Case: Marbury vs.

Madison, 5 US 137 (1803)

Doctrine: This is the first instance in the legal history of the United States where the power of judicial review was
established. By the oaths of office of the Supreme Court Justices, they are required to protect the Constitution.
Thus, they are mandated to declare any statute contradicting any part of the Constitution, the highest law of the
land, unworthy of being implemented.

Facts: President Adams appointed Marbury to a new position as justice of the peace. To begin his new
position, he had to receive a document—a “commission”—which officially gave the role to him. The President
signed the commission for Marbury and all those appointed to the office of justice of the peace at the time of
appointment. James Madison was supposed to have given Marbury this document but failed to do so. Marbury
and other appointed justices of the peace who had not received their commissions filed a lawsuit demanding that a
writ of mandamus be issued which ordered Madison to send Marbury and the other justices of the peace their
commissions.

Issue/s: (i) whether it is constitutional for the Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus; (ii) whether the U.S.
Secretary of State is allowed to issue writs of mandamus; (iii) whether, in this case involving commissions, the
Supreme Court can issue a writ of mandamus to the U.S. Secretary of State.

Ruling: The petition is denied and the writ of mandamus is not issued. The Judiciary Act of 1789 is declared
unconstitutional and, thus, void.

Case: Garcia v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 157584, April 2, 2009

Doctrine: The Power of Judicial Review and its requirements needed to be satisfied:

(1) Actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;

(2) Person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;

(3) Question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and

(4) The issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case ( actual case controversy).

Facts: Petitioner Garcia asked the Court to examine the constitutionality of Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 8479 or the Oil
Deregulation Law of 1998. The petitioner raises that implementing full deregulation by removing the system of
price control in the local downstream oil industry has ruled before.

On March 1996 the Philippine government pursued a policy of deregulation by enacting the R.A. No. 8180 or the
Downstream Oil industry deregulation act of 1996, however, the court conclude on the case of Tatad vs Secretary
of Department of Energy, that the law was invalid because the three key provision intended to promote free
competition shows the opposite result that it was contrary to its intent encourage monopolistic power and
interfered with the free interaction of market forces the court declared that the R.A. No. 8180 needs a provision
to vouchsafe free and fair competition. The big three companies Shell, Petron and Caltex had no real competitors
but did not have a free run on the market because the government control the pricing and non-pricing of the oil
industry.

On February 10, 1998, the Congress responded to the court decision in Tatad vs Secretary of Department of
Energy and enacted a new oil deregulation law R.A. No. 8479. The petitioner sought to declare that the new
deregulation law was unconstitutional because it violates Article XII, Sec. 19 of the Constitution. The petitioner
objected that Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 8479 in essence, prescribes a period for removal of price control on gasoline
and other finished petroleum products and sets the time for full deregulation of the local downstream oil industry.
According to Sec 19 of 8479 “Full deregulation of the Industry shall start five (5) months following the effectivity
of this Act: Provided, however, That when the public interest so requires, the President may accelerate the start of
full deregulation upon the recommendation of the DOE and the Department of Finance (DOF) when the prices of
crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and the value of the peso in relation to the US
dollar is stable, taking into account relevant trends and prospects; Provided, further, That the foregoing provision
notwithstanding, the five (5)-month Transition Phase shall continue to apply to LPG, regular gasoline and
kerosene as socially sensitive petroleum products and said petroleum products shall be covered by the automatic
pricing mechanism during the said period.

Upon the implementation of full deregulation as provided herein, the Transition Phase is deemed terminated and
the following laws are repealed:

a) Republic Act No. 6173, as amended;

b) Section 5 of Executive Order No. 172, as amended;

c) Letter of Instruction No. 1431, dated October 15, 1984;

d) Letter of Instruction No. 1441, dated November 20, 1984, as amended;

e) Letter of Instruction No. 1460, dated May 9, 1985;

f) Presidential Decree No. 1889; and

g) Presidential Decree No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137

Petitioner Garcia contended that implementing full deregulation and removing price control, the market is still
dominated and controlled by oligopoly and would be contrary to public interest and would provide an opportunity
for the big three companies to engage in price fixing and over pricing. The petitioner also stated that the Sec 19 of
R.A. No. 8479 is pro-oligopoly, anticompetition, and anti-people. He asked the Court to declare that the said
provision is unconstitutional.

On December 17, 1999, the Court denied the petitioner's plea for nullity and declined to rule on constitutionality
of Sec 19 of R.A. No. 8479. The Court is not concerned whether or not there should be deregulation. It is outside
the court’s jurisdiction and only the Congress can reverse it.

Issue/s: WON the Court can exercise its power of Judicial Review.

Ruling: The Court resolved to dismiss the petition.

The petitioner invokes to exercise to the Court its power of judicial review to declare Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 8479 as
unconstitutional which expressly recognize under Sec. 4 (2), Article VIII of the Constitution, the power of judicial
review is the power of the Court to ask the validity of executive and legislative acts for conformity with the
constitution. The judiciary enforces and upholds the supremacy of the Constitution. For the court to exercise its
judicial power there are certain requirements must first be met, namely:

(1) Actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;

(2) Person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial
 interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;

(3) Question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and

(4) The issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

The petitioner fails to satisfy the very first of the requirements – the existence of an actual case or controversy
calling for the exercise of judicial power. An actual case or controversy is one that involves a conflict of legal
rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or
academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. It is not the
mere existence of a conflict or controversy that will authorize the exercise by the courts of its power of review;
more importantly, the issue involved must be susceptible of judicial determination. Excluded from these are
questions of policy or wisdom, otherwise referred to as political questions.

