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In the matter of the estate of GEORGE M. ICARD, deceased:
JOSEPH ICARD vs. CLARO MASIGAN, as special
administrator of the estate of George M. Icard; and EFFIE
CARLAND ICARD
Facts: Joseph Icard filed a claim against the estate of George
Icard for services rendered in connection with mining claims. The
claim having been allowed by the Commissioners, the
administrator appealed to the CFI.
ADMINISTRATOR: the probate court erred in allowing the
claimant to testify to the services rendered by him in favor of his
father, because the action being one against the administrator
of a deceased person, plaintiff cannot be allowed to testify as to
any matter of fact which occurred before the death of such
deceased person.
Undisputed facts: the Antamok Central Group of Mining Claims
were owned in common by one Fred, deceased George, and
petitioner Joseph Icard. These mining claims were sold to Big
Wedge Mining Company, evidenced by the deed of sale executed
jointly by the common owners. A dispute arose as to the price still
due under the contract, prompting Big Wedge Company to file an
action to rescind the contract.
The contract was, however, settled between the parties, and a
compromise agreement was duly approved by the court. Pursuant
to the compromise, an order was issued decreeing that the sum
of P39,478.16 be paid to Joseph K. Icard in full settlement of his
personal interest. The order directed that said amount be
divided between Joseph K. Icard and the estate of the
deceased George M. Icard in the manner and proportion to be
determined by the probate court.
HELD:
It is thus clear that Joseph K. Icard had an interest in the mining
claims aforementioned, as evidenced by the deed of sale
executed in favor of the Big Wedge Mining Company and the
compromise agreement approved by the court.
The amount of this interest being undetermined, Joseph K. Icard
may, if he wishes to, properly claim one-half of P39,478.16, under
the legal provision that "the interest of the coowners shall be
presumed to be equal until the contrary is prove." Instead, he
claims P2,000 only, and it is this reduced claim which he
seeks to establish by his oral testimony.
Under the DMS, where, as in the instant case, the purpose of the
oral testimony is to prove a lesser claim than what might be
warranted by clear written evidence, to avoid prejudice to the
estate of the deceased, the law has certainly no reason for its
application ratione cessante, cessat ipsa lex.
SEC 24. DISQUALIFICATION BY REASON OF PRIVILEGED
COMMUNICATION
EAGLERIDGE VS
CAMERON GRANVILLE INC
Facts:
RESP: “Loan Sale and Purchase Agreement” cannot be produced
as evidence, being a privileged and confidential document
PET: it has not been shown that the parties fall under…or at the
very least are analogous to any of the relationships enumerated
in R130S24 that would exempt respondent from disclosing
information as to their transaction.
HELD:
Re: Discovery mode of production/inspection of document
under R27S1 does not provide for any time frame within
which the discovery mode can be utilized. The rule only
requires leave of court upon due application and a showing of due
cause.
R27S1 contains a proviso that the documents sought to be
produced and inspected must not be privileged against disclosure.
Rule 130, Section 24 describes the types of privileged
communication. These are communication between or
involving the following:
(a) between husband and wife;
(b) between attorney and client;
(c) between physician and patient;
(d) between priest and penitent; and
(e) public officers and public interest.
This court has previously cited other privileged matters such
as the following:
(a) editors may not be compelled to disclose the source of
published news;
(b) voters may not be compelled to disclose for whom they
voted;
(c) trade secrets;
(d) information contained in tax census returns; . . .
(e) bank deposits (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank
Deposits Act); (f) national security matters and
intelligence information; and
(f) criminal matters.
Nonetheless, the LSPA does not fall within any of these classes
of information. Moreover, the privilege is not absolute, and the
court may compel disclosure where it is indispensable for doing
justice.
At any rate, respondent failed to discharge the burden of showing
that the LSPA is a privileged document. Respondent did not
present any law or regulation that considers bank documents such
as the LSPA as classified information.
AIR PHILIPPINES CORP VS
PENNSWELL
Facts:
Petitioner Air Philippines Corporation is a domestic corporation
engaged in the business of air transportation services.
Respondent Pennswell, Inc. was organized to engage in the
business of manufacturing and selling industrial chemicals,
solvents, and special lubricants.
PET: it was defrauded by respondent for its previous sale of items,
which respondent misrepresented as belonging to a new line, but
were in fact identical products petitioner had previously purchased
from respondent; petitioner filed a Motion to Compel
respondent to give a detailed list of the ingredients and
chemical components of the some of its products.
RTC: granted Motion to Compel, ordering resp to give a detailed
list of the ingredients or chemical components of the chemical
products
RESP: MR; it cannot be compelled to disclose the chemical
components because the matter is confidential, being a trade
secret which it cannot be forced to divulge.
RTC: reversed itself, chem components are trade secrets hence
privileged.
CA: to compel respondent to reveal in detail the list of ingredients
of its lubricants is to disregard respondent's rights over its trade
secrets
PET with SC: it has a right to obtain the chemical composition and
ingredients of respondent's products to conduct a comparative
analysis of its products.

HELD: A trade secret is defined as a plan or process, tool,
mechanism or compound known only to its owner and those of his
employees to whom it is necessary to confide it. The definition also
extends to a secret formula or process not patented, but known
only to certain individuals using it in compounding some article of
trade having a commercial value.
The inventor, discoverer, or possessor of a trade secret or similar
innovation has rights therein which may be treated as property,
and ordinarily an injunction will be granted to prevent the
disclosure of the trade secret by one who obtained the
information "in confidence" or through a "confidential
relationship.”
Factors to determine if the information is a trade secret:
1) the extent to which the information is known outside of
the employer's business;
2) the extent to which the information is known by
employees and others involved in the business;
3) the extent of measures taken by the employer to guard
the secrecy of the information;
4) the value of the information to the employer and to
competitors;
5) the amount of effort or money expended by the
company in developing the information; and
6) the extent to which the information could be easily or
readily obtained through an independent source.
The chemical composition, formulation, and ingredients of
respondent's special lubricants are trade secrets within the
contemplation of the law. Respondent was established to
engage in the business of general manufacturing and selling of,
and to deal in, distribute, sell or otherwise dispose of goods,
wares, merchandise, products, including industrial chemicals. The
ingredients constitute the very fabric of respondent's
production and business. No doubt, the information is also
valuable to respondent's competitors. To compel its disclosure
is to cripple respondent's business, and to place it at an undue
disadvantage.
Re: Production or Inspection of Documents/Things: Rule 27
sets an unequivocal proviso that the documents, papers, books,
accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things that may
be produced and inspected should not be privileged. The
documents must not be privileged against disclosure. On the
ground of public policy, the rules providing for production and
inspection of books and papers do not authorize the production or
inspection of privileged matter. That trade secrets are of a
privileged nature is beyond quibble. The protection that this
jurisdiction affords to trade secrets is evident in our laws.
A. HUSBAND AND WIFE
CECILIA ZULUETA VS
CA & ALFREDO MARTIN
Facts: A case for legal separation involving petitioner and private
respondent.
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta entered the clinic of her husband, a
doctor of medicine, and forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet
in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of
private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged
paramours, greeting cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's
passport, and photographs. The documents were seized for use
in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from
practice of medicine.
RESP: brought this action below for recovery of the documents
and papers and for damages against petitioner.
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RTC: in favor of respondent, ordering Cecilia to immediately return
the properties to Dr. Martin; petitioner is enjoined from using or
admitting as evidence the documents and papers in question
CA: affirmed
PET with SC: in a case filed by Martin against the lawyer of
petitioner, the Court ruled that the documents and papers twere
admissible in evidence and their use by petitioner’s attorney did
not constitute malpractice or gross misconduct.
HELD: Petitioner’s contention has no merit. The case against the
lawyer of Petitioner was for disbarment.
The documents and papers in question are inadmissible in
evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of
communication and correspondence to be inviolable" is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself
aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party
against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced.
The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there
is a "lawful order from a court or when public safety or order
requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this
provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for
any purpose in any proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one
of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in
ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A
person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or
his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional
protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between
the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife
may testify for or against the other without the consent of the
affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be
examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other
during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing
is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion
for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this
has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the
other.
JUDGE LACUROM VS
ATTY ELLIS JACOBA and ATTY OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA
Facts: In a case handled by respondent lawyers (Veneracion vs
Barrientos), the MTC ruled in favor of lawyers’ client, Veneracion.
On appeal to the RTC where petitioner Judge was sitting as
pairing judge, the Judge reversed the MTC judgment.
Veneracion’s counsel filed MR with Request for Inhibition
(July 2001 Motion), prefatory statements of which were
“disrespectful, insulting and humiliating” directed against
petitioner Judge.
Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba was ordered to appear before the
Judge.
In her explanation and Answer: Atty. Olivia claimed that she did
not actually participate in the case, and that His Honor knows
beforehand who actually prepared the Subject Motion.
Nevertheless, she expressed willingness to apologize.
Judge: found Atty. Olivia guilty of contempt
Atty. Olivia: moved for reconsideration; she recounted that on
her way out of the house, her husband stopped her and made her
sign the pleading, without having been able to read it. Such
pleading turned out to be the July 2001 motion which Atty. Ellis

Jacoba drafted but could not sign because of suspension
from the practice of law.
Judge: directing Atty. Ellis to explain why he should not be held
in contempt.
Atty. Ellis: filed an Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition;
he denied that he typed or prepared the motion; against Atty.
Olivia’s statements implicating him, he invoked the marital
privilege rule.
HELD: The Court cannot easily let Jacoba off the hook.
Firstly, his Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition did not
contain a denial of his wife's account. Instead, Jacoba impliedly
admitted authorship of the motion by stating that he "trained his
guns and fired at the errors which he perceived and believed to be
gigantic and monumental."
The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be
waived by failure of the claimant to object timely to its
presentation or by any conduct that may be construed as
implied consent. This waiver applies to Jacoba who impliedly
admitted authorship of the July 2001 motion.
UNITED STATES VS
DALMACIO ANTIPOLO
Facts: Accused Dalmacio was charged with the murder of one
Fortunato Dinal. The trial court convicted him of homicide and from
that decision he has appealed.
In his appeal, accused contends that the trial judge erred in
refusing to permit Susan, the widow of the man whom
appellant allegedly murdered, to testify as a witness on behalf
of the defense concerning certain alleged dying declarations.
The witness was called to the stand and having stated that she is
the widow of the deceased, the Fiscal objected on the ground that:
unless it be with the consent of her husband, and as he is dead
and cannot grant that permission, it follows that this witness is
disqualified from testifying.
The counsel for accused insisted that the witness was competent,
arguing that the disqualification which the fiscal evidently had in
mind relates only to cases in which a husband or wife of one of
the parties to a proceeding is called to testify.
Trial Judge: sustained the Fiscal’s objection to testimony of
Susan.
HELD: The great object of the rule disqualifying a wife/husband
as a competent witness for/against the other….is to secure
domestic happiness by placing the protecting seal of the law upon
all confidential communications between husband and wife; and
whatever has come to the knowledge of either by means of the
hallowed confidence which that relation inspires, cannot be
afterwards divulged in testimony even through the other party be
no longer living.
This case does not fall with the text of the statute or the reason
upon which it is based. The purpose of the rule is to protect
accused persons against statements made in the confidence
engendered by the marital relation, and to relieve the husband or
wife to whom such confidential communications might have been
made from the obligation of revealing them to the prejudice of the
other spouse.
Obviously, when a person at the point of death as a result of
injuries he has suffered makes a statement regarding the
manner in which he received those injuries, the
communication so made is in no sense confidential. On the
contrary, such a communication is made for the express purpose
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that it may be communicated after the death of the declarant to
the authorities concerned in inquiring into the cause of his death.
Re: Meaning of “afterwards”
A husband cannot be examined for or against his wife without her
consent; nor a wife for or against her husband without his consent;
nor can either, during the marriage or afterwards, be, without the
consent of the other, examined as to any communication made by
one to the other during the marriage; but this exception does not
apply to a civil action or proceeding for a crime committed by one
against the other."
The only doubt which can arise from a reading of this provision
relates to the meaning of the words "during the marriage or
afterwards," and this doubt can arise only by a consideration of
this phrase separately from the rest of the paragraph. Construed
as a whole it is evident that it relates only to cases in which the
testimony of a spouse is offered for or against the other in a
proceeding to which the other is a party. The use of the word
"afterwards" in the phrase "during the marriage of afterwards" was
intended to cover cases in which a marriage has been dissolved
otherwise than by the death of one of the spouses — as, for
instance, by decree of annulment or divorce.
On grounds of public policy, the wife cannot testify against her
husband as to what came to her from him confidentially or by
reason of the marriage relation, but this rule does not apply to
a dying communication made by the husband to the wife on
the trial of the one who killed him. The declaration of the
deceased made in extremes in such cases is a thing to be proven,
and this proof may be made by any competent witness who heard
the statement. The wife may testify for the state in cases of this
character as to any other fact known to her.
Hence, a new trial is granted at which Susan’s testimony will be
admitted.
PEOPLE VS FAUSTO CARLOS
Facts: Fausto was alleged to have murdered Dr. Pablo, who
performed a surgical operation upon Fausto’s wife. Fausto’s wife
remained in the hospital but after being released, she had to go to
the clinic of Dr. Pablo for dressing the wounds caused by the
operation. According to Fausto, on one of the visits, Dr. Pablo sent
him out, and shortly after leaving the clinic, Dr. Pablo allegedly
outraged the wife.
Some months after, defendant received a letter from Dr. Pablo,
asking for settlement of the account for services rendered his wife.
Defendant went to the office of Dr. Pablo, and attacked the
deceased, stabbing him twice.
Defendant admits that he killed the deceased, but maintains
that he went to the office to protest against the amount being
charged, and that during the conversation, Dr. Pablo insulted him
with an allegedly threatening attitude.
The court below found that the crime was committed with
premeditation hence constituted murder, taking into consideration
a letter written to the defendant by his wife, seized by the
police in searching his effects on the day of his arrest.
The letter shows that the wife feared that Fausto contemplated
resorting to physical violence in dealing with the doctor.
Counsel for defendant argues that the letter was privileged
communication hence inadmissible.
HELD:
Where a privileged communication from one spouse to
another comes into the hands of a third party, whether legally

or not, without collusion and voluntary disclosure on the part of
either of the spouses, the privilege is thereby extinguished and
the communication, if otherwise competent, becomes
admissible.
HOWEVER, the letter in question was obtained through a search
for which no warrant appears to have been issued, hence
inadmissible.
RE: Hearsay
The letter was written by the wife of the defendant and if she had
testified at the trial the letter might have been admissible to
impeach her testimony, but she was not put on the witness-stand
and the letter was therefore not offered for the purpose. If the
defendant either by answer or otherwise had indicated his assent
to the statements contained in the letter it might also have been
admissible, but such is not the case here; the fact that he had the
letter in his possession is no indication of acquiescence or assent
on his part. The letter is therefore nothing but pure hearsay
and its admission in evidence violates the constitutional right of
the defendant in a criminal case to be confronted with the
witnesses for the prosecution and have the opportunity to cross-
examine them. In this respect there can be no difference between
an ordinary communication and one originally privileged.
The question is radically different from that of the admissibility of
testimony of a third party as to a conversation between a
husband and wife overheard by the witness. Testimony of that
character is admissible on the ground that it relates to a
conversation in which both spouses took part and on the further
ground that where the defendant has the opportunity to answer a
statement made to him by his spouse and fails to do so, his silence
implies assent. That cannot apply where the statement is
contained in an unanswered letter.
As we have already intimated, if the letter is excluded, there is in
our opinion not sufficient evidence in the record to show that the
crime was premeditated. Hence, simple homicide only.
B. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT
BLANDINA HILADO vs JOSE DAVID, VICENTE FRANCISCO
Facts: Petitioner filed a case against Selim Jacob to annul the
sale of several houses and lot during the Japanese occupation.
Atty. Francisco entered his appearance for Selim Jacob.
Subsequently, however, Atty. Francisco received a letter from
Atty. Dizon, urging him to discontinue representing Selim Jacob
on the ground that their (Atty Dizon and firm) client (Hilado) had
previously consulted him (Francisco) about her case, on which
occasion, Hilado turned over the papers to Francisco, and the
latter sent her a written opinion.
Having received no response, Atty. Dizon et al filed a motion to
disqualify Atty. Francisco.
JUDGE (Jose David): no information other than that already
alleged in plaintiff's complaint in the main cause was conveyed to
Atty. Francisco, and concluded that the intercourse between the
plaintiff and the respondent did not attain the point of creating
the relation of attorney and client.
HELD: It is undisputed that Atty. Francisco's law firm mailed to the
plaintiff a written opinion over his signature on the merits of
her case; that this opinion was reached on the basis of papers
she had submitted at his office; that Mrs. Hilado's purpose in
submitting those papers was to secure Attorney Francisco's
professional services. Granting the facts to be no more than these,
we agree with petitioner's counsel that the relation of attorney
and client between Attorney Francisco and Mrs. Hilado
ensued.
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To constitute professional employment, it is not essential that
the client should have employed the attorney professionally
on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer
should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it
material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake
the case about which the consultation was had.
If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any
kind, consults with his attorney in his professional capacity
with the view to obtaining professional advice or assistance,
and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such
consultation, then the professional employment must be
regarded as established.
S26R130: an attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be
examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or
his advice given thereon in the course of professional
employment.
The fact that only copies of pleadings already filed in court were
furnished to Atty. Francisco’s assistant, and that, this being so, no
secret communication was transmitted to him by the plaintiff,
would not vary the situation even if we should discard Mrs.
Hilado's statement that other papers, personal and private in
character, were turned in by her.
Mere relation of attorney and client ought to preclude the attorney
from accepting the opposite party's retainer in the same litigation
regardless of what information was received by him from his first
client.
Communications between attorney and client are, in a great
number of litigations, a complicated affair, consisting of
entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well known facts. In
the complexity of what is said in the course of the dealings
between an attorney and a client, inquiry of the nature
suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the
trial, of other matters that might only further prejudice the
complainant's cause. And the theory would be productive of
other unsalutary results.
Litigants would in consequence be wary in going to an attorney,
lest by an unfortunate turn of the proceeding, if an investigation be
held, the court should accept the attorney's inaccurate version of
the facts that came to him.
No progress could be hoped for in "the public policy that the client
in consulting his legal adviser ought to be free from
apprehension of disclosure of his confidence," if the
prohibition were not extended to the attorney's partners,
employers or assistants.
REGALA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
Petitioners ACCRA Lawyers contend that the attorney-client
privilege prohibits them from revealing the identity of their cleints.
PCGG: the revelation of the identity of the client is not within the
ambit of lawyer-client confidentiality privilege, nor are the
documents it required (deeds of assignment) protected, because
they are evidence of nominee status.
ISSUE: May a lawyer’s duty to invoke lawyer-client privilege
be asserted in refusing to disclose the name of petitioners’
clients? YES
HELD:
Among the rules regarding the creation of lawyer-client
relationship is the fiduciary duty to his client which is of a very
delicate, exacting and confidential character, requiring a very high
degree of fidelity and good faith, that is required by reason of
necessity and public interest based on the hypothesis that
abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause is an evil
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which is fatal to the administration of justice. If a client were made From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily
to choose between legal representation without effective deduce that the clients indeed consulted the petitioners, in their
communication and disclosure and legal representation with all his capacity as lawyers, regarding the nancial and corporate
secrets revealed then he might be compelled, in some structure, framework and set-up of the corporations in question. In
instances, to either opt to stay away from the judicial system turn, petitioners gave their professional advice in the form of,
or to lose the right to counsel. If the price of disclosure is too among others, the aforementioned deeds of assignment covering
high, or if it amounts to self-incrimination, then the ow of their client's shareholdings.
information would be curtailed thereby rendering the right
practically nugatory. Furthermore, the revelation of the identity would provide the link
necessary for prosecution to build its case.
Generally, as a matter of public policy, a client's identity should
not be shrouded in mystery. Hence, a lawyer may not invoke the RE: Important distinction between:
privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client.
Where a client takes on the Where a client thinks he
Reasons: services of an attorney, for might have previously
1) the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged illicit purposes, seeking committed something
information is sought to be protected is flesh and blood. advice about how to go illegal and consults his
2) the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client around the law for the attorney about it
relationship has been established. The attorney-client purpose of committing
privilege does not attach until there is a client illegal activities
3) the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the clearly does not fall within the falls within the exception
relationship. privilege because the same because whether or not the
4) due process considerations require that the opposing party cannot be invoked for act for which the client sought
should, as a general rule, know his adversary. purposes illegal. advice turns out to be illegal,
his name cannot be used or
Exceptions: disclosed if the disclosure
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists leads to evidence, not yet in
that revealing the client's name would implicate that client in the hands of the prosecution,
the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice. which might lead to possible
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his action against him.
identity is privileged. it is not within the Founded on the same policy
3) Where the government's lawyers have no case against an professional character of a grouds for which attorney
attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's name, the lawyer to give advice on the client privilege exists.
said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain commission of a crime.
of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the
client's name is privileged. Where the communicated information, which clearly falls within
the privilege, would suggest possible criminal activity but there
Apart from these principal exceptions, there exists other situations would be not much in the information known to the prosecution
which could qualify as exceptions to the general rule. For example, which would sustain a charge except that revealing the name of
the content of any client communication to a lawyer lies the client would open up other privileged information which would
within the privilege if it is relevant to the subject matter of the substantiate the prosecution's suspicions, then the client's
legal problem on which the client seeks legal assistance. identity is so inextricably linked to the subject matter itself
Moreover, where the nature of the attorney-client relationship that it falls within the protection.
has been previously disclosed and it is the identity which is
intended to be confidential, the identity of the client has been By compelling petitioners, not only to reveal the identity of their
held to be privileged, since such revelation would otherwise clients, but worse, to submit to the PCGG documents
result in disclosure of the entire transaction. substantiating the client-lawyer relationship, as well as deeds of
assignment petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering
Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the identity their respective shareholdings, the PCGG would exact from
of a client may fall within the ambit of the privilege when the petitioners a link, "that would inevitably form the chain of testimony
client's name itself has an independent significance, such that necessary to convict the (client) of a crime."
disclosure would then reveal client confidences.

The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the RAMON SAURA JR. vs ATTY AGDEPPA
case at bench, therefore, clearly reveal that the instant case falls
under at least two exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure
Facts:
of the alleged client's name would lead to establish said client's
Petitioners learned that the administrators of the property of their
connection with the very fact in issue of the case, which is
predecessors in interest had sold the property to Sandalwood
privileged information, because the privilege, as stated earlier,
Real Estate Corp, without petitioners’ knowledge. To
protects the subject matter or the substance.
compound matters, petitioners are asking from Sandalwood Corp,
or its counsel respondent herself, the disclosure of the amount of
The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal
the sale or account for the proceeds.
advice or legal service sought was duly established in the case
at bar, by no less than the PCGG itself. The key lies in the three
Not having heard from respondent, petitioners charged
specific conditions laid down by the PCGG which constitutes
respondent with violation of her lawyer’s oath, which arose from
petitioners' ticket to non-prosecution should they accede thereto: her handling of a settlement case.
1. Disclosure of clients’ identity
2. Submission of documents substantiating lawyer-client For respondent’s continuous refusal to the Court’s order to answer
relationship the charges, the Court penalized her with suspension for such
3. Submission of deeds of assignments petitioners administrative case.
executed in favor of their clients covering their
respective shareholdings.
RESP: MR; she could not answer the administrative charges
against her without divulging certain pieces of information in
violation of the attorney-client privilege.

