Case Study

Business Law (LW204)

Jatin Dohlani
20131200
4 September 2021

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 • Scammel v. Ouston, (1941) A.C.251.

Facts:
Ouston agreed to purchase a new motor van from Scammell but
stipulated that the purchase price should be set up on a hire-purchase basis
over a period of two years, with some of the figure being part-paid by a van
that Ouston already owned.
Scammell claimed that the hire-purchase agreement had not been
implemented and therefore neither party was bound, and the agreement was
void on the basis of uncertainty.
Before the hire purchase terms had been agreed, Scammell refused to
proceed with the sale and because of this, Ouston brought a claim for
breaching the contract for the supply of the vehicle.
The trial judge awarded Ouston damages as it was believed that the
contract had been wrongly repudiated. Scammell appealed to the Court of
Appeal who dismissed his action. Scammell re-appealed the decision of the
trial judge to the House of Lords.
Conclusion:
The court found that the stipulation with respect to the enroll purchase
terms was questionable to the point that there couldn't be a precise
importance gotten from it. In light of this finding, there was no enforceable
arrangement between the social affairs and the charm was pardoned.

• Caponier v. Mason, (1950) 21 T.L.R.633

Facts:
In Chaproniere v Mason, the buyer purchased a bun from a bakery, and
as he tried to bite it, his teeth struck on a stone in the bun as a consequence of
which one of his teeth was broken and an abscess formed in the jaw.
Conclusion:

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 The court's decision was that such a bun was held to be unsatisfactory to
eat, i.e., the reason for which the purchaser had bought something very
similar. Besides, the way that the purchaser had bought the bun from a
specific pastry shop was adequate to show that the purchaser had depended
on the dealer's expertise and judgment.

• Simpkins v.Pays,(1955) 3 All.E.R.10

Facts:
Ms. Simpkins was a paying boarder at Ms. Pays house, who lived with
her granddaughter.
Ms. Simpkins habitually entered into newspaper competitions.
Concerning one weekly Sunday newspaper competition, the three agreed that
Ms. Simpkins would fill in a weekly coupon, with each person making three
forecasts, yet submitting them in Ms. Pays name, and divide the prize in the
event of winning.
A forecast made by Ms. Pays’ granddaughter in one of the coupons
submitted won a prize of £750 under Ms. Pays name. Ms. Pays refused to
distribute the prize and Ms. Simpkins claimed for one-third of the prize
under their agreement.
Conclusion:
The Court held that, paying little heed to the familial relations and the
relaxed environment, there was shared trait in the arrangement between the
Parties, by which they assented to the method of the convenience of the
guess in Ms. Pays name reliably and that, on the off chance that there was a
victory, every one of the three individuals would share the prize money
comparatively. Notwithstanding the local setting, the balancing of the coupon
by Ms. Simpkins was not a purposeful help to Ms. Pays yet rather according
to a course of action by which each Party had shares in the result,
consequently showing an objective to make real relations. The Court held

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 that the normal arrangement, paying little heed to how easygoing, included a
legitimately definitive agree to isolate the proposals in thirds.

▪ Rose & Frank Co. v. Crompton Bros., (1925) A.C. 445.

Facts:
An American company and English company entered into a sole agency
agreement in 1913 for the sale of paper goods in the USA.
The written agreement contained a clause stipulating that it was not a
formal nor legal agreement, and an “honourable pledge” between business
partners. Subsequently, the American company placed orders for paper which
were accepted by the British company.
Before the orders were fulfilled, the British company terminated the
agency agreement and refused to send the goods, claiming that the 1913
agreement was not legally binding and that, consequently, the orders did not
create legal obligations.

Conclusion:
For the present circumstance, the report and conditions didn't plan to
make any legal interest, and the assertion unequivocally impeding the
arrangement's authentic enforceability applies. Likewise, the Court held that
the way that the blueprint doesn't build up a real arrangement doesn't hinder
the orders and affirmations from involving legally definitive arrangements.
The shortfall of enforceability of an express legal course of action under an
association game plan doesn't obstruct the legal trades. The orders set up
imparted offers and affirmations to each trade having typical genuine
significance.

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 ▪ Upton Rural District Council v. Powell, (1942) All. E.R.. 220.

