ROMEO JALOSJOS V COMELEC

FACTS:

Jalosjos was convicted by final judgment of two counts of statutory rape and 6 counts of acts of
lasciviousness. Consequently, he was sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of reclusion
perpetua and reclusion temporal5 for each count, respectively, which carried the accessory
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification pursuant to Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC).6 On April 30, 2007, then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued an order commuting
his prison term to sixteen (16) years, three (3) months and three (3) days (Order of
Commutation). After serving the same, he was issued a Certificate of Discharge From Prison on
March 18, 2009.7

He applied to register as a voter in Zamboanga City but his application was denied prompting to
file a petition for inclusion in the permanent list of voters before the MTCC. Pending resolution
of the same, he filed his COC for mayor for Zamboanga for MAY 2013 elections.

MTC Denied his petition and affirmed by RTC Zamboanga. There were 5 petitions lodged to
cancel petitioner’s COC and the same has been cancelled by COMELEC ENBANC due to his
perpetual disqualification as well as failure to comply with registration requirement.

It is the contention of the petitioner that Article 30 of RPC was partially amended by Section 40
of the LGC and thus claims that his perpetual disqualification has been removed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner Jalosjos has the right to run for public office after having been
convicted in a criminal case which carries with it absolute perpetual disqualification.

RESOLUTION:

No. Petitioner is not allowed to run for any public office when there is an absolute perpetual
disqualification attached in the decision of the criminal case.

ARTICLE 41 OF THE RPC in relation to Article 30 provides:

ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal – Their accessory penalties. - The penalties
of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for
life or during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute
disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the principal penalty,
unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
ART. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification. - The penalties of
perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for public office shall produce the following effects:

1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may have held, even if
conferred by popular election.

2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular office or to be elected to such
office.

3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of any of the rights
mentioned.

In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in paragraphs 2 and 3 of

this Article shall last during the term of the sentence.

4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Section 40(a) of the LGC, applicable as it is to local elective candidates, provides:

SEC. 40. Disqualifications. – The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after
serving sentence; (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Section 40 of the Local Government Code, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction. The final
judgment of conviction is notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from
running for public office. The law itself bars the convict from running for public office, and the
disqualification is part of the final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of the court is
addressed not only to the Executive branch, but also to other government agencies tasked to
implement the final judgment under the law. Section 40(a) of the LGC would not apply to cases
wherein a penal provision – such as Article 41 in this case – directly and specifically prohibits
the convict from running for elective office. Hence, despite the lapse of two (2) years from
petitioner’s service of his commuted prison term, he remains bound to suffer the accessory
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification which consequently, disqualifies him to run as
mayor for Zamboanga City.
In the present case, petitioner was sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of reclusion
perpetua and reclusion temporal which, pursuant to Article 41 of the RPC, carried with it the
accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification and in turn, pursuant to Article 30 of the
RPC, disqualified him to run for elective office. Notably, Article 41 of the RPC expressly states that one
who is previously convicted of a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal continues to
suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification even though pardoned as to the principal
penalty, unless the said accessory penalty shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. In this case, the
same accessory penalty had not been expressly remitted in the Order of Commutation or by any subsequent
pardon and as such, petitioner’s disqualification to run for elective office is deemed to subsist. The use
perpetual connotes a lifetime restriction and does not depend of the length if the prison term
which is imposed as its principal penalty. This accessory penalty deprives the convict of the right
to vote or to be elected or hold public office perpetually. It takes effect immediately once the
judgment of conviction becomes final.

Therefore, the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification does not depend on the duration of the
principal penalty but "deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office
perpetually.
OSORIO v COMELEC

FACTS:

Clementino and Osorio are both candidate for Barangay chariman in the 2002 barangay
elections.

Petitioner won the barangay  election by 21 votes. However, on August 23, 2002, the
COMELEC First Division released its resolution declaring petitioner disqualified to run for any
public elective position:

ISSUE:

Whether or not the term office in section 40b of the LGC refers exclusively to an elective office.

RESOLUTION:
No. the term office does not exclusively mean elective office.

Section 3(b) of COMELEC resolution 4801 provides that:

Section 3. Disqualifications. - The following are disqualified from running for any elective
barangay and sangguniang kabataan positions:

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case.

in relation to Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code:

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case.

in accordance with the maxim ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.

In the case at bar, The Respondent was found guilty of dishonesty in a decision of the Civil
Service Commission Since the penalty imposed upon herein Respondent include[d] dismissal
from service as a result of that administrative Case, the Respondent to have violated COMELEC
Resolution No. 4801 Section 3(b) in relation to Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code and
thus, disqualified to be a candidate in the 15 July [2002] Barangay Elections. in accordance with
the maxim ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. The above-stated provisions state
"removed from office" without any qualification. It is a cardinal rule in statutory construction
that when the law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish.
Thus, the term office was interpreted to mean any office whether appointive or elective as the
provision states “removed from office” without any qualification.

G.R. No. 195649               April 16, 2013

CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G.
BALUA, Respondents.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the use of foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to
undoing a renunciation made earlier thus, disqualifies him to run for public office.

RESOLUTION:

No. generally, the use of foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship does not amount to
undoing a renunciation made earlier but it r epudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a
former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local
elective position.

Jurisprudence provides: Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be
possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the
officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably
challenged. x x x.41 The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must
be possessed not just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any
act which violates the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack.

While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act
No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, 35 it is nevertheless an act which
repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of
another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.

In the case at bar, Arnado took oath of allegiance twice and re-acquired his Philippine
Citizenship and at the time, he also possessed American citizenship therefore became a dual
citizen. After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American citizenship by
executing an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing the requirements for eligibility to run for
public office. By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen.
Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office.

However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after
renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued
possession of a foreign citizenship. The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that
can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and
perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights
granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship. When Arnado used his US just eleven
days after he renounced his American citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation 36 that he
"absolutely and perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA"37 and that he "divest(s) himself of full employment of all civil and political rights and
privileges of the United States of America."

This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid
for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position.
Such act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he
acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado
voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not
retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using his
US passport.

Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil
and political rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to
maintain allegiance to one’s flag and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are
afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public office are required to
renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public office demands
full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.

Wherefore, by using his US passport after renouncing his American Citizenship, he recanted the
same oath of renunciation he took and he is disqualified not only from holding public office but even
becoming a candidate in the elections.