HOWARD TERREL

FACTS:

Howard D. Terrell, an attorney-at-law, was ordered to show cause in the Court of First
Instance. in the city of Manila, on the 5th day of February, 1903, why he should not be suspended
as a member of the bar of the city of Manila for the reasons:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

First, that he had assisted in the organization of the "Centro Bellas Artes" Club, after he
had been notified that the said organization was made for the purpose of evading the
law then in force in said city; and,

Secondly, for acting as attorney for said "Centro Bellas Artes" during the time of and
after its organization, which organization was known to him to be created for the
purpose of evading the law.

The accused appeared on the return day, and by his counsel, W. A. Kincaid, made answer to these
charges, denying the same, and filed affidavits in answer thereto. After reading testimony given by
said Howard D. Terrell, in the case of the United States v. H. D. Terrell, 1 wherein he was
charged with estafa, and after reading the said affidavits in his behalf, and hearing his
counsel, the court below found, and decided as a fact, that the charges aforesaid made
against Howard D. Terrell were true, and thereupon made an order suspending him
from his office as a lawyer in the Philippine Islands, and directed the clerk of the court
to transmit to this court a certified copy of the order of suspension, as well as a full
statement of the facts upon which the same was based.

We have carefully considered these facts, and have reached the conclusion that they were such as
to justify the court below in arriving at the conclusion that the knowledge and acts of the
accused in connection with the organization of the "Centro Bellas Artes" Club were of
such a nature and character as to warrant his suspension from practice.

The promoting of organizations, with knowledge of their objects, for the purpose of
violating or evading the laws against crime constitutes such misconduct on the part of
an attorney, an officer of the court, as amounts to malpractice or gross misconduct in
his office, and for which he may be removed or suspended. (Code of Civil Procedure,
sec. 21.) The assisting of a client in a scheme which the attorney knows to be dishonest, or the
conniving at a violation of law, are acts which justify disbarment.

In this case, however, inasmuch as the defendant in the case of United States v. Terrelle was
acquitted on the charge of estafa, and has not, therefore, been convicted of crime, and
as the acts with which he is charged in this proceeding, while unprofessional and hence to be
condemned, are not criminal in their nature, we are of opinion that the ends of justice will be
served by the suspension of said Howard D. Terrell from the practice of law in the Philippine Islands
for the term of one year from the 7th day of February, 1903.

It is therefore directed that the said Howard D. Terrell be suspended form the practice of
law for a term of one year from February 7, 1903. It is so ordered.
Estrada v Sandiganbayan, 416 SCRA 465, (2003)

On 23 September 2003, this Court issued its resolution in the above-numbered case; it read:

"The case for consideration has been brought to this Court via a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by Joseph Ejercito Estrada, acting through his counsel
Attorney Alan F. Paguia, against the Sandiganbayan, et al. The Petition prays –

"1. That Chief Justice Davide and the rest of the members of the Honorable Court
disqualify themselves from hearing and deciding this petition;

"2. That the assailed resolutions of the Sandiganbayan be vacated and set aside; and

"3. That Criminal Cases No. 26558, No. 26565 and No. 26905 pending before the Sandiganbayan
be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

"Attorney Alan F. Paguia, speaking for petitioner, asserts that the inhibition of the members of the
Supreme Court from hearing the petition is called for under Rule 5.10 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct prohibiting justices or judges from participating in any partisan political
activity which proscription, according to him, the justices have violated by attending
the ‘EDSA 2 Rally’ and by authorizing the assumption of Vice-President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo to the Presidency in violation of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends
that the justices have thereby prejudged a case that would assail the legality of the act
taken by President Arroyo. The subsequent decision of the Court in Estrada v. Arroyo (353
SCRA 452 and 356 SCRA 108) is, petitioner states, a patent mockery of justice and due
process.

"Attorney Paguia first made his appearance for petitioner when he filed an Omnibus Motion on 19
May 2003, before the Sandiganbayan, asking that ‘the appointment of counsels de officio (sic) be
declared functus officio’ and that, being the now counsel de parte, he be notified of all subsequent
proceedings in Criminal Cases No. 26558, No. 26565 and No. 26905 pending therein. Finally,
Attorney Paguia asked that all the foregoing criminal cases against his client be
dismissed.

"During the hearing of the Omnibus Motion on 30 May 2003, petitioner presented to the
court several portions of the book, entitled ‘Reforming the Judiciary,’ written by Justice
Artemio Panganiban, to be part of the evidence for the defense. On 9 June 2003,
petitioner filed a motion pleading, among other things, that –

"a) x x x President Estrada be granted the opportunity to prove the ‘truth’ of the statements
contained in Justice Artemio Panganiban’s book, ‘REFORMING THE JUDICIARY,’ in relation to the
prejudgment committed by the Supreme Court justices against President Estrada in the subject
case/s of Estrada v. Arroyo, 353 SCRA 452 and 356 SCRA 108; and,

"b) A subpoena ad testificandum and duces tecum be issued to Justice Artemio

Panganiban, Justice Antonio Carpio, Justice Renato Corona, Secretary Angelo Reyes of
the Department of National Defense, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Senator
Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., and Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. for them to testify and bring
whatever supporting documents they may have in relation to their direct and indirect
participation in the proclamation of Vice President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on January
20, 2001, as cited in the book of Justice Panganiban, including the material events that led to that
proclamation and the ruling/s in the Estrada vs. Arroyo, supra.’ (Rollo, pp. 6-7.)

"The ‘truth’ referred to in paragraph a) of the relief sought in the motion of petitioner pertains to
what he claims should have been included in the resolution of the Sandiganbayan; viz:

‘The request of the movant is simply for the Court to include in its Joint Resolution the TRUTH of
the acts of Chief Justice Davide, et al., last January 20, 2001 in:

‘a) going to EDSA 2;

‘b) authorizing the proclamation of Vice-President Arroyo as President on the ground of
‘permanent disability’ even without proof of compliance with the corresponding
constitutional conditions, e.g., written declaration by either the President or majority of his
cabinet; and

‘c) actually proclaiming Vice-President Arroyo on that same ground of permanent

disability.

‘It is patently unreasonable for the Court to refuse to include these material facts which are
obviously undeniable. Besides, it is the only defense of President Estrada.’ (Petition, Rollo, pp.
13-14.)

"On 2 July 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued an order denying the foregoing motion, as
well as the motion to dismiss, filed by petitioner. Forthwith, petitioner filed a ‘Mosyong
Pangrekonsiderasyon’ of the foregoing order. According to Attorney Paguia, during the hearing
of his ‘Mosyong Pangrekonsiderasyon’ on 11 June 2003, the three justices of the Special
Division of the Sandiganbayan made manifest their bias and partiality against his client.
Thus, he averred, Presiding Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario supposedly employed foul and
disrespectful language when she blurted out, ‘Magmumukha naman kaming gago,’
(Rollo, p. 13.) and Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro characterized the motion as insignificant
even before the prosecution could file its comments or opposition thereto, (Rollo, p. 12.) remarking
in open court that to grant Estrada’s motion would result in chaos and disorder. (Ibid.)
Prompted by the alleged ‘bias and partial attitude’ of the Sandiganbayan justices,
Attorney Paguia filed, on 14 July 2003, a motion for their disqualification. On 31 July 2003,
petitioner received the two assailed resolutions, i.e., the resolution (Promulgated on 30 July 2003.)
of 28 July 2003, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of 6 July 2003; viz:

‘WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused-movant Joseph Ejercito Estrada’s ‘Mosyong

Pangrekonsiderasyon’ (Na tumutukoy sa Joint Resolution ng Hulyo 2, 2003) dated July 6, 2003 is
DENIED for lack of merit.’ (Rollo, p. 37.)

"and the resolution (Promulgated on 30 July 2003.) of 25 July 2003, denying petitioner’s motion for
disqualification of 14 July 2003; viz:

‘WHEREFORE, prescinding from all the foregoing, the Court, for want of merit, hereby DENIES
the Motion for Disqualification.’ (Rollo, p. 48.)

"The instant petition assailing the foregoing orders must be DISMISSED for gross
insufficiency in substance and for utter lack of merit. The Sandiganbayan committed no
grave abuse of discretion, an indispensable requirement to warrant a recourse to the
extraordinary relief of petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. On the one hand, petitioner would disclaim the authority and jurisdiction of the
members of this tribunal and, on the other hand, he would elevate the petition now before it to
challenge the two resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. He denounces the decision as being a patent
mockery of justice and due process. Attorney Pagula went on to state that-

‘The act of the public officer, if LAWFUL, is the act of the public office.1awp++i1 But the act of
the public officer, if UNLAWFUL, is not the act of the public office. Consequently, the act
of the justices, if LAWFUL, is the act of the Supreme Court. But the act of the justices, if
UNLAWFUL, is not the act of the Supreme Court. It is submitted that the Decision in ESTRADA vs.
ARROYO being patently unlawful in view of Rule 5.10 of the CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, is not
the act of the Supreme Court but is merely the wrong or trespass of those individual Justices who
falsely spoke and acted in the name of the Supreme Court. (Urbano vs. Chavez, 183 SCRA [347]).
Furthermore, it would seem absurd to allow the Justices to use the name of the Supreme Court as
a shield for their UNLAWFUL act.’ (Petition, Rollo, p. 11.)

"Criticism or comment made in good faith on the correctness or wrongness, soundness

or unsoundness, of a decision of the Court would be welcome for, if well-founded, such
reaction can enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if
committed. (In Re Sotto, 82 Phil 595.)

"The ruling in Estrada v. Arroyo, being a final judgment, has long put to end any question
pertaining to the legality of the ascension of Arroyo into the presidency. By reviving the issue on
the validity of the assumption of Mme. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to the presidency, Attorney Paguia
is vainly seeking to breathe life into the carcass of a long dead issue.

