Fider Law Offices for complainant. 5. In the course of the implementation of the writ, which
lasted for four days, several pieces of machinery and
equipment were destroyed or taken away by
Respondent.
DOCTRINE: Under the Revised Rules of Court, the property
seized under a writ of replevin is not to be delivered 6. Respondent turned over the seized articles to the
immediately to the plaintiff. The sheriff must retain it in his counsel of PDCP and allowed these items to be stored
custody for five days and he shall return it to the defendant, if in PDCP’s warehouse in Taguig, Metro Manila.
the latter, as in the instant case, requires its return and files a
counterbond. 7. On November 14, 1990, complainant posted a
counterbond. In an order issued on the same day, the
FACTS: Regional Trial Court, Makati, approved the bond and
directed the immediate return of the seized items.
Marblecraft, Inc., represented by its Assistant General
After denying PDCP’s motion to set aside the
Manager, Reynaldo Sebastian, charges Alberto A. November 14 Order, the trial court reiterated the
Valino, Senior Deputy Sheriff, Office of the Regional Sheriff, directive for the return of the seized items in its
Pasig, Metro Manila, with (1) gross abuse of authority November 26 Order. Respondent did not implement
committed in connection with the implementation of the writ the orders.
of seizure issued by the Regional Trial Court, Makati, Metro
Manila, in Civil Case No. 89-3368, and (2) refusal to enforce the 8. PDCP filed a motion for reconsideration of the
trial court’s orders for the return of the seized items. November 26 Order, which was denied in an Order
dated December 11, 1990.
Complainant alleges that:
In his comment, respondent branded the administrative
1. On March 3, 1989, Private Development Corporation of complaint against him as pure harassment filed by Marblecraft
the Philippines (PDCP) filed a replevin suit against after he had refused to defer the implementation of the writ
Marblecraft, Inc. in Civil Case No. 89-3368, in order to of seizure. He said that if he did not implement the writ, he
foreclose the chattels mortgaged by Marblecraft. On would have been accused by PDCP of non-performance of his
March 30, 1989, the Regional Trial Court, Makati, duties as a sheriff. He pointed out that the criminal complaints
issued a writ of seizure directed against Marblecraft for theft filed against him by the employees of complainant
covering the chattels sought to be replevied. were dismissed by the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal.
2. The enforcement of the writ of seizure was delayed The administrative complaint was referred to Judge Martin
because of the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining
PDCP from proceeding with the foreclosure sale issued S. Villarama, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig. In his report,
by the Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Metro Manila in Civil Judge Villarama found respondent guilty of partiality when he
Case No. 58006. It was only on October 31, 1990, when immediately turned over the seized items to PDCP, and of
the Regional Trial Court, Pasig, dissolved the writ of wilfull refusal to enforce the November 14, 26 and December
preliminary injunction. 11, 1990 Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Makati.
3. On November 9, 1990, at around 10:37 A.M., ISSUE:
respondent, accompanied by several policemen and
PDCP employees, went to the office of Marblecraft at Whether or not the property seized under a writ of replevin is
Barrio Santolan, Pasig, to implement the writ of seizure. required to be immediately delivered to the plaintiff?
Respondent and his companions forcibly opened the
lockers and desk drawers of the employees of HELD:
complainant and took their personal belongings, as
well as some office equipment issued to them. The NO. Under the Revised Rules of Court, the property seized
employees filed with the Office of the Provincial under a writ of replevin is not to be delivered immediately to
Prosecutor of Rizal two criminal complaints for robbery the plaintiff. The sheriff must retain it in his custody for five
against respondent and his companions. days and he shall return it to the defendant, if the latter, as in
the instant case, requires its return and files a counterbond
(Sec. 4, Rule 60, Revised Rules of Court). In violation of said

Rule, respondent immediately turned over the seized articles
to PDCP. His claim that the Office of the Regional Sheriff did WILLIAM ANGIDAN SIY, Petitioner
not have a place to store the seized items, cannot justify his vs.
violation of the Rule. As aptly noted by the Investigating Judge, ALVIN TOMLIN, Respondent
the articles could have been deposited in a bonded warehouse.
Respondent must serve on Marblecraft not only a copy of the
order of seizure but also a copy of the application, affidavit and DOCTRINE: In a complaint of replevin, the claimant must
bond (Sec. 4, Rule 60, Revised Rules of Court). Respondent did convincingly show that he is the owner or clearly entitled to the
not furnish defendant with a copy of the application, affidavit possession of the object sought to be recovered, and that the
and bond. By his own admission, he only served it with a copy defendant, who is in actual or legal possession thereof,
of the order of seizure. wrongfully detains the same
The more serious infraction of respondent is his refusal to
FACTS:
implement the orders of the Regional Trial Court, Makati for
him to return to complainant the articles seized pursuant to
Petitioner filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession with
the writ of seizure dated March 30, 1990.
Prayer for Replevin before the RTC.
The Order dated November 14, 1990 directed him "to
immediately return to defendant all its properties seized and Petitioner alleged that he is the owner of a Range Rover which
taken from its premises pursuant to the writ of seizure of he entrusted to Ong. Ong claimed that he had a prospective
March 30, 1989, from receipt of this order. buyer therefor. However, Ong failed to neither remit the
proceeds of the purported sale nor return the vehicle.
The Order dated November 26, 1990, directed him "to
implement the Order of this Court dated November 14, 1990 Petitioner then reported the same to the PNP anti-carnapping
and to immediately return to defendant all its properties section. Petitioner later found out that the same was being
seized and taken from its premises pursuant to the writ of transferred to respondent. When the vehice was impounded,
seizure dated March 30, 1989 from receipt of this Order. respondent tempted to process a PNP clearance of the vehicle
with a view to transferring ownership thereof.
The Order dated December 11, 1990 directed him "to
implement the Order of this Court dated November 26, 1990, The RTC granted and issued a writ of replevin upon posting a
within three (3) days from receipt hereof, otherwise this Court bond of P8 million by petitioner.
will be constrained to appoint and deputize another sheriff to
implement the order dated November 26, 1990. Respondent then filed an Omnibus Motion seeking to quash
the Writ of Replevin but the same was denied by the RTC for
The only action taken by respondent to implement the Order lack of merit. It held that respondent's remedy is not to move
dated December 11, 1990 was to write a letter on December to quash the writ of replevin, but to post a counterbond within
12, 1990, addressed to the counsel of PDCP, requesting the the reglementary period but respondent failed to do the
turnover of seized articles. As expected, PDCP’s counsel same.
refused to part with the possession of the seized articles and
to issue a letter of authorization to withdraw the same from The CA reversed the decision of the RTC. It held that it was
the warehouse. Instead of taking possession of the articles, improper for the sheriff to serve a copy of the writ of replevin
respondent merely reported to the Regional Trial Court that" upon the respondent on the day following the seizure of the
[i]t is now clear that the undersigned cannot implement the subject vehicle, and not prior to the taking thereof; that the
Court order dated December 11, 1990 by reason of the trial court is deemed to have acted without or in excess of its
refusal of PDCP to accept or to honor said Court order.” jurisdiction when it seized and detained the vehicle on the
basis of an improperly served writ; and that respondent was
Respondent could have avoided getting into his present correct in moving to quash the writ, as the proper remedy in
predicament had he not turned over the possession of the case of an improperly served writ of replevin is to file a motion
seized goods prematurely to the PDCP. to quash the same or a motion to vacate the order of seizure,
and not to file a counterbond as the trial court declared.
It is not for respondent to question the validity of the orders of
the trial court. It is for him to execute them. Disobedience by
ISSUE:
court employees of orders of the court is not conducive to the
orderly administration of justice.
Whether or not a Writ of Replevin can be validly issued for the
return of the vehicle to petitioner
G.R. No. 205998 April 24, 2017
HELD: Enriquez filed a Complaint for Replevin against Asuten before
the RTC. This complaint was for the recovery of her Toyota Hi-
From petitioner's own account, he constituted and appointed Ace van valued at P300,000.00. Asuten allegedly refused to
Ong as his agent to sell the vehicle, In return, Ong accepted the return her van, claiming that it was given by Enriquez’s son as
agency by his receipt of the vehicle. Since Ong was able to sell a consequence of a gambling deal. Enriquez later applied for a
the subject vehicle to Chua, petitioner thus ceased to be the replevin bond from Mercantile Insurance for P600,000.
owner thereof. Nor is he entitled to the possession of the Enriquez also executed an indemnity agreement with
vehicle; together with his ownership, petitioner lost his right of Mercantile Insurance, where she agreed to indemnify the
possession over the vehicle. Considering that he was no longer latter for all damages, payments, advances, losses, costs,
the owner or rightful possessor of the subject vehicle at the taxes, penalties, charges, attorney’s fees and expenses of
time he filed the Civil Case, petitioner may not seek a return of whatever kind and nature that it would incur as surety of the
the same through replevin. Quite the contrary, respondent, replevin bond.
who obtained the vehicle from Chua and registered the
transfer with the Land Transportation Office, is the rightful The RTC dismissed the Complaint without prejudice due to
owner thereof, and as such, he is entitled to its possession Enriquez’s continued failure to present evidence. The trial
court also found that Enriquez surrendered the van to BPI, but
PETITIONER NEED NOT BE THE OWNER, IT IS SUFFICIENT did not comply when ordered to return it to the sheriff within
THAT HE HAS THE RIGHT TO POSSESS THE SAME 24 hours from receipt of the RTC order. She also did not comply
"Rule 60 x x x allows a plaintiff, in an action for the recovery of with prior court orders to provide payment for her premiums
possession of personal property, to apply for a writ of replevin on the replevin bond or to post a new bond. Thus, the RTC
if it can be shown that he is 'the owner of the property claimed declared Bond No. 138 forfeited. Mercantile Insurance was
... or is entitled to the possession thereof.’ The plaintiff need given 10 days to produce the van or to show cause why
not be the owner so long as he is able to specify his right to the judgment should not be rendered against it for the amount of
possession of the property and his legal basis therefor." the bond. Mercantile Insurance failed to produce the van, thus
ordering it to pay Asuten the amount of P600,000.
In Filinvest Credit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, this Court
likewise held that- Mercantile Insurance wrote to Enriquez requesting the
x x x It is not only the owner who can institute a replevin suit. remittance of P600,000 to be paid on the replevin bond. Due
A person "entitled to the possession" of the property also can, to Enriquez’s failure to remit the amount, Mercantile paid
as provided in the same paragraph cited by the trial court, Asuten P600,000, and filed a collection suit against Enriquez in
which reads: the RTC. In her defense, Enriquez claimed that her daughter-
in-law, Asela, filed the Complaint for Replevin in her name and
Sec. 2. Affidavit and bond. - Upon applying for such order the that Asela forged her signature in the indemnity agreement.
plaintiff must show... She also argued that she could not be held liable since the
(a) That the plaintiff is the owner of the property claimed, replevin bond had already expired. The RTC ruled in favor of
particularly describing it, or is entitled to the possession Mercantile, holding that the non-payment of the premiums
thereof; xxx did not cause the replevin bond to expire. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the RTC.
G.R. No. 210950 August 15, 2018 ISSUE
MILAGROS P. ENRIQUEZ, Petitioner, Whether or not petitioner Enriquez should be made liable for
vs. the full amount of the bond paid by respondent Mercantile
THE MERCANTILE INSURANCE CO. INC., Respondent Insurance, as surety, in relation to a previous case for replevin
filed by petitioner. (YES)
RULING
Replevin is an action for the recovery of personal property. It
DOCTRINE
is both a principal remedy and a provisional relief. When
“A surety bond remains effective until the action or proceeding utilized as a principal remedy, the objective is to recover
is finally decided, resolved, or terminated, regardless of possession of personal property that may have been
whether the applicant fails to renew the bond. The applicant wrongfully detained by another. When sought as a provisional
will be liable to the surety for any payment the surety makes relief, it allows a plaintiff to retain the contested property
on the bond, but only up to the amount of this bond.” during the pendency of the action. Replevin is an action for the
recovery of personal property. 39 It is both a principal remedy
FACTS and a provisional relief. When utilized as a principal remedy,

the objective is to recover possession of personal property that from petitioner, despite the van only being worth half the
may have been wrongfully detained by another. When sought amount of the bond.
as a provisional relief, it allows a plaintiff to retain the
contested property during the pendency of the action. There is a rationale to the requirement that the bond for a writ
of seizure in a replevin be double the value of the property.
Once the affidavit is filed and the bond is approved by the The bond functions not only to indemnify the defendant in
court, the court issues an order and a writ of seizure requiring case the property is lost, but also to answer for any damages
the sheriff to take the property into his or her custody. If there that may be awarded by the court if the judgment is rendered
is no further objection to the bond filed within five (5) days in defendant's favor.
from the taking of the property, the sheriff shall deliver it to
the applicant. The contested property remains in the Any application of the bond in a replevin case, therefore, is
applicant's custody until the court determines, after a trial on premised on the judgment rendered in favor of the defendant.
the issues, which among the parties has the right of The Rules of Court likewise require that for the defendant to
possession. be granted the full amount of the bond, he or she must first
apply to the court for damages.
petitioner Enriquez filed a replevin case against Asuten for the
recovery of the Toyota Hi-Ace van valued at P300,000.00. She Forfeiture of the replevin bond, therefore, requires first, a
applied for a bond in the amount of P600,000.00 with judgment on the merits in the defendant's favor, and second,
respondent in Asuten's favor. The Regional Trial Court an application by the defendant for damages. Neither
approved the bond and ordered the sheriff to recover the van circumstance appears in this case. When petitioner failed to
from Asuten and to deliver it to petitioner. While the van was produce the van, equity demanded that Asuten be awarded
in petitioner's custody, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the only an amount equal to the value of the van. The Regional
case without prejudice for failure to prosecute. Thus, it Trial Court would have erred in ordering the forfeiture of the
ordered the sheriff to restore the van to Asuten. When entire bond in Asuten's favor, considering that there was no
petitioner failed to produce the van, the Regional Trial Court trial on the merits or an application by Asuten for damages.
directed respondent to pay Asuten the amount of the bond. This judgment could have been reversed had petitioner
appealed the Regional Trial Court's May 24, 2004 Order in Civil
There was no trial on the merits. The Regional Trial Court's Case No. 10846. Unfortunately, she did not. Respondent was,
dismissal for failure to prosecute was a dismissal without thus, constrained to follow the Regional Trial Court's directive
prejudice to re-filing. In this particular instance, any writ of to pay Asuten the full amount of the bond.
seizure, being merely ancillary to the main action, becomes
functus oficio. The parties returned to the status quo as if no
case for replevin had been filed. Thus, upon the dismissal of
the case, it was imperative for petitioner to return the van to RULE 61: SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE
Asuten. G.R. No. 185595 January 9, 2013
MA. CARMINIA C. CALDERON represented by her
Any application on the bond should be made after hearing but Attorney-In-Fact, Marycris V. Baldevia, Petitioner, vs. JOSE
before the entry of judgment. Otherwise, the surety can no ANTONIO F. ROXAS and COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
longer be made liable under the bond. For this reason, a surety
bond remains effective until the action or proceeding is finally FACTS:
decided, resolved, or terminated. The condition is deemed Petitioner, Ma. Carminia C. Calderon and private respondent
incorporated in the contract between the applicant and the Jose Antonio F. Roxas, were married on December 4, 1985 and
surety, regardless of whether they failed to expressly state it. their union produced four children. On January 16, 1998,
petitioner filed an Amended Complaint for the declaration of
The civil case here is a rare instance where the writ of seizure nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological
is dissolved due to the dismissal without prejudice, but the incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
bond stands because the case has yet to be finally terminated
by the RTC. On May 19, 1998, the trial court issued an Order granting
petitioner’s application for support pendente lite. The
The peculiar circumstances in this case arose when petitioner aforesaid order and subsequent orders for support pendente
failed to return the van to Asuten, despite the dismissal of her lite were the subject of G.R. No. 139337 entitled “Ma. Carminia
action. This is an instance not covered by the Rules of Court or C. Roxas v. Court of Appeals and Jose Antonio F. Roxas”
jurisprudence. In its discretion, the Regional Trial Court decided by this Court on August 15, 2001. The Decision in said
proceeded to rule on the forfeiture of the bond. As a result, case declared that “the proceedings and orders issued by the
respondent paid Asuten twice the value of the van withheld by trial court in the application for support pendente lite (and the
petitioner. Respondent, thus, seeks to recover this amount main complaint for annulment of marriage) in the re-filed case,
that is, in Civil Case No. 97-0608 were not rendered null and

void by the omission of a statement in the certificate of non- An interlocutory order merely resolves incidental matters and
forum shopping regarding the prior filing and dismissal without leaves something more to be done to resolve the merits of the
prejudice of Civil Case No. 97-0523 which involves the same case. In contrast, a judgment or order is considered final if the
parties.” The assailed orders for support pendente lite were order disposes of the action or proceeding completely, or
thus reinstated and the trial court resumed hearing the main terminates a particular stage of the same action. Clearly,
case. whether an order or resolution is final or interlocutory is not
dependent on compliance or noncompliance by a party to its
On motion of petitioner’s counsel, the trial court issued an directive, as what petitioner suggests.
Order dated October 11, 2002 directing private respondent to
give support in the amount of P42,292.50 per month starting Moreover, private respondent’s obligation to give monthly
April 1, 1999 pursuant to the May 19, 1998 Order. support in the amount fixed by the RTC in the assailed orders
may be enforced by the court itself, as what transpired in the
On February 11, 2003, private respondent filed a Motion to early stage of the proceedings when the court cited the private
Reduce Support citing, among other grounds, that the respondent in contempt of court and ordered him arrested for
P42,292.50 monthly support for the children as fixed by the his refusal/failure to comply with the order granting support
court was even higher than his then P20,800.00 monthly salary pendente lite. A few years later, private respondent filed a
as city councilor. motion to reduce support while petitioner filed her own
motion to increase the same, and in addition sought spousal
After hearing, the trial court issued an Order9 dated March 7, support and support in arrears. This fact underscores the
2005 granting the motion to reduce support and denying provisional character of the order granting support pendente
petitioner’s motion for spousal support, increase of the lite.
children’s monthly support pendente lite and support-in-
arrears. Petitioner’s motion for partial reconsideration of the Petitioner’s theory that the assailed orders have ceased to be
March 7, 2005 Order was denied on May 4, 2005. provisional due to the arrearages incurred by private
respondent is therefore untenable.
In her appeal brief, petitioner emphasized that she is not
appealing the Decision dated May 16, 2005 which had become The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an
final as no appeal therefrom had been brought by the parties appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65
or the City Prosecutor or the Solicitor General. Petitioner provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in
pointed out that her appeal is “from the RTC Order dated excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Having
March 7, 2005, issued prior to the rendition of the decision in chosen the wrong remedy in questioning the subject
the main case”, as well as the May 4, 2005 Order denying her interlocutory orders of the RTC, petitioner's appeal was
motion for partial reconsideration. correctly dismissed by the CA.
By Decision dated September 9, 2008, the CA dismissed the G.R. NO. 175279-80 June 05, 2013
appeal on the ground that granting the appeal would disturb SUSAN LIM-LUA, petitioner, vs. DANILO Y. LUA,
the RTC Decision of May 16, 2005 which had long become final respondent.
and executory. The CA further noted that petitioner failed to
avail of the proper remedy to question an interlocutory order. PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by DOCTRINE: Upon receipt of a verified petition for declaration
the CA. of absolute nullity of void marriage or for annulment of
voidable marriage, or for legal separation, and at any time
ISSUE: Whether or not the matter of support pendente lite are during the proceeding, the court, motu proprio or upon
interlocutory or final. verified application of any of the parties, guardian or
designated custodian, may temporarily grant support
HELD: pendente lite prior to the rendition of judgment or final order.
Petitioner contends that the CA failed to recognize that the
interlocutory aspect of the assailed orders pertains only to FACTS: Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of
private respondent’s motion to reduce supportwhich was nullity of her marriage with respondent Danilo Y. Lua. Susan
granted, and to her own motion to increase support, which prayed for P500,000 monthly support for herself and her two
was denied. Petitioner points out that the ruling on support in children.
arrears which have remained unpaid, as well as her prayer for
reimbursement/payment were in the nature of final orders RTC: Granted the prayer for support pendente lite but only
assailable by ordinary appeal. SC disagrees. granted 250k monthly support based on the evidence
adduced. It ordered respondent to pay P1,750,000 (P250,000

x 7) corresponding to 7 months that lapsed since the instant voidable marriage, or for legal separation, and at any time
complaint was filed. during the proceeding, the court, motu proprio or upon
verified application of any of the parties, guardian or
CA: Reversed RTC’s decision and ruled that it committed grave designated custodian, may temporarily grant support
abuse of discretion when it awarded 250k monthly support pendente lite prior to the rendition of judgment or final order.
without evidence to prove his actual income. It modified RTC’s Because of its provisional nature, a court does not need to
award to 115k monthly support and ordered respondent to delve fully into the merits of the case before it can settle an
pay the support in arrears. application for this relief. All that a court is tasked to do is
determine the kind and amount of evidence which may suffice
Neither of the parties appealed in the CA decision. to enable it to justly resolve the application. It is enough that
the facts be established by affidavits or other documentary
In a Compliance, respondent attached a copy of the check he evidence appearing in the record.
issued payable to petitioner. The amount issued is equivalent
to the support in arrears ordered by the CA less the advances In this case, the amount of monthly support pendente lite for
given by him to his children and petitioner which includes car petitioner and her two children was determined after due
purchases for both their children Daniel and Angelli, car hearing and submission of documentary evidence by the
maintenance, payment of tuition fees, travel expenses, and parties. Although the amount fixed by the trial court was
the credit card purchases involving groceries, dry goods and reduced on appeal, it is clear that the monthly support
books (with attached photocopies of receipts/billings). pendente lite of P115,000.00 ordered by the CA was intended
primarily for the sustenance of petitioner and her children,
In her Comment to Compliance with Motion for Issuance of a e.g., food, clothing, salaries of drivers and house helpers, and
Writ of Execution, petitioner asserted that none of the other household expenses. Petitioner's testimony also
expenses deducted by respondent may be chargeable as part mentioned the cost of regular therapy for her scoliosis and
of the monthly support. The trial court issued an Order vitamins/medicines.
granting petitioner's motion for issuance of a writ of execution
as it rejected respondent's interpretation of the CA decision. 2. The CA, in ruling for the respondent said that all the
foregoing expenses already incurred by the respondent
The CA, in ruling for the respondent said that all the foregoing should, in equity, be considered advances which may be
expenses already incurred by the respondent should, in equity, properly deducted from the support in arrears due to the
be considered advances which may be properly deducted from petitioner and the two children.
the support in arrears due to the petitioner and the two
children. Said court also noted the absence of petitioner’s The court reverse in part the decision of the CA. Judicial
contribution to the joint obligation of support for their determination of support pendente lite in cases of legal
children. separation and petitions for declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage are guided by the provisions of the Rule
ISSUE/S: on Provisional Orders.
1. W/N THE COURT MAY TEMPORARILY GRANT SUPPORT
PENDENTE LITE PRIOR TO THE RENDITION OF JUDGMENT OR Subject to the sound discretion of the court, either parent or
FINAL ORDER. (YES) both may be ordered to give an amount necessary for the
2. W/N CERTAIN EXPENSES ALREADY INCURRED BY THE support, maintenance, and education of the child. It shall be in
RESPONDENT MAY BE DEDUCTED FROM THE TOTAL SUPPORT proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the
IN ARREARS OWING TO PETITIONER AND HER CHILDREN (YES necessities of the recipient.
BUT LIMITED TO THOSE BASIC NEEDS AND EXPENSES)
In determining the amount of provisional support, the court
HELD: may likewise consider the following factors: (1) the financial
1. As a matter of law, the amount of support which those resources of the custodial and non-custodial parent and those
related by marriage and family relationship is generally obliged of the child; (2) the physical and emotional health of the child
to give each other shall be in proportion to the resources or and his or her special needs and aptitudes; (3) the standard of
means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient. Such living the child has been accustomed to; (4) the non-monetary
support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, contributions that the parents will make toward the care and
dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and well-being of the child.
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family. Since the amount of monthly support pendente lite as fixed by
the CA was not appealed by either party, there is no
Upon receipt of a verified petition for declaration of absolute controversy as to its sufficiency and reasonableness. The
nullity of void marriage or for annulment of

dispute concerns the deductions made by respondent in in whole or in part is not disputed by the conflicting claimants,
settling the support in arrears. comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the said
property or who consider themselves entitled to demand
Here, the CA should not have allowed all the expenses incurred compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate among
by respondent to be credited against the accrued support themselves, in order to determine finally who is entitled to one
pendente lite. As earlier mentioned, the monthly support or the other thing. The remedy is afforded not to protect a
pendente lite granted by the trial court was intended primarily person against a double liability but to protect him against a
for food, household expenses such as salaries of drivers and double vexation in respect of one liability. When the court
house helpers, and also petitioner's scoliosis therapy sessions. orders that the claimants litigate among themselves, there
Hence, the value of two expensive cars bought by respondent arises in reality a new action and the former are styled
for his children plus their maintenance cost, travel expenses of interpleaders, and in such a case the pleading which initiates
petitioner and Angelli, purchases through credit card of items the action is called a complaint of interpleader and not a cross-
other than groceries and dry goods (clothing) should have complaint.
been disallowed, as these bear no relation to the judgment
awarding support pendente lite. While it is true that Court FACTS:
order directed the respondent to pay the support in arrears
"less than the amount supposedly given by petitioner to the Ocampo alleged that he is the owner of a parcel of land.
private respondent as her and their two (2) children monthly Ocampo bought the subject land from Rosauro Breton, heir of
support," the deductions should be limited to those basic the subject land’s registered owner Alipio Breton
needs and expenses considered by the trial and appellate Cruz. Possession and administration of the subject land are
courts. The assailed ruling of the CA allowing huge deductions claimed to be already in Ocampo’s management even though
from the accrued monthly support of petitioner and her the TCT is not yet in his name. Tirona, on the other hand, is a
children, while correct insofar as it commends the generosity lessee occupying a portion of the subject land.
of the respondent to his children, is clearly inconsistent with
the executory decision. More important, it completely ignores According to Ocampo upon acquisition of ownership of the
the unfair consequences to petitioner whose sustenance and subject premises, a formal written notice was given to Tirona]
well-being, was given due regard by the trial and appellate which was received by the latter. In recognition of Ocampo’s
courts. right of ownership over the subject premises, Tirona paid some
monthly rentals due, however, Ocampo received a letter from
The matter of increase or reduction of support should be Callejo Law Office stating among others, that, in view of the
submitted to the trial court in which the action for declaration fact that the subject premises was declared under area for
for nullity of marriage was filed, as this Court is not a trier of priority development, Tirona is invoking her right of first
facts. The amount of support may be reduced or increased refusal and in connection thereto Tirona will temporarily stop
proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the paying her monthly rentals until and unless the National
necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the Housing Authority have processed the pertinent papers as
person obliged to support. regards the amount due to Ocampo by reason of the
implementation of the above law.
As held in Advincula v. Advincula, judgment for support does
not become final. The right to support is of such nature that its Ocampo wrote Tirona for the payment of rentals, however, the
allowance is essentially provisional; for during the entire latter refused to pay hence Ocampo filed an unlawful detainer
period that a needy party is entitled to support, his or her case. In her Answer, Tirona asserted that Doña Lourdes
alimony may be modified or altered, in accordance with his Rodriguez Yaneza actually owns the subject land.
increased or decreased needs, and with the means of the giver.
It cannot be regarded as subject to final determination. Ocampo filed a motion to strike out the answer filed and a
motion for judgment. Ocampo claimed that the answer was
RULE 62: INTERPLEADER not verified; therefore, it was as if no answer was filed.
LEONARDO R. OCAMPO, Petitioners, vs.
LEONORA TIRONA, Respondents. Tirona filed a motion with leave to amend defendant’s
answer.8 She alleged that she filed her answer without the
assistance of a lawyer due to fear that she might be unable to
file the required pleading on time. In her amended answer,
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 Tirona maintained that Ocampo is not the owner of the subject
land.
DOCTRINE: The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a
person who has property whether personal or real, in his
possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially,
without claiming any right in both, or claims an interest which
MTC ruled that Tirona does not have any reason to suspend claims prior to the rendition of the judgment and neglected the
payment of rents until after PD No. 1517, in relation to PD Nos. opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the suit where
1893 and 1968, is implemented in her favor. Tirona’s non- judgment was entered. This must be so, because once
payment of rents rendered her occupation of the subject land judgment is obtained against him by one claimant, he becomes
illegal. liable to the latter.”
RTC issued a writ of execution pending appeal for the FACTS:

enforcement of the MTC’s decision. The RTC stated that
although Tirona perfected her appeal on time, the record Petitioner Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc. (WWGCC) is a
showed that she failed to pay the required supersedeas bond non-stock, civic and athletic corporation duly organized under
as well as deposit the current rentals as mandated by Section the laws of the Philippines, with a principal office in
8, Rule 70 of the 1964 Rules of Court. It subsequently affirmed Mandaluyong, Rizal.  
the MTC ruling in toto. WWGCC alleges that respondent Lee Won (Won) claims the
ownership of its membership fee certificate 201 pursuant to
CA on the other hand set aside the ruling. The appellate court another civil case.  
ruled that "[u]ntil the partition of the estate is ordered by the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City in the pending partition However, fellow respondent Bienvenido Tan (Tan) argues that
proceedings and the share of each co-heir is determined by he is the owner of the subject membership fee certificate
metes and bounds, [Ocampo] cannot rightfully claim that what pursuant to an assignment made in his favor by "Swan,
he bought is part of the property occupied by [Tirona]. Culbertson and Fritz," the original owner and holder of
membership fee certificate 201.  
WWGCC states that under its articles of incorporation and by-

Issue: WON the CA erred in considering an issue raised for the laws, it is authorized to issue a maximum of 400 membership
first time on appeal (YES) fee certificates and that it claims no interest whatsoever in the
disputed membership fee certificate.  
Ruling: Unlawful detainer cases are summary in nature. The Furthermore, WGCC alleges that the assailed membership fee
elements to be proved and resolved in unlawful detainer cases certificate is null and void asit was issued in violation of its by-
are the fact of lease and expiration or violation of its terms. laws, which require the surrender and cancellation of the
outstanding membership fee certificates before transfer can
Contrary to Tirona’s position, the issue of ownership is not be made.  
essential to an action for unlawful detainer. The fact of the
lease and the expiration of its term are the only elements of WGCC prayed that an order be issued requiring Wonand Tan
the action. The defense of ownership does not change the to interplead and litigate their conflicting claims and the
summary nature of the action. The affected party should raise judgement be rendered regarding the ownership of the
the issue of ownership in an appropriate action, because a membership certificate.  
certificate of title cannot be the subject of a collateral attack. Won and Tan moved to dismiss the complaint which was
granted by the trial court.  
The good faith of Tirona is put in question in her preference for
Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola. As a stakeholder, Tirona On appeal, WGCC contends that the trial court erred in
should have used reasonable diligence in hailing the dismissing the complaint on the ground of res judicata.  
contending claimants to court. Tirona need not have awaited
actual institution of a suit by Ocampo against her before filing ISSUE/S: Whether or not interpleader was the proper remedy.
a bill of interpleader. An action for interpleader is proper when
the lessee does not know the person to whom to pay rentals HELD: NO. The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a
due to conflicting claims on the property. person who has personal property in his possession, or an
obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any
G.R. No. L-23851 March 26, 1976 WACK WACK GOLF & right to either, comes to court and asks that the persons who
COUNTRY CLUB, INC., Petitioner-appellant, vs. LEE E. claim the said personal property or who consider themselves
WON alias RAMON LEE and BIENVENIDO A. TAN, Repondent- entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be
appellees. required to litigate among themselves in order to determine
finally who is entitled to tone or the one thing. The remedy is
DOCTRINE: “It has been held that a stakeholder's action of afforded to protect a person not against double liability but
interpleader is too late when filed after judgment has been against double vexation in respect of one liability.
rendered against him in favor of one of the contending A stakeholder should use reasonable diligence to hale the
claimants, especially where he had notice of the conflicting contending claimants to court. He need not await actual
institution of independent suits against him before filing a bill judgment. And it offered no satisfactory explanation for its
of interpleader. He should file an action of interpleader within failure to implead Tan in the same litigation. In this factual
a reasonable time after a dispute has arisen without waiting to situation, it is clear that this interpleader suit cannot prosper
be sued by either of the contending claimants. Otherwise, he because it was filed much too late.
may be barred by laches or undue delay. But where he acts
with reasonable diligence in view of the environmental The remedy by interpleader is afforded to protect the party
circumstances, the remedy is not barred. from the annoyance and hazard of two or more actions
touching the same property or demand; but one who, with
In this case, WWGCC did not act with diligence, in view of all knowledge of all the facts, neglects to avail himself of the
the circumstances. It was aware of the conflicting claims of the relief, or elects to take the chances for success in the actions
appellees with respect to the membership fee certificate 201 at law, ought to submit to the consequences of defeat. To
long before it filed the present interpleader suit. It had been permit an unsuccessful defendant to compel the successful
recognizing Tan as the lawful owner thereof. It was sued by Lee plaintiffs to interplead, is to increase instead of to diminish the
who also claimed the same membership fee certificate. Yet it number of suits; to put upon the shoulders of others the
did not interplead Tan. It preferred to proceed with the burden which he asks may be taken from his own. ....'
litigation and to defend itself therein. As a matter of fact, final
judgment was rendered against it and said judgment has Therefore, the instant interpleader suit cannot prosper
already been executed. because WWGCC had already been made independently
It has been held that a stakeholder's action of interpleader is liable in another civil case and, therefore, its present
too late when filed after judgment has been rendered against application for interpleader would in effect be a collateral
him in favor of one of the contending claimants, especially attack upon the final judgment in the said civil case; the
where he had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the appellee Lee had already established his rights to
rendition of the judgment and neglected the opportunity to membership fee certificate 201 in the aforesaid civil case and,
implead the adverse claimants in the suit where judgment was therefore, this interpleader suit would compel him to
entered. This must be so, because once judgment is obtained establish his rights anew, and thereby increase instead of
against him by one claimant he becomes liable to the latter. diminish litigations, which is one of the purposes of an
interpleader suit, with the possibility that the benefits of the
The Corporation has not shown any justifiable reason why it final judgment in the said civil case might eventually be taken
did not file an application for interpleader in the other civil case away from him; and because the Corporation allowed itself
to compel the appellees herein to litigate between themselves to be sued to final judgment in the said case, its action of
their conflicting claims of ownership. It was only after adverse interpleader was filed inexcusably late, for which reason it is
final judgment was rendered against it that the remedy of barred by laches or unreasonable delay.
interpleader was invoked by it. By then it was too late, because
to be entitled to this remedy, the applicant must be able to DISPOSITIVE PORTION: ACCORDINGLY, the order of May 28,
show that lie has not been made independently liable to any 1964, dismissing the complaint, is affirmed, at appellant's
of the claimants. And since the Corporation is already liable to cost.
Lee under a final judgment, the present interpleader suit is
clearly improper and unavailing. [G.R. No. L-26443. March 25, 1969.]
It is the general rule that before a person will be deemed to

MAKATI DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, plaintiff-
be in a position to ask for an order of interpleader, he must
appellant, vs. PEDRO C. TANJUATCO & CONCRETE
be prepared to show, among other prerequisites, that he has
AGGREGATES, INC., defendants-appellees.
not become independently liable to any of the claimants.
Furthermore, a bill of interpleader comes too late when it is
filed after judgment has been rendered in favor of one of the APPEAL FROM ORDER OF DISMISSAL
claimants of the fund, this being especially true when the
holder of the funds had notice of the conflicting claims prior to DOCTRINE: There is no question in this case that plaintiff
the rendition of the judgment and had an opportunity to may compel the defendants to interplead among
implead the adverse claimants in the suit in which the themselves. The failure of Section 19 of Rule 5 of the present
judgment was rendered. Rules of Court to make its Rule 63, on interpleading,
applicable to inferior courts, merely implies that the same
Indeed, if a stakeholder defends a suit filed by one of the are not bound to follow Rule 63 in dealing with cases of
adverse claimants and allows said suit to proceed to final interpleading, but may apply thereto the general rules on
judgment against him, he cannot later on have that part of the procedure applicable to ordinary civil action in said courts.
litigation repeated in an interpleader suit. In the case at hand,
the Corporation allowed the other civil case to proceed to final

FACTS: Plaintiff and defendant Tanjuatco entered into a various courts" belongs to Congress and is beyond
contract whereby the latter bound himself to construct a the rule-making power of the Supreme Court,
reinforced concrete covered water reservoir, office and pump which is limited to matters "concerning pleading,
house and water main at Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the
furnishing, inter alia, the materials necessary therefor. Before admission to the practice of law." Thirdly, the
making the final payment, plaintiff required from the failure of said Section 19 of Rule 5 of the present
suppliers of materials about the unpaid bills of Tanjuatco and Rules of Court to make its Rule 63, on interpleading,
whether he had settled his accounts with them. Concrete applicable to inferior courts, merely implies that
Aggregates, Inc. — hereinafter referred to as the Supplier — the same are not bound to follow Rule 63 in dealing
made a claim in the sum of P5,198.75, representing the cost with cases of interpleading, but may apply thereto
of transit-mixed concrete allegedly delivered to Tanjuatco. the general rules on procedure applicable to
With his consent, plaintiff withheld said amount from the ordinary civil action in said courts.
final payment made to him and, in view of his subsequent
failure to settle the issue thereon with the Supplier, plaintiff
instituted the present action, in the CFI of Rizal, G.R. No. 148182 March 07, 2007
against Tanjuatco and the Supplier, to compel them "to Maglente v. Padilla
interplead their conflicting claims."
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65
Tanjuatco moved to dismiss the case, upon the ground that
the court had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the DOCTRINE: A writ of possession complements the writ of
litigation, the amount involved therein being less than execution only when the right of possession or ownership has
P10,000.00. been validly determined in a case directly relating to either.
The interpleader case obviously did not delve into that issue.
CFI: GRANTED the motion to dismiss without costs.
Hence, this appeal. The rule is that the enforcement of a judgment may not vary
ISSUE: 1. WON plaintiff has the right to compel the or alter the tenor of the judgment but must strictly conform to
defendants "to litigate among themselves" in order to it. It should be in harmony with the judgment that gives it life
protect the plaintiff "against a double vexation in respect to and not exceed it.
one liability"
FACTS: PRC entered into a contract of lease for 3 years with
2. WON the CFI has jurisdiction Ursula Maglente. It was stated that, if PRC were to sell the
HELD: 1. YES. There is no question in this case that plaintiff leased property, Maglente would be given the right of first
may compel the defendants to interplead among refusal to buy it.
themselves, concerning the aforementioned sum of
P5,198.75. The only issue is who among the defendants is When the lease contract was about to expire, PRC sent a
entitled to collect the same. This is the object of the action, written offer to sell the leased property to Maglente. In
which is not within the jurisdiction of the lower court. The response, the latter intimated that she would exercise her right
dismissal of the action was therefore proper. of first refusal to purchase the property with co-petitioners as
her co-buyers. PRC received a letter from respondents
3. NO. The latter relies upon Rule 63 of the present expressing their desire to purchase the same property.
Rules of Court, prescribing the procedure in cases
of interpleading, and Section 19 of Rule 5 of said PRC filed a complaint for interpleader in the RTC against both
Rules of Court, which, unlike Section 19 of Rule 4 of petitioners and respondents so they could litigate among
the Old Rules, omits the Rules on Interpleading themselves on who had the right to purchase the property. The
among those made applicable to inferior courts. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners and declared them as the
This fact does not warrant, however, the conclusion rightful parties to purchase PRC's property.
drawn therefrom by plaintiff herein. To begin with,
the jurisdiction of our courts over the subject- Respondents appealed to the CA which affirmed the judgment
matter of justiciable controversies is governed of the trial court.
by Rep. Act No. 296, as amended, pursuant to
which municipal courts shall have exclusive original On motion of petitioners, a writ of execution was later issued
jurisdiction in all civil cases "in which the demand, by the RTC directing PRC to execute the contract of
exclusive of interest, or the value of the property in sale/contract to sell in favor of petitioners. PRC executed a
controversy" amounts to not more than "ten "deed of sale" in favor of petitioners.
thousand pesos." Secondly, "the power to define,
prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the

The latter then filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of HONESTO V. FERRER, JR., and ROMEO E.
possession but respondents objected on the ground that RTC’s ESPERA, Petitioners, vs. Mayor SULPICIO S. ROCO, JR., in his
decision on the interpleader case merely resolved petitioners' capacity as Mayor of Naga City, Sangguniang Panglungsod
right to purchase the leased property but did not declare them of the City of Naga, and Peñafrancia Memorial Park
as the owners entitled to possession. The RTC sustained Corporation, Respondent
respondents' argument and denied petitioners' motion.
ISSUE/S: W/N A WRIT OF POSSESSION SHOULD BE GRANTED
TO A PARTY WITH THE RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL IN AN DOCTRINE: Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any
INTERPLEADER CASE. person interested in a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any
HELD: NO. question of construction or validity arising from the instrument,
A writ of possession shall issue only in the following instances: executive order or regulation, or statute, and for a declaration
(1) land registration proceedings; (2) extrajudicial foreclosure of his rights and duties thereunder. The only issue that may be
of mortgage of real property; (3) judicial foreclosure of raised in such a petition is the question of construction or
property provided that the mortgagor has possession and no validity of the provisions in an instrument or statute.
third party has intervened, and (4) execution sales. Here,
petitioners seek the writ as a consequence of the trial court's FACTS:
decision ordering the execution of a contract of sale/contract Wenceslao D. San Andres, Jose A. Ocampo, Crisensana M.
to sell in their favor. The writ does not lie in such a case. Vargas, Honesto V. Ferrer, Jr., Alfonso N. Peralta, Otilla C.
Sierra, Jovito A. delos Santos, William Tan, Felipe Sese, and
Furthermore, the trial court's decision in the interpleader case Romeo E. Espera filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or
(affirmed by both the CA and the SC) merely resolved the Injunction with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
question of who, between petitioners and respondents, had questioning Resolution No. 2000-263, Resolution No. 2000-
the right to purchase PRC's property. 354 and Ordinance No. 2000-059 issued by the respondents,
Mayor Sulpicio S. Roco, Jr. and the members of the
The directive was only for PRC to execute the necessary Sangguniang Panglungsod of Naga City.
contract in favor of petitioners as the winning parties, nothing
else. The trial court's writ of execution read: “[…] NOW RTC dismissed the petition finding that the prayer of the
THEREFORE, [PRC] is hereby ordered to execute a contract of petitioners was premature as the questioned resolutions and
sale/contract to sell in favor of [petitioners] within thirty (30) ordinance were merely promulgated to pave the way for the
days from the date of execution hereof.[…]” endorsement of the application of the private respondent to
the HLURB. Petitioners appealed to the CA which affirmed this
It was clear that, at that point, petitioners were not yet the in toto.
owners of the property. Petitioners' argument that the trial
court's writ of execution in the interpleader case carried with Issue: WON the CA gravely erred in holding that the Petition
it the corollary right to a writ of possession is without merit. A for Declaratory Relief filed with the trial court was premature
writ of possession complements the writ of execution only and having no bases, on the pretext that the issue raised
when the right of possession or ownership has been validly therein is not yet ripe for adjudication (NO)
determined in a case directly relating to either. The
interpleader case obviously did not delve into that issue. Ruling:
Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person
Furthermore, the rule is that the enforcement of a judgment interested in a deed, will, contract or other written instrument,
may not vary or alter the tenor of the judgment but must executive order or resolution, to determine any question of
strictly conform to it. It should be in harmony with the construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive
judgment that gives it life and not exceed it. We thus cannot order or regulation, or statute, and for a declaration of his
fault the trial court for refusing to issue a writ of possession to rights and duties thereunder. The only issue that may be raised
petitioners as its issuance would not be in conformity with the in such a petition is the question of construction or validity of
trial court's judgment in the interpleader case. the provisions in an instrument or statute.
WHEREFORE, the assailed order of the Regional Trial Court of It is settled that the requisites of an action for declaratory relief
Manila, Branch 38, is hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the are: 1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed,
petition is DISMISSED. will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive
order or regulation, or ordinance; 2) the terms of said
RULE 63: DECLARATORY RELIEF documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require
judicial construction; 3) there must have been no breach of the

documents in question; 4) there must be an actual justiciable 2. W/N the trial court erred for ordering the immediate
controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons adjustments of the respondents' retirement benefits when the
whose interests are adverse; 5) the issue must be ripe for basic petition filed before it was one for declaratory relief.
judicial determination; and 6) adequate relief is not available (NO)
through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.
RULING:
In this case, the issue raised by petitioners is clearly not yet ripe 1. The INP was not abolished but was merely transformed to
for judicial determination. Nowhere in the assailed resolutions become the PNP. Members of the INP which include the
and ordinance does it show that the public respondents acted herein respondents are, therefore, not excluded from
on private respondent's application with finality. What availing themselves of the retirement benefits accorded to
appears therefrom is that the application of private PNP retirees under R.A. No. 6975, as amended by R.A. No.
respondent for development permit has been endorsed to the 8551.
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) for 2. In a further bid to scuttle respondents' entitlement to the
appropriate action, the latter being the sole regulatory body desired retirement benefits, the petitioners fault the trial
for housing and land development. court for ordering the immediate adjustments of the
respondents' retirement benefits when the basic petition
G.R. NO. 169466 May 9, 2007 filed before it was one for declaratory relief. To the
petitioners, such petition does not essentially entail an
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, executory process, the only relief proper under that
represented by SECRETARY ROMULO L. NERI, PHILIPPINE setting being a declaration of the parties' rights and
NATIONAL POLICE, represented by POLICE DIRECTOR duties.
GENERAL ARTURO L. LOMIBAO, NATIONAL POLICE Petitioners' above posture is valid to a point. However, the
COMMISSION, represented by CHAIRMAN ANGELO T. execution of judgments in a petition for declaratory relief is not
REYES, AND CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, represented by necessarily indefensible. In PDIC v. CA, wherein the Court
CHAIRPERSON KARINA C. DAVID, Petitioners, v. MANILA'S affirmed the order for the petitioners therein to pay the
FINEST RETIREES ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by balance of the deposit insurance to the therein respondents,
P/COL. FELICISIMO G. LAZARO (RET.), AND ALL THE OTHER we categorically ruled:
INP RETIREES, Respondents. Now, there is nothing in the nature of a special civil action for
declaratory relief that proscribes the filing of a counterclaim
FACTS: based on the same transaction, deed or contract subject of the
All Integrated National Police (INP) retirees, spearheaded by complaint. A special civil action is after all not essentially
the Manila's Finest Retirees Association, Inc. (MFRAI), filed a different from an ordinary civil action, which is generally
petition for declaratory relief. The petitioning INP-retirees pray governed by Rules 1 to 56 of the Rules of Court, except that
that a declaratory judgment be rendered in their favor, the former deals with a special subject matter which makes
declaring that they are truly absorbed and equally considered necessary some special regulation. But the identity between
as PNP retirees and thus, entitled to enjoy the same or their fundamental nature is such that the same rules governing
identical retirement benefits being bestowed to PNP-retirees ordinary civil suits may and do apply to special civil actions if
by virtue of R.A. 6975, as amended by R.A. 8551.’ not inconsistent with or if they may serve to supplement the
provisions of the peculiar rules governing special civil
The RTC rendered a judgment declaring the INP Retirees actions.
entitled to the same or identical 778retirement benefits
granted upon the PNP Retirees. The RTC also ordered the The Court sees no reason for treating this case differently from
petitioners (DBM, PNP, NAPOLCOM and CSC) to IMMEDIATELY PDIC .This disposition becomes all the more appropriate
EFFECT and IMPLEMENT the proper adjustments on the INP considering that the respondents, as petitioners in the RTC,
Retirees' retirement and such other benefits and PAY to the pleaded for the immediate adjustment of their retirement
INP Retirees the due payments of the amounts. benefits which, significantly, the herein petitioners, as
respondents in the same court, did not object to. Being aware
The petitioners interposed an appeal to the CA. The CA of said prayer, the petitioners then already knew the logical
affirmed the decision of trial court. Their motion for consequence if, as it turned out, a declaratory judgment is
reconsideration having been denied by the CA, the petitioners rendered in the respondents' favor.
filed the instant petition before the SC.
At bottom then, the trial court's judgment forestalled
ISSUES: multiplicity of suits which, needless to stress, would only entail
1. W/N respondents are entitled to avail the same retirement a long and arduous process. Considering their obvious
benefits accorded to PNP retirees. (YES) advanced years, the respondents can hardly afford another

protracted proceedings. It is thus for this Court to already write was no extraordinary inflation to warrant the application of
finish to this case. Article 1250.
G.R. NO. 184434 February 8, 2010 Bathala refused to pay the VAT and adjusted rentals, but
EUFEMIA ALMEDA & ROMEL ALMEDA, Petitioners, vs. continued to pay the stipulated amount in the contract.
BATHALA MARKETING INDUSTRIES, INC., Respondents.
Bathala filed an action for declaratory relief for the
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 determination of the correct interpretation of conditions Nos.
6 and 7. On the other hand, Almeda filed an action for
DOCTRINE: The requisites of a declaratory relief are as follows: ejectment, rescission, and damages. Almeda also sought the
1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, dismissal of the declaratory relief for being an improper
contract or other written instruments, statute, executive order remedy.
or regulation, or ordinance; 2) the terms of the said documents
and the validity are doubtful and require judicial construction; RTC: DENIED the motion to dismiss. On the merits, ruled IN
3) there must have been no breach of the documents in FAVOR OF BATHALA finding that the latter is not liable for the
question; 4) there must be an actual justiciable controversy VAT and the adjusted rent. It also ordered the restitution by
between persons whose interests are adverse; 5) the issue Almeda to Bathala for the amounts already paid,
must be ripe for judicial determination; and 6) adequate relief notwithstanding the rule that in an action for declaratory
is not available through other means or other forms of action relief, other than a declaration of rights and obligations,
or proceeding. affirmative reliefs are not sought by or awarded to the parties.
In this case, it cannot be said that the 3rd element was not CA: AFFIRMED the RTC’s decision, but found that the RTC
present since Bathala religiously complied with its obligation exceeded its jurisdiction in granting affirmative relief
under the lease contract. (restitution of its excess payment) to Bathala.
FACTS: ISSUE: Whether or not the action for declaratory relief is

Almeda and Bathala Marketing entered into a Contract of proper.
Lease of a portion of the Almeda Compound in Makati for a
monthly rental of P1,107,348.69. The contact contained the HELD: YES
following provisions:
The requisites of a declaratory relief are as follows: 1) the
SIXTH – xxx the rental rate stipulated is based on the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will,
present assessment on the property, and that in case contract or other written instruments, statute, executive
the assessment should hereafter be increased or any order or regulation, or ordinance; 2) the terms of the said
new tax, charge or burden be imposed by authorities documents and the validity are doubtful and require judicial
on the lot, LESSEE shall pay, when the rental herein construction; 3) there must have been no breach of the
becomes due, the additional rental or charge documents in question; 4) there must be an actual justiciable
corresponding to the portion hereby leased; xxx controversy between persons whose interests are adverse; 5)
the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and 6)
SEVENTH – In case of extraordinary inflation or adequate relief is not available through other means or other
devaluation of the Philippine Currency should forms of action or proceeding.
supervene, the value of the Philippine Peso at the
time of the establishment of the obligation shall be It was argued by Almeda that all elements are present except
the basis of the payment. the third element since Bathala was already in breach of the
contract when the petition was filed. However, the SC held
On May 1997, the lease was renewed. Subsequently, a letter that there was no breach. In this case, it cannot be said that
was sent by Almeda to Bathala informing the former shall the 3rd element was not present since Bathala religiously
assess and collect VAT on its monthly rentals. In response, complied with its obligation under the lease contract.
Bathala contended that VAT may not be imposed as the rentals
fixed in the contract of lease were supposed to include VAT. After Almeda demanded payment of adjusted rentals and in
the months that followed, Bathala complied with the terms
In another letter, Almeda informed Bathala that its monthly and conditions set forth in their contract of lease by paying the
rental should be increased by 73% pursuant to the stipulation rentals stipulated therein. Bathala religiously fulfilled its
number 7 of the contract pursuant to Article 1250, NCC obligations to Almeda even during the pendency of the present
(inflation/deflation). Bathala opposed this arguing that there case. There is no showing that Bathala committed an act

constituting breach of the subject contract. Thus, Bathala is not veteran-borrowers, salary loans of teachers and low-salaried
barred from instituting the petition. employees. These funds were, in turn, managed by
respondent’s Trust and Investment Department, with
Lastly, the rulings of the Court in the cases of Panganiban v. respondent as beneficiary. The fees charged against the
Pilipinas Shell and Teodoro, Jr. v. Mirasol are not applicable borrowers were credited to the respective trust funds, which
because they are not in all fours with the present case would be used to fully pay the outstanding obligation of the
borrowers in case of death.
In the two cases invoked by Almeda, the declaratory relief was
dismissed because of the pendency of a separate actions for An examination was later conducted by the Bangko Sentral ng
unlawful detainer because the unlawful detainer case had Pilipinas, which found that respondent’s collection of
already been resolved before the dismissal of the declaratory premiums violated Section 54 of RA 9791 which states that
relief. In this case, the RTC had not yet resolved the bansk shall not directly engage in insurance business as
rescission/ejectment case during the pendency of the insurer.
declaratory relief petition. In fact, the RTC, where the
rescission case was on appeal, itself initiated the suspension of Thus, BSP issued a directive for the discontinuance of the
the proceedings pending the resolution of the declaratory collection of fees for CRF, which respondent complied with.
relief. Petitioners then issued a resolution directing respondent’s
Trust and Investment Department to return to the borrowers
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, all the balances of the CRF and to preserve the records of
the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the court of Appeals in borrowers who were deducted CRFs from their loan proceeds
CA-G.R. CV No. 67784, dated September 3, 2001, and its pending resolution or ruling of the Office of the General
Resolution dated November 19, 2001, are AFFIRMED. Counsel of the BSP.
Upon denial of its request for reconsideration, respondent

filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with the RTC of Makati
G.R. No. 189571 January 21, 2015 City. In response, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging
that the petition for declaratory relief cannot prosper due to
THE HONORABLE MONETARY BOARD and GAIL U. FULE, respondent’s prior breach of Sec. 54 of RA No. 8791. The RTC
Petitioners, dismissed the respondent’s petition. However, upon motion,
vs. the RTC granted respondent’s petition for declaratory relief.
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, Respondent Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petition for declaratory relief is proper in
DOCTRINE this case. (NO)
“Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person RULING
interested in a deed, will, contract or other written instrument,
executive order or resolution, to determine any question of Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person
construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive interested in a deed, will, contract or other written instrument,
order or regulation, or statute; and for a declaration of his executive order or resolution, to determine any question of
rights and duties thereunder. The only issue that may be raised construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive
in such a petition is the question of construction or validity of order or regulation, or statute; and for a declaration of his
provisions in an instrument or statute.” rights and duties thereunder. The only issue that may be raised
in such a petition is the question of construction or validity of
FACTS provisions in an instrument or statute.
Respondent established a pension loan product for bona fide The Court, in CJH Development Corporation v. Bureau of
veterans or their surviving spouses, as well as salary loan Internal Revenue, held that in the same manner that court
product for teachers and low-salaried employees pursuant to decisions cannot be the proper subjects of a petition for
its mandate under RA Nos. 3518 and 7169 to provide financial declaratory relief, decisions of quasi-judicial agencies cannot
assistance to veterans and teachers. be subjects of a petition for declaratory relief for the simple
reason that if a party is not agreeable to a decision either on
For this, respondent devised a program by charging a premium
questions of law or of fact, it may avail of the various remedies
in the form of a higher fee known as Credit Redemption Fund
provided by the Rules of Court.
(CRF) from said borrowers. Resultantly, Special Trust Funds
were established by respondent for the pension loans of the