To summarize, we declare that the issues petitioner Garcia presented to this Court are non-justiciable matters that
preclude the Court from exercising its power of judicial review. The immediate implementation of full
deregulation of the local downstream oil industry is a policy determination by Congress which this Court cannot
overturn without offending the Constitution and the principle of separation of powers. That the law failed in its
objectives because its adoption spawned the evils petitioner Garcia alludes to does not warrant its nullification. In
the words of Mr. Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing in the 1999 Garcia case, "[a] calculus of fear and pessimism
xxx does not justify the remedy petitioner seeks: that we overturn a law enacted by Congress and approved by the
Chief Executive."

Case: Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, G.R. Nos. 192935 & 193036, December 7, 2010

Doctrine: (1)Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Constitution, imposes upon the President the duty to ensure that all laws are
faithfully executed. It carries with it the power to create bodies that will aid him in the performance of such tasks.
There is also no appropriation but merely allotment of the funds already appropriated.

(2) Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.

Facts: President Benigno Aquino found a need for a special body to investigate reported cases of graft and
corruption allegedly committed during the previous administration.

At the dawn of his administration, the President signed EO No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of
2010 (Truth Commission).

PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports
of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices
and accessories during the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to
the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an “independent collegial body,” it
is essentially an entity within the Office of the President Proper and subject to his control.

Petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails EO No. 1 for being
violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the
constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefore.
Issue/s: (1)WON EO No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to
create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions

(2)WON the EO No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause

Ruling: (1) NO. It does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation
but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.

(2) YES. EO No. 1 does not apply equally to all members of the same class such that the intent of singling out
the "previous administration" as its sole object makes the PTC an "adventure in partisan hostility."

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL
insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Fallo: WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Case: Salonga V. Paño, G.R. No. 59524, February 18, 1985

Doctrine: Functions of Judicial Review: Symbolic. – To educate the bench and bar as to the controlling principles
and concepts on matters of grave public importance for the guidance of, and restraint upon the future.

Facts: A rash of bombings occurred in Metro Manila area in the months of August, September and October of
1980.
● On September 6, 1980, an explosion of a small bomb inside the room of Victor Burns Lovely, Jr., a
Philippine-born American citizen, led to his arrest. Lovely almost killed himself and his younger brother,
Romeo, during the incident.
● Found in Lovely’s possession by police and military authorities were pictures taken sometime in May, 1980 at
the birthday party of former Congressman Raul Daza held at his residence in Los Angeles. Petitioner Jovito R.
Salonga and his wife were among those whose likenesses appeared in the group pictures together with other
guests, including Lovely.
● Lovely offered himself to be a “state witness”. He implicated petitioner Salonga along with other 39 accused,
tagging the petitioner as the leader of subversive organizations for two reasons: (1) his house was used as a
contact point; and (2) because of his remarks during the party of Daza in Los Angeles. Salonga allegedly
opined about the likelihood of a violent struggle in the Philippines if reforms are not instituted immediately by
President Marcos.
● Petitioner was arrested but was not informed of the nature of the charges against him during the arrest. Neither
was counsel allowed to talk to him until SC intervened through the issuance of an order directing that his
lawyers be permitted to visit him. Only after four months of detention was the petitioner informed for the first
time of the nature of the charges against him.
● The counsel for petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the charges against the petitioner for failure of the
prosecution to establish a prima facie case against him. The respondent judge Paño denied the motion. The
respondent judge then issued a resolution ordering the filing of an information for violation of the Revised
Anti-Subversion Act against 40 people, including herein petitioner. The aforementioned resolutions are now the
subject of the petition.

Issue/s: WON this case dropped by the lower court (Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXI (Quezon
City)) still deserves a decision from the Supreme Court.

Ruling: YES. Respondent Judge Rodolfo Ortiz granted the motion of respondent City Fiscal Sergio Apostol to
drop the subversion case against the petitioner. Pursuant to instructions of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution
restudied its evidence and decided to seek the exclusion of petitioner Jovito Salonga as one of the accused in the
information filed under the questioned resolution. The Supreme Court was constrained by this action of the
prosecution and the respondent Judge to withdraw the draft ponencia from circulating for concurrences and
signatures and to place it once again in the Court's crowded agenda for further deliberations. Insofar as the
absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of subversion charges is concerned, this decision has been
rendered moot and academic by the action of the prosecution.
Recent developments in this case serve to focus attention on a not too well known aspect of the Supreme Court's
functions. The setting aside or declaring void, in proper cases, of intrusions of State authority into areas reserved
by the Bill of Rights for the individual as constitutionally protected spheres where even the awesome powers of
Government may not enter at will is not the totality of the Court's functions. The Court also has the duty to
formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic
function of educating the bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees. The
fact that the case is moot and academic should not preclude this Tribunal from setting forth in language clear and
unmistakable, the obligation of fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the unequivocal command of the
Constitution that excessive bail shall not be required.

Fallo: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.

Case: David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 & 171424, May
3, 2006

Doctrine: Judicial inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the President’s decision is correct,
but that the President did not act arbitrarily.

Facts: As the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP
1017 declaring a state of national emergency, citing that political opposition has been conspiring with enemies of
the State to take down the government. On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017.

Petitioners in the consolidated case refute PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 for issues on 1) usurping legislative powers; (2)
subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) violating the consti
guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly; among others.

On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the declaration of a state of national emergency and after all these petiti
been filed, the President lifted PP 1017. She issued Proclamation No. 1021 declaring that the state of national eme
has ceased to exist.

Respondent: The petitions must be dismissed for being moot.

Issue/s: WON the Supreme Court can inquire into the existence of factual bases for the declaration of state of
national emergency and the exercise of the President’s calling-out power

Ruling: YES BUT WITH LIMITATIONS. Under the new definition of judicial power, the courts are
authorized not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable," but also "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government branch or instrumentality of the government."

In the present case, petitioners failed to show that Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out power is totally bereft of
factual basis. The OSG presented a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with
supporting reports. These events include the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo
D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from
the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the
Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military.

Fallo: WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL
insofar as it constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
violence. However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless
violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Case: ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 133486, January 28, 2000

Doctrine:

Facts: This is a petition for certiorari raised by ABS-CBN under Rule 165 of the Rules of Court assailing
Comelec en banc Resolution No. 98-14191, RESOLVED to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop
ABS-CBN or any other groups, its agents or representatives from conducting such exit survey & to authorize the
Honorable Chairman to issue the same.
The resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon “information from reliable source that ABS-CBN has
prepared a project, with PR groups to conduct radio-TV coverage of the election & to make an exit survey of the
vote during election for national officials particularly for President and Vice President wherein result of which
shall be broadcast immediately. The electoral body believed that such project might conflict with the official
Comelec court, as well as the unofficial quick count of the National Movement for the Elections (Namfrel). It also
noted it had not authorized or deputized petitioner ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey.
On May 9, 1998, the Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by the petitioner. Directed the
Comelec to cease and desist, until further orders,from implementing the assailed Resolution or the restraining
order issued pursuant thereto, if any. In fact, the exit polls were actually conducted and reported by the media
without any difficulty or problem.
In its Petition, ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation maintains that it is a responsible member of the mass media,
committed to report balanced election-related data, It argues that the holding of exit polls and the nationwide
reporting of their results are valid exercises of the freedoms of speech and of the press. It submits that, in
precipitately and unqualifiedly restraining the holding and the reporting of exit polls, the Comelec gravely abused
its discretion and grossly violated the petitioner's constitutional rights.
The solicitor general contends that the petition is moot and academic, because the May 11, 1998 election has
already been held and done and there is no longer actual controversy.

Issue/s:
1.WON the petition is moot and academic?

2. WON the “moot and academic” principle is a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in
resolving a case?

Ruling: No, the SC upheld that the issue is not totally moot. While the assailed Resolution referred specifically to
the May 11, 1998 election, its implications on the people's fundamental freedom of expression transcend the past
election. The holding of periodic elections is a basic feature of our democratic government. By its very nature,
exit polling is tied up with elections. To set aside the resolution of the issue now will only postpone a task that
could well crop up again in future elections. Respondent’s contested actions are capable of repetition. Thus, the
petition is subject to judicial review.

In any event, in Salonga v. Cruz Pano, the Court had occasion to reiterate that it "also has the duty to formulate
guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of
educating the bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees." Since the
fundamental freedoms of speech and of the press are being invoked here, we have resolved to settle, for the
guidance of posterity, whether they likewise protect the holding of exit polls and the dissemination of data derived
therefrom.
Fallo: Wherefore, the petition is GRANTED, and the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the court on May 9,
1998 is made PERMANENT.

Case: Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987

Doctrine: The SC stipulated that lower courts—in this case the RTC of Iloilo and the Intermediate Appellate
Court—should not shy away from the task of deciding constitutional questions or validity when properly raised
before them.

Facts: Ynot, the petitioner, have transported carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo. However, they were
confiscated by the police station commander of Iloilo, for violation of Executive Order No. 626-A.

· The said Executive order prohibits the interprovincial movement of carabaos. In other words, no carabao
or carabeef shall be transported from one province to another.

· A violation of the said Executive order would automatically mean confiscation of the carabaos by the
government to be distributed to charitable institutions or other institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat
inspection Commission may see fit.

· The RTC of Iloilo as well as the Intermediate Appellate Court or Court of Appeals upheld the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A.

· That is why, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.

Issue/s: WON Executive Order No. 626-A is unconstitutional.

Ruling: The Court declared Executive Order No. 626-A as unconstitutional.

- Firstly, the Executive order violates the rights of the individual to due process. The Executive order
convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, without giving him a chance to be heard.
Thus, denying him the chance for a fair trial or to be heard in his defense.
- Secondly, regarding the substance of the Executive order, the Court finds the confiscation of property to
be questionable—particularly, where the Chairman of the National Inspection Commission is allowed to
distribute the confiscated property he “may see fit” which is laden with perilous opportunities for
partiality and abuse.

Case: Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013

Doctrine:

Facts: R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and
their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners, i.e, husband; former husband; or
any person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the woman has a common child. The
law provides for protection orders from the barangay and the courts to prevent the commission of further acts of
VAWC; and outlines the duties and responsibilities of barangay officials, law enforcers, prosecutors and court
personnel, social workers, health care providers, and other local government officials in responding to complaints
of VAWC or requests for assistance.

●A husband is now before the Court assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being violative of the equal
protection and due process clauses, and an undue delegation of judicial power to barangay
officials.

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE:

●Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary Protection Order
against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women and
Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other
Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence, being
threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support and also a victim of marital
infidelity on the part of petitioner.
●The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set forth by the said TPO,
private-respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a modified
TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO should not be modified. After
the given time allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as it would be an
“exercise in futility.”
●Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on, questioning the
constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal protection clauses, and the validity of
the modified TPO for being “an unwanted product of an invalid law.”
●The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for failure to raise the
issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the petition for prohibition to annul
protection orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral attack on said law.
●Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.

Issue/s: WON RA 9262 is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause

Ruling: NO Because Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated disquisition in the early
case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union69 is instructive:
➔ The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guarantee of equality in the application of the laws
upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the
constitutional
prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute.
Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but
on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights.
The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they
were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It
does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory
within which it is to operate.
● The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as
in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or
practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because
of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so it goes without saying that the mere
fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid
classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has
held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational
basis and is not palpably arbitrary. Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find that
R.A. 9262 is based on a valid classification as shall hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not violate the
equal protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends
its protection.

Fallo: WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit

Case: Spouses Mirasol v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128448, February 1, 2001

Doctrine: Regional Trial Courts have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute,
presidential decree, or executive order.

Facts: The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters, financed by PNB through credit agreements. The chattel
mortgage enabled PNB to sell the sugarland and apply the proceeds to the former’s obligation. The Mirasols
asked for an accounting of the proceeds which PNB did not agree into because accdg to PD 579, there was
nothing to account since under the said law, all earnings from the export sales pertained to the National
Government. The petitioner challenged the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former president.

Issue/s: WON the trial court has jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional without notice to the Solicitor
General.

Ruling: Yes. It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree, or executive order.
The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty,international or executive
agreement, presidential decree,order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in thisCourt, but in all
Regional Trial Courts.

Fallo: Petition is DENIED.

Case: Baker v. Carr, 396 US 186, March 26, 1962

Doctrine: The Supreme Court set the standard courts use to weigh justiciability. It involved the issue of
legislative apportionment and to what extent federal courts can hear cases over the way states elect lawmakers.

Facts: Apportionment cases had often been brought under the Guaranty Clause of Article IV, Section: 4 of the
United States Constitution (Constitution), in which the United States guarantees to the individual states a
republican form of government. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) has long held that such
challenges present a political question, not addressable by the courts. In the current case, Appellants challenged
the state apportionment of legislatures under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Issue/s: WON it is possible to bring a malapportionment claim without raising a nonjusticiable political issue.

Ruling: Yes. In the past, apportionment challengers have generally based their challenge on the Guaranty Clause
of Art. IV, Section: 4 of the Constitution. These claims are nonjusticiable as they address issues solely directed to
the political branches of the government by the Constitution. This is a separation of powers issue. The Supreme
Court rules that the equal protection challenge in this case is separable from the political questions.

Fallo: Reversed and remanded.

Case: Torrecampo v. Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System, G.R. No. 188296, May 30, 2011
Doctrine: Sec. 1, Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution “The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the government.”

Facts:
• Personnel and heavy equipment from the DPWH entered a portion of Brgy. Matandang Balara to implement the
C-5 Road Extension Project on MWSS owned subject lots (Lot Nos. 42-A-4. 42-A-6, and 42-A-4) Beneath the
said area were three aqueducts of the MWSS, which supply water to 8 million residents of Metro Manila.
• Brgy. Capt. Beda Torrecampo filed a petition for injunction and issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
and Writ of preliminary injunction to the SC to enjoin the implementation of the project in Tandang Sora Section
(Lot Nos. 42-B-2-A, 42-A-6 and 42-A-4) and insisted that the RIPADA (Ricarte, Palaris, Dagohoy) area was a
better alternative to subject lots for the said project.
• Atty. Villamor for the petitioner alleged that the implementation of the road project would result to grave
injustice and irreparable injury to the petitioner and 8 millions residents of Metro Manila as aqueducts underneath
the MWSS’s subject lots might be damaged and thus imperil and disrupt water supply; that the petition raised the
fundamental right to health under Sec. 15, Art II of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, the petition was directly
filed to the SC as RA 8975 prohibits the lower courts to issue TRO and preliminary injunction on government
infrastructure projects.
• On the other hand, Assistant Solicitor General Eric Panga for DPWH argued that the petition should have been
filed first with the RTC under the principle of hierarchy of courts and clarified that DPWH had yet to conduct
studies and tests on the safety concerns, including the existence and actual location of the aqueducts in the area.
• Atty. Alberto Agra for MWSS also found the petition as premature as there was no road expansion project yet to
be implemented, as it had not yet passed the prior review of MWSS after the submission by DPWH of a detailed
study of actual engineering design and actual tests for
construction work.
• MWSS resolved that the entry of DPWH to the area were due to the following reasons (1) to secure the property
for the DPWH to conduct the necessary complete study and detailed design of the project and (2) an act of
ownership of MWSS to fence off its property after the expiration of the lease contract with Capital Golf.

Issue/s: WON the petition present a justiciable question that requires the Court to exercise its power of judicial
review.

Ruling: NO. An inquiry on issues raised by the petitioner would delve into matters that are exclusively within the
wisdom of the Executive branch. Torrecampo wanted SC to determine whether the Tandang Sora area was a
better alternative to the RIPADA area for the C-5 Road Extension Project. Such determination belongs to the
Executive branch and cannot be touched upon by the SC. The petitioner sought judicial review of a question of
Executive policy, a matter outside SC’s jurisdiction. The issue was dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure.

Fallo: WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition led by Barangay Captain Beda Torrecampo. No
pronouncement as to costs.

Case: Osmeña, Jr. v Pendatun, G.R. No. L-17144, October 28, 1960

Doctrine:

Facts: On July 14th 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmena Jr,submitted to this court a verified petition for
declamatory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, against congressman Salpida K.
Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by
House Resolution No. 59. He asked for annulment resolution on the ground of infringement of his parliamentary
immunity, he also asked,principally that said members of the special committee be enjoined from proceeding in
accordance with it ,particularly the portion authorizing them to require him to substantiate his charges against the
President with the admonition that if he failed to do so, he must show cause why the house should not push him.

Issue/s: WON the court has jurisdiction over the case at bar.

Ruling: No, the court upheld that the House of Representatives has exclusive power to discipline its member,
while the courts have no jurisdiction to interfere. The theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this
court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each department, had exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere, Finally that this court possesses no power to
direct or compel the Legislature to act in any specified manner, should not deter it from recognizing and declaring
the unconstitutionality and nullify of the questioned resolutions and all of the action that has been disbanded after
the case was filed, the basic issues remain so important as to require adjudication by this court.

Fallo: Wherefore, the petition has been DISMISSED.

Case: Arroyo v. De Venecia, G,R, No. 127255, August 14, 1997

Doctrine: Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and the courts have no concern with their observance. They
may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to parliamentary
usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have
agreed to a particular measure.

Facts: Petitioners challenge the validity of RA 8240 (imposes sin taxes on the manufacture and sale of beer and
cigarettes) based on violation of the rules of the House when Rep. Arroyo was allegedly prevented from
questioning the presence of a quorum during the sponsorship speech of Rep. Javier.

Issue/s: WON Congress committed grave abuse of discretion in enacting RA No. 8240.

Ruling: No. The Court finds no ground for holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion based on
the following:

Scope of Judicial Review

As the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account merely of
noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not present a situation in
which a branch of the government has "gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction" so as to call for
the exercise of the Court’s Art. VIII, Sec. 1 power.

Fallo: WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.

Case: Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1988

Doctrine: The Constitution and even the Rules of Senate are silent on election of minority leaders. In absence of
constitutional or statutory guideline, Court is devoid of basis to determine legality of acts. It forms part of internal
affairs of Legislative branch and should not be interfered with by Courts.

Facts:
• On July 27, 1998, the Senate convened for its first regular session to elect officers.
• The Senate is composed of 23 senators representing: (10 LAMP; 7 Lakas-NUCD-UMPD; 1 LP; 1 AKSYON; 1
PRP; 1 Gabay Bayan; 2 Independent.)
• Senate President candidates: Marcelo Fernan & Francisco Tatad (nominated by Miriam Santiago) RESULT:
Fernan won. (Votes: 20 Fernan v. 2 Tatad)
• Sen. Tatad manifested that, since he is the only other person that voted for minority in the Senate President
election, he will assume the minority leader position.
• Lakas-NUCD-UMPD Party: We form part of minority. We elect Sen. Guingona as the minority leader.
• Lakas senators wrote letter to the majority leader. Thus, SP Fernan recognized Guingona.
• Sen. Santiago and Tatad filed petition for quo warranto against Sen. Guingona (present case).
• Article 6, Section 16(1): The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representative its
Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective Members.
• The above provision determines who forms part of the majority and minority groups.
• Those who voted for Fernan to be Senate President are the majority. Guingona voted for Fernan; hence, he is
part of the majority and cannot be elected minority leader.

Issue/s: WON Guingona should be the minority leader?

Ruling:
CONSTITUTION SILENT ON ELECTION OF OTHER OFFICERS

• The Constitution only mentioned election of Senate President and HR Speaker. Each house shall choose other
officers as it may deem necessary (Art 6, Sec 16(1)).
• Art. 6, Sec 16(3): Each House may determine the rules of its proceeding [...]
• Rules of the Senate did not even provide for majority or minority leaders. Nonetheless, such offices exist. In
absence of constitutional or statutory guideline, Court is devoid of basis to determine legality of acts.
• Court cannot look into internal affairs of the legislative branch. [SEPARATION OF POWERS]

NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

GUINGONA (No usurpation and grave abuse of discretion)

• Usurpation: unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power.
• Quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy. To be successful, it requires person suing have clear right
over contested office. Tadtad did not have sufficient proof of clear franchise to the minority leader position.
FERNAN (No grave abuse of discretion)
• Fernan did not commit grave abuse of discretion in formally recognizing Sen. Guingona as the minority leader.
• Formal recognition came only after at least two sessions where both sides were liberally allowed to articulate
their standpoints.

Fallo: Court ruled that election on minority leader is not provided in the Constitution, but form part of rules of
Senate. Courts cannot interfere with the internal affairs of Legislative branch; otherwise, it violates separation of
powers.

Case: International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, G.R. No. 85750, 89331, September 28, 1990

Doctrine: “It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that
diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a
determination by the executive branch of the government.”

Facts: The International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) and the International Rice Research Institute
(IRRI) are both international organizations with centers operating in the Philippines.
Labor organizations have filed petitions for certification election with the then Ministry of Labor and
Employment for ICMC and IRRI. Both organizations opposed the petitions on the ground that both are
international organizations with diplomatic immunity from Philippine labor laws.

Issue/s: WON the Labor Secretary has committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the Petition for
Certification Election
Ruling:

Fallo: WHEREFORE, the petition in the ICMC case is GRANTED, while the petition in the IRRI case is
DISMISSED.

Case: Tañada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997

Doctrine:

Facts: Respondent then Secretary of The Department of Trade and Industry, representing the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines, signed the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Negotiations embodying the WTO Agreement and its integral annexes, the Ministerial Declarations
and Decisions and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services. The Philippine Senate adopted
Resolution No. 97 which "Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, that the Senate concur, as it hereby concurs, in the
ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. The
WTO Agreement ratified by the President of the Philippines is composed of the Agreement Proper and its integral
annexes.

Issue/s: WON the petition presents a political question or is otherwise not justiciable.

Ruling: In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution,
the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged
to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to
assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld." Once a "controversy as to the application or
interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal
issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide." As the petition alleges grave abuse of
discretion and as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the Court has
no hesitation at all in holding that this petition should be given due course and the vital questions raised therein
ruled upon under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Fallo: The petition was dismissed.

Case: Garcia v. Corona, G.R. No. 132451, December 17, 1999

Doctrine: The term "political question" refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to
the legislative or executive branch of the government.

Facts: • The SC initially declared RA 8180 unconstitutional and EO 392 void because 3 key provisions intended
to promote free competition were shown to achieve the opposite result.
•Consequently, Congress enacted RA 8479, a new deregulation law without the offending provisions of the earlier
law.
• The petitioner seeks to declare Sec. 19 of RA 8470, which sets the time of full deregulation,
unconstitutional.

