Selznik - Sociology of Law

Association of American Law Schools
Southwestern Law School
THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW

Author(s): Philip Selznick
Source: Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 12, No. 4 (1960), pp. 521-531
Published by: Association of American Law Schools
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THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW *
Philip Selznick f
idea of dealing with legal conceptsand'doctrine froma sociologi-

THEcal point of view has been vaguely familiarto at least two generations
of sociologists and legal scholars. In this country, the premises of
sociological jurisprudence achieved a rather quick and general victory,
helped along by a pragmatictemper,an impatiencewith abstractions,and
a settingof rapid social change. This victory,such as it is, has had but
littleto do with the actual researches of sociologists; nor does it reflect
the particular concepts and funded knowledge of the field. It is a point
of view, an approach, a sensitivitythat has been accepted.
Of course, the autonomy of legal scholarship still finds considerable
support. It could not be otherwise, given the technical character and
intricate development of many legal notions, the peculiarities of legal
history,the depth of professional pride, and the relative isolation of the
law schools. But the overridingfact,it seems to me, is that legal science
in America is open to new ideas and influences. Certainlythe intellectual
foundationsfor a sociological approach have been laid. There is no need
today to argue the general interdependenceof law and societyor to insist
that legal rules be tested by their practical effects. Little will be gained
from furtherdemonstrationsthat law serves social interests and that
these interests,in turn,reflectthe changing structureof society. It may
even be that legal realism,legal positivism,and sociological jurisprudence
have been accepted altogether too easily and that problems of great
moment have received less than their due appreciation and concern. I
shall returnto that issue presently.
The sociology of law may be regarded as an attemptto marshal what
we know about the natural elements of social life and to bring that
knowledge to bear on a consciously sustained enterprise,governed by
special objectives and ideals. Thus understood,legal sociology follows
a patternsimilar to that of industrial sociology, political sociology, and
educational sociology. With some propheticlicense, we can detect in all
these effortsthree basis stages of development.
The primitive,or missionary,stage is that of communicatinga per-
spective, bringing to a hithertoisolated area an appreciation of basic
♦ Reprintedby permission fromSociologyToday, published
by Basic Books,Inc.,
New York,N. Y., underthe auspicesof theAmericanSociologicalSociety. Copy-
right,1959,Basic Books,Inc.
t Professor
ofSociology, ofCalifornia,
University Berkeley.
521
522 Journal of Legal Education [Vol. 12
and quite general sociological truths,such as the significanceof group
membershipfor individual behavior. This early phase characteristically
includes much theoretical discussion and analysis of everyday experi-
ence. There may also be some organized research, but what there is
is mostly demonstrativein function,more valuable for its educational
effectthan for anythingelse. In law, such demonstrativeresearch has
not been particularlyimportant,in part because of the role played by
fact-guidedjudicial decisions and by the writingsof men with rich ex-
perience in legal affairs. Although most of the the theoreticalwork in
this field has been done by European social scientists,the task of com-
municatingan elementary,not-very-sophisticated sociological perspective
has been accomplished largely by American legal scholars who were in-
fluencedby Eurpoean thought,and by some of the more articulateappel-
late judges.
The second stage belongs to the sociological craftsman. It is a muscle-
flexing period marked by intellectualself-confidence,a zeal for detail,
and an earnest desire to be of service. At this stage the sociologist seeks
more than the communicationof a general perspective. He wants to
explore the area in depth, to help to solve its problems,and to bring to
bear quite specificsociological techniquesand ideas. There are a number
of signs that the sociology of law is about to enterthis stage of develop-
ment.
The third stage, as I envision it, is one of true intellectualautonomy
and maturity. This stage is entered when the sociologist goes beyond
(without repudiating) the role of technician or engineer and addresses
himself to the larger objectives and guiding principlesof the particular
human enterprisehe has elected to study. He reasserts the moral im-
pulse that marked the firststage of sociological interestand influence.
But the third stage is of a higher,more sophisticatedlevel than the first
because the second stage has provided a sounder basis for critical analy-
sis.
I shall limit myself here to a few remarks concerning the imminent
second stage and an even briefer discussion of the ultimate third stage
of developmentin legal sociology. Before going on to these matters,I
should like to emphasize one general point. In a broad sense, there is
no real problemof articulatingsociological inquiry to the needs of legal
development. Sociology can contributemost to law by tendingits own
garden. Truly sound knowledge regardingbasic human relationsand in-
stitutionswill inevitablyfindits way into legal doctrine. Truths so well
founded that no reasonable, educated man can deny them need no spe-
cial means of communicationbeyond the ordinarychannels of education.
It is well to rememberthat, although the law is abstract, its decision-
1960] The Sociology of Law 523
making institutionsdeal with a concrete and practical world. Recogni-

tion of basic truthsabout that world cannot be long denied. Moreover,
the legal order is becoming increasinglybroad in scope, touching more
and more elements of society. This means that sociological research
addressed to the importantcharacteristicsof society, and to the basic
changes in it, will automaticallyhave legal relevance. This relevance,of
course, goes beyond bare description. It includes making the law sensi-
tive to the values that are at stake as new circumstancesalter our institu-
tions.
If this be true, if sociologists have only to mind their own business,
why a special concern for sociology of law? Perhaps the most obvious
answer is that two-way communicationcan bring to legal analysis more
rapid and directbenefitsfrom sociological research. But as soon as this
communication begins, we see that the real problem and the real op-
portunitystem fromthe incompleteand tentativecharacterof our knowl-
edge. There are very few incontrovertiblesociological truths. Most of
what we know is tentative,not only in the sense that all scientificconclu-
sions are tentative,but also in the sense that our research in many vital
areas is still primitiveand pioneering. Yet legal scholars are interested
in this work, and properlyso, because the veryleast it does is to challenge
older images of man and societyand offernew guides for the assessment
of experience. This kind of knowledge, however, cannot be absorbed
directly; it must be tested within the specificareas of legal interest; it
must withstand the common-sense critiques of the practical lawyer.
Such communicationcannot take place effectivelyunless sociological in-
quiry is made directlyrelevant to legal problems.
But the sociology of law has an additional, and more profound, ra-
tionale than the communicationof specificsociological knowledge regard-
ing nonlegal phenomena. The law is itself a social phenomenon,an im-
portant agency of social control. The study of the law for itself, as a
part of the natural order, is very much the sociologist's business. From
this standpoint the sociology of law can contributeboth to the science
of society itself and to the self-knowledgeof legal practitioners. Since
self-knowledgeand moral development are so intimatelyrelated, it is
plain that here lies sociology's most importantspecial contribution. This
is the distinctiveofficeof the third,most advanced stage of legal soci-
ology.
Stage II and its Problems

In the second stage of developmentof legal sociology, as I have sug-
gested,the main effortis to apply sociological analysis to particularprob-
lems of legal doctrineand legal institutions.
The presentoutcroppingof interestin law on the part of sociologists
has been stimulatedby a numberof relateddevelopments. Probably most
important is the rising self-confidenceamong sociologists- confidence
in the abilityof the fieldto cast new light on particularareas and to help
in the solution of practical problems. Another stimulushas been the de-
velopment and refinementof research methods, involving not merely
statistical sophisticationbut the identificationof characteristicsocial fa-
vors of proven researchability. This means that at least one brand of
empiricismhas been available for active service, ready to formthe basis
of large and quicklyorganized researchoperations.
Interestin law has also been encouraged by new work in the sociology
of administration. These studies have restatedsome older problemsre-
garding the interplayof formal systemsof social control and the spon-
taneous behavior of men and groups. Some of us who have worked in
that fieldhave discovered that in studyingformalorganizations we were
also studyinglegal systems. It is clear that what we were learningabout
the functionsof formal rules, the interdependenceof authorityand con-
sent, and similar matterswas not really new from the larger perspective
of legal sociology. It is also painfullyevident that some sociologists are
prone to repeatmistakesof the past by overemphasizingthe informaland
spontaneous and deprecatingthe significanceand the peculiar problems
of a legal order.
Finally, recent years have seen a fresh approach to the relation be-
tween custom and law; today we regard the law as a more creative
agency than earlier sociologists believed it to be. This new perspective
has been largely stimulatedand sustained by recenthistoryin the fieldof
race relations,especially by the Supreme Court's extension of the consti-
tutional concept of equal protectionof the laws.
These developments promise a new and fruitfulperiod of research
and analysis. But we should take a close look at the characteristicav-
enues by which sociologists will enter the field. Perhaps we should
speak of these as temptations,the betterto mark out the probable risks
and pitfalls.
An obvious temptation(although also an opportunity) is to offerre-
search technique as the peculiar contributionof the sociologist. By
technique,of course, I mean the apparatus of survey and experimental
research, not the more common-sense historical and reportorial data-
gathering that has been the main standby of sociological classics. It
seems obvious to me that quantitativeresearch can and must play an im-
portantrole in legal sociology. Any continuingprogram of study in that
field could easily keep a staff of survey technicians busy on fruitful
projects. The subjective meaning of specificrules, such as the lawyer-
client privilege, for clients as well as members of the bar; the social
compositionof the bench and of juror panels ; the self-imagesof lawyers,
theircareer lines, and other mattersaffectingprofessional integrity; the
quasi-legal claims and expectations of various classes of citizens- these
and a host of otherspecificstudies depend for theirexecution on sophisti-
cated surveytechnique.
But a serious risk is entailed and should not be overlooked. If we
emphasize technique,we inevitablydesign projects that are congenial to
the skills at hand. To be sure, such projects often have a market value
in that theypromise informationthat seems to be of immediatepractical
use to a client. Yet we know fromexperience that technique-stimulated
research is seldom effectivelyguided by significanttheoreticalconcerns
or even by mattersof the greatestlong-runimportanceto the clienthim-
self. Attemptsto apply small-grouptheoryto the study of juries may
seem an exception,but in fact theyare not. The study of small groups,
beyond certainfirstprinciples,is one of the more weakly developed areas
in sociology; if this work is pushed to the forefrontin legal sociology,
it will be less for the sound knowledge it can offer than for the op-
portunityit presentsto apply sophisticatedresearchtechnique.
Another approach involves a similar risk,although it also begins from
a posture of strength. Here one emphasizes the fund of sociological
ideas, rather than the availability of research methods. The plan is to
draw upon this sociological armoryin order to illuminateparticularprob-
lems in the legal field,whetherof doctrineor of institutionalfunctioning.
This is the approach that Leonard Broom and I would take if we were
to add a chapteron the sociology of law to the second part of our intro-
ductorytextbook. The effectupon legal doctrinesand institutionsof a
numberof sociological phenomena,includingsocialization, value systems,
stratification,collective behavior, and demographic trends, would be
studied. But the main objective of this pedagogical device is to impress
upon the studentthe force of sociological concepts and principles; it is
not offeredas a substitutefor the autonomous, research-orientedorgani-
zation of a field of inquiry. We cannot indiscriminatelyapply all our
sociological ideas to legal studies; we must have a theoretical ground
for supposing that some notions will be more importantthan others.
An indifferentappreciation of the entire sociological armory encour-
ages intellectuallylow-level research,for two reasons. On the one hand,
thereis a natural tendencyto choose those sociological conceptsor factors
that are easiest to handle; since it is all sociology anyway,if no theoreti-
cal ground exists for choosing the more difficultproblems this solution
will seem quite respectable. Yet the net resultmay be fact-gatheringof a
quite trivial nature. On the other hand, this same indifferencemay re-
suit in choosing problems of immediate interestto a client, whetheror
not the studies entail any advance in our general knowledge.
The alternative to these approaches is more painful. It involves a
double intellectualcommitment,to problems of greatest theoreticalcon-
cern in sociology and to problems that are truly importantto the legal
order itself. In sociology,the roughlydefinedarea we call "social organi-
zation" remains a challenging frontier. In this fieldwe attemptto iden-
tify the essential characteristicsof differenttypes of society, to locate
the key human relationshipsthat give a social order its distinctivequali-
ties, to discover how major groups interactand what stable arrangements
result. Most of the trulygreat names in sociology have been identified
with broad studies of this sort. At the same time, these problems are
the hardest to handle and are most frequentlyshunned.
From the legal side, the importantproblems also suggest an emphasis
on studies of social organization. For example, what are the limits of
law as an instrumentof social control? What are the capabilities of
courts, as we know them and as they could be? How much does
society require of these agencies? How much can legitimatelybe de-
manded ? Roscoe Pound stated this problemmore than a generationago,
and offeredsome answers.1 But researchhas been wanting. This is the
kind of problem that can be approached in many ways, but it surely de-
mands both a broad theoreticalperspectiveand an emphasis on societal
needs and institutionalpotentialities. Thus an assessment of demands
upon the legal systemdepends on what is going on withinmajor groups
and in the relationsamong them. Whether modern economic institutions
can autonomously safeguard their members against arbitrarytreatment
and undue loss of libertydepends on the nature of participationand the
dynamics of internalcontrol. The sociological answer to this question
inevitablyaffectsthe role of the courts. The potentialachievementsand
vulnerabilitiesof both legal and nonlegal institutionsare a proper and
even urgentsubject for sociological inquiry.
It is an interestingparadox that theoriesof social organization include
both the best-foundedand the most questionable of sociological writings.
But this is not really strange. Obviously, an effortto delineate a broad
patternof social change runs the risk of speculative over-generalization.
On the other hand, if a broad theory becomes well established, this is
because it findsconfirmationon many levels and in a wide varietyof con-
texts. Thus sociology has identifiedsome of the main characteristics
of modernindustrialsociety,includingthe rise and dominance of bureau-
cratic formsof organization. The outlines of this theoryhave been well
developed, and many specific inferences have been drawn and tested.
1 Pound,The LimitsofEffective , 27 Int'l J. Ethics 150(1917).
Legal Action
I am sure that any effortto ground legal doctrineon social-scienceknowl-

edge must look to these theoriesof the origins of our social order and the
direction in which it is moving. Moreover, such developmentalmodels
are most likely to have somethingsignificantto say about the probable
evolution of the law itself.
There is an unfortunatetendencyto thinkof social-science knowledge
as equivalent to the conclusions of specificpieces of research. I do not
doubt that every generalization must be grounded in a specificempirical
studies, and there is always the possibilityof a logically crucial experi-
ment. But sound general knowledge is a complex resultof many diverse
pieces of work, analytical and empirical, each indirectlysupportingthe
general theory. This means that we should avoid the temptationto pre-
sent social-scienceknowledge as based on the specificresultsof a limited
survey or experiment,for any one of the lattermay be vulnerable while
the basic generalization remains firm. The general agreement among
social scientistsregardingthe damaging effectsof segregationis actually
based, not on specificstudies of Negroes and whites, but on a theoryof
personalityand on quite diverse,though logically related,empiricalwork.
The very need to defend our own conclusions should recall us to basic
theory.
In calling for an emphasis on broader theoretical problems, such as
arise in the interpretationof trendsin social organization and in the study
of cultural systems,I do not mean to say that only the broad-gauged
speculative and historial writingsof the sociological classics is in order.
On the contrary,it is characteristicof this middle stage of development
that research must be sharply focused, exploring limited problems in
depth. I wish only to emphasize that this work should take its departure
from our funded knowledge and carry forward the theoreticalconcerns
that have stimulatedthe most fruitfuland lasting contributions.
Perhaps I can best indicate the research perspectiveI have in mind by
brieflydescribinga currentproject of my own.2 This is a study of due
process and job rightsin modernindustry. Let me say a word firstabout
the intellectualorientationand backgroundof the study,then something
about procedure. I began with a general interestin the social sources
and the dynamics of legal change. I knew from the theoryof bureauc-
racy that significantchanges should be expected in the employmentrela-
tion with the shiftfromearlierentrepreneurialformsto the modernman-
agerial enterprise. The same theory suggested the hypothesisthat the
conditions of order within the enterprisewould lead management itself
2 Supportedby the Social ScienceResearchCouncilthrough a FacultyResearch
Fellowship, of California,
and by the Instituteof IndustrialRelations,University
Berkeley.This workis beingcarriedon in collaboration withHowardVollmer
and PatrickMcGillivray.
ofLegalEd.No.4- 4
12Journal
to sponsor a rule of law ; and it also suggested that the balance of power
broughtabout by trade unionism would not persist as a mere power ar-
rangementbut would become part of a rationalized juridicial system,
based on a consensus regarding the rights and duties of employees.
These hypotheses regarding what Ehrlich would have called the inner
order of private institutionsalso raised the question of whether,in the
formal legal order itself,there would not be a breakdown of traditional
doctrine regarding master-servantrelations and the employmentcon-
tract. In other words, we see a quasi-legal developmentin private gov-
ernmentand we ask what significancethis has for "official" legal doc-
trine. Here again the problem of the competence of the law, and of
legitimatedemands upon it, comes up in acute form.
Bearing in mind the meaning of social organization, the reader will
note that this setting focuses attention on the essential characteristics
of a particular relationship,the meaning of employmentin the large in-
dustrial firm. At the same time,it sees this relationshipagainst the back-
ground of changes in the social structureof the enterprise. Also, the
patternof major group relations- organized labor and management- is
explored in the lightof a particularhypothesisregardingthe outcome of
theirinteraction. I see this outcome as a creative movementfrompower
to justice, fromself-helpthroughintimidationto a systemof justice and
legality.
These ideas are being explored and tested in a variety of ways. The
outlook for managerial self-restraintis being examined throughintensive
study of the doctrine and practice of modern personnel management,
based on interviewsas well as a review of the managementliterature. A
detailed study of labor-arbitrationdecisions promises to show the emer-
gence of a code for the protectionof workers against arbitraryaction.
In the developmentof this code, the collective-bargainingcontractis seen
not as a terminalpointbut as a vehicle of legal evolution,establishingthe
conditions for the emergenceof a sense of justice as well as the machin-
ery for specifyingits meaning. We are also undertakinga survey of
employees' expectations and beliefs regarding rights in a job and pro-
tection against arbitrarytreatment. The correlativestudies of manage-
ment policy and of subjective expectations will help to determine,given
the nature of the enterprise,what expectationsare legitimateand provide
the basis for legally recognizable rights.
My aim in these studies is, as far as possible, to bring our broad

hypothesesabout law and social organization down to the level of specific
behaviors, specificchoices, and specificattitudes. Thus, the project de-
scribed above mightwell lead to a study of the participantsin grievance
machinery, both labor and management representatives,to test the
hypothesisthat there are discernibleand ultimatelycompellingpressures

to substituteuniversalist for particularistcriteria of choice. This, too,
would tell us somethingabout how legal change is mediated and sustained
by problem-solvingon the job.
My primaryconcernis that this middle stage of legal sociology should
fulfillits highest potentialities. It will do so, I suggest, only if it truly
makes sociological theorythe source of hypothesesabout the law. If it
does, I am confidentthat the problemsdealt with will be significantfrom
the standpointof jurisprudence.
This second stage properlyemphasizes the contributionof sociology.
But we shall also gain as we see the legal problemspress the limitsof our
understanding. It will not be long before we find that new basic re-
search is needed- for example, on the meaning of the integrityof the
person- if the assumptions of legal doctrine are to be tested. But I
would rather have our basic understanding challenged then limit our
horizons by becoming mere fact-finders. No doubt there are many mat-
ters of fact that lawyers and law professorswould like to ascertain, but
such fact-finding, useful as it is, should not be confused with the scholarly
objectives of a sociology of law.
Whatever the difficulties of this stage, they do not include the need to
wrestle with ultimate problems of definitionand of philosophical per-
spective. A great deal of work can be carried on, even work of high
theoreticalcontent,withoutworryingtoo much about the nature of law
itself, or of justice. At this stage, we can accept working notions of
positive law and we can see most of our work as dealing with the social
sources of legal change. By taking this practical view, we can facilitate
the release of intellectualenergies; it does not follow, however, that we
must remain forevercontentwith that intellectualaccommodation.
Stage III and its Problems

As we approach a more advanced stage of development,all the classic
problemsof legal philosophyemerge again. For at this point we should
be ready to explore the meaning of legalityitself,to assess its moral au-
thority,and to clarifythe role of social science in creatinga societybased
on justice.
In a considerationof these matters,the central fact is the role of rea-
son in the legal order. Legality as we know it is based on a combination
of sovereign will and objective reason. The word reason has an old-
fashionedring to it,but its long life is notyetover. Reason is an author-
itative ideal, and the bearers of reason have, inevitably,a creative legal
role. We see this,not only in the idea and practice of grounded judicial
decision-making,but in the vast body of critical literatureproduced by
legal scholars. Whatever the lawyer's commitmentto legal positivism,