In view of the foregoing, the decision of the BSP Monetary Preliminary Injunction in order to suspend the revision
Board cannot be a proper subject matter for a petition for proceedings ordered by the RTC.
declaratory relief since it was issued by the BSP Monetary
Board in the exercise of its quasi-judicial powers or functions. The COMELEC issued the writ prayed for.
The authority of the petitioners to issue the questioned MB Hence, the petition for certiorari under Rules 64 and 65 of the
Resolution emanated from its powers under Sec. 37 of RA 7653 Rules of Court
and Sec. 66 of RA No. 8791 to impose, at its discretion,
administrative sanctions, upon any bank for violation of any ISSUE:
banking law. This arises from the nature of the BSP Monetary
Board as a quasi-judicial agency, and the character of its Whether or not private respondent was correct in filing a
determination of whether or not appropriate sanctions may be petition for certiorari under Rule 64 and 65 in order to assail
imposed upon erring banks. the order of the COMELEC
Having established that the BSP Monetary Board is indeed a HELD:

quasi-judicial body exercising quasi-judicial functions, then its
decision in MB Resolution No. 1139 cannot be the proper An examination of the records of the subject Petitions
subject of declaratory relief. undeniably demonstrates that the assailed Order of public
respondent COMELEC is not the kind contemplated under Sec.
RULE 64: REVIEW OF JUDGMENTS AND FINAL ORDERS OR
2 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.
RESOLUTIONS OF THE COMELEC AND THE COA
G.R. Nos. 167989-93 March 6, 2007 In any event, as further manifested in its Comment, the reliefs
prayed for in the instant Petitions have already been
TEODORO M. JUMAMIL, GRACIANO CENTINO, ANICETO addressed by public respondent COMELEC in various
CASTILLO, ORLANO MILLANO, and FAUSTINO FRANCISCO, Resolutions. The Petitions for Certiorari filed by herein private
Petitioners, respondents Purog, et al., have not only been dismissed for
vs. lack of merit, the former also lifted the writs of preliminary
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NICOLAS PUROG, JR., injunction it had earlier issued.
DOLORES ORQUIN-VERDE, ARTURO ALILUYAH, JOHN A.
MEDICE, RUFINO A. SUBIAGA and FELIX G. AUCENTE, JR., Noel Y. Repol, v. Commission on Elections and Violeto
Respondents. Ceracas
G.R. No. 161418 ; April 28, 2004
DOCTRINE:
DOCTRINE: The Supreme Court has no power to review via The COMELEC En Banc shall decide motions for reconsideration
certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a only for “decisions” of a Division, meaning final orders, rulings
Division of the Commission on Elections. and decisions of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The Supreme Court has
FACTS: no power to review via certiorari, an interlocutory order or even
a final resolution of a Division of the COMELEC.
Petitioners and Private respondents ran as candidates in the
forthcoming elections. FACTS:
Petitioner Repol and private respondent Ceracas were
Private respondents were all proclaimed winning candidates in candidates for Municipal Mayor of Pagsanghan, Samar in the
the respective positions they ran for. 2001 elections. Ceracas was proclaimed as the duly elected
mayor with 66 votes more than Repol.
Contending an assortment of election anomalies, irregularities
and fraud alleged to have been committed by respondents, Repol filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court
petitioners individually filed election protest before the RTC. (RTC). He claimed fraud and other irregularities in election
precincts. This protest however was dismissed.
Private respondents moved for the dismissal of the cases but
the same was denied by the RTC. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) reversed the
dismissal order and directed the trial court to conduct the
Private respondents elevated to the COMELEC, via a Petition revision of ballots from the protested precincts.Trial and
for Certiorari, and likewise asked for the issuance of a revision of the ballots ensued.
Temporary Restraining Order and/or the issuance of a Writ of
In 2003, the trial court declared Ceracas’ proclamation void COMELEC. The decision must be a final decision or resolution
and proclaimed Repol as the duly elected mayor. The court of the COMELEC en banc. The Supreme Court has no power to
found that electoral fraud was committed. Voters with no review via certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final
identifications were allowed to vote, the handwriting of one resolution of a Division of the COMELEC.
person in some ballots were found in other precincts, and
some ballots were marked for easy identification. A total of Nevertheless, in the case of ABS-CBN Broadcasting
142 were illegally counted. Corporation v. COMELEC, the rule is not iron-clad. The
procedural requirement may be glossed over to prevent
Upon motion by Repol, the trial court issued a writ of miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle of
execution. Ceracas moved to set aside and quash the writ of social justice or the protection of labor, or when the relief is
execution. extremely urgent. The exception was warranted under
peculiar circumstances, the same can be said in this case.
Ceracas appealed the judgment of the trial court before the
COMELEC. The Court held that direct resort to this Court through a special
civil action for certiorari is justified under the circumstances in
During the pendency of his appeal with the COMELEC, Ceracas the present case.
filed a Petition for Certiorari before the same. The COMELEC
(First Division) issued an Order directing the parties to Validity of the status quo ante
maintain status quo ante. NO. The status quo ante order was a temporary restraining
order. The order had a lifespan of more than 20 days since the
Repol filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court directive was qualified by the phrase “until further orders from
questioning the status quo ante ordered by the COMELEC. this Commission”. This violates the rule that a TRO has an
effective period of only 20 days.
The Office of the Solicitor General, appearing on behalf of the
COMELEC, prayed for the dismissal of the petition. The OSG Since the trial court found that Repol is the candidate who won
argued that Repol cannot challenge by way of a petition for the election by valid votes, it has the discretionary power to
certiorari an interlocutory order issued by COMELEC Division grant execution pending appeal. By depriving the trial court of
without filing a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC their discretion to grant execution pending appeal would
en banc. prolong the protest. Such is a technique resorted by devious
politicians in their efforts to perpetuate their hold to an
elective office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC has the power to issue a status
quo ante that overturns the enforcement of a writ of execution
issued by the trial court. G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015
HELD: THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST

REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP
Proper Remedy HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners
The remedy of Repol is not to file a Petition for Certiorari v.
before the Supreme Court, nor a motion for reconsideration COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER
before COMELEC en banc. According to COMELEC Rules of OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V.
Procedure, interlocutory orders of the division shall be MAJARUCON, Respondent
resolved by the division which issued the order. Therefore,
Repol’s remedy was to file a motion for reconsideration before
the COMELEC First Division. SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI AND
PROHIBITION WITH APPLICATION FOR PRELIMINARY
Only the final order of the COMELEC in Division may be raised INJUNCTION AND TEMPORARY RESTRAININNG ORDER
before COMELEC en banc. UNDER RULE 65
Repol went directly to the Supreme Court from an FACTS:

interlocutory order of the COMELEC First Division.
Petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private
Power of the Supreme Court compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod.
The Court interpreted the constitutional provision on the Each tarpaulin was approx. 6x10 ft in size. They were posted
power of the Supreme Court to review decisions of the on the front walls of the cathedral within public view.

a. The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH final decisions, orders, rulings and judgments of the COMELEC
Law.” En Banc. However, these cases are not applicable.
b. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present Cases cited by respondents do not operate as precedents to
case, which contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists oust this court from taking jurisdiction over this case. All these
candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check cases cited involve election protests or disqualification cases
mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. filed by the losing candidate against the winning candidate.
Respondent Atty. Majarucon, in her capacity as Election Officer In the present case, petitioners are not candidates seeking for
of Bacolod City, issued a Notice to Remove Campaign Materials public office. Their petition is filed to assert their fundamental
addressed to petitioner for being oversized. COMELEC right to expression. Furthermore, all these cases cited by
Resolution No. 9615 provides for the size requirement of 2x3 respondents pertained to COMELEC’s exercise of its
ft. adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power. This case pertains to acts
of COMELEC in the implementation of its regulatory powers.
COMELEC: The COMELEC Law Department issued a letter When it issued the notice and letter, the COMELEC was
ordering the immediate removal of tarpaulin; otherwise, it will allegedly enforcing election laws.
be constrained to file an election offense against petitioners.
The letter of COMELEC was silent on the remedies available to Petitioners allege that respondents committed grave abuse of
petitioners. discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing
the notice and letter ordering the removal of the tarpaulin. It
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION WITH is their position that these infringe on their fundamental right
APPLICATION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND TRO. to freedom of expression and violate the principle of
Concerned about the imminent threat of prosecution for their separation of church and state, and thus, are unconstitutional.
exercise of free speech, petitioners initiated this case and filed
this petition. COMELEC’s notice and letter affect preferred speech.
Respondents’ acts are capable of repetition. Under the
Respondents filed their comment arguing that (1) a petition for conditions in which it was issued and in view of the novelty of
certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court this case, it could result in a "chilling effect" that would affect
filed before this court is not the proper remedy, and (2) the other citizens who want their voices heard on issues during the
tarpaulin is an election propaganda subject to regulation by elections. Other citizens who wish to express their views
COMELEC pursuant to its mandate under Art. IX-C, Sec. 4 of the regarding the election and other related issues may choose not
Constitution. to, for fear of reprisal or sanction by the COMELEC. Direct
resort to this court is allowed to avoid such proscribed
ISSUE: conditions. Rule 65 is also the procedural platform for raising
grave abuse of discretion.
Whether this Petition would warrant a review of this Court via
Rule 65 Petition? Both parties point to constitutional provisions on jurisdiction.
Respondents relied on its constitutional mandate to decide all
HELD:
questions affecting elections. Article IX-C, Section 2(3) of the
YES. Respondents ask that this petition be dismissed on the Constitution, provides:
ground that the notice and letter are not final orders,
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the
decisions, rulings, or judgments of the COMELEC En Banc
following powers and functions:
issued in the exercise of its adjudicatory powers, reviewable
via Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. … (3) Decide, except those involving the right
to vote, all questions affecting elections,
Rule 64 is not the exclusive remedy for all acts of the
including determination of the number and
COMELEC. Rule 65 is applicable especially to raise objections
location of polling places, appointment of
relating to a grave abuse of discretion resulting in the ouster of
election officials and inspectors, and
jurisdiction. As a special civil action, there must also be a
registration of voters
showing that there be no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of the law. Respondents’ reliance on this provision is misplaced.
Respondents claim that the assailed notice and letter are We are not confronted here with the question of whether the
reviewable only by COMELEC itself pursuant to Article IX- C, COMELEC, in its exercise of jurisdiction, gravely abused it. We
Section 2(3) of the Constitution on COMELEC’s power to decide are confronted with the question as to whether the COMELEC
all questions affecting elections. Respondents invoke the had any jurisdiction at all with its acts threatening imminent
several cases to illustrate how judicial intervention is limited to

criminal action effectively abridging meaningful political FACTS: Causing assumed office as the Municipal Civil
speech. Registrar of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo. Mayor Biron issued
Memorandum No. 12 detailing Causing to the Office of the
It is clear that the subject matter of the controversy is the Municipal Mayor. Biron also issued 3 more memoranda.
effect of COMELEC’s notice and letter on free speech. This does
not fall under Article IX-C, Section 2(3) of the Constitution. The Causing filed the complaint-affidavit claiming that Office
use of the word "affecting" in this provision cannot be Order No. 12 ordering her detail to the Office of the
interpreted to mean that COMELEC has the exclusive power to Municipal Mayor, being made within the election period and
decide any and all questions that arise during elections. without prior authority from the COMELEC, was illegal and
COMELEC’s constitutional competencies during elections violative of Section 1, Paragraph A, No. 1, in connection with
should not operate to divest this court of its own jurisdiction. Section 6 (B) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8737, Series of
2009.
The more relevant provision for jurisdiction in this case is In his counter-affidavit, Mayor Biron countered that the
Article VIII, Section 5(1) of the Constitution. This provision purpose of transferring the office of Causing was to closely
provides for this court’s original jurisdiction over petitions for supervise the performance of her functions after complaints
certiorari and prohibition. This should be read alongside the regarding her negative behavior in dealing with her co-
expanded jurisdiction of the court in Article VIII, Section 1 of employees and with the public transacting business in her
the Constitution. office had been received; that as the local chief executive,
he was empowered to take personnel actions and other
Certainly, a breach of the fundamental right of expression by
management prerogatives for the good of public service;
COMELEC is grave abuse of discretion. Thus, the
that Causing was not being stripped of her functions as the
constitutionality of the notice and letter coming from
Municipal Civil Registrar; that she was not transferred or
COMELEC is within this court’s power to review.
detailed to another office in order to perform a different
During elections, we have the power and the duty to correct function; and that she was not demoted to a lower position
any grave abuse of discretion or any act tainted with that diminished her salary and other benefits.
unconstitutionality on the part of any government branch or Atty. Elizabeth Doronilla, the Provincial Election Supervisor
instrumentality. This includes actions by the COMELEC. (PES), recommended the dismissal of the complaint-affidavit
Furthermore, it is this court’s constitutional mandate to for lack of probable cause to charge Mayor Biron with the
protect the people against government’s infringement of their violation of Section (h) of the Omnibus Election Code.
fundamental rights. This constitutional mandate outweighs
the jurisdiction vested with the COMELEC. COMELEC En Banc: AFFIRMED the findings and
recommendation of PES Doronilla. Mayor Biron did not
WHEREFOR, the instant petition is GRANTED. The temporary transfer or detail Causing but only required her to physically
restraining order previously issued is hereby made permanent. report to the Mayor's office and to perform her functions
The act of the COMELEC in issuing the assailed notice dated thereat; and that he did not strip her of her functions as the
February 22, 2013 and letter dated February 27, 2013 is Municipal Civil Registrar, and did not deprive her of her
declared unconstitutional. supervisory functions over her staff.
ISSUES: WON COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of
discretion in affirming the findings of PES Doronilla to the
[G.R. No. 199139. September 9, 2014.]
effect that there was no probable cause to hold Mayor Biron
ELSIE liable for violating the Omnibus Election Code
S. CAUSING, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND HELD: NO. The petition has no merit. Causing did not file a
HERNAN D. BIRON, SR., respondents. motion for reconsideration before filing the Petition
for certiorari. The well-established rule is that the motion for
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI reconsideration is an indispensable condition before an
aggrieved party can resort to the special civil action
DOCTRINE: The motion for reconsideration is an indispensable
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The filing of
condition before an aggrieved party can resort to the special
the motion for reconsideration before the resort
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
to certiorari will lie is intended to afford to the public
The filing of the motion for reconsideration before the resort
respondent the opportunity to correct any actual or fancied
to certiorari will lie is intended to afford to the public
error attributed to it by way of re-examination of the legal
and factual aspects of the case.
error attributed to it by way of re-examination of the legal
and factual aspects of the case. However, this is not absolute
The rule is not absolute, however, considering that
and there are exceptions provided by jurisprudence. (See
jurisprudence has laid down exceptions to the requirement for
ruling of this case)
the filing of a petition for certiorari without first filing a motion brought by the aggrieved party to this Court on certiorari
for reconsideration, namely: (a) where the order is a patent under Rule 65.
nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where
the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been FACTS: Falcis had the duty, among others, to encash checks for
duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the the DepEd's expenses and activities. Together with a coworker,
same as those raised and passed upon in the lower went to the Land Bank to encash a check for Php313,024.50.
court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution After completing the transaction, they took a public utility
of the question, and any further delay would prejudice the tricycle in going back to their office. On their way, three men
interests of the Government, or of the petitioner, or the blocked their path and at gunpoint grabbed the envelope
subject matter of the petition is perishable; (d) where, under containing the money. The robbers then sped away in a
the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be motorcycle. Falcis filed with the COA ATL a request for relief
useless; (e) where the petitioner was deprived of due process, from money accountability.
case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent, and the granting ATL: investigated the incident and found that Falcis failed to
of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the exert extra care and due diligence in handling the encashment;
proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due she did not request a security escort and the use of a
process; (h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the government vehicle.
petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the
issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved. The ATL forwarded its findings to the Regional Legal and
Adjudication Office (COA Regional Office) for further study.
Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution states that unless
otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, any
The COA Regional Office concurred with the ATL findings and
decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought
elevated Falcis's request for relief to the Adjudication and
to the Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within 30 days
Settlement Board (ASB) of the COA National Office, for final
from receipt of a copy thereof. For this reason, the Rules of
disposition.
Court (1997) contains a separate rule (Rule 64) on the review
of the decisions of the COMELEC and
ASB: DENIED Falcis’ request for relief based on the finding that
the Commission on Audit. Rule 64 is generally identical
she had been negligent, thus, liable for the amount of money
with certiorari under Rule 65, except as to the period of the
lost.
filing of the petition for certiorari, that is, in the former, the
period is 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order or
COA Proper: AFFIRMED ASB’s decision.
resolution sought to be reviewed but, in the latter, not later
• The COA, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argues
than 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution
that Dr. Fontanilla availed of the wrong remedy. Sections 1 and
assailed.
2, Rule 64, in relation to Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, provide that decisions and resolutions of the COA are
Mayor Biron indicates that Causing did not file a motion for
reviewable by this Court, not via an appeal by certiorari under
reconsideration before coming to the Court. Causing submits,
Rule 45, but through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
however, that she was not required to file the motion for
• In any case, the COA submits that had the petition been filed
reconsideration because the only recourse of an aggrieved
under Rule 65, it would still fail considering that Dr. Fontanilla
party from the decision of the COMELEC was the filing of the
does not allege any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
petition for certiorari under either Rule 64 or Rule 65.
COA.
A perusal of the circumstances of the case shows that none of • On the issue of due process, the COA submits that Dr.
the foregoing exceptions was applicable herein. Fontanilla's motion for intervention, exclusion, and
Hence, Causing should have filed the motion for reconsideration effectively cured the alleged denial of due
reconsideration, especially because there was nothing in process.
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that precluded the filing of
the motion for reconsideration in election offense cases. ISSUE: W/N DR. FONTANILLA AVAILED OF THE WRONG
REMEDY
G.R. NO. 209714 June 21, 2016 RAPHAEL C. FONTANILLA,
petitioner, v. THE COMMISSIONER PROPER, COMMISSION HELD: YES, but, in a proper case, the Court can liberally apply
ON AUDIT, respondent. the Rules of Court
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution provides that
decisions, orders, or rulings of the COA may be brought to this
DOCTRINE: Section 2, Rule 64, of the Rules of Court states that Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party. This is echoed by
a judgment or final order or resolution of the COA may be Section 2, Rule 64, of the Rules of Court, which states that a

judgment or final order or resolution of the COA may be
brought by the aggrieved party to this Court on certiorari G.R. No. 236573 August 14, 2018
under Rule 65.
BARANGAY CHAIRMAN HERBERT O. CHUA, Petitioner
The COA gravely abused its discretion when it denied Dr. vs.
Fontanilla of due process. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. MARIANITO C.
SANTOS, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of METC,
While we have ruled in the past that the filing of a motion for Branch 57, San Juan City, and SOPHIA PATRICIA K. GIL,
reconsideration cures the defect in procedural due process Respondents
because the process of reconsideration is itself an opportunity
to be heard, this ruling does not embody an absolute rule that PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 64, IN RELATION TO
applies in all circumstances. RULE 65
The mere filing of a motion for reconsideration cannot cure the DOCTRINE: the resolution of Comelec En Banc "is not subject
due process defect, especially if the motion was filed precisely to reconsideration and, therefore, any party who disagreed
to raise the issue of violation of the right to due process and with it had only one recourse, and that is to file a petition for
the lack of opportunity to be heard on the merits remained. certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure." Even
supposing that a motion for reconsideration was filed, the
Instead of asking Dr. Fontanilla to explain his side (by allowing concerned party need not wait for the resolution of the same
him to submit his memorandum or calling for an oral argument and may nonetheless proceed to file a petition for certiorari
as provided under Rule X, Section 3 of the COA Rules of with this Court within the reglementary period.
Procedure), the COA concluded right away that the motion for
intervention, exclusion, and reconsideration had effectively FACTS:
cured the alleged denial of due process. The COA failed or
simply refused to realize that Dr. Fontanilla filed the motion Chua and Gil were candidates for the position of Punong
precisely for the purpose of participating in the proceedings to Barangay.
explain his side.
Chua was proclaimed the winner.
We cannot tolerate this flippant view of administrative due
process in this case or in any other case. Gil filed an election protest with the MeTC, alleging that fraud
and illegal acts marred the voting and counting thereof.
We stress that administrative due process also requires the
following: 1) A finding or decision by a competent tribunal that The MeTC dismissed the election protest.
is supported by substantial evidence, either presented at the
hearing or at least contained in the records or disclosed to the Gil filed an appeal before the COMELEC. The COMELEC
parties affected; 2) The tribunal must act on its own reversed the decision of the MeTC and declared Gil as the duly-
independent consideration of the law and facts of the elected Punong Barangay.
controversy and not simply accept the view of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision; and 3) The tribunal should in all Chua filed a verified motion for reconsideration of the
controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner foregoing resolution to the Comelec En Banc but the same was
that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues denied.
involved and the reason for the decision rendered.
Thereafter, Chua filed a Manifestation with Clarification and
In the present case, not only did the COA deny Dr. Fontanilla's Motion to Stay Execution. The COMELEC En Banc denied the
plea to be heard, it proceeded to confirm his liability on same. It ruled that the said manifestation is in the nature of a
reconsideration without hearing his possible defense or motion for reconsideration of the Comelec En Bane's
defenses. resolution which is among the prohibited pleading
enumerated in Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of
The COA held that Dr. Fontanilla was presumed to be Procedure.
knowledgeable of the transactions entered into by his
subordinates. With such a large amount involved, the COA ISSUE:
found it improbable that he did not know about the
transaction. He must have known of the withdrawal, but he Whether or not the petition was filed out of time
failed to exercise the diligence required.
HELD:
PETITION IS GRANTED

Chua failed to take the proper legal remedy in questioning the Oriondo, Hernandez, Basco, Merino, and Salvador, as officers
ruling of Comelec En Banc within the reglementary period. He of the Foundation, constituted double compensation
had twenty-four (24) days to file a petition for certiorari with prohibited in Article IX-B, Section 8 of the Constitution because
this Court. Instead of filing a petition for certiorari, however, they had already received honoraria and cash gifts as
Chua filed a Manifestation with Clarification and Motion to employees of the Philippine Tourism Authority.
Stay Execution which is a prohibited pleading under Section
l(d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. The Legal and Adjudication Office-Corporate of the
Commission on Audit issued Notice of Disallowance,
Even assuming that the petition for certiorari was properly disallowing in audit the honoraria and cash gift paid.
filed, the same must still be dismissed on the ground of Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Notice of
mootness. The issue of whether who between Chua and Gil Disallowance, arguing that Corregidor Foundation, Inc. is a
won the seat for Punong Barangay in the 2013 Barangay private corporation created under the Corporation Code and,
Elections had been rendered moot and academic by the therefore, cannot be audited by the Commission on Audit. This
recently-concluded Barangay and SK Elections held on May 14, was denied by the Legal Adjudication Office-Corporate. The
2018. Considering that there is no longer any post to vacate or appeal filed was likewise denied by the Adjudication and
assume, the petition must be dismissed on the ground of Settlement Board of the Commission on Audit.
mootness.
The Commission on Audit Commission Proper maintained that
PROHIBITED PLEADINGS the Corregidor Foundation, Inc. is a government-owned or
Section l(d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure which controlled corporation. Petitioners filed a Motion for
states, thus: Reconsideration, which the Commission on Audit En Banc
denied.
Section 1. What Pleadings are not Allowed - The following
pleadings are not allowed: Petitioners filed before this Court a Petition designated as a
(a) motion to dismiss; "Petition for Review on Certiorari" under Rule 64 of the Rules
(b) motion for a bill of particulars; of Court. Countering petitioners, respondent CoA first
(c) motion for extension of time to file memorandum or highlighted that the Petition was erroneously denominated as
brief; a Petition for Review under Rule 64. The error
(d) motion for reconsideration of an en bane ruling, notwithstanding, respondent Commission contends that the
resolution, order or decision except in election offense cases; Petition should be treated as one for certiorari, specifically, to
(e) motion for re-opening or re-hearing of a case; determine whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion
(f) reply in special actions and in special cases; and on the part of the CoA in disallowing the grant of honoraria and
(g) supplemental pleadings in special actions and in special cash gifts to petitioners.
cases.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners erroneously referred to
PROHIBITED PLEADING DOES NOT TOLL RUNNING OF THE their Petition as a “Petition for Review on Certiorari” under
PERIOD Rule 64 of the Rules of Court—YES
A prohibited pleading does not produce any legal effect and
may be deemed not filed at all. In Landbank of the Philippines RULING: The court agrees with respondent Commission that
vs. Ascot Holdings and Equities, Inc., the Court emphasized petitioners erroneously denominated their Petition as a
that "a prohibited pleading cannot toll the running of the "Petition for Review on Certiorari." A petition for review on
period to appeal since such pleading cannot be given any legal certiorari is the remedy provided in Rule 45, Section 1 of the
effect precisely because of its being prohibited. Rules of Court against an adverse judgment, final order, or
resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
G.R. NO. 211293 June 4, 2019 Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by
ADELAIDO ORIONDO, TEODORO M. HERNANDEZ, RENATO L. law.
BASCO, CARMEN MERINO, AND REYNALDO SALVADOR,
PETITIONERS, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, On the other hand, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court pertains to
Respondent. "Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit."
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 64 Section 1 of Rule 64 defines the scope of the Rule, while
section 2 refers to "Mode of Review" and provides that the
FACTS: judgments, final orders, and resolutions of the Commission on
The Commission on Audit issued an Audit Observation Audit are to be brought on certiorari to this Court under Rule
Memorandum for comments of then Corregidor Foundation, 65.
Inc. According to the Audit Team, the cash gifts given to

A Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 is an appeal with the provisions of the Family Code. He and his wife Arsenia
and a true review that involves "digging into the merits and Bautista Tagle (Arsenia) never mortgaged the subject property
unearthing errors of judgment." However, despite the to respondent Equitable PCI Bank (respondent E-PCI) whether
repeated use of the word "review" in Rule 64, the remedy is before or after the subject property was constituted as their
principally one for certiorari that "deals exclusively with grave Family Home. t was Josefino Tagle (Josefino), who was not the
abuse of discretion, which may not exist even when the owner of the subject property, who mortgaged the same with
decision is otherwise erroneous." respondent E-PCI. Josefino was religiously paying the
installments on his mortgage obligation and had paid more
That the remedy against an adverse decision, order, or ruling than half thereof. Josefino, however, passed away. Petitioner
of the Commission on Audit is a petition for certiorari, not Alfredo was then forced to assume Josefino's outstanding
review or appeal, is based on Article IX-A, Section 7 of the mortgage obligation. Even as petitioner Alfredo was already
Constitution. paying Josefino's mortgage obligation in installments,
respondent E-PCI still foreclosed the mortgage on the subject
In the absence of grave abuse of discretion, questions of fact property
cannot be raised in a petition for certiorari, under Rule 64 of
the Rules of Court. The office of the petition for certiorari is E-PCI recounts that the subject property was formerly
not to correct simple errors of judgment; any resort to the registered in the name of petitioner Alfredo. It was mortgaged,
said petition under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, is limited pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney executed by petitioner
to the resolution of jurisdictional issues. Alfredo, to secure the obligation of the spouses Josefino and
Emma Tagle with respondent E-PCI. Respondent E-PCI
The court agrees with respondent Commission that petitioners foreclosed the mortgage on the subject property upon default
erroneously denominated their Petition as a "Petition for in payment by spouses Josefino and Emma, and upon the
Review on Certiorari." Except for the designation, however, we expiration of the period of redemption, caused the
find that the Petition was filed under Rule 64 of the Rules of consolidation and transfer of the title to the subject property
Court given that the Petition refers to Rule 64 and was filed in its name. Consequently, respondent E-PCI filed with the RTC
within 30 days from notice of the Resolution denying a Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession of the subject
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration before the property, which was docketed as LRC Case No. P-71-2004.
Commission on Audit. Therefore, we shall resolve the Petition Petitioner Alfredo, however, filed a Motion to Stop Writ of
in the exercise of our certiorari jurisdiction under Article IX-A, Possession on the ground that the subject property is a Family
Section 7 of the Constitution. Home which is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the Petition for
Certiorari is DISMISSED. CA denied the petition filed by Alfredo on the ground that no
Order of the RTC was attached.
RULE 65: CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS
ALFREDO TAGLE, Petitioner, v. EQUITABLE PCI BANK Respondent E-PCI then concludes that "the present Petition
(Formerly Philippine Commercial International Bank) for Certiorari was filed not to question the jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals but as a vain hope of appealing the Order of
RTC.
DOCTRINE: A special civil action for Certiorari, or simply a

Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Issue: WON petition filed by Alfredo has merit (NO)
Court is intended for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only
or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of Ruling: A Petition for Certiorari is governed by Rule 65 of the
jurisdiction. Its principal office is only to keep the inferior court Revised Rules of Court. A writ of certiorari may be issued only
within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from for the correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
or excess of jurisdiction Such cannot be used for any other purpose, as its function is
limited to keeping the inferior court within the bounds of its
FACTS: jurisdiction.
This case stemmed from an Order issued by RTC denying

petitioner’s Motion to Stop Writ of Possession. According to For a Petition for Certiorari to prosper, the essential requisites
petitioner Alfredo, the subject property is registered in his that have to concur are: (1) the writ is directed against a
name and was constituted as a Family Home in accordance tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-

judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted HELD:
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) No. Petitioners have unduly disregarded the hierarchy of
there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy courts by coming directly to the Court with their petition for
in the ordinary course of law. certiorari, prohibition and mandamus without tendering
therein any special, important or compelling reason to justify
the direct filing of the petition. The concurrence of jurisdiction
G.R. No. 188056 January 8, 2013
among the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional
Trial Courts to issue the writs of certiorari, prohibition,
SPOUSES AUGUSTO G. DACUDAO AND OFELIA R. mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction did
DACUDAO, Petitioners not give petitioners the unrestricted freedom of choice of
v. court forum.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE RAUL M. GONZALES OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Respondent Even assuming arguendo that petitioners’ direct resort to the
Court was permissible, the petition must still be dismissed. The
writ of certiorari is available only when any tribunal, board or
DOCTRINE: For a special civil action for certiorari to prosper, officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
therefore, the following requisites must concur, namely: (a) it without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
must be directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) the tribunal, board, or and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or remedy in the ordinary course of law.
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
Petitioner failed to show that the Secretary of Justice was an
jurisdiction; and (c) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy,
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Instead,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
the Secretary of Justice would appear to be not exercising any
FACTS: judicial or quasi-judicial functions because his questioned
issuances were ostensibly intended to ensure his subordinates’
Petitioners were among the investors whom Delos Angeles, Jr. efficiency and economy in the conduct of the preliminary
and his associates allegedly defrauded through the Legacy investigation of all the cases involving the Legacy Group. The
Group's "buy back agreement" that earned them check function involved was purely executive or administrative.
payments that were dishonored. After several demands for the
of their investments, Petitioner charged Delos Angeles, jr. et. The fact that the DOJ is the primary prosecution arm of the
Al for syndicated estafa. Government does not make it a quasi-judicial office or agency.
Its preliminary investigation of cases is not a quasi- judicial
the Secretary of Justice issued Department Order directing all proceeding. Nor does the DOJ exercise a quasi- judicial
Regional State Prosecutors, Provincial Prosecutors, and City function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor on
Prosecutors to forward all cases already filed against Delos the finding of probable cause in any case.
Angeles, Jr., et al. to the Secretariat of the DOJ Special Panel in
Manila for appropriate action. Hence, the complaints of Hon. Carlos O. Fortich, Provincial Governor of Bukidnon,
petitioners were forwarded by the Office of the City Hon. Rey B. Raula, Municipal Mayor of Sumilao, Bukidnon,
Prosecutor of Davao City to the Secretariat of the Special Panel NQSR Management and Development Corporations, v. Hon.
of the DOJ. Renato C. Corona, Deputy Executive Secretary, Hon. Ernesto
D. Garilao, Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Petitioners have directly come to the Court via petition for G.R. No. 131457 ; November 17, 1998
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, alleging that the Sec. Of
Justice committed grave abuse of discretion and such order FACTS:
violated their right to due process. They insist that DO No. 182 In 1993, an application for land use conversion was filed before
was an obstruction of justice and a violation of the rule against the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in behalf of the
enactment of laws with retroactive effect. Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Development Association (BAIDA),
and NQSR Management and Development Corporation
OSG maintains the constitutionality of the assailed order and (NQSRMDC) concerning its 144-hectares land in Sumilao
prays the dismissal of the petition. Bukidnon.
ISSUE: The Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon became

interested in the property, and enacted an ordinance
Whether the petitioners properly bring their petition directly
converting the said land to industrial/institutional with a view
to the court?
to attract investors in order to achieve economic vitality.

correctable only by the extraordinary writ of
DAR Secretary Garilao denied the application for conversion of certiorari.
the land from agricultural to agro-industrial use, and ordered
its distribution to qualified landless farmers. BAIDA and On the other hand, an error of judgment is one which
NQSRMDC filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied. the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction, and which is reviewable only by an
Bukidnon Governor Carlos O. Fortich sent a letter to President appeal.
Fidel V. Ramos requesting the suspension of the order of
Garilao and confirmation of the ordinance enacted by the The crucial issue raised involves an error of
Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao converting the subject land jurisdiction. The appropriate remedy to annul and set
from agricultural to industrial land. aside the resolution is an original special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65.
In 1996, Executive Secretary Torres, acting on the letter,
reversed the order of Garilao and upheld the power of the local
government units to convert portions of their agricultural 2. NO. Administrative Order No. 18, Section 7 provides
lands into industrial areas. that decisions, resolutions, and orders of the Office of the
President shall become final after the lapse of fifteen days
Respondent Garilao filed a motion for reconsideration out of from receipt of a copy by the parties unless a motion for
time, which was denied by the Executive Secretary on the reconsideration is filed within such period.
ground that the decision had become final and executory.
The Office of the President issued an order declaring
A second motion for reconsideration was filed, and President the Torres Decision as final and executory. By doing
Ramos formed the Presidential Fact-Finding Task Force. so, it loses jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so
Petitioner Deputy Executive Secretary Corona, pursuant to the modify its Decision. It has no authority to entertain
recommendations of the task force, issued a win-win the second motion for reconsideration filed by the
resolution modifying the Torres decision. It awarded 100 DAR Secretary.
hectares of the property to the qualified farmer beneficiaries,
and allocated 44 hectares for the establishment of the Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of
industrial zone. the Revised Rules of Court permits only one motion
for reconsideration; and even if the second motion for
Governor Fortich, Mayor Baula of Sumilao, and NQSRMDC filed reconsideration was permitted in exceptionally
a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and injunction with urgent meritorious cases, the same should not be
prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of entertained for being filed out of time.
preliminary injunction.
G.R. No. L-15950 April 20, 1961
The respondents contended that the petition for certiorari by
the petitioners was improper in the absence of a motion for GERVACIO DAUZ, Petitioner-appellant,
reconsideration. vs.
HON. FELIPE ELEOSIDA ET AL., Respondents-appellee
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the petitioners availed of the proper
remedy by filing a petition for certiorari.
Direct Appeal
2. Whether or not the Torres decision can still be
modified by the win-win resolution. DOCTRINE
HELD: “[W]here appeal is available, certiorari and prohibition do not
1. YES. The petition alleges that the win-win resolution lie.”
was illegal and was issued with grave abuse of
discretion and beyond the Deputy Executive FACTS
Secretary’s jurisdiction.
On November 25, 1958, petitioner Diaz was prosecuted before
the justice of the peace of Kidapawan, Cotabato, because
An error of jurisdiction is one where the act being a general merchant in that locality, and as such required
complained of was issued by the court, officer, or a to pay license fees under the local Ordinance No. 21, series of
quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, 1956, he willfully failed to pay the second, third and fourth
or with grave abuse of discretion. This error is quarter fees for the year 1958.

Summoned to answer, Gervacio Dauz filed a motion to quash attempt to resurrect the remedy of a petition for certiorari,
on the ground that the facts charged did not constitute a which had been lost long before its filing.
criminal offense. The justice of the peace denied the motion.
Whereupon, he instituted in the court of first instance this FACTS: Respondent Gina de Guzman obtained a loan from
petition for certiorari and prohibition contending that as he petitioner PNB, secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel
had paid the first quarter for the year 1958, the remedy of the of land registered in her name. Gina acquired the property
Government was to collect by civil action — not a criminal from her father, Francisco de Guzman, through a Deed of
prosecution — the other quarter fees, plus the surcharges Absolute Sale. Gina’s sister, Rosalia, the beneficiary of the
which the same Ordinance had fixed. family home standing on the said lot, gave her consent to the
mortgage.
The Hon. Juan A. Sarenas, judge, dismissed the petition,
explaining that petitioner's remedy was to appeal, if he should Later, Rosalia filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
after hearing on the merits, be convicted in the justice of the Document, Cancellation of Title, Reconveyance, Cancellation
peace court. of Mortgage, and Damages against Gina and petitioner,
alleging that the purported sale of the property by Francisco to
ISSUE Gina was fraudulent. The Complaint was then amended to
replace respondent Intestate Estate of Francisco de Guzman as
Whether or not Hon. Sarenas acted with grave abuse of
plaintiff.
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiciton. (NO)
RULING RTC: DISMISSED due to plaintiff’s failure to comply with its

order to pay the legal fees so that alias summons could be
Hon. Sarenas acted correctly. There is no doubt that the served.
complaint alleged violation of the ordinance; there is also no
question that the ordinance provided the penalty of not more No appeal was taken from this order; hence, the dismissal
than P200.00 fine, or imprisonment not to exceed 6 months or became final and executory.
both. So the offense, if any, was within the original jurisdiction
of the justice of the peace court. [Republic Act 296, sec. 87]. 1 Respondent Intestate Estate filed another Complaint, also for
Whether or not Dauz' having paid the first quarter for the 1958 Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Cancellation of Title,
constituted a defense, is a matter which he should prove and Reconveyance, Cancellation of Mortgage, and Damages,
discuss upon the trial on the merits, and if that defense should against Gina and petitioner, with essentially the same
fail, the way is open for him to appeal to the court of first allegations as the former Complaint.
instance.
Petitioner filed 3 Motions to Dismiss: (1) on the ground of res
Needless to add, where appeal is available, certiorari and judicata; (2) on the ground of forum shopping; and (3) on the
prohibition do not lie. ground of forum shopping. All of these motions were denied
by the RTC.
For these reasons, the decision dismissing Dauz' petition is
hereby affirmed, with costs. Petitioner then filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration
of the three RTC Orders, this time, raising the following
G.R. No. 182507 June 18, 2010 grounds: (a) res judicata; (b) forum-shopping; (c) lack of
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner, vs. THE jurisdiction over the person; and (d) complaint states no cause
INTESTATE ESTATE OF FRANCISCO DE GUZMAN, of action.
represented by HIS HEIRS: ROSALIA, ELEUTERIO, JOE,
ERNESTO, HARRISON, ALL SURNAMED DE GUZMAN; Again, the RTC denied the omnibus motion for lack of merit
and GINA DE GUZMAN, Respondents. and gave petitioner five days within which to file its answer.
Three years later, petitioner filed another Motion to

Dismiss with leave of court, alleging res judicata and forum-
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI shopping which was again denied by the RTC.
DOCTRINE: The 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari CA: DENIED petition for certiorari. AFFIRMED RTC.
shall be reckoned from the trial court’s denial of the first
motion for reconsideration, otherwise, indefinite delays will ISSUE: WON the reglementary period for filing a petition for
ensue. In the case at bar, petition for certiorari was evidently certiorari shall be reckoned from the notice of denial of the last
filed out of time, as its filing was reckoned from the denial of motion for reconsideration
the last motion. The subject Motion to Dismiss was filed in an

HELD: NO. The 60 -day period for filing a petition for certiorari specify the date of receipt of the NLRC Decision as well as the
shall be reckoned from the trial court’s denial of the first filing of the motion for reconsideration.
motion for reconsideration, otherwise, indefinite delays will
ensue. ISSUE: W/N there was a failure to comply with the
requirements of the rules in filing their petition for certiorari
Applying the ruling in San Juan, the petition for certiorari was
evidently filed out of time, as its filing was reckoned from the HELD: NO. First, it is clear that the certification must be made
denial of the last motion. The subject Motion to Dismiss was by the petitioner himself and not by counsel since it is
filed in an attempt to resurrect the remedy of a petition for petitioner who is in the best position to know whether he has
certiorari, which had been lost long before its filing. previously commenced any similar action involving the same
issues in any other tribunal or agency. Moreover, the petition
Nonetheless, bearing in mind the circumstances obtaining in failed to indicate the material dates that would show the
this case, we hold that res judicata should not be applied as it timeliness of the filing thereof with the Court of Appeals. There
would not serve the interest of substantial justice. Proceedings are three essential dates that must be stated in a petition for
on the case had already been delayed by petitioner, and it is Certiorari brought under Rule 65. First, the date when the
only fair that the case be allowed to proceed and be resolved notice of the judgment or final order or Resolution was
on the merits. Indeed, we have held that res judicata is to be received; second, when a motion for new trial or
disregarded if its rigid application would involve the sacrifice reconsideration was filed; and third, when notice of the denial
of justice to technicality, particularly in this case where there thereof was received. In this case, petitioner failed to show the
was actually no determination of the substantive issues in the first and second dates. The requirement of setting forth the
first case and what is at stake is respondents’ home. three dates in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is for the
purpose of determining its timeliness.
G.R. NO. 141947 July 5, 2001
ISMAEL SANTOS, ALFREDO G. ARCE, and HILARIO M. Joaquin GA, Jr., Judith Ga Gadnanan, and Jesusa Ga Esmana,
PASTRANA, Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEPSI v. Spouses Antonio Tubungan and Rosalinda Tubungan and
COLA PRODUCTS PHILS INC., LUIS P. LORENZO, JR. and Norberto Ga.
FREDERICK DAEL, Respondents. G.R. No. 182185 ; September 18, 2009
FACTS: FACTS: In 1985, petitioner Joaquin Ga, Jr. filed a Complaint for
Private respondent PEPSI informed its employees that Recovery of Property and Ownership of a parcel of land against
due to poor performance of its Metro Manila Sales Operations, respondent Norberto Ga before the Commission on
it would restructure and streamline certain physical and sales Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP).
distribution systems to improve its warehousing efficiency.
Certain positions, including ones held by the petitioners, were In 2000, COSLAP rendered judgment declaring petitioner
declared redundant and abolished and they were terminated. Joaquin and his heirs as the lawful owners of the disputed lot.
Respondent Norberto’s motion for reconsideration was denied
Petitioners left their respective positions. However, before the by COSLAP.
end of the year, petitioners learned that PEPSI created new
positions with substantially the same duties as them. This led In 2002, respondents Norberto and spouses Tubungan filed a
to the filing of a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for illegal petition for certiorari, prohibition, preliminary injunction,
dismissal. quieting of title and damages with prayer for temporary
restraining order before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
LA: DISMISSED the complaint for lack of merit. Guimaras. They sought to enjoin the implementation of writs
of execution and demolition issued by the COSLAP.
NLRC: AFFIRMED the ruling of the Labor Arbiter.
In 2005, the RTC dismissed the case, holding that it has no
Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari with jurisdiction to nullify the COSLAP decision, which was a co-
the Court of Appeals. equal with the RTC. Aggrieved, the respondents filed a Petition
for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA).
CA: DISMISSED the petition outright for failure to comply with
a number of requirements mandated by Section 3, Rule 46, in The CA granted the petition, and set aside the writ of
relation to Sec, 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure. The demolition issued by COSLAP.
Court of Appeals ruled that the verification and certification
against forum shopping were executed merely by petitioner’s The appellate court noted that the respondents erred in filing
counsel and not by petitioners. The petition also failed to a petition for certiorari before the trial court, when the same
should have been filed with the Court of Appeals.

Nevertheless, the suspension of the rules on appeal was DOCTRINE: A petition for certiorari may only be filed when
warranted, considering that the determination of the there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the course of
respondents’ substantive rights over the disputed lot far law. Since a motion for reconsideration is generally regarded
outweighs any procedural lapse. as a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, the failure to first
take recourse to is usually regarded as fatal omission.
The CA held that COSLAP had no jurisdiction over the subject However, there are exceptions, among these are: a) there was
matter. Its jurisdiction was limited only to those involving an urgent necessity for the CA to resolve the questions it raised
public lands or those covered by a specific license or grant from and any further delay would prejudice its interests; and b)
the government. Absent any that shows that the subject land under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would
is a public land, the determination of which party was entitled have been useless.
to its ownership and possession belonged to the regular
courts.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents availed of the proper remedy. Trader Royal Bank proposed sell to petitioner Bank of
Commerce (Bancommerce) for ₱10.4 billion its banking
HELD: business consisting of specified assets and liabilities.
YES. In Sy v. COSLAP, the Court held that all appeals from Bancommerce agreed subject to prior Bangko Sentral ng
orders, resolutions, or decisions of COSLAP should have been Pilipinas' (BSP's) approval of their Purchase and Assumption (P
taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of & A) Agreement.
Court, or a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 if alleging grave
abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction. The respondents BSP approved that agreement subject to the condition that
filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the RTC, a Bancommerce and TRB would set up an escrow fund of PSO
body co-equal with COSLAP. million with another bank to cover TRB liabilities for contingent
claims that may subsequently be adjudged against it, which
The respondents availed of the correct remedy, but they liabilities were excluded from the purchase.
sought the same from the wrong court. This mistake would
have rendered the assailed decision final and executory, were Bancommerce entered into a P & A Agreement with TRB and
it not for its nullity. acquired its specified assets and liabilities, excluding liabilities
arising from judicial actions which were to be covered by the
In the instant case, COSLAP had no jurisdiction over the subject BSP-mandated escrow of ₱50 million. To comply with the BSP
matter. It was not shown to be public land, and its nature is not mandate, on December 6, 2001 TRB placed ₱50 million in
among those which fall under the jurisdiction of COSLAP. A escrow with Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (Metrobank) to
void judgment can never be final and executory, and may be answer for those claims and liabilities that were excluded from
assailed at any time. the P & A Agreement and remained with TRB.
The failure of the respondents to properly appeal from the Shortly after or on October 10, 2002, acting in G.R. 138510,
COSLAP decision before the appropriate court was not fatal to Traders Royal Bank v. Radio Philippines Network (RPN), Inc.,
the petition for certiorari that they eventually filed with the this Court ordered TRB to pay respondents RPN,
Court of Appeals. The remedy remained available despite the Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation, and Banahaw
lapse of period to appeal from the void COSLAP decision. Broadcasting Corporation (collectively, RPN, et al.) actual
damages plus 12% legal interest.
G.R. No. 195615 April 21, 2014
RPN, et al.filed a motion for execution against TRB before the
BANK OF COMMERCE, Petitioner, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. But rather than
v. pursue a levy in execution of the corresponding amounts on
RADIO PHILIPPINES NETWORK, INC., INTERCONTINENTAL escrow with Metrobank, RPN, et al. filed a Supplemental
BROADCASTING CORPORATION, and BANAHA W Motion for Execution where they described TRB as "now Bank
BROADCASTING CORPORATION, THRU BOARD OF of Commerce" based on the assumption that TRB had been
ADMINISTRATOR, and SHERIFF BIENVENIDO S. REYES, JR., merged into Bancommerce.
Sheriff, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
98, Respondents RTC granted the Motion for Execution. CA modified the RTC
decision by deleting the” P & A Agreement between TRB and
PETITION FOR MANDAMUS Bancommerce is a farce or "a mere tool to effectuate a merger
and/or consolidation between TRB and BANCOM."

RPN, et al. filed before RTC a motion to cause the issuance of to P1,520,000 and deposited the same with the LandBank. He
an alias writ of execution against BOC based on the CA. This also seized the several computers of the bank, printers, and
was granted by RTC. BOC sought the reconsideration of this monitors which caused the cessation of their bank operations
decision which was denied by RTC. and putting an unwarranted danger that would hurt the
interests of BOC. The Bank of Commerce clearly had valid
On appeal, CA dismissed the petition outright for failure of BOC justifications for skipping the technical requirement of a
to file the motion for reconsideration of the assailed order. motion for reconsideration before filing a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65.
ISSUE:
G.R. No. 210500, Apr. 2, 2019
WON the outright dismissal was correct (NO) KILUSANG MAYO UNO v. HON. BENIGNO AQUINO, ET AL
HELD: PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION
As to the direct filing of the petition for certiorari by BOC, DOCTRINE: The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the
for certiorari may only be filed when there is no commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the course of law. Since jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant
a motion for reconsideration is generally regarded as a plain, the issuance of the writ.
speedy, and adequate remedy, the failure to first take recourse
to is usually regarded as fatal omission. BOC stated exceptions FACTS: Social Security Commission issued Resolution No. 262-
from Republic vs Bayao. It said that it had to bypass the s. 2013, which provided an increase in: (1) the SSS members'
requirement of filing a motion for reconsideration first before contribution rate from 10.4% to 11%; and (2) the maximum
resorting to the filing of petition for certiorari under Rule 65 monthly salary credit from ₱15,000.00 to ₱16,000.00. The
because: a. there was an urgent necessity for the CA to resolve increase was made subject to the approval of the President of
the questions it raised and any further delay would prejudice the Philippines. Thereafter, the Resolution was approved the
its interests; b. under the circumstances, the motion for Resolution. The employer and the employee shall equally
reconsideration would have been useless; c. BOC had been shoulder the 0.6% increase in contributions. (employer: 7.37%;
deprived of its right to due process when the RTC issued the employee: 3.63%)
challenged order ex parte, depriving it of an opportunity to
object; and d. issues it presented were purely of law. Kilusang Mayo Uno, et al. filed Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition questioning the validity of the assailed issuances.
In the instant case, the records show that BOC’s situation fell a. (unlawful delegation of power to respondent) They offer
within the exceptions to the general rule of the need to file a vague and unclear standards, and are incomplete in its terms
motion for reconsideration first before filing a petition for and conditions
certiorari. b. (Increased contribution rate violates Sec. 4(b)(2) of the
These are the reasons: Social Security Act)
1. The filing of Motion for Reconsideration would be Increases in benefits shall not require any increase in the rate
REDUNDANT because the RTC Order of August 18, 2010 of contribution
already amounts to a denial of the BOC’s motion for c. (Increased contributions is an invalid exercise of police
reconsideration of the February 19, 2010 Order which granted power)
the issuance of alias writ of execution. Furthermore, the alias Not being reasonably necessary for the attainment of the
writ itself, the quashal by BOC derived its existence from the purpose sought, and unduly oppressive on the labor sector
RTC’s February 19, 2010 d. Revised ratio of contributions between employers and
order and another motion for reconsideration would be employees, is grossly unjust to the working class
superfluous because the RTC had not budged on the issues
before. There was no point in asking for another. ISSUE: WON PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION
WAS PROPER AND WITH MERIT
2. There was an urgent necessity in directly filing before the CA
because any further delay would hurt the interests of BOC. An RULING: NO. Rule 65, Sections 1 and 2 of the Rules of Court
immediate resolution of the case would have avoided the provides remedies to address grave abuse of discretion by any
prejudice. Sheriff Reyes had been relentless and resolute in government branch or instrumentality, particularly through
trying to execute the judgment and dispose of the levied assets petitions for certiorari and prohibition. In this regard, mere
of BOC. It was found that on April 22, 2010, the Sheriff started abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of
garnishing BOC’s deposits on other banks. Sheriff Reyes the writ. The abuse of discretion must be grave, which means
forcibly levied on BOC’s Lipa Branch cash on hand amounting either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in

an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or on February 19, 2002, the RTC, acting upon the petitioners'
personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or motion for reconsideration, set aside its decision and declared
board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform that Resolution No. 552 was null and void. Aggrieved, the City
the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as appealed to the CA.
when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to In its decision promulgated on October 18, 2002, the CA
be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. concluded that the reversal of the January 31, 2001 decision
by the RTC was not justified. The petitioners moved for
Petitioners must show that the assailed issuances were made reconsideration, but the CAdenied their motion.
without any reference to any law, or that respondents
knowingly issued resolutions in excess of the authority granted ISSUE: Whether or not the prohibition does not lie against
to them under the Social Security Act to constitute grave abuse expropriation.
of discretion. Any act of a government branch, agency, or
instrumentality that violates a statute or a treaty is grave abuse RULING: YES. The special civil action for prohibition is
of discretion. However, grave abuse of discretion pertains to governed also by Section 2 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
acts of discretion exercised in areas outside an agency's Procedure, which states:Section 2. Petition for prohibition. —
granted authority and, thus, abusing the power granted to it. When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board,
Moreover, it is the agency's exercise of its power that is officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
examined and adjudged, not whether its application of the law ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his
is correct. jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any
Here, respondents were only complying with their duties other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
under the Social Security Act when they issued the assailed course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
issuances. There is no showing that respondents went beyond petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty
the powers under the law that amounts to lack of or in excess and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
of their jurisdiction. Petitioners' claims are unsubstantiated respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or
and merit no finding of grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental
failed to show that there was an invasion of a material and reliefs as law and justice may require. xxx xxx xxx
substantial right, or that they were entitled to such a right.
Moreover, they failed to show that "there is an urgent and The function of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious and oppressive exercise of legal authority and to provide for a fair
irreparable damage." and orderly administration of justice. The writ of prohibition is
directed against proceedings that are done without or in
G.R. No. 156684 April 6, 2011 excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there
being no appeal or other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
SPOUSES ANTONIO and FE YUSAY, petitioners, vs. COURT in the ordinary course of law. For grave abuse of discretion to
OF APPEALS, CITY MAYOR and CITY COUNCIL OF be a ground for prohibition, the petitioner must first
MANDALUYONG CITY, respondents demonstrate that the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or
person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
FACTS: functions, has exercised its or his power in an arbitrary or
On October 2, 1997, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility,
Mandaluyong City adopted Resolution No. 552, Series of 1997, which must be so patent and gross as would amount to an
to authorize then City Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. to take evasion, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or
the necessary legal steps for the expropriation of the land of to act in contemplation of law. On the other hand, the term
the petitioners for the purpose of developing it for low cost excess of jurisdiction signifies that the court, board, or officer
housing for the less privileged but deserving city inhabitants. has jurisdiction over a case but has transcended such
jurisdiction or acted without any authority. The petitioner
Notwithstanding that the enactment of Resolution No. 552 must further allege in the petition and establish facts to show
was but the initial step in the City's exercise of its power of that any other existing remedy is not speedy or adequate. A
eminent domain granted under Section 19 of the Local remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve
Government Code of 1991, the petitioners became alarmed, the petitioner from the injurious effects of that judgment and
and filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the RTC, the acts of the tribunal or inferior court.
praying for the annulment of Resolution No. 552 due to its
being unconstitutional, confiscatory, improper, and without The rule and relevant jurisprudence indicate that prohibition
force and effect. On January 31, 2001, the RTC ruled in favor of was not available to the petitioners as a remedy against the
the City and dismissed the petition for lack of merit. However, adoption of Resolution No. 552, for the Sangguniang

Panglungsod, by such adoption, was not exercising judicial, However, Regional State Prosecutor Aurillo decided to assume
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, but only expressing its jurisdiction over the case and to order the conduct of a new
collective sentiment or opinion. Verily, there can be no preliminary investigation thereof. He then directed the City
prohibition against a procedure whereby the immediate Prosecutor to transfer all the records in the criminal charge
possession of the land under expropriation proceedings may against Rabi to which the City Prosecutor acceded.
be taken, provided always that due provision is made to secure
the prompt adjudication and payment of just compensation to Thereafter, a subpoena was issued to Rabi and Villanueva
the owner. This bar against prohibition comes from the nature notifying of the preliminary investigation not only for violation
of the power of eminent domain as necessitating the taking of of PD 1866 but also for the crimes of "Violation of Comelec
private land intended for public use, and the interest of the Resolution No. 2323 (gun banned), BP Bilang 9" (possession of
affected landowner is thus made subordinate to the deadly weapon) and "Malicious Mischief.
power of the State. Once the State decides to exercise its
power of eminent domain, the power of judicial review Rabi then filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for a
becomes limited in scope, and the courts will be left to temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction.
determine the appropriate amount of just compensation to be
paid to the affected landowners. Only when the landowners Acting on the petition, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining
are not given their just compensation for the taking of their Order.
property or when there has been no agreement on the amount
of just compensation may the remedy of prohibition become On Rabi’s motion for issuance of a writ of preliminary
available.Here, however, the remedy of prohibition was not injunction, the RTC failed to issue a resolution thereon.
called for, considering that only a resolution expressing the
desire of the Sangguniang Panglungsod to expropriate the Meanwhile, the assistant regional state prosecutor continued
petitioners' property was issued. As of then, it was premature with his preliminary investigation. Thereafter, with Aurillo’s
for the petitioners to mount any judicial challenge, for the approval, he filed with the RTC an Information against Rabi for
power of eminent domain could be exercised by the City only violation of PD 1866.
through the filing of a verified complaint in the proper court.
Before the City as the expropriating authority filed such The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Rabi and nullified the
verified complaint, no expropriation proceeding could be said preliminary investigation done. It held that the power of a
to exist. Until regional state prosecutor to conduct a preliminary
then, the petitioners as the owners could not also be investigation was confined solely to specific criminal cases and
deprived of their property under the power of eminent only when the Secretary of Justice directs him to do so. The
domain. trial court further held that without any order from the
Secretary of Justice, Aurillo cannot motu proprio take over the
G. R. No. 120014 November 26, 2002 preliminary investigation of a case already investigated by the
city prosecutor or conduct a new one.
FRANCISCO Q. AURILLO, JR., petitioner,
vs. ISSUE:
NOEL RABI, and THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 9,
Tacloban City, respondents. Whether or not the Information filed by Aurillo against Rabi
with the RTC for violation of PD 1866 may be nullified by said
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI court
DOCTRINE: Jurisprudence has it that prohibition will give HELD:

complete relief not only by preventing what remains to be done
but by undoing what has been done. The Court has authority to the RTC did not commit any error in nullifying not only the
grant any appropriate relief within the issues presented by the preliminary investigation by the Office of the Regional State
pleadings of the parties: Prosecutor in I.S. No. 95-043 for want of authority but also the
Information approved by Aurillo and filed with the Regional
FACTS: Trial Court.
Rabi was arrested without a warrant of arrest and charged in The pendency of the special civil action for prohibition before
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Tacloban City with violation the trial court did not interrupt the investigation in I.S. No. 95-
of PD No. 1866 (possession of unlicensed firearm). The City 043.26 It goes without saying, however, that in proceeding
Prosecutor, in a resolution, recommend the dismissal of the with the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 95-043 and
charge for lack of probable cause. terminating the same, Aurillo did so subject to the outcome of
the petition for prohibition. In this case, the RTC granted the

petition of Rabi, declared Aurillo bereft of authority to take to be entitled to the office (sec. 6, Rule 68) or by the Solicitor
over the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 95-043 and General (secs. 3, 4, Rule 68).
nullified the preliminary investigation conducted by Aurillo as
well as the Information thereafter filed by him. The RTC is Extraordinary Legal Remedies: Thus, when the legislature has,
possessed of residual power to restore the parties to their by an unconstitutional statute, referred to a body of judges the
status before Aurillo proceeded with the preliminary determination of the validity of a statute concerning the
investigation, and grant in favor of the aggrieved party such liability of the state upon bonds issued in aid of railways,
other relief as may be proper. prohibition will lie to prevent such body from acting upon the
matters thus submitted.
WRIT OF PROHIBITION VS. PROHIBITION
Generally, the relief granted in a prohibition proceeding is In the case at bar, however, as we have found that the
governed by the nature of the grievance proved and the respondent's designation to act temporarily as member of the
situation at the time of judgment. Although the general rule is Commission on Elections is unlawful because it offends against
that a writ of prohibition issues only to restrain the the provisions of the Constitution creating the Commission on
commission of a future act, and not to undo an act already Elections, the dismissal of the petition would deny and deprive
performed, where anything remains to be done by the court, the parties that are affected by such designation of a remedy
prohibition will give complete relief, not only by preventing and relief, because no one is entitled now to the office and a
what remains to be done but by undoing what has been done. party who is not entitled to the office may not institute quo
Under some statutes, the court must grant the appropriate warranto proceedings, and the respondent as Solicitor
relief whatever the proceeding is called if facts stating ground General, the only other party who may institute the
for relief are pleaded. Although prohibition is requested only proceedings, would not proceed against himself. In these
as to a particular matter, the court has authority to grant any circumstances, it is incumbent upon and the duty of this Court
appropriate relief within the issues presented by the to grant a remedy.
pleadings. If the application for prohibition is too broad, the
court may mould the writ and limit it to as much as is proper DISPOSITIVE PORTION: The petitioner is granted five days
to be granted. In the exercise of its jurisdiction to issue writs, within which to amend its petition so as to substitute the real
the court has, as a necessary incident thereto, the power to parties in interest for it (the petitioner), or to show that it is a
make such incidental order as may be necessary to maintain its juridical person entitled to institute these proceedings.
jurisdiction and to effectuate its final judgment. The court may Otherwise, or if the petitioner does not amend its petition or
retain jurisdiction of the cause to enable it to make an does not show that it is a juridical entity, the petition will be
appropriate order in the future, even though the petition for a dismissed. After the amendment or showing referred to shall
writ of prohibition is dismissed. have been made, the writ prayed for will issue, without costs.
THE NACIONALISTA PARTY, petitioner, vs. FELIX ANGELO