HELD: The request for the information regarding the sale of
the property and to account for the proceeds is not a violation
of the attorney-client privilege.
The information requested by petitioners is not privileged. The
petitioners are only asking for the disclosure of the amount of the
sale or account for the proceeds. Petitioners certainly have the
right to ask for such information since they own the property
as co-heirs of the late Ramon E. Saura and as co-administrators
of the property. Hence, respondent cannot refuse to divulge such
information to them and hide behind the cloak of the attorney-
client relationship.
JOEL SANVICENTE VS PEOPLE
Facts:
Joel Sanvicente was charged with homicide for killing Dennis
Wong after the latter allegedly attempted to rob him of cash after
he had just withdrawn from the ATM.
The police found the body of Dennis Wong, and recovered the atm
card of Sanvicente, as well as the car of accused, taking custody
thereof.
Petitioner’s counsel, Atty Valmonte, sent a letter to P/Major Diaz
which letter (Exhibit LL) states that:
According to my client, Sanvicente, he just withdrew from the Far
East Bank and Trust Co., Katipunan branch a large amount of
cash. On his way out of the bank, said victim immediately attacked
him to grab the money. My said client pulled out his gun (duly
licensed with Permit to Carry) and fired a warning shot upwards.
Still the deceased continued his attack and grabbed his gun. After
a brief struggle, my client was forced to shoot the deceased.
xxx
For all intense (sic) & purposes, this letter shall serve as a
voluntary surrender, without admission of guilt on the part of my
client.
The prosecution filed its Formal Offer of Exhibits, including the
above-letter as EXHIBIT LL. After the admission of the exhibits,
petitioner filed a leave to file a demurrer, which was granted.
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proof of other facts, to prove
his guilt.
In short, in a confession, an accused acknowledges his guilt;
while there is no such acknowledgment of guilt in an
admission.
There is no question that the letter dated June 14, 1995 is an
admission, not a confession, because of the unmistakable
qualification in its last paragraph that — For all intents &
purposes, this letter shall serve as a voluntary surrender, without
admission of guilt on the part of my client.
With the foregoing distinctions in mind, the trial court correctly
rejected the prosecution's motion to have Exhibit LL further
identified "in the manner that it wanted," i.e., through the proposed
testimony of petitioner's counsel, Atty. Valmonte, who incidentally
refused to testify. Aside from covering a subject which
squarely falls within the scope of "privileged
communication," it would, more importantly, be tantamount
to converting the admission into a confession.
RE: Hearsay
The letter marked as Exhibit LL is hearsay inasmuch as its
probative force depends in whole or in part on the competency
and credibility of some person other than the witness by whom it
is sought to produce it.
The term as used in the law of evidence "signifies all evidence
which is not founded upon the personal knowledge of the
witness from whom it is elicited, and which consequently
does not depend wholly for its credibility and weight upon the
confidence which the court may have in him. Its value, if any,
is measured by the credit to be given to some third persons
not sworn as witnesses to that fact and consequently not
subject to cross- examination." In short,
it is "the evidence not of what the witness knows himself but of
what he has heard from others." Thus, in one case we stated that
when evidence is based on what was supposedly told the witness,
the same is without any evidentiary weight being patently
hearsay." In the case at bar, it is noteworthy that the statements
in the letter were made by petitioner's counsel, who even began
his narration of the events with the phrase: "According to my
client."

Hence, petitioner filed a M2Dismiss on the ground of lack of
positive identification of accused.
TC: dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence
PROSECUTION: MR; denied.
As has lengthily been discussed earlier, Exhibit LL is merely an
admission and not a confession. In fact, petitioner specifically
denied criminal intent therein. By and of itself it is insufficient to
support a conviction unless it is considered in connection with
other proof to establish the ultimate fact of guilt.

PROSEC: maintains that the letter constituted a confession and

that this EJ confession constitutes the strongest evidence of guilt.
HELD:
Confession
under Rule 130, Section 33 is
the declaration of an accused
acknowledging his guilt of the
offense charged or any
offense necessarily included
therein.
declaration made at any time
by a person, voluntarily and
without compulsion or
inducement stating or
acknowledging that he had
committed or participated in
the commission of a crime
acknowledgment in express
terms, by a party in a criminal
case, of his guilt of the crime
charged
Admission
under Rule 130, Section 26 of
the Rules of Court as the act,
declaration or omission of a
party as to a relevant fact
usually applied in criminal
cases to statements of fact by
the accused which do not
directly involve an
acknowledgment of the guilt
of the accused or of criminal
intent to commit the offense
with which he is charged
a statement by the accused,
direct or implied, of facts
pertinent to the issue, and
tending, in connection with
C. PERSON AUTHORIZED TO PRACTICE MEDICINE AND
PATIENT
CAROLINA ABAD GONZALES
vs CA, HONORIA EMPAYNADO
Facts: Petitioners are the sisters of Ricardo Abad, who is the
deceased herein. They sought the settlement of the intestate
estate of their brother, claiming that they were the only heirs of
the deceased.
Honoria Empaynado, on the other hand, alleges that she had
been the common-law wife of Ricardo for 27years, and their
union had produced two children.
PETS: presented the affidavit of Dr. Pedro Arenas, Ricardo
Abad’s physican, declaring that in 1935, he had examined Ricardo
Abad and found him to be infected with gonorrhea, and that the
latter had become sterile as a consequence thereof.
The affidavit of Arenas was objected to by private respondent,
being a privileged communication. Petitioners however, assert

that the findings as to Ricardo’s sterility does not blacken
his character.
ISSUE: Is Dr. Arenas admissible?
HELD: No.
The rule on confidential communications between physician and
patient requires that:
a. the action in which the advice or treatment given or any
information is to be used is a civil case;
b. the relation of physician and patient existed between the
person claiming the privilege or his legal representative
and the physician;
c. c) the advice or treatment given by him or any
information was acquired by the physician while
professionally attending the patient;
d. the information was necessary for the performance of his
professional duty; and
e. the disclosure of the information would tend to blacken
the reputation of the patient.
Petitioners conveniently forget that Ricardo Abad's "sterility" arose
when the latter contracted gonorrhea, a fact which most
assuredly blackens his reputation. In fact, given that society holds
virility at a premium, sterility alone, without the attendant
embarrassment of contracting a sexually-transmitted
disease, would be sufficient to blacken the reputation of any
patient. We thus hold the affidavit inadmissible in evidence. And
the same remains inadmissible in evidence, notwithstanding the
death of Ricardo Abad.
NELLY LIM vs
CA and HON. MANUEL VICTORIO and JUAN SIM
Facts: In a case for the annulment of marriage on the ground that
petitioner suffers from mental illness called “schizophrenia”,
private respondent presented, among others, Dr. Lydia
Acampado, who was a Doctor of Medicine. An application for the
issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum requiring Dr. Lydia to
testify was filed.
PET: opposed, the testimony sought to be elicited from the
witness is privileged since the latter had examined the petitioner
in a professional capacity and had diagnosed her to be suffering
from schizophrenia.
JUAN SIM: Dr. Acampado would be presented as an expert
witness and would not testify on any information acquired while
attending to the petitioner in a professional capacity.
HELD:
RE: ACTING IN A PROFESSIONAL CAPACITY: The physician
may be considered to be acting in his professional capacity when
he attends to the patient for curative, preventive, or palliative
treatment. Thus, only disclosures which would have been made
to the physician to enable him "safely and efficaciously to treat his
patient" are covered by the privilege. It is to be emphasized that
"it is the tenor only of the communication that is privileged.
The mere fact of making a communication, as well as the date of
a consultation and the number of consultations, are therefore not
privileged from disclosure, so long as the subject communicated
is not stated.
One who claims this privilege must prove the presence of these
aforementioned requisites.
Here, petitioner failed to discharge that burden.
In the first place, Dr. Acampado was presented and qualified as
an expert witness. She did not disclose anything obtained in the
course of her examination, interview and treatment of the
petitioner.
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Moreover, the facts and conditions alleged in the hypothetical
problem did not refer to and had no bearing on whatever
information or findings the doctor obtained while attending to the
patient. There is, as well, no showing that Dr. Acampado's
answers to the questions propounded to her relating to the
hypothetical problem were influenced by the information
obtained from the petitioner. Otherwise stated, her expert
opinion excluded whatever information or knowledge she had
about the petitioner which was acquired by reason of the
physician-patient relationship existing between them. As an expert
witness, her testimony before the trial court cannot then be
excluded.
Second, petitioner was never interviewed alone, but always in
the presence of a third party. The information elicited during
consultation with a physician in the presence of third parties
removes such information from the mantle of the privilege.
Third, nothing specific or concrete was offered to show that
indeed, the information obtained from Dr. Acampado would
blacken the former's "character" (or "reputation"). Dr. Acampado
never disclosed any information obtained from the petitioner
regarding the latter's ailment and the treatment recommended
therefor.
Lastly, the petitioner makes no claim in any of her pleadings that
her counsel had objected to any question asked of the witness on
the ground that it elicited an answer that would violate the
privilege, despite the trial court's advise that said counsel may
interpose his objection to the testimony "once it becomes apparent
that the testimony, sought to be elicited is covered by the
privileged communication rule."
JOSIELENE CHAN vs JOHNNY CHAN
Facts:
JOSIELENE: filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage to respondent Johnny, claiming that Johnny failed to
care for and support his family and that a psychiatrist diagnosed
him as mentally deficient due to incessant drinking and excessive
use of prohibited drugs.
JOHNNY: it was Josielene who failed in her wifely duties.
JOSIELENE: pre-marked the Philhealth Claim Form that Johnny
attached to his answer as proof that he was forcibly confined at
the rehabilitation unit of a hospital. The form carried a
physician's handwritten note that Johnny suffered from
"methamphetamine and alcohol abuse; subsequently, a
request for the issuance of a Subpoena Duces Tecum was filed,
addressed to Medical city, covering Johnny's medical records
when he was there confined.
JOHNNY: opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records
were covered by physician- patient privilege.
TC: denied Josielene’s motion
CA: prohibition covers not only testimonies, but also affidavits,
and hospital records.
JOSIELENE WITH SC: it is only the testimonial evidence of the
physician that may be regarded as privileged, not the hospital
records.
ISSUE: Did the lower court correctly deny the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum covering the hospital records on the
ground of physician-patient privilege?
HELD: YES.
The physician-patient privileged communication rule
essentially means that a physician who gets information while
professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil case be

examined without the patient's consent as to any facts which
would blacken the latter's reputation.
This rule is intended to encourage the patient to open up to the
physician, relate to him the history of his ailment, and give him
access to his body, enabling the physician to make a correct
diagnosis of that ailment and provide the appropriate cure. Any
fear that a physician could be compelled in the future to come to
court and narrate all that had transpired between him and the
patient might prompt the latter to clam up, thus putting his own
health at great risk.
WHEN TO OBJECT TO ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE: the time to
object to the admission of evidence, such as the hospital records,
would be at the time they are offered. The offer could be made
part of the physician's testimony or as independent evidence that
he had made entries in those records that concern the patient's
health problems.
RE: SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM OF JOSIELENE: possible to
treat Josielene's motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces
tecum covering the hospital records as a motion for production of
documents, a discovery procedure available to a litigant prior to
trial. However, the right to compel production of documents
has a limitation: documents to be disclosed must not be
privileged.
RE: HOSPITAL RECORDS: To allow the disclosure during
discovery procedure of the hospital records — the results of tests
that the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient's illness,
and the advice or treatment he gave him — would be to allow
access to evidence that is inadmissible without the patient's
consent. Physician memorializes all this information in the
patient's records. Disclosing them would be the equivalent of
compelling the physician to testify on privileged matters he gained
while dealing with the patient, without the latter's prior consent.
MA PAZ FERNANDEZ KROHN vs
CA and EDGAR KROHN
Facts: After Edgar and Ma. Paz separated in fact, Edgar was able
to secure a copy of the confidential psychiatric report on Ma. Paz
prepared and signed by Drs. Cornelio Banaag, Jr., and Baltazar
Reyes. Edgar filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage with
Ma. Paz before the trial court. In his petition, he cited the
Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report.
Edgar took the witness stand and tried to testify on the contents
of the report. This was objected to on the ground that it violated
the rule on privileged communication between physician and
patient.
Subsequently, Ma. Paz filed a Manifestation expressing her
"continuing objection" to any evidence, oral or documentary, "that
would thwart the physician-patient privileged communication rule,
TC: admitted the Confidential Psych Eval. Report.
With CA: PetCert.
CA: dismissed petition
PET with SC: since S24c, R130 prohibits a physician from
testifying on matters which he may have acquired in attending to
a patient in a professional capacity, "WITH MORE REASON
should a third person (like respondent-husband in this particular
instance) be PROHIBITED from testifying on privileged matters
between a physician and patient or from submitting any medical
report, findings or evaluation prepared by a physician which the
latter has acquired as a result of his confidential and privileged
relation with a patient.
RESP: the legal prohibition to testify is not applicable to the case
at bar where the person sought to be barred from testifying on the
privileged communication is the husband and not the physician of
the petitioner.
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HELD: The person against whom the privilege is claimed is not
one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery obstetrics. He is
simply the patient's husband who wishes to testify on a document
executed by medical practitioners. Plainly and clearly, this does
not fall within the claimed prohibition. Neither can his
testimony be considered a circumvention of the prohibition
because his testimony cannot have the force and effect of the
testimony of the physician who examined the patient and
executed the report.
D. MINISTER OR PRIEST AND PERSON MAKING THE
CONFESSION
E. PUBLIC OFFICER
F. OTHERS
NERI vs SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF
PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS
Facts: Respondent committees initiated an investigation by
sending invitations to certain personalities and cabinet officials
involved in the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project of the
National Government. Among those invited was petitioner, former
Director General of the National Economic and Development
Authority (NEDA). He was summoned to appear and testify.
He attended only the Sept 26 hearing, claiming he was “out of
town” during the other dates. During such hearing, petitioner
testified before respondent committees, and disclosed facts upon
question. He narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the
bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about
the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking
"executive privilege". In particular, he refused to answer the
questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN
Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
Unrelenting, respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad
Testificandum to petitioner, requiring him to appear and testify on
Nov 20. However, in a Letter, Executive Secretary Ermita
requested respondent Committees to dispense with
petitioner's testimony on the ground of executive privilege.
Petitioner submitted a letter prepared by his counsel, stating,
among others that: (1) his (petitioner) non-appearance was upon
the order of the President; and (2) his conversation with President
Arroyo dealt with delicate and sensitive national security and
diplomatic matters relating to the impact of the bribery scandal
involving high government officials and the possible loss of
confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines. The
letter ended with a reiteration of petitioner's request that he "be
furnished in advance" as to what else he needs to clarify so that
he may adequately prepare for the hearing.
ISSUE/S:
1. Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3)
questions covered by executive privilege?
The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
broad. The power extends even to executive officials and the only
way for them to be exempted is through a valid claim of executive
privilege. There are two kinds of executive privilege:
presidential communications privilege and deliberative
process privilege.
Presidential Deliberative Process
Communications Privilege Privilege
Communications, documents Advisory opinions,
or other materials that reflect recommendations and
presidential decision-making deliberations comprising part
and deliberations and that the of a process by which
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President believes should governmental decisions and
remain confidential. policies are formulated. Presidential communications privilege is presumptively privileged
Applies to decision-making of Applies to the decision- and that presumption can be overcome only by mere showing
the President making of executive officials of public need by the branch seeking access to
Rooted in the constitutional Rooted on common law conversations. The courts are enjoined to resolve the competing
principle of separation of privilege. interests of the political branches of the government "in the
power and the President's manner that preserves the essential functions of each Branch.
unique constitutional role;
the presidential Here, Exec. Sec. Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege
communications privilege on the ground that the communications elicited by the three (3)
applies to documents in their questions "fall under conversation and correspondence between
entirety, and covers final and the President and public officials" necessary in "her executive and
post-decisional materials as policy decision-making process" and, that "the information sought
well as pre-deliberative ones to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as
economic relations with the People's Republic of China." Simply
As a consequence, congressional or judicial negation of the put, the bases are presidential communications privilege and
presidential communications privilege is always subject to greater executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or
scrutiny than denial of the deliberative process privilege. foreign relations.

2. Who are the officials covered by the presidential
communications privilege?
The privilege is meant to encompass only those functions that
form the core of presidential authority, involving what the court
characterized as "quintessential and non-delegable
Presidential power", such as commander-in-chief power,
appointment and removal power, the power to grant pardons and
reprieves, the sole-authority to receive ambassadors and other
public officers, the power to negotiate treaties etc.
Applying the abovementioned elements to the case at bar:
1. Communication relates to the power of the President
here is the power to enter into exec agreements without
concurrence of Legislature
2. The communications are received by petitioner. He is
considered a close advisor, being a member of the
President’s cabinet.
3. No showing of compelling need to justify limitation of
privilege. No explanation from respondents to show
critical need for the answers.

Courts ruled early that the Executive has a right to withhold
documents that might reveal military or state secrets identity of
government informers in some circumstances, and information
related to pending investigations. An area where the privilege is
highly revered is in foreign relations.
There is a "governmental privilege against public disclosure
with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic
and other security matters." There is also a recognition of the
confidentiality of Presidential conversations, correspondences,
and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings.
Hence, the claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in
cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually
committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the
area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the
President is the repository of the commander-in- chief, appointing,
pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of
separation of powers, the information relating to these powers
may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
3. Respondents argue that a claim of executive privilege
does not guard against a possible disclosure of a crime
or wrongdoing.
It is settled in United States v. Nixon that "demonstrated, specific
need for evidence in pending criminal trial" outweighs the
President's "generalized interest in confidentiality." However,
different from the factual mileu of the Nixon case, the information
here is elicited, not in a criminal proceeding, but in a legislative
inquiry. The validity of the claim of executive privilege
depends not only on the ground invoked but, also, the
procedural setting or the context in which the claim is made.
4. Was the claim properly invoked by the President?
For the claim to be properly invoked, there must be a formal
claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department
which has control over the matter." A formal and proper claim
of executive privilege requires a "precise and certain reason"
for preserving their confidentiality.

ELEMENTS OF PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS The letter of Exec Sec Ermita satisfies the requirement. There he
PRIVILEGE: expressly states that "this Office is constrained to invoke the
settled doctrine of executive privilege…” A less categorical letter
1. The protected communication must relate to a was even adjudged to be sufficient.
quintessential and non- delegable presidential
power. With regard to the existence of "precise and certain reason", we
2. The communication must be authored or "solicited find the grounds relied upon by Executive Secretary Ermita
and received" by a close advisor of the President or specific enough so as not to leave respondent Committees in the
the President himself. The judicial test is that an dark on how the requested information could be classified as
advisor must be in "operational proximity" with the privileged. An allegation must be made "whether the information
President. demanded involves military or diplomatic secrets, closed-
3. The presidential communications privilege remains a door Cabinet meetings, etc." The particular ground must only be
qualified privilege that may be overcome by a specified. The enumeration is not even intended to be
showing of adequate need, such that the comprehensive.
information sought "likely contains important
evidence" and by the unavailability of the Here, given the confidential nature in which these information
information elsewhere by an appropriate were conveyed to the President, he cannot provide the Committee
investigating authority. any further details of these conversations, without disclosing the
very thing the privilege is designed to protect.

With regard to the third element: the claim of exec privilege is

subject to the balancing against other interest. Meaning,
confidentiality in exec privilege is not absolutely protected.

PNB VS GANCAYCO
Facts: Defendant Gancayco, as special prosecutors of the DOJ,
required the plaintiff Philippine National Bank to produce at a
hearing the records of the bank deposits of Ernesto T. Jimenez,
former administrator of the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative
Administration, who was then under investigation for unexplained
wealth. In declining to reveal its records, the plaintiff bank invoked
RA. 1405, which provides:
All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking
institutions may not be examined, inquired or looked into by
any person, government official, bureau or office, except
upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of
impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases
of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases
where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter
of the litigation.
Defendants on the other hand cited the Anti Graft Law in support
of their claim of authority and demanded anew that plaintiff
Eduardo Z. Romualdez, as bank president, produce the records
or he would be prosecuted for contempt:
Sec. 8: If a pub official has been found to have acquired an
amount manifestly out of proportion to his salary……xxxx
Bank deposits shall be taken into consideration in the
enforcement of this section, notwithstanding any provision of
law to the contrary.
TC: rendered judgment sustaining the power of defendants to
compel disclosure of bank accounts of Jimenez, ruling that
Congress clearly intended to provide an additional ground for the
examination of bank deposits.
PETS with the SC: section 8 of the Anti-Graft Law "simply means
that such bank deposits may be included or added to the assets
of the Government official or employee for the purpose of
computing his unexplained wealth
Issue: Can a bank be compelled to disclose the records of
accounts of a depositor who is under investigation for
unexplained wealth?
HELD: While Republic Act No. 1405 provides that bank deposits
are absolutely confidential hence may not be examined, inquired
or looked into, except in those cases enumerated therein, the
Anti-Graft Law directs in mandatory terms that bank deposits
"shall be taken into consideration in the enforcement of this
section, notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary."
The only conclusion possible is that section 8 of the Anti-
Graft Law is intended to amend section 2 of Republic Act No.
1405 by providing an additional exception to the rule against
the disclosure of bank deposits.
With regard to the claim that disclosure would be contrary to the
policy making bank deposits confidential, it is enough to point out
that while Sec. 2 of Republic Act No. 1405 declares bank deposits
to be "absolutely confidential" it nevertheless allows such
disclosure in the following instances:
1. Upon written permission of the depositor;
2. In cases of impeachment;
3. Upon order of a competent court in cases of
bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials;
4. In cases where the money deposited is the subject
of litigation.
Cases of unexplained wealth are similar to cases of bribery or
dereliction of duty and no reason is seen why these two
classes of cases cannot be excepted from the rule making bank
deposits confidential. The policy as to one cannot be different from
the policy as to the other. This policy expresses the notion that a
public office is a public trust and any person who enters upon its
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discharge does so with the full knowledge that his life, so far as
relevant to his duty, is open to public scrutiny.
BANCO FILIPINO VS PURISIMA
Facts: Manuel Caturla was a Customs special agent, accused for
violation of the anti-graft law. The tanodbayan issued a subpoena
duces tecum to the petitioner bank, commanding its
representative to furnish the Tanodbayad with certified copies of
the records appearing in Caturla’s name, his wife and their
children.
Caturla moved to quash the subpoena duces tecum, 5 arguing
that compliance therewith would result in a violation of Sections 2
and 3 of the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits.
Issue: Does the "Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits” preclude
production by subpoena duces tecum of bank records of
transactions by or in the names of the wife, children and friends of
a special agent of the Bureau of Customs, accused before the
Tanodbayan of having allegedly acquired property manifestly out
of proportion to his salary and other lawful income, in violation of
the Anti Graft law?
HELD: The inquiry into illegally acquired property — or property
NOT "legitimately acquired" — extends to cases where such
property is concealed by being held by or recorded in the
name of other persons.
This proposition is made clear by R.A. No. 3019 which quite
categorically states that the term, "legitimately acquired
property of a public officer or employee shall not include
property unlawfully acquired by the respondent, but its
ownership is concealed by its being recorded in the name of,
or held by, respondent's spouse, ascendants, descendants,
relatives or any other persons."
To sustain the petitioner's theory, and restrict the inquiry only
to property held by or in the name of the government official or
employee, or his spouse and unmarried children is unwarranted
in the light of the provisions of the statutes in question, and would
make available to persons in government who illegally
acquire property an easy and fool-proof means of evading
investigation and prosecution; all they would have to do would
be to simply place the property in the possession or name of
persons other than their spouse and unmarried children. This is
an absurdity that we will not ascribe to the lawmakers.
PEOPLE VS ESTRADA
Facts: An information for illegal use of alias was filed against
Estada, in that he unlawfully represented himself as 'JOSE
VELARDE' IN SEVERAL TRANSACTIONS AND use and employ
the SAID alias "Jose Velarde" which IS neither his registered
name.
The testimonies of PCIB Officers Ocampo and Curato, (both
commonly declared that Estrada opened a trust account and
signed as Jose Velarde) were presented by petitioner.
Estrada filed a Demurrers to Evidence, based on the ground that
there is no proof of public and habitual use of alias as the
documents offered by the prosecution are banking
documents which, by their nature, are confidential and cannot
be revealed without following proper procedures.
Sandiganbayan: the opening of a numbered trust account made
before the officers is protected by the secrecy provisions of
RA1405.
Petitioner claims that: R.A. No. 1405 does not apply to trust
transactions, such as Trust Account No. C-163, as it applies only

to traditional deposits (simple loans). A trust account, according to
the People, may not be considered a deposit because it does not
create the juridical relation of creditor and debtor.
Issue: Are trust accounts covered under RA1405?
HELD: Yes.
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PET: the CA cannot use the parties' actions and/or
agreements during the negotiation for a compromise
agreement as basis for the conclusion that the respondent
was illegally dismissed because an offer of compromise is
not admissible in evidence under Section 27, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.