Facts:
A fire broke out on the farm, and the appellant telephoned to the police
inspector at Upton and asked for the fire brigade to be sent. The Upton fire
brigade was informed, and it went in the form at once.
The appellant was entitled to the services of the Pershore fire brigade
without charge, but the Upton brigade, if it .... went to a fire outside its own
area, was entitled to contract for payment for its services.
At the time when the brigade was summoned, all the parties concerned
were under the impression that the farm was in the Upton fire district. For the
Upton fire brigade, it was contended that a contract had been created by
implication, under which it was entitled to be remunerated for its services.
Conclusion:
The engaging party ought to be treated as having mentioned the Upton
fire separation to be dispatched off his farm, and the way that at the time the
get-togethers accepted that the fire was in, its space didn't hinder there being
a lawfully restricting relationship. The prosecutor was, in like manner, in
danger under a deduced consent to pay for the separation 's organizations.

▪ Willkie v. London Passenger Transport Board,(1947) 1 All. E.R. 258.

The action of an intending passenger in boarding an omnibus is
something done not by virtue of a contract but by virtue of the implied
licence given him by the bus company to get to the position where he may
make a contract with the company. A person holding a free travelling pass
boards a bus as a pass-holder. The plaintiff, a person holding a free travelling
pass, was injured by the negligence of the bus company by being thrown on
to the ground in the act of boarding the bus. The pass contained a condition
exempting the company from liability for injury however caused. The

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 plaintiff contended that the condition did not come into operation until he
was being conveyed as a passenger is conveyed. Held, the condition covered
the case.
The plaintiff further contended that the pass constituted a contract of
conveyance and that the condition there was rendered void by s.97 of the
Road Traffic Act, 1930(20 & 21 Geo. 5, c. 43). Held, the pass was merely a
revocable licence without contractual effect and s.97 of the Road Traffic Act,
1930, did not apply thereto.

▪ Taylor v. Partington, (1855) All E.R. 128.

In this case there is a Contract between A and B according to which A
has to modernize his house and B has to join as tenant. If the mode of
modernization is satisfactory to B. Here court decides that there is no
Certainty and therefore it is Void.

▪ Gould v. Gould. (1970) 1 Q.B. 275.

Facts:
The defendant was the claimant’s husband. He left her in 1966, telling
her that so long as his business was ‘ok’ he would pay her £15 a week. He
did so until 1968, when he fell into arrears.
The claimant sued for the overdue maintenance money. She argued that
the husband was bound by contract to continue paying as long as he still had
his business.
The husband responded that the agreement was not enforceable for two
reasons. The first was that he did not intend to be legally bound by it. The
second was that any contract would be void for uncertainty.
Conclusion
The Court of Appeal held for the litigant. The words utilized by the
spouse were unsure in light of the fact that they gave no measurement by

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 which to gauge whether the business was 'alright'. This, and the homegrown
idea of the plan, likewise showed that he didn't impartially expect to be
lawfully bound.

▪ Foley v. Classique Coaches Ltd., (1934) 2 K.B.1.

Facts:
Foley owned some land and a petrol station. He sold part of the land
adjoining the station to Classique Coaches Ltd, a coach company.
One of the conditions of the agreement was that the company purchase
all of their fuel for the coaches from Foley’s filling station as long as it could
be provided by him. The agreement also contained an arbitration clause. It
did not, however, provide a price for the agreement.
Classique complied with the terms of this agreement for three years until
one of their lawyers advised them that as a price had not been indicated, it
was unlikely in his opinion that there was a binding agreement. After this,
Classique stopped buying fuel from Foley, who sued them for breach of
contract.
Conclusion:
The agreement was not void for weakness essentially in light of the fact
that the expense for the fuel had not been referred to in the course of action.
Classique had played out their comprehension for a long time, and this
responsibility couldn't simply be denied. Where the social events had gone
with regards to like an agreement had been made and played out their
responsibilities accordingly, there was fairly a gathered term that the expense
of the fuel to be purchased under the course of action was to be reasonable.
Plus, if game plan couldn't be reached on what was a reasonable or sensible
worth, the agreement contained a carefulness arrangement unequivocally
planned to decide inquiries of this nature. Classique guides were

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 consequently in break of understanding by fail to purchase fuel from Foley,

depending on the situation by the course of action.

▪ Harris v. Nickerson, (1873) L.R.8 Q.B.286.