BAUTISTA, Solicitor General of the Philippines, respondent.
G.R. No. L-3452. December 7, 1949. G.R. No. L-2422 September 30, 1949
Petition for prohibition MARCELO ENRIQUEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
FACTS: The petitioner respectfully prays that after due hearing HIGINIO B. MACADAEG, Judge of the CFI of Cebu,
a writ of prohibition issue commanding the respondent MELITON YBURAN, and THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK,
Solicitor General to desist forever from acting as acting Respondents
member of the Commission on Elections under the designation
rendered to him by President Quirino. Said designation is
Petition for Mandamus
contended is invalid, illegal, and unconstitutional as no
vacancy in the Commission on Elections. DOCTRINE
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for prohibition is the proper “When a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue is
remedy—NO erroneously denied, mandamus is not the proper remedy for
correcting the error. It being a case where a judge is proceeding
HELD: Strictly speaking, there are no proceedings of the in defiance of the Rules of Court by refusing to dismiss an action
Commission on Elections in the exercise of its judicial or which should not be maintained in his court, the remedy is
ministerial functions, which are being performed by it without prohibition.”
or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of its
discretion (sec. 2, Rule 67). It is in the nature of a quo warranto, FACTS
and as such it may only be instituted by the party who claims

This petition arose from an action for the recovery of a piece as Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, Director and Graft
of real property situated in Negros Oriental. Before filing their Investigation
answer, the defendants in that case moved for the dismissal of
the complaint on the ground, among others, that, as the action
concerned title to and possession of real estate situated in PETITION FOR MANDAMUS
Negros Oriental, venue was improperly laid in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu. The motion having been denied, the DOCTRINE: It is elementary that mandamus applies as a
defendants filed the present petition for mandamus to compel remedy only where petitioner's right is founded clearly on law
the respondent judge to dismiss the action. and not when it is doubtful. In varying language, the principle
echoed and reechoed is that legal rights may be enforced by
ISSUE mandamus only if those rights are well-defined, clear and
certain.
Whether or not mandamus is the proper remedy in this case.
(NO) FACTS:
Petitioner operates the Eastern Laguna Tours and Tourist
RULING Services in Siniloan, Laguna. Private respondent Roberto J.
Acoba was the Vice-Mayor of Siniloan, Laguna. The other
Section 3 of Rule 5 of the Rules of Court requires that actions
respondent were councilors of the Sangguniang Bayan of
affecting title to or recovery of possession of real property be
Laguna.
commenced and tried in the province where the property lies,
while paragraph 1(b) of Rule 8, provides that defendant may,
Petitioner filed a complaint before the office of the Deputy
within the time for pleading, file a motion to dismiss the action
Ombudsman against respondents for violation Anti-Graft and
when "venue is improperly laid." As the action sought to be
Corruption Law. He alleged that he was given a mayor's permit
dismissed affects title to and the recovery of possession of real
from the municipal government of Siniloan, Laguna, for his
property situated in Oriental Negros, it is obvious that the
tours and tourist services business. He applied for a
action was improperly brought in the Court of First Instance of
registration with the Office of DTI where he was advised to
Cebu. The motion to dismiss was therefore proper and should
change the name from Mabuhay Tour to Eastern Laguna Tours
have been granted.
and Services. He was thereafter summoned by Vice Mayor
But, while the respondent judge committed a manifest error in Acoba before the Sangguniang Bayan ng Laguna. He was
denying the motion, mandamus is not the proper remedy for informed that a certain Igos filed a complaint alleging that he
correcting that error, for this is not a case where a tribunal has no franchise of public convenience.
"unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office" or The Sangguniang Bayan cancelled the municipal license and
"unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a permit of petitioner, thus the operation of his business ceased,
right." (Section 3, Rule 67, Rules of Court.) It is rather a case causing him injury and unwarranted benefits and advantage
where a judge is proceeding in defiance of the Rules of Court to his competitor, Van on the Run.
by refusing to dismiss an action which would not be
maintained in his court. The remedy in such case is prohibition Respondents on the hand averred that They contended that
(section 2, Rule 67), and that remedy is available in the present there was nothing irregular in the issuance of Kapasiyahan
case because the order complained of, being merely of an Bilang 81 T-2001, as the same was merely a request to the
interlocutory nature, is not appealable. municipal mayor for cancellation of the mayor's permit after a
finding on their part that the petitioner violated the terms and
While the petition is for mandamus, the same may well be conditions set in the permit.
treated as one for prohibition by waiving strict adherence to
technicalities in the interest of a speedy administration of
justice pursuant to section 2, Rule 1, Rules of Court. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman dismissed the case for lack
of probable cause. It was later on found that respondents
Wherefore, let a writ of prohibition issue, enjoining the failed to respond to the complainant’s demand letter, hence,
respondent judge or his successor from taking cognizance of they were given a stern warning.
this case unless it be to dismiss the same in accordance with
the Rules. Without costs. So ordered.
Issue: WON a mandamus should be issued to compel the Office
NEMESIO M. CALIM, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE JESUS of the Deputy Ombudsman to file the appropriate Information
F. against respondents (NO)
GUERRERO, THE HONORABLE EMILIO A. GONZALEZ III, THE
HONORABLE ADORACION A. AGBADA, in their respective
capacities
Ruling: A writ of mandamus can be issued only when the cases be resolved immediately considering that all the
petitioner's legal right to the performance of a particular act evidence have been formally offered and the parties’
which is sought to be compelled is clear and complete. A clear arguments have been submitted.
legal right is a right which is indubitably granted by law or is
inferable as a matter of law. Mandamus, therefore, is Despite all these and petitioners’ repeated personal follow-
employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ups, still, respondent failed to resolve the cases.
ministerial duty, this being its chief use and not a discretionary
duty. Six (6) years from the filing of the complaints- affidavits
and more than four (4) years after the parties formally offered
Mandamus will not issue to control or review the exercise of their evidence on January 29, 2002, petitioners filed a Motion
discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon said to Dismiss all the cases against them as respondent’s
public o4cer the right and duty to exercise his judgment in "inordinate delay" constitutes a violation of their
reference to any matter in which he is required to act. It is his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of their cases. They
judgment that alleged that such delay "has not only besmirched their
is to be exercised and not that of the court. reputation but also caused them severe anxiety and great and
G.R. Nos. 174902-06 February 15, 2008 irreparable injustice as they have been denied employment
opportunities and retirement benefits rightfully due them."
ALFREDO R. ENRIQUEZ, GENER C. ENDONA, and
RHANDOLFO B. AMANSEC, petitioners, vs. OFFICE OF Significantly, complainant FFIB, despite notice, did not
THE OMBUDSMAN, respondent. interpose any objection to petitioners’ motion to dismiss. Yet,
the cases have remained unresolved.
PETITION FOR MANDAMUS: Owing to respondent’s "stubborn inaction," petitioners, on

October 20, 2006, filed the present petition, invoking their
DOCTRINE: A petition for a writ of mandamus is proper to constitutional right to a speedy disposition of their cases. They
compel the public official concerned to perform a ministerial alleged therein that respondent acted with grave abuse of
act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in not
an office, trust or station. However, it is inaccurate to say that resolving expeditiously the cases without any justification,
the writ will never issue to control the public official’s thereby causing them to suffer grave injustice and agony.
discretion. Thus, this Court held that if the questioned act was
done with grave abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or In its Comment, filed through Solicitor General Agnes VST
palpable excess of authority, the writ will be issued to control Devanadera, respondent maintains that it did not violate
the exercise of such discretion. petitioners’ right to a speedy disposition of their cases; that
petitioners cannot resort to the remedy of mandamus because
FACTS: The Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB), Office dismissing the administrative and criminal cases against them
of the Ombudsman, filed with the Administrative Adjudication involves respondent’s exercise of discretion; and that
Bureau, same Office, separate Complaints-Affidavits of even respondent did not act with grave abuse of discretion for
date, charging, herein petitioners with administrative and failing to resolve the cases, contending that "the prosecutors
criminal offenses in connection with the bidding of the Land assigned to these cases are merely exercising extreme care in
Titling Computerization Project of the LRA. verifying, evaluating and assessing the charges against
petitioners to enable them to arrive at a just determination of
Finding sufficient basis to proceed with the investigation of the the cases" and that "the delay in the ongoing review is not
complaints, respondent required petitioners to submit their vexatious, capricious or oppressive."
counter-affidavits and controverting evidence. In their Joint
Counter-Affidavit, petitioners vehemently denied the charges. ISSUE: 1. WON the petition for mandamus is an appropriate
remedy.
Thereafter, respondent conducted several hearings.
2. WON Whether respondent violated petitioners'
Evidence were presented and petitioners then waited for constitutional right to a speedy disposition of their cases.
respondent’s resolution but there was none. This prompted
petitioners, to file a Motion to Set Date for the Simultaneous HELD: YES. Ordinarily, a petition for a writ of mandamus is
Filing of Memorandum by Each Party. Respondent, however, proper to compel the public official concerned to perform a
did not act on petitioners’ motion. ministerial act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust or station. However, it is
Edilberto R. Feliciano, one of those charged with petitioners, inaccurate to say that the writ will never issue to control the
filed a Motion for Early Resolution expressing alarm over the public official’s discretion. Our jurisprudence is replete with
"inaction of the Office of the Ombudsman," and praying that
exceptions to that rule. Thus, this Court held that if the to "determine the causes of inefficiency … in the Government,
questioned act was done with grave abuse of discretion, and make recommendations for (its) elimination and the
manifest injustice or palpable excess of authority, the writ will observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency," its
be issued to control the exercise of such prolonged delay is manifestly a violation of due process.
discretion. Likewise, mandamus is a proper recourse for
citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the Uy Kiao Eng, v. Nixon Lee
performance of a public duty, most especially when mandated G.R. No. 176831 ; January 15, 2010
by the Constitution. Thus, a party to a case may demand
expeditious action from all officials who are tasked with the FACTS:
administration of justice. Petitioner Uy Kiao Eng is the mother of the respondent Nixon
Lee.
Under the undisputed facts before us, we hold that respondent Lee alleges that his father passed away and left a holographic
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or will, which was in the custody of the petitioner. Despite
excess of jurisdiction by failing to resolve the administrative requests that the petitioner should settle and liquidate the
and criminal cases against petitioners even to this day, or a patriarch's estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their
period of almost eight (8) years from the filing of their inheritance, the petitioner refused to do so without justifiable
complaints- affidavits. reason.
2. YES. "All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition Lee filed a petition for mandamus with damages before the
of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative Regional Trial Court (RTC) Manila to compel the petitioner to
bodies," so the Constitution declares in no uncertain terms. produce the will so that the probate proceedings could be
This right, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated instituted.
when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious,
and oppressive delays. The petitioner denied having custody of the holographic will.
In her answer with counterclaim, she claimed that the petition
When the Constitution enjoins respondent to "act be dismissed for failure to state cause of action, lack of cause
promptly" on any complaint against any public officer or of action, and non-compliance with the condition precedent
employee, it has the concomitant duty to speedily resolve the for the filing. The respondent had not exerted earnest efforts
same. But respondent did not act promptly or resolve speedily to amicably settle the controversy before he filed the suit.
petitioners’ cases. The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman requires that the hearing officer is given a The RTC dismissed the petition. The respondent sought review
definite period of "not later than thirty (30) days" to resolve from the appellate court. The Court of Appeals (CA) issued the
the case after the formal investigation shall have been writ and ordered the production of the will.
concluded. Definitely, respondent did not observe this 30-day
rule. The petitioner brought the matter before this Court,
contending that the petition for mandamus was not the proper
Here, respondent did not resolve the administrative and remedy.
criminal cases against petitioners although the investigation of
the said cases had long been terminated when the latter ISSUE:
formally offered their evidence way back on January 29, Whether or not the petition for mandamus filed by the
2002. In fact, due to respondent’s inaction, petitioners, more respondent was proper.
than four (4) years from January 29, 2002, filed a motion
praying the immediate dismissal of all the cases against them, HELD:
contending that respondent’s "inordinate delay" in resolving NO. Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of
them constitutes a violation of their constitutional right to a competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the
speedy disposition of their cases. Significantly, this motion was sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board,
never resisted by complainant FFIB. Nonetheless, respondent or to some corporation or person requiring the performance
did not even bother to act on the motion. Likewise, it did not of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from
inform petitioners why the cases remain unresolved. the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or
from operation of law.
Clearly, respondent’s inaction does not only violate
petitioners’ right to speedy disposition of their cases As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the
guaranteed by the Constitution, but is also opposed to its role following grounds:
as the vanguard in the promotion of efficient service by the a. The court, officer, board, or person against whom the
government to the people and in ensuring accountability in action is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an act
public office. Considering that respondent is tasked

which the slaw specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from health, productivity, infrastructure and the overall quality of
office, trust, or station; or life. They cited and/or submitted studies and also the
b. That such court, officer, board, or person has estimated damages.
unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and According to petitioners, CNG is a natural gas. It is colorless and
enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled. odorless and considered the cleanest fossil fuel. The only
On the part of the relator, it is essential that he should have a drawback is that it produces more methane.
clear legal right to the thing demanded, and it must be the
imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act The Solicitor General alleged that (1) the writ may be issued
required. only to command a tribunal, corporation, board or person to
do an act that is required to be done, when he or it unlawfully
Mandamus cannot be used to enforce contractual obligations. neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
The writ is not appropriate to enforce a private right against an enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or
individual. It is not used for the redress of private wrongs, but unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a
only in matters relating to the public. right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of course of law; (2) Rep. Act No. 8749 does not even mention the
the writ is that there should be no plain, speedy and adequate existence of CNG as alternative fuel and avers that unless this
remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy of law is amended to provide CNG as alternative fuel for PUVs,
mandamus. the respondents cannot propose that PUVs use CNG as
alternative fuel; (3) t it is the DENR that is tasked to implement
The respondent, in this case, is not prevented from instituting Rep. Act No. 8749 and not the LTFRB nor the DOTC.
probate proceedings for the allowance of the will as provided
in Rule 76. There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy ISSUE:
in the ordinary course of law for the production of the subject
will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of. Whether or not a mandamus be issued against respondents to
compel PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel
G.R. No. 158290 October 23, 2006
HELD:
HILARION M. HENARES, JR., VICTOR C. AGUSTIN,
ALFREDO L. HENARES, DANIEL L. HENARES, ENRIQUE Petition for the issuance of a writ of mandamus is dismissed
BELO HENARES, and CRISTINA BELO HENARES, for lack of merit.
petitioners,
vs. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act
LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that
REGULATORY BOARD and DEPARTMENT OF mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, owners of motor vehicles to use CNG.
respondents.
In University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we said,
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS …It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the
performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its
DOCTRINE: The writ will not issue to compel an official to do main objective. It does not lie to require anyone to fulfill
anything which is not his duty to do or which is his duty not to contractual obligations or to compel a course of conduct, nor
do, or give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled to control or review the exercise of discretion. On the part of
by law. The writ neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It the petitioner, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of
is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing
and to perform a duty already imposed. demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the
respondent to perform the act required. It never issues in
FACTS: doubtful cases. While it may not be necessary that the duty be
absolutely expressed, it must however, be clear. The writ will
Petitioners filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to order the not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his
LTFRB to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel. duty to do or which is his duty not to do, or give to the
applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. The writ
Petitioners alleged that particulate matters (PM) – complex neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a
mixtures of dust, dirt, smoke, and liquid droplets, varying in command to exercise a power already possessed and to
sizes and compositions emitted into the air from various perform a duty already imposed.
engine combustions – have caused detrimental effects on

Mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of not well defined, clear, and certain, the petition must be
government to a coordinate branch, for the obvious reason dismissed. Stated otherwise, the writ never issues in doubtful
that neither is inferior to the other. The need for future cases. It neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply
changes in both legislation and its implementation cannot be a command to exercise a power already possessed and to
pre-empted by orders from this Court, especially when what is perform a duty already imposed.
prayed for is procedurally infirm. Besides, comity with and
courtesy to a coequal branch dictate that we give sufficient The law is clear and must be applied as is. For the lower court
time and leeway for the coequal branches to address by to view it otherwise would have been to alter the law. That
themselves the environmental problems raised in this petition. cannot be done by the judiciary. That is a function that
properly appertains to the legislative branch. The law, leaving
G.R. NO. L-25316 FEBRUARY 278, 1979 no doubt as to the scope of its operation, must be obeyed. Our
KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA MANILA decisions have consistently born to that effect.
RAILDROAD COMPANY CREDIT UNION v. MANILA
RAILROAD COMPANY
JOSEPH OMAR O. ANDAYA , petitioner, vs. RURAL BANK OF
Petition for Mandamus CABADBARAN, INC., DEMOSTHENES P. ORAIZ and
RICARDO D. GONZALEZ, respondents.
DOCTRINE: Only specific legal rights may be enforced by
mandamus if they are clear and certain. If the legal rights are
of the petitioner are not well defined, clear, and certain, the PETITION FOR MANDAMUS
petition must be dismissed. Stated otherwise, the writ never
issues in doubtful cases. It neither confers powers nor imposes DOCTRINE: A person who has purchased stock, and who
duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already desires to be recognized as a stockholder, for the purpose of
possessed and to perform a duty already imposed. voting, must secure a standing by having the transfer recorded
upon the books. If the transfer is not duly made upon request,
FACTS: In this case, the Union seeks a reversal of the decision he has, as his remedy, to compel it to be made. Consequently,
of the lower court through a petition for mandamus which transferees of shares of stock are real parties in interest having
relied on Section 62 of RA 2023. The petitioners contend that a cause of action for mandamus to compel the registration of
the loans granted by credit union to its members enjoy first the transfer and the corresponding issuance of stock
priority in the payroll collection from the employees' wages certificates.
and salaries.
However, the decision of the lower courts states that the FACTS:
mandatory character of RA 2023 is only to compel the
employer to make the deduction of the employees' debt from Andaya has filed a Rule 45 petition directly before this Court,
the latter's salary and turn this over to the employees' credit insisting that he has a cause of action to institute the suit. The
union but this mandatory character does not convert the credit Cabadbaran City Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled that
union's credit into a first priority credit. If the legislative intent petitioner Andaya was not entitled to the remedy of
were to give first priority then, the law would have so expressly mandamus, since the transfer of the subject shares of stock
declared. had not yet been recorded in the corporation's stock and
transfer book, and the registered owner, Concepcion O. Chute,
The lower court ruled in favor of Manila Railroad Company, had not given him a special power of attorney to make the
which implemented the reference of credit rather than the transfer.
prioritizing the credit union dues of the petitioners.
The bank's legal counsel, respondent Gonzalez, informed
ISSUES: WON mandamus is proper – NO. Andaya that the latter's request had been referred to the
bank's board of directors for evaluation. The bank eventually
RULING: Mandamus does not lie. Petitioner-appellant was denied the request of Andaya. It reasoned that he had a
unable to show a clear legal right. Mandamus is the proper conflict of interest, as he was then president and chief
remedy if it could be shown that there was neglect on the part executive officer of the Green Bank of Caraga, a competitor
of a tribunal in the performance of an act, which specifically bank. Respondent bank concluded that the purchase of shares
the law enjoins as a duty or an unlawful exclusion of a party was not in good faith, and that the purchase "could be the
from the use and enjoyment of a right which he is entitled. beginning of a hostile bid to take-over control of the bank.
Only specific legal rights may be enforced by mandamus if they Hence, Andaya filed an action for mandamus and damages
are clear and certain. If the legal rights are of the petitioner are against Rural Bank to compel them to record the transfer in the

bank’s stock and transfer book and issue new certificates of PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
stock in his name.
DOCTRINE: The motion for reconsideration is an indispensable
condition before an aggrieved party can resort to the special
Issue: WON a mandamus should be issued to compel the bank civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
to record the transfer in the bank’s stock and transfer book and The filing of the motion for reconsideration before the resort
issue new certificates of stock in his name (YES) to certiorari will lie is intended to afford to the public
Ruling: A It is already settled jurisprudence that the error attributed to it by way of re-examination of the legal
registration of a transfer of shares of stock is a ministerial duty and factual aspects of the case. However, this is not absolute
on the part of the corporation. Aggrieved parties may then and there are exceptions provided by jurisprudence. (See
resort to the remedy of mandamus to compel corporations ruling of this case)
that wrongfully or unjustifiably refuse to record the transfer or FACTS: Causing assumed office as the Municipal Civil
to issue new certificates of stock. This remedy is available even Registrar of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo. Mayor Biron issued
upon the instance of a bona ;de transferee who is able to Memorandum No. 12 detailing Causing to the Office of the
establish a clear legal right to the registration of the transfer. Municipal Mayor. Biron also issued 3 more memoranda.
This legal right inherently flows from the transferee's
established ownership of the stocks, a right that has been Causing filed the complaint-affidavit claiming that Office
recognized by this Court as early as in Price v. Martin. Order No. 12 ordering her detail to the Office of the
Municipal Mayor, being made within the election period and
without prior authority from the COMELEC, was illegal and
Accordingly, a writ of mandamus to enforce a ministerial act violative of Section 1, Paragraph A, No. 1, in connection with
may issue only when petitioner is able to establish the Section 6 (B) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8737, Series of
presence of the following: (1) right clearly founded in law and 2009.
is not doubtful; (2) a legal duty to perform the act; (3) unlawful In his counter-affidavit, Mayor Biron countered that the
neglect in performing the duty enjoined by law; (4) the purpose of transferring the office of Causing was to closely
ministerial nature of the act to be performed; and (5) the supervise the performance of her functions after complaints
absence of other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the regarding her negative behavior in dealing with her co-
ordinary course of law. employees and with the public transacting business in her
office had been received; that as the local chief executive,
Respondents primarily challenge the mandamus suit on the he was empowered to take personnel actions and other
grounds that the transfer violated the bank stockholders' right management prerogatives for the good of public service;
of first refusal and that petitioner was a buyer in bad faith. that Causing was not being stripped of her functions as the
Both parties refer to Section 98 of the Corporation Code to Municipal Civil Registrar; that she was not transferred or
support their arguments. detailed to another office in order to perform a different
function; and that she was not demoted to a lower position
It must be noted that Section 98 applies only to close that diminished her salary and other benefits.
corporations. Hence, before the Court can allow the operation
of this section in the case at bar, there must first be a factual Atty. Elizabeth Doronilla, the Provincial Election Supervisor
determination that respondent Rural Bank of Cabadbaran is (PES), recommended the dismissal of the complaint-affidavit
indeed a close corporation. There needs to be a presentation for lack of probable cause to charge Mayor Biron with the
of evidence on the relevant restrictions in the articles of violation of Section (h) of the Omnibus Election Code.
incorporation and bylaws of the said bank. From the records or COMELEC En Banc: AFFIRMED the findings and
the RTC Decision, there is apparently no such determination or recommendation of PES Doronilla. Mayor Biron did not
even transfer or detail Causing but only required her to physically
allegation that would assist this Court in ruling on these two report to the Mayor's office and to perform her functions
major factual matters. With the foregoing, the validity of the thereat; and that he did not strip her of her functions as the
transfer cannot yet be tested using that provision. These are Municipal Civil Registrar, and did not deprive her of her
the factual matters that the parties must first thresh out before supervisory functions over her staff.
the RTC.
ISSUES: WON COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of
[G.R. No. 199139. September 9, 2014.] discretion in affirming the findings of PES Doronilla to the
effect that there was no probable cause to hold Mayor Biron
ELSIE liable for violating the Omnibus Election Code
S. CAUSING, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND HELD: NO. The petition has no merit. Causing did not file a
HERNAN D. BIRON, SR., respondents. motion for reconsideration before filing the Petition

for certiorari. The well-established rule is that the motion for reconsideration, especially because there was nothing in
reconsideration is an indispensable condition before an the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that precluded the filing of
aggrieved party can resort to the special civil action the motion for reconsideration in election offense cases.
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The filing of
the motion for reconsideration before the resort
to certiorari will lie is intended to afford to the public G.R. No. 195594 September 29, 2014
error attributed to it by way of re-examination of the legal REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
and factual aspects of the case. NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION, Petitioners
v.
The rule is not absolute, however, considering that SPOUSES ROGELIO LAZO and DOLORES
jurisprudence has laid down exceptions to the requirement for LAZO, Respondent
the filing of a petition for certiorari without first filing a motion
for reconsideration, namely: (a) where the order is a patent PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 45
nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where
the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been DOCTRINE: The CA and this Court unquestionably have full
duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the discretionary power to take cognizance and assume
same as those raised and passed upon in the lower jurisdiction of special civil actions for certiorari filed directly
court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution with it for exceptionally compelling reasons or if warranted by
of the question, and any further delay would prejudice the the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised in the
interests of the Government, or of the petitioner, or the petition. The Court deems it proper to adopt an open-minded
subject matter of the petition is perishable; (d) where, under approach in the present case.
the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be
useless; (e) where the petitioner was deprived of due process, FACTS:
Spouses Lazo are the owners and developers of Monte Vista
case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent, and the granting
Homes (Monte Vista), a residential subdivision located in
of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the
Ilocos Sur. In 2006, they voluntarily sold to National Irrigation
proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due
Administration (NIA) a portion of Monte Vista for the
process; (h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the
construction of an open irrigation canal that is part of the
petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the
Banaoang Pump Irrigation Project (BPIP). Subsequently,
issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.
respondents engaged the services of Engr. to conduct a
Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution states that unless geohazard study on the possible effects of the BPIP on Monte
otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, any Vista. Engr. Custodio later came up with a Geohazard
decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought Assessment Report (GAR) and recommended constructions
to the Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within 30 days and planting of ornamentals.
from receipt of a copy thereof. For this reason, the Rules of
Court (1997) contains a separate rule (Rule 64) on the review The Sangguniang Bayan approved Resolution No. 34, which
of the decisions of the COMELEC and adopted the recommendations contained in the GAR.
the Commission on Audit. Rule 64 is generally identical Respondent Rogelio brought to NIA’s attention the resolution
with certiorari under Rule 65, except as to the period of the and specifically asked for the implementation of the GAR
filing of the petition for certiorari, that is, in the former, the recommendations and the payment of just compensation.
period is 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order or When these demands were not acted upon, they decided to
resolution sought to be reviewed but, in the latter, not later file a complaint for just compensation with damages against
than 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution NIA. Prior to the filing of an Answer, respondents filed an
assailed. Amended Complaint with application for a TRO and
preliminary injunction. They further alleged that the BPIP
Mayor Biron indicates that Causing did not file a motion for contractor is undertaking substandard works that increase the
reconsideration before coming to the Court. Causing submits, risk of a fatal accident.
however, that she was not required to file the motion for
reconsideration because the only recourse of an aggrieved The trial court issued an ex parte 72-hour TRO and directed the
party from the decision of the COMELEC was the filing of the NIA to appear in a summary hearing to show cause why the
petition for certiorari under either Rule 64 or Rule 65. injunction should not be granted. Instead of a personal
appearance, the NIA, through the OSG, filed a Manifestation
A perusal of the circumstances of the case shows that none of and Motion praying that the TRO be lifted and the application
the foregoing exceptions was applicable herein. for preliminary injunction be denied. In the hearing, the trial
Hence, Causing should have filed the motion for court ordered respondents to comment after which it

extended the TRO for 20 days from its issuance. In another where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the
hearing on respondents’ prayer for provisional relief. questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly
Petitioner filed its Answer to the Amended Complaint. After raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as
which, respondents filed a Reply. The trial court granted those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where
respondents’ application for preliminary injunction ordering there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question
the defendant to comply with Resolution. Without moving for and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the
a reconsideration of the two Orders, petitioner directly filed a Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the
petition for certiorari before the CA. Petitioner filed a Very petition is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a
Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a TRO and/or Writ of motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where
Preliminary Injunction. The CA denied the motion and directed petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme
the parties to submit their respective memoranda. urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an
Accordingly, both parties filed their Memorandum. Eventually, order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the
the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the challenged trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the
Orders of the trial court. lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the
proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no
On procedural matters, the appellate court resolved the issues opportunity to object; and, (i) where the issue raised is one
of whether petitioner failed to exhaust administrative purely of law or public interest is involved.
remedies and whether the petition should be dismissed for
lack of motion for reconsideration filed before the trial court. The Court agrees with petitioner that this case falls within
The CA opined that the controversy falls squarely within the instances (a), (b), (c), (d), and (i) above-mentioned. As will be
jurisdiction of the regular courts and not of the Sangguniang elucidated in the discussion below, the assailed Orders of the
Bayan concerned, because what petitioner seeks to nullify are trial court are patent nullity for having been issued in excess of
the Orders of the trial court allegedly rendered in violation of its jurisdiction. Also, the questions raised in the certiorari
R.A. No. 8975 and not the act or propriety of the issuance of proceedings are the same as those already raised and passed
Resolution No.34. It agreed, however, with respondents that upon in the lower court; hence, filing a motion for
the petition for certiorari suffers from fatal defect since it was reconsideration would be useless and serve no practical
filed without seeking first the reconsideration of the trial court. purpose. There is likewise an urgent necessity for the
It was said that petitioner omitted to show sufficient resolution of the question and any further delay would
justification that there was no appeal or any plain, speedy, and prejudice the interests of the Government. In its petition and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. memorandum filed before the CA, petitioner in fact noted that
the BPIP is intended to cater the year- round irrigation needs
ISSUE: of 6,312 hectares of agricultural land in Bantay, Caoayan,
Magsingal, San Ildefonso, San Vicente, Sto. Domingo, Sta.
Whether or not the petition should be dismissed for lack of Catalina, and Vigan in Ilocos Sur. Even Resolution No. 34
Motion for Reconsideration filed before the Trial Court? recognizes this. Public interest is actually involved as the
targeted increase in agricultural production is expected to
HELD:
uplift the farmers’ standard of living. Lastly, the issue raised –
Yes. A petition for certiorari may be given due course that is, under the antecedent facts, whether the trial court
notwithstanding that no motion for reconsideration was filed committed grave abuse of discretion in granting respondents’
in the trial court. Although the direct filing of petitions for prayer for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction
certiorari with the CA is discouraged when litigants may still despite the mandate of R.A. No. 8975 – is one purely of law.
resort to remedies with the trial court, the acceptance of and
The CA and this Court unquestionably have full discretionary
the grant of due course to a petition for certiorari is generally
power to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction of special
addressed to the sound discretion of the court because the
civil actions for certiorari filed directly with it for exceptionally
technical provisions of the Rules may be relaxed or suspended
compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues
if it will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice.
clearly and specifically raised in the petition. We deem it
The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a proper to adopt an open-minded approach in the present case.
condition sine qua non before a petition for certiorari may lie,
RULE 66
its purpose being to grant an opportunity for the court a quo
G.R. No. L-18315 September 29, 1962
to correct any error attributed to it by a re- examination of the
legal and factual circumstances of the case. However, the rule
ERNESTO CAMPOS and FLORENCIO OROC, petitioners
is not absolute and jurisprudence has laid down the following
appellants, vs. ESTEBAN DEGAMO and FELINO PALARCA,
exceptions when the filing of a petition for certiorari is proper
Respondents.
notwithstanding the failure to file a motion for
reconsideration: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as

Quo Warranto Whether or not mandamus is the proper remedy in this case.
(NO)
DOCTRINE
RULING
“When a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue is
erroneously denied, mandamus is not the proper remedy for Under the theory that Special Civil Action No. 117 comes under
correcting the error. It being a case where a judge is proceeding the provisions of the Revised Election Code, its filing violates
in defiance of the Rules of Court by refusing to dismiss an action section 173 thereof which states:
which should not be maintained in his court, the remedy is
prohibition.” "When a person who is not eligible is elected to a provincial or
Municipal Office, his right to the Office may be contested by
FACTS any registered candidate for the same office before the Court
of First Instance of the province, within one week after the
Petitioners Campos and Orog were elected and proclaimed proclamation of his election, by filing a petition for quo
councilor No. 1 and 2, respectively. On December 7, 1959, warranto. The case shall be conducted in accordance with the
respondents Degamo and Palarca were proclaimed Mayor and usual procedure and shall be decided within thirty days from
Vice Mayor, respectively, of the said municipality, the filing of the complaint. A copy of the decision shall be
notwithstanding the protest and request that the furnished the Commission on Elections."
proclamation be suspended on the ground that the Board of
Canvassers used in their canvass for election in Precint No. 6, Petitioners Campos and Oroc were not registered candidates
the election return coming from the Provincial Treasurer’s for the offices of Mayor and vice-mayor, and the quo warranto
Office, in spite of the fact that the copy of the election return was not filed within one week after the proclamation of the
in the hands of the municipal treasurer was available. Thus, persons sought to be ousted — the respondents herein. The
there was allegedly no valid canvass for the offices of Mayor proclamation of the respondents was made on December 7,
and Vice Mayor and respondents could not have legally 1959, and the present quo warranto complaint was filed on
occupied the said positions. On 1960, respondents installed September 27, 1960, about a year later.
their own offices in a temporary building near the municipal
hall and appointed policemen, with the approval of the On the assumption that the present action is presented as an
provincial treasurer. Petitioners made verbal demands upon ordinary quo warranto case (Rule 68, Rules of Court), same can
respondents to stop performing the duties and functions of not also prosper. Section 7, Rule 68, provides:
their offices, but respondents denied and refused. Hence,
petitioners filed a petition for quo warranto with the lower "What complaint for usurpation to set forth, and who may be
court. made parties. — When the action is against a person for
usurping an office or franchise, the complaint shall set forth
The lower court denied the petition for lack of jurisdiction the name of the person who claims to be entitled thereto, if
and cause of action – petitioners were not entitled to the any, with an averment of his right to the same and that the
positions concerned. defendant is unlawfully in possession thereof. All persons who
claim to be entitled to the office or franchise may be made
The dominant facts brought out at the hearing, pleadings and parties, and their respective rights to such office or franchise
decisions of our court, of which we take judicial cognizance, determined, in the action."
are the following: That neither petitioners Campos or Oroc,
was a candidate for the office of mayor or vice-mayor of the Malimit and Acain who claimed to be entitled to the offices of
municipality of Carmen during the 1959 elections; that mayor and vice-mayor, respectively, are not parties herein.
Degamo and Palarca were candidates and duly elected mayor The complaint must likewise allege that plaintiffs were duly
and vice-mayor of said municipality in said election and their elected to such positions. Where the office in question is an
close rivals were Jose Malimit for Mayor and Vicente Acain for elective one, the complaint must show that the plaintiff was
Vice-Mayor; that when this present action for quo warranto, duly elected thereto (Luna vs. Rodriguez, 38 Phil. 401; Acosta
(Sp. Civil Case No. 117) was filed with the CFI of Agusan, there vs. Flor, 5 Phil. 18). Petitioners-appellants Campos and Oroc,
was pending Quo Warranto proceeding filed by Malimit and having been candidates and elected for the office of councilors
Acain, against Degamo and Palarca for the same offices and an and not for the office of mayor and vice-mayor, they are not
election protest was also filed by Malimit against Degamo; and the proper parties to institute the present action.
that the complaint in special civil case No. 117 did not set forth
the names of Malimit and Acain who also claimed to be Moreover, there being a pending case for quo warranto before
entitled to the offices in question. this court (G.R. No. L-17850 foot note No. 1, supra), filed by
Malimit and Acain against the same Degamo and Palarca, for
ISSUE the office of mayor and vice-mayor of Carmen, respectively,
the filing of the case at bar was premature and the cause of
action had not as yet accrued.
ABRAHAM C. SISON, Petitioners, vs. HON. EPI REY judicial action. (Torres vs. Quintos, 88 Phil. 436; Galano vs.
PANGRAMUYEN, Commissioner of Civil Service; Roxas, G. R. L-31241, Sept. 12, 1975, 67 SCRA 8.)
GERONIMO LIPUMANO, Mayor, Olongapo City; ALFREDO DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed
D. OCAMPO, Officer-in- Charge, Civil Service, Regional and the restraining order heretofore issued is hereby lifted
Office No. 3, San Fernando, Pampanga; and EUREKA F. effective immediately. No costs.
MALIWANAG, Assistant City Assessor, Olongapo City, G.R. No. 103702 December 6, 1994
Respondents.
G.R. NO. L-40295 July 31, 1978 MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO, QUEZON, et al.,
petitioners, vs. HON. MENDEZ, et al., respondents.
FACTS:
The Mayor of Olongapo City appointed Eureka F. Maliwanag as FACTS:
Assistant City Assessor on November 23, 1973. Petitioner In 1959, President Carlos P. Garcia issued Executive Order No.
Abraham Sison protested the appointment as being illegal and 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres, Quezon, by
violative to the next-in-rank rule since at the time of the segregating from the municipality of San Narciso of the same
dispute he was Chief Deputy Assessor exercising immediate province, several barrios.
administrative control and supervision over Maliwanag. He In 1989, the Municipality of San Narciso filed a petition for quo
alleges that as he has superior educational and appropriate warranto against the officials of the Municipality of San
civil service eligibilities than that of Maliwanag, he should have Andres. The Municipality of San Narciso contended that E.O.
been appointed as Assisstant City Assessor instead. The 353, a presidential act, was a clear usurpation of the inherent
Commissioner dismissed Sison’s protest on May 3, 1974 and powers of the legislature and in violation of the constitutional
denied Sison’s reconsideration through his resolution on June principle of separation of powers. Hence, the Municipality of
24, 1974. Hence, Sison instituted an instant San Narciso argued, the officials of the Municipal District of San
certiorari,mandamus and quo warranto proceedings to annul Andres had no right to exercise the duties and functions of
the actions of the respondent officals. their respective offices that righfully belonged to the
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Sison’s petition for certiorari, corresponding officials of the Municipality of San Narciso.
mandamus, and quo warranto may be granted In their answer, respondents asked for the dismissal of the
HELD: NO. Withal, the most fatal drawback of petitioner's petition. The trial court resolved to defer action on the motion
cause is that he came to the courts out of time. As already to dismiss and to deny a judgment on
stated, the appointment in controversy was made on the pleadings. The Municipality of San Andres filed anew a
November 23, 1973 and respondent Maliwanag assumed motion to dismiss alleging that the case had become moot and
office on the strength thereof, albeit she claims she has not academic with the enactment of the Local Government Code
been paid her salary. On the other hand, the petition herein of 1991.The motion was opposed by petitioner municipality.
was filed only on March 13, 1975, clearly more than one year The lower court finally dismissed the petition for lack of cause
after the pretended right of petitioner to hold the office in of action. The lower court also denied petitioner municipality's
question arose. This single circumstance has closed the door motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition "for review on
for any judicial remedy in his favor. certiorari."
Petitioner contends in regard to this point that Section 16 of ISSUE: Whether or not the Municipality of San Narciso’s
Rule 66 invoked by private respondent refers to actions of quo petition for quo warranto was timely filed.
warranto and since his petition is also for certiorari and RULING: NO. While petitioners would grant that the
mandamus, said rule is inapplicable. Such contention is not enactment of Republic Act No. 7160 may have converted the
correct. As earlier noted in this decision, the allegations Municipality of San Andres into a de facto municipality, they,
supporting petitioner's cause or causes of action boil down to however, contend that since the petition for quo warranto had
no more than the removal of respondent Maliwanag from the been filed prior to the passage of said law, petitioner
position to which she has been appointed in order to be municipality had acquired a vested right to seek the
replaced by him, with a new appointment in his favor. nullification of Executive Order No. 353, and any attempt to
Necessarily, the ouster of Maliwanag by quo warranto has to apply Section 442 of Republic Act 7160 to the petition would
be based on a nullification of her appointment, which perforce be violative of due process and the equal protection
petitioner seeks, albeit unnecessarily, by certiorari. His clause of the Constitution.
ultimate remedy, therefore, is quo warranto. Besides, even if Petitioners' theory might perhaps be a point to consider had
it could be also viewed as mandamus, it is already settled that the case been seasonably brought. Executive Order No. 353
this latter remedy prescribes also after one year. (Cornejo vs. creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20
Sec. of Justice, L-32818, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 663.) And it is August 1959 but it was only after almost thirty (30) years, or
of no avail to petitioner that during the intervening period of on 05 June 1989, that the municipality of San Narciso finally
more than one year, he was seeking relief from the decided to challenge the legality of the executive order. In the
corresponding administrative authorities. The resort to such meantime, the Municipal District, and later the Municipality,
administrative remedy does not abate the period for the of San Andres, began and continued to exercise the powers

and authority of a duly created local government unit. In the available on record and filed by Respondent were only 11 out
same manner that the failure of a public officer to question his of 15 SALNs that ought to have been filed.
ouster or the right of another to hold a position within a one-
year period can abrogate an action belatedly filed, so also, if Respondent was appointed Associate Justice. On 2012, the
not indeed with greatest imperativeness, must a quo warranto position of Chief Justice was declared vacant, and the JBC
proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a political directed the applicants to submit documents, among which
subdivision be timely raised. Public interest demands it. are “all previous SALNs up to December 31, 2011” for those in
G.R. No. 237428 the government and “SALN as of December 31, 2011” for those
from the private sector. Moreover, the JBC stated that
REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, represented by SOLICITOR “applicants with incomplete or out-of-date documentary
GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA, Petitioner vs. MARIA LOURDES requirements will not be interviewed or considered for
P.A. SERENO, Respondent nomination.”
Sereno submitted her SALNs for the years 1995-1999, the

period within which she was employed by UP. Respondent
DOCTRINE: Quo warranto and impeachment are two distinct
replied through a letter that considering that such government
proceedings, although both may result in the ouster of a public
records in UP are more than 15 years old, “it is reasonable to
officer. Strictly speaking, quo warranto grants the relief of
consider it infeasible to retrieve all those files.” She also
"ouster", while impeachment affords "removal."
assured OSRN that UP has cleared her of all responsibilities,
A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to accountabilities, and administrative charges in 2006. Lastly,
determine a person's right or title to a public office and to oust she emphasized that her service in the government was not
the holder from its enjoyment. It is the proper action to inquire continuous, having had a break between 2006 (when her
into a public officer's eligibility or the validity of his service in UP ended) and 2010 (when she was appointed to the
appointment. Under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, a quo SC).
warranto proceeding involves a judicial determination of the
Such letter was not examined or deliberated upon by the JBC
right to the use or exercise of the office.
however, Sereno was said to have “complete requirements.”
Impeachment, on the other hand, is a political process On August 2012, Sereno was appointed Chief Justice.
undertaken by the legislature to determine whether the public
Five years later, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty.
officer committed any of the impeachable offenses, namely,
Larry Gadon against Sereno, alleging that Sereno failed to
culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft
make truthful declarations in her SALNs. Such complaint filed
and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. It
in the House spawned a letter dated 21 February 2018 of Atty.
does not ascertain the officer's eligibility for appointment or
Eligio Mallari to the OSG requesting the latter to initiate a quo
election, or challenge the legality of his assumption of office.
warranto proceeding against Respondent.
Conviction for any of the impeachable offenses shall result in
the removal of the impeachable official from office. The OSG argues that quo warranto is an available remedy in
questioning the validity of Respondent’s appointment, and
FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines, represented by
that the one-year bar rule does not apply against the State. It
Solicitor General Jose C. Calida, filed a Petition for the issuance
also argues that the SC has jurisdiction over the petition. The
of the extraordinary writ of quo warranto to declare void
petition alleges that the failure of Respondent to submit her
Respondent Sereno’s appointment as Chief Justice of the
SALNs as required by the JBC disqualifies her, at the outset,
Supreme Court (SC) and to oust and altogether exclude her
from being a candidate for the position of Chief Justice. Lacking
therefrom.
the required number of SALNs, Respondent has not proven her
Respondent served as a member of the faculty of the UP integrity, which is a requirement under the Constitution. The
College of Law (UP) for 20 years from 1986 to 2006. She also Republic thus concludes that since Respondent is ineligible for
served as legal counsel for the Republic of the Philippines for the position of Chief Justice for lack of proven integrity, she has
several agencies from 1994 until 2009. On July 2010, no right to hold office and may therefore be ousted via quo
Respondent submitted her application for the position of warranto.
Associate Justice of the SC.
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Chief Justice
Records from the UP Human Resources Development Office, may only be ousted from office by impeachment on the basis
Central Records Division of the Office of the Ombudsman, and of the Constitution and a long line of jurisprudence.
the Office of Recruitment Selection and Nomination (ORSN) of Alternatively, she argues that the present petition is time-
the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) show that the only barred, as it should have been filed within one year from the
Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) cause of ouster, and not from the discovery of the
disqualification.

It is likewise the contention of Respondent that public officers warranto proceeding involves a judicial determination of the
without pay or those who do not receive compensation are not right to the use or exercise of the office.
required to file a SALN. Thus, Respondent argues that for the
years that she was on official leave without pay, she was Impeachment, on the other hand, is a political process
actually not required to file any SALN. She adds that to require undertaken by the legislature to determine whether the public
the submission of SALNs as an absolute requirement is to officer committed any of the impeachable offenses, namely,
expand the qualifications provided by the Constitution. culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft
and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.
ISSUE: Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due It does not ascertain the officer's eligibility for appointment or
course to the instant petition for quo warranto against election, or challenge the legality of his assumption of office.
Respondent who is an impeachable officer and against whom Conviction for any of the impeachable offenses shall result in
an impeachment complaint has already been filed with the the removal of the impeachable official from office.
House of Representatives
Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly
HELD: YES. SC has original jurisdiction over an action for quo appointed or invalidly elected impeachable official may be
warranto. Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution states that removed from office. The language of Section 2, Article XI of
the SC has original jurisdiction over petitions for quo warranto. the Constitution does not foreclose a quo warranto action
This jurisdiction is concurrent with the Court of Appeals (CA) against impeachable officers: “Section 2. The President, the
and the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Section 7, Rule 66 of Rules Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the
of Court provides that the venue for an action for quo warranto Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
is in the RTC of Manila, CA, or SC when commenced by the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment
Solicitor General. for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or
While the hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant betrayal of public trust.” The provision uses the permissive
of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary term “may” which denote discretion and cannot be construed
writs, a direct invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction in this as having a mandatory effect, indicative of a mere possibility,
case is justified considering that the qualification of a Member an opportunity, or an option. In American jurisprudence, it has
of the Court is in question, and the issue is of public concern. been held that “the express provision for removal by
impeachment ought not to be taken as a tacit prohibition of
The petition for quo warranto is of transcendental importance. removal by other methods when there are other adequate
The instant petition is one of first impression and of paramount reasons to account for this express provision.”
importance to the public in the sense that the qualification,
eligibility and appointment of an incumbent Chief Justice, the RULE 67
highest official of the Judiciary, are being scrutinized through G.R. No. L-2929 February 28, 1950
an action for quo warranto. THE CITY OF MANILA, petitioner(s), v. THE ARELLANO
LAW COLLEGES, INC., respondent(s).
On the argument that Respondent is an impeachable officer
such that a quo warranto petition cannot prosper, the Court
DOCTRINE: The Court is inclined to believe that Act No. 267
held that the origin, nature and purpose of impeachment and
empowers cities to expropriate as well as to purchase lands for
quo warranto are materially different. While both
homesites. The word "expropriating," taken singly or with the
impeachment and quo warranto may result in the ouster of the
text, is susceptible of only one meaning. But this power to
public official, the two proceedings materially differ. At its
expropriate is necessarily subject to the limitations and
most basic, impeachment proceedings are political in nature;
conditions noted in the decisions above cited. The National
while an action for quo warranto is judicial or a proceeding
Government may not confer upon its instrumentalities
traditionally lodged in the courts.
authority which it itself may not exercise. A stream cannot run
Quo warranto and impeachment are two distinct proceedings, higher than its source.
although both may result in the ouster of a public officer. FACTS: Sec. 1 of RA 267 provides: "Cities and municipalities are
Strictly speaking, quo warranto grants the relief of "ouster", authorized to contract loans from the Reconstruction Finance
while impeachment affords "removal." Corporation, the Philippine National Bank, and/or any other
entity or person at a rate of interest not exceeding 8% per
A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to annum for the purpose of purchasing or expropriating
determine a person's right or title to a public office and to oust homesites within their respective territorial jurisdiction and
the holder from its enjoyment. It is the proper action to inquire reselling them at cost to residents of the said cities and
into a public officer's eligibility or the validity of his municipalities."
appointment. Under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, a quo CFI: ruled that this provision empowers cities to purchase but
not to expropriate lands for the purpose of subdivision and
resale. It dismissed the present action which seeks to condemn
several parcels of land having a combined area of 7,270 square issuance of a writ of possession against the private for the
meters and situated on Legarda Street, City of Manila. expropriation of the parcels of land.
ISSUE: WON CFI decision was correct. At the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed that the only
HELD: YES, CFI decision was affirmed. The Court is inclined to issue to be resolved is just compensation. The respondent
believe that Act No. 267 empowers cities to expropriate as well judge ordered three persons as commissioners to ascertain
as to purchase lands for homesites. The word "expropriating" and report the just compensation for the properties. The
taken singly or with the text, is susceptible of only one commissioners deemed the fair and reasonable value of
meaning. But this power to expropriate is necessarily subject P15.00 per square meter.
to the limitations and conditions. The National Government The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration objecting the
may not confer upon its instrumentalities authority which it commissioners’ report. It claimed that P.D. No. 1533
itself may not exercise. A stream cannot run higher than its superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67. Under P.D. No. 1533,
source. the value of compensation shall not exceed the value declared
In the first place, the land that is the subject of the present by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest
expropriation is only 1/3 of the land sought to be taken in the in the property.
Guido case, and about 2/3 of that involved in the Borja The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration.
condemnation proceeding. In the second place, the Arellano The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus
Colleges' land is situated in a highly commercial section of the with preliminary restraining order before the Supreme Court.
city and is occupied by persons who are not bona fide tenants. ISSUE:
Lastly, this land was bought by the defendant for a university Whether or not Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Revised Rules
site to take the place of rented buildings that are unsuitable of Court had been repealed or amended by P.D. No. 1533.
for schools of higher learning. HELD:
To authorize the condemnation of any particular land by a NO. Under P.D. No. 1533, the value of just compensation shall
grantee of the power of eminent domain, a necessity must be the declared value by the owner or administrator, or as
exist for the taking thereof for the proposed uses and determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.
purposes. In City of Manila vs. Manila Chinese Community, this P.D. No. 1533 eliminates the court’s discretion to appoint
Court, citing American decisions, laid down this rule: "The very commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. It is
foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a therefore unconstitutional and void
genuine necessity, and that necessity must be of a public The determination of “just compensation” in eminent domain
character. cases is a judicial function. The method of ascertaining just
The ascertainment of the necessity must precede or compensation under P.D. No 1533 encroaches on judicial
accompany, and not follow, the taking of the land. And this prerogatives.
passage in Blackstone's Commentaries on the English Law is The decree should only serve as a guiding principle, it may not
cited in that decision: "So great is the regard of the law for substitute the court’s own judgment as to what the amount
private property that it will not authorize the least violation of should be awarded, and how to arrive at such an amount.
it, even for the public good, unless there exists a very great
necessity thereof." G.R. No. 135042 September 23, 1999
WHEREFORE, the order of the CFI of Manila is affirmed without
costs. ROBERN DEVELOPMENT CORP., petitioner, vs. JUDGE
Export Processing Zone Authority v. Hon. Ceferino E. JESUS V. QUITAIN, et al., respondents.
Dulay, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge, Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu City, and San FACTS:
Antonio Development Corporation Robern is the registered owner of a parcel of land, which the
G.R. No. L-59603 ; April 29, 1987 National Power Corporation is seeking to expropriate. to form
part of a proposed low-cost housing project.NPC filed a
FACTS: Complaint for Eminent Domain against Robern. Instead of
In 1979, the President of the Philippines issued a proclamation filing an answer, Robern countered with a Motion to Dismiss,
reserving a parcel of land of the public domain in Lapu-Lapu alleging, among others, that the choice of property to be
covering a total of 1.2M square meters, for the establishment expropriated was improper, as it had already been intended
of the export processing zone by Export Processing Zone for use in a low-cost housing project, a public purpose within
Authority (EPZA). the contemplation of law; and the choice was also arbitrary, as
The proclamation included four parcels of land owned and there were similar properties available within the area
registered in the name of the private respondent. The parties Before the Motion could be resolved, however, NPC filed a
failed to reach an agreement regarding the sale of the Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Possession based on
property. Presidential Decree No. 42 and made their deposit at the
The petitioner filed with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Philippine National Bank.
Cebu a complaint for expropriation with a prayer for the

