Professional Documents
Culture Documents
A Court of Appeal
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R (Patel) v General Medical Council (CA) [2013] 1 WLR
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[2013] 1 WLR R (Patel) v General Medical Council (CA)
A decisions to change the rules had been made in 2006 and 2010 no consideration had
been given to whether it was necessary to introduce the new rules with immediate
e›ect or the consequences of doing so, was su–cient to require the decision to apply
the rules to the claimant to be quashed; that in the circumstances it was not open to the
GMC to change its policy without adopting some transitional provisions to cater for
the claimant, there being no su–cient public interest which outweighed the unfairness
to the claimant of refusing to honour the assurance given; and that, accordingly, the
B claimant was entitled to a declaration that the defendant be compelled to recognise his
primary medical qualication for the purposes of registration under the Medical Act
1983 (post, paras 40—41, 43—48, 55, 56, 59—62, 75, 81, 83—85, 91, 93, 94, 95).
R v Inland Revenue Comrs, Ex p MFK Underwriting Agents Ltd [1990] 1 WLR
1545, DC, R v North and East Devon Health Authority, Ex p Coughlan [2001] QB
213, CA, R (Association of British Civilian Internees: Far East Region) v Secretary of
State for Defence [2003] QB 1397, CA and R (Bhatt Murphy) v Independent
Assessor [2008] EWCA Civ 755, CA applied.
C
Decision of Hickinbottom J [2012] EWHC 2120 (Admin); 128 BMLR 146
reversed.
The following cases are referred to in the judgment of Lloyd Jones LJ:
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corpn [1948] 1 KB 223;
[1947] 2 All ER 680, CA
D Belgian Linguistic Case (No 2) (1968) 1 EHRR 252
British Oxygen Co Ltd v Board of Trade [1971] AC 610; [1970] 3 WLR 488; [1970]
3 All ER 165, HL(E)
Paponette v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago [2010] UKPC 32; [2012] 1 AC
1; [2011] 3 WLR 219, PC
R v Inland Revenue Comrs, Ex p MFK Underwriting Agents Ltd [1990] 1 WLR
1545; [1990] 1 All ER 91, DC
R v Inland Revenue Comrs, Ex p Unilever plc [1996] STC 681, CA
E
R v North and East Devon Health Authority, Ex p Coughlan [2001] QB 213; [2000]
2 WLR 622; [2000] 3 All ER 850, CA
R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment, Ex p Begbie [2000] 1 WLR
1115, CA
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p Brind [1991] 1 AC 696; [1991]
2 WLR 588; [1991] 1 All ER 720, HL(E)
R v Specialist Training Authority of the Medical Royal Colleges, Ex p British Medical
F Association (1998) 47 BMLR 95
R (Association of British Civilian Internees: Far East Region) v Secretary of State for
Defence [2003] EWCA Civ 473; [2003] QB 1397; [2003] 3 WLR 80, CA
R (Bhatt Murphy) v Independent Assessor [2008] EWCA Civ 755, CA
R (Bibi) v Newham London Borough Council [2001] EWCA Civ 607; [2002] 1 WLR
237, CA
R (Sivills) v General Social Care Council [2007] EWHC 2576 (Admin)
G
The following additional cases were cited in argument:
R (Dudley Metropolitan Borough Council) v Secretary of State for Communities and
Local Government [2012] EWHC 1729 (Admin); [2013] LGR 68
R (HSMP Forum Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWHC
664 (Admin); [2008] INLR 262
H The following additional cases, although not cited, were referred to in the skeleton
arguments:
R v Devon County Council, Ex p Baker [1995] 1 All ER 73, CA
R v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Ex p Hamble (O›shore) Fisheries
Ltd [1995] 2 All ER 714
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R (Patel) v General Medical Council (CA) [2013] 1 WLR
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p Pierson [1998] AC 539; [1997] A
3 WLR 492; [1997] 3 All ER 577, HL(E)
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p Venables [1998] AC 407;
[1997] 3 WLR 23; [1997] 3 All ER 97, HL(E)
R (Aguilar Quila) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (AIRE Centre
intervening) [2010] EWCA Civ 1482; [2011] 3 All ER 81, CA; [2011] UKSC 45;
[2012] 1 AC 621; [2011] 3 WLR 836; [2012] 1 All ER 1011, SC(E)
R (Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, B
Transport and the Regions [2001] UKHL 23; [2003] 2 AC 295; [2001] 2 WLR
1389; [2001] 2 All ER 929, HL(E)
R (Amraf Training plc) v Secretary of State for Education and Employment [2001]
ELR 125
R (Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport
[2008] UKHL 15; [2008] AC 1312; [2008] 2 WLR 781; [2008] 3 All ER 193, HL(E)
R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 26; [2001] C
2 AC 532; [2001] 2 WLR 1622; [2001] 3 All ER 433, HL(E)
R (Godfrey) v Southwark London Borough Council [2012] EWCA Civ 500; [2012]
LGR 683, CA
R (Licheld Securities Ltd) v Licheld District Council [2001] EWCA Civ 304;
[2001] 3 PLR 33, CA
R (Luton Borough Council) v Secretary of State for Education [2011] EWHC 217
(Admin); [2011] ELR 222 D
R (Nicholds) v Security Industry Authority [2006] EWHC 1792 (Admin); [2007]
1 WLR 2067; [2007] ICR 1076
Runa Begum v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council (First Secretary of State
intervening) [2003] UKHL 5; [2003] 2 AC 430; [2003] 2 WLR 388; [2003] 1 All
ER 731, HL(E)
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[2013] 1 WLR R (Patel) v General Medical Council (CA)
Lloyd Jones LJ
LLOYD JONES LJ
1 This is an appeal by the claimant, Dr Sailesh Patel against the order of
Hickinbottom J dismissing his application for judicial review of the decision
of the defendant, the General Medical Council (GMC) to refuse to accept
his primary medical qualication obtained from the International University
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of Health Sciences, St Kitts and Nevis (IUHS) as an acceptable overseas
qualication pursuant to section 21C of the Medical Act 1983. The e›ect of
this refusal has been that the claimant has not been permitted to progress
his application for registration with the General Medical Council. As a
consequence he has been unable to take a competency and linguists
examinations set by the Professional and Linguists Assessment Board
F (PLAB) or undertake a placement in a National Health Service hospital for
foundation year 1.
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and Social Care Professions) Regulations 2007, make provision for the A
registration of doctors who have overseas qualications. Section 21B(1)
concerns registration as a fully registered medical practitioner. It provides:
Where a person satises the registrar (a) that he holds, or has
passed all the qualifying examinations necessary for obtaining, an
acceptable overseas qualication; (b) that he possesses the knowledge,
skills and experience necessary for practising as a fully registered medical B
practitioner in the United Kingdom; (c) that his tness to practise is not
impaired; (d) unless he is an exempt person, that he has the necessary
knowledge of English, and (e) that, where (i) the person is an exempt
person, (ii) his acceptable overseas qualication was, or would have been,
granted otherwise than in a relevant European state, and (iii) that
qualication, or the persons having passed those examinations, has not
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previously been accepted by a relevant European state as qualifying the
person to practise as a medical practitioner in that state, that qualication
is, or would have been, evidence of medical training which satises
the [basic medical training] requirements of [the relevant European
Directive], that person shall, if the General Council think t so to direct,
be registered under this section as a fully registered medical practitioner.
D
4 The denition of acceptable overseas qualication was originally
provided by section 22(4):
In this Act an acceptable overseas qualication means any
qualication granted outside the United Kingdom and for the time being
accepted by the General Council for the purposes of this section as
furnishing a su–cient guarantee of the possession of the knowledge and
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skills requisite for the practice of medicine under the supervision of a
person who is registered as a fully registered medical practitioner.
However, the 2006 Order substituted a new denition in section 21B(2):
In this Act, an acceptable overseas qualication means any
qualication granted outside the United Kingdom, where that
qualication is for the time being accepted by the General Council F
as qualifying a person to practise as a medical practitioner in the
United Kingdom.
5 Section 21C concerns provisional registration of doctors with an
overseas qualication. Section 21C(2) provides:
A person who satises the registrar (a) of the matters specied in
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paragraphs (a), (c), (d) and (e) of subsection (1) of 21B above so far as
they are matters of which the Registrar would in the persons case have to
be satised in order for the person to be eligible to benet from a direction
under that subsection; and (b) that he possesses the knowledge and skill
requisite for embarking upon an acceptable programme for provisionally
registered doctors, may apply to the General Council to be provisionally
registered under this section and, if the Council think t so to direct, that H
person shall be so registered.
6 Where an application for registration is refused by the registrar, there
is a right of appeal to the Registration Appeals Panel, a statutory committee
of the GMC.
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should have a decision posted on the GMC website. We will not currently A
accept the primary medical qualications as eligibility for taking the
PLAB test. If your qualication is given by the International School of
Health Studies this accepted by the GMC.
18 The claimant sent a further e-mail on 8 November:
Thank you for your prompt reply to my e-mail of 5 November B
regarding the qualication given by IUHS medical school in St Kitts,
which you conrm the GMC recognises and accepts. However my
question was that if I apply to IUHS and complete the PRE-CLINICAL by
distance learning and then complete the CLINICAL in the UKwould
that be acceptable to the GMC?
19 The GMC replied on 9 November: C
Thank you for your reply. If you have completed the qualication but
not an internship, you can still take the PLAB test but the test is concerned
with mainly senior house o–cer levels. I hope this answers your query, if
not please reply and explain further.
20 The claimant responded the same day:
D
Further to your e-mail of 9 November, my question is that does the
GMC recognise and accept the distance learning (on-line) pre-clinical
element of the medical course o›ered by the IUHS in St Kitts?PLEASE
REPLY YES OR NO. As you are aware that the clinical part of the course
is in a UK hospital under full supervision and further IUHS is also
recognised by the GMC and WHO.
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21 The GMC responded on 10 November:
Thank you for your e-mail dated 9 November. We have recently
had further clarication regarding the medical degrees awarded by the
London Medical College/London School of Medicine (awarded by the
IUHS). We are now accepting these degrees for the purposes of limited
registration. The medical degree awarded by IUHS is also accepted for F
the purpose of limited registration. You need to be aware that as the
GMC does not currently recognise this school, a degree from the
university will not automatically lead to registration, students will still
have to sit PLAB or full alternative criteria to be eligible for limited
registration. The school is not subject to any quality assurance or
inspection by the GMC and potential students will have to satisfy
themselves both that the schools will be awarding a degree from G
WHO-listed universities when they graduate and that they are nancially
stable institutions. If you have any further queries please contact us and
we will do our best to help.
22 The reference in the GMCs e-mail of 10 November to limited
registration is to a di›erent form of registration, which is no longer
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available. However, the precise form of registration is of no relevance to the
present proceedings. In that e-mail the GMC made clear that the claimant
could not rely on the a–liation of the IUHS with the UK-based London
College of Medicine. However, the focus of the claimants inquiries then
shifted from that a–liation.
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The appeal
29 The grounds of appeal advanced by Mr Drabble QC on behalf of the
claimant fall into two categories. (1) Challenges to the new criteria adopted
in 2006 and 2010. (2) Challenges founded on legitimate expectation. At the
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hearing it became clear that the real substance of this appeal lies in the claim
based on legitimate expectation. Accordingly I propose to deal relatively
briey with the challenges to the new criteria. However, it is appropriate to
address them rst because they provide part of the context of the case on
legitimate expectation.
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registered and that that is what the GMC has done. I also agree with the A
judge that there is a striking similarity between the position here and that in
R v Specialist Training Authority of the Medical Royal Colleges, Ex p British
Medical Association (1998) 47 BMLR 95, where Dyson J held that the
Specialist Training Authority was entitled to specify certain minimum
criteria which had to be satised by every applicant.
34 Accordingly I do not consider that there was any unlawful fettering B
of discretion by the GMC.
Irrationality
35 Mr Drabble submits that the judge erred in holding that the
retrospective change in requirement was not irrational or arbitrary.
He submits that the broad statutory purpose in section 1(1A) of the Act
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which underpins the grant of discretionary power to the GMC does not
require, still less encourage, the imposition of blanket criteria. He submits
that a blanket policy which excludes high quality candidates who, on the
objective evidence, clearly possess the knowledge and skill requisite for
practising medicine under supervision, must be contrary to the purpose of
the Act and/or irrational.
36 In approaching this issue the judge emphasised that the rationality D
of this requirement must be seen in its context which includes the absence
of any universally recognised standards for primary medical qualications
and the intention of Parliament that the GMC must identify the criteria by
which a primary medical qualication will be acceptable. He considered
that the change in criteria reected the broad concerns identied in the
GMC paper of 6 June 2006 and the registration committees wish to see a
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requirement of greater association between students, the educational
establishment and the degree course, concerns that were carried through to
the 2010 deliberations. He also drew attention to the impracticability of
the GMC assessing or verifying the many primary medical qualications
issued around the world. He concluded at 128 BMLR 146, para 64 that,
when considered in this context, it was not irrational for the GMC to
insist on a requirement that goes to ensure to a signicant degree that the F
awarding institution has a proper degree of control and supervision
over the period of study looked at as a whole. I agree with the judges
reasoning and conclusion.
37 The judge went on to conclude that the new criteria were not
rendered irrational by the lack of any transitional provisions. For my part,
I accept that in principle the GMC would be entitled to change the criteria G
with immediate e›ect if it was satised on reasonable grounds that it was
necessary to bring in the necessary changes with such immediacy. However,
it will be necessary to examine later in this judgment the decision making
process which actually occurred in this case.
Proportionality
H
38 Mr Drabble submits that article 2 of the First Protocol to the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
as scheduled to the Human Rights At 1998 is engaged in this case because
the decision to refuse recognition to the claimants qualication denies him
the right to draw prot from the education he has obtained. Mr Drabble
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the representations had given rise. This raises the further question as to A
the burden of proof in cases of frustration of a legitimate expectation.
37. The initial burden lies on the applicant to prove the legitimacy of
his expectation. This means that in a claim based on a promise, the
applicant must prove the promise and that it was clear and unambiguous
and devoid of relevant qualication. If he wishes to reinforce his case by
saying that he relied on the promise to his detriment, then obviously B
he must prove that too. Once these elements have been proved by
the applicant, however, the onus shifts to the authority to justify the
frustration of the legitimate expectation. It is for the authority to identify
any overriding interest on which it relies to justify the frustration of the
expectation. It will then be a matter for the court to weigh the
requirements of fairness against that interest.
C
59 Under the Medical Act 1983 the GMC is given the responsibility of
deciding which qualications granted outside the United Kingdom it will,
for the time being, accept. In doing so it must act in accordance with its
main objective, namely to protect, promote and maintain the health and
safety of the public. The GMC is clearly entitled to adopt, from time to time,
a new policy in relation to the recognition of overseas qualications and,
depending on the view it takes of the relevant courses, may well be under a D
duty to do so. For the reasons set out earlier in this judgment, I consider that
the new criteria adopted by the GMC in 2006 and again in 2010 were,
in themselves, lawful. The question which arises for decision in this part of
the case is, to my mind, a much more specic one: was there a su–cient
public interest to justify changing the rules so as to deny recognition to
qualications which were obtained following a course of study which E
involved a substantial distance learning element, without making
transitional provision for the case of the claimant who had received an
assurance that his qualication would be recognised if obtained within a
reasonable time. Within this context, it is for the GMC to prove that its
refusal to honour its assurance to the claimant was justied in the public
interest. There is no burden on the claimant to prove that it was
not justied. F
60 This leads directly to the question of the appropriate standard of
review in such a case. In Ex p Coughlan [2001] QB 213, para 58 this court
considered that in a case of substantive legitimate expectation the court has
to decide for itself whether there is a su–cient overriding interest to justify a
departure from what has been previously promised. As Laws LJ explained
in the Bhatt Murphy case [2008] EWCA Civ 755 at [35]: G
The establishment of any policy, new or substitute, by a public body is
in principle subject to Wednesbury review. But a claim that a substitute
policy has been established in breach of a substantive legitimate
expectation engages a much more rigorous standard. It will be
adjudged . . . by the courts own view of what fairness requires.
H
61 In applying an objective standard of fairness, in seeking to establish
whether a refusal to honour a promise is an abuse of power, the court must
weigh the competing interests. As appears from a particularly illuminating
passage, once again from Laws LJ, this time in R v Secretary of State for
Education and Employment, Ex p Begbie [2000] 1 WLR 1115, 1130—1131,
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A the degree of intensity of review will vary from case to case, depending on
the character of the decision challenged.
As it seems to me the rst and third categories explained in Coughlan
are not hermetically sealed. The facts of the case, viewed always in their
statutory context, will steer the court to a more or less intrusive quality of
review. In some cases a change of tack by a public authority, though
B unfair from the applicants stance, may involve questions of general
policy a›ecting the public at large or a signicant section of it (including
interests not represented before the court); here the judges may well be in
no position to adjudicate save at most on a bare Wednesbury basis,
without themselves donning the garb of policy-maker, which they cannot
wear. The local government nance cases, such as R v Secretary of State,
Ex p Hammersmith [1991] 1 AC 521, exemplify this. As Wade & Forsyth
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observe (Administrative Law, 7th ed (1994), p 404): Ministers decisions
on important matters of policy are not on that account sacrosanct against
the unreasonableness doctrine, though the court must take special care,
for constitutional reasons, not to pass judgment on action which is
essentially political.
In other cases the act or omission complained of may take place on a
D much smaller stage, with far fewer players. Here, with respect, lies the
importance of the fact in Coughlan that few individuals were a›ected by
the promise in question. The cases facts may be discrete and limited,
having no implications for an innominate class of persons. There may be
no wide-ranging issues of general policy, or none with multi-layered
e›ects, upon whose merits the court is asked to embark. The court
may be able to envisage clearly and with su–cient certainty what the full
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consequences will be of any order it makes. In such a case the courts
condemnation of what is done as an abuse of power, justiable (or rather,
falling to be relieved of its character as abusive) only if an overriding
public interest is shown of which the court is the judge, o›ers no o›ence
to the claims of democratic power.
There will of course be a multitude of cases falling within these
F extremes, or sharing the characteristics of one or other. The more
the decision challenged lies in what may inelegantly be called the
macro-political eld, the less intrusive will be the courts supervision.
More than this: in that eld, true abuse of power is less likely to be found,
since within it changes of policy, fuelled by broad conceptions of the
public interest, may more readily be accepted as taking precedence
over the interests of groups which enjoyed expectations generated by an
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earlier policy.
62 In considering the justication put forward by the GMC the court
must give weight to the fact that it is an expert professional body charged by
Parliament with the specic function of deciding which overseas medical
qualications should be recognised and that it is required to act to protect,
promote and maintain the health and safety of the public. The courts would,
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therefore, normally expect to treat with considerable respect its assessment
of the need for the adoption of a particular policy. However, it is necessary
to subject the proposed justication to critical analysis and to weigh it
against the competing interests in favour of honouring the assurance given to
the claimant.
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A public at risk. (6) Some organisations may fail to provide adequate facilities
for their students. The 50% criterion requires students physically to attend
the awarding institution and to access all the available facilities. If they nd
these facilities are lacking then they are in the position to make a decision
about continuing their course of study at an early stage.
71 Miss Conway does not claim that the 50% requirement alone ensures
a proper standard of education. However, she explains that the aim is to
B
ensure that, for those intending to practise in the United Kingdom, the
opportunities for direct contact with teaching sta›, access to relevant
support and facilities and active engagement in their medical education will
be optimised. She states that it is believed to be one of the most e›ective
safeguards available to the GMC in its endeavour to ensure that the standard
of medical education provided by overseas awarding bodies is satisfactory.
C Finally, she emphasises that the 50% requirement is just one criterion which
makes up the denition of what is an acceptable overseas qualication.
72 I do not intend to be critical of Miss Conway in any way, but not all
of the factors which she identies are apparent from the contemporaneous
documents and there may be an element of ex post facto justication on the
part of the GMC here. The justications summarised under heads (1), (2)
and (4) relate to distinct abuses which are not alleged to have occurred in the
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case of the claimants training. So far as head (6) is concerned, the fact that
some universities may fail to provide facilities for students in residence is not
a good reason for refusing to recognise distance learning qualications.
It has no bearing on the quality of qualications obtained by distance
learning. In the same way, the fact that presence at the teaching institution
may help reveal other deciencies or abuses, if such exist, is not in itself an
E objection to distance learning.
73 So far as possible risk to the public is concerned, Miss Conways
statement in her rst witness statement that the 50% rule also prevents
graduates from such schools entering into the profession and putting the
public at risk is little more than a bold assertion, with little to substantiate
it. In the contemporaneous documents there is no evaluation of the degree of
risk arising from distance learning in itself. Rather, distance learning is
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considered in the 2006 paper as one factor in conjunction with courses
of shorter duration than would be accepted in the United Kingdom and
situations where there are insu–cient quality checks on degree courses.
Furthermore, it is necessary to consider this aspect of the case in the context
of the other requirements of professional training. I accept that the 2006
paper expressed a reservation about the use of the PLAB test as an e›ective
G screening tool. However the specic concern which was raised was that,
with the growth of private colleges schooling candidates to take the PLAB
test, it may no longer be e›ective in screening out candidates who do not
have the depth of underlying knowledge and skills for limited registration.
(I note, however, that the GMCs website currently describes the PLAB test
as the main route by which international medical graduates (IMGs)
demonstrate that they have the necessary skills and knowledge to practise
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medicine in the UK.) It is, to my mind, highly material to the present issue
that, before he would be able to practise medicine independently in the
United Kingdom, the claimant would be required to pass a number of
further tests. He would be required to pass an objective, structured, clinical
examination (OSCE) as part of a foundation programme clinical assessment.
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H Delay
87 Miss Grey makes two further submissions, both relating to the
considerable passage of time since the change of policy in 2006.
88 First, she submits that the GMC could not be taken to have given an
assurance that the IUHS qualication would be recognised in perpetuity, but
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only for a reasonable time. The course in question was a four-year course A
but it took the claimant six years to complete it. This delay, she submits, had
caused any assurance to lapse. I accept that the assurance could only be
invoked if the qualication were obtained within a reasonable time.
However, I have no doubt that in the particular circumstances of this case
the course was completed in a reasonable time. The four-year course was
available to the claimant only because he already had a BSc, so the GMC
B
should have had in contemplation the possibility of students embarking on a
six-year course. Furthermore, there has to be some exibility in this regard.
The claimant has explained that while following this course of study he had
to work part-time as a locum pharmacist to fund the course. In addition, he
was subject to additional strains as a result of his wifes illness. In these
circumstances, the progress he made and the results he achieved were
commendable. I have come to the rm conclusion that the assurance had not C
lapsed by the time the claimant sought to invoke it.
89 Miss Grey observed, in passing, that the irony of the present case is
that had the claimant completed his course in the standard four years, the
qualication he had obtained would have been considered by the GMC
before the second change of policy in 2010 and would have been dealt with
by the Registration Appeals Panel. I attach no weight to this consideration,
D
not least because the position of the GMC has been and remains that the
Registration Appeals Panel was not entitled to act as it did.
90 Secondly, Miss Grey relies on the power under section 31(6) of the
Senior Courts Act 1981 to refuse relief on grounds of delay if the court
considers that it would be detrimental to good administration. She submits
that if the claim had been brought at or near the time at which the criteria
changed in 2006, remedies would have been relatively straightforward and E
would have been likely to have caused relatively little delay. Furthermore,
she submits that if this challenge had been brought closer to the dates at
which the criteria were changed, it would have been possible for the GMC to
consider whether there were any additional measures that feasibly could be
put in place to deal with the situation, or the claimant could have been
advised to alter his chosen course of study at an earlier date so as to ensure
F
that it complied with the new criteria.
91 Arguments based on the alleged delay, as opposed to the nature
of the assurance given by the GMC, have failed at earlier stages in these
proceedings. I accept that in an appropriate case it would nevertheless be
open to this court to refuse to grant relief on grounds of delay. However,
I have no hesitation in rejecting this submission. I am totally unpersuaded
that there is potential for prejudice to good administration by the grant of G
relief in this case. In this regard, I draw attention to my conclusion as to
the number of persons likely to be in a similar position to the claimant.
Furthermore, the nature of the assurance given by the GMC in this case and
the duration of the course which it was understood the claimant proposed to
undertake were such that it was likely to be a long time before the assurance
could be relied upon. When the claimant was refused permission he acted
H
promptly to challenge the decision.
92 Finally, I should record that, following the completion of argument
before us, the GMC applied for permission to put in evidence further e-mails
which had passed between the claimant and the GMC in 2009 and 2010.
For my part, I would refuse permission. As the GMC accepts, this evidence
' 2013 The Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for England and Wales
2831
[2013] 1 WLR R (Patel) v General Medical Council (CA)
Lloyd Jones LJ
LLOYD LJ
94 I agree.
LORD DYSON MR
C 95 I also agree.
' 2013 The Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for England and Wales