ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER v ESTATE OF ALICE O.

SHEKER
G.R. No. 157912
December 13, 2022

FACTS:
1. The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice Sheker.
Then, it issued an order for all creditors to file their respective
claims against the estate.
2. The petitioner then filed a contingent claim for agent’s commission
due to him in the sale of certain parcels of land belonging to the
estate.
3. The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker moved to dismiss the
said money claim on the ground that the petitioner failed to attach
a certification against non-forum shopping and a written
explanation why the money claim was not filed and served
personally.
4. The RTC then dismissed the money claim made by the Petitioner
on the grounds raised by the respondent.
5. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
1. Whether a contingent claim filed in the probate proceeding should
contain a certification against non-forum shopping

2. Whether a contingent claim filed against an estate in a probate

proceeding be dismissed for failing to pay the docket fees at the
time of its filing

3. Whether a contingent claim filed in a probate proceeding be

dismissed because of its failure to contain a written explanation on
the service and filing by registered mail

HELD:
1. NO, because the certification of non-forum shopping is required
only for complaints and other initiatory pleadings.

In the present case, the whole probate proceeding was initiated

upon the filing of the petition for allowance of the decedent's
will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after
granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all persons
having money claims against the decedent are mandated to file or
 notify the court and the estate administrator of their respective
money claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain
exceptions.

Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin
to a motion for creditors' claims to be recognized and taken into
consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of the
estate.

A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for

the settlement of the decedent's estate; more so if the claim is
contingent since the claimant cannot even institute a separate
action for a mere contingent claim. Hence, herein petitioner's
contingent money claim, not being an initiatory pleading, does
not require a certification against non-forum shopping.

2. No, because non-payment of filing fees for a money claim against

the estate is not one of the grounds for dismissing a money claim
against the estate.

The Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of Appeals, that the trial court
has jurisdiction to act on a money claim (attorney's fees) against
an estate for services rendered by a lawyer to the administratrix to
assist her in fulfilling her duties to the estate even without
payment of separate docket fees because the filing fees shall
constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141
of the Rules of Court, or the trial court may order the payment of
such filing fees within a reasonable time.

3. No, because the petitioner holds office in Salcedo Village, Makati

City, while counsel for respondent and the RTC which rendered the
assailed orders are both in Iligan City. The lower court should have
taken judicial notice of the great distance between said cities and
realized that it is indeed not practicable to serve and file the money
claim personally. Thus, following Medina v. Court of Appeals, the
failure of petitioner to submit a written explanation why service
has not been done personally, may be considered as superfluous
and the RTC should have exercised its discretion under Section 11,
Rule 13, not to dismiss the money claim of petitioner, in the
interest of substantial justice.
 Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may resort
to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a
written explanation as to why personal service or filing was not
practicable to begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an
explanation, a court shall likewise consider the importance of the
subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and the
prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for
violation of Section 11.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial

Court of Iligan City, Branch 6 dated January 15, 2003 and April 9, 2003,
respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court
of Iligan City, Branch 6, is hereby DIRECTED to give due course and take
appropriate action on petitioner's money claim in accordance with Rule 82
of the Rules of Court.
 MINORU FUJIKI v. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI
MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE
ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE
G.R. No. 196049
June 26, 2013

FACTS:
ANTECEDENTS
1. Fujiki, Japanese, married Marinay in the Philippines. When their
marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents, he couldn’t
bring Marinay to Japan. Hence, they lost contact.
2. Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara, and got married
eventually without Marinay’s first marriage being dissolved. But
then she left Maekara because she allegedly suffered physical
abuse from him. She then contacted Fujiki
3. Fujiki and Marinay reconciled and Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a
judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of
bigamy.
4. They eventually petitioned the RTC that the Japanese Family
Court judgment be recognized; that the bigamous marriage
between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under
Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; and (3)
for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to
annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of
Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such
annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar
General in the National Statistics Office

RTC
1. It dismissed said petition based on Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages  which states that “A petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife”. Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband or
the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the
petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.

2. Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered, claiming that the

Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family
 Code of the Philippines on bigamy and was therefore entitled to
recognition by Philippine courts. Also, Fujiki had material interest
and therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.

3. Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries

in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable. Section 2
of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to
"marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage" and
"judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning" are
subject to cancellation or correction. The petition in the RTC
sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese
Family Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara.

4. However, such motion for reconsideration was still denied stating

that Fujiki is a "third person" in the proceeding because he "is not
the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese
Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized.

OFFICE OF THE SOLGEN

1. The trial court asked the public respondents to file their comment
about the petition for review. They then participated through the
Office of the Solicitor General.
2. The SolGen agreed with the petition and argued that Fujiki, as the
spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to
declare the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara
void. 
3. The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the
Japanese Family Court judgment may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding. In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas, this Court held that "[t]he
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule
108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as
that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact."
While Corpuz concerned a foreign divorce decree, in the present
case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil
status of the parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.
ISSUE: Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign
judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the
Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court

HELD: Yes. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign

judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal
prosecution for bigamy.

In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are

incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was decided
under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties,
or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who
is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to
the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide
whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex
nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the
foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the
Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an
extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate
proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default,
recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations.

Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign
judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right between the
parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes
conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or
cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that
establishes a new status, right and fact that needs to be reflected in the
civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the
recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public
records in the Philippines.1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the
Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City,
in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial
Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in
accordance with this Decision.