RTC denied Robern’s Motion to Dismiss and first Motion for 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is the prevailing and
Reconsideration for lack of merit. Robern filed its second MR, governing law in this case. Thus, the trial court's issuance of
but without awaiting for the outcome, the RTC issued a Writ of the Writ of Possession becomes ministerial, once the
Possession and NPC proceeded to occupy the disputed provisional compensation mentioned in the 1997 Rule is
property. deposited. Thus, in the instant case the trial court did not
Robern assailed the Writ in a Petition for Certiorari before the commit grave abuse of discretion when it granted
CA, which upheld the same because the issuance of the Writ of the NPC's Motion for the issuance of the Writ, despite the
Possession was proper in view of NPC's compliance with absence of hearing on the amount of the provisional deposit.
Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, by SPOUSES MARIAN LINTAG and ANGELO ARRASTIA,
depositing with the Philippine National Bank an amount Petitioners, vs. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION,
equivalent to the assessed value of the disputed property. Respondents.
ISSUE: WON the CA was correct in its rulings; and the Writ of G.R. No. 158609 July 27, 2007
Possession was validly issued.
RULING: PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 (DENIED)
The Court of Appeals was correct in its rulings, but in the FACTS: Petitioners-spouses are the registered owners of a
interest of substantial justice, the petitioner should be given property with an area of 80,001sqm located at Sorsogon,
an opportunity to file its answer. Sorsogon.
Founded on common necessity and interest, eminent domain Respondent National Power Corporation (NPC) filed a
is the inherent right of the stare (and of those entities to which Complaint for Eminent Domain against petitioners in order to
the power has been lawfully delegated) to condemn private acquire an easement of a right of way over a portion of said
property to public use upon payment of just compensation. It property consisting of 8,050sqm with an initial assessed value
may appear to be harsh and encompassing, but judicial review at P2,468.09.
limits the exercise of eminent domain to the following areas of After the deposit of said initial assessed value with the PNB,
concern: (1) the adequacy of the compensation, (2) the the RTC, upon ex-parte motion of NPC, ordered the issuance of
necessity of the taking, and (3) the public-use character of the a Writ of Possession on the subject property in favor of NPC.
purpose of the taking. RTC issued an Order appointing 3 new Commissioners to
Thus, the Supreme Court ruled for the private respondent. appraise the value of the subject property. Petitioners filed a
Rule 67, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, provides that the right Motion asking the Court to order the NPC to pay them the
of eminent domain shall be exercised by the filing of a verified amount of P49,665.53, as the tentative value of the damaged
complaint which shall state with certainty the right and improvements, which NPC paid.
purpose of expropriation, describe the real or personal RA No. 8974 or “An Act To Facilitate The Acquisition Of Right-
property sought to be expropriated, and join as defendants all Of-Way, Site or Location For National Government
persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part Infrastructure Projects And For Other Purposes” was
thereof. approved.
The foregoing Rule does not require that the Complaint be Petitioners filed a Motion asking the RTC to direct the NPC to
expressly approved by the board of directors of a corporation. comply with RA No. 8974, arguing that they are entitled to
In any event, such authorization is a factual issue that can be 100% of the value of the subject property based on the current
threshed out during the trial. As held by the appellate court, relevant zonal valuation made by the BIR. Thus, petitioners
"the issue of whether or not the expropriation proceedings prayed that NPC pay P5,635.00
were authorized by the Board of Directors or that those who RTC: Ruled in favor of petitioners. Directing NPC to comply
signed the complaint were authorized representatives are with RA No. 8974, as it is procedural in nature, hence, may be
evidentiary in character determinable only in [the] trial given retroactive effect. MR was Denied.
proper." CA: Ruled in favor of NPC. RA No. 8974 cannot be applied
If there are objections and defenses that require the retroactively since an initial deposit had already been made
presentation of evidence and the hearing of arguments, the and possession had already been obtained by NPC.
trial court should not immediately issue an order of ISSUE: Whether RA No. 8974 may be given retroactive effect.
expropriation. This is clearly implied in Section 4 of Rule 67, RULING: NO. In the case of Republic v. Gingoyon, this Court
which mandates that “[i]f the objections to and the defenses held that RA No. 8974 is a substantive law, to wit:
against the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the property are It likewise bears noting that the appropriate standard
overruled, or when no party appears to defend as required by of just compensation is a substantive matter. It is well
this Rule, the court may issue an order of expropriation within the province of the legislature to fix the
declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the standard, which it did through the enactment of Rep.
property sought to be expropriated, for the public use or Act No. 8974. Specifically, this prescribes the new
purpose described in the complaint.” standards in determining the amount of just
With regards to the Writ of Possession, Section 2, Rule compensation in expropriation cases relating to
national government infrastructure projects, as well

as the payment of the provisional value as a of the complaint, whichever came first, not the value of the
prerequisite to the issuance of a writ of possession. land at the time of the rendition of judgment which should be
It is a well-entrenched principle that statutes, including considered.31 In this case, where the institution of an
administrative rules and regulations, operate prospectively expropriation action preceded the taking of the subject
unless the legislative intent to the contrary is manifest by property, just compensation is based on the value of the land
express terms or by necessary implication because the at the time of the filing of the complaint. This is provided by
retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have the Rules of Court, the assumption of possession by the
already become vested. This is based on the Latin maxim: Lex expropriator ordinarily being conditioned on its deposit with
prospicit non respicit (the law looks forward, not backward). the National or Provincial Treasurer of the amount equivalent
Expropriation of lands consists of two stages: to the value of the property as provisionally ascertained by the
The first is concerned with the determination of the authority court having jurisdiction of the proceedings.
of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved hereby DENIED. The Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon,
in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the Sorsogon, guided by the foregoing principles, is hereby
action, "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a directed to proceed with the hearing of the expropriation case,
lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for docketed as Civil Case No. 96-6295, and to resolve the issue of
the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the just compensation with utmost dispatch. No costs.
payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date G.R. No. 172243 June 26, 2007
of the filing of the complaint
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the TOLL
x x x. REGULATORY BOARD, petitioner,
The second phase of the eminent domain action is vs.
concerned with the determination by the court of "the PHIL-VILLE DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING CORPORATION
just compensation for the property sought to be and SY CHI SIONG AND CO., INC., respondents.
taken." This is done by the court with the assistance of PETITION FOR REVIEW
not more than three (3) commissioners x x x. DOCTRINE: payment of just compensation is not a condition
It is only upon the completion of these two stages that sine qua non to the issuance of an order of expropriation. In
expropriation is said to have been completed. The process is expropriation proceedings, it is the transfer of title to the land
not complete until payment of just compensation. Accordingly, expropriated that must wait until the indemnity is actually
the issuance of the writ of possession in this case does not paid. This is made all the more clear when note is taken of the
write finis to the expropriation proceedings. To effectuate the second paragraph of Section 4, Rule 67, supra, which states
transfer of ownership, it is necessary for the NPC to pay the that the defendant may appeal from the order of expropriation
property owners the final just compensation. by filing a record on appeal, which appeal does not prevent the
We observe that petitioners are not questioning the authority court from determining the just compensation to be paid.
of the NPC to exercise the power of eminent domain nor the FACTS:
propriety of its exercise. While the constitutional restraint of Petitioner Republic, through the Toll Regulatory Board, sought
public use has been overcome, the imperative just to widen the Balintawak Toll Plaza which would necessarily
compensation is still wanting. Thus, petitioners now appeal for affect 2 parcels of land registered under the names of herein
the prompt payment of just compensation. Indeed, just respondents
compensation is not only the correct determination of the Petitioner filed a complaint for expropriation before the RTC
amount to be paid to the property owner but also the payment for the acquisition of the parcels of land.
of the property within a reasonable time. Without prompt Petitioner deposited with the Land Bank of the Philippines the
payment, compensation cannot be considered "just." amount of ₱2,311,200.00, representing the total zonal value of
This Court understands the plight of petitioners. It has been the properties under expropriation. Thereafter, it filed with
ten (10) years since they were divested of possession of their the court a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession.
property, but they still have to be paid just compensation. It The court directed the issuance of a writ of possession in favor
may be noted that the expropriation case still pends at the of petitioner
RTC, and it is in that case where a determination of the amount Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion for Issuance of Order of
of just compensation shall be made. Inasmuch as this Expropriation and Appointment of Commissioners on the
determination necessarily involves factual matters, and rationale that the respondents had never challenged its right
considering that this Court is not a trier of facts, at this point, to expropriate their properties subject of the suit.
we can only direct the RTC to try the case expeditiously, so that
the amount of just compensation for the subject property can The RTC deferred the "Motion for issuance of Order of
be fixed and promptly paid, as justice and equity dictate. Expropriation" pending final determination of just
For this purpose, the RTC must bear in mind that it is the value compensation. It held that Section 4 Rule 67 is quite clear
of the land at the time of the taking or at the time of the filing that just compensation of the subject properties must first be

determined and paid before the Court can issue an order of the power of local government units to adopt zoning
expropriation. ordinances. Discretion is vested in the appropriate government
The CA found no grave abuse of discretion on the court's agencies to determine the suitability of a land for residential,
deferment of the issuance of the Order of expropriation commercial, industrial or other purposes. It is also a settled rule
pending the determination of just compensation, for this is not that an ordinance enjoys the presumption of validity. Having
a major procedural flaw fatal to the action of the petitioner. the power to classify lands, the local government unit may
The issuance of an order in this case is only a permissive one consider factors that are just, reasonable and legal, for it is
and discretionary on the part of the trial court. within the local government unit's power to determine these.
ISSUE: Whether or not payment of just compensation is a However, if they abuse their authority in the performance of
condition sine qua non for the issuance of the order for this duty, the courts, if prompted, can step in.”
expropriation
HELD: FACTS
Payment of just compensation is not a condition sine qua non
to the issuance of an order of expropriation. In expropriation Petitioner Republic, represented by the Secretary of DPWH,
proceedings, it is the transfer of title to the land expropriated filed a Complaint for Eminent Domain before the RTC of
that must wait until the indemnity is actually paid. This is made Nasugbu, Batangas against respondents, who were said to be
all the more clear when note is taken of the second paragraph the owners of the subject parcels of land. Apparently, there
of Section 4, Rule 67, supra, which states that the defendant were negotiations prior to the complaint, wherein the DPWH
may appeal from the order of expropriation by filing a record offered P75.00 per square meter, considering that the land is
on appeal, which appeal does not prevent the court from agricultural, not residential. The respondents, on the other
determining the just compensation to be paid. hand, offered the said properties at P600 per square meter,
Two stages in every action for expropriation claiming that it is residential pursuant to a Municipal Zoning
1. Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise Ordinance.
the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise
RTC: ordered petitioner to correct its zonal valuation.
in the context of the facts involved in the suit.; and
However, upon motion, the trial court reconsidered in favor of
2. Determination by the court of the just compensation for the
Republic. Upon Joint Motion for Reconsideration by
property sought to be taken.
respondents, the trial court again reversed itself, ordering
During the first stage, if the defendant had denied or objected
Republic to make an additional deposit based on the valuation
to the plaintiff's right to expropriate, a hearing would have
of P500 per square meter. Thus, petitioner filed a Petition for
been held to decide upon whether the land was private, and
Certiorari with the CA. In the meantime, the trial court still
whether the purpose was, in fact, public. However, once the
issued a writ of possession, considering the certificate of
objections and defenses against the right of the plaintiff to
availability of funds filed by petitioner to be sufficient
expropriate are overruled, an order of expropriation may
compliance.
issue. With all the more reason must this be so when, as in this
case, there is no contest or objection by either of the herein CA: Denied the petition for certiorari – no grave abuse of
respondents as to the petitioner’s right to expropriate. discretion in ordering the payment of P425.00 per square
G.R. No. 176487 August 25, 2009 meter, basing it on the BIR’s Zonal Values of Real Properties in
the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, ISSUE
Petitioner, vs. FAR EAST ENTERPRISES, INC., ARSOL
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION,* MARIA CHRISTINA C. Whether or not the courts, in the first instance, are the proper
BERNASCONI, JORGE C. BERNASCONI, RENE C. venue in which to resolve any dispute involving the
BERNASCONI, REGINA B. TUASON, CHRISTIAN C. classification of lands.
BERNASCONI, MARTIN C. BERNASCONI, JAIME C.
BERNASCONI and CHRISTINA MARIE C. BERNASCONI, RULING
Respondents.
Under RA No. 8974, the requirements for authorizing
immediate entry in expropriation proceedings involving real
Petition for Review on Certiorari property are: (1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation
sufficient in form and substance; (2) due notice to the
DOCTRINE defendant; (3) payment of an amount equivalent to 100% of
the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal
“This Court recognizes the power of a local government to valuation of the BIR including payment of the value of the
reclassify and convert lands through local ordinance, especially improvements and/or structures if any, or if no such valuation
if said ordinance is approved by the HLURB. In Pasong Bayabas is available and in cases of utmost urgency, the payment of the
Farmers Association, Inc. v. Court Appeals, we acknowledged proffered value of the property to be seized; and (4)
presentation to the court of a certificate of availability of funds Ordinance No. 3 dated 3 May 1982 as approved under
from the proper officials. Resolution No. 123, series of 1983 dated 4 May 1983 by the
Human Settlement Regulatory Commission (now HLURB). The
Upon compliance, a complainant in an expropriation case is tax declarations adduced and the certification show that the
entitled to a writ of possession as a matter of right, and it lands concerned are classified as residential. There is no
becomes the ministerial duty of the trial court to forthwith discrepancy between the two as regards classification. Even if
issue the writ of possession. No hearing is required, and the there is any inconsistency, what prevails is the determination
court exercises neither its discretion nor its judgment in for zoning purposes.
determining the amount of the provisional value of the
properties to be expropriated, as the legislature has fixed the Under the facts obtaining, the Court agrees with both lower
amount under Sec. 4 of RA 9874. courts that the classification of the lands concerned is
residential. No other certification from the municipal council
In this case, what petitioners question is not the provisional has been presented to show that a new zoning ordinance has
value to be paid before a writ of possession can be issued, but been passed by it changing the present classification of the
the classification of the properties sought to be expropriated. lands, subject of the expropriation case. Even if we consider
the allegations of petitioner that said lands are actually used
By questioning the classification of the lands involved, for agriculture, and that the lands adjoining the same are all
petitioner is, in effect, questioning the propriety, wisdom and classified as agricultural, the same will not necessarily change
legality of the act of the Municipal Council of Nasugbu, said classification to agricultural.
Batangas of reclassifying the subject lands as Residential. Per
certification of the Office of the Municipal Planning and As the preliminary or provisional determination of the value of
Development Coordinator/Zoning Administrator of the the property equivalent to 100% of the value of the property
Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas, the lands of Far East and based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR, said
the Bernasconis sought to be expropriated were classified as amount serves a double purpose of pre-payment if the
Residential, pursuant to Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 3 property is fully expropriated, and of indemnity for damages if
dated 3 May 1982, as approved under Resolution No. 123, the proceedings are dismissed. Said provisional value must be
series of 1983 dated 4 May 1983 by the Human Settlement paid to the owner of the land before a writ of possession may
Regulatory Commission (now HLURB). be issued. The issuance of a certificate of availability of funds
will not suffice for the purpose of issuance of a writ of
Local governments have the power to reclassify and convert possession.
lands through local ordinance, especially if said ordinance is
approved by the HLURB. In this case, the lands in question had After payment of the provisional amount, the court may now
long been reclassified as residential before the instant case proceed to determine the amount of just compensation.
was filed. All those years, no one questioned the ordinance Petitioner can now present its evidence relative to the
reclassifying the lands. If petitioner would like to have the properties' fair market value as provided in Section 5 of
reclassification of the lands involved changed to agricultural, Republic Act No. 8974.
the just and reasonable way of doing it is to go to the municipal
council – not the courts – that enacted the ordinance and to G.R. No. 168967 February 12, 2010
ask that the lands be reclassified as agricultural. Technical
matters such as zoning classifications and building CITY OF ILOILO represented by HON. JERRY P. TREÑAS, City
certifications should be primarily resolved first by the Mayor, Petitioner, vs. HON. LOLITA CONTRERAS-BESANA,
administrative agency whose expertise relates therein. Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, and
ELPIDIO JAVELLANA, Respondents.
If after going to the local government unit or government
agencies that made the classification of the lands and the PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65
implementing agency fails to obtain the redress they seek
(proper classification), despite evidence clearly showing DOCTRINE: Expropriation proceedings have two stages. The
erroneous classification, it is only then that it can go to the first phase ends with an order of dismissal, or a determination
court to ask for intervention. that the property is to be acquired for a public purpose. Either
order will be a final order that may be appealed by the
In the case at bar, the trial court and the Court of Appeals aggrieved party. The second phase consists of the
based their classification of the lands concerned, not only on determination of just compensation. It ends with an order
the tax declarations, but more importantly on the certification fixing the amount to be paid to the landowner. Both orders,
issued by the Office of the Municipal Planning and being final, are appealable.
Development Coordinator/Zoning Administrator of the
Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas that said lands had been FACTS:
(re)classified as residential pursuant to Municipal Zoning

An expropriation case was filed against Elpidio T. Javellana and the expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the
Southern Negros Development Bank, the latter as mortgagee. action precedes entry into the property, the just compensation
It sought to expropriate 2 parcels of land to be used as a school is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint.
site. When the taking of the property sought to be expropriated
coincides with the commencement of the expropriation
Javellana filed his answer admitting the ownership of the proceedings or takes place subsequent to the filing of the
subject properties. However, He denied he petitioner’s complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should
avowed public purpose of the sought-for expropriation, since be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.
the City of Iloilo already had an existing school site for Lapaz
High School. Private respondent claims that the reckoning date should be in
2004 because of the "clear injustice to the private respondent
Petitioner filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession. It who all these years has been deprived of the beneficial use of
claimed that it was entitled to the immediate possession of the his properties. SC commiserates with the private respondent.
Subject Property after it had deposited an amount equivalent The school was constructed and has been in operation since
to 10% of the amount of compensation. Javellana opposed the 1985. Petitioner and the residents of Iloilo City have long
motion. reaped the benefits of the property. However, non-payment of
just compensation does not entitle the private landowners to
The trial court granted that motion for issuance of writ of recover possession of their expropriated lot.
possession and later on, petitioner was able to take physical
possession of the properties. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 32 in Civil Case No.
16 years later, Javellana filed an Ex Parte Motion alleging that 14052 and Civil Case No. 03-27571 dated December 12, 2003,
he discovered that no deposit was ever made. He presented a June 15, 2004, and March 9, 2005 are hereby ANNULLED and
Certification from the Philippine National Bank stating that no SET ASIDE.
deposit was ever made for the expropriation of the Subject
Property. APO FRUITS CORPORATION and HIJO PLANTATION,
INC., Petitioners,
Private respondent filed a complaint for Recovery of vs.
Possession. Private respondent alleged that since he had not THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LAND BANK OF THE
been compensated for the Subject Property, petitioner’s PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
possession was illegal, and he was entitled to recovery of
possession of his lots. PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45
Petitioner filed its answer alleging that Javellana could not DOCTRINE: Apart from the requirement that compensation
recover the property since it was already taken for public use. for expropriated land must be fair and reasonable,
compensation, to be "just," must also be made without delay.
RTC issued the First Assailed Order, which nullified the Order
Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be
concerning the issuance of a writ of possession over the
considered "just" if the property is immediately taken as the
Subject Property. RTC issued the Second Assailed Order, which
property owner suffers the immediate deprivation of both his
it denominated as an "Amended Order. It is identical to the
land and its fruits or income.
first order except that the reckoning point for just
compensation was now the "time this order was issued”. FACTS:
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied. Petitioners AFC owned 640.3483 hectares, while HPI
owned 805.5308 hectares of land. On October 12,
Petitioner claims that just compensation for the expropriation
should be based on the Subject Property’s fair market value 1995, they voluntarily offered to sell these landholdings to the
either at the time of taking or filing of the complaint. government via Voluntary Offer to Sell applications filed with
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). AFC and HPI
ISSUE:
received separate notices of land acquisition and valuation of
Whether or not the reckoning date of the determination of just their properties from the DARs Provincial Agrarian Reform
compensation should at the date when the expropriation Officer (PARO). At the assessed valuation of P165, 484.47 per
complaint was filed? hectare, AFCs land was valued at P86, 900,925.88, while HPIs
property was valued at P164, 478,178.14. HPI and AFC rejected
HELD: these valuations for being very low.
Yes. Just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of In its follow through action, the DAR requested the Land Bank
the taking, which usually coincides with the commencement of of the Philippines (LBP) to deposit P26,

409,549.86 in AFCs bank account and P45, 481,706.76 in HPIs Thus, the landowners lost not only their properties, but the
bank account, which amounts the petitioners then withdrew. fruits of these properties. These were all lost in 1996, leaving
the landowners without any replacement income from their
AFC and HPI filed separate petitions for determination of just properties, except for the possible interest for the trifling
compensation with the payment made at the time of the taking that, together with the
subsequent payment, only amounted to a third of the total
DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB). When the DARAB failed to amount due. Thus, for twelve long years, the amount of
act on these petitions for more than three years, AFC and HPI P971,409,831.68 was withheld from the landowners.
filed separate complaints for determination and payment of
just compensation with the RTC of Tagum City, acting as a G.R. No. 165354 January 12, 2015
Special Agrarian Court. These complaints were subsequently
consolidated REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. HEIRS
The third division of the SC affirmed the RTCs decision setting OF SATURNINO Q. BORBON, AND COURT OF APPEALS,
the just compensation to be paid and fixing the interest due on Respondents.
the balance of the compensation due at 12% per annum. On
motion for reconsideration, the third division deleted the 12%
interest due on the balance of the awarded just compensation. Petition for Review on Certiorari
Despite the entry of judgment, the present petitioners filed a DOCTRINE

second motion for reconsideration that prayed as well that the
“The expropriator who has taken possession of the property
case be referred to the Court en banc. However, the Court en
subject of expropriation is obliged to pay reasonable
banc denied the petitioners second motion for
compensation to the landowner for the period of such
reconsideration. Maintaining their belief in their demand to be
possession although the proceedings had been discontinued on
granted 12% interest, the petitioners persisted in filing another
the ground that the public purpose for the expropriation had
motion for reconsideration.
meanwhile ceased.”
By a vote of 8 for and 4 against the petitioners motion and FACTS
awarded the 12% interests the petitioners prayed for, thus
affirming the interests the RTC originally awarded. The Court The NAPOCOR entered a property located in Batangas City in
subsequently denied the respondents motion for order to construct and maintain transmission lines for the 230
reconsideration, giving rise to the present 2nd motion for KV Mahabang Parang-Pinamucan Power Transmission Project.
reconsideration. Respondents heirs of Saturnino Q. Borbon owned the
property.
LBP assailed the Courts resolution, emphasizing the need to
respect the doctrine of immutability of final judgments, It Thereafter, NAPOCOR filed a complaint for expropriation in
maintains that the Court should have not granted the the RTC, seeking the acquisition of an easement of right of way
petitioners motion for reconsideration. Resolution because over a portion of the property. Allegedly, negotiations were
the ruling deleting the 12% interest had already attained made with respondents but they failed to reach any
finality when an Entry of Judgment was issued. agreement, which respondents denied. The RTC ordered
NAPOCOR to pay the respondents just compensation for the
Issue: WON the Motion for Reconsdieration filed should be whole area. Hence, NAPOCOR appealed.
granted (NO)
During the pendency of the appeal, NAPOCOR filed a
Ruling: The issues posed by this case are of transcendental Manifestation and Motion to Discontinue Expropriation
importance. A constitutional limitation, guaranteed under no Proceedings, informing that the parties failed to reach an
less than the all-important Bill of Rights, is at stake in this case: amicable agreement; and that the property sought to be
how can compensation in an eminent domain case be "just" expropriated was no longer necessary for public purpose
when the payment for the compensation for property already because of the intervening retirement of the transmission lines
taken has been unreasonably delayed? To claim, as the installed on the respondents’ property.
assailed Resolution does, that only private interest is involved
in this case is to forget that an expropriation involves the ISSUE
government as a necessary actor.
Whether or not the expropriation proceedings should be
It should be considered as highlighted in our October 12, 2010 discontinued or dismissed pending appeal. (YES, but
Resolution that the properties the government took were fully conditioned on Sec. 4 of Rule 67)
operating and earning plantations at the time of the taking.
RULING compensate the respondents for the disturbance of their
property rights from the time of entry in March 1993 until the
The dismissal of the proceedings for expropriation at the time of restoration of the possession by paying to them actual
instance of NAPOCOR is proper, but, conformably with Sec. 4, or other compensatory damages.
Rule 67 of the RoC, the dismissal or discontinuance of the
proceedings must be upon such terms as the court deems just G.R. No. 210218 August 17, 2016
and equitable.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF
he right of eminent domain is "the ultimate right of the ANTONINA RABIE, REPRESENTED BY ABRAHAM R. DELA
sovereign power to appropriate, not only the public but the CRUZ, Respondent.
private property of all citizens within the territorial
sovereignty, to public purpose." But the exercise of such right
is not unlimited, for two mandatory requirements should PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI
underlie the Government's exercise of the power of eminent
domain, namely: (1) that it is for a particular public purpose; DOCTRINE: While the trial court still had jurisdiction when it
and (2) that just compensation be paid to the property owner. issued the order granting execution pending appeal, the Court
These requirements partake the nature of implied conditions holds that discretionary execution does not apply to eminent
that should be complied with to enable the condemnor to keep domain proceedings.
the property expropriated.
FACTS: NAPOCOR filed a complaint for expropriation against
The element of public use of the property should be
respondents Heirs of Antonina Rabie (respondents) for the
maintained throughout the proceedgins for expropriation, the acquisition of the 822-square meter portion of Lot No. 1439, a
abandonment of which would oblige the expropriator to residential lot, to be used as access road for the Caliraya Hydro
return the said property to its private owner if the latter Electric Power Plant of the Caliraya Botocan-Kalayaan Build
desires to reacquire the same. Rehabilitate and Operate Transfer Project of the NAPOCOR.
Indeed, public use is the fundamental basis for the action for
Respondents filed a Verified Answer, claiming that the then
expropriation; hecne, NAPOCOR’s motion to discontinue the
current market value of the property was ₱10,000 per square
proceedings is warranted and should be granted.
meter on the inner portion and ₱12,000 per square meter near
Here, NAPOCOR seeks to discontinue the expropriation the highway. Respondents prayed, among others, for a just
proceedings on the ground that the transmission lines compensation in the amount of ₱1,250,700, representing the
constructed on the respondents' property had already been Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) zonal valuation for the
retired. Verily, the retirement of the transmission lines "actual area to be occupied" by NAPOCOR which is 2,274
necessarily stripped the expropriation proceedings of the square meters, instead of 822 square meters only. In addition,
element of public use. To continue with the expropriation respondents sought payment for NAPOCOR’s alleged
proceedings despite the definite cessation of the public unauthorized entry and use of the property from 1940 to date.
purpose of the project would result in the rendition of an
invalid judgment in favor of the expropriator due to the NAPOCOR deposited with the Land Bank the amount of
absence of the essential element of public use. ₱411,000 representing the BIR zonal valuation of the affected
portion of the subject property, which was ₱500 per square
Accordingly, the Court grants the motion to discontinue the meter.
proceedings. However, NAPOCOR entered the property
without the owners’ consent and without paying just Respondents filed a Motion to Withdraw Deposit which the
compensation to the respondents. Neither did it deposit any trial court granted.
amount as required by law prior to its entry. In the process,
NAPOCOR destroyed some fruit trees and plants without NAPOCOR filed a Motion to Issue Order of Expropriation and
payment, and the installation of the transmission lines went also filed a Motion for Annotation/Registration of Partial
through the middle of the land as to divide the property into Payment.
three lots, thereby effectively rendering the entire property
inutile for any future use. The RTC granted the motions and constituted the Board of
Commissioners to assist the trial court in the determination of
In view of the discontinuance of the proceedings and the just compensation for the affected portion of the subject
eventual return of the property to the respondents, there is no property.
need to pay "just compensation" to them because their
property would not be taken by NAPOCOR. Instead of full The Board of Commissioners submitted its Report. NAPOCOR
market value of the property, therefore, NAPOCOR should filed its Comment/Opposition to the Commissioners’ Report

objecting to the recommendation that the affected portion of As early as 1919 in Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and Paredes,
the subject property consists of 2,274 square meters and that the Court held:
the value per square meter is ₱11,000. NAPOCOR also
questioned the Commissioners’ recommendation on the When the Government is plaintiff, the judgment will naturally
payment of rentals and the fact that NAPOCOR was not given take the form of an order merely requiring the payment of the
the opportunity to be heard and to argue as to the amount of award as a condition precedent to the transfer of the title, as
just compensation. a personal judgment against the Government could not be
realized upon execution.
RTC: IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS
In Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, no less than
Respondents filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal. the eminent Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee explained the
NAPOCOR filed its Notice of Appeal and Record on Appeal. rationale behind the doctrine that government funds and
properties cannot be seized under a writ of execution, thus:
The RTC gave due course to NAPOCOR’s Notice of Appeal and
directed the transmittal of the records of the case to the Court The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be
of Appeals. Respondents’ Motion for Execution Pending sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may
Appeal was granted. limit claimants action only up to the completion of proceedings
anterior to the stage of execution and that the power of the
The RTC’s Officer-in-Charge issued a Writ of Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government
Execution.19 Sheriff Raymundo P. Claveria issued a funds and properties may not be seized under writs of
Notice addressed to the President of NAPOCOR demanding execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based
payment of ₱9,042,000 and ₱12,000 yearly rentals plus 12% on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of
interest from 1940 up to the present until fully paid within ten public funds must be covered by the corresponding
days from receipt thereof. appropriation as required by law. The functions and public
services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be
On 30 July 2013, NAPOCOR received a letter from the paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from
LBPNAPOCOR Extension Office informing NAPOCOR of its their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.
receipt of a Notice of Garnishment in the amount of
₱14,873,999.28 issued by Sheriff Claveria. The Court of Appeals’ reliance on the case of Borja v. Court of
Appeals is misplaced. Borja involved a complaint for sum of
Aggrieved, NAPOCOR filed with the Court of Appeals a petition money totalling ₱78,325 representing unpaid commissions
for certiorari under Rule 65, with prayer for the issuance of a and damages. On the other hand, this case involves
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary expropriation proceedings, where the trial court fixed the just
injunction. compensation for the subject property at ₱9,042,000 and
yearly rentals at ₱12,000 since 1940 plus 12% interest per
CA: RTC still had jurisdiction when respondents filed their annum for a total award of ₱14,873,999.28. The difference in
motion for execution pending appeal on 22 May 2013, or seven the nature of the actions and the amounts involved in Borja
days after their receipt of the trial court’s order denying their and in this case justifies the non-application of the rule on
Motion for Partial Reconsideration. Hence, respondents’ discretionary execution.
motion for execution pending appeal was timely filed.
G.R. NO. 170506 January 11, 2017
ISSUE: WON the discretionary execution of judgments pending
appeal under Sec. 2(a) of Rule 39 does not apply to eminent LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF
domain proceedings LORENZO TANADA and EXPEDITA EBARLE, Respondents.
HELD: NO. While the trial court still had jurisdiction when it
issued the order granting execution pending appeal, the Court
holds that discretionary execution does not apply to eminent DOCTRINE: It is settled in jurisprudence that, in order to
domain proceedings. In Spouses Curata v. Philippine Ports determine just compensation, the trial a court acting as a
Authority, where movants alleged advanced age as ground for Special Agrarian Court must take into consideration the factors
their motion for discretionary execution, the Court found the prescribed by Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 and is
trial court to have committed grave abuse of discretion in obliged to apply the formula crafted by the DAR.
issuing the order granting execution pending appeal. The Court
held that discretionary execution is not applicable to FACTS: Heirs of Tanada and Ebarle, are the owners of several
expropriation proceedings. parcels of land situated in Bataan. The lands were placed under
the land reform program.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The Decision dated April 8, 2005 and the Resolution
Pursuant to its mandate under EO No. 405, petitioner Land dated November 22, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
Bank of the Philippines valued the properties to be taken. SP No. 79245 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case Nos.
However, respondents were unsatisfied with the valuation for 6328 and 6333 are REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of
being low and prompted them to institute summary Bataan, Branch 1 for the determination of just compensation,
administrative proceedings for the preliminary determination based on Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 and the
of just compensation. applicable administrative orders of the Department of
Agrarian Reform, and in consonance with prevailing
DARAB: AFFIRMED the acquisition cost fixed by the petitioner jurisprudence.
for the subject properties.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the
Respondents instituted separate petitioners for the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH),
determination and payment of just compensation. The petitioner, vs. ESTATE OF JUAN MARIA POSADAS III,
petitions were subsequently consolidated. MARIA ELENA POSADAS, and ESTELA MARFORI DE
POSADAS, respondents.
RTC: RENDERED A DECISION in favor of the respondents. MR:
DENIED. G.R. No. 214310. February 24, 2020. SECOND DIVISION.
A.B. REYES, JR., J.
CA: DENIED petitioner’s appeal and affirmed the decision of
the trial court.
ISSUE: WON THE TRIAL COURT UTILIZED THE CORRECT This is a petition for review on certiorari
METHOD IN FIXING JUST COMPENSATION DUE TO
RESPONDENTS’ PARCELS OF LAND FACTS: On July 4, 1990, the Republic filed a complaint for
expropriation before the RTC of Makati against 181 individuals
HELD: NO. When handling just compensation cases, the trial and corporations owning land situated along Sucat Road in
court acting as a SAC should be guided by the following factors: Parañaque. However, respondents filed a joint motion to
(1) the acquisition cost of the land; (2) the current value of the withdraw deposit, concurrently reserving their right to
properties: (3) its nature, actual use, and income; (4) the sworn substantiate their claim that the expropriated property had a
valuation of the owner: (5) the tax declarations: (6) the fair market value that was higher than what the Republic
assessment made by government assessors; (7) the social and alleged.
economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the
farmworkers, and by the government to the property; and (8) The RTC allowed the respondents to withdraw the amount of
the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any P1,866,480.00, ruling that there was indeed no issue as to
government financing institution on the said land, if any. And public purpose of the taking.
is obliged to apply the formula crafted by the DAR. The
mandatory application of the DAR Formula has been applied The respondents filed another Joint Motion to Withdraw
by the court in a number of cases. Deposit, this time praying for the payment of P16,798,320.00,
representing the balance of the property's provisional value.
In the case at bar, the trial court, in arriving at the amount of However, despite the grant of the motion and subsequent
just compensation to be paid to respondents solely based its orders directing the disbursement of the balance, the Republic
conclusion on the alleged selling price or market value of the never paid.
land adjoining the respondents’ properties.
In 1998, DPWH Secretary Gregorio Vigilar informed the OSG
However, despite the necessity of setting aside the that the government was no longer interested in pursuing the
computation of just compensation of the trial court, the Court road-widening project. The estate likewise prayed that it be
cannot automatically adopt petitioner's own calculation as allowed to present evidence on the damages it suffered
prayed for in the instant petition. As the Court ruled in Heirs of because of the suit.
Lorenzo and Carmen Vidad v. Land Bank of the Philippines, the
"LBP's valuation has to be substantiated during an appropriate In 2005, Acting DPWH Secretary Hermogenes Edbane, Jr.
hearing before it could be considered sufficient in accordance wrote a letter informing the OSG that the Republic had once
with Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 and the DAR again changed its mind, and that this time it has finally resolved
regulations." to expropriate the respondents' property.

In 2008, the RTC ordered the submission of an amended may result in the dismissal of the complaint either motu
complaint to reflect the new area used by the road-widening proprio or on motion by the defendant.
project. the RTC again directed the Republic, through the OSG,
to submit an amended complaint. Here, the trial court dismissed the case after Atty. Luis M.
Posadas, counsel for the Estate of Juan M. Posadas III, orally
Instead of amending its complaint, the Republic filed a moved for dismissal on the ground that the Republic had failed
manifestation and motion 33 stating that respondent Maria to comply with the order directing the filing of an amended
Elena Posadas had died on December 10, 2007. Accordingly, it complaint.
prayed for the suspension of the period to file its amended
complaint, contending that it could not make the required As elsewhere noted, the Republic contends that it was unable
amendments without the name of her substitute. to amend its complaint because it was never informed of the
substitute for the late Maria Elena Posadas.
the RTC, while refusing to altogether suspend the deadline for
the amendment of the complaint. In the same order, the trial The contention is without merit.
court directed the respondents' counsel to inform the court of
the substitute for the late Maria Elena Posadas. It appears, Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court lays down the
however, that a substitute was never named by the deceased's procedure for the substitution of a party-litigant who dies
counsel. during the pendency of a case.
Republic filed a motion seeking an extension citing the tedious As can be gleaned from the above provision, when a party to a
and time-consuming process of securing funds for just case dies, his or her counsel is charged with the duty of
compensation. The Republic filed another motion for informing the trial court of, first, the fact of the litigant's death
extension of time, stating that it could not immediately and, second, the name and address of the litigant's
disburse the amount due as just compensation. representative. The court must then issue an order requiring
the said representative to appear and formally be substituted.
The OSG, however, failed to appear on the scheduled date due However, if no representative is so named or if he or she does
to his prolonged travel time caused by the construction of the not appear, the court may direct the adverse party to procure
Skyway extension from Alabang to Bicutan. For that reason, an executor or administrator, who will be tasked to represent
the respondents orally moved for the dismissal of the case in the deceased party until the case is terminated.
open court. They maintained that the Republic had no
justification for failing to comply with the RTC's order directing In this case, the trial court issued an order directing Atty.
the amendment of the complaint. Antonio Pesigan (Atty. Pesigan), Maria Elena Posadas's counsel
of record, to name his client's substitute. It appears, however,
Agreeing with the respondents, the RTC issued an Order that a representative was never named in the proceedings a
dismissing the case for failure to comply with an order of the quo. In accordance with the rules, it thus became incumbent
court. On appeal, the CA rendered decision holding that the on the trial court to direct the Republic to procure an executor
RTC did not commit any reversible error in dismissing the case. or administrator for the estate of the deceased litigant. Yet,
this was never done. The Republic capitalized on this
Hence, the instant Petition. circumstance, ascribing its failure to file an amended
complaint to the fact that a representative was never named.
ISSUE: Whether or not the absence of a substitute for the late
Maria Elena Posadas justified the Republic's failure to amend DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the February 19, 2014
its complaint. Decision and the September 15, 2014 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94901 are SET ASIDE. The case is
HELD: NO. At the outset, it bears noting that the RTC based its REMANDED to Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
order of dismissal on Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. City, which is hereby directed to:
The provision contemplates certain instances where the
complaint may be dismissed due to the plaintiff's fault: (1) if he 1. ORDER the appointment of a substitute or
or she fails to appear during a scheduled hearing, especially on representative for deceased respondent Maria Elena
the date for the presentation of his or her evidence in chief; (2) Posadas, or an executor or administrator for her
if he or she fails to prosecute his or her action for an estate;
unreasonable length of time; (3) if he or she fails to comply 2. DETERMINE the just compensation due on
with the rules; or (4) if he or she fails to comply with any order respondents' property in accordance with the
of the court. Thus, failure on the part of the plaintiff, without principles laid down in this Decision;
any justifiable cause, to comply with any order of the court

3. Pending the determination of the amount provided in judicial foreclosure except only where the mortgagee is the
the next preceding number, IMMEDIATELY ORDER Philippine National Bank or a bank or banking institution.
the Republic to deposit:
a. The assessed value of those portions of FACTS:
respondents' property taken before
November 26, 2000, in accordance with In a complaint for judicial foreclosure of mortgage with
Section 2 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court; preliminary injunction filed on October 19, 1989, docketed as
and Civil Case No. 89-5424 before the Regional Trial Court of
b. 100% of the current relevant zonal valuation Makati City, the herein private respondent sought the
of those portions taken on or after foreclosure of four (4) parcels of land mortgaged by petitioner
November 26, 2000, plus the current market to Intercon Fund Resource, Inc. ("Intercon").
value of the structures erected thereon, in
Private respondent instituted Civil Case No. 89-5424 as
accordance with Section 4 of Republic Act
mortgagee-assignee of a loan amounting to P8.5 million
No. 8974 and Section 6 of Republic Act No.
obtained by petitioner from Intercon, in whose favor
10752.
petitioner mortgaged the aforesaid parcels of land as security
4. IMPOSE legal interest on the amount arrived at as just
for the said loan. In its answer below, petitioner questioned
compensation, less the amount of P1,866,480.00
the assignment by Intercon of its mortgage right thereover to
representing the prior deposit made by the Republic
the private respondent, on the ground that the same was ultra
and any amount that will actually be paid by the
vires. Petitioner also questioned during the trial the
Republic as initial deposit/provisional value pursuant
correctness of the charges and interest on the mortgage debt
to the net preceding number, at the rate of 12%
in question.
percent per annum from the time of taking up to June
30, 2013 and, thereafter, 6% per annum from July 1, The trial court, through the then Judge now Court of Appeals
2013 until finality of this decision; Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero, came out with its decision
5. AWARD to the respondents the total amount of just "granting herein private respondent SMGI's complaint for
compensation inclusive of interest, which shall earn judicial foreclosure of mortgage", On August 23, 1994,
legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from petitioner filed with the same trial court an Urgent Motion to
finality of the Decision until full satisfaction; and Quash and Set Aside Writ of Execution ascribing to it grave
6. Lastly, anent the portions of the property included in abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned Writ of Execution.
the Republic's original complaint for which return is To support its motion, petitioner invited attention and argued
feasible, REVEST title thereto in the name of the that the records of the case were still with the Court of Appeals
respondents. and therefore, issuance of the writ of execution was
premature since the 150-day period for petitioner to pay the
The trial court is also directed to conduct the proceedings in judgment obligation had not yet lapsed and petitioner had not
this case with utmost dispatch and to submit to the Court a yet defaulted in the payment thereof since no demand for it’s
report on its findings and recommended conclusions within payment was made by the private respondent. In petitioner's
sixty (60) days from notice of this Decision. own words, the dispute between the parties was "principally
RULE 68 on the issue as to when the 150- day period within which
Huerta Alba may exercise its equity of redemption should be
[G.R. No. 128567. September 1, 2000.] counted."
HUERTA ALBA RESORT INC., Petitioner, v. COURT OF On September 6, 1994, the scheduled auction sale of subject
APPEALS and SYNDICATED MANAGEMENT GROUP INC., pieces of properties proceeded and the private respondent
Respondents. was declared the highest bidder. Thus, private respondent was
awarded subject bidded pieces of property. The covering
Certificate of Sale issued in its favor was registered with the
Registry of Deeds on October 21, 1994. The trial court ruled
PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 45 that the period of redemption of subject property should be
governed by the rule on the sale of judicially foreclosed
DOCTRINE: DIFFERENCE BET RIGHT OF REDEMPTION AND property under Rule 68 of the Rules of Court.
EQUITY OF REDEMPTION: The right of redemption in relation
to a mortgage - understood in the sense of a prerogative to re- Thereafter, petitioner then filed an Exception to the Order
acquire mortgaged property after registration of the dated September 26, 1994 and Motion to Set Aside Said Order,
foreclosure sale, exists only in the case of the extrajudicial contending that the said Order materially altered the Decision
foreclosure of the mortgage. No such right is recognized in a dated April 30, 1992 "which declared that the satisfaction of
the judgment shall be in the manner and under the regulation

that govern sale of real estate under execution." Meanwhile, HELD:
in its Decision of September 30, 1994, the Court of Appeals
resolved the issues raised by the petitioner in C.A.-G.R. SP No. NO. Petitioner failed to seasonably invoke its purported right
35086, holding that the one hundred-fifty day period within under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337. Petitioner avers in its petition
which petitioner may redeem subject properties should be that the Intercom, predecessor in interest of the private
computed from the date petitioner was notified of the Entry of respondent, is a credit institution, such that Section 78 of
Judgment in G.R. No. 112044; and that the 150-day period Republic Act No. 337 should apply in this case. Stated
within which petitioner may exercise its equity of redemption differently, it is the submission of petitioner that it should be
expired on September 11, 1994. Thus: allowed to redeem subject properties within one year from the
date of sale as a result of the foreclosure of the mortgage
"Petitioner must have received the resolution of the Supreme constituted thereon. Petitioner theorizes that it invoked its
Court dated February 16, 1994 denying with finality its motion "right" in "timely fashion", that is, after confirmation by the
for reconsideration in G.R. No. 112044 before March 14, 1994, court of the foreclosure sale, and within one (1) year from the
otherwise the Supreme Court would not have made an entry date of registration of the certificate of sale. Indeed, the facts
of judgment on March 14,1994. While, computing the 150-day show that it was only on May 2, 1995 when, in opposition to
period, petitioner may have until September 11, 1994, within the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession, did petitioner
which to pay the amounts covered by the judgment, such file a Motion to Compel Private Respondent to Accept
period has already expired by this time, and therefore, this Redemption, invoking for the very first time its alleged right to
Court has no more reason to pass upon the parties' opposing redeem subject properties under to Section 78 of R.A. No. 337.
contentions, the same having become moot and academic.”
In light of the aforementioned facts, it was too late in the day
During the hearing called on April 21, 1995, the counsel of for petitioner to invoke a right to redeem under Section 78 of
record of petitioner entered appearance and asked for time to R.A. No. 337. Petitioner failed to assert a right to redeem in
interpose opposition to the Motion for Issuance of Writ of several crucial stages of the Proceedings. For instance, on
Possession. In opposition to private respondent's Motion for September 7, 1994, when it filed with the trial court an Ex-part
Issuance of writ of Possession, petitioner filed a "Motion to Motion for Clarification, petitioner failed to allege and prove
Compel Private Respondent to Accept Redemption." It was the that private respondent's predecessor in interest was a credit
first time petitioner ever asserted the right to redeem subject institution and therefore, Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 was
properties under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337, the General applicable.
Banking Act; theorizing that the original mortgagee, being a
credit institution, its assignment of the mortgage credit to Petitioner merely asked the trial court to clarify whether the
petitioner did not remove petitioner from the coverage of sale of subject properties was execution sale or judicial
Section 78 of R.A. No. 337. Therefore, it should have the right foreclosure sale. Then, too, nothing was heard from petitioner
to redeem subject properties within one year from registration on its alleged right under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 and of the
of the auction sale, theorized the petitioner which concluded predecessor in interest of private respondent as a credit
that in view of its "right of redemption," the issuance of the institution, when the trial court came out with an order on
titles over subject parcels of land to the private respondent February 10, 1995, confirming the sale of subject properties in
was irregular and premature. favor of private respondent and declaring that all pending
incidents with respect to the Order dated September 26, 1994
In its Order of July 21, 1995, the trial court, presided over by had become moot and academic.
Judge Napoleon Inoturan, denied private respondent's motion
for a writ of possession, opining that Section 78 of the General Similarly, when petitioner filed on February 27, 1995 a Motion
Banking Act was applicable and therefore, the petitioner had for Clarification with the Court of Appeals, seeking
until October 21, 1995 to redeem the said parcels of land. "clarification" of the date of commencement of the one (1)
year redemption period for the subject properties, petitioner
Docketed as G.R. No. 387457 on November 14, 1996, the Court never intimated any alleged right under Section 78 of R.A. No.
of Appeals gave due course to the petition and set aside the 337 nor did it invite attention to its present stance that private
trial court's Order dated July 21, 1995 and Order dated respondent's predecessor-in-interest was a credit institution.
September 4, 1995. Consequently, in its Resolution dated March 20, 1995, the
Court of Appeals ruled on the said motion thus:
ISSUE:
"But we never made any pronouncement on the one-year right
Whether or not petitioner has the one-year right of of redemption of petitioner because, in the first place, the
redemption of subject properties under Section 78 of Republic foreclosure in this case is judicial, and as such, the mortgagor
Act No. 337 otherwise known as the General Banking Act, and has only the equity, not the right of redemption. While it may
has seasonably invoked its asserted right to redeem subject be true that under Section 78 of R.A. 337 as amended,
properties? otherwise known as the General Banking Act, a mortgagor of a

bank, banking or credit institution, whether the foreclosure G.R. No. 214803
was done judicially or extrajudicially, has a period of one year
from the auction sale within which to redeem the foreclosed
property, the question of whether the Syndicated FACTS:
Management Group, Inc., is bank or credit institution was In 2014, petitioner Roldan filed an action for foreclosure of real
never brought before us squarely, and it is indeed odd and estate mortgage against respondents spouses Clarence and
strange that petitioner would now sarcastically ask a rhetorical Anna Lee Barrios, and respondent Matorress before the
question in its motion for clarification." If petitioner were Regional Trial Court (RTC), Aldan.
really acting in good faith, it would have ventilated before the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 35086 its alleged right under The petitioner alleged that the respondents spouses borrowed
Section 78 of R.A. No. 337; but petitioner never did do so. P250,000 payable within one year, the loan was secured by a
parcel of land and its improvements in Aklan. The time for
Indeed, at the earliest opportunity, when it submitted its payment was overdue and the respondents failed and refused
answer to the complaint for judicial foreclosure, petitioner to pay their principal obligation and interests due.
should have alleged that it was entitled to the beneficial
provisions of Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 but again, it did not The petitioner further alleged that the property was
make any allegation in its answer regarding any right mortgaged to respondent Matorres, who is a mortgagee in bad
thereunder. It bears stressing that the applicability of Section faith.
78 of R.A. No. 337 hinges on the factual question of whether
or not private respondent's predecessor in interest was a The RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. It held that
credit institution. As was held in Limpin, a judicial foreclosure the value of the property is below P20,000.00.
sale, "when confirmed by an order of the court, shall operate
to divest the rights of all the parties to the action and to vest The petitioner thus filed this petition for certiorari alleging
their rights in the purchaser, subject to such rights of grave abuse of discretion by the RTC.
redemption as may be allowed by law” which confer on the
mortgagor, his successors in interest or any judgment creditor ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of
of the mortgagor, the right to redeem the property sold on discretion by dismissing the foreclosure case filed by the
foreclosure after confirmation by the court of the judicial petitioner.
foreclosure sale. Thus, the claim that petitioner is entitled to
the beneficial provisions of Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 since HELD: NO. A foreclosure suit is a real action against a property,
private respondent's predecessor-in-interest is a credit it seeks the judicial recognition of a property debt, and an
institution is in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim which order of the sale of the res.
should have been averred in petitioner's answer to the
compliant for judicial foreclosure. Under Section 33, of B.P 129, civil actions which involve title
to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, are
The failure of petitioner to seasonably assert its alleged right incapable of pecuniary estimation as it is not a recovery of
under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 precludes it from so doing at money, the court’s jurisdiction will be determined by the
this late stage of the case. Estoppel may be successfully assessed value of the property involved.
invoked if the party fails to raise the question in the early
stages of the proceedings. Thus, "a party to a case who failed In the present case, the value of the property was deemed to
to invoked his claim in the main case, while having the be P13,380.00. Therefore, it is the first level court which has
opportunity to do so, will be precluded, subsequently, from jurisdiction over the case, and not the RTC.
invoking his claim, even if it were true, after the decision has
become final, otherwise the judgment may be reduced to a G.R. No. L-3619 October 29, 1951
mockery and the administration of justice may be placed in
disrepute."
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the assailed decision

BERNARDO TIGLAO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ENGRACIO
of the Court of Appeals, declaring null and void the Order
BOTONES, defendant-appellant.
dated 21 July 1995 and Order dated 4 September 1997 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City in Civil Case No. 89-5424,
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
Alona G. Roldan, v. Spouses Clarence I. Barrios and Anna FACTS:

Lee T. Barrios, Rommel Matorres, and Hon. Jemena Abellar
Arbis, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 6, In a civil case between Barnardo Tiglao and Engracio Botones,
Regional Trial Court, Aldan judgement was rendered in favor of Tiglao. The court ordered

Botones to pay P4,000 until full payment, and ordered him to sufficient. The confirmation operates to divest the title out of
deposit the amount to the Clerk within 90 days, otherwise the the former owner and to vest it in the purchaser. It is at this
selling of the mortgaged property at the public auction shall be time when the rights or title passes, and not before. Sales of
ordered. mortgaged real estate should be more strictly scrutinized than
ordinary sales under execution. In the former the title, as we
Upon motion, he ordered the issuance of writ of execution to have said, passes to the purchaser upon confirmation by the
CFI Tarlac. Accordingly, the provincial sheriff sold at public court, and the defendant or debtor has no right to
auction the mortgaged properties to the Tiglao as the highest
bidder. On March 7, 1944, the plaintiff filed an ex parte motion redeem within the statutory period granted in cases ordinary
with the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, for the confirmation execution sales.” In said case this Court held that a hearing "is
of the sale in his favor. Subsequently, Tiglao filed a motion for a very essential part of those proceedings because the hearing
the issuance of a writ of possession. gives the interested parties an opportunity to lay before the
court their reasons why the sale should or should not be
Botones filed an opposition alleging (1) that the judgment is confirmed, and it is the result of this hearing which diverts the
null and void, because the defendant's former counsel had no title if the sale is confirmed."
special authority to settle the
In Grimalt vs. Velasquez, the court ruled that "in order that a
case in the manner stated in said judgment, and (2) that the foreclosure sale may be validly confirmed by the court, it is
sheriff's sale was not legally confirmed, because the defendant necessary that a hearing be given the interested parties at
was not given notice of the motion for confirmation or its which they may have an opportunity to show cause why the
hearing. sale should not be confirmed; that a failure to give notice is
good cause for setting aside the sale." Notice and hearing of
The court granted Tiglao’s motion for the issuance of a writ of motion for confirmation are therefore essential to the validity
possession. – GRANTED of the order of confirmation, not only to enable the interested
parties to resist the motion but also to inform them of the time
Botones filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion when their right of redemption is cut off.
invoking moratorium under Republic Act No. 342 and praying
that all proceedings be suspended. -DENIED In the case at bar, the lower court undoubtedly had acquired
jurisdiction over the foreclosure proceedings but, in
Thus, the defendant appealed. He contends that trial court confirming the sheriff's sale without the essential requisite as
erred in sustaining the order confirming the sheriff's sale and to notice of the motion for confirmation, it exceeded its power,
in issuing the corresponding writ of possession in favor of the with the result that the order of confirmation is null and void.
appellee.
In Ang Lam vs. Rosillosa, it was held that "a void judgment may
ISSUE: Whether or not the sheriff’s sale of the mortgaged be assailed or impugned at any time either directly or
property and the issuance of writ of possession in favor of collaterally, by means of a petition filed in the same case or by
Tiglao was proper. means of a separate action, or by resisting such judgment in
any action or proceeding wherein it is invoked." Hence there is
RULING: Under Section 3 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the no merit in Tiglao’s contention that the order of confirmation
sale of mortgaged property "when confirmed by an order of had become final and cannot be set aside after the 6-month
the court shall operate to divest the rights of all the parties to period provided in Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, within which
the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser, subject to relief could be asked, had expire.
such rights of redemption as may be allowed by law."
G.R. No. L-45322 July 5, 1989
The effect of confirmation was more elaborately explained in
the case of Raymundo vs. Sunico, "As the title to mortgaged GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS),
real property does not vest in the purchaser until after the petitioner,
confirmation of the sale, he has, prior to that time, no right to vs.
the possession of such property, and no legal cause of THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ILOILO, BRANCH III,
complaint against the defendants, who remain in possession, ILOILO CITY and NELITA M. VDA. DE BACALING & MARIA
exercising the rights of ownership. On the other hand, the TERESA INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
mortgagors have no means, until the confirmation of respondents.
compelling the purchaser to comply with the terms of the sale.
Should the mortgagors attempt to compel a purchaser to pay PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
in his money, an answer on the part of the purchaser to the DOCTRINE: There is no right of redemption from a judicial
effect that the sale had not been confirmed would be foreclosure sale after the confirmation of the sale, except those

granted by banks or banking institutions as provided by the This is simply the right of the defendant mortgagor to
General Banking Act extinguish the mortgage and retain ownership of the property
by paying the secured debt within the 90-day period after the
FACTS: Spouses Bacaling obtained a loan in the amount of judgment becomes final, in accordance with Rule 68, or even
P600,000 from GSIS which is secured by a real estate mortgage after the foreclosure sale but prior to its confirmation.
on 4 lots owned by the spouses. However, out of P600,000 only
P240,000 was released by the GSIS. RIGHT OF REDEMPTION
The spouses failed to pay the loan thus the GSIS filed for a These laws (those granted by the charter of the Philippine
judicial foreclosure in the CFI. The CFI ruled in favor of GSIS. National Bank (Acts No. 2747 and 2938), and the General
Banking Act (R.A. 337)) confer on the mortgagor, his successors
Mrs. Bacaling failed to pay the judgement within 90 days after in interest or any judgment creditor of the mortgagor, the right
receipt of the decision of the court. Consequently, the to redeem the property sold on the foreclosure-after
mortgaged lots were sold at public auction which the GSIS was confirmation by the court of the foreclosure sale — which right
the highest bidder. may be exercised within a period of one (1) year, counted from
the date of registration of the certificate of sale in the Registry
GSIS filed a motion for confirmation of the sale and asked for of Property.
a deficiency judgement.
EPIFANIO CRUZ and EVELINA CRUZ, petitioners, vs.
MTIDC alleged that it was an assignee of the mortgagor's "right INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, CALIXTRO O.
of redemption," and filed a "Motion to Exercise the Right of ADRIATICO, RUFINO J. SANTIAGO and GODOFREDO
Redemption". The motion was granted and a Chinabank check VALMEO, respondents.
was delivered to GSIS as payment of the redemption price.
However, the check was dishonored. PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45
Meanwhile, the CFI confirmed the sale and rendered DOCTRINE: True, the procedural requirement in Section 2
deficiency judgement in favor of GSIS. grants a substantive right to the mortgagor, consisting of the
so-called equity of redemption, which after the ordinary
14 years after the foreclosure sale and almost 3 years its adversarial course of a controverted trial of a case may not be
redemption of the foreclosed property had been denied, omitted in the relief to be awarded in the judgment
MTIDC filed a motion for reconsideration sought the therein. The same, however, may be waived, as already
restoration of its right of redemption. The court granted demonstrated.
MTIDC a period of one year from January 19, 1976 to redeem
the properties. FACTS:
ISSUE: The relevant and undisputed facts indicate that petitioners

mortgaged certain properties to private respondents who
Whether or not the CFI exceeded its jurisdiction and acted with eventually sued them for non-payment and for the judicial
grave abuse of discretion when it granted respondent another foreclosure of aforementioned mortgages under Rule 68 of the
1 year to redeem the property Rules of Court. In the course of the proceedings a compromise
agreement was reached and this became the basis of the
HELD: Judgment on Compromise issued by the respondent Judge of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan.
Since the GSIS is not a bank or banking institution, its mortgage
is covered by the general rule that there is no right of Part of the agreement states that should the defendants fail to
redemption after the judicial foreclosure sale has been pay the sums agreed upon within the period stipulated, the
confirmed. Hence, Judge Numeriano Estenzo exceeded his defendants shall pay plaintiff the entire sum of P92,149.00
jurisdiction and acted with grave abuse of discretion in under the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage attached to the
granting the respondent, MTIDC, another one-year period to complaint as Annex 'C' and an additional sum of P44,700.00 as
redeem the Bacaling properties over the opposition of attorney's fees; Upon failure of the defendants to pay the
petitioner GSIS as mortgagee- purchaser thereof at the public sums agreed upon within the period stipulated, plaintiff shall
sale. be entitled to a writ of execution directing the foreclosure of
all the mortgages subject matter of this litigation and to the
EQUITY OF REDEMPTION principal sum of P300,000.00 in the Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage attached to the complaint as Annex 'B shall be added
the sum of P44,700.00 as attorney's fees.

