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A Review of the African Union framework and

mechanism on political peace and security

Article · April 2018

DOI: 10.31920/2050-4306/2018/v7n1a4

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 Journal of African Union Studies (JoAUS)
ISSN 2050-4306 (Online) ISSN 2050-4292 (Print)

• Indexed at: EBSCO, ProQuest, J-Gate and Sabinet

• Accredited by IBSS

Vol. 7, (Issue 1), April 2018

pp 67-90

A Review of the African Union Framework and

Mechanism on Political Peace and Security

Tinashe Sithole
Department of Politics and International Relations,
Faculty of Humanities, University of Johannesburg,
Johannesburg, South Africa
Email: tsitholetinashe@gmail.com

Abstract

This paper reviews the African Union’s (AU) key frameworks adopted in
response to unconstitutional changes of government and which identify the
best practices in relation to conflict management and elections. These include
the Constitutive Act of the African Union of 2000, Lomé Declaration on the
Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of
Government of 2000, the Declaration Governing Democratic Elections in
Africa of 2002, the Declaration on Observing and Monitoring Elections of
2002, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG)
of 2007, and the Ezulwini Framework for the Enhancement of the
Implementation of Measures of the African Union in Situations of
Unconstitutional Changes of Government (African Union Peace and Security,
2009). Despite the existence of these frameworks for best practices in conflict
management, the AU has faltered in its application when the need has arisen.
The recurrence of election-related violence and other forms of unconstitutional
changes of government, and AU’s consequent response have exposed the its
shortfalls and incompetence in managing conflict. The findings in this paper
point to the fact that, unless the AU embraces its commitment to protecting
democratic development in the continent, Africa faces a difficult and daunting
task towards consolidating democracy. Hence, this study recommends that
member states commit more resources in order to prevent, manage and resolve
election-related conflict.

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Keywords: African Union, Conflict, Intervention, Framework, Mechanism and Africa

1. Introduction

Peace and security are indispensable for social and economic

development (Matlosa, Shale & Motsamai, 2009: 14). The AU, concerned
by threats to peace and stability in the post-cold war environment,
developed frameworks to address issues such as civil unrest, genocide,
ethnic cleansing, political violence and electoral related violence. This
paper outlines key frameworks adopted by the AU in response to
unconstitutional changes of government and which identify the best
practices in relation to conflict management and elections. It also
provides an overview of the structure of African Peace and Security
Architecture (APSA). These frameworks and mechanisms assist in the
analysis of the responses of the AU to election-related violence.
The five frameworks are the Constitutive Act of the African Union
(2000), Lomé Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to
Unconstitutional Changes of Government of (2000), the Declaration
Governing Democratic Elections in Africa (2002), the Declaration on
Observing and Monitoring Elections (2002), the African Charter on
Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) (2007), and the
Ezulwini Framework (African Union Peace and Security, 2009).

2. Background to AU’s Role in Democratization and Election

Processes

The OAU started showing a marked interest in the promotion of

democracy and the integrity of elections in the early 1990s (Akokpari
et.al, 2009). The OAU’s involvement was marked by the adoption of
declarations and resolutions and by its undertaking in the field of election
observation and assistance (Akokpari et al, 2009: 42). The first declaration
in which African Heads of State and Government agreed on the OAU’s
involvement in the democratization process was the “Declaration of the
Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of
African Unity on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa
and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World, which was
formally adopted in July 1990” (Karume & Mura, 2012: 21).

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Tinashe Sithole (JoAUS) Vol. 7, (Issue 1), April 2018, Pp 67-90

The transition of OAU to AU also saw the adoption of numerous

declarations and decisions on the promotion of democracy and good
governance which include, first and foremost, “the Constitutive Act of
the African Union (2000), the founding document of the AU and the
first document to enshrine the promotion of democracy as part of the
core mandate of the AU” (Cheeseman, 2014: 1). As a first step to
endorse the newly founded AU and its role, the Protocol on the
Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) was adopted in
2002, which outlines the various components and responsibilities of the
APSA (African Union Peace and Security Report, 2012: 1). Other
significant declarations are the Lomé Declaration of July 2000 for an
OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government, the
Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa
of 2002 and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and
Governance, which came into force in May 2007 (Engel & Porto, 2014:
137).
According to Karume and Mura (2012: 22), “election observation
emerged as a significant mechanism for supporting democratic
development in the post-Cold War period”. Election monitoring
provided the norms and best practices in election management. Some of
the OAU’s early involvement includes the referendum on self-
determination in Namibia, in 1989, where it deployed observers to
“report on the democratic quality of electoral practices” (Karume &
Mura, 2012: 22). An increasing demand for political reform in the 1990s
led to the OAU taking on the responsibility to respond to appeals from
its members to assist in the democratic transitions particularly through
election observation. Towards the end of the 1990s, the OAU recognized
the importance of the democratization process in Africa, formally
condemning changes of government that violated constitutions of
relevant countries. Karume & Mura (2012: 23) note that “in 1999, during
its 35th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government in Algiers, the OAU took a tougher stance and
strengthened the measures against unconstitutional changes” of
government through imposing sanctions. Consequently, the Lomé
Declaration was a follow up to the Algiers Declaration as it provided
additional stimulus for the OAU’s agenda of democratization (Karume &
Mura, 2012: 23-24). The OAU attitudes to democracy, human rights and
good governance had become more explicit.

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These frameworks prepared the ground for issues of governance,

democracy and human rights to become a central part of the agenda of
the AU. Hence, it became imperative to institutionalize the norms and
best practices towards election management and conflict resolution.

3. Conflict Management Frameworks

The Lomé Declaration (2000) - was adopted at the “36th Ordinary

Session of the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments of the
OAU held in the Togolese capital, Lomé, from 10 to 12 July 2000”
(Souaré, 2009: 1). According to Souaré, (2009: 1), it was necessitated by
the OAU Member States’ worry towards the resurgence of
unconstitutional change of government on the continent. Nkosi (2010:
17) notes that the declaration acknowledged the “role of the principles of
good governance, transparency and human rights in building
representative and stable governments as well as promoting democracy
and democratic institutions in Africa”. Through the declaration, the
importance of peaceful and credible elections is identified as an
important factor in determining the legitimacy of a government. The
declaration encouraged constitutional means to ascension unto power
and rejected unconstitutional changes of government (Nkosi, 2010: 17).
The Lomé Declaration also articulated values that drive democracy in
the continent, which if strictly observed would significantly reduce the
incidence of unconstitutional changes of government in Africa (Sturman,
2011: 2). These include the implementation and:

Respect of democratic constitutions embodying the separation of

powers and independence of the judiciary; the promotion of political
pluralism through guarantees on freedom of expression and of the
press allowing for the opposition to gain political space; democratic
change through the organisation of free and fair elections; and
constitutional recognition, guarantee and protection of fundamental
human rights (Dube, 2010: 14).

Furthermore, the Lomé Declaration denounces coups as “sad and

unacceptable developments, which must be ‘unequivocally condemned
and rejected” (Sturman, 2011: 2).The Lomé Declaration defines a set of
circumstances such as the activities of rebel groups, military coups
against a democratically elected government, “mercenary activities and

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situations in which incumbents refuse to vacate office after losing

elections” as constituting unconstitutional changes of government
(Sturman, 2011: 2). The response of the AU set out in the Lomé
Declaration has four steps. Firstly, the chairperson of the AU
Commission publicly condemns the unconstitutional change of
government and calls for a prompt return to constitutional order.
Secondly, a meeting is set up by the PSC to discuss the unconstitutional
change of government as a matter of urgency. Thirdly, the AU suspends
“the unconstitutional government from participating in the activities of
the AU for a period of six months until a constitutional rule is
reinstated” (Souaré, 2009: 3). The AU member states and the Chair of
the AU Commission in cooperation with RECs will continuously engage
the belligerents and employ diplomatic means in order to restore
democratic rule. When all this effort fails to restore constitutional rule
within the specified six-month suspension period, the AU can impose
targeted sanctions such as trade sanctions (Souaré, 2009: 3). The PSC then
enforces the sanctions, with member states, regional blocs and the
international societies. The Lome Declaration therefore provides
veritable ground for upholding political peace and stability on the
continent if strictly followed.

The Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000) - The Constitutive

Act sets the “founding principles of the AU drawing lessons from the
OAU” (Dube, 2010: 15). It draws from the fragmented, lived realities of
Africa, recognizing the need of the realization “of human rights,
democracy and good governance” (Dube, 2010: 15). The main objectives
entail the “promotion of democratic principles and institutions, popular
participation and good governance” (Gawanas, 2009: 203). Through the
Constitutive Act, states are obliged to respect human rights, democratic
principles, good governance and the rule of law, as well as to denounce
and reject unconstitutional changes of government. Gawanas (2009: 203)
notes that on this commitment the AU reserves the right to reject any
government that comes to power through unconstitutional means,
denying it participation in the organization’s activities.
Furthermore, the Constitutive Act introduced a new era in which
“the sovereignty of states is overridden by the quest for democratic
culture and practices” (Akokpari et al, 2009: 42). Intervention is
institutionalized under the responsibility to protect, at least theoretically
(Williams, 2007). Engel and Porto (2010: 1-3) note that in contrast to the

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OAU’s emphasis on non-interference as a paramount principle of

engagement among African states, the AU introduces non-indifference.
This presented a turning point as it showed the commitment of the AU
to issues of human rights, democracy and good governance. This
interventionist approach extended to areas of human rights violations,
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity (AU Constitutive Act;
Article 4(h); Apuuli, 2012: 140). This act provides the AU with the
legitimate power to intervene in areas that threaten regional peace and
security to avoid escalation of conflict (Engel & Porto, 2010: 1-2).
The act also provided “for the establishment of the Pan-African
Parliament (PAP) as an advisory body promoting the principles of
human rights and democracy in Africa” (Nkosi, 2010: 16). As such the
Pan-African Parliament has the power to “examine, discuss or express an
opinion on any matter relating to respect for human rights, the
consolidation of democratic institutions, the culture of democracy as well
as the promotion of good governance and the rule of law” (Dube, 2010:
16). The AU Constitutive Act extends the AU’s responsibilities towards
unconstitutional changes of government in the Lomé Declaration, in
three ways. Firstly, the member state accused of perpetuating an
unconstitutional change of government being excluded from
participating in AU activities (Nkosi, 2010: 15-16). Secondly, it
encompasses the AU’s ability to intervene in instances where legitimate
order is threatened; for instance, in cases where incumbents fail to
relinquish power. Lastly, some binding obligations are made on the
“Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the PAP and the PSC to
implement measures against perpetrators” of unconstitutional change of
government (Engel & Porto, 2010: 6). In light of this, the AU
frameworks clearly articulate the role of the organisation on issues of
peace and security on the continent.

The Declaration on Observing and Monitoring Elections (2002) -

Election monitoring and observation plays an integral part in the
democratic and electoral processes in Africa (Dorman, nd: 2). During the
“38th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the OAU, in July 2002,
African Heads of State and Government considered the report of the
Secretary General on strengthening the role of the OAU in election
observation and monitoring and the advancement of the democratisation
process” (Souaré, 2009: 2). Since then, election observers have come
from national, regional and international organisations in order to

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augment the transparency and credibility of elections in the continent.

Various procedures and principles are put in place for guiding election
observers and monitors in assessing the election processes and
environment (Dorman, nd: 1-2). The declaration provides guidelines
through which elections can be carried out in order to regulate them. In a
way, it determines the credibility of an election in an environment where
elections are often manipulated, resulting in election violence (Fraser,
2011: 2).
The guidelines are divided between “responsibilities of member
states and the rights and obligations under which democratic elections
must be held” (Part, 2014: 14). Dorman (nd: 1-2) is of the view that
election observers play a crucial role in lessening conflict before, during
and after election, i.e., throughout the election phase. For instance, the
presence of monitors can mitigate election violence through naming and
shaming mechanisms and by creating awareness of tensions building up
(Jarstad & Höglund, 2010: 2). It is important to note that through
election observation, the AU has made significant progress in
institutionalizing electoral democracy in the past decade. It is also
important to note that the AU’s engagement in election observation and
monitoring has strengthened the democratisation process in the
continent.
In addition, an official invite for the AU in terms of paragraphs V (1)
and (3) of the OAU Declaration on the Principles Governing
Democratic Elections (2002), is to be made by the country organizing the
elections. However, the process of getting a formal invitation has
received its fair amount of criticism, as other countries may opt not to
invite observers, which defeats the purpose of enhancing transparency
during elections. Consequently, this will reduce the scope and visibility of
observer missions; hence, creating opportunities for irregularities. This
to an extent has influenced how incumbents continue to manipulate
votes in their favour. Despite this, the kind of peace espoused by the
Constitutive Act is a long and difficult process, open to challenges and
difficulties (Jeng, 2010:126). A consensus amongst academic and policy
makers highlight that, lack of political determination which includes
(political) will and leadership capacity within the Africa has compounded
the process of achieving peace in the continent.

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The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance

(2007) - The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance
(ACGEG) was inspired by the principles and objectives enshrined in the
Constitutive Act of the AU, specifically articles 3 and 4, which call for
the intervention of the organisation (Sturman, 2011). It was adopted in
Addis Ababa by the “eighth ordinary summit of the AU in January 2007”
(Souaré, 2009: 1). The development of the Charter sought to entrench a
culture of changing power, which is based on facilitating regular free and
fair elections carried out by competent, independent and non-partisan
national election bodies. This shows that the AU recognized the
importance of transparent electoral processes. The Charter prescribes the
best practices for election management in the continent.
Furthermore, the Charter brought the desire to augment the AU’s
earlier declarations and decisions about peace and security on
unconstitutional changes of government such as the Lomé Declaration
on responses to such issues. Consequently, this set a commitment by the
AU to improving the nature of elections, democracy and governance
(Matlosa et.al, 2009: 19). In article 23(4) of the Charter, the refusal by an
incumbent to relinquish power to the winning party was deliberated as an
unconstitutional change of government (ADCEG, 2007: 9). The AU has
therefore recognized the dangers of the entrenchment of incumbents
towards the democratic development of the continent. In this case, use
of election violence as a means to attain and maintain power could no
longer be ignored. This development clearly shows the commitment the
AU has to promoting peace (Matlosa et.al, 2009: 19).
Dube (2010: 39) notes that the Charter was a response to a new
practice of amending constitutions in order to prolong the tenure of
incumbent regimes beyond the two terms provided for in the
constitution. In this regard, the AU’s Charter Article 10 (3) necessitates
that to ensure such amendments occur they should enjoy the support of
the general population (Nkosi, 2010: 51). However, he further argues
that “to date, none of the attempts to amend the constitution have been
subjected to the will of the people in an unfettered and transparent
manner” (Nkosi, 2010: 51). This has been the case in Republic of Congo,
Brazzaville (Dennis Sassou Ngueso), Cameroon (Paul Biya), Rwanda
(Paul Kagame), Uganda (Yoweri Museveni), DRC (Joseph Kabila),
Burundi (Pierre Nkurunziza) and Burkina Faso (Blaise Compaoré)
between 2014 and 2015 (Aglionby & Flick, 2015: 1; Hengari, 2015: 1-4).

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The Charter condemns the unconstitutional changes in government

and goes further to define what it entails. This includes any “refusal by an
incumbent to relinquish power to the winning party or candidate after
free and fair elections and any amendment or revision of the constitution
or legal instrument, which is an infringement on the principle of
democratic change of government” (ACDEG, 2007: 9). In addition,
Matlosa et al (2009: 19) add that “any intervention by mercenaries to
replace a democratically elected government and any replacement of a
democratically elected government by armed dissidents or rebels”
constitute an unconstitutional change of government. Despite the
guidelines provided, unconstitutional changes of governments continue
to happen with incumbents’ refusal to consider defeat and amendments
of constitutions becoming more common as evidenced in recent times in
the 2015 and 2018 (referendum) election in Burundi (ISS, 2018: internet).
Matlosa et al (2009: 19) notes that the reluctance of the African
governments to commit fully to the Charter has been a major
impediment to the implementation of the Charter. In the same way, they
further highlight the ineffectiveness of the AU in conflict situations by
arguing that despite Mauritania’s ratification of the Charter, subsequently
a coup occurred in 2008 (Hengari, 2015: 4). Other issues that continue to
occur is the trend of constitutional revisions that allow African leaders to
extend their stay in power as evidenced in Rwanda 2015 and Burundi
2015; 2018 (Aglionby & Flick, 2015: 1; ISS, 2018: internet). “Despite the
volume and the diversity of instruments and principles on democratic
governance, there remains a challenge in enforcing them” (Matlosa et. al,
2009: 15).
In addition, Article 25 of the Charter acknowledges that the AU
reserves the right to suspend perpetrators of “unconstitutional changes
of government through sanctions” (ACDEG, 2007: 11). Similarly, article
30 of the AU Constitutive Act and article 7(g) of the PSC Protocol” also
gives the AU the right to suspend the state party from exercising its
rights to participate in the activities of the Union (Nkosi, 2010: 15). From
the above, one can deduce that there exist various frameworks that give
the AU the capacity to manage conflict before it escalates.

The Ezulwini Framework (2009) - The principles in the Constitutive

Act and Lomé Declaration are given further expression in the Ezulwini
Framework. It is aimed at “enhancing the effectiveness of the legal
framework in the implementation of AU Instruments against

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unconstitutional changes of Government in Africa” (African Union

Peace and Security, 2009). The framework is founded upon the ideas and
principles enshrined in the Charter. In this aspect, the framework
recognizes how issues relating to unconstitutional changes of
governments are regressive in terms of the democratic process which has
brought instability in Africa (Dube, 2010: 2; 17). The Ezulwini
framework adopts a different view on how the AU tackles issues relating
to unconstitutional changes of government, as it takes a zero-tolerance
stance on coups and human right violations. Hence, it realizes this
urgency due to the persistence and recurrence of unconstitutional
changes of government (Dube, 2010: 17). According to paragraph 5 (i) of
the framework, perpetrators of unconstitutional changes of governments
should be suspended from the activities of the AU; other measures
(paragraph 4(x) on the AU responses such as imposing of sanctions
(African Union Peace and Security, 2009: 3) are suggested. Stuurman
(2011: 1-4) views the document as progressive. This is so because it
“adopts coordination between various bodies mandated to deal with
unconstitutional changes of government” (Nkosi, 2010). It encourages
concerted efforts between the Chairman of the Commission, the Panel
of the Wise (POW) and the Peace and Security Council in taking
measures to prevent unconstitutional changes of governments (Gerenge,
2015: 9). The framework is also progressive to the extent that it addresses
the weaknesses of the previous responses, emphasizing the need for
international cooperation, without which, AU efforts such as sanctions
would be undermined (Dube, 2010 :10). The Chairperson of the African
Union Commission (AUC) is tasked to oversee the implementation of
the framework.
From the above, one can argue that there exist legal and institutional
frameworks that provide the best practices and norms for elections and
conflict management. Against this background, this research will
ascertain why the AU has seemingly struggled to manage election-related
conflict.

Push and Pulls forces of election-related conflict - This paper

highlights post-election violence as a means to devise unconstitutional
ways of grabbing power. It underlines that, although the AU has
developed the necessary architecture and frameworks to deal with
electoral conflict, its conflict management approach inadvertently
contributes to the rise in election-related violence. That is to say, the

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formation of Governments of National Unity (GNUs) could be

contributing to the use of violence by those who lose elections as a way
of retaining power. Also, the institutional culture of protecting
incumbents undermines the functioning of the AU’s conflict
management mechanism, as it tends to mediate and push for
governments of unity, rather than acting against them.
It is also important to note that factors such as ‘winner-takes-all’
electoral system has contributed to election conflict (ISS, 2010: internet).
For the most part, winner-takes-all politics has the tendency of increasing
the cost of losing elections for political parties in any country or political
system. Against this background, opposition parties often end up
desperate to win power by all means and at whatever cost; whilst the
incumbents, mindful of the cost of losing elections, also prepare to
maintain power by all means and at anybody’s expense, as was in Kenya
2007, Zimbabwe 2010 and Cote d’Ivoire 2011 (Adolfo, 2012: 1-4).
Hence, losers tend to reject results and contribute to election-related
violence and conflict in the continent.
In all, arrangements for the promotion of good governance,
transparency and entrenchment of democracy in Africa exist in the
continent. Taking into consideration the push and pull forces of election-
related conflict, the study will identify instances of election related
violence and the AU’s responses.

4. African Union Peace and Security Architecture and its

Framework for Intervention

Due to the proliferation of intra-state conflict in the 1990s in Africa, it

became evident that an interventionist policy was necessary to stem this
development. Building from its predecessor, the AU adopted a more
interventionist stance, i.e., the principle of non-indifference, establishing
the necessary institutions through which to do so. The APSA is the
primary institutional mechanism through which the APSA deals with
conflict. It includes three central roles i.e. conflict prevention, conflict
management and peace building (Nnaeme and Asuelime, 2015).
The OAU’s African “Mechanism for Conflict Prevention,
Management and Resolution” of Conflict was established in Cairo, in
1993 (Belachew, 2010: 80). However, it was ineffective in resolving
disputes on the continent, for example, the Rwandan genocide in 1994
transpired while the mechanism was operational. During the last decade

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of the 21st century, we saw the collapse of the Somalia State, the conflicts
in DRC, Angola, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Burundi and Rwanda, among
others, which led to the death of millions of Africans (Murithi, 2012: 89;
Williams, 2011). Political changes that transpired in Africa in the 1990s
were surrounded by social, economic and political crises (Gibson, 2002:
202). For instance, the introduction of multiparty politics (third wave of
democratisation) brought with it fierce competition amongst competing
rival groups. Consequently, political pressures to maintain power led to
conflict evidenced by the trend of ethnic violence which has often been
used as a tool with which the government maintain power (Rørbæk &
Knudsen, 2017: 640). These events highlighted the limitations of the
OAU as an institution tasked with conflict resolution (Murithi, 2012: 89).
Prior to its transition, the statutes governing the OAU did not allow
for intervention in the inner affairs of another state (Akokpari et.al, 2009:
51). As noted by Engel and Porto, “this lack of a more robust mandate
on issues of peace and security had become unpalatable” (2010: 1).
Therefore, in order to be able to intervene in situations of severe human
rights violations, the member states of OAU established the AU in
2002. Desmidt (2016: 3-4) notes that APSA was established two years
later in order to operationalise the role of the new organisation. Engel
and Porto (2010: 1) concur that the “unprecedented increase in the
number and intensity of violent armed conflicts and the perception of
the inability and disengagement of the international community to the
worst forms of violence in the early part of the decade form part of the
complex background within the reinvention, repositioning and
restructuring of the OAU”. The former chairperson of the AU
Commission, Alpha Oumar Konare “described the AU’s emergence as a
shift from the old norm of non-interference in armed conflicts to a new
posture of non-indifference to member states’ internal affairs” (Williams,
2011: 1). Engel and Porto (2010: 1) further note that a change was
necessary because the OAU was “too preoccupied with lofty political
ideals and declarations which bore little resemblance to the challenges
posed by extreme poverty, conflict, governance or the respect of human
rights in vast areas of Africa.” As a result, an overhaul of the organisation
was necessary and was achieved through the “endorsement of new
norms and the adoption of new rules to govern interaction in matters of
peace, security and development as well as establishment of new
institutions to enforce these norms” (Engel & Porto, 2010: 1).

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According to Dube (2010: 2), “the adoption of the Constitutive Act

of the AU marked a turning point in African relations. Article 4 (h) and
(j) of the Constitutive Act allowed AU member states to intervene in a
third state even against the will of the respective government, in cases
of crimes against humanity, such as war crimes and genocide”. With
regards to the implementation of this norm, the AU has met resistance
from its member states. For instance, the AU failed to resolve a new
crisis in Burundi, which erupted in April 2015 as proposed sanctions and
a peacekeeping mission never materialised (ISS, 2016: internet). Murithi
(2012:130) adds that, “normative preferences regarding sovereignty, non-
intervention and non-interference remain contentious issues within the
AU”, hence the institution tends to avoid military intervention even
when it is necessary. In this regard, the AU was less relevant in 2011
during the crises in Ivory Coast and Libya, where its role was
overshadowed by other regional and international actors (Sharpe, 2017:
5).
Therefore, the AU Constitutive Act encompassed the legal ground
to militarily intervene in a third state based on humanitarian reasons
(Akokpari et.al, 2009: 51). Cilliers (2014) notes that the “adoption of the
Constitutive Act was a decisive step showing that African States were not
only conveniently changing the name of the continental organisation, but
gave it a radical new vision and mission and a set of clearly defined
objectives and responsibilities”. This normative shift improved when
“the founding Protocol of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the
AU came into effect on December 26, 2003” (Dube, 2010: 2). The
protocol highlights a comprehensive agenda for peace and security,
which includes central elements such as “conflict prevention, early
warning, preventive diplomacy, conflict management, peacemaking and
peace building as well as support for and development of democratic
policies, humanitarian actions and conflict management. Consequently,
the PSC founding protocol is viewed as the basis for the APSA” (Dube,
2010: 2).
APSA consists of five pillars, namely, Panel of the Wise (POW), the
Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the Peace Fund (AUPF),
African Standby Force (ASF), and the Peace and Security Council (PSC)
(Engel&Porto, 2010: 4). The successes of the APSA heavily rely upon
the close coordination amongst its five pillars. Each pillar plays different
and equally important roles towards promoting political peace in the
continent. For instance, the CEWS has been instrumental in data

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collection and fact-finding missions such as was in Burundi 2015. Also,

in 2011 Cote d’Ivoire post-election crisis, the PSC appointed a mediation
team to the crisis between Laurent Gbagbo and Alassane Ouattara,
which marked the beginning of talks in the crisis (Omotola, 2014: 23). In
other instances, the ASF has been used in peacekeeping missions such as
in Burundi in 2013 (AU Mission in Burundi – AMIB) (Hentz, 2013: 194).
These examples underline some of the contributions of the APSA to
political peace in the continent. In all, APSA supports the mandate of the
AU to intervene. It is the aim of the APSA to provide the AU, the REC’s
and the Regional Mechanisms (RM) with all the support necessary to
fulfill the tasks and mandate as stated by the Constitutive Act of the AU
and the founding protocol of the PSC. This therefore implies that the
processes the AU instituted in conflict management are done through the
APSA.

5. African Stand by Force

The ASF is a “peacekeeping force composed of military, police and

civilian contingents” (APSA Assessment, 2010: 20). The “civilian and
military components are designed to be ‘on standby’ in their countries of
origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice. ASF force
elements can be authorized to participate in peace support missions by
the PSC, or in interventions authorized by the AU Assembly” (APSA
Assessment, 2010: 21). The ASF mandate also includes intervention in
member states in cases of grave circumstances in accordance with article
4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act, peacebuilding including
(Demobilization, Disarmament), humanitarian assistance to alleviate the
suffering of civilian population in conflict areas and observation and
monitoring missions (African Union, 2017; ISS, 2017b). Many factors
such as financial resources have an impact on the functions of the ASF
and the AU as a whole. ISS (2017b) highlights that, “despite the full
operationalization of the ASF, the AU has opted for ad hoc
arrangements” i.e. non-standard arrangements instead of deploying the
ASF. For instance, in cases where it has the mandate to intervene in
respect of grave circumstances such as highlighted in the Constitutive
Act article 4(h; j), it has not been deployed as required (Abatan & Spies,
2016: 31). The ASF challenges in terms of funding and lack of political
will have implications for AU’s interventions.

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A study by the Institute of Security Studies highlights that, challenges

in terms of funding and a lack of political will have hampered the AU’s
interventions. Also, instead of deploying the ASF, the AU has chosen ad
hoc measures (ISS, 2017). Darkwa (2016: 471) highlights that, despite
being declared operationally ready in 2016, the African Standby Force
(ASF) has not been deployed in its originally designed form. It is against
this background that the AU’s delay and lack of political will to
operationalise the ASF implies “that the AU lacks the enforcement
means to undertake forceful intervention when the need arises”, as was
the case with Cote d’Ivoire.

Figure 1
The following diagram illustrates the importance of the role each APSA
pillar (POW, ASF, AUPF, CEWS) plays towards the functioning of the
PSC. . The efficiency of the whole structure largely depends on each
pillar’s contribution, in order for the PSC to make well-informed
decisions.

(as cited in Maasdorp, 2011).

From the aforementioned, one can note the importance of the APSA
through its five pillars in the execution of its responsibilities in conflict
management. The PSC is a key central decision-making body, which

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 A Review of the African Union Framework…

ideally is supported by the other four pillars in a properly coordinated

and coherent manner. One can therefore assume that informed decisions
by the PSC depend on the competence of the other pillars. In summary,
the PSCs’ role of decision-making, POW’s mandate of mediation,
AUPF’s role of mobilizing resources, CEWS’s role of data-gathering and
the ASF as a standby force should complement each other in order for
APSA to work effectively.

6. Challenges and Critiques of the AU’s Institutions and

Frameworks

Williams (2011: 1) asserts that the AU has faced major obstacles in

enforcing its frameworks, “its small number of bureaucrats struggle to
keep the organization working effectively and efficiently, and its member
states are often divided over how to respond to Africa’s conflicts”. These
and other remarks will form the basis of the analysis in identifying the
challenges the institution faces. One of the major issues that arise is the
supposed lack of political will by and amongst AU leaders. Sturman and
Hayatou in Engel and Porto (2010: 71), highlight that “none of the
interventions undertaken by the PSC have invoked the controversial
article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act” which gives the AU the legal right to
intervene in a member state in response to “grave circumstances; namely,
war-crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity” (AU Constitutive
Act, Article 4 (h)).
Williams (2007) suggests that, the norm of non-indifference has not
yet been institutionalized by the PSC. As stated above, this norm has
been agreed on in principle by AU member states. The tension between
this principle and the more entrenched norm of non-interference gave
impetus to this research. In relation to this, Sturman and Hayatou (in
Engel and Porto, 2010) have argued that this has resulted in a
“diplomatic egg-dance around questions of sovereignty and consent each
time the PSC has built consensus for troop deployments to conflict
situations”.
Moller’s (2009: 11) argues that, “if the political will is there, states will
find a way around organizational obstacles, but if is lacking even the best
organizational set up under the most binding commitment will be of little
help.” Dube (2010: 4) adds that, “If there is no political will the
framework becomes redundant.” This paper reflects on the relevance of
these critiques. Karock (2014: 5) argues that the availability of resources

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has affected the functioning of the security architecture. These include

financial, human and social networks, among others. For instance, the
AU Peace fund, which is intended to finance AU-led peace support,
suffers from chronic underfunding. Much of the AU’s peace operations
involve the mobilization of resources towards the payment of the ASF.
Belachew (2010: 86) notes that, “due to lack of funds, it took more than
six months for AMIB to complete the deployment of its 2,800 troops.”
African peacekeeping missions continue to be hampered by being
underequipped, undermanned and underfunded (Belachew, 2010: 86).
For example, during the conflict in Mali in 2013, the AU response
towards the conflict took time due to the lack of financial resources
towards the mobilization of a military force to deploy in the terrorist
region of the country (Aljazeera, 2013). In all, the issues and critiques
identified will assist in this research analysis.
Engel and Porto (2010: 1-2) notes that there are inconsistencies
concerning the conflict management approach that the AU has adopted.
Sithole (2012: 127) argues that “African leaders have initiated and
sustained over the years, a conservatism buttressed by the culture of
peer-shielding that entails an unwillingness to criticize one another –
especially on questionable governance issues.” This critique of the AU
and institutions underlies the challenges the institution faces. In addition,
Matlosa et al (2009: 19) argues that, the reluctance of the African
governments to commit fully to the AU Charter have been a major
impediment to the implementation of the Charter and its norms.
Another critique by Dorman (nd: 1-2) focuses on the role AU observer
missions play towards lessening and aggravating conflict before, during
and after elections, i.e., throughout the election phase. In this light, with
the recent controversy surrounding the Kenyan 2017 election, large
criticism has been leveled at the role election observers’ have played; as
they have been accused of rubber-stamping flawed elections, a trend that
seems to undermine the organisation’s role (Kuo & Dahir, 2017: 1-5).
The involvement of the International Community (IC) in the internal
affairs of the continent cannot be ignored given the vested interests of
many Western countries in the continent. Against this background, the
IC is identified as a major player in African politics and is perceived as
interfering in the resolution of conflicts. For instance, the EU has
assisted the AU by providing technical and financial assistance to
improve the functioning of the organisation. This includes military
support, “electoral support, consisting of technical assistance and

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election observation, from on-going peacebuilding measures through

which mediation and dialogue are important tools” (European Union
External Action, 2012: 2). Despite the positive outcomes that come with
cooperation and partnerships, it is widely viewed that the interests of
these external actors have had a profound effect on the actions of the
AU. For example, in the Libyan crisis, the international community
intervened despite the PSC roadmap, which had called for a political
solution (Ping, 2011: 1-2). Former AU Commission Chairperson, Jean
Ping, notes that one of the aspects highlighted by the crisis in Libya was
“the reluctance of some of the members of the IC to acknowledge the
AU’s role” (Ping, 2011). He added that lasting peace could only be
achieved if efforts were based on “full involvement of Africa and
recognition of its leadership role” (2011: 3). Therefore, without such a
role, there would be no ownership and sustainability (Ping, 2011: 3). This
assertion will form part of the analysis of the AU’s response in Kenya
and Cote d’Ivoire.
Both the internal and external issues highlighted above have been
advanced as impediments to the AU’s ability to effectively deal with
conflict, particularly election conflict. Challenges include the lack of
political will, lack of resources (human, financial, technical), it’s supposed
‘soft’ conflict management approach, the bureaucratic nature of the
organization and the perceived meddling of the IC. Akokpari et.al (2009:
42) highlights that the three issues that will give the doctrine of non-
difference a chance depend on the AU’s ability to enforce agreed norms
and principles among member states, commitment to provide sustainable
and predictable financing of AU peace and security initiatives by African
governments and the will to harmonize Africa’s regional security
arrangements. Institutional theory highlights that norms and rules of
institutions will shape the actions of those acting in them. Hence, an
effective institution is able to influence members to conform to the
norms of the organisation (March & Olsen, 2005).

7. Recommendations

The paper found that the African Union faces a number of challenges in
managing election-related conflict, such as a lack of resources, a lack of
ratification and implementation of legal frameworks and disunity among
leaders: these challenges have undermined the institutionalisation of the
organisations’ norms for democratic development in Africa. The study

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recommends that, the African Union should address these

implementation challenges through follow up mechanisms such as,
enforcing its sanctions regime to ensure that states ratify and implement
key instruments. Also, the AU should introduce stringent penalties on
countries that default on their financial contribution to the African
Union and improve the information technology infrastructure to
complement Continental Early Warning System efforts, in turn making
the organisation more proactive to electoral-related violence. These
challenges undermine the African Union’s election-monitoring activities.
This study demonstrates that the full operationalisation of the African
Union’s Peace and Security Architecture has a long way to go and
recommends that its member states commit more resources in order to
prevent, manage and resolve election-related conflict.

8. Conclusion

This paper looks at the normative shift i.e. (non-interference to non-

indifference) within the continent’s peace and security architecture. The
threats to peace and stability in the post-cold war environment resulted
in the development of various frameworks to address issues such as, civil
unrest, genocide, ethnic cleansing, political violence and electoral-related
violence. The Constitutive Act, Lomé Declaration, Durban Declaration,
ACDEG and the Ezulwini Framework inform the best practices
concerning elections and conflict management by the AU. These
instruments also provide the legal basis for the AU to intervene in the
internal affairs of member states, in the event of imminent threats to
peace, security and stability. The management and resolution of conflict
is done through the pillars of the APSA, namely, the PSC, CEWS, ASF,
POW and APF, which ideally provide a firm commitment of the AU to
issues of peace and security. In addition, the Political Affairs Department
and Peace, and Security Department play an important role in elections
in the continent.
The descriptive overview of these frameworks and instruments
highlight the norms, values and capacity to respond to election-related
conflict. The paper concludes with a number of critiques observed from
the literature, in relation to the AU’s political will, lack of resources,
conflict management approach and bureaucratic nature of the
organisation.

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