Issue/s: WON the timeliness or wisdom of the date when full deregulation should be effective is unconstitutional.

Ruling: The Court ruled that what constitutes reasonable time is not for judicial determination
Reasonable time involves the appraisal of a great variety of relevant conditions, political, social and economic.
They are not within the appropriate range of evidence in a court of justice.

Fallo:

Case: Liang v. People, G.R. No. 125865 (Resolution), March 26, 2001

Doctrine: Immunity from suit of exempted or diplomatic foreign nationals is not absolute.

Facts: Chinese national and ADB employee Jeffrey Liang was charged with two counts of grave oral defamation
against fellow ADB employee Joyce Cabal.

Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC.

The MeTC judge received an "office of protocol" from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that
petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and
the Philippine Government. The MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution dismissed the two criminal cases.

The prosecution for reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was denied, the
prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City which
set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued.

After the motion for reconsideration was denied, Liang elevated the case to this Court via a petition for review.

Liang argued his defenses as follows:

According to Sec. 45 of the DFA-ADB Agreement, he was immune from suit]
He lost his right to due process because there was no preliminary investigation held before the criminal cases
were filed in court.

Issue/s: W/N Liang is immune from suit?

W/N petitioner’s right to due process was transgressed?

Ruling: NO. Immunity from suit under the DFA-ADB Agreement is not absolute. The ADB employee must have
been acting in official capacity, thus, Liang’s case is not covered by said agreement. NO. Immunity from suit
under the DFA-ADB Agreement is not absolute. The ADB employee must have been acting in official capacity,
thus, Liang’s case is not covered by said agreement. Slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the
immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime in the name of official duty.

NO. Preliminary investigation is not a matter of right (not required) in cases cognizable by the MeTC. Being a
purely statutory right, it may be invoked only when granted by law
The rule on criminal procedure is clear that no preliminary investigation is required in cases falling within the
jurisdiction of the MeTC.

Fallo: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED

Case: Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. 45081, July 15, 1936

Doctrine:
Facts: Angara and Ynsua were rival in an electoral post in Tayabas 1st District. After the election, on Dec. 3
1935, the National Assembly proclaimed Angara as the winner. Ynsua filed a Motion of Protest. On Dec. 9, 1935,
the Electoral Commission issued a resolution stating that the last day of filing electoral protests is Dec. 9, 1935.

With Ynsua’s protest within the prescribed date, the Electoral Commission recognized Ynsua’ protest. Angara
filed a Motion to Dismiss the Protest on account that the National Assembly has already proclaimed him the
winner last Dec. 3. This proclamation, he claims, should nullify the Electoral Commission’s due date for filing.
The Electoral Commission denied Angara’s Motion to Dismiss.

Angara went to the Supreme Court asking for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the
Electoral Commission from taking further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua.

Angara argues, “the constitution excludes from the Commission’s jurisdiction the power to regulate the
proceedings of such election contests. Moreover, the Commission can regulate the proceedings of election
protests only if the National Assembly has not availed of its primary power to regulate such proceedings.

Issue/s: WON the Supreme has Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy upon the foregoing related facts.

Ruling: In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to
determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. The court has jurisdiction
over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining
the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." (Sec 4 Art.
VI 1935 Constitution). It is held, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate
exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the election protest filed by Ynsua.

Fallo:

Case: Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989

Doctrine: JUDICIAL REVIEW; POWER TO DETERMINE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR EXCESS

OF JURISDICTION ON ANY BRANCH OR INSTRUMENTALITY OF THE GOVERNMENT. — The present
Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas
which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to decide.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission cited by petitioners show that the framers intended to widen
the scope of judicial review but they did not intend courts of justice to settle all actual controversies before them.
When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination to whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is
being questioned.

Facts: - Mr. Ferdinand E. Marcos expressed his wish to return to the Philippines to die a mere three years after he
was removed from office by the People Power Revolution. President Corazon Aquino, however, barred his and
his
family’s return, in consideration of the dire consequences that his return may have to a country that’s still reeling
from the Martial Law era and is constantly being threatened from various directions.
- Petitioners claim that their right to return to the Philippines is founded on Sections 1 and 6 of the Bill of Rights,
the equal protection and liberty of abode clauses. They claim that the president is without power to impair their
liberty of abode as only a court may do so. The president, it is claimed, also cannot impair their right to travel as
there was no law authorizing her to do so. Further, petitioners argue that their right to return to
the Philippines is guaranteed under international law, specifically under the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (Declaration) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Covenant).
- The respondents, on the other hand, base their arguments on Article II, Sections 4 and 5, claiming that the right
of the State to national security takes primacy over individual rights.

Issue/s: W/N the president acted in grave abuse of discretion when she prohibited the return of the Marcoses

Ruling: NO.
a. The Court can rule on political questions by virtue of the expanded certiorari powers granted in Art. VIII, Sec.
1 of the Constitution.

b. There exist factual bases to bar the return of the Marcoses.

- The country is “besieged from within by a well-organized communist insurgency, a separatist movement
in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to grab power, urban terrorism, the murder with impunity of military
men, police officers and civilian officials, to mention only a few.” The return of the Marcoses “would
only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the State and instigate more chaos.” This is in
addition to the fact that the country is only beginning to recover from the effects of the Martial law era,
specifically from the plunder of the economy. Close associates and relatives of Marcos are still in the
country, in a prime position to destabilize the country. The excessive foreign borrowing “stifles and
stagnates development and is one of the root causes of poverty and its attendant ills.”
- In consideration of the above mentioned circumstances, the President has determined that the return of
the Marcoses “would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years and lead to total economic
collapse.”

