The IOC: failure to tackle the ethical issues it faces and need for public

intervention

Contents table

1. Introduction.................................................................................................................................1
2. The IOC’s autonomy, governance structure and the Games selection process.......2
3. The ethical issues that the IOC failed to tackle..................................................................3
3.1. Outside of the Games.........................................................................................................3
(i) The persisting corruption in the HSP.................................................................................3
(ii) The disregard for athletes’ dignity..................................................................................5
3.2. In the organisation and conduct of the Games................................................................6
(i) The corruption in procurement and match-fixing.............................................................7
(ii) The failing sustainable orientation of the Games........................................................8
(iii) The unsanctioned violations of HR by Hosts.............................................................10
4. The potential measures to be adopted in relation to the IOC.......................................12
4.1. Adjusting the current model to specifically target the aforementioned issues...........12
4.2. Modifying integrally the current model by involving public bodies...............................14
5. Conclusion................................................................................................................................15
6. Bibliography.............................................................................................................................16
 1. Introduction

According to the International Olympic Committee (“IOC”)’s president Thomas

Bach, recent changes in the organisation’s legal instruments are “another reflection
of the IOC’s commitment to embedding the fundamental values of Olympism in all
aspects of the Olympic Games [the “Games”]”1. However, this commitment is still
questioned.

The IOC was constituted in June 1894 by Pierre de Coubertin and is the
organisation charged with managing the Olympic Movement (the “Movement”),
which encompasses the organisation of the Games. Its role is to promote Olympism,
defined as a “philosophy of life”2 oriented towards sports and its benefits for human
beings, including potential in the promotion of peace in the world 3. Given the
importance of its mission, the IOC always revendicated a certain autonomy from
public entities. However, the latter is only justified insofar as the organisation can
answer the “obligations of autonomy”4 including the establishment of “principles of
good governance”5 for the IOC and the Movement.

Ever since the Games became a financial resources generator, the IOC has
constantly faced scandals of various orders. It all started with the Salt Lake City
(“SLC”) bid scandal and corruption of IOC members and continued with more
corruption, disregard for environmental damages and human rights (“HR”) violations
in Sochi 2014 or Beijing 2022. And all of these scandals happened despite various
IOC reforms to fix issues.

This raises a major question: is the IOC’s complete autonomy still legitimate when
it constantly fails to tackle corruption, environmental damage, and HR issues with its
current governance system?

To well understand the IOC’s failure, one should be familiar with the
organisation’s autonomy, how its governance is structured and how the Games
selection process works (II). This base will allow us to expose the ethical issues the

1
https://www.olympic.org/news/ioc-strengthens-its-stance-in-favour-of-human-rights-and-against-corruption-
in-new-host-city-contract.
2
IOC. Olympic Charter [2021] 8, para 1.
3
Ibid, para 2.
4
Ibid, para 5.
5
Ibid.

1
IOC failed to tackle, at different levels of the movement (III). Finally, we will try to
provide potential measures to be adopted to effectively resolve those issues (IV).

2. The IOC’s autonomy, governance structure and the Games selection

process

The Olympic Charter (the “Charter”), which is a “basic instrument of constitutional

nature”6, defines the IOC as the supreme authority under which the Movement must
be developed7. The IOC’s legal object is to execute the “mission, role and
responsibilities” that the Charter provided for it8.

The IOC is established as a Swiss not-for-profit organisation 9. However, it seems

to escape Swiss legal provisions for it is neither a “foreign public agent”, a necessary
condition to apply the criminal code, nor an enterprise with economic activity, which
is necessary to apply competition law 10. Thus, IOC appears completely autonomous
from the legal system where it is recognised. The IOC’s specific mission, generally
the promotion of the values of Olympism, seems to justify this complete autonomy
towards public bodies. Its autonomy stems from the autonomy of sports which was
recently recognised by the United Nations (“UN”)11 after the TFEU already recognised
the “specific nature of sports”12. This is strongly advocated by the IOC which defines
sports as the unique domain of life with “truly universal law based on global ethics,
fair play, respect and friendship”13.