For failure of the petitioners to comply with certain provisions annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure itself (without
of the agreement, private respondent moved for a writ of prejudice of course to the eventual outcome of said case).
execution. The mortgaged properties were foreclosed upon in Hence, an injunction to prohibit the issuance of the writ of
an auction sale and were purchased by the private possession is entirely out of place.
respondents as the highest bidder. The sale was latter judicially
confirmed. FACTS: The spouses Kho (private respondents herein)
constituted in favor of herein petitioner Banco Filipino a real
Issue: WON the compromise agreement is void av initio for estate mortgage over a parcel of land registered in the name
allegedly denying petitioners their right of equity redemption of plaintiff Miguel Kho to guarantee a loan granted them by
(NO) petitioner bank. Sps. Kho defaulted in the payment of some
Ruling: There being no such agreement, the specified amortizations. Hence, Banco Filipino extrajudicially foreclosed
procedure has necessarily to be followed and the minimum the mortgage and purchased the mortgaged as the sole and
period of ninety (90) days for payment, also referred to as the highest bidder.
period for the exercise of the equity, as distinguished from the
The end of the redemption period was then fast approaching
right, of redemption has to be observed and provided for in the
but still petitioners had not made any move to redeem the
judgment in the foreclosure suit. Jurisprudentially, it has also
foreclosed property. Then just about ten (10) days before the
been held that the exercise of the equity of redemption may
end of the redemption period, petitioners filed with the RTC a
be made beyond the 90-days period but before the foreclosure
complaint for the annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure of
sale is confirmed by the court.
mortgage. The verified complaint specifically prayed for
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction restraining and
It stands to reason, however, that the aforesaid procedure
enjoining the defendants jointly and severally from obtaining
cannot be of substantial application to, and can be modified
a writ of possession or a final deed of conveyance over
by, a valid agreement of the parties, such as in the compromise
plaintiffs' land and restrain the defendants from registering the
agreement subject of and constituting the basis for the
same; as well as restraining and enjoining the defendants from
judgment on compromise. The dispositions of Section 2 of
collecting any rentals of the properties of the plaintiffs.
Rule 68 clearly cannot apply since the parties therein had
specifically agreed on the amounts to be paid, when they RTC: GRANTED the motion.
should be paid and the effects of non-payment or violation of
the terms of their agreement. Respondent objected and filed an Urgent Motion to Lift
Injunction but was denied. Subsequently, respondent filed a
This is not an isolated proposition as it may initially appear. motion for reconsideration and was denied.
True, the procedural requirement in Section 2 grants a
substantive right to the mortgagor, consisting of the so-called Finally, the three (3) above mentioned orders (1) granting writ
equity of redemption, which after the ordinary adversarial of injunction; (2) denying respondent bank's motion to lift
course of a controverted trial of a case may not be omitted in injunction; and (3) denying respondent bank's motion for
the relief to be awarded in the judgment therein. 9 The same, reconsideration were all reversed by the CA.
however, may be waived, as already demonstrated.
ISSUE: WON the issuance of a writ of possession was proper
There can be no pretension that the compromise agreement
as formulated and approved is contrary to law, public policy or HELD: YES. The law and jurisprudence are clear that both
morals or that the same was tainted with circumstances during and after the period of redemption, the purchaser at
vitiating consent. The petitioners entered into the same duly the foreclosure sale is entitled as of right to a writ of
assisted by competent counsel and the entire judicial possession, regardless of whether or not there is a pending suit
proceeding was under judicial scrutiny and supervision. for annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure itself
(without prejudice of course to the eventual outcome of said
G.R. No. 83498 October 22, 1991 case). Hence, an injunction to prohibit the issuance of the writ
of possession is entirely out of place.
SPS. MIGUEL S. KHO and JUANITA KHO, petitioners, vs. Blanca Consuelo Roxas, v. Court of Appeals and Rural Bank
COURT OF APPEALS and BANCO FILIPINO, respondents. of Dumalag, Inc.,
G.R. No. 100480 ; May 1, 1993
FACTS:
DOCTRINE: The law and jurisprudence are clear that both
during and after the period of redemption, the purchaser at the
Petitioner Roxas is the owner of a parcel of land in Panay,
foreclosure sale is entitled as of right to a writ of possession,
Capiz. She executed a special power of attorney appointing her
regardless of whether or not there is a pending suit for
brother as attorney-in-fact for the purpose of applying for an
agricultural loan with private respondent bank, Rural Bank of was situated, and in Roxas City, where the public auction took
Dumalag, Inc., using said land as a collateral. place.
Manuel Roxas granted and received an agricultural loan of The same law provides that the proof of publication shall be
P2,000.00, and as security, executed a real estate mortgage accomplished by an affidavit, which is a sworn statement in
over the subject land. writing. It is not the same as a Certificate of Posting. The lack
of compliance with the provisions invalidates the foreclosure
The respondent bank foreclosed the real estate mortgage for and public action sale of the subject land.
failure to pay the loan on maturity. The land was sold at the
public auction to the private respondent for P3,009. The TERESITA MONZON, petitioner, versus SPS. JAMES AND
petitioner failed to exercise the right of redemption, the sheriff MARIA ROSA NIEVES RELOVA AND SPS. BIENVENIDO AND
delivered the possession of the property to the private EUFRACIA PEREZ, respondents, versus ADDIO PROPERTIES,
respondent. INC., intervener
The petitioner later filed a complaint for cancellation of DOCTRINE: Unlike Rule 68, which governs judicial foreclosure
foreclosure of mortgage and annulment of auction sale before sales, neither Act No. 3135 as amended, nor A.M. No. 99-10-
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Roxas City. 05-0 grants to junior encumbrancers the right to receive the
balance of the purchase price. The only right given to second
The petitioner claimed that she was never informed of the mortgagees in said issuances is the right to redeem the
approval of the loan, she did not receive any demand for foreclosed property
payment, and she was not informed of the foreclosure. FACTS:
Respondents filed against Atty. Ana Liza Luna, Clerk of Court of
The respondent bank on the other hand argued that the Branch 18 of the RTC of Tagaytay City, and herein petitioner
petitioner was aware of the status of the loan, and that she Teresita Monzon an initiatory pleading captioned as a Petition
was duly notified of the foreclosure and auction sale. for Injunction. In their Petition for Injunction, respondents
alleged that on 28 December 1998, Monzon executed a
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, promissory note in favor of the spouses Perez for the amount
declaring the public auction sale as null and void. The trial of P600,000.00, with interest of five percent per month,
court held that under Section 5, Republic Act No. 720, notices payable on or before 28 December 1999. This was secured by
of foreclosure must be posted in at least three of the most a 300-square meter lot. On 31 December 1998, Monzon
conspicuous places in the municipality and barrio where the executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the said parcel of land
land is situated. While the notices were posted in the in favor of the spouses Perez.
municipality, the same was not posted in the barrio.
Respondents also claim in their Petition for Injunction that on
The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the decision of the trial 29 March 1999, Monzon executed another promissory note,
court. It held that personal notification to the mortgagor is not this time in favor of the spouses Relova for the amount
required. of P200,000.00 with interest of five percent per month payable
on or before 31 December 1999. This loan was secured by a
ISSUE: Whether or not the requirement on the notices of 200 square meter lot, denominated as Lot No. 2B, another
foreclosure was followed. portion of the aforementioned Psu-232001.
HELD:
Coastal Lending Corporation extrajudicially foreclosed the
entire 9,967-square meter property covered by Psu-232001,
NO. In the case of Tambunting, et al., v. CA, et al., the statutory
including the portions mortgaged and subsequently sold to
provisions governing publication of notice of mortgage
respondents. According to the Petition for Injunction, Monzon
foreclosure sales must be strictly complied with. Even slight
was indebted to the Coastal Lending Corporation.
deviations therefrom are not allowed.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 720 provides that notices of foreclosure The winning bidder in the extrajudicial foreclosure, Addio
should be posted in at least three of the most conspicuous Properties Inc., paid the amount of P5,001,127.00, thus leaving
places in the municipality and barrio where the land a P1,602,393.65 residue. According to respondents, this
mortgaged is situated. In the present case, the Certificate of residue amount, which is in the custody of Atty. Luna as Branch
Posting which was executed by the sheriff states that he Clerk of Court, should be turned over to them pursuant to
posted three copies of the notice of public auction sale in three Section 4, Rule 68 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
conspicuous places in the municipality of Panay where the land
Monzon, in her Answer, claimed that the Petition for
Injunction should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of
action. Monzon likewise claimed that respondents could no without regard to the second mortgage; but the consequence
longer ask for the enforcement of the two promissory notes of a failure to make the second mortgagee a party to the
because she had already performed her obligation to them by proceeding is that the lien of the second mortgagee on the
dacion en pago as evidenced by the Deed of Conditional Sale equity of redemption is not affected by the decree of
and the Deed of Absolute Sale foreclosure.
For failure of petitioner to appear despite notice, an ex parte

presentation of evidence was granted by RTC. RTC ruled in 448 SCRA 203 January 2005
favor of herein respondents. CA dismissed the subsequent DE VERA V. AGLORO
appeal of the petitioner
448 SCRA 203 January 2005
Issue: WON respondents has the right over the residue DE VERA V. AGLORO
amount from the extrajudicial foreclosure (NO)
PETITION FOR REVIEW RULE 45
Ruling: It can be seen that despite the fact that Monzon was
not declared in default by the RTC, the RTC nevertheless Doctrine: In the present case, the petitioners-mortgagors
applied the effects of a default order upon petitioner under failed to redeem the property within 1 year from the
Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court registration of the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale with the Register
of Deeds. The respondent, being the purchaser of the property
at public auction, thus, had the right to file an ex parte motion
Failure to file a responsive pleading within the reglementary
for the issuance of a writ of possession; and considering that it
period, and not failure to appear at the hearing, is the sole
was its ministerial duty to do so, the trial court had to grant the
ground for an order of default (Rosario, et al. vs. Alonzo, et al.,
motion and to thereafter issue the writ of possession. Any
L-17320, June 29, 1963), except the failure to appear at a pre-
question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its
trial conference wherein the effects of a default on the part of
foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for refusing the issuance
the defendant are followed, that is, the plaintiff shall be
of a writ of execution. The right of the purchaser to have
allowed to present evidence ex parte and a judgment based
possession of the subject property would not be defeated
thereon may be rendered against the defendant.
notwithstanding the pendency of a civil case seeking the
annulment of the mortgage or of the extrajudicial foreclosure.
In view of the foregoing, we are, therefore, inclined to remand
the case to the trial court for reception of evidence for the
FACTS: Spouses De Vera secured a loan in the amount of
defense. Before we do so, however, we need to point out that
₱1.2M from the BPI Family Savings Bank. To secure the
the trial court had committed another error which we should
payment they executed REM over their property located in
address to put the remand in its proper perspective.
Bulacan. When the Spouses defaulted and failed to pay despite
demands of the Bank, the latter filed a petition with the ex-
Section 4, Rule 68 of the Rules of Court, which is the basis of officio sheriff of RTC for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
respondent’s alleged cause of action entitling them to the REM. At the public auction, the Bank was declared the highest
residue of the amount paid in the foreclosure sale. However, bidder for the property, and the Sheriff executed a certificate
Rule 68 governs the judicial foreclosure of mortgages. Extra- of sale in its favor.
judicial foreclosure of mortgages, which was what transpired
in the case at bar, is governed by Act No. 3135, as amended by The Bank filed in the Office of the RD an affidavit for the
Act No. 4118. consolidation of its ownership over the property. Thus, TCT
was issued in its name. Spouses filed a Complaint for the
Unlike Rule 68, which governs judicial foreclosure sales, nullification of the real estate mortgage against the Bank and
neither Act No. 3135 as amended, nor A.M. No. 99-10-05-0 the Sheriff with the RTC as well as the extrajudicial sale of the
grants to junior encumbrancers the right to receive the property at public auction. Bank filed an Ex Parte Petition for
balance of the purchase price. The only right given to second Writ of Possession. The Bank impleaded the Spouses as
mortgagees in said issuances is the right to redeem the respondents and prayed that after an ex parte hearing. TC set
foreclosed propert. Even if, for the sake of argument, Rule 68 the petition for hearing. When the petition was called for
is to be applied to extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages, such hearing, no oppositor appeared. TC authorized its Branch Clerk
right can only be given to second mortgagees who are made of Court to receive the evidence of the Bank ex parte, and the
parties to the (judicial) foreclosure. While a second mortgagee Bank adduced its testimonial and documentary evidence ex
is a proper and in a sense even a necessary party to a parte.
proceeding to foreclose a first mortgage on real property, he is
not an indispensable party, because a valid decree may be Spouses filed in LRC an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings
made, as between the mortgagor and the first mortgagee, to await the resolution of Civil Case or for the consolidation of

the two cases. Opposing the motion, the Bank alleged that the served upon persons interested in the subject property.
pendency of Civil Case was not a bar to the petition for a writ Hence, there is no necessity of giving notice to the petitioners
of possession because the issuance of the said writ was since they had already lost all their interests in the property
ministerial on the part of the trial court. TC denied the motion when they failed to redeem the same.
of the Spouses and ruled that the purchaser of the foreclosed
property, upon ex parte application and the posting of the Second. As a rule, any question regarding the validity of the
required bond, has the right to acquire possession of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for
foreclosed property during the 12-month redemption period. refusing the issuance of a writ of execution. The right of the
It also declared that considering that the redemption period purchaser to have possession of the subject property would
had already expired, the Bank as purchaser, can, and with not be defeated notwithstanding the pendency of a civil case
more reason, demand for a writ of possession. It also seeking the annulment of the mortgage or of the extrajudicial
emphasized that it is its ministerial duty to issue the writ of foreclosure. Indeed, under Section 8 of Act No. 3135, even if
possession in favor of a purchaser at public auction, and that the mortgagor files a petition assailing the writ of possession
such duty could not be defeated by the pendency of a civil granted to the buyer and the sale at public auction within 30
case. MR was filed by the Spouses. days from the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the
buyer at public auction of the property, and the court denies
The Spouses filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the same, the buyer may appeal the order of denial. However,
TRO and writ of PI before the CA. The CA rendered a decision the buyer at public auction remains in possession of the
denying due course to and dismissing the petition. The property pending resolution of the appeal. We have
Spouses filed an MR which the appellate court denied. The consistently ruled that it is the ministerial duty of the court to
Spouses forthwith filed their petition for review on certiorari issue writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in a
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. foreclosure sale. The trial court has no discretion on this
matter.
ISSUE: Whether CA erred in not suspending the proceedings in
LRC Case No. N-3507 because of the pendency of Civil Case No. G.R. No. 160479 June 8, 2005
109- M- 2000 filed by petitioners seeking the nullity, not only
of the foreclosure and auction sale, but also of the mortgage
itself.
SPOUSES GODOFREDO V. ARQUIZA and REMEDIOS D.
RULING: NO. In the present case, the petitioners-mortgagors ARQUIZA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
failed to redeem the property within 1 year from the EQUITABLE PCIBANK, respondents.
registration of the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale with the RD. The
respondent, being the purchaser of the property at public
auction, thus, had the right to file an ex parte motion for the
issuance of a writ of possession; and considering that it was its FACTS: Spouses Godofredo V. Arquiza and Remedios D.
ministerial duty to do so, the trial court had to grant the Arquiza, obtained a loan from private respondent Equitable
motion and to thereafter issue the writ of possession. PCI Bank for ₱2.5 million. To secure the payment thereof, the
petitioners executed a Real Estate Mortgage. When the
There was no need for the court to suspend the proceedings spouses defaulted in the payment of their loan, the private
merely and solely because the petitioners filed a complaint in respondent filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the
the RTC for the nullification of the REM, the sale at public real estate mortgage. A public auction was held on October 18,
auction and the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale issued in favor of 1999 in accordance with Act No. 3135. The property was sold
the respondent. to the private respondent as the highest bidder. Accordingly, a
Certificate of Sale over the property was issued in favor of the
First. An ex parte petition is a judicial proceeding for the private respondent. This was registered with the Registry of
enforcement of one’s right of possession as purchaser in a Deeds. Following the expiry date of the redemption period
foreclosure sale. It is not an ordinary suit filed in court, by without the petitioners having exercised their right to redeem
which one party "sues another for the enforcement of a wrong the property, the private respondent consolidated its
or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a ownership over the subject property. As a consequence, the
wrong." It is a non-litigious proceeding authorized in an Registry of Deeds issued TCT No. N-2216507 in the name of the
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage pursuant to Act No. private respondent, canceling the petitioners’ former title. The
3135, as amended. It is brought for the benefit of one party petitioners filed a complaint against the private respondent
only, and without notice to, or consent by any person and the sheriffs with the RTC for the declaration of the nullity
adversely interested. It is a proceeding where the relief is of the promissory note, real estate mortgage and the
granted without an opportunity for the person against whom foreclosure sale and damages with a plea for injunctive relief
the relief is sought to be heard. No notice is needed to be for the suspension redemption period. , the private

respondent demanded that the petitioners vacate and for possession after the one-year period for redemption has
surrender possession of the subject property, but the latter expired and after he has obtained the sheriff’s final certificate
refused to do so. This compelled the private respondent to file of sale. The basis of this right to possession is the purchaser’s
an Ex Parte Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession. They ownership of the property. The mere filing of an ex parte
filed an answer alleging that the petition was abated by the motion for the issuance of the writ of possession would suffice,
pendency of their complaint in Civil Case No. Q-98-34094 and no bond is required. Well established is the rule that after
involving the non-payment of their mortgage obligation, the the consolidation of title in the buyer’s name for failure of the
validity of the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property and mortgagor to redeem, the writ of possession becomes a
their failure to redeem the same. The petitioners prayed that matter of right. Its issuance to a purchaser in an extrajudicial
the trial court dismiss the petition outright. foreclosure is merely a ministerial function. The issuance of the
writ of possession being a ministerial function, and summary
The petitioners contend that they are legally entitled to be in nature, it cannot be said to be a judgment on the merits, but
protected in their possession over the subject property simply an incident in the transfer of title. Hence, a separate
pending the resolution of Civil Case No. Q-98-34094 for the case for annulment of mortgage and foreclosure sale cannot
declaration of nullity of the promissory note, real estate be barred by litis pendentia or res judicata. any question
mortgage, and foreclosure sale. They argue that the issuance regarding the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot
of a writ of possession preempted and pre-judged the outcome be a legal ground for refusing the issuance of a writ of
of Civil Case No. Q-98-34094. The petitioners maintain that the possession. Regardless of whether or not there is a pending
ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession suit for annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure itself,
violated the petitioners’ right to procedural due process. They the purchaser is entitled to a writ of
question the private respondent’s failure to attach the
promissory notes evidencing their loan, which would have possession, without prejudice of course to the eventual
shown that the real estate mortgage was outcome of said case. The petitioners fault the trial court for
not delving into the validity of the mortgage and the
executed prior to the execution of the said promissory notes. foreclosure proceeding before granting the petition for a writ
The petitioners aver that the private respondent failed to of possession. This contention is barren of legal basis. The
prove the validity and legality of the real estate mortgage, and judge to whom an application for writ of possession is filed
without a valid mortgage, there can be no valid foreclosure need not look into the validity of the mortgage or the manner
sale or valid title. The private respondent maintains that after
the expiration of the redemption period and the consolidation of its foreclosure. In the issuance of a writ of possession, no
of ownership over the property, it had the right to be placed in discretion is left to the trial court. Any question regarding the
possession thereof without the need of a separate and cancellation of the writ or in respect of the validity and
independent action. It posits that the right to possess an regularity of the public sale should be determined in a
extrajudicially foreclosed property is not affected by the subsequent proceeding as outlined in Section 8 of Act No.
pendency of an action for annulment of foreclosure 3135.
proceedings. The private respondent stresses that the issuance
of a writ of possession is a ministerial function of the court, and G.R. No. 196950 June 18, 2014
should be issued as a matter of course upon the filing of the
proper ex parte motion. It asserts that the petitioners were not
denied their right to due process because, notwithstanding the
grant of the writ of possession, they may still resort to another HELEN E. CABLING, assisted by her husband ARIEL
proceeding to question the regularity and validity of the CABLING, Petitioner,
foreclosure sale. It points out that the petitioners should
appreciate the fact that the court a quo allowed them to vs.
participate in the proceedings even if the motion for issuance
of a writ of possession was ex parte in nature. JOSELIN TAN LUMAPAS, as represented by NORY
ABELLANES, Respondent.
ISSUE: W/N the a case questioning the validity of the mortgage
or its foreclosure can be a legal ground for refusing the PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI
issuance of a writ of possession
HELD: NO. Indeed, it is well-settled that an ordinary action to

acquire possession in favor of the purchaser at an extrajudicial DOCTRINE: the exception provided under Section 33, Rule 39 of
foreclosure of real property is not necessary. There is no law in the Rules of Court contemplates a situation in which a third
this jurisdiction whereby the purchaser at a sheriff’s sale of real party holds the property by adverse title or right, such as that
property is obliged to bring a separate and independent suit of a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary, who possesses the

property in his own right, and is not merely the successor or independent of and even superior to that of the judgment
transferee of the right of possession of another co-owner or the debtor/mortgagor.
owner of the property.
JUANITO M. GOPIAO V METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST
FACTS: CO.
Petitioner was the highest bidder in an extrajudicial G.R. NO. 188931 JULY 28, 2014
foreclosure. A final deed of sale was issued by the sheriff and
also title to the property was duly transferred and issued in the
name of petitioner.
Petition for Review Under Rule 45
Petitioner filed an application for the issuance if a writ of
possession with the RTC. DOCTRINE: The issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser
in public auction is a ministerial function of the court, however,
The RTC granted and issued a writ of possession. it admits if a few exceptions, one of which is when a third party
in possession of the property claims a right adverse to that of
Respondent filed a Motion for Leave of Court for Intervention the debtor-mortgagor, however, in this case sale of the
as Party Defendant (with Urgent Motion to Hold in Abeyance property was not duly proven.
Implementation of Writ of Possession) in actual possession of
the foreclosed property. She claimed that the property had FACTS: Metropolitan Bank filed a Petition for the issuance of
previously been sold to her by the property’s registered owner Writ of Possession of real properties. A writ of possession was
pursuant to a Deed of Conditional Sale. issued in favor of the Bank when it purchased the subject
properties at a public auction and registered the same.
The RTC recalled and rendered ineffective the writ of Consequently, a Notice to vacate was served on Green Asia
possession issued. It held that "an ex-parte writ of possession Construction and development Corporation, represented by
issued pursuant to Act No. 3135, cannot be enforced against a spouses Legaspi.
third person who is in actual possession of the foreclosed
property and who is not in privity with the debtor/mortgagor." Upon learning the of the Notice to vacate, petitioner filed an
Affidavit of third Party Claim and a Very Urgent Motion for
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. It held that the Intervention and to Recall and/or Stop the
issuance of a writ of possession ceases to be ministerial once Enforcement/Implementation of the Writ of Possession.
it appears that there is a third party in possession of the Petitioner alleged actual occupation of the subject properties
property claiming a right adverse to that of the and claimed ownership thereof by virtue of a Deed of Sale
debtor/mortgagor, and where such third party exists, the trial dated May 20, 1995 executed by the Spouses Legaspi in his
court should conduct a hearing to determine the nature of his favor.
adverse possession.
RTC: Denied. Motion for intervention was untimely filed. It has
ISSUE: Whether or not the present case is not an exception to beeb 23 years since the alleged Deed of Absolute Sale was
the ministerial issuance of a writ of possession executed and yet he has not registered the properties in his
name. MR denied.
HELD: In this case, the general rule, and not the exception,
applies. CA: Dismissed the petition for certiorari. respondent bank was
a mortgagee in good faith. It has shown that prior to the
The Deed of Conditional Sale between the respondent and the approval of the loan application of the borrowers, it checked
subject property’s registered owner (seller) expressly reserved the records of the properties offered as collaterals at the
to the latter ownership over the property until full payment; Registry of Deeds and verified that the titles were clean.
and that only upon full payment that the seller shall execute a Moreover, it inspected the premises and found no occupants.
deed of absolute sale in favor of the respondent. Thus, it approved the loan secured by the mortgage over the
subject properties which they caused to be registered. When
It appears that no deed of absolute sale has been executed in the borrowers defaulted, it foreclosed the mortgage,
the respondent's favor. Thus, respondent's possession cannot purchased the property at the public auction and registered
be claimed as possession in the concept of an owner, as the the Certificate of Sale.
ownership and title to the subject property still then remained
with the seller. In order for the respondent not to be ousted by ISSUE/S:
the ex parte issuance of a writ of possession, her possession of 1) WON the issuance of a writ of possession was proper given
the property must be adverse in that she must prove a right that there is an adverse claim to the property?

2) WON there exists a double sale in the case and if respondent sales rule to cases where one of the two sales was good faith
Bank acted in good faith? of respondent Bank, which is really a non-issue herein. As such,
the CA erred in giving credence to the conducted in a public
RULING: auction.
1) YES, it was proper. A writ of possession is a writ of execution The court disagrees. In fact, in Express credit Financing
employed to enforce a judgment to recover the possession of Corporation v. Spouses Velasco, facts of which are strikingly
land. Under Sections 6 and 7 of Act 3135, as amended by Act similar to the case at hand, we applied the rule on double sales
4118, a writ of possession may be issued in favor of a in determining the party who has preferential right over the
purchases in a foreclosure sale of a real estate mortgage either disputed property in question. In said case, the subject
(1) within a one-year redemption period, upon the filing of a property was sold first, to respondent spouses by virtue of a
bond; or (2) after the lapse of the redemption period, without Deed of Absolute Sale and, second, to petitioner corporation
need of a bond. in a foreclosure sale of a real estate mortgage. We ruled,
however, in favor of respondent spouses due to the bad faith
It a well-established rule that the issuance of a writ of of petitioner corporation as records reveal that they were well
possession to a purchaser in public auction is a ministerial aware of the earliest sale to respondent spouses.
function of the court, however, it admits if a few exceptions,
one of which is when a third party in possession of the property
claims a right adverse to that of the debtor- mortgagor, as this
Court has time and again upheld in numerous cases. Petitioner In contrast, the CA aptly noted the good faith of respondent
cites several jurisprudence, While the facts of the foregoing Bank in this case. In its decision, it has sufficiently shown that
rulings are similar to that of the instant case, there remains one prior to the approval of the loan application of the Spouses
crucial difference: the certainty of possession. In all three cases Legaspi, it checked the records of the properties offered as
cited by the petitioner, the fact that the subject property was collaterals at the Register of deeds and verified that the titles
actually in the possession of the adverse third party is were clean.
undisputed. In fact, it was proven that the mortgagee-banks
therein even had actual knowledge of the third parties’ For the sake of argument, that the Spouses Legaspi actually
adverse possession. But in spite of this, the mortgagee-banks sold the subject properties to both petitioner and respondent
insisted on obtaining writs of possession instead of pursuing Bank. The same is on the supposition that the first sale to the
independent actions to assert their claims. petitioner had indeed taken place. However, as mentioned
above, there is doubt as to whether petitioner had truly
In contrast, petitioner’s possession of the subject properties in purchased the properties subject of this case. What can be
this case is questionable. As correctly observed by the courts derived from the CA’s discussion is that even if petitioner is
below, petitioner failed to substantiate his possession with able to establish his possession, he would still have to
sufficient evidence. On its face, the Deed of Absolute Sale overcome the rule on double sale wherein the good faith of
relied upon by petitioner is neither complete nor in due form. respondent Bank is material.
Certain essential details are missing therein, such as the tax
account numbers of the interested parties and the names of
the witnesses. More importantly, the same was not notarized. G.R. No. 196040 August 26, 2014
Petitioner failed to prove due execution and authenticity of the
document. FE H. OKABE, Petitioner, vs. ERNESTO A. SATURNINO,
Respondent.
Upon verification at the Office of the register of deeds,
municipal assessor and treasurer’s office, respondent bank
found out that the subject titles and latest tax declarations
covering the disputed properties were still registered under Petition for Review on Certiorari
the names of the Spouses Legaspi without any annotation on
the same as to the existence of a sale between said spouses DOCTRINE: The remedy of a writ of possession, a remedy that
and petitioner. is available to the mortgagee-purchaser to acquire possession
of the foreclosed property from the mortgagor, is made
2. YES, there is double sale and respondent Bank acted in good available to a subsequent purchaser, but only after hearing and
faith. According to the petitioner, the rule on double sales after determining that the subject property is still in the
under Article 154433 of the Civil Code is inapplicable herein possession of the mortgagor. Unlike if the purchaser is the
since there is no double sale to speak of; the first transaction, mortgagee or a third party during the redemption period, a
a sale and the second mortgage. We disagree. On the contrary, writ of possession may issue ex-parte or without hearing. In
jurisprudence is replete with rulings that apply the double other words, if the purchaser is a third party who acquired the
property after the redemption period, a hearing must be
conducted to determine whether possession over the subject RULING
property is still with the mortgagor or is already in the
possession of a third party holding the same adversely to the Sec. 7 of Act No. 3135 states that the purchaser or the
defaulting debtor or mortgagor. If the property is in the mortgagee who is also the purchaser in the foreclosure sale
possession of the mortgagor, a writ of possession could thus be may apply for a writ of possession during the redemption
issued. Otherwise, the remedy of a writ of possession is no period, upon an ex parte motion after furnishing a bond.
longer available to such purchaser, but he can wrest possession
over the property through an ordinary action of ejectment. The issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in an
extrajudicial foreclosure is summary and ministerial in nature
FACTS as such proceeding is merely an incident in the transfer of title.
In China Banking Corp. v. Ordinario, it was held that the
Respondent and his wife obtained a loan with PNB secured by purchaser in a foreclosure sale is entitled to possession of the
the wife’s property. Because of the couple’s failure to settle property. In the case of Spouses Marquez v. Spouses Alindog,
their obligation, PNB extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage. the Court allowed the purchaser in a foreclosure sale to
demand possession of the land during the redemption period
A Certificate of Sale was inscribed on the TCT of the subject but upon the posting of a bond.
property. The property was not redeemed by respondent
during the redemption period, thus consolidation of However, in this case, petitioner does not fall under the
ownership was inscribed and a new TCT was issued in favor of circumstances mentioned above. She bought the property
PNB. long after the expiration of the redemption period. Thus, it is
PNB, if it was the purchaser in the foreclosure sale, or the
Without taking possession of the property, PNB sold the land purchaser during the foreclosure sale, who can file the ex parte
to petitioner Fe H. Okabe. Petitioner later filed before the RTC petition.
an Ex-Parte Petition for the Issuance of Writ of Possession over
the subject property, to which respondent submitted an But in this case, the REM contains a waiver executed by the
Opposition with Motion to Dismiss. mortgagor allowing the mortgagee to take actual possession
of the mortgaged properties without the necessity of any
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss and opined that the judicial order or permission. Moreover, even without the
issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the petitioner as waiver, the issuance of the writ of possession is ministerial and
merely a ministerial and complementary duty of the court. The non-adversarial for the only issue involved is the purchaser’s
RTC subsequently denied respondent’s MR. right to possession; thus, an ex parte proceeding is allowed.
On certiorari before the CA, the CA reversed and set aside, Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser
issuing a TRO enjoining the RTC from hearing the petition. Still, or redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all the
the RTC was able to render a decision in favor of petitioner, rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment debtor to the
granting her ex-parte petition. Thus, the writ of possession was property, and its possession shall be given to the purchaser or
implemented. last redemptioner unless a third party is actually holding the
property adversely to the judgment debtor. In which case, the
However, the CA eventually issued a resolution granting the issuance of the writ of possession ceases to be ex-parte and
issuance of a TRO in favor of respondent and commanding non-adversarial. Thus, where the property levied upon on
petitioner and the RTC to refrain from committing any acts execution is occupied by a party other than a judgment debtor,
relative to the proceedings before it upon the posting of a the procedure is for the court to conduct a hearing to
bond. determine the nature of said possession, i.e., whether or not
he is in possession of the subject property under a claim
The RTC responded by informing the CA that the former can no
adverse to that of the judgment debtor.
longer do so because the writ of possession had already been
implemented by the branch sheriff. Eventually, the CA granted It is but logical that Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court be
the petition for certiorari and ordered the orders of the RTC applied to cases involving extrajudicially foreclosed properties
vacated. that were bought by a purchaser and later sold to third-party-
purchasers after the lapse of the redemption period. The
After denial of MR, this instant petition was filed.
remedy of a writ of possession, a remedy that is available to
ISSUE the mortgagee-purchaser to acquire possession of the
foreclosed property from the mortgagor, is made available to
Whether or not an ex-parte petition for the issuance of a writ a subsequent purchaser, but only after hearing and after
of possession was the proper remedy of the petitioner in determining that the subject property is still in the possession
obtaining possession of the subject property. (NO, but petition of the mortgagor. Unlike if the purchaser is the mortgagee or
granted on other grounds) a third party during the redemption period, a writ of

possession may issue ex-parte or without hearing. In other P55, 000.00 loan. Prudential Bank, through counsel, filed two
words, if the purchaser is a third party who acquired the separate petitions for foreclosure of the mortgage.
property after the redemption period, a hearing must be
conducted to determine whether possession over the subject In their first petition, Prudential Bank admitted that through
property is still with the mortgagor or is already in the inadvertence, the photocopies of the first two pages of the
possession of a third party holding the same adversely to the REM covering the properties in Laguna were mixed and
defaulting debtor or mortgagor. If the property is in the attached to the photocopies of the last two pages of the REM
possession of the mortgagor, a writ of possession could thus covering the Quezon City property. Thus, in the Notice of
be issued. Otherwise, the remedy of a writ of possession is no Sheriff's Sale, the name "Guellerma Malabanan rep. by her AIF
longer available to such purchaser, but he can wrest David M. Castro" appeared as mortgagor while the amount of
possession over the property through an ordinary action of mortgaged indebtedness is P96, 870.20. The real property
ejectment. described therein however is the Quezon City property. After
which, the Quezon City property was sold at a public auction in
To be sure, immediately requiring the subsequent purchaser favor of Prudential Bank whose winning bid was P396, 000.00.
to file a separate case of ejectment instead of a petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession, albeit not ex-parte, will only In their Complaint, Spouses Castro alleged that the
prolong the proceedings and unduly deny the subsequent extrajudicial foreclosure and sale of the Quezon City property
purchaser of possession of the property which he already is null and void for lack of notice and publication of the
bought. extrajudicial foreclosure sale. Spouses Castro proffered that
the property foreclosed is not one of the properties covered
G.R. No. 195272 January 14, 2015 by the REM executed by Guellerma Malabanan which was the
basis of the Notice of Sheriff's Sale which was posted and
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS (FORMERLY published.
PRUDENTIAL BANK), Petitioner, v. SPOUSES DAVID M.
CASTRO AND CONSUELO B. CASTRO, Respondents. Prudential Bank cited a clerical and harmless inadvertence in
the preparation of the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure.
The issue before the RTC was whether Prudential Bank legally
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI complied with the jurisdictional requirement of due notice
prior to the extrajudicial sale of the property in question.
DOCTRINE: The object of a notice of sale is to inform the public
of the nature and condition of the property to be sold, and of The trial court ruled IN FAVOR OF PRUDENTIAL BANK and
the time, place and terms of the sale. Notices are given for the dismissed the complaint
purpose of securing bidders and to prevent a sacrifice of the
On appeal, the Court of Appeals REVERSED the ruling of the
property. If these objects are attained, immaterial errors and
mistakes will not affect the sufficiency of the notice; but if trial court. The appellate court stressed the importance of
notice in a foreclosure sale and ruled that failure to advertise
mistakes or omissions occur in the notices of sale, which are
a mortgage foreclosure sale in compliance with statutory
calculated to deter or mislead bidders, to depreciate the value
of the property, or to prevent it from bringing a fair price, such requirements constitutes a jurisdictional defect invalidating
mistakes or omissions will be fatal to the validity of the notice, the sale.
and also to the sale made pursuant thereto.
Prudential Bank filed a MR.
FACTS: In a Resolution, the CA, expounded on the previous Decision.
The appellate court clarified that the erroneous designation of
The Complaint has its origins from the two loans contracted by
Guellerma Malabanan as mortgagor, instead of David, did not
respondent Spouses David M. Castro (David) and Consuelo B.
affect the validity of the notice. With respect to the amount of
Castro (Consuelo) from Prudential Bank in the amounts of
the mortgaged indebtedness however, the appellate court
P100, 000.00 and P55, 000.00. The P100,000.00 loan was
noted that the discrepancy vis-a-vis the actual amount owed
secured by a REM over petitioners' property located in Quezon
by Spouses Castro is so huge that it can hardly be considered
City while the P55, 000.00 loan was secured by another REM
immaterial. The appellate court opined that declaring a small
over two parcels of land located in Alaminos, Laguna,
amount of indebtedness in the petition for extrajudicial
registered in the name of David's mother, Guellerma
foreclosure and in the notice of sheriff's sale would effectively
Malabanan
depreciate the value of the property. The appellate court then
The loans remained unpaid and the balances ballooned to concluded that statutory provisions governing publication of
P290, 205.05 on the P100, 000.00 loan and P96, 870.20 on the notice of mortgage foreclosure sales must be strictly complied
with and that even slight deviations will invalidate the notice.

ISSUE: "penalties, charges, attorney's fees and all legal fees and
expenses for the foreclosure and sale."
Whether or not the errors in the Notice of Sheriff's Sale
invalidate the notice and render the sale and the certificate of As regards the designation of Guellerma Malabanan as the
such sale void? mortgagor, we rule that the erroneous designation of an entity
as the mortgagor does not invalidate the notice of sale.
HELD:
There is much significance in the fact that David admitted on
NO. The errors in the Notice of Sheriff's Sale will not the witness stand that he knew that there was an application
invalidate the notice and render the sale and the certificate of for foreclosure on their Quezon City property but the REM
such sale void. used as basis of the foreclosure covered the Laguna properties.
Upon learning this information, he should have registered his
At the outset, it bears emphasis that foreclosure proceedings objection or sought clarification from the sheriff's office.
have in their favor the presumption of regularity and the party Instead, he let the public auction run its course and belatedly
who seeks to challenge the proceedings has the burden of objected to the sale.
evidence to rebut the same. In this case, respondent failed to
prove that Prudential Bank has not complied with the notice WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
requirement of the law.
G.R. No. 212674, March 25, 2019
In Philippine National Bank v. Maraya, Jr., we elucidated that
one of the most important requirements of Act No. 3135 is that CENTRAL VISAYAS FINANCE CORPORATION, PETITIONER, v.
the notice of the time and place of sale shall be given. SPOUSES ELIEZER S. ADLAWAN AND LEILA ADLAWAN, AND
SPOUSES ELIEZER ADLAWAN, SR. AND ELENA ADLAWAN,
If the sheriff acts without notice, or at a time and place other RESPONDENTS.
than that designated in the notice, the sheriff acts without
warrant of law
The object of a notice of sale is to inform the public of the PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI
nature and condition of the property to be sold, and of the
time, place and terms of the sale. Notices are given for the DOCTRINE: In case of a loan secured by a mortgage, the
purpose of securing bidders and to prevent a sacrifice of the creditor has a single cause of action against the debtor - the
property. If these objects are attained, immaterial errors and recovery of the credit with execution upon the security. The
mistakes will not affect the sufficiency of the notice; but if creditor cannot split his single cause of action by filing a
mistakes or omissions occur in the notices of sale, which are: complaint on the loan, and thereafter another separate
complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage.
1. calculated to deter or mislead bidders,
FACTS: Respondents Eliezer and Leila Adlawan obtained a loan
2. to depreciate the value of the property, or from petitioner Central Visayas Finance Corporation covered
3. to prevent it from bringing a fair price, such by a Promissory Note, Chattel Mortgage over a Komatsu
Highway Dump Truck, and a Continuing Guaranty executed by
mistakes or omissions will be fatal to the validity
respondents Eliezer, Sr. and Elena Adlawan.
of the notice, and also to the sale made
pursuant thereto Eliezer and Leila Adlawan failed to pay the loan, prompting
With jurisprudence as the measure, the errors pointed out by petitioner to file an action against respondents for replevin
before the RTC.
respondents appear to be harmless. The evils that can result
from an erroneous notice did not arise. There was no intention RTC: IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER. Foreclose the chattel mortgage
to mislead, as the errors in fact did not mislead the bidders as and caused sale at public auction.
shown by the fact that the winning registered bid of
P396,000.00 is over and above the real amount of A second case case was file for the collection of sum of money
indebtedness of P209,205.05. As correctly observed by the and/or deficiency judgment relative to respondents' supposed
trial court, the amount mentioned in the notice did not unpaid balance on their loan with damages. This time,
indicate a collusion between the sheriff who conducted the petitioner in its Amended Complaint sought to hold
sale and the respondent bank. Notably, the mentioned respondents Eliezer, Sr. and Elena Adlawan liable on their
amount of P96,870.20 refers to the mortgage indebtedness continuing guaranty.
not the value of the property. Equally notable is the
announcement in the notice that the amount excludes RTC: IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS. Instant complaint is barred
by res judicata. Remedy should be appeal.

CA: DENIED petitioner’s appeal. AFFIRMED RTC. Only Petitioner's complaint for replevin was doubtless a mixed
substantial identity is necessary to warrant the application of action - in rem with respect to its prayer for the recovery of the
res judicata and the addition or elimination of some parties vessel, and in personam with respect to its claim for damages.
would not even alter the situation. There is substantial identity And it was, with respect to its alternative prayer, clearly one in
of parties when there is a community of interest between the personam.
party in the first case and a party in the second case albeit the
latter was not impleaded in the first case. Following paragraph (b) of Section 49, Rule 39 of the 1964
Rules of Court, now [Section] 47 of Rule 39 of the present
ISSUE: WON an action for replevin bars a deficiency suit and Rules, petitioner's second complaint is unquestionably barred
res judicata will apply by res judicata.
HELD: YES. The case for replevin was in the alternative, and not Luz V. Fallarme, vs. Romeo Pagedped
cumulative or successive, to wit: recover possession of the G.R. No. 247229 ; September 3, 2020
dump truck, or, if recovery is no longer feasible, a money
judgment for the outstanding loan amount. Petitioner did not FACTS:
pray for both reliefs cumulatively or successively. "The rule is In 1999, spouses Avilas obtained a loan from Pagedped
that a party is entitled only to such relief consistent with and secured by a real estate mortgage over the subject property in
limited to that sought by the pleadings or incidental thereto. A Baguio City. The real estate mortgage was annotated on the
trial court would be acting beyond its jurisdiction if it grants title. An owner’s duplicate copy of the TCT was given to him.
relief to a party beyond the scope of the pleadings."
In 2005, Spouses Avilas failed to settle their obligation,
By praying for recovery of possession with a money judgment Pagedped judicially foreclosed the mortgage. Pagedped
as a mere alternative relief in the replevin case, and when it emerged as the highest bidder.
did not pursue a claim for deficiency at any time during the
proceedings in said case, including appeal, petitioner led the One year after the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale was recorded,
courts to believe that it was not interested in suing for a Pagedped consolidated his ownership over the property. The
deficiency so long as it recovered possession of the dump TCT that was issued to him carried over all annotations from
truck; after all, the basis of its alternative relief for collection the TCT previously covering the land. Pagedped discovered
of the outstanding loan is the same as that of its prayer for that several annotations were made in the name of Fallarme.
replevin. Its actions were thus consistent with and limited to
the allegations and relief sought in its pleadings. This Fallarme instituted a case before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
consistency in action carried on until the dump truck was against spouses Avilas. A Notice of Attachment and a Notice of
foreclosed and sold at auction. Levy were issued involving one-half of the subject property. In
the public auction, Fallarme emerged as the highest bidder.
In case of a loan secured by a mortgage, the creditor has a
single cause of action against the debtor - the recovery of the In 2010, surprised by the Notice of Attachment and Notice of
credit with execution upon the security. The creditor cannot Levy annotated at the back of his TCT, Pagedped filed a petition
split his single cause of action by filing a complaint on the loan, for the cancellation of all annotations. Pagedped claimed that
and thereafter another separate complaint for foreclosure of the Deed of REM executed in his favor was annotated earlier
the mortgage. than Fallarme’s, yet, despite knowing this encumbrance,
Fallarme did not notify Pagedped of the foreclosure.
Replevin, broadly understood, is both a form of principal
remedy and of a provisional relief. It may refer either to the
Fallarme maintained that she had ½ interest in the property.
action itself, i.e., to regain the possession of personal chattels
Pagedped refused her offer to redeem half of the property,
being wrongfully detained from the plaintiff by another, or to
which prompted Fallarme to file a complaint for redemption
the provisional remedy that would allow the plaintiff to retain
and consignation.
the thing during the pendency of the action and hold it
pendente lite. The action is primarily possessory in nature and
ISSUE:
generally determines nothing more than the right of
possession. Replevin is so usually described as a mixed action,
Whether or not Fallarme has the equity of redemption over
being partly in rem and partly in personam — in rem insofar as
her interest in the property.
the recovery of specific property is concerned, and in
personam as regards to damages involved. As an action in rem,
HELD:
the gist of the replevin action is the right of the plaintiff to
obtain possession of specific personal property by reason of his
YES. Under Rule 68 of the Rules of Court, all persons having or
being the owner or of his having a special interest therein.
claiming an interest in the premises subordinate in right should
be made defendants in the action for foreclosure. While failure
to do so will not invalidate the foreclosure proceedings, the FACTS: A parcel of land in Malolos was originally owned by
equity of redemption of the persons not joined as defendants Januario Avendaño (Januario)
still exists.
Januario died intestate and the lot was inherited by his heirs.
Under Equity of Redemption, after the foreclosure sale but Januario’s heirs sold 3⁄4 of their share of the lot to respondents
before its confirmation, the mortgagor may exercise his right Ernesto Roque and Victor Roque. (Respondents)
to pay the proceeds of the sale and prevent the confirmation
of the sale. Subsequently, in an unnotarized "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan",
respondents purportedly sold their 3/4 undivided portion to
The lien-holders not joined in the foreclosure action will not be their half-sister, petitioner Concepcion Roque (Concepcion).
affected by the judgment in the mortgagor’s favor. They retain The property, however, remained registered in the name of
the foreclosed equity of redemption, and a separate Januario.
foreclosure proceeding should be brought to require them to
redeem from the party acquiring title to the mortgaged The subject lot was surveyed and a Geodetic Engineer
property at the foreclosure sale, within 90 days from the date identified and delineated the 1/4 portion of the property that
the decision becomes final. still belonged to respondents and the 3/4 portion that was sold
to petitioner Concepion.
In this case, when Pagedped judicially foreclosed the property
in 2005, he failed to join Fallarme as defendant in the Concepcion claimed that the partition was agreed upon.
foreclosure proceedings. Pagedped filed a petition for the However, respondents refused to acknowledge Concepcion’s
cancellation of all annotations in his title, not a separate claim of ownership of any portion of the subject lot.
foreclosure proceeding to require Fallarme to redeem from
him the contested property.
Therefore, Fallarme’s equity of redemption remained Concepcion filed a Complaint for "Partition with Specific
unaffected. Performance" with the then Court of First Instance of Malolos
against respondents. Concepcion claimed legal ownership of
RULE 69 an undivided 3⁄4 portion of the subject lot, pursuant to the
unnotarized "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan" executed in her
CONCEPCION ROQUE, PETITIONER, favor. Respondents impugned the genuineness and due
execution of the "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan" and argued
V. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ERNESTO further that they merely tolerated Concepcion’s occupation of
ROQUE, FILOMENA OSMUNDO, CECILIA ROQUE, the lot.
MARCELA ROQUE, JOSE ROQUE AND RUBEN ROQUE,
RESPONDENTS. RTC: Rendered a Decision in favor of Concepcion, and ordered
the execution of the deed of sale.Respondents appealed the
G.R. NO. 75886AUGUST 30, 1988 decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)
IAC: REVERSED the decision of the RTC. It ruled that the case
is one of ownership. Therefore, an action for partition will not
PETITION FOR REVIEW prosper. The RTC should have dismissed the case and
Concepcion can refile it through accion reivindicatoria. A
DOCTRINE: “If, upon the other hand, the court after trial should Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner Concepcion Roque
find the existence of co-ownership among the parties litigant, was denied.
the court may and should order the partition of the property in
the same action. Judgment for one or the other party being on ISSUE/S: Whether IAC erred in reversing the decision of the
the merits, the losing party may then appeal the same. In either RTC
case, however, it is quite unnecessary to require the plaintiff to
file another action, separate and independent from that for HELD: YES. The Supreme Court did not agree with the IAC. An
partition originally instituted. Functionally, an action for action for partition-which is typically brought by a person
partition may be seen to be at once an action for declaration of claiming to be co-owner of a specified property against a
co ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a defendant or defendants whom the plaintiff recognizes to be
determinate portion of the property involved” co-owners — may be seen to present simultaneously two
principal issues. First, there is the issue of whether the plaintiff
is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned.
Second, assuming that the plaintiff successfully hurdles the

first issue, there is the secondary issue of how the property is While the action for the partition of the thing owned in
to be divided between plaintiff and defendant(s) — i.e., what common (actio communi dividendo or actio familiae
portion should go to which co-owner. erciscundae) does not prescribe, the co-ownership does not
last forever since it may be repudiated by a co- owner. In such
Should the trial court find that the respondents do not dispute a case, the action for partition does not lie. What may be
the status of Concepcion as co-owner, the court can forthwith brought by the aggrieved co-owner is an accion reivindicatoria
proceed to the actual partitioning of the property involved. In or action for recovery of title and possession. That action may
case the respondent assert in their Answer exclusive title in be barred by prescription.
themselves adversely to Concepcion, the court should not
dismiss Concepcion’s action for partition but, on the contrary If the co-heir or co-owner having possession of the hereditary
and in the exercise of its general jurisdiction, resolve the or community property, holds the same in his own name, that
question of whether Concepcion is a co-owner or not. is, under claim of exclusive ownership, he may acquire the
property by prescription if his possession meets all the other
If the trial court found that Concepcion was unable to sustain requirements of the law, and after the expiration of the
her claimed status as co-owner, or that the respondents are or prescriptive period, his co- heir or co-owner may lose their
have become the sole and exclusive owners of the property right to demand partition, and their action may then be held
involved, the court will necessarily have to dismiss the action to have prescribed
for partition. This result would be reached, not because the
wrong action was commenced by Concepcion, but rather First of all, Concepcion has been and is presently in open and
because she was unable to show her co-ownership rights, no continuous possession of a 3/4 portion of the property owned
basis exists for requiring the respondents to submit to partition in common. Second, co-ownership of the property had
the property at stake. If, upon the other hand, the court after continued to be recognized by all the owners since none of
trial should find the existence of co- ownership among the them claimed ownership over the entire lot. Consequently, the
parties litigant, the court may and should order the partition action for partition could not have and, as a matter of fact, had
of the property in the same action. Judgment for one or the not yet been prescribed at the time of institution by
other party being on the merits, the losing party (respondents Concepcion of the action below.
in this case) may then appeal the same. In either case,
however, it is quite unnecessary to require the plaintiff to file Further, the validity of the "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan" already
another action, separate and independent from that for prescribed because respondents did not contest it within 4
partition originally instituted. Functionally, an action for years.
partition may be seen to be at once an action for declaration
of co ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the Decision of the
determinate portion of the property involved. This is the Intermediate Appellate Court dated 31 July 1986 in A.C.-G.R.
import of our jurisprudence on the matter and is sustained by CV No. 02248 is SET ASIDE with respect to that portion which
the public policy which abhors multiplicity of actions. orders the dismissal of the Complaint in Civil Case No. 5236-M,
but is AFFIRMED with respect to that portion which orders the
The question of prescription also needs to be addressed in this dismissal of the respondents' appeal in A.C.-G.R. CV No. 02248.
connection. It is sometimes said that "the action for partition The Decision of Branch 9 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos
of the thing owned in common (actio communi dividendo or dated 27 June 1983 in Civil Case No. 5236-M is hereby
actio familiae erciscundae) does not prescribe." This statement REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
bears some refinement. In the words of Article 494 of the Civil
Code, "each co- owner may demand at any time the partition
of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is
concemed." No matter how long the co-ownership has lasted, G.R. L-47360 December 15, 1986
a co- owner can always opt out of the co-ownership, and
provided the defendant co-owners or co-heirs have
theretofore expressly or impliedly recognized the co-
ownership, they cannot set up as a defense the prescription of PETRA FABRICA, EUGENIO BAS, PETRONA BAS, ANTONIO
the action for partition. But if the respondents show that they BAS, VICENTE BAS, FLAVIANA BAS, JOSEFINA BAS,
had previously asserted title in themselves adversely to the NUMERIANA BAS, PASCUAL ZAFRA, MARCIAL BAS, RUFINA
plaintiff and for the requisite period of time, Concepcion's right LAREGO, FAUSTA OBEJERO, TEOFILO TABAY, VICTORIA
to require recognition of her status as a co-owner will have OBEJERO, PEDRO GAHUM, ARSENIO CANEDA, FAUSTINA
been lost by prescription and the court cannot issue an order BAS, MOISES BAS, and GIL OBEJERO, petitioners, vs.
requiring partition. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ZACARIAS BAS,
CIPRIANO BAS, ELEUTERIA BAS, AGUSTIN BAS, ISIDRO
OBEJERO, DEMETRIA BAS, JOSE BAS, OSMUNDO BAS,

ANDREA BAS, VIVENCIA BAS, FRANCISCO BAS, ESTELITA RTC ruled that the only issue to be resolved in this case is
BAS, BUENAVENTURA BAS, JUANA BAS, DOMINGO BAS, whether Lots Nos. 2464 and 2467 registered in the name of the
DOLORES BAS and DULCE BAS, respondents. legal heirs of Catalino Bas are still owned in common pro-
indiviso by the heirs of Catalino and Cristeta, or whether the
said lots belong exclusively to Pedro Bas or his heirs. It
rendered declaring Lots Nos. 2464 and 2467 of the Talisay-
Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate in the name of the Legal Heirs of
PETITION TO REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 Catalino Bas, as properties still owned in common by the heirs
of Catalino Bas and Cristeta Niebres, and ordering their
DOCTRINE: Unless this issue of ownership is definitely and partition among the children of Catalino Niebres, Alberto,
finally resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of Andres, Deogracias, Miguel, and Pedro, all surnamed Bas and
the disputed properties. Thus, when the trial court rendered its or their heirs.
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, rejecting defendants' claim
of exclusive ownership of the properties by oral partition, it Petitioners appealed to the CA which ruled that the judgment
rendered a final or definitive judgment on the merits from of the court a quo in the partition case is not appealable, it
which the party adversely affected can make an appeal. being interlocutory, and ordered the remanding of the case to
the lower court.
FACTS:
ISSUE: Whether or not the lots in question registered ddin the
All the plaintiffs, except for defendant Petra Fabrica who is the name of legal heirrs of Catalino are still owned in
surviving spouse of Pedro Bas, and the other defendants are common pro-indiviso by the heirs of Catalina and Cristeta?
the grandchildren and/or great grandchildren of spouses
Catalino Bas and Cristeta Niebres, who died in 1916 and 1930, HELD:
respectively, leaving six (6) children, namely: Alberto, Andres,
Diogracias, Miguel, Pedro and Restituta, all surnamed Bas, now Yes. The instant case is for partition of properties left by the
all deceased. deceased spouses Catalino and Cristeta filed with the lower
court by private respondents against petitioners. In their
Spouses Catalino and Cristeta during their lifetime possessed amended complaint for partition filed with the private
and owned, and, after their deaths, left to their 6 aforenamed respondents herein alleged among other things that after the
children, 8 parcels of land, situated in Cebu, and known as death of Restituta Bas the defendants (Petra Fabrica and her
Lots Nos. 2464, 2467 (the lots in question), 2528, 2535, 2542, children) took possession of the 2 parcels of land in question
2549, 2552 and 4041 of the Talisay- Minglanilla Friar Lands and claimed that they are the owners thereof; and despite
Estate. repeated demands for partition made upon them, the
defendants refused and still refuse to partition the same,
Plaintiffs: Zacarias Bas is the only surviving child and only heir thereby depriving the plaintiffs of their shares in the products
of Miguel Bas; Juana, Domingo, Dolores and Dulce all of the said land notwithstanding the fact that deeds of
surnamed Bas, are the only surviving children and heirs of conveyance over Lot No. 2464 and Lot No. 2467 were made in
Alberto Bas; Cipriano, Numeriana, Eleuteria, Marcial, Faustina, favor of the legal heirs of Catalino. The defendants in their
Agustin and Moises, all surnamed Bas, and Victoria, Isidro, Gil, answer as their affirmative defenses alleged among other
and Fausta, all surnamed Obejero, are the only surviving things that Pedro Bas took possession of lots Nos. 2464 and
grandchildren and heirs of Diogracias Bas, by his son Rufino Bas 2467 in 1929 after Cristeta and her children orally and
and daughter Eulogia Bas-Obejero, respectively, both extrajudicially partitioned the estate left by Catalino, and that
deceased; and Fortunata, Demetria, Jose, children and widow Lots Nos. 2464 and 2467 were given to Pedro Bas while Lot
of Alberto Bas who moved to Cotabato a few years ago. 2528 was given to the 6 children, subject to the usufruct of
Cristeta during her lifetime, and Lots Nos. 2542, 2549, 2552
and 4041 were given to Alberto, Andres, Deogracias, Miguel
and Restituta Bas; and that since 1929 up to the present, they
Lots in question were originally sold on installments payable in have been in the actual physical, material and exclusive
10 and 18 regular yearly installments by the Talisay-Minglanilla possession and dominion of the lots in question, declaring
Friar Lands Estate to spouses Catalino and Cristeta , and same for taxation and paying the taxes thereon in the name of
patents were issues the "The Legal Heirs of Catalino Bas, Pooc, Pedro Bas, planting them to corn and coconuts and enjoying
Talisay, Cebu". Restituta Bas died single and without issue in the fruits thereof to the exclusion of Restituta Bas and of all
1966 in Cebu. That the total assessed value of the above others.
described lots in question is P1,640.00.
The records of the case clearly reveal that the main purpose of
the complaint is to determine who between the parties are the

true owners and entitled to the exclusive use of the disputed appeals in a single case' is of lesser import and consequence. "
properties. While it is true that the complaint is one for We reiterate the validity of that doctrine and find it clearly
partition, it is one which is premised on the resolution of the applicable in this case. Indeed, it would be more conducive to
issue on the validity of the oral partition allegedly made in the speedy and inexpensive determination of the case, if the
favor of defendants and the two deeds of conveyance issue of the validity of the two deeds of sale is first finally
executed in the names of the heirs of the deceased spouses resolved by the Appellate Court before the question of
Catalino and Cristeta. Unless this issue of ownership is partition can be taken up by the trial court.”
definitely and finally resolved, it would be premature to effect
a partition of the disputed properties. Thus, when the trial WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered SETTING ASIDE the
court rendered its judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, rejecting assailed decision of the respondent Court of Appeals and
defendants' claim of exclusive ownership of the properties by ordering the same to give due course to petitioners' appeal
oral partition, it rendered a final or definitive judgment on the and to decide the appeal on the merits. Let the records of the
merits from which the party adversely affected can make an case be remanded to the Court of Appeals for further
appeal. In Valdez case the Court held that: “Contrary to the proceedings
holding of the Appellate Court, the decision of the trial court
declaring null the aforesaid conveyances and granting recovery G.R. No. 17080 April 03, 2007
of the properties for the purpose of ordering their partition is
a definitive judgment because it decided the rights of the
parties upon the issue submitted. It was not, therefore, an
interlocutory order. As this Court enunciated in Miranda, et al. CONSOLACION Q. AUSTRIA, petitioners, vs. CONSUELO Q.
v. CA, et al. supra, a judgment which grants recovery of the JALANDONI, JOSE ALBERTO L. QUINTOS, RICARDO M.
ownership and possession of property in favor of one party as QUINTOS, JR., AILEEN M. QUINTOS, AND TYRONE M.
against the adverse claim of title of the other is in effect a final QUINTOS, respondents.
judgment which is appealable. In Miranda, this Court
considered as the better rule the one enunciated in H.E.
Heacock Co. vs. American Trading Co., to wit; that where the
primary purpose of a case is to ascertain and determine who, FACTS:
as between plaintiff and defendant, is the true owner and
entitled to the exclusive use of the disputed property, the Plaintiffs-appellees Constancia Lichauco, Consuelo Jalandoni,
judgment rendered by the lower court is a judgment on the defendants Benedicto Quintos and Antonio Quintos, and
merits as to those questions, and that the order for an defendant-appellant Consolacion Austriaare siblings of full
accounting is merely incidental to such judgment. We blood. Jose Alberto, Ricardo, Jr., Aileen and Tyrone Quintos,
explained therein that if said judgment is merely considered are the nephews and niece of the defendant-appellant.
interlocutory subject to the control of the judge, there would
be as many decisions to be taken up on appeal as there were The above-named persons are co-owners of two (2) parcels of
successor judges inclined to review or reverse his land located in Palanan, Makati City. The aforesaid parcels of
predecessor's judgment. "With none of the parties adversely land have permanent improvements thereon which straddle
affected able to appeal from any of the fluctuating decisions both lots, namely, a residential bungalow and two (2) units,
for as long as the accounting has not been terminated." Such two-storey apartments, the titles of which are registered
unbridled power of the Court to change at will its judgment jointly in the names of the parties as co-owners thereof.
does violence to the very purpose for which courts are
organized which is to put an end to controversy. This Court The plaintiffs-appellees allege that they informed defendant-
adverted to the fact that "imperative considerations of public appellant Austria of their desire to have the subject properties
policy and of sound practice in the courts and adherence to the partitioned based on the percentage of each co-owner's
constitutional mandate of simplified, just, speedy, and respective share. However, Austria refused to the partition.
inexpensive determination of every action call for considering Because of the refusal of the defendant-appellant Austria to
such judgments for recovery of property with accounting as partition the property, and the inability of the co-owners to
final judgments which are duly appealable (and would mutually agree on an arrangement acceptable to all of them,
therefore become final and executory if not appealed within the plaintiffs-appellees filed a complaint with the RTC against
the reglementary period) with the accounting as a mere the defendant-appellant Austria and two other defendants,
incident of the judgment to be rendered during the course of Benedicto Quintos and Antonio Quintos (as unwilling co-
the appeal as provided in Rule 39, section 4 or to be plaintiffs) for partition of the subject property.
implemented at the execution stage upon final affirmance on
appeal of the judgment ... and that the only reason given in Within the period for filing an answer, Austria filed an
Fuentebella for the contrary ruling, viz, "the general harm that
would follow from throwing the door open to multiplicity of