Fallo: The petition was denied.

Case: Daza v. Singson, G.R. No. 86344, December 21, 1989

Doctrine:

Facts: In the middle of general congressional elections, 24 members of the Liberal Party (LP) formally resigned
and shifted their allegiance to Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP). This reduced the former party to 17
members, and added to the former’s total of 159 members. The HoR responded by reorganizing the Commission
on Appointments to achieve proportional representation in accordance with Section 18, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, which led to LP losing 1 out of 2 seats. As a result, Petitioner was replaced with Respondent as a
member of said commission. Petitioner then filed a petition for prohibition and injunction on the grounds that the
LDP is not a registered political party, and that the HoR’s reorganization was not valid. Respondent replied saying
the issue cannot be raised to the Court since it is political in nature, the real party respondent should be the HoR,
and that there is no requirement that a political party must be registered before its entitlement to representation.

Issue/s: W/N Court had jurisdiction

Ruling: YES.
a) The issue presented in the petition, whether or not Petitioner’s removal from the Commission
on Appointments and Respondent’s election was valid, is an issue of legality.
b) Even if it’s a political issue, and not a justiciable issue, the Court can still rule within its
expanded jurisdiction stated in the 1987 Constitution.

Fallo: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, and affirmed validity of respondent’s election to the
Commission on Appointments.

Case: Garcia v. Board of Investments, G.R. No. 92024, November 9, 1990

Doctrine: Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution

Facts: Former Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), now Luzon Petrochemical Corporation, formed by a
group of Taiwanese investors, was granted by the BOI for the transfer of its proposed plant site from Bataan to
Batangas and the shift of the plant’s feedstock or fuel for its petrochemical plant from “naphta only” to “naptha
and/or liquefied petroleum gas. In February 1989, one year after the BPC began its production in Bataan, the
corporation applied to the BOI to have its plant site transferred from Bataan to Batangas. Despite vigorous
opposition from petitioner Cong. Enrique Garcia and others, the BOI granted private respondent BPC’s
application, stating that the investors have the final choice as to where to have their plant site because they are the
ones who risk capital for the project.

Issue/s: WON the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in yielding to the application of the investors
without considering the national interest

Ruling: Yes, the Supreme Court found the BOI to have committed grave abuse of discretion in this case, and
ordered the original application of the BPC to have its plant site in Bataan and the product naphta as feedstock
maintained. The ponente, Justice Gutierrez, Jr., first stated the Court’s judicial power to settle actual controversies
as provided for by Section 1 of Article VIII in our 1987 Constitution before he wrote the reasons as to how the
Court arrived to its conclusion. He mentioned that nothing is shown to justify the BOI’s action in letting the
investors decide on an issue which, if handled by our own government, could have been very beneficial to the
State, as he remembered the word of a great Filipino leader, to wit: “.. he would not mind having a government
run like hell by Filipinos than one subservient to foreign dictation”. Justice Griño Aquino, in her dissenting
opinion, argued that the petition was not well-taken because the 1987 Investment Code does not prohibit the
registration of a certain project, as well as any decision of the BOI regarding the amended application. She stated
that the fact that petitioner disagrees with BOI does not make the BOI wrong in its decision, and that petitioner
should have appealed to the President of the country and not to the Court, as provided for by Section 36 of the
1987 Investment Code. Justice Melencio-Herrera, in another dissenting opinion, stated that the Constitution does
not vest in the Court the power to enter the realm of policy considerations, such as in this case.

Fallo:

Case: Mariano, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 118577 & 118627, March 7, 1995

Doctrine: Dumlao v. COMELEC (1980); The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of
a law are: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by
the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the
decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.

Facts: Several individuals filed a case to declare Sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. 7854 entitled “An Act Converting
the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati” unconstitutional.
Only one of the petitioners is a resident of Makati while the others are suing as taxpayers.

Issue/s: WON Sections 2, 51 and 52 of RA No. 7854 are unconstitutional

Ruling: NO.

1. Sec. 2 - Petitioners did not show that the description made in this Section will cause confusion regarding its
boundaries. Also, the delineation did not change even by an inch the land previously covered by Makati as a
Municipality. Congress also saw it fit to allow the court to decide on the case involving the issue of jurisdiction
over Fort Bonifacio between Makati and Taguig that was still pending during that time. If Congress defined the
metes and bounds with technical description it would have effectively decided the issue pending with the court.
2. Sec. 51- the petitioners were not able to meet the requirements before a litigant can challenge the
constitutionality of a law which are as follows:
 1. There must be an actual case or controversy
○ There is no actual case or controversy because the petition is premised on a hypothetical issue
based merely on the possibility that Mayor Binay will run again in the subsequent elections, that
he would be re-elected and that he would seek re-election for the same post in the 1998
elections.
2. The question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party
○ The Petitioners, except one, are not residents of Makati and are not the proper parties to raise
the issue
3. The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity
○ Seeing that there is no actual controversy because the issue is merely based on hypothetical
scenarios the case is not ripe for adjudication.
4. The decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself
3. Sec. 52 - The petitioners contend that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional
for: (1) reapportionment 6 cannot made by a special law; (2) the addition of a legislative district is not expressed
in the title of the bill; 7 and (3) Makati's population, as per the 1990 census, stands at only 450,000. These issues
have already been laid to rest in the case of Tobias v. Abalos. In the said case, (1) the court ruled that Congress
may increase its membership not only through a general reapportionment law but also through a special law such
as R.A. No. 7854. To allow reapportionment only through a general law would create an inequitable situation
where a new city created by Congress would be denied legislative representation and as an effect would deny the
people of the new city a particle of their sovereignty. (2) Also in the case of Tobias, the court favored the policy of
liberal construction to the “one title-one subject” rule so as not to impede legislation. Furthermore, (3) Sec. 5(3),
Art. VI of the Constitution provides that a city with a population of at least 250,000 shall have a minimum of 1
representative and even granting that Makati had a population of 450,000 in 1990 its legislative district may be
increased since it has met the minimum population requirement.