Facts:
The defendant was an auctioneer who had advertised in the London
papers that certain brewing materials, plant, and office furniture would be
sold by him by auction at Bury St. Edmunds over a period of three specified
days.
The plaintiff was a commission broker in London, who attended the sale
on the final day (on which it had been advertised that the office furniture,
which he had commission to purchase, would be sold). However, on that day,
all the lots of furniture were withdrawn by the defendant.
The claimant sought to recover his expenses and the time which he had
wasted in attending the auction from the defendant, arguing that the
withdrawal of the lots was a breach of contract which had been formed by
the offer made by the defendant in the advertisement, and accepted by the
claimant in attending the auction.

Conclusion:
The court held, pardoning the applicant's case, that the notification was
just a disclosure to enlighten potential purchasers that the arrangement was
happening. It was everything except a proposition to contract with any
person who might circle back to it by going to the deal, nor was it an
assurance that all of the articles advanced would be put or arrangement.
Taking everything into account, it didn't legally attach the respondent to sell
the things being alluded to on a particular day

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 ▪ Fitch v. Snedaker, (1868) 38 N.Y.288.

Facts:
Snedeker offered a reward to anyone who found and return the dog.
Fitch found the dog and returned it to before being aware of the offer made
by Snedeker.
Conclusion:
Fitch would not be qualified for the award. This is on the grounds that
acknowledgment of a deal, in obliviousness of deal, is no acknowledgment
and doesn't present any on Fitch. An individual who gives data without
information on the proposal of remuneration can't guarantee the award.

▪ Harvey v. Facey. (1893) A.C. 552.

Facts:
Harvey Telegraphed Facey "Will you sell us Bumper Hall Pen?
Telegraph lowest cash price-answer paid".
Facey responded stating “Bumper Hall Pen £900”
Harvey promptly sent his last message expressing "we consent to
purchase Bumper Hall Pen for 900 lakes asked by you.
Facey, however refused to sell at that price, at which Harvey sued,
stating that the telegram was an offer and he had accepted, therefore there
was a binding contract.

Conclusion:
The House of Lords held that the wire was an encouragement to treat,
not a substantial deal. Along these lines, no legitimate agreement existed.
The wire just instructed regarding the value, it didn't clarify different terms or
data and in this way couldn't make any legitimate commitment. Harvey's
wire "tolerating" the £900 was rather a proposition which Facey could either
acknowledge or dismiss. He dismissed it so there was no agreement made.

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 The preliminary appointed authority held that no legitimate agreement

existed and excused the suit. The court of allure turned around, holding that a
legitimate agreement existed among Harvey and Facey. Their Lordships will
in this manner submissively instruct Her Majesty that the judgment with
respect to the Supreme Court ought to be maintained. The appellants should
pay to the respondents the expenses of the allure for the Supreme Court and
of this allure.

▪ Great Northern Rail v. Witham(1873) L.R..9 C.P.16

Facts:
Great Northern advertised for tenders for the supply of iron for a period
of twelve months.
Witham tendered to supply the iron required for the period at certain
fixed prices and “in such quantities as the company’s store-keeper might
order from time to time”.
Great Northern accepted the tender but eventually Witham stopped
supplying the iron. Great Northern sued for breach of contract. Witham
defended the claim and alleged that the agreement was not an
enforceable contract as the was no consideration by Great Northern.

Conclusion:
The court needed to choose the commitment of a delicate party ensuring
their capacity to give products and services at fixed costs when this delicate
is acknowledged by the party welcoming tenders.

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 ▪ Olley v. Marlborough Court Ltd., (1949) K.B.532.

Facts:
Olley was a guest in the defendant hotel. On arrival, Olley paid for a
week’s board in advance and then went to the room. In the room, a notice
was displayed stating the proprietors would not be responsible for any items
lost or stolen, unless handed to them for safe keeping.
Olley left the room and deposited her key on the board in reception
before leaving the hotel. The key was taken, and several items were stolen
from her room. Olley sought damages in negligence.

Conclusion:
Olley was fruitful in her case and recuperated the expense of the taken
things completely. The rejection proviso had not been effectively
consolidated into the agreement on the grounds that the agreement was
closed at gathering, and the notification implying to prohibit obligation was
not noticeable until after the agreement was framed, when the visitor entered
the room.

▪ Lancaster v. Walsh, (1838) 4 M. & W. 16.

Facts:
Only the first person to give the info gets the reward
Whether more than one person gets a reward depends on how its phrased

Conclusion:
As a rule, in situations where an award has been given as a trade off for
data, the lone individual qualified for be reward is the person who initially
gave data, despite the fact that the deal was made to general society and
different individuals approached to give the data.

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 In the event that few individuals each in turn embrace the demonstration
to guarantee an award just the first is entitled.

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