Omnibus Motion to Dismiss. The RTC denied the omnibus for lack of merit. Austria elevated the case to the CA and
motion to dismiss and directed the defendants to file their averred that her motion for new trial and appeal of the
answer within the remaining period provided by the Rules. judgment by default are valid remedies under the Rules of
Within the prescriptive period, Austria filed a Motion for Court. She insists that the appellate court erred in not
Reconsideration, which the lower court denied. Not satisfied, reversing the declaration of default despite the fact that she
Austria filed before the CA a Petition for certiorari and questioned the default order in the petition for review which
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, she seasonably filed with the CA.
seeking to annul the orders of November 10, 1997 (denial of
the Omnibus Motion to Dismiss) and February 2, 1998 (denial ISSUE: W/N the trial court's decision alternatively ordering the
of the Motion for Reconsideration). partition of the subject property or authorizing its sale is valid?
The CA dismissed Austria’s petition for certiorari and HELD: NO. There are two stages in every action for partition.
The first phase is the determination of whether a co-ownership
prohibition. Austria then moved for the reconsideration in fact exists and a partition is proper, i.e., not otherwise legally
thereof, which was also denied. proscribed, and may be made by voluntary agreement of all
the parties interested in the property. This phase may end
Undaunted, Austria then filed a petition for review under Rule either: (a) with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to
45 of the Revised Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist,
or partition is legally prohibited; or (b) with a determination
The SC denied the petition for review for non-compliance with that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to pay on time the premises, and an accounting of rents and profits received
docket and other fees and deposit costs in violation of Sec. 3, by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order.
Rule 45 in relation to Sec. 5(c), Rule 56. Still not satisfied, In the latter case, the parties may, if they are able to agree,
Austria filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution make partition among themselves by proper instruments of
denying her petition for review, which was also denied with conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so
finality. agreed upon.
During the pendency of the defendant-appellant's petition for The second phase commences when it appears that the parties
certiorari and prohibition before the Court, the plaintiffs- are unable to agree upon the partition directed by the court.
appellees filed with the RTC where the main case is pending, a In that event, partition shall be done for the parties by the
motion praying that a declaration of default be issued against court with the assistance of not more than three (3)
all defendants and for plaintiffs to be allowed to present commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with the
evidence ex-parte. rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the court
after the parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard
In an order, the Presiding Judge of the RTC held in abeyance thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties
the proceedings before it while awaiting the resolution of the thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of
motion for reconsideration pending before the CA. the real estate in question.
Notwithstanding the order holding in abeyance the
proceedings in the RTC, plaintiffs-appellees filed a The proceedings in this case have only reached the first phase.
Manifestation and Motion, praying for the resolution of their There is no question that a co-ownership
Motion. In its order, the RTC deemed the incident submitted exists between petitioner and respondents. To this extent, the
for resolution. trial court was correct in decreeing partition in line with the
Civil Code provision that no co-owner shall be obliged to
While the motion for reconsideration filed by the appellant is remain in the co-ownership.
still pending before the CA, the RTC declared the defendants in However, the trial court went astray when it also authorized
default, set the reception of ex-parte evidence, and the sale of the subject properties to a third party and the
commissioned the Branch Clerk of Court to receive the ex- division of the proceeds thereof. What
parte evidence and to submit her corresponding report makes this portion of the decision all the more objectionable
thereon as soon as the same is concluded. is the fact that the trial court conditioned the sale upon the
price and terms acceptable to plaintiffs (respondents herein)
Austria filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated only, and adjudicated the proceeds of the sale again only to
July 6, 1999 with an urgent prayer to cancel plaintiff's ex parte plaintiffs.
presentation of evidence, which was however denied for lack G.R. No. 151334 February 13, 2013
of merit. The assailed decision was subsequently rendered by
the RTC, finding in favor of the plaintiffs-appellees. A motion CAROLINA (CARLINA) VDA. DE FIGURACION, HEIRS OF
for new trial was thereafter filed by Austria, which was denied ELENA FIGURACION-ANCHETA, namely: LEONCIO

ANCHETA, JR., and ROMULO ANCHETA, HEIRS OF HILARIA RULING
A. FIGURACION, namely: FELIPA FIGURACION-MANUEL,
MARY FIGURACION-GINEZ, and EMILIA FIGURACION- Respondent can compel the partition of Lot No. 707.
GERILLA, AND HEIRS OF QUINTIN FIGURACION, namely:
The first stage in an action for partition is the settlement of the
LINDA M. FIGURACION, LEANDRO M. FIGURACION, II, and
issue of ownership. Such action will not lie if the claimant has
ALLAN M. FIGURACION, Petitioners, vs. EMILIA
no rightful interest in the subject property.
FIGURACION-GERILLA, Respondent.
Here, respondent traces her ownership over the eastern half
of the subject lot from the Deed of Quitclaim executed by
Agripina, who in turn, was the co-owner thereof being one of
FACTS the legitimate heirs of Eulalio. Petitioners aver that the
quitclaim had been rendered ineffective by a TCT in the name
Involved in the controversy is Lot No. 707 of the Cadastral of Felipa and Hilaria.
Survey of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, with an area of 3,164 square
meters originally owned by Eulalio Adviento (Eulalio), covered Mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person
by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 15867 issued in his does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be
name on August 21, 1917. Eulalio begot Agripina Adviento under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate,
(Agripina) with his first wife Marcela Estioko (Marcela), whom or that the registrant may only be a trustee, or that other
Eulalio survived. When he remarried, Eulalio had another parties may have acquired interest over the property
daughter, herein petitioner Carolina, with his second wife, subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. Stated
Faustina Escabesa (Faustina). differently, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the
Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no
Agripina executed a deed of quitclaim over the eastern half of longer be disputed. The certificate cannot always be
Lot No. 707 in favor of her niece, Emilia, while Carolina considered as conclusive evidence of ownership. In this case,
executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication, adjudicating to co-ownership of Lot No. 707 was precisely what respondent
herself the entire Lot No. 707 as the “sole and exclusive heir” Emilia was able to successfully establish, as correctly found by
of Eulalio and Faustina. Subsequently, she executed a DoAS in the RTC and affirmed by the CA.
favor of petitioners Hilaria and Felipa.
Here, both Agripina and Carolina were co-owners of the
Upon return from the US, Emilia built a house on the eastern subject property, being legitimate heirs of Eulalio. As such,
half of Lot No. 707, relying on the quitclaim. However, a legal each of them had full ownership of her part and of the fruits
debacle began when Hilaria threatened to demolish the house and benefits pertaining thereto. Each of them also had the
of Emilia who, in retaliation, sought for the partition of the right to alienate the lot but only in so far as the extent of their
subject lot. After failure to reach amicable settlement, a portion was affected.
Complaint was filed with the RTC.
Thus, the sale executed by Carolina without the consent of
The RTC declared that the affidavit of self-adjudication, deed Agripina is valid, but only as to Carolina’s share. Hilaria and
of sale and the transfer certificate related to Carolina’s Felipa could not thus acquire any superior right in the property
transactions were null and void. than what Carolina is entitled to or could transfer or alienate
after partition. In a contract of sale of co-owned property,
On appeal, the CA granted ownership over the subject lot to what the vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale are the same
Emilia with ½ share, Felipa with ¼ share, and Hilaria with ¼ rights as the vendor had as co-owner, and the vendee merely
share, directing them to partition the same and, upon failure, steps into the shoes of the vendor as co-owner. Hilaria and
to petition the trial court for the appointment of a Felipa did not acquire the undivided portion pertaining to
commissioner. Agripina, which has already been effectively bequeathed to
respondent Emilia as early as November 28, 1961 thru the
Thus, the instant petition. Here, Emilia’s right to compel Deed of Quitclaim. In turn, being the successor-in-interest of
partition was questioned. Agripina's share in Lot No. 707, respondent Emilia took the
former's place in the co-ownership and as such co-owner, has
ISSUE
the right to compel partition at any time.
• Whether or not the respondent can compel the
Respondent’s right to demand for partition is not barred by
partition of the subject lot. (YES)
acquisitive prescription or laches
• Whether or not respondent’s right to demand for
partition is not barred by acquisitive prescription or Co-heirs or co-owners cannot acquire by acquisitive
laches. (YES) prescription the share of the other co-heirs or co-owners
absent a clear repudiation of the co ownership. The act of
repudiation, as a mode of terminating co-ownership, is subject 1. Whether the CA correctly ruled that Felcon’s siblings and
to certain conditions, to wit: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co- Cebeleo, Sr. and Maude’s children are indispensable parties to
ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made Santiago’s complaint for judicial partition.
known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is
clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession through 2. Whether the CA correctly dismissed Santiago’s complaint for
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the his failure to implead said omitted heirs.
property for the period required by law.
RULING:
The petitioners failed to comply with these conditions. The act
of Hilaria and Felipa in effecting the registration of the entire 1. YES. Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court requires that all
Lot No. 707 in their names thru TCT No. 42244 did not serve to persons interested in the property shall be joined as
effectively repudiate the co-ownership. The respondent built defendants, viz.: SEC. 1. Complaint in action for partition of real
her house on the eastern portion of the lot in 1981 without any estate. – A person having the right to compel the partition of
opposition from the petitioners. Hilaria also paid realty taxes real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in
on the lot, in behalf of the respondent, for the years 1983- his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an
1987. These events indubitably show that Hilaria and Felipa adequate description of the real estate of which partition is
failed to assert exclusive title in themselves adversely to Emilia. demanded and joining as defendants all other persons
Their acts clearly manifest that they recognized the interested in the property.
subsistence of their co-ownership with respondent Emilia
despite the issuance of TCT No. 42244 in 1962. Their acts Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the
constitute an implied recognition of the co-ownership which in property are indispensable parties; as such, an action for
turn negates the presence of a clear notice of repudiation to partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties.
the respondent.
In the instant case, records reveal that Conrado, Sr. has the
G.R. No. 196750, March 11, 2015 following heirs, legitimate and illegitimate, who are entitled to
MA. ELENA R. DIVINAGRACIA, AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF a pro-indiviso share in the subject land, namely: Conrado, Jr.,
THE ESTATE OF THE LATE SANTIAGO C. DIVINAGRACIA, Cresencio, Mateo, Sr., Coronacion, Cecilia, Celestial,
Petitioner, v. CORONACION PARILLA, CELESTIAL Celedonio, Ceruleo, Cebeleo, Sr., Eduardo, Rogelio, and
NOBLEZA, CECILIA LELINA, CELEDONIO NOBLEZA, AND Ricardo. However, both Mateo, Sr. and Cebeleo, Sr. pre-
MAUDE NOBLEZA, Respondent. deceased Conrado, Sr. and, thus, pursuant to the rules on
representation under the Civil Code, their respective interests
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI shall be represented by their children, namely: (a) for Mateo,
DOCTRINE: All the co-heirs and persons having an interest in Sr.: Felcon, Landelin, Eusela, Giovanni, Mateo, Jr., Tito, and
the property are indispensable parties; as such, an action for Gaylord; and (b) for Cebeleo, Sr.: Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel.
partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties.
The aforementioned heirs – whether in their own capacity or
FACTS: Conrado Nobleza, Sr. owned a 313-square meters in representation of their direct ascendant – have vested rights
parcel of land. During his lifetime, he contracted 2 marriages. over the subject land and, as such, should be impleaded as
He had 2 children with his first wife and 7 children with his indispensable parties in an action for partition thereof.
second wife. He also begot 3 illegitimate children. Conrado, Sr. However, a reading of Santiago’s complaint shows that as
was pre-deceased by some of his children who were survived regards Mateo, Sr.’s interest, only Felcon was impleaded,
by their respective wife and children. Upon Conrado, Sr.’s excluding therefrom his siblings and co-representatives.
death, majority of his heirs sold their respective interests over Similarly, with regard to Cebeleo, Sr.’s interest over the subject
the subject land to Santiago. Santiago to file a Complaint for land, the complaint impleaded his wife, Maude, when
judicial partition and for receivership. The RTC ordered the pursuant to Article 972 of the Civil Code, the proper
partition of the subject land. Respondents appealed to the CA. representatives to his interest should have been his children,
The CA set aside the RTC rulings and dismissed Santiago’s Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel. Verily, Santiago’s omission of the
complaint for judicial partition. It held that Felcon’s siblings, as aforesaid heirs renders his complaint for partition defective.
well as Maude’s children, are indispensable parties to the
judicial partition of the subject land and, thus, their non- 2. NO. The CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the complaint
inclusion as defendants in Santiago’s complaint would on account of Santiago’s failure to implead all the
necessarily result in its dismissal. The heirs of Santiago moved indispensable parties in his complaint. In Heirs of Mesina v.
for reconsideration which was, however, denied. Hence, this Heirs of Fian, Sr., the Court definitively explained that in
petition. instances of non-joinder of indispensable parties, the proper
remedy is to implead them and not to dismiss the case.
ISSUES:

In view of the foregoing, the correct course of action in the The CA reversed the decision of the RTC. It held that the court
instant case is to order its remand to the RTC for the inclusion a quo had no jurisdiction over the case as the allegations by
of those indispensable parties who were not impleaded and the heirs constitute a collateral attack against Dominic's title,
for the disposition of the case on the merits. WHEREFORE, the which cannot be allowed in an accion publiciana.
petition is PARTLY GRANTED.
ISSUE:
RULE 70
Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the Decision of the
G.R. No. 212938 July 30, 2019 RTC and in granting Dominic's petition for annulment of
judgment
HELD:
THE HEIRS OF ALFREDO CULLADO,* NAMELY LOLITA
CULLADO, DOMINADOR CULLADO, ROMEO CULLADO, The Court agrees with the CA that the RTC acted without
NOEL CULLADO, REBECCA LAMBINICIO, MARY JANE jurisdiction when it ordered the reconveyance of such
BAUTISTA AND JIMMY CULLADO, PETITIONERS, property to Heirs of Cullado. The grant of reconveyance
pertains to an issue of ownership, which the accion publiciana
v. may grant provisionally in some cases but is not binding due to
the fact that what is resolved in an accion publiciana case is
DOMINIC V. GUTIERREZ, RESPONDENT. “who has a better right of possession”
3 USUAL ACTIONS TO RECOVER POSSESSION OF REAL

PROPERTY
1. Accion interdictal or a summary ejectment proceeding,
DOCTRINE: In an accion publiciana, the defense of ownership which may be either for forcible entry (detentacion) or
(i.e., that the defendant, and not the plaintiff, is the rightful unlawful detainer (desahucio), for the recovery of physical or
owner) will not trigger a collateral attack on the plaintiffs material possession (possession de facto) where the
Torrens or certificate of title because the resolution of the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, and
issue of ownership is done only to determine the issue of should be brought in the proper inferior court;
possession.
2. Accion publiciana or the plenary action to recover the better
FACTS: right of possession (possession de jure), which should be
brought in the proper inferior court or Regional Trial Court
Dominic owns a parcel of land evidenced by an OCT, in which, (depending upon the value of the property) when the
it was alleged that Cullado had been squatting on and despite dispossession has lasted for more than one year (or for less
demand the latter refused to vacate the lot. Hence, Dominic’s than a year in cases other than those mentioned in Rule 70 of
father, representing Dominic who was at that time a minor, the Rules of Court); and
filed for an action for recovery of ownership.
3. Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion or
Cullado, in his answer, maintained that he had been in actual reivindicatory action, which is an action for recovery of
possession of the property; and that Dominic and his father ownership which must be brought in the proper inferior court
fraudulently obtained a title of the property. or Regional Trial Court (depending upon the value of the
property).
Cullado died and was substituted by his heirs.
CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP IN ACCION PUBLICIANA
The Court has recognized two approaches in dealing with the

Dominic's counsel repeatedly failed to attend the scheduled claim of ownership raised in the defendant's answer in an
hearings, and as a consequence, petitioners were eventually accion publiciana, namely: (1) to allow the provisional
allowed to present their evidence. resolution of the issue of ownership to determine the "better
right of possession," or (2) not to allow its resolution because
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered Dominic to the accion publiciana court is bereft of jurisdiction to rule with
reconvey the property to petitioners. finality on the issue of ownership and the attack on a
certificate of title is deemed a collateral one that is therefore
proscribed.

RENE MICHAEL FRENCH, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, as accommodation to their relatives, Wilson French and
EIGHTEENTH DIVISION, CEBU CITY AND MAGDALENA Edward French.
O'DELL, REPRESENTED BY HECTOR P. TEODOSIO AS HER
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, Respondents. The RTC sustained the MTCC's finding .that neither Rene nor
his predecessor-in-interest was the owner of the land.
Issue: WON Rene should vacate the property(YES)

Ruling: As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, all the
DOCTRINE: In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical allegations in the complaint constitute a cause of action for
possession of real property by means of force, intimidation, unlawful detainer. The complaint clearly indicated that
strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, one Magdalena allowed Henry to occupy the land subject to certain
illegally withholds possession after the expiration or conditions. Among the conditions is that Henry will vacate the
termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, land when the time comes for Magdalena to use it. In 1991,
express or implied. The two are distinguished from each other Henry died and Rene took over the property. On 10 January
in that in forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is 2008, Magdalena, through her counsel, sent a demand letter
illegal from the beginning, and that the issue is which party has to Rene to vacate the land but the latter failed to comply.
prior de facto possession while in unlawful detainer, possession Rene's refusal to vacate the land prompted Magdalena to file
of the defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to the complaint for unlawful detainer on 13 October 2008, well
the expiration or termination of the right to possess. within the one year period from the demand to vacate. Thus,
all the requirements for an action for unlawful detainer have
FACTS: been sufficiently shown in the complaint.
Andaya has filed a Rule 45 petition directly Magdalena O'dell G.R. NO. 191527 August 22, 2016
(Magdalena), an American citizen residing in Houston, Texas,
United States of America (U.S.A.), through her attorney-in-fact
Thomas O'dell (Thomas), filed a complaint for ejectment
against Rene Michael French5 (Rene). Magdalena alleged that BALIBAGO FAITH BAPTIST CHURCH, INC. AND PHILIPPINE
she is one of the owners of a parcel of land. According to BAPTIST S.B.C., INC., Petitioners, v. FAITH IN CHRIST JESUS
Magdalena, she and Henry had an agreement that he would BAPTIST CHURCH, INC. AND REYNALDO GALVAN,
pay some of her loans with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) Respondent.
and would vacate the land once she needs it. However,
Magdalena alleged that upon Henry's death in 1991, Rene took
over possession of the land without her permission. As such,
Rene was occupying the land by mere tolerance of the owner. FACTS:
Magdalena sent a letter, dated 10 January 2008, demanding
Rene to vacate the land but he failed to comply, prompting A contract of loan was entered into between PBSBC and BFBC
Magdalena to file a case against him. where the latter borrowed money from the former to enable
it to purchase the subject property. Thereafter, respondent
Rene countered that his father Henry and French-Solinap BFBC took possession of the subject property and held therein
Development Corporation (the corporation) had been in their religious activities. While BFBC was still in possession of
possession and acted as owners of the land since 1985. Rene the subject property, Galvan and his companions began
alleged that sometime in 1980, Magdalena and Thomas attending BFBC's religious activities at the subject property.
obtained a loan from PNB and used the land as collateral. BFBC alleged that Galvan apparently was interested on the
Magdalena and Thomas, then living in the U.S.A., defaulted in property because after some time Galvan formed and
their payment and asked Henry to redeem the land. Rene incorporated FCJBC and took control of the subject property.
alleged that Magdalena and Thomas assigned, abandoned, and
waived their rights and interests over the land in favor of Henry Galvan's actuations came to the attention of the Luzon
and his successors-in-interest who had been in open, Convention of Southern Baptist Churches, Inc. (LCSBC). Thus,
continuous, notorious, and public possession of the land in the in a Letter dated September 5, 2001, LCSBC upheld BFBC's right
concept of an owner for 23 years. over the subject property and recognized BFBC's pastor, Rev.
Rolando T. Santos, as its legitimate pastor. However, FCJBC
MTCC ruled that Rene’s occupation of the land was by mere continued to occupy the subject property, thus, in a Demand
tolerance of the owner. The MTCC found that the special Letter dated September 4, 2002, BFBC demanded that FCJBC
power of attorney to mortgage the property was executed vacate the property within five (5) days from notice and to pay
while Magdalena and Thomas were in the U.S.A. and was made the amount of P10,000.00 per month beginning October 2001

as reasonable compensation for its use. Due to non- It should then be stressed that what determines the cause of
compliance with its demand, on September 24, 2003, BFBC action is the nature of defendants' entry into the land. If entry
and PBSBC filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer and is illegal, then the cause of action which may be filed against
damages against FCJBC and Galvan. the intruder within one year therefrom is forcible entry. If, on
the other hand, entry is legal but thereafter possession
Meanwhile, FBC continued to occupy the subject property and, became illegal, the case is one of illegal detainer which must
on January 9, 2001, organized themselves into FCJBC. MTC be filed within one year from the date of the last demand.
rendered its Decision in favor of respondent. The MTC ruled
that the case was one of forcible entry and not unlawful Indeed, to vest the court of jurisdiction to effect the ejectment
detainer. Both parties filed their respective appeal of an occupant, it is necessary that the complaint should
memoranda with embody such a statement of facts which brings the party
clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide
the RTC. RTC issued the assailed Decision which affirmed the a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The
Decision of the MTC. FCJBC moved for reconsideration, but complaint must show enough on its face the court's
was denied. Thus, FCJBC filed a petition for review on certiorari jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony. This is where
before the CA, which petitioners' cause of action fails. This case would have to fall
under the concept of forcible entry as it has been long settled
reversed the decision. Undaunted, BFBC and PBSBC filed the that in forcible entry cases, no force is really necessary. The act
instant petition for review on certiorari of going on the property and excluding the lawful possessor
therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over the
ISSUE: property, and this is all that is necessary. However, while BFBC
sufficiently alleged that they had prior physical possession of
W/N the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint for the subject property, nothing has been said on how FCJBC's
unlawful detainer and ruling that the MTC has no jurisdiction entry was effected or when dispossession started. It is in this
over the case. light that we rule that the present complaint is similarly
defective even if we are to treat the same as forcible entry as
RULING: it failed to allege how and when entry was effected. The bare
allegation of BFBC that "[i]t turned out that defendants have
In Sumulong v. Court of Appeals,, the Court differentiated the an interest in the subject premises and defendant Reynaldo
distinct causes of action in forcible entry vis-a-vis unlawful Galvan formed and incorporated the defendant FCJBC and
detainer. In sum, it was held: took control of the subject premises," would not suffice since
it only shows that FCJBC entered the land and occupied the
Unlawful detainer and forcible entry are entirely distinct house thereon without BFBC and PBSBC's consent or
causes of action, to wit: (a) action to recover possession permission which are constitutive of forcible entry.
founded on illegal occupation from the beginning - forcible Unfortunately, BFBC and PB SBC's failure to allege when the
entry; and (b) action founded on unlawful detention by a dispossession took place and how it was effected leaves the
person who originally acquired possession lawfully -unlawful complaint wanting in jurisdictional ground.
detainer.
Suffice it to say, the one-year period within which to bring an
The rule is that the allegations in the complaint determine both action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of
the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the court. The actual entry on the land, except that when entry was made
cause of action in a complaint is not what the designation of through stealth, the one-year period is counted from the time
the complaint states, but what the allegations in the body of the plaintiff learned thereof. If the dispossession did not occur
the complaint define and describe. The designation or caption by any of the means stated in Section 1, Rule 70, as in this case,
is not controlling, more than the allegations in the complaint the proper recourse is to file a plenary action to recover
themselves are, for it is not even an indispensable part of the possession with the Regional Trial Court. Consequently, the
complaint. The complaint must specifically allege the facts MTC has no jurisdiction over the case. We likewise reiterate
constituting unlawful detainer or forcible entry if the that a court's jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
complaint filed was for unlawful detainer, or forcible entry, proceedings, even on appeal. The reason is that jurisdiction is
respectively. It cannot be made to depend on the exclusive conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the
characterization of the case by one of the parties, jurisdiction court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the
cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the action. Indeed, a void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no
answer, in a motion to dismiss or in a motion for judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor the
reconsideration. creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and
all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can

never become final and any writ of execution based on it is 2. That they were deprived of possession either by
void. force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth; and
3. That the action was filed within one year from the
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, v. CITI time the owners or legal possessors learned of the
Appliance M.C. Corporation deprivation of the physical possession of the
G.R. No. 214546 ; October 9, 2019 property.
I.In the present case, the Court finds that the first and third
FACTS: elements of forcible entry are absent. The prior physical
possession is an indispensable element in forcible entry cases.
Citi Appliance owned a parcel of land in Cebu City, and Citi should have specifically and clearly alleged and proved that
constructed on it a commercial building. it was in prior physical possession of the property. General
claim of its possession is insufficient.
In April 2003, when Citi Appliance made deep excavations to
build a parking area, it discovered telephone lines, cables, and II. Citi filed a complaint for forcible entry on October,
manholes underground placed by Philippine Long Distance 2004. However, Citi discovered the underground
Telephone Company (PLDT). cables and lines in April 2003. The prescriptive period
had already prescribed, and the Municipal Trial Court
In 2004, Citi demanded the removal of the underground no longer had jurisdiction to resolve the case.
telephone lines, cables, and manholes. In October 2004, after
its last demand to vacate, when PLDT refused to comply, Citi FATIMA O. DE GUZMAN-FUERTE, MARRIED TO MAURICE
filed a complaint for ejectment against PLDT. GEORGE FUERTE, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES SILVINO S.
ESTOMO AND CONCEPCION C. ESTOMO, Respondents.
PLDT, in its answer, alleged that the lines and cables ran [G.R. No. 223399 | April 23, 2018]
alongside the property, and not through it. It further claimed
that the case should be dismissed since the action for forcible PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI
entry had prescribed. PLDT claims that in forcible entry case FACTS: A Complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by Fuerte
based on stealth, the one-year prescription period runs from against respondents Spouses Estomo.
the discovery of the alleged unlawful entry. Fuerte alleged that Manuela Co executed a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage over the subject property in her favor. However, Co
PLDT also argues that there is no cause of action because Citi failed to pay the loan, which caused Fuerte to foreclosure and
failed to prove its prior physical possession. It showed its to obtain ownership over the property (2009).
certificate of title, indicating that PLDT was the property owner
nine years before Citi. The writ of possession was returned unsatisfied since Co was
no longer residing at the property and that the Sps. Estomo
The Municipal Trial Court, as affirmed by the Regional Trial and their family occupied the same, and it was only after the
Court, and further affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the said return that Fuerte discovered and verified the same. Thus,
prescription period shall run from the time when the last she demanded them to vacate, surrender possession of the
demand was made. Restitution and monthly rental pay was subject property and pay compensation. The Spouses Estomo
ordered by the courts. refused.
In their Answer, the Sps. Estomo denied that they illegally
ISSUE: occupied the subject property. They also denied the existence
of demand letter. They averred that they acquired the
Whether or not the prescription period runs from the date property from the Homeowners Development Corporation
when the last demand was made. through a Contract to Sell and registered it under their names.
HELD: The respondent-spouses also alleged that Concepcion sought

An action for ejectment is a summary proceeding meant to the services of Co, a real estate broker, to assist her in securing
‘provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession a loan. Co obtained the certificate of title to be shown to
or right of possession of property. The question is as to who is potential creditors, however, she never returned it. The TCT
entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises. was cancelled by an alleged Absolute Sale of Real Property and
Forcible entry suits require three elements which must be was issued under Co's name.
alleged and proved: Thus, Co mortgaged the subject property causing Sps. Estomo
1. That they have prior physical possession of the to file an annulment case (2007) against Co and Fuerte. When
property; they were served with the writ of possession in favor of Fuerte,
they filed a terceria with the sheriff, a motion to recall the writ

of possession and asked for the consolidation of the land cause of action of unlawful detainer is that the possession was
registration case to the annulment case on. Sps. Estomo also originally lawful but turned unlawful only upon the expiration
prayed that the complaint be dismissed on the ground that the of the right to possess. To show that the possession was
allegations are insufficient to establish a cause of action for initially lawful, the basis of such lawful possession must then
unlawful detainer. be established.
RTC: Quashed the writ and directed the consolidation of the However, the Complaint stated that Spouses Estomo's
cases. occupancy was illegal and without Fuerte's consent. Likewise,
the Complaint did not contain an allegation that Fuerte or her
MTCC: Dismissed the complaint without prejudice and found predecessor-in-interest tolerated the spouses' possession on
that Fuerte failed to attach a copy of the demand letter. account of an express or implied contract between them.
Neither was there any averment which shows any overt act on
RTC: Reversed MTCC decision. Fuerte established the Fuerte's part indicatiye of her permission to occupy the land.
existence of the demand letter because the notice to vacate Acts of tolerance must be proved showing the overt acts
the subject property served through registered mail is a indicative of his or his predecessor's tolerance or permission
substantial compliance with the modes of service under for them to occupy the disputed property. There should be any
Section 2, Rule 70 of the RoC. supporting evidence on record that would show when the
respondents entered the properties or who had granted them
CA: Reversed the decision of the RTC. Complaint in ejectment to enter the same and how the entry was effected.21 Without
cases should embody such statement of facts as to bring the these allegations and evidence, the bare claim regarding
party clearly within the class of cases for which Section 1, Rule "tolerance" cannot be upheld. Moreover, the demand letter
70 of the Rules of Court provides a summary remedy and must supports the fact that she characterized the Spouses Estomo's
show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without possession of the subject property as unlawful from the start
resort to parole evidence. It is apparent from the letter that Fuerte demanded the
spouses to immediately vacate the subject property, contrary
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in dismissing Fuerte’s Complaint for to her allegation in the instant petition that she granted such
unlawful detainer. period, during which she tolerated the spouses' possession.
She failed to satisfy the requirement that her supposed act of
RULING: The instant petition is devoid of merit. In summary tolerance was present right from the start of the possession by
ejectment suits such as unlawful detainer and forcible entry, the Spouses Estomo. It is worth noting that the absence of the
the only issue to be determined is who between the first requisite is significant in the light of the Spouses Estomo's
contending parties has better possession of the contested claim that they have been occupying the property as owner
property. The Municipal Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in thereof, and that they have filed an annulment of sale and real
Cities, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts exercise exclusive estate mortgage against Co and Fuerte even before the
original jurisdiction over these cases and the proceedings are property was foreclosed.
governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure.
Thus, the SC Court found that the complaint failed to state a
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real cause of action for unlawful detainer. Since the complaint fell
property from one who illegally withholds possession after the short of the jurisdictional facts to vest the court jurisdiction to
expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under effect the ejectment of respondent, the MTCC failed to acquire
any contract, express or implied. The possession of the jurisdiction to take cognizance of Fuerte's complaint and the
defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became CA correctly dismissed the unlawful detainer case against the
illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to Spouses Estomo.
possess.
Unlawful detainer and forcible entry suits are designed to
As the allegations in Fuerte’s complaint determine both the summarily restore physical possession of a piece of land or
nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the court, the building to one who has been illegally or forcibly deprived
complaint must specifically allege the facts constituting thereof, without prejudice to the settlement of the parties'
unlawful detainer. In the absence of these factual allegations, opposing claims of juridical possession in appropriate
an action for unlawful detainer is not the proper remedy and proceedings. These actions are intended to avoid disruption of
the municipal trial court does not have jurisdiction over the public order by those who would take the law in their hands
case. purportedly to enforce their claimed right of possession.
A judgment rendered in a forcible entry case or an unlawful

A perusal of the Complaint shows that it contradicts the detainer as in this case, will not bar an action between the
requirements for unlawful detainer. A requisite for a valid same parties respecting title or ownership because there is no

identity of causes of action. Such determination does not bind (f) members of the family, relatives and other privies of the
the title or affect the ownership of the land; neither is it defendant.
conclusive of the facts found in a case between the same
parties upon a different cause of action involving possession. In such cases, court hearing is a must to determine the
character of such possession.
Section 18, Rule 70 expressly provides that a "judgment
rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be FACTS:
conclusive with respect to the possession only and shall in no
wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land." Since Petitioners are occupants of a lot which was the subject of a
there is no identity of causes of action, there can be no complaint for forcible entry filed by respondents against
multiplicity of suits. Abarnas. The Nisperoses claimed ownership and prior
possession of the land by succession, alleging that their
Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is father, Igmedio Nisperos, occupied and tilled it from 1950 to
entitled to its possession. However, the registered owner 1982.
cannot simply wrest possession thereof from whoever is in
actual occupation of the property. To recover possession, he The MTCC dismissed the ejectment complaint. The RTC
must resort to the proper remedy, and once he chooses what reversed the decision of the MTCC. The CA likewise affirmed
action to file, he is required to satisfy the conditions necessary the ruling of the RTC. When the decision attained finality, the
for such action to prosper. In this case, Fuerte chose the RTC issued an Alias Writ of Execution, an Alias Writ of Special
remedy of unlawful detainer to eject the Sps. Estomo, but, Demolition and a Notice to Vacate.
failed to sufficiently allege the facts which are necessary to
vest jurisdiction to MTCC over an unlawful detainer case. In To prevent the demolition, petitioners filed a complaint for
fine, the CA did not commit reversible error in dismissing injunction before the RTC. The RTC dismissed the complaint
Fuerte's complaint for unlawful detainer. finding that the petitioners are occupants in bad faith and
squatters on the lots.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. It held that

G.R. NO. 169047 November 3, 2008 petitioners have not shown a clear and unmistakable right to
be protected, and found that they occupied the land during
the pendency of the ejectment case, thereby taking
advantage of such conflict.
EVA FLOYD and RODOLFO CALIXTRO,
Petitioners v. BENJAMIN GONZALES, ATILANO NANQUIL, ISSUE:
LINDA NISPEROS, LILIAN NISPEROS, SALVADOR NISPEROS
& VIRGILIO CONSTANTINO, Respondents. (1) Whether or not petitioners are bound by the decision in
the ejectment case
(2) Whether or not petitioners are entitled to an injunctive

PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI writ
DOCTRINE: Persons can be bound by said judgment in the (1) Whether or not petitioners has better right over the
ejectment suit, even if they were not impleaded as defendants, property
only if they are shown to be:
HELD:
(a) trespassers, squatters or agents of the defendant
fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the judgment; (1) Petitioners had not been given their day in court to
present their side to prove their alleged bona fide possession.
(b) guests or other occupants of the premises with the Neither was a court hearing held to prove that they are mere
permission of the defendant; successors-in-interest, guests, or agents of defendant
Abarnas when the ejectment judgment was sought to be
(c) transferees pendente lite; enforced against them. Thus, they cannot be bound by the
decision in the ejectment case.
(d) sub-lessees;
(2) Petitioners have a right to be protected against the
(e) co-lessees; or summary demolition of their houses. Hence, the RTC correctly
issued a writ of preliminary injunction. The determination as

to whether petitioners are entitled to a permanent injunction intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. This latter
rests on the issue of who between petitioners and requirement implies that the possession of the disputed
respondents have a better right of possession over the land property by the intruder has been unlawful from the very start.
on which the houses sought to be demolished stand. Then, the action must be brought within one year from the
date of actual entry to the property or, in cases where stealth
(3) Respondents have the better right to possession of the was employed, from the date the plaintiff learned about it.
land. "Petitioners' claim of possession that started in 1988
must - yield to that of the Nisperoses who trace their Here, the case is for unlawful detainer. The complaint clearly
possession of the property to that of their predecessor-in- alleges that Almario Bejar sold one-half portion of his house to
interest, their father Igmedio who began occupying the Fernando Mijares; that the latter, in turn, sold the same
property in 1950." Hence, petitioners must relinquish portion of the house to respondent; that eventually, Almario
possession of the land to the Nisperoses and accordingly Bejar became the owner in fee simple of the entire lot where
remove their houses which are built on the subject land. his house was built; that he needs the portion of the lot
occupied by respondent for the construction of a house for the
G.R. NO. 171277 FEBRUARY 15, 2007 use of his family; and that despite demand, respondent failed
and still fails to vacate the premises. From the records, it
BEJAR v. CALUAG appears that Almario Bejar filed his complaint within one year
from the date of his last demand upon respondent to vacate
the contested portion of the land.
Doctrine: In unlawful detainer and forcible entry cases, the A suit for unlawful detainer will prosper if the complaint
only issue to be determined is who between the contending sufficiently alleges that there is a withholding of possession or
parties has better possession of the contested property. refusal to vacate the property by a defendant. The cause of
action arises from the expiration or termination of the
FACTS: Plaintiff is the owner of a residential house made of defendant's right to continue possession which is upon
light materials consisting of wood and galvanized iron roof plaintiff's demand to vacate the premises. The complaint for
built on government-owned land in Tondo. Plantiff sold 1/2 unlawful detainer must then be instituted within one year
portion of the said residential house with an area of 22ft in from the date of the last demand. All these incidents are
length and 15ft in width to Mijares for P11k. Subsequently, present in the instant case.
plaintiff became the owner in fee simple of the government
land where his residential house was built including the 1/2 ALFREDO YASAY DEL ROSARIO, petitioner, vs.
portion he sold to Mijares in Tondo evidenced by TCT SPS. JOSE E. MANUEL and CONCORDIA MANUEL,
registered and entered in the RD. represented by Attorney-in-fact, PATRICIA
ARIOLA,respondents
Mijares sold his residential house to Caluag to be used as a
warehouse for her business. Plaintiff badly needs the portion
of his land occupied by the defendant to build a residential
house for use of his family; Plaintiff through counsel sent a PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45
formal demand letter to defendant for the latter to vacate the
portion of the property in Tondo within 10 days from receipt DOCTRINE: Prior physical possession is not always a condition
of the demand letter. Despite formal demand from the sine qua non in an ejectment case.
plaintiff, defendant failed and refused and still fails and refuses
to vacate said portion of the property owned by the plaintiff to FACTS:
the damage and prejudice of plaintiff.
Jose and Concordia Manuel, respondents, filed with the
ISSUE: Whether the MeTC has jurisdiction over the case. Municipal Trial Court (MTC), San Mateo, Rizal a complaint for
unlawful detainer against Alfredo Yasay del Rosario, petitioner.
HELD: YES: We are guided by the elementary principle that They alleged that they are the true and lawful owners of a 251
what determines the nature of an action as well as which court square meter lot located at Sta. Ana, San Mateo, Rizal. Because
has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and of their compassion, they allowed petitioner, whose house was
the character of the relief sought. destroyed by a strong typhoon, to occupy their lot. They
agreed that he could build thereon a temporary shelter of light
To make out a suit for illegal detainer or forcible entry, the materials. But without their consent, what he constructed was
complaint must contain two mandatory allegations: (1) prior a house of concrete materials.
physical possession of the property by the plaintiff; and (2)
deprivation of said possession by another by means of force,

Respondents asked petitioner to vacate the lot. his was FELICIDAD JAVIER, petitioner, vs. HON. REGINO T.
followed by repeated verbal demands but to no avail, VERIDIANO II, Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of First
prompting them to bring the matter to the barangay. But the Instance of Zambales and REINO ROSETE, respondents.
parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. Hence, the
barangay chairman issued a Certification to File Action.
DOCTRINE: The doctrine in Emilia v. Bado, decided more than
Petitioner claimed that sometime in 1968, respondents twenty-five years ago, is still good law and has preserved the
allowed him to build his house on the lot, provided he would age-old remedies available under existing laws and
guard the premises to prevent landgrabbers and squatters jurisprudence to recover possession of real property, namely,
from occupying the area. In 1995, when respondents visited accion interdictal, which is the summary action for forcible
this country, they agreed verbally to sell the portion on which entry (detentacion) where the defendant’s possession of the
his house was constructed. A year later, he made an offer to property is illegal ab initio, or the summary action for unlawful
buy the 60 square meter portion occupied by him and to spend detainer (desahuico) where the defendant’s possession was
for its survey. But what respondents wanted to sell was the originally lawful but ceased to be so by the expiration of his
whole area containing 251 square meters. He then informed right to possess, both of which must be brought within one year
them that he would first consult his children and they said they from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible
will wait. Instead, they filed the instant complaint. entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful
detainer, in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan
MTCC ruled in favor of the respondents. On appeal, RTC trial court; 20 accion publiciana which is a plenary action for
affirmed this in toto. CA dismissed the subsequent petition for recovery of the right to possess and which should be brought in
certiorari. the proper regional trial court when the dispossession has
lasted for more than one year; and, accion reivindicatoria or
Petitioner claimed that the trial court has no jurisdiction over accion de reivindicacion which seeks the recovery of ownership
the case considering that there is no allegation in the and includes the jus utendi and the jus fruendi brought in the
complaint that respondents have prior physical possession of proper regional trial court.
the lot and that they were ousted therefrom by force, threat,
strategy or stealth. FACTS:
Javier filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application for the subject

Issue: WON petitioner unlawfully detained the property (YES)
property. She instituted a complaint for forcible entry against
Ruling: Prior physical possession is not always a condition sine Ben Babol alleging that the defencdant, without express
qua non in an ejectment case. We must distinguish the two consent of plaintiff and without lawful authority, through
kinds of ejectment, namely, forcible entry and unlawful scheme, strategy and stealth, forcibly entered a portion on the
detainer. In forcible entry, the plaintiff is deprived of physical southwestern part of Lot and started construction of riprap
possession of his land or building by means of force, along the Kalaklan River perimeter of said portion of land.
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In this light, he must
The court dismissed that case on the ground that the Bureau
allege and prove prior physical possession. In illegal detainer,
of Lands has considered the area in question to be outside of
the defendant unlawfully withholds possession after the
the subject property. Such decision became final and
expiration or termination of his right thereto under any
executory when he then Court of First Instance of Zambales
contract, express or implied. What respondents filed is a
dismissed the appeal and affirmed the findings and
complaint for unlawful detainer. Prior physical possession is
conclusions of the City Court.
not required. Hence, respondents need not allege the same in
their complaint. Subsequently, petitioner was granted Miscellaneous Sales
Patent and issued Original Certificate of Title. Meanwhile, Ben
As found by the trial court, petitioner’s possession of the land Babol had sold the property he was occupying to Reino Rosete.
was by mere tolerance of the respondents. We have held in a petitioner demanded the surrender of the same area
number of cases that one whose stay is merely tolerated in dispute from Reino Rosete who repeatedly refused to
becomes a deforciant occupant the moment he is required to comply with the demand. about four years from the finality of
leave. He is bound by his implied promise, in the absence of a the dismissal of the case, Javier instituted a complaint for
contract, that he will vacate upon demand. quieting of title and recovery of possession with damages
against Ben Babol and Reino Rosete. Reino Rosete moved to
G.R. No. L-48050 October 10, 1994 dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata.
Petitioner contends that res judicata cannot apply in the

instant case since there is no identity of parties and causes of
action between her complaint for forcible entry, which had

long become final and executory, and her subsequent petition DOCTRINE
for quieting of title. She argues that private respondent Reino
Rosete, who invokes the defense or res judicata, was never “The damages which a plaintiff expects to obtain from his
impleaded in the forcible entry case, which is an action in business to be located in the premises, or for material injury
personam; neither was he a purchaser pendente lite who, caused to the premises cannot be claimed in connection with
perhaps, could have validly invoked the defense of res judicata. or as incidental to an action of illegal detainer or forcible
entry.”
ISSUE:
Petition for Certiorari
Whether res judicata can be invoke as a defense?
FACTS
HELD:
Petitioner is the lessor of private respondent Seng, bound by
No. Petitioner's argument that there is no identity of parties oral contract of lease over the premises subject of the
between the two actions is without merit. We have repeatedly controversy. After leaving the premises to be treated by a hilot
ruled that for res judicata to apply, what is required is not in Bulacan, Seng went back to find out that petitioner placed
absolute but only substantial identity of parties. In the case at other padlocks at the door to “prevent loss or damage to the
bench, it is evident that private respondent Reino Rosete is a things inside the premises.” Petitioner refused to remove the
successor in interest of Ben Babol by title subsequent to the padlocks. Seng later tendered payment for his October and
commencement and termination of the first action. Hence, November rentals, but in response, he was told to remove
there is actual, if not substantial, identity of the parties whatever belonging he has on the premises within 10 days,
between the two actions. But there is merit in petitioner's otherwise, it shall be opened.
argument that there is no identity of causes of action between
Civil Case No. 926 and Civil Case No. 2203-0. Thus, Seng filed an action for forcible entry against petitioner,
alleging that petitioner’s refusal to remove the padlocks was a
Civil Case No. 926 is a complaint for forcible entry, where what breach of the contract of lease consisting in the deprivation of
is at issue is prior possession, regardless of who has lawful title plaintiff’s right to occupy and use the leased premises.
over the disputed property. 14 Thus, "[t]he only issue in an Petitioner later expressed her assent to restore Seng to the
action for forcible entry is the physical or material possession possession of the disputed premises. Later on, she filed her
of real property, that is, possession de facto and not answer to the complaint alleging that Seng’s right to occupy
possession de jure. , a judgment rendered in a case for the said premises had long expired and that respondent failed
recovery of possession is conclusive only on the question of to pay the rentals due and had voluntarily vacated the
possession and not on the ownership. It does not in any way premises.
bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building.
Petitioner later filed her own action for unlawful detainer
On the other hand, Civil Case No. 2203-0 while inaccurately against lessee Seng, alleging the same facts raised in her
captioned as an action for "Quieting of Title and Recovery of answer, with Seng’s answer alleging the same as his previous
Possession with Damages" is in reality an action to recover a complaint. This was jointly tried with Seng’s forcible entry
parcel of land or an accion reivindicatoria. case. The City Court of Manila rendered a consolidated
decision in favor of Seng.
In Civil Case No. 926 petitioner merely claimed a better right
or prior possession over the disputed area without asserting On appeal, petitioner questioned the decision in toto, and
title thereto. It should be distinguished from Civil Case No. private respondent questioned only the portion which
2203-0 where she expressly alleged ownership, specifically denied his claim for damages against petitioner.
praying that she be declared the rightful owner and given
possession of the disputed portion. Hence, in Civil Case No. 926 The CFI affirmed the lower court’s decision, but granted the
petitioner merely alleged that she was "the true, lawful claim for damages. On appeal, the CA reduced the amount of
(possessor) and in actual, prior physical possession" of the damages and granted immediate execution.
subject parcel of land, whereas in Civil Case No. 2203-0 she
asserted that she was "the absolute owner in fee simple" of ISSUE
the parcel of land "covered by Original Transfer Certificate of
• Whether or not the award of damages is proper in
Title.
unlawful detainer/forcible entry. (NO)
[G.R. No. L-57091. November 23, 1983.] • Whether or not the contract of lease in this case, a
verbal contract, should be deemed expired. (NO)
PAZ S. BAENS, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and
RULING
CHUA SENG, Respondents.

On award of damages considered terminated as of the end of the month, after
proper notice or demand to vacate has been given.
Although Section 1 of Rule 70 uses the word "damages", the
authors of the Rules of Court, in drafting Section 6 of Rule 70 However, the said law does not cover all residential units.
on the judgment to be pronounced, eliminated the word B.P. 25 shows that the subject matter of the law is the
"damages", placing in lieu thereof, the words "reasonable regulation of rentals. Thus, the law is intended only for
compensation for the use and occupation of the premises. dwelling units specified monthly rentals and constructed
before the law became effective.
The damages which a plaintiff expects to obtain from his
business to be located in the premises, or for material injury The suspension under Section 6 of the law shall last for five
caused to the premises cannot be claimed in connection with years from and after the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25.
or as incidental to an action of illegal detainer or forcible entry. The statute became effective April 10, 1979. cdll
Since moral, exemplary, and actual damages are neither
“rents” nor “reasonable compensation for the use and WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of First Instance is
occupation of the premises” nor “fair rental value” as hereby modified by deleting therefrom the award of moral
abovestated, the Court is constrained to deny award of moral damages, exemplary damages, and actual damages. The
and exemplary damages and actual damages. decision is affirmed insofar as it restores respondent Chua Seng
to the possession and enjoyment of the leased premises and
NOTE: The private respondent's reliance on Art. 32 of the Civil sets aside the order allowing execution pending appeal. Civil
Code is inappropriate. The personal freedoms protected by Case No. 008378-CV, the complaint for unlawful detainer filed
that provision refer to the right to transfer from one place to by petitioner Paz S. Baens, shall be given due course and the
another and to choose one's residence. It is a recognition of case is remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings in
the freedom of a person to have his home in a place chosen by said Civil Case No. 008378-CV
him and, thereafter, to change it without interference from
Government except upon lawful orders of the court, or when G.R. No. 116665 March 20, 1996
necessary in the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health. MELQUIADES D. AZCUNA, JR., petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, ET. AL., respondents.
On expiration of verbal lease
The contract of lease was verbal. It had no fixed terms and

rentals were paid every month. Applying Article 1687 of the DOCTRINE: The damages that may be recovered in actions for
Civil Code, petitioner Baens states that since the rentals agreed ejectment are those equivalent to a reasonable compensation
upon were paid monthly, then the term of the lease should be for the use and occupation of the premises by defendant.
understood to be on a month to month basis. The petitioner Nonetheless, this latter legal proposition is not pertinent to the
contends that Presidential Decree No. 20 covers only leases of issue raised in the instant case because here, the damage
dwelling units where the rental is P300.00 or less a month and, sought to be recovered had previously been agreed to by lessee
therefore, does not apply to this case where the rental is (in the contract of lease) and imposed by lessor by way of
P390.00 a month. The said decree basically covers two distinct damages.
matters: (1) the prohibition against the increase of the monthly
rentals agreed upon between the lessor and the lessee when FACTS: Under a one (1) year lease contract, herein petitioner
said rental does not exceed P300.00 a month and (2) Azcuna, Jr., as lessee, occupied three (3) units (C, E and F) of
suspension of Par. I, Art. 1673 of the Civil Code insofar as it the building owned by private respondent Barcelona's family.
refers to dwelling units or land on which another’s dwelling is Came expiration date of the lease without an agreed renewal
located. Now, the said suspension is covered by B.P. No. 25. thereof and coupled by petitioner's failure to surrender the
leased units despite private respondent's demands, private
In Rantael v. Court of Appeals, et al. (97 SCRA 453), although respondent filed before the MTC an ejectment case against
the lease was on a month to month basis, the court ordered petitioner.
the surrender of the premises to the lessor because the
duration of the lease was fixed in a written agreement MTC; RTC; CA: IN FAVOR OF BARCELONA. Ordered Azcuna to
between the parties. However, even if the month to month pay accrued rents, damages for failure to turn over the
arrangement is on a verbal basis, if it is shown that the lessor property, attorney’s fees and cost of suit and to vacate the
needs the property for his own use or for the use of an property
immediate member of the family or for any of the other
statutory grounds to eject under Section 5 of Batas Pambansa ISSUE: WON the award of damages for failure to turn over
Blg. 25, which happens to be applicable, then the lease is property was proper

HELD: YES. Here, the municipal trial court, in making the the premises as long as the monthly rental will be ₱2,000 per
"P3,000.00 per day" award, was merely enforcing what was month plus 2 months deposit, otherwise, Sps. Penas will file an
stipulated upon in black and white by private respondent- unlawful detainer case. They were given until February
lessor and petitioner-lessee appearing in paragraph 10 of the 28,1990 to decide.
lease contract which reads:
Calaycay continued staying in the premises without following
That after the termination of the Lease, the LESSEE shall the Sps. demands. Calaycay, however, deposited monthly
peaceably deliver to the LESSOR the leased premises vacant rentals with the PNB in his name in trust for the Sps. since the
and unencumbered and in good tenantable conditions minus Sps. refused to accept the same personally. Still, the Sps. did
the ordinary wear and tear. In case the LESSEE's failure or not manifest intent to withdraw the same in the bank. On
inability to do so, LESSOR has the right to charge the LESSEE August 1992, Sps. again, through counsel, demanded Calaycay
P1,000.00 per day as damages without prejudice to other to vacate the subject property and pay rental arrearages from
remedies which LESSOR is entitled in the premise. March 1990 or a total of ₱60,000. Calaycay still failed to
comply, hence, the Sps. filed a case of unlawful detainer
This is clearly an agreement for liquidated damages — entitling (September 25, 1992).
private respondent to claim a stipulated amount by way of
damages (correctly totalling P3,000.00 per day as there were MTC: DISMISSED the case due to lack of jurisdiction as it was
three (3) units being leased by petitioner) over and above filed more than one year after Calaycay bagan
other damages still legally due him, i.e., the fair rental value for
the use and occupation of the property as provided for in unlawfully occupying the property.
Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
RTC: UPHELD the MTC’s decision as the Sps. action was
This Court has often stated that inferior courts have exclusive
converted from action de mero hecho to an accion publiciana
jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and detainer regardless
since more than one year has elapsed.
of the value of damages demanded. It has also ruled that the
damages that may be recovered in actions for ejectment are
CA: Ruled in favor of Calaycay. The proper remedy of the
those equivalent to a reasonable compensation for the use and
spouses is to fil an action for recovery of possession in the RTC.
occupation of the premises by defendant. Nonetheless, this
latter legal proposition is not pertinent to the issue raised in
ISSUE: Whether or not the MTC had jurisdiction over the
the instant case because here, the damage sought to be
complaint filed by Sps. Penas represented by atty-in-fact
recovered had previously been agreed to by lessee (in the
Viernes
contract of lease) and imposed by lessor by way of damages.
Besides, nobody can affirm that the liquidated amount of
HELD: YES. The MTC had jurisdiction and the CA is wrong in
damages stipulated in the lease contract was not due to
claiming that the Sps. Penas’ remedy is to file for recovery of
occupation or loss of possession of the premises and non-
possession of property. The one (1) year period provided for in
compliance with the contract.
section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court within which a
complaint for unlawful
G.R. No. 112734 July 7, 1994
SPOUSES NAZARIO P. PENAS, JR. represented by ELPIDIO
detainer can be filed should be counted from the LAST letter
R. VIERNES, ATTORNEY-IN-FACT vs. COURT OF APPEALS
of demand to vacate, the reason being that the lessor has the
and LUPO CALAYCAY
right to waive his right of action based on previous demands
and let the lessee remain meanwhile in the premises. (Sy Oh v.
FACTS:
Garcia)The notice giving the lessee the alternative either to pay
the increased rental or otherwise vacate the land (which in this
Nazario Penas (deceased lessor) executed a lease contract
case was on or before February 28, 1990) is not the demand
with Lupo Calaycay (lessee) in 1964 at an agreed monthly
contemplated by the Rules of Court in unlawful detainer cases.
rental of ₱110. Penas died in 1976 and thereafter an extra-
When after such notice, the lessee elects to stay, he thereby
judicial settlement of his estate was executed by his surviving
merely assumes the new rental and cannot be ejected until he
heirs, one of whom is his son, Nazario Penas, Jr. (petitioner in
defaults in said obligation and necessary demand is first made.
this case). In 1985, petitioner’s mother Conception also died
and her children including executed an extra judicial
It should be noted that even if the private respondent was
settlement of her estate. Time passed and the rents on the
depositing rentals in trust for the petitioners, what was being
premises increased up to ₱691.20.
deposited were rentals at the old rate, which petitioners were
not bound to accept or withdraw. When private respondent
In 1990, Sps. Penas (petitioners) notified Calaycay that they
elected to remain in the premises after petitioners had sent
were terminating the lease contract and demanded Calaycay
him the letter of 18 January 1990 giving him the option to
to vacate the same. Sps. Penas agreed for Calaycay to stay in
vacate by 28 February 1990 or to sign a new lease contract for ISSUE: Whether or not the Metropolitan Trial Court has
one (1) year at an increased rental rate of ₱2,000 a month, he jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
assumed the new rental rate and could be ejected from the
premises only upon default and by a proper demand from the HELD: YES. What confers jurisdiction on the inferior court in
petitioners. The demand was made on 10 August 1992, forcible entry and illegal detainer cases is not the amount of
followed by the action for unlawful detainer on 25 September unpaid rentals or damages involved , but rather the nature of
1992. the action because rents or damages are only incidental to
the main action.
Lim Kieh Tong, Inc., v. The Court of Appeals, Hon. Judge
Rogelio M. Pizarro, Presiding Judge of Branch 16 of the From the nature of the complaint, the Court held that the suit
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, and Reginaldo Y. Lim is one for forcible entry and detainer under Rule 70 of the Rules
of Court. The private respondent retained possession over the
G.R. No. 93451 ; March 18, 1991 room, but the petitioner prevented him from enjoying his right
by depriving him of the right of egress and ingress through the
main door.
FACTS: G.R. NO. 76656 December 11, 1992
The petitioner Lim Kieh Tong, Inc., is a corporation handling a SPOUSES EUTIQUIANO CLUTARIO and ARACEL CLUTARIO,
residential building. petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. GEORGE
C. MACLI-ING, RTC Judge of Quezon City, Branch C (100),
The private respondent and his family resided in Room 301 of and SPOUSES MELQUIADES GANDIA and MARIA V.
the residential building. When they transferred to a different GANDIA, respondents.
residence, Room 301 was converted as a storage of important
belongings such as books, documents, and appliances.
The private respondent intended to go to Room 301, but he PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 45
found out that the door lock of the main door had already been
changed. He requested furnished keys for the main door, but FACTS: Private respondents, Spouses Gandia are the owners of
his request was denied. a 2-storey residential apartment located, Cubao. While private
respondents have been occupying the upper storey of the
In 1987, private respondent Reginaldo Lim filed an action for house, petitioners have been staying on the ground floor by
damages with injunction before the Metropolitan Trial Court virtue of a verbal lease agreement for a monthly rental of
(MTC) of Manila. He alleged that the refusal of the petitioner P150. Private respondents, through their counsel, wrote a
to furnish him the appropriate key constituted a violation of letter to the petitioners giving them 90 days to vacate the
his right for the use and enjoyment of Room 301, as well as premises. According to them, due to their advanced age and
deprivation of his properties in Room 301. The action was failing health, they have decided to occupy the entire.
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners did not heed the demand letter, so the private
respondents brought the matter to the Katarungan
Private respondent instituted another action at the Pambarangay for settlement, but this did not meet with
Metropolitan Trial Court reiterating the same allegations. A success.
temporary restraining order was issued by the respondent
judge, and ordered the petitioner to deliver the appropriate Another demand letter was sent by private respondents to
keys to the private respondent. petitioners. Petitioners were in arrears in the payment of their
rentals. Private respondents filed a complaint for ejectment
The MTC, ruling in favor of the private respondent, held that against Clutario before the MTC. Petitioners paid the back
force was used to deprive the private respondent of the rentals. After trial, the MTC rendered judgment dismissing the
physical possession of Room 301 when the lock to the main complaint on the ground that private respondents "failed to
door was changed without his consent or knowledge. support their causes of action with substantial evidence."
The petitioner instituted this instant petition. It argued that Private respondents then filed an appeal with RTC. Respondent
the MTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, as the Judge George C. Macli-ing rendered a decision reversing the
amount of damages claimed is not specifically alleged in the MTC judgment. Respondent Judge ruled that petitioners'
complaint. It further held that the action is an action for nonpayment of rentals for more than 3 months and private
specific performance, therefore an action incapable of respondents' genuine need for the leased premises are
pecuniary estimation. sufficient causes for petitioners' ejectment.