The nature of the transaction on which the indictment rests,
affords Estrada a reasonable expectation of privacy, as the
alleged criminal act related to the opening of a trust account
— a transaction that R.A. No. 1405 considers absolutely
confidential in nature.
The contention that trust accounts are not covered by the term
"deposits", as used in R.A. 1405, by the mere fact that they do not
entail a creditor-debtor relationship between the trustor and the
bank, does not lie. The contention that trust accounts are not
covered by the term "deposits", as used in R.A. 1405, by the mere
fact that they do not entail a creditor-debtor relationship between
the trustor and the bank, does not lie.
If the money deposited under an account may be used by bank
for authorized loans to third persons, then such account,
regardless of whether it creates a creditor-debtor relationship
between the depositor and the bank, falls under the category of
accounts which the law precisely seeks to protect for the
purpose of boosting the economic development of the
country.
Bank deposits under R.A. No. 1405 (the Secrecy of Bank Deposits
Law) are statutorily protected or recognized zones of privacy.
Given the private nature of Estrada's act of signing the
documents as "Jose Velarde" related to the opening of the
trust account, the People cannot claim that there was already a
public use of alias when Ocampo and Curato witnessed the
signing. What is essentially significant is the privacy situation that
is necessarily implied in these kinds of transactions.
This statutorily guaranteed privacy and secrecy effectively negate
a conclusion that the transaction was done publicly or with the
intent to use the alias publicly.
PENTAGON VS CA
Facts: The petitioner alleged that the respondent absented
himself from work on August 7, 2002 without giving prior notice of
his absence. As a result, the petitioner sent him a letter by
registered mail requiring an explanation for his absence. Having
failed to respond to demands for an explanation, petitioner was
considered AWOL.
Issue: May the statements made at conciliation proceedings be
used as evidence?
HELD: NO.
Article 233 of the Labor Code states that "information and
statements made at conciliation proceedings shall be treated as
privileged communication and shall not be used as evidence in
the Commission. Conciliators and similar officials shall not testify
in any court or body regarding any matters taken up at conciliation
proceedings conducted by them."
Here, the CA did indeed consider the statements the parties made
during conciliation; thus, the CA erred by considering excluded
materials in arriving at its conclusion. The reasons behind the
exclusion are two-fold:
First, since the law favors the settlement of controversies out of
court, a person is entitled to "buy his or her peace" without danger
of being prejudiced in case his or her efforts fail; hence, any
communication made toward that end will be regarded as
privileged. Indeed, if every offer to buy peace could be used as
evidence against a person who presents it, many settlements
would be prevented and unnecessary litigation would result,
since no prudent person would dare offer or entertain a
compromise if his or her compromise position could be exploited
as a confession of weakness.
Second, offers for compromise are irrelevant because they are
not intended as admissions by the parties making them. A true
offer of compromise does not, in legal contemplation, involve an
admission on the part of a defendant that he or she is legally
liable, or on the part of a plaintiff, that his or her claim is
groundless or even doubtful, since it is made with a view to
avoid controversy and save the expense of litigation. It is the
distinguishing mark of an offer of compromise that it is made
tentatively, hypothetically, and in contemplation of mutual
concessions.

Subsequently, respondent led a complaint with the Arbitration

Branch of the NLRC for underpayment/nonpayment of salaries
and wages.

During the conciliation, the respondent presented the medical

certificate covering his period of absence. The petitioner required
him, however, to submit himself to the company physician to
determine whether he was fit to return to work in accordance with
existing policies. On October 22, 2002, still during the
conciliation proceedings, the respondent presented a
medical certificate issued by the company physician;
according to the petitioner, the respondent refused to return to
work and insisted that he be paid his separation pay. The
petitioner refused the respondent's demand for separation pay for
lack of basis.

Labor Arbiter: ruled in favor of petitioner.

NLRC: in favor of respondent, vacating Arbiter decision.
CA: affirmed NLRC’s finding that dismissal was illegal; CA took
note of the respondent’s eagerness to return to work when he
obtained a note from his doctor about his fitness to return for work.

SEC 25. PARENTAL FILIAL PRIVILEGE
PEOPLE VS ARTEMIO INVENCION y SORIANO
Facts: Accused was charged for the crime of qualified rape
against his daughter Cynthia. One of the prosecution witnessesqz
aqz a presented was Elven
Invencion, who is the half brother of Cynthia, and son of
accused with his second common law wife.
Accused attacks the competency and credibility of Elven as a
witness, arguing that the latter as his son should have been
disqualified as a witness against him.
Issue: Is Elven competent to testify?
HELD: Yes.
As to the competency of Elven to testify, we rule that such is not
affected by Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, otherwise
known as the rule on "filial privilege."
This rule is not strictly a rule on disqualification because a
descendant is not incompetent or disqualified to testify
against an ascendant. The rule refers to a privilege not to testify,
which can be invoked or waived like other privileges.
As correctly observed by the lower court, Elven was not compelled
to testify against his father; he chose to waive that filial privilege
when he voluntarily testified against Artemio. Elven declared
that he was testifying as a witness against his father of his own
accord and only "to tell the truth.”
EMMA LEE vs CA, Rita Lee et al.
Facts: Sps. Lee had 11 children, as represented by respondent
herein. The housemaid of Sps. Lee, a woman named Tiu Chan,
was alleged to have a relation with Lee Tek Sheng. In the
investigation they sought to be conducted, it was found that one
Emma Lee’s birth certificate bore the surname “Keh”, which
respondents sought to have removed, and replaced with Tiu.
Hence, the respondents filed with the RTC a request for the
issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to compel Tiu, Emma
Lee’s presumed mother, to testify in the case.
Tiu moved to quash the subpoena, claiming that it violates
the rule on Parental Privilege, she being Emma Lee’s
STEPmother.
Issue: May Tiu be compelled to testify in the correction of entry
case involving the certificate of birth of Emma Lee?
HELD: Yes.
The parental and filial privilege under S25 of R130 extends to all
kinds of actions, whether civil, criminal or administrative, filed
against parents and other direct descendants or ascendants.
But here, Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the
stepmother of petitioner Emma Lee. The privilege cannot apply
to them because the rule applies only to "direct" ascendants
and descendants, a family tie connected by a common
ancestry. A stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her
stepmother. Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify
against petitioner Emma Lee.
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SEC 26. ADMISSIONS OF A PARTY
JOEL SANVICENTE vs PEOPLE
See: Page 44 on
Whether or not the Letter of Atty. Valmonte constitutes an
admission or a confession on the part of his client.
PEOPLE vs DOLORES LORENZO y CORSINO
Facts: For having killed her husband, accused policewoman was
charged with parricide. The prosecution presented as witness
barangay captain Liban and SPO1 Eclipse as witness.
SPO1 Eclipse: while on his way to the crime scene, he met
accused who immediately surrendered to him the bolo and told
him “I killed my husband”. When SPO1 Eclipse called for
Barangay Capt. Liban, in the presence of the two, accused
repeated the statement “I’m surrendering because I killed my
husband”. SPO1 Eclipse turned over accused to the Desk
Officer. Eclipse orally made his report to the Desk Officer which
was noted down in the Police Blotter.
ACCUSED: there was a quarrel between her deceased husband
and one named Robert Santos. Accused was allegedly
overwhelmed by nervousness that she collapsed, and when she
regained her consciousness, she found herself beside her
dying husband. She stood and picked the knife, and it was at this
precise time when Eclipse arrived at the scene of the incident.
Accused gave the knife to Eclipse, and the latter invited her to the
police station. When they arrived, Eclipse reported, in her
presence, that the accused killed her husband, but accused did
not say anything, since she had not yet regained her composure.
TC: when appellant surrendered the knife and bolo to SPO1
Eclipse and volunteered the information that she killed her
husband, she made an extrajudicial confession and nothing
more was needed to prove her culpability. Also, the story of
accused is a palpably put-up scenario, because:
1. If denial of accused (of fact that she confessed to
Policeman) is true, why did she not correct or even
protest when Eclipse reported to the desk officer that
she confessed?
2. If it was really Robert Santos who stabbed her
husband, why did she not tell it to the Policeman at the
scene of the crime? Why did she withhold such info?
Accused contends that she did not file a case against
Robert because she found herself to be the suspect
and later on the accused. No one with ordinary
intelligence would buy such reasons.
3. Accused never filed a counter-affidavit, which could
have been the best opportunity for her to explain her
innocence.
On appeal, accused contends that the testimonies of Liban and
Eclipse were inconsistent and that it is required that Liban’s
testimony must corroborate Eclipse’s testimony or the
confession of the accused, since without such corroboration,
Eclipse’s testimony would have no probative value.
Issue: Whether or not accused’s declaration is a confession or
admission.
HELD: The court does not agree with the trial court’s
characterization of the appellant’s declaration (that she killed her
husband) as an extrajudicial confession. It is only an admission.
It is clear from S26 and 33 of R130 that there is a distinction
between admission and confession. In a confession, there is an
acknowledgment of guilt. Admission is usually applied in criminal
cases to statements of fact by the accused which do not directly
involve an acknowledgment of guilt of the accused or of the
criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is charged.

NEVERTHELESS, whether it was a confession or an admission,
it was admissible against the appellant and, having been duly
proved, together with the other facts and circumstances, the
burden of the evidence was shifted to the appellant to
disprove, by strong evidence, that she made the admission or,
admitting it, to prove that she was not guilty of killing her husband.
The trial court characterized her story as "palpably a put-up
scenario”. A story which runs against the grain of ordinary reality,
controverts logic and assails common sense." The reasons
enumerated by the trial court to support this conclusion are
founded on or are inferred from facts duly established by the
prosecution or are otherwise solidly based on common
experience, logic, and common sense.
Re: Credibility of Witnesses: There is nothing in the records, and
more specifically in the cross-examination of Eclipse and the direct
examination of the appellant, which suggests, even remotely, that
Eclipse had any improper motive to implicate a fellow police officer
in the commission of a serious crime or the slightest bias against
the appellant which would blemish his objectivity and truthfulness.
RE: On accused’s contention that Liban’s testimony must
corroborate Eclipse’s testimony or the confession of
accused.
Accused’s theory is a product of a misunderstanding of S3R133.
Note that under S3R133, what must be corroborated is the
extrajudicial confession and not the testimony of the person to
whom the confession is made, and the corroborative evidence
required is not the testimony of another person who heard the
confession but the evidence of corpus delicti.
Except when expressly required by law, the testimony of a
single person, if credible and positive and if it satisfies the court
as to the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, is
sufficient to convict. In determining the value and credibility of
evidence, witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered.
As to the corroborative evidence of corpus delicti, the appellant
herself does not question its presence because she knows that it
has been overwhelmingly established in this case. Corpus delicti
is the body (material substance) upon which a crime has been
committed. In a derivative sense, it means the substantial fact
that a crime was committed. It is made up of two elements:
a. that a certain result has been proved, for example a
man has died or a building has been burned, and
b. that some person is criminally responsible for the act
Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court does not mean that
every element of the crime charged must be clearly established
by independent evidence apart from the confession. It means
merely that there should be some evidence tending to show
the commission of the crime apart from the confession.
Otherwise, the utility of the confession as a species of proof
would vanish if it were necessary, in addition to the confession,
to adduce other evidence sufficient to justify conviction
independently of such confession. Otherwise stated, the other
evidence need not, independently of the confession, establish the
corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt.
ESTRADA vs DESIERTO
(Doctrine of Adoptive Admission; Hearsay Rule,
Independently Relevant Statements, Res Inter Alios Acta)
Facts: In determining the state of mind of the petitioner during the
process of his resignation from the Presidential position, the Court
took note of the contents of the Angara Diary.
Petitioner urges that the use of the Angara Diary violates the Rules
on Evidence: 1) Hearsay; 2) Res Inter Alios Acta.
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HELD:
ON HEARSAY EVIDENCE
The Angara diary is not an out of court statement. The Angara
Diary is part of the pleadings in the cases at bar. Petitioner cannot
complain he was not furnished a copy of the Angara Diary. Nor
can he feign surprise on its use. To be sure, the said Diary was
frequently referred to by the parties in their pleadings. In fact,
petitioner even cited in his Second Supplemental Reply
Memorandum both the second part of the diary, published on
February 5, 2001, and the third part, published on February 6,
2001.
Even assuming arguendo that the Angara Diary was an out of
court statement, still its use is not covered by the hearsay rule.
Evidence is called hearsay when its probative force depends,
in whole or in part, on the competency and credibility of some
persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to
produce it. There are three reasons for excluding hearsay
evidence:
1. absence of cross examination;
2. absence of demeanor evidence, and
3. absence of the oath.
Not at all hearsay evidence, however, is inadmissible as evidence.
Over the years, a huge body of hearsay evidence has been
admitted by courts due to their relevance, trustworthiness
and necessity.
A complete analysis of any hearsay problem requires that we
further determine whether the hearsay evidence is one exempted
from the rules of exclusion. A more circumspect examination of
our rules of exclusion will show that they do not cover
admissions of a party and the Angara Diary belongs to this class.
S26R130 provides that the act, declaration or omission of a party
as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. It has
long been settled that these admissions are admissible even
if they are hearsay.
A party’s declaration has a special value when offered
against such party. In that circumstance, the admission
discredits the party’s statement with the present claim
asserted in pleadings and testimony. Moreover, he continued,
admissions pass the gauntlet of the hearsay rule, which
requires that extrajudicial assertions be excluded if there was
no opportunity for the opponent to cross-examine because it
is the opponents own declaration, and he does not need to
cross examine himself. A party can hardly object that he had no
opportunity to cross-examine himself or that he is unworthy of
credence save when speaking under sanction of an oath
The Angara Diary contains direct statements of petitioner
which can be categorized as admissions of a party: his
proposal for a snap election, his statement that he would leave by
Monday and saying “pagod na pagod na ako, ayoko na, masyado
nang masakit”, and that “I just want to clear my name then I will
go.”
Also, notwithstanding the fact that the Angara Diary is not the
diary of the petitioner, such admissions contained therein are
binding upon him under the Doctrine of Adoptive Admission.
Adoptive Admission is a party’s reaction to a statement or action
by another person when it is reasonable to treat the party’s
reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the
other person. The basis for admissibility of admissions made
vicariously is that arising from the ratification or adoption by the
party of the statements which the other person had made.
INDEPENDENTLY RELEVANT STATEMENTS
The ban on hearsay evidence does not cover independently
relevant statements. These are statements which are relevant

independently of whether they are true or not. They belong to
two (2) classes:
1) those statements which are the very facts in issue, and
2) those statements which are circumstantial evidence of
the facts in issue. The second class includes the
following:
a. Statement of a person showing his state of
mind, that is, his mental condition, knowledge,
belief, intention, ill will and other emotions;
b. Statements of a person which show his
physical condition, as illness and the like;
c. Statements of a person from which an
inference may be made as to the state of mind
of another, that is, the knowledge, belief, motive,
good or bad faith, etc. of the latter;
d. Statements which may identify the date, place
and person in question; and
e. Statements showing the lack of credibility of a
witness.
These independently relevant statements are not covered by the
prohibition against hearsay evidence. These are common issues,
forming a general class, in proof of which hearsay is so
obviously necessary that it is not customary to refer to its
admissibility as by virtue of any exception to the general
exclusionary rule. They become admissible of necessity.
The Angara Diary contains statements which reflect petitioner’s
state of mind and are circumstantial evidence of his intent to
resign.
ON VIOLATION OF RES INTER ALIOS ACTA RULE
Such rule has several exceptions, one of which is admissions by
a co-partner or agent.
Executive Secretary Angara as such was an alter ego of the
petitioner. He was the Little President. Indeed, he was authorized
by the petitioner to act for him in the critical hours and days
before he abandoned Malacanang Palace. The diary shows that
petitioner was always briefed by Secretary Angara on the progress
of their negotiations. Secretary Angara acted for and in behalf
of the petitioner in the crucial days before respondent Arroyo
took her oath as President. Consequently, petitioner is bound
by the acts and declarations of Secretary Angara. Under the
rules, the admissions of an agent are binding on the principal
(petitioner).
ON BEST EVIDENCE RULE
True, the Court relied only upon the copy of the Angara Diary as
published in the Phil. Daily Inquirer. However, production of the
original may be dispensed with whenever the opponent does not
bona fide dispute the contents of the document, and no other
useful purpose will be served by requiring production.
PEOPLE vs LARRY CARITATIVO
(there was a dance; two men sleeping in the
jeepney were stabbed)
Facts: Appellant was charged for the murder of Mariano. The
prosecution presented as witness, among others, Catalino
Gonzales and Expedito Prado.
According to Catalino, while in the occasion of the dance, Larry
whispered to him that he was going to stab somebody. Moments
thereafter, a commotion arose, two persons having been stabbed.
Catalino thereafter went home. And while walking home, Catalino
came across Larry, who told him that he was the one who
stabbed the victims. Catalino testified that Larry’s clothes had
blood.
According to Expedito, he saw appellant stab the two persons
sleeping inside the jeepney.
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TC: gave credence to the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses.
On appeal, Catalino was not a credible witness, since his
testimony did not conform to the post-mortem exam.
HELD: No basis to doubt the testimony of Catalino Gonzales.
Catalino testified categorically and candidly that appellant
confessed to him that he killed deceased. Nowhere in the
records of the case did appellant categorically deny his admission
of guilt to Catalino Gonzales.
Accordingly, the admission by the accused expressly
acknowledging his guilt to Catalino Gonzales, a private party, can
very well be taken in evidence against him.
Of course, appellant attempts to discredit Catalino's credibility by
saying that Catalino's testimony did not conform to the post-
mortem examination result. Such argument is misplaced.
Catalino only testified on the substance of what the appellant
told him. And it was not improbable that the appellant himself was
mistaken as to where he stabbed the victim. What was of critical
importance in Catalino's testimony was appellant's admission
of guilt to him. All this the appellant failed to controvert. He never
denied his admission of guilt to Catalino.
It is imperative for the accused to disprove the extrajudicial
admission. This admission can be received against the
accused since it is not within the purview of the hearsay rule.
Thus, the trial court correctly admitted in evidence the testimony
of Catalino Gonzales regarding the admission of guilt by the
appellant.
Thus, the trial court correctly admitted in evidence the testimony
of Catalino Gonzales regarding the admission of guilt by the
appellant. But appellant's admission, standing alone, is not
sufficient to convict him. Being merely an inference,
appellant's admission must be supported by some other
proof which shows his culpability for the crime charged.
This is where Expedito’s testimony assumes great importance.
The eyewitness testified clearly, candidly and categorically that
he saw appellant kill the victims.
No evidence of ill will on the part of Expedito having been
presented, his positive identification, together with the statement
of Catalino regarding appellant’s admission of guilt, his conviction
is affirmed.
ESTRELLA (owner of power wagon) VS CA
Facts: An old woman was run over by a power wagon driven by
Rodolfo Arcalas. An investigation was conducted, and Arcalas
declared in a sworn statement that it was the power wagon
he was operating which, while backing up, had run over
Mauricia Baraceros; that the wagon belonged to the spouses
Conrado Estrella and Sergia Bautista Estrella; and that he was
said spouses' driver.
In their answer, petitioners alleged that Arcalas has always driven
in a careful and prudent manner.
On appeal, the Estrellas, and Arcalas submit that it was error to
use Arcalas’ sworn statement before the police as evidence, it
being hearsay; and to have adjudged the Sps. liable despite the
absence of proof of their ownership of the vehicle, and the
employment relation between them and Arcalas.
HELD: Arcalas' statement to the police in which he declared that
while he was driving a vehicle owned by the spouses Estrella,
he had "run over an old woman," constitutes competent proof.
It is an extrajudicial admission, admissible pursuant to the well-
known rule that the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a

relevant fact may be received in evidence against him. It is
properly receivable as proof against the declarant, it being
contrary to the position taken by him in the action.
In the answer filed in behalf of the declarant, Arcalas denied the
allegation in the complaint that the wagon being driven by him ran
over the deceased. Such denial is inconsistent with Arcalas’ sworn
written declaration that he had indeed been operating the wagon
and had run over an old woman. It is precisely the factor of
inconsistency between that declaration and the allegations in
the pleading subsequently filed by him, concerning relevant
facts, that makes the former admissible in evidence against
the declarant.
The hearsay rule has no application to the situation. The
extrajudicial declaration is not excludible on the ground of hearsay
— which proscribes evidence as to which opportunity to cross-
examine is not provided to the party against whom it is adduced
at the time of presentation — since the declarant can hardly
complain of not having the opportunity to cross-examine himself
at the time that his prior statement is submitted as proof against
him.
On the absence of proof that the wagon was theirs and that
Arcalas is their employee, such does not carry weight. The answer
of petitioners contains an implicit albeit unmistakable
acknowledgement of both these facts.
KUE CUISON VS CA & Valiant Inc.
Facts: Checks were given to Lilian Tan pursuant to the orders of
Tiu Huy Tiac, who was employed by petitioner Cuison. Tiac in turn
paid for merchandise issuing PDCs. However, the PDCs were
dishonored. Priv respondent made several demands upon
Cuison, claiming that Tiac was duly authorized by petitioner
as Manager to enter into the questioned transactions.
TC: ordered Kue Cuison to pay respondent the amount involved
in the transactions entered into by Tiac.
PET: court erred in finfing Tiac as his agent.
Villanueva, respondent’s manager, testified that petitioner
introduced Tiac as manager of his store.
Issue: Whether or not Tiac possessed the required authority from
Cuison sufficient to hold the latter liable for the transaction.
HELD:
ON ADMISSION
One who clothes another with apparent authority as his agent and
holds him out to the public as such cannot be permitted to deny
the authority of such person to act as his agent, to the
prejudice of innocent third parties dealing with such person in
good faith and in the honest belief that he is what he appears to
be.
By his own acts and admission, petitioner held out Tiac to the
public as the manager of his store. Petitioner explicitly introduced
Tiac to respondent's manager, as his (petitioner's) branch
manager as testified to by Bernardino Villanueva. This general
perception of Tiac as the manager of petitioner's Sto. Cristo store
is even made manifest by the fact that Tiac is known in the
community to be the "kinakapatid" (godbrother) of petitioner.
There was no reason for anybody transacting business with
petitioner to even doubt the authority of Tiac as his manager
in the Sto. Cristo Branch.
Also, petitioner’s admission in the witness stand that Tiac
takes charge of the management of his store is sufficient to
negate all the denials made by petitioner regarding the
capacity of Tiac to enter into the transaction in question.
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Petitioner’s holding out to the public of Tiac is his manager, taken
together with the declaration of petitioner in open court amount to
admissions.
ON ADMISSION BY SILENCE
Moreover, petitioner's unexplained delay in disowning the
transactions entered into by Tiu Huy Tiac despite several attempts
made by respondent to collect the amount from him, proved all the
more that petitioner was aware of the questioned transactions.
Such omission was tantamount to an admission by silence.
Tiu Huy Tiac, therefore, by petitioner's own representations
and manifestations, became an agent of petitioner by
estoppel. Under the doctrine of estoppel, an admission or
representation is rendered conclusive upon the person
making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the
person relying thereon. Taken in this light, petitioner is liable for
the transaction entered into by Tiu Huy Tiac on his behalf. Thus,
even when the agent has exceeded his authority, the principal is
solidarily liable with the agent if the former allowed the latter to act
as though he had full powers.
PEOPLE VS LICAYAN y SUCANO
Facts: When Rowena was missing, a posse looked for her, and
while searching, they spotted accused when they trained a
flashlight to him. Accused ran towards the ricefield and the posse
chased him, but failed to catch him. Accused also allegedly came
across Jun-jun, and told him the location of the body of Rowen,
who, in turn, told the searchers. (During the trial, accused escaped
detention).
TC: convicted; since accused at large, warrant of arrest is issued.
On automatic review, accused contends that TC erred in
convicting him despite insufficiency of evidence. Accused insists
that assuming he was the one seen by the posse, he was not
committing any wrong by running away. Also, accused
contends that the statement made by Jun-Jun as to the location
of the victim’s body is hearsay.
HELD:
ON RUNNING AWAY: FLIGHT
Accused-appellant's argument that he did not commit any wrong
in running away upon being espied by the search party deserves
scant consideration. Courts go by the biblical truism that "the
wicked flee when no man pursueth but the righteous are as
bold as a lion." Accused-appellant has not satisfactorily
explained why he fled upon being spotted by the posse.
The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact
may be given in evidence against him. One type of act that can
be given in evidence against him is flight.
In criminal law, flight means an act of evading the course of
justice by voluntarily withdrawing oneself to avoid arrest or
detention or the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings.
The unexplained flight of the accused person may as a
general rule be taken as evidence having tendency to
establish his guilt." In short, flight is an indication of guilt. What
makes flight particularly damaging for accused-appellant is
that he fled twice, i.e., first, upon being spotted by the search
party and second, by scaling the perimeter fence of the Provincial
Jail while he was in the custody of the law and undergoing trial.
ON HEARSAY
As to the fact that the statement made by Jun-jun is hearsay,
this contention is erroneous. Any oral or documentary
evidence is hearsay by nature if its probative value is not
based on the personal knowledge of the witnesses but on the
knowledge of some other person who was never presented on the
witness stand, because it is the opportunity to cross-examine

