Is The U.S. Bankruptcy Court For The Southern District of California Bankrupt of Judicial Integrity?

Is the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of California

Bankrupt of Judicial Integrity?
(Jump-to hyperlinks and bookmarks are provided to more quickly navigate documents in this pdf file)
On July 11, 2022, a motion with new evidence was filed in U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of
California by Carlton Roark (“Roark”) in Adv. Case No. 18-90158, to vacate a corrupted default judgment (and for
damages, sanctions and other relief), on the basis it was secured by an early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic1 fraud on the
court scheme in a 2011 state trial court action initiated by plaintiff San Diego County Credit Union (“SDCCU”),
against co-defendants North Island Financial Credit Union (NIFCU)2 and its employee Roark. The email and other
evidence filed with the court proves that attorneys as officers of the court from the Sheppard Mullin law firm,
funded and directed by SDCCU, conspired with attorneys as officers of the court funded and directed by NIFCU
and its credit union owned insurer CUNA Mutual (“CUNA”) for NIFCU and its employee Roark, to perpetrate an
extrinsic fraud on the court scheme using tainted/fabricated evidence against Roark.
First, attorneys as officers of the court from Sheppard Mullin for SDCCU, secured a court order to have Roark’s
home PC hard drive accessed (for evidence alleging SDCCU was engaged in financial wrongdoing and fraud), that
unbeknownst to the court, was by a non-neutral computer forensic expert with a conflict of interest favoring SDCCU
(who tampered with Roark’s PC to create evidence of wholesale file deletion). Attorneys as officers of the court
from Sheppard Mullin then conspired with attorneys as officers of the court for opposing parties (NIFCU and Roark)
to use, and only inform the court about, neutral computer forensic experts who were later used, to analyze already
tainted/fabricated evidence on Roark’s home PC hard drive and copies thereof (from the first non-neutral computer
forensics expert) to propound the deceptive fallacy to the court that neutral computer forensic experts were used.
The intent of the extrinsic fraud on the court scheme was to allege destruction of evidence by Roark on his home
PC so that terminating sanctions could be secured against him. Terminating sanctions are a rare form of sanctions
seldom imposed by courts because of their draconian nature. They not only strip you of your constitutional rights
to due process and a trial to present evidence to defend yourself, but they also allow the party securing them to have
false and unproven allegations made against you, deemed as though admitted by you. The foregoing left Roark with
a corrupted, nondischargeable default judgment of now more than $1,000,000 for alleged defamation. The extrinsic
fraud on the court scheme to secure terminating sanctions against Roark was intended to prevent Roark (previously
employed by SDCCU) from corroborating financial institution offenses by SDCCU pursuant to 18 U.S. Code §3293
and §1006, alleged by others, as intended by the separation agreements SDCCU (and Sheppard Mullin) used, that
conditioned receipt of severance pay for former employees, to not raising allegations of SDCCU wrongdoing with
the government (see provision below from SDCCU’s entire separation agreement filed in Bankruptcy Court).
1
“Extrinsic fraud is conduct which prevents a party from presenting his claim in court” Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc. 359 F.3d
1136, 1140-1141, 1164, (9th Cir. 2004). The 9th Circuit Court in Green v. Ancora-Citronelle Corp., 577 F.2d 1380, 1384, (9th
Cir. 1978) also defined extrinsic fraud as conduct that “…prevents a party from having an opportunity to present his claim or
defense in court . . . or deprives a party of his right to a day in court.". Extrinsic fraud is also the only type of fraud within the
9th Circuit court system that is an exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, that otherwise prohibits a party from contesting
state court rulings based on fraud, in federal court.
2
NIFCU merged into California Credit Union (“CCU”) in February of 2017, before this case entered into federal courts
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Roark’s case was assigned to U.S. Bankruptcy Court Judge, Laura S. Taylor, a former 21-year associate and
partner of Sheppard Mullin (San Diego), the law firm whose attorneys as officers of the court perpetrated extrinsic
and other fraud on the court schemes in two state courts and in three federal courts, in conspiracy with opposing
counsel as officers of the court (all funded and directed by credit union interests). Five weeks later, Judge Taylor
assigns the case to Judge Christopher B. Latham, who does not issue the customary tentative ruling (that gives all
parties advance notice to prepare) for Roark’s motion hearing on September 14, 2022. In that hearing Judge Latham
not only disregards the evidence, but also disregards admissions by counsel for SDCCU (Sheppard Mullin), and
NIFCU/CCU, acknowledging Roark’s evidence and allegations that favor granting, to instead deny, Roark’s
motion. After Roark files a motion for reconsideration calling out the court’s clear error, Judge Latham issues a
second ruling to falsely state Roark asserted the legal authority that Sheppard Mullin counsel for SDCCU asserted
(to falsely reframe Roark’s motion, in order to defeat it). Judge Latham’s rulings are therefore currently on appeal
in U.S. District Court, for the Southern District of California as Case No. 22-CV-01962.
The Evidence
The email exhibits below (filed in Bankruptcy Court) were printed-to-pdf to show the time, date, sender and
recipient names, with email headers and metadata, and are self-authenticating pursuant to Federal Rules of
Evidence, Rule 901 and 902, but were also authenticated by an IT computer expert (Exhibit M, Dkt #71), with the
original emails made available to, but not requested by, Judge Latham (lines 18, p. 6 through line 1, p. 7, Dkt #71).
1. Exhibit B, Dkt #71 – February 11th 2014 email from Roark’s attorneys at the Yee & Belilove law firm, funded
and directed by, and copied to, CUNA who was also funding and directing counsel for NIFCU, Roark’s co-
defendant employer, informing Roark that his home PC hard drive needed to be accessed as soon as possible.
In a later email to Roark’s attorney only on February 13th 2014, 9:43 a.m. (without the customary cc: to Roark),
CUNA’s agent states “I would recommend that we reach out to Jim Sevel first. I have used him in the past
on cases and have had good results” [Emphasis added]. This proves (after all conflict checks) CUNA was in
a position to have foreknowledge of Mr. Sevel’s conflict of interest, before recommending him, for the extrinsic
fraud on the court scheme attorneys as officers of the court for credit union interests took part in.
2. Exhibit C through Exhibit F, Dkt #71 – Emails between March 3rd and March 19th, 2014 involving Jim Sevel,
the computer forensics expert CUNA wanted counsel they funded and directed for Roark to use, to first access
(tamper with) and copy, Roark’s home computer hard drive.
3. Exhibit G, Dkt #71 – SMOKING GUN emails dated April 8th and 9th 2014 from Roark’s CUNA funded and
directed attorneys to both CUNA and Roark, each with an attached letter acknowledging that counsel for
SDCCU (Sheppard Mullin) had informed them (only after Roark’s home PC hard drive was first accessed,
tampered with and copied) that Jim Sevel had concealed his conflict of interest for SDCCU. This was after
all conflict checks by all the attorneys and after CUNA, who was in a position to know of Mr. Sevel’s conflict
of interest beforehand, recommended he be used first!
4. Exhibit H through Exhibit J, Dkt #71 – Emails between April 9, 2014 and October 14th 2014 about, the return
of Mr. Sevel’s payments to CUNA for having concealed his conflict of interest for SDCCU and, the selection
of subsequent computer forensic experts who were engaged to analyze Roark’s home PC hard drive and copies
thereof, after it was first accessed (and tampered with) by Jim Sevel, whose conflict of interest for SDCCU
was concealed from the court!
5. Exhibit K, Dkt #71 – Emails from October 9th 2014 to August 13th 2015 between CUNA and the attorneys they
funded and directed for Roark, including the law firm of Higgs, Fletcher & Mack who were engaged by CUNA
to also represent their interests (i.e., conceal extrinsic and other fraud on the court schemes), about Pixley
Forensics Group and Bruce Pixley. Pixley was the fourth, last and only computer forensic expert used in the
2011 state trial court action, cited in that court’s minute order and judgment, who was used to analyze tainted
copies of Roark’s home PC hard drive, after it was first accessed (and tampered with) by Mr. Sevel, whose
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conflict of interest for SDCCU was concealed from the court! On p. 11 of 36 through p. 16 of 36 of Ex. K, Dkt
#71, is more SMOKING GUN evidence in the form of an email from Roark’s CUNA funded and directed
attorneys at the Yee Law firm to CUNA with attachments. The attachments include a March 17 th 2015 letter
(eleven months after Mr. Sevel’s concealed conflict of interest for SDCCU was disclosed, per Ex. G, Dkt #71),
copied to; (per p. 14 of 36, Ex. K, Dkt #71) Shannon Z. Petersen and Travis Anderson, officers of the court
for SDCCU from the Sheppard Mullin law firm, Mark H. Nys and Susan K. Chelsea, officers of the court for
NIFCU from the Klinedinst PC law firm, and Steven J. Cologne, Robert J. Fitzpatrick and Derek W. Paradis,
officers of the court for CUNA and Roark, from the Higgs, Fletcher and Mack law firm, with the chain of
custody for Mr. Sevel. This proves they all knew about Mr. Sevel, and conspired to conceal from the 2011 state
trial court, their use of tainted/fabricated evidence from Mr. Sevel, to support SDCCU’s claim of spoliation,
and demand for terminating sanctions to strip Roark of his right to due process and a trial to present evidence,
violating section one of the Fourteenth, and Seventh Amendment respectively to the U.S. Constitution!
6. Exhibit L, Dkt #71 – SMOKING GUN email dated October 17th 2014, between CUNA and the attorneys they
funded and directed for Roark, acknowledging it was Jim Sevel who first accessed (to tamper with) Roark’s
home PC hard drive on March 7th 2014.
Aside from the defamatory claims that a corrupted default judgment secured by an extrinsic fraud on the court
scheme allowed SDCCU to make against Roark uncontested, is the fraudulent use of the word “neutral” it allowed
in the Notice of Entry of Judgment and state trial court minute order (imposing terminating sanctions) on line 14,
p. 5 of 16, and mentioned four times on p. 12 of 16 of Ex. A, Dkt #71 to describe the computer forensic expert used.
Terminating sanctions also prevented Roark from proving (aside from other fraud on the court schemes) that the
USB drive (mentioned in Exhibit A), used against him (lines 10–11, p. 6, Dkt #71) was tainted because it was first
given to him by another party affiliated with NIFCU. Roark was also instructed in an email at 1:57 p.m., on August
21, 2014 by his CUNA funded and directed attorneys as officers of the court who are now evidenced having
conspired with Sheppard Mullin attorneys as officers of the court for SDCCU, et al, in extrinsic (and other) fraud
on the court schemes, to first send the USB drive directly to them. This is precisely why a chain of custody and
evidence of where the USB drive originated, was NOT provided to the court in the 2011 state trial court action.
As the above email exhibits prove, this was NOT a reference to the computer forensics expert who first
accessed Roark’s home computer hard drive, but to those who later accessed and analyzed it, after it was first
accessed by Jim Sevel, the non-neutral computer forensic expert with a conflict of interest for SDCCU, who
tampered with Roark’s home PC hard drive to produce evidence of wholesale file deletion activity to support a
claim by SDCCU that evidence was destroyed.
In his first ruling (Dkt #89), Judge Latham failed to recognize, or abused his discretion to disregard, all the
evidence and legal authorities cited by Roark supporting his motion, to deny Roark’s motion to vacate a default
judgment based on new evidence proving it was secured through extrinsic (and other) fraud on the court schemes
in state and federal courts, and for damages, sanctions and other relief, (Dkt #71). In the September 14, 2022 U.S.
Bankruptcy Court hearing with Judge Latham that preceded his first ruling, Sheppard Mullin counsel argued that
Roark was asserting fraud (in the general sense) in order to assert that the one-year time limit under FRCP Rule
60(b) barred Roark from asserting his claim. However, Roark never asserted fraud in the general sense. Roark
asserted extrinsic fraud on the court schemes by attorneys as officers of the court in a state and federal trial court,
in which there is no statute of limitations pursuant to the legal authorities cited by Roark. When Judge Latham
reminds Sheppard Mullin counsel of the dozen or so legal authorities cited by Roark (p. i, and line 9, p. 12 through
line 12, p. 18, Dkt #71) that create an exception to the one-year time bar of Rule 60(b), Lisa Yun Pruitt, Sheppard
Mullin counsel for SDCCU acknowledges “…there is an exception…” (lines 5–19, p. 12, Ex. T, Dkt #92), but
continues to advocate for Rule 60(b) anyway.
In the September 14, 2022 U.S. Bankruptcy Court hearing with Judge Latham that preceded his first ruling
(Dkt #89), Judge Latham also failed to recognize, or abused his discretion to disregard, the criminal conspiracy
Roark alleged, and evidenced with his motion, Dkt #71 (and subsequent filings), by attorneys as officers of the
court to defraud a plurality of state and federal courts, even after it was admitted in that hearing by attorney
Gerald Sims, for NIFCU/CCU, and not denied by Sheppard Mullin counsel for SDCCU! Per lines 12–13, p.
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14, Ex. T, Dkt #92, Mr. Sims explicitly stated, about the attorneys as officers of the court for all opposing parties
who agreed to conceal from state and federal courts, their use of tainted/fabricated evidence (and court rulings based
thereon) from a non-neutral computer forensic expert with a conflict of interest for Roark’s adversary, SDCCU, to
propound the deceptive fallacy that neutral computer forensic experts were used, that “…everybody knew…”, and
“…squared it away.” with themselves to assent to it. It was never squared away with Roark, who was repeatedly
told by his CUNA attorneys that the fraud on the state trial court would be raised later (until it could not).
In his second ruling (Dkt #98) denying Roark’s motion for reconsideration based on clear court error, (Dkt
#92), Judge Latham, then falsely states (to support denying and not reconsidering, Roark’s motion to vacate and
for other relief, Dkt #71) in the 3rd ¶, p. 2, Dkt #98, that Roark had asserted Rule 60(b) with its one-year time bar.
The foregoing statement by Judge Latham is easily proven to be false because not only is Rule 60(b) absent from
Roark’s table of authorities on pp. iv–vi, Dkt #71, it’s also absent from Roark’s entire motion.
Judge Latham also failed to recognize, or abused his discretion to disregard, evidence that the corrupted
default judgment produced by extrinsic (and other) fraud on the court schemes in a 2011 state trial court was:
(a) also used for a fraud on the court scheme in, that entered the rendered rulings of, a 2018 state appellate
court (line 20, p. 2 through line 19, p. 3, Dkt #71), as evidenced by the 2018 state court appeal ruling (Ex.
V, Dkt #92) that makes no mention of Mr. Sevel, but clearly relies on the deceptive fallacy that neutral
computer forensic experts were used, and was;
(b) also used for an extrinsic fraud on the court scheme in, that entered the rendered rulings of, a 2018–2019
U.S. Bankruptcy (adversary trial) Court (line 20, p. 3 through line 3, p, 4, Dkt #71), using a bankruptcy
Trustee with a conflict of interest she refused to recuse herself of (line 4–20, p. 4, Dkt #71) and was;
(c) also used for a fraud on the court scheme by counsel for Sheppard Mullin counsel for SDCCU and counsel
for NIFCU/CCU and the bankruptcy Trustee, in, that entered the rendered rulings of, a U.S. District Court
(twice), and the Ninth Circuit Court, to defeat Roark’s appeals for other matters in this case, that included
efforts to have his evidence considered (line 6–10, p. 2, and line 21, p. 4 through line 12, p. 5, Dkt #71),
before Roark filed his evidence as new evidence in U.S. Bankruptcy Court on July 11, 2022 and thereafter.
Judge Latham also failed to recognize, or abused his discretion to disregard, evidence of the gaslighting effort
by Sheppard Mullin attorney, Shannon Petersen, in Roark’s December 2, 2014 deposition to conceal the name of
Jim Sevel, line 5, p. 4 through line 2, p. 5, Dkt #75.
Judge Latham also failed to recognize, or abused his discretion to disregard, evidence of the fraud on the
court scheme in a 2018 state appellate court evidenced by the opening brief in that state court appeal, prepared
by Roark’s CUNA funded and directed attorneys as officers of the court (to conceal the early-to-mid 2014
extrinsic fraud on the court scheme in the 2011 state trial court action), and the effort to further defraud that court
with Sheppard Mullin attorney, Shannon Petersen for SDCCU, evidenced in an authenticated audio of that court
hearing, also made available to, but not requested by, Judge Latham (line 20, p. 2 through line 19, p. 3, Dkt #71).
And finally, Judge Latham not only failed to recognize, or abused his discretion to disregard, evidence for all
of the above, he also failed to recognize, or abused his discretion to disregard, that fraudulent acts on the judicial
machinery of the court (i.e., extrinsic fraud on the courts schemes), “…to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due
administration of justice…” (in a plurality of state and federal courts no less) to strip Roark of his constitutional
rights, is a criminal offense pursuant to the second prong of 18 U.S.C. §1503. Judge Latham also failed to
recognize, or abused his discretion to disregard, evidence, that a conspiracy to do the foregoing between two or
more (attorneys as officers of the court in state and federal courts no less), admitted by NIFCU/CCU counsel and
not denied by Sheppard Mullin Counsel for SDCCU, as discussed above, and on line 7, p. 6 through line 1, p. 8,
Dkt #92, is a conspiracy against rights and also a criminal offense pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §241.
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Case 18-90158-CL Filed 07/28/22 Entered 07/28/22 09:17:30 Doc 75 Pg. 1 of 15
October 12, 2022
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
325 West “F” Street, San Diego, California 92101-6991
In re:
CARLTON ROARK, BANKRUPTCY NO. 18-04093-LT7
Debtor.
SAN DIEGO COUNTY CREDIT UNION, ADVERSARY NO. 18-90158-CL

Plaintiff.
v. Date of Hearing: 09/14/2022
CARLTON ROARK, Time of Hearing: 10:00 a.m.
Defendant. Name of Judge: Christopher B. Latham
ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as set forth on the continuation page(s) attached, numbered two (2)
through eight (8).
DATED: October 12, 2022

Page 2 | ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT
DEBTOR: CARLTON ROARK Bankruptcy No. 18-04093-LT7

SAN DIEGO COUNTY CREDIT UNION V. CARLTON ROARK Adversary No. 18-90158-CL
The court has considered Defendant Carlton Roark’s motion to vacate judgment (ECF No. 71), the
Chapter 7 Trustee’s opposition (ECF No. 73), Plaintiff San Diego County Credit Union’s
opposition (ECF No. 74), North Island Federal Credit Union’s (“NIFCU”) response (ECF No. 77);
Defendant’s replies (ECF Nos. 75, 76, & 78), the parties’ arguments at the September 14, 2022
hearing, and its docket. For the following reasons, the court will deny the motion.
Background
History Pre-Bankruptcy
In 2011 Defendant anonymously began posting defamatory comments about Plaintiff on the
Internet (ECF No. 74). Plaintiff sued a John Doe defendant in San Diego Superior Court,
eventually joining Defendant and his then-employer NIFCU. See Case No. 37-2011-00100322-
CU-DF-CTL (the “State Court Action”). Defendant and NIFCU’s attorneys hired a computer
forensics expert, Mr. James Sevel, to examine and image Defendant’s hard drive (ECF No. 71).
After doing so, Mr. Sevel and Defendant’s counsel realized he had a conflict of interest with
Plaintiff from a different case. Id. So Defendant’s counsel fired him and retained a new, neutral
expert to re-examine the computer (ECF No. 74).
This new expert discovered that Defendant had deleted tens of thousands of potentially relevant
files and emails from the computer (ECF No. 74). Defendant admitted to deleting some 33,000
files before Mr. Sevel examined his computer. Id. He claimed that Mr. Sevel – while colluding
with Plaintiff, his co-defendants, and his own counsel – deleted another 10,000 files to frame him
for spoliation (ECF No. 71). The second expert contradicted this, stating that all deletion happened
before and after Mr. Sevel had the computer, not while he did (ECF No. 74). Based on this and
Defendant’s own admissions, the state court found that he violated its protective order, issued
terminating sanctions, and struck his answer. See Case No. 37-2011-00100322-CU-DF-CTL. On
December 16, 2016, it entered a default judgment against him. Id. Defendant appealed. But the
Court of Appeal affirmed, and the California Supreme Court denied review (ECF No. 73). See
San Diego County Credit Union v. Roark, 2018 WL1663204 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 6, 2018); Case
No. S248735.
Defendant’s Bankruptcy
Defendant then filed for Chapter 7 relief. See Case No. 18-04093-LT7. He listed one disputed
liability (the default judgment) and one asset (an employment claim against his now former
employer NIFCU) (ECF No. 74). He brought an adversary proceeding against Plaintiff for abuse
of process, which the court dismissed. See AP No. 18-90109-LA. Plaintiff then filed its own
adversary proceeding seeking to hold its default judgment nondischargeable (ECF No. 1). The
court found for Plaintiff on summary judgment (ECF No. 50). Defendant appealed, and the
District Court affirmed (ECF No. 68). See also Case No. 3:19-cv-0344-AJB-MSB.
Signed by Judge Christopher B. Latham October 12, 2022


Meanwhile, in the main bankruptcy case the Trustee settled Defendant’s employment claim and
brought $152,000 into the estate (ECF No. 73). Defendant balked at the settlement and asserted
that the Trustee was now involved in the conspiracy against him. Id. This stemmed from one
Ms. Angela Brill – who worked for NIFCU during the State Court Action – working for the Trustee
from 2005 to 2006 (ECF No. 71). So he appealed this as well (ECF No. 73). Both the District
Court and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. See Case Nos. 19-cv-2117-TWR-WVG; Roark v. Gladstone
(In re Roark), 2022 WL885155 (9th Cir. March 25, 2022).
Plaintiff now moves to: (1) vacate the State Court Action’s judgment; (2) set aside the court’s
finding of nondischargeability based on that; (3) set aside its approval of the Trustee’s settlement
in his main bankruptcy case; and (4) award him $19,750,000 in compensatory damages. Id. The
Trustee, Plaintiff, and NIFCU oppose (ECF Nos. 73, 74, & 77).1
Legal Standards
Rule 60
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “do not recognize a motion for reconsideration.” In re
Captain Blythers, Inc., 311 B.R. 530, 539 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004), aff’d, 182 F. App’x 708, 709
(9th Cir. 2006). There are instead “two types of motions to obtain post-judgment relief: a motion
to alter or amend judgment, FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e), and a motion for relief from judgment, FED. R.
CIV. P. 60.” In re Walker, 332 B.R. 820, 826 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2005).
“When a party files a motion for reconsideration within 14 days after the entry of judgment, the
motion is treated as a motion to alter or amend judgment under Civil Rule 59(e).” In re Lee, BAP
Nos. CC-15-1240 & CC-15-1272, 2016 WL1450210, at *7 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Apr. 11, 2016) (citing
Am. Ironworks & Erectors, Inc. v. N. Am. Constr. Corp., 248 F.3d 892, 898-99 (9th Cir. 2001)).
See also FED. R. BANKR. P. 9023. “Otherwise, it is treated as a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from
judgment or order.” Am. Ironworks & Erectors, Inc., 248 F.3d at 899.
Relief from an order under Rule 60(b), incorporated by Bankruptcy Rule 9024, is available “only
upon a showing of: (1) mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence;
(3) fraud; (4) a void judgment; (5) a satisfied or discharged judgment; or (6) ‘extraordinary
circumstances’ which would justify relief.” In re Safarian, BAP No. CC-09-1335, 2010
WL6259763, *5 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Apr. 13, 2010) (quoting Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437,
1442 (9th Cir. 1991)).
Reconsideration is an “extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and

conservation of judicial resources.” Kona Enter., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th
Cir. 2000) (quotations omitted).
1
NIFCU opposes only to state that it has never been a party to this adversary proceeding (ECF No. 77).
The court sees this and notes that Defendant need not have named NIFCU in his motion (see ECF No. 71).


Res Judicata
Res judicata – or claim preclusion – “provides that ‘a final judgment on the merits bars further
claims by parties or their privies based on the same cause of action.’” United States v. Schimmels
(In re Schimmels), 127 F.3d 875, 881 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Montana v. United States, 440 U.S.
147, 153 (1979)). “Res judicata applies when there is: (1) an identity of claims; (2) a final
judgment on the merits; and (3) identity or privity between parties.” Ruiz v. Snohomish Cnty. Pub.
Util. Dist. No. 1, 824 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 2016). Further, res judicata “prevents parties from
raising issues that could have been raised and decided in a prior action – even if they were not
actually litigated.” Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Group, Inc., 140 S.Ct. 1589,
1594 (2020) (quoting Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979)). And “[d]efault judgments are
considered ‘final judgments on the merits’ and are thus effective for the purposes of claim
preclusion.” In re Garcia, 313 B.R. 307, 311 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004) (citing Howard v. Lewis, 905
F.2d 1318, 1323 (9th Cir. 1990)).
The Law of the Case Doctrine
Under the law of the case doctrine, “a court is generally precluded from reconsidering an issue that
has already been decided by the same court, or a higher court in the identical case.” Thomas v.
Bible, 983 F.2d 152, 154 (9th Cir. 1993), see also U.S. v. Alexander, 106 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir.
1997). The doctrine is not a limitation on a tribunal’s power, but rather a guide to discretion.
Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983). It “is a judicial invention designed to aid in the
efficient operation of court affairs.” Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. of Am., 902 F.2d 703,
715 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Lockert v. United States Dep’t of Labor, 867 F.2d 513, 518 (9th Cir.
1989)). And the doctrine “states that the decision of an appellate court on a legal issue must be
followed in all subsequent proceedings in the same case.” Alaimalo v. U.S., 645 F.3d 1042, 1049
(9th Cir. 2011).
The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, established by two Supreme Court decisions handed down sixty
years apart, provides that a federal district court lacks the jurisdiction to hear a collateral attack on
a state court judgment or to review final determinations of state court decisions.” In re Audre, Inc.,
216 B.R. 19, 26 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997) (first citing Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413
(1923); and then citing District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, (1983)).
Federal courts are barred from deciding “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of
injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced
and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi
Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
If a federal bankruptcy court were to intervene in a state court judgment, it could only do so if the
state proceedings were void ab initio. In re Audre, Inc., 216 B.R. at 29. That said, the “doctrine
applies even when a state court judgment may be in error.” In re Roussos, 251 B.R. 86, 95 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. 2000) (quoting In re Audre, Inc., 216 B.R. at 29); see also In re Pardee, 218 B.R. 916,


924 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998) (“[A] final order that is not appealed cannot be collaterally attacked in
a later proceeding even if the order was entered in error.”).
“The collateral attack doctrine precludes litigants from collaterally attacking the judgments of
other courts.” Rein v. Providian Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2001). See Celotex Corp.
v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 313 (1995) (“We have made clear that [i]t is for the court of first instance
to determine the question of the validity of the law, and until its decision is reversed for error by
orderly review, either by itself or by a higher court, its orders based on its decisions are to be
respected.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). For the court to apply the
doctrine, “the relevant claims must have been directly ruled on in the prior proceeding.” In re RCS
Capital Dev., LLC, BAP No. AZ-12-1626, 2013 WL 3619172, at *7 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. July 16,
2013) (citing Skokomish Indian Tribe v. United States, 332 F.3d 551, 560 (9th Cir. 2003)).
Legal Analysis and Discussion
Judicial Notice
In its opposition, Plaintiff asks the court to judicially notice: (1) its third amended complaint from
the State Court Action; (2) that court’s preservation order; (3) its terminating sanctions order;
(4) its judgment; and (5) two stipulated protocols for the inspection of Defendant’s hard drive
(ECF No. 74). Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, the court may take judicial notice of “matters
of public record.” Id. at 688-89. Those include other court proceedings. See U.S. ex rel. Robinson
Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992); Grant v. Aurora
Loan Services, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1263 (C.D. Cal. 2010). All of Plaintiff’s documents
qualify as such and are appropriate for judicial notice. The court will accordingly grant Plaintiff’s
request.
Defendant’s Motion
Defendant seeks to vacate or set aside: (1) the State Court Action’s default judgment; (2) the
bankruptcy court’s nondischargeability finding at summary judgment; and (3) its approval of the
Trustee’s settlement. (ECF No. 71). He bases his request on purported new evidence proving the
alleged conspiracy against him, extrinsic fraud, and fraud on the court. Id. The motion is not well
taken and must be denied. Even if Defendant’s allegations held merit (and they do not), at least
four legal grounds prevent the court from ruling in his favor.
Rule 60(b)
One, Rule 60 – made applicable here by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9024 – itself bars
aspects of Defendant’s requested relief. True, Rule 60(b)(2) and (3) allow for relief from
judgments based on new evidence or extrinsic fraud, respectively. But motions predicated on
either must be brought “no more than a year after the entry of judgment.” FED. R. CIV. P. 60(c).
The court approved the Trustee’s settlement on February 25, 2019 (Bankr. ECF No. 88) and
entered its summary judgment order a day later (ECF No. 50). And the state court entered default


judgment on December 16, 2016. See Case No. 37-2011-00100322-CU-DF-CTL. Yet Defendant
filed his motion on July 12, 2022 (ECF No. 71). All three decisions were final well over a year
before then. Thus Rule 60(c) bars the motion insofar as it seeks relief under Rule 60(b)(2) or (3).2
Reconsideration for fraud on the court is not time-barred under the rule. See FED. R. CIV. P.
60(d)(3) (“This rule does not limit a court’s power to . . . set aside judgment for fraud on the
court.”). But the remaining grounds prohibit it as well.
Res Judicata
Two, res judicata precludes the court from reconsidering any further claims based on a final
judgment. Three elements must exist: “(1) an identity of claims; (2) a final judgment on the merits;
and (3) identity or privity between parties.” Snohomish Cnty., 824 F.3d at 1164. This doctrine
applies to the myriad final judgments that have been entered against Defendant. The State Court
Action is claim preclusive against Defendant. There is an identity of claims – the underlying
dispute between Plaintiff and Defendant (ECF Nos. 71 & 74). This includes any fraud allegations
Defendant could have but failed to raise there. Lucky Brand Dungarees, 140 S.Ct. at 1594. The
State Court Action resulted in a final judgment on the merits; namely, the December 16, 2016
default judgment upheld on appeal. See Garcia, 313 B.R. at 311. And there is an identity of
parties – both Plaintiff and Defendant litigated there.
Likewise, both the bankruptcy court’s settlement and nondischargeability rulings have preclusive
effect. Claim identity exists, specifically Defendant’s allegations of a conspiracy against him and
fraud on the court. These were raised – or could have been – during those disputes or their appeals
(see ECF No. 50 & Bankr. ECF No. 73). Both are final judgments on the merits. Quality of
Judgments Entitled to Res Judicata, 18A FED. PRAC. & PROC. JURIS. (WRIGHT & MILLER) § 4427
(3d ed.) The orders affirming them on appeal are as well (ECF No. 68; Bankr. ECF Nos. 177 &
193). Again, there is an identity of parties, whether between Plaintiff and Defendant or him and
the Trustee (ECF No. 50 & Bankr. ECF No. 73). Thus all those orders and judgments retain their
effects against Defendant and bind the court. Schimmels, 127 F.3d at 881.
The Law of the Case Doctrine
Three, the law of the case doctrine generally precludes a court from reconsidering an issue it (or a
higher court in the same case) has already decided. U.S. v. Alexander, 106 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir.
2
Even if Rule 60(c) did not bar any Rule 60(b)(2) or (3) motion, Defendant still would not be entitled to
relief. As in his Ninth Circuit appeal, Defendant has “failed to establish any basis for relief” and is trying
to raise argument and present evidence when he could have reasonably done so earlier. Roark, 2022 WL
885155, at *1 (citing Kona Enters., 229 F.3d at 890). Specifically, Defendant fails to show “newly
discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b).” FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(2). For supposed new evidence, he mainly offers emails
between attorneys and the computer experts during the State Court Action – emails he was copied on and
received (ECF Nos. 71 & 78). Thus it cannot be newly discovered because “it was in the moving party’s
possession at the time of trial.” Coastal Transfer Co. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 833 F.2d 208, 212
(9th Cir. 1987).


