044 People v.

Estomaca *take note of italicized words in TSN

[G.R. Nos. 117485-86. April 22, 1996
TOPIC: suspension of arraignment
PONENTE: Regalado, J.
FACTS:
1. 1994, 5 complaints were filed in the RTC, Iloilo City charging an illiterate laborer, with rape committed on five separate occasions
against his own daughter, complainant Estelita Estomaca.
2. The trial court detailed its findings and the prosecutions contentions on the multiple incestuous rapes:
 Melita is the eldest daughter of accused, the second husband of Melitas mother. Melita has a full-blood younger brother around
(12) years old. She has (2) half-blood sisters (from) the first marriage of her mother who are residing in Manila.
 Melita claims that she was first raped in July 1993, at their residence at Iloilo. This is now the subject of Criminal Case No.
43567. The offense was repeated by her father before Christmas of December, 1993 (Criminal Case No. 43568); January 1994
(Criminal Case No. 43569); February 1994 (Criminal Case No. 43570); and on March 6, 1994 (Criminal Case No. 43571).
3. There is some inconsistency in the statements on record as to what actually took place on June 14, 1994 during the arraignment of
appellant, assisted by his government counsel de oficio, Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera. The decision of the court below, dated July 15,
1994, declares that he entered a plea of guilty to Criminal Cases Nos. 43568 and 43571, and a plea of not guilty to Criminal Cases
Nos. 43567,43569 and 43570.
4. The two criminal complaints, both subscribed by the offended party on April29, 1994 and which are the subject of the joint judgment
of the lower court challenged in this appellate review, respectively allege rape on December 1993 and March 6, 1994.
5. Trial court, after appellant waived the presentation of evidence for his defense, required prosecution to adduce evidence to
establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
6. Complainant herself, Melita Estomaca, appeared in court and testified that she was raped by her father once in December, 1993
and, again, on March 6, 1994. Both incidents, according to her, took place inside their residence at Sitio Tan-agan, Barangay Tiolas
in San Joaquin, Iloilo at nighttime and that, on those two occasions, she tried to resist her fathers assaults to no avail. After the last
rape, she gathered enough courage to flee from their home, and thereafter she reported the incidents to her mother who was then
living separately from them. Apparently, appellant was later apprehended and has since been under detention.
7. RA. 7659 which took effect December 31, 1993, the lower court imposed penalty of reclusion perpetua for the sexual assault
supposedly perpetrated in December, 1993, and the supreme penalty of death to the rape allegedly committed on March 6, 1994.
ISSUE(S): WON the arraignment was valid.
HELD: NO! Arraignment was void, the judgment of conviction rendered against him is likewise void
RATIO:
We stressed the need to avoid improvident pleas of guilt since the accused may thereby forfeit his life and liberty without having fully
understood the meaning, significance and consequences of his plea.

Section 1(a) of Rule 116 requires that the arraignment should be made in open court by the judge himself or by the clerk of court
furnishing the accused a copy of the complaint or information with the list of witnesses stated therein, then reading the same in the
language or dialect that is known to him, and asking him what his plea is to the charge. The requirement that the reading be made in a
language or dialect that the accused understands and knows is a mandatory requirement, just as the whole of said Section 1 should be
strictly followed by trial courts. This the law affords the accused by way of implementation of the all-important constitutional mandate
regarding the right of an accused to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation leveled at him and is, therefore, really an
avenue for him to be able to hoist the necessary defense in rebuttal thereof. It is an integral aspect of the due process clause under the
Constitution.

Court : What is your educational attainment?

Witness : I was not able to finish Grade I.
Court : The court would like to explain to you in your plea of Guilty. If you plead Guilty to these five (5) offenses,
definitely, you will have five (5) sentences.
Accused : Yes, your honor.
Court : Under the New Law the least most probably would be life sentence.
Accused : Yes, your honor.
Court : How old are you now?
Accused : Forty two.
Court : Because of this fact you have no chance to get back to the new society and your rights will be affected.
Accused : I know. Thats what they told to me.
Court : Despite of (sic) this fact you still insist on your plea of guilty in these five cases?
Interpreter : According to him, he performed only two (2) acts.
Court : When (were) these two acts performed?
Accused : December 1993 and March 1994.
Court : The other cases charged against you (are) not true?
Accused : It is not true maybe it was committed by her boyfriend then it was charged against me.
Court : In so far as . . . What is not included in the plea therefore, is the month of July 1993, January 1994 and
the month of February 1994. You did not commit these? Why is it that when you were asked you entered a
plea of guilty?
Accused : Because I committed two acts only.
Court : Why is it that when you were asked you entered a plea of guilty?
Accused : Because what I recall is that I just committed two acts of rape.
 Court : Not Guilty in the three (3) charges and Guilty in two (2) charges. Does counsel and accused agree to pre-
trial conference?
Atty. : We dispense (with) the pre-trial conference.
Court : For the two charges (to) which he pleads guilty, the court will receive evidence in order to impose the
proper penalty and on the other charges, the court will receive evidence for the prosecution.
At the subsequent hearing, just like what happened in Alicando, the presiding judge went through the same formality of having appellant
stand again before him, and this is what transpired:
Court : The court informs you as accused that you are charged (with) the crime of rape; under the new law which if you
plead guilty, you will be sentence(d) to death penalty, did you understand that?
A : Yes, Your Honor.
Q : Despite this warning for the second time by the court to you, do you still insist (o)n plea of guilty?
A : Yes, Your Honor.
Q : Is this plea your voluntary will without force or intimidation from anyone else to include the complaining witness
or the family?
A : No, Your Honor.
Q : So, therefore, the court will allow you to present evidence if you wis(h) to because you insist (o)n your plea of
guilty. Do you intend to present evidence.
A : No, I will not present evidence.
Court : Okey, because of this the court will receive evidence of the prosecution. In another case, the last time when
arraigned, you admitted that sometime in December, 1993, you likewise raped your daughter, do you still
confirm and affirm this?
A : Yes, Your Honor.
Q : In this case, because this was committed (i)n December 1993, the penalty here is reclusion perpetua. After
learning this as informed to you by the court, do still insist on your plea of guilty?
A : Yes, I will admit. I did it.
Q : Do you admit this voluntarily without force, intimidation or physical injuries or mauling on you by anyone
whomsoever?
A : No, Sir.
Q : In connection with this, therefore, definitely you will be convicted in both cases?
A : Yes, your honor.
Q :Being Grade I, the court emphasized that you are swayed by your own fashion because of your low education?
A : I am not.
Q : In other words, you still insist on your plea of guilty?
A : Yes, sir.

Arraignment appears to have consisted merely of the bare reading of the five complaints, synthetically and cryptically reported in the
transcript, thus: (Reading to the accused in Ilonggo/local dialect). Since what was supposed to have been read was stated in the
singular, but there were five criminal complaints against appellant, this Court is then left to speculate on whether all five criminal
complaints were actually read, translated or explained to appellant on a level within his comprehension, considering his limited
education.

For instance, there is no showing whether or not appellant or his counsel de oficio was furnished a copy of each complaint with the list of
witnesses against him, in order that the latter may duly prepare and comply with his responsibilities. Of more troublous concern is the
fact that appellant was not specifically warned that on his plea of guilty, he would definitely and in any event be given the death penalty
under the New Law, as the trial court calls Republic Act No. 7659. He was also not categorically advised that his plea of guilty would not
under any circumstance affect or reduce the death sentence as he may have believed or may have been erroneously advised.