This autonomy is manifested in the IOC’s freedom to determine the “structure and
governance” of the organisations composing the Movement 14. Therefore, the Charter
is the main instrument establishing the IOC’s governance structure centred around
three main organs15. The Session is the “supreme organ” of the IOC and is
composed of all IOC current members16. Then comes the Executive Board, which is
6
Ibid, 6, a.
7
Ibid, 8, para 3.
8
Ibid, rule 15.
9
Ibid.
10
Michael Mrkonjic, “AGGIS: The Swiss Regulatory Framework and International Sports Organisations” [2013]
Play the Game, https://playthegame.org/news/news-articles/2013/aggis-the-swiss-regulatory-framework-and-
international-sports-organisations/.
11
UNGA Res 69/6 (31 October 2014) UN Doc A/RES/69/6.
12
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ 326/47, art. 165.
13
IOC. Olympic Agenda 2020, context and background [2014], 83.
14
Op. cit. 2, para 5.
15
Ibid. rule 17.
16
Ibid. rule 18.

2
composed of the President, four vice-presidents and ten other members, and has the
power to administrate and manage the affairs 17. Finally, the President has power over
all IOC activities18 within the limits of the other organs’ powers. Next to those main
organs are Commissions that provide recommendations for the Executive Board,
including an Ethics Commission19 that was created after the SLC scandal.

Most of these entities intervene in the Host Selection Process (“HSP”)20, which
follows two main steps. Firstly, the Executive Board, after examination of the
commitments by a commission, selects several candidates that are to be presented
to the Session21. Secondly, the Session elects the future host by vote as per the
Charter22.

Whether for the HSP or other issues, the IOC’s autonomy is evident which
explains why it has often been criticised as a “passe-partout” to justify self-
governance23. This issue gets even more concerning when self-governance fails to
fulfil its mission.

3. The ethical issues that the IOC failed to tackle

Governing the Movement is not limited to the Games but entails the constant
supervision of sports. The IOC failed to tackle ethical issues both outside the Games
(3.1.) and in their organisation and conduct (3.2.).

3.1. Outside of the Games

The IOC’s current governance has not only failed to suppress the corruption at
play in the HSP (i) but also disregarded athletes’ dignity (ii).

(i) The persisting corruption in the HSP

After the SLC scandal, the IOC, in an effort to fulfil its mission on ethics and
good governance24, complemented the Charter’s provisions with a Code of Ethics
(“CoE”) redacted by the Ethics Commission and forming part of the Charter 25. These
17
Ibid. rule 19.
18
Ibid. rule 20.
19
Ibid. by-law 2 of rule 21.
20
Ibid. rule 33.
21
IOC. Candidature Process 2024 [2015], 15.
22
Op. cit. 2, art. 18.2.4.
23
Wagner and others, When Sport Meets Business: Capabilities, Challenges, Critiques (SAGE, 2016).
24
Op. cit. 2., rule 2.1.
25
Ibid, rule 22.

3
rules apply to the "Olympic Parties" including the IOC members, a compliance
obligation that is explicit in the Charter26.

IOC members have to signal any “actual” conflict of interests 27 that could
threaten the “highest degree of integrity” they must act with 28. Additionally, the CoE
prevents IOC members from accepting any concealed benefit or gift related to the
Games29. Those measures aimed at preventing corruption, a goal mentioned in
article 2 of the CoE30. As for the sanctions, IOC members that “jeopardise the
interests of the IOC” could suffer a reprimand or a suspension, all decided by the
Executive Board31. Corruption clearly fulfils the aforementioned requirements and
should be sanctioned.

Despite these provisions, corruption scandals are still common in the IOC.
This can be seen through investigations of Tokyo 2020 suspected lobbying and
bribery to get the Games or the confession of Rio's former governor of bribing
officials to obtain the 2016 Games32. Multiple explanations can be found for the
ineffectiveness of the IOC's legal tools.

First, the IOC has a monopoly on the Games, as per the Charter, which is then
passed on the Host City (“HC”) after the HSP. The Games are seen as a cash
machine for the HC for it generates multiple positive externalities such as reputation
and prestige, intense tourism, and also political and social benefits such as
employment33. Considering these benefits the Games bring, applicants to the HSP
are highly incentivised to bribe voters. Concurrently, the IOC is not incentivised to
control this for it does not have any constraint from peers that could take control of
the Movement34. Their control of the resource (i.e. the rights to delegate the
organisation of the Games) makes them corruptible 35.

