QUALITY

ASSURANCE
DIRECTORATE

EASA FINDINGS
(2017-2019)

23.10.2019
QUALITY
ASSURANCE
DIRECTORATE
 EASA AUDITS & NUMBER of FINDINGS/OBS.

EASA AUDITS & FINDINGS LEVEL-1 LEVEL-2 OBS

2017 MAY 0 6 0

MARCH 0 4 0
2018
DECEMBER 0 2 1

2019 JUNE 0 5 3

TOTAL 0 17 4
QUALITY
ASSURANCE 2
DIRECTORATE
 EASA AUDITS & NUMBER of FINDINGS/OBS.

0
MAY MARCH DECEMBER JUNE
2017 2018 2019
LEVEL-1 0 0 0 0
LEVEL-2 6 4 2 5
OBS 0 0 1 3
QUALITY
ASSURANCE 3
DIRECTORATE
 EASA AUDIT FINDINGS

2019 JUNE

QUALITY
ASSURANCE 4
DIRECTORATE
 AUDIT FINDINGS - 2019 JUNE

FINDING-1

The organisation is unable to demonstrate compliance with 145.A.25 (d) with regards to
Storage facilities , as evidenced by:

The line station store located in AYT contains wheels stored without any protection for
covering the hubs

Note: additionally the MPM procedure 1.24, with regards of the periodic wheel rotation, does
not specify how many degrees are expected for every rotation's event; the actual procedure
in place at AYT uses a 90 degrees rotation, differently from the 45 degrees rotation that is in
use at IST.

QUALITY
ASSURANCE 5
DIRECTORATE
 AUDIT FINDINGS - 2019 JUNE

The related personnel’s lack of information about the necessity of the protective cover for wheel & tire assies in MPM
1.24G.
Root Cause of Finding:
There isn’t any fixed angle for rotation defined in MPM 1.24G.

Hub caps have been sent to AYT and installed on the wheel and tire assies. (Attachment-1990.1)

Immediate Corrective Action(s): Wheel and tire assies in other EASA approved Line stations (ESB, PRN, IST) have been checked for the existence of
cover or hub cap on the wheels. (Attachments-1990.2,1990.3,1990.4,1990.5)

MPM 1.24G (Maintenance and Inspection Procedure for Aircraft Tires) has been revised. In the revision
Protective cover or hup cap usage requirement has been added to the storage conditions. (Attachment-1990.6)
Rotation procedure has been defined with respect to manufacturer’s recommendations, and INFLATED WHEEL AND
TIRE ASSY ROTATION RECORD FORM has been developed as a new form for the control of wheel assy rotation.
(Attachment-1990.7)
Preventive Action(s):
After the procedure revision, associated personnel has been trained. (Attachment-1990.8)
Additionally LINE STATION MONTHLY CHECKLIST FORM has been revised for the routine control of stored wheel
assies to check whether they are stored with covers or hub caps and rotation of wheels. (Attachment-1990.9)

QUALITY
ASSURANCE 6
DIRECTORATE
 AUDIT FINDINGS - 2019 JUNE

FINDING-2

The Organisation cannot demonstrate compliance with Part 145.A.40 (a) with regards to
Availability and use of equipment and tools , as evidenced by:

Some tools necessary to perform basic line maintenance services are missing in the line
stations of AYT and IST (i.e. 757 & 767 tools for wheels replacement in AYT, 767 thrust
reverser deactivation tools in IST)

Note: a new evaluation of the capability in the stations of AYT and IST is required to the
organization.

QUALITY
ASSURANCE 7
DIRECTORATE
 AUDIT FINDINGS - 2019 JUNE

Tracking method for the availability of the necessary tools to perform basic line maintenance services at the station
Root Cause of Finding:
has not been defined in details in MPM L1.1 and/or attachments.

AYT and IST line station capabilities have been evaluated by the responsible management and decided that the
capabilities can continue.
Immediate Corrective Action(s):
B757 and B767 tools have been checked and missing tools have been ordered.

The tools inventory of the EASA approved line stations (AYT, ESB, PRN, IST) necessary to perform basic line
maintenance services for all A/C types recorded in station capability list has been checked for the availability in the
stations.

MPM L1.1 attachments have been revised and combined as Attachment -1 on the A/C type basis iaw EASA User
Preventive Action(s): Guide.

Form MPM L1.1/03 (Line station Monthly Checklist Form) has been revised: The item "Are the tools necessary to
perform basic line maintenance services for all A/C types recorded in station capability list available in the station?"
has been added in the checklist.

QUALITY
ASSURANCE 8
DIRECTORATE
 AUDIT FINDINGS - 2019 JUNE

FINDING-3
"The Organisation cannot demonstrate compliance with Part 145.A.45 (e) with regards to
the Maintenance Data, as evidenced by:

Job card in use in the special processes shop does not have precise reference to the
maintenance instructions included in the standard process accepted by the TCH (i.e. the job
card “Boeing SOPM 20-10-03- shot peening” issued by THT includes wrong references to the
AMS 2430 procedure)

QUALITY
ASSURANCE 9
DIRECTORATE
 AUDIT FINDINGS - 2019 JUNE
The shop engineer had checked the updated reference document (AMS 2430 Rev U) after its publication. He reviewed
the rationale section (summary of affected chapters) and checked the vertical lines that were put to the left of the
Root Cause of Finding: revised rows on revised pages. Although, the numbering of subparts has been revised, these changes were neither
indicated with vertical lines nor mentioned in the rationale section. Since he did not expect any changes on the
numbering of subparts, the shop engineer could not notice the differences as lack of awareness.