 A searching inquiry, under the Rules, means more than informing cursorily the accused that he faces a jail term (because the
accused is aware of that) but so also, the exact length of imprisonment under the law and the certainty that he will serve time at
the national penitentiary or a penal colony. Not infrequently indeed, an accused pleads guilty in the hope, as we said, of a
lenient treatment, or upon a bad advice or promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or
express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to see to it that he does not labor under these. mistaken impressions,

Likewise of very serious importance and consequence is the fact that the complaints were supposedly read to appellant in Ilonggo/local
dialect. Parenthetically, there was no statement of record that appellant fully understood that medium of expression. Within a province or
major geographical area using a basic regional language, there may be other local dialects spoken in certain parts thereof. Section 1(a)
of Rule 116 which, cognizant of the aforestated linguistic variations, deliberately required that the complaint or information be read to the
accused in the language or the dialect known to him, to ensure his comprehension of the charges.

Trial court must fully discharge its duty to conduct the requisite searching inquiry in such a way as would indubitably show that appellant
had made not only a clear, definite and unconditional plea, but that he did so with a well-informed understanding and full realization of
the consequences thereof. To ask an accused about his educational attainment and then warn him that he might have admitted the
crime because of his poor intelligence is certainly not the logical approach in assaying the sufficiency of his plea of guilty.

In the same manner, a mere warning to him that he could possibly face extreme retribution in the form of death or face a life sentence in
jail is not even enough, The trial judge should ascertain and be totally convinced that, for all intents and purposes, the plea recorded has
all the earmarks of a valid and acceptable confession upon which an eventual judgment of conviction can stand. Although there is no
definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge may go about the matter of a proper searching inquiry, it would be well for the court, for
instance, to require the accused to fully narrate the incident that spawned the charges against him, or by making him reenact the
manner in which he perpetrated the crime, or by causing him to furnish and explain to the court missing details of significance.

The trial court should also be convinced that the accused has not been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual
threats of physical harm coming from malevolent or avenging quarters and this it can do, such as by ascertaining from the accused
himself the manner in which he was subsequently brought into the custody of the law; or whether he had the assistance of competent
counsel during the custodial and preliminary investigations; and, ascertaining from him the conditions under which he was detained and
interrogated during the aforestated investigations. Likewise, a series of questions directed at defense counsel as to whether or not said
counsel had conferred with, and completely explained to the accused the meaning of a plea and its consequences, would be a well-
taken step along those lines.

 A plea of guilt must be based on a free and informed judgment. Thus, the searching inquiry of the trial court must be focused
on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea; and (2) the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea. The questions of the trial
court failed to show the voluntariness of the plea of guilt of the appellant nor did the questions demonstrate appellants full
comprehension of the consequences of the plea. The records do not reveal any information about the personality profile of the
appellant which can serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilt. The age, socio-
economic status, and educational background of the appellant were not plumbed by the trial court.

Accused’s low intelligence quotient and lack of education combined to deprive him of fully understanding what obviously appeared to
him as mysterious rituals and unfamiliar jargons. Italicized portions of TSN showing grossly inadequate or ambiguous, if not indifferent,
questions of the lower court but also the erratic answers of appellant which are neither responsive nor rational. The judicial conscience
cannot accept as valid a plea of guilty to a charge with a mandatory death penalty when entered by an accused with a befuddled state of
mind at an arraignment with reversible lapses in law.
045 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALFREDO PANGILINAN AUTHOR:
y TRINIDAD NOTES: (if applicable)
G.R. No. 171020, March 14, 2007
TOPIC: Rule 116 – Suspension of Arraignment
PONENTE: CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

FACTS:

1. Two informations were filed charging appellant with raping AAA, his daughter.
2. 30 October 1997: the prosecution formally offered its evidence consisting of Exhibits "A" to "E," with sub-markings, and the
testimonies of its witnesses, praying that they be admitted and considered in the resolution of the petition for bail, and that the
same be considered as part of its evidence in chief. On 15 December 1997, appellant filed his comment and/or opposition to
the prosecution’s offer of evidence.
3. In an Order dated 23 April 1998, the trial court, finding that the evidence against the accused is strong, denied appellant’s
petition for bail. Thereafter, the defense presented its evidence with appellant as the sole witness (alibi and denial).
4. 9 June 1999: the trial court, having discovered that appellant had not yet been arraigned, scheduled his arraignment.
5. 17 June 1999: appellant, with the assistance of counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the charges against him. Since the
prosecution adopted all the evidence it adduced during the hearing for the petition for bail as part of its evidence-in-chief, which
evidence the trial court admitted, the trial court deemed the cases submitted for decision.
6. Trial Court: convicted accused of two counts of rape and imposed death penalty (Inasmuch as the penalty it imposed was the
death penalty, the trial court forwarded the records of the case to the Supreme Court for automatic review pursuant to Section
10, Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure. However, pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo, the case was
transferred to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and
disposition.)http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/mar2007/gr_171020_2007.html - fnt16
7. CA: affirmed the death penalties imposed by the trial court but modified the amounts of damages awarded. -> elevated case to
SC for automatic review http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/mar2007/gr_171020_2007.html - fnt9
ISSUE(S): WON THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF TWO (2) COUNTS
OF RAPE DESPITE THE FACT THAT HE WAS NOT PROPERLY ARRAIGNED, AND WAS NOT INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND
CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM BEFORE THE EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION WAS PRESENTED

HELD: NO. While the arraignment of appellant was conducted after the cases had been submitted for decision, the error is non-
prejudicial and has been fully cured. Since appellant’s rights and interests were not prejudiced by this lapse in procedure, it only follows
that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was not violated.

RATIO:

Appellant’s argument
- assails his conviction because he was not properly arraigned. Since he was arraigned only after the case was submitted for
decision, said irregularity, he argues, is a procedural error which is prejudicial to the appellant and is tantamount to denial of his
constitutional right to be informed of the accusation against him. He claims that his subsequent arraignment did not cure the
defect in the trial proceedings because at the time the petition for bail was heard, the trial court had not yet acquired jurisdiction
over his person. -> WRONG

1. When the hearings for his petition for bail were conducted, the trial court had already acquired jurisdiction over his person.
Settled is the rule that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. In the case
at bar, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the appellant when he was arrested on 19 March 1997. His arrest, not
his arraignment, conferred on the trial court jurisdiction over his person.
2. Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. The purpose of arraignment is, thus, to apprise the accused of the possible loss
of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him, or at the very least to inform him of why the
prosecuting arm of the State is mobilized against him.
3. Admittedly, appellant was arraigned after the case was submitted for decision. The question is: Were appellant’s rights and
interests prejudiced by the fact that he was arraigned only at this stage of the proceedings? NO!
4. Appellant’s belated arraignment did not prejudice him. This procedural defect was cured when his counsel participated in the
trial without raising any objection that his client had yet to be arraigned. In fact, his counsel even cross-examined the prosecution
witnesses. His counsel’s active participation in the hearings is a clear indication that he was fully aware of the charges against
him; otherwise, his counsel would have objected and informed the court of this blunder. Moreover, no protest was made when
appellant was subsequently arraigned. The parties did not question the procedure undertaken by the trial court. It is only now,
after being convicted and sentenced to two death sentences, that appellant cries that his constitutional right has been violated. It is
already too late to raise this procedural defect. This Court will not allow it.
5. In People v. Cabale and People v. Atienza where the same issue was raised under similar circumstances, we held that while
the arraignment of appellant was conducted after the cases had been submitted for decision, the error is non-prejudicial
and has been fully cured. Since appellant’s rights and interests were not prejudiced by this lapse in procedure, it only
follows that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was not
violated.
046 Daan vs Sandiganbayan AUTHOR:
G.R. Nos. 163972-77               March 28, 2008 NOTES: (if applicable)Joselito Raniero J. Daan (petitioner), one of
Topic: Rule 116 the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 24167-24170, 24195-24196,
Ponente: AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J., questions the denial by the Sandiganbayan of his plea bargaining
proposal
FACTS: (chronological order)

1. Said petitioner-accused, together with accused Benedicto E. Kuizon, were charged before this Court for three counts of
malversation of public funds involving the sums of P3,293.00, P1,869.00, and P13,528.00, respectively, which they purportedly
tried to conceal by falsifying the time book and payrolls for given period making it appear that some laborers worked on the
construction of the new municipal hall building of Bato, Leyte and collected their respective salaries thereon when, in truth and
in fact, they did not. Thus, in addition to the charge for malversation, the accused were also indicted before this Court for three
counts of falsification of public document by a public officer or employee.