26
Ibid, rule 16.2.1.
27
IOC. Rules concerning conflict of interest affecting the behaviour of Olympic parties, Art. 4.
28
IOC. Code of Ethics [2020] Article 2.
29
Ibid. article 3.
30
Ibid. article 2.
31
Op. cit. 2. Rule 59.
32
Marina Manoukian, “The controversial History of the International Olympic Committee” [2021] Grunge
https://www.grunge.com/461215/the-controversial-history-of-the-international-olympic-committee/.
33
P. Scandizzo and others, “Assessing the Olympic Games: The Economic Impact and Beyond” [2018] 32 Journal
of economic surveys 649.
34
Travis Nelson, Patrick Cottrell, “Sport without referees? The power of the IOC and the social politics of
accountability” [2016] 22 European Journal of International Relations 437, 444.

4
 Even if the IOC had the incentive to control the corruption of its members, it is
affected by an agency problem. Not-for-profit organisations are usually guided by
human values and not money which makes the residual loss of an agency
relationship null. It is not the case for the IOC. As it is non-profit, identifying
stakeholders, which are claimants for the residual loss, is harder 36. Therefore, the
incentive to correct the inefficiencies is too low. This probably explains why the IOC
members are only constrained by compliance obligations and not by any contract
with the organisation. Additionally, the sanctions for non-compliance are too light and
restricted. Only a few members were expelled while multiple "warnings", followed by
recidivism, were issued after the SLC scandal. This might be explained by the
necessary quorum of two-thirds of the Session to expel a member 37, which allows for
corrupts to protect each other.

Finally, there are flaws in the Ethics Commission’s procedure itself. All rely on
a nominated Chief Ethics Compliance Officer and the Executive Board 38, not on
independent members. This is worsened by a lack of transparency, for investigations
remain confidential until a decision is reached.

The IOC’s provisions on corruption are deeply flawed but solutions will be
explored at the end of this paper.

(ii) The disregard for athletes’ dignity

At first sight, the preservation of human dignity is at the centre of the IOC’s
actions, for it is one of its fundamental principles 39. This includes promoting safe
sport40 and prohibiting any form of exploitation of young athletes 41.

The CoE strengthens this orientation by insisting on the “respect for international
conventions on protecting [HR]”42. These evidently include the Universal Declaration
of HR and its article 3 on the right to security. Freedom from sexual harassment can

35
Vasile Triboi, Natalia Nastas, “The Fight against Corruption in Sport […]” [2021] 17 Lumen proceedings 674.
676.
36
Daniel Mason and others, “An Agency Theory Perspective on Corruption in Sport: The Case of the IOC” [2006]
20 Journal of Sport Management 52, 60.
37
Op. cit. 2, rule 16.3.8.2.
38
IOC. Code of Ethics – Rules of procedure, art. 16.
39
Op. cit. 2. para. 2.
40
Ibid, rule 2.18.
41
IOC. Good governance [2020] principle 6.2.
42
Op. cit. 27, article 1.4.

5
be considered security and should therefore be protected by the IOC. However,
cases of harassment of young athletes keep developing, like the recent abuse in the
US gymnastics team.

The main explanation for this is the IOC’s hierarchical structure 43. It delegates its
responsibility to national federations and cannot be held accountable for their
inaction. As for US gymnastics, the IOC relied on the US Olympic Committee and did
not address the issue or act in any regard. This echoes what happened with the
Russian doping scandal and IOC’s inefficiency to investigate and declare sanctions
compared to the World Anti-Doping Agency (“WADA”). The IOC’s disregard was
made clearer by the absence of the issue from Agenda 2020.

The IOC’s inaction links with its position as a “supreme authority” that has a
supra-national power, an out-of-system decision-making process, but still rely on
Swiss law for its legal status 44. The uncertainty on who could challenge the IOC’s
behaviour on legal grounds, if there is even someone, makes reputation the only
mean available to hold the IOC accountable. However, some argued that the
“symbolism of sports”45 installed a certain trust in the IOC that limits reputational
sanctions. However, there is an evident unbalance between this HR and all other
fundamental HRs that needs to be addressed. This could only happen by increasing
the IOC’s accountability.

3.2. In the organisation and conduct of the Games

The Games’ organisation is flawed by corruption (i), disregard for the

environmental damage (ii) and basic HRs (iii).

(i) The corruption in procurement and match-fixing

The previously mentioned principles of the Charter and the CoE apply to the
Olympic Parties, including National Olympic Committees (“NOCs”), the HC and the
Organising Committee for the Games (“OCOG”).

These are reinforced by NOCs’ specific obligation to “resist pressures of any

kind”, including political or economic, “which may prevent from complying with the
43
Anne-Marie Burke, “Raising the Bar: Increasing Protection for Athletes in the Olympic Movement from Sexual
Harassment and Abuse” [2021] 31 Journal of Legal Aspects of Sport 60, 82.
44
Op. cit. 33, 441.
45
Ibid. 443.

6
Charter”46. This provision, that appears applicable to the OCOG and HC due to their
joint liability with the NOC47, englobes resisting corruption. Binding documents for the
organising parties, which include the HC Contract (“HCC”) and the HSP
commitments48, clearly impose an obligation to refrain from “acts involving fraud”49
which includes corruption.

Yet again corruption persists in procurement and match-fixing. This can be

explained by several factors. First, the IOC has not shown a strong willingness to
apply these provisions50 as can be seen from the nomination of an organised criminal
at the AIBA presidency, or even by its delayed intervention in the Russian doping
scandal even after WADA’s report. Even if the IOC was willing to sanction corruption,
uncertainty on the scope of applicability for the HCC provisions is an issue. Multiple
third parties are involved, which would in principle not be bound by provisions of a
contract to which they are not signatories. Two things explain this profusion of third
parties. First, the IOC governs a movement, making it focused on principles and not
entities51 which causes a vague definition of who Olympic Parties are. This is
worsened by the delegation of the Games which increases uncertainty on who is
targeted by the anti-corruption provisions. Finally, even when targets are identified,
sanctions are either insufficient or unrealistic. The first option is focused on the
financial harm52 where corruption generates more social harm. Corruption is a
negative externality that needs to be sanctioned appropriately. The second option is
a “nuclear threat”53 for it is the termination of the HCC and removal of the rights to
organise the Games. The unrealistic aspect of this will be developed further in this
paper.

On a positive note, the IOC partially fixed the issue by making HCCs available
to the public from Tokyo 2020 onwards. More transparency on Hosts’ legal
obligations might make it easier to argue a potential breach in front of a court.

46
Ibid, rule 27.6.
47
IOC. Host City Contract 2024 – Principles [2017] article 4.
48
Ibid. article 1.1.
49
Ibid. article 13.2.c.
50
Richard Pound, “The Russian Doping Scandal: Some reflections on Responsibility in Sport Governance” [2020]
1 Journal of Olympic Studies 4.
51
Thomas Kruessmann, “Extending integrity to third parties: in search of a new model for anti-corruption in
sports” [2019] 18 The International Sports Law Journal 136, 145.
52
Ibid, 147.
53
Ibid.

7
However, this supposes that there is a court having jurisdiction against the Olympic
parties’ actions.

(ii) The failing sustainable orientation of the Games

Again, the IOC’s main legal instrument is the HCC. However, it is worth noting
the organisation’s own orientation towards sustainability.

Sustainability is part of the IOC’s mission for it must “encourage and support a
responsible concern for environmental issues” in line with sustainable development,
and “require” that the Games respect these principles 54. Environment has become a
pillar of Olympism55, causing the IOC to invest in sustainability with projects such as
the Olympic Forest or collaborate with the UN on its "Sports for Climate Action
Framework"56. This orientation guides the HCC provisions, obliging the parties to
“embrace sustainable development” by adopting a “sustainability programme” while
relying on compliance with international agreements, laws or regulations on
environment protection applicable in the country 57. Requirements for the
establishment of both a "sustainability strategy” and a “carbon management plan”58
complement this.

Yet again, these measures failed. Beijing 2022, advocated as “green, open,
inclusive and clean”59, made use of infrastructures like the one in the picture below.

54
Op. cit. 2, rule 2.14.
55
Walker Ross and others, “Governance of Olympic Environmental Stakeholders” [2019] 4 Journal of Global
Sport Management 331, 333.
56
IOC. IOC Annual Report 2020 [2021], 34.
57
Op. cit. 47, article 15.1.
58
IOC. Host City Contract – Operational Requirements – June 2018 [2019], 166.
59
Op. cit. 56, 83.

8
 https://edition.cnn.com/2022/02/08/asia/ski-jump-winter-olympics-beijing-climate-hnk-intl/index.html

This failure’s main driver is the conflict of interests between the IOC, which
must ensure sustainable and "regular celebration of the Games”60, and the Host that
is focused on generating a maximum of benefits. This conflict, reinforced by an
asymmetry of information in favour of the Host, is characteristic of an agency
relationship and causes failure on several levels.

First, candidates are incentivised to lie about their abilities in terms of

sustainability at the selection stage. The Future Host Commission, missioned to
verify the commitments61, constantly fails to accurately fulfil its mission 62. Benefitting
from this information failure, candidates do not hesitate to overestimate their abilities.
This problem cannot be fixed by slightly modifying the current procedure, as the
ineffective inclusion of a “sustainability and legacy” section in the decision for 2020
onwards63 demonstrates. After the Host is selected another problem persists. The
provisions are vague and rely on national law. Thus, the Games are “left in the hands
of the local stakeholders”64 that can easily adapt their law to limit their obligations.
This was Russia’s strategy in Sochi, to allow massive garbage dumping 65. Finally, the
HCC plays the role assigned to corporate law by Jensen and Meckling (i.e. reducing
agency costs and aligning interests 66) and therefore needs effective sanctions. This is
not the case. If parties do not comply with their obligations, they risk retention of 5%
of the funds promised by the IOC67, which is clearly insignificant. Alternatively, the
IOC can terminate the contract in case of a violation of "any material obligation
pursuant the contract” or any applicable law68. This provision raises two problems.
First, the vagueness of “material obligation” makes its application difficult. Second,
the sanction is unrealistic. The IOC has the mission to ensure the Games happen but

60
Op. cit. 2, rule 2.3.
61
Ibid. by-law rule 33.
62
Arnout Geeraert, Ryan Gauthier, “Out-of-control Olympics: why the IOC is unable to ensure an
environmentally sustainable Olympic Games” [2018] 20 Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning 16, 23.
63
Op. cit. 13, reco. 2.
64
Op. cit. 55, 333.
65
Op. cit 62, 24.
66
M Jensen and T Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”
[1976] 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305, 330.
67
Op. cit. 47, article 36.2.
68
Ibid. article 38.2

9
lacks sufficient funds to organise them. Thus, the Host has strong bargaining power,
coming from the unequal distribution of the property of funds 69, that prevents the IOC
from acting against it.

The IOC’s wrong handling of this agency relationship causes it to fail in its
sustainability commitments. One good aspect is however to be noted: media
monitoring is today efficient enough to compensate for part of the information
asymmetry between the IOC and the Host.

(iii) The unsanctioned violations of HR by Hosts

The IOC recently reformed its HR policy by including provisions in the HCC, but it
still does not seem to be enough.

Before this reform, the only legal obligations on HR that applied to the Host
parties were in the Charter and the CoE in virtue of their “Olympic Party” quality.
However, this did not suffice to prevent the various violations that followed. It started
with a violation of labour rights as guaranteed by the ICESCR 70 in Beijing 2008 and
Sochi 2014 regarding migrant workers and the withholding of their documents 71. It
continued with expropriation without due compensation in Sochi 2014 and Rio
201672. This complete disregard for HRs led the IOC to introduce provisions
addressing the issue directly in the HCC. The Host parties are now obliged to the
protection of HRs and the effective remediation of any violation, all this “in a manner
consistent with international agreements, laws, and regulations applicable [in the
country and] consistent with all internationally-recognised [HRs] standards and
principles, including the UN Guiding Principles on Business and HR”73. This evident
legal obligation for the Host parties is strengthened by a mention of problematics like
“migrant workers, labour conditions [and] displacement of local population”74 in the
operational requirements.

This reform signals the IOC’s willingness to tackle HR issues related to the
Games, but it is not enough. First, we still are in an agency relationship that is
69
H. Sinzheimer, Grundzüge des Arbeitsrechts, ch 2, 22.
70
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [1966] art. 7 and 8.
71
T. Grell "The International Olympic Committee and human rights reforms: game-changer or mere window
dressing?" [2018] 17 Int Sports Law J 160, 162.
72
Ibid.
73
Op. cit. 47, 13.2.b.
74
Op. cit. 48, 127.

10
characterised by a conflict of interests and cannot be mitigated by value-driven
incentives, despite human values being a vital source of the IOC’s power and
authority75. Financial concerns have taken over. This focus got even easier
considering that the HCC provisions on HRs refer to conventions ratified by the Host.
The less convention they have ratified, the fewer legal obligations they will have.
Second, the Coordination Commission’s monitoring 76, supposed to reduce
asymmetry of information, is not efficient enough 77. Sanctions are also flawed in the
same way as for the environmental damage. Finally, a major issue comes from the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”) in appeal of an IOC
decision78. Doubts have been raised about its independence from the IOC in the
past79, which questions whether there should be another body competent for those
issues.

The IOC's willingness to fix these issues is to be even more doubtful when one of
its top partners is Panasonic80, a company that reportedly uses subcontractors
exploiting Uighurs81.

4. The potential measures to be adopted in relation to the IOC

The Movement's legitimacy and autonomy depend on the IOC's good ethical
governance82. If it fails two options are left: adjusting the current model (4.1.) or
integrally modifying it (4.2.).

4.1. Adjusting the current model to specifically target the aforementioned issues

The current model could be adjusted in two aspects to tackle the IOC’s recurring
ethical challenges: the governance system and contractual relationships.

On governance, two options are available. First, a change could be made to the
selection of IOC members. The current system relying on co-optation 83 is corruption-
incentivising, which is why involving more stakeholders could be beneficial. However,
75
Op. cit. 33, 446.
76
Op. cit. 2, rule 37.
77
Op. cit. 71, 164.
78
Op. cit. 2, rule 61.
79
SFT, Gundel v. FEI (4P.217/1992) Decision of 15 March 1993.
80
Op. cit. 56, 27.
81
LaDepeche (2022) https://www.ladepeche.fr/2022/01/21/travail-force-des-ouighours-des-marques-
internationales-toujours-dans-le-viseur-10060253.php.
82
IOC. XIII Olympic Congress [2009] reco. 41.
83
Op. cit. 2, by-law 16.

11
this would raise a “world election” problem 84. Thus, an expert examination of the
candidates85 might be preferable. These experts would have to be completely
independent of the IOC, to avoid repeating past mistakes. This selection process
would consequently meliorate the Ethics Commission's composition and functioning
for its members are elected by the Session86.
Second, the selection process and procedure could be changed. This does not
mean adopting radical measures such as hosting the Games in one place only
forever or multiple countries at once 87 or even organising downsized Games 88. Those
would contravene the IOC’s gathering mission and its world spirit. However, it has
been suggested that the selection process could involve two separate organs with a
board of directors in charge of controlling the decision 89. The latter could involve more
stakeholders, like partner companies and NGOs, reducing the risk of corruption on
the decision-making side that persisted without separation of management and
control. This measure would bring the IOC’s structure closer to the governance that
is advertised for the private sector in the UK 90. Additionally, the IOC could use public
consultations to monitor candidates' satisfaction with HSP’s requirements. This
measure has often been used in the EU to evaluate undertakings’ commitments in
competition infringement investigations and has been proven to work.

On contractual relationships, several points must be addressed. First, rules must

be clear-cut on the obligations’ content. Clearly enumerating targets of provisions in
the HCC would fix the issue of third parties 91 related to corruption and HR. Also,
obligations and sanctions’ vagueness should be eliminated. This entails the
abandonment of the current frameworks 92 in favour of clear principles, without
reference to international treaties and national law 93 which brought heterogeneity in
compliance. The argument relying on the risk for a state’s sovereignty could easily be

84
Jean-Loup Chappelet, “Beyond governance: the need to improve the regulation of international sport” [2018]
21 Sport in Society 724.
85
Wladimir Andreff, An Economic Roadmap to the Dark Side of Sport, Volume II Corruption in Sport (Palgrave
Pivots, 2019).
86
Op. cit. 13, reco. 30.
87
Op. cit. 84.
88
Wolfgang Maennig, “Corruption in International Sports and Sport Management […]” [2005] 5 European Sport
Management Quartely 187.
89
Op. cit. 35.
90
UK Corporate Governance Code [2018] 6.
91
Op. cit. 51.
92
Op. cit. 2, 22.
93
Op. cit. 62.

12
declined considering that the IOC has a habit of forcing Hosts to modify their
intellectual property law if it does not fit its requirements 94.
Second, sanctions should be more realistic to deter non-compliance.
Compensation chambers could be implemented. They would retain funds until certain
thresholds related to a Host’s obligations are reached 95. This would ensure that
candidates do not exaggerate their abilities and make efforts to reach their
established goals. Complementarily, the HCC should include higher contractual
penalties, which is the traditional solution to externality issues. Even though the IOC
is not obliged to positively act on a state’s affairs 96, it could make respect for HR and
the environment a condition to the HSP, combined with enforced sanctions in case of
non-compliance. This would fix the externality issue. Another solution could be the
request for damages in torts, but this is made impossible by the IOC’s autonomy.

4.2. Modifying integrally the current model by involving public bodies

The IOC has already accepted collaboration with public authorities on issues it
cannot tackle alone like manipulation of competition 97. This must be extended.

Collaboration with public bodies can be a solution to improve the IOC’s

governance standards. This initiative started recently with the IPACS, which is
described as an intent to install cooperation with national and international bodies 98
for the fight against corruption in sports. Some argued that this collaboration as a
“world sports government” is the only solution to corruption99. However, IPACS still
relies heavily on the CoE which questions whether it will be sufficient. Concurrently,
such a form of collaboration could solve the athletes' safety issues. Inspired by the
US Safe Sport Act100, international collaboration could lead to a convention
establishing the same mechanisms, including formations and regulatory bodies.

However, public bodies should mainly focus on holding the IOC more
accountable. Sport as a HR does not justify its current disregard for other

94
M. James and G. Osborn, “The Olympics, transnational law and legal transplants: the International Olympic
Committee, ambush marketing and ticket touting.” [2016] 36 Legal studies 93.
95
Op. cit. 93.
96
R. Gauthier, The IOC, Law, and Accountability (Routledge Research, 2017).
97
IOC. CoE and other texts, 75.
98
Op. cit. 51.
99
Op. cit. 85.
100
Op. cit. 42.

13
fundamental HR. The “guardian” needs to be monitored101. The IOC is focused on
limiting reputational costs and preserving its “worldly, ethical, HR-oriented
organisation” image102, incentivised to occult internal issues and scandals when
possible. The protection the hierarchical structure currently gives it must end.
Inspired by the “piercing the corporate veil” doctrine, public bodies should hold the
IOC accountable for its delegates’ actions. This would incentivise the IOC to
implement better policies103. Again, an international convention could be a useful tool
to create an international body monitoring governance 104 and sanctioning the IOC for
its failures. This could take the model of WADA, which has proven to be working in
the past.
Additionally, public intervention is needed to ensure the right to an effective
remedy105 is guaranteed. The only court that has certain jurisdiction is the CAS and
its questionable independence endangers the effectiveness of the remedy.
Therefore, parties need to have another means to appeal the IOC's decisions or
claim damages in torts. Here again, an international convention could give each court
of countries belonging to the Movement jurisdiction over these matters.

Despite all its flaws, the IOC should however not be made public. First, its
greatness is due to private development with Coubertin’s initiative 106, and it would not
survive publicization. Second, the Movement is time and money consuming 107 and
international and national bodies have more important issues than this. Third,
publicising would endanger the Movement’s “political neutrality” that is at the core of
its existence. Finally, history shows how difficult it is to establish a supra-national
federal body which is what the IOC would be if it was publicised.

5. Conclusion

A variety of issues are raised by the IOC’s governance and its autonomy from
public bodies. Even though progress has been made through legal reforms scandals
keep happening and the goals are not reached. There are several options to fix these

101
Saul Fridman, “Conflict of interest, accountability and corporate governance: the case of the IOC and
SOCOG” [1999] 22 UNSW Law Journal 781.
102
Op. cit. 35.
103
Op. cit. 100.
104
Op. cit. 84.
105
Universal Declaration of HR, art. 8.
106
Op. cit. 101.
107
Op. cit. 104.

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failures, but they should not include transferring the Movement into the public
domain. The focus should be on improving the current governance model without
however completely excluding public bodies. They are needed to reinforce the IOC's
accountability and exercise control through international conventions and their own
judicial systems. The IOC’s autonomy needs to be set partially set aside considering
its constant failure to face governance challenges.

6. Bibliography

Cases/resolutions:

SFT, Gundel v. FEI (4P.217/1992) Decision of 15 March 1993.

UNGA Res 69/6 (31 October 2014) UN Doc A/RES/69/6.

Legislation:

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [1966] art. 7 and 8.

IOC. Candidature Process 2024 [2015].

IOC. Code of Ethics [2020].

IOC. Code of Ethics – Rules of procedure [2020].

IOC. Good governance [2020].

IOC. Olympic Agenda 2020, context and background [2014].

IOC. Olympic Charter [2021].

IOC. Host City Contract – Operational Requirements – June 2018 [2019].

IOC. Host City Contract 2024 – Principles [2017].

15
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IOC. Rules concerning conflict of interest affecting the behaviour of Olympic parties
[2020].

IOC. XIII Olympic Congress [2009].

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ 326/47.

UK Corporate Governance Code [2018].

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