It was then petitioners' turn to impugn this judgment by filing occupied the upper floor of the unit, discounting respondents
a petition for review before the CA. In a decision, the age and failing health. In the instant case, petitioners allege
respondent CA affirmed the RTC judgment but deleted the that the other apartment units of private respondents are
award of attorney's fees to private respondents. vacant and available to the latter for occupancy Private
respondents deny this allegation, claiming that the other units
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in affirming RTC’s ruling. were occupied when they gave notice to the petitioners to
vacate the disputed premises, and remain so occupied until
HELD: NO. B.P. Blg. 25 (1979), which was the governing law at now. None of the three courts which have already adjudicated
the time of the filing of the complaint and which the parties on the controversy gave credence to petitioners' allegation.
had to rely on, provides, in section 5, 6 grounds for ejectment. The MTC which decided in petitioners' favor did not make a
In seeking to oust petitioners from the leased premises, private finding that the other apartment units of private respondents
respondents invoked 2 of the 6 grounds for ejectment were available for occupancy by the latter. On the contrary,
provided under sec 5 of BP 25 (1979), namely: (1) arrears in the respondent Court of Appeals ruled that "the other
payment of rent for three (3) months at any one time; and (2) apartments of private respondents were tenanted." The Court
need of the lessors to repossess their property for their own finds no cogent reason to disturb this finding.
use or for the use of any immediate member of their family as
residential unit. Petitioner’s payment of the back rentals and However, the SC finds in the case at bar, that the decision of
acceptance of the respondent does not constitute a waiver or private respondents to occupy both the lower and upper
abandonment of their cause of action for ejectment against portions of the property sprang not only from mere
the latter. Respondents showed through their conduct, convenience, but from necessity as well, due to their advanced
subsequent to the acceptance of the back rentals, that they age and the poor health of respondent Melquiades Gandia.
have no intention of to waive their right to eject the While the upper portion of the premises may have been
petitioners. Since they continued on with the complaint and sufficient to satisfy private respondents' residential needs in
did not notify the trial court of their intention to have the said 1961 when they leased the lower portion to petitioners, it no
complaint dismissed. Also, the action of ejectment started longer sufficed in 1980 or 19 years later, when they served the
before their payment to respondent, not after payment of notice to vacate, their personal circumstances having
ejectment. Hence it falls under the said grounds for ejectment drastically changed.
under sec.5 of BP 25.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the Decision of the
Proof of any one of the factors enumerated in section 5 of B.P. Court of Appeals AFFIRMED
Blg. 25 (1979) is sufficient cause for judicial ejectment of a
lessee. Having proved one of such grounds, i.e., arrears in G.R. No. L-50335 August 7, 1989
payment of rent for 3 months at any one time, private
respondents may legally eject petitioners without having to FLORENTINO CURSINO, petitioner, vs. HON. PEDRO JL.
prove the other grounds for ejectment. Nevertheless, to BAUTISTA, (District Judge, CFI, Branch III, Pasay City), HON.
bolster their action for ejectment, private respondents NICANOR J. CRUZ, JR. (Presiding Judge, Mun. Court of
invoked in their complaint a second ground for ejectment, Paranaque, MM), and MARIA JAMES, respondents.
namely, their need for the leased premises. Petitioners are
bound by the established jurisprudence that under B.P. Blg. 25
(1979), the need by the lessor of the leased premises for his
own use or that of his immediate family is a valid ground for PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI
ejectment. They, however, submit that this ground for
ejectment is not available to private respondents who own, DOCTRINE: It is the landlord’s demand for tenant to vacate the
apart from the disputed premises, three other apartment units premises, when the tenant has failed to pay the rents on time
located at Nos. 56-A, 56-B and 56-C Liberty St., Murphy, Cubao, and tenant’s refusal or failure to vacate, which make unlawful
Quezon City, at least one of which is allegedly available for withholding of possession.
occupancy by private respondents.
That consent, no matter how long it may last makes lawful
tenant's possession. Only when that consent is withdrawn and
In relation to the second ground raised by the respondent, for
the owner demands tenant to leave the property is the owner's
the lessor to be able to validly eject the lessee on the ground
right of possession asserted and the tenant's refusal or failure
of need for the leased property, it must be shown that there is
to move out makes his possession unlawful because it is
no other available residential unit to satisfy that need. The
violative of the owner's preferential right of possession.
non-availability must exist at the time of the demand by the
lessor on the lessee to vacate the property. Which was FACTS:
declared to be occupied by the RTC. MTC’s decision ruling in
favor of petitioners, was because the petitioners had already

Respondent Maria James is the lawful owner and lessor of the In the instant case, records show that petitioner-lessee
property in Parañaque. It was leased by petitioner Florentino Florentino has defaulted in the payment of rentals for the
Cursino at a monthly rental of P100 payable within first 5 days months October, November, and December 1997. Although
of each month. there was a payment made on December 22, 1977 when
respondent received the postal money orders, he has not paid
Petitioner defaulted for the months October, November, and it in time. Their agreement was for the monthly rentals be paid
December 1977. Petitioner sent 2 postal money orders both within the first five days of every month.
dated December 21, 1977. One bearing money order in the
amount of P200 as payment of months October and November The petitioner-lessee stated that he refused to vacate because
and another bearing P200 as payment for the month of he is protected under Sections 1 and 4 of PD 20. Under PD 20,
December. it is very clear that only paragraph 1 of Article 1673 of Civil
Code, which refers to expiration of leases of dwelling unit or
Prior to the sending of postal money orders, respondent land for an indefinite period, as ground for ejectment, is
demanded on December 14, 1977 that petitioner pay the back suspended but not the other provisions of the Civil Code and
rentals and vacate the premises of the property within 5 days the Rules of Court.
“from the receipt of this letter”. Despite the formal demand,
petitioner failed and refused to vacate the premises without In Velez vs Avelino, the Court has categorically ruled that PD 20
justifiable cause. As a result, the respondent was forced to only suspended ejectment when the lease is for an indefinite
secure services of a counsel and incur expenses in period. It did not suspend ejectment on other grounds like lack
litigation.Petitioner contends that he has not defaulted. It was of payment of t he rental stipulated.
the respondent who refused to accept the payments. He
claims he sent postal money orders as payment. He also Petitioner-lessee insists that he has not defaulted because
contended that since the lease of the subject dwelling place is the lessor refused to accept the payment. This contention is
only for P100 a month, it is protected under Section 1 and 4 of wrong. In Velez vs Avelino, the Court ruled that the failure of
PD 20. the owners to collect, or their refusal to accept the rentals
are not valid defenses as Article 1256 of the Civil Code
Petitioner did not vacate the property and thus, a complaint provides that if the creditor to whom tender of payment has
for unlawful detainer was filed by respondent before the been made refuses to accept it without just case, the debtor
Municipal Court of Parañaque. shall be released from responsibility by the consignation of
the thing or sum due.
MUNICIPAL COURT OF PARAÑAQUE:
In the instant case, petitioner-lessee failed to consign the sum
Judgment in favor of the plaintiff (respondent herein) and due.
against the defendant (petitioner herein). It ordered petitioner
to vacate the property and to pay monthly rentals accruing Petitioner further argues that despite paying the back rentals
until the premises are vacated. within 5 days from the receipt of the demand letter,
respondent still filed the complaint for ejectment. He said
Petitioner then appealed to the then CFI of Rizal. these is contrary to the provision in Section 2 of Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court.
CFI OF RIZAL:
Such argument is very wrong. The respondent lessor formally
AFFIRMED the decision of Municipal Court with double costs demanded from the petitioner to pay the back rentals and to
against the petitioner. vacate the premises. Petitioner was able to pay the back
rentals but refused to vacate.
His subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Furthermore, such belated payments do not automatically
ISSUE:
restore the contract of lease without the respondent lessor’s
Whether or not Maria James still has a cause of action against consent. It is clear that the terms of the contract of lease was
the petitioner after she received and accepted the rentals for violated and the respondent lessor has every right to withdraw
October, November, and December 1977 at the time of the from the said contract whether oral or written.
instant case?
In Canaynay vs Sarmiento, the Court ruled that it is the
HELD: landlord’s demand for tenant to vacate the premises, when the
tenant has failed to pay the rents on time and tenant’s refusal
Yes. Respondent Maria James exercised two unquestionable or failure to vacate, which make unlawful withholding of
prerogatives of an owner-lessor when a tenant-lessee defaults possession. That consent, no matter how long it may last
in the payment of rent— to demand that back rentals be paid; makes lawful tenants possession. Only when that consent is
and to demand that premises be vacated. withdrawn and the owners demands tenant to leave the
property is the owner’s right of possession asserted and the ISSUE: WON private respondent may legally be ejected from
tenant’s refusal or failure to move out makes his possession the subject property on the sole basis of the expiration of the
unlawful because it is violative of the owner’s preferential right verbal lease agreement under which rental are paid monthly
of possession.
HELD: YES. Lease agreements with no specified period, but in
In the instant case, the respondent-lessor did not consent to which rentals are paid monthly, are paid monthly, are
the petitioner-lessee’s possession after the default. Despite considered to be on a month-to-month basis. They are for
demand to vacate after the default, the petitioner- lessee did definite period and expire after the last day of any given thirty-
not do so. Such refusal, makes his possession unlawful. day period, upon proper demand and notice by the lessor to
vacate.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision and order of the then Court
of First Instance of Rizal is Affirmed in toto In the case at bench, it was found by all three lower courts that
the lease over the subject property was on a month-to-month
[G.R. No. 112285. February 21, 1995.] basis, and that there was proper notice of non-renewal of
contract and demand for vacation of premises made by
LOIDA, BIENVENIDO & JOSELITO, all surnamed ACAB, petitioners on private respondent. Unquestionably, therefore,
CARINA VALERIO & ESMERALDA ZAPANTA, Petitioners, v. the verbal lease agreement entered into by private respondent
COURT OF APPEALS and AMPARO C. VILLANUEVA, and petitioners' father and predecessor-in-interest has been
Respondents. validly terminated, in which case there is sufficient cause for
ejectment under Section 5(f) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 877.
PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE DECISION OF THE CA
Furthermore, it must be noted that, since the month-to-month
DOCTRINE: Lease agreements with no specified period, but in lease in the case at bench is considered one with a definite
which rentals are paid monthly, are paid monthly, are period, it falls within the exception provided in Section 6 of
considered to be on a month-to-month basis. 8 They are for Batas Pambansa Blg. 877. In other words, the first paragraph
definite period and expire after the last day of any given thirty- of Article 1673 of the New Civil Code, which provides that:
day period, upon proper demand and notice by the lessor to
vacate. "Art. 1673. The lessor may judicially eject the lessee for any of
the following causes:
FACTS: Petitioners' father, Jose R. Acab was the owner of the
subject residential lot. In 1942, he entered into a verbal lease "(1) When the period agreed upon, or that which is fixed for
agreement with private respondent and her now-deceased the duration of leases under Articles 1682 and 1687 has
husband. Under the agreement, the Villanueva spouses were expired;
obliged to pay Acab a monthly rental of fifty pesos (P50.00).
applies to the case at bench. Thus, ejectment of private
Petitioner's counsel, wrote private respondent saying they will respondent by petitioners is justified.
terminate the contract to repossess the property and gave
respondent 3 months to vacate. Failure to do so would force
the petitioners bring the matter to the barangay and G.R. No. L-57259 October 13, 1983
eventually to the court without further notice. ANGEL P. PERAN, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH II, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
Private respondent refused to vacate the subject premises. OF SORSOGON, 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICT, RAMON ESPERA
Petitioners, armed with a Certification to File Action from the and ENCARNACION EVASCO, as private-respondents,
proper barangay Lupon Tagapayapa, filed their complaint for respondents.
ejectment with the MTC.
MTC: IN FAVOR OF PETITIONERS. RTC: AFFIRMED
DOCTRINE: The one-year-period of limitation commences from
CA: REVERSED MTC and RTC. Reasoning: (1) petitioners failed the time of demand to vacate, and when several demands are
to prove that they do not own any other available residential made, the same is counted from the last letter of demand.
units within Kalookan; (2) consequently, petitioners' claim that Demand may either be personal or in writing.
they need the subject premises is unsubstantiated; (3)
therefore, private respondent's ejectment from the subject FACTS:
premises only be based on the termination of the month-to-
month lease agreement; and (4) ejectment based solely on Jose Evasco owns a land. He executed a "Reparticion
termination of month-to-month lease contract is not justified. Extrajudicial" whereby he partitioned his properties among his

five heirs. The deceased Anacleto Evasco, was one of the heirs demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the
and Encarnacion being his child. proper remedy against him. It is not necessary that there be a
formal agreement or contract of lease before an unlawful
Alejandro Evasco sold his property and after a series of detainer suit may be filed against a possessor by tolerance.
transactions to different persons it fell in to the hands of Peran, Neither is prior physical possession of the property by
who acquired the land by purchasing it. He declared it in his petitioner an indispensable requisite.
name under a Tax Declaration. The sale was duly recorded in
the Register of Deeds. G.R. No. L-44806 March 31, 1977
Petitioner personally asked private respondents, whose house BIENVENIDO ONCE, petitioner, vs. HON. CARLOS Y.
is erected on the lot in question, to remove the same and GONZALES, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance
vacate the premises. Respondents refused and they tried to of Iloilo Branch VI; PROVINCIAL SHERIFF of Iloilo, and
settle the dispute before a municipal judge but no settlement JUANITO PEÑA, respondents.
was reached.
Petitioner filed a complaint for Forcible Entry and Illegal DOCTRINE

Detainer against private respondents before Municipal Circuit
Court alleging that respondents are mere squatters thereon “Section 8 requires a supersedeas bond only if there are
and that they had prevented plaintiff from entering the accrued rentals in arrears. It dispenses with that bond if the
property. defeated tenant deposits in court the rentals due from time to
time.”
Private respondents alleged that they are the lawful
Special Civil Actions of Certiorari and Prohibition
possessors for more than 20 years of the said portion, which
formerly belonged to Jose Evasco, grandfather of Encarnacion FACTS
Evasco and that petitioner has no right to eject them
therefrom. The issue in this case arose from a decision by the City Court of
Iloilo City, ordering Once to vacate an apartment in a building
The MCC ruled in favor of petitioner and ordered private owned by Pena and to pay a monthly rental of P290 until the
respondents to vacate the lot. premises have been vacated plus attorney’s fees. It was not
indicated in the decision when the payment of the monthly
The CFI reversed the decision of the MCC. It held that said rental should commence, and no back rentals were adjudged.
Court had no jurisdiction over the case as the same was filed
beyond the one-year-period of limitation. Once appealed from the decision, depositing payment for
rentals. Pena, on the other hand, filed in the CFI a motion for
ISSUE: immediate execution of the city court’s judgment, invoking
Once’s alleged failure to file a supersedeas bond and the
Whether or not the CFI erred when it declared the MCC had no supposed untenable condition of the apartment.
jurisdiction over the case
Executive Judge Rovira granted the motion for execution. MR
HELD: was denied. Thus, Once filed with the Supreme Court the
instant special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition.
The one-year-period of limitation commences from the time of
demand to vacate, and when several demands are made, the ISSUE
same is counted from the last letter of demand. Demand may
either be personal or in writing. The demand to vacate having • Whether or not the lower court erred in ordering
been made by petitioner in January 1979, and the ejectment execution of the city court’s judgment pending
suit having been instituted on February 8, 1979, the 2nd appeal. (YES)
Municipal Circuit Court of Bulusan-Barcelona acted well within
RULING
its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the case.
The lower court committed a patent error in ordering
POSSESSOR BY TOLERANCE execution of the city court's judgment on the ground that
Bienvenido Once did not file a supersedeas bond. No such
Possession by tolerance is lawful but this becomes illegal bond was necessary because no back rentals were adjudged in
when, upon demand to vacate by the owner, the possessor the city court's judgment. The attorney's fees of P1,000 need
refuses to comply with such demand. A possessor by tolerance not be covered by a supersedeas bond. (De Laureano vs. Adil,
is necessarily bound by an implied promise to vacate upon L-43345, July 29, 1976, 72 SCRA 148, 155).

Once's timely deposit of the rentals for April, May, June, July that the Deed was falsified, and his and Verona's signatures
and August, 1976 stayed the execution of the judgment thereat were forgeries.20 In January of 2010, Eddie filed two
pending appeal. In such a situation, no supersedeas bond was complaints against Vida. One was a civil case for nullification of
required to stay execution of the city court's judgment. (Sison the Deed, and for payment of damages and attorney's
vs. Bayona, 109 Phil. 557, 561). fees.21 The other was a criminal complaint for falsification of
public document. MTCC rendered a Decision30 directing the
Consequently, the order of execution was groundless. It was petitioners and their co-defendants to turn over to Vida the
not justified under section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. possession of the disputed property, and pay ₱1,000.00
Section 8 requires a supersedeas bond only if there are monthly rent
accrued rentals in arrears. It dispenses with that bond if the
defeated tenant deposits in court the rentals due from time to RTC reversed the MTCC ruling, dismissed the complaint for
time. The execution proceeding already mentioned is void. cdll unlawful detainer and denied Vida's motion for the issuance of
a writ of execution. RTC likewise resolved the issue on
It may be noted that according to Once's manifestation of ownership. It ruled for the petitioners.
March 22, 1977, the lower court in its decision of February 5,
1977 reversed the city court's judgment and ordered that Once Issue: WON RTC correctly ruled that in an unlawful detainer
be allowed to reoccupy the leased premises. case, the MTCC can resolve the issue of ownership. (NO)
WHEREFORE, the lower court's orders of August 9 and
Ruling: By analogy, in the unlawful detainer case from which
September 14, 1976 are set aside with costs against
the instant petition arose, Eddie was originally a co-owner of
respondent Peña.
the disputed property, and he remains in possession thereof.
EDDIE E. DIZON and BRYAN R. DIZON, Petitioners, Vida, on the other, is not even a resident of Davao
vs. YOLANDA VIDA P. BELTRAN, Respondent. City.58 Moreover, prior to Vida's filing of the unlawful detainer
case, Eddie had already instituted actions for nullification of
the Deed and falsification of public documents. The Office of
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 the Davao City Prosecutor had likewise made a preliminary
determination of probable cause that forgery was committed.
DOCTRINE: If the addressee fails to claim his mail from the Eddie, thus, insists that no valid conveyance was made by
post office within five (5) days from the date of the first notice, Verona to Vida. In the mind of the Court, the foregoing are
service becomes effective upon the expiration of five (5) days persuasive; reasons justifying the non-immediate execution of
therefrom. In such a case, there arises a presumption that the the MTCC judgment despite the petitioners' belated posting of
service was complete at the end of the said five-day period. This the supersedeas bond. Hence, the CA erred in declaring that
means that the period to appeal or to file the necessary the RTC improperly denied Vida's motion for the issuance of a
pleading begins to run after five days from the first notice given writ of execution pending appeal.
by the postmaster. This is because a party is deemed to have
received and to have been notified of the judgment at that In the instant petition, Vida impliedly admits the irregularity of
point.
the Deed's notarization as both of the vendors were not
personally present.1avvphi1 Consequently, clue execution can
FACTS: no longer be presumed. Besides, the extant circumstances
surrounding the controversy constitute preponderant
Eddie and Verona Juana Pascua-Dizon (Verona) (collectively,
evidence suggesting that forgery was committed. Eddie
the Spouses Dizon) got married on March 8, 1995.7Verona was
promptly filed a criminal case for falsification of documents
a housewife. She and her mother, together with Bryan and
and a civil case to nullify the Deed. Later, the Office of the
James, resided in the house erected on a 240-square-meter lot
Davao City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict Vida for
(disputed property) at No. 42 Mahogany Street, Nova Tierra
falsification. Consequently, the issue of ownership cannot be
Subdivision, Lanang, Davao City
disregarded in the unlawful detainer case. It bears stressing
though that while the RTC aptly resolved the issue of
Verona filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City
ownership, it is at best preliminary and shall not be
a petition for the issuance of Temporary and Permanent
determinative of the outcome of the two other cases filed by
Protection Orders against Eddie and James.
Eddie against Vida.
They subsequently entered into a Compromise Agreement
ADOLFO RACAZA, petitioner, vs. SUSANA REALTY INC.,
hereby they contemplated selling the disputed property. They
respondent.
would thereafter equally divide the proceeds from the sale.
G.R. NO. L-20330 December 22, 1966
Later on, Verona died. A copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale was
shown to Eddie wherein he alleged was falsified. Eddie alleged
dismissed as the amount of the demand (P12,000) was beyond
the jurisdiction of the municipal court to grant.
DOCTRINE: Rule 70, Section 2, Rules of Court, requires previous
demand only when the action is "for failure to pay rent due or CA: ONE YEAR PERIOD SHOULD BE COUNTED FROM DEC. 17,
to comply with the conditions of his lease." Where the action is 1958; CFI TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE COUNTERCLAIM
to terminate the lease because of the expiration of its term, no
such demand is necessary (Civil Code Arts. 1669 and 1687). In Starting point should be December 17, 1958 when the second
the latter case, upon the expiration of the term of the lease, the demand to quit was made by respondent
landlord may go into the property and occupy it, and if the
lessee refuses to vacate the premises, and action for unlawful Citing article 1678 of the Civil Code, the court held that
detainer may immediately be brought against him even before petitioner should be reimbursed one half of what he had spent
the expiration of the fifteen or five days provided in Rule 70, in building his house. While petitioner claimed that he had
Section 2. spent P12,000 for the improvement of his house, the appellate
court found that the fair market value of the house was P7,000
FACTS: Petitioner is the lessee of a portion of a piece of land and, on the basis of this amount, awarded P3,500 to
owned by respondent corporation. He started renting this petitioner.
portion of the lot in 1952 when his wife, Evarista P. Racaza,
bought an unfinished house that had been built on it. On ISSUE: W/N previous demand required in Rule 70, Sec. 2 is
assurance of respondent that petitioner's family could stay on necessary in this case
the land by paying a monthly rent of P15, petitioner finished
the construction of the house and he and his family lived in it. HELD: NO such demand is necessary.
On December 16, 1955, however, petitioner was asked to
vacate the land because respondent needed it. The demand To begin with, this case was brought not on the theory that
was followed by the filing on February 10, 1956 of a complaint petitioner, as lessee, failed to pay rents, but on the theory that
for ejectment in the Municipal Court of Pasay City. Petitioner the lease had expired and that respondent had asked
and his family remained in the premises as the case was petitioner to vacate the land. The averment that the lease was
dismissed for failure of respondent to proceed to trial. on a month-to-month basis is equivalent to an allegation that
the lease expired at the end of every month. It is therefore
On December 17, 1957, petitioner received another letter immaterial that rents had not been paid since July, 1955, since
from respondent demanding anew the surrender of the what made petitioner liable for ejectment was the expiration
premises. On February 19, 1958, another ejectment suit was of the lease. This being the case, demand to vacate was
filed against him. unnecessary. As this Court explained in Co Tiamcovs. Diaz,
Rule 70, section 2 requires previous demand only when the
In his answer, petitioner denied that the lease was on a month- action is "for failure to pay rent due or to comply with the
to-month basis and claimed that his understanding with conditions of his lease." Where the action is to terminate the
respondent was that he would be allowed to stay on the lease because of the expiration of its term, no such demand
premises as long as he paid a monthly rent of P15. As is necessary. In the latter case, upon the expiration of the term
counterclaim, petitioner demanded the payment of P12,000 of the lease, the landlord may go into the property and occupy
which he said he had spent to finish the construction of his it, and if the lessee refuses to vacate the premises, an action
house. for unlawful detainer may immediately be brought against him
even before the expiration of the fifteen or five days provided
After trial, the court ordered petitioner to vacate the premises in Rule 70, section 2.
and pay P15 a month until he had done so, even as it dismissed
his counterclaim for lack of merit. This brings us to petitioner's next point. As earlier stated,
petitioner was twice asked to quit the premises. The first was
CFI: ORDERED PETITIONER EVICTED; HIS COUNTERCLAIM on December 16, 1955, but as pointed out in the beginning,
WAS THROWN OUT FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION. the complaint filed afterwards was dismissed for non-suit. The
second time he was asked to move out was on December 17,
It was held that petitioner's illegal possession should be 1957, followed by a complaint filed on February 19, 1958.
deemed to have started on December 17, 1957, when the Petitioner insists that respondent's cause of action must be
second demand to vacate was made on him, because the deemed to have accrued on December 16, 1955. But, as
complaint in this case was not intended to revive the one already stated, respondent's action is not based on non-
previously dismissed for lack of prosecution. Since the payment of rent coupled with a demand; its action is based
complaint was filed on February 19, 1958, jurisdiction over the on the expiration of the term of the lease and the demand
case was properly acquired by the municipal court. At the made by it to vacate the premises merely evidences its
same time, it was held that the counterclaim was correctly determination not to extend the lease. Moreover, even if the

action were based on non-payment of rent, the one-year Plaintiffs filed a "Supplemental Motion for Execution
period should be reckoned from the second notice, on the
theory that respondent has the right to waive his action based Pending Appeal," dated June 30, 1993, in the MTCC. The
on the first demand and to let the lessee remain in the supplemental motion was opposed by complainant in its
premises. "Comment or Opposition to Supplemental Motion for
Execution Pending Appeal”.
Nor is there merit in petitioner's last point that he should have
been allowed full reimbursement for what he had spent by On August 11, 1993, respondent judge issued a special order,
applying to this case article 448 of the Civil Code. It is now granting plaintiffs' motion for a writ of execution pending
settled that article 443, in relation to article 546, applies only appeal. Respondent judge used as a basis in granting the writ
to possessors in good faith and since lessees, like petitioner, of execution pending appeal the provisions of the Rules of
are not possessors in good faith, because they know that their Court, particularly, Rule 39, Sec. 2. The good reasons of
occupation of the premises continues only during the life of plaintiffs were for the use of the members of the latter’s
the lease, they cannot recover the value of their improvement (plaintiff’s) families, the bonafide intention to cultivate the
from the lessor, much less retain the premises until they are land and that the defendant, complaint herein, already owned
reimbursed. Their rights are governed by article 1678 which more than 10 hectares thus, complainant is already prohibited
allows reimbursement of lessees up to one-half of the value of from acquiring the subject lot. Plaintiffs posted a bond as
their useful improvements. required by the special order. Respondent judge approved the
bond in an order, dated September 8, 1993. MR of both the
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed special order and the order approving the bond was not acted
from is affirmed, with costs against petitioner. upon by respondent judge.
A.M. No. MTJ-93-892 October 25, 1995 Complainant now accuses respondent judge of grave
partiality, serious misconduct, abuse of authority and/or

ignorance of the law for issuing the August 11, 1993 Special
SAN MANUEL WOOD PRODUCTS, INC., complainant, vs. Order and the September 8, 1993 Order.
JUDGE RAMON B. TUPAS and CITY SHERIFF FIDEL
CASUYON, both of 2nd Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Complainant contends that, upon perfection of its appeal on
Davao City, respondents. July 16, 1993, respondent judge lost its jurisdiction over the
case. Thus, the Special Order, dated August 11, 1993, ordering
the issuance of the writ of execution pending appeal, is null
and void. Complainant argues, further, that the issuance of the
FACTS: July 16, 1993 Order should be considered as a denial of the
motion for execution pending appeal filed by the plaintiffs.
Complainant San Manuel Wood Products charged Judge Tupas Furthermore, complainant points out that the rule governing
of the MTCC with grave partiality, serious execution of judgment in ejectment cases Rule 70, Sec. 8 not
Rule 39, Sec. 2, the provision relied upon by respondent judge.
misconduct, abuse of authority and/or ignorance of the law.
Complainant is the defendant in an unlawful detainer case. COURT ADMINISTRATOR: The Court administrator held that
Respondent judge rendered a decision in the said unlawful since both plaintiffs and defendant (complainant in this case)
detainer case, in favor of the plaintiffs therein and against received their respective copies of the decision on June 14,
herein complainant. The parties received their copies of the 1993, the last day to appeal was June 29, 1993 and, by
decision on June 14, 1993.Within the reglementary period to operation of law, the appeal of complainant was perfected on
appeal, the plaintiffs filed a "Motion for Immediate Execution," June 30, 1993, it having filed its Notice of Appeal on June 24,
of the MTCC decision. 1993. The Court administrator held that the settled rule is:
“Should the defendant fail to make the payments above
On June 24, 1993, while the motion for immediate execution prescribed from time to time during the pendency of the
was pending in the MTCC, complainant filed a "Notice of appeal, the appellate court, upon motion of the plaintiff, of
Appeal and Approval of Cash/Supersedeas Bond" to stay the which the defendant shall have notice, and upon proof of such
execution of the unlawful detainer decision. The notice of failure shall order the execution of the judgment appealed
appeal and the supersedeas bond were approved by from with respect to the restoration of possession, but such
respondent judge in an Order, dated July 16, 1993. On execution shall not be a bar to the appeal taking its course until
September 3, 1993, complainant deposited with the clerk of the final disposition thereof on its merits.”
court the sum of 8,000, the rentals due from June 6, 1993 to
October 5, 1993.

Judge Tupas had, therefore, no jurisdiction and authority to jurisprudence, the respondent judge showed gross ignorance,
issue his Special Order. He should have dismissed all of the albeit without any malice or corrupt motive.
plaintiffs' motion for execution pending appeal because Rule
70, Sec. 8 and not Rule 39, Sec. 2 is what is applicable as this is Quintina S. Vda. De Ampil, and Domingo Brothers Inc., v.
an ejectment case. Furthermore, it ruled that it is only the The Hon. Judge Carmelino G. Alvendia, Branch XVI, Court
appellate court — the RTC for ejectment cases — which can of First Instance of Manila, and Vicente Manuel
order the issuance of the writ of execution pending appeal but
only for the explicit reason that the periodic rentals as found G.R. No. L-19761 ; April 30, 1964
in the inferior court decision were not paid, with notice and
hearing mandated.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of gross FACTS:

ignorance of law in applying Rule 39, Sec. 2 instead of Rule 70,
Sec. 8 in ejectment cases. Petitioners Quintina S. Vda. de Ampil and Domingo Brothers
Inc., obtained a favorable judgment in a forcible entry or
HELD: Yes. Respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of law detainer case filed against Vicente Manuel, private
in applying Rule 39, Sec. 2 instead of Rule 70, Sec. 8 in respondent.
ejectment cases. This is an ejectment case, hence, the
applicable rule is Rule 70, Sec. 8….Respondent judge missed
the foregoing rule when it applied Rule 39, Sec. 2… It ought to
be mentioned that Rule 39, Sec. 2 applies to execution pending The Municipal Court ordered Manuel to pay a sum
appeal in ordinary civil actions. This rule requires good reasons representing the arrears at the rate of P70.00 a month within
before a writ of execution can be issued in favor of the the first five days of each month.
prevailing party. Its issuance is subject to the sound discretion
of the court and is usually not favored because it affects the Pending Manuel’s appeal, the petitioners filed a motion
rights of the parties which are yet to be ascertained on appeal. averring that Manuel failed to deposit the P70.00 monthly set
by the lower court within the first five days of each month.
In stark contrast, under Rule 70, Sec. 8, it is not necessary to
show good reasons for the immediate execution of the The respondent judge found that Manuel had been making
judgment against the defendant. The monthly deposits exacted by the appealed judgment within
the first ten days of the month following that for which the
judgment is executed immediately in favor of the plaintiff, as a deposit was made, and it can no longer be said that he failed
matter of right, to prevent further damage arising from the loss to make his monthly deposit on time.
of possession.
ISSUE:
It is settled that to stay the execution of judgment of an inferior
court, the losing defendant in an ejectment case must: (a) Whether or not the portion of the decision of the Municipal
perfect his appeal; (b) file a supersedeas bond; and (c) make a Court requiring Manuel to deposit rentals within the first five
periodic deposit of the rentals due or the reasonable days of each month is controlling.
compensation for the use and occupation of the property
during the pendency of the appeal. These requisites must HELD:
concur.
NO. In the absence of any finding as to the provisions of the
In the case at bar, complainant filed his appeal on time and lease contract by the Municipal Court, the monthly deposit
deposited the required supersedeas bond in the inferior court, may be made within the first ten days of the month.Where the
but it failed to comply with the third requisite as related above. time for payment under the contract is not specifically
As borne by the records, the rentals accruing for the months of declared, the ten-day period must be followed.
June, July and August were deposited only on September 3,
1993. Upon its failure to meet the third requisite prescribed Mere allegations of an agreement or undertaking of payment
under the rules, the plaintiffs have the right to move for within the first five days of every month does not satisfy the
execution of the judgment appealed from. The order of requirement of the Rule. The rule requires that the judgment
execution, however, has to be issued by the appellate court, in shall make specific findings as to the existence and the terms
this case the RTC, since the respondent judge had lost his of the contract.
jurisdiction over the ejectment case after the appeal to the RTC
had been perfected. In disregarding the rules and settled In the case above the Municipal Trial Court made no findings
that the contract of lease required the monthly rent to be paid

within five days of each month - therefore, the ten-day period supersedeas bond and making the necessary deposit for
must be followed. ensuing rentals particularly when, by his failure to appeal, the
lessee does not question said accrued and incoming rents.
WHEREFORE, We hereby SET ASIDE the assailed decision and

G.R. No. L-42364 April 9, 1987 reinstate the writ of execution issued, and We hereby render
a new decision ordering the lessee to vacate the premises and
CITY OF MANILA and HON. JOSE B. JIMENEZ, CFI Judge of to pay the rentals fixed by the City Court from the time the
Manila and the CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA, petitioners, vs. complaint was filed until the premises are vacated and full
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and AUGUSTO SANTOS, payment is made, with 12% per cent interest yearly. No
respondents. pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 103727 December 18, 1996

INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DON MARIANO SAN
FACTS: It appears that after the expiration of its contract of PEDRO Y ESTEBAN, represented by its HEIR-JUDICIAL
lease involving two market stalls, owned by the City of Manila ADMINISTRATOR, ENGRACIO F. SAN PEDRO, petitioner-
in the Lacson Underpass, the lessor-City wanted to increase appellant, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division)
the lease rentals. Despite the refusal of the lessee to agree to AURELIO OCAMPO, DOMINADOR D. BUHAIN, TERESA C.
the increased rates, it refused to vacate the premises, DELA CRUZ, respondents-appellees.
prompting the City to file ejectment proceedings against it. The
City Court rendered a decision ordering the defendant to pay G.R. No. 106496 December 18, 1996
for the premises and that failure of the defendant to pay any
rent on or before the due date spelled out herein shall entitle
ENGRACIO SAN PEDRO, CANDIDO GENER, ROSA
the plaintiff to the issuance of a Writ of Execution for
PANTALEON, VICENTE PANTALEON, ELEUTERIO
ejectment and collection of rent.
PANTALEON, TRINIDAD SAN PEDRO, RODRIGO SAN
PEDRO, RICARDO NICOLAS, FELISA NICOLAS, and LEONA
Court fixed new rental rates and allowed the eventual
SAN PEDRO, petitioners, vs.
ejectment of the lessee in case of noncompliance. In view of
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, (Sixteenth Division)
the lessee's refusal to pay the increased rates, the City, without
and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
filing any supersedeas bond, asked for immediate execution of
the City Court's judgment pending appeal. The lessee opposed PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WITH PROHIBITION AND
this execution on the theory that the judgment was a PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
"conditional" one; that, there must first be a hearing or a new
action for ejectment to determine whether or not the lessee's DOCTRINE: Firmly settled is the rule that the pendency of an
refusal to pay was justified; and that there can be no execution action questioning the ownership of property will not abate
pending appeal because the City had not filed any supersedeas ejectment suits or bar the execution of the judgments therein.
bond. The CFI granted the writ of execution prayed for. The rationale of the rule is that an ejectment suit involves only
the issue of material possession or possession de facto while an
The appellate tribunal reversed the CFI and set aside the writ action for annulment of title, such as the case at bar, involves
of execution, explaining that Sec. 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of the question of ownership. There may be identity of parties and
Court, execution pending appeal in ejectment cases does not subject matter but not of the cause of action or the relief
apply for said provision operates only when it is the lessee, not prayed for.
the lessor, who appeals, for in such a case, it is the lessee who
is supposed to file a supersedeas bond and to deposit the FACTS:
monthly rentals in court, as said rentals fall due
Private respondent William Ledesma filed with the
ISSUE: WHETHER THERE CAN BE EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL Metropolitan Trial Court of Kalookan City a complaint against
petitioner spouses Pedie and Cecilia Loresto for unlawful
HELD: We rule that Sec. 8 of Rule 70 can apply even if it is the detainer with preliminary injunction. The court rendered
lessor who appeals in the sense that in such a case, if the lessee judgment against the Lorestos.
desires to prevent execution pending appeal, the lessee must
still file the supersedeas bond and deposit in court the accruing The spouses appealed to the RTC.
rentals. The rationale for the ruling is simple, why should the
Lorestos, together with petitioner Catalino San Pedro,
lessee continue occupying the premises without filing the
instituted an action for the annulment of Ledesma's title over
the disputed property, premised mainly on the ground that it averment that the private respondent is claiming the wrong
had already been titled in the name of Don Mariano San Pedro lot. These are factual matters that should be threshed out in
under Titulo Propriedad No. 4136 and has been in the the annulment suit pending with Branch 125 of the Regional
possession of the predecessors of petitioner San Pedro since Trial Court of Kalookan City.
1900. Ledesma filed a motion for execution pending appeal.
The motion was granted and a writ of execution and notice to WHEREFORE, petition is DENIED.
vacate were forthwith issued.
[G.R. No. 136274. September 3, 2003.]
Petitioners then filed with the respondent Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition, which was SUNFLOWER NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, represented
denied. The MR was likewise denied. by FLORO ARAGAN, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE LORIFEL LACAP PHIMNA,
ISSUE: Whether or not the execution of the decision in the MeTC, Branch 77, Parañaque City and ELISA MAGLAQUI-
eviction case could be ordered pending annulment suit in CAPARAS, Respondents.
another court?
PETITION FOR REVIEW
HELD:
DOCTRINE: It is well-settled that, although an ejectment suit is
Yes. Firmly settled is the rule that the pendency of an action an action in personam wherein the judgment is binding only
questioning the ownership of property will not abate upon the parties properly impleaded and given an opportunity
ejectment suits or bar the execution of the judgments to be heard, the judgment becomes binding on anyone who has
therein. not been impleaded if he or she is: (a) a trespasser, squatter or
agent of the defendant fraudulently occupying the property to
In Wilmon Auto Supply Corp. v. Court of Appeals, this Court
frustrate the judgment; (b) a guest or occupant of the premises
specified the cases where this principle was applied, thus:
with the permission of the defendant; (c) a transferee pendente
Neither do suits for annulment of sale, or title, or lite; (d) a sublessee; (e) a co-lessee or (f) a member of the
document affecting property operate to abate family, relative or privy of the defendant.
ejectment actions respecting the same property.
FACTS: Private respondent Elisa Maglaqui-Caparas filed a
The rationale of the rule is that an ejectment suit involves only complaint for unlawful detainer against Alfredo Mogar and 46
the issue of material possession or possession de facto while other persons occupying several parcels of land (Lots 1-A, B, C,
an action for annulment of title, such as the case at bar, E, F and G) in Yellow Ville, United Parañaque Subdivision IV,
involves the question of ownership. There may be identity of Metro Manila covered by individual transfer certificates of title
parties and subject matter but not of the cause of action or the registered in the name of Macaria Maglaqui, private
relief prayed for. respondent’s mother.
Petitioners seek dismissal of the the unlawful detainer case. MeTC: IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT; RTC: AFFIRMED;
The prayer cannot be granted. If this Court were to dismiss the CA: DISMISSED.
ejectment suit, it would in effect be annulling the decision of
After the dismissal became final, a writ of demolition was
the Municipal Trial Court which concededly had jurisdiction
issued by the MeTC but was not immediately implemented
over the case in spite of petitioner San Pedro's claim of
because the case was transferred to Branch 77 of the same
ownership over the subject property. The instant petition
court. Mogar et al. filed a petition with the RTC of Parañaque
being one for certiorari, this Court must confine itself to the
to enjoin the implementation of the writ of demolition.
issue of whether or not the respondent court lacked or
However, this petition was denied and subsequently, an alias
exceeded its jurisdiction or committed grave abuse of
writ of demolition was issued by the court of origin.
discretion in affirming the order of the Regional Trial Court of
Kalookan City authorizing the execution of the decision in the The alias writ of demolition was, again, not executed, this time
eviction case. Besides, the petitioners' appeal from the due to the ex parte issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
decision in the ejectment suit is still pending with the Regional by Judge Amelita Tolentino, in connection with the
Trial Court. expropriation case (Civil Case No. 96-0253) filed by the
Municipality of Parañaque against the Testate Estate of
The question of whether or not the action for unlawful
Macaria Maglaqui.
detainer was the proper remedy of the private respondent
should be addressed in that appeal, not in this Meanwhile, another group of persons occupying portions of
certiorari proceeding. Neither can this Court rule on the the parcels of land (Lots I-F and I-G) subject of the unlawful
petitioners' allegations of ownership of the disputed property detainer case, organized themselves into the Sunflower
or the falsity of the private respondent's title or on their Neighborhood Association (Sunflower), the petitioner herein.
Sunflower filed a complaint for prohibition/injunction with to occupy the land in any capacity, whether as lessees, tenants
preliminary injunction against private respondent also with the and the like. Petitioner’s only defense against the eviction and
RTC of Parañaque City. demolition orders is their supposed non-inclusion in the
original detainer case. This defense, however, has no legal
Sunflower argued that its members should be excluded from support since its members are trespassers or squatters who
the demolition order as they were not parties to the original are bound by the judgment.
unlawful detainer case. This time, the injunction was granted
and ordered the exclusion of the houses belonging to The Court commiserates with respondent, already in her
petitioner from demolition. twilight years, who has been unlawfully deprived of her land
for a good number of years. Thus, we exhort the court of origin
Thus, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari, to execute this decision with reasonable dispatch, consistent
prohibition and mandamus with the Court of Appeals (CA GR with the requirements of Section 28 of RA 7279 and EO 152,12
SP No. 46861) assailing both the injunction orders issued in the on eviction and demolition.
expropriation case and in the prohibition case.
G.R. No. 147695 September 13, 2007
CA: IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT. The judgment in the
unlawful detainer case had already become final the execution MANUEL C. PAGTALUNAN, petitioner,
could not be enjoined. Consequently, the MeTC of Parañaque vs.
City, Branch 77 issued another alias writ of demolition. RUFINA DELA CRUZ VDA. DE MANZANO, respondent.
In order to stay the execution of the writ of demolition,
Sunflower an urgent motion in this Court for the issuance of a
status quo order and was granted. Prior to the issuance, the
writ of demolition was implemented. Petitioner thus filed a DOCTRINE: The cancellation of the contract by the seller must
motion to allow its members to return to the premises, which be in accordance with Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 6552, which
was granted. requires a notarial act of rescission and the refund to the buyer
of the full payment of the cash surrender value of the payments
Petitioner Sunflower likewise assailed the same decision of the
on the property. Actual cancellation of the contract takes place
Court of Appeals in this petition for review on certiorari under
after 30 days from receipt by the buyer of the notice of
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
cancellation or the demand for rescission of the contract by a
Before we proceed, it should be pointed out that any issue notarial act and upon full payment of the cash surrender value
relating to the expropriation case filed by the Municipality of to the buyer.
Parañaque has been rendered moot by the dismissal of that
case. FACTS:
ISSUE: WON petitioner’s members, who were not parties to Patricio, petitioner’s stepfather and predecessor-in-interest,
the unlawful detainer case, may be ejected from the land entered into a Contract to Sell with respondent, whereby the
subject of this case former agreed to sell, and the latter to buy, a house and lot
which formed half of a parcel of land. It was also stipulated in
HELD: YES. It is well-settled that, although an ejectment suit is the contract that respondent could immediately occupy the
an action in personam wherein the judgment is binding only house and lot; that in case of default in the payment the
upon the parties properly impleaded and given an opportunity contract would automatically be rescinded.
to be heard, the judgment becomes binding on anyone who
has not been impleaded if he or she is: (a) a trespasser, Petitioner alleged that respondent stopped payment still she
squatter or agent of the defendant fraudulently occupying the continued to possess the property by mere tolerance of
property to frustrate the judgment; (b) a guest or occupant of Patricio and, subsequently, of petitioner.
the premises with the permission of the defendant; (c) a
transferee pendente lite; (d) a sublessee; (e) a co-lessee or (f) On the other hand, respondent alleged that she paid her
a member of the family, relative or privy of the defendant. monthly installments religiously, until Patricio changed his
mind and offered to refund all her payments provided she
In the case at bar, the records show that petitioner’s members would surrender the house. She refused. Patricio then started
are trespassers or squatters who do not have any right to harassing her and began demolishing the house portion by
occupy the property of respondent. Petitioner does not portion. Because of the unlawful acts of Patricio, respondent
dispute the ownership of the parcels of land in question. In suspended her monthly payment.
fact, it even admitted that the subject property is owned by
Macaria Maglaqui, mother of private respondent. Petitioner Petitioner then sent letter to respondent demanding the latter
failed to establish any right which would entitle its members to vacate the premises but respondent ignored the demand.
Petitioner then filed a complaint for unlawful detainer with the
MTC.
DOCTRINE
The MTC ruled on favor of petitioner. It held that respondent’s
failure to pay not a few installments caused the resolution or “The fact alone of working on another's landholding does not
termination of the Contract to Sell. Thereafter, respondent’s raise a presumption of the existence of agricultural tenancy.
right of possession ipso facto ceased to be a legal right, and For tenancy to be proven, all indispensable elements must be
became possession by mere tolerance of Patricio and his established, the absence of one or more requisites will not
successors-in-interest. make the alleged tenant a de facto one. These are: 1) the
parties are the landowner and the tenant; 2) the subject is
The RTC reversed the decision of the MTC. It held that the agricultural land; 3) there is consent by the landowner; 4) the
agreement could not be automatically rescinded since there purpose is agricultural production; 5) there is personal
was delivery to the buyer. Therefore, a judicial determination cultivation; and 6) there is sharing of the harvests.”
of rescission must be secured by petitioner as a condition
precedent to convert the possession de facto of respondent
from lawful to unlawful. FACTS
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. It held that the Irene, together with her husband Carlos, bought from the heirs
Contract to Sell was not validly cancelled or rescinded and of Teresita a parcel of land principally planted with rambutan,
recognized respondent’s right to continue occupying the a number of coconut trees and other fruit-bearing plants.
property subject of the contract to sell. Miraflor Andal, respondent in this case, brokered the sale and
signed as tenant. Ten days prior to the sale, Miraflor appeared
ISSUE: before the BARC Chairman to testify that there were no
tenants or workers in the land.
Whether or not the Contract to sell was validly rescinded
Two weeks after the sale, Miraflor, with the consent of her
HELD: husband Ruben, executed a sinumpaang salaysay wherein she
acknowledged Irene and Carlos as the new owners of the
The CA correctly ruled that R.A No. 6552, which governs sales property. While it stated therein that she will continue to take
of real estate on installment, is applicable in the resolution of care of the property, she nevertheless waived any tenancy
this case. rights that she and her husband might have over the land.
Clearly, the demand letter (which was written by petitioner’s Eight years later, Irene filed an ejectment suit against the
counsel, merely made formal demand) is not the same as the spouses Andal, alleging that she only acceded to the spouses
notice of cancellation or demand for rescission by a notarial act Andal’s request to take care of her two parcels of land,
required by R.A No. 6552. provided that they would not be considered tenants, further
averring that they were mere caretakers of the land. In their
In addition, Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 6552 requires refund of the answer, the spouses Andal denied Irene’s allegations and
cash surrender value of the payments on the property to the claimed that they were tenants of Irene’s predecessor-in-
buyer before cancellation of the contract. The provision does interest.
not provide a different requirement for contracts to sell which
allow possession of the property by the buyer upon execution In response, spouses Andal claimed that the controversy
of the contract like the instant case. Hence, petitioner cannot should be resolved by the DARAB because of the issue of
insist on compliance with the requirement by assuming that tenancy.
the cash surrender value payable to the buyer had been
The MTC ruled in favor of Irene, finding no evidentiary weight
applied to rentals of the property after respondent failed to
on spouses Andal’s evidence of tenancy.
pay the installments due.
On appeal, the RTC affirmed in toto. Subsequently, the CA
There being no valid cancellation of the Contract to Sell, the CA reversed, ratiocinating that there were previous tenancy
correctly recognized respondent’s right to continue occupying relations between the previous owners of the properties and
the property subject of the Contract to Sell and affirmed the the spouses Andal, and thus the question of their ejectment
dismissal of the unlawful detainer case by the RTC. constitutes an agrarian dispute.
G.R. No. 192270 January 26, 2015
ISSUE
IRENE D. OFILADA, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES RUBEN ANDAL
and MIRAFLOR ANDAL, Respondents.

• Whether or not a tenancy relationship between Irene agrarian dispute, the rightful possession of the land being an
and the spouses Andal exists as to strip off the MTC of incident of such previous landlord-tenant relationship. In the
its jurisdiction over Irene’s suit for unlawful detainer. present case, there is no claim that the subject properties were
(NO) given to the spouses Andal by their former landlord as a form
of disturbance compensation. While the spouses Andal in this
RULING case refuse to surrender the properties to Irene on the ground
that they are tenants of the same just like in Amurao, it cannot
The tenancy relationship between the former owners of the be gainsaid that in Amurao, the tenancy relations between the
properties and the spouses Andal was clearly severed prior to former owners of the property involved therein and the
Irene’s purchase of the same; no such relationship was spouses Villalobos, had, undisputedly, been continued by and
subsequently created between Irene and the spouses Andal. between the said spouses and the spouses Amurao when the
latter acquired the property. And it was on that supposition
Certainly telling are the Pagpapatunay and the Sinumpaang
that the Court held that even if the Kasulatan executed by the
Salaysay which were voluntarily executed and never impugned
spouses Amurao and the spouses Villalobos terminated the
by the spouses Andal. Both contain express declarations that
tenancy relationship between them, the action of the former
at the time Irene and her husband bought the property, the
to dispossess the latter from the property tenanted involved
tenancy then existing between the heirs of Teresita as former
an agrarian dispute. However, in this case, unlike in Amurao
owners and the spouses Andal as tenants had already ceased,
the severance of the tenancy relations between the former
and that no tenancy relations would continue between the
owners of the properties and the spouses Andal, as well as the
latter and the new owner, Irene. Notably, the Sinumpaang
non-existence of a similar relationship between the said
Salaysay,being a public document, is evidence of the facts in
spouses and Irene as the new owner, were sufficiently shown
the clear unequivocal manner therein expressed and has in its
as will be discussed below. Hence, the said pronouncement
favor the presumption of regularity. The spouses Andal are
made in Amurao finds no application in this case.
bound by their admissions against their own interest.
DOMINGA B. QUITO, Petitioner, vs.
The Court agrees with the conclusion of both the MTC and the
STOP & SAVE CORPORATION, as represented by GREGORY
RTC that for dearth of evidence, tenurial relationship between
DAVID DICKENSON, as its Chairman, and JULIETA BUAN-
the parties was not sufficiently shown. Thus, the said courts
DICKENSON, as its President, ROBERTO BUAN, HENRY CO,
correctly assumed jurisdiction over the ejectment case.
ANGELINA LUMOTAN, RODEL PINEDA and ROSE
In sum, the Court holds that absent any tenurial relationship CALMA, Respondents.
between them, the spouses Andal's possession of Irene's
properties was by mere tolerance of the latter. The action to
dispossess the spouses Andal therefrom is therefore a clear
case of summary action for ejectment cognizable by the
DOCTRINE:
regular courts.
NOTE ON CA’S INVOCATION OF RIVERA AND AMURAO: FACTS: To constitute litis pendentia, the following requisites
must be present: (1) identity of the parties in the two actions;
Here, Irene claims that there can be no agrarian dispute since (2) substantial identity in the causes of action and in the reliefs
there exists no landlord-tenant relationship between her and sought by the parties; (3) and the identity between the two
the spouses Andal. If ever such a relationship existed, it was actions should be such that any judgment that may be
between the former owner of the properties and the spouses rendered in one case, regardless of which party is successful,
Andal and the same had already been renounced by Miraflor would amount to res judicata in the other
prior to Irene's acquisition of the properties. The CA, however,
ruled that even if the landlord-tenant relationship between the Dominga filed before the MCTC a complaint for unlawful
previous owner and the spouses Andal had already ceased, the detainer6 against Stop & Save and its sub-lessees/co-
action to dispossess the latter from the subject properties still respondents Roberto Buan, Henry Co, Angelina Lumotan,
involves an agrarian dispute, as held in Rivera and Amurao. Rodel Pineda and Rose Calma. She alleged that Stop & Save
failed to pay the agreed monthly rentals since June 2003 and,
Suffice it to say, however, that the present case is not on all despite repeated verbal and written demands, refused to pay
fours with Rivera and Amurao. and vacate the leased building, in violation of their April 4,
2002 Lease Agreement.
In Rivera, the land involved is claimed to have been given to
the former tenant by the former landlord by way of In its answer to the complaint, Stop & Save denied that it
disturbance compensation. Hence, even if the landlord-tenant committed a violation of the lease contract, but merely
relationship was asserted to have been severed as early as suspended its payment of rent because of Dominga’s failure to
1957, the Court considered the action as arising from an comply with their subsequent agreement dated November 15,
2003; they had agreed that rent payments for the months of and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and
June, July, August, September and October 2003 shall be (4) there must be[,] between the first and second actions[,] (a)
deferred and paid on or before January 15, 2004 - the deadline identity of parties; (b) identity of subject matter; and (c)
given to Dominga to complete the necessary repairs on the 2nd identity of cause of action."
floor of the leased building.
RUBEN MANALANG, CARLOS MANALANG, CONCEPCION
MTC dismissed the unlawful detainer case. On appeal, the RTC GONZALES AND LUIS MANALANG, petitioners,
set aside the MCTC’s decision and ordered the dismissal of vs. BIENVENIDO AND MERCEDES BACANI, respondents.
Dominga’s unlawful detainer complaint due to the pending
case for annulment of lease contract filed by Stop & Save with G.R. No. 156995 January 12, 2015
the same RTC. Dominga filed a petition for review with the CA
upon the denial of her motion for reconsideration with the
RTC.
DOCTRINE: Sec 18, Rule 70: [...] The judgment or final order
CA dismissed Dominga’s petition for review for lack of merit, shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial Court
which, in effect, affirmed the RTC’s decision dismissing which shall decide the same on the basis of the entire record of
Dominga’s unlawful detainer complaint. It ruled that the RTC the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda
correctly abated the unlawful detainer case because Stop & and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by
Save’s annulment case was filed first in time and was the more the Regional Trial Court.
appropriate vehicle in litigating the issues between the parties,
since both their claims were anchored on the same lease FACTS: Ruben Manalang, Amado Manalang, Carlos
contract. Manalang, Concepcion M. Gonzales, Ladislao Manalang and
Luis Manalang were the co-owners of Lot No. 4236, and
Issue: WON litis pendentia is a ground for the dismissal of the declared for taxation purposes in the name of Tomasa B.
unlawful detainer case. (NO) Garcia. Adjacent to Lot 4236 was the respondents' Lot No.
Ruling: Litis pendentia refers to the situation where another In 1997, the petitioners caused the relocation and verification
action is pending between the same parties for the same cause survey of Lot 4236 and the adjoining lots, and the result
of action so that one of these actions is unnecessary and showed that the respondents had encroached on Lot No. 4236
vexatious. The dismissal of a civil action on the ground of litis to the extent of 405 square meters. A preliminary relocation
pendentiais based on the policy that a party is not allowed to survey conducted by the Lands Management Section of the
vex another more than once regarding the same subject DENR confirmed the result on the encroachment. When the
matter and for the same cause of action in order that possible respondents refused to vacate the encroached portion and to
conflicting judgments may be avoided for the sake of the surrender peaceful possession thereof despite demands, the
stability of the rights and statuses of persons. petitioners commenced this action for unlawful detainer.
In the unlawful detainer suit, the issue is who between the MTC: DISMISSED the case for lack of jurisdiction based on its
parties has a better right to physical possession over the finding that the action involved an essentially boundary
property or possession de facto and the principal relief prayed dispute that should be properly resolved in an accion
for is for Stop and Save to vacate the property for failure to pay reivindicatoria. It stated that the complaint did not aver any
the rent. In contrast, in the annulment of lease contract, the contract, whether express or implied, between the petitioners
issue is the validity of the lease contract, where Stop and Save and the respondents that qualified the case as one for unlawful
puts in issue Dominga’s ownership. In other words, the issue detainer; and that there was also no showing that the
of physical possession in the action for unlawful detainer respondents were in possession of the disputed area by the
cannot be identical with the issues of ownership and validity of mere tolerance of the petitioners due to the latter having
contract in the action for annulment. From these essential become aware of the encroachment only after the relocation
differences, the lack of required identity in the causes of action survey held in 1997.
for litis pendentia to exist cannot be denied.
RTC: On appeal, however, MTC’s decision was REVERSED and
Since the causes of action in the subject case for unlawful REMANDED the case for further proceedings, holding that
detainer and annulment of lease contract are entirely because there was an apparent withholding of possession of
different, a judgment in one case would not amount to res the property and the action was brought within one year from
judicata in the other. "[F]or res judicatato bar the institution of such withholding of possession the proper action was
a subsequent action[,] the following requisites must concur: ejectment which was within the jurisdiction of the MTC; and
(1) the former judgment must be final; (2) it must have been that the case was not a boundary dispute that could be
rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter resolved in an accion reivindicatoria, considering that it

involved a sizeable area of property and not a mere The CA held that considering that the petitioners' complaint
transferring of boundary. for unlawful detainer did not set forth when and how the
respondents had entered the land in question and constructed
MTC: Upon remand, it ULTIMATELY DISMISSED the complaint their houses thereon, jurisdiction did not vest in the MTC to
and counterclaim for lack of merit, ruling that the petitioners try and decide the case; and that the complaint, if at all, made
failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence showing that out a case for either accion reivindicatoria or accion
the respondents had encroached on their property and had publiciana, either of which fell within the original jurisdiction
been occupying and possessing property outside the metes of the RTC.
and bounds described in Bienvenido Bacani's OCT No. N-
216701; that the preponderance of evidence was in favor of ISSUES:
the respondents' right of possession; and that the
respondent's counterclaim for damages should also be 1. W/N THE RTC HAD AUTHORITY TO RECEIVE ADDITIONAL
dismissed, there being no showing that the complaint had EVIDENCE ON APPEAL IN AN EJECTMENT CASE — NO.
been filed in gross and evident bad faith.
2. W/N THE CASE WAS AN EJECTMENT CASE WITHIN
Once more, the petitioners appealed to the RTC. THE ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE MTC –
NO.
At that point, the RTC ordered the petitioners to conduct a
relocation survey to determine their allegation of
encroachment, and also heard the testimony of the surveyor,
Engr. Emmanuel Limpin, then Acting Chief of the Survey HELD: 1. The RTC, in an appeal of the judgment in an
Section of the CENR-DENR. ejectment case, shall not conduct a rehearing or trial de
novo.
RTC: REVERSED and SET ASIDE the MTC's decision, observing
that the respondents had encroached on the petitioners' In this connection, Sec. 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court clearly
property based on the court-ordered relocation survey, the provides: “Sec. 18. Judgment conclusive only on possession; not
reports by Engr. Limpin, and his testimony; and that the conclusive in actions involving title or ownership. — […] The
respondents could not rely on their OCT No. N-216701, judgment or final order shall be appealable to the
considering that although their title covered only 481 square appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same
meters, the relocation survey revealed that they had occupied on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the
also 560 square meters of the petitioners' Lot No. 4236. court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be
submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial
The respondents moved for reconsideration, but the RTC Court.”
denied their motion for its lack of merit. The respondents then
appealed to the CA. Hence, the RTC violated the foregoing rule by ordering the
conduct of the relocation and verification survey "in aid of its
CA: REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the decisions of the MTC of appellate jurisdiction" and by hearing the testimony of the
Guagua, Pampanga, Branches 1 and 2, are REINSTATED. surveyor, for its doing so was tantamount to its holding of a
trial de novo. The violation was accented by the fact that the
The CA concluded that the RTC, by ordering the relocation and RTC ultimately decided the appeal based on the survey and the
verification survey "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" upon surveyor's testimony instead of the record of the proceedings
motion of the petitioners and over the objection of the had in the court of origin.
respondents, and making a determination of whether there
was an encroachment based on such survey and testimony of 2. The case should be dismissed without prejudice to the
the surveyor, had acted as a trial court in complete disregard filing of a non-summary action like accion reivindicatoria.
of the second paragraph of Sec. 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court. In our view, the CA correctly held that a boundary dispute
must be resolved in the context of accion reivindicatoria, not
It declared such action by the RTC as unwarranted because it an ejectment case. The boundary dispute is not about
amounted to the reopening of the trial, which was not allowed possession, but encroachment, that is, whether the property
under Sec.13 (3) Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. It observed that claimed by the defendant formed part of the plaintiff's
the relocation and verification survey was inconclusive property.
inasmuch as the surveyor had himself admitted that he could
not determine which of the three survey plans he had used was A boundary dispute cannot be settled summarily under Rule
correct without a full- blown trial. 70 of the Rules of Court, the proceedings under which are
limited to unlawful detainer and forcible entry. In unlawful

detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds the possession sufficient allegation of respondents' prior physical possession
of the premises upon the expiration or termination of his right of the subject property.
to hold such possession under any contract, express or
implied. The defendant's possession was lawful at the We now stress that under the Revised Rules on Summary
beginning, becoming unlawful only because of the expiration Procedure, the weight of evidence is not considered when a
or termination of his right of possession. In forcible entry, the judgment is rendered based on the complaint. Here,
possession of the defendant is illegal from the very beginning, petitioner's failure to timely file his answer to the complaint
and the issue centers on which between the plaintiff and the constitutes her acquiescence to all of the allegations stated
defendant had the prior possession de facto. therein. Consequently, there is actually nothing else to be
done in this situation except to render judgment as may be
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the warranted by, and based solely on, the facts alleged in the
decision promulgated on October 18, 2002; and ORDERS the complaint. Thus, given that all the required allegations to make
petitioners to pay the costs of suit. out a cause of action for forcible entry have been sufficiently
alleged in the complaint and that petitioner Garcia is deemed
G.R. No. 237122 to have admitted all the allegations in the complaint including
respondents' claim of ownership over the subject property, for
Gloria Garcia and all persons claiming rights under her v. having failure to file her answer, the Court of Appeals and the
Spouses Victor G. Esguerra, Jr. and Paulina B. Esguerra Metropolitan Trial Court correctly ruled in favor of
respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner argues that respondents' act of posting a
security guard on the subject property is not the physical RULE 71
possession contemplated by law in forcible entry cases.
Petitioner posits that respondents were never in prior physical Lorenzo Shipping Corporation, Oceanic Container Lines,
possession of the subject property for not having physically Inc., Solid Shipping Lines Corporation, Sulpicio Lines, Inc.,
occupied the same themselves. et al., vs. Distribution Management Association of the
Philippines, Lorenzo Cinco, and Cora Curay
ISSUE: Whether the facts constitute forcible entry. G.R. No. 155849 ; August 31, 2011
FACTS:
RULING: YES. In forcible entry cases, which is likewise In 1994, President Fidel Ramos promulgated Executive Order
governed by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, three No. 213 Deregulating Domestic Shipping Rates.
things must be alleged in the complaint; first, prior physical In 2001, the Distribution Management Association of the
possession of the property, second, deprivation of the Philippines (DMAP) commenced in the Court of Appeals (CA) a
property either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or special civil action for certiorari and prohibition challenging the
stealth, and third, that the action was filed within one (1) year constitutionality of EO 213. The CA dismissed the petitioner
from the time the owners or legal possessors learned of their and upheld the constitutionality of the EO.
deprivation of the physical possession of the property. Here, DMAP appealed to the Court in 2002, but its petition was
petitioner Garcia argues that the complaint failed to denied. The Court held that the appeal was filed out of time,
sufficiently allege respondents' prior physical possession of the and failure to pay deposit for sheriff’s fee and clerk’s
subject property. We do not agree. In forcible entry cases, commission.
prior physical possession is an indispensable requirement. The Later, DMAP publicly circulated Sea Transport Update. In the
Court have consistently ruled, however, that possession can be update, DMAP claims that its motion for reconsideration filed
acquired not only by material occupation, but also by the fact before the Supreme Court was denied based on technicalities
that a thing is subject to the action of one's will or by the and not on the legal issues it presented.
proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such Petitioners brought this special civil action for contempt
right. against the respondents.
ISSUE:
The Court notes that respondents, relying on the Certificate of Whether or not the statements in the Sea Transport Update
Title covering the property in question issued in their name, constituted indirect contempt of court.
exercised dominion over the property by posting thereon a HELD:
security guard to protect it from people who will try to enter NO. Contempt of court has been defined as the willful
and take over it without their consent or against their will. The disregard or disobedience of a public authority. The power to
Court rules that this act or exercise of dominion by punish for contempt is inherent in all courts. The reason
respondents, subjecting the property to the action of their will, behind the power to punish for contempt is that respect of the
is equivalent to the prior physical possession required in courts guarantees the stability of their institution; without
forcible entry cases. Evidently, the complaint contained a such guarantee, the institution of the courts would be resting
on a very shaky foundation.

Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near the degrade the administration of justice; that the article contains
judge as to obstruct him in the administration of justice; averments which are disrespectful, discourteous, insulting,
indirect contempt consists of willful disobedience of the lawful offensive and derogatory; that it does not only cast aspersions
process or order of the court. on the integrity and honesty of complainant as a judge and on
Punishment for direct contempt is generally summary and his ability to administer justice objectively and impartially, but
immediate, while punishment for indirect contempt requires is an imputation that he is biased and he prejudges the cases
proceedings less summary than that of direct contempt. filed before him; and that the article is sub judice because it is
In the present case, the petitioners failed to sufficiently show still pending automatic review.
that the respondent’s publication constituted any acts
punishable as indirect contempt under Section 3 of Rule 71. ISSUE: Whether the article constitutes contempt.
The allegations of the petitioners were insufficient to sustain
the charge of indirect contempt. RULING: NO. A reading of the subject article in its entirety will
show that the same does not constitute contempt, but at most,
The Court recognizes the right of a lawyer or any individual to merely constitutes fair criticism. The first portion of the article
be critical of the courts and their judges, as long as the criticism does not even deal with the merits of the case, but with the
is made in respectful terms and through legitimate channels. public accusations being made by Complainant that he is being
given death threats by the family of the accused, Danny Godoy.
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct, and they should and The article only makes a justifiable query as to why
expect critical evaluation of their performance. However, such Complainant does not file the appropriate charges if his
criticisms must be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls accusations are true.
of decency and propriety.
The test for these criticisms therefore is whether or not it is The article is merely a report of rumors regarding the accused
bona fide or done in good faith, and does not spill over the Danny Godoy. They are not presented as facts by respondent
walls of decency and propriety. Viewed through these, the Mauricio Reynoso, Jr. In fact, he even goes to the extent of
statements in the Sea Transport Update were not acknowledging that he himself does not know if the rumors are
disrespectful, abusive, or slanderous, nor did it spill over the true or not. The article is nothing more than a fair analysis. For
walls of decency and propriety. indeed, if the Honorable Court affirms the Decision of
Complainant, the accused Danny Godoy would be meted the
G.R. Nos. 115908-09. March 29, 1995 death sentence. On the other hand, if the Decision is reversed,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DANNY this may adversely affect the aspirations of Complainant to be
GODOY, Accused-Appellant. promoted to the Court of Appeals, and eventually to the
Honorable Court.
JUDGE EUSTAQUIO Z. GACOTT, JR., * Complainant, v.
MAURICIO REYNOSO, JR., and EVA PONCE DE Snide remarks or sarcastic innuendoes do not necessarily
LEON, Respondents. assume that level of contumely which is actionable under Rule
71 of the Rules of Court. Neither do we believe that the
DOCTRINE: publication in question was intended to influence this Court for
it could not conceivably be capable of doing so. The article has
Snide remarks or sarcastic innuendoes do not necessarily not transcended the legal limits for editorial comment and
assume that level of contumely which is actionable under Rule criticism. Besides, it has not been shown that there exists a
71 of the Rules of Court. substantive evil which is extremely serious and that the degree
of its imminence is so exceptionally high as to warrant
Under paragraph (d) of Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court punishment for contempt and sufficient to disregard the
on indirect contempt, any improper conduct tending, directly constitutional guaranties of free speech and press.
or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice, constitutes criminal contempt. WHEREFORE, the complaint for indirect contempt against
respondents Mauricio Reynoso, Jr. and Eva P. Ponce de Leon is
FACTS: Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. of the RTC of Palawan and DISMISSED
Puerto Princesa City, filed a complaint to cite for indirect
contempt Reynoso, Jr., a columnist, and de Leon, publisher and G.R. No. L-66371 May 15, 1985
chairman of the editorial board, respectively, of the Palawan
Times. His Honor's complaint is based on an article written by ARMANDO ANG, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE JOSE P.
respondent Reynoso, Jr. in his column, "On the Beat," and CASTRO, Regional Trial Judge, Branch LXXXIV and HON.
published the issue of said newspaper which is of general JUDGE JOSE P. ARRO, Branch CIII, both of the Regional Trial
circulation in Puerto Princesa City. The complaint avers that Court of Rizal, and ASSISTANT FISCAL NARCISO T. ATIENZA
the article tends to impede, obstruct, belittle, downgrade and of Quezon City, respondents.

SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION, the CA or the SC, but the execution of the judgment or order
AND MANDAMUS shall be suspended until a bond is filed by the person in
contempt.
DOCTRINE: The Rules of Court provides that the use of
disrespectful or contemptuous language against a particular In addition, the SC ruled that the basis of the libel case against
judge in pleadings presented in another court or proceedings is Ang was a communication addressed to the Chief Justice of the
indirect, not direct contempt as it is not tantamount to a SC which is of privileged character which would bar a
misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to prosecution for libel
interrupt the administration of justice.
G.R. No. L-27152 November 2, 1982
FACTS:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs. LUIS
Ang, through the Office of the Presidential Assistant on Legal E. TORIO, ET AL., accused, BRIGIDO G. ESTRADA, appellant.
Affairs, filed with the SC an administrative complaint against
Judge Castro for ignorance of the law, gross inexcusable APPEAL
negligence, incompetence, manifest partiality, grave abuse of
discretion, grave misconduct, rendering unjust decision in a DOCTRINE: Failure to appear in court for trial is not a direct
civil case and dereliction of duties in not resolving his motion contempt, summarily punishable under Section I of Rule 71 of
for reconsideration of the adverse decision in said civil case. the New Rules of Court, for it is not a misbehavior in the
Upon learning of the administrative case, Judge Castro ordered presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the
Ang to appear before him and to show cause why he should administration of justice. It may, however, constitute an
not be punished for contempt of court, for malicious, insolent, indirect contempt punishable only after written charges and
inexcusable disrespect and contemptuous attitude towards hearing under Section 3, Rule 71, par. (b).
the court and towards him.
FACTS: The appellant was the attorney of record for the
The RTC through Judge Castro found Ang G guilty of [Direct] accused Jose Vinluan, one of the four accused in a criminal
contempt of court, and sentenced him to suffer 5 days case before CFI of Pangasinan presided by the Honorable
imprisonment and ordered his arrest for failure to appear Antonio C. Masaquel. The parties agreed to a continuance of
before the court despite notice. the hearing of the case. Because the Lower Court held a pre-
trial conference also assigned on said date, said criminal case
Judge Castro then instituted before the Office of the City Fiscal was later called at 2:30 in the afternoon.
of QC a criminal complaint for libel against Ang for using
malicious, insolent, and contemptuous language against him in When the case was called for hearing the presiding judge
his letter-complaint filed before the SC. noticed that the accused was not represented by counsel.
Accused Vinluan was asked by the Court to look for his
ISSUE: lawyer, who was not yet present in court, and so he called the
appellant by telephone in his residence but there was no
Whether or not Ang is guilty of Direct Contempt?
answer. In view of the failure of the appellant, as counsel for
HELD: accused Vinluan, to appear for the hearing the Lower Court
ordered the continuation of the trial at 9:00 o'clock in the
NO. The Rules of Court provides that the use of disrespectful morning.
or contemptuous language against a particular judge in
pleadings presented in another court or proceedings is However, FIFTEEN (15) MINUTES later, the appellant arrived
indirect, not direct contempt as it is not tantamount to a and the Court ordered the resumption of the trial. The judge
misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as asked the appellant why he was not late to which he
to interrupt the administration of justice. answered that his 'car stopped while on his way to the Court
house'. His Honor considered the explanation as 'not
If the pleading containing derogatory, offensive or malicious satisfactory' and right then and there imposed a fine of
statements is submitted in the same court or judge in which P50.00 upon the appellant, without any charge in writing nor
the proceedings are pending, it is direct contempt because it is an opportunity given to be heard by himself or counsel, held
equivalent to a misbehavior committed in the presence of or in contempt of court, and further ordered him to pay the fine
so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of within 24 hours.
justice.
The hearing of the criminal case proceeded with the appellant
Ang’s conduct, if at all, constitutes indirect contempt and if assisting his client, until the final termination of the trial.
found guilty, he may appeal pursuant to Sec. 10, Rule 71. The
order finding him guilty of contempt mayyy be reviewed by

Appellant alleged that the lower court erred (1) in summarily refused to vacate the premises. Upon motion of respondent,
ordering the appellant to pay a fine of P50.00 without any the court issued another writ of possession and if petitioners
charge in writing considering that the alleged contemptuous still refused to obey they will be declared in contempt of court
act constitutes indirect contempt; (2) in holding the appellant for refusing to obey the writ of possession.
in contempt of court without the benefit of hearing thus
depriving him of an opportunity to prove his innocence; and ISSUE:
(3) in ordering the appellant to pay the fine within twenty-
four hours, considering that, the order would only become Whether or not petitioners can be declared in contempt of
final after the lapse of fifteen days. court
ISSUE: WON the appellant was guilty of direct contempt HELD:
HELD: NO. Failure to appear in court for trial is not a direct Note that the writ of possession was directed not to
contempt, summarily punishable under Section I of Rule 71 of petitioners, but to the sheriff for him to deliver the properties
the New Rules of Court, for it is not a misbehavior in the to respondents. As the writ did not command the petitioners
presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the to do anything, they cannot be held guilty of "disobedience of
administration of justice. It may, however, constitute an or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment or
indirect contempt punishable only after written charges and command of a court."
hearing under Section 3, Rule 71, par. (b).
The proper procedure if the petitioners refuse to deliver
It is apparent from the order of the court that the accused
possession of the lands is not for the court to cite them for
arrived only fifteen minutes late. Counsel explained but the
contempt but for the sheriff to dispossess them of the
lower court did not consider this explanation satisfactory.
premises and deliver the possession thereof to the
However, such unforeseen incident at times do happen, and
respondents. However, if subsequent to such dispossession,
if the court had wanted to satisfy itself as to whether the
petitioners enter into or upon the properties for the purpose
explanation was meritorious, or not, it could have caused the
of executing acts of ownership or possession or in any manner
filing of the proper complaint for contempt of court and
disturb the possession of respondents, then and only then may
received evidence on the matter. Considering that the
they be charged with and punished for contempt.
accused is a municipal court judge, the Court of First Instance
might have accorded him some credence by accepting his
The contumacious act punishable under Rule 71, Section 3(b)
explanation at face value and given him a warning that a
is:
similar offense would be drastically dealt with. After all
appellant was only 15 minutes late.
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process,
order, judgment or command of a court, or injunction granted
G.R. No. L-47717 May 2, 1988
by a court or judge, including the act of a person who after
being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the
IGNACIO PASCUA, and URSULA DUGAY, in representation
judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction,
of her deceased husband CATALINO DUGAY, petitioners,
enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon
vs.
such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of
HEIRS OF SEGUNDO SIMEON, HON. JUDGE ANACLETO
ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the
ALZATE, Tarlac Court of First Instance, PROVINCIAL
possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto
SHERIFF OF TARLAC, and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF TARLAC,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 159286. April 5, 2005]
DOCTRINE: Mere refusal or unwillingness on the part of
petitioners to relinquish the properties would not constitute
contempt.
TACARDON vs. ANG
FACTS:
DOCTRINE
In a civil case judgement was rendered in favor of respondent.
To satisfy the judgment, 20 parcels of land were levied upon “[C]ontemptuous statements made in the pleadings filed with
and then sold at public auction in which the highest bidders the court constitute direct contempt. This is a reiteration of our
were the respondents. ruling in Ang vs. Castro, declaring that if the pleading
containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements is
The judgement debtors failed to redeem the same and thus a submitted in the same court or judge in which the proceedings
writ of possession was issued. The petitioners, however, are pending, it is direct contempt because it is equivalent to a
misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or NOTE: Atty. Cruz is also guilty of professional misconduct.
judge as to interrupt the administration of justice.” Every lawyer is expected to maintain the proper decorum in his
dealings with the courts of justice and is never justified in using
Petition for Review on Certiorari scurrilous and threatening language in pleading his client's
cause. Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
FACTS mandates that "A lawyer shall observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to judicial officers x x x." Rule
After the Court resolved to deny petitioners’ petition for
11.03 thereof mandates that "A lawyer shall abstain from
review on certiorari and MR, Attorney Cruz, counsel for
scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior
petitioners, filed “A Practicing Lawyer’s Plaint” and other
before the courts." Impoliteness is a vice that every member
manifestations containing improvident and disrespectful
of the Bar must avoid. Intimidations do not suit his role as an
language. In the said pleading, Atty. Cruz stated that the Court,
officer of the court. While criticism of judicial conduct is not
in denying his petition for review on certiorari and MR,
forbidden and zeal in advocacy is in fact encouraged, every
“desecrated legal and jurisprudential norms” and cautioned its
lawyer must always act within the limits of propriety and good
members that “acts not anchored on the rule of law buto n the
taste and with deference to the courts before which he pleads.
rule of the powerful and the influential can be worse than the
most heinous crimes.” He concluded that this Court “has ACCORDINGLY, Atty. Francisco B. Cruz is found guilty both of
become unpredictable” and thus, it is time for him “to consider direct contempt of court and gross misconduct as an officer of
retiring from the practice of law.” the court and member of the Bar. He is hereby SUSPENDED as
a member of the Bar and is prohibited from engaging in the
ISSUE
practice of law until otherwise ordered by this Court.
• Whether or not Atty. Cruz’s statements constitute
direct contempt of court and call for the exercise of
MA. CONCEPCION L. REGALADO, Petitioner,
its disciplinary authority. (YES)
vs.
RULING ANTONIO S. GO, Respondent.
The case at bar involves the interplay of two (2) related

powers: this Court's inherent powers to (a) discipline attorneys
and (b) punish them for contempt. PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45
In Ante vs. Pascua, this Court held that contemptuous DOCTRINE: The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all
statements made in the pleadings filed with the court courts and is essential to the preservation of order in judicial
constitute direct contempt. This is a reiteration of our ruling in proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and
Ang vs. Castro, declaring that if the pleading containing mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due
derogatory, offensive or malicious statements is submitted in administration of justice. Thus, contempt proceedings has a
the same court or judge in which the proceedings are pending, dual function: (1) vindication of public interest by punishment
it is direct contempt because it is equivalent to a misbehavior of contemptuous conduct; and (2) coercion to compel the
committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to contemnor to do what the law requires him to uphold the
interrupt the administration of justice. power of the Court, and also to secure the rights of the parties
to a suit awarded by the Court.
While professing reverence for the Court, Atty. Cruz has
repeatedly insulted and threatened the Court, even alleging FACTS:
that there is a lot of corruption going around involving Justices
and that respondent is a very powerful and influential person On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),
to whom many will kowtow and pay obeisance, even without EHSI, Kunack and Barin employed the legal services of De Borja
being asked. He further insulted the Court by expressing his Medialdea Bello Guevarra and Gerodias Law Offices where
intent to retire due to this “unpredictability,” and even herein petitioner Atty. Regalado worked as an associate. LRC
challenged the Court to censure him if there is no basis for his rendered a Decision reversing the Labor Arbiter’s decision and
suspicions. declaring that respondent Go’s separation from employment
was legal for it was attended by a just cause and was validly
Viewed vis-à-vis similar statements penalized as effected by EHSI, Kunack and Barin. Aggrieved, respondent Go
contemptuous in the past, Atty. Cruz’s statements constitute elevated the adverse decision to the Court of Appeals. Court of
direct contempt of court and call for the exercise of its Appeals promulgated a Decision8 setting aside the ruling of the
disciplinary authority. NLRC and reinstating the decision of the Labor Arbiter
adjudging EHSI, Kunack and Barin guilty of illegal dismissal. The
appellate court thus ordered EHSI, Kunack and Barin to pay
respondent Go full backwages, separation pay, moral and docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its
exemplary damages. discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge
and the principal action for joint hearing and decision.
After the promulgation of the Court of Appeals decision but (Emphases supplied.)
prior to the receipt of the parties of their respective copies, the
parties decided to settle the case and signed a Release Waiver As can be gleaned above, the provisions of the Rules are
and Quitclaim with the approval of the Labor Arbiter. In view unequivocal. Indirect contempt proceedings may be initiated
of the amicable settlement, the Labor Arbiter, on the same only in two ways: (1) motu proprio by the court; or (2) through
day, issued an Order dismissing the illegal dismissal case with a verified petition and upon compliance with the requirements
prejudice. for initiatory pleadings. Procedural requirements as outlined
must be complied with.
After the receipt of a copy of the Court of Appeals decision,
respondent Go, through counsel, filed, on 29 July 2003, a The limitations in the exercise of the power to punish for
Manifestation with Omnibus Motion seeking to nullify the indirect contempt are delineated by the procedural guidelines
Release Waiver and Quitclaim dated 16 July 2003 on the specified under Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. Strict
ground of fraud, mistake or undue influence. In the same compliance with such procedural guidelines is mandatory
motion, respondent Go, through counsel, moved that considering that proceedings against person alleged to be
petitioner Atty. Regalado be made to explain her unethical guilty of contempt are commonly treated as criminal in nature.
conduct for directly negotiating with respondent Go without
the knowledge of his counsel.
Henceforth, except for indirect contempt proceedings
initiated motu propio by order of or a formal charge by the
Considering the circumstances, petitioner Atty. Regalado
offended court, all charges shall be commenced by a verified
firmly stood that there was no way that she had directly dealt
petition with full compliance with the requirements therefore
with respondent Go, to the latter’s damage and prejudice, and
and shall be disposed in accordance with the second paragraph
misled him to enter into an amicable settlement with her
of this section.
client. e Court of Appeals issued a Resolution disregarding
petitioner Atty. Regalado’s defenses and adjudging her guilty
of indirect contempt under Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Time and again we rule that the use of the word "shall"
Court. As declared by the appellate court, even underscores the mandatory character of the Rule. The term
granting arguendo that petitioner Atty. Regalado did not "shall" is a word of command, and one which has always or
participate in the negotiation process, she was nonetheless which must be given a compulsory meaning, and it is generally
under the obligation to restrain her clients from doing acts that imperative or mandatory.
she herself was prohibited to perform as mandated by Canon
16 of the Canons of Professional Ethics. G.R. NO. 150949 JUNE 21, 2007
Issue: WON Atty. Regalado is guilty of indirect contempt (NO) JUDGE DOLORES L. ESPAÑOL (JUDGE RTC DASMARIÑAS,
CAVITE) VS. ATTY. BENJAMIN S. FORMOSO AND SPOUSES
Ruling: Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice BENITO SEE AND MARLY SEE
or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the
authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to
interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses Doctrine: Direct contempt as one done "in the presence of or
during litigation. It is defined as disobedience to the Court by so near the court or judge as to obstruct the administration of
acting in opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity. It justice." It is a contumacious act done facie curiae and may be
signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the punished summarily without hearing.
court’s orders, but such conduct as tends to bring the authority Facts:
of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or in On April 15, 1994, Sharcons Builders Philippines, Inc.
some manner to impede the due administration of justice. (Sharcons) bought from Evanswinda Morales a piece of land
consisting of 33,130 sq.m. in Paliparan, Dasmariñas. A new TCT
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be was issued in the name of Sharcons. However, when the
commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars latter’s workers tried to fence and take possession of the lot,
and certified true copies of documents or papers involved they were prevented by the caretaker of spouses Joseph and
therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for Enriqueta Mapua.
filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court The caretaker claimed that spouses Mapua are the owners of
concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related the land. Sharcons verified the status of the title and found
to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for that it was indeed registered in the names of spouses Mapua
contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be as early as July 13, 1979.

On January 2000, Sharcons filed with RTC Dasmariñas a 1) YES. In Gener v. De Leon, we held that courts are not
complaint for quieting of title, impleading as defendants were authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of records of
spouses Mapua, Evanswinda Morales, and the Register of other cases even when such cases have been tried or pending
Deeds of Trece Martires City. in the same court. Such does not fall under Sec. 1, Rule 129 of
In their answer, spouses Mapua alleged, among others, that all the Rules of Court on mandatory judicial notice.
the documents relied upon by Sharcons are spurious and 2) NO. Use of falsified and forged documents constitutes
falsified. indirect (not direct) contempt.
In the course of the proceedings, in July 2001, Judge Español, Contempt of court is despising of the authority, justice, or
petitioner, issued an Order stating Sharcons, and its counsel, dignity of the court. In NARCIDA V. BOWEN, this Court
Atty. Benjamin Formoso, respondents, have used a spurious characterized direct contempt as one done "in the presence of
certificate of title and tax declaration when it (Sharcons) filed or so near the court or judge as to obstruct the administration
with the RTC its complaint for quieting of title. Consequently, of justice." It is a contumacious act done facie curiae and may
petitioner declared respondents guilty of direct contempt of be punished summarily without hearing. In other words, one
court and ordered their confinement for ten (10) days in the may be summarily adjudged in direct contempt at the very
municipal jail of Dasmariñas, Cavite. moment or at the very instance of the commission of the act
Petitioner’s Order is partly reproduced as follows: of contumely.
Indirect or constructive contempt, in turn, is one perpetrated
Using the presumption that whoever is in possession and user outside of the sitting of the court and may include misbehavior
of falsified document is the forger thereof (Gamido v. Court of of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties
Appeals, 25 SCRA 101 [1995]), let the appropriate falsification or in his official transactions, disobedience of or resistance to
charges be filed against Benito See and Marly See together a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court,
with Evanswinda C. Morales. Thus, let a copy of this Order be or injunction granted by a court or a judge, any abuse or any
forwarded to the National Bureau of Investigation and the unlawful interference with the process or proceedings of a
Department of Justice for their appropriate action. As regards court not constituting direct contempt, or any improper
Atty. Benjamin S. Formoso, let a copy of this Order be conduct tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or
forwarded to the Bar Confidant’s Office, Supreme Court. degrade the administration of justice.
Manila. We agree with petitioner that the use of falsified and forged
Petitioner stated that in determining the merits of Sharcons' documents is a contumacious act. However, it constitutes
complaint for quieting of title, she "stumbled" upon Civil Case indirect contempt not direct contempt. Pursuant to Sec. 3 Rule
No. 623-92 for cancellation of title and damages filed with the 71, such act is an improper conduct which degrades the
RTC Imus, presided by then Judge Lucenito N. Tagle. Petitioner administration of justice. In Santos v. Court of First Instance of
then took judicial notice of the judge’s Decision declaring that Cebu, Branch VI, we ruled that the imputed use of a falsified
Sharcons' TCT and other supporting documents are falsified document, more so where the falsity of the document is not
and that respondents are responsible therefor. apparent on its face, merely constitutes indirect contempt,
On July 12, 2001, petitioner issued warrants of arrest against and as such is subject to such defenses as the accused may
respondents, and thus the latter were confined in the raise in the proper proceedings. Thus, following Section 3, Rule
municipal jail. That same day, respondents filed a motion for 71, a contemner may be punished only after a charge in writing
bail and a motion to lift the order of arrest, but were denied has been filed, and an opportunity has been given to the
outright by petitioner. accused to be heard by himself and counsel.
Respondents then filed with the CA a petition for a writ of Moreover, settled is the rule that a contempt proceeding is not
habeas corpus, which said court granted. The CA ruled that a civil action, but a separate proceeding of a criminal nature in
petitioner judge erred in taking judicial cognizance of the which the court exercises limited jurisdiction. Thus, the modes
Decision in the other civil case for cancellation of title, since it of procedure and the rules of evidence in contempt
was not offered in evidence in the case for quieting of title. proceedings are assimilated as far as practicable to those
Furthermore, direct contempt of court is criminal in nature and adapted to criminal prosecutions. Perforce, petitioner judge
the defendants should have been accorded a hearing. Thus, erred in declaring summarily that respondents are guilty of
petitioner judge’s Order of contempt and the issued Warrants direct contempt and ordering their incarceration. She should
of Arrest were nullified. have conducted a hearing with notice to respondents.
ISSUE:
1. WON petitioner judge erred in taking judicial notice G.R. No. 234812 November 25, 2019
of the Decision in the civil case for cancellation of title
declaring Sharcons’ TCT and documents as falsified
2. WON respondents should be held guilty of direct
contempt MASAKAZU UEMATSU, PETITIONER, v. ALMA N. BALINON,
HELD: RESPONDENT.

had filed first a verified petition in pursuing the contempt
charge against respondent.
FACTS:
In Arriola, et al. v. Arriola (Arriola), the Court emphasized that
On July 23, 2014, or almost three years after the finality of the the indirect contempt, not initiated by the court motu proprio,
PPO case, petitioner filed a Complaint with RTC-Lapu-Lapu for must be commenced by a verified petition. It ratiocinated that
the dissolution of co-ownership, partnership, liquidation, and even if the contempt proceedings emanated from a principal
accounting (Dissolution case) against respondent. case, still, the governing rules require that a petition be filed
and treated independently of the main action. It stressed that
On June 30, 2015, while the Dissolution case was pending, it is beyond doubt that the requirement of a verified petition
petitioner filed with the RTC-Tagum a Motion to Order in initiating an indirect contempt proceeding is a mandatory
Defendant Alma N. Balinon to Account (Motion to Account) all requirement.
the proceeds of their closed businesses and sold properties.
The RTC-Tagum directed respondent to file a comment on the Even if the contempt proceedings stemmed from the main
motion. However, despite the 15-day extension period granted case over which the court already acquired jurisdiction, the
her, respondent failed to file her comment. rules direct that the petition for contempt be treated
independently of the principal action.
Subsequently, petitioner filed Motion to Direct [Respondent]
to Comply with the Order of the Court stating that Like in Arriola, the indirect contempt charge against
respondent's failure to file a comment and to make an account respondent was initiated by petitioner's mere motion; thus,
was an act of disobedience to the lawful order of the court. without compliance with the mandatory requirements under
Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. Specifically, not only
RTC-Tagum directed respondent to explain why she should not did petitioner fail to file a verified petition, he, likewise, did not
be sanctioned for her failure to comply with the directive of comply with the requirements for the filing of initiatory
the court within a period of five days. Petitioner prayed for the pleadings. This being so, the RTC-Tagum had improperly taken
RTC-Tagum to issue an order citing her in contempt of court to cognizance of the charge and conversely, it should have
resolve his Motion to Account. dismissed the motion.
RTC-Tagum: found respondent guilty of indirect contempt.

Respondent moved for a reconsideration, but her motion was
denied. Undeterred, respondent filed a notice of appeal. Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun, vs. Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas, Ma.
Gemma Oquendo, Dennis Ayon, Nenita Oquendo, Esmael
CA: The CA ruled that the RTC-Tagum committed grave abuse Mangudadatu, Jose Pavia, Melinda Quintos de Jesus,
of its discretion when it cited respondent in indirect contempt Reynaldo Hulog, Redmond Batavo, Malou Mangahas,
even if its basis was a mere motion filed by petitioner, without Danilo Gozo, GMA Network Inc., through its new editors
observance of the required procedure in indirect contempt Raffy Jimenez and Victor Sollorano, Sophia Dedace, ABS-
cases. CBN Corporation, through the Head of its News Group,
Maria Ressa, Cecilia Victoria Orena-Drilon, Philippine Daily
ISSUE: Whether RTC-Tagum committed grave abuse of its Inquirer, Inc., represented by its Editor-in-Chief Letty
discretion when it cited respondent in indirect contempt. Jimenez Magsanoc, Tetch Torres, Philippine Star,
represented by its Editor-in-Chief Isaac Belmonte, and Edu
RULING: YES. A person may be punished for indirect contempt Punay
when he or she disobeys or resists a lawful court order, among
other acts enumerated in Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of G.R. No. 194578 ; February 13, 2013
Court. The proceedings thereto may be commenced by the
court initiating it motu proprio or by a verified petition with
supporting particulars as well as certified true copies of
relevant documents and upon full compliance with the FACTS:
requirements for filing of initiatory pleadings for civil actions.
In 2009, a convoy carrying the relatives of Maguindanao vice-
As the CA observed, the RTC-Tagum found respondent guilty mayor Mangudadatu, as well as lawyers and journalists was on
of indirect contempt, not on account of it having initiated the their way to the Commission on Elections when they were
proceedings motu proprio, but on the basis of the motion filed accosted by a group of 100 armed men.They were taken as
by petitioner. Petitioner claimed that respondent disobeyed hostage, and were systematically killed.
the lawful order of the court and prayed that she be cited in
indirect contempt. Such being the case, petitioner should have

The petitioner is counsel for Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., the Quinsayas is familiar with the confidential nature of
principal accused in the murder cases. disbarment proceedings. However, instead of preserving its
confidentiality, Atty. Quinsayas disseminated copies of the
In 2010, Atty. Quinsayas, et al. filed a disbarment complaint disbarment complaint against the petitioner to members of
against the petitioner. the media which constituted contempt of court.
The petitioner filed a petition for Contempt against the G.R. No. 178733 September 15, 2014
respondents.He claimed that the respondents spoke of, wrote, ELISA ANGELES, Petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
and published articles which claims that he abused legal OFFICER-IN-CHARGE MARILOU C. MARTIN, DEPUTY
remedies available to unduly delay the proceedings, that his SHERIFF JOSELITO SP ASTORGA, MARCO BOCO, AND
actions mislead the prosecution and the trial court, and that a JOHN DOES, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, BRANCH
disbarment complaint was filed against him, and the 268, Respondents.
respondents disseminated the details of this complaint which
were confidential in nature. PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
The petitioner alleged that the public circulation of the DOCTRINE: Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated
disbarment complaint exposed the Court and its investigations motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was
to outside influence and public interference. committed and where the charge for indirect contempt has
been committed against RTC or court of equivalent or higher
ISSUE: rank, or against an officer appointed by it, the charge may be
filed with such court.
Whether or not the respondents violated the confidentiality
rule in disbarment proceedings. FACTS: A complaint for annulment of REM, foreclosure sale,
reconveyance and damages in the RTC, was filed by spouses
HELD: Coronel against Angeles and several others. The TC rendered a
Decision in favor of the plaintiffs (1) declaring that the TCT as
Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides that null and void; (2) ordering the RD for the City of Pasig to cancel
proceedings against attorneys shall be private and the TCT in the name of Rosalina Liwag and to issue a new one
confidential. The purpose of this rule is to enable the Court to in the names of plaintiffs Spouses Coronel; (3) ordering
make its investigations free from any influence or interference, plaintiff to pay defendant Miguel Galicia the amount of P960,
and also to protect the personal and professional reputation of 000.00 as reimbursement for his redemption of the property.
attorneys and judges from baseless charges.
Petitioner was evicted from the subject property as a result of
Malicious and unauthorized publication of administrative the enforcement of the Writ of Execution Pending Appeal.
complaints against lawyers in newspapers may be actionable, Petitioner filed a Petition for Contempt with the CA against
and such premature publication constitutes a contempt of herein respondents. The Petition alleged that Martin defied
court. the trial court’s order to elevate the records of the case to the
CA and acted in collusion with the Coronels to ensure that the
Nevertheless, Rule 139-B is not a restriction on the freedom of latter obtain execution pending appeal that the respondent
the press. If there is a legitimate public interest, the media is public officers’ actions were abusive, illegal, and constitute
not prohibited from making a fair, true, and accurate news indirect contempt of the appellate court. Petitioner prayed
report of a disbarment complaint. that Martin, Astorga, Boco and John Does whose identities
have yet to be ascertained be declared in contempt of court
The petitioners failed to prove that the media groups and and penalized accordingly. CA DISMISSED the petition for lack
personalities acted in bad faith, with malicious intent. There of merit. Hence, the instant Petition.
was also no proof that the media groups and personalities
published their news articles to influence the Court in the ISSUE: Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in
disbarment proceedings. dismissing the petition to hold the respondent public officers
in contempt of court for defying the orders and directives of
Of the respondents, only Atty. Quinsayas was shown to be the trial court, and for disregarding the CA’s authority after it
responsible for the distribution of copies of the disbarment acquired jurisdiction over the case through the appeal
complaint. interposed by petitioner and her codefendants.
Atty. Quinsayas is bound by Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules RULING: NO. The Court dismisses the Petition. The CA is
of Court both as a complainant in the disbarment case and as correct in its pronouncement that basic is the rule that unless
a lawyer. As a lawyer and an officer of the Court, Atty. an order/resolution/directive issued by a court of competent

jurisdiction is declared null and void, such orders are presumed filed with the court contemned. Although this provision is
to be valid. But in this case, there is nothing on record to show permissive in nature, in the event of concurrent jurisdiction
that petitioner availed herself of any of the legal remedies over cases of contempt of court, it would be a good practice to
under the Rules of Court to assail the validity of the said order acknowledge the preferential right of the court against which
or writ, hence, the same remained valid and enforceable. the act of contempt was committed to try and punish the guilty
party.
It should be stressed that the authority to issue an order or writ
of execution pertains to the presiding judge of the court a quo. Besides, it cannot be said that the issuance and
Respondents do not occupy positions of discretion but are implementation by the individual respondents of the writ
subject to the authority or control of the court a quo. Their
functions as officers or employees of the court are purely of execution pending appeal is a contemptible disregard of the
ministerial or administrative in character and confined to CA’s jurisdiction over CA-G.R. CV No. 86451.
serving court orders and processes and carrying the same into
effect. Contrary to petitioner’s allegations, the records show Apparently, the trial court had the authority to grant execution
that respondents were merely implementing the orders issued pending appeal on February 1, 2006 and issue the writ on
by the trial court and that no stay order was issued against the February 15, 2006. The record of case was transmitted to the
enforcement of the subject writ of execution. There is no CA only on February 27, 2006. Prior to the transmittal of the
sufficient showing of acts committed by respondents which original record, the trial court may order execution pending
may constitute contempt, such as among others, refusing to appeal. “The ‘residual jurisdiction’ of trial courts is available at
obey a lawful order of the court or act of disrespect to the a stage in which the court is normally deemed to have lost
dignity of the court which tends to hamper the orderly jurisdiction over the case, or the subject matter involved in the
proceedings and lessen its efficiency. appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of the
appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the records on
Indeed, contrary to petitioner’s claims, it appears that the appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original records or
respondent public officers acted faithfully in carrying out the the records on appeal. In either instance, the trial court still
trial court’s directives. If petitioner doubted these directives – retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to issue protective
arguing as she does that the trial court lost jurisdiction over the orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent
case when her appeal was perfected – then she should have litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the
questioned them by filing the corresponding appeal or petition withdrawal of the appeal.”
in order to set them aside. Punishing the respondents for
contempt will not solve her dilemma; it will not reverse the Having found no irregularity in the assailed pronouncement,
effects of the trial court’s orders and processes. And, speaking and instead declaring herein that judgment was rendered
of contempt, the appellate court is likewise correct in its correctly, it cannot be said that the appellate court committed
position that if respondent public officers should be punished any abuse of its discretion at all as to allow the remedy of
for their perceived defiance or failure to abide by the trial certiorari petitioner prays for. WHEREFORE, the Petition is
court’s directives and processes, then the contempt charge DISMISSED.
should have been initiated in the court a quo, and not in the
CA. Sections 4 and 5, Rule 71 of the ROC state, respectively, G.R. No. 213525, November 21, 2017
that “proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu
proprio by the court against which the contempt was FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
committed” and “where the charge for indirect contempt has INC., Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA) PROPER;
been committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of COA REGIONAL OFFICE NO. VI-WESTERN VISAYAS; AUDIT
equivalent or higher rank, or against an officer appointed by it, GROUP LGS-B, PROVINCE OF ANTIQUE; AND PROVINCIAL
the charge may be filed with such court.” GOVERNMENT OF ANTIQUE, Respondents.
Contempt proceedings are sui generis and are triable only by SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION,
the court against whose authority the contempts are charged; AND MANDAMUS
the power to punish for contempt exists for the purpose of
enabling a court to compel due decorum and respect in its DOCTRINE: The Rules of Court provides that the use of
presence and due obedience to its judgments, orders and disrespectful or contemptuous language against a particular
processes and in order that a court may compel obedience to judge in pleadings presented in another court or proceedings is
its orders, it must have the right to inquire whether there has indirect, not direct contempt as it is not tantamount to a
been any disobedience thereof, for to submit the question of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to
disobedience to another tribunal would operate to deprive the interrupt the administration of justice.
proceeding of half its efficiency. Section 4, Rule 71 of the ROC
provides, in effect, that a charge for indirect contempt must be FACTS: Ang, through the Office of the Presidential Assistant on
Legal Affairs, filed with the SC an administrative complaint
against Judge Castro for ignorance of the law, gross immediately executory upon receipt thereof if the decision so
inexcusable negligence, incompetence, manifest partiality, indicates, as in this case.
grave abuse of discretion, grave misconduct, rendering unjust
decision in a civil case and dereliction of duties in not resolving FACTS: The Court rendered a Decision suspending Basilio from
his motion for reconsideration of the adverse decision in said the practice of law for one (1) year, revoked his incumbent
civil case. Upon learning of the administrative case, Judge commission as a notary public, and prohibited him from being
Castro ordered Ang to appear before him and to show cause commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years, effective
why he should not be punished for contempt of court, for immediately, after finding him guilty of violating the 2004
malicious, insolent, inexcusable disrespect and contemptuous Rules of Notarial Practice and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code
attitude towards the court and towards him. of Professional Responsibility. He is further warned that a
repetition of the same offense or similar acts in the future shall
The RTC through Judge Castro found Ang G guilty of [Direct] be dealt with more severely.
contempt of court, and sentenced him to suffer 5 days
imprisonment and ordered his arrest for failure to appear Thru his counsel, Basilio claimed he received a copy of the
before the court despite notice. Decision on December 2, 2015, hence, the suspension,
revocation and prohibition should have all effectively
Judge Castro then instituted before the Office of the City Fiscal commenced on the same date. The Court denied with finality
of QC a criminal complaint for libel against Ang for using Basilio's motion for reconsideration.
malicious, insolent, and contemptuous language against him in
his letter-complaint filed before the SC. However, in a letter, Atty. Sotero T. Rambayon inquired about
Basilio's suspension alleging that he still appeared before MTC
ISSUE: Whether or not Ang is guilty of Direct Contempt? Paniqui, Tarlac on April 26, 2016 but was subsequently
referred to the OBC for appropriate action. The OBC informed
HELD: NO. The Rules of Court provides that the use of Rambayon that the Decision had already been circulated to all
disrespectful or contemptuous language against a particular courts for implementation, and that Basilio's motion for
judge in pleadings presented in another court or proceedings reconsideration had been denied with finality by the Court.
is indirect, not direct contempt as it is not tantamount to a
misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as Basilio explained that he did not immediately comply with the
to interrupt the administration of justice. suspension order because he believed that his suspension was
held in abeyance pending resolution of his motion for
If the pleading containing derogatory, offensive or malicious reconsideration. He averred that "[u]nless the Court explicitly
statements is submitted in the same court or judge in which states that the decision is immediately executory upon receipt
the proceedings are pending, it is direct contempt because it is thereof, respondent has fifteen (15) days within which to file a
equivalent to a misbehavior committed in the presence of or motion for reconsideration thereof. The denial of said motion
so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of shall render the decision final and executory." On this score,
justice. he maintained that what was immediately executory was only
the revocation of his notarial commission and the two (2)-year
Ang’s conduct, if at all, constitutes indirect contempt and if prohibition of being commissioned as a notary public.
found guilty, he may appeal pursuant to Sec. 10, Rule 71. The
order finding him guilty of contempt mayyy be reviewed by Before the Court could act on the OBC's Report and
the CA or the SC, but the execution of the judgment or order Recommendation, Basilio filed a Motion to Lift Suspension
shall be suspended until a bond is filed by the person in (Motion) attaching an Affidavit of Cessation/Desistance from
contempt. Practice of Law or Appearance in Court. In his motion, Basilio
stated that he "has commenced to serve his penalty and
In addition, the SC ruled that the basis of the libel case against continue to serve his penalty until the present upon his receipt
Ang was a communication addressed to the Chief Justice of the of the Order of the Court denying his Motion for
SC which is of privileged character which would bar a Reconsideration.
prosecution for libel
The OBC recommended Basilio be meted with an additional
A.C. No. 10783 penalty of a fine in the amount of ₱10,000.00 for his failure to
immediately comply with the Court's order of suspension from
ATTY. BENIGNO T. BARTOLOME,, Complainant vs. ATTY. the practice of law, as mandated in the Decision. Likewise, it
CHRISTOPHER A. BASILIO, Respondent recommended that the lifting of the order of suspension from
the practice of law be held in abeyance pending his payment
of the fine.
DOCTRINE: The clause “effective immediately” placed at the
end of the penalties shall mean that the Decision is

ISSUE: WON Basilio is guilty of indirect contempt for his failure
to immediately comply with the order of the Court.
HELD: YES. Basilio's compliance with the order of suspension,

as well as all the other penalties, should have commenced on
the day he received the Decision.
Irrefragably, the clause "effective immediately" was placed at

the end of the enumerated series of penalties to indicate that
the same pertained to and therefore, qualified all three (3)
penalties, which clearly include his suspension from the
practice of law. The immediate effectivity of the order of
suspension - not just of the revocation and prohibition against
his notarial practice - logically proceeds from the fact that all
three (3) penalties were imposed on Basilio as a result of the
Court's finding that he failed to comply with his duties as a
notary public, in violation of the provisions of the 2004 Rules
of Notarial Practice, and his sworn duties as a lawyer, in
violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Thus, with the Decision's explicit wording that
the same was "effective immediately", there is no gainsaying
that Basilio's compliance therewith should have commenced
immediately from his receipt of the Decision on December 2,
2015. On this score, Basilio cannot rely on the Maniago ruling
as above-claimed since it was, in fact, held therein that a
decision is immediately executory upon receipt thereof if the
decision so indicates, as in this case.
All told, for his failure to immediately serve the penalties in the
Decision against him upon receipt, Basilio acted
contumaciously, and thus should be meted with a fine in the
amount of ₱10,000.00, as recommended by the OBC. Pending
his payment of the fine and presentation of proof thereof, the
lifting of the order of suspension from the practice of law is
perforce held in abeyance.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby FINDS respondent Atty.

Christopher A. Basilio GUILTY of indirect contempt. He is
hereby FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos
(₱10,000.00) and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar infractions will be dealt with more severely.
The lifting of the order of suspension from the practice of law
is HELD IN ABEYANCE pending his payment of the fine and
presentation of proof thereof.

2b Civpro Case Digests Ay 2021 2022

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

2b Civpro Case Digests Ay 2021 2022

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y.

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y. 2020-2021

Petition for Review on Certiorari Rule 45

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y. 2020-2021

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y. 2020-2021

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y. 2020-2021

Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45

Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 NLRC – Affirmed

FACTS: On appeal: Respondent contends that NLRC had no jurisdiction

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y. 2020-2021

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y. 2020-2021

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y. 2020-2021

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y. 2020-2021

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y. 2020-2021

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y. 2020-2021

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y. 2020-2021

However, prior to the sale that occurred on November 14,

Determined to recover possession of the portions of the lot

The RTC rendered a Judgment voiding the two Deeds of

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y. 2020-2021

As already explained, the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte had FACTS:

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y. 2020-2021

Nevertheless, while the certificates of title issued in the name

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y. 2020-2021

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y. 2020-2021

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y. 2020-2021

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y. 2020-2021

The RTC issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. In the

The RTC dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y. 2020-2021

RULING FACTS: Spouses Hernandez obtained from the Rural Bank of

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y. 2020-2021

SO ORDERED. HELD: The petitioner’s complaint is a real action. As held by the

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y. 2020-2021

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y. 2020-2021

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y. 2020-2021

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y. 2020-2021

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y. 2020-2021

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y. 2020-2021

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y. 2020-2021

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y. 2020-2021

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y. 2020-2021

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y. 2020-2021

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y. 2020-2021

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y. 2020-2021

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y. 2020-2021

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y. 2020-2021

(2) In such a case, is the defendant entitled to the dismissal of FACTS

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y. 2020-2021

According to the respondents, the original occupant and HELD:

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y. 2020-2021

Furthermore, the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement was also

RULING: Petitioners filed a Complaint denominated as Damages with

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y. 2020-2021

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y. 2020-2021

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y. 2020-2021

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y. 2020-2021

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y. 2020-2021

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y. 2020-2021

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y. 2020-2021

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y. 2020-2021

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y. 2020-2021

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y. 2020-2021

CIVIL PROCEDURE – 2B | DEAN S.D. MAWIS UST | S.Y. 2020-2021