The wrong references on Technical Process Record Form No:31-16-009 were corrected in accordance with AMS 2430
Revision U Also, all other Technical Process Record Form used by the shop were checked and verified to be have been
updated according to related MPM 1.8F The Procedure for Preparation and Usage of Technical Process Record Form
Immediate Corrective Action(s): procedure and applicable standards

An informative quality bulletin about root causes of this finding has been prepared to assign Component Shops
Directorate as an online training

A classroom training about the following regulations/procedures on the preparation of shop job card has been given to
all personnel of Special Processes Shop in order to increase awareness;

1. EASA MOE 2.8 Maintenance Instructions and Relationship to Aircraft / Aircraft Component Manufacturer’s
Instructions Including Updating and Availability to Staff,
Preventive Action(s): 2. EASA MOE 2.13 Maintenance Documentation in Use and Its Completion and Turkish Technic,
3. MPM 1.8F The Procedure for Preparation and Usage of Technical Process Record Form)

This training included into tailored company procedures (MOE/MPM) training has been given to Special Processes
Shop personnel as classroom Training
Also, this training has been given to all Component Shops Directorate as an online training
QUALITY
ASSURANCE 10
DIRECTORATE
 AUDIT FINDINGS - 2019 JUNE

FINDING-4
"The Organisation can not demonstrate compliance with 145.A.48 (a) with regards to
Procedure for general verification of aircraft/component after maintenance completion,

As evidenced by: the control method in use for standard tools could potentially affect
negatively the ability to ensure that component is clear of tools after completion of
maintenance (i.e. the location of some scissors in the toolboxes present in the emergency
equipment shop; the location of some bits in the toolboxes present in the cabin seats shop);

Note: The standard tools are not registered for tracking purposes."

QUALITY
ASSURANCE 11
DIRECTORATE

Root Cause of Finding:
Immediate Corrective Action(s):
Preventive Action(s):
AUDIT FINDINGS - 2019 JUNE
MPM 1.6 Off-Wing Tool/Equipment Management for Component Maintenance Procedure, MPM 1.6A On-wing Tool and Equipment Management Procedure, MPM
1.8F The Procedure for Preparation and Usage of Technical Process Record Form did not clearly define did not explain in detailed how IR 145.A.48(a) and MOE 2.16
requirements will be applied.
MPM 1.6A On-wing Tool and Equipment Management Procedure did not clearly defined how the technician will proceed when the extraneous tools/parts present in
the toolbox that are not listed in toolbox list.
During the audit, all components in the Emergency Equipment Shop were checked that they were clear of tools and equipment. Special tools and standard tools
were checked and tool catalogs were updated according to spare standard tools .
It was ensured that standard tools are matched with the tool catalog and all tools are in place.
A Quality Information Bulletin has been issued to Component Shops Directorate about the verification that a check has been carried out to ensure that the
engine/component is clear of all tools, equipment and any extraneous parts or material by referring EASA 145.A.48(a) and MOE 2.16.5.3 as an online training.
All toolbox which are used by Cabin Interior Shop were checked and the bits used during the maintenance were listed in the Technician Tool Box Tool List
MPM 1.6 Off-Wing Tool/Equipment Management for Component Maintenance has been revised that the special and standard tools used during the maintenance
will be returned to tool shop during final inspection (Attachment 1993.4).
MPM 1.6A On-wing Tool and Equipment Management has been revised the special and standard tools used during the maintenance will be returned to tool shop at
the end of each shift. (Attachment 1993.5 draft MPM 1.6A On-wing Tool and Equipment Management Procedure).
MPM 1.8F The Procedure for Preparation and Usage of Technical Process Record Form and FM MPM 1.8F/02 Technical Process Record Form has been revised that
Component Certifying Staff who performs the final inspection of the component by using Technical Process Record Form (TPRF) will check that standard tools used
at maintenance are matched with the tool catalog and all tools are in place, the component is free from standard and special tools. At the end of this check, CC/S will
sign off the final inspection section of Technical Process Record Form (Attachment 1993.6).
MPM 1.8F “The Procedure for Preparation and Usage of Technical Process Record Form” and FM MPM 1.8F/02 “Technical Process Record Form” and MPM 1.6 “Off-
Wing Tool/Equipment Management for Component Maintenance” procedures have been assigned to all related maintenance personnel as an online training.
(Attachment 1993.7).
MPM 1.6A On-wing Tool and Equipment Management Procedure has been revised that the tools/parts in the toolbox should be compared with the toolbox list by
the technician using the toolbox whether there is missing or extraneous tool/part.
MPM 1.6A “On-wing Tool and Equipment Management Procedure” will be assigned to all related maintenance personnel as an online training after approval
internally. (Attachment 1993.8 draft On-wing Tool and Equipment Management Procedure).
QUALITY
ASSURANCE 12
DIRECTORATE
 AUDIT FINDINGS - 2019 JUNE

FINDING-5
"The Organisation cannot demonstrate compliance with Part 145.A.50 (d) with regards to the
Certification of Maintenance, as evidenced by:

The process in use for releasing to service landing gears assemblies to third party customers:

1) Does not include final verification of the list of Life Limited Parts (LLP) by the certifying
staff before the release to service with EASA Form 1 (i.e. LLP status sheet issued with
reference to Form 1 tracking nr. 2120676-5-ES)

2) The EASA Form 1 block 12 ""remarks"" does not refer to the LLP status sheet (i.e. Form 1
tracking nr. 2120676-5-E)"

QUALITY
ASSURANCE 13
DIRECTORATE
 AUDIT FINDINGS - 2019 JUNE
MOE 2.16 “Release to Service Procedure” and MPM 1.13J “Landing Gear Maintenance Documents and Their Completion”, MPM1.16B “Issuance of EASA
Root Cause of Finding: Form 1” and MPM1.16C “Release to Service Procedure for Engines, APUs, Components and Parts” procedures did not clearly define how and when the
status of life limited parts are checked and verified/stamped by Component/Engine/APU Certifying Staff.

Immediate Corrective Action(s):
A Quality Information Bulletin has been prepared to notify that the final verification of the List of Life Limited Parts (LLP) shall be performed by the
certifying staff before the release to service with EASA Form 1 and the LLP status shall be written/referred in Block 12 “remarks” of the EASA Form 1. The
Quality Information Bulletin was given as classroom training for Certifying Staffs of Landing Gear Shop and was assigned as a Continuation Training to all
Component/Engine/APU Certifying Staff. Thus Workshops of the Component Shop Directorate which have component/engine/APU maintenance
capability for the component/engine/APU that contains Life Limited Part(s) will be informed about the List of Life Limited Parts which should be checked
and verified/stamped by the certifying staff before the issuance of the EASA Form 1. Also, a reference to Life Limited Part status is written/referred in
Block 12 “Remarks” of the EASA Form 1.

24 June 2019 dated EASA Form 1s were issued by the Landing Gear Shop after the EASA audit was performed. Life Limited Part Status in Block 12
“Remarks” and the List of Life Limited Parts was checked, verified and stamped by certifying staff. List of Life Limited Part was attached to related EASA
Form 1s. (Attachment 1994.3)

Preventive Action(s):
• FM MPM 1.13J/07 Life Limited Part Status Sheet List has been revised to verify LLP status of components for adding the Block 12 “Remarks” part to
EASA Form 1
• MOE 2.16 “Release to Service Procedure”(Attachment 1994.5) and MPM 1.13J “Landing Gear Maintenance Documents and Their Completion» and
MPM1.16C “Release to Service Procedure for Engines, APUs, Components and Parts” procedures has been revised including but not limited to
checking and verification of Life Limited Parts Status
• Note 1: Attachment 5.5 has sent to EASA for approval. After approval of EASA procedure will be used.
• Note 2: MPM1.16C “Release to Service Procedure for Engines, APUs, Components and Parts” procedures has been revised but internal approval
process has not completed yet. After internal approval Quality Information Bulletin will be assigned to all related personnel as an online training.
• Note 3 :MPM 1.16B “Issuance of EASA Form” procedure has not been revised because there is no reference to FM MPM 1.13J/07 “Life Limited Part
Status Sheet List”.
• Revised and draft procedures has been given as an online training to all related shops’ component/engine/APU certifying staff.

QUALITY
ASSURANCE 14
DIRECTORATE
 AUDIT FINDINGS - 2019 JUNE

OBSERVATION-1
The organisation is strongly recommended to recall to all the certifying staff:

a) To report in the aircraft technical logbook reference to the revision number for every
maintenance data used (i.e. AMM, TSM/FIM, MEL)

b) To report sistematically in the aircraft logbook reference to the TSM/FIM when the entry
point in the technical logbook is a fault reported by pilots or aircraft systems

QUALITY
ASSURANCE 15
DIRECTORATE
 AUDIT FINDINGS - 2019 JUNE

Root Cause of Finding: N/A

A Quality Information Bulletin has been prepared to remind all the certifying staff:

a) To report in the aircraft technical logbook reference to the revision number for every maintenance data used (i.e.
AMM, TSM/FIM, MEL)
Immediate Corrective Action(s):
b) To report sistematically in the aircraft logbook reference to the TSM/FIM when the entry point in the technical
logbook is a fault reported by pilots or aircraft systems and assigned to the related maintenance personnel as online
training.

Preventive Action(s): N/A

QUALITY
ASSURANCE 16
DIRECTORATE
 AUDIT FINDINGS - 2019 JUNE

OBSERVATION-2

The organisation is recommended to include the NRC as one of the possible references to be
included in the block "remarks" of the unserviceable tag form.

QUALITY
ASSURANCE 17
DIRECTORATE
 AUDIT FINDINGS - 2019 JUNE

Root Cause of Finding: N/A

Unserviceable Tag” Form (FM MPM 1.13C/01 numbered) has been revised to facilitate the recording of
component/part/material serial number (S/N) on the subject tag. It has been approved internally.
After the completion of EASA MOE approval process, FM MPM 1.13C/01 numbered “Unservicaeable Tag” will be
used.

Immediate Corrective Action(s): Quality Information Bulletin has prepared about revised draft “Unserviceable Tag” and assigned to the related
maintenance personnel as online training.

Note: The attachments could not have been uploaded to the Private Document Attachment section. Therefore they
are sent via e-mail to Mr. Bazzocchi.

Preventive Action(s): N/A

QUALITY
ASSURANCE 18
DIRECTORATE
 AUDIT FINDINGS - 2019 JUNE

OBSERVATION-3

The organisation is recommended to identify appropriate areas for unserviceable parts

located in the drawers included in the movable stools used in the cabin seats shop.

QUALITY
ASSURANCE 19
DIRECTORATE
 AUDIT FINDINGS - 2019 JUNE

Root Cause of Finding: N/A

Immediate Corrective Action(s): Parts without proper identification have been removed from drawers of movable stools and sent for disposal.

Serviceable and unserviceable boxes have been prepared in order to secure and segregate the sub-parts removed for
the main part undergoes the maintenance. Drawers of stools have been identified for keeping in-use tools during
Preventive Action(s): maintenance

The related staff have been informed about the usage of part boxes and stool drawers

QUALITY
ASSURANCE 20
DIRECTORATE
 EASA AUDIT FINDINGS

2018 DECEMBER

QUALITY
ASSURANCE 21
DIRECTORATE
 AUDIT FINDINGS – 2018 DECEMBER

FINDING-1

"The Organisation can not demonstrate compliance with 145.A.30 (e) with regards to
Control of staff competence / Control of staff human factors understanding, as evidenced
by:
Interview with Cat "C" Certifying Staff reveals that personnel does not demonstrate enough
knowledge regarding the conditions to apply the critical tasks list issued by the customer
and by the Part-145 approved organisation.

Note: the interview has been conducted during the attendance of on going maintenance on
A/C B737-800 reg. marks EI-ENJ, check "C" + works, THT WO: 2061623”

QUALITY
ASSURANCE 22
DIRECTORATE
 AUDIT FINDINGS – 2018 DECEMBER

Category C Certifying Staff could not thoroughly express himself due to improper choice of English wordings to
Root Cause of Finding: explain the usage of Company and Customer Critical Task Lists despites it has been clearly explained in these
procedures.

Immediate Corrective Action(s):
Classroom training has been provided to the interviewed Category C Certifying Staff about the performance of the
critical maintenance tasks (including the usage of Company and Customer Critical Task Lists) by referring related
paragraphs of MPM 1.10C “Independent Inspection Procedure” and MPM 1.16D “The Procedure for Preparation of
Aircraft Release to Service Certificate” (Attachment-1.1). An examination has been performed about the performance
of the critical tasks and the staff found competent after the training

Training presentation has been prepared by extracting the related paragraphs of MPM 1.10C “Independent
Inspection Procedure” and MPM 1.16D “The Procedure for Preparation of Aircraft Release to Service Certificate”
Preventive Action(s):
about the performance of critical maintenance tasks (Attachment-1.3). Classroom training will be provided to all
Category C Certifying Staff and an online training will be provided to all aircraft maintenance staff.

QUALITY
ASSURANCE 23
DIRECTORATE
 AUDIT FINDINGS – 2018 DECEMBER

FINDING-2
"The Organisation can not demonstrate compliance with 145.A.48 (b) with regards to
Procedure to implement an error capturing method after performance of critical task, as
evidenced by:

EWIS Zonal Inspection card (EZAP TC) have been performed and signed-off, however
subsequent inspection on the same zone conducted by EASA inspector reveals dirty sections
of cables/wirings that affect the inspection's effectiveness (task card 20-360-00-01 for EWIS
inspection of MLG Wheel Well performed on A/C B737-800 reg. marks EI-ENJ during check
"C" + works, THT WO: 2061623)”

QUALITY
ASSURANCE 24
DIRECTORATE
 AUDIT FINDINGS – 2018 DECEMBER

Maintenance Staff who has performed EWIS inspections could not access and clean some sections of inspection area
Root Cause of Finding:
because that he did not use proper access equipment/stand that was available in the hangar equipment shop

Non-routine work card (No: 00276) has been raised about re-performance of “the task 20-360-00-01 EWIS harness
cleaning and inspection in the main landing gear” (Attachment-2.1). Cleaning of related area has been performed and
Immediate Corrective Action(s):
EWIS inspections have been made. Inspections on the other EWIS related areas have re-performed and found that
previous inspections made satisfactorily.

Training presentation has been prepared about the performance of EWIS inspection (including the usage of
equipment) (Attachment-2.2), it will be provided as classroom training to Base Maintenance staff and as online
training to Cabin Interior and Line Maintenance staff.
Preventive Action(s):
Quality Assurance Directorate will perform at least two unscheduled audits for the performance of EWIS inspections
for SAW and IST base maintenance facilities.

QUALITY
ASSURANCE 25
DIRECTORATE
 AUDIT FINDINGS – 2018 DECEMBER

OBSERVATION-1

"Interview with Cat "B1" staff reveals that personnel cannot demonstrate complete
awareness regarding the performance of the tool in use with reference to the Boeing
"Caution" note mentioning tool limitations in terms of maximum Torque and maximum
rotation speed to be delivered.

Note: observed during the attendance of on going maintenance on A/C B777-200 reg. marks
HZ-AKU, check "C" + works, THT WO: 2003911 (AMM task 52-37-04-710-801 Cargo Door Lift
& Latch/Hook Manual Drives)"

QUALITY
ASSURANCE 26
DIRECTORATE
 AUDIT FINDINGS - 2018 DECEMBER
MPM 1.6A On-wing Tool and Equipment Management Procedure does not clearly define how the aircraft maintenance
Root Cause of Finding:
staff will ensure the tool specifications in maintenance manual are satisfied by the tool they use.

A non-routine work card (No: 01554) has been created to re-perform AMM task 52-37-04-710-81 Cargo Door Lift &
Hatch/Hook Manual Drives. Non-routine work card has been performed by using the tool with P/N: 14RAA11AH3
Immediate Corrective Action(s):
which ensures the tool specifications (J52017) mentioned in AMM (Attachment-3.1). Detailed visual inspection has
been also performed on the related cargo door area to ensure there were no damaged occurred.

MPM 1.6A On-wing Tool and Equipment Management Procedure will be revised to explain the details how the tool
room staff and aircraft maintenance staff are going to ensure tool specifications in maintenance data are satisfied by
the tool they are used. “The technician will request the tool (except task specific tools) from tool room by using
specification code mentioned in maintenance data. TRAX system will show the available tools the meets specifications
and the technician can check the documentation (such as CofC) in which the tool’s specifications (if cannot ensure after
physical check) in the TRAX system to compare both specifications.

Preventive Action(s): If tool specification code mentioned in maintenance data is not associated with any tool in the tool room in TRAX
system, aircraft maintenance department will apply to Tool Room and Tool Planning Management for evaluating
available tools with the specification mentioned in maintenance data. The evaluation records are uploaded for the (to
be used) tool in TRAX system.

Revised MPM 1.6A procedure will assigned as online training to aircraft maintenance staff, tool room staff and tool
planning staff.

QUALITY
ASSURANCE 27
DIRECTORATE
 EASA AUDIT FINDINGS

2018 MARCH

QUALITY
ASSURANCE 28
DIRECTORATE
 AUDIT FINDINGS – 2018 MARCH

FINDING-1

The Organisation cannot demonstrate compliance with Part 145.A.30 (e) with regards to
Personnel Requirement.
This is evidenced by:

The format & layout for the competence assessment is to some extent “tick-boxes” and
not an open text field that allow the person responsible for the assessment to record
questions raised, responses from the candidate.
E.g. Competence assessment for CRS staff authorization no. 2869E in connection with
authorization granted 1DEC2017.

QUALITY
ASSURANCE 29
DIRECTORATE
 AUDIT FINDINGS – 2018 MARCH
Following MPM 2.14 definition is deemed to be sufficient by the quality personnel who check the applicant's
Competence Assessment Forms.
“The observation of the Assessor(s) can be indicated by at least one (1) maintenance record (selected maintenance
Root Cause of Finding:
task should enable the Assessor to observe the staff i.a.w. the defined assessment criteria and it should not be a task
such as a visual inspection or preparation to maintenance).”

MPM 2.14 "Competence Assessment of Personnel" Procedure and FM 2.14 / 01 "Competence Assessment Form" will
be revised that assessment should not be deemed only marking the boxes, assessor’s remarks should be written on
Immediate Corrective Action(s):
related fields also.

Quality Information Bulletin will be prepared for revised MPM 2.14 "Competence Assessment of Personnel"
procedure and FM 2.14 / 01 "Competence Assessment Forms. This bulletin will be assigned to relevant personnel’s CT
Preventive Action(s):
accounts.

QUALITY
ASSURANCE 30
DIRECTORATE
 AUDIT FINDINGS – 2018 MARCH

FINDING-2

The Organisation cannot demonstrate compliance with Part 145.A.40 (b) with regards to
Tool.

This is evidenced by:

In line maintenance tool store Pressure Gauge (batch no. 13033505) is apparently lost as it
cannot be located in tool store.

QUALITY
ASSURANCE 31
DIRECTORATE
 AUDIT FINDINGS – 2018 MARCH

Root Cause of Finding: Lack of process

In order to determine current status of the inventory, a complete tool inventory check has been performed returning
Immediate Corrective Action(s): with no findings other than the subject missing pressure gauge. All tools, except the tool subject to the Finding, were
in their designated bins per TRAX data

To improve inventory control; a process has been described and a software has been created to provide that in Line
Maintenance Tool Shop inventory count is performed on monthly basis instead of yearly to increase check frequency,
all the control findings are recorded. Besides, the related signed forms will be uploaded into the server to have
records archived and accessible.
Preventive Action(s):
MPM 1.6A Procedure (On-Wing Tool/ Equipment Management) is going to be revised to include monthly control
criteria and all relevant tool shop staff is going to be trained about this new process and the changes made to the
procedure.

QUALITY
ASSURANCE 32
DIRECTORATE
 AUDIT FINDINGS – 2018 MARCH

FINDING-3

The Organisation cannot demonstrate compliance with Part 145.A.42 (a) with regards to
Acceptance of Components.

This is evidenced by:

3 ea. parts in British Airways storage were found without certification (CoC or similar)
despite of the attached records confirms that a certificate is checked.
E.g. fuel filter, p/n: 5L066 s/n:59003 – checked on 23MAY2016.

QUALITY
ASSURANCE 33
DIRECTORATE
 AUDIT FINDINGS – 2018 MARCH

Root Cause of Finding: Related staff is not trained for receiving inspection of incoming customer parts/materials.

All customer parts/materials are checked for proper certification documents. The ones improperly documented are
Immediate Corrective Action(s): put into quarantine and asked customer to send acceptable certificates for them.

All customer stored part/material management including receiving inspections has been handed over to Stores and
Acceptance Management in order to manage receiving inspections of customer parts/materials by experienced staff.
Store and acceptance management defined in MPM L1.1 (Line Maintenance Control and Storing of Aircraft
Preventive Action(s):
Components, Tools and Equipment) procedure will be changed as receiving inspections are to be carried out by Stores
and Acceptance Management but not with a staff from Customer A/C Maintenance department.

QUALITY
ASSURANCE 34
DIRECTORATE
 AUDIT FINDINGS – 2018 MARCH

FINDING-4

The Organisation cannot demonstrate compliance with Part 145.A.55 (a) with regards to
Maintenance Records.

This is evidenced by:

Maintenance records generated in “customer” line maintenance department is not signed

and archived according to MPM 1.14 procedures.

E.g. British Airways daily check performed on 1MAR2018 on A320 reg. G-EUYL.

QUALITY
ASSURANCE 35
DIRECTORATE
 AUDIT FINDINGS – 2018 MARCH

There was not awareness about signing/stamping customer line maintenance task cards (etc. transit check, daily check
Root Cause of Finding:
cards) without the request of customers.

A phone call has been made with the representative of British Airways about the Finding and confirmed that daily
Immediate Corrective Action(s): check cards should be stamped and archived as maintenance records. After that first daily check at 03.March.2018
was done according to Finding.

All certifying staff have been informed briefly about the Finding and announced that they should sign/stamp line
maintenance task cards of customers properly and attach them into work orders for archiving. Furthermore a
Preventive Action(s):
comprehensive quality information bulletin will be issued about sign/stamp procedure of customer line maintenance
task card.

QUALITY
ASSURANCE 36
DIRECTORATE
 EASA AUDIT FINDINGS

2017 MAY

QUALITY
ASSURANCE 37
DIRECTORATE
 AUDIT FINDINGS - 2017 MAY
FINDING-1

The Organisation cannot demonstrate compliance with Part 145.A.25 (a) with regards to
ensure that environmental and work area contamination is unlikely to occur. This is
evidenced by:

The hangar IST-1 Hangar 2 is permanently used at the same time for base and line
maintenance, and hangar doors are kept open in order to allow the movement of the
aircraft.

This generates dust, airborne contamination and birds to enter the hangar, up to a level in
the work task area where visible aircraft/component surface contamination is evident.

QUALITY
ASSURANCE 38
DIRECTORATE
 AUDIT FINDINGS - 2017 MAY
Root Cause of Finding: All hangar responsible directorates are specified except the IST1 2nd hangar.

Cleaning of the hangar has been provided and Aircraft Maintenance Directorate Personnel have been informed via CT
Immediate Corrective Action(s):
(computer training) about closing the hangar doors immediately right after the A/C entrance and exit movements.

The IST1 1st hangar is under the Line Maintenance Directorate’s responsibility and IST1 2nd hangar will be assigned under the Aircraft Maintenance
Directorate’s responsibility; new subcontracting personnel will be hired and will be appointed to control A/C entrance and exit movements, control
hangar doors and hangar cleaning in the IST1 2nd hangar.
According to the actions above, MPM 1.7 and MPM 1.10B will be updated.

After the procedures have been approved, all related personnel (Aircraft Maintenance Directorate, Line Maintenance Directorate) will be informed
by a detailed presentation bulletin via CT (computer training).

The fields in front of the hangars will be cleaned periodically by the Facility Maintenance directorate. Unit vehicles will not be allowed in the
hangar field and general hangar usage will be respected by all directorates.

A warning label will be placed on the hangar doors.

Last Status (15.August.2017):

Preventive Action(s): In total, 18 personnel have been assigned for the general cleaning of the IST1 2nd hangar, 9 of which have been assigned the morning shift
between 7:00-15:00 and 9 personnel during the afternoon shift between 15:00-23:00. An e-mail outlining these job definitions has been sent to
the technical cleaning personnel and hangar doors have been taken into consideration.
MPM 1.7 ‘Occupational Health, Safety, Environment and Cleanliness Procedure’ has been updated to reflect above mentioned topics (page:12/14).

MPM 1.10B ‘Application of a Work Package’ was not updated because the context is not found relevant.

A detailed presentation was assigned to the Aircraft Maintenance Directorate personnel and Line Maintenance Directorate personnel.

Periodic cleaning has begun in the fields in front of the hangars by the Facility Maintenance Directorate. Samples of the cleaning chart can be
found in the attachment.
QUALITY
ASSURANCE A warning label was placed on the hangar doors.
DIRECTORATE
39
 AUDIT FINDINGS - 2017 MAY
FINDING-2

The Organisation cannot demonstrate compliance with Part 145.A.42 (a) with regards to
acceptance of components. This is evidenced by:

Engine bleed valve pn 6764B040000 sn 676402026 have been accepted by THY store and
cleared for installation without having the required acceptance documentation

QUALITY
ASSURANCE 40
DIRECTORATE
 AUDIT FINDINGS - 2017 MAY
Root Cause of Finding: Inadequate procedure.

Engine bleed valve P/N 6764B040000, S/N 676402026 has been sent to Liebherr Aerospace Toulouse Company in
Immediate Corrective Action(s): order to be repaired and certificated .
Engine bleed valve was tagged as unserviceable and sent to Repair Pursuit Management.

MPM 1.2 Receiving Procedure will be revised so as to include the statement (Pls. see pages 9 and 10):
“Components which come seperately from Engine, APU or next higher assembly are checked to make sure whether
they are accompanied with appropriate release certificate or not even if they were sent as installed on Engine, APU or
next higher assembly. Components which are not accompanied with appropriate release certificate are directed to
Repair Pursuit Management as unserviceable in order to make them serviceable appropriately.”

All related staff ( at departments: Purchasing and Logistics Directorate, Component Shops Directorate, A/C
Maintenance Directorates – SAW and IST) will be informed about revised procedure by CT (computer training).
Preventive Action(s): Note: A Quality Bulletin has been prepared and assigned to CT accounts of the related staff at Purchasing and
Logistics Directorate.

Last Status (15.August.2017):

All related staff ( at departments: Purchasing and Logistics Directorate, Component Shops Directorate, A/C
Maintenance Directorates – SAW and IST) have been informed about revised procedure (MPM 1.2) via a Quality
Bulletin over CT (computer based training).

QUALITY
ASSURANCE 41
DIRECTORATE
 AUDIT FINDINGS - 2017 MAY
FINDING-3

The Organisation cannot demonstrate compliance with Part 145.A.55 (a) with regards to
recording of maintenance. This is evidenced by:

The removal installation task of blankets in the aft cargo compartment necessary to
accomplish a structural repair on aircraft TC-JFZ (WO 1677855, NRWI 00084) has not been
recorded.

QUALITY
ASSURANCE 42
DIRECTORATE
 AUDIT FINDINGS - 2017 MAY
Lack of knowledge on how to create and fill an NRWI due to lack of detailed information in the relevant Form Manual
Root Cause of Finding: (FM MPM 1.10B/04: Non-Routine Work Item Form)

A new NRWI (NRC00440: “All blankets in aft&fwd cargo compartment to be inspected for condition and correct
Immediate Corrective Action(s):
installation. This to make sure the work in NRWI: 084 has been completed”) has been created and completed.

The instructions of NRWI Form Manual (FM MPM 1.10B/04) will be reviewed and be detailed to specify that all major
fields and steps should be written correctly and adequately on NRWI. This procedure will be given to all related
maintenance staff in a class training or CT(computer based training) after revision approved.

Last Status (15.August.2017):

Preventive Action(s):
The instructions of NRWI Form Manual (FM MPM 1.10B/04) has been reviewed and detailed to specify that all major
fields and steps should be written correctly and adequately on NRWI.

This procedure revision has been given to all related maintenance staff as CT (computer based training).

QUALITY
ASSURANCE 43
DIRECTORATE
 AUDIT FINDINGS - 2017 MAY
FINDING-4

The Organisation cannot demonstrate compliance with Part 145.A.65 (b) with regards to
maintenance practices This is evidenced by:

Several bonding straps worn and damaged have been found on A330 TC-JDP (WO 17318863)
in the RH and LH conditioning packs area while the related zonal GVI task (A330-06-083) has
been closed without findings.

QUALITY
ASSURANCE 44
DIRECTORATE
 AUDIT FINDINGS - 2017 MAY
Root Cause of Finding: Lack of detailed training.

A new NRWI (NRC00162: There are damaged bonding straps (4 ea) on temperature control valves both packs and
both plenums) has been created to replace bonding straps. According to the NRWI, 4ea damaged bonding straps on
Temperature control valves at both packs and both plenums have been replaced.
Immediate Corrective Action(s):
The mechanics who missed this bonding strap inspection have been taken on an “on job training” session.

The mechanics who missed this bonding strap inspection have been taken on an “EWIS training” session.

