Jose P.

Laurel: A "Collaborator" Misunderstood

Author(s): David Steinberg
Source: The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Aug., 1965), pp. 651-665
Published by: Association for Asian Studies
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2051111 .
Accessed: 18/06/2014 21:49

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Association for Asian Studies is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The
Journal of Asian Studies.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 195.78.108.147 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 21:49:49 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Jose P. Laurel:
A "COLLABORATOR"
MISUNDERSTOOD

DAVID STEINBERG

JN I943, towards the middle of Japan's occupation of the Philippines, as the tide
of war was turning, Jose P. Laurel accepted the Presidency of the Republic.'
Two years later, when he was under indictment for treason, he claimed that he
had been forced to take that office. He maintained in his War Memoirs, supposedly
written while interned in I945 by the Americans in Japan, that his collaboration
was ex necessitate re and that "forced collaboration is not collaboration. Voluntary
collaboration as a means of national survival and to tide over our people to better
times is not punishable."2
Laurel characterized himself as a devoted patriot whose only aim was to serve
selflessly,free of any base or complex motives. He maintained that he had acted upon
the express instructions of President Manuel Quezon and General Douglas Mac-
Arthur, given just before these two men left Manila for Corregidor in I94I. He
quoted MacArthur as saying, "What can you do under the circumstances [of the oc-
cupation]? You have to do what they ask you to do except one thing-the taking
of any oath of allegiance to Japan."3Laurel claimed that he had avoided this one
pitfall and that he had been badly treated by the victorious Americans who failed to
discern his patriotism.
However, to accept this self-evaluation, as most Filipinos have done subsequently,
is underestimate the complexity of Laurel's motives. His argument presents a sim-
to

David Steinberg is an Assistant Professor at the University of Michigan Center for South and Southeast
Asian Studies.
1 Jose Paciano Laurel was born on March 9, I89I, at Tanauan, Batangas Province, and he died on
November 6, 1959. Married in 19I2, he was the father of nine children. He received an LL.B. degree
in i9I5 from the University of the Philippines, a D.C.L. degree from Yale in I920, and an LL.D. honoris
causa from Tokyo Imperial University in 1938. His pre-war public career included holding the posts of
Secretary of the Department of the Interior in 1923, Senator and floor leader from 1925 to I93I, and
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court from I936 to I94I. Prior to his inauguration as President of the
Republic in I943, he served as a Member of the Provincial Council of State in January, I942; as Com-
missioner of Justice in the Philippine Executive Commission from January until June, I942; as Commis-
sioner of the Interior in the Philippine Executive Commission until September, I943; as Chairman of the
Central Pacification Committee, President of the PreparatoryCommission for Filipino Independence, and
Chairman of the Drafting Committee for the 1943 Constitution.
2 Laurel, War Memoirs of Dr. lose P. Laurel (Manila, I962), pp. 5i and 57. These memoirs, pub-
lished as a part of a volume of tribute to Jose Laurel by the Laurel Foundation, are supposed to have been
written by him while he was in Sugamo Prison in Japan, from September I5, 1945, to November I6,
1945. Because the Americans supposedly denied Laurel writing paper, the memoirs were written across
a copy of The World of 2030 A.D. by the Earl of Birkenhead. The Foundation claims that the Memoirs
are as they "came from the pen of Dr. Laurel" and that they were not reworked by him sometime after
I945. The reader is urged to examine these memoirs, but with the caveat that they may contain inten-
tional omissions. The reader is also directed toward the writings of other members of the war-time govern-
ment, such as Claro M. Recto's Three Years of Enemy Occupation:The Issue of Political Collaborationin
the Philippines (Manila, 1946), and Quinton Paredes' "Speech on the Amnesty Proclamation" (Manila,
CongressionalReprint, 1948), an address delivered to the House of Representativeson February 13, 1948.
3 War Memoirs, p. 5 and pp. 55-66 passim.

651

This content downloaded from 195.78.108.147 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 21:49:49 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
652 DAVID STEINBERG
plified and misleading impression, one which should be questioned. This paper con-
tends that Laurel accepted the Presidency because he wanted to use the power of that
office, albeit circumscribed by the Japanese occupation authorities, to effect reforms
which he felt were essential to the growth of Philippine society.
Jose Laurel was neither a weak puppet, as was claimed by his post-war enemies,
nor a martyr, as was claimed by his friends and himself. He believed that he could
achieve certain goals despite the occupation, or perhaps because of it, and he gambled
on that belief. He failed in the gamble, but his motivation has been so misunderstood
that it is nearly impossible now to perceive what he wanted to accomplish and why.
He must bear a large share of the responsibility for this confusion since he knew that
his own post-war rehabilitation depended on creating a sympathetic image of his
war-time behavior.4
On June 6, 1943, Laurel, then Minister of the Interior in the Philippine Executive
Commission led by Jorge B. Vargas, was shot while playing golf, probably by an
anti-Japanese guerrilla. Critically wounded, he was confined to a hospital bed for
seven weeks. If he had wanted to avoid any future involvement in a Japanese-sup-
ported government, his wounds afforded him a perfect excuse to go into semi-re-
tirement at the least. Nevertheless, exactly twelve weeks after he was released from
the hospital, he was inaugurated as the first and only President of the Japanese-spon-
sored Republic. Laurel was not a weak man, and he obviously did not accept the of-
fice on a whim.
Unfortunately, as a part of his post-war defense of his actions, he argued a kind of
non-specific duress and compulsion,5 justifying his action on the basis of the instruc-
tions left by Quezon and MacArthur. It is impossible to verify whether Quezon ever
left such instructions, but MacArthur denied that he did so in a letter to the author
in which he wrote, "I gave no instructions to Santos, Roxas, Laurel, or any other
Filipinos. ... Every Filipino except those in the armed services, acted according to
his own conscience so far as I know."6 And indeed, of the three men MacArthur
mentioned, one, Jose Abad Santos, preferred to die by the firing squad rather than
participate in the Japanese administration; and the other, Manuel Roxas, President
Quezon's heir presumptive, avoided high office throughout the war years by pleading
a cardiac condition more severe than it was. If Roxas, who became the first post-war
president, managed to deceive the Japanese, surely Laurel, near death from his
wounds, could have opted for retirement for the remainder of the war.
Despite claims by Laurel and other ranking officialslike Claro Recto that the risk
to their families and themselves was too great, the Japanese were remarkably tolerant
toward those who chose not to serve.7 Jose Yulo, for example, who was initially un
der intense pressure as one of the ranking pre-war officials, was able to assume a
more and more obscure role during the war years merely by doing as little as possible.
The wives and families of officialslike Romulo and Osmefia, who had been evacuated
to Washington, were allowed to live in peaceful retirement in the Philippines. And in
'For a more detailed discussion of the trials and the restoration of the war-time "collaborators,"see
David J. Steinberg, "The Philippines During World War II: A Study in Political Collaboration,"unpubl.
diss. (Harvard University, 1964).
5 War Memoirs, pp. 15-I6 and pp. 63-68 passim.
6 Letter to the author from Douglas MacArthur,April I4, I96I.
7 Except for Jose Abad Santos, the only members of the pre-war clite who were killed were those who
actively participatedin the anti-Japaneseguerrilla movement.

This content downloaded from 195.78.108.147 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 21:49:49 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
JOSE P. LAUREL 653
a secret report submitted by Jorge Vargas to the Japanese Military Commander-in-
Chief, Vargas indicated that it was possible to avoid holding office. He wrote, "In
those cases where important provincial, city, or municipal offices were abandoned
by the incumbents at the outbreak of the war or where the incumbents refused to
reassume or continue in office, the local Japanese military command designated
other Filipinos willing to accept the positions vacated. ..."8 Obviously, Japanese
policy in the Philippines encouraged peaceful compliance by the pre-war Filipino
elite, since their best hope for establishing a good rapport with the Filipinos was to
have friendly, or at least non-hostile, bureaucratsin office.
Therefore, it is not sufficient to accept Laurel's own claim that he had no choice
but to accept the presidency. Rather it seems necessary to examine specifically what
he said during the war, since he later declared, "I boldly announced my national
policy, my political ideology, and my moral philosophy in my speeches, interviews,
and conferences."9In 1943, Laurel wrote a short book entitled Forces That Make a
Nation Great, in which he codified his aims and presented his own credo. He wrote
it, he said, "in response to the needs of spiritual rejuvenation of the Filipinos," and he
emphasized that
the suggestedreformis comprehensiveand far reachingand implies a completerenova-
tion of the individualand collectivelife of the Filipinos, the overhaulingof institutions
and laws, the adaptationof our systemof jurisprudenceto what is genuinelyautochthon-
ous, and the revisionand reorientationof educationalpoliciesparticularlyin referenceto
ethical and civil instructionin our schools;nay it means the formulationof a system of
governmentthat is responsiveto the needs and exigenciesof the New Order.'0
Laurel intended to overhaul Philippine society and its standard of values by utilizing
this opportunity afforded by occupation. He expressed his intentions quite clearly
in his InauguralAddressdeliveredon October14, I943.
There is need of awakening the moral consciousnessof our people so that they may be
able to face theirnew responsibilitieswith addedvigor and enthusiasm.We shouldevolve
a new type of citizen who would be ready and willing to subordinatehimself to the
largerand more vital interestsof the State.The [1943] Constitutionguaranteesto every
man that modicumof personallibertyessentialto his enjoymentof relativecontentment
and happiness.But of more transcendantimportancethan his privileges,are the duties
which the individualowes to the State. The Constitutiongives precedenceto those obli-
gations in consonancewith the fundamentalidea that man does not live for himself and
his family alone but also for the State and humanityat large. The new citizen, therefore,
is he who knows his rights as well as his duties, and knowing them, will dischargehis
dutieseven to the extentof sacrificinghis rights.1"
In effect, Laurel was trying to help mold that "new type of citizen" who would be
"ready and willing to subordinate himself" to the State and for whom national good
would take precedenceover personal liberty and rights.

8 Jorge B. Vargas, "Report of the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission to the Com-
coveringthe periodJanuary23,
mander-in-Chief, I942, to March3I, 1943," unpubl.documentof August
23, pp. 40-4I. This seventy-four page typed document marked "secret," was discovered by the
I943,
author and is in his possession.
9 War Memoirs, p. 2I.
10 Laurel, Forces that Make a Nation Great (Manila, 1943), p. 8.
11 OfficialGazette(Manila),II, No. io (OctoberI-I4, I943), 983.

This content downloaded from 195.78.108.147 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 21:49:49 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
654 DAVID STEINBERG
Laurel chafed at many aspects of Philippine life which he viewed as both wasteful
and deleterious. In many ways he was not in harmony with the main elements of his
own culture, which he felt lacked discipline, control and purpose. Not surprisingly,
he was lured by features of the Japanesesocietal structure which he felt would have a
beneficial effect on Philippine life if they could only be transplanted.
The integrityand compactnessof the Japanesefamily are not only a sourceof communal
strength because of the ever-pervadingauthority and responsibilityof the heads of
families, the consequentdiscipline engenderedby the patriarchalsystem, but with the
politicalconcepthappilyconceivedregardingthe divinity of the Emperoras the supreme
patriarchof the nation, they make for a strong and cohesivepeople ever united to move
and to act, to fight and to die at the behestof their August Ruler.Japanhas succeededin
cementing the lasting foundationsof her national existencethrough the family system
which is one of the secretsof her almostincrediblespiritualstrengthand power.12
Laurel admired Japan'sseemingly graft-free society, in which profits seemed to be re-
invested in the state rather than drawn off for individual luxuries. He admired the
seeming domestic tranquility, in which all classes appeared to accept willingly their
respective places in the social order, and he admired the way the Japanese system of
education focused on service to the state.
The regimentationimplied by the compulsoryeducationof the masses may give a Fili-
pino observerthe impressionthat the systemis undemocratic.The truth, however,is that
in educationwhat is needed is not democracy. .. but regimentation,not liberty,but dis,
cipline, not liberalismbut correctorientation,not flexibilitybut rigidity in the formation
of the desiredmould of citizenship.13
He spoke of the importance of "racialpride in shaping the destiny of a nation," and,
along with many other Asians in the pre-war period, admired the apparent bene
fits which the Japanesederived from their identity.'4
Laurel was greatly impressed with the achievements of Japanese frugality, hard
work and sacrifice,virtues he found sorely lacking in the Filipino personality.
To the Greeksof that far-offtime, as it is to the Japanesethroughoutthe ages, no sacri-
fice was too great if it was made, in the words of the ImperialRescripton Education
to "advancepublic good and promotecommon interests."In Japanthey have a saying,
"Life is nothing, duty is everything."And out of that final moral concept has stemmed
the might and solidarityof the greatNippon Empire.15
Laurel was a puritan, demanding of himself rigid physical and mental standards.
Born into what he must have viewed as a lazy and corrupt, if lovable, society, he
marvelled, often mistakenly, at seeming efficiency elsewhere. His puritanical disposi.
tion is reflected in the chapter titles of Forces that Make a Nation Great: "Honor,"
"Frugality and Cleanliness," "Self-Reliance and Perseverance,""Man Perfects him-
self by Working," "The Value of Ethical Principles,"and "Truth, the Mother of All
Virtues."
Laurel was fascinated by the role of the Emperor as a symbol for the Japanese.

12 Forces, p. 85.
13 Forces, p. 9i.
14Forces, p. I2.
5 Forces, p. i6.

This content downloaded from 195.78.108.147 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 21:49:49 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
JOSE P. LAUREL 655
Like many others in the pre-war period, he attributed much of Japan's success in
industrialization to the impact of this symbol upon the lives of the Japanese people,
and he wrote that "the Philippines is in need of a symbol possessed of similar com-
pelling force and dynamic reality."'6 He believed that the presidency of the Philip-
pines should be elevated to fulfill this function. But more than a mere symbol, Laurel
saw it as the single vehicle for imposing the needed reforms. He wrote, "Shall we re-
turn to the system of popular elections and create a temporary ruling aristocracy,or at
the worst, a ruling clique of mediocre 'intellectuals' in whose hands we would entrust
the destiny of the nation?"'7
Laurel lived most of his adult political life in the shadow of Manuel Quezon, who
was clearly a demi-dictator but one who loved the chaos and exuberance of Philip-
pine politics. Quezon encouraged dissent and factionalism, a practice which Laurel
must have viewed as inefficient. Months before Pearl Harbor, Laurel is quoted, in
defending his support of emergency powers for Quezon, to have said that "consti-
tutional dictatorship"was in keeping with a world-wide trend in which "totalitarian-
ism [is] gradually supplanting democracy."Even then he praised the "constitutional
and benevolent dictatorshipin Japan,"'8and during the war he wrote:
In the interrelationshipof powersof governmenta centerof politicalgravitymust, in the
natureof things, be provided.Such a centermust necessarilybe the Executive.... The
unificationof responsibilityas a resultof the relativecentralizationof authorityin the con-
duct of State affairsduring a criticalperiodis one of the predominatingprinciplesof the
new [ 1943] constitution.'9
While President, Laurel seized every opportunity to strengthen his concept of the
office. Almost immediately after assuming office, he got an appointed legislature to
pass Act 39 which declared a state of emergency and authorized the "President of the
Republic of the Philippines to promulgate rules and regulations to safeguard the
safety, health, and tranquillity of the inhabitants of the Philippines."20Laurel made
maximum use of the powers granted him by the I943 Constitution and this legisla-
tive act to dominate all governmental activity. In a series of bureaucraticreorganiza-
tions, he personally assumed the portfolios of the Interior (Home), Economic and
Education Ministries, thereby holding direct executive control of the most critical
agencies of his government. As President of the Japanese-sponsoredmass political
party, the Kalibapi, he supervised the activity of the only legitimate political organiza-
tion permitted by the Japanese.Indeed, he was ubiquitous. Virtually every govermen-
tal agency felt his driving force.
His political aims can perhaps be most clearly observed in the structure of the
1943 Constitution, in which Laurel's own views predominated.2' From his hospital
bed he accepted the position of President of the Preparatory Commission for Philip-
pine Independence, the PCPI; and as self-appointed Chairman of the Drafting Com-
mittee, he determined the language and content of the Constitution within the limi-

16 Forces, p. 75.
17 Forces, pp. 75-76.
18 David Bernstein, The Philippine Story (New York, I947), p. i68.
19 Manuel E. Buenefe, War-time Philippines (Manila, I950), p. 203.
20 OfficialGazette,I, No. 5 (February,I944), 492-494.
21 The official version of the Constitution can be found in the Official Gazette, II, No. 9A (September
4, 1943), I-48.

This content downloaded from 195.78.108.147 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 21:49:49 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
656 DAVID STEINBERG
tations imposed by the Japanese Military Administration and Tokyo authorities.22
Laurel knew that the war-time Constitution would not survive a peace treaty,
but he did not view his effort on it as a purely academic exercise. He hoped that by
introducing his ideas in the war-time draft, the post-war Constitution might be
materially influenced. While maintaining its pre-war format as much as possible to
gain popular compliance, he altered the very basis of the Commonwealth Constitu-
tion by ending the American-supported concept of a balance of powers. The process
of selecting a President, for example, was altered from one of a direct vote of the
electorate to that of an indirect vote of an appointed assembly. The "Declaration of
Human Rights" of the Commonwealth edition became the "Duties and Rights of
the Citizens" by which constitutional liberties were severely restricted. The Presiden-
tial veto was made almost absolute. The right of the Supreme Court to invoke judicial
review was abolished, the Legislature's sole power over appropriationswas removed,
and real power devolved upon the Executive. And, in the words of his Inaugural,
"The orientation of the new government under the Republic is one of centralized
control for service to the people regardless of any obstacle.... Without political
consolidation we can not hope to accomplish the desired integration of our political,
economic, and social life."123
Obviously Laurel was subject to close supervision by the Japanese, who them-
selves were sharply divided over policy aims in the Philippines. These differences
among the Japanese existed both locally and in Tokyo, and produced a policy which
contained contradictions. At one extreme were the civilian officials, men who served
either in the Foreign Ministry, the Greater East Asia Ministry, or both. On the whole
these men were the most interested in the actual introduction of the Co-Prosperity
Sphere; their prime spokesman in Manila was Murata Shozo, who functioned first as
chief civilian advisor and during the Laurel period as ambassador.24
In the middle of the spectrum were the members of the Japanese Military Admin-
istration, the political wing of the army. These officers, who were jointly responsi-
ble to both the Commander-in-Chief in the Philippines and the Director-General of
Military Administration in Tokyo, where the officials responsible for the creation,
functioning and maintenance of a Filipino government. Finally, there were the field
commanders stationed throughout the Philippines. This group was most con-
cerned with the health of its troops and the success of its military assignment, and
least concerned with maintaining good relations with the Filipinos. As the war
progressed and MacArthur's reinvasion drew near, the field commanders proved to
be the most callous and the most powerful. Although there was originally a rough
consensus in intent for the countries conquered in early I942, the Japanese actually

22 The Japanese were more concerned with the popular acceptance of the new government than with
the specific language of the Constitution. Consequently, and contrary to public opinion, they allowed the
document to be at least partially Filipino-drafted and gave Laurel and the PCPI some choice. The various
confidential dispatches sent to Tokyo can be found in Hito Dokuritsu To Nippi Domei loyaku Teiketsu
Kankei, Checklist of the Archives of the JapaneseMinistry of Foreign Affairs, 1868-1945, comp. Uyehara
and Beal (Washington, Library of Congress Microfilm, 1954), Reel 584, Code S.I.7.0.0-47.
23 Official Gazette, II, No. io (October 1-14, 1943), 985.
24 Murata Shozo was a former President of the Osaka Steamship Company (the O.S.K.) and a former
Minister of Communications in a Konoe Cabinet. He was an experienced and able man who gained the
respect of many of the Filipino officials. Many of his staff members were career foreign service officers
who had served either in the United States or in Southeast Asia.

This content downloaded from 195.78.108.147 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 21:49:49 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
JOSE P. LAUREL 657
had a troika policy, the field commanders determining its direction in the end.25
All three of these groups, however, appear to have misunderstood Laurel. Having
ignored him initially as the prime candidate for the Presidency, they gradually came
to believe that he was just their man. They noted that he had got a Doctorate of
Jurisprudencein Japan before the war, that he had sent one of his sons to Japan for
military training, that he had represented a large number of Japanesefirms in his pre-
war law firm, and that he had spoken very favorably of some Japanese institutions.
The assassination attempt against Laurel only seemed to verify their belief that he
must have been more pro-Japanesethan even they suspected. Unfortunately for them,
they misjudged Laurel's true purpose. In fact, his desire to strengthen the executive
authority of the Presidency was inimical to the Japanese fantasy of finding a charis-
matic but pliant puppet to serve them.
Laurel was genuinely a devout nationalist for whom modern colonialism was
anathema. Frequently he spoke out against the American colonial legacy. "We are
weary," he said during the war, "with the pretensions of the 'White man's burden,'
which more often than not has only served to cloak exploitations of weaker peo-
ples."26He reasoned that "if the Americans are no longer here and we are earnest in
our desire for independence, we should not want them back."27Indeed, in his post-
war defense of his actions, Laurel wrote that

the offer of independence[by Japan] could not have been rejectedfor historicalreasons
and as a matterof nationaldignity. Our ancestorshad fought for it and succeedinggen-
erationshave worked and laboredfor it. We could not affordto appearin the historyof
our country as belonging to a generationwhich, offered to become free, rejected the
pricelessboon and preferredsomethingelse. Acceptingall of the covetedfreedomwhich
America herself promisedto give is not an act of disloyalty.You shouldn'tblame a fel-
low for getting what you yourselfpromisedbut for reasonsbeyondyour own controlyou
could not give! I was personallymore interestedin genuine freedom than in its trade-
marks.The realityof independencedependsupon the Filipinosthemselves.28

However, what the Japanese failed to realize was that Laurel was equally hostile
to Japanese imperalism. He cooperated with the Japanese because he was confident
that Japan lacked the power to sustain the Greater East Asia Co-ProsperitySphere for
any protracted length of time. He calculated that Japan would be forced to contract
the bounds of her empire, but Laurel's major mistake lay in estimating how long
this process would take. Prior to December 8, I94I, it had been so inconceivable that
Japan could have the military triumphs of Pearl Harbor, Singapore and Bataan, that
after these Japanese victories men like Laurel revised their estimates too much in
Japan'sfavor. In I943, he wrote:
The war is still raging.... After defeatingGermany,how long will it take the Allies to
bring their war with Japanto a decisiveend? Assuming that it takes the Allies six years
to defeat Germany,it is reasonableto assumethat it will take four or more yearsto fin-

25 International Military Tribunal: Far East, Document 2402 B, Exhibit I336; Document 837 A,
Exhibit 628; Document III2 A, Exhibit 1333 A; Document 1448, Exhibit 877.
26Manila Tribune, November I0, 1943, p. 6.
27 Ang Kapit Bahay, I, No. 2 (May, 1943), 7.
28 War Memoirs, p. 58.

This content downloaded from 195.78.108.147 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 21:49:49 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
658 DAVID STEINBERG
ish the war with Japan.Let us say six more yearswill elapsebeforethe conclusionof the
war.29
This candid appraisal proved incorrect, and events overtook him. Had it proved
right, Laurel might well have been able to achieve some of the reforms he wanted.
It is likely that Laurel reasoned that, as a result of the expected duration and
severity of the war, America would be willing to conclude some sort of negotiated
settlement short of total victory. This was not an irrational argument before the
atomic bomb, even though it mistook the nature of the American response to war.
If such a settlement were to have taken place, however, it was not an unwarrantable
further assumption that President Quezon's original plan to neutralize the Philip-
pines under the joint guarantee of both Japan and the United States might be resur-
rected. In that contingency Laurel would have been in a strong bargaining position
with the returning Commonwealth government-in-exile, which of necessity would
have had to make a pragmatic settlement with his Japanese-sponsoredRepublic. In
his firstanniversaryaddressdeliveredon OctoberI4, I944, he said:
The Republicof the Philippinesis young ... it has had the advantageof being able to
set up basicprinciplesof nationalpolicy in an atmosphereleast hostile to radicalchange.
It has been observedthat "war servesas a catalyzer,"speedingup transformationsin so-
cial and politicallife which under peace-timeconditionsmay take years,or even genera-
tions to carryout. But, on the other hand, the Republicsuffersfrom the transitorychar-
acterof its background,the war, which, of course,has to end someday;and, born out of
a war, the Republicmay have to effectfurtherradicaladjustmentsto the shapeof things
to be, following this world-wideupheaval.30
Events unfolded in a radically different way, but here again, Laurel may have rea-
soned that even if he did not have the six years as President, he might still be able to
alter materially the post-war state.
As President, Laurel was unable to prevent the Japanese from doing anything
they really wanted. In the post-war period he wrote, "But a small country is a small
country and a weak people is a weak people. We had no choice, and everything
depended on the result of war."'31 The Japanese certainly had sufficient military
power to dominate Laurel's actions in Manila even if they did not have the strength
to suppress the widespread guerrilla movement throughout the provinces. And the
Laurel government yielded to every major Japanese political, economic or propa-
gandist measure, including that of the recruitment of forced labor gangs, a greatly in-
creased Philippine Constabularyto help suppress the guerrilla movement, a Treaty of
Alliance and Friendship, and a declaration of war against the United States and
Great Britain. Laurel and his assistants subsequently maintained that they negated
the declaration of war by refusing to authorize Filipino conscription, and therefore
did not subject themselves to this serious charge of treason. As Laurel later wrote,
"There being no conscription of Filipinos for military purposes, a formal declara-
tion of a state of war was a good move..., reducing the declarationof a state of war to
a mereformality."32
29 Official Journal of the Japanese Military Administration (Manila, Imperial Japanese Army, I943),
XIII, p. lxi.
30 Laurel, "The Republic's Goal," Philippine Review, II, No. 9 (November, I944), I2.
31 War Memoirs, P. 6o.
82 War Memoirs, pp. 24 and 6o.

This content downloaded from 195.78.108.147 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 21:49:49 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
JOSE P. LAUREL 659
However, it is quite clear that the Japanese had little interest in Philippine
conscription. They could not supply logistically the quarter of a million Japanese
troops they had in the Philippines, and they had no interest in supplying weapons to
Filipinos, many of whom would pass these weapons on to the guerrillas. Their in-
terest was a propagandistic one in which it would appear to the world that the Fili-
pinos were active participants on the Japanese side. On September 22, I944, Laurel
issued Proclamation No. 30, which declared the state of war and which concluded:
Face to face with the grim realitiesof war, I earnestlycall upon everyFilipino at this mo-
mentoushour to show his unswervingloyaltyand to give his supportto the government,
so that, regardlessof the trialsand tribulationsthat we are undergoingand those we shall
have to suffer in the near future, we may closely and firmly unite to safeguardthe free
and independentexistenceof the Philippines.33
However, this proclamation indicated less that Laurel was a pliant puppet than that
he believed that it was folly to battle the Japanese and destroy his limited chance to
accomplish his own objectives. Recognizing his inability to influence Japanese de-
mands and policy, he did what was demanded of him in order to rework those areas
of Philippine life in which his influence could survive the war.
Consequently, he advocated the restoration of peace and order among the guerril-
las, not because he was particularly interested in aiding the Japanese war effort, as he
was accused of by his enemies right after the war, but rather because he viewed
guerrilla activity as a destructive waste, a meaningless defiance of an unavoidable
situation.
Second,with respectto so-calledguerrillas,we emphasiseto them the fact that they serve
no militarypurpose,but on the contrarythey but unnecessarilyharm the interestsof their
country and their people. For, however strong they might become in numbers and in
arms, they can not possibly influencethe outcome of this war one way or another. In
these days of mechanisedwarfare,the forces that are pitted against each other are, ulti-
mately,those of industrialproductionand resources.To be sure, it is not easy for a self-
respectingman to changeconvictionsovernighteven afterobjectiverealitieshaverendered
such convictionsirrelevant,and to those of our countrymenwho are in this predicament
we earnestlyaffirm the validityof our Constitution,the significanceof our hoistedFlag,
and the workabilityof our independence.34
To Laurel the Japanese occupation was an inevitable fact which must be utilized for
whatever advantage it might bring. He wrote that whoever believed that "after the

33 Manila Tribune, September 24, 1944, pp. 1-2. It is worth noting that the Japaneserecruited,armed
and trained a corps of Filipinos loyal to the Japanesecause. The Makapili (an abbreviationof the Tagalog,
Kalipunang Makabayan ng mga Pilipinos, the Patriotic League of the Filipinos) was inaugurated on
December 8, 1944, on the third anniversary of the war, with Laurel as the nominal "highest supreme
advisor." Manila Tribune, December 9, 1944, p. 2. The Japanesehad trained some 5,000 Makapili by the
time the Americansreinvaded Luzon. The post-war Philippine Courts held that
"being a Makapili is in itself constitutive of an overt act [of treason]. It is not necessary except for
the purpose of increasing the punishment that the defendent actually went to battle or committed
nefarious acts against his country or against his countrymen. . . . Such membership by its very nature
gave the enemy aid and comfort. . . . It furnished the enemy aid in that his cause was advanced, his
force augmented, and his courage was enhanced by the knowledge that he could count on such men
as the accused. The practical effect of it was no different from that of enlisting in the invader's
army." People v. Adriano, Official Gazette, XLIV, 4300.
84Laurel, "The Republic'sGoal," p. 4.

This content downloaded from 195.78.108.147 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 21:49:49 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
660 DAVID STEINBERG
fall of Bataan and Corregidor . . . we can drive away the Japanese from the Phillip-
pines by guerrilla warfare must be either a fool or a renegade."35
Laurel also sought respect for law and order not only because he became com-
mitted to the success of his own regime, which required popular compliance, but also
because the observance of law was an essential, universal constant, without which,
he believed, society soon collapsed. Law, to Laurel, was the cement of society, by
which authority could be maintained and order could be preserved. The observance
of law, therefore, was the positive force of social life which could not be abandoned
even during a period of military occupation. When he was still only Minister of the
Interior, he issued a circular letter to "all Church dignitaries and Heads of Religious
Organizations," in which he wrote:
You are requestedto instruct all your priests and ministers in every sermon that they
preachand wheneverand whereverthe opportunitypresentsitself, and by everymeans in
their power, aside from the spiritualand moral principles,they should inculcatein the
minds of the faithful or flock loyalty to the constitutedauthoritiesand the absolutene-
cessityon the part of all Filipinos and residentsof the Philippinesof cooperatingwhole-
heartedlywith the presentadministrationin the establishmentof peaceand orderin every
nook and cornerof the Philippines.Your faithful or flock should also be informed every
Sunday,of the policiesadoptedby the government.... Far from being political,the colt
laborationof all Churchesis, in the ultimateanalysis,a religiousenterprisedemandedby
conscience.36
Indeed, Laurel, along with many other thoughtful Filipinos, deplored the outbreak
of post-war violence that has plagued the Philippines since I945, and attributed much
of it to the war-time breakdown of respect for the law. Laurel, although probably
cheated out of victory in the Presidential election of I949, refused to follow some of
his supporterswho wanted to take to the hills to fight what they thought was Presi-
dent Quirino's illegal victory. In large measure he believed that such an action, even
if justified, was a repudiation of the law.
Any analysis of Laurel's actions must also consider his complex character and
personal ambition which for years had been circumscribed,despite his widely recog-
nized brilliance and administrative ability, by Quezon's political domination and his
own mistakes. At eighteen he first received public attention when he stabbed a man
in a fight over a girl. He was convicted of "frustratedmurder" in the Court of First
Instance, but his conviction was reversed in the Supreme Court on March i5, I9I2,
when his action was labeled as one of self-defense.37The swash-buckling Don Juan
image this gave him actually helped his political career later, but it is impossible to
gauge how much this trauma affected Laurel's personality.
In the following years he achieved a superb academic record first in Manila and
later at Yale, and by I923, when Governor-General Leonard Wood appointed him
Secretary of the Interior at the age of thirty-two, he was already a leader of the new
elite. Shortly thereafter he got involved in a bitter fight with Wood over the
Governor-General'sright to ignore his Filipino cabinet and reinstate an American
police officer named Conley, against whom there were malfeasance charges. Laurel
35 Ang Kapit Bahay, I, No. 2 (May, 1943), 8.
36 Tagapagturo,I, No. 3 (March, 1943), 4-5.
37 "BiographicalReport on Jose Paciano Laurel-Confidential,"November 25, 1944, Office of Strategic
Services, Researchand Analysis Branch, United States Army, p. 4.

This content downloaded from 195.78.108.147 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 21:49:49 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
JOSE P. LAUREL 661
resigned and led the rest of the Filipino cabinet with him, but Washington supported
Wood's decision and the bureaucraticrevolt failed. All of the cabinet officersreturned
to government service but Laurel, who, except for one term as Senator, remained out-
side the government until appointed to the Supreme Court in I936. According to the
confidential war-time intelligence report of the United States Army:
It may be surmisedthat Laurel, who was the cabinetofficermost directlyaffected,and
who apparentlyresignedof his own free will, was instrumentalin pursuadingthe others
to submit their resignations,for he enjoyeda reputationas an able constitutionallawyer.
Since the maneuverwas a failurefrom the standpointof the Filipino leadersit is possible
that their inclinationswere to blame Laurel for having led them into an embarrassing
situation;and that as a resulthe was given little or no recognitionfor some twelve years.
Laurel. . . during these yearssaw many men, undoubtedlyinferiorto him in intelligence,
occupyingthe limelight as leadersof the Filipino people. This apparentlycausedLaurel
to feel that he had been used to promotethe ambitionsof others,and as a resulthe is re-
ported to have been very bitter.38
Whatever the causes, Laurel must have held little hope of ever replacing Osmenfa
and Roxas as Quezon's heirs to the Presidency, and he accepted a judicial career as
the best alternative. However, if he wanted the Presidency, no lesser job could be a
satisfying substitute and no residence as attractive as the Presidential Palace, Mala-
cafian. When Quezon and Osmefia brought the Commonwealth government-in-exile
to Washington in I942, a power vacuum was created in Manila for the first time in
decades, and when Roxas chose not to fill that vacuum, pleading his cardiac con-
dition, Laurel was given his first chance at Malacafian.While still in the hospital after
being shot on the golf-course, Laurel said, upon accepting the Presidency of the
PCPI, "I did not expect so great an honor, but I accept the position with humility,
believing that the ability, wisdom, and patriotism of the other members of the Com-
mission will fill whatever void my shortcomings may entail."39He said of his unani-
mous election by the appointed legislature that "the unanimity of the choice makes
me doubly appreciative,the more so because I have never aspired to this position."40
After the war, Laurel wrote,
I was not an aspirant,I did not like to be President.... I wished, indeed,I had been able
to fold my arms . . . and laterin the end, afterthe catastrophehad ended and the danger
had disappeared,to come out from amongst the silent crowd, or from my monastic se-
clusion, and presentmyself as the archetypeof genuine patriotismand proven loyalty!
But it was neithermy lot nor my temperperhaps.And so, I carriedon, and with me, the
other collaboratorsas a matterof necessity,and for the love of the people.4'
It is not surprising that most Filipinos have had difficulty in evaluating Laurel's
war-time actions. His detractors argued that regardless of the justifications he might
attempt, he served the Japanese too willingly and was therefore a "puppet."42His
friends claimed that he was the unsung hero of the war, risking his life for his coun-
try, for his principles and for his friend Manuel Roxas, whom he shielded by assum-
38 "BiographicalReport," p. 6.
39 Manila Tribune, June 30, 1943, p. I.
40 Official lournal of the lapanese Military Administration,XIII, p. xxxxi.
41 War Memoirs, pp. 59-60.
42 Interviews, conducted by the author, with Senator Lorenzo Tafiada (Solicitor General during the
early post-war period), March 9, March 17, March 24, I960.

This content downloaded from 195.78.108.147 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 21:49:49 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
662 DAVID STEINBERG
ing office. Among others, Claro Recto, Laurel's Foreign Minister, called him a
"courageousman" for taking office. Quintin Paredes felt Laurel's administration was
better than Quezon's pre-war government and that Laurel did a masterful job in
avoiding conscription. And Jorge Vargas, although contending that Laurel had al-
ways wanted to be President, maintained that he had "guts" and that "Laurel turned
out as successfully as anyone" could.43
Despite Laurel's indictment on more than one hundred counts of treason, he was
restored to political power along with most of his associates long before his case
could come to trial. Indeed, pardoned by a general amnesty proclamation issued be-
fore his trial was called, Laurel was elected Senator after the war and was nearly
successful in the presidential contest in I949. His portrait now hangs in the great hall
of Malacafian along with those of Presidents Quezon, Osmefia, Roxas, and Magsay-
say. Its plaque merely reads, "President Laurel." In the years since the war, most
Filipinos have come to believe that he was forced to accept the office and have
sympathized with his alleged plight. He frequently claimed that his post-war
strength at the polls was the most valid vindication of his war-time actions and
freed him from any taint of the pejorative "collaborator."Together with men like
Recto he refused to admit the possibility of any motive but pure and unselfish patriot-
ism, maintaining that "thereis 'heroism'in collaboration.""
However, this restoration to power was based largely on the tacit assumption
that Laurel had been a pawn, forced into a position he did not want by circum-
stances beyond his control. The irony for Laurel was that, to achieve post-war re-
habilitation, he had to deny his war-time reasons for taking office.He discovered later
that most Filipinos who had heard him speak during the war believed that his
words and ideas were forced on him by Japanese propagandists. As a result, many
Filipinos instinctively rejected the substance of his speeches as an elaborate sham to
fool the Japanese. If the contention of this paper is correct, that is, that Laurel used
his war-time position to achieve his own aims, this Filipino response must have put
Laurel in an exceedingly awkward position. By accepting the role of the long-suffer-
ing servant he could be reinstated but only by watching the rejection of all his re-
forms and ideas. Laurel chose to appear as the self-sacrificing martyr, and was, as a
result, granted sympathy and pardon. He made this choice to remain active in politi-
cal life, but it must have galled him to see his rather remarkable war-time gamble
totally ignored.
During the war Laurel wrote what may have been his true view on governmental
theory:
The whole historyof governmentshows that public affairswould be betteradministered
and the welfare of the people better subservedin the hands of a moral and intellectual
aristocracy.The peoplecan not both be governorsand governedat the same time; a state-
ment affirmingthe contrarywould be a contradictionin terms. On the other hand, a
good and efficientgovernment,a benevolentgovernment,may exist and continue in-
definitelyto function with admirableharmony,when men of superiormoral and intel-
lectualendowmentsare in controlof the state.45
43 Interviews, conducted by the author, with Claro M. Recto, March 17, I960; Quintin Paredes, March
I0, I960; and Jorge B. Vargas, April 13, I960.
44 War Memoirs, p. 57
45 Forces, p. I09.

This content downloaded from 195.78.108.147 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 21:49:49 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
JOSE P. LAUREL 663
He deduced that Japan's "phenomenal rise . .. within half a century from primi-
tivism to modernism, from obscurity to primacy as a world power has been due, in
the main, to its system of government which is characterized by massive powers
rigidly centralized, but exercised with wise benevolence . . ." and his goal seems to
have been to apply Japan's methods to industrialize and develop his own country.46
Since the Second World War, this type of authoritarian nationalism has become the
vogue in most underdeveloped countries which have recently gained their independ-
ence. Many of these states have adopted measures similar to those Laurel sought. In-
deed, because Philippine nationalism and independence developed earlier, Laurel
may rank as a pioneer in this seemingly universal attraction toward "guided democ-
racy" as a means of modernization. Many of the leaders of the Afro-Asian countries
are attempting, as did Laurel, to maintain the Western style institutional forms of
constitutional democracy while actually creating modified dictatorships in order to
effect needed reforms. These states are in an understandable rush, and their leaders
do not believe that they have the time needed to create a truly viable democratic gov-
ernment. This belief implies that democratic, parliamentary rule is less efficient
than autocratic control; that the leaders have the necessary resolve, foresight and
wisdom to determine correctly what is best for their people and under what priorities
these aims are to be pursued; and that, except in the industrialized states, democracy
is a wasteful luxury which they cannot afford. However, since the concept of demo-
cratic government was so widely publicized as the ultimate goal of the nationalist
movements, few leaders have dared to disregard the emotional impact of democracy's
connotations and the external institutional forms by abolishing the trappings. As
Laurel did, most of these new states have attempted the centralization of executive
power along with the apparent maintenance of the institutions of popular suffrage.47
If, then, Laurel's philosophy of government has gained such wide acceptance in
other newly independent societies, why did it fail in his own? In part, the answer
lies in Laurel's misinterpretation of the international situation and his miscalcula-
tion of the time he would have to institute his reforms. He also overestimated the
degree of compliance he would receive from the Filipino people. Guilty of projecting
his own reasoning on that of his countrymen, he failed to take careful enough ac-
count of the depth of the Filipino commitment to the United States against Japan
as manifested in the guerrilla movement. Moreover, Laurel failed to realize that the
Filipinos became involved in the war from its very beginning not only because they
had to but because they wanted to. Filipinos fought beside Americans because they
truly believed that they had an equal obligation to help defend democracy and
liberty as well as their country. Filipinos fought willingly to protect their values and
ideals, and however inaccurately or superficially the average Filipino may have un-
derstood the ideology, he made a fervent and positive response to the Allied cause.
46 Forces, p. IIO.
47 David Bernstein, "America and Dr. Laurel," Harper's Magazine, CXCVII (October, 1948), 87.
Interestingly, but perhaps not surprisingly, Laurel is quoted as saying in April of 1948:
"At a time like this when the young Republic of the Philippines is facing a crisis, we should adopt
what other countries are doing and that is to suspend temporarily all political parties. . . . I do not
want it as construed that I am against political parties. That would be undemocratic and totalitarian.
But at a time like this when a country is faced with a crisis, the best way to achieve unity is to stop
the political bickerings and quarrels. As a temporary measure, we should do away with partisan
politics."

This content downloaded from 195.78.108.147 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 21:49:49 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
664 DAVID STEINBERG
Laurel became intellectually arrogant. He forgot that, even if his rational ap-
proach was best, it was irrelevant for the major portion of his nation. Laurel chose
one course, and most of the nation opted for another, which was in favor of the
guerrillas and America and against Japan and his Republic. As a direct consequence,
he seriously misread the national will. The result was that Laurel's administration
lost its popular support. To succeed, Laurel would have had to divorce his govern-
ment and his views from those of the occupation. Unfortunately for him, the two were
so completely fused in the minds of most Filipinos that he had neither room to ma-
neuver nor an independent platform to present to his people. This inability to create
an independent posture doomed his chances and decreasedhis political potential.
As the threat of fighting resumed when MacArthur's army drew near again, the
Japanese abandoned any efforts to accommodate the Filipinos politically. Instead, the
Japanese prepared for a fight to the death by ruthlessly plundering the Philippines,
and Laurel was trapped between a hostile guerrilla movement, which had at least
the tacit support of the people, and an unsympathetic Japanese military which had
aims inimical to his own. His situation became intolerable, though perhaps predict-
able, and whatever he dreamed of accomplishing became impossible.
Laurel may have failed to project his views, however, for an even more profound
reason. The attractiveness of "guided democracy" as a means of development may
have appeal only to a society at a certain stage of political development which the
Philippines had already passed through by 1943. Unlike a military dictatorship,
which can unfortunately arise at any time and anywhere, Laurel's type of authoritar-
ian centralization (however pragmatically and materially beneficial) must depend on
the willing compliance of the political elite and the tacit approval of the people, who
would agree that such political restrictions are necessary for the general advance-
ment. Unless there is that recognition of the need to devolve power to one man, there
is scant chance that one man can attain that paramount position. Men like Sukarno
of Indonesia have gained the essential consent of their society; without it, they must
either assume total military dictatorshipor yield-power.
The Philippine people, both at the top and at the bottom of the political structure,
were no longer willing to tolerate such complete rule by one man, no matter how
great the material rewards of industrialization. The years of American colonial con-
trol had created a framework of institutional life in which a system of checks and
balances emerged within the Filipino oligarchy. Quezon possessed enough power to
disregard this system when he wanted to, but he was usually content to exercise con-
trol by operating within the system. With his death there was no one strong enough
to impose his will either on the other politicans or on the institutional system. Once
a group emerged which believed that the greatest hope for both its personal and
group ambitions lay in strengthening its hegemony as an oligarchy, there probably
was no longer room for authoritarian domination by one man. While this group,
which has held political power since the war, certainly has not been completely dem-
ocratic, it has nevertheless effectively prevented the sort of political situation that has
emerged in Egypt, Ghana or Indonesia. If it is not a democratic elite of talent, it has
also not accepted Laurel's appeal for the imperative need for "massive powers
rigidly centralized."
The failure of Laurel's wartime gamble, then, can be seen as an interesting control

This content downloaded from 195.78.108.147 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 21:49:49 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
JOSE P. LAUREL 665
in an experiment involving what has happened so commonly elsewhere since the
war. Brilliant, charismatic,and determined in his efforts toward his objectives, Laurel
failed for reasons beyond his control. But the meaning of that failure transcends its
implications during the war. The crisis in the political development of the newly-
emerged nations has just begun. There is much to be learned from Laurel's unsuc-
cessful attempt to reform his society along lines which have become so familiar
as underdeveloped states try to alter their very essence in order to achieve the so-
called benefits of the modern world.

This content downloaded from 195.78.108.147 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 21:49:49 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions