PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FIRST EXAM (2019) Ignorantia facti excusat – Ignorance of fact may excuse a party
Ignorance of fact may excuse a party from the legal
ARTICLE 2 – EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS
- A newspaper is considered of general circulation if its circulation is made
within the court’s jurisdiction, published at regular intervals for the
dissemination of local news and general information, with bona fide
subscription list of paying subscribers, and if it is not devoted to the interest
or published for the entertainment of a particular class, profession, trade,
calling, race or religious denomination.
EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS:
 If NO DATE – law becomes effective “after fifteen days following
the completion of its publication in the OG or newspaper of
general circulation”
 If provided w/ a SPECIFIC DATE – it becomes effective only upon
the lapse of said period following its complete publication and not
before.
“unless otherwise provided” – refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement if publication.
Note: Publication is INDISPENSABLE – no law can become effective upon
approval without publication. To rule otherwise, is to run collision with the
constitutional requirement of the due process clause of the Constitution.
TANADA V. TUVERA
HELD: Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at
hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude
the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity.
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and
conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no
basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would
be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general
application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect.
Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible
unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the
validity of those presidential decrees which were published only during the
pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's
declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or
implemented prior to their publication.
DE ROY V. CA
HELD: There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in
the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their
becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law
practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where
issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the
advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications
as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
ARTICLE 3
IGNORANCE OF LAW – want of knowledge or acquaintance with the laws of
the land insofar as they apply to the act, relation, duty, or matter under
consideration.
IGNORANCE OF FACT – want of knowledge of some fact or facts constituting
or relating to the subject matter in hand.
Ignorantia juris non excusat – “Ignorance of the law excuses no one for
noncompliance thereof.”
consequences of his conduct.
PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION – A foreign law is a matter of fact which must
be proven with evidence. In the absence of any contrary evidence, it is
presumed to be the same as our domestic law.
ARTICLE 4 – PROSPECTIVITY OF LAWS
GR: Laws operate prospectively. Statutes have only a prospective operation
unless the intention to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared
or is necessarily implied from the language used.
XPN: Unless the intention to give them a retrospective effect is expressly
declared or is necessarily implied from the language used.
RETROACTIVITY
- There is retroactivity when a law is made applicable to situations
or acts already done before the passage of the said law.
- Takes away or impair vested rights acquired under existing laws,
or creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty or attaches a
new disability in respect to transaction or consideration already
past.
- The retrospective applicability of a law should be expressly
provided therein. In the absence of such, the presumption is in
favor of the prospective operation of the law.
- Art. 4 recognizes the validity of laws with retrospective
applicability if retroactivity is expressly provided therein. It is
understood that the retroactive law is not contrary to the
Constitution.
NOTE: Rule against Retroactivity – to protect vested rights.
STATUTES WHICH MAY BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE APPLICATION:
1. Remedial Laws– laws which provide for the methods of enforcing
rights or obtaining redress for their violation. No vested rights in
rules of procedure.
2. Penal Laws favorable to the accused or convict – shall have a
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a
felony, who is not a habitual criminal.
3. Curative Laws – intended to correct errors or irregularities
incurred in judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of public
officers, or private deeds and contracts w/c otherwise would not
produce their intended consequences by reason of some
statutory disability or the failure to comply with some technical
requirements.
4. Emergency Laws – laws intended to meet exigencies which
require immediate action.
5. Laws creating new rights – may be given retroactive effect
provided no vested right of same origin is affected.
6. Tax Laws
ATIENZA V. BRILLANTES
HELD: Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity
of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first
marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given
"retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is
particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has
not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40
to his case.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights
may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The
retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a
person who may feel that he is adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of
Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The reason is that as a general rule no vested
right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.
 4 ways of validating an act or contract contrary to a Mandatory Law (XPN):

1. By expressly validating the contract;

2. By making the invalidity to depend on the will of the injured party,
CARLOS V. SANDOVAL such as voidable or annullable contracts;
3. By punishing it criminally but validating the act; and
HELD: Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent
4. By invalidating the act but recognizing the legal effects as flowing
Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14,
from the invalid act
1962. Which law would govern depends upon when the marriage took
place.23 ARTICLE 6 – WAIVER OF RIGHTS

The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Right – a legally enforceable claim of one person against another, that the
Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the other shall do a given act, or shall not do a given act. It is that which one
time of its celebration.24 But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an person ought to have or receive from another, it being withheld from him, or
action to declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any person can not in his possession.
bring an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage?
RIGHT VS. DUTY
We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code
cannot be construed as a license for any person to institute a nullity of Right – need not be exercised; might even be waived
marriage case. Such person must appear to be the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the Duty – must be performed; one who does not discharge the same must
avails of the suit. Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest. necessarily be prepared to face the consequence of his dereliction or
For it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and omission.
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.
GENERAL CLASSIFICATION OF RIGHTS:
CHENG V. SY
As to clarity:
HELD: Petitioner is in error when she insists that the 2000 Rules on Criminal
1. Perfect – when the scope is clear, settled and determinate.
Procedure should not apply because she filed her BP Blg. 22 complaints in
2. Imperfect – when the scope is vague and unfixed.
1999. It is now settled that rules of procedure apply even to cases already
pending at the time of their promulgation. The fact that procedural statutes As to the passive subject of the right:
may somehow affect the litigants’ rights does not preclude their retroactive
application to pending actions. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application 1. In Personam – one which imposes an obligation on a definite
of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel that person.
he is adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason 2. In Rem – one which imposes an obligation on a definite person or
for this is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise persons generally.
from, procedural laws.
Rights as classified under the Constitution:
CAROLINO V. SENGA
1. Natural rights – are those which grow out of the nature of man
HELD: Notably, petitioner's husband did not retire under those above- and depend upon personality, as distinguished from such as are
enumerated Sections of PD No. 1638 as he retired under RA No. 340. created by law and depend upon civilized society.
2. Civil rights – are such as belong to every citizen of the state or
It has been held that before a right to retirement benefits or pension vests in country, or, in a wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not
an employee, he must have met the stated conditions of eligibility with connected with the organization or administration of government.
respect to the nature of employment, age, and length of service. Undeniably,
petitioner's husband had complied with the conditions of eligibility to Waiver - the intentional or voluntary relinquishment of a known right or
retirement benefits as he was then receiving his retirement benefits on a such conduct as warrants an inference of relinquishment of such right. It can
monthly basis until it was terminated. Where the employee retires and be express or implied.
meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested right to the benefits
- are not presumed but must be clearly and convincingly shown,
that is protected by the due process clause. It is only upon retirement that
either by express stipulation or acts admitting no other reasonable
military personnel acquire a vested right to retirement benefits. Retirees
explanation.
enjoy a protected property interest whenever they acquire a right to
immediate payment under pre-existing law. REQUISITES FOR A VALID WAIVER:
Petitioner's husband acquired vested right to the payment of his retirement 1. The person waiving must be capacitated to make the waiver.
benefits which must be respected and cannot be affected by the subsequent 2. The waiver must be clear and unequivocal, but not necessarily
enactment of PD No. 1638 which provides that loss of Filipino citizenship express.
terminates retirement benefits. Vested rights include not only legal or 3. The person waiving must actually have the right which he is
equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from renouncing.
new obligations after the right has vested. 4. The waiver must not be contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals, or good customs.
5. The waiver must not be prejudicial to a third person with a right
ARTICLE 5 recognized by law.
6. When formalities are required as in the case of express
Mandatory provision – the omission to follow which, renders the
condonation of debt, the formalities must be complied with.
proceedings to which it relates void.
Waiver will also be void if:
Directory provision – the observance of which is not necessary to validity if
the proceeding. a. If the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals
or good customs.
 b. If the waiver is prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized
by law.
FAMANILA V. CA
HELD: It is true that quitclaims and waivers are oftentimes frowned upon and
are considered as ineffective in barring recovery for the full measure of the
worker’s right and that acceptance of the benefits therefrom does not
amount to estoppel. The reason is plain. Employer and employee, obviously
do not stand on the same footing. However, not all waivers and quitclaims
are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered
into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and
may not later be disowned simply because of change of mind. It is only where
there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or
gullible person, or the terms of the settlement are unconscionable on its
face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction. But
where it is shown that the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with
full understanding of what he was doing, and the consideration for the
quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a
valid and binding undertaking, as in this case.
GUY V. CA
HELD: As regards Remedios' Release and Waiver of Claim, the same does not
bar private respondents from claiming successional rights. To be valid and
effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which
leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit
which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed to a person
when its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince an intent to abandon a
right.
In this case, we find that there was no waiver of hereditary rights. The
Release and Waiver of Claim does not state with clarity the purpose of its
execution. It merely states that Remedios received P300,000.00 and an
educational plan for her minor daughters "by way of financial assistance and
in full settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever nature and kind x x x
against the estate of the late Rufino Guy Susim." Considering that the
document did not specifically mention private respondents' hereditary share
in the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be construed as a waiver of successional
rights.
OTAMIAS V. REPUBLIC
HELD: [T]he doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any
character, and, since the word 'waiver' covers every conceivable right, it is
the general rule that a person may waive any matter which affects his
property, and any alienable right or privilege of which he is the owner or
which belongs to him or to which he is legally entitled, whether secured by
contract, conferred with statute, or guaranteed by constitution, provided
such rights and privileges rest in the individual, are intended for his sole
benefit, do not infringe on the rights of others, and further provided the
waiver of the right or privilege is not forbidden by law, and does not
contravene public policy; and the principle is recognized that everyone has a
right to waive, and agree to waive, the advantage of a law or rule made solely
for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity, if it can
be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any public right,
and without detriment to the community at large[.]
When Colonel Otamias executed the Deed of Assignment, he effectively
waived his right to claim that his retirement benefits are exempt from
execution. The right to receive retirement benefits belongs to Colonel
Otamias. His decision to waive a portion of his retirement benefits does not
infringe on the right of third persons, but even protects the right of his family
to receive support.
ARTICLE 7
Laws are subject to repeal, self-cancellation – due to the lapse of their period
of effectivity or declaration of nullity – due to unconstitutionality.
KINDS OF REPEAL:
1. Express – when the repealing law provides for a provision or a
repealing clause explicitly stating that a particular existing law or
part of a law is thereby repealed.
2. Implied – when there is no repealing clause in the repealing law,
but the prior law and the subsequent law could not reconcile
being substantially inconsistent with one another. If both can
reasonably stand together, there is no repeal because it rests only
on presumption that there is an intention to repeal.
ON GENERAL AND SPECIAL LAWS:
1. If the GENERAL law is prior to the SPECIAL law, the latter is
considered merely as an EXCEPTION to the general law. Hence,
the general law remains effective subject to the exception. Insofar
as the excepted subject matter is concerned, the special law
prevails.
2. If the GENERAL law is later in enactment, the special law prevails,
EXCEPT:
a. When there is a clear, necessary and irreconcilable conflict
between the two.
b. The general law covers the whole subject and is clearly
intended to replace the special law.
CONDITIONS ON REVIVAL OF REPEALED LAWS
1. If the first law is repealed by IMPLICATION by the second law, and
the second law is itself repealed by the third law, the first law is
revived unless otherwise provided in the third law.
2. If the first law is repealed EXPRESSLY by the second law, and the
second law is repealed by third law, the first law is not revived,
unless expressly so provided.
ARTICLE 8
- Judicial decisions are NOT LAWS but have the force and effect of
laws.
- Under the principle of separation of powers, the Congress makes
the laws, and the JUDICIARY merely applies or interprets them in
given cases, and the Executive Department executes the laws as
interpreted by the Judiciary.
- Although not laws, the decisions of the Supreme Court applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of the legal
system in the country.
- The Court’s interpretation of a statute constitutes part of the laws
as of the date it was originally enacted.
STARE DECISIS (et non quieta movere) – “Stand by the thing and do not
disturb the calm” refers to the principle of adherence to precedents for
reasons of stability in the law. The doctrine requires lower courts to follow
the rules established in prevailing decisions of the Supreme Court.
ARTICLE 9 – DUTY OF COURTS/JUDGES TO RENDER JUDGMENT
- In view of the principle of separation of powers in our
governmental system, the Courts shall not legislate, otherwise,
they will be encroaching on the functions of the Legislature.
- However, situations do arise where cases are brought to court and
there is no law exactly applicable to them. Sometimes, while there
is a law, it is obscure or vague and insufficient in its guidance.
When these do happen, the judge is enjoined to render a decision.
He shall not abstain or decline in adjudging the case.
- There are limits in the filling of gaps in obscure or insufficient
laws. The judge is not free to decide according to his whims and
caprices. He must see to it that the decision is just and equitable,
and not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, and
good customs.
 - Art. 9 is applicable only to Civil cases.
SILVERIO V. REPUBLIC
HELD: The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging
legal and public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found
that the petition was but petitioner’s first step towards his eventual marriage
to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social
institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman. One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting
parties who must be a male and a female. To grant the changes sought by
petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on
marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another
man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative
transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to
women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women,
certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code and the presumption of
survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court, among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to
women which could be substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to
be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court
shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or
insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in
judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not
to make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do
so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects
of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly
important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first
name and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they
may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented
and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on
a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his
name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation
laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that
privilege.
ARTICLE 10
- Article applies only if there is doubt. In case of the same, the judge
should proceed on “the presumption that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail.”
- In the interpretation of doubtful laws, the judge should acquaint
himself with the prevailing principles in statutory construction to
guide and enlighten him every now and then in arriving at what is
reasonable, just and lawful.
ARTICLE 11
- The Court is duty-bound to resolve the instant case applying such
laws and rights as are in existence at the time the pertinent civil
acts took place, and is unable to supplant governing law with
customs, albeit how widely observed.
ARTICLE 12
CUSTOM – a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly
observed as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory.
USAGE – a repetition of acts, and differs from “custom” in that the latter is
the law or general rule which arises from such repetition.
KINDS OF CUSTOMS:
GENERAL – are such as prevail throughout a country and become the law of
that country, and their existence is to be determined by the court.
LOCAL – are such as prevail only in some particular district or locality, or in
some city, county or town.
PARTICULAR – are nearly the same, being such as affect only the inhabitants
of some particular district.
- Customs of whatever classification, if contrary to law, public
order, or public policy will not be abetted or tolerated.
ARTICLE 14 – OBLIGATORY EFFECT ON PENAL LAWS
PRINCIPLE OF TERRITORIALITY – any offense committed by anyone within
the territory of the country is an offense against the State.
 Penal laws equally apply to aliens who live or sojourn in the PH.
XPN:
1. Those who under principles of PIL enjoy diplomatic
immunities.
2. Those expressly stated from our jurisdiction due to treaty
stipulations.
 EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION – a juridical power extending
beyond the physical limits of a particular state or country.
DEL SOCORRO V. WILSEM
HELD: Considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we
find strength in petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal
law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case,
which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public security and safety
shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory,
subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations."
On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent
in refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed here in the
Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu
City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged
against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the
respondent was acquired upon his arrest.
ARTICLE 15 – NATIONALITY THEORY
 Laws relating to family rights and obligations, and status,
condition, and legal capacity of persons, accompany a person
even when he moves to a foreign country.
 PH follows the nationality or citizenship theory where national law
of the person is applied in matters involving personal relations.
VAN DORN V. ROMILLO
HELD: There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in
any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private
respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot
sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is
contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this
jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the
Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of
public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under
which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as
petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is
bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is
estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his divorce from spouse and eventually becomes successful in getting an
right over the alleged conjugal property. absolute divorce decree, the Philippines will not recognize such absolute
divorce
PILABIL V. IBAY-SOMERA
SAN LUIS V. SAN LUIS
HELD: The person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended
spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at HELD: The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely
the time of the filing of the complaint. allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal
personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the
in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of
its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the
respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law
the matter of status of persons. and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree
is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the
presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may
Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an
absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of
official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
to their national law.
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in
RECIO V. RECIO the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the
seal of his office. 
HELD: Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts
cannot grant it. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even LAVADIA V. HEIRS OF LUNA
by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil
HELD: Absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in
Code. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the
the Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos
party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
has remained even under the Family Code, even if either or both of the
conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce
spouses are residing abroad.
decree is insufficient.
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto.
Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the
Domingo in the Dominican Republic issued the Divorce Decree dissolving the
document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce
first marriage of Atty. Luna and Eugenia. Conformably with the nationality
obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best
rule, however, the divorce, even if voluntarily obtained abroad, did not
evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a
dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up to
written act or record of an act of an officially body or tribunal of a foreign
the time of his death on July 12, 1997.
country.
The non-recognition of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a manifestation
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or
of the respect for the sanctity of the marital union especially among Filipino
document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by
citizens. It affirms that the extinguishment of a valid marriage must be
either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer
grounded only upon the death of either spouse, or upon a ground expressly
having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
provided bylaw. For as long as this public policy on marriage between
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
Filipinos exists, no divorce decree dissolving the marriage between them can
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
ever be given legal or judicial recognition and enforcement in this
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
jurisdiction.
authenticated by the seal of his office.
NOVERAS V. NOVERAS
QUITA V. CA
HELD: The requirements of presenting the foreign divorce decree and the
HELD: We deduce that the finding on their citizenship pertained solely to the
national law of the foreigner must comply with our Rules of Evidence.
time of their marriage as the trial court was not supplied with a basis to
Specifically, for Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to
determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of their divorce. The doubt
the status of a marriage, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in
persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was
evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation
decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect.
to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their
divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence.
lose her right to inherit from Arturo. The required certificates to prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent
California law on divorce were not presented.
PEREZ V. CA
Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption as the lower courts
HELD: When petitioner and Tristan married on July 14, 1984, Tristan was still
did with respect to the property regime of the parties, the recognition of
lawfully married to Lily. The divorce decree that Tristan and Lily obtained
divorce is entirely a different matter because, to begin with, divorce is not
from the Dominican Republic never dissolved the marriage bond between
recognized between Filipino citizens in the Philippines. Absent a valid
them. It is basic that laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still legally
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to
Philippines, even though living abroad. Regardless of where a citizen of the
liquidation.
Philippines might be, he or she will be governed by Philippine laws with
respect to his or her family rights and duties, or to his or her status, condition ORION SAVINGS BANK V. SUZUKI
and legal capacity. Hence, if a Filipino regardless of whether he or she was
married here or abroad, initiates a petition abroad to obtain an absolute
HELD: Property relations between spouses are governed principally by the
national law of the spouses.However, the party invoking the application of a
foreign law has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is a
question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge cannot take
judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or the
law of the forum.
To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and
comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court.
In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the South Korean
law on the conjugal ownership ofproperty. It merely attached a "Certification
from the Embassy of the Republic of Korea" to prove the existence of Korean
Law. This certification, does not qualify as sufficient proof of the conjugal
nature of the property for there is no showing that it was properly
authenticated bythe seal of his office, as required under Section 24 of Rule
132.
Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or
processual presumption comes into play, i.e., where a foreign law is not
pleaded or, evenif pleaded, is not proven, the presumption is that foreign law
is the same as Philippine Law.
DEL SOCORRO V. WILSEM
HELD: In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied
to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present
case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands,
he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to
support. While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing
his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the
same.
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts
are not authorized to takejudicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they
must be alleged and proved.
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands
in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this
doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our
courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic
or internal law. Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the
obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the
instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which
enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing
the non-compliance therewith.
ARTICLE 16 – LAW GOVERNING REAL & PERSONAL PROPERTY
LEX SITUS OR LEX REI SITAE – Property shall be governed by the law of the
place where it is situated.
XPN: INCIDENTS OF SUCCESSION – Intestate or testamentary
These incidents are governed by the national law of the deceased
irrespective of the nature of the property involved and regardless of the
country wherein said property may be found:
1. Order of succession in intestacy
2. Amount of successional rights
3. Intrinsic validity of the provision of the will
4. Capacity to succeed
RENVOI DOCTRINE – “referring back” – where our laws refers a case to
another country for solution, but the law of that country refers it back to our
country for determination.
SINGLE RENVOI/REMISSION – reference is made back to the law of the
forum.
DOUBLE RENVOI/TRANSMISSION – reference made to a third state.
ORION SAVINGS BANK V. SUZUKI
HELD: It is a universal principle thatreal or immovable property is exclusively
subject to the laws of the country or state where it is located. The reason is
found in the very nature of immovable property — its immobility.
Immovables are part of the country and so closely connected to it that all
rights over them have their natural center of gravity there.
Thus, all matters concerning the title and disposition ofreal property are
determined by what is known as the lex loci rei sitae, which can alone
prescribe the mode by which a title canpass from one person to another, or
by which an interest therein can be gained or lost. This general principle
includes all rules governing the descent, alienation and transfer of
immovable property and the validity, effect and construction of wills and
other conveyances. Accordingly, matters concerning the title and disposition
of real property shall be governed by Philippine law.
ARTICLE 17
LEX LOCI CELEBRATIONIS – matters bearing upon the execution,
interpretation and validity of a contract are determined by the law of the
place where the contract is made
PRINCIPLE OF EXTERRITORIALITY – recognized in par.2.
- Acts executed before PH diplomatic and consular officials in their
offices abroad are considered done in the PH because said offices
although found abroad, are considered extensions of the PH
territory.
ARTICLE 19 – PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE RIGHTS
Abuse of Rights – acts performed which are not illegal but nevertheless make
the actor liable for damages, if in so acting or in exercising his right, his
purpose is to prejudice or injure another.
- A person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to
honesty and good faith, otherwise he opens himself to
liability.
ELEMENTS OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS:
1. There is a legal right or duty;
2. Which is exercised in bad faith; and
3. For the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
Good faith – an honest intention to refrain from taking undue advantage of
another and to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of
another
Bad faith – presupposes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and
conscious performance of a wrong. Mere bad judgment or negligence does
not necessarily mean bad faith.
FAR EAST BANK V. PACILAN
HELD: It is observed that nowhere under its rules and regulations is petitioner
bank required to notify the respondent, or any depositor for that matter, of
the closure of the account for frequently drawing checks against insufficient
funds. No malice or bad faith could be imputed on petitioner bank for so
acting since the records bear out that the respondent had indeed been
improperly and irregularly handling his account not just a few times but
hundreds of times. Under the circumstances, petitioner bank could not be
faulted for exercising its right in accordance with the express rules and
regulations governing the current accounts of its depositors. Upon the
opening of his account, the respondent had agreed to be bound by these
terms and conditions.
Neither the fact that petitioner bank accepted the deposit made by the
respondent the day following the closure of his account constitutes bad faith
or malice on the part of petitioner bank. The same could be characterized as
simple negligence by its personnel. Said act, by itself, is not constitutive of
bad faith.
Further, it has not been shown that these acts were done by petitioner bank
with the sole intention of prejudicing and injuring the respondent. It is
conceded that the respondent may have suffered damages as a result of the
closure of his current account.
UYPITCHING V. QUIAMCO
HELD: There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or
injure another. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the
purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly
harsh; there must be no intention to harm another. Otherwise, liability for
damages to the injured party will attach.
In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was taken at petitioners’
instance was not only attended by bad faith but also contrary to the
procedure laid down by law. Considered in conjunction with the defamatory
statement, petitioners’ exercise of the right to recover the mortgaged vehicle
was utterly prejudicial and injurious to respondent. On the other hand, the
precipitate act of filing an unfounded complaint could not in any way be
considered to be in accordance with the purpose for which the right to
prosecute a crime was established. Thus, the totality of petitioners’ actions
showed a calculated design to embarrass, humiliate and publicly ridicule
respondent. Petitioners acted in an excessively harsh fashion to the prejudice
of respondent. Contrary to law, petitioners willfully caused damage to
respondent. Hence, they should indemnify him.
CEBU COUNTRY CLUB V. ELIZAGAQUE
HELD: Obviously, the CCCI Board of Directors, under its Articles of
Incorporation, has the right to approve or disapprove an application for
proprietary membership. But such right should not be exercised arbitrarily.
Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code on the Chapter on Human Relations
provide restrictions.
In rejecting respondent’s application for proprietary membership, we find
that petitioners violated the rules governing human relations, the basic
principles to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings
and for the stability of social order. The trial court and the Court of Appeals
aptly held that petitioners committed fraud and evident bad faith in
disapproving respondent’s applications. This is contrary to morals, good
custom or public policy. Hence, petitioners are liable for damages pursuant
to Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the same Code.
It is thus clear that respondent was left groping in the dark wondering why
his application was disapproved. He was not even informed that a unanimous
vote of the Board members was required. When he sent a letter for
reconsideration and an inquiry whether there was an objection to his
application, petitioners apparently ignored him. Certainly, respondent did
not deserve this kind of treatment.
When the right is exercised arbitrarily, unjustly or excessively and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which the wrongdoer
must be held responsible. It bears reiterating that the trial court and the
Court of Appeals held that petitioners’ disapproval of respondent’s
application is characterized by bad faith.
CALATAGAN GOLF CLUB V. CLEMENTE
HELD: It is noteworthy that Clemente in his membership application had
provided his residential address along with his residence and office telephone
numbers. Nothing in Section 32 of Calatagan’s By-Laws requires that the final
notice prior to the sale be made solely through the member’s mailing
address.
Calatagan’s bad faith and failure to observe its own By-Laws had resulted not
merely in the loss of Clemente’s privilege to play golf at its golf course and
avail of its amenities, but also in significant pecuniary damage to him. For
that loss, the only blame that could be thrown Clemente’s way was his failure
to notify Calatagan of the closure of the P.O. Box. That lapse, if we uphold
Calatagan would cost Clemente a lot. But, in the first place, does he deserve
answerability for failing to notify the club of the closure of the postal box?
Indeed, knowing as he did that Calatagan was in possession of his home
address as well as residence and office telephone numbers, he had every
reason to assume that the club would not be at a loss should it need to
contact him.
The obligation of a corporation to treat every person honestly and in good
faith extends even to its shareholders or members, even if the latter find
themselves contractually bound to perform certain obligations to the
corporation. A certificate of stock cannot be a charter of dehumanization.
ARDIENTE V. JAVIER
HELD: The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for
which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there
must be no intention to harm another. Otherwise, liability for damages to the
injured party will attach. In the present case, intention to harm was evident
on the part of petitioner when she requested for the disconnection of
respondent spouses’ water supply without warning or informing the latter of
such request. What made matters worse is the fact that COWD undertook
the disconnection also without prior notice and even failed to reconnect the
Spouses Pastorfide’s water supply despite payment of their arrears. There
was clearly an abuse of right on the part of petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez.
They are guilty of bad faith.
The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in
their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be
observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law
as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right
is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined
in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.
SESBRENO V. CA
HELD: It is worth noting that the VOC inspectors decided to enter the main
premises only after finding the meter of Sesbreño turned upside down,
hanging and its disc not rotating. Their doing so would enable them to
determine the unbilled electricity consumed by his household. The
circumstances justified their decision, and their inspection of the main
premises was a continuation of the authorized entry. There was no question
then that their ability to determine the unbilled electricity called for them to
see for themselves the usage of electricity inside. Not being agents of the
State, they did not have to first obtain a search warrant to do so.
The inspection did not zero in on Sesbreño’s residence because the other
houses within the area were similarly subjected to the routine inspection.
This, we think, eliminated any notion of malice or bad faith.
Clearly, Sesbreño did not establish his claim for damages if the respondents
were not guilty of abuse of rights. To stress, the concept of abuse of rights
prescribes that a person should not use his right unjustly or in bad faith;
otherwise, he may be liable to another who suffers injury. The rationale for
the concept is to present some basic principles to be followed for the rightful
relationship between human beings and the stability of social order
SALADAGA V. ASTORGA
HELD: More significantly, respondent transgressed the laws and the
fundamental tenet of human relations asembodied in Article 19 of the Civil
Code:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
Respondent, as owner of the property, had the right to mortgage it to
complainant but, as a lawyer, he should have seen to it that his agreement
with complainant is embodied in an instrument that clearly expresses the
intent of the contracting parties. A lawyer who drafts a contract must see to
it that the agreement faithfully and clearly reflects the intention of the
contracting parties. Otherwise, the respective rights and obligations of the
contracting parties will be uncertain, which opens the door to legal disputes
between the said parties. Indeed, the uncertainty caused by respondent’s
poor formulation of the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" was a
significant factor in the legal controversy between respondent and
complainant. Such poor formulation reflects at the very least negatively on
the legal competence of respondent.
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS V. BERNARDO
HELD: Petitioner had employed oppressive and high-handed schemes to
unjustly limit the market coverage and diminish the investment returns of
respondents. It took advantage of the information provided by respondents
to facilitate its takeover of the latter's usual business area.
The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears; and it disappears
when it is abused, especially to the prejudice of others. The mask of a right
without the spirit of justice which gives it life is repugnant to the modern
concept of social law. It cannot be said that a person exercises a right when
he unnecessarily prejudices another or offends morals or good customs. Over
and above the specific precepts of positive law are the supreme norms of
justice which the law develops and which are expressed in three
principles: honeste vivere, alterum non laedere and jus suum quique tribuere;
and he who violates them violates the law. For this reason, it is not
permissible to abuse our rights to prejudice others.
Meanwhile, the use of unjust, oppressive, or high-handed business methods
resulting in unfair competition also gives a right of action to the injured party.
(Article 28)
ST. MARTIN POLYCLINIC, INC, V. LWV CONSTRUCTION
HELD: Thus, with respect to negligent acts or omissions, it should therefore
be discerned that Article 20 of the Civil Code concerns "violations of existing
law as basis for an injury", whereas Article 2176 applies when the negligent
act causing damage to another does not constitute "a breach of an existing
law or a pre-existing contractual obligation."
In this case, the courts a quo erroneously anchored their respective rulings
on the provisions of Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code. This is because
respondent did not proffer (nor have these courts mentioned) any law as
basis for which damages may be recovered due to petitioner's alleged
negligent act. In its amended complaint, respondent mainly avers that had
petitioner not issue a "fit for employment" Medical Report to Raguindin,
respondent would not have processed his documents, deployed him to Saudi
Arabia, and later on - in view of the subsequent findings that Raguindin was
positive for HCV and hence, unfit to work. Thus, as the claimed negligent act
of petitioner was not premised on the breach of any law, and not to mention
the incontestable fact that no pre-existing contractual relation was averred
to exist between the parties, Article 2176 - instead of Articles 19, 20 and 21 -
of the Civil Code should govern.
ARTICLE 21 – ACTS CONTRARY TO MORALS
BUENAVENTURA V. CA
HELD: It must be noted that Article 21 states that the individual must willfully
cause loss or injury to another. There is a need that the act is willful and
hence done in complete freedom.
It is contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological
incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party because of an innate
inability, while at the same time considering the same set of acts as willful. By
declaring the petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of
awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was negated. The award of
moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into
the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with
malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully
concealed the same. No such evidence appears to have been adduced in this
case.
For the same reason, since psychological incapacity means that one is truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that one must assume and
discharge as a consequence of marriage, it removes the basis for the
contention that the petitioner purposely deceived the private respondent. If
the private respondent was deceived, it was not due to a willful act on the
part of the petitioner. Therefore, the award of moral damages was without
basis in law and in fact.
ARTICLE 22 – UNJUST ENRICHMENT
 Unjust enrichment exists when a person unjustly retains a benefit
to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or
property of another against fundamental principles of justice,
equity, and good conscience.
 No one shall unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another
 There is unjust enrichment when:
1. A person is unjustly benefited
2. Such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to
another
ACCION IN REM VERSO – recovery of what has been paid without just cause.
Payment could have been made knowingly and voluntarily
*In SOLUTIO INDEBITI, payment was made by mistake, which is an essential
element to maintain the action for recovery.
REQUISITES OF ACCION REM VERSO:
1. That the defendant has been enriched;
2. That the plaintiff has suffered a loss;
3. That the enrichment of the defendant is without just or legal
ground; and
4. That the plaintiff has no other action based on contract, quasi-
contract, crime, or quasi-delict.
FILINVEST LAND V. NGILAY
HELD: The rule is settled that the declaration of nullity of a contract which is
void ab initio operates to restore things to the state in condition in which
they were found before the execution thereof. Petitioner is correct in its
argument that allowing respondents to keep the amount received from the
petitioner is tantamount to judicial acquiescence to unjust enrichment.
Unjust enrichment exists "when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss
of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against
the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience." There is
unjust enrichment under Article 22 of the Civil Code when:
(1) a person is unjustly benefited; and
(2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another.
Thus, the sale which created the obligation of petitioner to pay the agreed
amount having been declared void, respondents have the duty to return the
down payment as they no longer have the right to keep it. The principle of
unjust enrichment essentially contemplates payment when there is no duty
to pay, and the person who receives the payment has no right to receive it.
GONZALO V. TARNATE
HELD: There is no question that every contractor is prohibited from
subcontracting with or assigning to another person any contract or project
that he has with the DPWH unless the DPWH Secretary has approved the
subcontracting or assignment.
Gonzalo, who was the sole contractor of the project in question,
subcontracted the implementation of the project to Tarnate in violation of
the statutory prohibition. Their subcontract was illegal, therefore, because it
did not bear the approval of the DPWH Secretary. Necessarily, the deed of
assignment was also illegal, because it sprung from the subcontract.
Tarnate had voluntarily entered into the agreements with Gonzalo. Tarnate
also admitted that he did not participate in the bidding for the project
because he knew that he was not authorized to contract with the DPWH.
Given that Tarnate was a businessman who had represented himself in the
subcontract as "being financially and organizationally sound and established,
with the necessary personnel and equipment for the performance of the
project," he justifiably presumed to be aware of the illegality of his
agreements with Gonzalo. For these reasons, Tarnate was not less guilty than
Gonzalo.
According to Article 1412 (1) of the Civil Code, the guilty parties to an illegal
contract cannot recover from one another and are not entitled to an
affirmative relief because they are in pari delicto or in equal fault. The
doctrine of in pari delicto is a universal doctrine that holds that no action
arises, in equity or at law, from an illegal contract; no suit can be maintained
for its specific performance, or to recover the property agreed to be sold or
delivered, or the money agreed to be paid, or damages for its violation; and
where the parties are in pari delicto, no affirmative relief of any kind will be
given to one against the other.
There is no question that Tarnate provided the equipment, labor and
materials for the project in compliance with his obligations under the
subcontract and the deed of assignment; and that it was Gonzalo as the
contractor who received the payment for his contract with the DPWH as well
as the 10% retention fee that should have been paid to Tarnate pursuant to
the deed of assignment. Considering that Gonzalo refused despite demands
to deliver to Tarnate the stipulated 10% retention fee that would have
compensated the latter for the use of his equipment in the project, Gonzalo
would be unjustly enriched at the expense of Tarnate if the latter was to be
barred from recovering because of the rigid application of the doctrine of in
pari delicto. The prevention of unjust enrichment called for the exception to
apply in Tarnate’s favor.
BLISS DEVELOPMENT (BDC) V. DIAZ
HELD: BDC is nevertheless liable to return to Diaz the amortizations which he
already paid on the property, applying the rule on unjust enrichment.
Unjust enrichment exists when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss
of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against
the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience. Under
Article 22 of the Civil Code, there is unjust enrichment when (1) a person is
unjustly benefited and (2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or with
damages to another
As a direct result of the final and executory ruling that Arreza is the rightful
buyer of the subject property, the buyer-seller relationship between Diaz and
BDC is rendered null and void. Consequently, there remains no valid
consideration whatsoever for the payments made by Diaz to BDC. There
being no indication of intent to donate, because such payments were made
under the impression that Diaz is the rightful buyer of the property, it is only
but just that Diaz be allowed to claim back what he has paid. This is only a
natural consequence of the final and executory ruling that Diaz is not the
rightful buyer of the subject property. Allowing BDC to keep such payments,
at the expense of and to the damage of Diaz, still amounts to unjust
enrichment.
ARTICLE 26 – ACTS NOT CONSTITUTING CRIMINAL OFFENSE BUT SHALL
PRODUCE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DAMAGES
CASTRO V. PEOPLE
HELD: Castro is found guilty only of slight oral defamation. But because Tan
filed his complaint 5 months after the discovery, prescription had already set
in. It therefore acquitted Castro on that ground.
At most, Castro could have been liable for damages under Art. 26, par. 3 of
the Civil Code. Castro is reminded that, as an educator, he is supposed to be
a role model of the youth. As such, he should always act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
ARTICLE 27 – LIABILITY OF PUBLIC SERVANT OR EMPLOYEE
REQUISITES FOR FILING OF ACTION:
1. A public servant or employee refuses or neglects to perform his
duty;
2. There is no valid reason for the refusal or neglect to perform
official duty;
3. That injury or damage is suffered by the plaintiff
NONFEASANCE – the omission of an act which a person ought to do.
MISFEASANCE – the improper doing of an act which a person might lawfully
do.
MALFEASANCE – doing of an act which a person ought not to do at all.
NOTE: For a public servant to be held liable under this Article, the duty which
he refused or failed to perform, must be MINISTERIAL in character, that is,
the law absolutely requires him to perform it. If the duty is DISCRETIONARY,
he is not liable for his refusal or neglect to perform it, unless, he acted in a
notoriously arbitrary manner or he acted wilfully, maliciously, or with gross
neglect.
LEDESMA V. CA AND DELMO
HELD: It cannot be disputed that Violeta Delmo went through a painful
ordeal which was brought about by Ledesma’s neglect of duty and
callousness. Thus, moral damages are but proper.
There is no argument that moral damages include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of
pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of defendant’s wrongly act or omission.
Granting that it was not the duty of the petitioner to furnish a copy of the
Director’s decision, it was nevertheless Ledesma’s duty to enforce the said
decision. He could have done so considering that he received the decision on
April 27, 1966 and even though he sent it back with the records of the case,
he undoubtedly read the whole of it which consisted of only three pages.
Moreover, Ledesma should have had the decency to meet with Mr. Delmo,
the girl’s father, and inform the latter, at the very least of the decision. This,
Ledesma likewise failed to do, and not without the attendant bad faith.
CAMPUGAN V. TOLENTINO
HELD: The complainants’ allegations of the respondents’ acts and omissions
are insufficient to establish any censurable conduct against them.
The duty of Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument
presented for registration dealing with real or personal property is ministerial
in nature. A purely ministerial act or duty is one that an officer or tribunal
performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to
the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own
judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law
imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or
when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary, not ministerial.
The duty is ministerial only when its discharge requires neither the exercise
of official discretion nor the exercise of judgment.
We find no abuse of authority or irregularity committed by Atty. Quilala, Atty.
Cunanan, and Atty. Caluya, Jr. with respect to the cancellation of the notice
of adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens. Whether or not the RTC order
or the letter-request had been falsified, fraudulent or invalid was not for
them to determine inasmuch as their duty to examine documents presented
for registration was limited only to what appears on the face of the
documents. If, upon their evaluation of the letter-request and the RTC order,
they found the same to be sufficient in law and to be in conformity with
existing requirements, it became obligatory for them to perform their
ministerial duty without unnecessary delay.
ARTS. 29-35: CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM A CRIMINAL OFFENSE
ARTICLE 29 (Dependent civil action)
 What is contemplated in this article is an acquittal where the guilt
of the accused is based on a reasonable doubt. Such kind of
acquittal does not bar the filing of a civil action for damages
against the defendant for the same act of omission. Since the
action is now civil, preponderance of evidence suffices to establish
the claim.
 ACQUITTAL WHICH BARS CIVIL ACTION
(a) The accused is not the author of the crime
(b) No crime existed (on which the civil action ex delicto is based)
(c) When the acquittal is based on pure innocence and not on
reasonable doubt
(d) If there is a finding that in a final judgment in the criminal
action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may
arise did not exist
 ACQUITTAL WHICH DOES NOT BAR CIVIL ACTION
(a) If the decision contains a declaration that the liability of the
accused is not criminal but only civil
(b) The civil liability is not derived from or based on the criminal
act of which the accused is acquitted
(c) When the civil action is based on quasi-delict
(d) When acquittal is based on reasonable doubt
 The dismissal of a criminal case based on prescription will not bar
the filing of a civil action based on the same act or omission
specially if pursued as a quasi-delict or based on the principle of
unjust enrichment.
ARTICLE 30 (Dependent civil action)
 When a crime is committed, the offended party has the option of
not filing a criminal case but only a civil action for damages against
the offender. Should he file only a civil action, then, mere
preponderance of evidence is required for him to prove the civil
case.
 Should he decide to file a criminal case later on, the civil case that
he filed will have to be suspended as it is not an independent civil
action.
ARTICLE 31 (Independent civil action)
 Civil action contemplated in this article is one which arises not
from the act or omission complained of as a felony. It arises from
some other acts such as contract or a suit based on culpa
contractual, legal obligation to return money malversed, or a suit
based on quasi-delict.
 The civil action, not being based on the crime for which the
defendant is being prosecuted, it can proceed independently of
the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
In other words, despite the acquittal of the defendant, a civil
action can still be filed against him.
ARTICLE 32 (Independent civil action)
 Violation of constitutional rights may give rise to an independent
civil action under Art. 32. The same article is to provide a sanction
to the deeply cherished rights and freedom enshrined in the
Constitution.
 Good faith is not a defense in Art. 32. To be liable under the same,
it is enough that there was a violation of constitutional rights of
the plaintiffs and it is not required that defendants should have
acted with malice or bad faith.
ARTICLE 33 (Independent civil action)
 In cases of Defamation, Fraud, and Physical Injuries, an
independent civil action may be filed.
 Under Rule 111, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court, the civil action for
the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall
be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended
party:
a. Waives the civil action;
b. Reserves his right to institute it separately; or
c. Institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
 Even in independent civil action, there is a need of reservation
before one can institute it independently from the civil action. The
reservation shall be made before the prosecution starts
presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the
offended a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
ARTICLE 34 (Independent civil action)
 Independent civil action under Art. 34 refers to the damage
suffered by the offended party by reason of refusal or failure of
the policeman to render aid or protection to him in case of danger
to his life or property when requested. The said peace officer shall
be primarily liable, and the city or municipality where he is
assigned shall be subsidiarily liable in case if his solvency.
ARTICLE 35
 When a criminal case is filed by the offended party in those cases
where no independent civil action may be filed, and the
prosecuting attorney refuses to file the civil case in court, the
complainant may bring a civil action for damages against the
alleged offender and mere preponderance of evidence is required
to win the civil case. The defendant in the civil case may require
plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify him in case the complaint
should be found to be malicious.
 If during the pendency of the civil action, an Information be filed
by the prosecuting attorney, the civil action shall be suspended
until the termination of the criminal proceedings.
PEOPLE V. BAYOTAS
HELD: In pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final
determination of the criminal liability is a condition precedent to the
prosecution of the civil action, such that when the criminal action is
extinguished by the demise of accused appellant pending appeal thereof,
said civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs out of and is
dependent upon facts which, if true, would constitute a crime. Such civil
liability is an inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and is to be
declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding.
Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal
action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as
the accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex
delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal.
FRIAS V. SAN DIEGO-SISON
HELD: Article 31 of the CC provides that when the civil action is based on an
obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony,
such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter.
While Frias was acquitted in the false testimony and perjury cases filed by
respondent against her, those actions are entirely distinct from the collection
of sum of money with damages filed by San Diego-Sison against Frias.
Frias’ act of trying to deprive San Diego-Sison of the security of her loan by
executing an affidavit of loss of the title and instituting a petition for the
issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 168173 entitles
respondent to moral damages. Moral damages may be awarded in culpa
contractual or breach of contract cases when the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment
or negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and
conscious doing of wrong. It partakes of the nature of fraud.
DALURAYA V. OLIVA
HELD: Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. The
acquittal of an accused of the crime charged, however, does not necessarily
extinguish his civil liability.
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil
liability of the accused. FIRST, is an acquittal on the ground that the accused
is not the author of the actor omission complained of. This instance closes
the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the
perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for
such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of
the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be
based on the grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the
situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The SECOND
instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the
accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not yet been
satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be
proved by preponderance of evidence only.
The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment
against him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action
does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is
required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil;
and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based
upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. However, the civil action
based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final
judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts
or omission imputed to him.
Daluraya’s acquittal was based on the conclusion that the act or omission
from which the civil liability may arise did not exist, given that the
prosecution was not able to establish that he was the author of the crime
imputed against him. Such conclusion is clear and categorical when the MeTC
delared that “the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are wanting in
material details and they did not sufficiently establish that the accused
precisely committed the crime charge against him.”
PEOPLE V. DIONALDO
HELD: As Renato’s death transpired before the promulgation of the Court’s
July 23, 2014 Resolution in this case, i.e. when his appeal before the Court
was still pending resolution, his criminal liability is totally extinguished in view
of the provisions of Art. 89 of the RPC.
The Court explained that the death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as his civil liability ex
delicto. Consequently, Renato’s death on June 10, 2014 renders the Court’s
July 23, 2014 Resolution irrelevant and ineffectual as to him, and is therefore
set aside.
DY V. PEOPLE
HELD: Whenever the elements of estafa are not established, and that the
delivery of any personal property was made pursuant to a contract, any civil
liability arising from the estafa cannot be awarded in the criminal case. This is
because the civil liability arising from the contract is not civil liability ex
delicto, which arises from the same act or omission constituting the crime.
Civil liability ex delicto is the liability sought to be recovered in a civil action
deemed instituted with the criminal case.
The situation envision in this case is civil liability ex contractu where the civil
liability arises from an entirely different source of obligation. Therefore, it is
not the type of civil action deemed instituted in the criminal case, and
consequently must be filed separately. This is necessarily so because
whenever the court makes a finding that the elements of estafa do not exist,
it effectively says that there is no crime. There is no act or omission that
constitutes criminal fraud. Civil liability ex delicto cannot be awarded as it
cannot be sourced from something that does not exist.
Dy was acquitted because of the absence of the element of misappropriation
or conversion. It was found that Mandy delivered the checks to Dy pursuant
to a loan agreement. Clearly, there is no crime of estafa. There is no proof of
the presence of any act or omission constituting criminal fraud. Thus, civil
liability ex delicto cannot be awarded because there is no act or omission
punished by law which can serve as the source of obligation. Any civil liability
arising from the loan takes the nature of a civil liability ex contractu. It does
mot pertain to the civil action deemed instituted with the criminal case.
PEOPLE V. CALOMIA
HELD: The death of an accused pending the appeal of his conviction
extinguishes the criminal action, as there is no longer a defendant to stand
the accused; and the civil action instituted therein for the recovery of civil
liability ex delicto is likewise ipso facto extinguished, as it is grounded on the
criminal action.
In the instant case, Calomia’s death occurred prior to the finality of the
judgment of conviction rendered against him. In fact, he died way back
during the pendency of his appeal before the CA.
Irrefragably, Calomia’s death extinguished his criminal liability and his civil
liabilities directly arising from and based solely on the crime/s he committed.
ARTICLE 36 – PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION – a question which arises in a case, the resolution of
which is a logical antecedent to the issue involved in said case and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.
 A prejudicial question is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the
crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must
appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those
upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would be necessarily determined.
 There are always two cases involved, one is a criminal case and the other is
a civil case. The criminal case will have to be suspended because the issue
in the civil case is determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in
the criminal case.
ELEMENTS:
1. The civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to
the issue raised in the criminal action; and
2. The resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.
GR: Where both criminal and civil case arising from the same facts are filed
on court, the criminal case will always take precedence.
XPN: (1) when the civil case is an independent civil action (Arts. 32, 33, 34,
and 2177), (2) when there exists a prejudicial question in the civil case, in
which case it must be resolved first before the criminal action can proceed.
TUANDA V. SANDIGANBAYAN
HELD: A prejudicial question is one that must be decided before any criminal
prosecution may be instituted or before it may proceed because a decision
on that point is vital to the eventual judgment in the criminal case. Thus, the
resolution of the prejudicial question is a logical antecedent of the issues
involved in said criminal case.
A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution
of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question
must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try
and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a
question based on a fact distinct and separate from “the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only
that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the
issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined. It comes into play generally in a situation
where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in
the former an issue which must be pre-emptively resolved before the
criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil
action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case.”
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two
conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements:
(a) The civil action involves a similar issue or intimately related to the
issue raised in the criminal action; and
(b) The resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bench, we find that the issue
in the civil case, CA-GR CV No. 36769, constitutes a valid prejudicial question
to warrant suspension of the arraignment and further proceedings in the
criminal case against petitioners.
All the elements of prejudicial question are clearly and unmistakably present
in this case. There is no doubt that the facts and issues involved in the civil
action and the criminal case are closely related. The filing of the criminal case
was premised on Tuanda, et. al.’s alleged partiality and evident bad faith in
not paying Binaohan and Estrellanes’ salaries and per diems as sectoral
representatives, while the civil action was instituted precisely to resolve
whether or not the designations of the latter as sectoral representatives
were made in accordance with the law.
BELTRAN V. PEOPLE
HELD: The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s
marriage is not prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case
to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of
the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not
only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined.
So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like Beltran need not present
a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in
the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final
judgment declaring his marriage void.
With regards to Beltran’s argument that he could be acquitted of the charge
of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to
state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from
the beginning is not a defense.
PASI V. LICHAUCO
HELD: The rationale for the principle of prejudicial question is that although it
does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused, it tests
the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint or information in order to
sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. Hence, the need for its
prior resolution before further proceedings in the criminal action may be
had.
PASI concedes that the issues in the civil cases are similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the criminal case. It contends, however, that the
resolution of the issues in the civil case is not determinative of the guilt or
innocence of Lichauco, it arguing that even if she is adjudged liable for
damages, it does not necessarily follow that she would be convicted of the
crime charged.
If the award to the undisclosed bidder of orbital slot 153°E is, in the civil case,
declared valid for being within Lichauco’s scope of authority to thus free her
from liability for damages, there would be no prohibited act to speak of nor
would there be basis for undue injury claimed to have been suffered by
petitioner. The finding of the Ombudsman of the existence of a prejudicial
question is thus well-taken.
YAP V. CABALES
HELD: If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues, or the issue in one is
intimately related to the issues raised in the other, then a prejudicial
question would likely exist, provided the other element or characteristic is
satisfied. It must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts
upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the
resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would be necessarily
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If the resolution of
the issue in civil action will determine the criminal responsibility of the
accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or if there is no
necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal
case, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. Neither is there a
prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law,
proceed independently of each other.
The issue in the criminal cases is whether Yap is guilty of violating BP Blg. 22,
while in the civil case, it is whether the Sps. Mirabueno and Dimalanta are
entitled to collect from Yap the sum or the value of the checks that they have
rediscounted from Evelyn.
The resolution of the issue raised in the civil action is not determinative of
the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal cases against him, and
there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up
the criminal cases.
In the aforementioned civil actions, even if Yap is declared not liable for the
payment of value of the checks and damages, he cannot be adjudged free
from criminal liability for violation of BP Blg. 22. The mere issuance of
worthless checks with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds to support the
checks is in itself an offense.
It is clear that the determination of the cases involved in the civil cases for
collection of sum of money and damage is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence
of the petitioner in the criminal cases for violation of BP Blg. 22.
DREAMWORK V. JANIOLA
HELD: A prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede
the criminal action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can
be rendered in the criminal action with which said question is closely
connected. The civil action must be instituted prior to the institution of the
criminal action.
It is bears pointing out that the circumstances present in the instant case
indicate that the filing of civil action and the subsequent move to suspend
the criminal proceedings by reason of the presence of a prejudicial question
were a mere afterthought and instituted to delay the criminal proceedings.
PIMENTEL V. PIMENTEL
HELD: Civil case must be instituted before the criminal case. The rule is clear
that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal
action. Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the
criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Sec. 7, Rule
111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil
action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.
The resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would
warrant suspension of the criminal action. The issue in the annulment of
marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case
for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is
not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Art. 36 of FC is
whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused
killed the victim. Even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is
annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of
the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.
CONSING, JR. V. PEOPLE
HELD: It is well-settled that a civil action based on defamation, fraud, and
physical injuries may be independently instituted pursuant to Art. 33 of the
CC, and does not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the
suspension of a criminal case.
We find no prejudicial question that would justify the suspension of the
proceedings in the Cavite criminal case. The issue in the Pasig civil case for
Injunctive Relief is WON Consing merely acted as an agent of his mother;
while in the Manila civil case for Damages and Attachment, the question is
whether respondent and his mother are liable to pay damages and to return
the amount paid by PBI for the purchase of the disputed lot. Even if
respondent is declared merely an agent of his mother in the transaction
involving the sale of the questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged free from
criminal liability. An agent or any person may be held liable for conspiring to
falsify public documents. Hence, the determination of the issue involve in the
civil case for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the
respondent in the criminal case for estafa through falsification of public
document.
CATERPILLAR INC., V. SAMSON
HELD: The common element in the acts constituting unfair competition is
fraud. Pursuant to Art. 33 of the CC, in cases of defamation, fraud, and
physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Hence, Civil
Case admitted by Samson also relate to unfair competition, is an
independent civil action under Art. 33 of the CC. As such, it will not operate
as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal cases
at bar.
A civil action for damages and cancellation of trademark cannot be
considered a prejudicial question by which to suspend the proceedings in the
criminal cases for unfair competition. A prejudicial question is that which
arises in a civil case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the
issues to be determined in the criminal case. It must appear not only that the
civil case involves facts upon which the criminal action is based, but also that
the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action will necessarily be
determinative of the criminal case.
ARTICLES 37-39 – JURIDICAL CAPACITY, CAPACITY TO ACT,
RESTRICTIONS/MODIFICATIONS
JURIDICAL CAPACITY CAPACITY TO ACT
a. Inherent in every human being a. Merely acquired upon fulfilment
(not artificial persons) of certain conditions or
requisites fixed by law.
b. Capacity to be subject of legal b. Capacity to do acts with binding
relations or legal effect
c. Can exist without capacity to act c. Cannot exist without juridical
capacity
d. Lost only through death d. May be lost through grounds
other than death
 Article 39 restricts the person’s capacity to act. Even if a person
has the capacity to act under the law, there are certain acts he
cannot do so because of his minority, or the fact that he is insane
or imbecile, prodigality or that he is under civil interdiction.
NATURAL PERSONS
ARTICLES 40-42 – PERSONALITY SPRINGS FROM BIRTH AND ITS EXCEPTION
QUIMIGUING V. ICAO
HELD: A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional
personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in
Art. 40 of the CC. The unborn child, therefore, has the right to support from
its progenitors, particularly of Icao, even if the said child is only “en ventre de
sa mere”.
It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code
declaring that support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children
"does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn," violates Article 40
aforesaid, besides imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the text of
Article 291. It is true that Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived child shall
be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it" adds further
"provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following
article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered
from the mother's womb). This proviso, however, is not a condition
precedent to the right of the conceived child; for if it were, the first part of
Article 40 would become entirely useless and ineffective.
CONTINENTAL STEEL V. MONTANO
HELD: First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Art. 40, 41, 42
of the CC on natural persons, must be applied in relation to Art. 37 of the
same.
We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since
his/her juridical capacity and capacity to act as a person are not in issue. It is
not a question before us whether the unborn child acquired any rights or
incurred any obligations prior to his/her death that were passed on to or
assumed by the child’s parents. The rights to bereavement leave and other
benefits in the instant case pertain directly to the parents of the unborn child
upon the latter’s death.
Second, Sec. 40, 41, 42 of the CC do not provide at all a definition of death.
Moreover, while the CC expressly provides that civil personality may be
extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have
acquired juridical personality could die.
And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life. Life is not
synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first
before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No
less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception,
that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn
already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being
delivered, qualifies as death.
The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child dependent, such that the
child must have been born or must have acquired civil personality. Without
such qualifications, then child shall be understood in its more general sense,
which includes the unborn fetus in the mother’s womb.
ARTICLE 44 – JURIDICAL PERSONS
MAYOR V. TIU
HELD: Artificial persons include (1) a collection or succession of natural
persons forming a corporation; and (2) a collection of property to which the
law attributes the capacity of having rights and duties. This class of artificial
persons is recognized only to a limited extent in our law. Example is the
estate of a bankrupt or deceased person. From this pronouncement, it can be
gleaned that the estate of the deceased person is a juridical person separate
and distinct from the person of the decedent and any other corporation. This
status of an estate comes about by operation of law. This is in consonance
with the basic tenet under corporation law that a corporation has a separate
personality distinct from its stockholders and from other corporations to
which it may be connected.