to the belief that law is what the legislaturesand the courts enunciateand
enforce,there is at least an implicitrecognitionthat not all law is on the
same level. Some law is inferiorbecause it contains the wrong mixture
of arbitrarysovereign will, including majority will, and right reason.
This is especially true of judge-made law, but legislaturescan also make
inferior laws. An inferior legality is manifested in the disposition of
judges to give a narrow constructionto statutes that depart from com-
mon-law principles,and in the ease with which judicial conclusions are
modifiedor reversed. An inherentlegality is doubtless much influenced
by the derivationof a rule- whetherfrom immediatepolitical pressures
or from a larger evolution consonant with underlyingprinciplesof legal
order. I thinkthat the quality of legality,and gradations in it, will be
a primarypreoccupationof the sociology of law in the future,as it has
been in the past. In this work,moreover,we shall have to studythe rela-
tion between reason and social consensus, for we shall not be satisfied
with the assumption that communitysentiment,as it bears on law, is
basically nonrational.
Because reason is legally authoritative,scholarship has a direct sig-
nificancefor law that it does not have for other fields. This is indicated
by the special role of law-review articles and legal treatises cited as au-
thorityby the courts. This work usually involves a critical restatement
of common-lawdoctrine,but it also can and does locate new rights. The
restatementaspect does give work a special status,but there is no funda-
mental differencebetween sociological learning made legally relevant
and the kind of analytical writing found in the law reviews. In any
case, like any other inquiry, legal reasoning cannot but accept the au-
thorityof scientificallyvalidated conclusionsregardingthe nature of man
and his institutions. Therefore, inevitably,sociology and every other
social science have a part in the legal order.
The underlyingrole of reason explains why legal scholarship and the
sociology of law are mainly preoccupied with common law, and there-
fore with judicial behavior, ratherthan with legislation. It is true that
somewhat more emphasis in legal training is now placed on legisla-
tion, reflectingthe great growthof the legislativeprocess. It is also true
that the interpretationof statutesplays a large role in the judicial process.
But it is and will undoubtedlyremaintrue that the main access to the law
by legal analysts is through the judiciary. More important for legal
sociology, legal doctrineis a vital part of common law but of much less
importancein legislation.
A concern for the role of reason must bring with it a certain dis-
affectionwith what has come to be known as legal realism. The hard-
headed effortto base our notionof law on actual behavior is certainlycon-

genial to a sociological orientation. But human behavior is a very subtle
mixture of self-restraintand impulse, idealism and self-interest,be-
havior guided by a long-range end-in-view and behavior compelled b/
day-to-daypressures. We cannot accept as more than a passing polemi-
cal formulathe aphorismthat the law is what the judges say it is. Taken
literally,this settlesnothing,for if a consistencyis found in judicial be-
havior, searching out the underlyingpremisesof a normativesystemand
upholding the essential ingredientsof legality, then all nonpositivistin-
terpretationsof law are still available and the problems they raise are
with us still.
The idea of reason presumes that there are principlesof criticismof
positive law. It also presumes,as Lon Fuller has pointedout,3that there
are principles of criticism of "living" law. Little is gained in any
ultimate sense by looking beyond positive law to actual normative be-
havior. We must go on to seek out the foundationsin reason for choos-
ing among human norms those that are to be given the sanction of law.
This will bringus, I cannot doubt, to an acceptance of some version of a
doctrine of natural law, although it may not, and perhaps should not,
be called that,given its historicalassociations. A modern naturalistper-
spective may be preferable,despite the still-unsettledquestion of wheth-
er an objective basis of normative order can be discovered, and despite
the large differencesbetween positivism and pragmatism,affectingthe
ideal of reason in law, regarding the subjective componentof valuation
and the role of will in judgment. But whatever the philosophical
auspices, the search for principlesof criticismbased on social naturalism
must go on. Law based on reason and nature summons man to his
potentialitiesbut sees those potentialitiesas somethingthat science can
identify; law based on reason and nature locates the weaknesses of the
human spirit,such as pride,apathy,and self-abasement,and works to off-
set them. The natural order, as it concerns man, is compact of poten-
tiality and vulnerability,and it is our long-run task to see how these
characteristicsof man work themselvesout in the structureand dynamics
of social institutions.
3 Fuller,American
LegalRealism
, 82 U.Pa.L.Rev.458(1934).

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Association of American Law Schools

Southwestern Law School

THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW

idea of dealing with legal conceptsand'doctrine froma sociologi-

making institutionsdeal with a concrete and practical world. Recogni-

Stage II and its Problems

I am sure that any effortto ground legal doctrineon social-scienceknowl-

My aim in these studies is, as far as possible, to bring our broad

hypothesisthat there are discernibleand ultimatelycompellingpressures

Stage III and its Problems

legal scholars. Whatever the lawyer's commitmentto legal positivism,

headed effortto base our notionof law on actual behavior is certainlycon-

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