2. In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of "not guilty" and substitute the same with a plea of
"guilty", provided, the mitigating circumstances of confession or plea of guilt and voluntary surrender will be appreciated in their
favor. In the alternative, if such proposal is not acceptable, said accused proposed instead to substitute their plea of "not guilty"
to the crime of falsification of public document by a public officer or employee with a plea of "guilty", but to the lesser crime of
falsification of a public document by a private individual.

3. In the malversation cases, the accused offered to substitute their plea of "not guilty" thereto with a plea of "guilty", but to the
lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to render accounts.

4. Insofar as the falsification cases are concerned, the prosecution found as acceptable the proposal of the accused to plead
"guilty" to the lesser crime of falsification of public document by a private individual.

5. Sandiganbayan, in the herein assailed Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion to Plea Bargain, despite favorable
recommendation by the prosecution, on the main ground that no cogent reason was presented to justify its approval. It likewise
denied petitioner's MR

6. petitioner to file the present case for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/
or writ of preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court

CONTENTION: He argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his plea bargaining offer on the
following grounds: first, petitioner is not an accountable officer and he merely affixed his signature on the payrolls on a "routinary basis,"
negating any criminal intent; and that the amount involved is only P18,860.00, which he already restituted
ISSUE(S): Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his plea bargaining offer
HELD: YES

RATIO:
Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of
the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the
counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge.

Plea bargaining is authorized under Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 118 of the Rules of Court,
require plea bargaining to be considered by the trial court at the pre-trial conference,

But it may also be made during the trial proper and even after the prosecution has finished presenting its evidence and rested its case.
Thus, the Court has held that it is immaterial that plea bargaining was not made during the pre-trial stage or that it was made only after
the prosecution already presented several witnesses.

Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court presents the basic requisites upon which plea bargaining may be made,i.e., that it should be
with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, and that the plea of guilt should be to a lesser offense which is necessarily
included in the offense charged. The rules however use word may in the second sentence of Section 2, denoting an exercise of
discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused to make such plea. Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of
guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the
convenience of the accused.

In the present case, the Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner's plea offer on the ground that petitioner and the prosecution failed to
demonstrate that the proposal would redound to the benefit of the public. The Sandiganbayan believes that approving the proposal
would "only serve to trivialize the seriousness of the charges against them and send the wrong signal to potential grafters in public office
that the penalties they are likely to face would be lighter than what their criminal acts would have merited or that the economic benefits
they are likely to derive from their criminal activities far outweigh the risks they face in committing them; thus, setting to naught the
deterrent value of the laws intended to curb graft and corruption in government."

Apparently, the Sandiganbayan has proffered valid reasons in rejecting petitioner's plea offer. However, subsequent events and higher
interests of justice and fair play dictate that petitioner's plea offer should be accepted. The present case calls for the judicious exercise of
this Court's equity jurisdiction.

In People of the Philippines v. Estrada, the Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution dated March 14, 2007, approved the Plea Bargaining
Agreement entered into by the prosecution and one of the accused, Charlie "Atong" Ang. The agreement provided that the accused
undertakes to assist in the prosecution of the case and promises to return the amount of P25,000,000.00. In approving the Plea
Bargaining Agreement, the Sandiganbayan took into consideration the timeliness of the plea bargaining and whether the agreement
complied with the requirements of Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court. The Sandigabayan noted that the accused had already
withdrawn his earlier plea of "not guilty"; and that the prosecution consented to the plea of guilt to a lesser offense; and the lesser
offense, which is Corruption of Public Officials in relation to Indirect Bribery, is necessarily included in the offense charged, which is
Plunder.

The Court sees no reason why the standards applied by the Sandiganbayan to Estrada should not be applied to the present case.
Records show that there was a favorable recommendation by the Office of the Special Prosecutor to approve petitioner's motion to plea
bargain. The Office of the Special Prosecutor rationalized:the damage caused to the government has already been restituted by the
accused.

There is also no dispute that accused DAAN voluntarily surrendered in the instant cases. Moreover, the accused is also willing to plead
guilty to a lesser offense which to our mind, merits consideration.

With respect to the falsification cases earlier mentioned, it appears that the act of the accused in pleading guilty for a lesser offense of
falsification by private individual defined and penalized under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code will strengthen our cases against
the principal accused, the Municipal Mayor Benedicto Kuizon, who appears to be the master mind of these criminal acts. After all, the
movants herein JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN was merely designated as draftsman detailed as foreman/timekeeper of the Municipality
of Bato, Leyte.

Moreover, the lesser offenses of Falsification by Private Individuals and Failure to Render Account by an Accountable Officer are
necessarily included in the crimes of Falsification of Public Documents and Malversation of Public Funds, respectively, with which
petitioner was originally charged.

Given, therefore, that some of the essential elements of offenses charged in this case likewise constitute the lesser offenses, then
petitioner may plead guilty to such lesser offenses.

Finally, as propounded by petitioner, indeed, he is not an accountable officer in that the nature of his duty as foreman/timekeeper does
not permit or require possession or custody of local government funds, not to mention that petitioner has already restituted the amount
of P18,860.00 involved in this case. Unlike Estrada which involves a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, and a
whopping P25,000,000.00 taken from the public coffers, this case tremendously pales in comparison.

Under the peculiar circumstances of the present case, where gross inequity will result in a discriminatory dispensation of justice, the
Court will not hesitate to intervene in order to equalize the imbalance.
047 People vs. KHADDAFY JANJALANI, GAMAL B. AUTHOR:
BAHARAN a.k.a. Tapay, ANGELO TRINIDAD a.k.a. Abu Khalil, NOTES: (if applicable)
GAPPAL BANNAH ASALI a.k.a. Maidan or Negro, JAINAL
SALI a.k.a. Abu Solaiman, ROHMAT ABDURROHIM a.k.a. Valentines day bombing case.
Jackie or Zaky, and other JOHN and JANE DOES,
G.R. No. 188314, January 10, 2011 Allahu akbar! Allahu akbar!! ALLAHU AKBAR!!!!! *Explosions
TOPIC: Arraignment and Plea
PONENTE: SERENO, J.

FACTS: (chronological order)

Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 30 June 2008, which affirmed the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City in Criminal Case Nos. 05-476 and 05-4777 dated 18 October 2005. The latter Decision convicted the
three accused-appellants namely, Gamal B. Baharan a.k.a. Tapay, Angelo Trinidad a.k.a. Abu Khalil, and Rohmat Abdurrohim a.k.a.
Abu Jackie or Zaky of the complex crime of multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder, and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of
death by lethal injection. The CA modified the sentence to reclusion perpetua as required by Republic Act No. 9346 (Act Abolishing the
Imposition of Death Penalty).

On Feb 14, 2005, a bus was going from Navotas to Alabang. Two men got on the bus. Both seemed suspicious according to
Elmer Andales, the conductor. The two men alighted in Ayala Ave. and the bus exploded. After the explosion, the
spokesperson for Abu Sayyaff announced over radio that the explosion was a valentine’s gift from the said group to then
President GMA.

As stipulated during pre-trial(di ko na sinama yung stipulation, pero basically ang napagkasunduan nila is aamin yung accused sa
charges sakanila), accused Trinidad gave ABS-CBN News Network an exclusive interview some time after the incident, confessing his
participation in the Valentines Day bombing incident. In another exclusive interview on the network, accused Baharan likewise admitted
his role in the bombing incident. Finally, accused Asali gave a television interview, confessing that he had supplied the explosive devices
for the 14 February 2005 bombing. The bus conductor identified the accused Baharan and Trinidad, and confirmed that they were the
two men who had entered the RRCG bus on the evening of 14 February.

Members of the Abu Sayyaf Group namely Khaddafy Janjalani, Gamal B. Baharan, Angelo Trinidad, Gappal Bannah Asali, Jainal Asali,
Rohmat Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky, and other John and Jane Does were then charged with multiple murder and multiple
frustrated murder. Only Baharan, Trinidad, Asali, and Rohmat were arrested, while the other accused remain at-large.

On their arraignment for the multiple murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05-476), Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all entered a plea of
guilty. On the other hand, upon arraignment for the multiple frustrated murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05-477), accused Asali
pled guilty. Accused Trinidad and Baharan pled not guilty. Rohmat pled not guilty to both charges.

In the light of the pretrial stipulations, the trial court asked whether accused Baharan and Trinidad were amenable to changing
their not guilty pleas to the charge of multiple frustrated murder, considering that they pled guilty to the heavier charge of
multiple murder, creating an apparent inconsistency in their pleas. Defense counsel conferred with accused Baharan and
Trinidad and explained to them the consequences of the pleas. The two accused acknowledged the inconsistencies and
manifested their readiness for re-arraignment. After the Information was read to them, Baharan and Trinidad pled guilty to the
charge of multiple frustrated murder.

Accused appellants now question their arraignment and plea, contending that the trial court gravely erred in accepting accused-
appellants plea of guilt despite insufficiency of searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of
the said plea.
ISSUE(S):
HELD: (YES/NO, and a short explanation)

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, as affirmed with modification by the Court of
Appeals, is hereby AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
As early as in People v. Apduhan, the Supreme Court has ruled that all trial judges must refrain from accepting with alacrity an
accused's plea of guilty, for while justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous in
seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty, he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable
conviction.[6] Thus, trial court judges are required to observe the following procedure under Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall
conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require the
prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf. (Emphasis
supplied)

The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry applies more so in cases of re-arraignment. In People v. Galvez, the Court noted that
since accused-appellant's original plea was not guilty, the trial court should have exerted careful effort in inquiring into why he changed
his plea to guilty.[7] According to the Court:

The stringent procedure governing the reception of a plea of guilt, especially in a case involving the death penalty, is imposed upon the
trial judge in order to leave no room for doubt on the possibility that the accused might have misunderstood the nature of the charge and
the consequences of the plea.[8]

Likewise, the requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be deemed satisfied in cases in which it was the defense counsel
who explained the consequences of a guilty plea to the accused, as it appears in this case. In People v. Alborida, this Court found that
there was still an improvident plea of guilty, even if the accused had already signified in open court that his counsel had explained the
consequences of the guilty plea; that he understood the explanation of his counsel; that the accused understood that the penalty of
death would still be meted out to him; and that he had not been intimidated, bribed, or threatened.[9]

We have reiterated in a long line of cases that the conduct of a searching inquiry remains the duty of judges, as they are mandated by
the rules to satisfy themselves that the accused had not been under coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or a misunderstanding of
the significance, effects, and consequences of their guilty plea.[10] This requirement is stringent and mandatory.[11]

Nevertheless, we are not unmindful of the context under which the re-arraignment was conducted or of the factual milieu
surrounding the finding of guilt against the accused. The Court observes that accused Baharan and Trinidad previously pled
guilty to another charge multiple murder based on the same act relied upon in the multiple frustrated murder charge. The
Court further notes that prior to the change of plea to one of guilt, accused Baharan and Trinidad made two other confessions
of guilt one through an extrajudicial confession (exclusive television interviews, as stipulated by both accused during pretrial),
and the other via judicial admission (pretrial stipulation). Considering the foregoing circumstances, we deem it unnecessary to
rule on the sufficiency of the searching inquiry in this instance. Remanding the case for re-arraignment is not warranted, as
the accused’s plea of guilt was not the sole basis of the condemnatory judgment under consideration.
048 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs PANFILO M. LACSON
GR No. 149453 May 28, 2002
TOPIC: Rule 117 Motion to Quash
PONENTE: Callejo, Sr. J.

FACTS:
On May 18, 1995, then PNP Director-General Recaredo Sarmiento II announced, in a press conference, the killing of eleven (11)
members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang (KBG) in a shootout with police elements near the fly-over along Commonwealth Avenue,
Quezon City at about 4:00 A.M. that day. Delos Reyes claimed that the police team arrested the eleven (11) gang members in early
morning of May 18, 1995 at the gang’s safe house in Superville Subdivision, Parañaque; that after their arrest, the gang members were
made to board two vans, their hands tied behind their backs, and brought initially to Camp Crame where a decision to summarily execute
them was made, and later to Commonwealth Avenue where they were shot to death by elements of ABRITFG. The ABRITFG is a
composite police team called the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Force Group (ABRITFG) composed of elements of the
National Capital Region Command (NCRC) and headed by Chief Superintendent Jewel Canson; Traffic Management Command, headed
by Senior Superintendent Francisco Subia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC), headed by Chief Superintendent Panfilo M.
Lacson; Central Police District Command, headed by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and Criminal Investigation Command (CIC),
headed by Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop. However, there were assertions that the killing was a rubout and not a shootout, hence an
investigation was conducted.

On June 1, 1995, PNP Director for Investigation, filed murder charges with the Office of the Ombudsman against ninety-seven (97)
officers and personnel of ABRITFG. The next-of-kin of the slain KBG members also filed murder charges against the same officers and
personnel. Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eleven (11) Informations for MURDER, docketed against respondent Panfilo M.
Lacson and twenty-five (25) other accused. All twenty-six (26) of them were charged as principals. Amended Informations were filed
against the same twenty-six (26) suspects but the participation of respondent Lacson was downgraded from principal to accessory. With
the downgrading of charges against him, respondent Lacson questioned the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to hear the criminal cases
as none of the “principal” accused in the Amended Informations was a government official with a Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, citing
Section 2 of R. A. No. 7975 then prevailing. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the cases transferred to the Regional Trial Court.
The Ombudsman then cited the amendment to RA 7975 by RA 8249 which deleted the word principal as qualifying the participation of
the public official. Supreme Court, while agreeing that with the amendment the case should go to the Sandiganbayan , nonetheless
ordered the transfer of the criminal cases to the Regional Trial Court on the ground that the Amended Informations for murder failed to
indicate that the offenses charged therein were committed in relation to, or in discharge of, the official functions of the respondent, as
required by R. A. No. 8249.

The cases were raffled off to Branch 81 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, then presided by Judge, now Associate Justice of the
Court of Appeals, Wenceslao Agnir,Jr. Before the accused could be arraigned, some prosecution witnesses recanted their affidavits
which implicated respondent Lacson in the murder of the KBG members while others also executed their respective affidavits of
desistance declaring that they were no longer interested to prosecute these cases. Due to these developments, the twenty-six (26)
accused, including respondent Lacson, filed five separate but identical motions to (1) make a judicial determination of the existence of
probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest; (2) hold in abeyance the issuance of the warrants, and (3) dismiss the cases
should the trial court find lack of probable cause. On March 29, 1999, Judge Agnir issued a Resolution dismissing criminal cases.
Meanwhile, amendments on the Rules of Court as to the Criminal Procedure were being deliberated and the modified Rules on Criminal
Procedure took effect on December 1, 2000.

On March 27, 2001, PNP Director Leandro R. Mendoza indorsed to the Department of Justice the new affidavits of P/Insp. Ysmael S. Yu
and P/S Insp. Abelardo Ramos regarding the Kuratong Baleleng incident for preliminary investigation. On the strength of these new
evidence, on June 6, 2001, eleven (11) Informations for murder were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and were
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112. The new Informations charged as principals thirty-four (34) people, including
respondent Lacson and his twenty-five (25) other co-accused in the previous cases. On the same day, respondent Lacson filed before
the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. On August 24, 2001, the Court of Appeals (Special Third Division), rendered the now
assailed Decision. It characterized the termination of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 ( the previous cases ) as
“provisional dismissal,” and considered Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 as mere revivals of the same. Applying Section 8,
Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, it dismissed the criminal cases against the respondent.

On May 28, 2002, the Supreme Court, in a Resolution dated as such, granted the petition of the Republic stating that “in light of the lack
of or the conflicting evidence on the various requirements to determine the applicability of Section 8, Rule 117, this Court is not in a
position to rule whether or not the re-filing of the cases for multiple murder against respondent Lacson should be enjoined. Fundamental
fairness requires that both the prosecution and the respondent Lacson should be afforded the opportunity to be heard and to adduce
evidence on the presence or absence of the predicate facts upon which the application of the new rule depends. They involve disputed
facts and arguable questions of law. The reception of evidence on these various issues cannot be done in this Court but before the trial
cour. Hence, the cases were remanded to RTC Quezon City. The petitioners then filed a petition for reconsideration contending that
there was no provisional dismissal and that Rule 117 Sec 8 cannot be given retroactive application.

On April 3, 2003, in a Resolution , the Supreme Court favored the petitioners. The Resolution was prepared by Justice Romeo Callejo Sr.
He prepared the draft for the reason that he was the one who replaced Ret. Justice De Leon, to whom the Lacson case was originally
assigned. It was here where the court finally resolved the issues and held that Sec 8 of Rule 117 will not apply to Criminal Cases Nos.
01-101102 to 01-101112 because it was not proven that the respondent Lacson gave consent to the dismissal of such cases and that the
heirs of the victims were notified. Also, assuming that the said rule applies, it would be applied prospectively and not retroactively. This
time it was the turn of respondent Lacson to file his motion for reconsideration. The respondent also filed an omnibus motion asking the
inhibition of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s appointed SC justices and a motion to set the case for oral arguments.

On October 7, 2003, the latest En Banc Resolution was promulgated which denied the omnibus motion and motion to set the case for
oral arguments; and denied with finality Lacson’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, the Supreme Court ordered the criminal cases be
re-raffled to one of the branches of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to hear and decide the case.

UPDATE: After the Oct 3, 2003 SC Resolution, the case was re-raffled to the sala of Judge Yadao. On November 12, 2003 Quezon City
Regional Trial Court Judge Theresa Yadao dismissed the multiple murder case against Lacson and 33 other accused citing “manifest
error” made by the prosecution.

ISSUE(S):
1. Whether or not the rules on Provisional Dismissal (The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure Sec 8, Rule 117) applies in criminal
cases 01-101101 to 01-101112.

2. Whether or not Sec 8 Rule 117 be applied retroactively from March 1999 dismissal by Judge Agnir or prospectively from the date of its
effectivity on December 2001.

HELD:

Having invoked said rule before the petitioners-panel of prosecutors and before the Court of Appeals, the respondent is burdened to
establish the essential requisites thereof, namely:

1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case;
or both the prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case;

2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;
3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally;
4.the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case.

Petitioners contend that it will not apply since the dismissal of the cases was without the consent of herein respondent Lacson and that
there were no notices given to the heirs of the victims which are conditions sine qua non for the application of the said rule. Respondent,
on the other hand, insists that as found by Judge Agnir, he himself moved for the dismissal of the cases and that the heirs of the victims
were notified through the public and private prosecutors since the prosecutors were present during the March 22, 1999 hearing wherein
respondent moved for the judicial determination of probable cause.

In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that the first and second requisites of the first paragraph of the new rule were present
when Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99- 81679 to Q-99-81689. Irrefragably, the prosecution did not file any motion
for the provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases. For his part, the respondent merely filed a motion for judicial determination of
probable cause and for examination of prosecution witnesses alleging that under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. The
respondent, through counsel, even admitted that despite his plea for equitable relief in his motion for a judicial determination of probable
cause in the RTC, he did not agree to a provisional dismissal of the cases. The respondent insisted that the only relief he prayed for
before Judge Agnir, Jr. was that warrants for his arrest be withheld pending a finding of probable cause. He asserted that the judge did
not even require him to agree to a provisional dismissal of the cases. A judicial admission is a formal statement made either by a party or
his or her attorney, in the course of judicial proceeding which removes an admitted fact from the field of controversy. It is a voluntary
concession of fact by a party or a party’s attorney during such judicial proceedings, including admissions in pleadings made by a party. It
may occur at any point during the litigation process. An admission in open court is a judicial admission. A judicial admission binds the
client even if made by his counsel.

As to notice the facts show that the heirs of the victims were not notified thereof prior to the hearing on said motion on March 22, 1999.
Respondent filed his motion only on March 17, 1999 and set it for hearing on March 22, 1999 or barely five days from the filing thereof.
Although the public prosecutor was served with a copy of the motion, the records do not show that notices thereof were separately given
to the heirs of the victims or that subpoenae were issued to and received by them, including those who executed their affidavits of
desistance who were residents of Dipolog City or Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte or Palompon, Leyte. There is as well no proof in the
records that the public prosecutor notified the heirs of the victims of said motion or of the hearing thereof on March 22, 1999. Since the
conditions sine qua non for the application of the new rule were not present when Judge Agnir, Jr. issued his resolution, the State is not
barred by the time limit set forth in the second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The State
can thus revive or refile Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or file new Informations for multiple murder against the
respondent.

The State says that if it will be applied retroactively, it would violate the right of the People to due process, and unduly impair, reduce,
and diminish the State’s substantive right to prosecute the accused. While the respondent asserts that the rule may be applied
retroactively since there is no substantive right of the State that may be impaired since the State’s witnesses were ready, willing and able
to provide their testimony and that the State has more than reasonable time to indict him when the rule took effect on December 2000.

Statutes of limitations are construed as acts of grace, and a surrender by the sovereign of its right to prosecute or of its right to prosecute
at its discretion. The periods fixed under such statutes are jurisdictional and are essential elements of the offenses covered. On the other
hand, the time-bar under Section 8 of Rule 117 is akin to a special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute
making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of the time-bar operates to extinguish
the right of the State to prosecute the accused. The time-bar under the new rule does not reduce the periods under Article 90 of the
Revised Penal Code, a substantive law. It is but a limitation of the right of the State to revive a criminal case against the accused after
the Information had been filed but subsequently provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused. Upon the lapse of the
timeline under the new rule, the State is presumed, albeit disputably, to have abandoned or waived its right to revive the case and
prosecute the accused. The dismissal becomes ipso facto permanent.

Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the
litigants’ rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. Nor is the retroactive application of procedural statutes
constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. It has
been held that “a person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his
case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of procedure. The new rule is not unreasonable to both the State and
the accused. The time-bar may appear, on first impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal
Code. However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those of the accused for the orderly and speedy
disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into account the substantial rights of both the
State and of the accused to due process.

