JESUS NICARDO M. FALCIS, III, PETITIONER, v.
CIVIL REGISTRAR marriage” and that they have a “right to found a family in accordance with their
GENERAL, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 217910, September 03, 2019
Facts:
On May 18, 2015, Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III (Falcis) filed pro se before
this Court a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. His Petition sought to "declare Articles 1 and 2 of the Family
Code as unconstitutional and, as a consequence, nullify Articles 46 (4) and 55 (6)
of the Family Code." Falcis claims that a resort to Rule 65 was appropriate, citing
Magallona v. Executive Secretary, Araullo v. Executive Secretary, and the
separate opinion of now-retired Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion in Araullo. Again
citing Associate Justice Brion's separate opinion, he claims that this Court should
follow a "'fresh' approach to this Court's judicial power" and find that his Petition
pertains to a constitutional case attended by grave abuse of discretion. He also
asserts that the mere passage of the Family Code, with its Articles 1 and 2, was a
prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion, and that the issues he raised were
of such transcendental importance as to warrant the setting aside of procedural
niceties.
Petitioner’s arguments:
Falcis alleged that he has standing as he is an open and self-identified
homosexual. He thus alleges that the Family Code has a “normative impact” on the
status of same-sex relationships in the country. He also claims that he was injured
by the prohibition against the right to marry the same-sex and that this prohibition
prevents his plans to settle down in the Philippines.
Falcis further claims that strict scrutiny should be the test used in
appraising the constitutionality of Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code, and that the
compelling state interest involved is the protection of marriage pursuant to Article
XV, Section 2 of the Constitution, not the protection of heterosexual relationships.
He argues that like opposite-sex couples, same-sex couples are equally capable of
founding their own families and fulfilling essential marital obligations. He claims
that contrary to Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, procreation is not an essential
marital obligation. Because there is allegedly no necessity to limit marriage as only
between a man and a woman, Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code are supposedly
unconstitutional for depriving Falcis of his right to liberty without substantive due
process of law.
He argues that there is a violation of the equal protection clause since
there is no substantial distinction between same-sex marriage and opposite-sex
couples.
Falcis also claims that Art. 1 and 2 of the Family Code deny the existence
of “individuals belonging to religious denominations that believe in same-sex
religious convictions.”
Respondent’s arguments:
The Civil Registrar General, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
filed its Comment (Ad Cautelam) on March 29, 2016. It prays that this Court deny
due course to or dismiss the Petition. It notes that the Petition was not in the
nature of a class suit, but was instead personal only to Falcis. Because of this, it
claims that Falcis failed to show injury-in-fact and an actual case or controversy,
but was rather seeking an advisory opinion that this Court cannot issue.
The Civil Registrar General also faults Falcis for not impleading Congress,
as his Petition actually challenged the current legislative policy on same-sex
marriage, and not any act committed by the Civil Registrar-General. Finally, it
claims that Falcis has not proven that the issues in this case are of such
transcendental importance, there being no law or facts contained in his Petition to
determine any principles concerning the constitutionality of same-sex marriage in
the Philippines.
The Civil Registrar General claims that the issues raised in the Petition are
political questions, saying that marriage's legal definition is a policy issue for
Congress to determine, and that any amendment to the definition in Articles 1 and
2 of the Family Code should be addressed to Congress.
Issues:
1. W/n the case presents an actual case or controversy.
2. W/n the self-identification of petitioner Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III as a member
of the LGBTQI+ community gives him standing to challenge the Family Code;
Ruling:
1. NO. The Petition before this Court does not present an actual case over which
we may properly exercise our power of judicial review.
Despite a goal of proving to this Court that there is a continuing and
pervasive violation of fundamental rights of a marginalized minority group, the
Petition is woefully bereft of sufficient actual facts to substantiate its arguments.
All told, petitioner's 29-page initiatory pleading neither cites nor annexes
any credible or reputable studies, statistics, affidavits, papers, or statements that
would impress upon this Court the gravity of his purported cause. The Petition
stays firmly in the realm of the speculative and conjectural, failing to represent the
very real and well-documented issues that the LGBTQI+ community face in
Philippine society.
Even petitioner's choice of respondent exposes the lack of an actual case
or controversy.
 He claims that he impleaded the Civil Registrar General as respondent
because "it is the instrumentality of the government that is tasked to enforce the
law in relation with (sic) marriage[.]"
Lest petitioner himself forget, what he asserts as ground for the allowance of his
suit is the existence of grave abuse of discretion; specifically, grave abuse of
discretion in the enactment of the Family Code.
Respondent Civil Registrar General was not involved in the formulation or
enactment of the Family Code. It did not participate in limiting the definition of
marriage to only opposite-sex couples. That is the province and power of
Congress alone.
His choice of the Civil Registrar General as respondent is manifestly
misguided. No factual antecedents existed prior to the filing of the Petition apart
from the passage of the Family Code. Petitioner has never applied for a marriage
license. He has never even visited the premises of respondent's office, or of
anyone acting under its authority. Petitioner has never bothered to show that he
himself acted in any way that asked respondent to exercise any kind of discretion.
Indeed, no discretion was ever exercised by respondent. Without an exercise of
discretion, there could not have been abuse of discretion, let alone one that could
conceivably be characterized as "grave."
Petitioner noted258 that grave abuse of discretion may be shown by prima
facie evidence. This does not help his case. What it indicates is his own
acknowledgement that proof cannot be dispensed with, and that he cannot win his
case based on pure allegations of actual or imminent injury caused by respondent.
The burden is on petitioner to point to any grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent to avail of this Court's extraordinary certiorari power of review.
By petitioner's own standards, his Petition lacks an essential requisite that
would trigger this Court's review.
Consequently, the task of devising an arrangement where same-sex
relations will earn state recognition is better left to Congress in order that it may
thresh out the many issues that may arise.
2. NO. Petitioner has no legal standing to file his Petition.
Legal standing is a party's "personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement." Interest in the case "means a material interest, an interest in issue
affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question
involved, or a mere incidental interest."
Here, petitioner asserts that he, being an "open and self-identified
homosexual[,]"has standing to question Articles 1, 2, 46(4), and 55(6) of the Family
Code due to his "personal stake in the outcome of the case":
Petitioner's supposed "personal stake in the outcome of this case" is not
the direct injury contemplated by jurisprudence as that which would endow him
with standing. Mere assertions of a "law's normative impact"; "impairment" of his
"ability to find and enter into long-term monogamous same-sex relationships"; as
well as injury to his "plans to settle down and have a companion for life in his
beloved country"; or influence over his "decision to stay or migrate to a more LGBT
friendly country" cannot be recognized by this Court as sufficient interest.
Petitioner's desire "to find and enter into long-term monogamous same-sex
relationships" and "to settle down and have a companion for life in his beloved
country" does not constitute legally demandable rights that require judicial
enforcement. This Court will not witlessly indulge petitioner in blaming the Family
Code for his admitted inability to find a partner.
Petitioner presents no proof at all of the immediate, inextricable danger
that the Family Code poses to him. His assertions of injury cannot, without
sufficient proof, be directly linked to the imputed cause, the existence of the Family
Code. His fixation on how the Family Code is the definitive cause of his inability to
find a partner is plainly non sequitur.
Similarly, anticipation of harm is not equivalent to direct injury. Petitioner
fails to show how the Family Code is the proximate cause of his alleged
deprivations. His mere allegation that this injury comes from "the law's normative
impact" is insufficient to establish the connection between the Family Code and his
alleged injury.
If the mere passage of a law does not create an actual case or
controversy, neither can it be a source of direct injury to establish legal standing.
This Court is not duty bound to find facts on petitioner's behalf just so he can
support his claims.
It does not escape this Court's notice that the Family Code was enacted in
1987. This Petition was filed only in 2015. Petitioner, as a member of the Philippine
Bar, has been aware of the Family Code and its allegedly repugnant provisions,
since at least his freshman year in law school. It is then extraordinary for him to
claim, first, that he has been continually injured by the existence of the Family
Code; and second, that he raised the unconstitutionality of Articles 1 and 2 of the
Family Code at the earliest possible opportunity.
Petitioner has neither suffered any direct personal injury nor shown that he
is in danger of suffering any injury from the present implementation of the Family
Code. He has neither an actual case nor legal standing.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition and the Petition-in-
Intervention are DISMISSED.