Fallo: WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs.

Case: Philippine Press Institute, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 119694 (Resolution), May 22, 1995

Doctrine:

Facts:
- Comelec has promulgated Resolution No. 2772 Section 2 stating that “the commission
shall procure ½ page free in atleast 1 newspaper of general circulation in every province or city for use as
‘comelec space’”.

- On Section 8 of the said resolution, it states that there should be no news newspaper or publication shall
allow to be printed or published in the news, opinion, features, or other sections of the newspaper or
publication accounts or comments which manifestly favor or oppose any candidate or political party by
unduly or repeatedly referring to or including therein said candidate or political party, unless the facts and
circumstances clearly indicate otherwise.

- The solicitor General has filed a comment on behalf of COMELEC alleging that the Resolution No. 2772
Sec 2 does not mean to be taken as an obligation to provide free space since it does not provide any criminal
or administrative sanctions.

- The Sol Gen also maintains that Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 is a permissible exercise of the power of
supervision or regulation of the Comelec over the communication and information operations of print media
enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.

- The petitioners are challenging the constitutionality of Section 2 Resolution 2772 since it violates Section
18(2) Article 3 of the constitution. Also, they are arguing that Section 8 of Resolution 2772 is violative of the
 constitutionality of free speech and expression.

Issue/s: WON the Section 8 of the resolution is a justiciable controversy.

Ruling: No, Section 8 of Resolution no. 2772 only appears to establish a guideline for implementation and should
not be taken as a violation of the right of free speech. Put a little differently, the Court considers that the precise
constitutional issue here sought to be raised is not ripe for judicial review for lack of an actual case or controversy
involving, as the very lis mota thereof, the constitutionality of Section 8.

Fallo:

Case: Tañada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997

Doctrine:

Facts: Petitioners prayed for the nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the concurrence of the Philippine
Senate in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization (WTO Agreement, for brevity) and for the prohibition of its implementation and enforcement
through the release and utilization of public funds, the assignment of public officials and employees, as well as
the use of government properties and resources by respondent-heads of various executive offices concerned.

Issue/s: W/N said provisions unduly impair or interfere with the exercise of judicial power by this court in
promulgating rules on evidence

Ruling: No.

Paragraph 1 of Article 34 of the General Provisions and Basic Principles of the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) does not intrude on the power of the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedures. The foregoing should really present no problem
in changing the rules of evidence as the present law on the subject, Republic Act No. 165, as amended, otherwise
known as the Patent Law, provides a similar presumption in cases of infringement of patented design or utility
model.

By and large, the arguments adduced in connection with our disposition of the third issue—derogation of
legislative power—will apply to this fourth issue also. Suffice it to say that the reciprocity clause more than
justifies such intrusion, if any actually exists. Besides, Article 34 does not contain an unreasonable burden,
consistent as it is with the due process and the concept of adversarial dispute settlement in our judicial system.

So too, since the Philippines is a signatory to most international conventions on patents, trademarks and
copyrights, the adjustment in legislation and rules of procedure will not be substantial.

Fallo: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Case: Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 132922, April 21, 1998

Doctrine:

Facts: Petitioners contend that §92 of BP Blg. 881 violates the due process clause and the eminent domain
provision of the Constitution by taking airtime from radio and television broadcasting stations without payment of
just compensation. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the
sale of airtime to advertisers and that to require these stations to provide free airtime is to authorize a taking which
is not “a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of private property.”

Issue/s: WON Sec. 92 of B.P. 881 is unconstitutional

Ruling:
[DUE PROCESS & EMINENT DOMAIN] All broadcasting is licensed by the government through a franchise,
which is a privilege. The constitutional provision states that "any such franchise or right granted… shall be
subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires."
i. COMELEC time has always been free of charge in Election Code of 1971 (R.A.
6388) and 1978 Election Code (P.D. 1296).
ii. Even in the United States, there are responsible scholars who believe that government
controls on broadcast media can constitutionally be instituted to ensure diversity of
views and attention to public affairs to further the system of free expression. For this
purpose, broadcast stations may be required to give free airtime to candidates in an
election.
iii. No private property is taken away from broadcasting companies because they do not
own the airwaves and frequencies. They are merely given the temporary privilege to
use them, which may be reasonably burdened with the performance of some form of
public service. The duty imposed on GMA Network, Inc. by its franchise is to render
"adequate public service time" under §92 of B.P. 881.
iv. The amendment on Sec. 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2983-A providing for the
payment of "just compensation" is invalid and unconstitutional, being in
contravention of §92 of B.P. 881.
o [EXCESS POWER OF COMELEC] Procurement of COMELEC time is determined by the
overall objective of informing the public about the candidates, their qualifications and their
programs of government. §92 was intentionally undetailed to leave room for accommodation
of the demands of radio and television programming.
o [EQUAL PROTECTION] Differential treatment for free speech purposes is justified because
of important differences.
i. Due to physical limitations of the broadcast spectrum, the government is tasked to
allocate and regulate broadcast frequencies, which they do not do for print media.
ii. By granting them privilege, the government spends considerable public funds in
licensing and supervising radio and television, which it does not for print media.
Requiring them to provide free airtime for the COMELEC Time is a fair exchange for
what the industry gets.
iii. Freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the
freedom accorded to newspaper and print media because of their unique and pervasive
influence.

Fallo: