FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 139603. July 14, 2000 ]

CONCHITA QUINAO, PETITIONER, VS. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REP. BY THE OFFICE OF THE
SOLICITOR GENERAL, AND FRANCISCO DEL MONTE, RESPONDENTS.

RESOLUTION

KAPUNAN, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision, dated 14 January 1999, of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 19412 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Eighth Judicial Region, Branch 21, Laoang, Northern Samar finding herein petitioner Conchita
Quinao and Salvador Cases guilty of the crime of Usurpation of Real Property. Likewise sought to be
reversed is the Resolution, dated 30 June 1999, of the appellate court denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.

The Information filed against petitioner and Cases read as follows:

That on or about the 2nd day of February, 1993, at about 9:00 o'clock in the morning, more or less, at
Sitio Bagacay, Bgy. Petong, Lapinig, Northern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with
intent to gain, with the use of force and intimidation, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously usurped [sic] and occupied [sic] a real property owned by FRANCISCO F. DEL MONTE, and
while there gathered 12,000 coconuts and converted it into copra [sic] and sold the same in the amount
of P14,580, to the damage and prejudice to the said owner in the total amount of FOURTEEN
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED EIGHTY (P14,580.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]

At the arraignment, both accused pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued. The facts established during the trial
are as follows:

As borne out by the evidence, both the accused and private complainant are claiming ownership over
the land in question. Private complainant Francisco Delmonte submitted and offered in evidence Tax
Declaration No. 1202 (Exh. "D") in the name of Petre Delmonte, the predecessor-in-interest of
complainant. This Tax Declaration No. 1202 cancels Tax Declaration No. 18612 which shows that the
land covered by Tax Declaration No. 1202 is the same land litigated and awarded to the predecessor-in-
interest of the complainant in Civil Case No. 3561. The decision in Civil Case No. 3561 shows that the
land being claimed by the accused was already litigated and awarded to the parents of the complainant
in Civil Case No. 3561.

The accused-appellant, on the other hand, presented Tax Declaration No. 1195 (Exh. "1") in the name of
Lorenzo Cases Leoniso dated January 25, 1993. He alleged that the land being claimed by the
complainant in the present criminal case is different from the land litigated in Civil Case No. 3561 and
that the land subject of Civil Case No. 3561 which came from Angel Pelison is now in the possession of
the complainant.

The parties presented witnesses during the hearing of the case to buttress their claims. Complainant's
witness Bienvenido Delmonte declared that on February 2, 1993 at around 9 o'clock in the morning
while he was busy working in the agricultural land which he owns in common with complainant
Francisco Delmonte, accused Salvador Cases and Conchita Quinao, together with their other close
relatives suddenly appeared and while there, with the use of force, violence and intimidation, usurped
and took possession of their landholding, claiming that the same is their inheritance from their
ascendants and while there, accused immediately gathered coconuts and made them into copra.
Complainant was forcibly driven out by the accused from their landholding and was threatened that if
he will try to return to the land in question, something will happen to him. Complainant was thus forced
to seek assistance from the Lapinig Philippine National Police.

Complainant's witness further declared that the actual primitive owner of the land in question was
Angel Pelison but the land was purchased by his grandfather Petre Delmonte. The land is situated at
Sitio Bagacay, Brgy. Potong, Lapinig, N. Samar with an area of 9 ½ hectares, bounded on the East by the
properties of Roman Vernas and Marcelino Delmonte; on the North by Dimas Moscosa; on the West by
Alcantara and on the South by Bagacay group (tsn, pp. 31-32, April 20, 1994)

Accused Salvador Cases and Conchita Quinao testified for the defense. They claimed that they are the
grandchildren of Lorenzo Cases; that during the lifetime of their grandfather, he acquired the real
property in question and declared the same in his name under Tax Declaration No. 1195 (Exh. "1"); that
the land has an area of 6 hectares, 34 centares and 28 ares and is devoted to rice and coconut; that they
are in actual possession of the land and paid realty taxes thereon; that the father of accused Conchita
Quinao was Pedro Cases, the son of Lorenzo Cases; that the land is located in Brgy. Potong, Lapinig,
Northern Samar; and that the boundaries are as follows: on the North: Dimas Moscosa; on the East:
Petre Delmonte; on the South: Ananias Delmonte; and on the West: Bagacay River.[2]

The trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby finds both accused guilty of the crime of
Usurpation of Real Rights in Property, defined and penalized under Art. 312 of the Revised Penal Code,
beyond reasonable doubt and hereby sentences both of them jointly and severally, to pay a fine in the
amount of One Hundred Seventy Four Thousand and Nine Hundred Sixty (P174,960.00) Pesos which
amount is equivalent to the gain which said accused have obtained in a period of almost three (3) years
from the time they forcibly took possession of this land belonging to Francisco Delmonte computed at
the rate of P14,580.00 per quarter proceeds from the produce of the land as alleged in the Information.

The accused are further sentenced not to enter or intrude upon this property rightfully adjudged to
belong to Francisco Delmonte, private complainant herein and they are ordered under pain of
imprisonment for Contempt of Court, to Cease and Desist forever from disturbing or molesting the
peaceful and quiet possession and ownership of the herein private offended party over the property
subject of litigation. The Chief of Police of the PNP, Lapinig, Northern Samar, is hereby ordered to assist
the private offended party in his possession of the herein property and see to it that he is not disturbed
or molested in such state, and in implementing this directive, the Chief of Police may, in his discretion,
use reasonable force necessary to carry out this decision. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the
Chief of Police of Lapinig, N. Samar.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[3]

Upon a notice of death filed only on 25 September 1997, it was learned that accused Cases died on 9
April 1995.

Petitioner appealed her conviction to the CA. The appellate court, however, affirmed the decision of the
trial court. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration thereof but the CA denied the same.

Before this Court, petitioner assails the decision of the CA raising the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER WHO IS A WOMAN OF AN ADVANCE AGE COULD BE HELD
LIABLE OF THE CRIME OF USURPATION OF REAL PROPERTY ON THE BASIS OF THE BARE ALLEGATION OF
CONSPIRACY AND WHICH CONCLUSION WAS BASED ON SPECULATIONS, SURMISES AND CONJECTURES;

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED FORCE AND INTIMIDATION WHICH TOOK PLACE SUBSEQUENT TO THE
ALLEGED ENTRY INTO THE PROPERTY WILL SUFFICE TO CONVICT THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER OF THE
CRIME OF USURPATION OF REAL PROPERTY;

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER WHO CLAIMS TO BE OWNER OF THE LAND IN QUESTION
COULD BE HELD LIABLE OF USURPATION OF HER OWN PROPERTY.[4]

The petition is bereft of merit.

Contrary to petitioner's allegation, the decision rendered by the trial court convicting her of the crime of
usurpation of real property was not based on "speculations, surmises and conjectures" but clearly on
the evidence on record and in accordance with the applicable law. Article 312 of Revised Penal Code
defines and penalizes the crime of usurpation of real property as follows:

Art. 312. Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property. - Any person who, by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons, shall take possession of any real property or shall
usurp any real rights in property belonging to another, in addition to the penalty incurred for the acts of
violence executed by him shall be punished by a fine from P50 to P100 per centum of the gain which he
shall have obtained, but not less than P75 pesos.
If the value of the gain cannot be ascertained, a fine from P200 to P500 pesos shall be imposed.

The requisites of usurpation are that the accused took possession of another's real property or usurped
real rights in another's property; that the possession or usurpation was committed with violence or
intimidation and that the accused had animo lucrandi. In order to sustain a conviction for "usurpacion
de derecho reales," the proof must show that the real property occupied or usurped belongs, not to the
occupant or usurper, but to some third person, and that the possession of the usurper was obtained by
means of intimidation or violence done to the person ousted of possession of the property.[5]

More explicitly, in Castrodes vs. Cubelo,[6] the Court stated that the elements of the offense are (1)
occupation of another's real property or usurpation of a real right belonging to another person; (2)
violence or intimidation should be employed in possessing the real property or in usurping the real right,
and (3) the accused should be animated by the intent to gain.[7]

Thus, in order to absolve herself of any liability for the crime, petitioner insists that the elements of the
crime are not present in this case. Specifically, she maintains that she owns the property involved
herein. The matter on the ownership of the lot in question, however, had long been settled when, in
Civil Case No. 3561 (ownership of real property) involving the predecessors-in-interest of private
complainant and that of accused Cases, the Court of First Instance of Samar, Branch III, Thirteenth
Judicial Region, adjudicated said lot to private complainant's predecessors-in-interest.[8]

Further, as established by the commissioner appointed by the trial court to look into petitioner's
defense, i.e, she owns the lot subject of this criminal case, the area being claimed by petitioner is the
same area adjudicated in Civil Case No. 3561. Deputy Sheriff A. Anacta, as commissioner, made the
following the report:

Taking the matter in relation to the order of the Honorable Court dated February 1, 1994 which is the
basis of this commission, which merely directs the undersigned to find out if the area claimed by by the
accused encroached the area of the plaintiffs, then, based from the above findings and the herein
sketch, it is indeed very clear that the area claimed by the accused encroached the area of the plaintiffs.
[9]

The foregoing findings of the commissioner was adopted by the trial court and the latter subsequently
convicted petitioner for the crime of usurpation of real property. This findings of the commissioner was
affirmed by the CA stating, thus:

Based on the above findings and the sketch maps submitted, it is clear that the disputed land which is
the red shaded area (Exh. "B-2") is within the boundary of the land awarded to the complainant in Civil
Case No. 3516 [should be 3561]. The issue of ownership over the land in question having been decided
in Civil Case No. 3516 [should be 3561] in favor of the complainant in 1949, the same will not be
disturbed. The accused has to respect the findings of the court.[10]

We fully agree with the findings of both the trial court and the CA on the issue of the ownership of the
lot involved in this case. The evidence on record sufficiently refuted petitioner's claim of ownership.
The next issue that needs to be resolved is whether the other requisites of the usurpation of real
property are attendant in this case. These two (2) other requisites are: the employment of violence in
acquiring possession over the real property or in usurping the real right and accused was animated by
intent to gain.[11] On this point, the trial court and the CA ruled in the affirmative citing the testimony of
prosecution witness Bienvenido Delmonte as follows:

xxx

Complainant's witness Bienvenido Delmonte declared that on February 2, 1993 at around 9 o'clock in
the morning while he was busy working in the agricultural land which he owns in common with
complainant Francisco Delmonte, accused Salvador Cases and Conchita Quinao, together with their
other close relatives suddenly appeared and while there, with the use of force, violence and
intimidation, usurped and took possession of their landholding, claiming that the same is their
inheritance from their ascendants and while there, accused immediately gathered coconuts and made
them into copra. Complainant was forcibly driven out by the accused from their landholding and was
threatened that if he will try to return to the land in question, something will happen to him.
Complainant was thus forced to seek assistance from the Lapinig Philippine National Police.[12]

It is well settled that "factual findings of the CA are conclusive on the parties and carry even more
weight when the said court affirms the factual findings of the trial court."[13] Petitioner failed to give
any cogent reason for this Court to deviate from this salutary principle.

Finally, the fact that the judge who tried the case was different from the judge who penned the decision
does not in any way taint the same. Indeed, "the efficacy of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the
fact that its writer only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided at the trial, unless there is
showing of grave abuse of discretion in the factual findings reached by him."[14] There is no such
showing in this case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 19412 is affirmed in toto.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

REACTION:

My insight about this case is that even though you've claim that a
property is yours or inherit by your ascendance as long as you don't
have evidence to prove your claims, you should not use force or
violence because according to Art. 312. Occupation of real property or
usurpation of real rights in property. - Any person who, by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons, shall take possession of
any real property or shall usurp any real rights in property belonging
to another, because at the end you're the will suffer. All you have to
do is to accept the facts that not everything you've claim, will be
claimed.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-6641 July 28, 1955

FRANCISCO QUIZON, petitioner,

vs.

THE HON. JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF BACOLOR, PAMPANGA, ET AL., respondents.

Moises Sevilla Ocampo and Pedro S. David for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Assistant Solicitor General Francisco Carreon for
respondents.

REYES, J. B. L., J.:

On December 19, 1952, the respondents Chief of Police of Bacolor, Pampanga, filed a criminal complaint
against the herein petitioner, Francisco Quizon, with the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality
charging Quizon with the crime of damage to property through reckless imprudence, the value of the
damage amounting to P125.00. Quizon filed a motion to quash on the ground that, under Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code, the penalty which might be imposed on the accused would be a fine or from
P125.00 to P375.00, which is in excess of the fine that may be imposed by the justice of the peace court.
The Justice of the Peace forwarded the case to the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, but the latter
returned it to him for trial on the merits, holding that the justice of the peace court had jurisdiction. The
defendant appealed from this ruling of the Court of First Instance to this Court on the question of law
raised.

Section 44 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act No. 296) provides in part as follows:

Original jurisdiction.—Courts of First Instance shall have original jurisdiction:

(f) In all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months,
or a fine of more than two hundred pesos:

Section 87 of said Acts reads as follows:.

Original jurisdiction to try criminal cases.—Justices of the peace and judges of municipal courts of
chartered cities shall have original jurisdiction over:

(c) All criminal cases arising under the laws relating to:

(6) Malicious mischief;.

In the cases of People vs. Palmon, 86 Phil., 350; People vs. Peñas Y Ferrer and Rey y Rochas, 86 Phil.,
596; and Natividad, et al. vs. Robles, 87 Phil.,, 834, it was held that in the cases provided for in Section
87 (c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 above quoted, the jurisdiction given to justices of the peace and
judges of the municipal courts is not exclusive but concurrent with the courts of first instance, when the
penalty to be imposed is more than six months imprisonment or a fine of more than P200.00.

The question, therefore , is whether the justice of the peace court has concurrent jurisdiction with the
court of First Instance when the crime charged is damage to property through reckless negligence or
imprudence if the amount of the damage is P125.

We believe that the answer should be in the negative. To hold that the Justice of the Peace Court has
jurisdiction to try cases of damage to property through reckless negligence, because it has jurisdiction
over cases of malicious mischief, is to assume that the former offense is but a variant of the latter. This
assumption is not legally warranted.

Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code is as follows:

ART. 327. Who are liable for malicious mischief.—Any person who shall deliberately cause to the
property of another any damage not falling within the terms of the next preceding chapter shall be
guilty of malicious mischief.

It has always been regarded of the essence of this felony that the offender should have not only the
general intention to carry out the felonious act (a feature common to all willful crimes) but that he
should act under the impulse of a specific desire to inflict injury to another; "que en el hecho concurra
animo especifico de dañar"(Cuello Calon, Der. Penal [6th Ed.] Vol. II, p. 869; Sent. of Tribunal Supreme of
Spain, 21 Dec. 1909; 12 Feb. 1921).

El elemento interno de este delito require, ademas de la voluntad de ejecutar el hecho dañoso y de la
conciencia de su ilegitimidad, el animo de perjudicar, la intencion de dañar. Si no existe semejante
animo el hecho no constituey delito. (II Cuello Calon, p.870-871).

The necessity of the special malice for the crime of malicious mischief is contained in the requirement of
Art. 327 of our Revised Penal Code, already quoted, that the offender "shall deliberately cause to the
property of another any damage not falling within the terms of the next preceding chapter", i.e., not
punishable as arson. It follows that, in the very nature of things, malicious mischief can not be
committed through negligence, since culpa (negligence) and malice ( or deliberateness) are essentially
incompatible. Hence, the Supreme Court of Spain in its decisions of 12 Feb. 1912, 7 Oct. 1931, 13 Nov.
1934 and 5 Oct. 1942, has expressly recognized that this crime is one of those that can not be
committed by imprudence or negligence.

The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a
crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal
liability" is too broad to deserve unqualified assent . There are crimes that by their structure can not be
committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal
negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from
willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or terminology. In international crimes, the act
itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or
condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible.
Much of the confusion has arisen from the common use of such descriptive phrases as "homicide
through reckless imprudence," and the like; when the strict technical offense is, more accurately,
"reckless imprudence resulting in homicide"; or "simple imprudence causing damages to property".

Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the
penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack
of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would
require that the corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each
crime when committed willfully. For each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be a
corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the
penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional minimum, if the
willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all
the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual penalty for
criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class,
or series, of crimes.

It is difficult to believe that the Legislature, in giving Justices of the Peace jurisdiction to try cases of
malicious mischief, did so in total disregard of the principles and considerations above outlined. Our
conclusion is that "malicious mischief" as used in Section 87, par. 6, of the Judiciary Act, has exclusive
reference to the willful and deliberate crimes described in Arts. 327 to 331 of our Revised Penal Code,
and to no other offense.

A further reason for this restrictive interpretation of the term "malicious mischief" used in section 87 of
the Judiciary Act, is that the same constitutes an exception to the general jurisdiction of the Justice of
the Peace Courts in criminal cases, which had always stood prior to the said Act at offenses punishable
with not more than 6 months' imprisonment or a fine of not more than P200.00 or both. To this
traditional jurisdiction, the Judiciary Act added eight (8) specific exceptions in the form of felonies triable
in said courts without reference to the penalty imposable; and malicious mischief is one of these
exceptions, while imprudence resulting in damage to property is not one of them.

For the foregoing reasons, we declare that the jurisdiction over the offense in question lies exclusively in
the Court of First Instance. Hence, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of remand to the Justice
of the Peace Court is reversed and set aside. Without pronouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

MONTEMAYOR, J. concurring:

There is no question that the offense of malicious mischief, that is to say, causing damage to another's
property willfully and for the sake of causing injury, because of hate, revenge or other evil motive (Art.
327, Revised Penal Code), is much more serious than damage to property without intent or malice but
through negligence (Art. 365, Revised Penal Code). If the Justice of the peace court has jurisdiction, as
Republic Act 296, Sec. 87 gives him, to try and decide cases of malicious mischief, logically and with
more reason, it should also be allowed to try and decide cases of the less serious offense of damage to
property through negligence. Actually, however, under the law, this is not always so. Under Art. 365, in
damage to property thru negligence, "the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount
equal to the value of the damage to three times such value." In the present case, the value of the
damage is P125 and three times that amount would be P375 which is beyond the P 200.00 which a
justice of the peace court may impose as fine in criminal cases. For this reason, although I am not
convinced of the wisdom and rationale of the law in this respect, I vote with the majority because the
law is on its side.

REYES, A., J., concurring:

While it may not be good law to invest municipal and justice of the peace courts with "original
jurisdiction" over criminal cases involving damage to property where the damage was deliberately
cause, but not where the damage was the result of mere negligence, I am constrained to concur in the
majority opinion, because our duty is to apply the law as we find it and not as we think it should be.

The law has extended the criminal jurisdiction of the abovementioned courts to cases of "malicious
mischief," but not to cases of damage to property resulting from mere negligence. We should not
legislate by arbitrarily considering the latter as comprehended in the former. The two are essentially
different. Damage to property constitutes "malicious mischief" only when the object of the perpetrator
is "injury of the property merely for the sake of damaging it." (U. S. vs. Generale et al., 4 Phil., 216.) It
would be an incongruity to apply the term to cases of damages to property where that object is lacking,
as where the damage was due to mere negligence.

I therefore vote to grant the writ.

JUGO, J., dissenting:

The majority opinion seems to hold that there is no crime of damage to property through reckless
negligence, for the reason that in the crime of damage to property there should be malice or deliberate
intent to cause it. If that is so, then why remand the case of the court of first instance? If there is no such
crime neither the court of first instance nor the justice of the peace court can punish it. The result would
be that the numerous crimes committed almost daily of damage to property through reckless negligence
would go unpunished. Reckless negligence alone without any damage is not penalized by the Penal
Code. Article 327 of the Penal Code provides "Any person who shall deliberately cause to the property of
another any damage not falling within the terms of the next preceding chapter, shall be guilty of
malicious mischief. "That does not mean that a person who causes damage to property, without
deliberate intent, could not commit it through reckless negligence, for the deliberate intent to commit it
through reckless negligence, for the deliberate intent to commit a crime is common to all crimes.

Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code defines crimes as follows:

Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos).

Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa).

There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault when the wrongful
act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight. or lack of skill.

In the present case damage to property was committed through culpa "imprudence, negligence, lack of
foresight, or lack of skill". We should not be mislead by the word "malicious" in the phrase "malicious
mischief" for that is only a translation of the word "daños" as used in the Spanish text which governs.
(People vs. Abilong, 46 Off. Gaz., 1012.) The drafter of Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code in using the
word "malicious" in the phrase "malicious mischief" did not add anything to the general concept of
crimes as defined in Article 3, but may have used the word "mischief" simply to distinguish it from
damages which may give rise only to civil liability. However that may be, it is clear that he referred to
damage in general which may be committed with deliberate intent or through reckless negligence.

In the case of People vs. Faller, 67 Phil., 529, it was was held by this Court through Chief Justice Avaceña
that a person accused of malicious mischief may be convicted of damage to property through reckless
negligence. If the latter crime is essentially different from malicious mischief, then the accused could not
have been convicted of it.
For the above reasons, I dissent.

REACTION:
People have different attitude or behavior, we can't predict others mind what their supposed to do and we
can't questioned their actions for different kind of situation, In this case the accused are approved the
decision or the court which the result are not yet sure if the accused are being convicted of a malicious
mischief.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 116734 March 29, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

LARRY LAURENTE Y BEJASA, MELVIN DAGUDOG and RICHARD DISIPULO, accused.

LARRY LAURENTE Y BEJASA, accused appellant.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:p

This is a case for our automatic review1 in view of the death penalty imposed upon accused-appellant
Larry Laurente (hereinafter Laurente).

In a decision2 promulgated on 23 August 1994 in Criminal Case No. 104785, the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig, Branch 156, found Laurente guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Highway
Robbery with Homicide, defined and penalized under P.D. No. 532,3 and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of death; to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00, and to pay them
P27,300.00 as funeral expenses and P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; and to pay the
costs.

We declare at the outset that even granting ex gratia that the established facts prove beyond
reasonable doubt that Laurente and his two co-accused indeed committed the acts charged in the
information,4 Laurente cannot be validly convicted for highway robbery with homicide under P.D. No.
532. The object of the decree is to deter and punish lawless elements who commit acts of depredation
upon persons and properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to
another — which acts constitute either piracy or highway robbery/brigandage — thereby disturbing the
peace, order, and tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic and social progress of the
people.5 It is directed against acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any
person on Philippine highways, as defined therein, and not those committed against a predetermined or
particular victim. Accordingly, a robbery committed on a Philippine highway by persons who are not
members of the proscribed lawless elements or directed only against a specific, intended, or
preconceived victim, is not a violation of P.D. No. 532. This Court, per Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado, so
held in People vs. Puno6 and a reiteration of the discussion therein is in order. Thus:.

Contrary to the postulation of the Solicitor General. Presidential Decree No. 532 is not a modification of
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code on kidnapping and serious illegal detention, but of Articles 306 and
307 on brigandage. This is evident from the fact that the relevant portion thereof which treats of
"highway robbery" invariably uses this term in the alternative and synonymously with brigandage, that
is, as "highway robbery/brigandage." This is but in line with our previous ruling, and which still holds
sway in criminal law, that highway robbers (ladrones) and brigands are synonymous.

Harking back to the origin of our law on brigandage (bandolerismo) in order to put our discussion
thereon in the proper context and perspective, we find that a band of brigands, also known as
highwaymen or freebooters, is more than a gang of ordinary robbers. Jurisprudence on the matter
reveals chat during the early part of the American occupation of our country, roving bands were
organized for robbery and pillage and since the then existing law against robbery was inadequate to
cope with such moving bands of outlaws, the Brigandage Law was passed.

The following salient distinctions between brigandage and robbery are succinctly explained in a treatise
on the subject and are of continuing validity:

The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the ormation of bands of robbers.

The heart of the offense consists in the formation of a band by more than three armed persons for the
purpose indicated in art. 306. Such formation is sufficient to constitute a violation of art. 306. It would
not be necessary to show, in a prosecution under it, that a member or members of the band actually
committed robbery or kidnapping or any other purpose attainable by violent means. The crime is proven
when the organization and purpose of the band are shown to be such as are contemplated by art. 306.
On the other hand, if robbery is committed by a band, whose members were not primarily organized for
the purpose of committing robbery or kidnapping, etc., the crime would not be brigandage, but only
robbery. Simply because robbery was committed by a band of more than three armed persons, it would
not follow that it was committed by a band of brigands. In the Spanish text of art. 306, it is required that
the band "sala a los campos para dedicarse a robar."

In fine, the purpose of brigandage is, inter alia, indiscriminate highway robbery. If the purpose is only a
particular robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if there are at least four armed
participants. The martial law legislator, in creating and promulgating Presidential Decree No. 532 for the
objectives announced therein, could not have been unaware of that distinction and is presumed to have
adopted the same, there being no indication to the contrary. This conclusion is buttressed by the rule on
contemporaneous construction, since it is one drawn from the time when and the circumstances under
which the decree to be construed originated. Contemporaneous exposition or construction is the best
and strongest in the law.

Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or brigandage only acts of
robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine highways
as defined therein, and not acts of robbery committed against only a predetermined or particular victim,
is evident from the preambular clauses thereof, to wit:

WHEREAS, reports from law enforcement agencies reveal that lawless elements are still committing acts
of depredation upon the persons and properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel
from one place to another, thereby disturbing the peace, order and tranquility of the nation and
stunting the economic and social progress of the people;

WHEREAS, such acts and depredations constitute . . . highway robbery/brigandage which are among the
highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries;

WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from perpetrating such acts and
depredations by imposing [a] heavy penalty on the offenders, with the end in view of eliminating all
obstacles to the economic, social, educational and community progress of the people; (Emphasis
supplied.)

Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery against a particular person chosen by the
accused as their specific victim could be considered as committed on the "innocent and defenseless
inhabitants who travel from one place to another," and which single act of depredation could be capable
of "stunting the economic and social progress of the people" as to be considered "among the highest
forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries," and would accordingly
constitute an obstacle "to the economic, social, educational and community progress of the people,"
such that said isolated act would constitute the highway robbery or brigandage contemplated and
punished in said decree. This would be an exaggeration bordering on the ridiculous.

True, Presidential Decree No. 532 did introduce amendments to Articles 306 and 307 of the Revised
Penal Code by increasing the penalties, albeit limiting its applicability to the offenses stated therein
when committed on the highways and without prejudice to the liability for such acts if committed.
Furthermore, the decree does not require that there be at least four armed persons forming a band of
robbers; and the presumption in the Code that said accused are brigands if they use unlicensed firearms
no longer obtains under the decree. But, and this we broadly underline, the essence of brigandage
under the Code as a crime of depredation wherein the unlawful acts are directed not only against
specific, intended or pre conceived victims, but against any and all prospective victims anywhere on the
highway and whosoever they may potentially be, is the same as the concept of brigandage which is
maintained in Presidential Decree No. 532, in the same manner as it was under its aforementioned
precursor in the Code and, for that matter, under the old Brigandage Law.
Erroneous advertence is nevertheless made by the court below to the fact that the crime of robbery
committed by appellants should be covered by the said amendatory decree just because it was
committed on a highway. Aside from what has already been stressed regarding the absence of the
requisite elements which thereby necessarily puts the offense charged outside the purview and
intendment of that presidential issuance, it would be absurd to adopt a literal interpretation that any
unlawful taking of property committed on our highways would be covered thereby. It is an elementary
rule of statutory construction that the spirit of intent of the law should not be subordinated to the letter
thereof. Trite as it may appear, we have perforce to stress the elementary caveat that he who considers
merely the letter of an instrument goes but skin deep into its meaning, and the fundamental rule that
criminal justice inclines in favor of the milder form of liability in case of doubt.

If the mere fact that the offense charged was committed on a highway would be the determinant for the
application of Presidential Decree No. 532, it would not be far-fetched to expect mischievous, if not
absurd, effects on the corpus of our substantive criminal law. While we eschew resort to a reductio ad
absurdum line of reasoning, we apprehend that the aforestated theory adopted by the trial court falls
far short of the desideratum in the interpretation of laws, that is, to avoid absurdities and conflicts. For,
if a motor vehicle, either stationary or moving on a highway, is forcibly taken at gunpoint by the accused
who happened to take a fancy thereto, would the location of the vehicle at the time of the unlawful
taking necessarily put the offense within the ambit of Presidential Decree No. 532, thus rendering
nugatory the categorical provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972? And, if the scenario is one
where the subject matter of the unlawful asportation is large cattle which are incidentally being herded
along and traversing the same highway and are impulsively set upon by the accused, should we apply
Presidential Decree No. 532 and completely disregard the explicit prescriptions in the Anti-Cattle
Rustling Law of 1974?

We do not entertain any doubt, therefore, that the coincidental fact that the robbery in the present case
was committed inside a car which, in the natural course of things, was casually operating on a highway,
is not within the situation envisaged by Section 2(e) of the decree in its definition of terms. Besides, that
particular provision precisely define[s] "highway robbery/brigandage" and, as we have amply
demonstrated, the single act of robbery conceived and committed by appellants in this case does not
constitute highway robbery or brigandage. (citations omitted).

In the instant case, there is not a shred of evidence that Laurente and his co-accused, or their acts, fall
within the purview of P.D. No. 532, as interpreted above. Thus, to repeat, Laurente cannot be validly
convicted for highway robbery with homicide under P.D. No. 532.

Assuming further, however, that Laurente and his co-accused may be convicted under P.D. No. 532, the
death penalty cannot be legally imposed on Laurente. While it is true that Section 3 of the said decree
prescribes the penalty of death for highway robbery with homicide, the imposition of capital
punishment was suspended7 by Section 19(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution.8

The reimposition of the death penalty by R.A. No. 76599 did not ipso jure lift the suspension as far as
P.D. No. 532 is concerned. An examination of the former reveals that while it specifically imposed the
death penalty or restored it for certain crimes, 10 it failed to do so for the latter — in fact, R.A. No. 7659
does not mention P.D. No. 532 at all. Clearly, by failing to squarely deal with P.D. No. 532, Congress is
deemed not to have considered highway robbery with homicide a "heinous crime"; or if it did, it found
no "compelling reason" to reimpose the death penalty therefor.

Nevertheless, the amended. information hereinafter quoted 11 indubitably shows, that except for the
emphasis of the place where the robbery was committed, i.e., a highway, the charge is actually for
robbery with homicide as defined and penalized under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code. This
provision now reads, as amended by Section 9 of R.A. No. 7659:

Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons. — Penalties. — Any person guilty of
robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:

1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime
of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or
intentional mutilation or arson . . . .

Simply, the information remains a valid information for robbery with homicide under the above
provision. The investigating prosecutor's characterization that it was for highway robbery with homicide
is of no moment. On the matter of an accused's right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation, 12 it is elementary that what determines the offense charged is not the characterization
made by the prosecutor who prepared the information, but the allegations in the indictment. 13

Accordingly, on the assumption that the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt all the
elements of robbery and of homicide committed on the occasion thereof, Laurente can nevertheless be
meted the penalty of death under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No.
7659, since the crime was committed on 14 February 1994, or one month and thirteen days after the
effectivity of R.A. No. 7659. But whether the prosecution in fact discharged its burden is an entirely
different matter which goes into the merits of this appeal.

We shall the return our attention to the appeal proper.

In an information 14 dated 17 February 1994 and filed with the trial court on 21 February 1994,
Laurente was charged with the crime of Highway Robbery with Homicide. The information was later
amended to include his co-accused, Melvin Dagudog and Richard Disipulo. The indictment in the
amended information read as follows:

That on or about the 14th day of February, 1994 in the Municipality of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together with Melvin Dagudog and Richard Disipulo, who are still at large, and all of them
mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent of [sic] gain and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and divest from
Herminiano G. Artana of his earnings in and [sic] undetermined amount along F. Concepcion St., Bgy.
San Joaquin, Pasig, Metro Manila, which is a Philippine Highway; that on the occasion of the said
robbery and for the purpose of enabling them to take, divest and carry away the said money, in
pursuance of their conspiracy and for the purpose of insuring success of their criminal act, said accused
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously strangle said victim with a leather belt and hit
him with a blunt instrument, causing him to sustain physical injuries which directly caused his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 15

Laurente was taken into custody on 15 February 1994, 16 but his two co-accused have remained at
large. The case then proceeded as against Laurente only.

Upon arraignment, with the assistance of counsel de oficio, Laurente entered a plea of not guilty. 17 At
trial on the merits, the prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: (1) SPO1 Crispin Pio, the
investigating/arresting officer; (2) eyewitness Myra Guinto; (3) Felicitas Matematico, the victim's
daughter; and (4) Dr. Emmanuel Arañas, the medico-legal officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Crime Laboratory Services, who performed the autopsy on the victim. The prosecution attempted to
present the other eyewitness, Noel Guinto (Myra's brother-in-law), but despite the issuance of a
warrant for his arrest and the trial court's grant of one last chance to present him, the prosecution was
unable to do so. 18

SPO1 Crispin Pio testified that on 14 February 1994, while on duty as a homicide investigator at the Pasig
Police Station, he received a case assignment relative to one Herminio Artana. He proceeded to the
place of the incident, which was just a few meters away from the exit gate of the Capitol Compound in
Pasig. Upon arrival, he saw a parked taxicab and looked inside it. He saw a dead man, who, he supposed,
was the taxicab driver. Pio recalled that the taxicab was an "Adet taxi," but he forgot its plate number.
19

At such time, Pio asked the Guinto siblings-in-law and other persons present about the incident, but
gained no meaningful information from them. He conducted a "cursory investigation" and saw that the
body "sustained strangulation marked [sic] and wounds on the face and head," thus he sent the body to
the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. He then conducted a "crime scene search inside the taxicab
and within the vicinity," which yielded a "colored brown wallet containing an SSS [Social Security
System] ID of . . . Larry Laurente" and "a leather belt supposedly used in strangling the deadman." 20

Pio took the articles, went to the police station to make an incident report, and "requested the SSS to
secure the complete record" of Laurente. From the SSS records, the police authorities learned that
Laurente lived "somewhere in Kalawaan Sur, Pasig"; accordingly, a "follow-up" team was formed to
arrest him. 21

Pio further testified that on 15 February 1994, the "follow-up" team arrested and brought Laurente to
the police station for investigation, and that during the investigation, after having been apprised of his
constitutional rights, Laurente:
[V]erbally admitted that he together with his friend[s] Richard and Melvin boarded the taxicab and they
grabbed the taxicab driver and after which they strangulated [sic] the driver with the use of [the] belt
while Melvin hit the taxi driver with the used [sic] of a blunt instrument at the head and face. 22