However, the rule cannot be applied retroactively in this case. The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the
malaise that plagued the administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the accused
only. The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar retroactively is inconsistent with the intendment of the new rule.
Instead of giving the State two years to revive provisionally dismissed cases, the State had considerably less than two years to do so.
Thus, Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q- 99-81679 to Q-99-81689 on March 29, 1999. The new rule took effect on
December 1, 2000. If the Court applied the new time-bar retroactively, the State would have only one year and three months or until
March 31, 2001 within which to revive these criminal cases. The period is short of the two- year period fixed under the new rule. On the
other hand, if the time limit is applied prospectively, the State would have two years from December 1, 2000 or until December 1, 2002
within which to revive the cases. This is in consonance with the intendment of the new rule in fixing the time-bar and thus prevent
injustice to the State and avoid absurd, unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and wrongful results in the administration of justice.

In this case, when the Court approved Section 8, it intended the new rule to be applied prospectively and not retroactively, for if the
intention of the Court were otherwise, it would defeat the very purpose for which it was intended, namely, to give the State a period of two
years from notice of the provisional dismissal of criminal cases with the express consent of the accused. It would be a denial of the
State’s right to due process and a travesty of justice for the Court to apply the new rule retroactively in the present case as the
respondent insists, considering that the criminal cases were provisionally dismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr. on March 29, 1999 before the
new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. A retroactive application of the time-bar will result in absurd, unjust and oppressive
consequences to the State and to the victims of crimes and their heirs. It must be stressed that the institution and prosecution of criminal
cases are governed by existing rules and not by rules yet to exist. It would be the apex of injustice to hold that Section 8 had a platonic or
ideal existence before it was approved by the Court. The past cannot be erased by a capricious retroactive application of the new rule.

Due process requires fundamental fairness. In determining what fundamental fairness consists of in a particular situation, relevant
precedents must be considered and the interests that are at stake; private interests, as well as the interests of the government must be
assessed. In this case, in holding that the new rule has prospective and not retroactive application, the Court took into consideration not
only the interests of the respondent but all other accused, whatever their station in life may be. The interest of the State in the speedy,
impartial and inexpensive disposition of criminal cases was likewise considered.
Panaguiton vs DOJ
Facts:
 In this case panaguiton allowed casipin and tongson to obtain a loan from him in the amount of 1.9m
 Corresponding checks were issued by cawili wherein cawili and tongson were the signatories in the checks
 Upon presentment for payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account.
 Demand was made by panaguiton, but still, no payment was ever made.
 On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson4 for violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22)5 before the Quezon
City Prosecutor's Office.
 Ang naging malaking issue dito ay ang participation ni tongson.
 The defense of tongson was that he was also a creditor of cawili and that his signature in the check was falsified.
 During the preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit.6 Tongson claimed that he had been unjustly included as party-
respondent in the case since petitioner had lent money to Cawili in the latter's personal capacity
 In a resolution dated 6 December 1995,9 City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable cause only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against
Tongson
 Petition for review with the doj was filed by panaguiton.
 Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to
refer the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
 On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the complaint against Tongson without referring the
matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor's resolution. In her resolution,11 ACP Sampaga held that the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act
No. 3326, as amended,12 which provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years. In this case, the four (4)-year period
started on the date the checks were dishonored, or on 20 January 1993 and 18 March 1993
 filing of the complaint before the Quezon City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period, as the law
contemplates judicial, and not administrative proceedings. Thus, considering that from 1993 to 1998, more than four (4) years had already elapsed and no
information had as yet been filed against Tongson, the alleged violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imputed to him had already prescribed
 then came the flip flopping opinion of the doj.
 DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee, dismissed the same, stating that the offense had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326.
 the DOJ, this time through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in his favor and declared that the offense had not prescribed and that
the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor's office interrupted the running of the prescriptive period citing Ingco v. Sandiganbayan
 9 August 2004,22 the DOJ, presumably acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by Tongson, ruled that the subject offense had already prescribed and
ordered "the withdrawal of the three (3) informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against Tongson. In justifying its sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained
that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses
 CA ruling: dismissed the petition of panaguiton since he did not comply with the requirement of verification and certification against forum shopping.
 Panaguiton then files a petition for certiorari with the SC
Issue: when is the prescriptive period of the offense tolled? Is it at the filing of the complaint or the filing of an information by the prosecutor in court?
Sc: petition is with merit.
 Prescriptive period is tolled upon the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor.
 There is no question that Act No. 3326, appropriately entitled An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and
to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, is the law applicable to offenses under special laws which do not provide their own prescriptive periods. The
pertinent provisions read:
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) x x x; (b)
after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c) x x x
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
 we cannot uphold the position that only the filing of a case in court can toll the running of the prescriptive period.
 It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices
of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment," 39 and the prevailing rule at the time
was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted
 Ibig sabihin dati wala pa namang concept of prosecutor. If you have a complaint derecho ka na sa justice of peace which is judge na. Sa ngayon, nahati.
May prosecutor muna. Then upon determination ng probable cause, saka lang niya ifa-file yung information sa court.
 That the prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused
 term "proceedings" should now be understood either executive or judicial in character: executive when it involves the investigation phase and judicial
when it refers to the trial and judgment stage. With this clarification, any kind of investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty person which may
ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription
 to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. 55 A clear example would
be this case, wherein petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit on 24 August 1995, well within the four (4)-year prescriptive period. He likewise timely filed his
appeals and his motions for reconsideration on the dismissal of the charges against tongson.
 In this case hindi niya kasalanan na may mga flip flopping rulings with regards the tolling of the prescriptive period.
 Gumana kasi ang mga delaying tactics ni tongson.
 The offense had not yet prescribed. The petition of panaguiton is granted.
050 People vs. Dumlao
G.R. No. 168918, March 2, 2009
TOPIC: Motion to Quash
PONENTE: CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS:
1. An information was filed before the Sandiganbayan charging respondents Dumlao, La’o and others with violation of the
Section 3(g) of R.A. no. 3019 or Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The information alleged that the respondent-members of the
Board of Trustees of GSIS entered into a contract of lease-purchase with respondent La’o, a private person whereby GSIS agreed to
sell to La’o, a GSIS-acquired property consisting of a land and building known as the Government Counsel Centre for P2 Million on an
instalment basis with annual interest and amortization and grant La’o the right to sub-lease the ground floor during the period of lease,
from which he collected yearly rentals in excess of the yearly amortization causing gross disadvantage to the government.

2. During arraignment, Dumlao pleaded not guilty, and as agreed by prosecution and respondents, a Joint Stipulation of Facts
and Admission of Exhibits was submitted to the court. The Joint Stipulation admitted additional facts: (1) 3 members of the Board,
Dumlao being one of them, signed the Minutes; (2) 7 members of the Board were present during the board meeting; and (3) the
documentary evidence of was authentic and duly executed. It was further decided for the pre-trial to be terminated limiting the course
of the subsequent trial to “matters not disposed of... unless modified by the court.”

3. Dumlao filed a Motion to Dismiss/Quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. He stated that the
prosecution’s main thrust against him was the alleged approval by the GSIS Board of the Lease-Purchase Agreement. He argued that
the Resolution was not in fact approved by the GSIS Board. Since the signatures of fellow respondents did not appear in the minutes
of the meeting, these people did not participate in the Lease-Purchase Agreement. There was no quorum of the board; thus no
resolution approving the Agreement. Since the resolution was not approved, he was innocent. He added that the person liable was Atty.
Javellana who actually executed the contract.

4. Sandiganbayan ruled in favor of Dumlao. It found that the minutes shows that the Board failed to approve the Lease-Purchase
Agreement in question. As evidenced by the Joint Stipulation, of the 7 members, only 3 signed. It did not validly pass a resolution
because at least a majority of 4 votes were required. Therefore prosecution had no cause of action against Dumlao.

5. Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 45, Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the court erred in dismissing case after pre-trial and before prosecution could formally present its evidence
a. Whether facts charged in the information actually constitute an offense
b. Whether insufficiency of evidence is a ground for Motion to Dismiss

HELD:

Yes. The petition is granted. Resolution of Sandiganbayan is reversed and set aside. Sandiganbayan is ordered for reception of
evidence of prosecution.
a. Yes. Facts in the information contained elements of the crime charged.
b. No. Grounds for Motion to Dismiss/Quash are limited to those enumerated in Sec. 3, Rule 117 of the RRCP
RATIO:
1 1. The elements of the crime under Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019 are as follows: (1) that the accused is a public officer;
(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and (3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
2. The ground raised by Dumlao in his Motion to Quash/Dismiss is that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. And after
examining the information, we find that the facts alleged therein, if hypothetically admitted, will prove all the elements of Section 3(g)
as against respondent Dumlao. Therefore, the motion to quash should not have been granted.
3. It can also be gathered from the resolution of the Sandiganbayan that it did not consider the ground invoked by Dumlao (that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense); otherwise, it could have denied respondent Dumlao’s motion. From the reasoning given
by the Sandiganbayan, it is clear that it dismissed the case because of insufficiency of evidence.
4. According to Sec. 3, Rule 117 of RRCP, insufficiency of evidence is not one of the grounds of a Motion to Quash. It is only a
ground for dismissal of an action only after the prosecution rests its case as provided in Sec. 23, Rule 119 of RRCP on demurrer to
evidence.
5. In the case at bar, Sandiganbayan dismissed the case against respondent for insufficiency of evidence, even without giving the
prosecution the opportunity to present its evidence. In so doing, it violated the prosecution’s right to due process. It deprived the
prosecution of its opportunity to prosecute its case and to prove the accused’s culpability.
6. It was therefore erroneous for the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case under the premises. Not only did it not consider the
ground invoked by respondent Dumlao; it even dismissed the case on a ground not raised by him, and not at the appropriate time. The
dismissal was thus without basis and untimely.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
- Insufficiency of evidence is not one of the grounds of a Motion to Quash. It is only a ground for dismissal of an action only
after the prosecution rests its case as provided in Sec. 23, Rule 119 of RRCP on demurrer to evidence.
- The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the material averments of an information is whether the facts alleged
therein, which are hypothetically admitted, would establish the essentials elements of the crime defined by law. Evidence aliunde, or
matters extrinsic of the Information, are not be considered.

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
051 Soriano v. People AUTHOR:
G.R. Nos. 159517-18, June 30, 2009,/591 SCRA 244 - It is settled that in considering a motion to quash on such
TOPIC: Rule 117 ground, the test is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically
PONENTE: Del Castillo J. admitted, would establish the essential elements of the
offense charged as defined by law.
- The trial court may not consider a situation contrary to that
set forth in the criminal complaint or information.
- Facts that constitute the defense of the petitioner[s] against
the charge under the information must be proved by [him]
during trial.
- Such facts or circumstances do not constitute proper grounds
for a motion to quash the information on the ground that the
material averments do not constitute the offense.
FACTS:
1. Hilario P. Soriano (Soriano) and Rosalinda Ilagan (Ilagan) were the President and General Manager, respectively, of the Rural Bank of San
Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. (RBSM).
2. Allegedly, on June 27, 1997 and August 21, 1997, during their incumbency as president and manager of the bank, petitioners indirectly
obtained loans from RBSM.
3. They falsified the loan applications and other bank records, and made it appear that Virgilio J. Malang and Rogelio Maaol obtained loans
of P15,000,000.00 each, when in fact they did not.
4. Accordingly, on May 4, 2000, State Prosecutor Josefino A. Subia charged Soriano in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, with
violation of Section 83 of Republic Act No. 337 (R.A. No. 337) or the General Banking Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1795,
or Violation of the Director, Officer, Stockholder or Related Interest (DOSRI) Rules (DOSRI Rules).
5. Petitioners moved to quash the informations in Criminal Case (pending before Branch 14), and also in Criminal Case (pending with Branch
77), on grounds that: (i) more than one (1) offense is charged; and (ii) the facts charged do not constitute an offense. Specifically,
petitioners argued that the prosecutor charged more than one offense for a single act.  Soriano was charged with violation of DOSRI rules
and estafa thru falsification of commercial document for allegedly securing fictitious loans. They further argued that the facts as alleged in
the information do not constitute an offense.
6. RTC: denied the motion to quash. Rejecting petitioners arguments It held that
a. Section 13 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the complaint or information must charge but only
one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses. Under this Rule, the
Information is defective when it charges two (2) or more offenses.  The rule enjoining the charging of two (2) or more offenses in one
information has for its aim to give the defendant the necessary knowledge of the charge to enable him to prove his defense
b. While Section 3 (e) of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court provides as one of the grounds where the accused may move to quash
the complaint or information, considering Sec. 13 of Rule 110 of the Rules as aforestated, it is apparent that the said ground refers to
a situation where the accused is being charged in one information or criminal complaint for more than one offense.
c. The record shows that two (2) Informations were filed against the herein accused, one in Criminal Case No. against accused Hilario P.
Soriano for Violation of Sec. 83 of R.A. No. 337, as amended by PD 1795, and another one in Criminal Case No. 1981-M-2000 against
accused Hilario P. Soriano and Rosalinda Ilagan for Estafa Thru Falsification of Commercial Documents. Thus, each Information
charges only one offense.

7. Petitioners motion to quash informations in Criminal Case before Branch 14 likewise suffered the same fate, as Judge Braga Dime denied
the same in an Order holding that:
a. Duplicity in criminal pleading is the joinder of two or more distinct and separate offenses in the same court of an indictment or
information.
b. Whether two offenses are charged in an information, or otherwise, must not be made to depend upon the evidence presented at the
trial court but upon the facts alleged in the information
c. Where an offense may be committed in any of the different modes provided by law and the offense is alleged to have been
committed in two or more modes specified, the indictment is sufficient.
d. The allegations in the information of the various ways of committing the offense should be considered as a description of only one
offense and the information cannot be dismissed on the ground of multifariousness
8. CA: Petitioners went up to the Court of Appeals via certiorari, assailing the Orders of Branch 77 and Branch 14. CA, which priorly
consolidated the petitions, sustained the denial of petitioners separate motions to quash (Denied Due Couse and Dismissed).
9. Petitioners are now before this Court, submitting for resolution the same matters argued before the RTC and the CA.  They insist that RTC
Branch 14 and Branch 77 abused their discretion in denying their motions to quash informations. Thus, they posit that the CA committed
reversible error in dismissing their petitions for certiorari.
ISSUE: WON Petitioners are correct in arguing that “RTC Branch 14 and Branch 77 abused their discretion in denying their motions to quash
informations. Thus, they posit that the CA committed reversible error in dismissing their petitions for certiorari”
HELD: NO. There is no justification for the quashal of the Information filed against petitioners. The RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion in
denying the motions.
RATIO:

1. While Section 3 (e) of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court provides as one of the grounds where the accused may move to quash the
complaint or information, considering Sec. 13 of Rule 110 of the Rules as aforestated, it is apparent that the said ground refers to a
situation where the accused is being charged in one information or criminal complaint for more than one offense.
2. The record shows that two (2) Informations were filed against the herein accused, one in Criminal Case against accused Hilario P. Soriano
for Violation of Sec. 83 of R.A. No. 337, as amended by PD 1795, and another one in Criminal Case against accused Hilario P. Soriano and
Rosalinda Ilagan for Estafa Thru Falsification of Commercial Documents. Thus, each Information charges only one offense.
3. Indisputably, duplicity of offenses in a single information is a ground to quash the Information under Section 3(e), Rule 117 of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Rules prohibit the filing of a duplicitous information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing his
defense.
4. By duplicity of charges is meant a single complaint or information that charges more than one offense.[15] Section 13 of Rule 110 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
5. The fundamental test in considering a motion to quash anchored on Section 3 (a),[19] Rule 117 of the1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
is the sufficiency of the averments in the information; that is, whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the
essential elements of the offense charged as defined by law. The trial court may not consider a situation contrary to that set forth in the
criminal complaint or information. Facts that constitute the defense of the petitioners against the charge under the information must be
proved by them during trial. Such facts or circumstances do not constitute proper grounds for a motion to quash the information on the
ground that the material averments do not constitute the offense.
6. In fine, the Court has consistently held that a special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to
quash an information.
7. The proper procedure in such a case is for the accused to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present the special
defenses he had invoked in his motion to quash and if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the
manner authorized by law.
8. Thus, petitioners should not have forthwith filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA and instead, they should have gone to trial
and reiterated the special defenses contained in their motion to quash. There are no special or exceptional circumstances in the present
case that would justify immediate resort to a filing of a petition for certiorari. Clearly, the CA did not commit any reversible error, much
less, grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