"Attorney Paguia has not limited his discussions to the merits of his client’s case within the judicial
forum; indeed, he has repeated his assault on the Court in both broadcast and print
media. Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a member of the bar
from making such public statements on any pending case tending to arouse public
opinion for or against a party. By his acts, Attorney Paguia may have stoked the fires of public
dissension and posed a potentially dangerous threat to the administration of justice.

"It is not the first time that Attorney Paguia has exhibited similar conduct towards the Supreme
Court. In a letter, dated 30 June 2003, addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., and
Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, he has demanded, in a clearly disguised form of forum
shopping, for several advisory opinions on matters pending before the Sandiganbayan. In a
resolution, dated 08 July 2003, this Court has strongly warned Attorney Alan Paguia, on pain of
disciplinary sanction, to desist from further making, directly or indirectly, similar submissions to this
Court or to its Members. But, unmindful of the well-meant admonition to him by the Court, Attorney
Paguia appears to persist on end.

"WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED, and the Court hereby orders
Attorney Alan Paguia, counsel for petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, to SHOW CAUSE, within ten
days from notice hereof, why he should not be sanctioned for conduct unbecoming a
lawyer and an officer of the Court."

On 10 October 2003, Atty. Paguia submitted his compliance with the show-cause order. In a
three-page pleading, Atty. Paguia, in an obstinate display of defiance, repeated his earlier
claim of political partisanship against the members of the Court.

Canon 5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which Atty. Paguia has tirelessly quoted to
give some semblance of validity for his groundless attack on the Court and its
members, provides -

"Rule 5.10. A judge is entitled to entertain personal views on political questions. But to avoid
suspicion of political partisanship, a judge shall not make political speeches, contribute to party
funds, publicly endorse candidates for political office or participate in other partisan political
activities."

Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code defines the term "partisan political activities;" the law
states:

"The term ‘election campaign’ or ‘partisan political activity’ refers to an act designed to promote the
election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office which shall include:

"(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons for the
purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate;

"(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies,
for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a
candidate.

"(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or against the
election of any candidate for public office;

"(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or oppose the
election of any candidate; or

"(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate."

It should be clear that the phrase "partisan political activities," in its statutory context, relates to
acts designed to cause the success or the defeat of a particular candidate or candidates who have
filed certificates of candidacy to a public office in an election. The taking of an oath of office by any
incoming President of the Republic before the Chief Justice of the Philippines is a traditional official
function of the Highest Magistrate. The assailed presence of other justices of the Court at such an
event could be no different from their appearance in such other official functions as attending the
Annual State of the Nation Address by the President of the Philippines before the Legislative
Department.

The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; it will not denounce criticism made by anyone
against the Court for, if well-founded, can truly have constructive effects in the task of the Court,
but it will not countenance any wrongdoing nor allow the erosion of our people’s faith in the judicial
system, let alone, by those who have been privileged by it to practice law in the
Philippines.1âwphi1

Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that the lawyer should observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers and, indeed, should insist on similar
conduct by others. In liberally imputing sinister and devious motives and questioning the
impartiality, integrity, and authority of the members of the Court, Atty. Paguia has only succeeded
in seeking to impede, obstruct and pervert the dispensation of justice.

The attention of Atty. Paguia has also been called to the mandate of Rule 13.02 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibiting a member of the bar from
making such public statements on a case that may tend to arouse public
opinion for or against a party. Regrettably, Atty. Paguia has persisted in
ignoring the Court’s well-meant admonition.

On the 7th September 2003 issue of the Daily Tribune, Atty. Paguia wrote to say -

"What is the legal effect of that violation of President Estrada’s right to due process
of law? It renders the decision in Estrada vs. Arroyo unconstitutional and void. The
rudiments of fair play were not observed. There was no fair play since it appears
that when President Estrada filed his petition, Chief Justice Davide and his fellow
justices had already committed to the other party - GMA - with a judgment already
made and waiting to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the
charade of a formal hearing. After the justices had authorized the proclamation of
GMA as president, can they be expected to voluntarily admit the
unconstitutionality of their own act?"

Unrelentingly, Atty. Paguia has continued to make public statements of like nature.

The Court has already warned Atty. Paguia, on pain of disciplinary sanction, to become mindful of
his grave responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court. Apparently, he has chosen not
to at all take heed.

WHEREFORE, Attorney Alan Paguia is hereby indefinitely suspended from the practice
of law, effective upon his receipt hereof, for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the
Court.
Kupers v Hontanosas, 587 SCRA 325, (2009)

TINGA, J.:

This administrative case against respondent Atty. Johnson B. Hontanosas was triggered by
a letter-complaint1 dated April 15, 2002 of complainant Willem Kupers to the Court through
the Court Administrator. The Court Administrator referred the letter to the Bar Confidant on
April 25, 2002.2 On May 7, 2002, the Acting Bar Confidant wrote complainant that for the court to
take cognizance of an administrative case against a lawyer, a verified complaint must be filed in
nineteen (19) copies together with supporting documents.3 Thus, complainant was told to submit
an additional thirteen (13) copies of his complaint. On May 25, 2002, complainant complied and
submitted an additional thirteen (13) copies of his complaint.

Complainant alleged that respondent4 had: (1) prepared and notarized contracts that
are both invalid and illegal as these contracts violated the limitations on aliens leasing
private lands; (2) served conflicting interests since he performed legal services for
adverse parties; (3) refused to furnish copies of the contracts he notarized to the
parties thereof; (4) notarized documents without keeping copies thereof and (5) failed
to properly discharge his duty to his client Karl Novak, particularly when respondent
allegedly refused to accept his dismissal as counsel for Novak, failed to turn over Novak's
documents thereafter, handled legal matters without adequate preparation, betrayed
Novak's trust and refused to see Novak with a translator of Novak's choice.

Complainant claimed that as counsel for Hans and Vivian Busse, respondent had
prepared a memorandum of agreement and a contract of lease between the spouses
Busse and Hochstrasser, a Swiss national. Under said agreement, Hochstrasser would lease
Vivian Busse's property in Alcoy, Cebu for fifty (50) years, renewable for another fifty (50)
years.5 Complainant added that respondent had acted despite conflict of interest on his
part since the Spouses Busse and Hochstrasser were both his clients. Respondent
prepared a similar agreement and lease contract between the spouses Busse and Karl
Emberger, a Swiss national, over another parcel of land in Alcoy, Cebu. This time the lease
contract was for a period of forty nine (49) years renewable for another forty nine (49)
years.6 All four (4) documents were notarized by respondent. It was also averred that
respondent drafted two deeds of sale over the leased properties of Spouses Busse to Naomie
Melchior, a Filipina, and Karl Novak, a German National.

The Court required respondent to comment on the charges.7 He answered that if anyone should be
penalized, it should be respondent for meddling in the affairs of his clients and
otherwise making a mockery of the Philippine legal system by deceitfully passing as
material facts opinionated, baseless and false allegations as well as a falsified
document.8 Respondent also moved that complainant be made to show cause why he
should not be cited for contempt.

Complainant filed a reply on November 6, 2002, in which he stated among other things that
respondent is like Pontius Pilatus [sic].9

On February 10, 2003, the Court resolved to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.10

In lieu of hearings, Commissioner Doroteo Aguila required the parties to file their respective
memoranda due to the limited time period given by the Court. The parties did. The Commissioner
found that respondent had prepared and notarized contracts that violated Presidential
Decree No. 471 (P.D. No. 471) since leases of private lands by aliens cannot exceed
twenty five (25) years, renewable for another twenty five (25) years.11 Nonetheless,
complainant failed to prove the other charges he had hurled against respondent as the former was
not privy to the agreements between respondent and the latter's clients. Moreover, complainant
failed to present any concrete proof of the other charges. The commissioner
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2)
months.

Upon review, the IBP Board of Governors disregarded the recommendation of the commissioner
and dismissed the complaint on February 27, 2004.12 The Board of Governors ratiocinated that
suspension was not warranted since respondent did not really perform an illegal act. The act was
not illegal per se since the lease agreement was likely made to reflect the agreement among the
parties without considering the legality of the situation. While admittedly respondent may be guilty
of ignorance of the law or plain negligence, the Board dismissed the complaint out of
compassion.

We reject the Board's recommendation. We stress that much is demanded from those who engage
in the practice of law because they have a duty not only to their clients, but also to the
court, to the bar, and to the public.13 The lawyer's diligence and dedication to his work and
profession ideally should not only promote the interests of his clients. A lawyer has the duty to
attain the ends of justice by maintaining respect for the legal profession.14

The investigating commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors both found that the majority of
the charges against the respondent lack proof. Our own review of the records confirms that
most of the charges are unsupported by evidence. Such charges are simply the
unsubstantiated accusations in the complaint with nary a whit of concrete proof such as affidavits
of the clients whose trust respondents had allegedly breached.

However, administrative cases against lawyers are sui generes and as such the complainant
in the case need not be the aggrieved party. Thus even if complainant is not a party to the
contracts, the charge of drafting and notarizing contracts in contravention of law
holds weight. A plain reading of these contracts clearly shows that they violate the law limiting
lease of private lands to aliens for a period of twenty five (25) years renewable for another twenty
five (25) years.

In his defense, respondent avers that the assailed contracts are valid under Republic Act No. 7652
(R.A. No. 7652), entitled "An Act Allowing The Long-Term Lease of Private Lands by Foreign
Investors." They add that these contracts should not be viewed purely as lease contracts since they
allow the leasor to nominate a Filipino citizen or corporation to purchase the subject property within
the lease period. Respondent's defenses are frivolous. Assuming that it can be duly established that
his foreign clients are indeed "foreign investors" as contemplated under R.A. No. 7652,15 said law
allows the lease for the original period of fifty (50) years, renewable for another period of twenty
five (25) years, well below the periods of fifty (50) years renewable for another fifty (50) years, and
forty-nine (49) years renewable for another forty-nine (49) years respectively, stipulated in the two
lease agreements.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

Respondent, by drafting the questioned lease agreements, caused his clients to violate
Section 7 of R.A. No. 7652 which states:

Sec. 7. Penal Provision. ' Any contract or agreement made or executed in violation of any of the
following prohibited acts shall be null and void ab initio and both contracting parties shall be
punished by a fine of not less than One Hundred thousand pesos (P100,000) nor more than One
million pesos (P1,000,000), or imprisonment of six (6) months to (6) years, or both, at the
discretion of the court:

(1) Any provision in the lease agreement stipulating a lease period in excess of
that provided in paragraph (1) of Section 4;

(2) Use of the leased premises for the purpose contrary to existing laws of the land,
public order, public policy, morals, or good customs;

(3) Any agreement or agreements resulting is the lease of land in excess of the
area approved by the DTI: Provided, That, where the excess of the totality of the
area leased is due to the acts of the lessee, the lessee shall be held solely liable
therefor: Provided, further, That, in the case of corporations, associations, or
partnerships, the president, manager, director, trustee, or officers responsible for
the violation hereof shall bear the criminal liability. (Emphasis ours)

In preparing and notarizing the illegal lease contracts, respondent violated the
Attorney's Oath and several canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility. One of
the foremost sworn duties of an attorney-at-law is to "obey the laws of the Philippines."
This duty is enshrined in the Attorney's Oath16 and in Canon 1, which provides that "(a) lawyer shall
uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes." Rule 1.02 under Canon 1 states: "A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at decreasing confidence in the legal systems."

The other canons of professional responsibility which respondent transgressed are the following:

CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN

ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.

xxx

Rule 15.07 - A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of
hairness.

CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE

SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

Aside from constituting violation of the lawyer's oath, the acts of respondents also amount to gross
misconduct under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. ― A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct,
or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as
an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. x x x

The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously
affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. While we will not hesitate
to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers, where the evidence calls
for it, we will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.

We cannot accept, however, the plea of leniency expressed by the IBP Board of Governors in behalf
of respondent. We also find that the suspension for two (2) months recommended by the IBP
Investigating Commissioner too light. We find six (6) months suspension to be a sufficient sanction
against respondent.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Johnson B. Hontanosas, is found GUILTY of violating the

lawyer's oath and gross misconduct. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months
with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Respondent's suspension is effective upon notice hereof. Let notice of this Resolution be spread in
respondent's record as an attorney in this Court, and notice of the same served on the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts
concerned.
Stemmerik v Mas (review)

Complainant Keld Stemmerik is a citizen and resident of Denmark. In one of his trips to the
Philippines, he was introduced to respondent Atty. Leonuel N. Mas. That was his misfortu
After the various contracts and agreements were executed, complainant tried to get in
touch with respondent to inquire about when the property could be registered in his
name. However, respondent suddenly became scarce and refused to answer
complainant's calls and e-mail... messages.
When complainant visited the Philippines again in January 2005, he engaged the services
of the Jimenez Gonzales Liwanag Bello Valdez Caluya & Fernandez Law Office to
ascertain the status of the property he supposedly bought. He was devastated to learn
that aliens could... not own land under Philippine laws. Moreover, verification at the
Community Environment & Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources in Olongapo City revealed that the property was
inalienable as it was situated within the former
US Military Reservation.[5] The CENRO also stated that the property was not subject to
disposition or acquisition under Republic Act No. 14
Complainant filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent in the Commission on
Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP.[9] He deplored respondent's acts of serious misconduct.
In particular, he sought the expulsion of respondent from the legal profession for...
gravely misrepresenting that a foreigner could legally acquire land in the Philippines
and for maliciously absconding with complainant's P3.8 million.[10]
The CBD ruled that respondent used his position as a lawyer to mislead complainant on
the matter of land ownership by a foreigner.[12] He even went through the motion of
preparing falsified and fictitious contracts, deeds and agreements. And for all these...
shameless acts, he collected P400,000 from complainant. Worse, he pocketed the P3.8 million and
absconded with it.[13]
The CBD found respondent to be "nothing more than an embezzler" who misused his
professional status as an attorney as a tool for deceiving complainant and absconding with
complainant's money.[14] Respondent was dishonest and deceitful. He abused the trust...
and confidence reposed by complainant in him. The CBD recommended the disbarment of
respondent.[15]
Issues:
We shall first address a threshold issue: was respondent properly given notice of the disbarment
proceedings against him? Yes.
Ruling:
Lawyers, as members of a noble profession, have the duty to promote respect for the
law and uphold the integrity of the bar. As men and women entrusted with the law, they must
ensure that the law functions to protect liberty and not as an instrument of oppression
or... deception.
Respondent, in giving advice that directly contradicted a fundamental constitutional
policy, showed disrespect for the Constitution and gross ignorance of basic law. Worse,
he prepared spurious documents that he knew were void and illegal.
By making it appear that de Mesa undertook to sell the property to complainant and that de Mesa
thereafter sold the property to Gonzales who made the purchase for and in behalf of complainant,
he falsified public documents and knowingly violated the Anti-Dummy Law.[26]
Respondent's misconduct did not end there. By advising complainant that a foreigner could
legally and validly acquire real estate in the Philippines and by assuring complainant
that the property was alienable, respondent deliberately foisted a falsehood on his
client. He did not... give due regard to the trust and confidence reposed in him by complainant.
Instead, he deceived complainant and misled him into parting with P400,000 for services that were
both illegal and unprofessional. Moreover, by pocketing and misappropriating the P3.8
million given by... complainant for the purchase of the property, respondent committed a
fraudulent act that was criminal in nature.
Respondent spun an intricate web of lies. In the process, he committed unethical act after
unethical act, wantonly violating laws and professional standards.
A lawyer who resorts to nefarious schemes to circumvent the law and uses his legal knowledge to
further his selfish ends to the great prejudice of others, poses a clear and present danger to the
rule of law and to the legal system. He does not only tarnish the image of the bar... and degrade
the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, he also betrays everything that the legal profession
stands for.
It is respondent and his kind that give lawyering a bad name and make laymen support Dick the
Butcher's call, "Kill all lawyers!"[27] A disgrace to their professional brethren, they must be purged
from the bar.

Apolinar-Metilo v Maramot AC No 9067 (31 January 2018)

BERSAMIN, J.:

A lawyer is a disciple of truth because he swore upon his admission to the Bar that he would do no
falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court, and that he would conduct himself as a lawyer
according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as
to his clients. His violation of the Lawyer's Oath through the commission of falsehood can be
condignly sanctioned.

Antecedents

In her complaint-affidavit,1 complainant Marjorie A. Apolinar-Petilo (Marjorie) alleges that

the respondent consented to, abetted and participated in the illegal act of falsifying a
public document in violation of Article 171(4) in relation to Article 172(2) of
the Revised Penal Code; and that he thereby violated the Lawyer's Oath, Rules 1.01
and 1.02 of Canon 1 and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

The public document in question was the deed of donation2 executed in favor of Princess
Anne Apolinar-Petilo (Princess Anne) and Ma. Mommayda V. Apolinar (Mommayda)
who were only 12 years old and 16 1/2 years old, respectively, at the time of its
execution.3 Asserting that the respondent had known of the minority of the donees, Marjorie
insists that he was thereby guilty of falsification first in his capacity as a lawyer by
preparing the deed of donation and indicating therein that both donees were then "of
legal age"; and as a notary public by notarizing the document. She claims that he, being
Mommayda's counsel in the latter's adoption case, was aware of the untruthful
statements he made in the deed of donation because he thereafter submitted the deed
of donation as evidence therein.4

In his answer, the respondent states that Margarita Apolinar (Margarita) and her sister-in-law
Justina Villanueva-Apolinar (Justina) went to his law office sometime in 2000; that Margarita was
a grandaunt who owned a parcel of land in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro that she wanted
to donate to Princess Anne, Marjorie's own daughter, and Mommayda, the adopted
daughter of Justina; that upon learning of Princess Anne's minority, he advised that she had to
be represented by either parent;5 that not one to be easily turned down, Margarita persisted,
and prevailed over him; that he thereupon prepared the deed of donation but left the date, the
document number and page number blank; that he reserved the notarization for later after
the parties had signed the document; that he allowed Margarita to bring the deed of
donation to Manila where she was supposedly proceeding in order to procure the
signature of Princess Anne thereon and as a way of avoiding additional travel
expenses; and that Justina had mentioned to him at the time that Margarita was then
suffering from colon cancer and had only a little time to live.

The respondent recalled that a month afterwards Margarita and Justina returned to him with the
signed deed of donation; that he then noticed that the document did not bear the
signatures of Princess Anne's parents; that Margarita again offered to procure the
signatures on the document; and that Margarita and Justina did not anymore return
with the document until the time when he had to enter the instrument in his notarial
book for his monthly report.
Margarita eventually died on April 13, 2003. Later on, with issues about her properties left
unresolved, the relationship among her relatives quickly turned sour, and the deed of
donation again came to the fore. In 2004, Justina and her husband Tomas went to see the
respondent and confided to him that they were entangled in a court battle with Marjorie, their niece,
over Margarita's properties, including the apartment in Manila where they had been occupying
since 1980. They then learned from the respondent that because Mommayda's birth
certificate had been simulated, they needed to legally adopt her in order to enable her
to inherit from them. Hence, they filed a petition for the adoption of Mommayda,
which did not sit well with Marjorie.

Claiming that her successional rights as a niece or heir to Tomas vis-a-vis would be
adversely affected by the adoption of Mommayda, Marjorie vigorously opposed the
petition for adoption, and argued for its dismissal on the basis that Tomas and Justina
were not morally capable of adoption as shown by their simulation of the birth of
Mommayda. Marjorie also brought several criminal cases in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
on the ground of the simulation of the birth and falsification of the birth certificate of
Mommayda in violation of Articles 347, 359, 183 and 184 of the Revised Penal Code.

Marjorie's opposition to the petition for adoption and her criminal charges were dismissed.
Also dismissed were her opposition to the petition of Tomas and Justina for the correction of entry
in Mommayda's birth certificate, as well as Marjorie's motion to recall the social worker for cross
examination in the adoption case. The respondent claims that Marjorie -exasperated and
dissatisfied with the outcome - then turned against him and instituted the complaint for his
disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.6

The respondent submits that there was nothing illegal in the deed of donation; that as
the sole owner of the donated land, Margarita had an absolute right to dispose of her
property by donation; that no law prohibited donations to minors; and that the filing of
the petition for judicial partition was an express if not implied ratification of the defect
in the donation; and that in regard to the submission of the simulated birth certificate
in evidence, the purpose of filing the petition for adoption was to rectify the simulation
and to convert the relationship between Mommayda and her adopting parents into a
legal one.7

During the mandatory conference set by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on
Bar Discipline, Marjorie admitted that a petition for judicial partition involving the
donated land was meanwhile filed; that a compromise agreement8 was reached; and
that Princess Anne sold her share to Mommayda.9

In his position paper,10 the respondent asserts that the complaint was pure harassment calculated
only to besmirch and malign his reputation; and that the complaint was also a premeditated
tactic to prolong or pre-empt the adoption case considering that a favorable ruling thereat would
adversely affect Marjorie's rights as an heir of Mommayda's parents.

In his resolution dated May 22, 2008,11 the IBP Commissioner recommended that:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the undersigned

Commissioner finds respondent Atty. Aristedes A. Maramot to have violated
the Notarial Law, his act having undermined the confidence of the
public on notarial documents; and, respectfully recommends his
suspension from notarial practice for a period of one (1) year while the
other complaints against him are recommended dismissed for lack of
merit.12

In his motion for reconsideration,13 the respondent submitted that he did not employ any falsity
because it was only Margarita - the donor - who had in fact attested to the execution of the deed of
donation in the notarial acknowledgement of the deed of donation; that it was inconsequential
even if Princess Anne had signed the deed of donation not in his presence; that in conveyances,
only the person encumbering or conveying needed to personally appear, sign and acknowledge the
deed before the notary public; and that Princess Anne and Mommayda's names were placed in the
document merely for them to accept the donation.

The respondent pleads for the mitigation of his liability considering that he has exhibited candor in
admitting his offense. He represents that his act was not gross enough as to justify suspension;
that the complainant had thereby suffered no damage, but had actually benefitted from the act;
that he had notarized in good faith; and that with this offense being his first in his 12 years as a law
practitioner and as notary public, humanitarian considerations should be considered in his favor
because he had children to support and had been his family's sole bread winner.

In her comment on the respondent's motion for reconsideration,14 Majorie avers that Princess Anne
could not have signed the instrument in Manila because her daughter was then studying in Victoria,
Oriental Mindoro.

In Resolution No. XVII-2008-337 dated July 17, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the report and recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline, but modified the
penalty by recommending the immediate revocation of the respondent's notarial commission and
his disqualification from reappointment as a notary for two years, thus:15

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and

APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and for Respondent's
violation of the Notarial Law, Atty. Aristedes Maramot is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, immediate
Revocation of his Notarial Commission if presently Commissioned and Disqualified
from reappointment as Notary Public for Two (2) years.16

The IBP Board of Governors denied the respondent's motion for reconsideration through Resolution
No. XIX-2011-424 dated June 26, 2011,17 thus:

RESOLVED to unanimously DENY Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, there

being no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Board and it being a mere
reiteration of the matters which had already been threshed out and taken into
consideration. Thus, for lack of substantial ground or reason to disturb it, the
Board of Governors' Resolution No. XVIII-2008-337 dated July 17, 2008 is
hereby AFFIRMED.18

On September 6, 2011, the respondent filed in this Court his Comment on the IBP Board of
Governor's Resolution No. XVII-2008-337 and No. XIX-2011-424 dated August 16, 2011.19

In its Report dated June 27, 2012,20 the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended to treat the
comment as a petition for review.

On February 15, 2012, the respondent filed an amended comment dated December 5, 2011.21

On July 23, 2012, the Court resolved: (1) to direct the respondent to furnish the IBP a copy of his
amended comment and submit proof of its service within ten (10) days; and (2) to require the
complainant to file her comment thereon within 15 days from receipt.22

Accordingly, the complaint submitted her comment on November 9, 2012, opposing the
respondent's prayer for reconsideration and asking the Court to uphold the Resolutions of the IBP
Board of Governors.

Ruling of the Court

We affirm the Resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors.

A.
As a Lawyer

Every lawyer before entering his duties and responsibilities as a member of the Bar and an officer
of the Court, professes as a natural course the promises contained in the Lawyer's Oath, to wit:

I do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the

Philippines, I will support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor
 consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or
sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I
will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well
to the courts as to my clients, and I impose upon myself these voluntary
obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
(Emphasis supplied)

The letter and spirit of the Lawyer's Oath are oftentimes forgotten or taken for granted in the
course of the lawyer's practice of law. To give teeth thereto, the Court has adopted and instituted
the Code of Professional Responsibility to govern every lawyer's relationship with his profession,
the courts, the society, and his clients.

Pertinent in this case are Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of Canon 1; and Rule 10.1 of Canon 10, which
provide:

CANON 1 - x x x

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the
law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

CANON 10 - x x x

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

The respondent prepared the deed of donation. At the time of his preparation of the document, he
actually knew that Princess Anne was a minor; hence, his claim of having then advised that
her parents should represent her in the execution of the document. Mommayda was
likewise a minor. His awareness of the latter's minority at the time was not disputed because he
was also representing Mommayda in the latter's adoption proceedings aside from being
Mommayda's neighbor. Nonetheless, he still indicated in the deed of donation that the donees were
of legal age. His doing so, being undeniably dishonest, was contrary to his oath as a lawyer not to
utter a falsehood. He thereby consciously engaged in an unlawful and dishonest conduct, defying
the law and contributing to the erosion of confidence in the Law Profession.

The respondent's explanation that it was only Margarita who actually acknowledged that the deed
of donation was her own free act and deed does not extricate him from responsibility. The deed of
donation, whether or not acknowledged by the donees, should not bear any false statement upon a
material fact. The ages of the donees were material because they bore on their capacities to render
the donation efficacious. That neither Princess Anne nor Mommayda acknowledged the deed of
donation did not cure the defect.

The respondent justifies himself by stating that the persistence of the donor Margarita prevailed
upon him to prepare the deed of donation as he had done; and adverts to the donor's assurance
that she would herself procure the signatures of the parents of Princess Anne on the document. He
also submits that the execution of the deed had redounded to the advantage of the minors; and
that there was no law that prohibited the donation in favor of minors.

The respondent cannot be relieved by his justifications and submissions. As a lawyer, he should not
invoke good faith and good intentions as sufficient to excuse him from discharging his obligation to
be truthful and honest in his professional actions. His duty and responsibility in that regard were
clear and unambiguous. In Young v. Batuegas,23 this Court reminded that truthfulness and honesty
had the highest value for attorneys, thus:

A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his admission to the Bar that
he will do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court and he shall
conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion
with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients. He should bear in mind
that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon
 the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at
correct conclusion. The courts, on the other hand, are entitled to expect only
complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them. While a
lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his client's rights and is expected to display
the utmost zeal in defense of his client's cause, his conduct must never be at the
expense of truth.24

The respondent posits that a donation could be made in favor of a minor. Such position was not a
factor, however, because whether or not a minor could benefit from the donation did not determine
the merits of the complaint for his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law. Neither was
his claim that the filing of the petition for judicial partition amounted to the ratification of the deed
of donation a factor to be considered in his favor. The decisive consideration is whether or not he
committed a falsehood in his preparation of the deed of donation. Sadly for him, the answer is in
the affirmative.

Relative to the respondent's submission of the false birth certificate of Mommayda in the
proceedings for her adoption, we adopt with approval the following findings and recommendation
made by the IBP Commissioner absolving the respondent, viz.:

The Certificate of Live Birth of Ma. Mommayda Villanueva Apolinar is certainly a

simulated one where it was made to appear that she was the biological child of
Spouses Tomas V. Apolinar and Justina P. Villanueva when she was not. It was not
shown, however, that respondent has a hand when its contents were given to the
employee of the Local Civil Registrar of Victoria, Mindoro Oriental. From the face of
the document, it appears that Tomas Apolinar himself gave the details and he
signed the Certificate of Live concerned.

When the respondent used the document in the adoption case of Ma. Mommayda
Villanueva Apolinar by the Spouses Tomas and Justina Apolinar (docketed as Spec.
Proc. No. R-04-5396, RTC, Branch 40, Calapan City, Mindoro Oriental), the
respondent did not misrepresent that Ma. Mommayda V. Apolinar is the biological
daughter of the petitioners. In fact, there was nothing that was misrepresented in
the allegations in the petition. This led to the filing of another case for the
correction of entry in the birth certificate of the same Ma. Mommayda V. Apolinar
docketed as Spec. proc. CV-05-5445. It was alleged therein that Leini Villanueva
Guerrero and Johnny Ortega are the biological parents of Ma. Mommayda
Apolinar.25

B.
As a Notary Public

The respondent is also being hereby charged with having executed the notarial acknowledgment
for the deed of donation despite Princess Anne not having actually appeared before him.

The respondent explains that he did not employ any falsity or dishonesty, and that he did not make
untruthful statements in executing the notarial acknowledgment.

In this respect, the IBP Commissioner observed that:

It cannot be denied that the respondent violated the Notarial Law when he, by his
own admission, notarized the Deed of Donation which was signed by at least one
of the parties, namely: the donee, Princess Anne Petilo, who signed not in the
presence of the Notary Public but somewhere in Metro Manila. This fact the
respondent has admitted in his Answer (records, P. 22 Statement of Facts, par. 3).
For this reason, notaries public are once again reminded to observe with utmost
care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the
confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be
undermined. Hence a notary public should not notarized a document unless the
persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and
personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are
stated therein (Serzo vs. Flores, A.C. No. 6040 [formerly CBD 02-972, July 30,
2004] citing Fulgencio v. Martin, 403, 403 SCRA 216, 2200221).26
The IBP Commissioner obviously rendered his foregoing observations on the assumption that
Princess Anne had herself acknowledged the instrument not in the presence of the respondent as
the Notary Public. But, as borne out by the acknowledgment, only Margarita's name was indicated
as the person appearing before the respondent during the notarization of the instrument, to wit:

BEFORE ME, on the date and at the place afore-cited personally

appeared Margarita V. Apolinarwith her CTC indicated below her name and
signature, issued at Victoria, Oriental Mindoro, all known to me the same person
who executed the foregoing instrument and she acknowledged to me that the
same is her own free act and deed (Emphasis supplied)27

Nonetheless, the respondent's denial of having employed any falsity or dishonesty, or of making
untruthful statements in executing the notarial acknowledgment does not necessarily save the day
for him. There is no question that a donation can be accepted in a separate instrument. However,
the deed of donation in question was also the same instrument that apparently contained the
acceptance.28 The names of Princess Anne and Mommayda as the donees, even if still minors,
should have been included in the notarial acknowledgment of the deed itself; and, in view of their
minority, the names of their respective parents (or legal guardians) assisting them should have also
been indicated thereon. This requirement was not complied with. Moreover, Princess Anne and
Mommayda should have also signed the deed of donation themselves along with their assisting
parents or legal guardians.

The omission indicated that the deed of donation was not complete. Hence, the notarial
acknowledgment of the deed of donation was improper. Rule II Section 1 of the Rules on Notarial
Practice provides that:

SECTION 1. Acknowledgment. - "Acknowledgment" refers to an act in which an

individual on a single occasion:

(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an

integrally complete instrument or document; x x x x

We cannot approve of the recommended penalty of suspension for one year. The circumstances
peculiar to the complaint call for lenity in favor of the respondent, but who must nonetheless be
sternly warned against a repetition of the offense at the risk of suffering a more stringent penalty.
We hold that the penalties commensurate to the offense is suspension from the practice of law for
six months.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. ARISTEDES

MARAMOT guilty of violating the Lawyer's Oath, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of Canon 1 and Rule 10.01 of
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Rules on Notarial
Practice; SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for six months effective from notice of this
decision, with revocation of his notarial commission and disqualification from being re-appointed as
Notary Public for two years effective upon receipt; and warns him of a more stringent penalty upon
repetition of the offense.

Philippine Investments One (SPV-AMC) v Lomeda, AC No 11351 (14 August 2019)

PER CURIAM:

For our resolution is an Affidavit-Complaint1 filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) by Philippine Investment One (complainant) through its
General Manager, Carlos Gaudencio M. Manalac, against Atty. Aurelio Jesus V. Lomeda
(respondent) for violating Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

Factual Antecedents

This administrative case is rooted from a purported accommodation mortgage among Big "N"
Corporation (Big "N") as accommodation mortgagor, Lantaka Distributors Corporation (Lantaka) as
accommodated party, and United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) as mortgagee.2 This mortgage
came about by virtue of the transaction documents submitted by respondent to UCPB, which
include a purported Memorandum of Agreement3 between Lantaka and Big "N", the owner's copy
of the title4 over the townhouses owned by Big "N" and a notarized Secretary's Certificate5 issued
by respondent which reads as follows:
I, AURELIO JV LOMEDA, in my capacity as Corporate Secretary of Big N
Corporation, a private corporation organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines, x x x, hereby CERTIFY that:

During the meeting of the stockholders of the Corporation held on July 28, 2006 at
which a quorum was present, the following Resolutions were approved and
adopted, to wit:

"RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, that the Corporation's real property and all
improvements existing thereon and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
124230 of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City be made the subject of a real
estate mortgage under prevailing bank rates;"

"RESOLVED FURTHER, to authorize, as it hereby authorizes, EDGAR ARGOSINO

NANES, to sign, for and on behalf of the Corporation, any and all deeds of
mortgage and other relevant documents in connection with the real estate
mortgage;" and

"RESOLVED FINALLY, that any and all transactions entered into by Edgar Argosino
Nanes for and on behalf of the Corporation in connection with the real estate
mortgage be acknowledged, as they are hereby acknowledged, as transactions of
the Corporation."

The foregoing Resolutions have not been repealed or amended in any manner as
of the date hereof and may be relied upon for any and all legal intents and
purposes.

Thus, secured by the said mortgage, UCPB extended a credit line worth P10,000,000.00 to Lantaka.
Said real estate mortgage was annotated on the title of the mortgaged properties.7

After some time, UCPB assigned to complainant all its rights over Lantaka's credit line, which was
purportedly secured by Big "N"'s mortgage.8

In an unexpected turn of events, however, Big "N" filed a civil case for Declaration of Nullity of
Memorandum of Agreement, Secretary's Certificate, Real Estate Mortgage, and Cancellation of
Encumbrance on TCT No. 124230; Declaration of Nullity of Sale; Delivery of the Owner's Copy of
TCT No. 124230; and Damages against Lantaka, a certain Ric Raymund F. Palanca (Palanca) of
Lantaka, UCPB, and herein complainant and respondent, among others.9

Succinctly, in the said civil case, Big "N" alleged that it was not privy to any agreement as regards
accommodating Lantaka for UCPB to extend a credit line to the latter. Big "N" also alleged that the
Secretary's Certificate which was the basis of the accommodation mortgage was null and void as
the person who executed the same, herein respondent, "is not, was not, and has never been" the
corporate secretary of Big "N". According to Big "N," the company never knew who respondent was.
Hence, he could not have bound Big "N" to any contract. Neither was there any truth as to the
content of the said Secretary's Certificate as Big "N" emphatically denied having passed any
resolution as stated therein.10

On March 21, 2012, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 88, issued a Judgment
Based on Compromise11 in the said civil case, wherein it approved the Compromise
Agreement12 between Big "N" and herein respondent. In the said Compromise Agreement,
respondent admitted that he is not, was not, and has never been a corporate secretary of Big "N,"
and that he has no authority to issue a Secretary's Certificate on behalf of Big "N." Respondent also
explained therein that said document was prepared by and was part of Palanca's ploy; that he was
also a victim thereof as he was merely used as a tool to perpetrate the said ploy. Satisfied with the
explanation, Big "N" agreed to drop the case against respondent as agreed upon in the
Compromise Agreement.

Respondent's admission of his actions in the Compromise Agreement prompted herein complainant
to file this administrative case. Complainant argues that respondent's admission that the
statements in the Secretary's Certificate that he executed were not true, which were material to the
damage and prejudice caused to complainant, makes him liable criminally and administratively. It is
constitutive of a criminal act, i.e., falsification and/or estafa. It also constitutes as malpractice in
violation of his oath as a lawyer.13

Mandatory conferences were set by the IBP-CBD and the parties were directed to submit their
respective briefs with regard to the complaint. Notably, respondent never responded and
participated in the proceedings despite adequate and repeated notices.14

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

In its Report and Recommendation15 dated February 17, 2015, the IBP-CBD found respondent to
have engaged in an unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct in knowingly executing a
falsified Secretary's Certificate and having it notarized, which document became instrumental in
facilitating an obligation amounting to P10,000,000.00. The IBP-CBD also considered respondent's
unjustified refusal to participate in the proceedings, the gravity of the wrongful act done, and the
damage caused by his actions in recommending the penalty of one year suspension from the
practice of law.

In its Resolution No. XXI-2015-386,16 the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board) adopted and
approved the IBP-CBD's Report and Recommendation with modification to the penalty, viz.:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A", considering Respondent's violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility in relation to Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court. Thus, Respondent Atty. Aurelio Jesus V. Lomeda is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years.
No motion for reconsideration or petition for review was thereafter filed.

The Ruling of the Court

The IBP's findings are well-taken but we find it proper to modify its recommendation as to the
penalty.

Time and again, this Court has ruled that any misconduct or wrongdoing of a lawyer, indicating
unfitness for the profession justifies disciplinary action because good character is an essential and
continuing qualification for the practice of law.17

The CPR is emphatic in its provisions with regard to the high moral standards required in the legal
profession. The following provisions of the CPR are relevant, viz.:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF
THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Further, the lawyer's oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also to
refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court.18

In this case, respondent patently transgressed the lawyer's oath and the CPR by knowingly
misrepresenting himself as the corporate secretary of Big "N", executing a Secretary's Certificate
containing false statements, and knowingly allowing himself to be used in perpetrating fraud to the
prejudice of Big "N", which likewise resulted to the prejudice of herein complainant. These acts
were admitted by respondent, which admission was recognized by the trial court in its Judgment
Based on Compromise19 in the civil case filed by Big "N." Notably, respondent never questioned
said Judgment Based on Compromise.

We find the excuse given by respondent for his action, i.e., it was Palanca who prepared the
document, and that he was merely a victim and used as a tool in Palanca's ploy and scheme,
disturbing and unacceptable. The stubborn fact remains that, for whatever reason, he knowingly
executed a falsified document and made himself be used in his legal capacity to perpetrate a
deceptive ploy to the prejudice of Big "N". It must be stressed that the CPR exacted from him not
only a firm respect for the law and legal processes, but also the utmost degree of good faith in all
his professional and even personal dealings.

Worse, not only did respondent assist and became instrumental in perpetrating an activity which
was aimed at deceiving others and defying the law, he likewise displayed utter disrespect to, and
disregard of the authority of the Court. Despite several notices, respondent never bothered to
comply with the IBP's order for him to participate in the proceedings of this administrative case. By
his repeated dismissive conduct, the respondent exhibited an unpardonable lack of respect for the
authority of the Court. The Court cannot turn a blind eye on this matter because it reflected
respondent's undisguised contempt of the proceedings of the IBP, a body that the Court has
invested with the authority to investigate this administrative case against him. It cannot be
overemphasized that more than anyone who has dealings with the court and its duly constituted
authorities like the IBP, a lawyer has the bounden duty to comply with his/her lawful orders.
Section 27,20 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, provides that a member of the bar may be disbarred
or suspended from practice of law for willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
among other grounds.

Undoubtedly, these established factual circumstances warrant this Court's exercise of its
disciplinary authority. This Court cannot overstress the duty of the members of the Bar to, at all
times, uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The ethics of the legal profession
rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of truthfulness and nobility in the course of
their practice of law. If the lawyer falls short of this standard, the Court will not hesitate to
discipline the lawyer by imposing an appropriate penalty based on the exercise of sound judicial
discretion.21 Clearly, in this case, respondent failed to uphold such ethical standard in his practice
of law.

What is more, respondent's culpability is further aggravated by the fact that, when he was still
serving in the Judiciary as a Judge, he was severely sanctioned by the Court in A.M. No.
MTJ-90-400 entitled Moroño v. Judge Lomeda.22 In the said case, respondent was found guilty of:
(1) gross negligence in violating or disregarding the constitutional rights of the accused in a
criminal case for three counts of murder when he subscribed the purported extrajudicial
confessions of the accused therein without observing the essential requirements of the Constitution
and other applicable laws to ascertain the validity of such confessions of guilt, especially to such a
serious charge as triple murder; and (2) having given false testimony before the Regional Trial
Court of Dumaguete City when asked to testify as a prosecution witness in the said triple murder
case, with regard to the observance, or non-observance for that matter, of the constitutional rights
of the accused in connection with the extrajudicial confession that he subscribed.

As found by the Court in the said administrative matter, respondent categorically lied in open court
when he testified on the stand that the accused in the said triple murder case affixed their
thumbmark and/or signature in the subject extrajudicial confessions before him in his court, when
the evidence on record clearly proved otherwise. The Court then ruled that "respondent's false
testimony and his willingness to give that testimony, had serious consequences" for the accused,
which respondent evidently did not consider.

Thus, the Court held that such gross negligence and false testimony constitute serious dishonesty
and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service and thereby, sanctioned him with
dismissal from the Judiciary with prejudice to reinstatement or re-employment in any capacity in
any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, with forfeiture of all earned or accrued retirement and leave privileges and benefits to
which he might be entitled.

The circumstances in the instant administrative case against respondent as a lawyer, coupled with
those in the administrative matter against him as a Judge and as a witness in court certainly reveal
his character and manifest his propensity to commit falsehood without moral appreciation for, and
regard to the consequences of his lies and frauds.

To this Court's mind, there is no necessity for members of the bar to be repeatedly reminded that
as instruments in the administration of justice, as vanguards of our legal system, and as members
of this noble profession whose task is to always seek the truth, we are expected to maintain a high
standard of honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.23 In fact, before being admitted to the practice of
law, we took an oath "to obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities" and to "do no falsehood." Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly
bound to uphold the laws. For a lawyer to override the laws by committing falsity, is unfaithful to
his office and sets a detrimental example to the society.24 Thus, any resort to falsehood or
deception evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying the privilege to practice law and highlights
the unfitness to remain a member of the law profession.25

Therefore, rather than merely suspending respondent from the practice of law, this Court finds it
proper to impose the ultimate administrative penalty of disbarment upon respondent considering
the gravity of his infraction, the injury caused to entities such as herein complainant and Big "N",
his disrespect and disregard to the lawful orders of this Court, and the fact that he committed the
similar conduct of falsehood in his private practice as he had done when he was still in the service
of the Judiciary, wherein he was severely sanctioned therefor.

Indeed, by his acts, respondent proved himself to be what a lawyer should not be.26

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Arty. Aurelio Jesus V. Lomeda is

hereby DISBARRED and his name ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy
of this Decision be attached to his personal records in the Office of the Bar Confidant and furnished
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts in the country.

CANON 1.03

Saburnido v. Madrono, AC No. 4497, (26 September 2001)

FACTS:
Complainants filed an administrative case against respondent alleging that the latter
respondent has been harassing them by filing numerous complaints against them, in addition to
committing acts of dishonesty. At the time the present complaint was filed, the three actions filed
against Venustiano Saburnido had been dismissed while the case against Rosalia Saburnido was
still pending; Previous to this administrative case, complainants also filed three separate
administrative cases against respondent which resulted in the latter’s dismissal as a judge and
forfeiture of retirement benefits; In a resolution dated May 22, 1996, the Supreme Court
referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and
recommendation. The IBP concluded that complainants submitted convincing proof that
respondent indeed committed acts constituting gross misconduct that warrant the imposition of
administrative sanction. The IBP recommends that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for one year; The SC examined the records of the case and find no reason to disagree with
the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

ISSUE: WON respondent committed gross misconduct in the filing of numerous cases against
complainants.

LEGAL PRINCIPLE: Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to at
all times uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal profession. Specifically, in Rule 7.03, the Code
provides: RULE 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall be whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SECTION 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. — A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct,
or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as
an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. APPLICATION OF THE LEGAL
PRINCIPLE: In the present case, respondent's act of filing multiple complaints against complainants
evinces vindictiveness, a decidedly undesirable trait whether in a lawyer or another individual, as
complainants were instrumental in respondent's dismissal from the judiciary. The SC sees in
respondent's tenacity in pursuing several cases against complainants not the persistence of one
who has been grievously wronged but the obstinacy of one who is trying to exact revenge.
Respondent's action erodes rather than enhances public perception of the legal profession. It
constitutes gross misconduct for which he may be suspended. CONCLUSION: Respondent Atty.
Florante E. Madroño is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for one year with a WARNING that a repetition the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely. The SC finds suspension to be a sufficient sanction against respondent. Suspension is not
primarily intended as a punishment, but as a means to protect the public and the legal profession.
Avida Land Corporation v. Atty. Al Argosino, AC No. 7437 (17 August 2016)

Facts:

Complainant is a Philippine corporation engaged in the development and sale of subdivision houses
and lots.[6] Respondent was counsel for Rodman Construction & Development Corporation
(Rodman).
Complainant entered into a Contract to Sell with Rodman,[8] under which the latter was to acquire
from the former a subdivision house and lot in Santa Rosa, Laguna through bank financing. In the
event that such financing would be disapproved, Rodman was supposed to pay the full contract
price of P4,412,254.00, less the downpayment of P1,323,676.20, within 15 days from its receipt of
the loan disapproval.[9]
After settling the downpayment, Rodman took possession of the property.[10]In three separate
letters[11], complainant demanded that Rodman pay the outstanding balance of
P3,088,577.80.[12] Both parties agreed that the amount would be paid on a deferred basis within
18 months.[
Rodman made a partial payment... to P1,458,765.06 from March 1999 to July 1999, which
complainant disputed.[
Consequently, complainant rescinded the Contract to Sell by notarial act, and demanded that
Rodman vacate the subject property.[15]As Rodman remained in possession of the property,[16]
complainant filed an unlawful detainer case against the former before the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Makati City.[17]
Rodman filed a Complaint before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) seeking the
nullification of the rescission of the Contract to Sell. It also prayed for the accounting of payments
and the fixing of the period upon which the balance of the purchase price should be paid.
The MTC took cognizance of Rodman's HLURB Complaint, and dismissed the unlawful detainer case
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.[19]
HLURB Regional Office No. IV (HLURB Regional Office), through its arbiter Atty. Ma. Perpetua Y.
Aquino, similarly dismissed Rodman's Complaint and ordered it to pay damages and attorney's
fees.[20] Rodman appealed the ruling to the HLURB Board of Commissioners (HLURB Board).[21]
In its subsequent Decision,[22] the HLURB Board modified the arbiter's ruling, directing Rodman
"to immediately pay its outstanding balance failing in which respondent shall have the right to
rescind the contract subject to a refund of all the sums paid by complainant less deductions as may
be stipulated in the contract and less monthly... compensation for the use of the premises at the
rate of 1% of the contract price per month."[23]
Complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration[24] of the HLURB Board's Decision, questioning the
order to refund the sums paid by Rodman less deductions in case of a rescission of the contract.
Rodman filed a Comment/Opposition[25] to complainant's motion and sought a clarification of
certain aspects of the Decision,[26] but did not move for reconsideration.
The HLURB Board thereafter issued a Resolution[27] modifying its earlier Decision... complainant
(Rodman) is directed to immediately pay to the respondent (herein complainant) its outstanding
balance of P1,814,513.27, including interests and penalties... failing in which, the respondent shall
have the right to rescind the contract subject to a refund of all the sums paid by the complainant
less deductions as may be stipulated in the contract and less monthly compensation for the use of
the premise... neither of the parties appealed the judgment within the period allowed, it became
final and executory.
The parties thereafter attempted to arrive at a settlement on the judgment, but their efforts were
in vain.[28] With the judgment award still not satisfied after the lapse of six months, complainant
filed a motion for writs of execution and possession[29] before the HLURB Board.
Respondent filed an Opposition/Comment on the motion and subsequently a Rejoinder[30] to
complainant's Reply.[
HLURB Board granted complainant's motion and remanded the case records to the HLURB Regional
Office for proceedings on the execution of the judgment and/or other appropriate disposition.
Respondent moved for reconsideration of the Order... issues on the computation of interests.
Complainant filed an Opposition[34] and Rejoinder,[35] to which respondent filed a Reply[36] and
Surrejoinder.[37]
Board issued an Order[38] denying Rodman's Motion for Reconsideration... respondent filed a
Motion for Computation of Interest[40] before the HLURB Regional Office,... Complainant filed its
Opposition with Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution and Possession.
HLURB Regional Office accordingly computed the interest due, arriving at the total amount of
P2,685,479.64 as payment due to complainant. It also directed the issuance of a Writ of Execution
implementing the HLURB Board's earlier Resolution.[43]
Instead however of complying with the Order and the Writ of Execution,[44] respondent, on behalf
of Rodman, filed a Motion (1) to Quash... the Writ of Execution; (2) for Clarification; and (3) to Set
the Case for Confere
Conference... said motion injected new issues and claims and demanded the inclusion in the Order
of a "provision that upon actual receipt of the amount of P2,685,479.64, [complainant] should
simultaneously turn-over the duplicate original title to Rodman." (Emphasis omitted)
Respondent also filed a Petition[46] to Cite Complainant in Contempt for issuing a demand letter to
Rodman despite the pendency of the latter's Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution.
the HLURB Regional Office summoned the parties to a conference to thresh out the problems with
the execution of the writ. The conference, however, failed to serve its purpose.
Respondent thereafter moved for the inhibition of Atty. Aquino as arbiter of the case and for the
setting of a hearing on the Petition to Cite Complainant in Contempt.[47] The motion alleged that
Arbiter Aquino had shown bias in favor of complainant, and that she had failed to set the Petition
for hearing.[48]
HLURB Regional Office (1) denied the motion for inhibition; (2) granted complainant's Motion for
Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution and Writ of Possession; and (3) directed complainant to
comment on the Petition citing the latter for contempt.
Respondent moved for reconsideration of the aforementioned Order, reiterating that Arbiter
Aquino should inhibit herself from the case because of her bias. Arbiter Aquino eventually yielded
and ordered the re-raffle of the case, which went to Arbiter Raymundo A. Foronda.
When complainant filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Resolve Pending Motion for the Issuance of
an Alias Writ of Execution, respondent submitted his vehement Opposition.
He insisted that his Motion to be Furnished with Notice of Re-raffle should be acted upon firs... and
argued that "the merits of the instant case as well as the motions filed in relation thereto must be
re-evaluated by the new handling arbiter after the re-raffling... respondent filed a Manifestation on
the Notice of Conference issued by Arbiter Foronda. The Manifestation stated that Rodman would
be attending the conference, not to submit itself to the jurisdiction of Arbiter Foronda, but to
facilitate the re-raffling of the case.
respondent filed a Motion for Inhibition against Arbiter Foronda, claiming that his designation
violated due process. He said the re-raffle was questionable because he was not notified of its
conduct despite his earlier Motion to be Furnished with Notice of Re-raffle.
the parties submitted various pleadings on the issue of whether or not Arbiter Foronda could rule
on the pending motions.
Arbiter Foronda held that (1) the notice of re-raffle was not an indispensable prerequisite for a
substitute arbiter to have jurisdiction over a case at the execution stage; (2) the claim of
Rodman that its Motion for Reconsideration of the 23 April 2008 Order had remained unresolved
was rendered moot by Arbiter Aquino's eventual inhibition from the case; and (3) Rodman's prayer
for the... summary dismissal of complainant's motions to resolve the Motion for the Issuance of an
Alias Writ of Execution was denied
Resolution put an end to the long-drawn-out dispute, as respondent did not file any more
pleadings.
On 21 February 2007, in the midst of the squabble over the HLURB case, complainant - through its
vice president for project development Steven J. Dy - filed a Complaint-Affidavit[50] against
respondent for alleged professional misconduct and violation of the Lawyer's Oath. The Complaint
alleged that respondent's conduct in relation to the HLURB case manifested a disregard of the
following tenets:[... his Comment,[52] respondent claimed that what primarily caused the delays in
the HLURB case were the legal blunders of complainant's counsel
Respondent also raised the issue of complainant's counsel's erroneous acts of notarial rescission
and filing of an ejectment suit before the trial court. These acts allegedly contributed to the delay in
the resolution of the dispute.[55]... argued that he could not have possibly caused delays in the
execution of the Decision dated 22 June 2005 at the time the instant Complaint was filed on 21
February 2007, as complainant filed its Motion for Writ of Execution before the HLURB Regional
Office only in April 2007.[56]... respondent asserted that he merely followed his legal oath by
defending the cause of his client with utmost dedication, diligence, and good faith.[57]As
respondent allegedly continued performing dilatory and frivolous tactics, complainant filed
Supplemental Complaints[58] against him.
Court referred this case to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation.[... the IBP issued
a Resolution adopting and approving the Investigating Commissioner's Report and
Recommendation on the Complaint.[60] Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration or a
petition within the period allowed.
Respondent is guilty of professional misconduct.
Issues:
The only issue before Us is whether respondent's act of filing numerous pleadings, that caused
delay in the execution of a final judgment, constitutes professional misconduct in violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Al C. Argosino is found GUILTY of violating Rules 10.03
and 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath, for which he is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year effective upon the finality of this Resolution.
He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

Castaneda v Ago, 65 SCRA 505 (1975)

CASTRO, J.:
The parties in this case, except Lourdes Yu Ago, have been commuting to this Court for more than
a decade.

In 1955 the petitioners Venancio Castaneda and Nicetas Henson filed a replevin suit against Pastor
Ago in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover certain machineries (civil case 27251). In
1957 judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering Ago to return the machineries or
pay definite sums of money. Ago appealed, and on June 30, 1961 this Court, in Ago vs. Castaneda,
L-14066, affirmed the judgment. After remand, the trial court issued on August 25, 1961 a writ of
execution for the sum of P172,923.87. Ago moved for a stay of execution but his motion was
denied, and levy was made on Ago's house and lots located in Quezon City. The sheriff then
advertised them for auction sale on October 25, 1961. Ago moved to stop the auction sale, failing
in which he filed a petition for certiorariwith the Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed
the petition and Ago appealed. On January 31, 1966 this Court, in Ago vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
L-19718, affirmed the dismissal. Ago thrice attempted to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction to
restrain the sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution "to save his family house and lot;" his
motions were denied, and the sheriff sold the house and lots on March 9, 1963 to the highest
bidders, the petitioners Castaneda and Henson. Ago failed to redeem, and on April 17, 1964 the
sheriff executed the final deed of sale in favor of the vendees Castaneda and Henson. Upon their
petition, the Court of First Instance of Manilaissued a writ of possession to the properties.

However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor Ago, now joined by his wife, Lourdes Yu Ago, as his co-plaintiff,
filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City (civil case Q-7986) to annul the
sheriff's sale on the ground that the obligation of Pastor Ago upon which judgment was rendered
against him in the replevin suit was his personal obligation, and that Lourdes Yu Ago's one-half
share in their conjugal residential house and lots which were levied upon and sold by the sheriff
could not legally be reached for the satisfaction of the judgment. They alleged in their complaint
that wife Lourdes was not a party in the replevin suit, that the judgment was rendered and the writ
of execution was issued only against husband Pastor, and that wife Lourdes was not a party to her
husband's venture in the logging business which failed and resulted in the replevin suit and which
did not benefit the conjugal partnership.

The Court of First Instance of Quezon City issued an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction
restraining the petitioners, the Register of Deeds and the sheriff of Quezon City, from registering
the latter's final deed of sale, from cancelling the respondents' certificates of title and issuing new
ones to the petitioners and from carrying out any writ of possession. A situation thus arose where
what the Manila court had ordered to be done, the Quezon City court countermanded. On
November 1, 1965, however, the latter court lifted the preliminary injunction it had previously
issued, and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City cancelled the respondents' certificates of title and
issued new ones in favor of the petitioners. But enforcement of the writ of possession was again
thwarted as the Quezon City court again issued a temporary restraining order which it later lifted
but then re-restored. On May 3, 1967 the court finally, and for the third time, lifted the restraining
order.

While the battle on the matter of the lifting and restoring of the restraining order was being fought
in the Quezon City court, the Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with this Court
under date of May 26, 1966, docketed as L-26116, praying for a writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin the sheriff from enforcing the writ of possession. This Court found no merit in the petition
and dismissed it in a minute resolution on June 3, 1966; reconsideration was denied on July 18,
1966. The respondents then filed on August 2, 1966 a similar petition for certiorari and prohibition
with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. 37830-R), praying for the same preliminary injunction. The
Court of Appeals also dismissed the petition. The respondents then appealed to this Court
(L-27140). We dismissed the petition in a minute resolution on February 8, 1967.

The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of Appeals where they filed another petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. 39438-R). The said court gave
due course to the petition and granted preliminary injunction. After hearing, it rendered decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, writ of preliminary injunction from enforcement of the writ of

possession on and ejectment from the one-half share in the properties involved
belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago dated June 15, 1967 is made permanent pending
decision on the merits in Civil Case No. Q-7986 and ordering respondent Court to
proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. Q-7986 on the merits without unnecessary
delay. No pronouncement as to costs."

Failing to obtain reconsideration, the petitioners Castaneda and Henson filed the present petition
for review of the aforesaid decision.

1. We do not see how the doctrine that a court may not interfere with the orders of a co-equal
court can apply in the case at bar. The Court of First Instance of Manila, which issued the writ of
possession, ultimately was not interfered with by its co-equal court, the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City as the latter lifted the restraining order it had previously issued against the
enforcement of the Manila court's writ of possession; it is the Court of Appeals that enjoined, in part,
the enforcement of the writ.

2. Invoking Comilang vs. Buendia, et al.,[1] where the wife was a party in one case and the
husband was a party in another case and a levy on their conjugal properties was upheld, the
petitioners would have Lourdes Yu Ago similarly bound by the replevin judgment against her
husband for which their conjugal properties would be answerable. The case invoked is not at par
with the present case. In Comilang the actions were admittedly instituted for the protection of the
common interest of the spouses; in the present case, the Agos deny that their conjugal partnership
benefited from the husband's business venture.

3. Relying upon Omnas vs. Rivera, 67 Phil. 419, the Court of Appeals held that a writ of possession
may not issue until the claim of a third person to half-interest in the property is adversely
determined, the said appellate court assuming that Lourdes Yu Ago was a "stranger" or a
"third-party" to her husband. The assumption is of course obviously wrong, for, besides living with
her husband Pastor, she does not claim ignorance of his business that failed, of the relevant cases
in which he got embroiled, and of the auction sale made by the sheriff of their conjugal
properties. Even then, the ruling in Omnas is not that a writ of possession may not issue until the
claim of a third person is adversely determined, but that the writ of possession being a complement
of the writ of execution, a judge with jurisdiction to issue the latter also has jurisdiction to issue the
former, unless in the interval between the judicial sale and the issuance of the writ of possession,
the rights of third parties to the property sold have supervened. The ruling in Omnas is clearly
inapplicable in the present case, for, here, there has been no change in the ownership of the
properties or of any interest therein from the time the writ of execution was issued up to the time
the writ of possession was issued, and even up to the present.

4. We agree with the trial court (then presided by Judge Lourdes P. San Diego) that it is much too
late in the day for the respondents Agos to raise the question that part of the property is unleviable
because it belongs to Lourdes Yu Ago, considering that (1) a wife is normally privy to her husband's
activities; (2) the levy was made and the properties advertised for auction sale in 1961; (3) she
lives in the very properties in question; (4) her husband had moved to stop the auction sale; (5) the
properties were sold at auction in 1963; (6) her husband had thrice attempted to obtain a
preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution; (7) the sheriff
executed the deed of final sale on April 17, 1964 when Pastor failed to redeem; (8) Pastor had
impliedly admitted that the conjugal properties could be levied upon by his pleas "to save his family
house and lot" in his efforts to prevent execution; and (9) it was only on May 2, 1964 when he and
his wife filed the complaint for annulment of the sheriff's sale upon the issue that the wife's share in
the properties cannot be levied upon on the ground that she was not a party to the logging
business and not a party to the replevin suit. The spouses Ago had every opportunity to raise the
issue in the various proceedings hereinbefore discussed but did not; laches now effectively bars
them from raising it.

"Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and

unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within
a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
either has abandoned it or declined to assert it."[2]

5. The decision of the appellate court under review suffers from two fatal infirmities.

(a) It enjoined the enforcement of the writ of possession to and ejectment from
the one-half share in the properties involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago. This
half-share is not in esse, but is merely an inchoate interest, a mere expectancy,
constituting neither legal nor equitable estate, and will ripen into title when only
upon liquidation and settlement there appears to be assets of the
community.[3] The decision sets at naught the well-settled rule that injunction
does not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise.[4]

(b) The decision did not foresee the absurdity, or even the impossibility, of its
enforcement. The Ago spouses admittedly live together in the same
house,[5] which is conjugal property. By the Manila court's writ of possession
Pastor could be ousted from the house, but the decision under review would
prevent the ejectment of Lourdes. Now, which part of the house would be
vacated by Pastor and which part would Lourdes continue to stay in? The
absurdity does not stop here; the decision would actually separate husband and
wife, prevent them from living together, and in effect divide their conjugal
properties during coverture and before the dissolution of the conjugal union.

6. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment of the sheriffs sale
(civil case Q-7986), elementary justice demands that the petitioners, long denied the fruits of their
victory in the replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the respondents Agos, abetted by their
lawyer Jose M. Luison, have misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial process to thwart
the satisfaction of the judgment, to the extended prejudice of the petitioners. The respondents,
with the assistance of counsel, maneuvered for fourteen (14) years to doggedly resist execution of
the judgment thru manifold tactics in and from one court to another (5 times in the Supreme Court).

We condemn the attitude of the respondents and their counsel who,

"far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to
use them to subvert the very ends of justice."[6]

Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an officer of the
court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy and a predator of
conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of
technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral
justice.

"A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's
cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what we do not and cannot
countenance is a lawyer's insistence- despite the patent futility of his client's
 position, as in the case at bar.

"It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies
and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that
his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to
acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must
resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his client's propensity to
litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his
client; its primacy is indisputable."[7]

7. In view of the private respondents' propensity to use the courts for purposes other than to seek
justice, and in order to obviate further delay in the disposition of the case below which might again
come up to the appellate courts but only to fail in the end, we have motu proprio examined the
record of civil case Q-7986 (the mother case of the present case). We find that

.
. the complaint was filed on May 2, 1964 (more than 11 years ago) but trial on
the merits has not even started;

. after the defendants Castanedas had filed their answer with a counterclaim,
the plaintiffs Agos filed a supplemental complaint where they impleaded
new parties-defendants;

. after the admission of the supplemental complaint, the Agos filed a motion
to admit an amended supplemental complaint, which impleads an
additional new party-defendant (no action has yet been taken on this
motion);

. the defendants have not filed an answer to the admitted supplemental

complaint; and

. the last order of the Court of First Instance, dated April 20, 1974, grants an
extension to the suspension of time to file answer. (Expediente, p. 815)

We also find that the alleged causes of action in the complaint, supplemental complaint and
amended supplemental complaint are all untenable, for the reasons hereunder stated.

The Complaint

Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that the sheriff levied upon conjugal properties of the
spouses Ago despite the fact that the judgment to be satisfied was personal only to Pastor Ago, and
the business venture that he entered into, which resulted in the replevin suit, did not redound to
the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The issue here, which is whether or not the wife's
inchoate share in the conjugal property is leviable, is the same issue that we have already resolved,
as barred by laches, in striking down the decision of the Court of Appeals granting preliminary
injunction, the dispositive portion of which was hereinbefore quoted. This ruling applies as well to
the first cause of action of the complaint.

Upon the second cause of action, the Agos allege that on January 5, 1959 the Castanedas and the
sheriff, pursuant to an alias writ of seizure, seized and took possession of certain machineries,
depriving the Agos of the use thereof, to their damage in the sum of P256,000 up to May 5,
1964. This second cause of action fails to state a valid cause of action for it fails to allege that the
order of seizure is invalid or illegal.

It averred as a third cause of action that the sheriff's sale of the conjugal properties was irregular,
illegal and unlawful because the sheriff did not require the Castaneda spouses to pay or liquidate
the sum of P141,750 (the amount for which they bought the properties at the auction sale) despite
the fact that there was annotated at the back of the certificates of title a mortgage of P75,000 in
favor of the Philippine National Bank; moreover, the sheriff sold the properties for P141,750 despite
the pendency of L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the amount of P99,877.08 out of the
judgment value of P172,923.37 in civil case 27251; and because of said acts, the Agos suffered
P174,877.08 in damages.

Anent this third cause of action, the sheriff was under no obligation to require payment of the
purchase price in the auction sale because "when the purchaser is the judgment creditor, and no
third-party claim has been filed, he need not pay the amount of the bid if it does not exceed the
amount of his judgment." (Sec. 23, Rule 39, Rules of Court)

The annotated mortgage in favor of the PNB is the concern of the vendees Castanedas but did not
affect the sheriff's sale; the cancellation of the annotation is of no moment to the Agos.

Case L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the sum of P99,877.08 out of the amount of the
judgment was dismissed by this Court on January 31, 1966.

This third cause of action, therefore, actually states no valid cause of action and is moreover barred
by prior judgment.

The fourth cause of action pertains to moral damages allegedly suffered by the Agos on account of
the acts complained of in the preceding causes of action. As the fourth cause of action derives its
life from the preceding causes of action, which, as shown, are baseless, the said fourth cause of
action must necessarily fail.

The Counterclaim

As a counterclaim against the Agos, the Castanedas aver that the action was unfounded and as a
consequence of its filing they were compelled to retain the services of counsel for not less than
P7,500; that because the Agos obtained a preliminary injunction enjoining the transfer of titles and
possession of the properties to the Castanedas, they were unlawfully deprived of the use of the
properties from April 17, 1964, the value of such deprived use being 20% annually of their actual
value; and that the filing of the unfounded action besmirched their feelings, the pecuniary worth of
which is for the court to assess.

The Supplemental Complaint

Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that after the filing of the complaint, the defendants,
taking advantage of the dissolution of the preliminary injunction, in conspiracy and with gross bad
faith and evident intent to cause damage to the plaintiffs, caused the registration of the sheriff's
final deed of sale; that, to cause more damage, the defendants sold to their lawyer and his wife two
of the parcels of land in question; that the purchasers acquired the properties in bad faith; that the
defendants mortgaged the two other parcels to the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation while
the defendants' lawyer and his wife also mortgaged the parcels bought by them to the Rizal
Commercial Bank; and that the bank also acted in bad faith.

The second cause of action consists of an allegation of additional damages caused by the
defendants' bad faith in entering into the aforesaid agreements and transactions.

The Amended Supplemental Complaint

The amendment made pertains to the first cause of action of the supplemental complaint, which is,
the inclusion of a paragraph averring that, still to cause damage and prejudice to the plaintiffs, Atty.
& Mrs. Juan Quijano, in bad faith sold the two parcels of land they had previously bought to Eloy
Ocampo who acquired them also in bad faith, while Venancio Castaneda and Nicetas Henson in bad
faith sold the two other parcels to Juan Quijano (60%) and Eloy Ocampo (40%) who acquired them
in bad faith and with knowledge that the properties are the subject of a pending litigation.

Discussion on The Causes of Action

of The Supplemental Complaint And
The Amended Supplemental Complaint

Assuming hypothetically as true the allegations in the first cause of action of the supplemental
complaint and the amended supplemental complaint, the validity of the cause of action would
depend upon the validity of the first cause of action of the original complaint, for, the Agos would
suffer no transgression upon their rights of ownership and possession of the properties by reason
of the agreements subsequently entered into by the Castanedas and their lawyer if the sheriff's
levy and sale are valid. The reverse is also true: if the sheriff's levy and sale are invalid on the
ground that the conjugal properties could not be levied upon, then the transactions would perhaps
prejudice the Agos, but, we have already indicated that the issue in the first cause of action of the
original complaint is barred by laches, and it must therefore follow that the first cause of action of
the supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint is also barred.

For the same reason, the same holding applies to the remaining cause of action in the
supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is set aside. Civil case Q-7986
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal is ordered dismissed, without prejudice to the re-filing of the
petitioners' counterclaim in a new and independent action. Treble costs are assessed against the
spouses Pastor Ago and Lourdes Yu Ago, which shall be paid by their lawyer, Atty. Jose M.
Luison. Let a copy of this decision be made a part of the personal file of Atty. Luison in the custody
of the Clerk of Court.