Thereafter, Laurente was "put under [sic] police line-up wherein the 2 witnesses positively identified him
as one of the 3 persons they saw coming from the taxicab." Pio was present during the conduct of the
police line-up and, under his and his superior's 23 supervision, he had the line-up photographed
(Exhibits "D" and "D-l"). 24

Pio next took the statements of the witnesses (Exhibits "F" and G") 25 and the complainant (Exhibit "E"),
26 proceeded to make his report (Exhibit "I"), 27 executed an affidavit (Exhibit "H") 28 attesting to the
conduct of the investigation and arrest, and secured the death certificate of the victim from the PNP
Crime Laboratory (Exhibit "J"). 29 To close his testimony on direct examination, Pio identified Laurente
and further disclosed their efforts to locate the other suspects. 30

On cross-examination, Pio clarified certain details regarding the findings of the investigation, e.g., the
locus criminis was well lit as a lamp post was nearby. 31 However, Pio admitted that although he
informed Laurente of his constitutional rights while he was investigated at the police station, Laurente
was not represented by counsel during such investigation; he was merely accompanied by a sister and
some cousins. Nevertheless, despite the absence of counsel, Laurente verbally admitted his complicity in
the crime, although the admission was not reduced in writing. 32

Myra Guinto testified that on 14 February 1994, at about 9:15 p.m., she was selling cigarettes at Sitio
Square, Shaw Boulevard, Pasig, around a meter away from the Provincial Capitol. 33 At such time, she
saw people scrambling inside a yellow taxicab which was "at the stop position" on the other side of the
street. Three men then left the taxicab, ran towards her, and at the time these men passed in front of
her, they were

"about 2 arms length[s]" away. These men then boarded a jeepney headed towards Pasig. A fourth man
approached the taxicab, saw the taxicab driver inside already dead and called the police. 34

She was questioned by the policemen upon their arrival, and at a later date, reduced her statements
into writing (Exhibit "F"). After she identified Exhibit "F," Guinto then identified Larry Laurente as one of
the three men who left the taxicab and passed in front of her. 35

On cross-examination, Guinto declared that the "taxi was rather of old vintage" and that it did not have
tinted windows, in fact, one "could see the persons inside the taxi." She likewise declared that the place
where she first saw the taxicab had "a big white bulb" and was approximately fifteen meters away from
where she was selling cigarettes. 36

Felicitas Matematico testified that the victim was her father and presented the following as evidence of
funeral expenses: (a) several pieces of paper with the tagalog caption "nagastos noong lamay" 3 7
(Exhibit "K"); 38 (b) a receipt dated 22 February 1994 for P800.00, for the construction of a niche cover
(Exhibit "L"); 39 and (c) a receipt dated 21 February 1994 from Sta. Marta Funeral Homes for P10,000.00
(Exhibit "N"); 40 for a total of P27,300.00. To close her testimony on direct examination, she stated that
she was "still sad" about the death of her father; and when asked to "quantify her sadness," she
responded that her mother was in a better position to do so. 41

Dr. Emmanuel Arañas testified on the autopsy he conducted on the cadaver of the victim and the
medico-legal report (Exhibit "O") he made on 15 February 1994. 42 He reiterated his finding that the
cause of death of the victim was "traumatic injuries of head," and that he suffered the following injuries:
"(1) Hematoma, right peri-orbital region, measuring 5 by 3 cm., 4 cm. on the anterior midline; and (2)
Contusion, neck, measuring 15 by 1.8 cm., crossing the anterior midline, 2 cm. to the right and 13 cm. to
the left," and that "[t]here are subdural and subarachnoidal hemorrhages." He opined that the injuries
could have been caused by a "hard blunt instrument," such as a belt, a piece of wood, or a head (buckle)
of a belt. 43

On his part, accused Larry Laurente interposed the defense of alibi. On the witness stand, he related
that on 14 February 1994, at around 3:00 to 3:30 p.m., he was in his house at Consorcia Street, San
Joaquin, Pasig, together with his friends Melvin Dagudog and Richard Disipulo. Supposedly, they began a
drinking session at around 3:30 p.m. which lasted four hours, during which period they consumed two
bottles of "Tanduay 5 years." After that, he did not leave his house anymore, 44 as he got so drunk, "lost
consciousness," and did not wake up until 4:00 a.m. the next day. It was only then that he found out his
two friends had left his house. 45

In the morning of 15 February 1994, he had to look for his wallet as it got lost "in [his]wooden bed
(papag) where [he slept]." That wallet contained an "I.D., SSS number and P250.00." He then presumed
that Melvin Dagudog and Richard Disipulo had taken his wallet as they were the only ones in the house
during the drinking session. Having failed to obtain any information from his neighbors, Mang Roming
and Ate Baby, as to where Dagudog and Disipulo had gone, he went home to rest; then he took a
shower And got ready to report for work. He had been a shingle molder at Winning Enterprises for the
past three years, with offices in Taguig, Rizal. 46 He maintained that on 15 February 1994, he reported
for work at 6:00 a.m. and stayed in the office till 8:00 p.m. 4 7

After returning home from work, four policemen were waiting for him, and in Laurente's own words,
"bigla na lang po akong sinugod at hinila." 48 He surmised that they were policemen even if they were
not in uniform because they were "holding guns." Although they had no warrant of arrest, the
policemen brought him to the Pasig police station where he was investigated for being "a hold-upper";
and throughout the investigation, he was not assisted by counsel. 49 On cross-examination of Laurente,
the prosecution obtained an admission that it would take him "about half an hour" to travel from his
house to the Provincial Capitol. 50

On 23 August 1994, the trial court promulgated the challenged decision wherein, as stated earlier, it
found Laurente guilty beyond reasonable doubt of highway robbery with homicide "punishable by death
as a single indivisible penalty under Presidential Decree No. 532 entitled 'Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway
Robbery Law of 1974.'" 51 It gave full faith and credit to the eyewitness account of Myra Guinto and
rejected the defense of alibi proffered by the Laurente as "he failed miserably to give any evidence to
support this claim." 52 Regarding Laurente's presence at the locus criminis, it relied on the positive
identification made by Myra and Laurente's SSS ID card which was found inside the taxicab of the victim.
Apparently, finding it difficult to impose a death penalty, the trial court stated:

While the undersigned Presiding Judge does not believe in the imposition of the death penalty as a form
of punishment, as he has stated about a month ago in Criminal Case No. 104781, entitled People of the
Philippines vs. Elpidio Mercado, et al., this same Court, nevertheless, in obedience to the law which is his
duty to uphold, the Court hereby sentences accused LARRY LAURENTE y Bejasa to death . . . 53

Laurente forthwith filed a Notice of Appeal. The trial court noted therein that the review by this Court
was automatic. 54

In his Brief, Laurente assigns the following errors committed by the trial court, but being interrelated,
discusses them jointly:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT LARRY LAURENTE WAS
POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY THE PROSECUTION WITNESS.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF HIGHWAY ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE ELEMENTS OF COMMITTING SUCH CRIME WERE NOT SUBSTANTIALLY
PROVEN BY THE PROSECUTION. 55

Laurente anchors his prayer for acquittal on the unreliability of the positive identification made of him
by the lone eyewitness who testified at the trial, Myra Guinto. He initially attempts to discredit this by
deducing from Myra's testimony in court that she was neither able to recognize the three men she
allegedly saw coming out of the taxicab, nor see Laurente stab the victim. Thus:

ATTY. FERNANDEZ:

xxx xxx xxx

Q: By the way, do you know these men who came out from the taxi and passed by you?

A: No, sir.

xxx xxx xxx (TSN, May 6, 1994)

Q: And also did not have any knowledge that there was a stabbing incident that happened inside the
taxi?

A: None, sir.
Q: Now, you said that there were three men who ran passed [sic] infront of you. Is that correct?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And because of that speed, you were not able to identify any of these persons?

A: No, sir. I was able to recognize one of them because they ran in front of me, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Will you describe to the Honorable Court how fast these man passed by in front of you?

A: It was quite fast, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: You identified the accused in this case as the one who allegedly killed the victim in this case. Is that
correct?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, did you personally see the accused stabbed [sic] the victim or killed [sic] the victim?

A: No, sir. (Ibid, p. 7-8) (Emphasis Ours) 56

Hence, Laurente concludes that "[t]he identification [by Myra Guinto] of the accused-appellant in the
police line-up as one of those who killed the victim . . . is . . . not entirely reliable." 57

Laurente then continues his assault on Myra's positive identification by surmising:

[T]hat it was only thru the SSS ID Card of the accused-appellant which was found inside the taxicab that
made the police authorities conclude or suspect [the] accused-appellant . . . Thus, in all probability, the
identification . . . in the police line-up was because of the SSS ID Card but not for the reason that she
recognized the accused-appellant on the night of the incident. 58

As to his SSS ID card in the wallet found inside the taxicab, Laurente submits that the said card:

[W]ill not suffice as a ground for conviction, for neither was it established that accused-appellant had
left the I.D. while committing the felony. It may well be that who ever took appellant's wallet with the
I.D. in it purposely left the same to implicate [the appellant. . . . It was established by the defense that
the wallet of the accused-appellant which contained his SSS ID Card was stolen from him by his co-
accused [and] this allegation remain[s] unrebutted by the prosecution. 59

Finally, Laurente challenges the trial court's rejection of the defense of alibi and relates this to the
allegedly improbable positive identification by Myra Guinto and ultimately, the constitutional
presumption of innocence:
While it may be admitted that the defense of alibi . . . is . . . weak this gains strength when the evidence
of the prosecution is equally weak. As earlier discussed, there is no positive identification of the
[appellant] by . . . Myra Guinto, thus the defense of alibi of the appellant perforce prevails. As held, the
weakness of alibi of the accused could not strengthen the prosecution's case for settled is [the] rule that
the prosecution must rely on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.
(People v. Garcia, 215 SCRA 349) Further, alibi as a defense assumes commensurate strength . . . where
the evidence presented by the prosecution [is] unreliable and uncertain since it is not relieved of the
onus probandi just because alibi is the defense invoked by the accused (People v. Jalon, 215 SCRA 680).
60

At bottom, Laurente's line of reasoning flows as such: First, the positive identification by Myra Guinto is
unreliable as she did not see the three men who came out of the taxicab, neither did she see Laurente
stab the victim. Second, in the light of the improbability of Myra having adequately seen Laurente at the
locus criminis, the positive identification at the police line-up necessarily cannot be relied upon as well.
Third, without the positive identification of Laurente, only his SSS ID card found inside the taxicab links
him to the crime; however, Laurente satisfactorily proved that his wallet containing his SSS ID card had
been taken. Hence, he concludes, the spurious positive identification, either at the scene of the crime or
at the police line-up, coupled with the weak link provided by his SSS ID card found inside the taxicab,
should not be allowed to overcome the defense of alibi and the presumption of innocence.

Laurente's attempts to cast doubt upon the positive identification made of him by Myra must fail.

Laurente's contention that Myra did not see the three men who came out of the taxicab deserves scant
consideration. As the proceedings below clearly established, the place where Myra saw Laurente was
well-lit due to a lamp post nearby and the latter was only two arms lengths away from her when he
passed in front of her. Moreover, she identified Laurente at the police line-up, which was even
photographed, and in open court. Finally, as observed by the trial court:

Nothing in the demeanor of prosecution witness Myra Guinto would indicate that she harbors ill-
feelings towards accused Larry Laurente that she will falsely testify against him. Her testimony is thus
given much weight by the Court. . . . 61

This assessment of the credibility of eyewitness Myra Guinto deserves the highest respect of this Court,
considering that the trial court had the direct opportunity to observe her deportment and manner of
testifying and availed of the various aids to determine whether she was telling the truth or concocting

lies. 62 This is a settled rule in this jurisdiction and the exceptions thereto, viz., some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence has been overlooked or the significance of which has been
misinterpreted, which if considered might affect the result of the case, 63 have not been shown to exist
in this case.

Equally settled is the rule that where there is no evidence, and nothing to indicate that the principal
witnesses for the prosecution — like Myra in this
case — were actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that they were not so actuated and their
testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. 64

Laurente's next contention that Myra did not actually see him stab the victim must likewise fail. From
the circumstances obtaining in this case, it cannot be doubted that Laurente and his companions acted
in conspiracy in committing the crime. They were together in the taxicab when it stopped and Myra saw
them "scrambling inside," after which, they ran off and boarded a jeepney to escape. On the matter of
proving the existence of conspiracy, it is settled that direct proof of the previous agreement to commit a
crime is not necessary. It may be deduced from the mode and manner by which the offense was
perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such point to a joint purpose and
design, concerted action and community of

interest. 65 There is no doubt in our minds that the victim was killed by the co-conspirators. That Myra
did not actually see that it was Laurente who stabbed the victim is of no moment. Once conspiracy is
established, the act of one is the act of all. 66

Laurente's story on the alleged loss of his SSS ID card and its being found in the taxicab is simply
unbelievable. As to his defense, the trial court assessed Laurente's testimony in this manner:

Accused Larry Laurente would like the Court to believe that he was someplace else when the hold-up
and killing . . . occurred . . . During his testimony, he first claimed to have gone to work on February 14,
1994, and then on the same breath, he suddenly changed his mind and said that he was absent. He
would also like to convince the Court that his co-accused in this case, Richard Disipulo and Melvin
Dagudog, came out of the blue, had a drinking session with him, and just left with nary a word to him.