which negates the claim that the matters testified to by a witness
are hearsay. Here, Jun-jun testified that the accused indeed
told him where the victim’s body can be found, and the
victim’s body was actually recovered at such place.
ON ADMISSION
Accused objection to the admissibility of the statement as to
where accused dumped the body which allegedly partakes of an
extra-judicial confession, is just as tenuous. Such is not an extra-
judicial confession, but an extrajudicial admission. Jun-jun
was neither a law enforcement nor a public officer conducting
custodial interrogation of accused. He was merely a jeepney
driver who asked the whereabouts of the missing child. There was
no showing that Junjun colluded with police authorities.
Constitutional procedure on custodial investigation do not apply
to a spontaneous statement not elicited through questioning by
the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby the
accused orally admitted having committed the crime.
Even assuming that the accused’s admissions partake of
extrajudicial confession, the same would still be admissible not
only on account of the foregoing considerations but also because
it is corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.
ON EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION AND CORPUS DELICTI
Under Rule 133, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, 33 an extra-
judicial confession shall not be sufficient ground for
conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus
delicti, which is defined as the body of the crime and, in its primary
sense, means a crime has actually been committed. Applied to a
particular offense, it is the actual commission by someone of
the particular crime charged.
In this case, aside from the admission made by accused-
appellant, the bruised and battered body of the victim herself
recovered at the exact spot described by accused-appellant
conclusively established the corroborating evidence of corpus
delicti.
PEOPLE VS TITO ZUELA, MAXIMO VELARDA and NELSON
GARCIA
Facts: The crime of robbery with homicide was allegedly
committed by accused herein. Though there were no
eyewitnesses, the prosecution established how the crime was
committed with the testimony of Romualda Algarin, which was
in turn based on the extrajudicial admission given by Maximo
Velarde to Romualda when she visited the latter at the
Camaligan municipal jail on June 6, 1985.
Accused Maximo was arrested without a warrant and was brought
to the police station. He was investigated and asked to give a
written statement in the presence of Atty Ocampo, from the
Citizen’s Legal Assistance Office.
Subsequently, accused Tito and Nelson, on the other hand, were
arrested without a warrant, for the crime of robbery with homicide.
They underwent custodial investigation without the assistance of
counsel. They voluntarily gave their statements and that no one
coerced or promised them anything to admit responsibility for the
crime.
Maximo, Nelson and Tito signed their individual statements before
Judge Lore R. Valencia Bagalacsa, Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Libmanan, Camarines Sur on three (3) different dates.
Issue: Were the extra-judicial confessions executed in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution?
HELD: NO.
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The right to counsel attaches the moment an investigating officer
starts to ask questions to elicit information on the crime from the
suspected offender. It is at this point that the law requires the
assistance of counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting
forced or coerced admissions or confessions from the person
undergoing interrogation.
In other words, "the moment there is a move or even urge of
said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even
plain information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the
time, from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted
by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be
made in writing and in the presence of counsel."
Lt. Idian's team apprehended appellant Maximo in Magallanes,
Sorsogon on June 1, 1985 when no warrant had been issued for
his arrest. Immediately thereafter, the arresting peace officers
investigated appellant Maximo. His statement was reduced in
writing when they were in Camaligan, Camarines Sur. It was in
Camaligan that CLAO lawyer Ocampo was summoned to assist
appellant Maximo in the execution of his written confession. Atty.
Ocampo was not present during the entire duration that
accused Maximo was subjected to custodial investigation.
There was no evidence that Maximo executed a waiver of his right
to counsel. In light of these facts, we are constrained to rule that
Maximo Velarde's extra-judicial statement is inadmissible in
evidence. "An uncounseled extra-judicial confession without
a valid waiver of the right to counsel — that is, in writing and
in the presence of counsel - is inadmissible in evidence.
The respective sworn statements of appellants Tito and Nelson
were likewise inadmissible in evidence because they were
executed without the assistance of counsel. Despite the fact
that the reason for the absence of lawyer during the custodial
investigation was the scarcity of lawyers in the area, the Court
could not be lenient in this case. The absence or scarcity of
lawyers in any given place is not a valid reason for defying the
constitutional mandate on counseled confessions.
EXTRA-JUDICIAL ADMISSION OF MAXIMO TO ROMUALDA
Nevertheless, the infirmity of accused-appellants' sworn
statements did not leave a void in the prosecution's case.
Accused-appellant Maximo repeated the contents of his
sworn statement to Romualda Algarin who, in turn, related
these in court. Such declaration to a private person is admissible
in evidence against accused-appellant Maximo.
The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt
of the offense may be given in evidence against him and any
person, otherwise competent to testify as a witness, who
heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the
substance of what he heard if he heard and understood it. The
said witness need not repeat verbatim the oral confession; it
suffices if he gives its substance. By analogy, that rule applies to
oral extrajudicial admission. However, it is not necessary that the
witness should be able to fix accurately the date of the
conversation in which the admission was made. What is important
is that the witness is able to state the substance of the
conversation or declaration.
Romualda's testimony on accused-appellant Maximo's admission
sealed not only the latter's fate but also that of appellants Tito and
Nelson. The rule that an extrajudicial confession is binding
only upon the confessant and is not admissible against his co-
accused because the latter has no opportunity to cross-examine
the confessant and therefore, as against him, the confession is
hearsay, is not applicable here. What is involved in the case
at bar is an admission, not a confession.
Appellants Tito and Nelson were afforded the opportunity to cross-
examine witness Romualda on accused-appellant Maximo's
declaration. They could have questioned its veracity by presenting
evidence in support of their defenses of denial and alibi so they

could put to test Romualda's credibility. Having failed to do so,
Romualda's testimony, which the trial court correctly considered
as credible, stands unscathed. However, Romualda's testimony
on the substance of accused-appellant Maximo's admission
standing alone, may not be the basis for conviction of the
appellants. However, such testimony, taken with
circumstances duly established by the prosecution, point
unerringly to accused-appellants' culpability.
PEOPLE VS OMICTIN y SINGCO
Facts: ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT CASE.
One of the prosecution witness, Mr. Anthony Ambrosio, testified
that he gave accused 16K representing intial payment in
consideration of the work abroad.
According to Omictin during trial, the complainants agreed to
pay her 40K for the processing fees. And that a check was
issued as initial payment. And the balance was paid as well.
But both later backed out from the placement agreement. She thus
promised Mago and Guevarra that they would be reimbursed
RTC found Omictin guilty.
On appeal. Omictin contends that Anthony's testimony that he was
divested of said amount, through the misrepresentation of the
accused-appellant, amounts to nothing but a mere
uncorroborated and self-serving allegation.
Issue: Is Anthony’s testimony self-serving?
HELD: NO.
Self-serving statements are those made by a party out of
court advocating his own interest; they do not include a
party's testimony as a witness in court. Self-serving statements
are inadmissible because the adverse party is not given the
opportunity for cross-examination, and their admission would
encourage fabrication of testimony. Thus, Ambrosio’s testimony is
not self-serving and is admissible in evidence.
Even if we assume that the testimony of Anthony is
unsubstantiated and self-serving, still, the unsubstantiated and
self-serving nature of said testimonies would not carry the day
for Omictin, since she admitted, during trial, the substance of
their testimonies. Through her testimony, Omictin admitted and
established the fact that she was paid by Guevarra the amount of
PhP40,000 and Ambrosio the amount of PhP16,000.
HEIRS OF CLEMEÑA vs HEIRS OF BIEN
Facts: Case involving that predecessors of both petitioner and
respondent. Petitioner Clemeña alleged that the land was his
and that it was in his exclusive possession.
RTC: declared petitioners to be the absolute owners of the land,
and directed respondents to respect such possession.
On reconsideration, the RTC ruled that both petitioners and
respondent failed to prove their claims of ownership, therefore, the
land still belongs to its original owner (neither pet nor resp own the
same).
CA: reversed ruling on the ownership of land; CA ruled that
respondents own the land and awarded respondents damages as
compensation for having been deprived of possession and of the
harvest, on the basis of Gregorio Clemeña’s testimony with
regard to damages incurred due to the deprivation of owner’s
share.
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Petitioners no longer dispute the ownership of respondent.
They insist, however, that they cannot be held liable to
respondents for the harvest because they never took
possession of the property declared; and that Gregorio
Clemeña’s testimony was self serving hence an improper basis for
the award of damages to respondents.
Issue: Are petitioners bound by the admission of Pedro in his
answer, their predecessor in interest, that he was in exclusive
possession of the land?
HELD: YES.
ADMISSION
Petitioners' predecessor Pedro Clemeña y Zurbano alleged in his
answer that the land declared in TD 5299 was in his exclusive
possession. That statement, insofar as it confirmed the
allegation in the complaint that petitioners' predecessor had
retained possession of the land in question, took on the
character of a judicial admission.
Petitioners' newly-contrived assertion that they were never in
possession of the land cannot hold up against these
pronouncements. As substituting defendants, they were bound
by the admission of Pedro Clemeña y Zurbano, their
predecessor in the litigation. Without any showing that the
admission was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made, petitioners cannot now contradict it.
SELF-SERVING EVIDENCE
"Self-serving evidence" is not to be taken literally to mean any
evidence that serves its proponent's interest. The term, if used
with any legal sense, refers only to acts or declarations made
by a party in his own interest at some place and time out of
court, and it does not include testimony that he gives as a witness
in court. Evidence of this sort is excluded on the same ground as
any hearsay evidence, that is, lack of opportunity for cross-
examination by the adverse party and on the consideration that its
admission would open the door to fraud and fabrication. In
contrast, a party's testimony in court is sworn and subject to
cross-examination by the other party, and therefore, not
susceptible to an objection on the ground that it is self-
serving.
SEC 27. OFFER OF COMPROMISE NOT ADMISSIBLE
PEOPLE vs. PAULINO MAGDADARO Y GERONA
Facts: In the Rape committed against Beverlinda, the father heard
the shout of Beverlina, and upon arriving at the scene, accused
fled. He was also asked by the Barangay Captain as to why he
had done the act, but he did not answer such a question.
The father of Beverlinda declared that on his way to the City Hall,
accused, in the company of Sgt. Romero, his wife, a Bantay
Bayan, asked for forgiveness twice and offered to pay
damages but that he refused because the matter was already
before the authorities.
TC: found Paulino guilty.
PAULINO: TC erred in holding that:
1. the flight of the accused from the scene of the crime is
evidence of guilt;
2. the alleged repeated request for settlement of the case
by the accused is an implied admission of guilt; and
3. his silence when asked as to why he committed the
crime is admission of his guilt

HELD:
ON FLIGHT
When the father chased him with a bolo, he was fast on his feet
and successfully eluded pursuit. That immediate flight is strongly
indicative of his consciousness of guilt. The wicked flee when no
man pursueth; but the righteous are as bold as the lion."
ON SILENCE
His silence when asked by the Barangay Captain "why he had
done it?" is likewise significant. His claim that there was no
admission by silence on his part since he was not given the
opportunity to make a reply besides the fact that whoever asked
the question was not known to him, hardly deserves consideration.
Silence is assent as well as consent, and may, where a direct
and specific accusation of crime is made, be regarded under
some circumstances as a quasi-confession.
OFFER TO SETTLE
Appellant's offers to settle the case in exchange for money or land,
which were all rejected by Beverlinda's father, were correctly
appreciated by the Trial Court as evidential of his culpability. An
offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence
as an implied admission of guilt.
CIVIL CASES
SMITH BELL INC, and TOKYO MARINE INC vs
CA and CARLOS THONG
Facts: Case involving a collision between two vessels owned by
respondent and another vessel of Japanese Registry.
Respondent argues that a compromise agreement entered into
between Sanyo Shipping Company as owner of the "Yotai Maru"
and Go Thong as owner of the "Don Carlos," under which the
former paid P268,000.00 to the latter effectively settled that the
"Yotai Maru" had been at fault.
Issue: Did the compromise agreement admit Yotai Maru as being
at fault?
HELD: NO. True it is that by virtue of the compromise agreement,
the owner of the "Yotai Maru" paid a sum of money to the owner
of the "Don Carlos." Nowhere, however, in the compromise
agreement did the owner of the "Yotai Maru" admit or
concede that the "Yotai Maru" had been at fault in the
collision.
The familiar rule is that "an offer of compromise is not an
admission that anything is due, and is not admissible in evidence
against the person making the offer. A compromise is an
agreement between two (2) or more persons who, in order to
forestall or put an end to a law suit, adjust their differences
by mutual consent, an adjustment which every one of them
prefers to the hope of gaining more, balanced by the danger
of losing more.
An offer to compromise does not, in legal contemplation, involve
an admission on the part of a defendant that he is legally liable,
nor on the part of a plaintiff that his claim or demand is groundless
or even doubtful, since the compromise is arrived at precisely with
a view to avoiding further controversy and saving the expenses of
litigation. It is of the very nature of an offer of compromise that it is
made tentatively, hypothetically and in contemplation of
mutual concessions. The above rule on compromises is
anchored on public policy of the most insistent and basic kind; that
the incidence of litigation should be reduced and its duration
shortened to the maximum extent feasible.
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TRANS-PACIFIC INDUSTRIAL SUPPLIES vs
CA & Assoc Bank
Facts: Petitioner contends that the proposal to settle the
obligation by way of dacion en pago is not an admission that
anything is due, and is inadmissible against the party making
the offer.
Issue: Is petitioner’s proposal to permit to fully liquidate the
remaining obligations through dacion en pago admissible to prove
the indebtedness?
HELD: Yes. Sec 27, Rule 130 is not an ironclad rule.
TEST TO DETERMINE ADMISSIBILITY OF OFFER TO
COMPROMISE: To determine the admissibility or non-
admissibility of an offer to compromise, the circumstances of the
case and the intent of the party making the offer should be
considered.
Thus, if a party denies the existence of a debt but offers to pay
the same for the purpose of buying peace and avoiding
litigation, the offer of settlement is inadmissible.
If in the course thereof, the party making the offer admits the
existence of an indebtedness combined with a proposal to
settle the claim amicably, then, the admission is admissible to
prove such indebtedness.
Indeed, an offer of settlement is an effective admission of a
borrower's loan balance. Exactly, this is what petitioner did in
the case before us for review.
LUCIANO TAN vs RODIL ENTERPRISES
Facts: In an unlawful detainer case involving a sublease,
petitioner filed a Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals of
400K, and the subsequent monthly rentals due. Petitioner
contends that the aforesaid admission, made in open court,
and then reiterated in his Motion to Allow Defendant to
Deposit Rentals, cannot be taken as an admission of his
liability under Section 27, Rule 130.
Issue: Is petitioner’s motion to allow the deposit of rentals an
admission of his liability?
HELD: Yes. The general rule is an offer of compromise in a civil
case is not an admission of liability. It is not admissible in evidence
against the offeror. The rule, however, is not iron-clad. (Re: Test
to determine admissibility: see Trans-Pacific case).
Petitioner’s admission is an exception to the general rule of
inadmissibility. Petitioner did not contest the existence of the
sublease. The Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals
was deemed by as an explicit acknowledgment of petitioner's
liability on the subleased premises. Indeed, the existence of the
Contract of Lease was not denied.
Petitioner agreed in open court to pay the amount of
P440,000.00, representing petitioner's unpaid rentals from
September 1997 to June 2000; and that petitioner will pay the
monthly rentals computed at P13,750.00 on or before the 5th
day of each month after 30 June 2000. The petitioner's judicial
admission in open court finds particular significance when
viewed together with his Motion to Allow Defendant to
Deposit Rentals, wherein petitioner stated that the rentals due on
the premises in question amounted to P467,500.00, as of the date
of filing the Motion. Petitioner cannot now be allowed to reject the
same.
An admission made in the pleading cannot be controverted by the
party making such admission and are conclusive as to him, and
that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent

therewith should be ignored whether objection is interposed by a
party or not. A judicial admission is an admission made by a party
in the course of the proceedings in the same case, for purposes
of the truth of some alleged fact, which said party cannot thereafter
disprove.
SERVICEWIDE SPECIALISTS, INC vs
CA and SPS TOLOSA, BIÑAN MOTOR SALES CORP, and
EDUARDO GARCIA
Facts: In a replevin and/or a sum of money with damages case
against the Tolosa spouses, respondents alleged that they had
arrived at an amicable settlement of their claims. The TC granred
the motion. Subsequently, the TC ruled in favor of petitioner,
granting it the right to foreclose on the vehicle subject of the
replevin case, or to demand from defendants.
Defendant Garcia moved for reconsideration, on the ground
that he was not one of the defendants in the replevin and/or
sum of money case. The trial court amended the decision to
include Garcia as one of the defendants liable to petitioner.
On appeal, the CA found that no summons had been served
on Garcia, and that no evidence is presented to hold Garcia liable
with the other respondents.
Petitioner with SC contends that the compromise between
respondents and Garcia is sufficient evidence to prove his liability.
Issue: was there sufficient evidence to hold Garcia liable with
respondents in favor of petitioner?
HELD: The compromise between respondent Biñan Corp and
Garcia cannot be taken as an admission of the latter’s
liability. In civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an admission
of any liability. With more reason, a compromise agreement
should not be treated as an admission of liability on the part
of the parties vis-a-vis a third person.
The compromise settlement of a claim or cause of action is not an
admission that the claim is valid, but merely admits that there is
a dispute, and that an amount is paid to be rid of the
controversy, nor is a compromise with one person an admission
of any liability to someone else. The policy of the law should be,
and is, to encourage compromises. When they are made, the
rights of third parties are not in any way affected thereby.
EL VARADERO DE MANILA VS
INSULAR LUMBER COMPANY
Facts: Petitioner completed repairs on the property of respondent,
pursuant to an implicit understanding that the price would be as
low as could be secured from other companies.
Respondent is of the opinion that the bill presented by petitioner
is grossly exorbinant, and a proposed compromise having
failed of realization, the matter was taken to court.
During the negotiations, plaintiff was willing to accept 10K.
Defendant however says that a reasonable figure is 5K.
subsequently, defendant expressed willingness to pay 8K.
CFI: respondent ordered to pay petitioner 5K
Petitioner appealed to SC, asking that the amount be increased to
12K.
Issue: Is the offer admissible?
HELD: The offer of compromise must naturally be excluded under
the rules, except that as the amounts named in the offers to
accept certain sums in settlement appear to have been
arrived at as a fair estimate of the value, they are relevant.
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Here, there was no de ial of liability, and the only question was
the amount to be paid which the plaintiff insisted should not be
less than P10,241.37, and which the defendant insisted should not
be more than P8,070.12.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES vs
PAL EMPLOYEES SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION
(PESALA)
Facts: In the course of the dispute as to the salary deductions on
Philippine-based employees to be paid to PESALA, PAL’s counsel
assured the Labor Affairs OIC that:
2. PAL will regularly remit to PESALA the full amount per
pay period that is due to the latter, and
3. PAL will pay PESALA the balance of P44,488,716.41
by January 1999. These assurances were embodied in
the Order
Issue: Is PAL bound by the acknowledgement of its counsel?
HELD: Yes.
Even if viewed as an offer of compromise, which is generally
inadmissible in evidence against the offeror in civil cases, PAL's
acknowledgment of its liability to PESALA in the amount of
P44,488,716.41 falls under one of the exceptions to the rule of
exclusion of compromise negotiations. If there is neither an
expressed nor implied denial of liability, but during the course
of negotiations the defendant expressed a willingness to pay
the plaintiff, then such offer of the defendant can be taken in
evidence against him.
In the case at bar, PAL admitted the amount of P44,488,716.41
without an expressed nor implied denial of liability. This admission,
coupled with an assurance of payment, binds PAL.
CRIMINAL CASES
PEOPLE vs DE JOYA
Facts: Alvin, 10 years old, went home and saw Eulalia drenched
with blood. The deceased victim, when asked about what
happened, uttered the phrase “Si Paqui” (referring to accused).
Accused was arrested.
It was revealed during trial that before the release of accused from
the municipal jail, accused’s lawyer talked to Arnedo, the son-in-
law of the deceased. And that the accused’s lawyer told him that
he (the lawyer) can settle the case. Such conversation was
allegedly heard by accused.
Issue: May such offer to settle, made by the counsel of accused,
be admissible as evidence against accused?
HELD: No.
OFFER TO SETTLE
The court does not feel justified in concluding from the above
testimony from a member of the (extended) family of the deceased
victim that "an offer of compromise" had been made "by the
accused" nor that "an implied admission of guilt" on the part of the
appellant may be reasonably inferred in the instant case. The trial
court itself made no mention of any attempt on the part of
appellant to settle the criminal case amicably through the
defense counsel; we must assume that the trial court either did
not believe that appellant had tried to compromise the criminal
case or considered that appellant could not fairly be deemed
to have impliedly admitted that he had indeed robbed and
killed Eulalia.