- Facts that constitute the defense of the petitioner[s] against the charge under the information must be proved by [him] during trial. Such
facts or circumstances do not constitute proper grounds for a motion to quash the information on the ground that the material averments
do not constitute the offense.
- SC reviewed the sufficiency of informations for DOSRI violation and estafa thru falsification of commercial documents, which were almost
identical, mutatis mutandis, with the subject informations herein.
- SC held that there is no basis for the quashal of the informations as they contain material allegations charging Soriano with violation of
DOSRI rules and estafa thru falsification of commercial documents.
052 Cerezo v. People AUTHOR:
G.R. No. 185230 June 1, 2011

TOPIC: Remedies against denial/grant of motion

PONENTE: NACHURA, J.:
FACTS:
On September 12, 2002, petitioner Joseph Cerezo filed a complaint for libel against respondents Juliet Yaneza, Pablo Abunda, Jr., and Vicente
Afulugencia (respondents), as well as Oscar Mapalo (Mapalo).

Finding probable cause to indict respondents, the Quezon City Prosecutors Office (OP-QC) filed the corresponding Information against them on
February 18, 2003 before the RTC.

Respondents thereafter filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Motion to Re-evaluate Prosecutions Evidence before the OP-QC.

In its resolution dated November 20, 2003, the OP-QC reversed its earlier finding and recommended the withdrawal of the Information.
Consequently, a Motion to Dismiss and Withdraw Information was filed before the RTC on December 3, 2003. During the intervening period,
specifically on November 24, 2003, respondents were arraigned. All of them entered a not guilty plea.

In deference to the prosecutors last resolution, the RTC ordered the criminal case dismissed in its Order dated March 17, 2004, viz.:

Settled is the rule that the determination of the persons to be prosecuted rests primarily with the Public Prosecutor who is
vested with quasi-judicial discretion in the discharge of this function. Being vested with such power, he can reconsider his own
resolution if he finds that there is reasonable ground to do so. x x x.

More so, the Court cannot interfere with the Public Prosecutors discretion to determine probable cause or the propriety of
pursuing or not a criminal case when the case is not yet filed in Court, as a general rule. However, if the same criminal case has
been filed in Court already, the Public Prosecutor can still interfere with it subject to the approval of the Court. In the case of
Republic vs. Sunga, et al., the Supreme Court held that while it has been settled in the case of Crespo vs. Mogul that the trial
court is the sole judge on whether a criminal case should be dismissed after the complaint or information has been filed in court,
nonetheless any motion of the offended party for the dismissal of the criminal case, even if without objection of the accused,
should first be referred to the prosecuting fiscal and only after hearing should the court exercise its exclusive authority to dismiss
or continue with the prosecution of the case. The Court, therefore, after hearing and conferring with the fiscal, can dismiss the
case if convinced that there is [no] reason to continue with the prosecution [of] the same. As in this case, the Court finds merit
[in] the motion of the Public Prosecutor.

Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the said Order, arguing that the November 20, 2003 OP-QC resolution has not yet attained
finality, considering that the same was the subject of a Petition for Review filed before the Department of Justice (DOJ). The RTC deferred action on
the said motion to await the resolution of the DOJ.

On June 26, 2006, the Secretary of Justice promulgated his resolution reversing and setting aside the OP-QCs November 20, 2003 resolution, and
directing the latter to refile the earlier Information for libel.

On October 24, 2006, the RTC issued its first assailed Order granting petitioners motion for reconsideration, conformably with the resolution of the
DOJ Secretary.

Respondents moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied in the RTCs second assailed Order dated February 26, 2007. Relentless,
respondents elevated their predicament to the CA through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, arguing in the main that the
RTC Orders violated their constitutional right against double jeopardy.

The appellate court found the RTC to have gravely abused its discretion in ordering the reinstatement of the case. The CA annulled the impugned
RTC Orders, ruling that all the elements of double jeopardy exist. There was a valid Information sufficient in form and substance filed before a court
of competent jurisdiction to which respondents had pleaded, and that the termination of the case was not expressly consented to by respondents;
hence, the same could not be revived or refiled without transgressing respondents right against double jeopardy.

The CA further found that the DOJ Secretary improperly took cognizance of the Petition for Review because DOJ Department Order No. 223
mandates that no appeal shall be entertained if the accused has already been arraigned or, if the arraignment took place during the pendency of the
appeal, the same shall be dismissed.
ISSUE(S): Whether there was a valid termination of the case so as to usher in the impregnable wall of double jeopardy.

HELD: Since we have held that the March 17, 2004 Order granting the motion to dismiss was committed with grave abuse of discretion, then
respondents were not acquitted nor was there a valid and legal dismissal or termination of the case. Ergo, the fifth requisite which requires the
conviction and acquittal of the accused, or the dismissal of the case without the approval of the accused, was not met. Thus, double jeopardy has
not set in.
RATIO:
Well-entrenched is the rule that once a case is filed with the court, any disposition of it rests on the sound discretion of the court. In thus resolving a
motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw an Information, the trial court should not rely solely and merely on the findings of the public prosecutor or
the Secretary of Justice. It is the courts bounden duty to assess independently the merits of the motion, and this assessment must be embodied in a
written order disposing of the motion. While the recommendation of the prosecutor or the ruling of the Secretary of Justice is persuasive, it is not
binding on courts.

In this case, it is obvious from the March 17, 2004 Order of the RTC, dismissing the criminal case, that the RTC judge failed to make his own
determination of whether or not there was a prima facie case to hold respondents for trial. He failed to make an independent evaluation or
assessment of the merits of the case. The RTC judge blindly relied on the manifestation and recommendation of the prosecutor when he should
have been more circumspect and judicious in resolving the Motion to Dismiss and Withdraw Information especially so when the prosecution
appeared to be uncertain, undecided, and irresolute on whether to indict respondents.

The same holds true with respect to the October 24, 2006 Order, which reinstated the case. The RTC judge failed to make a separate evaluation and
merely awaited the resolution of the DOJ Secretary. This is evident from the general tenor of the Order and highlighted in the following portion
thereof:

As discussed during the hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration, the Court will resolve it depending on the outcome of the Petition for
Review. Considering the findings of the Department of Justice reversing the resolution of the City Prosecutor, the Court gives favorable
action to the Motion for Reconsideration.

By relying solely on the manifestation of the public prosecutor and the resolution of the DOJ Secretary, the trial court abdicated its judicial power
and refused to perform a positive duty enjoined by law.  The said Orders were thus stained with grave abuse of discretion and violated the
complainants right to due process. They were void, had no legal standing, and produced no effect whatsoever.

This Court must therefore remand the case to the RTC, so that the latter can rule on the merits of the case to determine if a prima facie case exists
and consequently resolve the Motion to Dismiss and Withdraw Information anew.

It is beyond cavil that double jeopardy did not set in. Double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached
prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A first
jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and
(e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.