Evidence to be believed must proceed not only from the mouth of a credible witness but the same must
be credible in itself as when it conforms to the common experience and observation of mankind.
(People vs. Jalon, 215 SCRA 680)

The Court also noted that [the] accused . . . contradicted himself when he said that he ha[d] been a
molder . . . in Tagig, Metro Manila for the past three (3) years and yet, he has only been in Manila from
Negros Oriental last October! Such inconsistencies destroy his credibility and further bolster the Court's
findings that his defense of alibi is merely invoked as a matter of convenience. 67

We are in full accord with such assessment, and further reiterate the rule that alibi, being the weakest of
all defenses as it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove, cannot prevail over and is worthless in the
face of the positive identification of the accused. 68 But most telling in this case is that Laurente's alibi
does not meet the requirements of time and place. It is not enough to prove that the accused was
somewhere else when the crime was committed, but he must also demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time the
same was committed. 69 On cross-examination, Laurente admitted that it would take "about half an
hour" to traverse the distance from his house to the scene of the crime. 70 Such distance is so near as
not to preclude his having been at the scene of the crime when it was committed. We are, therefore, left
with no option but to rule that the prosecution has discharged its burden to prove the commission of
homicide by Laurente and to reject his defense of alibi.

Proof of the commission of robbery, however, must be examined more closely.

Laurente pleads that the prosecution failed to prove the element of robbery, thus, his conviction of the
crime charged should not be sustained. On this score, Laurente calls this Court's attention to the fact:

[T]hat not a single [shred of] evidence was introduced by the prosecution to prove robbery or unlawful
taking of property from the victim. Nothing was shown whether the victim was divested of his money or
other personal belongings. It cannot be presumed that the main purpose of the killing . . . was to rob
[the victim]. There must be evidence showing the unlawful taking of another by means of violence or
force upon things to make the accused-appellant liable under Pres. Dec. No. 532 . . . 71

An examination of the records of this case reveals that the following constitute the evidence to prove
the robbery aspect of the offense: the statement given by the victim's daughter to the
investigating/arresting officer, 72 and the contents of the affidavit executed by the
investigating/arresting officer himself. 73

The police statement of the victim's daughter contained the following exchange:

05. t: Nalaman mo ba naman kung ano ang dahilan at pinatay ang iyong tatay?

s: Ang tatay ko po ay hinoldap.

06. t: Ano naman ang trabaho nang iyong tatay, para siya holdapin?

s: Siya po ay taxi driver.

xxx xxx xxx

08. t: Nalaman mo ba naman kung magkano ang nakuha o' naholdap sa iyong tatay?

s: Hindi ko po alam kung magkano pero wala napo ang kinita niya sa pagpapasada ng taxi.

09. t: Papaano naman ninyo nalaman na hinoldap at napatay ang iyong tatay?

s: Nuong pang gabi ng petsa 14 ng Pebrero 1994, mayroon pong pumunta sa aming bahay at kami no ay
inimpormahan na ang aking tatay ay hinoldap at napatay habang sakay siya ng kanyang inilalabas na
taxi. 74 (emphasis supplied)

Clearly, such constituted inadmissible hearsay as any knowledge as to the robbery aspect of the offense
was not derived from her own perception 75 and did not fall within any of the exceptions to the hearsay
rule. 76 However, assuming arguendo that the said statements were admissible for failure of the
defense counsel to raise a timely objection,

nevertheless, such statements carry no probative value. 77

On the subject of SPO1 Pio's affidavit concerning the conduct of the investigation, it becomes the sole
piece of evidence to prove the robbery in the case before us. The relevant portion is quoted hereunder:

That . . . a crime scene search was conducted by this investigator, during said search, . . . a leather wallet
colored brown was found on the passenger seat at the back . . . further the personal belongings of the
dead man known as the taxi driver was [sic] intact, however, his daily earnings was [sic] missing,
showing that the victim was robbed before being killed . . . 78 (emphasis supplied)

This Court holds that the above statements, as the lone measure by which to judge the commission of
robbery, are insufficient to prove the same, i.e., that the victim actually earned money and that these
earnings were unlawfully taken by the accused. The prosecution, in this regard, failed to discharge the
burden of proof and satisfy the quantum of evidence for the robbery aspect in this case.

A conviction for robbery simply cannot be had in the light of the total absence of evidence regarding the
taxicab driver's earnings and the sweeping statement that "the personal belongings of the dead man . . .
[were] intact." Moreover, the prosecution did not even bother to introduce evidence as to what time
the victim in this case started plying his route, which may have led to a reasonable inference that he had
earned some money by the time the crime was committed. In sum, there is no conclusive evidence
proving the physical act of asportation by Laurente and his co-accused. 79

It is settled that in order to sustain a conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide, it is imperative
that the robbery itself be proven as conclusively as any other essential element of a crime. In the
absence of such proof, the killing of the victim would only be simple homicide or murder, depending on
the absence or presence of qualifying circumstances. 80

We thus rule that the crime committed by Laurente is homicide under Article 249 of the Revise Penal
Code and penalized therein with reclusion temporal. Since no modifying circumstances have been
established, it shall be imposed in its medium period pursuant to Article 64(1) of the Revised Penal
Code.

In passing, this Court notes with much concern that the law enforcers in this case failed to respect
Laurente's rights against unlawful arrests 81 and during custodial investigation. 82

In this case, the follow-up team which arrested Laurente on 15 February 1994 had only the latter's SSS
ID card as possible basis to link Laurente to the crime. None of the members of the team were
eyewitnesses to the commission of the crime; they had, therefore, nothing to support a lawful
warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Under this section, a peace officer or
a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person only: (a) when in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) when an
offense has in fact been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from confinement to another.
SPO1 Crispin Pio candidly admitted that he investigated Laurente without the benefit of counsel after
Laurente was arrested, although he informed him of his constitutional rights. As to what these rights
were, he never disclosed; moreover, neither did Pio demonstrate that he exerted the requisite effort to
ensure that Laurente understood his rights. 83 Undoubtedly, the custodial investigation had
commenced, as the police authorities had in fact pinpointed Laurente as the author or one of the
authors of the crime or had focused on him as a suspect thereof. Finally, there is no evidence that
Laurente waived the rights to remain silent and to counsel. Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987
Constitution provides as follows:

Sec. 12. (1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

There was then a total disregard of the duties of an investigator during custodial investigation, which
this Court laid down in Morales vs. Enrile, 84 reiterated in several cases. 85

It cannot be overemphasized that the rights enshrined in the Bill of

Rights 86 are the very mechanisms by which the delicate balance between governmental power and
individual liberties is maintained. Thus, it does not bode well for society when our law enforcers defy the
fundamental law of the land in ignoring these rights designed to ensure the very equilibrium of our
democracy.

It must, however, be pointed out that the conviction of Laurente is not based on his alleged oral
admission during his custodial investigation by SPO1 Crispin Pio.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of Branch 156 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig in Criminal Case
No. 104785 is hereby modified as to the nature of the offense committed. As modified, accused-
appellant LARRY LAURENTE Y BEJASA is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as co-principal by direct
participation, of the crime of Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, said accused-appellant LARRY LAURENTE Y BEJASA
is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from Ten (10) years of prision mayor
medium, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) years and Four (4) months of reclusion temporal medium, as
maximum. In all other respects, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED.

Costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco,
Hermosisima, Jr., and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Torres, Jr., J., is on leave.

REACTION:

My insight about this case is that, whatever accused denied the

crime, the truth will prevail because every contact leaves a trace that
might use to identify the perpetrator.