A much higher level of explicitness and specific detail is necessary
to justify a conclusion that an accused had impliedly admitted his
guilt of a crime as serious as robbery with homicide.
DYING DECLARATION: “SI PAQUI”; DOCTRINE OF
COMPLETENESS
It is not disputed that "Paqui" is the nickname of appellant
Pioquinto de Joya. It must be noted at once, however, that the
words "Si Paqui" do not constitute by themselves a sensible
sentence. Those two words could have been intended to
designate either (a) the subject of a sentence or (b) the object of
a verb. If they had been intended to designate the subject, we
must note that no predicate was uttered by the deceased. If they
were designed to designate the object of a verb, we must note
once more that no verb was used by the deceased.
A dying declaration to be admissible must be complete in itself. To
be complete in itself does not mean that the declarant must
recite everything that constituted the res gestae of the
subject of his statement, but that his statement of any given
fact should be a full expression of all that he intended to say
as conveying his meaning in respect of such fact.
The Doctrine of Completeness provides that: The statement as
offered must not be merely a part of the whole as it was expressed
by the declarant; it must be complete as far it goes.
But it is immaterial how much of the whole affair of the death is
related, provided the statement includes all that the declarant
wished or intended to include in it. Thus, if an interruption (by
death or by an intruder) cuts short a statement which thus remains
clearly less than that which the dying person wished to make, the
fragmentary statement is not receivable, because the intended
whole is not there, and the whole might be of a very different effect
from that of the fragment; yet if the dying person finishes the
statement he wishes to make, it is no objection that he has told
only a portion of what he might have been able to tell."
The reason upon which incomplete declarations are generally
excluded, or if admitted, accorded little or no weight, is that since
the declarant was prevented (by death or other circumstance)
from saying all that he wished to say, what he did say might
have been qualified by the statements which he was
prevented from making. That incomplete declaration is not
therefore entitled to the presumption of truthfulness which
constitutes the basis upon which dying declarations are received.
PEOPLE vs GREGORIO MEJIA y VILLAFANIA et al.
Facts: The murder suspects, respondents herein, were turned
over to the Police Station. These facts were entered in the Police
Station Blotter. The fact that they were suspected of having
committed the crime were indicated in the Police Blotter. The trial
court relied heavily on such entries on the police blotter.
According to the accused, the entries do not bind them, for it was
made by a police officer, contrary to what they had reported.
Issue: Is the silence of the police blotter conclusive evidence of
the fact that the accused did not report the incident?
HELD: No. The silence of the entries on what the appellants had
declared in court is not conclusive evidence that they did not
report the incident to the police authorities. They had no
participation in the preparation of the entries.
Entries in the police blotters should not be given undue
significance or probative value, for they are normally
incomplete and inaccurate sometimes from either partial
suggestion of for want of suggestion or inquiries. The entries in
question are sadly wanting in material particulars. At the very
most, they only recorded the impression that the appellants were
"suspects."
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SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION VS
HELEN KALALO
Facts: BP 22 CASE. Respondent issued checks to SMC as a
payment of its obligation. Upon the request of respondent to SMC
to provide her with a detailed statement of account, petitioner
failed to do so. Hence, to protect her rights, she ordered the bank
to stop payment of the checks she issued to petitioner.
In the face of constant threats made by agents of petitioner SMC,
respondent’s counsel wrote a letter (offer of compromise)
wherein Kalalo "acknowledged the receipt of the statement of
account demanding the payment of the sum of P800K, and
"submitted a proposal by way of 'Compromise Agreement' to settle
the said obligation."
SMC did not accept the proposal. Subsequently, SMC filed a
complaint against respondent.
The complaint was dismissed by the MeTC and the appeal was
dismissed by the RTC.
With SC, petitioner contends that in her offer of compromise,
respondent "unequivocally admitted her liability to private
complainant-appellant duly assisted by her counsel.":
- Ms. Helen Kalalo acknowledges the receipt of the
Statement of Account demanding the payment of
800K.
Issue: May the offer of compromise by respondent made prior to
the filing of the complaint be admissible as admission of guilt?
HELD: NO.
Contrary to petitioner's contention, the aforequoted letter does not
contain an express acknowledgment of liability. At most, what
respondent acknowledged was the receipt of the statement of
account, not the existence of her liability to petitioner.
Furthermore, the fact that respondent made a compromise offer
to petitioner SMC cannot be considered as an admission of guilt.
Note that the Offer of Compromise was made prior to the
filing of the criminal complaint against her for a violation of
the Bouncing Checks Law. The Offer of Compromise was
clearly not made in the context of a criminal proceeding and,
therefore, cannot be considered as an implied admission of
guilt.
PEOPLE vs CAMILO MANUEL
Facts: In the rape committed by the accused, the latter’s parents,
their daughter in law, and brother went to complainant’s house to
settle amicably the case. Accused would marry the complainant.
The complainant however refused to marry.
Issue: Is the offer of appellant’s family to settle the case an implied
admission of accused’s guilty?
HELD:
The attempt of the parents of the accused to settle the case with
the complainant was considered an implied admission of guilt. We
have further ruled that an offer of marriage by the accused, during
the investigation of the rape case, is also an admission of guilt.
PEOPLE vs DOMINADOR MANGAT
Facts: In a rape with homicide case committed by accused, while
at the police station, the accused and his father offered to settle
the case amicably. The affidavit executed by the police officer
indicated that the suspect orally manifested that they are willing to

talk to the complainant for the possible amicable settlement of
their case, and how much the amount will be given as payment for
the early death of Kristal.
HELD: In addition to the pieces of evidence offered to show the
guilt of the accused in the raping and killing of Kristal, perhaps
the most damaging piece of evidence which points to the
appellant's culpability is the affidavit executed by SPO1
Fajutag to the effect that the appellant and his father,
Benedicto Mangat, offered to settle the case amicably. It is
most telling for the defense not to have made any effort
whatsoever to dispute this.
Said gesture can only be taken to mean an admission of guilt. In
criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal
negligence) or those allowed by law to be amicably settled or
compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be
received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.
BRICENIO vs PEOPLE
Facts: In the homicide case involving the death of Roy Rivera, the
records show that the petitioner offered the prosecution witnesses
a compromise involving a separate case that he filed against
them.
Issue: Is the offer of compromise an implied admission of guilt?
HELD: Yes.
In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses or those
allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the
accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of
guilt.
PEOPLE vs DE GUZMAN y SICO
Facts: In the rape committed against Gilda Ambray, accused was
arrested and detained at the Municipal Jail of Bacoor.
The parents of the accused asked for the help of Resurreccion,
accused’s kumadre, to beg for Gilda’s forgiveness for the
accused’s sake. The following day, Resurreccion accompanied
the accused's parents, wife, children and sister-in-law to Gilda's
house. Gilda met them, but to their plea for forgiveness, she told
them "that should not be tolerated”.
TC: considered as evidence of the accused’s guilt the plea for
forgiveness and compromise.
Issue: Are the plea for forgiveness of the parents, wife, children
and sister-in-law implied admission of the guilt of the accused?
HELD:
On Plea for Forgiveness
Any scintilla of doubt both as to the identification of the accused
and as to his guilt was dissolved by the overtures of his parents,
wife, children and sister-in-law on pleading for forgiveness from
Gilda. The accused did not disown their acts, which were
testified to by his kumadre, Resurreccion Talub Quiocho, and
Gilda herself. He chose not to deny their testimony.
Finally, despite the unequivocal pronouncement by the trial
court that his guilt was "strongly established by the acts of
his parents, wife and relatives, who had gone to the house of the
victim to ask her forgiveness and to seek a compromise," the
accused dared not assign that finding and conclusion as an
error and his Appellant's brief is conspicuously silent
thereon. Indubitably then, the accused was a party to the decision
to seek for forgiveness, or had prior knowledge of the plan to seek
for it and consented to pursue it, or confirmed and ratified the act
of his parents, wife, children and sister-in-law.
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A plea for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an
attempt to compromise. In criminal cases, except those
involving quasi-offense (criminal negligence) or those allowed by
law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused
may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. No
one would ask for forgiveness unless he had committed
some wrong, for to forgive means to absolve, to pardon, to cease
to feel resentment against on account of wrong committed; give
up claim to requital from or retribution upon (an offender).
Guidelines in the review of Rape Cases:
1. an accusation for rape can be made with facility: it is dif cult
to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though
innocent, to disprove it;
2. in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where two
persons are usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and
3. the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense.
PEOPLE vs ABADIES y CLAVERIA
Facts: On the strength of the complaint of Rosalie, her father,
accused herein, was arrested, for allegedly kissing, mashing her
breasts, and touching her private parts.
The prosecution presented Rosalie, who testified that accused-
appellant wrote her a letter from his detention cell, which letter
contained:
“I made this letter to ask your 'forgiveness. Alam mo bang sobra-
sobra na ang pagsisisi ko sa ginawa kong iyon. Parang awa mo
na Ne hirap na hirap na ako at ang lahat ay buong puso ko ng
pinagsisisihan. Patawarin mo na ako anak.”
The trial court convicted accused for violation of RA 7610.
According to the accused, there is no factual basis for the trial
court to conclude that the plea for forgiveness contained in his
letter is to be deemed as an admission of guilt.
Issue: Does the letter constitute an admission of accused’s guilt?
HELD: Yes.
A cursory reading of the relevant parts of the letter will readily
show that accused- appellant was indeed seeking pardon for
his misdeeds. There is no iota of doubt that accused-appellant
was asking forgiveness for having committed the acts with which
he now stands charged.
Settled is the rule that in criminal cases, except those involving
quasi-offenses or those allowed by law to be settled through
mutual concessions, an offer of compromise by the accused may
be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.
Evidently, no one would ask for forgiveness unless he had
committed some wrong and a plea for forgiveness may be
considered as analogous to an attempt to compromise. Under
the circumstances, accused-appellant's plea of forgiveness
should be received as an implied admission of guilt.
PEOPLE vs PRADES
Facts: Accused Senen Prades was charged with the crime of rape
committed against Emmie Rosales.
Emmie Ramos testified that several days after accused satisfied
his lust, Emmie received letters, which letters were handed by
accused to Emmie’s grandmother who later gave it to her. She
received the other letter given by accused to complainant through
the latter’s sister.

During the trial of the case, appellant absconded. He escaped
from his escort guard while he was being transported from a
hearing at RTC Iriga. Trial continued in absentia.
Issue/HELD:
On letters sent to complainant:
After the rape, he sent complainant two letters in which he
implored her forgiveness and offered to leave his wife so that he
could be with her. In fine, appellant sealed his own fate by
admitting his crime under the seal of a virtual confession in fact, if
not in law.
In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses or those
allowed by law to be settled through mutual concessions, an offer
of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an
implied admission of guilt. For this rule to apply, it is not
necessary that a complaint be first filed by the victim because
all that is required is that after committing the crime,
appellant or his representative makes an offer to compromise
and such offer is proved. Evidently, no one would ask for
forgiveness unless he had committed some wrong and a plea for
forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt to
compromise. The letters of appellant containing an appeal for
condonation of his acts cannot but be construed as an implied
admission of his guilt.
The Court is persuaded that appellant sent complainant the
letters introduced in evidence by the prosecution and that
said letters contained an admission of his guilt, thus
confirming his culpability. If appellant did not forcibly rape
complainant, the latter may possibly have accepted appellant's
offer to live with her. At the very least, she would not have revealed
her misfortune so as not to expose the despoliation of her virtue.
That complainant chose to divulge the incident and subject herself
to the disgrace of public scrutiny and scandal buttresses the
charge that she had been criminally ravished by appellant.
Further, because no evidence was presented by the defense
to discredit this affirmation of guilt derived from the contents
of the letters, the authenticity of said letters is no longer open
to question. The letters thus bolster and corroborate
complainant's testimony on the identity and guilty of appellant.
On flight:
By escaping from confinement during trial and failing to turn
himself in despite his subsequent conviction by the trial court, and
despite the standing warrant of arrest, appellant has become a
fugitive from justice.
Flight is the evasion of the course of justice by voluntarily
withdrawing oneself in order to avoid arrest, detention or the
institution or continuance of criminal proceedings. It is
considered an indication of guilt. By his flight and thereafter
becoming a fugitive, appellant waived his right to adduce evidence
and consequently denied himself the opportunity to dispute the
charge against him.
The flight of appellant, by itself, does not sustain his
conviction because the law requires therefor no less than the
proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In the case before us,
however, complainant's testimony and positive identification of
appellant were sufficiently corroborated by the testimony of the
physician who examined her, the medico-legal report, and the
letters of appellant in which he acknowledged his guilt and sought
complainant's mercy.
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PEOPLE vs ERGUIZA
Facts: In the rape committed against AAA, a 13-year old girl, the
prosecution presented AAA, BBB (mother), CCC (father), among
others.
CCC testified that the family of accused-appellant went to their
house and initially offered 50K and later 150K.
Albina, the mother of accused, however, testified that when she
learned that the family of AAA were falsely accusing his son of
rape, CCC and BBB were demanding 1M which was later reduced
to 250K. Albina said she offered 5K to BBB and CCC only to
preserve peace.
**Note: The testimonies of the witnesses for both the prosecution
and the defense conflict on certain points, more notably the claim
by BBB and CCC that the family of appellant offered to settle the
case. This, however, was denied by Albina, who claimed that it
was BBB and CCC who demanded P1,000,000.00. The offer of
compromise allegedly made by Albina is critical to the case at bar
in light of law and jurisprudence that an offer of compromise in a
criminal case may be received in evidence as an implied
admission of guilt. The offer of compromise was first testified
to by BBB on cross-examination. On rebuttal, CCC
corroborated the testimony of BBB that the family of
appellant offered to settle the case.
Issue/HELD:
Offer to Settle
The alleged offer of the parents of appellant to settle the case
cannot be used against appellant as evidence of his guilt.
Appellant testified that he did not ask his parents to settle the
case. Moreover, appellant was not present when the offer to
settle was allegedly made.
An offer of compromise from an unauthorized person cannot
amount to an admission of the party himself. Although the Court
has held in some cases that an attempt of the parents of the
accused to settle the case is an implied admission of guilt, we
believe that the better rule is that for a compromise to amount
to an implied admission of guilt, the accused should have
been present or at least authorized the proposed
compromise.
Moreover, it has been held that where the accused was not
present at the time the offer for monetary consideration was made,
such offer of compromise would not save the day for the
prosecution.
Equipoise Rule
Where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two
or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the
innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt,
then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is
not sufficient to support a conviction. The equipoise rule provides
that where the evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced,
the constitutional presumption of innocence tilts the scales
in favor of the accused.
PEOPLE vs BAYANI
Facts: In the rape of Maria Elena, the prosecution presented the
complainant’s uncle, Romeo, among others, who testified that the
accused came to his house where the complainant resided
bringing gifts (powder, soap, cotton, and milk) for the
complainant and offered to amicably settle the case. In all, the
accused came thrice for the purpose:
a. on 15 December 1993, with a certain Maj. Armando
Aliño 30 when Romeo told them that he had no
authority to settle the case as the complainant's
parents were arriving from abroad in January 1994;

b. on 5 January 1994, with the secretary of Congressman
Roque Ablan; and
c. on 30 April 1994, with Vice-Governor Mariano Nalupta,
Jr.
The trial court, in convicting the accused, found that:
- the account of the private complainant on what transpired
between her and the accused were replete with details which
could not have been concocted by the private complainant
- the accused tried to amicably settle the case with the private
complainant's mother as testified to by Romeo; it is
inconceivable that Romeo Nieto, an ordinary citizen could
have the courage to drop the names of highly-placed and
influential officials in the province.
- no doubt that the accused was present in all the three (3)
occasions related by Romeo Nieto wherein they were
looking for the private complainant's mother. The mere
denials of the accused and Major Aliño cannot overcome the
positive testimony of Romeo Nieto.
- At any rate, his non-presence during these occasions
cannot erase the fact that the highly-placed and
influential provincial officials went there on his behalf —
that was to ask for a compromise deal. It would be absurd
to assume that these highly-placed and influential officials
went to the residence of Romeo Nieto on their own without
the knowledge of the accused.
On appeal, accused contends that: forgiveness is different
from compromise. All that the appellant and those who
intervened for him was to ask for forgiveness. The mother of the
complainant did not testify in court that the appellant or any of his
intercessors offered to compromise the case.
Issue: is asking for forgiveness an implied admission of
guilt?
HELD:
While compromise "is an agreement made between two or more
parties as a settlement of matters in dispute," the term
"forgiveness" necessarily implies a consciousness of
wrongdoing or guilt.
The weight both of authority and of reason sustains the rule which
admits evidence of offers to compromise, but permits the
accused to show that such offers were not made under a
consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the
inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason
which would justify a claim by the accused that the offer to
compromise was not in truth an admission of his guilt and an
attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily
ensure therefrom.
As such, we adopt the pertinent portions of the lower court's
ruling on this subject and declare that no reversible error was
committed in appreciating the accused's plea for forgiveness
as an implied admission of guilt.
SEC 28. ADMISSION BY THIRD PARTY/ RES INTER ALIOS
ACTA, PART ONE
PEOPLE VS RAQUEL
Facts: Crime of Robbery with Homicide. When the police came,
they found one of the perpetrators, Amado Ponce, of the crime,
wounded.
After being treated, Amado revealed to Pangato that appellants
Sabas and Valeriano Raquel were the perpetrators of the crime.
HELD: The identification of herein appellants as the culprits was
based chiefly on the extrajudicial statement of accused Amado
Ponce pointing to them as his co-perpetrators of the crime. The
said accused escaped from jail before he could testify in court.
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The extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating a co-
accused may not be utilized against the latter, unless these
are repeated in open court. If the accused never had the
opportunity to cross-examine his co-accused on the latter's
extrajudicial statements, it is elementary that the same are
hearsay as against said accused. That is exactly the situation,
and the disadvantaged plight of appellants, in the case at bar.
Extreme caution should be exercised by the courts in dealing with
the confession of an accused which implicates his co-accused. A
distinction, obviously, should be made between extrajudicial
and judicial confessions. The former deprives the other accused
of the opportunity to cross-examine the confessant, while in the
latter his confession is thrown wide open for cross-examination
and rebuttal.
The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot
be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another.
An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant
and is not admissible against his co-accused. The reason for
the rule is that, on a principle of good faith and mutual
convenience, a man's own acts are binding upon himself, and are
evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it
would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust,
that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized
strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of
strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence
against him.
Although the above-stated rule admits of certain jurisprudential
exceptions, the exceptions do not apply to the present case,
because:
1. except for that extrajudicial statement of accused
Amado Ponce, there exists no evidence whatsoever
linking appellants to the crime.
2. this extrajudicial statement, ironically relied upon as
prosecution evidence, was made in violation of the
constitutional rights of accused Amado Ponce since
Amado was not informed of his constitutional right
while on the process of investigation.
NOTE: EXCEPTIONS TO RIAA RULE
1. If the co-accused impliedly acquiesced in or adopted said
confession by not questioning its truthfulness, as where it was
made in his presence and he did not remonstrate against his
being implicated therein;
2. If the accused persons voluntarily and independently executed
identical confessions without collusion, commonly known as
interlocking which confessions are corroborated by other
evidence; and without contradiction by the other co-accused
who was present;
3. Where the accused admitted the facts stated by the confessant
after being apprised of such confession;
4. If they are charged as co-conspirators of the crime which was
confessed by one of the accused and said confession is used
only as a corroborating evidence;
5. Where the confession is used as circumstantial evidence to
show the probability of participation by the co-conspirator
6. Where the confessant testified for his co-defendant;
7. Where the co-conspirator's extrajudicial confession is
corroborated by other evidence of record.
TAMARGO VS AWINGAN
Facts: Columna was arrested for the killing of Atty. Tamargo. After
his arrest, Columna (whose real name was Manuel, Jr.) executed
an af davit wherein he admitted his participation as "look out"
during the shooting and implicated respondent Romulo Awingan
(alias "Mumoy") as the gunman and one Richard Mecate. He also
tagged as masterminds respondent Licerio Antiporda, Jr. and his
son, respondent Lloyd Antiporda.

Columna affirmed his affidavit before the investigating prosecutor
who subjected him to clarificatory questions. However, Columna
subsequently recanted his confession.
Respondents contends that Columna’s extrajudicial confession
was inadmissible against respondents because of the rule on
RIAA.
Held: Columna’s EJ confession in his affidavit was not admissible
as evidence against respondents.
Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. The rule on res
inter alios acta provides that the rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another.
Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the
confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused and is
considered as hearsay against them.
An exception to the RIAA is an admission made by a
conspirator. In order that the admission of a conspirator may
be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary
that:
a. the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than
the admission itself;
b. the admission relates to the common object and
c. it has been made while the declarant was engaged in
carrying out the conspiracy.
Otherwise, it cannot be used against the alleged co-conspirators
without violating their constitutional right to be confronted with the
witnesses against them and to cross-examine them.
Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, which was later on
recanted, no other piece of evidence was presented to prove
the alleged conspiracy. There was no other prosecution
evidence, direct or circumstantial, which the extrajudicial
confession could corroborate. Therefore, the recanted
confession of Columna, which was the sole evidence against
respondents, had no probative value and was inadmissible
as evidence against them.
Considering the paucity and inadmissibility of the evidence
presented against the respondents, it would be unfair to hold them
for trial. Once it is ascertained that no probable cause exists to
form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused, they should
be relieved from the pain of going through a full blown court case.
When, at the outset, the evidence offered during the
preliminary investigation is nothing more than an
uncorroborated extrajudicial confession of an alleged
conspirator, the criminal complaint should not prosper so
that the system would be spared from the unnecessary
expense of such useless and expensive litigation.
FGU INSURANCE CORP vs GPS
Facts: Respondent G.P. Sarmiento trucking company undertook
to transport cargoes for Concepcion Industries, Inc. when it
collided with an unidentified truck, causing damage to the cargoes.
Petitioner, FGU, insurer of the shipment, paid to Concepcion
Industries the value of the covered cargoes. Then, as subrogee of
Concepcion Industries, Inc., petitioner FGU sued GPS for breach
of contract of carriage for reimbursemen
The Trial Court ruled that plaintiff failed to adduce evidence that
defendant is a common carrier and defendant’s driver was the one
negligent, GPS cannot be made liable for damages.
HELD:
Notwithstanding the fact the GPS cannot be considered a
common carrier, GPS cannot escape from liability since in culpa
contractual, mere proof of the existence of the contract and the
failure of its compliance justify prima facie a corresponding right of
relief.
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Respondent driver, on the other hand, without concrete proof
of his negligence or fault, may not himself be ordered to pay
petitioner. The driver, not being a party to the contract between
petitioner’s principal (Concepcion Industries) and defendant, may
not be held liable under the agreement.
A contract can only bind the parties who have entered into it
or their successors who have assumed their personality or
their juridical position. Consonantly with the axiom res inter alios
acta aliis neque nocet prodest, such contract can neither favor nor
prejudice a third person. Petitioner's civil action against the driver
can only be based on culpa aquiliana, which, unlike culpa
contractual, would require the claimant for damages to prove
negligence or fault on the part of the defendant
REYES VS OMBUDSMAN
On Res Inter Alios Acta Rule
The foregoing rule constitutes a technical rule on evidence which
should not be rigidly applied in the course of preliminary
investigation proceedings. In Estrada, the Court sanctioned the
Ombudsman's appreciation of hearsay evidence, which would
otherwise be inadmissible under technical rules on evidence,
during the preliminary investigation "as long as there is substantial
basis for crediting the hearsay."
This is because "such investigation is merely preliminary, and
does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties."
Applying the same logic, and with the similar observation that
there lies substantial basis for crediting the testimonies of the
whistleblowers herein, the objection interposed by the Napoles
siblings under the evidentiary res inter alios acta rule should falter.
Ultimately, as case law edifies, "the technical rules on evidence
are not binding on the fuscal who has jurisdiction and control
over the conduct of a preliminary investigation,” as in this
case.
SALAPUDDIN VS CA
Facts: A bomb exploded near the lobby of the House of
Representatives. Police officers raided an alleged Abu Sayyaf
Group (ASG) safehouse. Aunal, Ikram and Kusain were arrested
and brought to Camp Crame.
Ikram executed first of his several affidavits.
First affidavit: he stated that those who took part in the planning
included Aunal and Kusain, and that he stayed uin the house
owned by Salapuddin.
Salapuddin went to Camp Crame and voluntarily gave a sworn
statement denying any knowledge of the Batasan bombing.
As the police investigation prospered, Ikram executed several
supplemental affidavits augmenting the statement he previously
gave to the authorities, and narrated that he, together with
Aunal, Redwan, and Bong, planned the Batasan bombing.
Notably, Ikram, in his first three affidavits, never mentioned
Salapuddin's involvement, let alone implicate him, in the plan to
kill Congressman Akbar.
In his fourth affidavit, alleging that he worked for Salapuddin, and
that he was beside Redwan when Salapuddin ordered the
killing of the Congressman.
Based on the affidavits executed, and after preliminary
investigation, probable cause to indict Aunal, Ikram and Kusain
was found.
The Sec. of Justice (SOJ) in a resolution excluded Salapuddin
from the information, on the ground that:

1. the only material evidence against Salapuddin is the
statements of Ikram, which are laden with irreconcilable
consistencies and contradictions;
2. there is nothing on record that will indicate that Salapuddin
performed the overt acts of the offense charged;
3. the statements of the other accused cannot be given weight
as they were obtained through force and intimidation
contrary to the Constitution and were in fact later recanted.
RESP: questioned SOJ’s resolution arguing that:
1. matters relating to the admissibility of evidence and
credibility of witnesses are best determined by the courts
during trial, and not at the stage of determining probable
cause;
2. there is overwhelming evidence to link Salapuddin in the
conspiracy to kill Congressman Akbar.
CA: set aside SOJ resolution; the totality of the evidence "suf
ciently indicates the probability that Salapuddin lent moral and
material support or assistance to the perpetrators in the
commission of the crime; the absence (or presence) of any
conspiracy among the accused is evidentiary in nature after a full-
blown trial on the merits.
PET: appellate court grievously erred in according full probative
value to Ikram's extrajudicial confession implicating Salapuddin
even if it was riddled with serious contradictions and
inconsistencies.
HELD: In favor of Salappudin.
On the determination of probable cause
Even at the stage of preliminary investigation, the investigating
prosecutors are duty-bound to sift through all the documents,
objects, and testimonies to determine what may serve as a
relevant and competent evidentiary foundation of a possible
case against the accused persons. They cannot defer and
entirely leave this verification of all the various matters to the
courts. Otherwise, the conduct of a preliminary investigation would
be rendered worthless; the State would still be forced to prosecute
frivolous suits and innocent men would still be unnecessarily
dragged to defend themselves in courts against groundless
charges. Indeed, while prosecutors are not required to
determine the rights and liabilities of the parties, a
preliminary investigation still constitutes a realistic judicial
appraisal of the merits of the case so that the investigating
prosecutor is not excused from the duty to weigh the
evidence submitted and ensure that what will be filed in court
is only such criminal charge that the evidence and inferences
can properly warrant.
Indeed, probable cause requires less proof than necessary for
conviction. Nonetheless, it demands more than bare suspicion
and must rest on competent relevant evidence.
On RIAA Rule
A review of the records, however, show that the only direct
material evidence against Salapuddin is the confession made by
Ikram. While the confession is arguably relevant, this is not
the evidence competent to establish the probability that
Salapuddin participated in the commission of the crime. On
the contrary, as pointed out by the Secretary of Justice, this cannot
be considered against Salapuddin on account of the principle of
res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet.
The exception provided allowing the admission of a conspirator
requires the prior establishment of the conspiracy by
evidence other than the confession.
In this case, there is a dearth of proof demonstrating the
participation of Salapuddin in a conspiracy to set off a bomb in the
Batasan grounds and thereby kill Congressman Akbar. Not one
of the other persons arrested and subjected to custodial
investigation professed that Salapuddin was involved in the
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plan to set off a bomb in the Batasan grounds. Instead, the
investigating prosecutors did no more than to rely on Salapuddin's
association with these persons to conclude that he was a
participant in the conspiracy.
On conspiracy
Mere association with the principals by direct participation, without
more, does not suffice. Relationship, association and
companionship do not prove conspiracy. Salapuddin's
complicity to the crime, if this be the case, cannot be anchored on
his relationship, if any, with the arrested persons or his ownership
of the place where they allegedly stayed while in Manila.
It must be shown that the person concerned has performed an
overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. In fact,
mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act, without the
cooperation or approval to cooperate, is not sufficient to prove
conspiracy. There must be positive and conclusive factual
evidence indicating the existence of conspiracy, and not
simple inferences, conjectures and speculations speciously
sustained because it cannot be mere coincidence.
It is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some
overt acts as a direct or indirect contribution in the execution
of the crime planned to be committed. However, this overt act
may consist of:
- active participation in the actual commission of the
crime itself, or
- moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being
present at the commission of the crime or
- exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-
conspirators.
The rule is that conspiracy must be shown to exist by direct or
circumstantial evidence, as clearly and convincingly as the
crime itself. In the absence of direct proof thereof, as in the
present case, it may be:
- deduced from the mode, method, and manner by which
the offense was perpetrated, or
- inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when
such acts point to a joint purpose and design,
concerted action and community of interest.
Hence,it is necessary that a conspirator should have
performed some overt acts as a direct or indirect contribution
in the execution of the crime planned to be committed.
The overt act may consist of active participation in the actual
commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral
assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the
commission of the crime or by exerting moral ascendancy over the
other co-conspirators. Conspiracy transcends mere
companionship, it denotes an intentional participation in the
transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common
design and purpose.
In this case, on the other hand, no evidence or testimony, not even
Ikram's, suggests the presence of Salapuddin during the blast that
killed Congressman Akbar and injured several others. He cannot,
therefore, be properly accused of exerting an "overt act" by
extending "assistance" to whoever was responsible for the
commission of the felony.
SANTIAGO VS CA
Facts: Violation of the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law committed by
petitioner Santiago, with Waquez, Lozada and Dagohoy.
One of the herein accused Rogar Lozada, when investigated, told
the police that his companions were Dagohoy, Waquez and
Santiago.

In convicting Santiago, the TC and CA held that Santiago was
positively identified by his cohorts.
Note that Petitioner Santiago was not caught stealing the
carabao. He was not seen by the Sapian PNP inside the jeep
used in transporting the carabao subject of the offense. He
was not even seen having possession, custody or control of
the carabao. He was not in the company of Lozada when the
latter was caught by the members of the Ivisan PNP.
Note further that the testimony of the policemen show that
the appellants surrendered to the Police Station and told
them that it was Joebert Santiago who rented the vehicle to
transport the carabaos.
However, he was identified and indicted by virtue of the
declarations of Lozada and Waquez during the investigation.
Issue: Can Santiago be held guilty of cattle rustling?
HELD:
On Hearsay
The testimony of the policemen linking Santiago to the crime, are
inadmissible in evidence for being unabashedly hearsay. Neither
one of them saw Santiago having possession, custody or
control of the carabao. They had no personal knowledge that
Santiago participated in the commission of the crime. Petitioner
was implicated solely and purely on the policemen's
recollection of statements given by Lozada and Waquez while
under interrogation.
On Res Inter Alios Acta Rule
During their custodial investigation, Lozada and Waquez both
implicated Santiago as the person who allegedly rented the jeep.
They said he was with them when they transported the carabao.
However, such declarations, being extrajudicial, are
inadmissible in evidence against Santiago. The rights of a
party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of
another, except as may be allowed by the Rules of Court. Verily,
the admission of such declarations will violate the right of the
petitioner to due process, specifically his right to confront and
cross-examine his co-accused.
A different rule applies with respect to testimonies given
during the trial. In a number of instances, we have held that the
testimonies of particeps criminis may be admissible against the
person incriminated. But such rule is not without qualification. We
always advise:
1. caution in according probative value to the testimony of an
alleged co-conspirator, as the latter is deemed a polluted
source;
2. His or her declaration must be scrutinized with care and
subjected to grave suspicion.
True, such testimony, even if uncorroborated, may be sufficient to
convict a co-accused, provided it is shown to be sincere,
unhesitating, straightforward and detailed that it could not
have been the result of deliberate afterthought. Otherwise, his
testimony would require corroborative evidence which, if strong
and convincing, may be given its due weight and force.
Here, the testimonies of Lozada and Waquez are insufficient to
convict Santiago:
- the testimonies were not frank, candid and straightforward;
- no guarantee that they testified truthfully, since they claim to
have no knowledge to the carabao being stolen
- the identification of petitioner as malefactor was not sufficiently
established; Lozada did not identify petitioner in open court but
merely mentioned his name
- testimonies were not corroborated by other pieces of evidence.
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SEC 29. ADMISSION BY CO-PARTNER OR AGENT
ESTRADA VS DESIERTO
See: page 51 on Admission by Agent as an exception to
the Res Inter Alios Acta Rule
LEARNING CHILD INC and SPS ALFONSO vs
AYALA ALABANG VILLAGE ASSOCIATION (AAVA)
Facts: Ayala Land Inc. (ALI) sold to Sps. Yuson a parcel of land,
and the latter sold the same land to Sps. Alfonso, the TCT of which
contains an annotation of Deed of Restrictions with regard to
the use and occupancy of the land only being used for preparatory
(nursery and kindergarten) school.
ALI turned over the right and power to enforce the
restrictions to respondent AAVA.
In 1989 the petitioners opened on the same lot the Learning Child
Center Pre-School (TLC). However, in 1991 it expanded to
include a grade school program, prompting AAVA wrote letters
to petitioners, protesting the violation of the Deed of Restrictions.
Petitioners contends that AAVA had allegedly abrogated the
restrictions by its own acts, since ALI itself requested
reclassification of the property as institutional and that ALI, in a
1991 letter, assented to the reclassification.
AAVA: claims that the acts of ALI cannot be considered under the
res inter alios acta rule, as ALI is not a party to the case.
HELD:
ALI's statements, if damaging to AAVA, would be binding on the
latter. The general Ayala Alabang Village "Deed Restrictions,"
which was attached to the Deed of Restrictions on the title of the
subject property, expressly state that:
2. Compliance with the said restrictions, reservation,
easements and conditions maybe enjoined and/or
enforced by Court action by Ayala Corporation and/or
the Ayala Alabang Village Association, their respective
successors and assigns, or by any member of the
Ayala Alabang Village Association
As such, it appears that Ayala Corporation is jointly interested
with AAVA in an action to enforce the Deed of Restrictions,
and is therefore covered under the following exception to the res
inter alios acta rule: S29: Admission by co-partner or agent.
However, the acts of ALI are not at all damaging to the position of
AAVA. The alleged assent of ALI to the reclassification of the
subject property as institutional which does not amount to a
nullification of the Deed of Restrictions.
As regards the statement in ALI’s 1991 letter, it should be pointed
out that ALI's purported assent came with conditions:
- That ALI interposes no objection to the proposed
expansion as long as the conditions mentioned below
are met:
- That any change in the restrictions for Ayala Alabang
should be concurred to by the AAVA Board
- Such change should be approved by the residents of
the Village..
Therefore, the conditions for ALI’s approval of the alteration were
clearly not met.

NARRA NICKEL MINING vs
REDMONT CONSOLIDATED MINES CORP
Facts: Petitioners challenge the conclusion of the CA which
pertains to the close characteristics of partnerships and joint
venture agreements. Further, they asserted that before this
particular partnership can be formed, it should have been formally
reduced into writing since the capital involved is more than three
thousand pesos (PhP3,000). Being that there is no evidence of
written agreement to form a partnership between petitioners and
MBMI, no partnership was created.
Issue: Distinction between Partnership and Joint Ventures
HELD:
A partnership is defined as two or more persons who bind
themselves to contribute money, property, or industry to a
common fund with the intention of dividing the profits among
themselves. On the other hand, joint ventures have been
deemed to be "akin" to partnerships since it is difficult to
distinguish between joint ventures and partnerships.
The relations of the parties to a joint venture and the nature of their
association are so similar and closely akin to a partnership
that it is ordinarily held that their rights, duties, and liabilities
are to be tested by rules which are closely analogous to and
substantially the same, if not exactly the same, as those which
govern partnership. In fact, it has been said that the trend in the
law has been to blur the distinctions between a partnership and a
joint venture, very little law being found applicable to one that does
not apply to the other.
Though some claim that partnerships and joint ventures are totally
different animals, there are very few rules that differentiate one
from the other; thus, joint ventures are deemed "akin" or similar
to a partnership. In fact, in joint venture agreements, rules and
legal incidents governing partnerships are applied.
Accordingly, culled from the incidents and records of this case, it
can be assumed that the relationships entered between and
among petitioners and MBMI are no simple "joint venture
agreements." As a rule, corporations are prohibited from entering
into partnership agreements; consequently, corporations enter
into joint venture agreements with other corporations or
partnerships for certain transactions in order to form "pseudo
partnerships." As the intricate web of "ventures" entered into
by and among petitioners and MBMI was executed to
circumvent the legal prohibition against corporations
entering into partnerships, then the relationship created
should be deemed as "partnerships," and the laws on
partnership should be applied. Thus, a joint venture agreement
between and among corporations may be seen as similar to
partnerships since the elements of partnership are present.
Considering that the relationships found between petitioners and
MBMI are considered to be partnerships, then the CA is justified
in applying Sec. 29, Rule 130 of the Rules by stating that "by
entering into a joint venture, MBMI have a joint interest" with
Narra, Tesoro and McArthur.
SEC 30. ADMISSION BY CONSPIRATOR
PEOPLE VS BOKINGO and COL
Facts: Crime of Murder committed by Michael Bokingo and
Reynante Col. During preliminary investigation, the
stenographic reporter attests that Bokingo admitted that he
conspired with Col to kill deceased, and that they planned the
killing days before. Bokingo pleaded guilty while Col pleaded not
guilty. During pre-trial, Bokingo confessed to the crime charged.
TC: found Col and Bokingo guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
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CA: affirmed findings; found COL as guilty as conspirator beyond
reasonable doubt of murder.
Appellants filed MR; noting the absence of other evidence, aside
from Bokingo’s admission, to prove that conspiracy existed, and
that the admission by Bokingo cannot be used as evidence
against his alleged co-conspirator.
CA: Bokingo and Col are found guilty as conspirators beyond
reasonable doubt of Murder.
Appellants with SC raising whether Col is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as a co-conspirator.
HELD:
On Confession
In the case at bar, it was during the preliminary investigation that
Bokingco mentioned his and Col's plan to kill Pasion. Bokingco's
confession was admittedly taken without the assistance of counsel
in violation of Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides:
Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of
his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or
Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against
him.
The right to counsel applies in certain pretrial proceedings that can
be deemed 'critical stages' in the criminal process. The
preliminary investigation can be no different from the in-
custody interrogations by the police, for a suspect who takes
part in a preliminary investigation will be subjected to no less
than the State's processes, oftentimes intimidating and
relentless, of pursuing those who might be liable for criminal
prosecution.
In the instant case, the extrajudicial confession is inadmissible
against Bokingco because he was not assisted at all by
counsel during the time his confession was taken before a judge.
On Conspiracy
In order to convict Col as a principal by direct participation in the
case before us, it is necessary that conspiracy between him
and Bokingco be proved.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement to commit an unlawful act.
- It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before,
during, and after the commission of the crime.
- It may be deduced from the mode and manner in which
the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of
the accused evincing a joint or common purpose and
design, concerted action, and community of interest.
Unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful
objective are essential to establish the existence of conspiracy. As
a rule, conspiracy must be established with the same
quantum of proof as the crime itself and must be shown as
clearly as the commission of the crime.
Their acts did not reveal a unity of purpose that is to kill Pasion.
Bokingco had already killed Pasion even before he sought
Col. Their moves were not coordinated because while
Bokingco was killing Pasion because of his pent-up anger, Col
was attempting to rob the pawnshop.

On Res Inter Alios Acta Rule
In as much as Bokingco's extrajudicial confession is inadmissible
against him, it is likewise inadmissible against Col, specifially
where he implicated the latter as a cohort. RE: S28R130.
An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made
by a conspirator. S30R130. In order that the admission of a
conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it
is necessary that:
1. first, the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than
the admission itself;
2. second, the admission relates to the common object; and
3. third, it has been made while the declarant was engaged in
carrying out the conspiracy.
As we have previously discussed, we did not find any sufficient
evidence to establish the existence of conspiracy. Therefore, the
extrajudicial confession has no probative value and is
inadmissible in evidence against Col.
PEOPLE VS PALIJON, MERCENE, DECENA,
PRIA and JOHN DOES
Facts: Crime of Robbery with Homicide by accused-appellants.
The prosecution’s case was propelled in the main by the testimony
of Mercene, who gave evidence against said co-accused, pointing
to the other accused as co-conspirators in the commission of the
crime.
Issue: Is Pria a conspirator as testified to by Mercene?
HELD: YES.
The trial court did not err in giving credence to the tesy5timony of
Mercene. The latter testified that Pria was only 1-1/2 meters away
from them when they were plotting the robbery. The house of
Palijon where they hatched their plan is a small, one-room house
with an area of approximately twenty (20) meters only.
Both facts clearly show that Pria could easily participate in the
discussion of the conspirators. Mercene's declarations are
positive testimonial evidence. They outweigh Decena's
unsubstantiated denial of Pria's participation in the criminal
conspiracy. Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, deserves no weight in law and cannot be given greater
evidentiary weight over the testimony of a credible witness who
testifies on affirmative matters.
In our view, notwithstanding her absence from the actual crime
scene, Pria, as a conspirator, is as liable for robbery with
homicide just as if she had participated in the actual robbing
and killing. At the instant that the plotters agree, expressly or
impliedly, to commit the crime and pursue it, each and every
member of the conspiracy is criminally liable for the felony
committed by anyone of them.
On Res Inter Alios Acta Rule
PALIJON’S CONTENTIONS: that the trial court erred when it
convicted him on the basis of the confession of his co-
accused; that in determining the weight and sufficiency of the
admissions of a self-confessed co-conspirator, the trial court
should have exercised the greatest caution and held that such
confession should have been corroborated by other evidence to
establish his participation in the conspiracy or in the commission
of the crime. Appellant Palijon denies he conspired with the others.
He says the trial court erred in convicting him on the basis of the
testimonies of his alleged conspirators. Their testimonies could
not be taken against him under the principle of res inter alios
acta alteri nocere non debet as formulated in Sections 28 38 and
30 39 Rule 130, of the Rules of Court.
In ruling upon Palijon's arguments, we must make a
distinction between extrajudicial and judicial confessions.
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EJ Confession Jud. Confession
may be given in evidence admissible against the
against the confessant but declarant's co-accused since
not against his co-accused as the latter are afforded
they are deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine
opportunity to cross-examine the former
him
S30R130 applies only to extrajudicial acts or admissions and not
to testimony at trial where the party adversely affected has the
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Mercene's
admission implicating his co-accused was given on the
witness stand. It is admissible in evidence against appellant
Palijon.
Moreover, where several accused are tried together for the
same offense, the testimony of a co-accused implicating his
co-accused is competent evidence against the latter.
PEOPLE VS CACHUELA AND IBAÑEZ
Facts: Crime of Robbery with Homicide. The NBI formed an
entrapment team. Upon their arrival, Melvin Nabilgas approached
them and told them that he had been sent by accused to look for
buyers of firearms. Nabilgas surrendered to the police and
gave the names of the other persons involved in the crime.
Zaldy, one of the employee of the premises robbed, pointed to
appellants during a police line-up, as the persosn responsible for
the robbery. Nabilgas also executed a handwritten confession
implicating the appellants and Zaldy in the crime.
Note that the prosecution filed an information for robbery against
appellants Nabilgas and Zaldy (because it was alleged to be an
inside job).
HELD:
On admissibility of the extrajudicial confession of Nabilgas
(note that the confession was made at the NBI Main Office, and
during trial, he repudiated this confession) Such ej confession is
inadmissible in evidence. An extrajudicial confession, to be
admissible, must satisfy the following requirements:
1. the confession must be voluntary;
2. it must be made with the assistance of a competent and
independent counsel, preferably of the confessant's
choice;
3. it must be express; and
4. it must be in writing.
Here, Nabilgas was already under custodial investigation by the
authorities when he executed the alleged written confession. A
custodial investigation begins when there is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime, and the investigation has
started to focus on a particular person as a suspect.
The lawyer called to be present during custodial investigations
should, as far as practicable, be the choice of the individual
undergoing questioning. If the lawyer is furnished by the police
for the accused, it is important that the lawyer should be
competent, independent and prepared to fully safeguard the
constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from one
who would merely be giving a routine, peremptory and
meaningless recital of the individual's constitutional rights.
Nabilgas' confession was not made with the assistance of a
competent and independent counsel. The services of Atty. Melita
Go, the lawyer who acted in Nabilgas' behalf, were provided by
the NBI itself; she was assigned the task despite Nabilgas' open
declaration to the agency's investigators that he already had a
lawyer in the person of Atty. Donardo Paglinawan. Nabilgas also
testified that Atty. Go did not disclose that she was a lawyer when

she was called to assist him; she merely represented herself to be
a mere witness to the confession.
On Res Inter Alios Acta Rule
Nabilgas' extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence
against the appellants in view of the res inter alios acta rule.
An exception to the res inter alias acta rule is an admission made
by a conspirator. This exception, however, does not apply in the
present case since there was no other piece of evidence
presented, aside from the extrajudicial confession, to prove that
Nabilgas conspired with the appellants in committing the crime
charged. Conspiracy cannot be presumed and must be shown
as distinctly and conclusively as the crime itself. Nabilgas, in
fact, was acquitted by the trial court due to insufficiency of
evidence to prove his participation in the crime.
On admissibility of the out-of-court identification
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various
ways. It is done thru:
1. show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face-to-
face with the witness for identification.
2. mug shots where photographs are shown to the
witness to identify the suspect.
3. line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a
group of persons lined up for the purpose.
In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court
identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of
circumstances test where they consider the following factors,
viz.:
1. the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time
of the crime;
2. the witness' degree of attention at that time;
3. the accuracy of any prior description, given by the
witness;
4. the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at
the identification;
5. the length of time between the crime and the
identification; and
6. the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
Failure to state relevant details is a glaring omission that renders
unreliable Zaldy’s out of court identification. The absence of an
independent in-court identification by Zaldy additionally justifies
our strict treatment and assessment of Lino's testimony.
PEOPLE VS CONSTANCIO y BACUNGAY and BERRY y
BACUNGAY
Facts: Rape with Homicide against AAA. Berry confessed his
participation in the crime and provided the names of his
companions namely: Pagkalinawan, one alias Burog, and Darden.
Also, a reporter of the ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation; that
he covered the news on the murder case of "AAA," and that he
personally interviewed Berry, who revealed that his co-accused
Constancio is his cousin, and his three companions were alias
Burog, Pagkalinawan, and Darden, all three of whom he just met
that very night, and disclosed the details of the commission of the
crime.
HELD:
On EJ Confession by Berry during Preliminary Investigation
Berry’s confession is admissible because it was voluntarily
executed with the assistance of a competent and independent
counsel in the person of Atty. Suarez. In point of fact Atty. Suarez
testified that he thoroughly explained to Berry his constitutional
rights and the consequences of any statements he would give.
Atty. Suarez is a competent and independent counsel and that he
was in fact chosen by Berry himself during the custodial
investigation; and that he was no stranger at all to the processes
and methods of a custodial investigation. In default of proof that
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Atty. Suarez was remiss in his duties, as in this case, this Court
must hold that the custodial investigation of Berry was
regularly conducted. For this reason, Berry's extrajudicial
confession is admissible in evidence against him.
On EJ Confession by Berry to News Reporter
It is already settled that statements spontaneously made by a
suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed
voluntary and are admissible in evidence. In this case, there
was no ample proof to show that appellant Berry's narration
of events to ABS-CBN reporter Dindo Amparo was the
product of intimidation or coercion, thus making the same
admissible in evidence. Berry's confession is admissible in
evidence because it was voluntarily made to a news reporter and
not to the police authority or to an investigating officer. Amparo
testified that he requested Berry for an interview in connection with
his confession, and that the latter freely acceded. Hence, Berry's
confession to Amparo, a news reporter, was made freely and
voluntarily and is admissible in evidence.
On Conspiracy
In this case, while there was no direct proof of a previous
agreement to rape and kill "AAA," it was nonetheless clear from
Berry's conduct that he acted in concerted effort and was united
in intent, aim and purpose in executing the group's criminal
design. This was established by Adarna's testimony stating that
he saw Berry throw the body of "AAA" over a bridge and that he
was in "AAA's" car the night she was killed. By helping his cousin
and co-accused Constancio dispose of the body of "AAA," Berry
became a co-conspirator by direct participation. It is immaterial
that Berry was merely present at the scene of the crime since it is
settled that in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. If it is true
that Berry was not privy to the plan of raping and killing "AAA," he
should have prevented the same from happening or at the very
least, left the group and reported the crime to the authorities. Berry
did neither and he even helped Constancio dispose of "AAA's"
body. Clearly, Berry, by his overt acts, became a co-conspirator
by directly participating in the execution of the criminal design.
On Berry’s confession being admissible against Constancio
The general rule is that an extra-judicial confession is binding only
on the confessant and is inadmissible in evidence against his co-
accused since it is considered hearsay against them. However,
as an exception to this rule, the Court has held that an extra-
judicial confession is admissible against a co-accused when
it is used as circumstantial evidence to show the probability
of participation of said co- accused in the crime.
In order that an extra-judicial confession may be used against a
co-accused of the confessant, "there must be a finding of other
circumstantial evidence which when taken together with the
confession would establish the guilt of a co-accused beyond
reasonable doubt.
Applying the rule to Constancio's case, the Court finds that the
prosecution was able to show circumstantial evidence to
implicate him in the crime.
Significantly, Constancio was positively identified as among those
who threw the body of "AAA" over a bridge. It is significant to note
that eyewitness also attests that Constancio was riding in the very
same car where "AAA" was raped and killed. This fact leaves this
Court without a doubt that Constancio is guilty of the crime
charged as the same qualifies as circumstantial evidence showing
his participation in the execution of the crime.