A special detailed training document about “How to perform an Inspection task (GVI, SDI etc.)” will be developed and
given to all related maintenance staff in a class training or CT(computer based training).

Incorporation of these details into current initial/recurrent Inspection Trainings will be discussed and decided, if
found necessary.

Last Status (15.August.2017):

Preventive Action(s):
A special detailed training document about “How to perform an Inspection task (GVI, SDI etc.)” has been
developed and given to all related maintenance staff as CT(computer based training).

Incorporation of these details into current initial/recurrent Inspection Trainings has been discussed but not
found necessary; because of the fact that these details already take place satisfactorily in current EWIS
Trainings.
QUALITY
ASSURANCE 45
DIRECTORATE
 AUDIT FINDINGS - 2017 MAY
FINDING-5

The Organisation cannot demonstrate compliance with Part 145.A.70 (a) with regards to
maintenance organisation exposition This is evidenced by:

The MOE 2.13.4.3 does not address the following points with regard of cases when
maintenance data are revised during on-going maintenance:

a) Assessing impact for on-going maintenance by the maintenance organisation

b) Communications with customer/operator regarding the revision status of maintenance

data specified in the work order

Note: This content shall be transferred to MOE 2.8.

QUALITY
ASSURANCE 46
DIRECTORATE
 AUDIT FINDINGS - 2017 MAY
Incomplete assessment on EASA UG.CAO.00024-004 Section 2.8.1, 2.13.1 and 2.13.2 due to lack of details in the
Root Cause of Finding:
associated sections.

A working group (composed of members from Engineering, Production Planning, Base/Line Maintenance and Quality
departments) studied the cases to be implemented for maintenance for both “customers with engineering support
Immediate Corrective Action(s):
services contract” and “3rd party customers”. A guideline has been prepared to guide for the necessary procedure
(MOE and associated MPM’s) revisions.

• Relevant statements in MOE 2.13.4.3 will be assessed as per Attachment-5.1 and new implementation rules will
be formed.
• This recomposed portion of the MOE section 2.13.4.3 will be transferred from there to (under) MOE 2.8. (As a
new separate section following MOE.2.8.5 and to be named as “Control of revised external maintenance data
during on-going aircraft maintenance”).
• For final decisions how to perform and share responsibilities between departments concerning the case “for the
customers with engineering support services contract”, a detailed workshop with all related
parties/departments will be carried out. (Note: TT does not have an EASA customer with engineering support
services contract at the moment.)
Preventive Action(s):
• Affected MPM’s (like MPM 1.10B, 1.8D and 3.1C) will be revised accordingly.
• All revised documentation will be assigned to all relevant staff’s ( in engineering, production planning, base/line
maintenance and quality departments) CT (continuation training) accounts.

Last Status (15.November.2017):

All procedure revisions (MOE 2.8.6, MOE 2.13.4.3, MPM 1.8, MPM 1.8A, MPM 1.8D, MPM 1.10B, MPM 1.26, MPM
3.1C, FM MPM1.8A/01) have been finalized and a new form manual (FM MPM 1.10B/09 “Impact Analysis Form”) has
been created. All these revised/created documents have been introduced to all relevant engineering, planning and
maintenance staff via Quality Bulletins being assigned to their CT (computer training) accounts.
QUALITY
ASSURANCE 47
DIRECTORATE
 AUDIT FINDINGS - 2017 MAY
FINDING-6

The Organisation cannot demonstrate compliance with Part M.A.504 (a) with regards to
identification of unserviceable components. This is evidenced by:

Several galley modules and wirings removed from aircraft TC-JGB are not identified as u/s
and not properly protected (i.e. electrical connectors not plugged, presence of dust and bird
drops).

QUALITY
ASSURANCE 48
DIRECTORATE
 AUDIT FINDINGS - 2017 MAY
a) The related staff have confusion about usage of temporary serviceable and temporary unserviceable cards.
Root Cause of Finding:
b) The related staff have lack of knowledge about putting protection around/on the component after removal

The related staff have been warned/informed via CT (computer training) about identifying the parts removed from
Immediate Corrective Action(s):
the aircraft immediately and putting proper protection as necessary

a) All related personnel will be informed by a detailed presentation bulletin about correct usage of temporary
serviceable and temporary unserviceable cards, and how to keep of A/C components under appropriate
conditions. (MPM 1.10B, MPM 1.13A and MPM 1.3)
b) Also related workflow will be established in order to remove parts (either serviceable or unserviceable) from
hangar that are not going to be used on specific aircraft.

Last Status (15.August.2017):

Preventive Action(s):
All related personnel were informed by a detailed presentation, via CT (computer based training)
regarding; correct usage of temporary serviceable and temporary unserviceable cards (MPM 1.10B, MPM
1.13A, MPM 1.3), keeping of A/C components under appropriate conditions and procedure of workflow for
the removed parts that are not going to be used on a specific aircraft.

Standby components that are removed from aircraft is surrounded and protected.

QUALITY
ASSURANCE 49
DIRECTORATE
Teşekkür Ederiz

QUALITY
ASSURANCE 50
DIRECTORATE