1997). The issue must have been “decided either expressly or by necessary implication in [the]
previous disposition.” Thomas v. Bible, 983 F.2d 152, 154 (9th Cir. 1993). This court previously
found that “[t]here is no evidence of any extrinsic fraud on the [c]ourt that led to the terminating
sanctions” (ECF No. 50). Because of this, no exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine existed,
and the State Court Action’s default judgment has collateral estoppel effect. Id. The district court
affirmed that decision and held that Defendant offered insufficient evidence to prove his
“conclusory inferences” of fraud (ECF No. 68). The issue of whether there was any fraud on the
court was expressly decided by this court and the district court. See Thomas, 983 F.2d at 154.
Under law of the case, the court cannot now revisit it. Similarly, this court approved the Trustee’s
settlement (Bankr. ECF No. 73). And both the district court and the Ninth Circuit affirmed that,
dismissing Defendant’s allegations of fraud and conspiracy (Bankr. ECF Nos. 176 & 193). The
law of this case bars reconsidering those issues as well.3
The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
And four, even if Rule 60(b), res judicata, and law of the case all weighed in Defendant’s favor,
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would bar his motion to vacate the State Court Action’s default
judgment. This provides that federal trial courts lack jurisdiction to entertain collateral attacks on
state court judgments. In re Audre, Inc., 216 B.R. 19, 26 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). The court is
consequently precluded from entertaining Defendant’s arguments. After presenting his case to the
San Diego Superior Court, the Court of Appeal, and the California Supreme Court, he asks this
court to vacate a default judgment entered years ago. He is a “state-court loser[] complaining of
injuries caused by [a] state-court judgment[] rendered” before his bankruptcy. Exxon Mobil, 544
U.S. at 284. So under Rooker-Feldman, the court cannot undo the state court’s terminating
sanctions order and its resulting default judgment.
Defendant correctly states that there is a limited exception to this doctrine for extrinsic fraud (ECF
No. 71). See Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140–41 (9th Cir. 2004). But as discussed
above, res judicata and the law of the case prevent Defendant from arguing that any fraud occurred.
Other federal courts have decided that Defendant did not show sufficient evidence of fraud, that
he could have raised the issue in the state appellate courts, and that the state court had an
independent ground to issue terminating sanctions because he admitted to destroying evidence.
(ECF No. 50 & 68; Bankr. ECF No. 176). Defendant’s attempt to recycle his earlier allegations
does not justify a collateral attack on the State Court Action. This court lacks jurisdiction to vacate
that default judgment. See Audre, 216 B.R. at 26 (first citing Rooker, 263 U.S. 413; and then citing
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462).
3
Nor do any exceptions to the doctrine apply. The court does not see: (1) a clearly erroneous decision;
(2) an intervening change in law; (3) substantially different evidence on remand; (4) other changed
circumstances; or (5) manifest injustice. Alexander, 106 F.3d at 876.


Conclusion
Under Rule 60(c), Defendant cannot argue that there is newly discovered evidence or extrinsic
fraud. Res judicata and the law of the case preclude reconsideration of the circuit, district, or
bankruptcy court rulings on the nondischargeability of Plaintiff’s judgment, the approval of the
Trustee’s settlement, and Defendant’s fraud and conspiracy allegations. And the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine bars his collateral attack on the State Court Action. For the foregoing reasons, the court
grants Plaintiff’s judicial notice request and denies Defendant’s motion.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

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December 9, 2022
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
325 West “F” Street, San Diego, California 92101-6991
In re:
CARLTON ROARK, BANKRUPTCY NO. 18-04093-LT7
Debtor.
SAN DIEGO COUNTY CREDIT UNION, ADVERSARY NO. 18-90158-CL

Plaintiff.
v.
CARLTON ROARK, Name of Judge: Christopher B. Latham
Defendant.
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR FURTHER RECONSIDERATION
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as set forth on the continuation page(s) attached, numbered two (2)
through three (3).
DATED: December 9, 2022

Page 2 | ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR FURTHER RECONSIDERATION

The court has considered Defendant Carlton Roark’s most recent motion for reconsideration (ECF
No. 92), the Chapter 7 Trustee’s opposition (ECF No. 93), North Island Federal Credit Union
(“NIFCU”)’s opposition (ECF No. 94), Plaintiff San Diego County Credit Union’s opposition
(ECF No. 95), Defendant’s reply (ECF No. 96), and its own docket. For the following reasons,
the court will deny the motion.
On July 12, 2022, Defendant moved to: (1) vacate a San Diego Superior Court judgment; (2) set
aside the court’s finding of nondischargeability based on that; (3) set aside its approval of the
Trustee’s settlement in his main bankruptcy case; and (4) award him $19,750,000 in compensatory
damages (ECF No. 71). The Trustee, Plaintiff, and NIFCU opposed (ECF Nos. 73, 74, & 77).
After carefully considering the parties’ papers and oral arguments at the September 14, 2022
hearing, the court denied the motion (ECF No. 89). Defendant now moves to reconsider that order
(ECF No. 92). The Trustee, Plaintiff, and NIFCU again oppose (ECF Nos. 93, 94, & 95). The
court then determined the matter suitable for disposition on the papers under Local Civil Rule
7.1(d)(1) and Local Bankruptcy Rule 9013-4 (ECF No. 97).
Defendant’s earlier motion to vacate sought relief under Rule 60(b) (ECF No. 71). Because he
filed his current reconsideration motion within 14 days of the order denying that it “is treated as a
motion to alter or amend judgment under Civil Rule 59(e).” In re Lee, BAP Nos. CC-15-1240 &
CC-15-1272, 2016 WL1450210, at *7 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. April 11, 2016). Rule 59(e) – made
applicable here through Bankruptcy Rule 9023 – permits the court to reconsider and amend a
previous order if: “(1) the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) the district
court committed clear error or made an initial decision that was manifestly unjust, or (3) there is
an intervening change in controlling law.” Ybarra v. McDaniel, 656 F.3d 984, 998 (9th Cir. 2011)
(internal citation marks omitted) (quoting Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 740 (9th
Cir. 2001)).
While two different procedural standards govern Defendant’s motions, there is no substantive
difference between them. Both allege the same fraudulent conspiracy (see ECF Nos. 71 & 92).
So Defendant essentially is moving the court to reconsider its order denying reconsideration. This
is without merit. Reconsideration is an “extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests
of finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Kona Enter., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d
877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotations omitted). And it is unwarranted here.1
The court helpfully directs Defendant to its previous order on his motion to vacate (ECF No. 89).
For similar reasons articulated there, it will deny this reconsideration motion. In short, Defendant
has shown no entitlement to Rule 59 relief. Despite his philippics to the contrary, he has not
pointed to any new evidence, clear error, or intervening change in law. See Ybarra, 656 F.3d at
998. Federal courts have ruled that there was no fraud on the Superior Court – and that Defendant’s
admissions of evidence spoliation provided it independent grounds to enter default. See id. And
1
While serial reconsideration motions are assuredly not in the interests of finality and judicial economy,
Defendant remains free to exercise any appellate rights he may have.
Signed by Judge Christopher B. Latham December 9, 2022

Page 3 | ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR FURTHER RECONSIDERATION

since there was no fraud on the Superior Court, there can be no subsequent conspiracies to hide
that nonexistent fraud from other courts. All prior judgments, decisions, and orders in the earlier
state and federal cases stand. Rules 59 and 60, res judicata, the law of the case, and the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine all bar reconsideration of those. Defendant’s motion is accordingly denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed by Judge Christopher B. Latham December 9, 2022

Is The U.S. Bankruptcy Court For The Southern District of California Bankrupt of Judicial Integrity?

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Is The U.S. Bankruptcy Court For The Southern District of California Bankrupt of Judicial Integrity?

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Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of California

October 12, 2022

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

SAN DIEGO COUNTY CREDIT UNION, ADVERSARY NO. 18-90158-CL

ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT

DATED: October 12, 2022

Page 2 | ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT

DEBTOR: CARLTON ROARK Bankruptcy No. 18-04093-LT7

Signed by Judge Christopher B. Latham October 12, 2022

Page 3 | ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT

DEBTOR: CARLTON ROARK Bankruptcy No. 18-04093-LT7

Reconsideration is an “extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and

Signed by Judge Christopher B. Latham October 12, 2022

Page 4 | ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT

DEBTOR: CARLTON ROARK Bankruptcy No. 18-04093-LT7

The Law of the Case Doctrine

The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

Signed by Judge Christopher B. Latham October 12, 2022

Page 5 | ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT

DEBTOR: CARLTON ROARK Bankruptcy No. 18-04093-LT7

Legal Analysis and Discussion

Signed by Judge Christopher B. Latham October 12, 2022

Page 6 | ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT

DEBTOR: CARLTON ROARK Bankruptcy No. 18-04093-LT7

The Law of the Case Doctrine

Signed by Judge Christopher B. Latham October 12, 2022

Page 7 | ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT

DEBTOR: CARLTON ROARK Bankruptcy No. 18-04093-LT7

The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

Signed by Judge Christopher B. Latham October 12, 2022

Page 8 | ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT

DEBTOR: CARLTON ROARK Bankruptcy No. 18-04093-LT7

Signed by Judge Christopher B. Latham October 12, 2022

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

SAN DIEGO COUNTY CREDIT UNION, ADVERSARY NO. 18-90158-CL

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR FURTHER RECONSIDERATION

DATED: December 9, 2022

Page 2 | ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR FURTHER RECONSIDERATION

DEBTOR: CARLTON ROARK Bankruptcy No. 18-04093-LT7

Signed by Judge Christopher B. Latham December 9, 2022

Page 3 | ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR FURTHER RECONSIDERATION

DEBTOR: CARLTON ROARK Bankruptcy No. 18-04093-LT7

Signed by Judge Christopher B. Latham December 9, 2022

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