PEOPLE vs
MAJOR COMILING, SALAGUBANG (acquitted), GALINGAN
(acquitted), CALDERON (at large), CABOTAJE (at large)
MENDOZA (at large
Facts: Crime of robbery with homicide.
Prosecution witness Naty Panimbaan testified that she was
present in all the four meetings in which the plan to rob the grocery
was hatched.
COMILING contends that
1. Naty's testimony showed that she was also a
conspirator, thus, the existence of conspiracy must
be shown by evidence other than Naty's admission.
2. there was no independent proof of conspiracy except
the testimony of Naty, the latter's testimony concerning
appellant’s participation in the conspiracy was
inadmissible against him
3. that he cannot be held liable as he was not
physically present and had no ostensible
participation therein
HELD: The contention is misplaced.
On Res Inter Alios Acta Rule
The res inter alios acta rule refers only to extrajudicial
declarations or admissions and not to testimony given on the
witness stand where the party adversely affected has the
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. In the present
case, Naty's admission implicating appellant Comiling was made
in open court and therefore may be taken in evidence against him.
On Comiling’s absence during the robbery
Although Comiling was never tagged as one of the three robbers
who entered the store of Ysiong Chua nor the one who mauled
the victim or who shot PO3 Erwil Pastor to death, his
participation was his leadership in the conspiracy to commit
robbery with homicide and his inducement to his cohorts to
perpetrate the same. One who plans the commission of a crime
is a principal by inducement.
Principalship by inducement (or by induction) presupposes that
the offender himself is determined to commit the felony and must
have persistently clung to his determination. In all the meetings
prior to the commission of the crime, Comiling was seen and heard
presiding over and leading the group. He was even the one who
assigned each of his men his specific role in the robbery.
PEOPLE vs BAYDO y ARACAMO
Facts: Crime of murder (by accused Baydo and Navarro). The
accused offered his testimony and that of his co-accused,
George Navarro.
For his part, George Navarro narrated the commission of the
offense and how they planned the killing, and that he, together
with Lino Salandanan, shot the deceased.
The trial court found accused Baydo guilty of murder.
BAYDO: the prosecution was not able to provide the qualifying
circumstance of evident premeditation.
HELD: The Court agrees that evident premeditation was not
proven in this case.
True, it can be deduced from the narration of George Navarro that
the commission of the offense was planned and that there was an
inexorable resolve to kill Leonardo Punongbayan.
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It cannot be ignored, however, that Navarro was referring to Lino
Salandanan as his accomplice. Nowhere was the name of
appellant mentioned as a member of the group which planned
the death of Leonardo. Although the evidence revealed that it
was really appellant who cooperated with Navarro in the killing,
the admission of Navarro regarding evident premeditation
cannot be taken against appellant in the absence of proof of
conspiracy.
"The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration,
or omission of another" 22 except as otherwise provided in
Sections 29 to 32 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Besides, it
does not follow that appellant was the one referred to as "Lino
Salandanan" just because he actually cooperated with Navarro in
the commission of the crime. No proof whatsoever was
adduced by the prosecution that appellant was ever called
"Lino Salandanan" or known by that name.
PEOPLE vs JANJALANI, BAHARAN, ASALI, SOLAIMAN, et al.
Facts: Multiple murder and frustrated murder. One of the accused
Abu Sayyaf members, accused Asali, was discharged as a state
witnessss, he testified that Abu Sayyaf group was determined to
sow terror in metro manila, and that accused herein had carefully
planned the valentine’s day bombing incident.
Accused contends that the testimony of Asali is inadmissible
under S30R130.
Held:
On res inter alios acta
It is true that under the rule, statements made by a conspirator
against a co-conspirator are admissible only when made during
the existence of the conspiracy.
However, as the Court, if the declarant repeats the statement
in court, his extrajudicial confession becomes a judicial
admission, making the testimony admissible as to both
conspirators.
On finding of conspiracy
Asali's clear and categorical testimony, which remains
unrebutted on its major points, coupled with the judicial
admissions freely and voluntarily given by the two other
accused, are sufficient to prove the existence of a conspiracy
hatched between and among the four accused, all members of the
terrorist group Abu Sayyaf, to wreak chaos and mayhem in the
metropolis by indiscriminately killing and injuring civilian victims by
utilizing bombs and other similar destructive explosive devices.
While said conspiracy involving the four malefactors has not been
expressly admitted by accused Baharan, Angelo Trinidad, and
Rohmat, more specifically with respect to the latter's participation
in the commission of the crimes, nonetheless it has been
established by virtue of the aforementioned evidence, which
established the existence of the conspiracy itself and the
indispensable participation of accused Rohmat in seeing to it that
the conspirators' criminal design would be realized.
The defendants are engaged in a conspiracy "when the
defendants by their acts aimed at the same object, one
performing one part and the other performing another part so
as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of the same
object; and their acts, though apparently independent, were
in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of
personal association, concerted action and concurrence of
sentiments."
 69
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SEC 31. ADMISSION BY PRIVIES

HELD:
An admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by
the party making such admission and becomes conclusive on him,
and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or
inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether an
objection is interposed by the adverse party or not. This doctrine
is embodied in Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. — An admission, verbal or

written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in
the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be
contradicted only by showing that it was made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.

In the absence of a compelling reason to the contrary,

respondents' judicial admission of ownership of the Swiss
deposits is definitely binding on them. The individual and
separate admissions of each respondent bind all of them
pursuant to Sections 29 and 31, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 29. Admission by co-partner or agent. — The act

or declaration of a partner or agent of the party within the
scope of his authority and during the existence of the
partnership or agency, may be given in evidence against such
party after the partnership or agency is shown by evidence
other than such act or declaration. The same rule applies to
the act or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other
person jointly interested with the party.
SEC. 31. Admission by privies. — Where one derives
title to property from another, the act, declaration, or
omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation
to the property, is evidence against the former.

The declarations of a person are admissible against a party

whenever a "privity of estate" exists between the declarant and
the party, the term "privity of estate" generally denoting a
succession in rights. Consequently, an admission of one in privity
with a party to the record is competent. Without doubt, privity
exists among the respondents in this case. And where several
co-parties to the record are jointly interested in the subject matter
of the controversy, the admission of one is competent against all.


SEC 32. ADMISSION BY SILENCE
PEOPLE VS ROA
Facts: Victim’s mother confronted appellant but he remained
silent. He was also confronted about the alleged rape and cursed
but he did not retaliate and remained silent. Appellant was
maltreated into jail where he was detained, but he did not
complain.
Held: His admitted silence when Nina's mother confronted and
even cursed him by his claim, betrays his guilt just as his passivity
does when he was allegedly maltreated and haled into jail by
Nina's father on account of the incidents. For an innocent man
would certainly strongly protest and deny a false accusation and
do something positive to spare himself of punishment. But he did
not.
PEOPLE VS MAGDADARO Y GERONA
See: page 55 on Admission
by Silence
PEOPLE VS PARAGSA
Facts: Appellant admits having sexual intercourse with Mirasol,
the complaining witness, but he stoutly denied that he did so by
employing force or intimidation against Mirasol. He claims he and
Mirasol were sweethearts; that on the day of the incident, it was
Mirasol who invited him to the latter's house where they had
sexual intercourse after kissing each other; and that the
intercourse they had that afternoon was, as a matter of fact, their
third sexual intercourse.
Held: A careful scrutiny of the record reveals that the
prosecution's evidence is weak, unsatisfactory and inconclusive
to justify a conviction. Certain circumstances negate the
commission by the appellant of the crime charged and point to the
conclusion that the sexual intercourse between the appellant
and the complaining witness was voluntary. Force and
intimidation were not proven.
Mirasol did not offer any resistance or vocal protestation against
the alleged sexual assault. She could have easily made an outcry
or resisted the appellant's advances without endangering her life.
But she did not. She was allegedly raped in her own home, not far
from her neighbors and during the daytime. If, indeed, she was
raped under the circumstances narrated by her, she could have
revealed the same the very moment she was confronted by her
aunt Lita who asked her what the accused did to her.
Mirasol did not reveal immediately to her parents that she was
raped. It was only after her mother arrived from Sagay, Negros
Occidental, three (3) days after the incident, and confronted her
about the rape incident that her mother learned through her aunt
Lita that she eventually revealed to her mother what the accused
did to her in the afternoon of July 13, 1971.
Still another circumstance is the fact that Mirasol did not bother
at all to rebut the testimony of the appellant and his witnesses
to the effect that the accused and Mirasol were actually
sweethearts; and that they had two previous sexual
communications.
The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as an implied
admission of the truth of the statements uttered in his presence is
applicable in criminal cases. But before the silence of a party
can be taken as an admission of what is said, it must appear:
1. that he heard and understood the statement;
2. that he was at liberty to interpose a denial;
3. that the statement was in respect to some matter
affecting his rights or in which he was then interested,
and calling, naturally, for an answer;
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4. that the facts were within his knowledge; and
5. that the fact admitted or the inference to be drawn from
his silence would be material to the issue.
These requisites of admission by silence all obtain in the present
case. Hence, the silence of Mirasol on the facts asserted by the
accused and his witnesses may be safely construed as an
admission of the truth of such assertion.
SOLAS VS POWER TELEPHONE SUPPLY
Facts: In this case, petitioner's allegations that respondents
committed acts of harassment, i.e., the withholding of his salary
for the month of February and directing him to return the company
car, cellphone and office keys, have been rebutted and sufficiently
explained by private respondent company in its Position Paper.
Respondents were able to show that its acts were not intended to
harass or discriminate against petitioner.
Held: Notably, petitioner never refuted respondents' explanations
for withholding his salary and the reasons why he was required to
return the company car, key and cellphone. This constitutes
admission by silence under Section 32, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. Verily, the only conclusion that may be reached is that
respondents' explanations are truthful and, based thereon, the
NLRC and the CA committed no grave abuse of discretion in ruling
that there was no constructive dismissal in this case.
PEOPLE VS RANARIO
Held: It is true that when Leon Caday made his confession, in
which he implicates Fulgencio Ranario, the latter was present
and said nothing, according to justice of the peace Castor del
Bando, but it does not appear that Fulgencio Ranario heard
the confession of Leon Caday nor had the opportunity to
deny it.
On the other hand, however, it does appear that when Leon
Caday, in the presence of the Constabulary soldiers, was shown
the bolo that Fulgencio Ranario carried and said it was the one
that had been given him by the appellant, a discussion took
place between them in which the said Fulgencio Ranario
denied having given the said Leon Caday his bolo and having
been in his house.
SEC 33. CONFESSION
PEOPLE VS DE LOS SANTOS
HELD: It is significant to consider that the confession was taken
on December 7, 1971 by Pat. Conrado Francisco while the alleged
maltreatment was done in the evening of December 6, 1971. It is
unbelievable that the alleged maltreatment made by the two
policemen was what induced appellant to admit the crime the
following day. Ordinarily, confessions executed through
intimidation or maltreatment are obtained during or
immediately after the supposed maltreatment.
In the instant case, appellant alleges that in spite of the alleged
manhandling, he never admitted anything that evening and the
two policemen desisted from further harming him. However, when
investigated the following day by police detective Conrado
Francisco, appellant readily confessed his participation in the
killing of Gregorio Dotado. In fact, during the cross-examination,
appellant expressly acknowledged that Pat. Francisco neither
maltreated nor intimidated him during the investigation.
A confession is deemed to have been made voluntarily if the
accused did not complain to the proper authorities regarding the
alleged maltreatment despite the opportunity to do so.

If appellant's confession was voluntary, we have to conclude that
Dotado was slain in the manner and for the reason set out in that
document. It is needless to say that no one in his right mind
would convict himself without compulsion by fabricating a
highly self-damaging story and suppressing the truth which
would absolve him.
Another factor that militates against the claim of appellant of
involuntariness in the execution of the confession is the fact that
the confession is replete with details that only the confessant
could have known.
The Court is of the view that appellant's admission voluntarily
made and confirmed by him in open court during his trial,
renders worthless the challenge now interposed by him to the
admissibility of his sworn statement (confession).
PEOPLE VS SATORRE
Facts: Appellant claims that his alleged confession or admission,
which was concocted by the Barangay Captain, is inadmissible in
evidence for being hearsay and for being obtained without a
competent and independent counsel of his choice.
HELD: An admission as an "act, declaration or omission of a party
as to a relevant fact." A confession, on the other hand is the
"declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense
charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein." Both
may be given in evidence against the person admitting or
confessing. On the whole, a confession, as distinguished from an
admission, is a declaration made at any time by a person,
voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement, stating or
acknowledging that he had committed or participated in the
commission of a crime.
Evidently, appellant's alleged declaration owning up to the
killing before the Barangay Captain was a confession. Since
the declaration was not put in writing and made out of court,
it is an oral extrajudicial confession.
Rationale for the admissibility of a confession: is that if it is
made freely and voluntarily, a confession constitutes evidence
of a high order since it is supported by the strong presumption
that no sane person or one of normal mind will deliberately and
knowingly confess himself to be the perpetrator of a crime, unless
prompted by truth and conscience.
Basic test for the validity of a confession: Was it voluntarily
and freely made?
On Voluntariness
The term "voluntary" means that the accused speaks of his free
will and accord, without inducement of any kind, and with a full and
complete knowledge of the nature and consequences of the
confession, and when the speaking is so free from influences
affecting the will of the accused, at the time the confession was
made, that it renders it admissible in evidence against him. Plainly,
the admissibility of a confession in evidence hinges on its
voluntariness.
The voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its
language such that if, upon its face, the confession exhibits no
suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its
integrity, it being replete with details — which could only be
supplied by the accused — reflecting spontaneity and
coherence, it may be considered voluntary.
At any rate, an extrajudicial confession forms but a prima facie
case against the party by whom it is made. Such confessions
are not conclusive proof of that which they state; it may be
proved that they were uttered in ignorance, or levity, or mistake;
and hence, they are, at best, to be regarded as only cumulative
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proof which affords but a precarious support and on which, when
uncorroborated, a verdict cannot be permitted to rest.
To be sure, a confession is not required to be in any particular
form. It may be oral or written, formal or informal in character.
It may be recorded on video tape, sound motion pictures, or tape.
However, while not required to be in writing to be admissible
in evidence, it is advisable, if not otherwise recorded by video
tape or other means, to reduce the confession to writing. This
adds weight to the confession and helps convince the court that it
was freely and voluntarily made. If possible the confession, after
being reduced to writing, should be read to the defendant, have it
read by defendant, have him sign it, and have it attested by
witnesses.
Indeed, an extrajudicial confession will not support a
conviction where it is uncorroborated. There must be such
corroboration that, when considered in connection with
confession, will show the guilt of accused beyond a reasonable
doubt. Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient corroboration of
a confession. It is not necessary that the supplementary
evidence be entirely free from variance with the extrajudicial
confession, or that it show the place of offense or the
defendant's identity or criminal agency. All facts and
circumstances attending the particular offense charged are
admissible to corroborate extrajudicial confession.
PEOPLE VS CAVITE
HELD: None of the three (3) affidavits contains any
acknowledgment of "guilt of the offense charged" on the part of
the affiants. Not one of them acknowledged having laid a hand
on the victim or assisted in inflicting any injury on him, or
having taken, or assisted in the taking of any property for
him. On the contrary, they all disclaimed any participation in the
offense or even knowledge of any intention or plan to kill or rob
Pedro Nacional. The most that perhaps may be said about the
affidavits, as evidence against the affiants, is that they are
admissions that the latter were in fact at the scene as the crime
was being perpetrated.
Moreover, it is impermissible to pick the affidavits apart, lending
credence only to the portions seen as incriminatory, while
disregarding as false and unacceptable those supportive of
innocence, absent, as here, any circumstance which would
logically justify such dismemberment.
The circumstances surrounding the custodial investigation of the
three affiants, Cavite, et al., suggests that the counsel who
assisted them — the same for all three as it turned out — was less
their free choice, as he should have been, than the arbitrary one
of their investigators.
UNITED STATES VS CORRALES
HELD: The statutory provision excluding evidence as to
confessions until and unless the prescribed foundation is laid is
not applicable to admissions, which do not amount to
confessions although they may be sufficient, when taken
together with other evidence of surrounding circumstances,
to sustain an inference of the guilt of the accused.
The reason for the rule excluding evidence as to confessions
unless it is first made to appear that they are made voluntarily
does not apply in cases of admissions, although, of course,
evidence of the fact that a particular statement was made under
duress would tend very strongly to destroy its evidentiary value.
There is no provision of law which prescribes that either
confessions or admissions are not competent evidence
unless made under oath. It is the fact that they are made by the
accused and against his own interest which gives to them their

evidentiary value, and provided the fact is established it does not
matter whether they are made under oath or not.
PEOPLE VS ARTELLERO
Issue: Whether the extrajudicial confession of accused Rodriguez
is admissible not only against him but also against appellant.
HELD: We find that Rodriguez's confession is
constitutionally flawed so that it could not be used as
evidence against them at all.
The four fundamental requisites for the admissibility of a
confession are:
1. the confession must be voluntary;
2. the confession must be made with the assistance of
competent and independent counsel;
3. the confession must be express; and
4. the confession must be in writing.
We find the second requisite lacking.
The accused and appellant were arrested and brought to the
police station at around 5:00 P.M. of October 11, 1991.
The extrajudicial confession of Rodriguez was taken at 2:00 P.M.
of October 15, 1991. Atty. Lao confirmed on the stand that the
police investigators called him at around 2:00 P.M. of October 15,
1991, and that he conferred with the accused for about 10 minutes
prior to the execution of the extrajudicial confession.
Evidently, the accused were detained for four days, but Atty. Lao
of the PAO was called only on the fourth day of detention
when accused was about to put his confession in writing.
Under the factual milieu, the moment accused and appellant
were arrested and brought to the police station, they were
already under custodial investigation. An accused who is on
board the police vehicle on the way to the police station is already
under custodial investigation, and should therefore be accorded
his rights under the Constitution.
Custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage
when the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular person
as a suspect. When Rodriguez and appellant were arrested by
the police in the afternoon of October 11, 1991, they were already
the suspects in the slaying of the security guard, Ramon Matias,
and should have been afforded the rights guaranteed by
Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, particularly the
right to counsel. Jurisprudence is clear that an accused under
custodial investigation must continuously have a counsel
assisting him from the very start thereof. In this case,
Rodriguez and appellant were in the hands of the police for about
four days without the assistance counsel.
The operative act, it has been stressed, is when the police
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect who has
been taken into custody by the police to carry out a process of
interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminatory statements,
and not the signing by the suspect of his supposed extrajudicial
confession. Thus, admissions obtained during custodial
investigation without the benefit of counsel although later
reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel are
still flawed under the Constitution.
Even granting that the extrajudicial confession of accused was
admissible, such confession is only admissible against the
confessant. In order to be admissible against his co-accused,
there must be independent evidence aside from the
extrajudicial confession to prove conspiracy. In this case,
however, no other piece of evidence was presented to prove the
alleged conspiracy.
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PEOPLE VS URRO
HELD: It is established doctrine that the confession or
"declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt
of the offense charged" may be given in evidence against
him, where it is voluntary.
Involuntary or coerced confessions obtained by force or
intimidation are null and void and are abhorred by the law,
which proscribes the use of such cruel and inhuman methods to
secure a confession. A coerced confession "stands discredited in
the eyes of the law and is as a thing that never existed.
While there is convincing evidence of violence, the validity and
admissibility of the confession are destroyed. The issue
generally focuses on the voluntariness of the confession which
in turn depends upon the credibility of the witnesses.
The case at bar is replete with numerous clear warning signals for
the rejection of the alleged confessions.
- The prosecution could not even establish who actually
reduced the confessions to writing and the intrinsic evidence
of the language and style of the confessions themselves
indicate their prefabrication per the homology and
identity of the words used, sentence for sentence, and
word for word but for necessary changes in the names
of the accused referred to, and that they could not have
been the confessions, voluntarily made, of two different
persons;
- The fact that the alleged confessions were made in a
language (English) not known to the accused, nor even to
their investigator and the official before whom they allegedly
swore to the truth thereof.
PEOPLE VS BASCUGIN Y AGQUIZ
HELD: The decisive factor in Bascugin's conviction was his
admission to the crime when he was examined by his lawyer in
court. Bascugin's confession was freely, intelligently, and
deliberately given. Judicial confession constitutes evidence of
a high order. The presumption is that no sane person would
deliberately confess to the commission of a crime unless
prompted to do so by truth and conscience. Admission of guilt
constitutes evidence against the accused.
PEOPLE VS MUIT
HELD: The extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and
Muit strengthened the case against them. There is nothing on
record to support appellants' claim that they were coerced
and tortured into executing their extra judicial confessions.
One of the indicia of voluntariness in the execution of
appellants' extra judicial statements is that each contains many
details and facts which the investigating officers could not
have known and could not have supplied, without the
knowledge and information given by appellants.
Moreover, the appellants were assisted by their lawyers when
they executed their statements.
The rule that an extra judicial confession is evidence only
against the person making it recognizes various exceptions,
to wit:
1. Where several extra judicial statements had been made by
several persons charged with an offense and there could
have been no collusion with reference to said several
confessions, the fact that the statements are in all material
respects identical is confirmatory of the confession of the co-
defendants and is admissible against other persons
implicated therein.

2. They are also admissible as circumstantial evidence
against the person implicated therein to show the
probability of the latter's actual participation in the
commission of the crime and may likewise serve as
corroborative evidence if it is clear from other facts and
circumstances that other persons had participated in
the perpetration of the crime charged and proved. These
are known as "interlocking confessions".
RA 7438, AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSON
ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE DUTIES OF THE
ARRESTING, DETAINING AND INVESTIGATING OFFICERS,
AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF
PEOPLE V. FELIXMINIA Y CAMACHO
HELD: A person under custodial investigation should enjoy the
right to counsel from its inception to its termination. Truly, the
accused's counsel of choice must be present and must be able to
advise and assist his client from the time he answers the first
question until the time he signs the extra-judicial confession.
PEOPLE V. JIMENEZ
HELD: The lawyer who assists the suspect under custodial
investigation should be of the latter's own choice, not one foisted
on him by the police investigators or other parties. In this case,
former Judge Jabagat was evidently not of Marcos Jimenez' own
choice; she was the police officers' choice; she did not ask Marcos
if he was willing to have her represent him; she just told him: "I am
here because I was summoned to assist you and I am going to
assist you." This is not the mode of solicitation of legal
assistance contemplated by the Constitution.
The typewritten confession is, in any event, unsigned, as are the
handwritten notes from which the former was derived. The
interrogation of Marcos Jimenez having been conducted without
the assistance of counsel, and no valid waiver of said right to
counsel having been made, not only the confession but also any
admission obtained in the course thereof are inadmissible against
Marcos Jimenez. Any confession or admission obtained in
violation among others of the rights guaranteed in custodial
investigations shall be inadmissible in evidence against the
person making the confession or admission. This is so even
if it be shown that the statements attributed to the accused
were voluntarily made, or are afterwards confirmed to be true
by external circumstances.
PEOPLE V. CHI CHAN LIU
HELD: Anent appellants' claim that their constitutional rights were
further violated for during custodial investigation, they did not have
counsel of their choice nor were they provided with one, this
deserves scant consideration since the same is relevant and
material only when an extrajudicial admission or confession
extracted from an accused becomes the basis of his
conviction. In this case, neither one of the appellants executed
an admission or confession. In fact, as the records clearly show,
appellants barely even spoke and merely kept repeating the
phrase "call China, big money." The trial court convicted them not
on the basis of anything they said during custodial investigation
but on other convincing evidence such as the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. Verily, there was no violation of appellants'
constitutional right to counsel during custodial investigation.
AQUINO V. PAISTE
HELD: Republic Act No. (RA) 7438 has extended this
constitutional guarantee to situations in which an individual has
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not been formally arrested but has merely been "invited" for
questioning. Specifically, Sec. 2 of RA 7438 provides that
custodial investigation shall include the practice of issuing an
invitation to a person who is investigated in connection with an
offense he is suspected to have committed.
When petitioner was brought by respondent before the NBI-NCR
to be investigated, she was already under custodial
investigation and the constitutional guarantee for her rights
under the Miranda Rule has set in. Since she did not have a
lawyer then, she was provided with one in the person of Atty. Uy,
which fact is undisputed. However, the custodial investigation
on the inquiry or investigation for the crime was either
aborted or did not push through as the parties, petitioner, and
respondent agreed to amicably settle. Thus, the amicable
settlement with a waiver of right to counsel appended was
executed with both parties affixing their signatures on it in the
presence of Atty. Uy and NBI agent Atty. Ely Tolentino.
When the accused never raised any objection against the
lawyer's appointment during the course of the investigation
and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his
statement before the swearing officer, the accused is deemed to
have engaged such lawyer.
Note that the infractions of the so-called Miranda rights render
inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission
made during custodial investigation. The admissibility of other
evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and is not
otherwise excluded by law or rules, is not affected even if
obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation.
MESINA V. PEOPLE
HELD: Contrary to the petitioner's claim, the fact that he was one
of those being investigated did not by itself define the nature
of the investigation as custodial. For him, the investigation was
still a general inquiry to ascertain the whereabouts of the missing
patubig collection. By its nature, the inquiry had to involve
persons who had direct supervision over the issue, including
the City Treasurer, the City Auditor, the representative from
different concerned offices, and even the City Mayor. What was
conducted w s not an investigation that already focused on the
petitioner as the culprit but an administrative inquiry into the
missing city funds. Besides, he was not as of then in the
custody of the police or other law enforcement office.
PEOPLE V. GUTING Y TOMAS
HELD: Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated
by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way. It is only after the investigation ceases to be a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus on a
particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the
police carries out a process of interrogations that lends itself to
eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate.
Hence, accused-appellant was not under custodial investigation
when he admitted, without assistance of counsel, to PO1 Torre
and PO1 Macusi that he stabbed his father to death. Accused-
appellant's verbal confession was so spontaneously and
voluntarily given and was not elicited through questioning by
the police authorities. It may be true that PO1 Macusi asked
accused-appellant who killed his father, but PO1 Macusi only did
so in response to accused-appellant's initial declaration that his
father was already dead. At that point, PO1 Macusi still had no
idea who actually committed the crime and did not consider
accused-appellant as the suspect in his father's killing.
Accused-appellant was also merely standing before PO1 Torre
and PO1 Macusi in front of the Camiling Police Station and
was not yet in police custody.

PEOPLE V. SISON
HELD: In People vs Galit, the Court reiterated the ruling in Morales
vs Enrile and Moncupa vs Enrile cases, to wit:
- At the time, a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the
arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest
and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any.
- He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he
might make could be used against him.
- The person arrested shall have the right to communicate
with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the
most expedient means — by telephone if possible — or by
letter of messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the
arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished.
- No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in
the presence of counsel engaged by the person
arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by
the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by
anyone on his behalf.
- The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall
not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel.
- Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein
laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in
part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
MANUEL V. N.C. CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY
HELD: The right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights
is meant to protect a suspect in a criminal case under
custodial investigation.
Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation
is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has
begun to focus on a particular suspect who had been taken into
custody by the police to carry out a process of interrogation that
lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. The right to counsel
attaches only upon the start of such investigation.
Therefore, the exclusionary rule under paragraph (3) Section 12
of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a
criminal investigation but not to those made in an
administrative investigation.
In the case at bar, the admission was made by petitioners during
the course of the investigation conducted by private respondents'
counsel to determine whether there is sufficient ground to
terminate their employment. Petitioners were not under
custodial investigation as they were not yet accused by the
police of committing a crime. The investigation was merely an
administrative investigation conducted by the employer, not
a criminal investigation. The questions were propounded by the
employer's lawyer, not by police officers. The fact that the
investigation was conducted at the police station did not
necessarily put petitioners under custodial investigation as the
venue of the investigation was merely incidental.
PEOPLE V. MARRA Y ZARATE
HELD: In the case at bar, appellant was not under custodial
investigation when he made the admission. There was no
coercion whatsoever to compel him to make such a statement.
Indeed, he could have refused to answer questions from the
very start when the policemen requested that they all go to
his residence. The police inquiry had not yet reached a level
wherein they considered him as a particular suspect. They
were just probing into a number of possibilities, having been
merely informed that the suspect was wearing what could be a
security guard's uniform.
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PEOPLE V. SUAREZ
HELD: While the initial choice of the lawyer in cases where a
person under custodial investigation cannot afford the services of
a lawyer is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the accused
really has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for
him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the
investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he
never raised any objection against the former's appointment
during the course of the investigation and the accused
thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the
swearing officer.
To be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the
questions being propounded to his client. The presence of a
lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying
anything which might incriminate him but, rather, it was
adopted in our Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion
as would lead the accused to admit something false. The
counsel, however, should never prevent an accused from freely
and voluntarily telling the truth.
PEOPLE V. BULURAN Y RAMIREZ
HELD: There is no violation of the constitutional rights of the
accused during custodial investigation since neither one executed
an extrajudicial confession or admission. In fact, the records 16
show that appellant Cielito Buluran opted to remain silent during
the custodial investigation. Any allegation of violation of rights
during custodial investigation is relevant and material only to
cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted
from the accused becomes the basis of their conviction.
However, in relation to the right to counsel during custodial
investigation, there can be no valid waiver of the right to counsel
unless such waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel as
mandated by Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution and
the pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 7438.
PEOPLE V. GUILLERMO Y GARCIA
HELD: The right of a person under interrogation "to be informed"
implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator
to explain and contemplates an effective communication that
results in an understanding of what is conveyed. Absent that
understanding, there is a denial of the right "to be informed,"
as it cannot be said that the person has been truly "informed"
of his rights. Ceremonial shortcuts in the communication of
abstract constitutional principles ought not be allowed for it
diminishes the liberty of the person facing custodial investigation.
Be that as it may, however, the constitutional safeguards on
custodial investigation (known, also as the Miranda principles) do
not apply to spontaneous statements, or those not elicited
through questioning by law enforcement authorities but
given in an ordinary manner whereby the appellant verbally
admits to having committed the offense. The rights
enumerated in the Constitution, Article III, Section 12, are meant
to preclude the slightest use of the State's coercive power as
would lead an accused to admit something false. But it is not
intended to prevent him from freely and voluntarily admitting
the truth outside the sphere of such power.
Appellant's spontaneous statements made to a private security
guard, not an agent of the State or a law enforcer, are not covered
by the Miranda principles and, as res gestae, admissible in
evidence against him. Thus, we have no hesitation in saying that,
despite the inadmissibility of appellant's alleged confession to the
police, the prosecution has amply proven the appellant's guilt in
the killing of Victor F. Keyser.

PEOPLE V. GALGARIN
HELD: Because of the inherent danger in the use of television as
a medium for admitting one's guilt, and the recurrence of this
phenomenon in several cases, it is prudent that trial courts are
reminded that extreme caution must be taken in further
admitting similar confessions. For in all probability, the police,
with the connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners, may
attempt to legitimize coerced extra-judicial confessions and
place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having an
accused admit an offense on television. Such a situation would
be detrimental to the guaranteed rights of the accused and thus
imperil our criminal justice system.
We do not suggest that videotaped confessions given before
media men by an accused with the knowledge of and in the
presence of police officers are impermissible. Indeed, the line
between proper and invalid police techniques and conduct is a
difficult one to draw, particularly in cases such as this where it is
essential to make sharp judgments in determining whether a
confession was given under coercive physical or psychological
atmosphere.
A word of counsel then to lower courts: we should never
presume that all media confessions described as voluntary
have been freely given. This type of confession always remains
suspect and therefore should be thoroughly examined and
scrutinized. Detection of coerced confessions is admittedly a
difficult and arduous task for the courts to make. It requires
persistence and determination in separating polluted confessions
from untainted ones. We have a sworn duty to be vigilant and
protective of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
GUTANG V. PEOPLE
Facts:
1. Petitioner insists that the trial court erred in admitting in
evidence the Receipts of Property Seized, considering that
it was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. The
said Receipts for Property Seized, which described the
properties seized from the petitioner by virtue of the search
warrant, contain his signature. According to petitioner,
inasmuch as the said evidence were obtained without
the assistance of a lawyer, said evidence are tantamount
to having been derived from an uncounselled extra-
judicial confession and, thus, are inadmissible in evidence
for being fruits of the poisonous tree."
HELD: We agree. It has been held that the signature of the
accused in the Receipt of Property Seized is inadmissible in
evidence if it was obtained without the assistance of counsel.
The signature of the accused on such a receipt is a declaration
against his interest and a tacit admission of the crime charged
for the reason that, in the case at bar, mere unexplained
possession of prohibited drugs is punishable by law. Therefore,
the signatures of the petitioner on the two (2) Receipts of Property
Seized (Exhibits I and R) are not admissible in evidence, the same
being tantamount to an uncounseled extra-judicial confession
which is prohibited by the Constitution.
2. Petitioner also posits the theory that since he had no counsel
during the custodial investigation when his urine sample was
taken and chemically examined, Exhibits "L" and "M", which
are the respective Chemistry and Physical Reports, both
dated March 9, 1994, are also inadmissible in evidence since
his urine sample was derived in effect from an uncounselled
extra-judicial confession.
HELD: The right to counsel begins from the time a person is taken
into custody and placed under investigation for the commission of
a crime, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions
to elicit information and/or confession or admissions from the
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accused. However, what the Constitution prohibits is the use
of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication
from the accused, but not an inclusion of his body in
evidence, when it may be material.
In fact, an accused may validly be compelled to be photographed
or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced,
or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done,
without running afoul of the proscription against testimonial
compulsion.
The situation in the case at bar falls within the exemption under
the freedom from testimonial compulsion since what was sought
to be examined came from the body of the accused. This was a
mechanical act the accused was made to undergo which was not
meant to unearth undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical
attributes determinable by simple observation.
PEOPLE V. PAYNOR
Facts: Appellant then asseverates that there was a violation of his
rights while under custodial investigation, in light of the Miranda
doctrine, when allegedly the police investigators unceremoniously
stripped him of his clothing and personal items, and the same
were later introduced as evidence during the trial.
HELD: The Court is not persuaded.
The protection of the accused under custodial investigation, which
is invoked by appellant, refers to testimonial compulsion.
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution provides that such
accused shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent, the right to counsel, and the right to waive the right to
counsel in the presence of counsel, and that any confession or
admission obtained in violation of his rights shall be inadmissible
in evidence against him. This constitutional right applies only
against testimonial compulsion and not when the body of the
accused is proposed to be examined. In fact, an accused may
validly be compelled to be photographed or measured, or his
garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to
enable the foregoing things to be done, without running afoul of
the proscription against testimonial compulsion.
PEOPLE V. GAMBOA
HELD: As to the paraffin test to which the appellant was subjected
to he raises the question that it was not conducted in the presence
of his lawyer. This right is afforded to any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense whose
confession or admission may not be taken unless he is
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel of his own choice. His right against
self-incrimination is not violated by the taking of the paraffin test
of his hands. This constitutional right extends only to
testimonial compulsion and not when the body of the
accused is proposed to be examined as in this case. Indeed,
the paraffin test proved positively that he just recently fired a gun.
Again, this kind of evidence buttresses the case of the
prosecution.
PEOPLE V. CARREON
HELD: Measuring or photographing the party is not within the
privilege" (against self-incrimination). Nor is the removal or
replacement of his garments or shoes. Nor is the requirement that
the party move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done.
LADIANA V. PEOPLE
HELD: The legal formalities required by the Constitution apply
only to extra-judicial confessions or admissions obtained during
custodial investigations. Indeed, the rights enumerated in the

constitutional provision "exist only in custodial interrogations, or
in-custody interrogation of accused persons." In the present case,
petitioner admits that the questioned statements were made
during the preliminary investigation, not during the custodial
investigation.
However, he argues that the right to competent and independent
counsel also applies during preliminary investigations. We
disagree. A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or a proceeding
to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the
respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.
The accused’s interrogation by the police would already have
ended at the time of the filing of the criminal case in court (or the
public prosecutor's office). Hence, with respect to a defendant in
a criminal case already pending in court (or the public prosecutor's
office), there is no occasion to speak of his right while under
'custodial interrogation' for the obvious reason that he is no
longer under 'custodial interrogation.
Even in the absence of counsel, the admissions made by
petitioner in his Counter-Affidavit are not violative of his
constitutional rights. It is clear from the undisputed facts that it
was not exacted by the police while he was under custody or
interrogation. Hence, the constitutional rights of a person under
custodial investigation as embodied in Article III, Section 12 of the
1987 Constitution, are not at issue in this case.
PEOPLE V. OMILIG Y MANCIA
HELD: As correctly found by the lower courts, accused-appellant
executed his extrajudicial confession not during custodial
investigation, but during the preliminary investigation.
Custodial Investigation Preliminary Investigation
the questioning initiated by an inquiry or a proceeding to
law enforcement officers after determine whether there is
a person has been taken into sufficient ground to engender
custody or otherwise a well-founded belief that a
deprived of his freedom of crime has been committed,
action in any significant way and that the respondent is
probably guilty thereof and
should be held for trial
A person undergoing preliminary investigation cannot be
considered as being under custodial investigation. The claim
by the accused of inadmissibility of his extrajudicial confession is
unavailing because his confessions were obtained during a
preliminary investigation.
On Independent and Competent Counsel
To be a competent and independent counsel in a custodial
investigation, the lawyer so engaged should be present at all
stages of the interview, counseling or advising caution
reasonably at every turn of the investigation, and stopping the
interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the
accused that he may either continue, choose to remain silent
or terminate the interview.
Counsel should be present and able to advise and assist his client
from the time the confessant answers the first question until the
signing of the extrajudicial confession. Moreover, the lawyer
should ascertain that the confession is made voluntarily and
that the person under investigation fully understands the
nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial confession in
relation to his constitutional rights.
Ideally, the lawyer called to be present during such investigations
should be as far as reasonably possible, the choice of the
individual undergoing questioning, but the word "preferably"
does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by
a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other
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equally competent and independent attorneys from handling
his defense. What is imperative is that the counsel should be
competent and independent.
PEOPLE V. DENIEGA Y MACOY
HELD:
The 1987 Constitution provided a stricter rule by mandating that
waiver of the right to counsel must be made not only in the
presence of counsel but also in writing. Section 33, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court requires, moreover, that a confession, to be
admissible, must be express. Finally, Republic Act 7438
mandates that the entire confession must be in writing.
On Competent and Independent Counsel
The lawyer called to be present during such investigations should
be as far as reasonably possible, the choice of the individual
undergoing questioning. If the lawyer were one furnished in the
accused's behalf, it is important that he should be competent and
independent, i.e., that he is willing to fully safeguard the
constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from one who
would merely be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless
recital of the individual's constitutional rights.
Ideally therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing
custodial investigation (if the latter could not afford one)
"should be engaged:
- by the accused (himself), or
- by the latter's relative or person authorized by him
to engage an attorney or
- by the court, upon proper petition of the accused or
person authorized by the accused to file such petition.
Lawyers engaged by the police, whatever testimonials are given
as proof of their probity and supposed independence, are
generally suspect, as in many areas, the relationship between
lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic.
SEC 34. SIMILAR ACTS AS EVIDENCE; RIAA PART II
CRUZ V. COURT OF APPEALS
HELD: Res inter alios acta, as a general rule, prohibits the
admission of evidence that tends to show that what a person
has done at one time is probative of the contention that he
has done a similar act at another time.
Evidence of similar acts or occurrences compels the defendant to
meet allegations that are not mentioned in the complaint, confuses
him in his defense, raises a variety of irrelevant issues, and diverts
the attention of the court from the issues immediately before it.
Hence, this evidentiary rule guards against the practical
inconvenience of trying collateral issues and protracting the
trial and prevents surprise or other mischief prejudicial to litigants.
The rule, however, is not without exception. While inadmissible in
general,
- Collateral facts may be received as evidence under
exceptional circumstances, as when there is a rational
similarity or resemblance between the conditions giving rise
to the fact offered and the circumstances surrounding the
issue or fact to be proved.
- Evidence of similar acts may frequently become relevant,
especially in actions based on fraud and deceit, because
it sheds light on the state of mind or knowledge of a
person; it provides insight into such person's motive or
intent; it uncovers a scheme, design or plan; or it reveals a
mistake.
Here, petitioners argue that transactions relating to the other
parcels of land they entered into, in the concept of absolute

owners, are inadmissible as evidence to show that the parcels in
issue are not co-owned. The Court is not persuaded. Evidence
of such transactions falls under the exception to the rule on res
inter alios acta. Such evidence is admissible because it is relevant
to an issue in the case and corroborative of evidence already
received.
The relevancy of such transactions is readily apparent. The nature
of ownership of said property should be the same as that of the
lots in question since they are all subject to the MOA. If the parcels
of land were held and disposed by petitioners in fee simple, in the
concept of absolute owners, then the lots in question should
similarly be treated as absolutely owned in fee simple by the
Tamayo spouses.
TANZO V. DRILON
HELD: Under the rule of res inter alios acta, evidence that one did
or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove
that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at another time,
but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge,
identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the
like.
The series of transactions between M.J.S. International and
Liwayway Dee Tanzo were entered into under similar
circumstances as those surrounding the contract between
petitioner and Mario. Just like the alleged trust agreement
between petitioner and Mario, the loan contracts between M.J.S.
International and Liwayway Dee Tanzo provide that the creditor
shall lend to the debtor a specific amount for use by the latter in
its business operations. Hence, private respondents' modus
operandi, if there ever was one, in raising additional capital for
M.J.S. International was to borrow money from willing investors. It
is thus unlikely, considering the scheme of things, that private
respondents would all of a sudden deviate from an established
business practice to enter into a trust agreement with the
petitioner.
PEOPLE V. ACOSTA (citing People vs Dadles)
HELD: Appellant's intent to commit the arson was established by
his previous attempt to set on fire a bed ("papag") inside the same
house (private complainant's) which was burned later in the night.
Prosecution witness Mona Aquino testified that at around 5:00 in
the afternoon of the same day, she saw appellant carrying a gas
stove and knife. When she asked him what he was going to do
with the stove, he answered that he was going to burn the house
of private complainant.
While it is true that "evidence that one did or did not do a certain
thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not
do the same or similar thing at another time," it may be received
"to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan system,
scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like.
While it was not the fire charged in the information, and does not
by any means amount to direct evidence against the accused, it
was competent to prove the intent of the accused in setting
the fire which was charged in the information. Where a person
is charged with the commission of a specific crime, testimony
may be received of other similar acts committed about the
same time, for the purpose only of establishing the criminal
intent of the accused.
PEOPLE V. DADLES
HELD: The general rule is that evidence is not admissible which
shows or tends to show, that the accused in a criminal case has
committed a crime wholly independent of the offense for which he
is on trial. It is not competent to prove that he committed other
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crimes of a like nature for the purpose of showing that he
would be likely to commit the crime charged in the
indictment. A man may be a notorious criminal, but this fact may
not be shown to influence a jury in passing upon the question of
his guilt or innocence of the particular offense for which he is on
trial. A man may have committed many crimes and still be
innocent of the crime charged in the case on trial.
To permit proof of other crimes would naturally predispose the
minds of the jurors against the defendant. One who commits one
crime may be more likely to commit another; yet logically, one
crime does not prove another, nor tend to prove another,
unless there is such a relation between them that proof of one
tends to prove the other.
In this case we find that there is such a relation between both
incidents of kidnapping charged in the two informations that "proof
of one tends to prove the other", and evidence of similar acts
committed about the same time establishes the criminal intent of
the appellant to deprive Salvador and Alipan of their liberty.
PEOPLE V. MAGPAYO
HELD: As a rule, evidence is not admissible which shows or tends
to show, that the accused in a criminal case has committed a
crime wholly independent of the offense for which he is on trial. It
is not competent to prove that he committed other crimes of a like
nature for the purpose of showing that he committed the crime
charged in the complaint or information.
An exception to this rule is when such evidence tends directly to
establish the particular crime, and it is usually competent to prove
the motive, the intent, the absence of mistake or accident, a
common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or
more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to
establish the other, or the identity of the person charged with the
commission of the crime on trial.
In the case at bar, evidence was introduced in Criminal Case
No. 6443 (Forcible Abduction with Rape) committed by
appellant against 11-year old Mara N. Chico on November 20,
1987, not as evidence of similar acts to prove that on April 10,
1988, the said appellant also committed a similar act of rape
(and robbery) against the person of 10-year old Lilibeth Bobis
(Criminal Case No. 6436). These offenses are separate crimes
and are the subject of separate complaints and proofs though
jointly tried. Hence, the evidence in one was not offered and
admitted to prove the other but only to show the plan, scheme
or modus operandi of the offender.
PEOPLE V. MAGTULOY Y MONTARAY
HELD: While evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at
one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the
same or a similar thing at another time, it may be received to prove
a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme,
habit, custom or usage, and the like.
It appears from the records that the accused-appellant could not
get along with the victim's mother. Quarrels between the two
were frequent. On occasions like this the accused-appellant
usually vented his anger on the victim. In the morning of June
16, 1991, the victim's mother and the accused-appellant again
quarreled simply because he did not like the idea that she and the
victim will be going home to her province in the Visayas. The
accused-appellant failed utterly to refute this testimony.
MALIG V. SANDIGANBAYAN
HELD: While it may be that pursuant to Section 48, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court "evidence that one did or omitted to do a certain
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thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or omitted
to do the same or similar thing at another time," the same Rule
also provides that "it may be received to prove a specific intent or
knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or
usage and the like." Emiliana Gerona's credible testimony
regarding the amounts petitioners received from the Matictic
project sufficiently establishes petitioners "intent" and/or
"habit" of demanding and receiving money from the
contractor-complainant, such that the latter, in exasperation,
felt that enough was enough, to the prejudice of his future
contracts.

PEOPLE V. SAGUBAN

HELD: In upholding the validity of the above-questioned act of the

court a quo, we find that not only was the previous conviction of
the accused-appellant in Criminal Case No. 6353 for rape duly
proved in the course of the trial but, more importantly, proof of
said previous conviction was not made the sole basis of
accused-appellant's conviction in the case at bench.

Rather, it was the confluence of duly established facts —

positive identification, medical certificate, healed lacerations and
body scars, as well as weak alibi — which, together with proof
of said previous conviction, all formed the basis for accused-
appellant's conviction in the present case.